text:
    No. 82-2028.
    Arnott v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

dissenting.

The petition for certiorari raises several issues, all but one of which do not warrant this Court’s review.

Petitioner Paul Arnott was convicted of a variety of drug-related offenses following a jury trial in which a number of hearsay statements made by his alleged co-conspirators were admitted. Before the trial commenced, the District Court ruled that such statements would be admitted conditionally subject to a later demonstration of their admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence under the procedure approved by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Vinson, 606 F. 2d 149, 153 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1074 and 445 U. S. 904 (1980). At the close of the Government’s case, petitioner moved to strike the co-conspirators’ statements that had been admitted over his continuing objection. In his view, the Government had failed to demonstrate that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) petitioner was a member of the conspiracy, and (3) the hearsay statements were made in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. See 606 F. 2d, at 152. The District Court denied petitioner’s motion.

On appeal, petitioner contended that the District Court had abused its discretion in considering the statements themselves in determining whether the Government had satisfied the prerequisites to admission of those statements. Without commenting on the sufficiency of the Government’s independent evidence, the Court of Appeals simply reaffirmed its previous holdings that Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) had modified prior law to the contrary so as to authorize the consideration of challenged hearsay statements in deciding the preliminary question of admissibility, see, e. g., United States v. Cassity, 631 F. 2d 461, 464 (1980); United States v. Vinson, supra, at 153, and rejected petitioner’s contention. 704 F. 2d 322, 325 (1983).

The rule adopted by the Sixth Circuit and applied in this case conflicts with the one enunciated by every other Court of Appeals that has addressed the issue. Those courts have, almost without exception, admitted statements of co-conspirators only upon a showing by a preponderance of independent evidence that a conspiracy existed in which the declarant and the defendant were both members and that the challenged statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Nardi, 633 F. 2d 972, 974 (CA1 1980); United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F. 2d 54, 56-57 (CA2), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 839 (1981); Government of Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 633 F. 2d 660, 665 (CA3), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 960 (1980); United States v. Gresko, 632 F. 2d 1128, 1131-1132 (CA4 1980); United States v. James, 590 F. 2d 575, 580-581 (CA5) (en banc), cert. denied, 442 U. S. 917 (1979); United States v. Regilio, 669 F. 2d 1169, 1174 (CA7 1981), cert. denied, 457 U. S. 1133 (1982); United States v. Bell, 573 F. 2d 1040, 1043-1044 (CA8 1978); United States v. Andrews, 585 F. 2d 961, 964-967 (CA10 1978); United States v. Monaco, 702 F. 2d 860, 876-880 (CA11 1983) (stating standard in terms of both substantial evidence and preponderance of the evidence); United States v. Jackson, 201 U. S. App. D. C. 212, 227-234, 627 F. 2d 1198, 1213-1220 (1980). The Ninth Circuit requires independent evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case that a conspiracy existed and that the defendant was part of it. See United States v. Miranda-Uriarte, 649 F. 2d 1345, 1349-1350 (1981). See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 701, and n. 14 (1974) (dicta).

In opposing the petition, the Government argues that it introduced sufficient independent evidence of the existence of a conspiracy and of the membership of petitioner and the declar-ants to render the hearsay statements admissible under the test adopted by most Courts of Appeals. Although a close examination of the record might support this claim, the Court of Appeals made no finding concerning the weight of the independent evidence and did not purport to hold that the prerequisites to admission of co-conspirator statements established by Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) would have been satisfied had the District Court not considered the statements themselves. Similarly, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that one co-conspirator’s statements “were few and cumulative to the overwhelming evidence against Arnott,” 704 F. 2d, at 325, does not establish that all of the admitted statements, considered together, did not prejudice petitioner. This Court need not scour the record to find alternative justifications — not relied on below — for a decision resting on a legal principle that consistently has been repudiated in other Circuits.

Accordingly, I would grant the petition for certiorari and set the case for oral argument.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 82-2107.
    Alabama v. Taylor.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-340.
    Greer, Warden, Menard Correctional Center v. Parisie.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice White,

text:
    No. 83-63.
    International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 323, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun join,

dissenting.

After determining that one of its members was working in a supervisory capacity for a nonunion employer, Local No. 323 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) charged the employee with violating the IBEW constitution. That document provides that a member may be penalized for “[wjorking in the interest of any organization or cause which is detrimental to, or opposed to, the I. B. E. W.” The employee was fined and ultimately expelled from the union.

The National Labor Relations Board charged the Local with an unfair labor practice for violating § 8(b)(1)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(1)(B), which provides in pertinent part that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents — (1) to restrain or coerce . . . (B) an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances.” After a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge found that the discipline was imposed for “working for a nonunion contractor,” which in his view constituted unlawful coercion. On review, the Board adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s findings and conclusions. It issued a cease-and-desist order and ordered various affirmative relief. 255 N. L. R. B. 1395 (1981).

The Board then successfully petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for enforcement of its order. The court noted that in NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 73 (Chewelah Contractors, Inc.), 621 F. 2d 1035 (1980), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had held that a union does not violate § 8(b)(1)(B) by disciplining a member-supervisor for his employment with a nonunion company if the union neither represents the company’s employees nor displays a representational interest in them. The Eleventh Circuit declined to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute, stating that it found the Chewelah limitation inconsistent with the statute’s central aim. 703 F. 2d 501, 507 (1983). It held that regardless of whether the union displays a representational interest in the company’s employees, an attempt to force a member supervisor to cease working for a nonunion company infringes the employer’s right to select that person as its representative.

The conflict between the Ninth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit is clear. Identical action by a union will constitute an unfair labor practice in the Eleventh Circuit but not in the Ninth. Implementation of the national labor policy is hampered by such conflicting rules. Accordingly, I would grant the petition to settle the conflict.


author: Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    No. 83-151.
    Marshall, Superintendent, Southern Ohio Correctional Facility v. Walker.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-rari denied.

Justice Rehnquist,

with whom The Chief Justice and Justice O’Connor join,

dissenting.

Respondent Walker was indicted in Stark County, Ohio, for murdering an off-duty policeman during a grocery store robbery in July 1972. Two accomplices, the wife of the victim, and a disinterested eyewitness identified respondent as the perpetrator of the murder. Respondent’s defense was alibi; the records of the jail in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, showed on their face that Walker was incarcerated there between April 14 and August 1, 1972. If these records were accurate, Walker could not have been in the grocery store on July 22, 1972, when the murder took place. The accuracy of these records was hotly contested at trial.

After a jury trial respondent was convicted of first-degree murder. His conviction was affirmed by the Ohio Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court of Ohio, State v. Walker, 55 Ohio St. 2d 208, 378 N. E. 2d 1049 (1978), cert. denied, 441 TJ. S. 924 (1979). Respondent then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, which granted the writ on the ground that six evidentiary rulings of the Ohio trial court concerning the scope of prosecutorial cross-examination and rebuttal testimony denied respondent a fair trial as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment on the same grounds. Walker v. Engle, 703 F. 2d 959 (1983). I would grant certiorari to review this novel holding that trial rulings on the scope of prosecutorial cross-examination and rebuttal testimony are cognizable on federal habeas. No case from this Court has ever held that they are, and several of our cases strongly suggest that they are not. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 317 (1974); Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 227 (1941); see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U. S. 637 (1974) (prosecutorial misconduct); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U. S. 141 (1973) (erroneous jury instruction).

Respondent has contended throughout that irrelevant and prejudicial evidence was allowed before the jury. The Supreme Court of Ohio rejected his contention with this language:

“Upon a review of the contested testimony, we find that it was relevant, in that it tended to disprove the accuracy of the jail records, which was a question in dispute in the instant cause. The contested evidence went to the credibility of the various jail records by demonstrating the overall inefficiency of the persons and the system in which they were maintained and the general lack of inmate supervision.
“Moreover, upon an examination of the record, we find that the admission of certain of this testimony occurred without an objection and that a great proportion of this testimony occurred during cross-examination. The trial judge is posited with broad discretion in controlling cross-examination, and the appellant has the burden to show a patent abuse of discretion. We find, in the instant cause, that the admission of this testimony was relevant to the credibility of the jail records which support appellant’s alibi and was neither an abuse of discretion nor a resultant prejudicial harm to appellant.” State v. Walker, supra, at 214, 378 N. E. 2d, at 1052-1053 (footnote and citations omitted).

The District Court and the Court of Appeals, without suggesting that there was anything peculiar about the Ohio rules regarding relevancy or the trial court’s discretion to control the examination of witnesses, picked out six isolated instances in which those courts thought that prosecutorial cross-examination or rebuttal examination had been too broad, thereby infecting respondent’s entire trial with some sort of federal constitutional error:

(1) Defense witnesses were asked about the conviction of “Major” Payne, a former Warden of the jail, for theft of property from the jail. Payne had not been Warden at the time respondent was allegedly incarcerated, however, and Payne’s conviction occurred after respondent’s recorded period of detention. Disagreeing with the Supreme Court of Ohio, the Court of Appeals held that testimony relating to Payne’s conviction for stealing evidence had “no apparent connection to the issue whether a prisoner could leave the jail and return undetected.” Walker v. Engle, 703 F. 2d, at 963 (emphasis in original).

(2) Jail commissary records were introduced to show that Walker made numerous transactions during his confinement, including one on the day of the crime. The prosecutor tried to undermine this circumstantial evidence with testimony from jail deputies that other inmates could have made purchases on Walker’s commissary account.

The State also called Frank Lancianese, an examiner for the Office of the State Auditor. He testified that (1) an audit of the commissary account between 1969 and 1975 revealed a $66,000 shortage; (2) the Sheriff’s Department obstructed access to the commissary records; and (3) an audit of jail vending machine profits showed $9,000 unaccounted for by the Sheriff’s Department. The Court of Appeals determined that this rebuttal testimony was not relevant to impeaching the accuracy of commissary records used by respondent to support his alibi, saying that “the alleged thefts did not affect the record of commissary transactions relied on by Walker, but showed merely that commissary funds may have at some time been misappropriated by Sheriff’s Department personnel.” Id., at 964 (emphasis in original).

(3) In the words of the Court of Appeals, “[t]he prosecution was permitted, without any basis in the record, to insinuate [on cross-examination] that several defense witnesses from the Sheriff’s Department were being monitored and coached by Tom Booth in furtherance of a Sheriff’s Department coverup of improprieties.” Ibid.

(4) Respondent was first located in Chicago, Illinois, and a prosecution rebuttal witness was permitted to testify that Cuyahoga County authorities impeded respondent’s return to Stark County. The Court of Appeals rejected the State's claim of relevancy, describing the testimony as “highly irrelevant and prejudicial conjecture.” Ibid.

(5) The State called as one of its witnesses John Appling, a prisoner who had served as a “range boss” for the cellblock to which Walker was assigned. Appling took the stand, identified himself, and refused to testify on the basis that his testimony might incriminate him. The State then questioned other witnesses concerning Appling, seeking, in the words of the Ohio Supreme Court, “to test the recollection and credibility of the witnesses . . . .” State v. Walker, 55 Ohio St. 2d, at 218, 378 N. E. 2d, at 1054. The District Court, in sharp contrast, thought that this testimony “suggest[ed] to the jury that Appling’s testimony would have been helpful to the prosecution had he testified . . . .” Walker v. Engle, C79-2132 (ND Ohio, Jan. 28, 1981), App. to Pet. for Cert. A41. The Court of Appeals agreed.

(6) The Court of Appeals also found objectionable the State’s use, over objection, of newspaper clippings to refresh the recollection of defense witnesses during cross-examination regarding the conditions at the Cuyahoga County jail. The clippings referred to problems within the jail, and the Court of Appeals thought the use of these clippings had an “inflammatory and prejudicial effect upon the jury.” Walker v. Engle, supra, at 968.

The lower courts agreed that the evidence could sustain respondent’s conviction for the murder with which he was charged. What the Court of Appeals did, in effect, was to select from this massive evidence three examples of trial rulings respecting the examination of defense witnesses, one ruling respecting a witness who refused to testify, and two instances of the scope of rebuttal testimony, and to conclude that their combined effect was to deny respondent a “fair trial.” In so doing, I think the Court of Appeals went far beyond the permissible scope of federal habeas review of a state conviction.

Whether we as trial judges in this case would have limited cross-examination or rebuttal testimony more stringently than did the judge who presided over the trial is scarcely material to the inquiry on federal habeas corpus. The prosecution was trying to impeach documentary evidence which gave a criminal defendant, placed at the scene of the crime by several witnesses, an apparently airtight alibi — that he was confined in jail in another county when the crime occurred. The manner in which these records might be impeached, whether by showing potential inaccuracies in the methods by which they were kept, or by showing other deficiencies in the office that was responsible for keeping the records, must under our system be left to the discretion of the trial judge. In Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S., at 227-228, this Court said:

“The Fourteenth Amendment leaves California free to adopt a rule of relevance which the court below holds was applied here in accordance with the state’s law.”

This Court has even gone so far as to overturn a trial judge’s ruling limiting cross-examination, stating that under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution,

“[sjubject always to the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness’ story to test the witness’ perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i. e., discredit, the witness.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S., at 316.

By failing to heed the rulings in Lisenba and Davis, the Court of Appeals impermissibly intruded federal habeas review into essentially discretionary rulings of a state trial judge on a hotly contested issue at trial. I would grant certiorari to review its judgment.


text:
    No. 83-171.
    Transamerica Computer Co., Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.

Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 83-418.
    Affeldt et al. v. J. C. Penney Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 83-190.
    Abatti Farms, Inc., et al. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Motion of Western Growers Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-272.
    Basic Construction Co. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 83-282.
    Wilson et al. v. Block, Secretary of Agriculture, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 83-388.
    E-Systems, Inc., et al. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondent Howard R. Clymer for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5025.
    Larsen v. Sielaff et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 83-5329.
    No. 83-5354.
    Buford v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. Amadeo v. Kemp, Superintendent, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center.
   Sup. Ct. Fla.; and

Sup. Ct. Ga. Cer-tiorari denied. Reported below: No. 83-5329, 428 So. 2d 1389.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    November 4, 1983
    No. 83-389.
    Filco et al. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    November 7, 1983
    No. 83-430.
    Heimbach, County Executive of Orange County, et al. v. New York et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 83-449.
    Burke Distributing Corp., dba B & W Transportation, et al. v. Massachusetts.
   Appeal from Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 83-467.
    Paulson et al. v. County of Pierce.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wash, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-1712.
    Sumner, Warden v. Mata.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pawperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded with directions to dismiss the appeal as moot. Justice Stevens would deny certiorari.


text:
    No. A-310 (82-6982).
    Narcisse v. Louisiana,
   ante, p. 865. Application to suspend the effect of the order denying certiorari pending action on the petition for rehearing, addressed to JUSTICE Brennan and referred to the Court, denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant the application.


text:
    No. D-345.
    In re Disbarment of Walgren.
    [For earlier order herein, see 461 U. S. 941.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-355.
    In re Disbarment of Gelb.
    [For earlier order herein, see 462 U. S. 1103.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-357.
    In re Disbarment of Harthun.
    [For earlier order herein, see 462 U. S. 1103.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-358.
    In re Disbarment of Sheehan.
    [For earlier order herein, see 462 U. S. 1103.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-359.
    In re Disbarment of McComb.
    [For earlier order herein, see 462 U. S. 1104.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-360.
    In re Disbarment of Tabenken.
    [For earlier order herein, see 462 U. S. 1114.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-36B.
    In re Disbarment of Gigliotti.
    [For earlier order herein, see 462 U. S. 1128.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-364.
    In re Disbarment of Downes.
    [For earlier order herein, see 463 U. S. 1204.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-381.
    In re Disbarment of Cairo.
   It is ordered that Victor C. Cairo, of Racine, Wis., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-384.
    In re Disbarment of Bizar.
   It is ordered that Philip Harold Bizar, of Highland Park, Ill., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-385.
    In re Disbarment of Drawdy.
   It is ordered that J. Wesley Drawdy, of Columbia, S. C., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-386.
    In re Disbarment of Perlow.
   It is ordered that Solomon Perlow, of Lawrence, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-387.
    In re Disbarment of Mandell.
   It is ordered that Irving Mandell, of Valley Stream, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 82-485.
    Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 1169.] Treating the telegram of David L. Kahn, Esquire, received November 3, 1983, as a motion of Larry Flynt for leave to present oral argument pro se, the motion is denied. Stephen M. Shapiro, Esquire, of Chicago, Ill., is invited to present oral argument as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below.


text:
    No. 82-940.
    Hishon v. King & Spalding.
   C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 1169.] Motion of petitioner for leave to file reply brief out of time denied.


text:
    No. 83-5384.
    Boylan v. United States Postal Service.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in-forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until November 28, 1983, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.

Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Black-mun,

dissenting.

For the reasons expressed in Brown v. Herald Co,, ante, p. 928, we would deny the petition for certiorari in this case without reaching the merits of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.


text:
    No. 83-5440.
    No. 83-5444.
    In re Green; and In re Percharo.
   Petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 83-18.
    Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Vt. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-317.
    Block, Sheriff of the County of Los Angeles, et al. v. Rutherford et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent Dennis Rutherford for leave to proceed informa pau-peris and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-321.
    No. 83-322.
    Waller v. Georgia; and Cole et al. v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certio-rari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 251 Ga. 124, 303 S. E. 2d 437.


text:
    No. 82-538.
    Godoy, aka Wood v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-2082.
    No. 82-2130.
    Larsen et al. v. Fisher; and Fisher v. Larsen et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 138 Cal. App. 3d 627, 188 Cal. Rptr. 216.


text:
    No. 82-6810.
    Mason v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6825.
    Kinner v. Morris, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6946.
    Ferguson v. Johnson et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-22.
    City of Rockford et al. v. Kaske et al.
   Sup. Ct. III. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-64.
    Alvero Cruz v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-65.
    Leaseway Transportation Corp. et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-71.
    United Parcel Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-79.
    Jensen v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-90.
    Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. Pierce, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-162.
    New York State Department of Taxation and Finance et al. v. Air Transport Association of America.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-179.
    Posey v. Skyline Corp.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-180.
    Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Secretary of the Interior et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-184.
    Hodges v. Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-278.
    Bobo v. DuCharme, Superintendent, Washington State Penitentiary, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-397.
    Ouimet Corp. et al. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-398.
    Mitsui & Co., Ltd., et al. v. Industrial Investment Development Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-408.
    Canadian Hidrogas Resources, Ltd., et al. v. MGPC, Inc.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-410.
    Roth v. Pritikin et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-416.
    Byrum et al. v. Lowe & Gordon, Ltd.; and Byrum et al. v. Patterson, Trustee, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-426.
    Sanchez et al. v. McFadden, Administrix of the Estate of McFadden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-437.
    Infant Doe v. Bloomington Hospital et al.
   Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-439.
    Siller et al. v. Hartz Mountain Associates et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-440.
    Scott v. Sylvester.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-448.
    MacDonald et al. v. Ferguson Reorganized School District R-2 et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-457.
    Hyde v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-462.
    Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. v. Zahrte.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-474.
    Stuart-Western, Inc. v. Cooling Systems & Flexibles, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-488.
    Kozachenko v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-522.
    Walker v. Marshall, Superintendent, Southern Ohio Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-543.
    Kirk v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-545.
    Sagan v. U. S. Supreme Court et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-566.
    Weiner v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-571.
    Arias v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-574.
    Eboli et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-584.
    Kramer v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5049.
    Carpenter v. Scoppa et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5111.
    Van Meter v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5123.
    Weston v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5127.
    Green v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5141.
    Davis v. Missouri.
   Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5179.
    Larson v. Kotos et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5184.
    Aguirre v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5198.
    Williams v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5224.
    Thompson v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5274.
    Fitzpatrick v. Smith, Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facility.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5283.
    Hopkins v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5316.
    Oliver et al. v. Huntingdon County Commissioners et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5393.
    Dollar et al. v. Haralson County, Georgia.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5397.
    Zerman v. Jacobs et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5404.
    West v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5405.
    Owens v. Barnes, Dauphin County Bureau of Elections, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5425.
    Bruce v. McKaskle, Acting Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5426.
    Finch v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5428.
    Bennett v. Texas et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5429.
    Gaddy v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5430.
    Lamore v. Inland Division of General Motors Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5434.
    Guy v. Tip Top, Faberge, Inc.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5436.
    Frost v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5439.
    Hoskins v. Thompson, Governor of Illinois.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5441.
    Meares-El v. Lane, Director, Illinois Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5443.
    Orenstein et al. v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5458.
    Cortez v. New Mexico.
   Ct. App. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5481.
    Castro v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Receiver for Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5503.
    Moore v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5515.
    Pineda-Chinchilla v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5518.
    Sammons v. Livesay, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5520.
    Pifer v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5532.
    Holliman v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5535.
    Jenks v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5546.
    Hillyard v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5554.
    Hampton v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5555.
    Zylstra v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1069.
    Peacock et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner Harvey Coleman Peacock for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1977.
    Wainwright, Director, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. v. Giardino.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-144.
    Vinzant v. King.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


author: Justice Brennan,

text:
    No. 82-2148.
    Whisenhunt et vir v. Spradlin et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan,

with whom Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun join,

dissenting.

This case raises important and recurring questions concerning the due process and privacy rights of public employees, and I therefore dissent from the denial of certiorari. Petitioners, a patrolwoman and a police sergeant, were suspended from their jobs, and the sergeant was demoted to patrolman, because they dated and spent several nights together. These punishments were imposed even though the Department failed to provide petitioners with any reasonable warning that their conduct was prohibited and did not come forward with any evidence that the activity adversely affected their job performance. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners’ contentions that the suspensions and demotion violated their constitutional rights. Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F. 2d 470 (CA5 1983).

Although issues concerning the regulation of the private conduct of public employees arise frequently, the lower courts have divided sharply both in their results and in their analytic approach, and guidance from this Court is unquestionably needed. I would grant certiorari and set the case for oral argument.

I

Petitioners Janet Shawgo and Stanley Whisenhunt met and began dating while both were with the Amarillo, Tex., Police Department. Whisenhunt was a sergeant who had been on the force for 11 years; Shawgo was a patrolwoman who had joined the Department a year earlier. The two worked different shifts, and Shawgo was not under Whisenhunt’s supervision. As their relationship developed, Whisenhunt informed his immediate supervisor, Lieutenant Boydston, that he and Shawgo would probably be spending some nights together. The lieutenant told Whisenhunt that that would be “fine, [but] that I didn’t want the two of them setting up housekeeping.” Petitioners spent an increasing amount of time together but, as directed by Lieutenant Boydston, maintained separate residences.

Sometime thereafter, respondent Chief of Police Lee Spradlin heard rumors about petitioners’ relationship. Without confronting them or their supervisors, Spradlin ordered Department detectives to conduct surveillance of the two police officers during off-duty hours. For 17 days, the detectives monitored Whisen-hunt’s home from a car parked in front of it and from a nearby apartment rented for that purpose. During that period, they observed Shawgo entering and leaving Whisenhunt’s apartment on a number of occasions. The detectives filed an investigative report with Chief Spradlin which detailed the times of Shawgo’s off-duty visits but also noted that petitioners had maintained separate residences.

On the Chief’s recommendation, the Department disciplined petitioners for their nonmarital “cohabitation.” Both were suspended without pay for 12 days; in addition, Whisenhunt was demoted from sergeant to patrolman. When notified of the punishments, petitioners were informed that their relationship violated § 113, Part 8, of Police Department regulations, which prohibits conduct that, “if brought to the attention of the public, could result in justified unfavorable criticism of [an officer] or the department.” Whisenhunt was told that his activities also violated § 123 of the regulations, which requires “diligent and competent” performance of duties that are not “otherwise specifically prescribed” in the rules, as well as city personnel Rule XIX, § 108, which proscribes “conduct prejudicial to good order.” No Amarillo police officer had ever before been disciplined for dating or “cohabitation” on these or any other grounds.

Petitioners exercised their statutory right to challenge the discipline before the Amarillo Civil Service Commission. The Commission refused to hear evidence of other known but unpunished instances of dating and cohabitation among members of the Police Department. There were no charges, evidence, or findings that the relationship violated any state law; that it affected the performance of petitioners’ duties; or that it was known to any members of the public. The Commission nevertheless upheld the discipline. Both officers subsequently resigned from the force because of unsatisfactory working conditions created by the discipline and publicity resulting from the hearing.

Petitioners brought this action in Federal District Court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against Chief Spradlin, the city, the Police Department, and members of the Amarillo Civil Service Commission. The complaint alleged that the discipline violated petitioners’ rights to privacy and to due process of law. After a trial, the District Court entered judgment in favor of the defendants in an unpublished opinion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F. 2d 470 (CA5 1983).

1 — 1 HH

Petitioners contend that, since they had no way of knowing that their private and otherwise lawful behavior violated the regulations quoted above, the discipline was imposed without due process of law. The Court of Appeals characterized this claim as “extremely persuasive”:

“[Whisenhunt] did not receive warning of the consequences of off-duty behavior that was a common practice at the Department and was expressly or tacitly approved by his supervisor. The actual conduct for which he was punished — dating and spending the night with a co-employee — is not self-evidently within the ambit of the regulations and thus does not carry with it its own warning of wrongdoing, as does illegal conduct .... In addition, the plaintiff here had no objective indication that his off-duty activities impaired his job- effectiveness.
“Moreover, the catchall regulation had not been given content by prior instances of discipline, for ‘the conduct resulting in their suspension was virtually identical to conduct previously tolerated.’ . . . The plaintiff had no notice, because he was the first officer disciplined for activities that were approved by his supervisor and that he had valid reasons to believe were common in the police force. In addition, by knowingly tolerating similar activities by other individuals, the Department may be seen as sanctioning conduct that could have fallen within the scope of the rule. . . . Whisenhunt’s supervisor’s express or tacit approval, the implicit sanctioning of similar behavior in the Department, and the absence of warnings or prior instances of.punishment, all raised a reasonable inference contradictory to the scope later ascribed to the general rule.” Id., at 478 (citations omitted).

Despite this conclusion, the Court of Appeals held that the rules afforded petitioners constitutionally sufficient notice that their conduct was prohibited. The court apparently believed that, in cases not involving criminal sanctions, formal administrative rule-makings, or activities protected by the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause imposes virtually no requirement of fair warning. See id., at 477-478, 479.

I believe this assumption fundamentally misperceives the purpose of the due process notice requirement. We have long recognized that “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.” Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926). See also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 357-358 (1983). The requirement that the government afford reasonable notice of the kinds of conduct that will result in deprivations of liberty and property reflects a sense of basic fairness as well as concern for the intrinsic dignity of human beings. Furthermore, the rule is instrumental to the constitutional concept of “ordered liberty.” By demanding that government articulate its aims with a reasonable degree of clarity, the Due Process Clause ensures that state power will be exercised only on behalf of policies reflecting a' conscious choice among competing social values; reduces the danger of caprice and discrimination in the administration of the laws; and permits meaningful judicial review of state actions. See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108-109 (1972); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399, 402-404 (1966); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 423, 437-439 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 532 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 307-308 (1940); Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 535-536 (1884). See generally McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 248-259 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting), and cases cited therein; Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67, 80-81 (1960).

The concern with arbitrary encroachments on freedom which underlies the notice requirement naturally has special force when the liberty interests at stake are fundamental. For this reason, we have demanded greater precision in laws which render conduct criminal or which may abridge First Amendment rights. See, e. g., Kolender v. Lawson, supra, at 858, and n. 8; Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 756 (1974); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 573, n. 10 (1974); Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 515 (1948). See infra, at 971. But the protections of the Due Process Clause are not limited to the most severe deprivations of liberty and property. As the Court held long ago, the requirement of fair warning does not prohibit particular types of penalties but rather “exaction of obedience to a rule or standard which [is] so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all.” A. B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U. S. 233, 239 (1925). Following the principle of A. B. Small, we have frequently entertained claims that regulations of economic and professional activity are unconstitutionally vague, even when the law at issue depends on civil enforcement and has no apparent effect on First Amendment rights. See, e. g., Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 497-505 (1982); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35, 48-49 (1966); Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 443, 448 (1954); Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U. S. 297, 302-303 (1938).

The unexpected and ad hoc application of the city of Amarillo’s vague personnel regulations to petitioners’ conduct implicates precisely the concerns underlying the due process requirement of fair warning. There is not the slightest hint in either the language or the prior interpretations of the city’s rules that they forbid private, off-duty, lawful, and consensual sexual relations. Whatever policy reasons may have justified the discipline, they had apparently never before been expressed by either the State, the city, or the Police Department. Indeed, as the Court of Appeals explained, petitioners had good reasons to believe that their relationship was not so proscribed. Upholding the discipline, therefore, is not merely unfair, it “sanction[s] the most indefensible sort of entrapment by the State.” Raley v. Ohio, supra, at 438.

H-t » — I HH

For these reasons, I believe the discipline imposed on petitioners would have failed to satisfy the requirements of fair notice even if no fundamental rights had been at stake. But petitioners’ lawful, off-duty sexual conduct clearly implicates the “fundamental . . . right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.” Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969). Without identifying the precise contours of this right, we have recognized that it includes a broad range of private choices involving family life and personal autonomy. See, e. g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416, 426-427 (1983) (abortion); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 753 (1982) (child raising); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 383-385 (1978) (marriage); Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 684-685 (1977) (contraception); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion) (right to determine family living arrangements); Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 639-640 (1974) (pregnancy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 152-153 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453-454 (1972) (contraception); id., at 460, 463-465 (White, J., concurring in result); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 483-486 (1965) (marital privacy); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944) (family relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535, 541-542 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925) (child rearing and education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923) (same). These and other cases reflect the view that constitutionally protected liberty includes freedom from governmental disclosure of or interference with certain kinds of intensely personal decisions. The intimate, consensual, and private relationship between petitioners involved both the “interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and . . . the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions,” Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 599-600 (1977), that our cases have recognized as fundamental. Therefore, the notice requirement of the Due Process Clause demands particular precision in this case. See supra, at 970.

Indeed, because petitioners’ conduct involved fundamental rights, it could only be abridged to the extent necessary to achieve strong, clearly articulated state interests. See, e. g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., supra, at 427. The Court of Appeals concluded that petitioners’ punishment served a hypothesized interest in “forbidding members of a quasi-military unit, especially those different in rank, to share an apartment or to cohabit.” 701 F. 2d, at 483. Even assuming that this concern is sufficiently compelling to support explicit regulation of petitioners’ off-duty sexual activities, the city’s deterrent purposes obviously cannot be rationally served by regulations that fail to warn officers that such conduct is forbidden. Cf. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U. S. 238, 239, n. 1, 247-248 (1976) (promulgation of explicit rule regulating police officers’ hairstyles is rationally related to goal of making officers readily recognizable and inculcating esprit de corps); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 160 (1974) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.) (longstanding constructions and availability of official interpretations gave content to personnel regulations).

Public employers in general, and police departments in particular, may well deserve considerable latitude in enforcing codes of conduct. See Arnett v. Kennedy, supra; Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 773 (1974). It is hard to understand, however, how such a code can be either fairly or effectively enforced when employees are not told the standards of conduct to which they are expected to conform.

       See, e. g., Andrade v. City of Phoenix, 692 F. 2d 557 (CA9 1982); Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School Dist., 507 F. 2d 611 (CA5 1975), cert. dism’d as improvidently granted, 425 U. S. 559 (1976); Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F. 2d 375 (CA8 1973); Scott v. Macy, 121 U. S. App. D. C. 205, 349 F. 2d 182 (1965); Drake v. Covington County Board of Education,
        371 F. Supp. 974 (MD Ala. 1974) (three-judge court); Briggs v. North Muskegon Police Dept., 563 F. Supp. 585 (WD Mich. 1983); Baron v. Meloni, 556 F. Supp. 796 (WDNY 1983); Swope v. Bratton, 541 F. Supp. 99 (WD Ark. 1982); Suddarth v. Slane, 539 F. Supp. 612 (WD Va. 1982); Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449 (ED Pa. 1979); Wilson v. Swing, 463 F. Supp. 555 (MDNC 1978); Smith v. Price, 446 F. Supp. 828 (MD Ga. 1977), rev’d on other grounds, 616 F. 2d 1371 (CA5 1980); Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 436 F. Supp. 1328 (WD Pa. 1977), aff’d, 578 F. 2d 1374 (CA3), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 1052 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Major v. Hampton, 413 F. Supp. 66 (ED La. 1976); Mindel v. U. S. Civil Service Comm’n, 312 F. Supp. 485 (ND Cal. 1970). See also Phillips v. Bergland, 586 F. 2d 1007, 1011 (CA4 1978); Norton v. Macy, 135 U. S. App. D. C. 214, 217, 417 F. 2d 1161, 1164 (1969); Meehan v. Macy, 129 U. S. App. D. C. 217, 229-230, 232, 392 F. 2d 822, 834-835, 837 (1968), on reconsideration, 138 U. S. App. D. C. 38, 425 F. 2d 469, on rehearing en banc, 138 U. S. App. D. C. 41, 425 F. 2d 472 (1969); Taylor v. U. S. Civil Service Comm’n, 374 F. 2d 466, 469-470 (CA9 1967).

       Subsequent to the decision below, petitioners were married and Shawgo has adopted her husband’s last name. For convenience, Mrs. Whisenhunt will be referred to herein by her previous name.

       The statement of facts is adopted from the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F. 2d 470, 472-474 (CA5 1983).

       The Texas Penal Code expressly excludes from its sexual offense provisions “the conduct of persons while cohabitating, regardless of the legal status of their relationship and of whether they hold themselves out as husband and wife.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. §21.12 (1974). In addition, Texas has no statute prohibiting fornication.

       The Court of Appeals recognized that Whisenhunt, at least, was deprived of a constitutionally protected property interest when he was demoted from sergeant to patrolman. 701 F. 2d, at 476. See also infra, at 971-972.

       As noted above, Whisenhunt was not Shawgo’s supervisor.


author: Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 82-6780.
    No. 82-6997.
    McIlwain v. United States; and Hines v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 454 A. 2d 770.

Justice Marshall,

with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

I

Petitioners, convicted of second-degree burglary while armed, challenge their convictions on the ground that they were denied due process and the right to an impartial jury in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Their claims stem from the fact that the deliberations of the jury that convicted them were disrupted by the intoxication of the foreman of the jury. On the second day of deliberations, Friday, July 23, 1981, the trial judge received a note from members of the jury stating that they “ ‘would like to change the foreperson of the jury due to the fact that the present foreperson seems somewhat unable to preside this morning.’” Lee v. United, States, 454 A. 2d 770, 772 (D. C. 1982). That morning, prior to receiving the note, the judge’s chambers had received a call indicating that the foreman of the jury would be late. In addition, a marshal suggested to the judge that there might be some question as to whether one of the jurors was intoxicated.

The trial judge held a separate voir dire of each member of the jury. The foreman of the jury denied any intoxication, and one juror stated that there was no indication that the foreman had been drinking. Nine members of the jury stated that it was their belief that the foreman had been drinking. Their estimation of her degree of intoxication varied from observations that she appeared to be “a little intoxicated” to claims that she was flatly “drunk.”

At the conclusion of the voir dire the trial court suggested that the petitioners agree to an arrangement whereby the foreman of the jury would be dismissed and the case would be submitted to the remaining 11 jurors. Petitioners rejected that suggestion and proposed instead that the judge declare a mistrial. The trial judge acknowledged that the juror in question was “somewhat under the influence in a fashion . . . that makes deliberations . . . inappropriate at this time.” Pet. for Cert, of McIlwain 11. But the judge nonetheless denied the motion for a mistrial. Instead, he ordered an immediate 3-day recess, noting his hope that the “offending juror [would be] perfectly sober and able to deliberate” on Monday when deliberations would resume. Lee v. United States, 454 A. 2d, at 773. The judge expressly asked the juror to “come back on Monday refreshed.” Ibid. Before the jury resumed deliberations on Monday, the trial judge “look[ed] in” on the jurors and informed counsel that he detected no further disability. Ibid. The jury acquitted the petitioners of armed robbery but convicted them of second-degree burglary while armed.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the petitioners’ convictions on the ground that they had failed to show that they were prejudiced by the juror’s intoxication. Justifying this conclusion, the Court of Appeals observed:

“[0]nly one juror was involved, and only a short period of the deliberations was called into question. There is no evidence that any drinking actually occurred in the jury room or during the course of the trial, and the jury foreperson was not conclusively shown to have been intoxicated at the time of voir dire. The recess, coupled with the judge’s checking in on the jury on Monday, both of which were done with the concurrence of appellants’ counsel, foreclosed the possibility of prejudice. Under these circumstances, it cannot reasonably be said that the appellants were substantially deprived of their right to the judgment of objective and competent jurors.” Id., at 774.

This Court should grant certiorari and review the Court of Appeals’ decision because it raises serious questions regarding the standard to be applied in determining the conditions under which a juror’s misconduct and incapacity deprive a defendant of his Fifth Amendment right to due process and his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.

II

This Court has repeatedly insisted in a wide variety of contexts that the right to be tried before a jury capable and willing to decide a case solely on the evidence before it is a cornerstone of our criminal justice system. See, e. g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961). This precious right is denigrated when a conviction resting upon deliberations tainted by a juror’s gross and debilitating impropriety is allowed to stand.

The issue of juror misconduct usually involves allegations of juror bias. Here, however, the complaint is not that the juror in question was biased against the petitioners. Rather, the complaint is that the juror’s drunkeness rendered her incompetent and that a necessary corollary of the right to an impartial jury is the right to a jury in which all of the members are mentally competent. This Court as well as other courts have recognized the right to a mentally competent jury. See, e. g., Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U. S. 167, 176 (1912); Sullivan v. Fogg, 613 F. 2d 465 (CA2 1980) (trial before jury with an insane juror inconsistent with due process).

It is undisputed that one of the members of the jury — the person chosen to be its foreman — was inebriated during at least part of the deliberations. The trial judge specifically found that the juror was “somewhat under the influence,” and recessed the trial so that the offending juror would be able to deliberate after a 3-day respite. The extent of the juror’s incapacitation is highlighted by the trial judge’s suggestion that he simply dismiss her and allow the remaining jurors to decide the case on their own.

The Court of Appeals finds comfort in the fact that “only” one juror was intoxicated. Yet “only” one juror may be the difference between liberty and imprisonment. Due process requires that every member of a jury meet minimal requirements of mental competence and impartiality. The Court of Appeals also finds it relevant that “only a short period of the deliberations was called into question.” 454 A. 2d, at 774. But the Court of Appeals cites no facts and gives no reasons which support the notion that the affected period of deliberations was insignificant. Given the delicate dynamics of jury deliberations, it is simply impossible to know the effects the intoxicated juror had on her fellow jurors. Common sense would seem to indicate, however, that the general effect would not be conducive to the careful and objective deliberations upon which our criminal justice system relies.

In defending the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Government strongly relies upon this Court’s holding in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209 (1982). Smith involved allegations that a defendant had been denied due process because, during his state-court trial, one of the jurors applied to the prosecutor’s office for a job as an investigator. The prosecutor learned of the application during the trial but failed to disclose this information until after the jury had convicted the defendant. The state court conducted a post-trial evidentiary hearing and determined that the juror was not actually biased. The Federal District Court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, granted habeas corpus relief to the defendant on the ground that the juror’s action had deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to an impartial jury. This Court reversed, holding that the post-trial evidentiary hearing provided sufficient protection for the defendant. Establishing a new standard by which to determine disputes over the integrity of jury deliberations, the majority of this Court declared that “the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.” Id., at 215.

Smith is a flawed ruling for reasons I have previously articulated. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S., at 224-244 (Marshall, J., dissenting). It misrepresents the factual circumstances of the incident that was at issue. Id., at 229. It constitutes a departure from the mainstream of this Court’s decisions concerning the integrity of jury deliberations. Cf. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U. S. 493, 502 (1972) (opinion of Marshall, J.) (“[E]ven if there is no showing of actual bias in the tribunal, this Court has held that due process is denied by circumstances that create the likelihood or the appearance of bias”). It posits a standard for challenging juror misconduct that is unrealistically demanding since proof of actual bias is virtually impossible to discover. Smith v. Phillips, supra, at 230-232. In sum, Smith was wrongly decided, exerts a baleful influence over this Court’s consideration of analogous cases, and should be reconsidered.

Due process requires far more protection against juror misconduct than the “actual bias” test mandated by Smith. With respect to the cases at bar, due process may well require the granting of a mistrial whenever a trial judge finds that a juror, already engaged in deliberations, is so drunk that the deliberations must be recessed. This rule would undoubtedly affect very few trials; drunkenness on the part of active jurors is certainly an aberration. As to objections that this per se rule would create inconvenience and pose a drain on judicial resources, the only response is that such costs are what we must pay in order to give more than lip-service to our claim that trial by an impartial and competent jury constitutes a “priceless” right. See Irvin v. Dowd, supra, at 721. Because these cases present important issues implicating the constitutional right to a fair trial, I would grant the petitions.

       “JUROR CURLEY: I will tell it like it is. It seems like she is a little intoxicated. . . .
      “JUROR FRAZIER: As far as I am concerned, she had been drinking this morning, Your Honor. . . .
      “JUROR TYSON: She is not herself. She is just talking a lot ... I assume she is under the influence of some kind. . . .
      “JUROR FORD: I thought she was incompetent to preside because of the fact that she was a little intoxicated. . . .
      “JUROR FLYNN: She did look like she was under the influence of alcohol ... I do not think she should be a juror on this this morning. . . .
      “JUROR JACKSON: She seemed to be under the influence of alcohol, sir ... I think she still is a little intoxicated, unreasonable . . .
      “JUROR WATSON: Well, it seemed like she had been drinking and she wouldn’t let anyone else talk; just difficult to accomplish anything. . . .
      “JUROR HUNTER: To my knowledge I think she had just a little too much to drink to be in this position that we are in . . .
      “JUROR WALL: She is drunk_” Pet. for Cert, of Mcllwain 9.

       Although the Court of Appeals asserted that there is no evidence that drinking occurred during the course of the trial, two jurors indicated that the offending juror had been drinking during the trial, prior to the day she was examined by the judge. See Lee v. United States, 454 A. 2d 770, 772-773 (D. C. 1982); Pet. for Cert. of McIlwain 10-11.


text:
    No. 83-97.
    Nevada, by and Through the Welfare Division of the Department of Human Resources v. Vine et al.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Motion of respondent John Michael Vine for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-300.
    City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. National Audubon Society et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.

Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 83-434.
    Fools Crow et al. v. Gullet et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motions of Christie Institute et al. and American Civil Liberties Union et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-465.
    Ronwin v. Supreme Court of Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 83-5153.
    No. 83-5389.
    No. 83-5406.
    No. 83-5567.
    Hill v. Mississippi. Mincey v. Georgia. Bunch v. Virginia. Waterhouse v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Miss.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. Va.; and

Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 83-5153, 432 So. 2d 427; No. 83-5389, 251 Ga. 255, 304 S. E. 2d 882; No. 83-5406, 225 Va. 423, 304 S. E. 2d 271; No. 83-5567, 429 So. 2d 301.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 82-1946.
    No. 82-1991.
    No. 82-6550.
    No. 82-6676.
    No. 82-6971.
    No. 82-7033.
    No. 83-5.
    No. 83-93.
    No. 83-5114.
    No. 83-5143.
    No. 83-5228.
    No. 83-5254.
    Oyster v. Oyster, Schwarz v. Coastal Resources Management et al., Mullen v. Starr et al., Hannan v. Secretary of the Army et al., Hartford v. Arizona, Panter et al. v. Miller et al., Polskie Linie Lotnicze (LOT Polish Airlines) v. Robles et al., Gee v. Fung et al., Stevenson v. Conrad, Holland v. Guest Quarters, Alexander v. Zeanah et al., Wright v. New York Life Insurance Co.,
   ante, p. 801;

ante, p. 823;

461 U. S. 960; ante, p. 833;

ante, p. 842;

ante, p. 845;

ante, p. 845;

ante, p. 849;

ante, p. 857;

ante, p. 858;

ante, p. 861; and

ante, p. 862. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    November 8, 1983
    No. 83-544.
    Doe v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-rari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    November 14, 1983
    No. 83-405.
    Indiana University Foundation et al. v. Reed et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Kan. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-531.
    Gaunce v. DeVincentis et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 7th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of cer-tiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5446.
    Tatu et al. v. Davis et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5460.
    Betka v. City of West Linn et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-253.
    Moya v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983).


text:
    No. 83-453.
    National Labor Relations Board v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U. S. 393 (1983).


text:
    No. 83-460.
    United States v. McManigal.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Russello v. United States, ante, p. 16.


text:
    No. 82-1925.
    United States Department of State et al. v. Washington Post Co.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 812.] Judgment vacated and case remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions that it instruct the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to dismiss the complaint as moot.


text:
    No. A-233 (83-711).
    Nifong v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Brennan and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-361.
    In re Disbarment of Moore.
    [For earlier order herein, see 462 U. S. 1114.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-388.
    In re Disbarment of Goldburn.
   It is ordered that Glenn Jermaine Goldburn, of Rockville, Md., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 82-1295.
    Escambia County, Florida, et al. v. McMillan et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 460 U. S. 1080.] Motion of Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion of appellants for an order maintaining status quo denied.


text:
    No. 82-1458.
    No. 82-1509.
    Badaracco et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and Deleet Merchandising Corp. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 461 U. S. 925.] Motion of petitioners in No. 82-1453 for leave to file motion for divided argument out of time denied.


text:
    No. 82-1474.
    Hoover et al. v. Ronwin et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 461 U. S. 926.] Motion of Maryland for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae, for divided argument, and for additional time for oral argument denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 83-56.
    Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 812.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 83-95.
    Patton et al. v. Yount.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certio-rari granted, ante, p. 913.] Motion of respondent for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that George E. Schu-macher, Esquire, of Pittsburgh, Pa., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 83-5338.
    Anderson v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until December 5, 1983, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.

Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

For the reasons expressed in Brown v. Herald Co., ante, p. 928, we would deny the petition for certiorari in this case without reaching the merits of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.


text:
    No. 82-7027.
    In re Abney.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 83-264.
    Burnett et al. v. Grattan et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-103.
    Woodkraft Division, Georgia Kraft Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-rari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 82-1885.
    Terramar Beach Community Improvement Assn., Inc. v. Carrithers et al.
   Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1990.
    Austin v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1993.
    Joiner v. Vasquez.
   Ct. App. Tex., 5th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-2147.
    International Association of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers, Local 17 v. Young et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6777.
    Woods v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6906.
    Kerns v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-3.
    Baginsky v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-9.
    New Mexico ex rel. “One Minute of Silence” Statute et al. v. Burciaga, Judge, United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-106.
    H. M. Trimble & Sons, Ltd. v. Kingsley & Keith (Canada) Ltd. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-189.
    Lewallen et al. v. Kentucky.
   Cir. Ct. Ky., Campbell County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-233.
    Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Aranson et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-260.
    Pettineo v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-263.
    Fogle v. Supreme Court of South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-279.
    Pius XII Academy, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-310.
    Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-347.
    Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction v. Dyas.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-472.
    Atchison v. Career Service Council of Wyoming.
   Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-477.
    Earle M. Jorgensen Co. et al. v. City of Seattle, Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-486.
    Thompson v. Moorman et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-489.
    Kazanzas v. Walt Disney World Co.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-500.
    Hartke v. McKelway.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-501.
    Hayes v. City of Baton Rouge.
   19th Jud. Dist. Ct. La., East Baton Rouge Parish. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-503.
    Rippetoe v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-505.
    Electronic Currency Corp. et al. v. Western States Bankcard Assn. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-515.
    Benally et al. v. UNC Resources, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-517.
    Chocallo v. Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, Social Security Administration, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-569.
    Hageman v. Home Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-622.
    Zuniga et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-626.
    Kleinman et ux. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5030.
    Daniels v. Mintzes, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5043.
    Rhodes v. Stewart, Trustee in Bankruptcy, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5058.
    Sharp v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5105.
    Fields v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5176.
    Zazueta-Lopez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5177.
    Whittington v. McKaskle, Acting Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5192.
    Healy v. Maggio, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5204.
    Guigno et al. v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5396.
    Mosley v. Smith et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5399.
    Holmes v. King, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5447.
    Redman v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5450.
    Schwartz v. Maiden et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5452.
    McCurdy v. Landmark Financial Corporation of Georgia et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5455.
    Smith v. Morris, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5456.
    Mingo v. Maggio, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5459.
    Stinson v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5461.
    Green v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5466.
    Robinson v. Warden, Maryland State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5467.
    Moreno v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5468.
    Phillips v. Alonzo et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5471.
    Morgan v. Zimmerman, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5476.
    John v. Wilkinson, Warden.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5478.
    Washington et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5480.
    Reseburg v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 12th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5485.
    Ashby v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5486.
    Dugar v. Maggio, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5487.
    Roby v. Kansas.
   Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5489.
    Christiansen v. Texas.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5491.
    Brown v. Douglas, Judge.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5499.
    Mayes v. Sowders, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5519.
    Powell v. Nuth et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5521.
    Ceniceros v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5522.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5529.
    Cserenyi et al. v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5531.
    Goodridge v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5556.
    Salser v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5557.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5558.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5580.
    Carter v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5584.
    Chernack v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5587.
    Mansaw v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5592.
    Webber v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5595.
    Ambrose v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5598.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-153.
    Faulkner et al. v. Merritt.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-483.
    Hydroculture, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 83-5339.
    No. 83-5367.
    No. 83-5449.
    No. 83-5454.
    No. 83-5457.
    No. 83-5463.
    Dick v. Kemp, Superintendent, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center. Moore v. Louisiana. Richmond v. Arizona. Womack v. Alabama. Jernigan v. Texas. Elledge v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. La.;

Sup. Ct. Ariz.;

Sup. Ct. Ala.;

Ct. Crim. App. Tex.; and

Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 83-5367, 432 So. 2d 209; No. 83-5449, 136 Ariz. 312, 666 P. 2d 57; No. 83-5454, 435 So. 2d 766; No. 83-5457, 661 S. W. 2d 936; No. 83-5463, 432 So. 2d 35.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 83-5438.
    Lewis v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 82-6255.
    No. 82-6888.
    No. 82-6960.
    No. 83-53.
    No. 83-5107.
    No. 83-5244.
    Smith, aka El-Amin v. Government of the Virgin Islands, Kaplan v. Office of the U. S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey et al., Clark v. Marston et al., Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Schaaf, Brown v. Lutheran Hospital Society of Southern California, dba Santa Monica Hospital Medical Center, Tucker v. London Gold Exchange,
   ante, p. 831;

ante, p. 839;

ante, p. 874; ante, p. 848;

ante, p. 856; and

ante, p. 897. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    November 28, 1983
    No. 83-451.
    Wilson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   Appeal from C. A. 10th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 83-534.
    Farber v. Oregon.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ore. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 83-535.
    Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc., et al. v. Town of Marshfield.
   Appeal from Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice Brennan and Justice White would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 83-555.
    Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Montana.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Mont, dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Justice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 83-561.
    Moretti et al. v. Multi-Pak Corp. et al.
   Appeal from Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1367.
    Roadway Express, Inc. v. Warren.
   Ct. App. Ga. [Certiorari granted, 461 U. S. 904.] Writ of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted.


text:
    No. A-335.
    Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections v. Thompson.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Application for stay of mandate, addressed to Justice Rehnquist and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-358.
    Knapp v. Arizona.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Rehnquist, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens would grant the application.


text:
    No. D-382.
    In re Disbarment of Laber.
   It is ordered that Henry W. Laber, of Madiera Beach, Fla., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-383.
    In re Disbarment of Lowenthal.
   It is ordered that Franklyn L. Lowenthal, of Yonkers, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 82-1295.
    Escambia County, Florida, et al. v. McMillan et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 460 U. S. 1080.] Motion of American Civil Liberties Union for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-1474.
    Hoover et al. v. Ronwin et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 461 U. S. 926.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted, and 15 minutes of respondents’ time for oral argument is allotted for that purpose. Motion of Maryland et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae and for divided argument denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions.


text:
    No. 82-1577.
    Michigan Canners & Freezers Assn., Inc., et al. v. Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Board et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 912.] Motion of appellees for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 82-1721.
    Seattle Times Co., dba The Seattle Times, et al. v. Rhinehart et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 812.] Motion of American Civil Liberties Union et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-1795.
    Capital Cities Cable, Inc., et al. v. Crisp, Director, Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 813.] Motion of National League of Cities for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-1845.
    Colorado v. Nunez.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. [Certio-rari granted, ante, p. 812.] Motion of respondent to dismiss the writ of certiorari for want of jurisdiction denied.


text:
    No. 82-1913.
    No. 82-1951.
    Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority et al.; and Donovan, Secretary of Labor v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority et al.
   D. C. W. D. Tex. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 812.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 82-1998.
    Secretary of the Interior et al. v. Community for Creative Non-Violence et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted sub nom. Watt v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, ante, p. 812.] Motion of respondents to vacate order staying the mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied.


text:
    No. 83-96.
    Limbach, Tax Commissioner of Ohio v. Hooven & Allison Co.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 813.] Motion of International Association of Assessing Officers for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 83-5581.
    Glover et al. v. Alexander, Secretary of the Army.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until December 19, 1983, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.

Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

For the reasons expressed in Brown v. Herald Co., ante, p. 928, we would deny the petition for certiorari in this case without reaching the merits of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.


text:
    No. 83-664.
    In re Freeman.
   Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 83-365.
    No. 83-5542.
    In re Moore, by Moore et al.; and In re Gill.
   Petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 83-498.
    No. 83-573.
    Brown, Director, Department of Law and Public Safety, Division of Gaming Enforcement, State of New Jersey, et al. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International Union Local 54 et al.; and Danziger, Acting Chairman, Casino Control Commission of New Jersey, et al. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International Union Local 54 et al.
   Appeals from C. A. 3d Cir. Probable jurisdiction noted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 709 F. 2d 815.


text:
    No. 83-436.
    Regan, Secretary of the Treasury, et al. v. Wald et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-458.
    Block, Secretary of Agriculture, et al. v. Community Nutrition Institute et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-346.
    United States v. Yermian.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-712.
    New Jersey v. T. L. O.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certio-rari granted.


text:
    No. 82-1983.
    Caliguri v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6620.
    Breitegan v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6945.
    Loe v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6986.
    Hardrich v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6992.
    Duran v. California.
    Reported below: 140 Cal. App. 3d 485, 189 Cal. Rptr. 595.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-28.
    Cina v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-61.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-73.
    No. 83-5083.
    Ferrante et al. v. United States; and Mers et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 701 F. 2d 1321.


text:
    No. 83-108.
    Shope, Executrix of the Estate of Shope v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-139.
    Pegues et al. v. Mississippi State Employment Service et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-159.
    Greenman v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-166.
    Guippone et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-176.
    No. 83-5195.
    Herrmann v. United States; and Ennis v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 707 F. 2d 362.


text:
    No. 83-177.
    Letnes v. United States District Court for the District of Arizona et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-186.
    Idaho ex rel. Moon, Treasurer of Idaho v. State Board of Examiners et al.
   Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-203.
    Barnett v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-205.
    City of Wauwatosa Fire Department v. Orzel.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-216.
    McCranie v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-229.
    Wimmer v. Lehman, Secretary of the Navy, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-234.
    Ennis v. North Dakota.
   Sup. Ct. N. D. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-244.
    Telegraph Savings & Loan Assn. et al. v. Schilling et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-296.
    Lebovitz v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-299.
    Tilford et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-325.
    City of Evanston et al. v. Lubavitch Chabad House of Illinois, Inc., et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-329.
    County of Rockland v. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-331.
    Shirilla, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Taylor v. Smallwood et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-336.
    Maintenance Contractors, Inc. v. Pierce, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-338.
    Xheka et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-353.
    No. 83-596.
    Salorio et al. v. Glaser, Director of the Division of Taxation, Department of the Treasury of New Jersey; and Glaser, Director of the Division of Taxation, Department of the Treasury of New Jersey v. Salorio et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 N. J. 447, 461 A. 2d 1100.


text:
    No. 83-358.
    Martorano v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-361.
    Erlbaum, New York City Criminal Court Judge v. Morgenthau, New York County District Attorney.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-368.
    Russo et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-425.
    Mancuso et al. v. City of New York et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-463.
    Stern v. Shouldice et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-510.
    Local Union 1702, United Mine Workers of America v. Consolidation Coal Co.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-516.
    Baer Manufacturing, Inc., et al. v. Sheet Metal Workers Pension Plan of Southern California, Arizona, and Nevada, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-520.
    Meyer v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-521.
    Plaza de las Armas, Inc., et al. v. City of San Antonio et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-526.
    Rickards et al. v. Canine Eye Registration Foundation, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-528.
    Coburn v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-536.
    Barclay Equestrian Center, Inc. v. Continental Bank of Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-540.
    Westbrook v. Hutchinson Crane Excavating Co., Inc.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-549.
    Abramoff v. Wisconsin.
   Ct. App. Wis. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-550.
    Jameson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-554.
    University College of the University of Alabama in Birmingham et al. v. Johnson et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-556.
    Presto Casting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-557.
    Regal et ux., dba Regal Crest Village of Brookfield, et al. v. Behul et ux.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 88-560.
    Edwards et al. v. Bechtel Associates Professional Corp., D.C., et al.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-562.
    Dean v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-564.
    Hawkins et al. v. Jno. McCall Coal Export Corp. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-567.
    Hess v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-577.
    Lionti et al. v. Lloyd’s Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-579.
    Elkins v. Board of Law Examiners of North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-582.
    Jones et ux. v. North Carolina et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-604.
    Sandlin v. North Carolina.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-609.
    Blair et al. v. Boulger.
   Sup. Ct. N. D. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-615.
    Marx v. Centran Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari before judgment denied.


text:
    No. 83-627.
    Wiginton v. Veterans Administration.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-642.
    State Bank of St. Charles, as Administrator of the Estate of Ward v. Camic et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-645.
    Paul v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-646.
    Suarez v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-667.
    Cross v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-680.
    Motlagh v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-684.
    Smith v. Lubbers, General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-695.
    Smith International, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-711.
    Nifong v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-718.
    Botti v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5001.
    Madyun v. Franzen et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5005.
    Catanese v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5019.
    Roberts v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5022.
    Salazar v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5023.
    No. 83-5212.
    Bustamante-Cuadros v. United States; and Gravier v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5029.
    Lester v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5032.
    Banuelos-Sanchez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5061.
    Oliver v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5064.
    Ewing et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5080.
    Tenorio-Bohoroquez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

1519.


text:
    No. 83-5116.
    Harris v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5151.
    Bell v. Marshall, Superintendent, Southern Ohio Correctional Institute.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5178.
    Goddard v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5215.
    Steebe v. United States Railroad Retirement Board.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5252.
    Parker v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5259.
    Horton et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5266.
    Nardone v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5287.
    Shedd v. Higgs.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5291.
    Noe v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5302.
    Moore v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5309.
    Rickett v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5312.
    Madera v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5313.
    Hachler v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5326.
    Fields v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5330.
    Duncan v. Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5361.
    Moore v. Michigan Department of Corrections et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5370.
    Myers v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5374.
    Jones et al. v. Superior Court of California, Orange County.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5394.
    Calderon v. Department of the Army et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5415.
    Thomas v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5445.
    Ondrusek v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5451.
    Tijerina v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5464.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5469.
    Russ v. United States Postal Service et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5473.
    McFadden v. Lucas, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5474.
    White v. Colorado et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5477.
    Yelverton v. Blue Bell, Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.