text:
    No. 85-6956.
    Aldrich v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall,

with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is under all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit insofar as it left undisturbed the death sentence imposed in this case. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). However, even if I believed that the death penalty could be imposed constitutionally under certain circumstances, I nevertheless would grant certiorari because petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel at his trial in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

I

Petitioner Levis Leon Aldrich was charged with the murder of Robert Ward, the night manager at a restaurant where Aldrich had at one time been employed. Ward’s body was discovered at 12:19 a.m. on September 3, 1974, by sheriff’s deputies responding to the restaurant’s burglar alarm. Ward had been shot in the head. The restaurant’s safe had been emptied of the evening’s receipts, estimated by the owner at between $600 and $900. At roughly 2 a.m., police stopped petitioner, who was driving his car slowly by the restaurant. Petitioner was carrying more than $500 in cash. At their request, petitioner took the police officers to the hotel room in which he had been staying since his release from prison the week before. There he showed the officers his receipt for $558.58 paid to him by the Department of Corrections at the time of his release.

The shotgun which had killed Ward was later discovered by the police, broken apart, in two ditches in the surrounding neighborhood. No physical evidence at the crime scene or on the shotgun linked petitioner to the killing. However, after further investigation, petitioner was arrested and indicted.

Aldrich was represented by appointed counsel from the Public Defender’s office. The only member of that office who conducted any investigation or undertook any preparation for the trial until two weeks before the trial date was a legal intern in the office, who during the relevant period was not yet a member of the bar. Trial counsel did not exercise the right, under Florida law, to depose any of the State’s 41 prospective witnesses. No one from the Public Defender’s office examined any of the State’s physical exhibits. Of the seven prospective witnesses identified by the defense before trial, petitioner’s counsel had interviewed only two. Pet. for Cert. 12.

Four days before the opening of trial, petitioner’s counsel moved for a continuance. The motion was heard on the scheduled trial date, at which time defense counsel told the court: “This case is not prepared. We are not in a position to provide competent legal representation.” Id., at 11. The trial court denied the motion and insisted that the trial begin immediately. Petitioner’s trial counsel, who was fully experienced in the trial of capital cases, testified in the state postconviction hearing that he had never been as unprepared to try even a misdemeanor case as he was for petitioner’s capital murder trial. Ibid.

The State’s case hinged upon the testimony of Charles Strickland. Strickland owned the shotgun which had killed Ward; he told police that he had lent it to petitioner on the evening of the murder. Strickland claimed that petitioner called him the next day and told him that he had used the gun in a robbery and had killed a man. According to Strickland, petitioner asked him to help recover the gun from a parking lot near the scene of the murder. Strickland testified that he did so, after which he cleaned the gun, broke it down, and threw the parts into separate ditches. Although Strickland initially told police that he had lost the gun, he later changed his mind and led police to the evidence. James Norman Sapp, who along with Strickland had met petitioner in prison, testified that while in prison petitioner had told Sapp that he intended to rob the restaurant when released.

The sole defense witness was petitioner himself, who denied any involvement in the crime. He testified that he had been fishing until 10:30 or 11 p.m. on the night of the murder, and had then gone to a bar until 1:30 or 2 a.m. After leaving the bar, petitioner testified, he drove out to meet a woman who had a room to rent. On the way to her house, he passed the restaurant, and was stopped by the police.

The jury found petitioner guilty of capital murder. At petitioner’s express request, counsel presented no evidence in mitigation of sentence. The jury returned an advisory verdict in favor of the death sentence, which the trial court then imposed. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s conviction and death sentence. Aldridge v. State, 351 So. 2d 942 (1977). Post-conviction relief was denied. Aldridge v. State, 425 So. 2d 1132 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U. S. 939 (1983). In his first federal habeas petition, Aldrich claimed that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel at his trial. The District Court denied relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 777 F. 2d 630 (CA11 1985).

II

The District Court found, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that petitioner’s trial counsel was so handicapped by absence of preparation that he could not meet the objective standard of reasonably effective assistance of counsel required by this Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). The Court of Appeals held, however, that petitioner had failed to show that he was prejudiced by the inadequacy of his counsel, as required by Strickland, supra. The Court of Appeals found that further investigation before trial would not have disclosed helpful evidence: “On cross-examination at the post-conviction hearing, [counsel] who represented Aldrich at trial were unable to point to any fact learned at trial, or later, that might have been discovered by deposition.” 777 F. 2d, at 637. In response to the statement of counsel that investigation would have shown that Strickland and Sapp had a motive to commit the robbery, and additionally had reasons to throw suspicion on petitioner, the Court of Appeals found this “insufficient to [create] ‘a reasonable probability’ of reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Id., at 636.

III

I continue to believe that “a showing that the performance of a defendant’s lawyer departed from constitutionally prescribed standards requires a new trial regardless of whether the defendant suffered demonstrable prejudice thereby.” Strickland, 466 U. S., at 712 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Even under the prejudice standard, however, the facts disclosed by the record demonstrate that petitioner is entitled to relief. As the Court recognized in fashioning the prejudice standard, “a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.” Id., at 696. The dissent in the Court of Appeals correctly characterized this case:

“Petitioner was convicted on the basis of evidence that was far from strong. No physical evidence implicating Aldrich was recovered at the scene of the killing. While in custody, Al-drich made no statements resembling a confession. The only direct evidence implicating Aldrich was testimony from a convicted felon who had violated the terms of his parole and lied to police investigators, and who was the other most likely suspect in the crime.” 777 F. 2d, at 642 (Johnson, J., dissenting).

Petitioner’s life rested on the outcome of the jury’s estimation of the relative credibility of petitioner and Charles Strickland. Yet because of the absence of preparation time, petitioner’s counsel had not interviewed the witnesses whose testimony might bear on the credibility of Strickland’s story. Even more importantly, counsel had not exercised his state-law right to take Strickland’s deposition. “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland, supra, at 686. In a case as closely balanced as this one, I believe we can have no confidence in the result where counsel’s inadequate preparation precluded the vigorous testing of the evidence upon which the State proposed to forfeit a man’s life.

I would grant the petition for certiorari.

      Petitioner’s last name was apparently misspelled as “Aldridge” in the state-court proceedings.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 85-7013.
    No. 86-5192.
    No. 86-5297.
    No. 86-5362.
    No. 86-5369.
    No. 86-5381.
    No. 86-5452.
    Stringer v. Mississippi. Evans v. McCotter, Director, Texas Department of Corrections. Jefferson v. Alabama. Nuckols v. Oklahoma et al. Jeffries v. Washington. Hogue v. Texas. Driscoll v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Miss.;

C. A. 5th Cir.;

Sup. Ct. Ala.;

Ct. Crim. App. Okla.;

Sup. Ct. Wash.;

Ct. Crim. App. Tex.; and

Sup. Ct. Mo. Certio-rari denied. Reported below: No. 85-7013, 485 So. 2d 274; No. 86-5192, 790 F. 2d 1232; No. 86-5297, 473 So. 2d 1110; No. 86-5369, 105 Wash. 2d 398, 717 P. 2d 722; No. 86-5381, 711 S. W. 2d 9; No. 86-5452, 711 S. W. 2d 512.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual'punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 86-84.
    National Bancard Corp. v. Visa U. S. A., Inc.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


author: Justice White,

text:
    No. 86-85.
    Risken v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

This case presents the issue whether 18 U. S. C. § 1503 prohibits witness tampering. In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that witness tampering is punishable under this provision. 788 F. 2d 1361 (1986). For the reasons stated in my previous dissent from denial of certiorari in Cooper v. United States and Wesley v. United States, 471 U. S. 1130 (1985), and consistent with my dissent from denial of certiorari in Rovetuso v. United States, 474 U. S. 1076 (1986), I would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 86-90.
    San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace et al. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun and Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 86-158.
    County of Wayne et al. v. Carroll.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

dissenting.

This case presents the question of which state statute of limitations should be applied in a case brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 when more than one state statute arguably can be characterized as addressing “personal injury” claims. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261 (1985). The lower courts continue to struggle with this question. In this case, for example, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 754 F. 2d 662 (1985), concluded that a 3-year, catchall statute should be applied which covers actions brought “to recover damages for the death of a person, or for injury to a person or property.” Mich. Comp. Laws §600.5805(8) (1979). The Sixth Circuit chose this section over other 2-year sections which specifically cover intentional torts. See, e. g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2) (1979) (“The period of limitations is 2 years for an action charging assault, battery, or false imprisonment.”) In so deciding, the Sixth Circuit has taken an approach directly contrary to its earlier decision in Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F. 2d 340, 344 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U. S. 1174 (1986).

I dissented from the denial of certiorari in Mulligan because of the split among the Courts of Appeals in dealing with this question, and I dissent here because the confusion evidenced by this split is underscored by the Sixth Circuit’s change in approach.


text:
    No. 86-172 (A-18).
    Araneta et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Application for stay, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. The stay heretofore entered by Chief Justice Burger [478 U. S. 1301] is vacated. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan, Justice White, and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 86-278.
    Jensen v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioner for accounting denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-310.
    Warden et al. v. Nolan, Judge, Circuit Court of DuPage County, Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 86-312.
    Wiggins v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 86-329.
    Gardiner et al. v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 85-890.
    Hubby v. Historic Savannah Foundation et al.,
   475 U. S. 1108. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    October 22, 1986
    No. A-290 (86-604).
    Townley et al. v. Clark.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Application for stay, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    October 30, 1986
    No. 86-548.
    Remus et al. v. Amoco Oil Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    November 3, 1986
    No. 86-369.
    Babbitt, Governor of Arizona, et al. v. Planned Parenthood of Central and Northern Arizona et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from C. A. 9th Cir.

The Chief Justice, Justice White, and Justice Scalia would note probable jurisdiction and set the case for oral argument. Justice O’Con-nor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 85-7217.
    Gibson v. Michigan Department of Social Services.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Mich, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 86-261.
    Garfield Trust Co. v. Director, Division of Taxation of New Jersey.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. J. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 86-263.
    Miyamoto v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Hawaii.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Haw. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 86-308.
    Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co. et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. La. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5501.
    McLeod v. Florida.
   Appeal from Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5509.
    Woods v. Keebler Co.
   Appeal from C. A. 11th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-378.
    Planned Parenthood of Central and Northern Arizona et al. v. Babbitt, Governor of Arizona, et al.
   Cross-appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. dismissed.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No.-.
    Parro et al. v. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration.
   Motion of petitioners to dispense with printing portions of the appendix to the petition for writ of certiorari granted.


text:
    No. A-271.
    Church of Scientology of California v. Wollersheim.
   Application for stay, presented to Justice O’Connor, and by her referred to the Court, is granted and the order entered by Justice O’Connor on October 8, 1986, is continued pending the timely filing and disposition of a petition for writ of certiorari.

Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this order.


text:
    No. A-307.
    Koczak et al. v. Dixon et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Application for stay and other relief, addressed to The Chief Justice and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-581.
    In re Disbarment of Hybsha.
   It is ordered that Adolph Allison Hybsha, of Wichita, Kan., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-582.
    In re Disbarment of Goodstein.
   It is ordered that Harold Goodstein, of Commack, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-583.
    In re Disbarment of Gonzales.
   It is ordered that Alphonse C. Gonzales, of Chicago, Ill., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-584.
    In re Disbarment of Fawell.
   It is ordered that Michael K. Fawell, of Wheaton, Ill., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-585.
    In re Disbarment of Reynolds.
   It is ordered that John Francis Reynolds, of Oak Brook, Ill., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-586.
    In re Disbarment of Seligman.
   It is ordered that Stanley L. Seligman, of Hollywood, Fla., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-587.
    In re Disbarment of Litterer.
   It is ordered that George E. Litterer, of Media, Pa., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 85-558.
    No. 85-559.
    No. 85-560.
    O’Connor et ux. v. United States; Coplin et ux. v. United States; and Mattox et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 474 U. S. 1050.] Motion of petitioners for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 85-608.
    Illinois v. Krull et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. [Certiorari granted, 475 U. S. 1080.] Motion of petitioner for leave to file reply brief out of time granted.


text:
    No. 85-1277.
    School Board of Nassau County, Florida, et al. v. Arline.
   C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 475 U. S. 1118.] Motion of respondent for divided argument to permit American Public Health Association to argue as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 85-1708.
    California et al. v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 476 U. S. 1168.] Motion of appellees for divided argument denied.

Justice Blackmun would grant the motion.


text:
    No. 85-2039.
    United States v. Johnson, Personal Representative of the Estate of Johnson.
   C. A. 11th Cir. [Cer-tiorari granted, ante, p. 811.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 85-2067.
    United States v. Mendoza-Lopez et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 811.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted.


text:
    No. 85-2099.
    Pennsylvania v. Finley.
   Super. Ct. Pa. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 812.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Catherine M. Harper, of Lansdale, Pa., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 85-5221.
    Griffith v. Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. [Certiorari granted, 476 U. S. 1157.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that J. Vincent Aprile II, Esquire, of Frankfort, Ky., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case.


text:
    No. 86-5479.
    Wrenn v. Ohio Department of Mental Health.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until November 24, 1986, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

For the reasons expressed in Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U. S. 928 (1983), we would deny the petition for writ of certiorari without reaching the merits of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.


text:
    No. 86-5678.
    Hill v. City of Houston, Texas.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of appellant to expedite consideration of the cross-appeal granted.


text:
    No. 86-5414.
    No. 86-5448. No. 86-5481.

      In re Magoon; In re Parrish; and In re Currey.
   Petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 86-5442.
    No. 86-5496.
    In re Baronowski; and In re Paskalik.
   Petitions for writs of prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 86-179.
    No. 86-401.
    Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints et al. v. Amos et al.; and United States v. Amos et al.
   Appeals from D. C Utah. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of cases on the merits, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument.


text:
    No. 86-421.
    Board of Directors of Rotary International et al. v. Rotary Club of Duarte et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits.

Justice Blackmun and Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 86-88.
    Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc. v. Brock, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 86-177.
    Tanner et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 86-87.
    United States v. Salerno et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted. Motion of the Solicitor General to expedite is granted. The Solicitor General’s opening brief is due November 18, 1986. Respondent’s brief is due December 18, 1986. Case is set for oral argument during the January Session.


text:
    No. 86-5375.
    Burger v. Kemp, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 85-2015.
    Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Harcon Barge Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-2019.
    Reardon, Sheriff of Essex County v. Cola.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-7078.
    Ammons et al. v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-7154.
    Bahramnia v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-7162.
    Brown v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-7188.
    Neyland v. Blackburn, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-7198.
    McSwain v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-7221.
    Gary v. Wilkes, Sheriff, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-78.
    Roberts, Personal Representative of the Estate of Roberts v. Spalding et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-137.
    Amend v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-163.
    Briggins v. Police Department of the City of New York et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-180.
    Krebs v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-189.
    Metz et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-212.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-227.
    Ridley v. United States.
   Ct. Mil. App. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-252.
    Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-256.
    Doe v. A Corporation et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-289.
    Ealey, Personal Representative of Ealey, et al. v. City of Detroit et al.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-342.
    Mandhare v. W. S. LaFargue Elementary School et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-368.
    Raffaelli v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the Village of Justice, Illinois, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-371.
    Irvin et al. v. Rabun County, Georgia, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-373.
    Flanagan et al. v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-374.
    Florida v. Scott.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-385.
    Daig Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-387.
    Howard Electrical & Mechanical, Inc. v. Baker Industries, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-392.
    Gordon et al. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-394.
    Citizens for Decency Through Law, Inc. v. Oak Industries, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-400.
    Trailways, Inc., Joint Council of the Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Trailways Lines, Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-403.
    Cribbs et al. v. Hill et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-406.
    Keystone Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-408.
    Massoud v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-410.
    Frint et al. v. Texaco Inc.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-425.
    Obiaya v. Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-426.
    Maddox et al. v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-436.
    Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority et al.; and Jones v. Siegfried Construction Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-446.
    Flynt Distributing Co., Inc. v. Lerman.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-466.
    Corcoran v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-470.
    Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc., et al. v. National Hockey League et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-474.
    Clissuras v. City of New York et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-477.
    Schurman et al. v. United States Patent and Trademark Office.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-479.
    Cory v. Uniroyal, Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-500.
    Leonard v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-504.
    Missick v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-506.
    Williams v. Hawaii.
   Sup. Ct. Haw. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-514.
    Silverstein v. Barnes et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-527.
    Ferguson v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-538.
    Hockersmith v. Partner Publishing Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-551.
    Wright v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-582.
    Waites v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5124.
    Brownscombe v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5154.
    Roberts v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5182.
    Veatch v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5188.
    Turner v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5202.
    Butler v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5243.
    Miller v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5245.
    Roberts v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5272.
    Taylor v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5386.
    White v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5390.
    Miller v. Cupp, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5392.
    Bartlett v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5396.
    Mason v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5397.
    Hill v. Perini, Superintendent, Marion Correctional Institute.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5403.
    Adelman v. Carlson et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5404.
    Crusos v. United Transportation Union, Local 1201, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5405.
    LaGrange v. Jones, Judge.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5407.
    McCloud v. LoValley et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5410.
    Singleton v. Frey, Superintendent, Missouri Eastern Correctional Center.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5411.
    White v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5412.
    Grubowski v. Grubowski.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5413.
    D’Zesati v. California State University, Sacramento, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5415.
    Spalla v. Foltz, Administrator, Michigan Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5421.
    Dixson v. Quarles, Superintendent, Huron Valley Women’s Facility.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5422.
    Smith v. Hensel, Supervisor, Office of Probation and Parole for Whatcom County, Washington, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5425.
    Havens v. Indiana et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5428.
    Williams v. Vasquez, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5433.
    Bagley v. Iowa.
   Ct. App. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5437.
    Clinton v. Georgia Ports Authority.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5438.
    Warren v. Allgood et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5440.
    Alves v. Hamilton, Fulton, and Montgomery Counties Boces et al.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5446.
    Tucker v. Spears, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5447.
    Fegley v. McClain, Judge.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5449.
    Young v. Cabana, Superintendent, Mississippi State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5454.
    Perez v. Sullivan, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5458.
    Edaburn v. Wisconsin.
   Ct. App. Wis. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5459.
    Berger v. Nadler, Judge.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5460.
    Centeno v. Thrifty Drug Stores, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5463.
    Hall v. Office of Personnel Management.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5467.
    Vazquez et al. v. Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5472.
    Creasey v. Muncy, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5473.
    Carr v. Parks et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5474.
    Carr v. Circuit Court of Kanahwa County.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5475.
    Lewis v. Martin, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5478.
    Perkins v. Cabana, Superintendent, Mississippi Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5480.
    Harvey v. McLennan County Jail et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5484.
    Ellison v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5486.
    Jaramillo v. United States Postal Service.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5487.
    Duvall v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5489.
    Hindman v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5490.
    Johnson v. Duckworth, Superintendent, Indiana State Prison, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5491.
    Dong Joon Ahn v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5493.
    Zaky v. United States Veterans Administration et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5494.
    Barber v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5497.
    Saunders v. McMacken, Superintendent, Hocking Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5498.
    Taylor v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5505.
    Thomas v. McCotter, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5507.
    Bourgeois v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5511.
    Ramirez v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5512.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5516.
    Lizotte v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5519.
    Chira v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5523.
    Toney v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5525.
    Cleary v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5536.
    Campo v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5543.
    Miller v. Beorn et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5552.
    Nelson v. Thieret, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5556.
    Farese v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5563.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5575.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5577.
    Kimberlin v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5578.
    Brinas v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5583.
    Wren v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-1962.
    Riddick et al. v. School Board of City of Norfolk et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 86-326.
    Board of Education of the Oklahoma City Public Schools, Independent District No. 89 v. Dowell et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 86-380.
    Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Assn. v. Attorney General of Michigan et al.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 86-389.
    City of Birmingham v. American Civil Liberties Union et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 85-7111.
    Peek v. Kemp, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari and set case for oral argument.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.


text:
    No. 86-48.
    No. 86-5114.
    No. 86-5120.
    No. 86-5277.
    Messino v. United States; Hlavach v. United States; Covello v. United States; and Turner v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 791 F. 2d 489.

Justice White,

dissenting.

The Courts of Appeals are divided over the kind of agreement necessary to support a conviction for so-called RICO conspiracy. In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that there is “a clear division among the circuit courts that have considered the issue.” United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F. 2d 489, 494-495 (1986). I adhere to the view expressed in my dissent in Adams v. United States, 474 U. S. 971 (1985), that we should grant certiorari and resolve this conflict.


text:
    No. 86-152.
    Investment Company Institute v. Clarke et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 86-153.
    Investment Company Institute v. Clarke et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 86-154.
    Investment Company Institute v. Clarke et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 86-195.
    Arkon Shipping Agency, Inc., et al. v. Kassapas, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Kassapas, et al.
   Ct. App. La., 5th Cir. Motion of Maritime Law Association of the United States for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-223.
    Neapolitan v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 86-367.
    New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department v. Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. N. M. Certiorari denied.

Justice White and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 86-376.
    Connecticut v. Badgett.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-448.
    Connecticut v. Gray.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5029.
    Wilson v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan would grant certiorari.


author: Justice O’Connor, Justice Brennan,

text:
    No. 86-5234.
    Brown v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor,

concurring.

I write briefly in support of the Court’s denial of the petition for certiorari in this case, and to respond to Justice Brennan’s suggestion that the limits on the prosecutor’s right to peremptorily challenge jurors found in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), apply outside the context of racial discrimination forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause. Batson does not touch, indeed, it clearly reaffirms, id., at 89, the ordinary rule that a prosecutor may exercise his peremptory strikes for any reason at all. Batson, in my view, depends upon this Nation’s profound commitment to the ideal of racial equality, a commitment that refuses to permit the State to act on the premise that racial differences matter. It is central to Batson that a “person’s race simply ‘is unrelated to his fitness as a juror.’” Id., at 87 (citation omitted).

There is no basis for declaring that a juror’s attitudes towards the death penalty are similarly irrelevant to the outcome of a capital sentencing proceeding. Indeed, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (1968), upon which Justice Brennan’s dissent so heavily relies, itself recognizes the relevance of this attitudinal factor. Categorical exclusion of jurors with moral qualms over capital punishment is forbidden precisely because such a practice would produce “a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die.” Id., at 521.

Moreover, Justice Brennan’s dissent ignores a fundamental distinction between peremptory challenges of jurors and challenges for cause. Challenges for cause permit the categorical and unlimited exclusion of jurors exhibiting an inability to serve fairly and impartially in the case to be tried, as noted in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412 (1985). In Witherspoon, the Court held that the Constitution does not tolerate such a categorical exclusion of jurors who merely express moral scruples about or general objections to capital punishment unless it would “‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’” Wainwright v. Witt, supra, at 424 (citation omitted).

Peremptory challenges are limited in number. Each party, the prosecutor, and the defense counsel, must balance a host of considerations in deciding which jurors should be peremptorily excused. Permitting prosecutors to take into account the concerns expressed about capital punishment by prospective jurors, or any other factor, in exercising peremptory challenges simply does not implicate the concerns expressed in Witherspoon.

We ought not delude ourselves that the deep faith that race should never be relevant has completely triumphed over the painful social reality that, sometimes, it may be. That the Court will not tolerate prosecutors’ racially discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge, in effect, is a special rule of relevance, a statement about what this Nation stands for, rather than a statement of fact. In my view, that special rule is a product of the unique history of racial discrimination in this country; it should not be divorced from that context. Outside the uniquely sensitive area of race the ordinary rule that a prosecutor may strike a juror without giving any reason applies. Because a juror’s attitudes towards the death penalty may be relevant to how the juror judges, while, as a matter of law, his race is not, this case is not like Batson.

Justice Brennan,

with whom Justice Marshall joins,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would vacate the decision below insofar as it left undisturbed the death sentence imposed in this case. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). However, even if I believed that the death penalty could be imposed constitutionally under certain circumstances, I nevertheless would grant certiorari because the petitioner presents strong evidence that the State used its peremptory challenges in this case to exclude jurors that it was forbidden to excuse for cause under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (1968).

In Witherspoon, this Court held that, in a capital case, the prosecution may not exclude for cause those jurors who indicate that they have scruples about the death penalty, but who nonetheless state that such beliefs would not prevent them from performing their duties as jurors according to law. Exclusion of such jurors, we said, denies a capital defendant the right to sentencing by an impartial jury that is representative of the community, for it “pro-ducéis] a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die.” Id., at 521. We underscored the importance of this right in Adams v. Texas, 448 U. S. 38 (1980), which held unconstitutional the exclusion of jurors who acknowledged that their concerns about capital punishment might affect their ability to find facts that would lead to its automatic imposition. Texas could not, we said, bar jurors who stated that they would honestly find the relevant facts if convinced of their existence beyond a reasonable doubt,

“yet who frankly concede that the prospects of the death penalty may affect what their honest judgment of the facts will be or what they may deem to be a reasonable doubt. Such assessments and judgments by jurors are inherent in the jury system, and to exclude all jurors who would be in the slightest way affected by the prospect of the death penalty or by their views about such a penalty would be to deprive the defendant of the impartial jury to which he or she is entitled under the law.” Id., at 50.

The petitioner in the case before us, David J. Brown, was convicted of the first-degree murder of two women and given two death sentences. At voir dire, the prosecutor had sought to determine not merely if prospective jurors had any scruples about the death penalty that might impair their performance, but if they had any scruples about it at all. The prosecutor was remarkably candid about this objective in addressing the venire at the start of voir dire:

“ “We want to know if you do in fact believe in capital punishment, not wavering. We want to know at the outset, that is when we approve you as a juror, if we do, that you surely do believe in capital punishment in some cases, and that you can, if necessary, make a decision that would involve capital punishment.’” Pet. for Cert. 10.

As the voir dire reveals, the prosecutor diligently pursued his goal of seating only those jurors rigidly committed to the death penalty:

“Q.: Mr. Caldwell, how do you feel about capital punishment? Are you for it or against it?
“A.: I am for it.
“Q.: I didn’t understand you.
“A.: I said I’m for it.
“Q.: How long have [you] been in favor of capital punishment in some cases, Mr. Caldwell?
“A.: All my life, every time I hear tale of something like that, about all my life, I guess.
“Q.: That’s what I wanted to hear, Mr. Caldwell.
“Q.: Mrs. Pope, do you know your mind to the extent of saying whether or not you believe in capital punishment?
“A.: I do.
“Q.: Have all of your adult life?
“A.: Yes, sir.
“Q.: And if ultimately you are called upon after a proper instruction by the Judge to carefully consider what should happen to, to determine life or death, that wouldn’t bother you unduly, will it?
“A.: No, sir.” Id., at 7, 9-10.

In another exchange, after juror Williams stated that he believed in capital punishment, the prosecutor continued to question him to establish that he had the “‘strength and fortitude’” to render a death verdict “without ‘any doubt.’” Id., at 10.

Those jurors who indicated the slightest uncertainty about the death penalty were excused by peremptory challenge, without inquiry into whether their convictions would render them incapable of performing their duties as jurors:

“Q.: Mrs. Beaver, having sat here for some several minutes in this courtroom today, you know what we are here for?
“A.: Yes.
“Q.: Having thoughts about capital punishment, at least I would assume here today, and no doubt having thought about it in the past, do you know your mind about that question? “A.: I’m afraid I don’t.
“Q.: Afraid you don’t?
“A.: No.
“[Prosecutor:] The State will excuse Mrs. Beaver with our thanks.” Id., at 9.

The State concedes that it could not have excused for cause those jurors failing the prosecutor’s litmus test. It maintains, however, that since it used peremptory challenges to accomplish this end, its conduct is immune from scrutiny. The State reads our recent decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), as significant only in that it proscribes racially discriminatory peremptory challenges. It insists that, since the challenges were exercised in this case in a racially neutral manner, they are free from constitutional infirmity.

The implication of the State’s position is that it is free to use its peremptory challenges to violate any constitutional command other than the Equal Protection Clause. The State, however, misses the wider significance of Batson: that the broad discretion afforded prosecutors in the exercise of peremptory challenges may not be abused to accomplish any unconstitutional end. In Bat-son, we said that “counsel’s effort to obtain possibly relevant information about prospective jurors is to be distinguished from the practice at issue here.” Id., at 89, n. 12 (emphasis added).

Justice O’Connor’s concurrence observes that, as an unfortunate matter of fact, race may be relevant in that it may actually influence a juror’s decision. The concurrence correctly notes that such factual relevance is insufficient to justify the exercise of a peremptory challenge on the basis of a juror’s race, because race has been deemed irrelevant as a matter of law. The concurrence, however, fails to recognize that precisely the same situation obtains with respect to scruples about the death penalty. Such scruples may be relevant as a matter oí fact. Nonetheless, that is insufficient to justify the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors with such scruples, for Witherspoon and Adams make clear that this characteristic is irrelevant as a matter of law. It does not minimize the tragic history of race discrimination in this country to insist that we enforce the Witherspoon proscription just as faithfully as that forbidding reliance on race, for we may not pick and choose which constitutional rights we will and will not vindicate in monitoring the jury selection process.

Peremptory challenges may be used for reasons that may not comport completely with rational analysis, or that may resist coherent articulation. Such latitude has for practical reasons required a presumption that these challenges are exercised in a constitutionally responsible fashion. As Batson makes clear, however, that presumption is rebuttable. In this case, the Court is presented with evidence from the voir dire that plainly indicates that the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to obtain the “hanging jury,” Witherspoon, 391 U. S., at 523, that he could not obtain through challenges for cause. We therefore cannot maintain the usual presumption that these challenges were properly used.

Agents of the State enjoy considerable discretion in performing certain functions within the criminal justice system. With great discretion, however, comes great responsibility. When a court has evidence that the State has not lived up to that responsibility, its refusal to intervene converts discretion into a license for constitutional violation. For this reason, I would grant the petition for certiorari in this case.


text:
    No. 86-5310.
    No. 86-5482.
    Roberts v. Missouri. Marlowe v. Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Mo.; and

Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 86-5310, 709 S. W. 2d 857; No. 86-5482, 709 S. W. 2d 424.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 86-5499.
    Reidt v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari before judgment denied.


text:
    November 10, 1986
    No. 86-424.
    Stich v. Stich.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certio-rari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5537.
    Ferris v. California.
   Appeal from Ct. App. CaL, 6th App. Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5593.
    Nicholas v. United States.
   Appeal from C. A. 1st Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of cer-tiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5559.
    Butler v. Texas.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No.-.
    Mechanical Technology, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc.
   Motion of respondent Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., to direct the Clerk not to file the petition for writ of cer-tiorari for failure to comply with Rule 33.7 denied.


text:
    No. A-283.
    Sykes v. Van de Water et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice White and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 86-5545.
    Preiser v. Department of Transportation et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until December 1, 1986, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.

Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

For the reasons expressed in Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U. S. 928 (1983), we would deny the petition for writ of certiorari without reaching the merits of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.


text:
    No. 86-5547.
    In re Johl.
   D. C. Conn. Petition for writ of common-law certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5526.
    In re Glazebrook.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 86-251.
    Rockford Life Insurance Co. v. Illinois Department of Revenue et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 86-341.
    Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, Director, Bureau of Labor Standards of Maine, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 86-357.
    American Trucking Assns., Inc., et al. v. Scheiner, Secretary, Department of Revenue of Pennsylvania, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Pa. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 86-130.
    Rock v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 86-228.
    Kungys v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 86-461.
    Board of Pardons et al. v. Allen et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 86-246.
    Sumner, Director, Nevada Department of Prisons, et al. v. Shuman.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 85-1986.
    Anderson v. Alaska.
   Ct. App. Alaska. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-2049.
    Choon Young Chung v. NANA Development Corp.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-7031.
    Young v. Schmidt.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-7203.
    Reeves v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-22.
    Michigan v. Parham.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-205.
    Howard Trucking Co., Inc. v. Stassi et al.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-259.
    City of Des Moines, Iowa, et al. v. Willson.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-399.
    Hamill v. Department of Justice.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-430.
    Trans World Airlines et al. v. Dissell.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-433.
    Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York v. Knowles.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-435.
    Stowe-Woodward Co. v. Viock et al.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Erie County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-437.
    Dabish, Executrix of the Estate of Dabish v. Charter Arms Corp.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-439.
    Century Brass Products, Inc. v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-441.
    Chicago Systems Software et al. v. Evans Newton, Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-447.
    Dawn Developers, Inc., et al. v. Real Estate Corporation of Florida, N. V.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-449.
    City of Wildwood v. Anela et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-452.
    Dixon v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-454.
    MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Kellerman, dba Authorized Sales & Service, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-456.
    Ahmad v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-457.
    Richardson v. Pennsylvania.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-462.
    Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-463.
    Fiorello et al. v. Eaton Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-464.
    Martori Bros. Distributors et al. v. James-Massengale et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-467.
    Langley et al. v. Young.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-469.
    Orange v. Bomersheim et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-480.
    Darby Dental Supply Co., Inc., et al. v. Premier Dental Products Co.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-502.
    Cumberland Oil Corp. et al. v. Thropp et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-507.
    Trans International Airlines v. Newsome et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-513.
    Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Wells, by her Mother and Next Friend, Maihafer, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-524.
    Bergh et al. v. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-540.
    Quillen v. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-587.
    Fortna v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-596.
    Sutherland v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5073.
    Abbott v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5076.
    Curnew v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5096.
    Blackston v. Secretary of the Navy.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5108.
    Webb v. Wainwright, Secretary of Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5130.
    Haynes v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5159.
    Freeburg v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5218.
    Porter v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5256.
    Kennedy v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5356.
    Jackson v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5439.
    Yates v. Secretary of the Army.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5444.
    Abushaar v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.-


text:
    No. 86-5457.
    Culbreth v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5466.
    Rector v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5469.
    Wright v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5477.
    Donaldson v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5485.
    Johnpoll v. Carlson, Director, United States Bureau of Prisons, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5488.
    In re Bryant.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5492.
    Kearney v. Davis, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5515.
    Kinnell v. Maschner, Director, Kansas State Penitentiary, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5517.
    Holt v. Weldon, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5521.
    Rodman v. Taylor et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5522.
    Minis v. Ohio Unemployment Compensation Board of Review.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5528.
    Brown v. Seawell et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5529.
    Chambers v. Industrial Commission of Illinois et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5534.
    Beeman v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5535.
    Herzog v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5538.
    Bell v. Stone.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5546.
    Brown v. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5553.
    Riley v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5603.
    Bittner v. United States Parole Commission.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5615.
    Cole v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5628.
    Elkins v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5630.
    Heath v. United States Parole Commission et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5659.
    Gupta v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-1922.
    Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections v. DeAngelo.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-445.
    New York v. Smith.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-143.
    Mustafa, aka Brown v. United States.
   Ct. Mil. App. Certiorari denied.

Justice White, with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

In this case the trial court admitted, over petitioner’s objection, the testimony of a purported expert on blood spatter techniques. On appeal, the Court of Military Appeals held that the testimony in question was admissible under Military Rule of Evidence 702, which is worded identically to Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The court held that the so-called Frye test for determining the admissibility of expert testimony, see Frye v. United States, 54 App. D. C. 46, 47, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923), was superseded by the 1975 enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court described Military Rule 702 as establishing a much lower threshold than Frye for determining whether a given person is an expert. This conclusion is supported by decisions interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as establishing a more flexible standard of admissibility than the Frye test. See, e. g., United States v. Downing, 753 F. 2d 1224 (CA3 1985). Other courts, however, have interpreted Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as incorporating the Frye test. Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 739 F. 2d 1028, 1031, n. 9 (CA5 1984); United States v. McBride, 786 F. 2d 45, 49 (CA2 1986). I would grant certiorari to resolve this conflict on an obviously recurring and important issue.


text:
    No. 86-386.
    United States Steel Corp. et al. v. Pryor.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Powell and Justice O’Connor would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 86-5211.
    Reed v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

dissenting.

In this case, the District Court permitted a 13th, alternate juror to participate in the jury’s deliberations, a procedure to which petitioner’s counsel stipulated. The 13 jurors unanimously found petitioner guilty. On appeal, petitioner argued that the use of a 13-member jury violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c), that the Rule is not waivable, and that even if it is, it can only be waived by a defendant personally and not by counsel. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner, through his counsel, had waived compliance with Rule 24(c). It concluded that “[bjecause the waiver herein was neither prejudicial nor of constitutional magnitude and was made in the presence of the defendant in open court, . . . the failure to obtain appellant’s personal assent... , [if erroneous,] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 790 F. 2d 208, 211 (CA2 1986). This decision conflicts with United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F. 2d 868, 870 (CA4 1964), which requires a defendant’s express and personal waiver of Rule 24(c), assuming that the Rule can be waived at all. See also United States v. Chatman, 584 F. 2d 1358 (CA4 1978) (explaining Virginia Erection as establishing a per se rule of plain error in cases where Rule 24(c) is violated without obtaining a defendant’s personal consent); United States v. Beasley, 464 F. 2d 468 (CA10 1972) (holding, in a case not involving an issue of waiver, that violations of Rule 24(c) are reversible per se, and approving the result in Virginia Erection). I would grant certiorari to resolve this conflict.


text:
    No. 86-5321.
    Malquist v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.


author:
Justice Marshall,
      Justice Blackmun,

text:
    No. 86-5542.
    Woods v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall,

with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is under all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would vacate the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court insofar as it left undisturbed the death sentence imposed in this case. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Even if I believed, however, that the death penalty could constitutionally be imposed under certain circumstances, petitioner’s youth and mental condition preclude imposition of a sentence of death under the requirements of the Eighth Amendment.

Petitioner Ronald Woods was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in connection with the stabbing of a guard at the Union Correctional Institution, at which Woods was an inmate. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s conviction and death sentence. 490 So. 2d 24 (1986). Woods was 18 years old at the time of his trial. Id., at 28, n. 7. The evidence submitted to the trial court in mitigation of sentence showed that petitioner had suffered seizures in childhood, and had sustained brain damage. Pet. for Cert. 20. Petitioner’s IQ is reported to be below 73, within the borderline range of mental retardation. Ibid.

I believe that the imposition of capital punishment for crimes committed by juveniles is unconstitutionally cruel punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. “Although ‘[ejrimes committed by youths may be just as harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, . . . they deserve less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults.’” Roach v. Aiken, 474 U. S. 1039 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime 7 (1978)); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 115-116 (1982). These considerations are particularly compelling where, as here, the offender’s mental capacities are organically impaired. While the trial court treated petitioner’s youth as a mitigating circumstance, it did not consider whether petitioner’s mental retardation, or the combination of his youth and mental incapacity, presented a circumstance that might foreclose application of the death penalty.

The execution of a mentally retarded child in retribution for a crime committed at or before the age of 18 cannot, in my judgment, be reconciled with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment, or with our fundamental commitment to the preservation of human rights. I would grant the petition for certiorari.

Justice Blackmun,

with whom Justice Brennan joins, dissenting.

In view of the presence in the courtroom throughout the trial of a substantial number of uniformed guards (up to as many as 45) and the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s request to clear the courtroom of uniformed spectators, and the failure of the Supreme Court of Florida in its opinion, see 490 So. 2d 24, 26-27 (1986), even to cite this Court’s then recent decision in Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U. S. 560 (1986), I would grant the petition for cer-tiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand the case to the Supreme Court of Florida for reconsideration in light of Holbrook.


text:
    No. 86-5548 (A-334).
    VanWoudenberg v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant the application for stay and the petition for writ of certiorari and would vacate the death sentence in this case.


text:
    No. 86-5591.
    Ingram v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-2080.
    No. 85-2081.
    No. 85-2082.
    No. 85-6575.
    No. 85-7000.
    No. 85-7010.
    No. 85-7225.
    Grace v. Heartland Transportation, Inc., In re Grace, In re Grace, Guthrie v. Sowders, Warden, Davidson v. McCotter, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, King v. Illinois, In re McDonald, Stoner v. Rees, Warden, Smith v. McCotter, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Pena-Perez v. Louisiana State Bar Assn., Dace v. South Dakota et al.,
   ante, p. 825;

ante, p. 810;

ante, p. 809;

ante, p. 830;

ante, p. 836;

ante, p. 872;

ante, p. 809;

No. 86-5031.

No. 86-5045.

No. 86-5053.

No. 86-5248.

ante, p. 857;

ante, p. 857;

ante, p. 858; and

ante, p. 867. Petitions for rehearing denied.

Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.


text:
    November 12, 1986
    No. 85-1623.
    Islamic Republic of Iran et al. v. Boeing Co. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    November 17, 1986
    No. 86-5576.
    Allen v. Department of Human Resources.
   Appeal from Super. Ct. Ga., Baldwin County, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-1011.
    United States v. Harris et ux.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of O’Connor v. United States, ante, p. 27.


text:
    No.-.
    Cane v. Sowders, Warden.
   Motion to proceed informa pauperis without submitting an affidavit in support thereof granted.


text:
    No. A-176 (86-5387).
    LaFramboise v. Alaska.
   Ct. App. Alaska. Application for stay, addressed to Justice O’Connor and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-369.
    Martin v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Powell, and by him referred to the Court, is granted pending the timely filing and disposition by this Court of a petition for writ of certio-rari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay terminates automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, this stay shall continue pending the issuance of the mandate of this Court.


text:
    No. D-588.
    In re Disbarment of Speert.
   It is ordered that Victor Allen Speert, of Austin, Tex., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-589.
    In re Disbarment of Benedict.
   It is ordered that Mark J. Benedict, of San Antonio, Tex., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-590.
    In re Disbarment of Kazdoy.
   It is ordered that Alan Craig Kazdoy, of Midlothian, Tex., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 84-6075.
    Tison v. Arizona (two cases).
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. [Certiorari granted, 475 U. S. 1010.] Motion of petitioners for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 85-732.
    Western Air Lines, Inc., et al. v. Board of Equalization of the State of South Dakota et al.
   Sup. Ct. S. D. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 475 U. S. 1008.] The parties are directed to file supplemental briefs within 20 days addressing the following questions:

“1. Under 49 U. S. C. § 1513(d)(3), the subsection ‘shall not apply to any in lieu tax which is wholly utilized for airport and aeronautical purposes.’ Is the question whether a state tax is an ‘in lieu tax which is wholly utilized for airport and aeronautical purposes,’ one of state or federal law?

“2. If federal law governs the question whether a tax is an ‘in lieu tax’ under § 1513(d)(3), is the South Dakota Airline Flight Property Tax, S. D. Codified Laws, Ch. 10-29, an ‘in lieu tax’ under § 1513(d)(3)?”

The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief within 20 days expressing the views of the United States on these questions.

Justice White and Justice Marshall dissent from the order directing supplemental briefing.


text:
    No. 85-782.
    Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 475 U. S. 1009.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 85-1626.
    Goodman et al. v. Lukens Steel Co. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of petitioners to expedite consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-1645.
    Lukens Steel Co. v. United Political Action Committee et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of the parties to defer consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 86-71.
    No. 86-97.
    CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corporation of America; and Indiana v. Dynamics Corporation of America.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 810.] Motion of appellants to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 86-87.
    United States v. Salerno et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 929.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 86-104.
    Board of Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles et al. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 812.] Motion of Andrew J. Ekonomou, Esquire, to permit Jay Alan Sekulow to present oral argument pro hac vice granted.


text:
    No. 86-5524.
    Mayer v. Angelica.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until December 8, 1986, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

For the reasons expressed in Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U. S. 928 (1983), we would deny the petition for writ of certiorari without reaching the merits of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.


text:
    No. 86-5718.
    In re Miesbauer.
   Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 86-98.
    Rivera v. Minnich.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Pa. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 86-281.
    Ray v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 86-511.
    Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fink et ux.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 86-475.
    Frazier v. Heebe, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of American Corporate Counsel Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 86-510.
    United States v. Hohri et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.

Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 86-526.
    Caterpillar Inc. et al. v. Williams et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Merchants & Manufacturers Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 86-5344.
    Miller v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 85-2047.
    Florida v. Kane.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-2077.
    Bryan et al. v. Erkins et al.; and United Steelworkers of America v. Erkins et al.
    No. 86-372.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-6911.
    Hyche v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-6917.
    Moss v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-6992.
    Gardner v. Lusby et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-7019.
    Ganus v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-7094.
    Thibault v. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-7179.
    Trench v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-170.
    Provenzano v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-280.
    Outboard Marine Corp. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-311.
    Richards v. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-314.
    Alley et vir v. Gubser Development Co. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-351.
    City of St. Charles et al. v. American Civil Liberties Union et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-352.
    Krzyske v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-362.
    House of Wheat et al. v. Wright et al.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Montgomery County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-404.
    Whaley v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-442.
    Air Line Employees Assn., International v. Republic Airlines, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-485.
    Maynard, Warden v. Bowen.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-486.
    Cohen, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, et al. v. Clark.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-488.
    Powell v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-494.
    Story v. Wyoming.
   Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-498.
    Gilmore v. Zimmerman, Attorney General of Pennsylvania.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-508.
    Mastropietro v. Mastropietro.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-515.
    Judy’s Foods, Inc., et al. v. A & B Food Services Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-517.
    Boles v. Ellis et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-519.
    Schiavone Construction Co. et al. v. Merola, District Attorney of Bronx County, New York.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-535.
    Lee v. Union Electric Co. et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-605.
    Keval v. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-616.
    Rogers v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-617.
    Becker et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-627.
    Montgomery et al. v. Board of Zoning Adjustments of City of New Orleans et al.
   Ct. App. La., 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-658.
    Bader et al. v. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-659.
    Reynolds et al. v. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-660.
    Bruce v. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-661.
    Allen et al. v. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5017.
    Graybill v. United States Postal Service.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5054.
    Mendiola-Navarette v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5077.
    Ruffen v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5081.
    Riley v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5118.
    Craig v. Engle, Deputy Director, Correctional Programs, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5187.
    Reeves v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5209.
    Windsor v. Idaho.
   Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5210.
    Lightfoot v. White, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5229.
    Salgado-Hernandez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5241.
    Bell v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5261.
    Slader v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5268.
    Artis v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5312.
    Rowland v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5328.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5514.
    Leyton-Argenal v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5551.
    Stankowski v. Conte et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5554.
    Rodrigues v. Gudeman et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5555.
    Smith v. Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5558.
    Britton v. Perini, Superintendent, Marion Correctional Institution.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5560.
    Brown v. Welldon et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5561.
    McCarthy v. Lopes, Commissioner, Connecticut Department of Corrections.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5562.
    McRae v. Blackburn, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5564.
    Herships v. McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5567.
    Clemente v. Campoy, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5568.
    Jones v. Kemp, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5569.
    Crochet v. Blackburn, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5574.
    Parr v. Foltz, Regional Administrator, Michigan Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5580.
    Baltsavias v. Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5584.
    Marsett v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5585.
    Salanardi v. Warden, Metropolitan Correctional Center, New York, New York.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5643.
    Masters v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5680.
    Hollis v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5685.
    Felton v. Hicks et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-1903.
    Colorado v. Santistevan.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Motion of Colorado District Attorneys Council et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice Blackmun,

text:
    No. 85-2107.
    Amoco Oil Co. v. Jim Heilig Oil & Gas, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun,

with whom Justice O’Connor joins,

dissenting.

This case concerns an application of the “separate document” requirement for judgments contained in Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I dissent from the denial of certiorari because I am persuaded that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit misconstrued our prior cases having to do with the requirement.

Petitioner Amoco Oil Co. took an appeal from an order issued by the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. On May 21, 1985, the District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling by a memorandum and order consisting of a single document. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The motion was denied on June 28 in a similar single-document memorandum and order.

On July 25, 1985, Amoco filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. That court issued an order directing Amoco to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed. It suggested that, because the District Court had issued its initial memorandum opinion and order on May 21, Amoeo’s filing would be 35 days late under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(a) and 26(a). App. to Pet. for Cert. C-1. In response, Amoco contended that, rather than being untimely, its appeal actually was premature, given that the District Court had never entered a judgment separate from the May 21 memorandum and order as Rule 58 requires. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention. It observed that in Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U. S. 381 (1978) (per curiam), this Court had adopted a commonsense, rather than a technical, approach to the requirements of Rule 58 so long as no party was misled. App. to Pet. for Cert. D-l. The Court of Appeals further noted that Amoco’s motion for reconsideration of the May 21 memorandum and order demonstrated that Amoco considered that opinion to be the final decision. Accordingly, the court concluded: “The mere technicality that the district court failed to file a separate judgment should not be used to give jurisdiction to this Court of an untimely filed appeal in which the parties were not misled by the lack of a separate judgment.” Id., at D-1 to D-2.

Rule 58 provides in pertinent part: “Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document.” See n. 1, supra. The genesis and purpose of this “separate document” requirement, which was added to Rule 58 by amendment in 1963, are explained in the Advisory Committee Notes. Prior to the amendment difficulties had arisen in situations where a court had “written an opinion or memorandum containing some apparently directive or dispositive words, e. g., ‘the plaintiff’s motion [for summary judgment] is granted.’” 28 U. S. C. App., p. 627. At times court clerks had viewed these documents as a sufficient basis for entering a judgment. Problems occasionally arose, however, when the documents did not provide all the necessary elements of the judgment or when the court later would issue a formal judgment. Parties were thus uncertain as to when the judgment was effective and as to when the time began to run for purposes of filing postjudgment motions and appeals. The Advisory Committee observed: “The amended rule eliminates these uncertainties by requiring that there be a judgment set out on a separate document — distinct from any opinion or memorandum — which provides the basis for the entry of judgment.” Id., at 628.

This Court already has been concerned with the interpretation of Rule 58. In United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U. S. 216 (1973) (per curiam), it was faced with a situation where, although a docket entry had been made on March 21, 1969, which noted jury verdicts in favor of respondent and another against the Government, the formal judgment specifying the amount of the verdicts was not entered until February 25, 1971. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the Government’s appeal, filed after the 1971 entry, as untimely. This Court reviewed the history of the 1963 amendment to Rule 58 and cited with approval Professor Moore’s remark that the Rule constituted “ ‘a mechanical change that would be subject to criticism for its formalism were it not for the fact that something like this was needed to make certain when a judgment becomes effective.’” Id., at 220 (quoting 6A J. Moore, Federal Practice § 58.04[4.-2], p. 58-161 (1972)). It also concluded that the appeal taken and abandoned by the Government during the time between the docketing of the jury verdict and the entry of judgment was not an appropriate part of the Rule 58 inquiry. It noted simply that “whatever may be the appropriate sanctions available in a particular case for capricious conduct on the part of a litigant, we do not believe that a case-by-case tailoring of the ‘separate document’ provision of Rule 58 is one of them.” 411 U. S., at 221. Accordingly, it concluded that the mechanical application of Rule 58, as advocated by Professor Moore, was appropriate and required reversal of the Court of Appeals’ judgment.

In Bankers Trust, supra, the Court returned to the separate-document matter. There the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had proceeded to a consideration of the merits of an appeal even though it could find no document appearing to be a judgment of the District Court. See id., at 382. The Court of Appeals based its decision on the fact that the District Court and the parties assumed that the dismissal had been adjudicated. Ibid. We approved that conclusion. We first observed that the major purpose behind the separate-document requirement was to clarify when the time for an appeal begins to run. Citing the remarks of the Advisory Committee mentioned above, we further noted that the separate-document requirement was aimed particularly at “avoid[ing] the inequities that were inherent when a party appealed from a document or docket entry that appeared to be a final judgment of the district court only to have the appellate court announce later that an earlier document or entry had been the judgment and dismiss the appeal as untimely.” Id., at 385. We could not see, however, how the purpose of Rule 58 or the concerns of the Advisory Committee would be served in that case by depriving the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction because of the absence of a separate document. If the court were to lose jurisdiction for this reason, then “[u]pon dismissal, the district court would simply file and enter the separate judgment, from which a timely appeal would then be taken. Wheels would spin for no practical purpose.” Ibid. While observing that “[technical application” of Rule 58 would be necessary in a situation similar to the one in Indrelunas to avoid a party’s uncertainty as to when to bring an appeal, we concluded that the rule “should not prevent the parties from waiving the separate-judgment requirement where one has accidentally not been entered.” 435 U. S., at 386. In this respect, we cited another remark of Professor Moore: “ ‘[I]t must be remembered that the rule is designed to simplify and make certain the matter of appealability. It is not designed as a trap for the inexperienced. . . . The rule should be interpreted to prevent loss of the right of appeal, not to facilitate loss.’” Ibid. (quoting 9 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 110.08[2], pp. 119-120 (1970)).

These two decisions, I believe, are to be read to support the following proposition: the separate-document requirement must be applied mechanically in order to protect a party’s right of appeal, although parties may waive this requirement in order to maintain appellate jurisdiction of their case. Cf. 6A J. Moore, J. Lucas, & G. Grotheer, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶58.02.1, p. 58-22 (2d ed. 1986). The fundamental error of the Court of Appeals in this case, therefore, was to employ Amoco’s purported waiver to defeat its appeal. Amoco’s filing for reconsideration might well have signaled its recognition that the May 21 order was indeed the final judgment. As the Court made clear in Indrelunas, however, while relevant to the question of sanctions, a party’s conduct is irrelevant to the application of Rule 58 unless it serves to maintain the right of appeal. Given that a finding of waiver in this case results in Amoco’s loss of its right of appeal, then, under our earlier decisions in Indrelunas and Bankers Trust, Rule 58 should have been applied mechanically. The Court of Appeals should have dismissed the purported appeal and directed the District Court to enter a final judgment, from which a proper appeal could lie. Accordingly, I would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

       Rule 58 reads in its entirety:
      “Subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b): (1) upon a general verdict of a jury, or upon a decision by the court that a party shall recover only a sum certain or costs or that all relief shall be denied, the clerk, unless the court otherwise orders, shall forthwith prepare, sign, and enter the judgment without awaiting any direction by the court; (2) upon a decision by the court granting other relief, or upon a special verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories, the court shall promptly approve the form of the judgment, and the clerk shall thereupon enter it. Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document. A judgment is effective only when so set forth and when entered as provided in Rule 79(a). Entry of the judgment shall not be delayed for taxing of costs. Attorneys shall not submit forms of judgment except upon direction of the court, and these directions shall not be given as a matter of course.” (Emphasis supplied.)

       Inasmuch as the motion for reconsideration was untimely, it is not clear why the District Court entertained it. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 59(e). In any event, because of its untimeliness, the motion would not have tolled the time for Amoco’s appeal had there been no Rule 58 problem with the District Court’s original memorandum opinion and order. See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(4).


text:
    No. 86-219.
    No. 86-224.
    No. 86-225.
    No. 86-226.
    Southern Union Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe et al.; Southland Royalty Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe et al.; Exxon Corp. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe et al.; and Unicon Producing Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of Mountain States Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 782 F. 2d 855 and 793 F. 2d 1171.


text:
    No. 86-283.
    Cox v. Cox.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

with whom Justice O’Connor joins,

dissenting.

This Court, in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U. S. 210 (1981), held that federal law precludes a state court from dividing military retired pay pursuant to state community property laws. Congress, concerned with the effect our holding would have on the divorced spouses of retired military personnel, enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouse’s Protection Act (USFSPA), Pub. L. 97-252, 96 Stat. 730, 10 U. S. C. § 1408. That Act, in effect, nullified our decision in McCarty and permitted States to treat military retired pay as either the property of the military member or as property of both the member and his spouse. California enacted 1983 Cal. Stats., ch. 775, Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 5124 (West) (effective up to January 1, 1986). In so doing, the California Legislature declared that California would return to its pre-McCarty practice of treating military retired pay as community property.

This case presents the question whether USFSPA is to be given retroactive effect. In other words, is that Act to be read to permit spouses, whose divorce decrees were made final after our decision in McCarty but before USFSPA was enacted, to set aside that part of their divorce decrees denying them a share in a military pension because of our holding in McCarty. Petitioner in this case attempted to set aside her divorce decree which became final during the period of time between our decision in McCarty and enactment of USFSPA. The California Court of Appeal held that USFSPA is not to be given retroactive effect. Other state courts which have considered this question have come to a different conclusion. E. g., Edsall v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 240, 693 P. 2d 895 (1984); Smith v. Smith, 458 A. 2d 711 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1983). Because of this confusion, and because the answer to the question presented turns on an interpretation of a federal statute, I would grant the petition for certiorari.


text:
    No. 86-459.
    Cooper Industries, Inc. v. I. A. M. National Pension Fund Benefit Plan A et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.