source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Blackmun Justice Rehnquist,

license: Public Domain

text:
    GOLDEN STATE TRANSIT CORP. v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
    No. 84-1644.
    Argued December 4, 1985
    Decided April 1, 1986
    Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BREnnan, White, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, and O’Con-NOR, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 620.

      Zachary D. Fasman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Clifton S. Elgarten.

      John F. Haggerty argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

        Peter G. Nash, Dixie L. Atwater, and Stephen A. Bokat filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal.
      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the National League of Cities et al. by Rex E. Lee, Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr., Carter G. Phillips, Benna Ruth Solomon, and Joyce Holmes Benjamin; and for the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers by George Agnost, Roy D. Bates, Benjamin L. Brown, J. Lamar Shelley, John W. Witt, and Roger F. Cutler.

      Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the National Labor Relations Board by Acting Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Bruce N. Kuhlik, Norton J. Come, Linda Sher, and Robert C. Bell, Jr.; and for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by David Silberman and Laurence Gold.

   Justice Blackmun

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The city of Los Angeles, Cal., refused to renew Golden State Transit Corporation’s taxicab franchise after the company’s drivers went on strike. We are asked to decide whether, under Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 132 (1976), the city’s action is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq.

I

In 1980, Golden State, which operated taxicabs under the Yellow Cab name, applied to the city for a renewal of its operating franchise eventually scheduled to lapse on March 31, 1981. That franchise had first been acquired in 1977. On September 4, 1980, the city’s Board of Transportation Commissioners recommended the renewal of Golden State’s franchise — the largest, with approximately 400 cabs, of companies operating in Los Angeles — along with the franchises of 12 other taxi companies.

In October, while the franchise renewal application was pending, Golden State’s labor contract with its drivers expired. The company and the drivers, represented by Local 572 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, signed a short-term contract in order that operations would continue while negotiation and mediation proceeded. This interim contract was to expire at midnight February 10, 1981, the day before the City Council was scheduled to consider action on the franchise renewals.

On February 2, the Council’s Transportation and Traffic Committee endorsed franchise renewals recommended by the Board of Transportation Commissioners. The Committee’s report stated that Golden State and other companies were “in compliance with all terms and conditions of their franchise[s].” App. 39.

On February 11, the drivers struck Golden State, halting its operations. At the Council meeting that day, Teamster representatives argued against renewal of Golden State’s franchise because of the pendency of the labor dispute. The Council postponed decision on Golden State’s application until February 17, but, with possibly one exception, approved all other franchise renewal applications. At the February 17 meeting, when the union again opposed the renewal, the Council voted to extend Golden State’s franchise from March 31 to April 30, but only if the Council expressly found, on or before March 27, that the extension was in the best interests of the city.

At its March 23 meeting, the Council held a short public hearing on whether it should grant the limited extension. By this time, the labor dispute and the franchise renewal issue had become clearly intertwined. The Teamsters opposed any extension of the Yellow Cab franchise, stating that such action would simply lengthen the strike and keep the drivers out of work. It preferred to see the franchise terminated, and to have the drivers seek jobs from Golden State’s successor or from other franchise holders. As others spoke, the discussion turned to whether there was even a need for Yellow Cab, in light of the services performed by the other 12 franchised taxi companies. There were comments regarding an excess of cabs; the city’s policy at the time, however, was not to limit the number of taxi companies or the number of taxis in each fleet. Id., at 81-82.

The strike was central to the discussion. One Council member charged Golden State with negotiating unreasonably, id., at 71, while another accused the company of trying to “brea[k] the back of the union.” Id., at 66. The sympathies of the Council members who spoke lay with the union. But rather than defeat the renewal outright, the council reached a consensus for rejection of the extension with a possibility for reopening the issue if the parties settled their labor dispute before the franchise expired the following week. Four Council members endorsed this approach, and the Assistant City Attorney said that he clearly had informed the parties that this was the city’s position. Id., at 68. The Council President said: “I find that it will be very difficult to get this ordinance past (sic) to extend this franchise if the labor dispute is not settled by the end of this week. ” Id., at 75. He added: “I just think that this kind of information should be put out in the open, so everybody understands it.” Ibid. The Council, by a vote of 11 to 1, defeated the motion to extend the franchise and it expired by its terms on March 31.

II

Golden State filed this action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that the city’s action was pre-empted by the NLRA and violated the company’s rights to due process and equal protection. It sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. The District Court found that it was “undisputed that the sole basis for refusing to extend [Golden State’s] franchise was its labor dispute with its Teamster drivers,” 520 F. Supp. 191, 193 (1981); that the Council had “threaten[ed] to allow Yellow Cab’s franchise to terminate unless it entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Teamsters,” id., at 194; and that the Council had denied the company an essential weapon of economic strength — the ability to wait out a strike. On the basis of the pre-emption claim, the District Court granted Golden State’s motion for a preliminary injunction to preserve the franchise. Ibid. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found “ample evidence” in the record to support the District Court’s finding, but nevertheless vacated the injunction. 686 F. 2d 758, 759, 762 (1982). The court reasoned that Golden State had little chance of prevailing on its pre-emption claim or on the other grounds it asserted. This Court denied Golden State’s petition for certiorari. 459 U. S. 1105 (1983).

Following litigation on unrelated issues, and with the company having abandoned its equal protection claim, the District Court granted summary judgment for the city. App. to Pet. for Cert. 11a. Golden State had not moved for summary judgment in its favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the city’s action was not pre-empted. 754 F. 2d 830 (1985). The court felt that, when the activity regulated is only a peripheral or incidental concern of labor policy, traditional municipal regulation is not pre-empted. The court found nothing in the record to suggest that the city’s nonrenewal decision “was not concerned with transportation.” Id., at 833. Moreover, to avoid undue restriction of local regulation, “only actions seeking to directly alter the substantive outcome of a labor dispute should be preempted.” Here, the city had not attempted to dictate the terms of the agreement, but had “merely insisted upon resolution of the dispute as a condition to franchise renewal.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals also rejected Golden State’s due process claim. Id., at 833-834. Because of our concern about the propriety of the grant of summary judgment for the city in this factual and labor context, we granted cer-tiorari. 472 U. S. 1016 (1985).

hH hH 1 — i

A

Last Term, in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724 (1985), we again noted: “The Court has articulated two distinct NLRA pre-emption principles.” Id., at 748. See also Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U. S. 491, 498-499 (1983). The first, the so-called Garmon preemption, see San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959), prohibits States from regulating “activity that the NLRA protects, prohibits, or arguably protects or prohibits.” Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould Inc., ante, at 286. The Garmon rule is intended to preclude state interference with the National Labor Relations Board’s interpretation and active enforcement of the “integrated scheme of regulation” established by the NLRA. Ante, at 289. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S., at 748, and n. 26.

This case, however, concerns the second pre-emption principle, the so-called Machinists pre-emption. See Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 132 (1976). This precludes state and municipal regulation “concerning conduct that Congress intended to be unregulated.” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S., at 749. Although the labor-management relationship is structured by the NLRA, certain areas intentionally have been left “ ‘to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.’” Machinists, 427 U. S., at 140, quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U. S. 138, 144 (1971). The Court recognized in Machinists that “‘Congress has been rather specific when it has come to outlaw particular economic weapons,’” 427 U. S., at 143, quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S. 477, 498 (1960), and that Congress’ decision to prohibit certain forms of economic pressure while leaving others unregulated represents an intentional balance “ ‘between the uncontrolled power of management and labor to further their respective interests.’” Machinists, 427 U. S., at 146, quoting Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U. S. 252, 258-259 (1964). States are therefore prohibited from imposing additional restrictions on economic weapons of self-help, such as strikes or lockouts, see 427 U. S., at 147, unless such restrictions presumably were contemplated by Congress. “Whether self-help economic activities are employed by employer or union, the crucial inquiry regarding pre-emption is the same: whether ‘the exercise of plenary state authority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frustrate effective implementation of the Act’s processes.’” Id., at 147-148, quoting Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U. S. 369, 380 (1969).

B

There is no question that the Teamsters and Golden State employed permissible economic tactics. The drivers were entitled to strike — and to time the strike to coincide with the Council’s decision — in an attempt to apply pressure on Golden State. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S., at 491, 496. And Golden State was entirely justified in using its economic power to withstand the strike in an attempt to obtain bargaining concessions from the union. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U. S., at 493, 500 (employer has power to hire replacements during an economic strike); American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U. S. 300, 318 (1965) (at bargaining impasse employer may use lockout solely to bring economic pressure on union).

The parties’ resort to economic pressure was a legitimate part of their collective-bargaining process. Machinists, 427 U. S., at 144. But the bargaining process was thwarted when the city in effect imposed a positive durational limit on the exercise of economic self-help. The District Court found that the Council had conditioned the franchise on a settlement of the labor dispute by March 31. We agree with the Court of Appeals that this finding is amply supported by the record. The city’s insistence on a settlement is pre-empted if the city “‘[entered] into the substantive aspects of the bargaining process to an extent Congress has not countenanced.’” Machinists, 427 U. S., at 149, quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S., at 498.

That such a condition — by a city or the National Labor Relations Board — contravenes congressional intent is demonstrated by the language of the NLRA and its legislative history. The NLRA requires an employer and a union to bargain in good faith, but it does not require them to reach agreement. § 8(d), as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158(d) (duty to bargain in good faith “does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a.concession”); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 45 (1937) (“The theory of the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation . . . may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself does not attempt to compel”).

The Act leaves the bargaining process largely to the parties. See H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U. S. 99, 103 (1970). It does not purport to set any time limits on negotiations or economic struggle. Instead, the Act provides a framework for the negotiations; it “is concerned primarily with establishing an equitable process for determining terms and conditions of employment.” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S., at 753. See also § 1, as amended, of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 151 (Act achieves national policy “by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining”).

The legislative history, too, makes clear that the Act and the National Labor Relations Board were intended to facilitate bargaining between the parties. The Senate Report states: “Disputes about wages, hours of work, and other working conditions should continue to be resolved by the play of competitive forces .... This bill in no respect regulates or even provides for supervision of wages or hours, nor does it establish any form of compulsory arbitration.” S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1935). Senator Wagner, sponsor of the NLRA, said that the Board would not usurp the role of free collective action. See 79 Cong. Rec. 6184 (1935). See also id., at 7574 (Sen. Wagner affirming that the Act encourages “voluntary settlement of industrial disputes”).

Protecting the free use of economic weapons during the course of negotiations was the rationale for this Court’s findings of pre-emption in Machinists and in its predecessor, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U. S. 252 (1964). In some areas of labor relations that the NLRA left unregulated, we have concluded that Congress contemplated state regulation. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S., at 754-758; New York Tel. Co. v. New York Labor Dept., 440 U. S. 519, 540-544 (1979) (plurality opinion); id., at 547 and 549 (opinions concurring in result and concurring in judgment). Los Angeles, however, has pointed to no evidence of such congressional intent with respect to the conduct at issue in this case.

Instead, the city argues that it is somehow immune from labor pre-emption solely because of the nature of its conduct. The city contends it was not regulating labor, but simply exercising a traditional municipal function in issuing taxicab franchises. We recently rejected a similar argument to the effect that a State’s spending decisions are not subject to pre-emption. See Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould Inc., ante, at 287-288. Cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S., at 754-758. Similarly, in the transportation area, a State may not ensure uninterrupted service to the public by prohibiting a strike by the unionized employees of a privately owned local transit company. See Bus Employees v. Missouri, 374 U. S. 74 (1963); cf. Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U. S. 383, 391-392 (1951). Nor in this case may a city restrict a transportation employer’s ability to resist a strike. Although in each Bus Employees case the employees’ right to strike was protected by § 7, as amended, of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 157, “ ‘[r]esort to economic weapons should more peaceful measures not avail’ is the right of the employer as well as the employee,” and “the State may not prohibit the use of such weapons . . . any more than in the case of employees.” Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S., at 147, quoting American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U. S., at 317. “[Fjederal law intended to leave the employer and the union free to use their economic weapons against one another.” Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U. S., at 500. We hold, therefore, that the city was preempted from conditioning Golden State’s franchise renewal on the settlement of the labor dispute.

The city, however, contends that it was in a no-win situation: having not renewed the franchise and thus permitting it to lapse, it stands accused of favoring the union; had it granted the renewal, it would have been accused of favoring the employer. But the question is not whether the city’s action favors one side or the other. Our holding does not require a city to renew or to refuse to renew any particular franchise. We hold only that a city cannot condition a franchise renewal in a way that intrudes into the collective-bargaining process.

C

“Free collective bargaining is the cornerstone of the structure of labor-management relations carefully designed by Congress when it enacted the NLRA.” New York Tel. Co. v. New York Labor Dept., 440 U. S., at 551 (Powell, J., dissenting). Even though agreement is sometimes impossible, government may not step in and become a party to the negotiations. See H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U. S., at 103-104. A local government, as well as the National Labor Relations Board, lacks the authority to “‘introduce some standard of properly “balanced” bargaining power’... or to define ‘what economic sanctions might be permitted negotiating parties in an “ideal” or “balanced” state of collective bargaining.’” Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U. S., at 149-150, quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S. 477, 497-500 (1960). The settlement condition imposed by the Los Angeles City Council, as we read the summary-judgment record before us, destroyed the balance of power designed by Congress, and frustrated Congress’ decision to leave open the use of economic weapons.

In this case, the District Court and the Court of Appeals found that the city had conditioned the renewal of Golden State’s franchise on the company’s reaching a labor agreement with the Teamsters, but held that the city’s action was not pre-empted by Machinists. This was error as a matter of law. Whether summary judgment should have been entered for Golden State is a matter we do not decide, for petitioner made no motion for summary judgment on the issue of pre-emption.

The Court of Appeals’ judgment affirming the summary judgment entered for the city is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Rehnquist,

dissenting.

The city of Los Angeles refused to renew Golden State’s taxicab franchise unless it settled a labor dispute with its drivers. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that “[njothing in the record indicates that the City’s refusal to renew or extend Golden State’s franchise until an agreement was reached and operations resumed was not concerned with transportation.” 754 F. 2d 830, 833 (1985). Nonetheless, the Court today holds that “a city cannot condition a franchise renewal in a way that intrudes into the collective-bargaining process.” Ante, at 619. The extraordinary breadth of the Court’s holding is best illustrated by comparing it to this Court’s initial cases involving federal labor preemption.

In Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U. S. 767 (1947), this Court addressed the permissible scope of state regulation of labor disputes by examining New York’s so-called Little Wagner Act, under which foremen were permitted to unionize. The status of foremen under the federal Act had been a matter of dispute at the time that New York asserted its right to supervise the organization of a union of foremen at the Bethlehem Steel Company plant in that State. See id., at 770. The State argued that its labor relations machinery could operate at least until similar benefits for foremen were sought by the union under the federal Act. See id., at 771. This Court held that the federal law pre-empted the state law on this point; both dealt with exactly the same subject matter and whether or not they were the same or different with respect to the permissibility of organizing foremen made no difference. Id., at 775. If they were the same, the procedures were duplicative. Id., at 776. If they were different, they were potentially antagonistic. Ibid.

Six years later, in Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U. S. 485 (1953), the Court was presented with a claim of pre-emption under the Taft-Hartley Act, which imposed regulations and duties on labor correlative to the those imposed on management by the Wagner Act. The case involved unionized drivers who had engaged in conduct clearly prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act, which might have made them subject to a cease-and-desist order by the National Labor Relations Board. See id., at 486-487. But instead of resorting to the federal agency, the employer successfully sought an injunction against the prohibited picketing from a Pennsylvania state court. See id., at 487. This Court held that state duplication of remedies provided by the National Labor Relations Act was pre-empted even though the state remedy was provided by a court rather than a state labor agency. See id., at 487, 499-501.

The opinions in both Bethlehem Steel and Garner observed that Congress had furnished no guidance to the Court as to whether or not state regulation should be pre-empted:

“Congress has not seen fit to lay down even the most general of guides to construction of the Act, as it sometimes does, by saying that its regulation either shall or shall not exclude state action.” Bethlehem Steel, supra, at 771.
“The national Labor Management Relations Act, as we have before pointed out, leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much.” Garner, supra, at 488 (footnote omitted).

The Court stated in both that it was forced simply to divine the will of Congress by implication:

“[The] exclusion of state action may be implied from the nature of the legislation and the subject matter although express declaration of such result is wanting.” Bethlehem Steel, supra, at 772.
“We must spell out from conflicting indications of congressional will the area in which state action is still permissible.” Garner, supra, at 488.

From the acorns of these two very sensible decisions has grown the mighty oak of this Court’s labor pre-emption doctrine, which sweeps ever outward though still totally uninformed by any express directive from Congress. The National Labor Relations Board, organized management, and organized labor have vied with each other in urging the Court to sweep into the maw of labor relations law concerns that would have been regarded as totally peripheral to that body of law by the Congresses which enacted the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act.

Today we are told that a city, not seeking to place its weight on one side or the other of the scales of economic warfare, may not condition the renewal of a taxicab franchise on the settlement of a labor dispute. The settlement of that dispute would have enabled the company to put its taxis back on the streets where the franchise presumably contemplated they would be. The Court says that since the Labor Board may not structure an ideal balance of collective-bargaining weapons, the city may not consider the existence of a labor dispute in deciding whether to renew a franchise. See ante, at 619-620. We are further told that because a State may not legislate to provide uninterrupted service to the public by prohibiting a strike of public utility employees, a city may not act upon its views of sound transportation policy to refuse to renew a taxi franchise unless the franchisee settles a labor dispute and returns its cabs to the purpose for which the franchise exists. See ante, at 617-618. Such sweeping generalizations commend themselves neither to common sense nor to whatever hypothetical “intent of Congress” as can be discerned in an area so remote from the core concerns of labor-management relations addressed by federal labor law.

Federal pre-emption of state law is a matter of congressional intent, presumed or expressed. Because Congress cannot foresee the various ways in which state laws might rub up against the operation of federal statutes, the Court in a multitude of cases has held state regulation pre-empted even when Congress has not expressed any intent to preempt because of the danger that the existence of federal and state regulations side by side will interfere with the achievement of the objectives of the federal legislation. The entire body of this Court’s labor law pre-emption doctrine has been built on a series of implications as to congressional intent in the face of congressional silence, so that we now have an elaborate pre-emption doctrine traceable not to any expression of Congress, but only to statements by this Court in its previous opinions of what Congress must have intended.

The Court today doffs its hat to the legislative history of the Wagner Act and comes up with the following three items:

“[1] The Senate Report states: ‘Disputes about wages, hours of work, and other working conditions should continue to be resolved by the play of competitive forces .... This bill in no respect regulates or even provides for supervision of wages or hours, nor does it establish any form of compulsory arbitration.’
“[2] Senator Wagner, sponsor of the NLRA, said that the Board would not usurp the role of free collective action.
“[3] Senator Wagner affirm[ed] that the Act encourages ‘voluntary settlement of industrial disputes.’” Ante, at 617 (citations omitted).

These three bits of legislative history furnish absolutely no support for the result the Court reaches today. The observations that the Wagner Act leaves it to the parties to resolve their disputes by the play of competitive forces, that the Labor Board would not usurp the role of free collective action, and that the Act encourages voluntary settlement of industrial disputes, simply do not speak to the question whether a city may condition the renewal of a taxicab franchise on the settlement of a labor dispute. I do not believe that Congress intended the labor law net to be cast this far, and I therefore dissent.

       Antitrust claims were asserted in a second amended complaint filed by Golden State. The District Court granted the city partial summary judgment as to these claims, 563 F. Supp. 169 (CD Cal. 1983), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 726 F. 2d 1430 (CA9 1984). We again denied certiorari. 471 U. S. 1003 (1985).

       One judge concurred in the majority’s due process analysis but otherwise concurred only in the judgment. As to pre-emption, he would have granted summary judgment for the city on the ground that Golden State had failed to provide evidence of the city’s motive or of the economic impact on Golden State. 754 F. 2d, at 834.

       The city contends that the case is moot because the franchise, if renewed, would have expired on March 31, 1985. But if petitioner’s franchise renewal had been granted in 1981, petitioner would have faced a renewal procedure in 1985 rather than the more onerous task of obtaining a franchise through competitive bidding. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 25-26. But for the nonrenewal in 1981, Golden State would be more likely to have an operating franchise now. At oral argument, counsel for Golden State said the company was ready to resume operations, even though it was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Id., at 5. It therefore cannot be said that “[ijnterven-ing events have . . . ‘irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.’” Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 101 (1983), quoting County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U. S. 625, 631 (1979). We conclude, therefore, that the case is not moot.

       We do not reach the question whether the city’s action in this ease is pre-empted under Gannon, because Golden State and its supporting amici, including the NLRB, rely exclusively on the Machinists doctrine, and we find their argument persuasive.

       Our pre-emption analysis is not affected by the fact that we are reviewing a city’s actions rather than those of a State. See Fisher v. Berkeley, ante, at 265. And the fact that the city acted through franchise procedures rather than a court order or a general law also is irrelevant to our analysis. “[J]udicial concern has necessarily focused on the nature of the activities which the States have sought to regulate, rather than on the method of regulation adopted.” San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 243 (1959). See Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould Inc., ante, p. 282.

       The District Court’s finding is supported by objective factors such as what the city — through the Council and the Assistant City Attorney-told the parties, and its schedule of Council meetings. At the meeting of March 23,1981, four Council members without contradiction pointedly conveyed the settlement condition to the parties as the Council’s “bottom line” on the issue. The condition also was announced to the parties by the Council’s agent, the Assistant City Attorney, revealing that the condition was city policy. Moreover, the condition was evident from the schedule on which the Council considered the question. Golden State’s franchise issue was deferred from February 11 to the 17th, from February 17 to March 23, and from March 23 to the 31st. Only Golden State, among the franchise applicants, was subjected to a conditional 1-month extension of its franchise. The only plausible reason for these repeated short extensions is that the city was giving the franchise holder additional time to comply with a particular requirement. Yet Golden State was in compliance with all the terms of the franchise except the Council’s desire for a settlement.

       There is no issue here that, rather than regulating the relationship between the employer and the union, the city’s action protected innocent third parties from the employer. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U. S. 491, 600 (1983) (third parties hired as strike replacements based on misrepresentations by the employer had state-law causes of action).

       The Court of Appeals, in holding that the city’s action was not preempted, reasoned that what the city did involved merely a peripheral concern of federal labor law. The idea that state action may be upheld under such circumstances is part of the Garmon analysis. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U. S., at 498-499. Because we hold that the city directly interfered with the bargaining process — a central concern of the NLRA — we need not reach the question whether this exception applies to a Machinists ease. But see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 754-758 (1985).


author: Justice Stevens Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    MICHIGAN v. JACKSON
    No. 84-1531.
    Argued December 9, 1985
    Decided April 1, 1986

    Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which BRENNAN, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined. BURGER, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 636. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Powell and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 637.

      Brian E. Thiede argued the cause for petitioner in both cases and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 84-1539. John D.

      O’Hair, Timothy A. Baughman, and A. George Best II filed a brief for petitioner in No. 84-1531.

      James Krogsrud, by appointment of the Court, 473 U. S. 903, argued the cause for respondent in No. 84-1531. With him on the brief was James R. Neuhard. Ronald J. Bretz, by appointment of the Court, 473 U. S. 903, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in No. 84-1539.

      Together with No. 84-1539, Michigan v. Bladel, also on certiorari to the same court.

   Justice Stevens

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), we held that an accused person in custody who has “expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Id., at 484-485. In Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 638 (1984), we reiterated that “Edwards established a bright-line rule to safeguard pre-existing rights,” id., at 646: “once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, any subsequent conversation must be initiated by him.” Id., at 641.

The question presented by these two cases is whether the same rule applies to a defendant who has been formally charged with a crime and who has requested appointment of counsel at his arraignment. In both cases, the Michigan Supreme Court held that postarraignment confessions were improperly obtained — and the Sixth Amendment violated— because the defendants had “requested counsel during their arraignments, but were not afforded an opportunity to consult with counsel before the police initiated further interrogations.” 421 Mich. 39, 67-68, 365 N. W. 2d 56, 69 (1984). We agree with that holding.

H-{

The relevant facts may be briefly stated. Respondent Bladel was convicted of the murder of three railroad employees at the Amtrak Station in Jackson, Michigan, on December 31, 1978. Bladel, a disgruntled former employee, was arrested on January 1, 1979, and, after being questioned on two occasions, was released on January 3. He was arrested again on March 22, 1979, and agreed to talk to the police that evening without counsel. On the following morning, Friday, March 23, 1979, Bladel was arraigned. He requested that counsel be appointed for him because he was indigent. The detective in charge of the Bladel investigation was present at the arraignment. A notice of appointment was promptly mailed to a law firm, but the law firm did not receive it until Tuesday, March 27. In the interim, on March 26, 1979, two police officers interviewed Bladel in the county jail and obtained a confession from him. Prior to that questioning, the officers properly advised Bladel of his Miranda rights. Although he had inquired about his representation several times since the arraignment, Bladel was not told that a law firm had been appointed to represent him.

The trial court overruled Bladel’s objection to the admissibility of all four statements. On appeal from his conviction and sentence, Bladel challenged only the postarraignment confession. The Michigan Court of Appeals first rejected that challenge and affirmed the conviction, 106 Mich. App. 397, 308 N. W. 2d 230 (1981), but, after reconsideration in the light of a recent decision by the State Supreme Court, it reversed and remanded for a new trial. 118 Mich. App. 498, 325 N. W. 2d 421 (1982). The Michigan Supreme Court then granted the prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal and considered the case with respondent Jackson’s appeal of his conviction. 421 Mich. 39, 365 N. W. 2d 56 (1984).

Respondent Jackson was convicted of second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. He was one of four participants in a wife’s plan to have her husband killed on July 12, 1979. Arrested on an unrelated charge on July 30, 1979, he made a series of six statements in response to police questioning prior to his arraignment at 4:30 p.m. on August 1. During the arraignment, Jackson requested that counsel be appointed for him. The police involved in his investigation were present at the arraignment. On the following morning, before he had an opportunity to consult with counsel, two police officers obtained another statement from Jackson to “confirm” that he was the person who had shot the victim. As was true of the six prearraignment statements, the questioning was preceded by advice of his Miranda rights and Jackson’s agreement to proceed without counsel being present.

The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the seventh statement was properly received in evidence. 114 Mich. App. 649, 319 N. W. 2d 613 (1982). It distinguished Edwards on the ground that Jackson’s request for an attorney had been made at his arraignment whereas Edwards’ request had been made during a custodial interrogation by the police. Accordingly, it affirmed Jackson’s conviction of murder, although it set aside the conspiracy conviction on unrelated grounds.

The Michigan Supreme Court held that the postarraignment statements in both cases should have been suppressed. Noting that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at the time of the arraignments, the court concluded that the Edwards rule “applies by analogy to those situations where an accused requests counsel before the arraigning magistrate. Once this request occurs, the police may not conduct further interrogations until counsel has been made available to the accused, unless the accused initiates further communications, exchanges, or conversations with the police. . . . The police cannot simply ignore a defendant’s unequivocal request for counsel.” 421 Mich., at 66-67, 365 N. W. 2d, at 68-69 (footnote omitted). We granted certiorari, 471 U. S. 1124 (1985), and we now affirm.

II

The question is not whether respondents had a right to counsel at their postarraignment, custodial interrogations. The existence of that right is clear. It has two sources. The Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination provides the right to counsel at custodial interrogations. Edwards, 451 U. S., at 482; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 470 (1966). The Sixth Amendment guarantee of the assistance of counsel also provides the right to counsel at postarraignment interrogations. The arraignment signals “the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings” and thus the attachment of the Sixth Amendment, United States v. Gouveia, 467 U. S. 180, 187, 188 (1984); thereafter, government efforts to elicit information from the accused, including interrogation, represent “critical stages” at which the Sixth Amendment applies. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. 159 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964). The question in these cases is whether respondents validly waived their right to counsel at the postarraignment custodial interrogations.

In Edwards, the request for counsel was made to the police during custodial interrogation, and the basis for the Court’s holding was the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The Court noted the relevance of various Sixth Amendment precedents, 451 U. S., at 484, n. 8, but found it unnecessary to rely on the possible applicability of the Sixth Amendment. Id., at 480, n. 7. In these cases, the request for counsel was made to a judge during arraignment, and the basis for the Michigan Supreme Court opinion was the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the assistance of counsel. The State argues that the Edwards rule should not apply to these circumstances because there are legal differences in the basis for the claims; because there are factual differences in the contexts of the claims; and because respondents signed valid waivers of their right to counsel at the postarraignment custodial interrogations. We consider these contentions in turn.

The State contends that differences in the legal principles underlying the Fifth and Sixth Amendments compel the conclusion that the Edwards rule should not apply to a Sixth Amendment claim. Edwards flows from the Fifth Amendment’s right to counsel at custodial interrogations, the State argues; its relevance to the Sixth Amendment’s provision of the assistance of counsel is far less clear, and thus the Edwards principle for assessing waivers is unnecessary and inappropriate.

In our opinion, however, the reasons for prohibiting the interrogation of an uncounseled prisoner who has asked for the help of a lawyer are even stronger after he has been formally charged with an offense than before. The State’s argument misapprehends the nature of the pretrial protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment. In United States v. Gouveia, we explained the significance of the formal accusation, and the corresponding attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel:

“[G]iven the plain language of the Amendment and its purpose of protecting the unaided layman at critical confrontations with his adversary, our conclusion that the right to counsel attaches at the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings ‘is far from a mere formalism.’ Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S., at 689. It is only at that time ‘that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecuto-rial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.’” 467 U. S., at 189.

As a result, the “Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused, at least after the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel as a ‘medium’ between him and the State.” Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S., at 176. Thus, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a postarraignment interrogation requires at least as much protection as the Fifth Amendment right to counsel at any custodial interrogation.

Indeed, after a formal accusation has been made — and a person who had previously been just a “suspect” has become an “accused” within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment— the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is of such importance that the police may no longer employ techniques for eliciting information from an uncounseled defendant that might have been entirely proper at an earlier stage of their investigation. Thus, the surreptitious employment of a cellmate, see United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980), or the electronic surveillance of conversations with third parties, see Maine v. Moulton, supra; Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), may violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel even though the same methods of investigation might have been permissible before arraignment or indictment. Far from undermining the Edwards rule, the difference between the legal basis for the rule applied in Edwards and the Sixth Amendment claim asserted in these cases actually provides additional support for the application of the rule in these circumstances.

The State also relies on the factual differences between a request for counsel during custodial interrogation and a request for counsel at an arraignment. The State maintains that respondents may not have actually intended their request for counsel to encompass representation during any further questioning by the police. This argument, however, must be considered against the backdrop of our standard for assessing waivers of constitutional rights. Almost a half century ago, in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938), a case involving an alleged waiver of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court explained that we should “indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.” Id., at 464. For that reason, it is the State that has the burden of establishing a valid waiver. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S., at 404. Doubts must be resolved in favor of protecting the constitutional claim. This settled approach to questions of waiver requires us to give a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation to a defendant’s request for counsel — we presume that the defendant requests the lawyer’s services at every critical stage of the prosecution. We thus reject the State’s suggestion that respondents’ requests for the appointment of counsel should be construed to apply only to representation in formal legal proceedings.

The State points to another factual difference: the police may not know of the defendant’s request for attorney at the arraignment. That claimed distinction is similarly unavailing. In the cases at bar, in which the officers in charge of the investigations of respondents were present at the arraignments, the argument is particularly unconvincing. More generally, however, Sixth Amendment principles require that we impute the State’s knowledge from one state actor to another. For the Sixth Amendment concerns the confrontation between the State and the individual. One set of state actors (the police) may not claim ignorance of defendants’ unequivocal request for counsel to another state actor (the court).

The State also argues that, because of these factual differences, the application of Edwards in a Sixth Amendment context will generate confusion. However, we have frequently emphasized that one of the characteristics of Edwards is its clear, “bright-line” quality. See, e. g., Smith v. Illinois, 469 U. S. 91, 98 (1984); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S., at 646; Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U. S. 1039, 1044 (1983) (plurality opinion); id., at 1054, n. 2 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). We do not agree that applying the rule when the accused requests counsel at an arraignment, rather than in the police station, somehow diminishes that clarity. To the extent that there may have been any doubts about interpreting a request for counsel at an arraignment, or about the police responsibility to know of and respond to such a request, our opinion today resolves them.

Finally, the State maintains that each of the respondents made a valid waiver of his Sixth Amendment rights by signing a postarraignment confession after again being advised of his constitutional rights. In Edwards, however, we rejected the notion that, after a suspect’s request for counsel, advice of rights and acquiescence in police-initiated questioning could establish a valid waiver. 451 U. S., at 484. We find no warrant for a different view under a Sixth Amendment analysis. Indeed, our rejection of the comparable argument in Edwards was based, in part, on our review of earlier Sixth Amendment cases. Just as written waivers are insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogations after the request for counsel in a Fifth Amendment analysis, so too they are insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogations after the request for counsel in a Sixth Amendment analysis.

r — H l-H

Edwards is grounded in the understanding that “the assertion of the right to counsel [is] a significant event,” 451 U. S., at 485, and that “additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel.” Id., at 484. We conclude that the assertion is no less significant, and the need for additional safeguards no less clear, when the request for counsel is made at an arraignment and when the basis for the claim is the Sixth Amendment. We thus hold that, if police initiate interrogation after a defendant’s assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.

Although the Edwards decision itself rested on the Fifth Amendment and concerned a request for counsel made during custodial interrogation, the Michigan Supreme Court correctly perceived that the reasoning of that case applies with even greater force to these cases. The judgments are accordingly affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Chief Justice Burger,

concurring in the judgment.

I concurred only in the judgment in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 487-488 (1981), and in doing so I observed:

“The extraordinary protections afforded a person in custody suspected of criminal conduct are not without a valid basis, but as with all ‘good’ things they can be carried too far.”

The urge for “bright-line” rules readily applicable to a host of varying situations would likely relieve this Court somewhat from more than a doubling of the Court’s work in recent decades, but this urge seems to be leading the Court to an absolutist, mechanical treatment of the subject. At times, it seems, the judicial mind is in conflict with what behavioral— and theological — specialists have long recognized as a natural human urge of people to confess wrongdoing. See, e. g., T. Reik, The Compulsion to Confess (1959).

We must, of course, protect persons in custody from coercion, but step by step we have carried this concept well beyond sound, common-sense boundaries. The Court’s treátment of this subject is an example of the infirmity of trying to perform the rulemaking function on a case-by-case basis, ignoring the reality that the criminal cases coming to this Court, far from typical, are the “hard” cases. This invokes the ancient axiom that hard cases can make bad law.

Stare decisis calls for my following the rule of Edwards in this context, but plainly the subject calls for reexamination. Increasingly, to borrow from Justice Cardozo, more and more “criminal[s]... go free because the constable has blundered.” People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 21, 150 N. E. 585, 587 (1926).

Justice Rehnquist,

with whom Justice Powell and Justice O’Connor join, dissenting.

The Court’s decision today rests on the following deceptively simple line of reasoning: Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), created a bright-line rule to protect a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights; Sixth Amendment rights are even more important than Fifth Amendment rights; therefore, we must also apply the Edwards rule to the Sixth Amendment. The Court prefers this neat syllogism to an effort to discuss or answer the only relevant question: Does the Edwards rule make sense in the context of the Sixth Amendment? I think it does not, and I therefore dissent from the Court’s unjustified extension of the Edwards rule to the Sixth Amendment.

My disagreement with the Court stems from our differing understandings of Edwards. In Edwards, this Court held that once a defendant has invoked his right under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, “a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.” 451 U. S., at 484. This “prophylactic rule,” see Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 638, 644, 645 (1984), was deemed necessary to prevent the police from effectively “overriding” a defendant’s assertion of his Miranda rights by “badgering” him into waiving those rights. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U. S. 1039, 1044 (1983) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.) (Edwards rule “designed to protect an accused in police custody from being badgered by police officers”). In short, as we explained in later cases, “Edwards did not confer a substantive constitutional right that had not existed before; it ‘created a protective umbrella serving to enhance a constitutional guarantee.’” Solem v. Stumes, supra, at 644, n. 4, quoting Michigan v. Payne, 412 U. S. 47, 54 (1973); see also Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U. S. 51, 61 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (describing “prophylactic purpose” of Edwards rule).

What the Court today either forgets or chooses to ignore is that the “constitutional guarantee” referred to in Solem v. Stumes is the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on compelled self-incrimination. This prohibition, of course, is also the constitutional underpinning for the set of prophylactic rules announced in Miranda itself. See Moran v. Burbine, ante, at 424-425; Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 304-305, 306, and n. 1 (1985). Edwards, like Miranda, imposes on the police a bright-line standard of conduct intended to help ensure that confessions obtained through custodial interrogation will not be “coerced” or “involuntary.” Seen in this proper light, Edwards provides nothing more than a second layer of protection, in addition to those rights conferred by Miranda, for a defendant who might otherwise be compelled by the police to incriminate himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

The dispositive question in the instant cases, and the question the Court should address in its opinion, is whether the same kind of prophylactic rule is needed to protect a defendant’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The answer to this question, it seems to me, is clearly “no.” The Court does not even suggest that the police commonly deny defendants their Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Nor, I suspect, would such a claim likely be borne out by empirical evidence. Thus, the justification for the prophylactic rules this Court created in Miranda and Edwards, namely, the perceived widespread problem that the police were violating, and would probably continue to violate, the Fifth Amendment rights of defendants during the course of custodial interrogations, see Miranda, supra, at 445-458, is conspicuously absent in the Sixth Amendment context. To put it simply, the prophylactic rule set forth in Edwards makes no sense at all except when linked to the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against compelled self-incrimination.

Not only does the Court today cut the Edwards rule loose from its analytical moorings, it does so in a manner that graphically reveals the illogic of the Court’s position. The Court phrases the question presented in these cases as whether the Edwards rule applies “to a defendant who has been formally charged with a crime and who has requested appointment of counsel at his arraignment.” Ante, at 626 (emphasis added). And the Court ultimately limits its holding to those situations where the police “initiate interrogation after a defendant’s assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel.” Ante, at 636 (emphasis added).

In other words, the Court most assuredly does not hold that the Edwards per se rule prohibiting all police-initiated interrogations applies from the moment the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, with or without a request for counsel by the defendant. Such a holding would represent, after all, a shockingly dramatic restructuring of the balance this Court has traditionally struck between the rights of the defendant and those of the larger society. Applying the Edwards rule to situations in which a defendant has not made an explicit request for counsel would also render completely nugatory the extensive discussion of “waiver” in such prior Sixth Amendment cases as Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 401-406 (1977). See also id., at 410 (Powell, J., concurring) (“The critical factual issue is whether there had been a voluntary waiver”); id., at 417 (Burger, C. J., dissenting) (“[I]t is very clear that Williams had made a valid waiver of his . . . Sixth Amendment right to counsel); id., at 430, n. 1 (White, J., joined by Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (“It does not matter whether the right not to make statements in the absence of counsel stems from Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), or Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). In either case the question is one of waiver”).

This leaves the Court, however, in an analytical straitjacket. The problem with the limitation the Court places on the Sixth Amendment version of the Edwards rule is that, unlike a defendant’s “right to counsel” under Miranda, which does not arise until affirmatively invoked by the defendant during custodial interrogation, a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not depend at all' on whether the defendant has requested counsel. See Brewer v. Williams, supra, at 404; Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 513 (1962). The Court acknowledges as much in footnote six of its opinion, where it stresses that “we do not, of course, suggest that the right to counsel turns on ... a request [for counsel].” Ante, at 633, n. 6.

The Court provides no satisfactory explanation for its decision to extend the Edwards rule to the Sixth Amendment, yet limit that rule to those defendants foresighted enough, or just plain lucky enough, to have made an explicit request for counsel which we have always understood to be completely unnecessary for Sixth Amendment purposes. The Court attempts to justify its emphasis on the otherwise legally insignificant request for counsel by stating that “we construe the defendant’s request for counsel as an extremely important fact in considering the validity of a subsequent waiver in response to police-initiated interrogation.” Ibid. This statement sounds reasonable, but it is flatly inconsistent with the remainder of the Court’s opinion, in which the Court holds that there can be no waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel after a request for counsel has been made. See ante, at 635-636, n. 10. It is obvious that, for the Court, the defendant’s request for counsel is not merely an “extremely important fact”; rather, it is the only fact that counts.

The truth is that there is no satisfactory explanation for the position the Court adopts in these cases. The glaring inconsistencies in the Court’s opinion arise precisely because the Court lacks a coherent, analytically sound basis for its decision. The prophylactic rule of Edwards, designed from its inception to protect a defendant’s right under the Fifth Amendment not to be compelled to incriminate himself, simply does not meaningfully apply to the Sixth Amendment. I would hold that Edwards has no application outside the context of the Fifth Amendment, and would therefore reverse the judgment of the court below.

       See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). The Miranda warnings were also given prior to the questioning on January 1, January 2, and March 22. Although Bladel made certain inculpatory statements on those occasions, he denied responsibility for the murder until after the arraignment. As the Michigan Supreme Court noted, even without his own statements, the evidence against Bladel was substantial. 421 Mich., at 44, and n. 2, 365 N. W. 2d, at 58-59, and n. 2.

       Respondent Jackson points out that the Michigan Supreme Court also held that his fourth, fifth, and sixth statements should have been suppressed on grounds of prearraignment delay under a state statute. He therefore argues that the decision rests on an adequate and independent state ground and that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed. The state-court opinion, however, does not apply that prearraignment-delay holding to the seventh statement. Thus, although the Michigan court’s holding on the other statements does mean that Jackson’s conviction must be reversed regardless of this Court’s decision, the admissibility of the seventh statement is controlled by that court’s Sixth Amendment analysis, and is properly before us.

       In Jackson, the State concedes that the arraignment represented the initiation of formal legal proceedings, and that the Sixth Amendment attached at that point. Brief for Petitioner in No. 84-1531, p. 10. In Bladel, however, the State disputes that contention, Brief for Petitioner in No. 84-1539, pp. 24-26. In view of the clear language in our decisions about the significance of arraignment, the State’s argument is untenable. See, e. g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 398 (1977) (“[A] person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him — ‘whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment’”) (emphasis added), quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion). See also United States v. Gouveia, 467 U. S., at 187-188 (quoting
        Kirby); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454, 469-470 (1981) (quoting Kirby); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U. S. 220, 226 (1977) (quoting Kirby). Cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 57 (1932) (“[T]he most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants” was “from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial”) (emphasis added). The question whether arraignment signals the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings, moreover, is distinct from the question whether the arraignment itself is a critical stage requiring the presence of counsel, absent a valid waiver. Cf. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52 (1961) (Alabama arraignment is a “critical stage”).

       The Michigan Supreme Court found that “defendants’ request to the arraigning magistrate for appointment of counsel implicated only their Sixth Amendment right to counsel,” 421 Mich., at 52, 365 N. W. 2d, at 62, because the request was not made during custodial interrogation. It was for that reason that the Michigan court did not rely on a Fifth Amendment Edwards analysis. We express no comment on the validity of the Michigan court’s Fifth Amendment analysis.

       Similarly, after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings, the Sixth Amendment provides a right to counsel at a “critical stage” even when there is no interrogation and no Fifth Amendment applicability. See United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967) (Sixth Amendment provides right to counsel at postindictment lineup even though Fifth Amendment is not implicated).

       In construing respondents’ request for counsel, we do not, of course, suggest that the right to counsel turns on such a request. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S., at 404 (“[T]he right to counsel does not depend upon a request by the defendant”); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 513 (1962) (“[I]t is settled that where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished counsel does not depend on a request”). Rather, we construe the defendant’s request for counsel as an extremely important fact in considering the validity of a subsequent waiver in response to police-initiated interrogation.

       We also agree with the comments of the Michigan Supreme Court about the nature of an accused’s request for counsel:
      “Although judges and lawyers may understand and appreciate the subtle distinctions between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, the average person does not. When an accused requests an attorney, either before a police officer or a magistrate, he does not know which constitutional right he is invoking; he therefore should not be expected to articulate exactly why or for what purposes he is seeking counsel. It makes little sense to afford relief from further interrogation to a defendant who asks a police officer for an attorney, but permit further interrogation to a defendant who makes an identical request to a judge. The simple fact that defendant has requested an attorney indicates that he does not believe that he is sufficiently capable of dealing with his adversaries singlehandedly.” 421 Mich., at 63-64, 365 N. W. 2d, at 67.

       See, e. g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. 159, 170-171 (1985):
      “Once the right to counsel has attached and been asserted, the State must of course honor it. This means more than simply that the State cannot prevent the accused from obtaining the assistance of counsel. The Sixth Amendment also imposes on the State an affirmative obligation to respect and preserve the accused’s choice to seek this assistance” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

       After stating our holding that “when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights,” 451 U. S., at 484, we appended this footnote:
      “In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977), where, as in Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had accrued, the Court held that a valid waiver of counsel rights should not be inferred from the mere response by the accused to overt or more subtle forms of interrogation or other efforts to elicit incriminating information. In Massiah and Brewer, counsel had been engaged or appointed and the admissions in question were elicited in his absence. But in McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U. S. 356 (1965), we summarily reversed a decision that the police could elicit information after indictment even though counsel had not yet been appointed.” Id., at 484, n. 8.

       The State also argues that the Michigan Supreme Court’s finding of a valid Fifth Amendment waiver should require the finding of a valid Sixth Amendment waiver. The relationship between the validity of waivers for Fifth and Sixth Amendment purposes has been the subject of considerable attention in the courts, 421 Mich., at 55-62, 365 N. W. 2d, at 63-67 (discussing and collecting eases), and the commentaries, id., at 54, n. 15, 365 N. W. 2d, at 63, n. 15. In view of our holding that the Edwards rule applies to the Sixth Amendment and that the Sixth Amendment requires the suppression of the postarraignment statements, we need not decide either the validity of the Fifth Amendment waiver in this case, see n. 4, supra, or the general relationship between Fifth and Sixth Amendment waivers.

       The four dissenters in Oregon v. Bradshaw apparently agreed with the plurality’s characterization of the Edwards rule. See 462 U. S., at 1055, n. 2 (MARSHALL, J., joined by BRENNAN, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (citing passage from plurality opinion quoted in the text, and noting that “[t]he only dispute between the plurality and the dissent in this case concerns the meaning of ‘initiation’ for purposes of Edwards’ per se rule”).

       The Court suggests, in dictum, that the Fifth Amendment also provides defendants with a “right to counsel.” See ante, at 629. But our cases make clear that the Fifth Amendment itself provides no such “right.” See Moran v. Burbine, ante, at 423, n. 1; Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S., at 304-305. Instead, Miranda confers upon a defendant a “right to counsel,” but only when such counsel is requested during custodial interrogations. Even under Miranda, the “right to counsel” exists solely as a means of protecting the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to incriminate himself.

       In Miranda, this Court reviewed numerous instances in which police brutality had been used to coerce a defendant into confessing his guilt. The Court then stated:
      “The use of physical brutality and violence is not, unfortunately, relegated to the past or to any part of the country. . . .
      “The examples given above are undoubtedly the exception now, but they are sufficiently widespread to be the object of concern. Unless a proper limitation upon custodial interrogation is achieved . . . there can be no assurance that practices of this nature will be eradicated in the foreseeable future.” 384 U. S., at 446-447.

       See also Moran v. Burbine, ante, at 428 (“It is clear, of course, that, absent a valid waiver, the defendant has the right to the presence of an attorney during any interrogation occurring after the first formal charging proceeding, the point at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel initially attaches”).
      Several of our Sixth Amendment eases have indeed erected virtually per se barriers against certain kinds of police conduct. See, e. g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. 159 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980); Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964). These cases, however, all share one fundamental characteristic that separates them from the instant cases; in each case, the nature of the police conduct was such that it would have been impossible to find a valid waiver of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Maine v. Moulton, supra, at 176-177 (undisclosed electronic surveillance of conversations with a third party); United States v. Henry, supra, at 265, 273 (use of undisclosed police informant); Massiah v. United States, supra, at 202 (undisclosed electronic surveillance). Here, on the other hand, the conduct of the police was totally open and aboveboard, and could not be said to prevent the defendant from executing a valid Sixth Amendment waiver under the standards set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938).


author: Justice White Justice Brennan,

text:
    AT&T TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA et al.
    No. 84-1913.
    Argued January 22, 1986
    Decided April 7, 1986

      White, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. BRENNAN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 652.

      Rex E. Lee argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were David W. Carpenter, Gerald D. Skoning, Charles C. Jackson, Howard J. Trienens, Alfred A. Green, and Joseph Ramirez.

      Laurence Gold argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Irving M. Friedman, Stanley Eisenstein, Harold A. Katz, David Silberman, and James Coppess.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by John S. Irving, Carl L. Taylor, and Stephen A. Bokat; and for the National Association of Manufacturers by Jan S. Admundson and Gary D. Lipkin.

        David E. Feller filed a brief for the National Academy of Arbitrators as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

   Justice White

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue presented in this case is whether a court asked to order arbitration of a grievance filed under a collective-bargaining agreement must first determine that the parties intended to arbitrate the dispute, or whether that determination is properly left to the arbitrator.

HH

AT&T Technologies, Inc. (AT&T or the Company), and the Communications Workers of America (the Union) are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement which covers telephone equipment installation workers. Article 8 of this agreement establishes that “differences arising with respect to the interpretation of this contract or the performance of any obligation hereunder” must be referred to a mutually agreeable arbitrator upon the written demand of either party. This Article expressly does not cover disputes “excluded from arbitration by other provisions of this contract.” Article 9 provides that, “subject to the limitations contained in the provisions of this contract, but otherwise not subject to the provisions of the arbitration clause,” AT&T is free to exercise certain management functions, including the hiring and placement of employees and the termination of employment. “When lack of work necessitates Layoff,” Article 20 prescribes the order in which employees are to be laid off.

On September 17, 1981, the Union filed a grievance challenging AT&T’s decision to lay off 79 installers from its Chicago base location. The Union claimed that, because there was no lack of work at the Chicago location, the planned layoffs would violate Article 20 of the agreement. Eight days later, however, AT&T laid off all 79 workers, and soon thereafter, the Company transferred approximately the same number of installers from base locations in Indiana and Wisconsin to the Chicago base. AT&T refused to submit the grievance to arbitration on the ground that under Article 9 the Company’s decision to lay off workers when it determines that a lack of work exists in a facility is not arbitrable.

The Union then sought to compel arbitration by filing suit in federal court pursuant to § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 185(a). Communications Workers of America v. Western Electric Co., No. 82 C 772 (ND Ill., Nov. 18, 1983). Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court reviewed the provisions of Articles 8, 9, and 20, and set forth the parties’ arguments as follows:

“Plaintiffs interpret Article 20 to require that there be an actual lack of work prior to employee layoffs and argue that there was no such lack of work in this case. Under plaintiffs’ interpretation, Article 20 would allow the union to take to arbitration the threshold issue of whether the layoffs were justified by a lack of work. Defendant interprets Article 20 as merely providing a sequence for any layoffs which management, in its exclusive judgment, determines are necessary. Under defendant’s interpretation, Article 20 would not allow for an arbitrator to decide whether the layoffs were warranted by a lack of work but only whether the company followed the proper order in laying off the employees.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 10A.

Finding that “the union’s interpretation of Article 20 was at least ‘arguable,’” the court held that it was “for the arbitrator, not the court to decide whether the union’s interpretation has merit,” and accordingly, ordered the Company to arbitrate. Id., at 11A.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Communications Workers of America v. Western Electric Co., 751 F. 2d 203 (1984). The Court of Appeals understood the District Court to have ordered arbitration of the threshold issue of arbitrability. Id., at 205, n. 4. The court acknowledged the “general rule” that the issue of arbitrability is for the courts to decide unless the parties stipulate otherwise, but noted that this Court’s decisions in Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574 (1960), and Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564 (1960), caution courts to avoid becoming entangled in the merits of a labor dispute under the guise of deciding arbitrability. From this observation, the court announced an “exception” to the general rule, under which “a court should compel arbitration of the arbitrability issue where the collective bargaining agreement contains a standard arbitration clause, the parties have not clearly excluded the arbitrability issue from arbitration, and deciding the issue would entangle the court in interpretation of substantive provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and thereby involve consideration of the merits of the dispute.” 751 F. 2d, at 206.

All of these factors were present in this case. Article 8 was a “standard arbitration clause,” and there was “no clear, unambiguous exclusion from arbitration of terminations predicated by a lack of work determination.” Id., at 206-207. Moreover, although there were “colorable arguments” on both sides of the exclusion issue, if the court were to decide this question it would have to interpret not only Article 8, but Articles 9 and 20 as well, both of which are “substantive provisions of the Agreement.” The court thus “decline[d] the invitation to decide arbitrability,” and ordered AT&T “to arbitrate the arbitrability issue.” Id., at 207.

The court admitted that its exception was “difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s discussion of a court’s duty to decide arbitrability in [John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U. S. 543 (1964)].” The court asserted, however, that the discussion was “dicta,” and that this Court had reopened the issue in Nolde Brothers, Inc. v. Bakery Workers, 430 U. S. 243, 255, n. 8 (1977). 751 F. 2d, at 206.

We granted certiorari, 474 U. S. 814 (1985), and now vacate the Seventh Circuit’s decision and remand for a determination of whether the Company is required to arbitrate the Union’s grievance.

II

The principles necessary to decide this case are not new. They were set out by this Court over 25 years ago in a series of cases known as the Steelworkers Trilogy: Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., supra; Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra; and Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593 (1960). These precepts have served the industrial relations community well, and have led to continued reliance on arbitration, rather than strikes or lockouts, as the preferred method of resolving disputes arising during the term of a collective-bargaining agreement. We see no reason either to question their continuing validity, or to eviscerate their meaning by creating an exception to their general applicability.

The first principle gleaned from the Trilogy is that “arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” Warrior & Gulf, supra, at 582; American Mfg. Co., supra, at 570-571 (Brennan, J., concurring). This axiom recognizes the fact that arbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes only because the parties have agreed in advance to submit such grievances to arbitration. Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, 414 U. S. 368, 374 (1974).

The second rule, which follows inexorably from the first, is that the question of arbitrability — whether a collective-bargaining agreement creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate the particular grievance — is undeniably an issue for judicial determination. Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator. Warrior & Gulf, supra, at 582-583. See Operating Engineers v. Flair Builders, Inc., 406 U. S. 487, 491 (1972); Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U. S. 238, 241 (1962), overruled in part on other grounds, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235 (1970). Accord, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 626 (1985).

The Court expressly reaffirmed this principle in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U. S. 543 (1964). The “threshold question” there was whether the court or an arbitrator should decide if arbitration provisions in a collective-bargaining contract survived a corporate merger so as to bind the surviving corporation. Id., at 546. The Court answered that there was “no doubt” that this question was for the courts. “‘Under our decisions, whether or not the company was bound to arbitrate, as well as what issues it must arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by the Court on the basis of the contract entered into by the parties.’ . . . The duty to arbitrate being of contractual origin, a compulsory submission to arbitration cannot precede judicial determination that the collective bargaining agreement does in fact create such a duty.” Id., at 546-547 (citations omitted).

The third principle derived from our prior cases is that, in deciding whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular grievance to arbitration, a court is not to rule on the potential merits of the underlying claims. Whether “arguable” or not, indeed even if it appears to the court to be frivolous, the union’s claim that the employer has violated the collective-bargaining agreement is to be decided, not by the court asked to order arbitration, but as the parties have agreed, by the arbitrator. “The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the merits of the grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether there is particular language in the written instrument which will support the claim. The agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those which the court will deem meritorious.” American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S., at 568 (footnote omitted).

Finally, it has been established that where the contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that “[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.” Warrior & Gulf, 363 U. S., at 582-583. See also Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, supra, at 377-378. Such a presumption is particularly applicable where the clause is as broad as the one employed in this case, which provides for arbitration of “any differences arising with respect to the interpretation of this contract or the performance of any obligation hereunder . . . .” In such cases, “[i]n the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail.” Warrior & Gulf, supra, at 584-585.

This presumption of arbitrability for labor disputes recognizes the greater institutional competence of arbitrators in interpreting collective-bargaining agreements, “furthers the national labor policy of peaceful resolution of labor disputes and thus best accords with the parties’ presumed objectives in pursuing collective bargaining.” Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robbins, 466 U. S. 364, 371-372 (1984) (citation omitted). See Gateway Coal Co., supra, at 378-379. The willingness of parties to enter into agreements that provide for arbitration of specified disputes would be “drastically reduced,” however, if a labor arbitrator had the “power to determine his own jurisdiction . . . .” Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1509 (1959). Were this the applicable rule, an arbitrator would not be constrained to resolve only those disputes that the parties have agreed in advance to settle by arbitration, but, instead, would be empowered “to impose obligations outside the contract limited only by his understanding and conscience.” Ibid. This result undercuts the longstanding federal policy of promoting industrial harmony through the use of collective-bargaining agreements, and is antithetical to the function of a collective-bargaining agreement as setting out the rights and duties of the parties.

With these principles in mind, it is evident that the Seventh Circuit erred in ordering the parties to arbitrate the arbitrability question. It is the court’s duty to interpret the agreement and to determine whether the parties intended to arbitrate grievances concerning layoffs predicated on a “lack of work” determination by the Company. If the court determines that the agreement so provides, then it is for the arbitrator to determine the relative merits of the parties’ substantive interpretations of the agreement. It was for the court, not the arbitrator, to decide in the first instance whether the dispute was to be resolved through arbitration.

The Union does not contest the application of these principles to the present case. Instead, it urges the Court to examine the specific provisions of the agreement for itself and to affirm the Court of Appeals on the ground that the parties had agreed to arbitrate the dispute over the layoffs at issue here. But it is usually not our function in the first instance to construe collective-bargaining contracts and arbitration clauses, or to consider any other evidence that might unmistakably demonstrate that a particular grievance was not to be subject to arbitration. The issue in the case is whether, because of express exclusion or other forceful evidence, the dispute over the interpretation of Article 20 of the contract, the layoff provision, is not subject to the arbitration clause. That issue’should have been decided by the District Court and reviewed by the Court of Appeals; it should not have been referred to the arbitrator.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Brennan,

with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Marshall join, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion and write separately only to supplement what has been said in order to avoid any misunderstanding on remand and in future cases.

The Seventh Circuit’s erroneous conclusion that the arbitrator should decide whether this dispute is arbitrable resulted from that court’s confusion respecting the “arbitra-bility” determination that we have held must be judicially made. Despite recognizing that Article 8 of the collective-bargaining agreement “is a standard arbitration clause, providing for arbitration of ‘any differences arising with respect to the interpretation of this contract or the performance of any obligation hereunder,”’ and that “there is no clear, unambiguous exclusion [of this dispute] from arbitration,” the Court of Appeals thought that “there [were] colorable arguments both for and against exclusion.” Communications Workers of America v. Western Electric Co., 751 F. 2d 203, 206-207 (1984). The “colorable arguments” referred to by the Court of Appeals were the parties’ claims concerning the meaning of Articles 9 and 20 of the collective-bargaining agreement: the Court of Appeals thought that if the Union’s interpretation of Article 20 was correct and management could not order layoffs for reasons other than lack of work, the dispute was arbitrable; but if AT&T’s interpretation of Article 20 was correct and management was free to order layoffs for other reasons, the dispute was not arbitrable under Article 9. Id., at 207. Because these were the very issues that would be presented to the arbitrator if the dispute was held to be arbitrable, the court reasoned that “determining arbitrability would enmesh a court in the merits of th[e] dispute,” ibid., and concluded that the arbitrability issue should be submitted to the arbitrator.

The Court of Appeals was mistaken insofar as it thought that determining arbitrability required resolution of the parties’ dispute with respect to the meaning of Articles 9 and 20 of the collective-bargaining agreement. This is clear from our opinion in Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574 (1960). In Warrior & Gulf, the Union challenged management’s contracting out of labor that had previously been performed by Company employees. The parties failed to resolve the dispute through grievance procedures, and the Union requested arbitration; the Company refused, and the Union sued to compel arbitration under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 185. The collective-bargaining agreement contained a standard arbitration clause similar to Article 8 of the AT&T/CWA contract, i. e., providing for arbitration of all differences with respect to the meaning or application of the contract. We held that, in light of the congressional policy making arbitration the favored method of dispute resolution, such a provision requires arbitration “unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.” Warrior & Gulf, supra, at 582-583 (footnote omitted).

The Company in Warrior & Gulf relied for its argument that the dispute was not arbitrable on a “Management Functions” clause which, like Article 9 of the AT&T/CWA agreement, excluded “matters which are strictly a function of management,” 363 U. S., at 576, from the arbitration provision. We recognized that such a clause “might be thought to refer to any practice of management in which, under particular circumstances prescribed by the agreement, it is permitted to indulge.” Id., at 584. However, we also recognized that to read the clause this way would make arbitrability in every case depend upon whether management could take the action challenged by the Union; the arbitrability of every dispute would turn upon a resolution of the merits, and “the arbitration clause would be swallowed up by the exception.” Ibid. Therefore, we held that, where a collective-bargaining agreement contains a standard arbitration clause and the “exception” found in the Management Functions clause is general, “judicial inquiry . . . should be limited to the search for an explicit provision which brings the grievance under the cover of the [Management Functions] clause . . . .” Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564, 572 (1960) (Brennan, J., concurring); Warrior & Gulf, supra, at 584. “In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, . . . only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail. . . .” 363 U. S., at 584-585.

The Seventh Circuit misunderstood these rules of contract construction and did precisely what we disapproved of in Warrior & Gulf—it read Article 9, a general Management Functions clause, to make arbitrability depend upon the merits of the parties’ dispute. As Warrior & Gulf makes clear, the judicial inquiry required to determine arbitrability is much simpler. The parties’ dispute concerns whether Article 20 of the collective-bargaining agreement limits management’s authority to order layoffs for reasons other than lack of work. The question for the court is “strictly confined,” id., at 582, to whether the parties agreed to submit disputes over the meaning of Article 20 to arbitration. Because the collective-bargaining agreement contains a standard arbitration clause, the answer must be affirmative unless the contract contains explicit language stating that disputes respecting Article 20 are not subject to arbitration, or unless the party opposing arbitration — here AT&T — adduces “the most forceful evidence” to this effect from the bargaining history. Under Warrior & Gulf, determining arbitrability does not require the court even to consider which party is correct with respect to the meaning of Article 20.

The Court remands this case so that the court below may apply the proper standard to determine arbitrability. The Court states that “it is usually not our function in the first instance to construe collective-bargaining contracts and arbitration clauses, or to consider any other evidence that might unmistakably demonstrate that a particular grievance was not to be subject to arbitration.” Ante, at 651-652. Of course, we have on numerous occasions construed collective-bargaining agreements “in the first instance”; we did so, for example, in the three cases comprising the Steelworkers Trilogy. See also John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U. S. 543, 552-555 (1964); Packinghouse Workers v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U. S. 247, 249-253 (1964). Nonetheless, I agree with the Court that we should interpret a collective-bargaining agreement only where there is some special reason to do so. Thus, it is appropriate for this Court to construe a collective-bargaining agreement where — as in the Steelworkers Trilogy — our decision announces a new principle of law, since applying this principle may help to clarify our meaning. There is no such need, however, where — as here — we simply reaffirm established principles. Moreover, since the determination left for the Court of Appeals on remand is straightforward and will require little time or effort, concerns for efficient judicial administration do not require us to interpret the agreement. Finally, because the parties have submitted to us only fragmentary pieces of the bargaining history, we are not in a position properly to evaluate whether there is “the most forceful evidence” that the parties did not intend for this dispute to be arbitrable. Therefore, I join the Court’s opinion and concur in the Court’s judgment remanding to the Court of Appeals.

       Article 8 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
      “If the National and the Company fail to settle by negotiation any differences arising with respect to the interpretation of this contract or the performance of any obligation hereunder, such differences shall (provided that such dispute is not excluded from arbitration by other provisions of this contract, and provided that the grievance procedures as to such dispute have been exhausted) be referred upon written demand of either party to an impartial arbitrator mutually agreeable to both parties.” App. 21.

       Article 9 states:
      “The Union recognizes the right of the Company (subject to the limitations contained in the provisions of this contract, but otherwise not subject to the provisions of the arbitration clause) to exercise the functions of managing the business which involve, among other things, the hiring and placement of Employees, the termination of employment, the assignment of work, the determination of methods and equipment to be used, and the control of the conduct of work.” Id., at 22.

       Article 20 provides, in pertinent part, that “[w]hen lack of work necessitates Layoff, Employees shall be Laid-Off in accordance with Term of Employment and by Layoff groups as set forth in the following [subpara-graphs stating the order of layoff].” Id., at 23. ' Article 1.11 defines the term “Layoff” to mean “a termination of employment arising out of a reduction in the force due to lack of work.” Id., at 20.

       Section 301(a), 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. § 185(a) states:
      “Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect of the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.”