text:
    No. 87-1730.
    Aponte Roque, Secretary of Department of Education of Puerto Rico v. Kercado-Melendez.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 87-1744.
    Phillips v. City of Martinez, California, et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1770.
    Damascus v. Borgia et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1820.
    Hyslep et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1831.
    Cook County College Teachers Union Local 1600, AFT, AFL-CIO v. City Colleges of Chicago, Board of Trustees of Community College District #508, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6450.
    Marra v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6489.
    Howard v. City of Fort Myers, Florida, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6574.
    Gipson v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6580.
    Homa v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6609.
    Rhodes v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6612.
    Williams v. York Steak House et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6617.
    Tasby, aka Amen-Ra v. Lee et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6726.
    Blyden v. Government of the Virgin Islands.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6749.
    Manning v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6759.
    Graves v. Brown.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6762.
    Gribble v. Ohio et al.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Tuscarawas County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6771.
    Olsen v. Village of Fox Lake et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6784.
    Simdram v. Maryland.
   Cir. Ct. Frederick County, Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6788.
    Thibeaux v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6792.
    Ziegler v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6795.
    Czemarmaczowicz v. Cowles Tool Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6798.
    Hewlett v. Owens et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6799.
    Lemons v. Clary, Sheriff of Fort Bend County, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6801.
    Dawns v. Canon U. S. A., Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6816.
    May v. Pro-Guard, Inc.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6843.
    Johnson v. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6874.
    Gibson v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6888.
    Martinez v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6889.
    Mustacchio v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6891.
    Free v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6901.
    Swytzer v. United States Postal Service.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6906.
    Blanco v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6911.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6913.
    Tompkins v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6914.
    Jackson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6915.
    Baynard v. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6925.
    Alston v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6929.
    Ramsey v. Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1325.
    Carruthers, Governor of New Mexico, et al. v. Duran et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1839.
    Doe et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of petitioners for leave to file appendix to petition under seal granted. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 87-6233.
    No. 87-6869.
    James v. Butler, Warden. Johns v. Missouri. Foster v. Illinois.
   C. A. 5th Cir.;

Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist.; and

No. 87-6905.

Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 87-6233, 827 F. 2d 1006; No. 87-6869, 741 S. W. 2d 771; No. 87-6905, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 518 N. E. 2d 82.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 87-6763.
    Foggy v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. III. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 87-6817.
    Williams v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari before judgment denied.


author: Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 87-6926.
    Johnson v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231-241 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), I would grant the petition for certiorari. But even if I did not hold this view, I would grant the petition to decide whether the Illinois capital sentencing scheme, under which petitioner was sentenced to death, is constitutionally invalid.

The Illinois Death Penalty Act provides that once a sentencer finds that a statutorily defined aggravating factor exists, the sentencer proceeds to consider the range of statutory and mitigating factors. “If the Court determines that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence, the Court shall sentence the defendant to death.” Ill. Rev. Stat., ch 38, ¶ 9 — 1(h) (1987). As I have stated on previous occasions, this language appears to place on the defendant the burden of proving that the death penalty is not appropriate in his particular case. See Gacy v. Illinois, 470 U. S. 1037, 1038 (1985); Jones v. Illinois, 464 U. S. 920, 920-921 (1983). Because I continue to believe that our precedents preclude the imposition of this burden on a capital defendant, I dissent.


text:
    No. 87-1013.
    No. 87-6326.
    No. 87-6391.
    No. 87-6485.
    No. 87-6515.
    No. 87-6541.
    Horne v. United States, Veale et al. v. Eggert, Hunziker et al. v. German-American State Bank, Boles v. Ellis et al., Conley v. Estate of Conley, Alston v. Marine Midland Bank, N. A.,
   485 U. S. 1020;

485 U. S. 978;

485 U. S. 1011;

485 U. S. 1001;

485 U. S. 1012; and

485 U. S. 1013. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    June 9, 1988
    No. A-896.
    Morison v. United States.
   Application for continued release from detention, presented to Justice Brennan, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun would grant the application.


text:
    No. A-906.
    No. A-907.
    Secretary of Commerce et al. v. Kokechik Fishermen’s Assn. et al.; and Federation of Japanese Salmon Fisheries Cooperative Assn. v. Kokechik Fishermen’s Assn. et al.
   Applications for stay of mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and for stay of preliminary injunction of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    June 13, 1988
    No. 87-1080.
    Maryland National Bank v. Maryland State Department of Assessments and Taxation.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Md. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 87-1710.
    Branson v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 87-1734.
    John R. P. v. Debra L. B.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 87-1728.
    Germantown Savings Bank et al. v. City of Philadelphia.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Pa. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 86-2035.
    Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Aldridge et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Monessen Southwestern R. Co. v. Morgan, ante, p. 330.


text:
    No. 87-417.
    Willoughby v. Central Illinois Light Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., ante, p. 399.


text:
    No. 87-723.
    Dougherty v. Parsec, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., ante, p. 399.


text:
    No. 87-851.
    Clark et al. v. Momence Packing Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., ante, p. 399.


text:
    No. 87-859.
    Martin v. Carling National Breweries, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., ante, p. 399.


text:
    No. 87-964.
    DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef Inc., ante, p. 399.


text:
    No. 87-1099.
    Hanneken v. Dixon Distributing Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., ante, p. 399.


text:
    No. 87-1103.
    Gerhardt, as Guardian ad Litem for Krueger v. Estate of Moore.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Clark v. Jeter, ante, p. 456.


text:
    No. 87-1189.
    Mays v. Reynolds Metal Co.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., ante, p. 399.


text:
    No. 87-1263.
    Lastimosa v. Hughes Aircraft Co. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., ante, p. 399.


text:
    No. 87-5355.
    Stout v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Maynard v. Cartwright, ante, p. 356.


text:
    No. 87-5676.
    Hayes v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Maynard v. Cartwright, ante, p. 356.


text:
    No. 87-5824.
    Jones v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Mills v. Maryland, ante, p. 367.


text:
    No. 87-6267.
    Woratzeck v. Ricketts, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Maynard v. Cartwright, ante, p. 356.


text:
    No. 87-6276.
    Lankford v. Idaho.
   Sup. Ct. Idaho. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Satterwhite v. Texas, ante, p. 249.


text:
    No. 87-6410.
    Bennett v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Satterwhite v. Texas, ante, p. 249.


text:
    No. A-926 (87-796).
    Cities Service Gas Co. et al. v. Mobil Oil Corp. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Application for recall and stay of mandate, presented to Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending this Court’s action on the petition for writ of certiorari. If the petition for writ of certiorari is denied, this stay is to terminate automatically. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be granted, this stay is to continue in effect pending the sending down of the judgment of this Court.


text:
    No. A-946 (87-7185).
    Byrne v. Butler, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens would grant the application.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant the application for stay of execution and the petition for -writ of certiorari and would vacate the death sentence in this case.


text:
    No. A-950.
    Byrne v. Butler, Warden.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Justice Stevens would grant the application.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant the application for stay of execution in order to give the applicant time to file a petition for writ of certiorari and would grant the petition and vacate the death sentence in this case.


text:
    No. D-687.
    In re Disbarment of Nahoom.
    [For earlier order herein, see 485 U. S. 973.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-714.
    In re Disbarment of Watkins.
   It is ordered that Marshall Word Watkins, of Houston, Tex., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-715.
    In re Disbarment of Youts.
   It is ordered that Charles A. Youts, of Waco, Tex., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 106,
    Orig.
    Illinois v. Kentucky.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 480 U. S. 903.]
   Request of the secretary to the Special Master for approval of final accounting granted.


text:
    No. 109,
    Orig.
    Oklahoma et al. v. New Mexico.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 484 U. S. 1023.]
   Motion of the Special Master for an order authorizing interim compensation and reimbursement of expenses granted, and the Special Master is awarded $16,771.79.


text:
    No. 87-548.
    Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 485 U. S. 958.] Motions of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Airline Industrial Relations Conference, and Crossover Flight Attendants for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 87-746.
    Michael H. et al. v. Gerald D.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 485 U. S. 903.] Motion of appellee for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 87-1165.
    California et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 485 U. S. 1020.] Motion of petitioners to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 87-6219.
    Perez et ux. v. United States,
   484 U. S. 1057. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.


text:
    No. 87-6405.
    Tompkins v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. The order of May 16, 1988 [ante, p. 1004], granting the petition for writ of certiorari is amended to read as follows: Certiorari granted limited to Questions 1 and 2 presented by the petition.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 87-6471.
    LaRocca v. Boardman Township et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until July 5, 1988, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit a petition for writ of certiorari in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.

Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Black-mun,

dissenting.

For the reasons expressed in Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U. S. 928 (1983), we would deny the petition for writ of certiorari without reaching the merits of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.


text:
    No. 87-6855.
    In re Maker.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 87-6826.
    In re Faunce.
   Petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 87-1383.
    United States v. Halper.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 87-1716.
    Granfinanciera, S. A., et al. v. Nordberg, Creditor Trustee for the Estate of Chase & Sanborn Corp., fka, General Coffee Corp.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 87-7028.
    No. 87-1904.
    Mistretta v. United States; and United States v. Mistretta.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motions of John Mistretta for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari before judgment granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument.


text:
    No. 87-318.
    Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division, United Technologies Corp. v. Baldracchi.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-924.
    Henry J. Kaiser Co. et al. v. Paige et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1122.
    No. 87-1391.
    No. 87-1698.
    Crowley Maritime Corp. et al. v. Zipfel et al.; Halliburton Co. et al. v. Zipfel et al.; and Zipfel et al. v. Crowley Maritime Corp. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 832 F. 2d 1477.


text:
    No. 87-1364.
    Milian-Rodriguez v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1386.
    Dayton et al. v. Czechoslovak Socialist Republic et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1434.
    Scrape v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1494.
    Martinez-Fabela et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1521.
    Mahoney, Executor of the Estate of Cox v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari. denied.


text:
    No. 87-1564.
    New York State Department of Social Services v. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1567.
    Sun Pipe Line Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1632.
    No. 87-1686.
    Yonkers Board of Education v. United States et al.; and City of Yonkers et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 837 F. 2d 1181.


text:
    No. 87-1640.
    Texas v. Crosby.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1656.
    Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. C. F. Bean Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1690.
    Bechtel Power Corp. et al. v. United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of United States and Canada, Local 57, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1694.
    Rose v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1724.
    Cates, Individually and as Independent Executrix of the Estate of Cates v. International Telephone & Telegraph Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1727.
    Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Tew, Receiver for ESM Group, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1732.
    Ducheneaux v. Secretary of the Interior et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1736.
    Molins PLC v. Quigg, Assistant Secretary of Commerce.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1745.
    South Central United Food & Commercial Workers Unions and Employers Health & Welfare Trust et al. v. C & G Markets, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1746.
    Southland Corp. et al. v. Superior Court of the County of Alameda (Keating et al., Real Parties in Interest).
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1747.
    Benton v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1748.
    Newsday, Inc. v. Sise, Chief Administrative Judge, Office of Court Administration of the State of New York, et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1752.
    DeWeerth v. Baldinger et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1753.
    Smith v. Smith et al.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1763.
    Bozek v. Danning, Chapter 7 Trustee.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1775.
    American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania v. Atlantic Permanent Federal Savings & Loan Assn.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1777.
    Baranski et al. v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1779.
    Larson v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1788.
    Rose v. Fultz.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1793.
    Reading Co. v. CJI Industries, Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1805.
    Komjathy v. Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1827.
    LoDuca v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1844.
    Behar v. Southeast Bank Trust Co. et al.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1850.
    J. E. T. S., Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6322.
    Pendleton v. Turner et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6379.
    O’Byrne v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6389.
    Downs v. Texas.
   Ct. Crira. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6476.
    Harp v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir.. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6511.
    Parkhurst v. Shillinger et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6687.
    Wall v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6699.
    Ruffin v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6737.
    Doyle v. United States Parole and Probation Commission.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6756.
    Allen v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6768.
    Petty v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6785.
    Tomburello et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6809.
    Murr v. Nelson et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6815.
    Rodgers v. Markey et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6828.
    Horton v. Barton et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6834.
    Fields v. Steinbrenner et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6836.
    Pinkerman v. Seiter, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6838.
    Mena v. San Diego County Department of Social Services.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6840.
    Battle v. Calhoun County Sheriff’s Department.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6846.
    Cortez v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6851.
    Uzarevic v. McMackin, Superintendent, Marion Correctional Institution.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6856.
    Whitney v. Charlton Methodist Hospital.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6882.
    Oliver v. Henman.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6935.
    Montgomery v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6939.
    Holmes v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6952.
    Shannon v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-6954.
    Theron v. United States Marshal.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-652.
    Alberta Gas Chemicals Ltd. et al. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of petitioners to file reply brief under seal granted. Certiorari denied.'


text:
    No. 87-1047.
    Nationwide Corp. et al. v. Howing Co. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 87-1370.
    N. W. Enterprises, Inc. v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment of conviction.


text:
    No. 87-1513.
    Securities Industry Assn. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun and Justice O’Connor would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 87-1581.
    Kurtz v. Baker, Secretary of the Treasury, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 87-1617.
    Newman et al. v. Universal Pictures, a Division of Universal City Studios, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


author: Justice White,

text:
    No. 87-1702.
    Chattem, Inc. v. Bailey.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

dissenting.

The question here is — when an initial money judgment for a plaintiff is vacated, but later reinstated — what date should be used when calculating an award of postjudgment interest: the date of the first judgment for the plaintiff or the date of the later award?

In this diversity action, respondent sued petitioner claiming fraud and breach of contract. The jury reached a verdict for respondent, and awarded damages. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, finding that the instructions given to the jury had been inadequate. 684 F. 2d 386, 396-397 (CA6 1982). A second trial ensued, where the jury again ruled for respondent; the jury’s verdict was even greater this time than was the initial award. This second judgment was affirmed on appeal. 779 F. 2d 49 (1985).

Respondent then asked the District Court to amend its judgment order, so that the postjudgment interest the District Court had awarded respondent would run from the date of the original judgment in the case, and not the date of the judgment following retrial. Petitioner opposed this request, noting that the statute which provides for postjudgment interest in civil cases, 28 U. S. C. § 1961, stipulates that interest “shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment.” Since the initial judgment had been invalidated on appeal, only the date of entry of the second judgment could be the basis for calculating postjudgment interest under §1961, petitioner argued. The District Court ruled for petitioner on this issue, but the Court of Appeals reversed and held that postjudgment interest would be calculated from the date of the initial judgment. 838 F. 2d 149, 153 (CA6 1988).

In so doing, the Sixth Circuit noted that petitioner’s position had been accepted by the Second, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. Ibid. See, e. g., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 607 F. 2d 335, 336 (CA10 1979); Hysell v. Iowa Public Service Co., 559 F. 2d 468, 476-477 (CA8 1977); Powers v. New York Central R. Co., 251 F. 2d 813, 818 (CA2 1958). The Seventh Circuit likewise has adopted a similar reading of § 1961. See Harris v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 197 F. 2d 829, 836 (1952). These courts all conclude that the phrase “date of the entry of the judgment” in § 1961 must be read narrowly, and cannot refer to a judgment later vacated on appeal.

By contrast, the Sixth Circuit in this case — and the First, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits in other cases — have adopted a broader reading of §1961. See, e. g., 838 F. 2d, at 153-155; Poleto v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, 826 F. 2d 1270, 1280-1281 (CA3 1987); Affiliated Capital Corp. v. Houston, 793 F. 2d 706, 710 (CA5 1986); Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 702 F. 2d 752, 755 (CA9 1983); United States v. Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 450 F. 2d 875, 876-877 (CA1 1971). These courts all have concluded that the purposes of § 1961 are best effectuated by giving a prevailing plaintiff postjudgment interest from the date of the original judgment in his favor.

Because this case presents a conflict among the Circuits over the proper application of an oft-used federal statute (28 U. S. C. § 1961), I would grant the petition for certiorari.


text:
    No. 87-1725.
    Lynaugh, Director, Texas Department of Corrections v. Cordova.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1765.
    Mellas et al. v. Walsh.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1781.
    Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections v. Miller.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 87-1739.
    D & S Auto Parts, Inc. v. Schwartz et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 87-1780.
    Burt v. Justices of the Supreme Court of Idaho et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 87-6008.
    No. 87-6125.
    No. 87-6196.
    No. 87-6365.
    No. 87-6460.
    No. 87-6644.
    No. 87-6674.
    No. 87-6774.
    No. 87-6845.
    Fisher v. Oklahoma. Spruill v. North Carolina. Gardner v. North Carolina. Knox v. Texas. Rupe v. Washington. Booker v. Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. Holden v. North Carolina. Miller v. Texas. Lincecum v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla.;

Sup. Ct. N. C.;

Gen. Ct. Justice, Super. Ct. Div., Forsyth County, N. C.;

Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;

Sup. Ct. Wash.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. N. C.;

Ct. Crim. App. Tex.; and

Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 87-6008, 736 P. 2d 1003 and 739 P. 2d 523; No. 87-6125, 320 N. C. 688, 360 S. E. 2d 667; No. 87-6365, 744 S. W. 2d 53; No. 87-6460, 108 Wash. 2d 734, 743 P. 2d 210; No. 87-6644, 520 So. 2d 246; No. 87-6674, 321 N. C. 125, 362 S. E. 2d 513; No. 87-6774, 741 S. W. 2d 382; No. 87-6845, 736 S. W. 2d 673.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 87-1463.
    No. 87-6418.
    No. 87-6492.
    No. 87-6539.
    No. 87-6544.
    No. 87-6548.
    No. 87-6564.
    No. 87-6589.
    Brown v. Brown & Root U. S. A. Inc. et al., Paris v. State Division of Correction et al., Adams v. Department of the Navy, Whitaker v. Peterson et al., Whitaker v. Pascarella et al., Sen Gupta v. METCO, Inc., Sisco v. County of Los Angeles et al., Mingledolph v. McKean et al.,
   485 U. S. 1017;

485 U. S. 1011;

485 U. S. 1023;

485 U. S. 1018;

485 U. S. 1018;

485 U. S. 1023;

485 U. S. 1023; and

485 U. S. 1031. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 94,
    No. 87-176.
    Orig.
    South Carolina v. Baker, Secretary of the Treasury, White et al. v. Elrod, Sheriff of Cook County, et al.,
   485 U. S. 505; and

484 U. S. 924. Petitions for rehearing denied.

Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.


text:
    No. 86-1712.
    TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. United States Department of the Interior et al.,
   484 U. S. 871. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.

Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    June 16, 1988
    No. 87-1375.
    Reifenhauser GmbH & Co. Maschinenfabrik et al. v. FMC Corp.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari, dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    No. 87-786.
    Northern Natural Gas Co. et al. v. Mobil Oil Corp. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


author: Justice Kennedy, Circuit Justice.

text:
    LUCAS et al. v. TOWNSEND et al.
    No. A-898.
    Decided May 30, 1988
   Justice Kennedy, Circuit Justice.

This is an application to enjoin a bond referendum election scheduled for May 31, 1988, in Bibb County, Georgia. The applicants are five black citizens registered to vote in Bibb County. On May 27, 1988, a three-judge District Court for the Middle District of Georgia declined to issue an injunction, concluding that the applicants had failed to establish that holding the election now contemplated would violate §5 of the Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. The United States has submitted, and I have reviewed, a memorandum advising me that it supports the applicants’ request for immediate injunctive relief. I have also reviewed and considered a submission by the respondents in opposition.

I

On December 17, 1987, the Bibb County Board of Education resolved to place a bond referendum on the March 8, 1988, ballot, a primary election date popularly known as “Super Tuesday.” The bond issue was intended to help defray the cost of air conditioning certain local schools. The Board subsequently voted, on January 4, 1988, to rescind its prior resolution. It resolved to postpone the referendum until May 31, 1988, when it would be voted on with a second bond issue for the building of a new high school.

On March 7, 1988, counsel for the applicants requested the Board to rescind its vote calling for the May 31 referendum. In his letter to the Board, counsel argued that changing the date of the election from a primary day would adversely affect minority voter turnout. The letter also argued that the two bond issues had been combined in an effort to manipulate the minority vote, and noted that the call for the May 31 referendum had not yet been submitted for preclearance to the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice.

On March 30,1988, the state authorities applied to the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division for preclearance. On May 25, 1988, the Civil Rights Division responded that “the information sent is insufficient to enable us to determine that the proposed change does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,” and asked for additional information, including a “detailed explanation of the réason for choosing May 31, 1988, as the bond election date.”

The Civil Rights Division also requested that state authorities respond to allegations (i) that the Super Tuesday date had been abandoned because the turnout of black voters was expected to be high on that date, and (ii) that the two bond issues were consolidated to prevent black voters from voting separately on each of the proposed projects. Finally, the Division noted that the Attorney General has 60 days to consider a completed submission, and that the period would begin to run upon receipt by the Division of all necessary information.

The applicants sought an injunction prohibiting the Board from holding the election on the ground that the election had not been precleared by the Attorney General in accordance with §5. On May 27, 1988, the three-judge court denied the request for an injunction. The court stated that it was required to determine whether the actions proposed “ ‘have the potential for diluting the value of the Negro vote and are within the definitional terms of §5.’” Civ. Action No. 88-166-1 (MD Ga., May 27, 1988) (slip op., at 3), quoting Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526, 534 (1973). It also adverted to the Attorney General’s regulation providing that any discretionary setting of the date for a special election, which is defined to include a referendum, is subject to the preclearance requirement, 28 CFR §51.17 (1987), and acknowledged that the Attorney General had not precleared the referendum.

The court concluded that the applicants had failed to present evidence that the procedures to be utilized in the upcoming election differ from those in use at the time the Act' became law. Accordingly, it concluded that the referendum was not a “change” covered by § 5. While the court noted that the Attorney General’s regulation provides otherwise, it held that the regulation is not supported by the language of §5. Alternatively, the court concluded that the applicants had failed to show that holding the referendum on May 31, 1988, “has even the potential for diluting the minority vote.” Civ. Action No. 88-166-1, supra, slip op., at 4-5. Accordingly, the court declined to issue the injunction prayed for by the applicants. This application followed.

H-» P-»

The principles that control a Circuit Justice’s consideration of in-chambers applications for equitable relief are well settled. As a threshold consideration, it must be established that four Members of the Court will consider the issue sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari or to note probable jurisdiction. See White v. Florida, 458 U. S. 1301, 1302 (1982) (Powell, J., in chambers); Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U. S. 1306, 1308 (1980) (Brennan, J., in chambers). I must also be persuaded that there is a fair prospect that five Justices will conclude that the case was erroneously decided below. See, e. g., Graves v. Barnes, 405 U. S. 1201, 1203 (1972) (Powell, J., in chambers). Finally, an applicant must demonstrate that irreparable harm will likely result from the denial of equitable relief. In appropriate cases, a Circuit Justice will balance the equities to determine whether the injury asserted by the applicant outweighs the harm to other parties or to the public. See Rostker v. Goldberg, supra, at 1308; Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U. S. 1301, 1304 (1974) (Powell. J., in chambers).

The substantiality of the federal questions presented by the case cannot be doubted. Section 5 provides that certain jurisdictions, including the one in which this case arose, may not implement any election practices different from those in force on November 1, 1964, without first obtaining approval from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or, alternatively, from the Attorney General. Neither statutory requirement has been met in this case. The three-judge court concluded, however, that the discretionary setting of the date of a special election is not a “change” covered by the statute, notwithstanding the provision in 28 CFR §51.17 (1987) to the contrary. The conclusion is most problematic under our precedents, see, e. g., NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm’n, 470 U. S. 166, 178 (1985) (noting that it could not seriously be disputed that “a change in the date of an election, if effected by statute, requires approval by the Attorney General under § 5”), and I have concluded that four Members of the Court would likely vote to note probable jurisdiction and that there is a fair prospect that the Court would vote to reverse the judgment below.

I am further persuaded that irreparable harm likely would flow from a denial of injunctive relief. Permitting the election to go forward would place the burdens of inertia and litigation delay on those whom the statute was intended to protect, despite their obvious diligence in seeking an adjudication of their rights prior to the election. Even if the election is subsequently invalidated, the effect on both the applicants and respondents likely would be most disruptive. Further, although an injunction would doubtless place certain burdens on the respondents, such burdens can fairly be ascribed to the respondents’ own failure to seek preclearance sufficiently in advance of the date chosen for the election. On balance, I conclude that the equities favor the applicants. Today I have entered an order enjoining the election, pending the timely docketing of an appeal.


text:
    MORISON v. UNITED STATES
    No. A-896.
    Decided June 2, 1988
   Chief Justice Rehnquist, Circuit Justice.

Samuel Loring Morison was convicted in the District Court of two counts each of espionage, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 793(d), (e), and theft of Government property, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 641. His conviction was affirmed on appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 844 F. 2d 1057 (1988), and he now asks that he be allowed to remain free on bond pending the consideration of his yet-to-be-filed petition for writ of certiorari. The statutory standard for determining whether a convicted defendant is entitled to be released pending a certiorari petition is clearly set out in 18 U. S. C. § 3143(b) (1982 ed., Supp. IV), and the only real issue in this application is whether Morison’s appeal “raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal, an order for a new trial, or a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment.” I agree with the courts below, however, that regardless of whether Morison has raised a “substantial question” with respect to the propriety of his conviction under the Espionage Act, he has not done so with respect to his conviction for theft of Government property under §641. Because Morison has not shown that his appeal is “likely to result in reversal” with respect to all the counts for which imprisonment was imposed, see United States v. Bayko, 774 F. 2d 516, 522 (CA1 1985), his application is denied.


author: Justice Stevens, Circuit Justice.

text:
    DOE v. SMITH
    No. A-954.
    Decided June 15, 1988
   Justice Stevens, Circuit Justice.

Applicant has filed an application with me as Circuit Justice to enter an order enjoining Jane Smith from obtaining an abortion of their unborn child. For the reasons hereinafter stated, the application is denied.

Applicant initiated proceedings seeking this relief from the Elkhart, Indiana, Superior Court on May 31, 1988. After granting a temporary restraining order without notice, the Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing, made detailed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and filed a written opinion. The findings recite, in part:

“5) That the unrebutted testimony from both the parties is that the Plaintiff is the natural father of the unborn child of the mother.
“6) That the Plaintiff and the Defendant have never been married and do not contemplate marriage.
“7) That the child was conceived in April of 1988 during a liaison between the mother and the father, which commenced in February or March and terminated shortly after conception.
“8) That at the time conception occurred, the father was separated from his wife of six months, and upon leaving the Defendant he became reunited with his first wife.
“9) That the father has two children, one his biological issue, with his first wife.
“12) That the father has been sporadically employed at low-paying jobs for the last eighteen months.
“13) That the mother has testified she is physically, emotionally and economically unwilling to bear the child.
“14) That the parties mutually agree that there is no foreseeable possibility of their reuniting in any way.”

In his opinion, the trial judge stated, in part:

“While the Court has carefully weighed the testimony, it is apparent that although the Plaintiff has expressed a legitimate and apparently sincere interest in the unborn fetus, his interest would not be sufficient to outweigh the Constitutionally protected right of the Defendant to abort her child. It would appear from the Danforth decision that in order to require the mother to carry a child to term against her wishes, the father must demonstrate clear and compelling reasons justifying such actions. In this case, the father has failed to do so. Reviewing the undisputed facts presented in this Cause, the Court is unable to find that the interests of the Plaintiff outweigh the interest of the Defendant. It is significant that, among other facts, the evidence discloses the parties are not married, that there is no suggestion they will ever reunite, that the Plaintiff is able to father other children and, in fact, has other children, and that the Plaintiff has showed substantial instability in his marital and romantic life. Based upon the Plaintiff’s romantic patterns over the last eight months, it would be impossible for the Court to predict the stability of his family unit at the time of birth.
“In summary, even if the Danforth decision permits the Court to balance the interest of the father of the unborn child against those of the mother, in this particular case the balancing would be in the mother’s favor.”

On June 14, 1988, the Indiana Supreme Court accepted transfer of the case, based on its emergency nature, but denied a petition for a stay. In doing so it relied on “the presumption of the validity accorded all trial court judgments,” this Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 67-72 (1976), and its conclusion that there was not a sufficient likelihood that John Doe would prevail on the merits of his appeal to justify a stay.

In addition to the reasons set forth by the trial court and the Indiana Supreme Court, I would add that I have serious doubts concerning the availability of a federal remedy for this claim in view of the fact that Jane Smith’s decision to obtain an abortion can be carried out without any action on the part of the State of Indiana or any other state governmental subdivision. Applicant does not argue that he has an absolute right to veto Jane Smith’s decision, but rather contends that the respective interests of the parties should be balanced by a neutral tribunal before her decision is implemented. Since such balancing has already been done by the trial court, since the Indiana Supreme Court has indicated that there is a presumption of correctness to the decision of the trial court in a matter of this kind, and since there is some danger that a delay in implementing Jane Smith’s decision may increase the risk of physical or emotional harm to Smith, applicant’s claim provides a particularly weak basis for invoking the extraordinary judicial relief that is sought. Indeed, I have substantial doubt whether there has yet been a final decision by the highest court of the State of Indiana that would provide a basis for appellate jurisdiction in this Court.


author: Justice White Justice O’Connor, Justice Scalia,

text:
    NEW YORK STATE CLUB ASSOCIATION, INC. v. CITY OF NEW YORK et al.
    No. 86-1836.
    Argued February 23, 1988
    Decided June 20, 1988

      White, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, and an opinion of the Court with respect to Part IV, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Kennedy, J., joined, post, p. 18. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 20.

      Alan Mansfield argued the causé for appellant. With him on the briefs were Angelo T. Cometa and Louis J. Lefkoivitz.

      Peter L. Zimroth argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Leonard J. Koerner and Fay Leoussis.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Conference of Private Organizations by Thomas P. Ondeck; for the Club Managers Association of America by John M. Wood and David Ferber; and for the Francisca Club et al. by Michael H. Salinsky and Kevin M. Fong.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of New Yorketal. by Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, 0. Peter Sherwood, Solicitor General, and Suzanne M. Lyon and Elvia Rosales Amóla, Assistant Attorneys General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: John Van de Kamp of California, W. Cary Edwards of New Jersey, Donald J. Hanaivay of Wisconsin, J. Joseph Cur-ran, Jr., of Maryland, Neil F. Hartigan of Illinois, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Dave Frohnmayer of Oregon, James M. Shannon of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, and Charles Brown of West Virginia; for the city of Chicago by Judson H. Miner and Ruth M. Mos-covitch; for the city of Los Angeles et al. by Pamela A. Albers, and Vanessa Place; for the city and county of San Francisco by Louise H. Renne; for the Licensing Board of the city of Boston by Barbara A. H. Smith; for the American Bar Association by Robert MacCrate and Stark Ritchie; for the Anti-Defamation League of B’Nai B’rith et al. by Jill L.

        Kahn, Justin J. Finger, and Jeffrey P. Sinensky; for the Committees on Civil Rights and Sex and Law of the Association of the Bar of the city of New York by Robert M. Kaufman, Jonathan Lang, Arthur Leonard, Evelyn F. Cohn, and Kay C. Murray; for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by Sarah E. Bums, Judith I. Avner, and Beverly Gross; and for the U. S. Conference of Mayors et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon, Beate Bloch, and Nancy J. Bregstein.

      Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al. by Burt Neubome, John A. Powell, Steven R. Shapiro, Isabelle Katz Pinzler, Arthur N. Eisenberg, Paul L. Hoffman, and Judith Resnik; and for the Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights Under Law by Lloyd N. Cutler, James Robertson, Conrad K. Harper, Stuart J. Land, Norman Redlich, William L. Robinson, and Judith Winston.

   Justice White

delivered the opinion of the Court.

New York City has adopted a local law that forbids discrimination by certain private clubs. The New York Court of Appeals rejected a facial challenge to this law based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments. We sit in review of that judgment.

I

In 1965, New York City adopted a Human Rights Law that prohibits discrimination by any “place of public accommodation, resort or amusement.” This term is defined broadly in the Law to cover such various places as hotels, restaurants, retail stores, hospitals, laundries, theaters, parks, public conveyances, and public halls, in addition to numerous other places that are specifically listed. N. Y. C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9) (1986). Yet the Law also exempted from its coverage various public educational facilities and “any institution, club or place of accommodation which proves that it is in its nature distinctly private.” Ibid. The city adopted this Law soon after the Federal Government adopted civil rights legislation to bar discrimination in places of public accommodation, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S. C. §2000a(e).

In 1984, New York City amended its Human Rights Law. The basic purpose of the amendment is to prohibit discrimi- . nation, in certain private clubs that are determined to be sufficiently “public” in nature that they do not fit properly within the exemption for “any institution, club or place of accommodation which is in its nature distinctly private.” As the City Council stated at greater length:

“It is hereby found and declared that the city of New York has a compelling interest in providing its citizens an environment where all persons, regardless of race, creed, color, national origin or sex, have a fair and equal opportunity to participate in the business and professional life of the city, and may be unfettered in availing themselves of employment opportunities. Although city, state and federal laws have been enacted to eliminate discrimination in employment, women and minority group members have not attained equal opportunity in business and the professions. One barrier to the advancement of women and minorities in the business and professional life of the city is the discriminatory practices of certain membership organizations where business deals are often made and personal contacts valuable for business purposes, employment and professional advancement are formed. While such organizations may avowedly be organized for social, cultural, civic or educational purposes, and while many perform valuable services to the community, the commercial nature of some of the activities occurring therein and the prejudicial impact of these activities on business, professional and employment opportunities of minorities and women cannot be ignored. ” Local Law No. 63 of 1984, § 1, App. 14-15.

For these reasons, the City Council found that “the public interest in equal opportunity” outweighs “the interest in private association asserted by club members.” Ibid. It cautioned, however, that it did not purpose “to interfere in club activities or subject club operations to scrutiny beyond what is necessary in good faith to enforce the human rights law,” and the amendments were not intended as an attempt “to dictate the manner in which certain private clubs conduct their activities or select their members, except insofar as is necessary to ensure that clubs do not automatically exclude persons from consideration for membership or enjoyment of club accommodations and facilities and the advantages and privileges of membership, on account of invidious discrimination.” Ibid.

The specific change wrought by the amendment is to extend the antidiscrimination provisions of the Human Rights Law to any “institution, club or place of accommodation [that] has more than four hundred members, provides regular meal service and regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages directly or indirectly from or.on behalf of nonmembers for the furtherance of trade or business.” N. Y. C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9) (1986). Any such club “shall not be considered in its nature distinctly private.” Ibid. Nonetheless, the city also stated that any such club “shall be deemed to be in its nature distinctly private” if it is “a corporation incorporated under the benevolent orders law or described in the benevolent orders law but formed under any other law of this state, or a religious corporation incorporated under the education law or the religious corporations law.” Ibid. The City Council explained that it drafted the amendment in this way so as to meet the specific problem confronting women and minorities in the city’s business and professional world: “Because small clubs, benevolent orders and religious corporations have not been identified in testimony before the Council as places where business activity is prevalent, the Council has determined not to apply the requirements of this local law to such organizations.” Local Law No. 63, § 1, App. 15.

Immediately after the 1984 Law became effective, the New York State Club Association filed suit against the city and some of its officers in state court, seeking a declaration that the Law is invalid on various state grounds and is unconstitutional on its face under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and requesting that defendants be enjoined from enforcing it. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court upheld the Law against all challenges, including the federal constitutional challenges. The intermediate state appellate court affirmed this judgment on appeal; one judge dissented, however, concluding that the exemption for benevolent orders violates the Equal Protection Clause because it fails to accord equal protection to similarly situated persons. 118 App. Div. 2d 392, 505 N. Y. S. 2d 152 (1986).

The State Club Association appealed this decision to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed in a unanimous opinion. 69 N. Y. 2d 211, 505 N. E. 2d 915 (1987). The court rejected the First Amendment challenge to Local Law 63, relying heavily on the decisions in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609 (1984), and Board of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U. S. 537 (1987). It ruled that any infringement on associational rights is amply justified by the city’s compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women and minorities. In addition, the Law employs the least restrictive means to achieve its ends because it interferes with the policies and activities of private clubs only “to the extent necessary to ensure that they do not automatically exclude persons from membership or use of the facilities on account of invidious discrimination.” 69 N. Y. 2d, at 223, 505 N. E. 2d, at 921. The court denied relief on the equal protection claim without discussing it.

The State Club Association appealed to this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction, 484 U. S. 812 (1987), and we now affirm the judgment below, upholding Local Law 63 against appellant’s facial attack on its constitutionality.

r — 4 H-4

The initial question in this case is whether appellant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of Local Law 63 in this Court. We hold that it does.

Appellant is a nonprofit corporation, which essentially consists of a consortium of 125 other private clubs and associations in the State of New York, many of which are located in New York City. In Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S. 333, 343 (1977), we held that an association has standing to sue on behalf of its members “when (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” See also Automobile Workers v. Brock, 477 U. S. 274 (1986). Appellees focus on the first part of this test; they read the requirement that the association’s members “would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right” as meaning that appellant’s member associations must have standing to sue only on behalf of themselves, and not on behalf of anyone else, such as their own individual members.

This reading of Hunt is incorrect. Under Hunt, an association has standing to sue on behalf of its members when those members would have standing to bring the same suit. It does not matter what specific analysis is necessary to determine that the members could bring the same suit, for the purpose of the first part of the Hunt test is simply to weed out plaintiffs who try to bring cases, which could not otherwise be brought, by manufacturing allegations of standing that lack any real foundation. Here, however, the appellant consortium has standing to sue on behalf of its member associations as long as those associations would have standing to bring the same challenge to Local Law 63. In this regard, it is sufficient to note that appellant’s member associations would have standing to bring this same suit on behalf of their own individual members, since those individuals “are suffering immediate or threatened injury” to their associational rights as a result of the Law’s enactment. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 511 (1975); see App. 10, 32, 34-35, 38. Thus the case is properly before us.

► — I H-4

New York City’s Human Rights Law authorizes the city’s Human Rights Commission or any aggrieved individual to initiate a complaint against any “place of public accommodation, resort or amusement” that is alleged to have discriminated in violation of the Law. N. Y. C. Admin. Code §8-109(1) (1986). The Commission investigates the complaint and determines whether probable cause exists to find a violation. When probable cause is found, the Commission may settle the matter by conciliatory measures, if possible; if the matter is not settled, the Commission schedules a hearing in which the defending party may present evidence and answer the charges against it. After the hearing is concluded, the Commission states its findings of fact and either dismisses the complaint or issues a cease-and-desist order. § 8-109(2). Any person aggrieved by an order of the Commission is entitled to seek judicial review of the order, and the Commission may seek enforcement of its orders in judicial proceedings. §8-110.

None of these procedures has come into play in this case, however, for appellant brought this suit challenging the constitutionality of the 1984 Law on its face before any enforcement proceedings were initiated against any of its member associations. Although such facial challenges are sometimes permissible and often have been entertained, especially when speech protected by the First Amendment is at stake, to prevail on a facial attack the plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged law either “could never be applied in a valid manner” or that even though it may be validly applied to the plaintiff and others, it nevertheless is so broad that it “may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third parties.” City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 798 (1984). Properly understood, the latter kind of facial challenge is an exception to ordinary standing requirements, and is justified only by the recognition that free expression may be inhibited almost as easily by the potential or threatened use of power as by the actual exercise of that power. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97-98 (1940). Both exceptions, however, are narrow ones: the first kind of facial challenge will not succeed unless the court finds that “every application of the statute created an impermissible risk of suppression of ideas,” Taxpayers for Vincent, supra, at 798, n. 15, and the second kind of facial challenge will not succeed unless the statute is “substantially” overbroad, which requires the court to find “a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court.” 466 U. S., at 801.

We are unpersuaded that appellant is entitled to make either one of these two distinct facial challenges. Appellant conceded at oral argument, understandably we think, that the antidiscrimination provisions of the Human Rights Law certainly could be constitutionally applied at least to some of the large clubs, under this Court’s decisions in Rotary and Roberts. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12. The clubs that are covered under the Law contain at least 400 members. They thus are comparable in size to the local chapters of the Jaycees that we found not to be protected private associations in Roberts, and they are considerably larger than many of the local clubs that were found to be unprotected in Rotary, some which included as few as 20 members. See Roberts, 468 U. S., at 621; Rotary, 481 U. S., at 546. Cf. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1974). The clubs covered by Local Law 63 also provide “regular meal service” and receive regular payments “directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers for the furtherance of trade or business.” N. Y. C. Admin. Code §8-102(9) (1986). The city found these two characteristics to be significant in pinpointing organizations which are “commercial” in nature, “where business deals are often made and personal contacts valuable for business purposes, employment and professional advancement are formed.” Local Law 63, § 1, App. 15.

These characteristics are at least as significant in defining the nonprivate nature of these associations, because of the kind of role that strangers play in their ordinary existence, as is the regular participation of strangers at meetings, which we emphasized in Roberts and Rotary. See Roberts, supra, at 621; Rotary, supra, at 547. It may well be that a considerable amount of private or intimate association occurs in such a setting, as is also true in many restaurants and other places of public accommodation, but that fact alone does not afford the entity as a whole any constitutional immunity to practice discrimination when the government has barred it from doing so. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U. S. 69, 78 (1984). Although there may be clubs that would be entitled to constitutional protection despite the presence of these characteristics, surely it cannot be said that Local Law 63 is invalid on its face because it infringes the private associational rights of each and every club covered by it.

The same may be said about the contention that the Law infringes upon every club member’s right of expressive association. The ability and the opportunity to combine with others to advance one’s views is a powerful practical means of ensuring the perpetuation of the freedoms the First Amendment has guaranteed to individuals as against the government. “Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.” NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 460 (1958). This is not to say, however, that in every setting in which individuals exercise some discrimination in choosing associates, their selective process of inclusion and exclusion is protected by the Constitution. Hishon, supra, at 78; Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 470 (1973); Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, 93-94 (1945).

On its face, Local Law 63 does not affect “in any significant way” the ability of individuals to form associations that will advocate public or private viewpoints. Rotary, 481 U. S., at 548. It does not require the clubs “to abandon or alter” any activities that are protected by the First Amendment. Ibid. If a club seeks to exclude individuals who do not share the views that the club’s members wish to promote, the Law erects no obstacle to this end. Instead, the Law merely prevents an association from using race, sex, and the other specified characteristics as shorthand measures in place of what the city considers to be more legitimate criteria for determining membership. It is conceivable, of course, that an association might be able to show that it is organized for specific expressive purposes and that it will not be able to advocate its desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its membership to those who share the same sex, for example, or the same religion. In the case before us, however, it seems sensible enough to believe that many of the large clubs covered by the Law are not of this kind. We could hardly hold otherwise on the record before us, which contains no specific evidence on the characteristics of any club covered by the Law.

The facial attack based on the claim that Local Law 63 is invalid in all of its applications must therefore fail. Appellant insists, however, that there are some clubs within the reach of the Law that are “distinctively private” and that the Law is therefore overbroad and invalid on its face. But as we have indicated, this kind of facial challenge also falls short.

The overbreadth doctrine is “strong medicine” that is used “sparingly and only as a last resort.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 613 (1973). A law is constitutional unless it is “substantially overbroad.” Id., at 615. To succeed in its challenge, appellant must demonstrate from the text of Local Law 63 and from actual fact that a substantial number of instances exist in which the Law cannot be applied constitutionally. Yet appellant has not identified those clubs for whom the antidiscrimination provisions will impair their ability to associate together or to advocate public or private viewpoints. No record was made in this respect, we are not informed of the characteristics of any particular clubs, and hence we cannot conclude that the Law threatens to undermine the associational or expressive purposes of any club, let alone a substantial number of them. We therefore cannot conclude that the Law is substantially overbroad and must assume that “whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied.” Id., at 615-616.

Appellant claims, however, that the Law erects an “irre-buttable” presumption that the clubs covered under it are not private in nature, and contends that its member associations will not be permitted to raise the constitutionality of the Law in individual administrative and judicial proceedings. Cf. Rotary, supra, at 547-548, n. 6. Even if this were a correct interpretation of what the Law says — and the decisions below at least suggest the contrary view — it does not affect our analysis. Although the city’s Human Rights Commission may not be empowered to consider the constitutionality of the statute under which it operates, under accepted legal principles it would be quite unusual if the Commission “could not construe its own statutory mandate in the light of federal constitutional principles.” Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U. S. 619, 629 (1986). And even if this were also true, nothing in the Law purports to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims that may be raised on appeal from the administrative enforcement proceedings. N. Y. C. Admin. Code §8-110 (1986); Dayton Christian Schools, supra, at 629. These opportunities for individual associations to contest the constitutionality of the Law as it may be applied against them are adequate to assure that any overbreadth under the Law will be curable through case-by-case analysis of specific facts.

IV

Appellant also contends that the exemption m Local Law 63 for benevolent and religious corporations, which deems them to be “distinctly private” in nature, violates the Equal Protection Clause. Since, as just discussed, it has not been demonstrated that the Law affects “in any significant way” the fundamental interests of any clubs covered by the Law, heightened scrutiny does not apply. See Lyng v. Automobile Workers, 485 U. S. 360, 365, 366 (1988); Rotary, 481 U. S., at 548. On this state of the record, the equal protection challenge must fail unless the city could not reasonably believe that the exempted organizations are different in relevant respects from appellant’s members.

As written, the legislative classification on its face is not manifestly without reasoned support. The City Council explained that it limited the Law’s coverage to large clubs and excluded smaller clubs, benevolent orders, and religious corporations because the latter associations “have not been identified in testimony before the Council as places where business activity is prevalent.” Local Law No. 63, § 1, App. 15. This explanation echoes the logic of the decision in New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63 (1928), which upheld a New York law that exempted benevolent orders from having to file certain documents with the State that must be filed by most other corporations and associations. See N. Y. Civ. Rights Law § 53 (McKinney 1976). The Court rejected a claim that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause, finding on the evidence before it that the legislative distinction was justified because benevolent orders were judged not to pose the same dangers as other groups that were required to file the documents. Bryant, supra, at 73-77. In addition, New York State law indicates that benevolent orders and religious corporations are unique and thus that a rational basis exists for their exemption here. For well over a century, the State has extended special treatment in the law to these associations, and each continues to be treated in a separate body of legislation. See N. Y. Ben. Ord. Law §§ 1-14 (McKinney 1951 and Supp. 1988); N. Y. Relig. Corp. Law §§ 1-437 (McKinney 1952 and Supp. 1988). It is plausible that these associations differ in their practices and pin-poses from other private clubs that are now covered under Local Law 63. As the Appellate Division in this case pointed out, the benevolent orders are organized under the relevant law “ ‘solely for the benefit of [their] membership and their beneficiaries/ ” and thus are not “public” organizations. 118 App. Div. 2d, at 394, 505 N. Y. S. 2d, at 154, quoting N. Y. Ins. Law § 4501(a) (McKinney 1985). Similarly, religious organizations are “ ‘created for religious purposes’ ” and are “patently not engaged in commercial activity for the benefit of non-members.” 118 App. Div. 2d, at 394-395, 505 N. Y. S. 2d, at 154, quoting N. Y. Relig. Corp. Law §2 (McKinney 1952).

Appellant contends, however, that the benevolent and religious corporations exempted in the Law are in fact no different in nature from the other clubs and associations that are now made subject to the city’s antidiscrimination restrictions. Because the Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike,” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432, 439 (1985), appellant contends that the exemption violates the Clause.

In support of its argument, appellant observes that appel-lees offered no evidence to support the city’s position that benevolent and religious groups are actually different from other private associations. Legislative classifications, however, are presumed to be constitutional, and the burden of showing a statute to be unconstitutional is on the challenging party, not on the party defending the statute: “those challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker.” Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 111 (1979). In a case such as this, the plaintiff can carry this burden by submitting evidence to show that the asserted grounds for the legislative classification lack any reasonable support in fact, but this burden is nonetheless a considerable one. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 154 (1938).

The City Council’s explanation for exempting benevolent orders and religious corporations from Local Law 63’s coverage reflects a view that these associations are different in kind, at least in the crucial respect of whether business activity is prevalent among them, from the associations on whose behalf appellant has brought suit. Appellant has the burden of showing that this view is erroneous and that the issue is not truly debatable, a burden that appellant has failed to carry. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that a detailed examination of the practices, purposes, and structures of benevolent orders and religious corporations would show them to be identical in this and other critical respects to the private clubs that are covered under the city’s antidis-crimination provisions. Without any such showing, appellant’s facial attack on the Law under the Equal Protection Clause must founder.

We therefore affirm the judgment below.

So ordered.

Justice O’Connor,

with whom Justice Kennedy joins, concurring.

I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the facial challenge to Local Law 63 must fail. I write separately only to note that nothing in the Court’s opinion in any way undermines or denigrates the importance of any associational interests at stake.

The Court reaffirms the “power of States to pursue the profoundly important goal of ensuring nondiscriminatory access to commercial opportunities in our society.” Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 632 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). But our cases also recognize an “association’s First Amendment right to control its membership,” acknowledging, of course, that the strength of any such right varies with the nature of the organization. Id., at 635. Balancing these two important interests calls for sensitive tools. As it has been interpreted, Local Law 63 is such a device.

The Law identifies three factors to be used to determine whether a particular club is “distinctly private” for purposes of applying the city’s antidiscrimination laws. As the Court notes, however, ante, at 15, n. 6, the court below has suggested that the factors identified in Local Law 63 are not exclusive, but are to be considered along with other considerations such as “‘size, purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics.’” 69 N. Y. 2d 211, 222, 505 N. E. 2d 915, 920-921 (1987) (quoting Roberts, supra, at 620). See also United States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 59 N. Y. 2d 401, 412-413, 452 N. E. 2d 1199, 1204 (1983). An association or club thus is permitted to demonstrate that its particular characteristics qualify it for constitutional protection, despite the presence of the three factors specified in Local Law 63. University Club v. City of New York, 842 F. 2d 37, 41 (CA2 1988) (noting that the three factors in Local Law 63 are not “the only ones relevant to the constitutionality of applying the new definition to [a particular club]”). Moreover, such organizations are provided with an adequate opportunity to raise any constitutional claims in the administrative proceedings through which Local Law 63 is applied. See ibid. See also ante, at 15.

In a city as large and diverse as New York City, there surely will be organizations that fall within the potential reach of Local Law 63 and yet are deserving of constitutional protection. For example, in such a large city a club with over 400 members may still be relatively intimate in nature, so that a constitutional right to control membership takes precedence. Similarly, there may well be organizations whose expressive purposes would be substantially undermined if they were unable to confine their membership to those of the same sex, race, religion, or ethnic background, or who share some other such common bond. The associational rights of such organizations must be respected.

But as the Court points out, ante/ at 11-12, 13-14, and indeed, as appellant conceded, Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12, the existence of such protected clubs does not mean that Local Law 63 cannot be applied to other clubs. Predominately commercial organizations are not entitled to claim a First Amendment associational or expressive right to be free from the anti-discrimination provisions triggered by the law. Because Local Law 63 may be applied constitutionally to these organizations, I agree with the Court that it is not invalid on its face.

Justice Scalia,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I concur in the judgment of the Court, and join all except Part IV of its opinion. I note that Part III assumes for purposes of its analysis, but does not hold, the existence of a constitutional right of private association for other than expressive or religious purposes.

With respect to the equal protection issue discussed in Part IV of the opinion, I do not believe that the mere fact that benevolent orders “are unique,” ante, at 16, suffices to establish that a rational basis exists for their exemption. As forgiving as the rational-basis test is, it does not go that far. There must at least be some plausible connection between the respect in which they are unique and the purpose of the law.

It is true, as appellant urges, that under the New York State statute to which Local Law 63 technically refers, no characteristic must be possessed in order to qualify as a “benevolent order” except the characteristic of being listed by the legislature in §2. See N. Y. Ben. Ord. Law §2 (McKinney 1951 and Supp. 1988). In fact, however, all the organizations that have been listed — or at least all I am familiar with — share the characteristic of being what might be called lodges or fraternal organizations. They include, for example, the American Legion, the Jewish War Veterans of the United States, the Catholic War Veterans, the Disabled American Veterans, AMVETS, the. Veterans of Foreign Wars, various orders of Masons, the Independent Order of Odd Fellows, the Loyal Order of Moose, the Knights of Columbus, the Improved Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the World, the Nobles of the Mystic Shrine, the Ancient Order of Hibernians, and the Knights of Malta. When the City Council stated that it had heard no testimony that “benevolent orders” were “places where business activity is prevalent,” Local Law No. 63, § 1, App. 15, I think it meant by “benevolent orders” organizations of that sort. While the fit between lodge and fraternal type organizations and the present or future content of §2 of. the New York State law may not be perfect, we do not require that for ordinary equal protection analysis. See, e. g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 108 (1979). I am content that it was rational to refer to that law as a means of identifying a category composed almost entirely of such associations; and that it was rational to think that such organizations did not significantly contribute to the problem the City Council was addressing. A lodge is not likely to be a club where men dine with clients and conduct business. Appellant introduced no evidence to the contrary.

       The Human Rights Law (Local Law No. 97 of 1965) makes it “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement, because of the race, creed, color, national origin or sex of any person directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof, or, directly or indirectly, to publish, circulate, issue, display, post or mail any written or printed communication, notice or advertisement, to the effect that any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any such place shall be refused, withheld from or denied to any person on account of race, creed, color, national origin or sex or that the patronage or custom thereat of any person belonging to or purporting to be of any particular race, creed, color, national origin, or sex is unwelcome, objectionable or not acceptable, desired or solicited.” N. Y. C. Admin. Code § 8-107(2) (1986). The city has also extended the Law’s coverage to discrimination against “an otherwise qualified person who is physically or mentally handicapped,” § 8-108, and to discrimination against “individuals because of their actual or perceived sexual orientation,” §8-108.1.

       The state trial court found that appellant has standing to challenge the validity of the Law, and neither of the other state courts addressed this issue on appeal. Nonetheless, an independent determination of the question of standing is necessary in this Court, for the special limitations that Article III of the Constitution imposes on the jurisdiction of the federal courts are not binding on the state courts. See Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U. S. 1, 8 (1988). The States are thus left free as a matter of their own procedural law to determine whether their courts may issue advisory opinions or to determine matters that would not satisfy the more stringent requirement in the federal courts that an actual “case” or “controversy” be presented for resolution. U. S. Const., Art. Ill, §2. Accordingly, this Court has dismissed cases on appeal from state courts when it appeared that the complaining party lacked standing to contest the law’s validity in the federal courts. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 44 (1943) (per curiam); Braxton County Court v. West Virginia ex rel. Tax Comm’rs, 208 U. S. 192 (1908). And the statement that “[b]y exercising their jurisdiction, state courts cannot determine the jurisdiction to be exercised by this Court,” is perhaps all the more applicable to actions brought in state court for declaratory relief. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 506 (1961) (plurality opinion).

       Appellees’ argument to the contrary, based on a footnote in the Rotary opinion, is unavailing. The footnote states that Rotary International, “an association of thousands of local Rotary Clubs, can claim no constitutionally protected right of private association. ” Board of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U. S. 537, 545, n. 4 (1987). But there the larger association had brought suit in its own right against one of its member clubs, and was not suing on behalf of any of its members, so the passage is inappo-site to the situation here.

       In light of the foregoing analysis, it is not necessary to consider also whether appellant consortium would have standing to sue directly on behalf of its member associations because those associations themselves are suffering some immediate or threatened injury from the Law. In addition, though appellees do not contest either of the other two parts of the Hunt test, those requirements clearly are met in this case. Here the associational interests that the consortium seeks to protect are germane to its purpose: appellant’s certificate of incorporation states that its purpose is “to promote the common business interests of its [member clubs].” App. 38. Moreover, appellant’s facial challenge to the Law does not require the participation of individual members, since there is complete identity between the interests of the consortium and those of its member associations with respect to the issues raised in this suit, and the necessary proof could be presented “in a group context.” Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S. 333, 344 (1977). See also Automobile Workers v. Brock, 477 U. S. 274, 287-288 (1986).

       In making this case-by-case inquiry into the constitutionality of Local Law 63 as applied to particular associations, it is relevant to note that the Court has recognized the State’s “compelling interest” in combating invidious discrimination. See, e. g., Rotary, 481 U. S., at 549.

       In its opinion, the Court of Appeals suggested that the three criteria identified in Local Law 63 are not exclusive but are to be considered in conjunction with other relevant characteristics. 69 N. Y. 2d, at 222, 505 N. E. 2d, at 920-921, citing United States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 59 N. Y. 2d 401, 412-413, 452 N. E. 2d 1199, 1204 (1983).

       The Court of Appeals did not separately address the equal protection question other than by affirming the decision of the Appellate Division.

      The Court, ante, at 17, relies upon the Appellate Division’s statement that benevolent orders are organized “ ‘ “solely for the benefit of [their] membership and their beneficiaries.’”” If I thought this to be an interpretation of New York law, I would honor it. In fact, however, it seems plain to me that the Appellate Division was not interpreting one section but misciting another. The language is quoted (with appropriate citation) from a provision of New York law dealing not with benevolent orders but with “fraternal benefit societies.” N. Y. Ins. Law § 4501(a) (McKinney 1985). The two are quite different, although an organization can qualify as both. See §§4501, 4502. In any event, even if benevolent orders were required to possess the characteristic of being “solely for the benefit of [their] membership and of their beneficiaries,” that would not distinguish them from appellant’s organizations. All of the clubs covered by Local Law 63 seemingly meet that description, since it establishes an exception to the “distinctly private” exemption of the New York City Human Rights Law (Local Law No. 97 of 1965), N. Y. C. Admin. Code § 8-107(2) (1986).