author: Justice O’Connor Justice Stevens,

text:
    SOUTH DAKOTA v. NEVILLE
    No. 81-1453.
    Argued December 8, 1982
    Decided February 22, 1983
    O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 566.

      Mark V. Meierhenry, Attorney General of South Dakota, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Mark Smith, Assistant Attorney General.

      David R. Gienapp argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Indiana et al. by Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, and Palmer K. Ward, Deputy Attorney General, by Donald M. Bouton, Acting Attorney General of the Virgin Islands, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Charles A. Graddick of Alabama, Wilson L. Condon, of Alaska, Jim Smith of Florida, Tany S. Hong of Hawaii, Tyrone C. Fahner of Illinois, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, James E. Tierney of Maine, Warren R. Spannaus of Minnesota, JohnD. Ashcroft of Missouri, Michael T. Greeley of Montana, Robert Abrams oí New York, Rufus L. Edmisten of North Carolina, William J. Brown of Ohio, David Frohnmayer of Oregon, LeRoy S. Zimmerman of Pennsylvania, Daniel R. McLeod of South Carolina, William M. Leech, Jr., of Tennessee, John J. Easton of Vermont, Chauncey H. Browning of West Virginia, Bronson C. La Follette of Wisconsin, and Steven F. Freudenthal of Wyoming; for Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, Inc., by Hartley T. Hansen; and for the Texas District and County Attorneys Association et al. by David Crump.

   Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966), held that a State could force a defendant to submit to a blood-alcohol test without violating the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. We now address a question left open in Schmerber, supra, at 765, n. 9, and hold that the admission into evidence of a defendant’s refusal to submit to such a test likewise does not offend the right against self-incrimination.

I

Two Madison, South Dakota, police officers stopped respondent’s car after they saw him fail to stop at a stop sign. The officers asked respondent for his driver’s license and asked him to get out of the car. As he left the car, respondent staggered and fell against the car to support himself. The officers smelled alcohol on his breath. Respondent did not have a driver’s license, and informed the officers that it was revoked after a previous driving-while-intoxicated conviction. The officers asked respondent to touch his finger to his nose and to walk a straight line. When respondent failed these field sobriety tests, he was placed under arrest and read his Miranda rights. Respondent acknowledged that he understood his rights and agreed to talk without a lawyer present. App. 11. Reading from a printed card, the officers then asked respondent to submit to a blood-alcohol test and warned him that he could lose his license if he refused. Respondent refused to take the test, stating “I’m too drunk, I won’t pass the test.” The officers again read the request to submit to a test, and then took respondent to the police station, where they read the request to submit a third time. Respondent continued to refuse to take the test, again saying he was too drunk to pass it.

South Dakota law specifically declares that refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test “may be admissible into evidence at the trial.” S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. §32-23-10.1 (Supp. 1982). Nevertheless, respondent sought to suppress all evidence of his refusal to take the blood-alcohol test. The Circuit Court granted the suppression motion for three reasons: the South Dakota statute allowing evidence of refusal violated respondent’s federal constitutional rights; the officers failed to advise respondent that the refusal could be used against him at trial; and the refusal was irrelevant to the issues before the court. The State appealed from the entire order. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the suppression of the act of refusal on the grounds that § 32-23-10.1, which allows the introduction of this evidence, violated the federal and state privilege against self-incrimination. 312 N. W. 2d 723 (1981). The court reasoned that the refusal was a communicative act involving respondent’s testimonial capacities and that the State compelled this communication by forcing respondent “‘to choose between submitting to a perhaps unpleasant examination and producing testimonial evidence against himself,’” id., at 726 (quoting State v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260, 262, 212 N. W. 2d 863, 864 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 881 (1974)).

Since other jurisdictions have found no Fifth Amendment violation from the admission of evidence of refusal to submit to blood-alcohol tests, we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 456 U. S. 971 (1982).

HH hH

The situation underlying this case — that of the drunk driver — occurs with tragic frequency on our Nation’s highways. The carnage caused by drunk drivers is well documented and needs no detailed recitation here. This Court, although not having the daily contact with the problem that the state courts have, has repeatedly lamented the tragedy. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U. S. 432, 439 (1957) (“The increasing slaughter on our highways, most of which should be avoidable, now reaches the astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield”); Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395, 401 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (deploring “traffic irresponsibility and the frightful carnage it spews upon our highways”); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 657, 672 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (“The slaughter on the highways of this Nation exceeds the death toll of all our wars”); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U. S. 1, 17-19 (1979) (recognizing the “compelling interest in highway safety”).

As part of its program to deter drinkers from driving, South Dakota has enacted an “implied consent” law. S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 32-23-10 (Supp. 1982). This statute declares that any person operating a vehicle in South Dakota is deemed to have consented to a chemical test of the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested for driving while intoxicated. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966), this Court upheld a state-compelled blood test against a claim that it infringed the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. We recognized- that a coerced blood test infringed to some degree the “inviolability of the human personality” and the “requirement that the State procure the evidence against an accused ‘by its own independent labors,’ ” but noted the privilege has never been given the full scope suggested by the values it helps to protect. Id., at 762. We therefore held that the privilege bars the State only from compelling “communications” or “testimony.” Since a blood test was “physical or real” evidence rather than testimonial evidence, we found it unprotected by the Fifth Amendment privilege.

Schmerber, then, clearly allows a State to force a person suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit to a blood-alcohol test. South Dakota, however, has declined to authorize its police officers to administer a blood-alcohol test against the suspect’s will. Rather, to avoid violent confrontations, the South Dakota statute permits a suspect to refuse the test, and indeed requires police officers to inform the suspect of his right to refuse. S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 32-23-10 (Supp. 1982). This permission is not without a price, however. South Dakota law authorizes the Department of Public Safety, after providing the person who has refused the test an opportunity for a hearing, to revoke for one year both the person’s license to drive and any nonresident operating privileges he may possess. § 32-23-11. Such a penalty for refusing to take a blood-alcohol test is unquestionably legitimate, assuming appropriate procedural protections. See Mackey v. Montrym, supra.

South Dakota further discourages the choice of refusal by allowing the refusal to be used against the defendant at trial. S. D. Comp. Laws. Ann. §§32-23-10.1 and 19-13-28.1 (Supp. 1982). Schmerber expressly reserved the question of whether evidence of refusal violated the privilege against self-incrimination. 384 U. S., at 765, n. 9. The Court did indicate that general Fifth Amendment principles, rather than the particular holding of Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965), should control the inquiry. 384 U. S., at 766, n. 9.

Most courts applying general Fifth Amendment principles to the refusal to take a blood test have found no violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. Many courts, following the lead of Justice Traynor’s opinion for the California Supreme Court in People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543, 421 P. 2d 401 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 850 (1967), have reasoned that refusal to submit is a physical act rather than a communication and for this reason is not protected by the privilege. As Justice Traynor explained more fully in the companion case of People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P. 2d 393 (1966) (refusal to display voice not testimonial), evidence of refusal to take a potentially incriminating test is similar to other circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt, such as escape from custody and suppression of evidence. The court below, relying on Dudley v. State, 548 S. W. 2d 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977), and State v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260, 212 N. W. 2d 863 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 881 (1974), rejected this view. This minority view emphasizes that the refusal is “a tacit or overt expression and communication of defendant’s thoughts,” 312 N. W. 2d, at 726, and that the Constitution “simply forbids any compulsory revealing or communication of an accused person’s thoughts or mental processes, whether it is by acts, failure to act, words spoken or failure to speak.” Dudley, supra, at 708.

While we find considerable force in the analogies to flight and suppression of evidence suggested by Justice Traynor, we decline to rest our decision on this ground. As we recognized in Schmerber, the distinction between real or physical evidence, on the one hand, and communications or testimony, on the other, is not readily drawn in many cases. 384 U. S., at 764. The situations arising from a refusal present a difficult gradation from a person who indicates refusal by complete inaction, to one who nods his head negatively, to one who states “I refuse to take the test,” to the respondent here, who stated “I’m too drunk, I won’t pass the test.” Since no impermissible coercion is involved when the suspect refuses to submit to take the test, regardless of the form of refusal, we prefer to rest our decision on this ground, and draw possible distinctions when necessary for decision in other circumstances.

As we stated in Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391, 397 (1976), “[t]he Court has held repeatedly that the Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of ‘physical or moral compulsion’ exerted on the person asserting the privilege.” This coercion requirement comes directly from the constitutional language directing that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U. S. Const., Arndt. 5 (emphasis added). And as Professor Levy concluded in his history of the privilege, “[t]he element of compulsion or involuntariness was always an ingredient of the right and, before the right existed, of protests against incriminating interrogatories.” L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment 328 (1968).

Here, the State did not directly compel respondent to refuse the test, for it gave him the choice of submitting to the test or refusing. Of course, the fact the government gives a defendant or suspect a “choice” does not always resolve the compulsion inquiry. The classic Fifth Amendment violation — telling a defendant at trial to testify — does not, under an extreme view, compel the defendant to incriminate himself. He could submit to self-accusation, or testify falsely (risking perjury) or decline to testify (risking contempt). But the Court has long recognized that the Fifth Amendment prevents the State from forcing the choice of this “cruel trilemma” on the defendant. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U. S. 52, 55 (1964). See also New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U. S. 450, 459 (1979) (telling a witness under a grant of legislative immunity to testify or face contempt sanctions is “the essence of coerced testimony”). Similarly, Schmerber cautioned that the Fifth Amendment may bar the use of testimony obtained when the proffered alternative was to submit to a test so painful, dangerous, or severe, or so violative of religious beliefs, that almost inevitably a person would prefer “confession.” 384 U. S., at 765, n. 9. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 458 (1966) (unless compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings is dispelled, no statement is truly a product of free choice).

In contrast to these prohibited choices, the values behind the Fifth Amendment are not hindered when the State offers a suspect the choice of submitting to the blood-alcohol test or having his refusal used against him. The simple blood-alcohol test is so safe, painless, and commonplace, see Schmerber, 384 U. S., at 771, that respondent concedes, as he must, that the State could legitimately compel the suspect, against his will, to accede to the test. Given, then, that the offer of taking a blood-alcohol test is clearly legitimate, the action becomes no less legitimate when the State offers a second option of refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice. Nor is this a case where the State has subtly coerced respondent into choosing the option it had no right to compel, rather than offering a true choice. To the contrary, the State wants respondent to choose to take the test, for the inference of intoxication arising from a positive blood-alcohol test is far stronger than that arising from a refusal to take the test.

We recognize, of course, that the choice to submit or refuse to take a blood-alcohol test will not be an easy or pleasant one for a suspect to make. But the criminal process often requires suspects and defendants to make difficult choices. See, e. g., Crampton v. Ohio, decided with McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 213-217 (1971). We hold, therefore, that a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully requested it, is not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.

III

Relying on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610 (1976), respondent also suggests that admission at trial of his refusal violates the Due Process Clause because respondent was not fully warned of the consequences of refusal. Doyle held that the Due Process Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using a defendant’s silence after Miranda warnings to impeach his testimony at trial. Just a Term before, in United States v. Hale, 422 U. S. 171 (1975), we had determined under our supervisory power that the federal courts could not use such silence for impeachment because of its dubious probative value. Although Doyle mentioned this rationale in applying the rule to the States, 426 U. S., at 617, the Court relied on the fundamental unfairness of implicitly assuring a suspect that his silence will not be used against him and then using his silence to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. Id., at 618.

Unlike the situation in Doyle, we do not think it fundamentally unfair for South Dakota to use the refusal to take the test as evidence of guilt, even though respondent was not specifically warned that his refusal could be used against him at trial. First, the right to silence underlying the Miranda warnings is one of constitutional dimension, and thus cannot be unduly burdened. See Miranda, supra, at 468, n. 37. Cf. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U. S. 603 (1982) (postarrest silence without Miranda warnings may be used to impeach trial testimony). Respondent’s right to refuse the blood-alcohol test, by contrast, is simply a matter of grace bestowed by the South Dakota Legislature.

Moreover, the Miranda warnings emphasize the dangers of choosing to speak (“whatever you say can and will be used as evidence against you in court”), but give no warning of adverse consequences from choosing to remain silent. This imbalance in the delivery of Miranda warnings, we recognized in Doyle, implicitly assures the suspect that his silence will not be used against him. The warnings challenged here, by contrast, contained no such misleading implicit assurances as to the relative consequences of his choice. The officers explained that, if respondent chose to submit to the test, he had the right to know the results- and could choose to take an additional test by a person chosen by him. The officers did not specifically warn respondent that the test results could be used against him at trial. Explaining the consequences of the other option, the officers specifically warned respondent that failure to take the test could lead to loss of driving privileges for one year. It is true the officers did not inform respondent of the further consequence that evidence of refusal could be used against him in court, but we think it unrealistic to say that the warnings given here implicitly assure a suspect that no consequences other than those mentioned will occur. Importantly, the warning that he could lose his driver’s license made it clear that refusing the test was not a “safe harbor,” free of adverse consequences.

While the State did not actually warn respondent that the test results could be used against him, we hold that such a failure to warn was not the sort of implicit promise to forgo use of evidence that would unfairly “trick” respondent if the evidence were later offered against him at trial. We therefore conclude that the use of evidence of refusal after these warnings comported with the fundamental fairness required by due process.

IV

The judgment of the South Dakota Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Marshall joins,

dissenting.

The Court is understandably anxious to do its part in curtailing the “carnage caused by drunk drivers.” Ante, at 558. I sympathize with that concern, but it does not justify the rendition of an advisory opinion on a constitutional issue. In this case, . íe Court has no power to reverse the judgment of the South Dakota Supreme Court, because its decision rests on an adequate and independent state ground. I therefore cannot join the Court’s opinion.

The South Dakota Supreme Court framed the question before it on appeal as “whether SDCL 32-23-10.1 is a violation of Neville’s federal and state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. U. S. Const. Amend. V; S. D. Const, art. VI, §9.” 312 N. W. 2d 723, 725 (1981). After analyzing both federal and state cases, the South Dakota Supreme Court concluded:

“We hold that evidence of the accused’s refusal to take a blood test violates the federal and state privilege against self-incrimination and therefore SDCL 32-23-10.1 is unconstitutional.” Id., at 726.

Thus, the South Dakota Supreme Court unambiguously held that the statute violated the State Constitution. That holding is certainly adequate to support its judgment and is beyond our power to review.

Given the existence of an adequate state ground, it is established beyond dispute that this Court may not take jurisdiction if the state ground is independent. In this case, we lack jurisdiction because the South Dakota Supreme Court has not indicated, explicitly or implicitly, that its construction of Art. VI, § 9, of the South Dakota Constitution was contingent on our agreement with its interpretation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. There is no general presumption of federal law, no general presumption of state law, and no specific language in the opinion below to suggest that the South Dakota Court harbored such an opinion.

Unless we have explicit notice that a provision of a State Constitution is intended to be a mere shadow of the comparable provision in the Federal Constitution, it is presumptuous — if not paternalistic — for this Court to make that assumption on its own. No matter how eloquent and persuasive our analysis of the Federal Constitution may be, we cannot simply presume that the highest court of a sovereign State will modify its interpretation of its own law whenever we interpret comparable federal law differently. Even when a state tribunal misconceives federal law, this Court cannot vacate its judgment merely to give it an unsolicited opportunity to reanalyze its own law. If a state-court judgment is premised on an adequate state ground, that ground must be presumed independent unless the state court suggests otherwise.

Nothing in South Dakota law establishes a presumption that the State Constitution adds no additional protections for South Dakota residents beyond those already provided by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Indeed, the South Dakota Supreme Court has explicitly established a contrary presumption:

“This court is the final authority on interpretation and enforcement of the South Dakota Constitution. We have always assumed the independent nature of our state constitution regardless of any similarity between the language of that document and the federal constitution.” State v. Opperman, 247 N. W. 2d 673, 674 (1976).

Thus, both federal and South Dakota law establish the presumption that an adequate state ground is independent. That presumption is reinforced in this case. For the opinion of the South Dakota Supreme Court explicitly noted that the language of the South Dakota Constitution is “more liberal” than the comparable federal language. 312 N. W. 2d, at 726, n. It was willing to rest the judgment on federal as well as state grounds, however, because this Court’s opinion in Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 761-762, n. 6 (1966), had assumed that the Fifth Amendment should be construed as broadly as the more liberal state language. 312 N. W. 2d, at 726, n. It concluded that federal law is “broad enough” to exclude the evidence in this case, and it therefore saw “no need to draw a distinction at this time” between state and federal law. Ibid, (emphasis added). Those words plainly suggest that the State Supreme Court did not understand its holding to be “dependent” on this Court’s view of federal law.

Because there exists an independent and adequate state ground for the judgment below, I would dismiss the writ of certiorari.

       The officer read the Miranda warning from a printed card. He read: “You have the right to remain silent. You don’t have to talk to me unless you want to do so. If you want to talk to me I must advise you whatever you say can and will be used as evidence against you in court. You have the right to confer with a lawyer, and to have a lawyer present with you while you’re being questioned. If you want a lawyer but are unable to pay for one, a lawyer will be appointed to represent you free of any cost to you. Knowing these rights, do you want to talk to me without having a lawyer present? You may stop talking to me at any time. You may also demand a lawyer at any time.” App. 8. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 467-473 (1966).

       The card read: “I have arrested you for driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, a violation of S. D. C. L. 32-23-1. I request that you submit to a chemical test of your blood to determine your blood alcohol concentration. You have the right to refuse to submit to such a test and if you do refuse no test will be given. You have the right to a chemical test by a person of your own choosing at your own expense in addition to the test I have requested. You have the right to know the results of any chemical test. If you refuse the test I have requested, your driver’s license and any non-residence driving privilege may be revoked for one year after an opportunity to appear before a hearing officer to determine if your driver’s license or non-residence driving privilege shall be revoked. If your driver’s license or non-residence driving privileges are revoked by the hearing officer, you have the right to appeal to Circuit Court. Do you understand what I told you? Do you wish to submit to the chemical test I have requested?” App. 8-10.

       Responding to other questions, respondent informed the officers that he had been drinking “close to one ease” by himself at home, and that his last drink was “about ten minutes ago.” Tr. of Preliminary Hearing 8.

       South Dakota Comp. Laws Ann. §19-13-28.1 (Supp. 1982) likewise declares that, notwithstanding the general rule in South Dakota that the claim of a privilege is not a proper subject of comment by judge or counsel, evidence of refusal to submit to a chemical analysis of blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance “is admissible into evidence” at a trial for driving under the influence of alcohol. A person “may not claim privilege against self-incrimination with regard to admission of refusal to submit to chemical analysis.” Ibid.

       As Justice Stevens emphasizes, post, at 567, the South Dakota Supreme Court clearly held that the statute violated the State as well as Federal Constitution. Although this would be an adequate state ground for decision, we do not read the opinion as resting on an independent state ground. Rather, we think the court determined that admission of this evidence violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and then concluded without further analysis that the state privilege was violated as well. In reaching its holding, the court first analyzed our decisions in Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966), and Miranda v. Arizona, supra. The court then described the issue for its review as being “[t]o determine whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to refusal evidence,” 312 N. W. 2d 723, 725 (1981) (emphasis added), and later asked “whether this testimonial evidence was compelled for purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment standard,” id., at 726 (emphasis added). The cases relied on by the court to resolve these issues analyze the federal privilege against self-incrimination.
      The analysis of the court below was remarkably similar to that of the state-court opinion reviewed in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 651-653 (1979). That state-court opinion analyzed various decisions interpreting the Federal Constitution, concluded that the Fourth Amendment violated the police procedure at issue there, and then summarily held that the State Constitution was therefore also infringed. As we characterized their analysis, every police practice found to violate the Fourth Amendment would, without further analysis, be held to be contrary to the State Constitution as well. In such a situation, we concluded, this Court has jurisdiction to review the federal constitutional issue decided below.
      Justice Stevens, while expressing general dissatisfaction with Prouse, attempts to distinguish it by noting that the state court there had said the State and Federal Constitutions are “ ‘substantially similar’ and that ‘a violation of the latter is necessarily a violation of the former.’ ” Post, at 571, n. 7. But the South Dakota Supreme Court made virtually identical statements. In a footnote, the court recognized the textual difference between the federal and state constitutional privileges against self-incrimination, but noted that this Court in Schmerber had interpreted the Fifth Amendment prohibition “in light of the more liberal definition of ‘evidence’ as used in our state constitution.” 312 N. W. 2d, at 726, n. Therefore, the court concluded, “[s]ince the Fifth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution is broad enough to exclude this evidence, there is no need to draw a distinction at this time between S. D. Const. Art. VI, § 9 and the Fifth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution.” Ibid. The court could not have stated more clearly that it simply assumed that any violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege also violated, without further analysis, the state privilege. This was precisely the reasoning we found sufficient in Prouse to give us jurisdiction to hear the case and decide the federal constitutional issue.

       The South Dakota Supreme Court also remanded for a determination whether respondent’s statement that he was too drunk to pass the test was made after a voluntary waiver of his right to remain silent. As yet, of course, there has been no final judgment in this ease. This Court nevertheless has jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3) to review the federal constitutional issue which has been finally determined, because if the State ultimately prevails at trial, the federal issue will be mooted; and if the State loses at trial, governing state law, S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 23A-32-4 and 23A-32-5 (1979), prevents it from again presenting the federal claim for review. See California v. Stewart (decided with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 498, n. 71 (1966)); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 481 (1975).

       See, e. g., cases cited in nn. 11 and 13, infra.

         Schmerber also rejected arguments that the coerced blood test violated the right to due process, the right to counsel, and the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.

        Schmerber did caution that due process concerns could be involved if the police initiated physical violence while administering the test, refused to respect a reasonable request to undergo a different form of testing, or responded to resistance with inappropriate force. 384 U. S., at 760, n. 4.

        Griffin held that a prosecutor’s or trial court’s comments on a defendant’s refusal to take the witness stand impermissibly burdened the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to refuse. Unlike the defendant’s situation in Griffin, a person suspected of drunk driving has no constitutional right to refuse to take a blood-alcohol test. The specific rule of Griffin is thus inapplicable.

       See, e. g., Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F. 2d 514 (CA9 1969); Hill v. State, 366 So. 2d 318, 324-325 (Ala. 1979); Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P. 2d 685 (1971); State v. Haze, 218 Kan. 60, 542 P. 2d 720 (1975) (refusal to give handwriting exemplar); City of Westerville v. Cunningham, 15 Ohio St. 2d 121, 239 N. E. 2d 40 (1968).

       The Court in Schmerber pointed to the lie detector test as an example of evidence that is difficult to characterize as testimonial or real. Even though the test may seek to obtain physical evidence, we reasoned that to compel a person to submit to such testing “is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment.” 384 U. S., at 764. See also People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 537, and n. 9, 421 P. 2d 393, 397, and n. 9 (1966) (analyzing lie detector tests as within the Fifth Amendment privilege). A second example of seemingly physical evidence that nevertheless invokes Fifth Amendment protection was presented in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454 (1981). There, we held that the Fifth Amendment privilege protected compelled disclosures during a court-ordered psychiatric examination. We specifically rejected the claim that the psychiatrist was observing the patient’s communications simply to infer facts of his mind, rather than to examine the truth of the patient’s statements.

       Many courts have found no self-incrimination problem on the ground of no coercion, or on the analytically related ground that the State, if it can compel submission to the test, can qualify the right to refuse the test. See, e. g., Welch v. District Court, 594 F. 2d 903 (CA2 1979); State v. Meints, 189 Neb. 264, 202 N. W. 2d 202 (1972); State v. Gardner, 52 Ore. App. 663, 629 P. 2d 412 (1981); State v. Brean, 136 Vt. 147, 385 A. 2d 1085 (1978).

       Nothing in the record suggests that respondent made or could sustain such a claim in this ease.

       In the context of an arrest for driving while intoxicated, a police inquiry of whether the suspect will take a blood-alcohol test is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. As we stated in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 301 (1980), police words or actions “normally attendant to arrest and custody” do not constitute interrogation. The police inquiry here is highly regulated by state law, and is presented in virtually the same words to all suspects. It is similar to a police request to submit to fingerprinting or photography. Respondent’s choice of refusal thus enjoys no prophylactic Miranda protection outside the basic Fifth Amendment protection. See generally Arenella, Schmerber and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal, 20 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 31, 56-58 (1982).

       Even though the officers did not specifically advise respondent that the test results could be used against him in court, no one would seriously contend that this failure to warn would make the test results inadmissible, had respondent chosen to submit to the test. Cf. Schneckloth v. Busta

        monte, 412 U. S. 218 (1973) (knowledge of right to refuse not an essential part of proving effective consent to a search).

       Since the State wants the suspect to submit to the test, it is in its interest fully to warn suspects of the consequences of refusal. We are informed that police officers in South Dakota now warn suspects that evidence of their refusal can be used against them in court. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16.

       “[W]e will not review a judgment of a state court that rests on an adequate and independent ground in state law. Nor will we review one until the fact that it does not do so appears of record.” Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 128 (1945). Accord, Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Comm’n, 379 U. S. 487 (1965); Honeyman v. Hanan, 300 U. S. 14, 18-19 (1937); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U. S. 207 (1935); Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson, 293 U. S. 52 (1934); McCoy v. Shaw, 277 U. S. 302 (1928); Petrie v. Nampa and Meridian Irrigation District, 248 U. S. 154, 157 (1918); Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers Mutual Canal Co., 243 U. S. 157, 163-166 (1917); Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361 (1893); Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875).

       As Justice Harlan wrote for the Court in Mental Hygiene Dept. v. Kirchner, 380 U. S. 194, 198 (1965):
      “[W]e would have jurisdiction to review only if the federal ground had been the sole basis for the decision, or the State Constitution was interpreted under what the state court deemed the compulsion of the Federal Constitution” (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).

       “[0]ur power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions. We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion.” Herb v. Pitcairn, supra, at 126. Accord, Minnick v. California Dept. of Corrections, 452 U. S. 105, 120-123 (1981); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549, 568-569 (1947); United States v. Hastings, 296 U. S. 188, 193 (1935).
      The policy of avoiding advisory opinions on federal constitutional issues is a consistent theme throughout our jurisprudence. Paschall v. Christie-Stewart, Inc., 414 U. S. 100 (1973) (per curiam), is especially instructive. In that case, our independent review of the record turned up a state ground supporting the Supreme Court of Oklahoma’s judgment that had not even been mentioned in the state court’s opinion. Observing that if the argument proved solid, “any decision by this Court would be advisory and beyond our jurisdiction,” we remanded for analysis of the state-law claim. Id., at 102.
      Even in cases arising through the federal courts, we have always been alert to opportunities to avoid federal constitutional issues by means of a state-law disposition. E. g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U. S. 291, 302-306 (1982); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U. S. 283, 294-295 (1982); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909). See generally Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 546-547, and nn. 12-13 (1974).

       The burden is on the petitioner or appellant to establish our jurisdiction. We have therefore regularly dismissed cases when the state judgment might have rested on an independent and adequate state ground. E. g., Durley v. Mayo, 351 U. S. 277, 285 (1956); Stembridge v. Georgia, 343 U. S. 541, 547 (1952); Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson, supra; Johnson v. Risk, 137 U. S. 300 (1890).

       The South Dakota Supreme Court was speaking on remand from this Court. The state court had previously held certain police conduct unconstitutional, relying solely on the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. State v. Opperman, 89 S. D. 25, 228 N. W. 2d 152 (1975). This Court had reversed. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976). The passage in text is excerpted from the South Dakota Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of the rationale of its prior opinion, relying on the State Constitution. In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that the language of the relevant state provision “is almost identical to that found in the Fourth Amendment,” 247 N. W. 2d, at 674, and was unmoved by the prosecutor’s observation that the defendant had not argued in his first appeal that state and federal law were different, id., at 675.

       After quoting a footnote from our opinion in Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 761-762, n. 6 (1966), the South Dakota Supreme Court stated:
      “This footnote indicates that Schmerber was decided in light of the more liberal definition of ‘evidence’ as used in our state constitution. Since the Fifth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution is broad enough to exclude this evidence, there is no need to draw a distinction at this time between S. D. Const, art. VI, § 9 and the Fifth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution.” 312 N. W. 2d, at 726, n.

       In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 651-653 (1979), we did not so interpret the opinion of the Delaware Supreme Court. Although I must confess that I now have some misgivings about our reaching that conclusion without further clarification, see n. 8, infra, there was far more indication in that case than in this one that the state court’s analysis was contingent on the correctness of its understanding of federal law. The opinion there began with a statement that the police stops “violate Federal and State constitutional guarantees,” State v. Prouse, 382 A. 2d 1359, 1361 (1978), but then went on to say that the State and Federal Constitutions are “substantially similar” and that “a violation of the latter is necessarily a violation of the former,” id., at 1362. The opinion drew to a close with the statement: “We hold, therefore, that a random stop of a motorist [absent reasonable suspicion] is constitutionally impermissible and violative of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” Id., at 1364.

       In cases where an apparent adequate state ground was arguably not independent, this Court has occasionally vacated the state-court judgment and remanded for clarification of the basis for the decision. E. g., Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U. S. 861, 866 (1974); California v. Krivda, 409 U. S. 33 (1972); Mental Hygiene Dept. v. Kirchner, 380 U. S. 194 (1965); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U. S. 551 (1940); State Tax Comm’n v. Van Cott, 306 U. S. 511 (1939). Cf. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117 (1945) (case held while parties sought a certificate from the state court clarifying the basis for judgment). The Court should, at the very least, follow that course today. “[I]n cases where the answer is not clear to us, it seems consistent with the respect due the highest courts of states of the Union that they be asked rather than told what they have intended.” Id., at 127-128.
      Some of us have pointed out that even this practice may be overused, because it “tak[es] from appellants the normal burden of demonstrating that we have jurisdiction and plac[es] it on the Supreme Court of [the State].” Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U. S. 241, 244 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Department of Motor Vehicles of California v. Rios, 410 U. S. 425, 427-430 (1973) (Douglas, J., joined by Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    October 4, 1982
    No. 81-2302.
    Giacobbe v. Andrews et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from C. A. 2d Cir.


text:
    No. 81-2385.
    King, Governor of New Mexico, et al. v. Sanchez et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. N. M.


text:
    No. 82-39.
    Hispanic Coalition on Reapportionment et al. v. Legislative Reapportionment Commission et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. E. D. Pa.


text:
    No. 82-55.
    City of West Helena, Arkansas, et al. v. Perkins et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from C. A. 8th Cir. Justice Rehnquist would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 81-2019.
    County of Arlington, Virginia v. United States et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 4th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certio-rari, certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens would affirm the judgment.


text:
    No. 81-2077.
    Thompson v. Indiana.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ind. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 81-2176.
    Fisher v. Anderson.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Mich, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 81-2197.
    Kranda v. Houser-Norborg Medical Corp. et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ind. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 81-2310.
    Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator Co.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Tex., 1st Sup. Jud. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 81-2377.
    Gianechini, Tutrix of the Estate of Gianechini v. City of New Orleans et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. La., 4th Cir., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 81-2383.
    Boswell, Inc., dba Broadacres v. Harkins, Secretary, Kansas Department of Health and Environment; and Boswell, Inc., dba Reno County Adult Care Home v. Harkins, Secretary, Kansas Department of Health and Environment.
   Appeals from Sup. Ct. Kan. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 230 Klan. 738, 640 P. 2d 1208 (first case); 230 Kan. 610, 640 P. 2d 1202 (second case).


text:
    No. 81-2403.
    Threlkeld et al. v. Robbinsdale Federation of Teachers, Local 872, AFL-CIO, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Minn, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 81-6818.
    Christensen v. Utah.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Utah dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-5.
    Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, Texas, et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Tex., 9th Sup. Jud. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-77.
    Griffin et al. v. Sims et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ga. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-135.
    Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Washington Department of Revenue.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wash, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-159.
    Syracuse Savings Bank et al. v. Town of Dewitt.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-5022.
    Flowers v. Colorado.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Colo, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-5046.
    Crumpacker v. Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ind. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 81-2084.
    Izzard et al. v. Florida.
   Appeal from Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 81-2113.
    Cooper v. California.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2213.
    Wake County Hospital System, Inc., et al. v. News & Observer Publishing Co. et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. C. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2217.
    Racer et vir v. Johnson & Johnson.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2236.
    Lockwood v. Jefferson Area Teachers Assn.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ohio dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2281.
    Rivoli Trucking Corp. et al. v. New York Shipping Assn., Inc., et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 2d Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certio-rari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2389.
    Stepak v. Rutgers Medical School et al.
   Appeal from Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2395.
    Kalin v. Aerospace Corp. et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6710.
    Michaelis v. Nebraska State Bar Assn.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Neb. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6839.
    Wayland v. O’Brien.
   Appeal from C. A. 1st Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6871.
    Gifford v. Tiernan, Chairman, Federal Election Commission.
   Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certio-rari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6912.
    Scholl v. Anselmi et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wyo. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6917.
    Hanson v. United States.
   Appeal from C. A. 5th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6947.
    Velasquez v. Colorado.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Colo, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6970.
    Bugg v. International Union of Allied Industrial Workers of America, Local 507, AFL-CIO, et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 7th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6998.
    Ogrod et al. v. School District of Philadelphia.
   Appeal from C. A. 3d Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-8.
    California State Board of Equalization v. Western Marina Corp., dba Shelter Island Inn.
   Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-107.
    Miles v. Shur-Good Biscuit Co., Inc., et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certio-rari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-193.
    Lampkin-Asam v. Miami Daily News, Inc., dba The Miami News, et al.
   Appeal from Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5064.
    Robinson v. Berg et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5089.
    Jones v. Fredericksburg Department of Public Welfare and Social Services.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Va. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5102.
    Johnson v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio; and Johnson v. Marshall.
   Appeal from C. A. 6th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. Reported below: 703 F. 2d 563 (second case).


text:
    No. 82-5105.
    Phillips, aka Haslem v. Marshall, Superintendent, Southern Ohio Correctional Facility.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ohio dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5112.
    Alfonso v. Board of Review, Department of Labor and Industry of New Jersey.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. J. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5179.
    Kinney, dba Media Graphics v. Kotler Exterminating Co., Inc.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Tenn. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certio-rari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2127.
    Vincent B. v. Joan R. et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice Brennan and Justice White would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 81-2144.
    Godwin v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. La. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice Marshall would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 81-2174.
    Queensgate Investment Co., dba Holiday Inn v. Liquor Control Commission of Ohio.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ohio dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 81-2225.
    Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Rose, Tax Commissioner of West Virginia.
   Appeal from Cir. Ct. W. Va., Kanawha County, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 81-2244.
    Goocher v. Texas.
   Appeal from Ct. Crim. App. Tex. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice Brennan would reverse the conviction.


text:
    No. 81-2352.
    Joffin v. Spain.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ohio, Trumbull County, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice White would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 82-5100.
    Gholston v. Martin et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ohio dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice White would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 81-2375.
    Evans v. Arizona Corporation Commission et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ariz. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 81-6779.
    Williams v. Indiana.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ind. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would vacate the death sentence in this case.


text:
    No. 81-2080.
    Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Montana.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Mont. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept. of N. M., 458 U. S. 354 (1982), and ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 458 U. S. 307 (1982).


text:
    No. 81-1282.
    No. 81-1283.
    No. 81-1312.
    No. 81-1313.
    National Organization for Women, Inc., et al. v. Idaho et al. National Organization for Women, Inc., et al. v. Idaho et al. Carmen, Administrator of General Services v. Idaho et al. Carmen, Administrator of General Services v. Idaho et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Idaho. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 455 U. S. 918];

C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari before judgment granted, 455 U. S. 918];

Appeal from D. C. Idaho. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 455 U. S. 918]; and

C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari before judgment granted, 455 U. S. 918.] Upon consideration of the memorandum for the Administrator of General Services suggesting mootness, filed July 9, 1982, and the responses thereto, the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Idaho is vacated and the cases are remanded to that court with instructions to dismiss the complaints as moot. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950).


text:
    No. 81-1653.
    University of Houston et al. v. Wilkins et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273 (1982), and General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U. S. 147 (1982).


text:
    No. 81-1778.
    California v. Ruggles.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982).


text:
    No. 81-2049.
    United States v. Armijo-Martinez et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motions of respondents Carlos Armijo-DeLeon and Carlos Armijo-Martinez for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S. 858 (1982).


text:
    No. 81-2189.
    County of Los Angeles v. Jordan.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U. S. 147 (1982).

Justice White dissents.


text:
    No. 81-2283.
    Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Music.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of UMWA Health & Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U. S. 562 (1982).

Justice White and Justice Blackmun dissent and would deny certiorari.


text:
    No. 81-6713.
    Britt v. Simi Valley Unified School District et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496 (1982).


text:
    No.-.
    Fowler v. Tucker.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file the petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No.-.
    Sumner et al. v. United States.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file the petition for writ of certio-rari denied.


text:
    No.-.
    Zerman v. Jacobs et al.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file the petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No.-.
    Souza et al. v. Trustees of the Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file the petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. A-172.
    Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections v. Bass.
   Application to vacate the stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Rehnquist, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-279.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Powell and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-274.
    In re Disbarment of Kleindienst.
    [For earlier order herein, see 456 U. S. 1004.]
   Disbarment entered.

Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this order.


text:
    No. 8,
    Orig.
    Arizona v. California et al.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 456 U. S. 912.]
   Motion of Pyramid Lake Indian Tribe for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Exceptions to the Report of the Special Master are set for oral argument in due course. Motion of Arizona et al. for leave to file a brief in response to the reply briefs of the United States et al. granted.

Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions and this order.


text:
    No. 67,
    Orig.
    Idaho ex rel. Evans, Governor of Idaho, et al. v. Oregon et al.
    [For earlier decision herein, see, e. g., 444 U. S. 380.]
   Final Report of the Special Master received and ordered filed. Exceptions to the Report, with supporting briefs, may be filed by the parties within 45 days. Replies to such Exceptions, with supporting briefs, may be filed within 30 days.


text:
    No. 73,
    Orig.
    California v. Nevada.
    [For earlier decision herein, see, e. g., 456 U. S. 867.]
   It is ordered that the Honorable Robert Van Pelt be discharged as Special Master in this case.


text:
    No. 93,
    Orig.
    Oklahoma v. Arkansas et al.
   The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 80-1074.
    Velde et al. v. National Black Police Assn., Inc., et al.,
   458 U. S. 591. Motion of respondents to defer taxation of costs denied.

Justice Powell and Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 80-1735.
    Federal Bureau of Investigation et al. v. Abramson,
   456 U. S. 615. Motion of respondent for reconsideration of taxation of costs denied.


text:
    No. 80-1991.
    Oregon v. Kennedy,
   456 U. S. 667. Motion of respondent to retax costs denied.


text:
    No. 81-1.
    No. 81-3.
    Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States; and Bob Jones University v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 454 U. S. 892.] Motions of National Association of Independent Schools, Lawrence E. Lewy, Independent Sector, International Human Rights Law Group, and Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Motions for divided argument and for additional time for oral argument granted, and a total of one hour and 15 minutes allotted for oral argument to be divided as follows: 15 minutes for Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc.; 15 minutes for Bob Jones University; 15 minutes for the United States; and 30 minutes for William T. Coleman, Jr., Esquire, as amicus curiae.


text:
    No. 81-150.
    No. 81-546.
    Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. et al.; and United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. et al.,
   458 U. S. 50. Upon consideration of the motion of the Solicitor General to extend stay of judgment and the responses thereto, it is ordered that the Clerk shall further stay the sending of the certified copy of the judgment to the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota to and including December 24, 1982.


text:
    No. 81-185.
    Simopoulos v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 456 U. S. 988.] Motions of American Public Health Association and Women Lawyers of Sacramento et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Motion of Legal Defense Fund for Unborn Children for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 81-523.
    Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 456 U. S. 960.] Motion of International Bankers Association in California et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.

Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 81-596.
    Springdale School District No. 50 of Washington County v. Grace et al.,
   458 U. S. 1118. Motion of state respondents to retax costs denied.


text:
    No. 81-680.
    No. 81-1076.
    Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston et al.; and Huddleston et al. v. Herman & MacLean et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 456 U. S. 914.] Motion of Arthur Andersen & Co. for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 81-857.
    Martinez, as Next Friend of Morales v. Bynum, Texas Commissioner of Education, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted sub nom. Martinez v. Brochette, 457 U. S. 1131.] Motion of respondents for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 81-746.
    No. 81-1172.
    City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., et al.; and Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., et al. v. City of Akron et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 456 U. S. 988.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. Motion of Francois Seguin, M. D., et al. for divided argument and for additional time for oral argument denied. Motion of Legal Defense Fund for Unborn Children for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 81-1020.
    No. 81-1268.
    Exxon Corp. et al. v. Eagerton, Commissioner of Revenue of Alabama, et al.; and Exchange Oil & Gas Corp. et al. v. Eagerton, Commissioner of Revenue of Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 456 U. S. 970.] Motion of appellants for divided argument granted. Request for additional time for oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 81-1180.
    Dickerson, Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. New Banner Institute, Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 455 U. S. 1015.] Motion of National Rifle Association of America for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 81-1255.
    No. 81-1623.
    Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., et al. v. Ashcroft, Attorney General of Missouri, et al.; and Ashcroft, Attorney General of Missouri, et al. v. Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 456 U. S. 988.] Motion of Legal Defense Fund for Unborn Children for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 81-1304.
    No. 81-1381.
    National Association of Greeting Card Publishers v. United States Postal Service et al.; and United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. United States Postal Service et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 456 U. S. 925.] Motion of petitioners for divided argument granted. Request for additional time for oral argument denied. Motion of American Newspaper Publishers Association et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Motion of Direct Mail/Marketing Association, Inc., for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 81-1314.
    W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 458 U. S. 1105.] Motion of Equal Employment Advisory Council for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 81-1335.
    District of Columbia Court of Appeals et al. v. Feldman et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Cer-tiorari granted, 458 U. S. 1105.] Motion of Conference of Chief Justices for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 81-1370.
    Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co.
   Sup. Ct. Kan. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 456 U. S. 904.] Motion of Energy Consumers & Producers Association et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae denied.


text:
    No. 81-1574.
    Local 926, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, et al. v. Jones.
   Ct. App. Ga. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 456 U. S. 987.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 81-1613.
    Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, Shelby County Trustee, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 456 U. S. 943.] Motion of appellees for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 81-1618.
    No. 81-1619.
    Weyerhaeuser Co. et al. v. Lyman Lamb Co. et al.; and Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Lyman Lamb Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 456 U. S. 971.] Motions of Business Roundtable et al. and City Investing Co. et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae, for divided argument, and for additional time for oral argument granted, and 10 additional minutes allotted for that purpose. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions.


text:
    No. 81-1627.
    Shepard v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 456 U. S. 970.] Motion of American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 81-1661.
    General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 456 U. S. 988.] Motion of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 81-1664.
    Metropolitan Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certio-rari granted, 457 U. S. 1116.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 81-1748.
    United States v. Mitchell et al.
   Ct. Cl. [Certiorari granted, 457 U. S. 1104.] Motion of the parties to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 81-1863.
    United States et al. v. Grace et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 457 U. S. 1131.] Motion of the parties to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 81-1756.
    Lehr v. Robertson et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 456 U. S. 970.] Motions of Community Action for Legal Services, Inc., et al. and National Committee For Adoption, Inc., for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 81-1774.
    Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections v. Bullard.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 457 U. S. 1116.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 81-1802.
    United States v. Knotts.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 457 U. S. 1131.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Mark W. Peterson, Esquire, of Minneapolis, Minn., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case. Motion of the parties to dispense with printing the joint appendix denied.


text:
    No. 81-1938.
    United States v. Baggot.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 457 U. S. 1131.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 81-1945.
    Pacific Gas & Electric Co. et al. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 457 U. S. 1132.] Motions of New England Legal Foundation and Fusion Energy Foundation for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 81-1966.
    Belknap, Inc. v. Hale et al.
   Ct. App. Ky. [Certiorari granted, 457 U. S. 1131.] Motions of American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations and Chamber of Commerce of the United States for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 81-2159.
    No. 81-2278.
    No. 81-2359.
    No. 82-116.
    No. 82-146.
    Silkwood, Administrator v. Kerr-McGee Corp. et al. Union Electric Co. v. City of Kirkwood, Missouri. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. et al. v. Phonetele, Inc. Greater Washington Central Labor Council v. District of Columbia et al. Food & Allied Services Trade Council of Metropolitan Washington v. District of Columbia et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 10th Cir.;

C. A. 8th Cir.;

C. A. 9th Cir.;

Ct. App. D. C.; and

Ct. App. D. C. The Solicitor General is invited to file briefs in these cases expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 81-2249.
    Sumner, Warden, San Quentin Prison v. Maxwell.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted.


text:
    No. 81-6737.
    No. 81-6916.
    In re Jaffer; and In re Weigang.
   Petitions for writs of common-law certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6878.
    No. 81-6898.
    No. 82-5016.
    No. 82-5166.
    No. 82-5172.
    No. 82-5193.
    No. 82-5221.
    No. 82-5326.
    In re Jones; In re Donnelson; In re Sullivan; In re Hoover; In re Von Ludwitz; In re McGourty; In re Kulik; and In re Barney.
   Petitions for writs of ha-beas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 81-6633.
    Bearden v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. [Certiorari granted, 458 U. S. 1105.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that James H. Lohr, Esquire, of Chattanooga, Tenn., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case.


text:
    No. 81-2153.
    No. 81-2319.
    No. 81-6693.
    No. 81-6729.
    No. 81-6776.
    No. 81-6831.
    No. 81-6889.
    No. 81-6909.
    No. 81-6997.
    No. 82-5137.
    No. 82-5168.
    No. 82-5184.
    In re Feinstein et al.; In re Pickering; In re Parker; In re Barney; In re Cavallaro; In re Carter; In re Kalec; In re Le Grand; In re Westover; In re Poole; In re Aloi; and In re Velilla.
   Petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 82-440.
    In re Farmers Union Central Exchange, Inc., et al.
   Motion of petitioners to expedite consideration of the petition for writ of mandamus denied. Petition for writ of mandamus denied.

Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and this petition.


text:
    No. 81-2205.
    In re Lieber.
   Petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 81-2338.
    Regan, Secretary of the Treasury, et al. v. Taxation With Representation of Washington.
   Appeal from C. A. D. C. Cir. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 82-65.
    Brown et al. v. Thomson, Secretary of State of Wyoming, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Wyo. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 81-2125.
    Bell, Secretary of Education v. New Jersey et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 81-2337.
    Block, Secretary of Agriculture, et al. v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of University and School Lands.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-63.
    City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-195.
    Mueller et al. v. Allen et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 81-1889.
    No. 81-1958.
    No. 81-2042.
    No. 82-19.
    Public Service Commission of the State of New York v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. et al.; Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. et al.; Michigan v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. et al.; and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of Public Utilities Commission of California et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae in Nos. 81-1889, 81-1958, and 81-2042 granted. Motion of Associated Gas Distributors for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in No. 81-1889 granted. Motions of National Rural Electric Cooperative Association and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of California, for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certio-rari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 664 F. 2d 530.


text:
    No. 81-1891.
    Morrison-Knudsen Construction Co. et al. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motions of American Insurance Association, Alliance of American Insurers et al., and National Association of Stevedores for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 81-1893.
    California v. Ramos.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 81-2147.
    No. 81-2188.
    Arizona et al. v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona et al.; Arizona et al. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians et al.; and Montana et al. v. Northern Cheyenne Tribe of the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one and one-half hours allotted for oral argument. Reported below: No. 81-2147, 668 F. 2d 1093 (first case), 668 F. 2d 1100 (second case); No. 81-2188, 668 F. 2d 1080.


text:
    No. 81-2318.
    Florida v. Casal et al.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed informa pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-131.
    Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of Keystone Shipping Co. et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Cer-tiorari granted limited to Questions I and II presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 81-1688.
    Gerber v. Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1755.
    Dollar v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1760.
    Mulligan v. Veterans Administration.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1808.
    Moore v. El Paso County, Texas, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1819.
    Navasky v. Central Intelligence Agency.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1828.
    Vavra et al. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1861.
    Wilkins et al. v. University of Houston et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1876.
    Davis v. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1880.
    Hall v. Board of Trustees of Arkansas Public Employees Retirement System et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1894.
    Cappuccilli et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1906.
    United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Sadlowski et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1910.
    South Dakota v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1936.
    Apodaca v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1961.
    Idaho ex rel. Trombley, Director, Idaho Department of Lands, et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1962.
    No. 81-2005.
    Regents of the University of California v. Lynn; and Lynn v. Regents of the University of California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 656 F. 2d 1337.


text:
    No. 81-1965.
    Bramson v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1970.
    Samuel T. Isaac & Associates, Inc. v. Government National Mortgage Association et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1976.
    Walters v. Tennessee Valley Authority et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1978.
    Freeman et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1986.
    Attorney General of Ohio v. Krause et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2004.
    Palm v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2014.
    Brewer v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2030.
    No. 81-2032.
    No. 81-2034.
    No. 81-2037.
    No. 81-2038.
    Edgewood School District et al. v. Hoots et al.; Hallenberg, President of the Allegheny County Board of School Directors v. Hoots et al.; Allegheny County School Board et al. v. Hoots et al.; Swissvale Area School District v. Hoots et al.; and Pennsylvania et al. v. Hoots et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 672 F. 2d 1107.


text:
    No. 81-2051.
    Petito v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2054.
    Sechan v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2061.
    New Jersey v. Department of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2064.
    Nichol v. Oregon.
   Ct. App. Ore. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2067.
    Hawaii v. Bloss; and Hawaii v. Hawkins.
   Sup. Ct. Haw. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 Haw. 148, 637 P. 2d 1117 (first case); 64 Haw. 499, 643 P. 2d 1058 (second case).


text:
    No. 81-2068.
    Rutuelo v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2069.
    Associated Grocers v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2072.
    Rubush et al. v. Bemis Co., Inc., et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2073.
    Thevis et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2075.
    Wold v. Wold et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2078.
    Amon et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2083.
    No. 81-2289.
    ITT Continental Baking Co. v. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. et al.; and William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. et al. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 668 F. 2d 1014.


text:
    No. 81-2089.
    Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2090.
    City of Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan v. Watt, Secretary of the Interior, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2093.
    County of Imperial et al. v. Munoz et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2100.
    Stephens v. Lowery et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2094.
    No. 81-2096.
    Clancy et al. v. Jartech, Inc., et al.; and Clancy et al. v. Jartech, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 666 F. 2d 403.


text:
    No. 81-2098.
    Suntex Dairy et al. v. Block, Secretary of Agriculture.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2102.
    Hustler Magazine, Inc., et al. v. Guccione.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2106.
    Johnson v. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2107.
    Miller et al. v. Curry, District Attorney, Tarrant County, et al.
   Ct. App. Tex., 2d Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2108.
    Corchado v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2109.
    Dohaish v. Tooley.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2111.
    Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Roy Export Company Establishment of Vaduz, Liechtenstein, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2112.
    Peters et al. v. Health and Hospitals Governing Commission of Cook County.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2114.
    Gunter et ux. v. Hutcheson et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2116.
    Pettibone Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2119.
    No. 81-6511.
    Axelrod, New York State Commissioner of Health v. Coe et al.; and Coe et al. v. Axelrod, New York State Commissioner of Health, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-rari denied. Reported below: 669 F. 2d 67.


text:
    No. 81-2120.
    Durham Industries, Inc. v. North River Insurance Co.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2121.
    Boll v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2122.
    No. 81-2179.
    Wisconsin Avenue Associates, Inc., et al. v. 2720 Wisconsin Avenue Cooperative Assn., Inc., et al.; and Gold Depository & Loan Co., Inc. v. 2720 Wisconsin Avenue Cooperative Assn., Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 441 A. 2d 956.


text:
    No. 81-2124.
    Boston Association of School Administrators & Supervisors, AFL-CIO v. Morgan et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2126.
    Fields, Acting Warden, Joseph Harp Correctional Center, et al. v. Paul M.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2129.
    Eisenberg v. Crowley.
   Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2130.
    Joseph et al. v. Bond et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2131.
    Hill v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2132.
    Cory, State Controller v. Campbell.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2136.
    Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, dba Rick’s Texaco, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2137.
    ARCO Polymers, Inc. v. Local 8-74, Affiliated With the Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers’ International Union.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2138.
    Parker et al. v. Anderson et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2139.
    Tyler v. Hartford Insurance Group et al.
   Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2140.
    Stewart v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2142.
    Lindquist et al. v. Fowler.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2143.
    Thompson v. Covington Housing Development Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2145.
    Arrandale v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2146.
    Singleton v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2154.
    No. 81-2163.
    Currier v. Fogel et al.; and Chestnutt et al. v. Fogel et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 668 F. 2d 100.


text:
    No. 81-2155.
    No. 81-2382.
    Varney et al. v. Smiddy; and Smiddy v. Varney et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 665 F. 2d 261.


text:
    No. 81-2157.
    Carolina Casualty Insurance Co. v. Transport Indemnity Co.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2158.
    Skaines, dba Wyatt Tire Distributors v. Uniroyal, Inc.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2160.
    Agrillo-Ladlad et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2161.
    Griffith v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2165.
    Kenneth M. M. v. Claire A. M.
   Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2166.
    Barber v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2167.
    Seekonk Water District v. Heritage Homes of Attleboro, Inc.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2170.
    Haser v. Wiskowski, Director, Division of Motor Vehicles of New Jersey.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2173.
    Grabinski v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2178.
    Thompson et al. v. Wood.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2180.
    Steed v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2182.
    Gana v. Hawaii.
   Sup. Ct. Haw. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2183.
    Ruffin v. Casey, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2185.
    Gibson v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2186.
    M. R. Yudofsky & Associates et al. v. Kentucky Department of Finance.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2187.
    Guthery v. Guthery.
   Ct. Civ. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2190.
    Hall v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2191.
    Mayberry v. Dees et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2192.
    Morran v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2193.
    Hern Iron Works, Inc. v. Donovan, Secretary of Labor; and Youngstrom, dba Youngstrom’s Log Homes v. U. S. Department of Labor.
   Certiorari (first case) and certiorari before judgment (second case) to C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 670 F. 2d 838 (first case).


text:
    No. 81-2196.
    Council of North Atlantic Shipping Assns. et al. v. Federal Maritime Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2200.
    Miners & Merchants Bank of Roundup, Montana v. Stensvad et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2201.
    Keefe v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2203.
    Giovanazi v. Giovanazi et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2207.
    C. B. Foods, Inc. v. United States Department of Agriculture.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2208.
    Intercollegiate (Big Ten) Conference of Faculty Representatives et al. v. Wilson.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2210.
    Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Price.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2212.
    Kaye v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2214.
    Andrus Energy Corp. et al. v. United States et al.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2216.
    Byrd v. San Francisco Unified School District.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2220.
    United States ex rel. Patrick v. Hilton, Warden, Trenton State Prison.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2222.
    Sweatt et al. v. Plumbago Mining Corp.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2223.
    Keltner v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2227.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2228.
    Soojian v. County of Fresno et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2229.
    Chiafari v. U. S. Department of Interior et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2230.
    McGough v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2232.
    Bruce v. Kosnoski.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2233.
    Valdes v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2234.
    Acme Quilting Co., Inc. v. Perfect Fit Industries, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2235.
    Garcia v. United States et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2238.
    Parsons, dba Executive Motors Unlimited et al. v. Ford Motor Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2241.
    Kember et al. v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2246.
    Constant v. Colorado.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2247.
    McCarthy et al. v. Mensch et al.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2248.
    Berns v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2250.
    Harvey et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2251.
    Williams v. Cook County Civil Service Commission et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2253.
    Vinston v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2255.
    Checkrite Petroleum Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2256.
    No. 82-28.
    Jefferson County, Kentucky, et al. v. Hays et al.; and Hays et al. v. Jefferson County, Kentucky, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 668 F. 2d 869 and 673 F. 2d 152.


text:
    No. 81-2259.
    Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Boubel.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2260.
    S. A. R. L. de Gestion Pierre Cardin v. Morse.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2261.
    Kim et al. v. Taylor et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2262.
    Sutton et al. v. Southern Natural Gas Co.; and Sun Fresh Farms of Louisiana et al. v. Southern Natural Gas Co.
   Ct. App. La., 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied. Reported below: 406 So. 2d 667 (first case); 406 So. 2d 669 (second case).


text:
    No. 81-2263.
    Uzzolino v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2264.
    Loney v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2265.
    Kelly v. Warminster Township Board of Supervisors et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2267.
    First National Bank of Scotia et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2269.
    Berger v. Berger.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuya-hoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2270.
    Gustafson et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2271.
    School Board of Dade County, Florida v. Travelers Indemnity Co.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2274.
    Jonnet Development Corp. v. Caliguiri et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2277.
    North State Chemicals, Inc. v. Strickland et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2282.
    Coughlin et al. v. Jacobson.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2286.
    Sarmiento-Perez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2287.
    Woolery v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2288.
    Speckter v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2290.
    Cincinnati Association for the Blind v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2291.
    Alexandro v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2292.
    Air Express International Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2293.
    Connecticut Light & Power Co. et al. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2295.
    Bonello v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2297.
    Ward v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2298.
    Williams v. United States et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2300.
    Considine et vir v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2301.
    Brenner, dba Teddy Brenner Enterprises v. World Boxing Council et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2304.
    United States Steel Corp. v. Gaudiano et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2308.
    Capps v. Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2311.
    Kersey et al. v. Shipley et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2312.
    Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States Steel Corp.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2314.
    Taylor v. Kentucky ex rel. May.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2315.
    Del Re v. Prudential Lines, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2317.
    Ranger Fuel Corp. v. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2320.
    Dazzo v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2321.
    Waide v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2323.
    W. H. Moseley Co., Inc. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2325.
    Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. United States Department of Energy et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2327.
    DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Insurance Co. et al.
   Ct. App. La., 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2329.
    No. 81-2330.
    Union Texas Petroleum, a Division of Allied Chemical Corp., et al. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma et al.; and Harper Oil Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma et al.
   Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 651 P. 2d 652.


text:
    No. 81-2335.
    Browning, Administratrix v. B. F. Diamond Construction Co., Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2339.
    Buchanon v. Macon County Community Action Committee, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2341.
    Kudler et al. v. Smith.
   Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2342.
    Gonsalves v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2345.
    Lyle v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2346.
    Rexroat v. Thorell.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2347.
    Boddicker et al. v. Arizona State Dental Assn. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2348.
    Aetna Life & Casualty Co. et al. v. Gurnee et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2350.
    Moffet et al. v. Stone Mountain Memorial Assn. et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2351.
    Schreffler v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board et al.
   Pa. Commw. Ct. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2353.
    Grace v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2354.
    Uniformed Firefighters Assn., Local 94, IAFF, AFL-CIO, et al. v. City of New York et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2356.
    Grant v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2357.
    John G. Rinaldo Limited Partnership Number 14 et al. v. Roadrunner Lake Parks, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2360.
    Moeller et al. v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2361.
    Grossman v. Fidelity Municipal Bond Fund, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2364.
    Gee v. Gee et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2365.
    Fitzpatrick v. New York.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2367.
    Solitron Devices, Inc., et al. v. Sirota et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2368.
    Armijo, Commissioner of Public Lands for New Mexico v. Jensen et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. M. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2372.
    Delesdernier v. Porterie et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2374.
    Ferguson v. Union Mutual Stock Life Insurance Company of America.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2378.
    Yachts America, Inc., et al. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2379.
    Proctor et al. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2380.
    Pennavaria v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2387.
    Restaurant Employees, Bartenders & Hotel Service Employees Welfare and Pension Trust et al. v. Gateway Cafe, Inc., et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2392.
    Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Saucedo.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2393.
    Munoz v. Department of Registration and Education of Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2396.
    No. 82-5228.
    No. 82-5252.
    Benjamin v. United States; Feeney v. United States; and Rosten v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 675 F. 2d 46.


text:
    No. 81-2397.
    Priddy v. Priddy.
   Sup. Ct. Tex. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2398.
    Perkins v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2400.
    Capitol Aggregates, Inc. v. Donovan, Secretary of Labor, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2401.
    Young et al. v. Fidelity Union Life Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2405.
    Pass Word, Inc., et al., dba Coeur D’Alene Answering Service v. Federal Communications Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2410.
    Gee v. Gee.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2411.
    Gee v. Dawson et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2412.
    Gulf Oil Corp. et al. v. Fisher.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2413.
    Valentine v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6183.
    Jones v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6309.
    Pickens v. Brand, Sheriff of Johnson County, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6356.
    Hernandez v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.