author: Justice Blackmun,

text:
    No. 81-656.
    Consolidated Foods Corp. v. Unger.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., ante, p. 461.

Justice Blackmun,

concurring.

Respondent Trudy Unger filed charges with the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) alleging that she had been a victim of sex discrimination in employment. The FEPC ruled against her, but on judicial review the state trial court found that the FEPC’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Appellate Court of Illinois reversed, concluding that the FEPC’s order was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Unger v. Sirena Division of Consolidated Foods Corp., 60 Ill. App. 3d 840, 845, 377 N. E. 2d 266, 270-271 (1978). The Illinois Supreme Court denied respondent’s petition for leave to appeal.

During the pendency of the state proceedings, respondent filed this Title VII suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Sometime after the Illinois Appellate Court ruled against respondent, the District Court found that she had in fact been a victim of sex discrimination. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed on this issue. 657 F. 2d 909 (1981).

Following its recent decision in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., ante, p. 461, the Court must grant, vacate, and remand the case for further consideration. But since the Illinois court professed to apply a deferential standard of review, it is not clear that Kremer governs this case. See ante, at 480-481, n. 21; ante, at 492-493, n. 8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In addition, on remand respondent will be free to argue that Kremer should not apply retroactively. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97 (1971).

If the Court of Appeals concludes that Kremer controls this case, it will be forced to order the dismissal of respondent’s complaint as barred by the Illinois Appellate Court’s affirmance of the FEPC’s decision. Only one court, the District Court, has given respondent a full de novo hearing, and that court determined that respondent had been discriminated against because of her sex. Yet application of this Court’s Kremer decision denies her any relief under Title VII, simply because she took the reasonable step of seeking correction of the FEPC’s decision in the state courts. As I explained in my Kremer dissent, ante, p. 486,1 cannot accept that this re-suit is consistent with the congressional purpose underlying Title VII — that the fight against employment discrimination be a national policy of the highest priority. Surely all future discrimination victims in respondent’s situation should be very careful to avoid the state courts entirely so that those victims will not risk losing the relief that Congress intended Title VII to afford them.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No.-.
    Hydaburg Cooperative Assn. et al. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.


text:
    No. A-968.
    Ernest v. Cohen, United States Attorney for the District of Maine, et al.
   Application for injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus, addressed to Justice O’Connor and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-988 (81-5848).
    Gilbert et al. v. South Carolina,
   ante, p. 984. Application to suspend the effect of the order denying certiorari, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant the application.


text:
    No. D-263.
    In re Disbarment of Kitchen.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 903.]


text:
    No. D-274.
    In re Disbarment of Kleindienst.
   It is ordered that Richard G. Kleindienst, of Tucson, Ariz., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this order.


text:
    No. 80,
    Orig.
    Colorado v. New Mexico et al.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 455 U. S. 932.]
   Motion of Kaiser Steel Corp. et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Exceptions of New Mexico to the Report of the Special Master are set for oral argument in due course.


text:
    No. 81-1120.
    United States et al. v. Rylander et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 943.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Joseph F. Harbison III, Esquire, of Sacramento, Cal., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent Richard W. Rylander, Sr., in this case.


text:
    No. 81-1798.
    Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pennsylvania Building & Construction Trades Council et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 81-1887.
    In re Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers of the United States, Inc.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 81-1487.
    BankAmerica Corp. et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 81-1581.
    Olim et al. v. Wakinekona.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 80-108.
    First Pennsylvania Bank N.A. v. Zeffiro et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1233.
    Giacomino et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1414.
    Hoskins v. Cuyler, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1525.
    Thompson v. Woltenberg.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1528.
    Lee v. Montana.
   Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1546.
    Cleppe v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1598.
    New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, dba The Main Event, et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1622.
    Pueblo of Santo Domingo v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1644.
    Dean v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1651.
    Galloway v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1831.
    Alabama v. McCurley.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1832.
    Link et ux. v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1845.
    Benson v. Wyoming.
   Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1847.
    Collins et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1848.
    Brock v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1853.
    Spudnik Equipment Co. v. Garza, Representative of the Estate of Garza, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1858.
    Cobbs v. Virginia.
   Cir. Ct. Henrico County, Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1867.
    Cohen v. Kentucky Bar Assn.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1869.
    Johns-Manville Corp. et al. v. Lam, Inc.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1870.
    Blue Diamond Coal Co. et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1871.
    Meco, Inc. v. Sinnette, Judge, Boyd Circuit Court, Division II, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1879.
    De Vault v. Menocal et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1883.
    United Air Lines, Inc. v. Smallwood.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1884.
    Stafos v. Bell.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1930.
    United Fruit & Vegetable Co., Inc. v. Director of the Fruit and Vegetable Division, Marketing Service, United States Department of Agriculture, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1996.
    Hospah Coal Co. et al. v. Chaco Energy Co. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2003.
    Labash et al. v. United States Department of the Army et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2017.
    Dean v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2023.
    Liles et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2025.
    Evans v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2035.
    Merling v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2052.
    Patterson v. Carr, Judge, United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6170.
    Slatin v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6272.
    Coble v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6333.
    Collins, Administrator v. Differ et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6363.
    Martinez v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6381.
    McNary v. Sowders, Superintendent, Kentucky State Pentitentiary.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6425.
    Nelson v. Scully, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6484.
    Matthews v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6492.
    Marshall v. United States Steel Corp.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6493.
    Kreps v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6499.
    Kostantas, Administratrix v. Exxon Co., U.S.A.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6500.
    Brock v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6502.
    Polk v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6503.
    Wilson v. Jago et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6505.
    Swain v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6506.
    Grijalva v. West, Director, California Youth Authority.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6509.
    Olson v. Green, Chairman, Minnesota Board of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6513.
    Green v. White, Superintendent, Missouri Training Center for Men.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6517.
    Morris v. Ross.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6520.
    Bridges v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6521.
    Gonzalez v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6522.
    Hemphill v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6566.
    Burns v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6571.
    Strahan v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6588.
    Ford v. California.
   App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6607.
    Celifie v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6615.
    Antonelli v. Schrieber et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6625.
    Howard v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6626.
    DiFronzo v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6632.
    Humphrey v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6643.
    Townley v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6646.
    McRary v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6648.
    Bennett v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6651.
    King v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6663.
    Fiorot v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6675.
    Wiggan v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6678.
    Whitley v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1587.
    Balkcom, Warden v. Baty.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pawperis granted. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 81-1776.
    No. 81-6419.
    Lewis v. Illinois. Mikenas v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Ill.; and

Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 81-1776, 88 Ill. 2d 129, 430 N. E. 2d 1346; No. 81-6419, 407 So. 2d 892.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 81-1872.
    Turf Paradise, Inc. v. Arizona Downs.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 81-2044.
    Three J Farms, Inc., et al. v. Adams Extract Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White and Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 81-1317.
    No. 81-6271.
    City of Parma, Ohio v. United States, Barham v. United States,
   ante, p. 926; and

ante, p. 947. Petitions for rehearing denied.


author: Chief Justice Burger

text:
    RODRIGUEZ et al. v. POPULAR DEMOCRATIC PARTY et al.
    No. 81-328.
    Argued March 22, 1982
    Decided June 7, 1982

      Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Phillip A. Lacovara argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Gerald Goldman and William R. Stein.

      Abe Fortas argued the cause for appellees. With him on the briefs was Rafael Hemandez-Colon.

   Chief Justice Burger

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented by this appeal is whether Puerto Rico may by statute vest in a political party the power to fill an interim vacancy in the Puerto Rico Legislature. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held that such a procedure did not violate the United States Constitution. We noted probable jurisdiction, 454 U. S. 938 (1981), and we affirm.

I

In the November 4, 1980, Puerto Rico general election, Ramon Muniz, a member of appellee Popular Democratic Party, was elected to the Puerto Rico House of Representatives from District 31. Muniz died on January 28, 1981. The Governor of Puerto Rico, a member of the opposition New Progressive Party, subsequently called for a “by-election” — open to all qualified voters in District 31 — to fill the vacancy caused by Muniz’ death. The Governor purported to act pursuant to Articles 5.006 and 5.007 of the Electoral Law of Puerto Rico, P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 16, §§3206, 3207 (Supp. 1980).

On March 3, 1981, the Popular Democratic Party instituted this action in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, alleging that Articles 5.006 and 5.007 authorized only candidates and electors affiliated with the Party to participate in the by-election. Appellants, 10 qualified electors in District 31 who are not affiliated with the Popular Democratic Party, intervened as defendants. On March 20,1981, the Superior Court entered judgment for the Popular Democratic Party; it ordered the Governor and General Administrator of Elections to limit participation in the by-election to Party members. App. to Juris. Statement 36a.

A divided Supreme Court of Puerto Rico modified the Superior Court’s judgment. It interpreted Articles 5.006 and 5.007 to require a by-election only in the event that the party of the legislator vacating the seat fails to designate a replacement within 60 days after the vacancy occurred; if the party selects a single candidate within the 60-day period, that candidate is “automatically elected to fill the vacancy,” rendering a by-election unnecessary. Popular Democratic Party v. Barcelo, — P. R. R. —, — (1981). The court held further that if the party presents more than one candidate during the 60-day period, a by-election must be conducted in which only party-affiliated candidates may run but in which all qualified electors may vote. In the event no candidate is presented within the 60-day period, candidates affiliated with any party, as well as independent candidates, are permitted to run in the by-election. Because of the delay already occasioned by the litigation, the court permitted appellee Party only 30 days from the entry of judgment, May 8, 1981, to present a “slate” of candidates to the Commonwealth Election Commission. The court ordered that “[i]f said slate is limited to only one candidate, he shall be certified by the General Administrator of Elections as the person entitled to hold the vacant seat.” Id., at-.

The court rejected appellants’ contention that this procedure violated the United States Constitution. It noted that the Constitution does not expressly require a fixed method for filling vacancies in a state or commonwealth legislature. The court also held that Puerto Rico’s party appointment system serves several “compelling interests,” such as ensuring the stability and continuity of the “legislative balance” until the next general election; protecting the “electoral mandate” of the previous election; and reducing “inter-partisan political campaigns to once every four years.” Id., at-.

II

Puerto Rico, in common with many of the States, has adopted means of filling interim vacancies in elective commonwealth offices without the necessity of a full-scale special election. If a vacancy occurs in the office of Governor, it is automatically filled by the Secretary of State, an officer appointed by the Governor. P. E. Const., Art. IV, §7. Mayoral vacancies and vacancies in the municipal assemblies are filled by appointment upon the recommendation of the political party to which the incumbent belonged. P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 21, §§ 1161, 1259 (1974). Similarly, the Commonwealth Constitution provides that vacancies in the posts of at-large senators and representatives, see n. 13, infra, shall be filled “upon recommendation of the political party to which belonged the Senator or Representative causing the vacancy . . . .” Art. Ill, §8. Article 5.006 of the Puerto Rico Electoral Law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico in this case, likewise confers on a political party the initial opportunity to appoint an interim replacement for one of its members who vacates a position as a district senator or representative. In each case, the appointee serves only until the next regularly scheduled election.

Appellants’ challenge to the procedure mandated by Article 5.006 is essentially two-pronged. Appellants first contend that qualified voters have a federal constitutional right to elect their representatives to the Puerto Rico Legislature, and that vacancies in legislative offices therefore must be filled by a special election open to all qualified electors, not by interim appointment of any kind. Alternatively, appellants maintain that even if legislative vacancies may be filled by an interim appointment of the Governor or some other elected official, Puerto Rico’s party appointment mechanism imper-missibly infringes upon their right of association under the First Amendment and denies them equal protection of the laws.

A

It is not disputed that the fundamental protections of the United States Constitution extend to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico. See Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U. S. 465, 469-470 (1979). Cf. Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138, 148 (1904). In particular, we have held that Puerto Rico is subject to the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws. Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572, 599-601 (1976); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663 (1974). We thus think it is clear that the voting rights of Puerto Rico citizens are constitutionally protected to the same extent as those of all other citizens of the United States.

At the same time, Puerto Rico, like a state, is an autonomous political entity, “ ‘sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution.’” Calero-Toledo, supra, at 673 (quoting Mora v. Mejias, 115 F. Supp. 610 (PR 1953)). See Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 649 F. 2d 36, 39-42 (CA1 1981). The methods by which the people of Puerto Rico and their representatives have chosen to structure the Commonwealth’s electoral system are entitled to substantial deference. Moreover, we should accord weight to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court’s assessment of the justification and need for particular provisions to fill vacancies caused by the death, resignation, or removal of a member of the legislature. Bearing these considerations in mind, we turn to appellants’ constitutional challenges.

B

No provision of the Federal Constitution expressly mandates the procedures that a state or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico must follow in filling vacancies in its own legislature. Cf. U. S. Const., Art. I, §2; Arndt. 17, cl. 2. Appellants nevertheless maintain that qualified electors have an absolute constitutional right to vote for the members of a state or commonwealth legislature, even when a special election is required for this purpose. However, this Court has often noted that the Constitution “does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one,” Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 178 (1875), and that “the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally protected right,” San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 35, n. 78 (1973). See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 38-39 (1892). Moreover, we have previously rejected claims that the Constitution compels a fixed method of choosing state or local officers or representatives.

For example, in Fortson v. Morris, 385 U. S. 231, 234 (1966), Justice Black, speaking for the Court, stated:

“There is no provision of the United States Constitution or any of its amendments which either expressly or impliedly dictates the method a State must use to select its Governor.”

In Fortson, the Court sustained a Georgia constitutional provision empowering the state legislature to elect a Governor from the two candidates receiving the highest number of votes cast in the general election, in the event neither received a majority. Similarly, in Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U. S. 105 (1967), the Court upheld a statute authorizing appointment rather than election of the members of a county school board.

To be sure, when a state or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has provided that its representatives be elected, “a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 336 (1972). See Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U. S. 621, 626-629 (1969); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, 379-380 (1963). However, the Puerto Rico statute at issue here does not restrict access to the electoral process or afford unequal treatment to different classes of voters or political parties. All qualified voters have an equal opportunity to select a district representative in the general election; and the interim appointment provision applies uniformly to all legislative vacancies, whenever they arise.

In Valenti v. Rockefeller, 393 U. S. 405 (1969), the Court sustained the authority of the Governor of New York to fill a vacancy in the United States Senate by appointment pending the next regularly scheduled congressional election — in that case, a period of over 29 months. Thus, although most Members of the United States Senate hold office by virtue of popular election, some Members, at any given time, may hold office by virtue of an interim appointment. The Court found nothing invidious or arbitrary in this distinction in Valenti, nor do we here. As the three-judge District Court observed in Valenti:

“In this case we are confronted with no fundamental imperfection in the functioning of democracy. No political party or portion of the state’s citizens can claim it is permanently disadvantaged ... or that it lacks effective means of securing legislative reform if the statute is regarded as unsatisfactory. We have, rather, only the unusual, temporary, and unfortunate combination of a tragic event and a reasonable statutory scheme.” Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 867 (SDNY 1968).

Valenti, of course, unlike this case, involved an interpretation of the Seventeenth Amendment, which explicitly outlines the procedures for filling vacancies in the United States Senate. See n. 7, supra. However, the fact that the Seventeenth Amendment permits a state, if it chooses, to forgo a special election in favor of a temporary appointment to the United States Senate suggests that a state is not constitutionally prohibited from exercising similar latitude with regard to vacancies in its own legislature. We discern nothing in the Federal Constitution that imposes greater constraints on the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

The Commonwealth’s choice to fill legislative vacancies by-appointment rather than by a full-scale special election may have some effect on the right of its citizens to elect the members of the Puerto Rico Legislature; however, the effect is minimal, and like that in Valenti, it does not fall disproportionately on any discrete group of voters, candidates, or political parties. See n. 10, supra. Moreover, the interim appointment system plainly serves the legitimate purpose of ensuring that vacancies are filled promptly, without the necessity of the expense and inconvenience of a special election. The Constitution does not preclude this practical and widely accepted means of addressing an infrequent problem.

C

Puerto Rico’s appointment mechanism is not rendered constitutionally defective by virtue of the fact that the interim appointment power is given to the political party with which the previous incumbent was affiliated. Appellants maintain that the power to make interim appointments must be vested in an elected official, such as the Governor of the Commonwealth, so that the appointments will have “the legitimacy of derivative voter approval and control.” Reply Brief for Appellants 15. However, that such control may often be largely illusory is illustrated by this case, where the Governor and the incumbent belonged to different parties. The Puerto Rico Legislature could reasonably conclude that appointment by the previous incumbent’s political party would more fairly reflect the will of the voters than appointment by the Governor or some other elected official.

The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held that party appointment was a legitimate mechanism serving to protect the mandate of the preceding election and to preserve the “legislative balance” until the next general election is held. Such protection is particularly important in light of Puerto Rico’s special interest in ensuring minority representation in its legislature. See Garcia v. Barcelo, 671 F. 2d 1, 6-7 (CA1 1982). It was thus not unreasonable for the Puerto Rico Legislature, in establishing an appointment systemior filling legislative vacancies, to make provision for continuity of party representation. Cf. Kaelin v. Warden, 334 F. Supp. 602, 607-608 (ED Pa. 1971) (three-judge District Court). Absent some clear constitutional limitation, Puerto Rico is free to structure its political system to meet its “special concerns and political circumstances,” Garcia, supra, at 7.

Finally, appellants argue that their rights of association and equal protection of the laws were violated by their exclusion, based solely upon their party affiliation, from the Party-sponsored election held to select Muniz' successor, see n. 3, supra. Cf. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S. 507 (1980). However, appellants' argument misconceives the nature of the election held in this case. Puerto Rico law authorized the Popular Democratic Party to designate an interim replacement to fill Muniz’ seat. The Party was entitled to adopt its own procedures to select this replacement; it was not required to include nonmembers in what can be analogized to a party primary election. Cf. Democratic Party of U. S. v. Wisconsin, 450 U. S. 107 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U. S. 477 (1975). Appellants’ exclusion from this election did not violate their rights of association, nor did it deprive them of equal protection of the laws.

hH H

We hold that the mechanism adopted by the Puerto Rico Legislature for filling legislative vacancies is not foreclosed by the Federal Constitution. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico is

Affirmed.

       The Puerto Rico Legislative Assembly consists of two chambers — the House of Representatives, with 51 members, and the Senate, with 27 members. P. R. Const., Art. Ill, §§ 1 and 2. A single general election is held in Puerto Rico every four years for all elective officials. Art. VI, § 4; P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 16, §§3201, 3205 (Supp. 1980).

       Article 5.006 provides, in pertinent part:
      “When a vacancy occurs in the office of a senator or representative elected as an independent candidate for a district, or when a vacancy occurs in the office of a senator or representative for a district, nominated by a party before the fifteen (15) months immediately preceding the date of the following general election, the Governor, with the advice of the [Commonwealth Election] Commission shall, within the thirty (30) days following the date on which the vacancy occurred, call a by-election in such district which shall be held no later than ninety (90) days after the date of the call, and the person elected in such by-election shall hold the office until the term of his predecessor has expired.
      “If within sixty (60) days following the date such vacancy arises, the party to which the legislator of the vacant office belonged has not presented a candidate to fill such office, the office shall be deemed to be that of an independent legislator, to the effects of holding the by-election to fill it.”
      Article 5.007 provides:
      “All electors entitled to vote within the geographic district in which the by-election is to be held, pursuant to the call issued by the Governor to such effect, shall vote in a by-election.”

       On March 22, 1981, while the case was pending before the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, the Popular Democratic Party held a primary election in which only its members were permitted to participate. From a field of four candidates, the Party’s members selected Juan Corujo Collazo. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s mandate, Corujo Collazo’s name was presented to the Election Commission, and on July 6,1981, he was sworn in as the new Representative from District 31.

         In 22 States, legislative vacancies are filled by appointment, with the appointee serving either until the next general election or until expiration of the term of the previous incumbent. Alaska Stat. Ann. § 15.40.320 et

        seq. (1975) (unless term expires or election held before next legislative session convenes); Colo. Rev. Stat. §1-12-103 (1980); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 17-3,17-4 (1976 and Supp. 1981); Idaho Code § 59-904A (1976); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, ¶25-6 (1980); Ind. Code §2-2.1-2-1 el seq. (Cum. Supp. 1981); Kan. Stat. Ann. §25-312 (1981); Md. Const., Art. Ill, §13; Mont. Code Ann. § 5-2-401 et seq. (1981); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-1042(3) (1978); Nev. Const., Art. IV, § 12 (unless biennial or regular election held between time of vacancy and next legislative session); N. M. Stat. Ann. §§2-7-9B, 2-8-9B (1978); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 163-11 (Cum. Supp. 1981); Ohio Const., Art. II, § 11; Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 171.051, 171.060 (1981) (unless the legislature is not in session; a general election will be held within 90 days; and no special session of the legislature will be convened before such election); S. D. Const., Art. Ill, § 10; Tenn. Code Ann. §2-14-201 et seq. (1979) (if less than 12 months remain before next general election); Utah Code Ann. §20-1-5 (Supp. 1981); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, §2623 (Supp. 1981); Wash. Const., Amdt. 52, Art. 2, §15; W. Va. Code §3-10-5 (1979); Wyo. Stat. §§ 22-18-lll(a)(ii), (iii) (1977). Like Puerto Rico, five of these States— Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, and North Carolina — confer the appointment power on the political party to which the previous incumbent belonged. Nine more States — Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming — require that the appointee be selected from a list submitted by the political party, or that the appointee be chosen or confirmed by elected officials affiliated with the party. Another two States — Hawaii and Nevada — simply require that the appointee be a member of the party to which his or her predecessor belonged.

       The current procedure for filling legislative vacancies is similar to that prescribed by a 1938 amendment to Puerto Rico’s Organic Act, which remained in effect until Puerto Rico assumed Commonwealth status in 1952. In the 1938 amendment, Congress mandated that vacancies in the Puerto Rico Legislature be filled by the Governor “upon the recommendation of the central committee of the political party of which such senator or representative was a member.” Act of June 1, 1938, ch. 308, § 30, 52 Stat. 595. Title 48 U. S. C. §§ 891, 892 presently provide that vacancies in the elective office of Resident Commissioner to the United States are to be filled by appointment of the Governor with the advice and consent of the Puerto Rico Senate.

       We have never found it necessary to resolve the precise question whether the guarantee of equal protection is provided to Puerto Ricans under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S., at 601.

       With regard to Members of the United States House of Representatives, Art. I, § 2, cl. 4, provides:
      “When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.”
      The Seventeenth Amendment provides:
      “When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.”

       The source of this purported right is somewhat unclear. Appellants contend that Art. I, § 2, cl. 1, of the Constitution — which provides that those eligible to vote for Members of the United States House of Representatives “shall have the Qualifications requisite for the Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature” — contemplates that state legislators will be popularly elected. See also U. S. Const., Arndt. 17. Moreover, appellants contend that a popularly elected legislature is an essential element of a “Republican Form of Government,” U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 4. See 48 U. S. C. § 731c, requiring Puerto Rico to provide a republican form of government. However, this seems largely irrelevant, since Puerto Rico has in fact established a legislature “whose members shall be elected by direct vote at each general election,” P. R. Const., Art. Ill, § 1. See also Art. II, §2, guaranteeing “equal, direct, and . . . universal suffrage . . . .”

       In Sailors, we expressly left open the question “whether a State may constitute a local legislative body through the appointive rather than the elective process.” 387 U. S., at 109-110 (emphasis added). However, we need not consider whether, as urged by appellants, a state or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is constitutionally barred from abolishing its elected legislative branch of government; that question is not presented. See n. 8, supra.

       Appellants contend that Article 5.006 “discriminates” between voters in districts in which a vacancy occurs and those in which the elected representative or senator serves out his term, because only the former are denied the opportunity to be represented by an elected legislator. Obviously, a statute designed to deal with the occasional problem of legislative vacancies will affect only those districts in which vacancies actually arise. However, such a statute is not for this reason rendered invalid under equal protection principles. A vacancy in the legislature is an unexpected, unpredictable event, and a statute providing that all such vacancies be filled by appointment does not have a special impact on any discrete group of voters or candidates. Cf. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968). Appellants’ equal protection argument adds nothing to their basic assertion of an absolute constitutional right to elect representatives to a state or commonwealth legislature.

       In Valenti, the vacancy was created by the death of Senator Robert F. Kennedy on June 6, 1968. Under New York law, since the vacancy arose less than 60 days prior to New York’s regular spring primary in an even-numbered year, an election to fill the vacancy would not be held until the general election in the next even-numbered year, i. e., November 1970. The Governor was empowered to make an interim appointment, effective until December 1, 1970. See Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 853 (SDNY 1968) (three-judge District Court).

       See Garcia v. Barcelo, 671 F. 2d 1, 6 (CA1 1982):
      “One might argue, as a matter of form, that appointment by a governor is indeed more ‘democratic’ because the governor is himself elected. Yet in practice this is not likely to be so when the governor and former representative are of different parties. In that case the party difference is likely to produce successors of different parties. In such circumstances, we see how the framers of a state constitution might conclude that party selection is more likely to reflect the will of the voters than selection by the governor, for it was the former representative’s party, not that of the governor, that won the prior seat. Such a judgment, reflecting a knowledge of political practice, seems perfectly consistent with the basic democratic role of the modem political party — translating the individual wills of myriad voters into a practically achievable program administered by a government that can be held responsible for its performance at the polls.”

       Two devices in Puerto Rico’s Constitution ensure representation of minority parties in the Puerto Rico Legislative Assembly. First, 11 of 27 senators and 11 of 51 representatives are elected "at-large,” and each voter may vote for only one candidate for senator or representative at-large. Art. Ill, § 3. Second, if any one party elects more than two-thirds of the members of either house of the legislature, the number of members in that house is increased by declaring elected a sufficient number of minority-party candidates to bring the total number of minority-party members to 9 in the Senate and to 17 in the House. Art. Ill, § 7. Appellees maintain that “the Commonwealth’s unique guarantee of minority party representation ... is and has been particularly important in Puerto Rico, far beyond its importance in any State of the Union, in order to provide a democratic forum and an outlet for the radically different views of the various political parties as to the ultimate status of Puerto Rico . . . .” Brief for Appellees 14.

       Puerto Rico is in no sense unique in maintaining continuity of party representation between elections; 16 States have chosen to require that legislative vacancies be filled by appointment of a person affiliated with the same party as the previous incumbent, or by designation of that party, see n. 4, supra.


author: Justice Blackmun Justice Powell,

text:
    JACKSON TRANSIT AUTHORITY et al. v. LOCAL DIVISION 1285, AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, AFL-CIO-CLC
    No. 81-411.
    Argued April 21, 1982
    Decided June 7, 1982
    Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which O’Connor, J., joined, post, p. 29.

      Joseph S. Kaufman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was William R. Rice.

      Linda R. Hirshman argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was Earle Putnam.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by John J. Vlahos and Ray E. McDevitt for the American Public Transit Association; by Benjamin L. Brown, J. Lamar Shelley, James B. Brennan, Henry W. Underhill, Jr., George Agnost, Roger F. Cutler, John Dekker, Lee E. Holt, George F. Knox, Jr., Walter M. Powell, WilliamH. Taube, John W. Witt, Max P. Zall, Conard B. Mattox, Jr., and Charles S. Rhyne for the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers; by William J. Olson and James H. Wentzel for the Public Service Research Council; and by Donald H. Clark and Gregory A. Giordano for the Tidewater Transportation District Commission.

        Edward J. Hickey, Jr., Michael S. Wolly, and Thomas A. Woodley filed a brief for the Railway Labor Executives’ Association as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
      Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Joseph H. Elcock and Ronald G. Busconi for the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority; and by W. Stell Huie and Terrence Lee Croft for the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority.

   Justice Blackmun

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under § 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 (Act or UMTA), 78 Stat. 307, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 1609(c), a state or local government must make arrangements to preserve transit workers’ existing collective-bargaining rights before that government may receive federal financial assistance for the acquisition of a privately owned transit company. This case presents the issue whether § 13(c) by itself permits a union to sue in federal court for alleged violations of an arrangement of this kind or of the collective-bargaining agreement between the union and the local government transit authority.

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When the Act was under consideration in the Congress, that body was aware of the increasingly precarious financial condition of a number of private transportation companies across the country, and it feared that communities might be left without adequate mass transportation. See S. Rep. No. 82, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 4-5, 19-20 (1963). The Act was designed in part to provide federal aid for local governments in acquiring failing private transit companies so that communities could continue to receive the benefits of mass transportation despite the collapse of the private operations. See § § 2(b) and 3, as amended, 49 U. S. C. §§ 1601(b) and 1602.

At the same time, however, Congress was aware that public ownership might threaten existing collective-bargaining rights of unionized transit workers employed by private companies. If, for example, state law forbade collective bargaining by state and local government employees, the workers might lose their collective-bargaining rights when a private company was acquired by a local government. See Urban Mass Transportation — 1963, Hearings on S. 6 and S. 917 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 318-323 (1963) (Senate Hearings) (statement of Andrew J. Biemiller, Director, Department. of Legislation, AFL-CIO). To prevent federal funds from being used to destroy the collective-bargaining rights of organized workers, Congress included § 13(c) in the Act. See H. R. Rep. No. 204, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 15-16 (1963).

Section 13(c) requires, as a condition of federal assistance under the Act, that the Secretary of Labor certify that “fair and equitable arrangements” have been made “to protect the interests of employees affected by [the] assistance.” The statute lists several protective steps that must be taken before a local government may receive federal aid; among these are the preservation of benefits under existing collective-bargaining agreements and the continuation of collective-bargaining rights. The protective arrangements must be specified in the contract granting federal aid.

B

In 1966, petitioner city of Jackson, Tenn., applied for federal aid to convert a failing private bus company into a public entity, petitioner Jackson Transit Authority. See App. 12a-16a. In order to satisfy § 13(c), the Authority so created entered into a “§ 13(c) agreement” with respondent Local Division 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, the union that represented the private company’s employees. See 29 CFR pt. 215 (1981). Among other things, the § 13(c) agreement guaranteed the preservation of the transit workers’ collective-bargaining rights. App. 16a-20a. The Secretary of Labor certified that the agreement was “fair and equitable.” Its substance was made a part of the grant contract between the city and the United States, and the city received approximately $279,000 in federal aid.

Thereafter, until 1975, the Authority’s unionized workers were covered by a series of collective-bargaining agreements. Six months after a new 3-year collective-bargaining agreement was signed in 1975, see id., at 31a, however, the Authority notified the union that it no longer considered itself bound by that contract. See id., at 45a.

Ultimately, the union filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. It sought damages and injunctive relief, alleging that petitioners had breached the § 13(c) agreement and the collective-bargaining contract. App. 8a, 10a-lla. The District Court concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the suit because the complaint rested on contract rights that should be enforced only in a state court. 447 F. Supp. 88 (1977).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. 650 F. 2d 1379 (1981). Relying on Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1946), that court first determined that it had subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1331, because the union’s claim arose under the laws of the United States, specifically § 13(c). The court then held that § 13(c) implicitly provides a federal private right of action. Section 13(c) reflects national labor policy, the Court of Appeals reasoned, and the rights protected by the statute are thus federal rights. The court concluded that it was consistent with the congressional intent behind § 13(c) to permit enforcement of these federal rights in federal court.

Because of the importance of the interpretation of § 13(c) for local transit labor relations, we granted certiorari. 454 U. S. 1079 (1981).

II

While the Court of Appeals treated this as a private right of action case, see, e. g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353 (1982), it does not fit comfortably in that mold. Indeed, since § 13(c) contemplates protective arrangements between grant recipients and unions as well as subsequent collective-bargaining agreements between those parties, see H. R. Rep. No. 204, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 (1963), it is reasonable to conclude that Congress expected the § 13(c) agreement and the collective-bargaining agreement, like .ordinary contracts, to be enforceable by private suit upon a breach. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 18-19 (1979). The gist of the union’s position is not that § 13(c) creates an implied right of action to sue for violations of the statute. Instead, the union argues that “[i]t was the intent of Congress that federal law would determine the binding effect of labor protective agreements under § 13(c) and of the collective bargaining agreements reached pursuant to § 13(c) between unions and recipients of UMTA funds” so that those agreements “are enforceable in the federal courts.” Brief for Respondent 24.

The issue, then, is not whether Congress intended the union to be able to bring contract actions for breaches of the two contracts, but whether Congress intended such contract actions to set forth federal, rather than state, claims. Admittedly, since the private right of action decisions address the related question whether Congress intended that a particular party be able to bring suit under a federal statute, those decisions may provide assistance in resolving this case. But the precise question before us is whether the union’s contract actions are federal causes of action, not whether the union can bring suit at all to enforce its contracts. See Local Div. 732, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 667 F. 2d 1327, 1329-1334 (CA11 1982).

As the union points out, on several occasions the Court has determined that a plaintiff stated a federal claim when he sued to vindicate contractual rights set forth by federal statutes, despite the fact that the relevant statutes lacked express provisions creating federal causes of action. In Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U. S. 682 (1963), the Court held that a union had a federal cause of action to enforce an award of an airline adjustment board included in a collective-bargaining contract pursuant to § 204 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 184 (1958 ed.). Similarly, in Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Nemitz, 404 U. S. 37 (1971), the Court ruled that a railroad’s employees made out federal claims when they sought to enforce assurances made by the railroad to secure the Interstate Commerce Commission’s approval of a consolidation under a provision of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. §5(2)(f) (1970 ed.). And recently, in an analogous private right of action decision, the Court permitted a federal suit for rescission of a contract declared void by § 215 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-15, although the statute itself made no express provision for private suits. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S., at 18-19. See also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S. 375, 388 (1970) (recognizing federal right to rescind contracts rendered void by § 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §78cc(b)); American Surety Co. v. Shulz, 237 U. S. 159 (1915) (finding federal-question jurisdiction to hear suit on su-persedeas bond required by Rev. Stat. § 1007).

These decisions demonstrate that suits to enforce contracts contemplated by federal statutes may set forth federal claims and that private parties in appropriate cases may sue in federal court to enforce contractual rights created by federal statutes. But they do not dictate the result in this case. Whenever we determine the scope of rights and remedies under a federal statute, the critical factor is the congressional intent behind the particular provision at issue. See, e. g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S., at 18; Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 688 (1979); Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U. S., at 685-692; see also n. 9, infra. Thus, if Congress intended that § 13(c) agreements and collective-bargaining agreements be “creations of federal law,” Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U. S., at 692, and that the rights and duties contained in those contracts be federal in nature, see id., at 695, then the union’s suit states federal claims. Otherwise, the union’s complaint presents only state-law claims. See Miree v. De Kalb County, 433 U. S. 25 (1977).

»■ — < h-l

We begin with the language of the statute itself. See, e. g., Universities Research Assn., Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U. S. 754,771 (1981). The bare language of § 13(c) is not conclusive. In some ways, the statute seems to make § 13(c) agreements and collective-bargaining contracts creatures of federal law. Section 13(c) demands “fair and equitable arrangements” as prerequisites for federal aid; it requires the approval of the Secretary of Labor for those arrangements; it specifies five different varieties of protective provisions that must be included among the § 13(c) arrangements; and it expressly incorporates the protective arrangements into the grant contract between the recipient and the Federal Government. See n. 2, supra. On the other hand, labor relations between local governments and their employees are the subject of a longstanding statutory exemption from the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U. S. C. § 152(2). Section 13(c) evinces no congressional intent to upset the decision in the National Labor Relations Act to permit state law to govern the relationships between local governmental entities and the unions representing their employees. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 (1975) (noting reluctance to permit suit in federal court when “the cause of action [is] one traditionally relegated to state law”).

While the statutory language supplies no definitive answer, the legislative history is conclusive. A consistent theme runs throughout the consideration of § 13(c): Congress intended that labor relations between transit workers and local governments would be controlled by state law.

In 1963, Secretary of Labor Wirtz presented the original version of § 13(c) to the relevant House and Senate Committees. Before both Committees, Members of Congress expressed concern about the effect of the statute on state laws. And Secretary Wirtz explained to both Committees that, while attempts would be made to accommodate state law to the preservation of collective-bargaining rights, state law would control local transit labor relations. The Secretary told the House Committee that “this proposal is submitted on this basis, . . . that the State laws must control.” Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1963, Hearings on H. R. 3881 before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 482 (1963) (House Hearings). A Committee member raised the issue again; the Secretary repeated that “State laws would be controlling in the situation,” though he suggested that there “would be few, if any, situations” where state law and § 13(c) could not be reconciled. House Hearings, at 486. When similar concerns were expressed during his testimony before the Senate Committee, the Secretary reiterated: “I should like it quite clear that I think that there could be no superseding here of the State law.” Senate Hearings, at 313.

The House and Senate Reports took the Secretary at his word. The House Report advised that § 13(c) would ensure protection of the interests of workers, but that “subject to the basic standards set forth in the bill, specific conditions for worker protection will normally be the product of local bargaining and negotiation.” H. R. Rep. No. 204, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 (1963). The Senate Report was more direct: “In regard to the question as to whether these provisions would supersede State labor laws, the committee concurs in a statement made by the Secretary of Labor ‘that there could be no superseding of State laws by a provision of this kind.’ ” S. Rep. No. 82, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 29 (1963).

During the debates, the role of state law under § 13(c) was discussed at length. Senators Goldwater and Tower suggested that § 13(c) would supplant state law with federal law. 109 Cong. Rec. 5416 (1963). Senator Williams, one of the bill’s chief sponsors, replied: “The legislative history has to be corrected” because “we must have a record that will show that the bill does not preempt State law; it does not control or dominate with irrevocable authority local situations.” Id., at 5417. The proposed statute, Senator Williams continued, would not “preempt or be a substitute for State law.” Ibid. Senator Goldwater remained adamant that “we are attempting a major alteration in the Nation’s labor laws.” Id., at 5418. But Senator Sparkman, the Chairman of the Senate Committee, repeated the Secretary’s assurance that § 13(c) “will not supersede or displace or override” state law. 109 Cong. Rec. 5418 (1963).

The Senate returned to the issue during a colloquy between Senator Goldwater and Senator Morse. Senator Goldwater feared that the proposed statute would override state laws denying public employees the right to strike. Id., at 5673. Senator Morse assured Senator Goldwater otherwise that “the State law would supervene.” Ibid. When Senator Goldwater inquired about state laws other than those concerning the right to strike, Senator Morse replied in the same vein: “The amendment does not supersede any State policy.” Ibid.

In an important exchange, Senator Goldwater noted that local government employers were excluded from the coverage of the National Labor Relations Act, see 29 U. S. C. §152(2), and asked whether § 13(c) would be inconsistent with that exclusion. 109 Cong. Rec. 5673-5674 (1963). Senator Morse responded that the language of the bill “make[s] it clear that the Taft-Hartley exemptions are not changed by the amendment.” Id., at 5674. See also id., at 5422 (remarks of Sen. Javits) (state law could not be overridden “under any phase of the Taft-Hartley law”). Senator Morse underscored the purpose of the amendment: “I cannot emphasize the point more than I already have done in the legislative history in our debate. It deals with municipal and State problems, and not Federal problems.” Id., at 5674. Finally, Senator Goldwater asked whether state law would control if there were no specific state law forbidding strikes by public employees. Senator Morse adhered to the same course: “In the absence of any local law, it would be for the State court to decide whether [the employees] had that right.” Ibid.

A similar, but more abbreviated, interchange took place on the House floor. When some Congressmen questioned the effect of § 13(c) on state law, they were reassured by Congressman Multer that “[n]othing in this bill. . . will infringe upon local law, whether it be of a State or municipality.” 110 Cong. Ree. 14980 (1964). And Congressman Rains repeated, “there is not one line in this bill that would vitiate in any way any State or local law.” Ibid.

Thus, Congress made it absolutely clear that it did not intend to create a body of federal law applicable to labor relations between local governmental entities and transit workers. Section 13(c) would not supersede state law, it would leave intact the exclusion of local government employers from the National Labor Relations Act, and state courts would retain jurisdiction to determine the application of state policy to local government transit labor relations. Congress intended that § 13(c) would be an important tool to protect the collective-bargaining rights of transit workers, by ensuring that state law preserved their rights before federal aid could be used to convert private companies into public entities. See 109 Cong. Rec. 5673 (1963) (remarks of Sen. Morse) (if city proposed to reject collective bargaining, it would be ineligible for federal aid). But Congress designed § 13(c) as a means to accommodate state law to collective bargaining, not as a means to substitute a federal law of collective bargaining for state labor law.

IV

Given this explicit legislative history, we cannot read § 13(c) to create federal causes of action for breaches of § 13(c) agreements and collective-bargaining contracts between UMTA aid recipients and transit unions. The legislative history indicates that Congress intended those contracts to be governed by state law applied in state courts.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Powell,

with whom Justice O’Connor joins, concurring.

As the Court notes, this case “does not fit comfortably in [the] mold” of our implied right of action cases. Ante, at 20. Congress here provided for the making of contracts that it must have intended to be enforced. The Court thus identifies the question correctly as whether Congress intended those contracts to be enforced in federal court. Ante, at 21. This of course is precisely the question on which implied rights of action cases properly are decided. See, e. g., Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 13 (1981); Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 639 (1981).

There are other parallels between this case and those in the more familiar implied right of action “mold.” Most significantly to me, both kinds of cases involve the same fundamental issues of congressional and judicial power. By enforcing contract rights not within the jurisdictional grant conferred by Congress, as much as by improperly “inferring” a right of action, “a court of limited jurisdiction necessarily extends its authority to embrace a dispute Congress has not assigned it to resolve. . . . This runs contrary to the established principle that ‘[t]he jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation . . . ,’ American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U. S. 6, 17 (1951), and conflicts with the authority of Congress under Art. Ill to set the limits of federal jurisdiction.” Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 746-747 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).

Because a federal court should exercise extreme caution before assuming jurisdiction not clearly conferred by Congress, we should not condone the implication of federal jurisdiction over contract claims in the absence of an unambiguous expression of congressional intent. As I do not view this position as inconsistent with the reasoning of the Court, I join its opinion.

       Originally, § 13(c) was § 10(c). In 1966, the Act was amended, and the section received its present designation. Pub. L. 89-562, § 2(b)(1), 80 Stat. 716. Throughout this opinion, it is referred to as § 13(c).

       Section 13(c) reads in full:
      “It shall be a condition of any assistance under section 3 of this Act that fair and equitable arrangements are made, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, to protect the interests of employees affected by such assistance. Such protective arrangements shall include, without being limited to, such provisions as may be necessary for (1) the preservation of rights, privileges, and benefits (including continuation of pension rights and benefits) under existing collective bargaining agreements or otherwise; (2) the continuation of collective bargaining rights; (3) the protection of individual employees against a worsening of their positions with respect to their employment; (4) assurances of employment to employees of acquired mass transportation systems and priority of reemployment of employees terminated or laid off; and (5) paid training or retraining programs. Such arrangements shall include provisions protecting individual employees against a worsening of their positions with respect to their employment which shall in no event provide benefits less than those established pursuant to section 5(2)(f) of the Act of February 4, 1887 (24 Stat. 379), as amended. The contract for the granting of any such assistance shall specify the terms and conditions of the protective arrangements.”

       According to the union’s complaint, the Authority since 1966 had contracted with a private individual, T. 0. Petty, for the management of the transportation system. App. 6a-7a. The union negotiated its 1975 contract with Petty; when he left as manager of the system, the Authority claimed it was not bound by the contract he had negotiated. Id., at 47a. The union alleged that petitioners had promised in the § 13(c) agreement to be bound by the contracts Petty had signed and that petitioners violated both the § 13(c) agreement and the 1975 collective-bargaining contract. App. 7a-8a.

       Prior to filing suit, the union asked the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Transportation to find that petitioners had violated the § 13(c) agreement and to ensure that petitioners complied with the agreement. Both Secretaries refused. See 650 F. 2d 1379, 1381 (CA6 1981).
      In addition to relief directed at petitioners, the union requested that the two Secretaries be ordered to take appropriate enforcement action against petitioners to compel compliance with the § 13(c) agreement. App. 11a. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals refused the union’s request. See 447 F. Supp. 88, 90-92 (1977); 650 F. 2d, at 1387-1388. The union has not sought review of this ruling, and we express no opinion on that aspect of the litigation.

       Several Courts of Appeals, in addition to the Sixth Circuit, have decided that § 13(e) authorizes federal suits for violations of § 13(c) agreements and collective-bargaining contracts between recipients of UMTA funds and transit unions. Division 587, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 663 F. 2d 875 (CA9 1981); Local Div. 714, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Greater Portland Transit District, 589 F. 2d 1 (CA1 1978); Local Div. 519, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. LaCrosse Municipal Transit Utility, 585 F. 2d 1340 (CA7 1978); Division 1287, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Kansas City Area Transportation Authority, 582 F. 2d 444 (CA8 1978), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 1090 (1979). One Court of Appeals has reached the opposite conclusion. Local Div. 732, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 667 F. 2d 1327 (CA11 1982). In a related decision, the First Circuit has concluded that the terms of § 13(c) agreements do not override conflicting provisions of state law. Local Div. 589, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Massachusetts, 666 F. 2d 618 (1981), cert. pending, No. 81-1817.

       Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals that, strictly speaking, the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 to hear the union’s suit. Under Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 681 (1946), jurisdiction exists if the complaint is “drawn so as to claim a right to recover under the Constitution and laws of the United States. ” The complaint alleged a violation of the § 13(c) agreement required by the UMTA and of the subsequent collective-bargaining agreement contemplated by the Act, and prayed for relief under federal law. We do not consider the union’s asserted federal claims to be “wholly insubstantial and frivolous,” 327 U. S., at 682-683, so that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the union’s suit. Thus, the District Court had jurisdiction for the purposes of determining whether the union stated a cause of action on which relief could be granted. Id., at 682. See also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U. S. 647 (1963).

       The statute also provides that the protective “arrangements shall include provisions . . . which shall in no event provide benefits less than those established pursuant to section 5(2)(f)....” As we explain, see n. 9, infra, this portion of the statute strengthens the union’s position, but we do not consider it at all determinative.

       The union points to the fact that Congress rejected amendments that would have required the continuation of collective-bargaining rights only to the extent not inconsistent with state law. See 109 Cong. Rec. 5422 (1963); id., at 5582; id., at 5684; 110 Cong. Rec. 14980 (1964). But, as Senator Williams explained, those amendments were rejected not because Congress thought § 13(c) would supplant state labor law but because such an amendment was “clearly . . . unnecessary” to guarantee that § 13(c) would not “supersede or preempt or override State law.” 109 Cong. Rec. 5421 (1963). Accord: 110 Cong. Rec. 14980 (1964) (remarks of Reps. Multer and Rains).
      Beyond the explanation given by Senator Williams and repeated on the House floor, the defeat of these amendments merely reflected a congressional intent that the Federal Government be able to seek changes in state law and ultimately to refuse financial assistance when state law prevented compliance with § 13(c). See 109 Cong. Rec. 5684 (1963) (remarks of Sen. Morse); id., at 5422 (remarks of Sen. Javits).

       In light of the legislative history of § 13(e), we do not find Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979), or Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U. S. 682 (1963), to be controlling. Both cases turned on the language, purpose, and legislative history of the particular statute involved, see Transamerica, 444 U. S., at 18-19; Machinists, 372 U. S., at 685-695, and we read the congressional intent behind § 13(c) to be far different from the congressional purpose underlying the statutes at issue in those cases.

        Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Nemitz, 404 U. S. 37 (1971), of course, is not to be overlooked. In that case, the Court decided that a railroad’s employees stated federal claims when they alleged a breach of an agreement entered into by the railroad under § 5(2)(f) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 5(2)(f) (1970 ed.). Section 13(c) refers to § 5(2)(f) and provides that the protective arrangements shall not provide benefits less than those established by § 5(2)(f). See nn. 2 and 7, swpra. If, when it passed § 13(c), Congress had expressed an awareness that § 5(2)(f) assurances could be enforced in federal court, or if there was reason to presume such awareness, the reference in § 13(c) to § 5(2)(f) would make this a different case. See generally Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353 (1982). But the legislative history contains no such congressional recognition. Furthermore, Nemitz was decided several years after § 13(c) was enacted. Consequently, we find the specific legislative history of § 13(c), not the holding of Nemitz, to be determinative.

       The union relies upon the fact that Congress strengthened the language of § 13(c) during the course of its passage. Congress wrote § 13(c) to require protective provisions “necessary for” the protection of collective-bargaining rights, rather than provisions “as are found to be appropriate for” the protection of those rights, as the Kennedy administration had recommended. See House Hearings, at 476; 110 Cong. Rec. 14976 (1964). In addition, § 13(c)(2) was amended at the request of Senator Morse to require the “continuation” of collective-bargaining rights rather than the mere "encouragement” of the continuation of those rights. See 109 Cong. Rec. 5627 (1963); id., at 5685. But these alterations in the bill demonstrate only that Congress demanded that the Secretary ensure that state law preserved collective-bargaining rights before he provided federal aid for acquisition of a private transit company. When viewed in conjunction with the discussion of state law in the legislative history, the modifications of the original bill do not prove that Congress intended that federal rather than state law would govern a contract between a UMTA aid recipient and a union representing its employees.

       Senator Javits summarized:
      “[W]e have a balanced scheme. We do not override the [state] law; at the same time, we do not compel the Federal Government to go in where the law is adverse to the interest of labor and labor’s own point of view, and perhaps also even give encouragement to exempt a situation of this kind where the State desires to get this type of Federal help.” 109 Cong. Rec. 5422 (1963).
      There remains the possibility that Congress might have intended a federal court to hear the union’s claims, but to apply state law. Such an anomalous result would be inconsistent with the emphasis in the legislative history that § 13(c) addresses “municipal and State problems, and not Federal problems,” id., at 5674. Thus, unless there is an independent source of jurisdiction, such as diversity or pendent jurisdiction, the union must sue in state court. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S., at 19, n. 8; Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U. S. 505, 506-507 (1900).

       Based on the legislative history, we could not permit the union to bring a federal suit if we characterized its complaint as alleging that petitioners violated § 13(c) itself by virtue of the alleged contractual breaches. See Brief for Respondent 33-34.
      Nor does 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) permit the union to bring suit. As the Court held in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980), § 1983 encompasses deprivations of rights secured by all “laws" of the United States, of which § 13(c) is, of course, one. But because we have determined that Congress did not intend that breaches of § 13(c) agreements or collective-bargaining contracts would constitute deprivations of federal rights secured by § 13(c), the union has no cause of action under § 1983. See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 19-21 (1981).

       There are other possible remedies for violations of § 13(c) agreements and collective-bargaining contracts. The union, of course, can pursue a contract action in state court. In addition, the Federal Government can respond by threatening to withhold additional financial assistance. See Local Div. 589, 666 F. 2d, at 634-635.
      While we hold that the union cannot sue in federal court to enforce its contracts, we express no view on the entirely separate question whether the Federal Government could bring a federal suit against a UMTA funding recipient for violating the terms of its grant agreement with the Government. Such a suit would involve a different contract from the § 13(c) agreement and the collective-bargaining agreement at issue in this case. See generally Local Div. 732, 667 F. 2d, at 1338-1339; Local Div. No. 714, 589 F. 2d, at 13.