text:
    No. 83-6865.
    Vincent v. Louisiana.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan,

with whom Justice Marshall joins,

dissenting.

“There is no higher duty of a court, under our constitutional system, than the careful processing and adjudication of petitions for writs of habeas corpus, for it is in such proceedings that a person in custody charges that error, neglect, or evil purpose has resulted in his unlawful confinement and that he is deprived of his freedom contrary to law.” Harris v. Nelson, 394 U. S. 286, 292 (1969). Because the proceedings in this case have fallen intolerably short of fulfilling this duty, and because this Court must be vigilant in ensuring that lower courts do not improperly cut corners in administering the Great Writ, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s denial of certiorari.

I

The petitioner Harold Vincent was convicted in 1974 of armed robbery and second-degree murder by a jury in Vernon Parish, Louisiana. Vincent’s trial had been delayed for over two years while he underwent evaluation and treatment for schizophrenia. This mental illness was so severe that psychiatrists at the Louisiana State Penitentiary General Hospital had certified that Vincent did not meet the constitutional standard of triability in that he could neither “realizfe] the nature of the charges against him” nor properly “assist his attorney.” 1 Record 17, 18. After intensive treatment with psychotropic drugs, particularly Thorazine, these psychiatrists notified the trial court that, so long as Vincent remained on his regulated dosage, he would have the mental capacity to proceed with trial. Id., at 18. They emphasized at Vincent’s pretrial sanity hearing that Vincent was dependent on Thorazine and that it was “almost a sure thing” that he would revert to episodes of psychosis if he stopped taking the medication. Id., at 64; see also id., at 20-23.

According to Vincent’s subsequent habeas petition, which Vincent prepared with the assistance of an inmate paralegal:

“On July 6, 1974, petitioner was transferred from the Louisiana State Penitentiary to Vernon Parish without any of his medication. Petitioner immediately inquired with Vernon Parish officials about his medication, but no one seemed to know anything about it. Consequently, on the morning trial was scheduled to commence, petitioner intentionally cut his leg to get to the hospital to see someone about receiving some Thorozine [sic]. When he appeared in court with his pants leg rolled up and a rag wrapped around his lower leg, petitioner’s mother and sisters became upset and rushed to talk with him. After petitioner told them the reason he cut his leg, they talked with petitioner’s trial attorneys, William E. Tilley and Chris Smith, III, concerning the likelihood of petitioner receiving some Thorozine [sic]. Petitioner’s attorneys brought the matter to the attention of the trial court, and after a few preliminary motions were argued, Judge Terrell ordered Vernon Parish officials to bring petitioner to the hospital.
“Petitioner was taken to the Leesville General Hospital where his leg was bandaged and he was given a shot. Petitioner explained his condition to the doctor that treated him, but was informed that it was against hospital regulations to prescribe Thorozine [sic] to him. Petitioner was returned to the courthouse for continuation of the proceedings against him. Throughout his trial . . . petitioner was without his prescribed medication, Thorozine [sic]. He was convicted as charged and . . . sentenced to a term of life imprisonment.” Id., at 9-10.

Vincent claimed that, as a result of this alleged deprivation of Thorazine, he was “mentally incompetent” during the trial in that he was unable “to maintain his ability to consult with his attorney and understand the proceedings against him.” Id., at 10.

After Vincent filed his federal habeas petition, the District Court ordered the State to submit a response. Ten months passed before the State, prompted by the court’s threat summarily to grant the petition, see id., at 36, finally filed an answer. The State denied Vincent’s material allegations and, in the alternative, asserted that “[assuming the facts to be as alleged by the defendant he knew exactly what he was doing in an attempt to get the medication that he desired” and thereby manifested his competence. Id., at 44-45, 57.

Without holding an evidentiary hearing or otherwise inquiring into the merits of Vincent’s allegations beyond reviewing the trial record, the District Court summarily dismissed the petition. Id., at 64-65. The court reasoned that “[t]he alleged lack of Thorazine, the alleged self mutilation, and the alleged trip to the hospital were occurances [sic] that were never brought to the trial Judge’s attention and are not reflected in the transcript record”; that the medical testimony concerning Vincent’s likely relapse in the absence of his medication pertained “to the time of the offense and not at the time of the trial”; and that Vincent’s counsel had not raised the issue at trial or on direct review. Ibid. “In short, there is nothing in the record, beyond the defendant’s assertion, of any lack of medication or the adverse effects from the lack therefrom.” Id., at 64. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in a brief unpublished order, reasoning that Vincent’s “proof” did not “reach the level required” to secure habeas relief. Id., at 86.

II

There can be no doubt that, if Vincent was in fact deprived of his Thorazine during trial and this deprivation rendered him incompetent to stand trial, he is entitled to have his conviction vacated. “[T]he conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process,” Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375, 378 (1966), and a petitioner is not barred from raising this issue by his failure to have challenged his competence at trial, id., at 384. See also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U. S. 162 (1975); Dusky v. United States, 362 U. S. 402 (1960); Bishop v. United States, 350 U. S. 961 (1956). Yet the Court today refuses to disturb the lower courts’ summary dismissal of Vincent’s petition for failure of proof even though Vincent has never been accorded an opportunity to adduce evidence in support of his allegations. This result is squarely at odds with our precedents, with 28 U. S. C. §2254, and with the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.

Where a habeas petition sets forth “specific and detailed factual assertions” that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the court must ensure the full development of the relevant facts. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U. S. 487, 496 (1962); see also Harris v. Nelson, 394 U. S., at 300. “Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court in habeas corpus must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding.” Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 312 (1963). See also 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). This duty requires “careful consideration and plenary processing of [habeas] claims including full opportunity for presentation of the relevant facts.” Harris v. Nelson, supra, at 298. Particular care is of course required where the habeas petitioner, as here, appears pro se or through the help of a fellow prisoner rather than with the assistance of an attorney.

Although a well-pleaded habeas petition frequently will require an evidentiary hearing, we have long recognized that federal courts may employ intermediate factfinding procedures in determining whether a full hearing is necessary. See, e. g., Machibroda v. United States, supra, at 495. Thus the Habeas Corpus Rules provide that the court may order limited discovery, 28 U. S. C. § 2254 Rule 6; “direct that the record be expanded b,y the parties by the inclusion of additional materials relevant tb the determination of the merits of the petition,” Rule 7(a); or arrange for informal conferences to inquire further into the merits of the petition, Advisory Committee’s Note to Habeas Corpus Rule 8, 28 U. S. C., p. 356. See also 28‘U. S. C. §§ 2246, 2247. Similarly, the court may direct the petitioner, on pain of dismissal, to specify the witnesses and evidence he relies upon. See, e. g., Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F. 2d 573, 575, n. 2, 585, n. 33 (CA5 1981), modified, 671 F. 2d 858, mandate recalled, 677 F. 2d 20, cert. denied, 459 U. S. 882 (1982). Although the particular procedures must necessarily vary with the circumstances of each case, the underlying concern is consistent: “where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is confined illegally and is therefore entitled to relief, it is the duty of the court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry.” Harris v. Nelson, supra, at 300.

Vincent’s claims have never even been addressed through a state evidentiary hearing, and the duty of the District Court to give full and fair consideration to them was therefore particularly clear. See, e. g., Townsend v. Sain, supra, at 313-314. None of the justifications proffered by the court or the State can excuse the court’s summary dismissal of Vincent’s petition. The court asserted, for example, that there is nothing in the transcript record suggesting that Vincent had acted irrationally or had otherwise been incompetent during trial. 1 Record 65. However, we have consistently rejected the notion that the absence of such evidence in the transcript can alone obviate the need for an eviden-tiary hearing on the issue of the petitioner’s mental capacity at trial. See, e. g., Drope v. Missouri, supra, at 179; Pate v. Robinson, supra, at 386 (“While [petitioner’s] demeanor at trial might be relevant to the ultimate decision as to his sanity, it cannot be relied upon to dispense with a hearing on that very issue”). Similarly, the court emphasized that Vincent’s attorneys had failed to raise the issue of his possible incompetence at trial. 1 Record 64. Again, however, while this failure might well be evidence indicating that Vincent was not incompetent, it could just as well reflect his attorneys’ unfamiliarity with the gravity of the situation or the ineffectiveness of their assistance; the ultimate truth cannot be determined in the absence of further inquiry.

The heart of the court’s summary rejection of Vincent’s petition appears to be that there is “nothing in the trial transcript” proving that Vincent was without his Thorazine during trial, mutilated himself in an attempt to obtain Thorazine, or would have reverted to his former incompetence if in fact he really were deprived of Thorazine. Ibid. Yet the alleged incidents occurred before the trial actually began, and the absence of supporting evidence in the transcript therefore obviously does not disprove Vincent’s claim. Indeed, one of the fundamental purposes of federal habeas fact-finding is to determine the truth of “purported occurrences outside the courtroom and upon which the record could, therefore, cast no real light.” Machibroda v. United States, supra, at 494-495. See also Hawk v. Olson, 326 U. S. 271, 274 (1945). In the proper exercise of its responsibilities under the Habeas Corpus Rules, the District Court easily could have sought independent verification of Vincent’s allegations from prison and hospital records, and from inquiries directed to Vincent’s former attorneys, prison officials, and Vincent’s family. Moreover, if the court had doubts about the effect of Thorazine deprivation on Vincent’s capacity to stand trial, it should have directed Vincent’s doctors to address the issue. These procedures might well have demonstrated that Vincent’s petition was without merit. If such discovery revealed substance in Vincent’s allegations, however, then an evidentiary hearing would be essential to determine whether his conviction was unconstitutionally procured.

The District Court emphasized that, under pertinent Fifth Circuit precedent, a habeas petitioner alleging that he was incompetent to stand trial must demonstrate facts that “'positively, unequivocally, and clearly generate the real, substantial, and legitimate doubt’” as to his mental capacity to assist in his defense. 1 Record 65, quoting Bruce v. Estelle, 483 F. 2d 1031, 1043 (CA5 1973). Although this standard may be perfectly appropriate, § 2254 and its attendant Rules forbid the invocation of the standard before a petitioner has been given the opportunity to present his supporting evidence. Where, as here, there is undisputed evidence that a habeas petitioner suffered from longstanding and severe mental illness, had previously been found unfit to stand trial as a result of his disorders, and would “almost [as] a sure thing” suffer a relapse if deprived of his medication, 1 Record 64, a court may not dismiss his claim that he was so deprived without inquiring into the merits or warning him that his petition would be dismissed if further substantiating evidence was not presented. “The Government’s contention that his allegations are improbable and unbelievable cannot serve to deny him an opportunity to support them by evidence. On this record it is his right to be heard.” Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275, 287 (1941).

I dissent.

       “[I]t is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently ‘waive’ his right” to stand trial only while competent. 383 U. S., at 384.

       “The expanded record may include, without limitation, letters predating the filing of the petition in the district court, documents, exhibits, and answers under oath; if so directed, to written interrogatories propounded by the judge. Affidavits may be submitted and considered as a part of the record.” Rule 7(b).

       As summarized in Vincent’s petition for certiorari, “[t]he facts alleged by Vincent that would be corroborated by outside sources include:
      “1. Thorazine not being sent with Vincent from Angola. Verification: Prison Records.
      “2. Vincent cut his leg to get to hospital to request thorazine. ■ Verification: Leesville General Hospital records; Police Jury payment records; William E. Tilley, Chris Smith, III, Della Vincent, Brenda Carlin.
      “3. Vincent made requests of jail officials, his attorneys and family for thorazine. Verification: Vernon Parish police officers, William E. Tilley, Chris Smith, III., Della Vincent, Brenda Carlin. . . .” Pet. for Cert. 7.

       The District Court acknowledged that prison psychiatrists had testified at Vincent’s sanity hearing that it was “almost a sure thing” that Vincent would revert to episodes of psychosis if deprived of Thorazine. 1 Record 64. Incredibly, the court dismissed the relevance of this testimony by observing that the psychiatrists’ discussion related to Vincent’s condition at the time of the offense “and not at the time of the trial.” Ibid. We have long recognized the probity of prior medical opinion on issues of trial competence, see, e. g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U. S. 162, 180 (1975), and the psychiatrists’ predictions in this case made further inquiries imperative.

        Bruce v. Estelle, relied on by the District Court below, itself illustrates this principle. After finding that Bruce had demonstrated “a history of mental illness” and “substantial evidence of mental incompetence at or near the time of trial,” the Fifth Circuit concluded that an evidentiary hearing was required to resolve Bruce’s claim of incompetence at trial. 483 F. 2d, at 1043. “We would thus be remiss in our duty if we turned a deaf ear to petitioner’s contentions since the record in this case evidences proceedings which did not adequately permit him to fairly present his serious allegations.” Ibid.

       The District Court never notified Vincent that his petition was subject to dismissal for want of sufficient evidence. Yet the Habeas Corpus Rules require such fair warning. Rule 11 commands the federal courts to apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “to the extent that they are not inconsistent with these rules.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) in turn provides that, if the court considers entering judgment for reasons beyond the bare sufficiency of the pleadings, “all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion.” See generally Stephens v. Kemp, ante, at 1057 (Brennan, J., dissenting).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Brennan,

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 84-49.
    Sweat et al. v. Arkansas.
   Ct. App. Ark. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan,

with whom Justice Marshall joins,

dissenting.

After the State of Arkansas had initiated formal criminal proceedings against the petitioners Russell and Richard (“Bud”) Sweat, a state undercover agent contacted the Sweats and, in a series of telephone conversations and face-to-face meetings, deliberately elicited incriminating statements from them. Because the Sweats’ right to counsel had accrued when formal criminal proceedings were begun, the prosecution’s introduction at trial of these subsequent statements clearly violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e. g., United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964). The Arkansas Court of Appeals held, however, that the Sweats’ right to counsel had not yet attached at the time the undercover agent elicited their statements on the ground that, since they had not “been arrested or deprived of [their] freedom in any significant way,” they were not entitled to notification of their rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). 5 Ark. App. 284, 288, 635 S. W. 2d 296, 299 (1982), subsequent appeal, 11 Ark. App. xix (1984).

This reasoning is clearly erroneous. We have made clear time and again that Miranda and concepts of “custody” have nothing to do with the accrual of a defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel. See, e. g., United States v. Henry, supra, at 273, n. 11; Massiah v. United States, supra, at 206. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s failure to correct a state court’s clear disregard of controlling federal constitutional precedent.

I

During an undercover investigation in Blytheville, Arkansas, Sergeant John Chappelle of the Arkansas State Police Criminal Investigation Division learned that Bud Sweat and his son, Russell, might be engaged in marihuana trafficking. Chappelle had an unwitting intermediary introduce him to the Sweats, and he proposed to sell them several hundred pounds of marihuana. Chappelle and the Sweats had several meetings and telephone conversations from early February through late March 1980, and they ultimately agreed that Chappelle would deliver 500 pounds of marihuana to Blytheville in exchange for $150,000. Chappelle surreptitiously taped these meetings and conversations.

When he felt that he had obtained enough evidence to prosecute the Sweats, Chappelle met on March 27 with David Burnett, Prosecuting Attorney for the Second Judicial District of the State of Arkansas. Burnett reviewed the evidence with Chappelle and decided to file a felony information against the Sweats charging them with criminal conspiracy in violation of Ark. Stat. Ann. §41-707 (1977). Chappelle was present while Burnett prepared and signed the felony information. Record of First Trial in CR-80-68 and CR-80-63A (Cir. Ct., Crina. Div., Chickasawba Dist. of Miss. Cty., Ark.), p. 591 (hereinafter First Trial Record). Adversary judicial criminal proceedings were formally begun at 4:30 that afternoon when Burnett filed the felony information in the Circuit Court for the Chickasawba District of Mississippi County and obtained bench warrants for the Sweats’ arrest. Second Trial Record 4~6.

Instead of arresting the Sweats, however, Chappelle decided that he would like to elicit additional incriminating evidence from them. Accordingly, he called them on the telephone that evening and urged them to continue with the deal. First Trial Record 388-389. In subsequent calls and meetings which followed from his initiation, Chappelle probed the Sweats for details about their financial resources, their plans for the marihuana, and their knowledge of each others’ activities. See generally id., at 390-426. When the Sweats informed Chappelle that they could not proceed with the purchase, he outlined an alternative “recommendation” for the delivery of “good faith” money and pressed them to “let’s get something going.” Id., at 402, 407. Only after Chappelle had succeeded in eliciting these further statements from the Sweats and in persuading them to give him what little money they could gather did he choose to execute the bench warrants. Id., at 422-426.

Chappelle surreptitiously taped all of these telephone conversations and meetings, and the State sought to introduce the recordings at trial as evidence of the Sweats’ statements and overt acts in furtherance of the charged conspiracy. The Sweats moved to suppress the recordings of and testimony pertaining to these statements, relying on Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), in support of their argument that Chappelle’s deliberate elicitation of these statements after the felony information had been filed violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Second Trial Record 35-40. The trial court, however, admitted the evidence on the ground that Massiah had been “further elaborated and explained” by Miranda v. Arizona, supra, so that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is now implicated only when a defendant is actually in custody. First Trial Record 57. On appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals agreed with this reasoning:

“[W]e note that one is not entitled to notification of his rights when the person has not been arrested or deprived of his freedom in any significant way. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966); Parker v. State, 258 Ark. 880, 529 S. W. 2d 860 (1975). Since no interrogation of appellants took place and they were not coerced or tricked into saying anything against their will, it was not error for the trial judge to refuse to suppress appellants’ statements. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293 (1966).” 5 Ark. App., at 288, 635 S. W. 2d, at 299.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Sweats’ convictions on other grounds, however, and remanded for a new trial. Over renewed objection, Chappelle once again testified about his conversations with the Sweats subsequent to the initiation of formal proceedings and once again played the challenged recordings for the jury. Second Trial Record 260-286. The Sweats again were convicted of criminal conspiracy, and once again the Arkansas Court of Appeals rejected their Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claim for the reasons stated in its earlier opinion. 11 Ark. App. xix (1984). The Arkansas Supreme Court denied the motion to review.

II

The Sixth Amendment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” This right to counsel accrues when “adversary judicial criminal proceedings” are initiated — “whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682, 689 (1972) (emphasis added). Thereafter, the authorities may not deliberately elicit incriminating statements from the defendant absent the presence of his counsel or a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. This prohibition applies both to express interrogation, see, e. g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S., at 398-401, and to surreptitious efforts by the authorities deliberately to elicit incriminating information, see, e. g., United States v. Henry, 447 U. S., at 269-275 (use of jailhouse informant to elicit admissions from incarcerated defendant); Massiah v. United States, supra, at 206-207 (use of informant to elicit admissions from defendant who was free on bail). This touchstone requirement of our constitutional scheme embodies the recognition that, once the government has “committed itself to prosecute” and the defendant thereby is “faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society,” Kirby v. Illinois, supra, at 689, any official effort to interrogate the defendant without the protections afforded by counsel “ ‘contravenes the basic dictates of fairness in the conduct of criminal causes and the fundamental rights of persons charged with crime.”’ Massiah v. United States, supra, at 205 (citation omitted). See also Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315, 325 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring); id., at 327 (Stewart, J., concurring).

Applying these principles to the circumstances of this ease, it is clear that the State’s introduction of the challenged recordings at trial violated the petitioners’ Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel.

First. Adversary judicial criminal proceedings began in this case with the filing of the felony information and the issuance of bench warrants at 4:30 p. m. on March 27. Kirby v. Illinois, supra, at 689. Although the State now attempts to minimize the fact that the felony information “evidently” had been filed before Sergeant Chappelle contacted the Sweats and elicited the challenged statements from them, Brief in Opposition 6-7, there is thus no question that at the time of these contacts the Sweats’ Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel already had accrued.

Second. The State contends that Sergeant Chappelle merely “continued with the operation and allowed the Petitioners to attempt to complete the proposed deal,” and that “the Petitioners were in fact arrested before there was any questioning.” Id., at 7. To the extent the State suggests’that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were implicated only by the “formal” questioning that occurred after the Sweats’ arrest, we have repeatedly rejected such arguments. The right to counsel must “‘apply to indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse.’” Massiah v. United States, supra, at 206 (citation omitted). See also United States v. Henry, supra, at 272-273. The relevant inquiry has been stated variously as whether the authorities “deliberately elicited” incriminating statements from the defendant, Massiah v. United States, supra, at 206; or “deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information” from the defendant, Brewer v. Williams, supra, at 399; or “intentionally creat[ed] a situation likely to induce [the defendant] to make incriminating statements,” United States v. Henry, supra, at 274.

There has occasionally been disagreement as to the precise formulation of the relevant standard and its application to the sometimes-ambiguous facts in cases before us. See, e. g., United States v. Henry, supra, at 275 (Powell, J., concurring); id., at 277 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Under even the most lenient application of the standard, however, there can be no question from the unambiguous facts of this case that Sergeant Chappelle “intentionally,” “deliberately,” and “designedly” elicited devastating admissions from the Sweats after formal judicial proceedings had begun. See supra, at 1174-1175, and n. 3. The Arkansas Court of Appeals itself conceded that the Sweats’ statements had been “elicited” by Chappelle. 5 Ark. App., at 288, 635 S. W. 2d, at 299.

Third. The State contends, however, that it is constitutionally significant that the Sweats had not yet “retained counsel or requested the assistance of counsel” when Chappelle elicited their admissions. Brief in Opposition 7. Although Massiah and Williams both involved situations in which the defendant had indeed already obtained the assistance of counsel, that factor was irrelevant to the outcome. “[T]he right to counsel . . . means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him . . . .” Brewer v. Williams, supra, at 398 (emphasis added). Thus we have specifically applied Massiah to cases in which the defendant was under indictment but where he was not represented by, nor had he even requested, counsel. See, e. g., McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U. S. 356 (1965) (per curiam), summarily rev’g 1 Ohio St. 2d 60, 203 N. E. 2d 349 (1964). Cf. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 484, n. 8 (1981) (discussing McLeod). And in Henry, the jailhouse informant was “contacted” by the Government six days before Henry obtained counsel. 447 U. S., at 266.

Fourth. The Arkansas Court of Appeals apparently believed that Miranda somehow modified the Massiah line of cases, because it viewed as dispositive the fact that, since the Sweats had not been arrested, they were not entitled to notification of their rights. 5 Ark. App., at 288, 635 S. W. 2d, at 299. The Fifth Amendment concerns embodied in Miranda and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel enunciated in Massiah are, however, obviously distinct. Miranda is directed at custodial interrogation and is therefore limited to those situations in which a suspect is “taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 384 U. S., at 444. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel, on the other hand, accrues upon initiation of formal judicial proceedings and continues whether or not the accused is at any given time in custody — as witnessed, of course, by the fact that Massiah himself was out on bail and engaged in a conversation with a friend who, “quite without the petitioner’s knowledge,” had become an undercover informant. 377 U. S., at 202. Thus we have repeatedly rejected arguments of this sort which “see[k] to infuse Fifth Amendment concerns against compelled self-incrimination into the Sixth Amendment protection of the right to the assistance of counsel.” United States v. Henry, 447 U. S., at 273.

In a similar vein, the court below contended that the Sweats “were not coerced or tricked into saying anything against their will.” 5 Ark. App., at 288, 635 S. W. 2d, at 299. Although the Sweats were not “coerced” in the Fifth Amendment sense, here again the court impermissibly injected Fifth Amendment concerns into the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment domain. We have “pointedly observed” on repeated occasions that an accused in such circumstances “was more seriously imposed upon because he did not know that [the person asking him questions] was a Government agent,” and accordingly have rejected suggestions that we “apply a less rigorous standard under the Sixth Amendment where the accused is prompted by an undisclosed undercover informant than where the accused is speaking in the hearing of persons he knows to be Government officers.” United States v. Henry, supra, at 272-273 (emphasis added). See also Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S., at 206. Thus the Sweats were indeed “tricked” in the sense that “[c]onversation stimulated in such circumstances may elicit information that an accused would not intentionally reveal to persons known to be Government agents.” United States v. Henry, supra, at 273.

Finally. The State relies heavily on Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293 (1966), as support for its argument that it was entitled to proceed with its undercover sting operation until it decided to arrest the Sweats, notwithstanding that formal judicial proceedings already had been initiated. In that case, the Government arranged for an informant to monitor Hoffa’s activities while Hoffa was on trial for alleged violations of the Taft-Hartley Act, a trial that ultimately ended with a hung jury. On the basis of the informant’s discoveries, Hoffa subsequently was indicted for and convicted of attempting to bribe members of the first jury. Hoffa contended that the bribery charges could have been brought long before they finally were, that if they had been timely filed the informant’s continued presence would have been barred under Massiah, and that the Government’s failure to bring charges earlier therefore violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Court rejected this argument out of hand:

“There is no constitutional right to be arrested. . . . Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.” 385 U. S., at 310.

Once again the State relies on precedent that is not relevant to the issue at hand. As we have previously emphasized, Hoffa has no bearing in cases where, as here, formal criminal proceedings actually have been initiated and the authorities deliberately elicit incriminating statements for use in those proceedings. United States v. Henry, supra, at 272. Thus while Hoffa stands for the proposition that the Sixth Amendment does not control the timing of the initiation of adversarial proceedings, it is “not relevant to the inquiry under the Sixth Amendment” once such proceedings have commenced and the right to counsel has attached, as it clearly had here. 447 U. S., at 272.

The State correctly notes that an investigation of criminal activities need not terminate upon the initiation of formal criminal proceedings. We have previously so emphasized. Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S., at 207. All that we have previously held, and all that the Court should have held today, “is that the defendant’s own incriminating statements, obtained by [state] agents under the circumstances here disclosed, could not constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial.” Ibid, (emphasis in original).

Ill

The press of our docket may well have led the Court to dismiss this petition for direct review as involving nothing more than an obviously aberrant failure by a state court to apply settled constitutional principles. Lest the fundamental right to counsel be blurred and then gradually eroded by the tremendous pressures put on those charged with enforcing the criminal law, however, I believe we have a duty rigorously to correct such obvious aberrations. For “it is precisely the predictability of those pressures that makes imperative a resolute loyalty to the guarantees that the Constitution extends to us all.” Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S., at 406.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari.

       The felony information charged that the Sweats “did unlawfully and feloni-ously commit the offense of criminal conspiracy with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the criminal offense of sale and delivery or possession with intent to sell or deliver a controlled substance, to wot: marijuana . . . .” Record of Second Trial in CR-80-63 and CR-80-63A (Cir. Ct., Crim. Div., Chickasawba Dist. of Miss. Cty., Ark.), p. 4 (hereinafter Second Trial Record).

       The warrants directed the authorities: “You are commanded forthwith to arrest [Russell and Bud Sweat] and bring [them] before the Mississippi County Circuit Court, Chickasawba District, to answer an indictment in that Court against [them] for the offense of Criminal Conspiracy ... or if the Court be adjourned for the Term, that you deliver [them] to the Jailer of Mississippi County.” Id., at 5-6.

       Specifically, Chappelle instructed Bud Sweat: “You go down to the office and you find, you gather up all you can gather and you call me back and you let me know how much. I ain’t leaving here without something, understand? . . . We can do each other a lot of good. . . . But, go get me what you can as a measure of good faith and I’ll take Russell’s word on it and in turn I’ll take your word on it. But, listen, don’t jack me around, all right, cause I’m not going to do you all — .” First Trial Record 400-402. In a later telephone conversation with Russell, Chappelle reiterated: “Russell, listen, I don’t want to — I don’t want to leave here without something. . . . Now, let’s get something going. ... I made a recommendation that your dad seemed to like and I’m sitting here waiting on an answer to that.” Id., at 406-409.

         The State also amended its felony information to include as substantiating details the statements and actions elicited by Chappelle after the filing of the original information. See Second Trial Record 16-17.

       The Sweats had argued at trial that Chappelle entrapped them, and they unsuccessfully had sought to introduce recordings of Chappelle’s conversations with an informant in support of this defense. Finding that some of Chappelle’s recorded statements were material to the entrapment issue, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s refusal to admit this evidence was reversible error. 5 Ark. App. 284, 286-287, 635 S. W. 2d 296, 298 (1982).


text:
    No. 84-764.
    In re New Orleans Public Service, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari and/or mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 84-825.
    Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Laffey et al.

      See also note, supra, p. 1145.

   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of Chamber of Commerce of the United States for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certio-rari denied.

Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and this petition.


text:
    No. 84-906.
    Carson v. American Telephone & Telegraph Technologies, Inc.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.*


text:
    No. 84-5369.
    Woodward v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 84-5538.
    No. 84-5625.
    No. 84-5632.
    No. 84-5659.
    No. 84-5776.
    Watson v. Louisiana. Solomon v. Kemp, Warden. Mann v. Florida. Blanco v. Florida. Gorham v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. La.;

C. A. 11th Cir.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.; and

Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 84-5538, 449 So. 2d 1321; No. 84-5625, 735 F. 2d 395; No. 84-5632, 453 So. 2d 784; No. 84-5659, 452 So. 2d 520; No. 84-5776, 454 So. 2d 556.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 83-1971.
    No. 83-2065.
    No. 83-6997.
    No. 83-7010.
    Illinois v. Washington, Jones v. Department of Human Resources of Georgia et al., Witherspoon, Individually, and as Mother and Next Friend of Gaines et al. v. Cordier et al., DePriest v. Puett, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Human Services, et al.,
   ante, p. 1022;

ante, p. 979;

ante, p. 1017; and

ante, p. 1034. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 84-191.
    No. 84-274.
    No. 84-5010.
    No. 84-5051.
    No. 84-5314.
    No. 84-5380.
    No. 84-5432.
    No. 84-5457.
    No. 84-5506.
    No. 84-5528.
    No. 84-5533.
    Eisenberg v. Schwalbe, Knapp Street Realty Corp. v. Wisconsin Insurance Plan et al., Noe v. Neaves, Warden, et al., Howell v. Maryland, Kulik v. California, Summa v. Hasson et al., Udell v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals Committee on Admissions, Fulsom v. White, Superintendent, Moberly Training Center for Men, Dingle v. Simpkins, Piatkowska v. Industrial Indemnity Co., Stephens v. Sneath et al.,
   ante, p. 858;

ante, p. 917;

ante, p. 860;

ante, p. 1039;

ante, p. 1074;

ante, p. 925;

ante, p. 1040;

ante, p. 1040;

ante, p. 1030;

ante, p. 1041; and

ante, p. 1041. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 83-826.
    No. 83-6770.
    No. 84-5366.
    Hamed & Salem, Inc. v. United States, Harris v. United States, Hayes v. Brotherhood of Railway & Airline Clerks, Allied Services Division,
   465 U. S. 1023;

ante, p. 840; and

ante, p. 935. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    January 15, 1985
    No. A-541.
    Skillern v. Procunier, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, et al.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death scheduled for Wednesday, January 16, 1985, presented to Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.

Justice Brennan,

with whom Justice Marshall joins,

dissenting.

I

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), I would grant the application for a stay of execution.

II

Even if I believed otherwise, however, I would stay the applicant’s execution pending this Court’s resolution of Heckler v. Chaney, No. 83-1878, cert. granted, 467 U. S. 1251 (1984), which has been argued to this Court and currently awaits decision. I cannot participate in the cruel irony visited on this applicant by the Court today.

Doyle Edward Skillern is one of the eight plaintiffs in Chaney. Those plaintiffs allege that lethal drugs used to carry out death sentences in Texas and Oklahoma cause “agonizingly slow and painful deaths” and consequently are not “safe and effective” for their intended use in executions, as allegedly is required under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U. S. C. § 301 et seq. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed that the Food and Drug Administration has a statutory duty to investigate this claim, and indicated that it was prepared to “compel” the FDA to take action against the lethal drugs. Chaney v. Heckler, 231 U. S. App. D. C. 136, 153, 718 F. 2d 1174, 1191 (1983).

The merits of the Court of Appeals’ action and order in Chaney are not before us on this application. In March 1984, the Solicitor General of the United States filed an application for stay of the Court of Appeals’ mandate in Chaney, arguing that the decision was “likely to interfere with state enforcement of capital punishment statutes . . . .” Application in Heckler v. Chaney, No. 83-1878, p. 6. “[I]f the mandate is not stayed, the FDA will in all likelihood be required ... to regulate the method of capital punishment used in several states,” including Texas. Id., at 10. The Chief Justice granted the motion for stay of the mandate based on this understanding of the effect of the judgment.

Thus the Government and this Court have proceeded in the Chaney case on the assumption that success by the plaintiffs will delay and perhaps ultimately preclude their execution by lethal injection. Yet today the Court decides to send one of those plaintiffs to his death by the very method challenged in Chaney. The Court obviously considers the issues in Chaney substantial enough to warrant plenary consideration. But despite our assertion of jurisdiction over applicant and his claim in Chaney, Texas subsequently has determined to execute applicant by lethal injection tomorrow morning. I am aware of no precedent that has permitted irreparable injury to a party in a case receiving plenary consideration from this Court when the subject matter of the case is so intimately related to the threatened harm. The same question would arise if Chaney raised a question of bankruptcy enforcement law and Texas were threatening to foreclose on applicant’s home despite this Court’s pending consideration of the legality of the method. It is only mere chance that this applicant has seven coplaintiffs in his case; were he the only plaintiff, surely his execution would moot any decision we might render in Chaney. The fortuity of multiple plaintiffs should not skew the Court’s analysis.

The applicant argued in his 42 U. S. C. § 1983 action below that, by executing him and thereby mooting his opportunity to litigate his case regarding the very method of execution at issue, Texas will deprive the applicant of his right to have his claim considered by the federal courts. The Courts of Appeals are unanimous in their discussion of the elements requiring consideration to obtain a stay under § 1983:

“(1) whether the movant has made a showing of likelihood of success on the merits, (2) whether the movant has made a showing of irreparable injury if the stay is not granted, (3) whether the granting of the stay would substantially harm the other parties, and (4) whether the granting of the stay would serve the public interest. Ruiz v. Estelle, 666 F. 2d 854, 856 (5th Cir.1982). . . . While ‘the movant need not always show a “probability” of success on the merits,’ he must ‘present a substantial case on the merits when a serious legal question is involved and show that the balance of the equities, [i. e. the other three factors] weighs heavily in the favor of granting the stay.’” O’Bryan v. McKaskle, 729 F. 2d 991, 993 (CA5 1984) (emphasis in original).

Accord, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm’n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 182 U. S. App. D. C. 220, 223, 559 F. 2d 841, 843 (1977); Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 595 F. 2d 889 (CA1 1979).

The balance of equities in this case runs entirely in the applicant’s favor; indeed, respondents do not even attempt to argue that any of the last three factors favor the Texas Department of Corrections. Irreparability of the injury is obvious. No possible harm can result to the Department if applicant’s execution is stayed pending our decision in Chaney. And certainly the public interest is not served if a party to a case receiving plenary consideration before the highest Court in the land is compelled to undergo the very injury whose legality his case challenges. Any interest in finality or execution of the State’s death penalty law will, at worst, simply be delayed but not denied if the decision in Chaney is adverse to the applicant. And if that decision were to go in the applicant’s favor, then a stay will have prevented a harm the legality of which will be open to serious question under federal law.

Respondents’ only argument against a stay is that applicant’s likelihood of success on the merits is slim. That may be so in the Fifth Circuit, which rejected a claim similar to applicant’s in O’Bryan, supra (although, interestingly, the O’Bryan court did not discuss the three equitable factors required by its own precedents). But the argument loses any force before this Court, which is currently giving plenary consideration to a split between the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the Court of Appeals that decided Chaney on the very issue applicant presents. Even the Solicitor General has advised us that if applicant succeeds in Chaney, his execution will likely be “interfere^]” with. Application in Heckler v. Chaney, No. 88-1878, p. 6. Our grant of the writ of certiorari in Chaney provides all the answer required to the question whether there is a “serious legal question involved” in applicant’s claim, see Autry v. Estelle, 464 U. S. 1301, 1302 (1983) (White, J., granting application for stay in chambers) (“[I]n view of our decision to give the case plenary consideration, I cannot say that the issue lacks substance”), unless the Court is prepared to hold that litigants that will be affected by our decisions may nevertheless take irreparable steps to oust us of our jurisdiction.

For these reasons, I dissent from the decision to deny this application for a stay of execution pending our decision in Chaney. The irony of the Court’s contrary action will not be lost on the public, when we ultimately issue a decision to a plaintiff no longer able to receive it.


text:
    January 16, 1985
    No. 83-6808.
    Dalton v. United States et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    January 21, 1985

    No. 84-807.
    Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc., Formerly Known as Hycel, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.

      Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the orders announced on this date.

   Appeal from C. A. 5th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-846.
    Klein v. Florida.
   Appeal from Cir. Ct. Fla., 12th Jud. Cir., Sarasota County, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 84-5481.
    Vega v. New York.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 84-5875.
    Neal v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.; and Neal v. City of Huntsville.

       See also note, immediately supra.

   Appeals from Sup. Ct. Ala. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeals were taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.


text:
    No. A-485.
    Carella v. Cooper et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Application to recall and stay the mandate, addressed to Justice White and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-458.
    In re Disbarment of Rey.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 915.]


text:
    No. D-472.
    In re Disbarment of Miller.
   It is ordered that Alan Manning Miller, of Garden City, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 83-1935.
    Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation et al. v. Donovan, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 915.] Motion of American Civil Liberties Union for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 83-1961.
    Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1016.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 84-165.
    Gould v. Ruefenacht et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1016.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 83-2143.
    Tennessee v. Street.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 929.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 84-28.
    No. 84-143.
    Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., et al.; and Eikenberry, Attorney General of Washington, et al. v. J-R Distributors, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 813.] Motion of American Booksellers Association, Inc., et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 84-465.
    Black, Director, Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Resources, et al. v. Romano.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1033.] Motion of the Attorney General of Missouri to permit David C. Mason, Esquire, of Jefferson City, Mo., to argue pro hac vice granted.


text:
    No. 84-718.
    Mendenhall v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Wayne Winters, Editor and Publisher of Western Prospector and Miner, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 84-5343.
    Hux v. Murphy, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of petitioner to consolidate this case with No. 83-1590, Francis v. Franklin [certiorari granted, 467 U. S. 1225], denied.


text:
    No. 84-5802.
    In re Ely.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 84-755.
    United States v. Montoya de Hernandez.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 84-823.
    United States v. Doe No. 462.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 84-861.
    National Labor Relations Board v. International Longshoremen’s Assn., AFL-CIO, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-1038.
    Doring, Executrix of the Estate of Kerber v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1647.
    Lindy Pen Co., Inc., et al. v. Bic Pen Corp.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1864.
    Thornburgh, Governor of Pennsylvania, et al. v. Nelson et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1988.
    Masi v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6713.
    Rankins v. Louisiana.
   Ct. App. La., 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6885.
    West v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6962.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-67.
    Linder v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-372.
    No. 84-409.
    Friedrich v. United States; and Beasley et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736 F. 2d 571.


text:
    No. 84-452.
    Todd v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-482.
    Gustafson v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-525.
    Baylor University Medical Center v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-537.
    Austin v. Pennsylvania.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-544.
    No. 84-553.
    Association of California Water Agencies et al. v. United States et al.; and County of Del Norte, California, et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732 F. 2d 1462.


text:
    No. 84-577.
    Goodrich v. Department of the Navy.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-579.
    Schuster v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-595.
    Jampol et al. v. Southern California Retail Clerks Union and Drug Employer Pension and Trust Fund.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-610.
    M/V Torvanger et al. v. Quaker Oats Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-612.
    Yarbro et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-637.
    Peterson v. Merit Systems Protection Board.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-650.
    Bristol-Myers Co. v. Federal Trade Commission.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-682.
    Monagle v. Bolger, Postmaster General of the United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-743.
    Rosen v. Chrysler Plastic Products Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-751.
    Lewis v. Joseph Magnin Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-765.
    Hillier, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Hillier v. Southern Towing Co. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-787.
    Lauderback v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-792.
    Foering v. Stratton et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-803.
    Michigan v. Burbank.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-810.
    Schneier v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-813.
    Murvine v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-817.
    Fox et al. v. Consolidated Rail Corporation.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-820.
    Polyak v. Hulen et al.
   Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-830.
    Ethicon, Inc. v. Handgards, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-837.
    Jacobs v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-838.
    George v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-840.
    Kashetta v. Kashetta.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-841.
    Kashetta v. Kashetta.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-844.
    Home Placement Service, Inc. v. Providence Journal Co.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-845.
    Arvanis, dba Industrial Contractors, et al. v. Noslo Engineering Consultants, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-847.
    Green v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-857.
    National Loss Control Service Corp. v. Canipe.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-862.
    Weiss v. Gill et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari before judgment denied.


text:
    No. 84-863.
    Griffith et ux. v. Montgomery County, Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-865.
    Gero v. Pires et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-868.
    Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Paul N. Howard Co. et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-872.
    Avco Corp. v. Precision Air Parts, Inc.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-876.
    Batiste, aka Williams v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-882.
    Baumann v. Typographic Innovations, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-886.
    Sullivan et ux. v. First Peoples Bank of New Jersey et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-887.
    Connecticut v. Couture.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-892.
    Bryant v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-893.
    Omega Corporation of Chesterfield v. Malloy et al.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-907.
    Fred Lavery Porsche Audi Co. et al. v. Kearns.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-913.
    Fleishman v. Eli Lilly & Co. et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-927.
    George v. George.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-938.
    Buss v. Western Airlines, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-968.
    Causey v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5178.
    No. 84-5179.
    Vereen v. United States; and Tuttle v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 F. 2d 1325.


text:
    No. 84-5423.
    Ignacio v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5449.
    Fuller et al. v. Lee, Solicitor General of the United States, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5476.
    Spainhower v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5502.
    Campbell v. Clark, Secretary of the Interior.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5518.
    Fleming v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5520.
    Charles v. Foltz, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5525.
    Owen v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5526.
    Roberts v. Marshall, Superintendent, Southern Ohio Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5529.
    Ward v. Knoblock, Huron County Circuit Judge, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5560.
    Stroger v. New Jersey.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5582.
    Mabery v. Knight et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5618.
    Miller v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5637.
    Freeman v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5753.
    Nunley v. Alford, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5773.
    Sumerlin v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5778.
    Foster v. DeRobertis, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5780.
    Gadomski v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5787.
    Vertin v. Koehler, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5788.
    Ross v. Delaware.
   Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5789.
    Sellner v. Handgun Permit Review Board.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5791.
    Banks v. McGinnis, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5798.
    Demoran v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5799.
    Krupp v. O’Lone, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5806.
    Day v. Supreme Court of Texas et al.
   Ct. App. Tex., 1st Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5807.
    Kane v. Baer, Chairman, United States Parole Commission, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5809.
    Baird v. Peterson et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5810.
    Brown v. Young et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5813.
    Crews v. District Attorney of Common Pleas Court for Washington County, Pennsylvania, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5815.
    Mahler v. Ward et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5823.
    Wood v. Garland et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5828.
    Rocco v. Central Municipal Court, County of Orange.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5830.
    Fordham v. National Bank of Boyertown.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5831.
    LaGrange v. Jones, Judge, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5832.
    Pozworski v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5833.
    Carr v. Holland, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5839.
    Rooks v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5847.
    Moore v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5858.
    Jordan v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5888.
    Whitehurst v. Virginia State Bar et al.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5891.
    Slater v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5895.
    Cooper v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5897.
    Hoskins v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5906.
    Hossman v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5913.
    Hersom v. United States Army.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5916.
    Morejon v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5917.
    Witherspoon v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5919.
    Otto v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5923.
    Salvador v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5926.
    Saunders v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5928.
    Duffy v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5937.
    Polselli v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5947.
    Lawson v. O’Lone et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5949.
    Travieso v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-21.
    No. 84-38.
    Scott v. City of Hammond, Indiana, et al.; and Illinois et al. v. City of Milwaukee et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White and Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.

Reported below: 731 F. 2d 403.


text:
    No. 84-288.
    The Sacramento Bee v. Municipal Court of California, Sacramento County (Mozingo, Real Party in Interest).
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Motion of respondent Mozingo for leave to proceed informa pawperis granted. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 84-842.
    Jack Faucett Associates, Inc., et al. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. et al.

      See also note *, supra, p. 1186.

   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 84-880.
    Shamrock Foods Co. v. Arizona et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.*


text:
    No. 84-5817.
    No. 84-5864.
    Caruthers v. Tennessee. Kennedy v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn.; and

Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 84-5817, 676 S. W. 2d 935; No. 84-5864, 455 So. 2d 351.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 83-6775.
    No. 84-5579.
    No. 84-5647.
    No. 84-5715.
    Thompson v. Louisiana, Johnpoll v. United States, Mazak v. United States, D’Arco v. United States,
   ante, p. 17;

ante, p. 1075;

ante, p. 1076; and

ante, p. 1090. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 84-5483.
    McIntosh v. United States et al.,
   ante, p. 937. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing and all other relief denied.


text:
    January 23, 1985
    No. 84-662.
    Greenville Shipping Corp. et al. v. Ollestad.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    January 26, 1985
    No. 84-205.
    Virginia ex rel. Department of Conservation and Economic Development et al. v. Clark, Secretary of the Interior, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 979.] Writ of certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    January 29, 1985
    No. A-584.
    Raulerson v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death scheduled for Wednesday, January 30, 1985, presented to Justice Rehnquist, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant the application for stay and a petition for writ of certiorari and would vacate the death sentence in this case.


text:
    February 4, 1985
    No. 84-774.
    United Air Lines, Inc. v. Higman et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    February 5, 1985
    No. A-603.
    Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. v. Songer.
   Application to vacate the stay of execution of sentence of death entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, presented to Justice Rehnquist, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Justice Rehnquist dissents.

The Chief Justice, Justice Powell, and Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.


text:
    February 6, 1985
    No. 84-1072.
    Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. West, Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari and other relief dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    No. 84-5976.
    In re Magee.
   Petition for writ of habeas corpus dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    February 7, 1985
    No. 84-873.
    Montes et al. v. Agosto, President of the Senate of Puerto Rico.
   Sup. Ct. P. R. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    February 8, 1985
    No. A-597.
    Celestine v. Blackburn, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death scheduled for Saturday, February 9, 1985, presented to Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, is granted pending the timely filing and disposition by this Court of a petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay terminates automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, this stay shall continue pending the sending down of the judgment of this Court. Justice White, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O’Connor would deny the application.

Justice Powell took.no part in the consideration or decision of this application.


text:
    February 12, 1985
    No. 84-572.
    Markgraf et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    No. 84-915.
    Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    February 14, 1985
    No. 84-1220.
    G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., et al. v. Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari and motion to expedite consideration of the petition dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    No. 84-935.
    H. S. Crocker Co., Inc. v. Ostrofe.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    February 19, 1985

    No. 84-827.
    Westhafer, Judge, Circuit Court of Decatur County, Indiana, et al. v. Worrell Newspapers of Indiana, Inc., dba Greensburg Daily News, et al.

       Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the orders announced on this date.

   Affirmed on appeal from C. A. 7th Cir.

Justice Rehnquist would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 84-833.
    Bean Dredging Corp. v. Alabama.
   Appeal from Ct. Civ. App. Ala. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 84-918.
    Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Limbach, Tax Commissioner of Ohio.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ohio dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 84-952.
    Gerzof v. Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District.
   Appeal from App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 84-1040.
    Cazalas, Dative Testamentary Executrix of the Succession of Cazalas v. Griot, Dative Testamentary Executrix of the Succession of Cazalas.
   Appeal from Ct. App. La., 4th Cir., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 84-911.
    Koker et ux. v. Sage et al.
   Appeal from Super. Ct. Wash., King County, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-937.
    Bell, Individually and dba Wes Outdoor Advertising Co. v. New Jersey et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 3d Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5860.
    Dingle v. Simpkins.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. S. C. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5974.
    Neal v. Alabama et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 11th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1027.
    Berman & Sons, Inc., et al. v. Scofield et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Motion of appellees for award of damages and double costs denied. Appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question


text:
    No. 84-1031.
    Communications Satellite Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 84-5610.
    Beck v. Kansas.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Kan. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 83-1613.
    Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections v. Darden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Wainwright v. Witt, ante, p. 412.


text:
    No. 84-578.
    Avtex Fibers, Inc. v. McDowell.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, ante, p. 111.


text:
    No. A-557.
    Eitel v. Baldwin.
   Sup. Ct. Alaska. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Powell and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-576.
    Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., et al. (No. 84-648) and American National Bank & Trust Company of Chicago et al. v. Haroco, Inc., et al. (No. 84-822)
   C. A. 2d Cir. [certiorari granted, ante, p. 1157];

C. A. 7th Cir. [certiorari granted, ante, p. 1157]. Application of the Attorney General of Arizona for leave to file a consolidated brief as amicus curiae in excess of the page limitation, presented to Justice Marshall, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-463.
    In re Disbarment of Hopt.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1069.]


text:
    No. D-466.
    In re Disbarment of Hill.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1083.]


text:
    No. D-473.
    In re Disbarment of Hutchins.
   It is ordered that Robert White Hutchins, of Columbia, N. C., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-474.
    In re Disbarment of Kozel.
   It is ordered that William Thomas Kozel, of San Luis Obispo, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-475.
    In re Disbarment of Padell.
   It is ordered that Bert Padell, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-476.
    In re Disbarment of Whittington.
   It is ordered that Ronald Paul Whittington, of Destrehan, La., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-477.
    In re Disbarment of Kennedy.
   It is ordered that John B. Kennedy, of Wilmington, Del., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 99,
    Orig.
    Kostadinov v. Smith, Attorney General of the United States.
   Motion for leave to file bill of complaint denied.


text:
    No. 82-1922.
    Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 467 U. S. 1240.] Motion of petitioners for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 83-1919.
    City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, Individually, and as Administratrix of the Estate of Tuttle.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 814.] Motion of respondent for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 83-2030.
    Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. National Gay Task Force.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 813.] Motion of appellee for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 84-165.
    Gould v. Ruefenacht et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1016.] Renewed motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 84-312.
    Devine, Director, Office of Personnel Management v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al.

      See also note, supra, p. 1200.

   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 929.] Motion of respondents to file appendix that does not comply with the Rules of this Court denied.

Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens would grant this motion. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 84-320.
    National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. et al. v. Crow Tribe of Indians et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1032.] Motion of Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. Motion of Montana for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 84-433.
    School Committee of the Town of Burlington, Massachusetts, et al. v. Department of Education of Massachusetts et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1071.] Motion of respondents for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 84-468.
    City of Cleburne, Texas, et al. v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1016.] Motion of Texas et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae, for divided argument, and for additional time for oral argument denied. Motions of Disabled Peoples’ International et al., American Association on Mental Deficiency et al., National Conference of Catholic Charities et al., Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 84-510.
    Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1071.] Motion of American Airlines, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 84-755.
    United States v. Montoya de Hernandez.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1188.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Peter M. Horstman, Esquire, of Los Angeles, Cal., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 84-951.
    Gulf Coast Cable Television Co. v. Affiliated Capital Corp.
   C. A. 5th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 84-1222.
    Kahn v. Alexander Grant & Co.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of petitioner to expedite consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1226.
    Badham et al. v. Secretary of State of California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioners to expedite consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1244.
    Davis et al. v. Bandemer et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. Ind. Motion of appellants to expedite consideration of the appeal denied.


text:
    No. 84-5909.
    Adams v. Fulcomer et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until March 12, 1985, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.

Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

For the reasons expressed in Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U. S. 928 (1983), we would deny the petition for writ of certiorari without reaching the merits of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.


text:
    No. 84-5918.
    Rowland v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until March 12, 1985, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

For the reasons expressed in Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U. S. 928 (1983), we would deny the petition for writ of certiorari without reaching the merits of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.


text:
    No. 84-6044.
    Day v. DeAnda, Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner to expedite consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari or in the alternative issue a temporary restraining order denied.


text:
    No. 84-896.
    No. 84-964.
    No. 84-5848.
    No. 84-5977.
    In re Anderson; In re Egle; In re Tyler; and In re Ray.
   Petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 84-435.
    Russell v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 84-489.
    Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Service et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 84-732.
    Cleavinger et al. v. Saxner et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 84-701.
    United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of National Wildlife Federation et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 84-744.
    No. 84-963.
    United States v. Lane et al.; and Lane et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 735 F. 2d 799.


text:
    No. 84-773.
    Bender et al. v. Williamsport Area School District et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of National Association of Secondary School Principals for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 84-786.
    Maine v. Moulton.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 84-1023.
    United States v. Rojas-Contreras.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 84-801.
    No. 84-805.
    Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection; and O’Neill, Trustee in Bankruptcy of Quanta Resources Corp., Debtor v. City of New York et al.; and O’Neill, Trustee in Bankruptcy of Quanta Resources Corp., Debtor v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: No. 84-801 and No. 84-805 (second case), 739 F. 2d 927; No. 84-805 (first case), 739 F. 2d 912.


text:
    No. 84-5872.
    Daniels v. Williams.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-1796.
    Alabama v. Gannaway.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-7028.
    Beam v. Hahalyak.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-56.
    Cazalas v. United States Department of Justice et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-129.
    Reavis & McGrath v. Antinore et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-307.
    Southern Bancorporation, Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-316.
    Kalish v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-425.
    Maryland v. Moon.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-502.
    No. 84-661.
    Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections v. Douglas; and Douglas v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 739 F. 2d 531.


text:
    No. 84-520.
    No. 84-542.
    Gregory et ux. v. United States; and Spurlock v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730 F. 2d 692.


text:
    No. 84-586.
    Angel et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-588.
    Insurance Financial Services, Inc. v. South Carolina Insurance Co.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-621.
    No. 84-633.
    No. 84-641.
    Kansas City Southern Railway Co. et al. v. United States et al.; Wheeler v. Interstate Commerce Commission et al.; and Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 237 U. S. App. D. C. 99, 736 F. 2d 708.


text:
    No. 84-631.
    Atterberry v. Jordan, Police Commissioner of the City of Boston.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-635.
    Woolery v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-638.
    Price v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-647.
    Van Dorn Plastic Machinery Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-656.
    Meyer v. Lehman, Secretary of the Navy.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-664.
    Wilder et al. v. Mossinghoff, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-666.
    Attorney General of Guam et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-698.
    Saizan v. Donovan, Secretary of Labor, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-699.
    National Motor Freight Traffic Assn., Inc., et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-702.
    Ohio v. Caponi.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-703.
    Raineri v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-713.
    District Lodge No. 166, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. TWA Services, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-718.
    Mendenhall v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-721.
    Pappalardi v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-730.
    Getty Oil Co. v. Department of Energy et al.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-735.
    House of Prime Rib v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-738.
    Moore v. Morrow, Secretary of North Carolina Department of Human Resources, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-741.
    Cassiliano v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-757.
    Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. v. Koch, Mayor of the City of New York, et al.; and Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. v. Goldstein et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-769.
    Fern et al. v. Turman et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-814.
    City of Oceanside v. Federal Emergency Management Agency et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-815.
    Blackmon et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-843.
    Durand et al. v. Simon Productions No. 2, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-848.
    Callari v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-854.
    Ecos Electronics Corp. v. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-874.
    Pittsburgh Building Construction Industry Administrative Committee for Research, Education & Training, Inc. v. United States Department of Labor.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-878.
    Dragna v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-879.
    Southmost Machinery Corp. et al. v. Seville Industrial Machinery Corp.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-883.
    Kollsman et al., Special Administrators of the Estate of Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-895.
    Evans v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-897.
    Tesch, Sheriff of Cass County, Nebraska, et al. v. McCurry et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-898.
    Dybczak v. Tuskegee Institute.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-903.
    Johnson v. John F. Beasley Construction Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-905.
    Texas American Bank et al., as Independent Co-Executors of the Will of Mitchell v. Sayers.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-908.
    Church of Scientology of California et al. v. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-910.
    Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc., et al. v. American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-912.
    Moore et ux. v. Southwestern Electric Power Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-925.
    General Marine Transport Corp. v. O’Hare et al., as Trustees of the New York Marine Towing & Transportation Industry Pension Fund & Insurance Fund.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-928.
    Abbey Nursing Home, Inc., et al. v. Estate of Richardson (Bentley, Administratrix).
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-931.
    Guenther v. Holmgreen et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-933.
    Hechenberger et al. v. Western Electric Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-934.
    Bergeron v. Loeb, Executrix of the Estate of Loeb.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-936.
    Banks v. North Carolina.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-940.
    Abbett v. Pennsylvania.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-945.
    A. W. Jones Co. et al. v. Jefferies & Co., Inc.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-946.
    Mannel v. Industrial Commission of Arizona et al.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-956.
    Shaw v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-957.
    Collins v. University of Cincinnati et al.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-960.
    Mendel et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-962.
    Wetzel v. State Bar of Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-965.
    Airweld, Inc. v. Airco, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-966.
    Seaboard System Railroad, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-967.
    Morgan Guaranty International Bank et al. v. City of Houston et al.
   Ct. App. Tex., 1st Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-969.
    Pournaras v. Pournaras.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-970.
    Berger v. Spellacy, Judge, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-972.
    Barton v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-973.
    Rothenberger v. Douglas County.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-977.
    Sagona v. Louisiana.
   Ct. App. La., 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-980.
    Fuentes-Coba v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-981.
    Cally v. Hoffman, United States District Judge.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-983.
    Todaro v. United States.


text:
    No. 84-985.
    Nichols v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-986.
    Capobianco et al. v. Howe et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-993.
    General Public Utilities Corp. et al. v. Stibitz et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-994.
    Lindsay v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1000.
    Greaves et al. v. Bee.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1001.
    Ruth v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1005.
    Eschweiler v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1006.
    Williams et ux. v. Tucson Unified School District No. 1 of Pima County et al.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1008.
    Dean et al. v. Duckworth, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1014.
    Lynne, Executor and Personal Representative of the Estate of Lynne, et al. v. Australian Government Aircraft Factories et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1021.
    Pasha et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1022.
    Young v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1024.
    Calaiaro, Trustee v. Pittsburgh National Bank et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1025.
    Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1026.
    Schmidt v. City of Fayetteville.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1029.
    Inosencio et al. v. Johnson et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1030.
    Schepp v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1034.
    Finch et al. v. Hughes Aircraft Co.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1035.
    Michelin Tire Corp. v. ITCO Corp. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1037.
    Henderson v. Sperduto, Spector & Vanacore (Formerly Sperduto, Priskie, Spector & Vanacore).
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1042.
    Safir v. Lykes Brothers Steamship Co., Inc.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1043.
    Shimman v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1045.
    Minnesota Association of Health Care Facilities, Inc., et al. v. Minnesota Department of Public Welfare et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1046.
    Park v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer/United Artists Corp.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1048.
    Cashin v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1049.
    Govern v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1052.
    Fishman v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1056.
    Zerovnik v. E. F. Hutton & Co., Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1059.
    Fennessy et al. v. International Dairy Queen, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1064.
    McNabb v. Oregonian Publishing Co.
   Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1066.
    Wallace v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1071.
    Brack v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1074.
    Stroom v. Carter, Former President of the United States, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1075.
    St. Louis County, Missouri v. Circuit Court of the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1081.
    Morrissey v. William Morrow & Co. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1088.
    Miller v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1091.
    Carver v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1096.
    Nicks et al. v. Ford.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1100.
    Stambaugh’s Air Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1113.
    Macri v. Grievance Committee for the Ninth Judicial District.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1121.
    Sir Speedy, Inc. v. Speedy Printing Centers, Inc.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1122.
    No. 84-1126.
    Harmon v. United States; and Sager v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 743 F. 2d 1261.


text:
    No. 84-1125.
    No. 84-6057.
    Gold v. United States; and Warren v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 743 F. 2d 800.


text:
    No. 84-1152.
    Gaspard v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1153.
    Otto v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1188.
    Carter v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1191.
    Pulitzer v. Pulitzer.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1194.
    O’Hare et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5123.
    Jenkins v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5268.
    Gordon v. Donovan, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5307.
    Thetford v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5308.
    O’Connor v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5352.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5367.
    No. 84-5472.
    No. 84-5493.
    No. 84-5497.
    No. 84-5510.
    Gibson v. United States; Hasting v. United States; Williams v. United States; Anderson v. United States; and Stewart v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 739 F. 2d 1269.


text:
    No. 84-5373.
    Holecek v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5374.
    Homer v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5397.
    Lippert v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5418.
    Smith v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5424.
    Herships v. Rees.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5458.
    Lucas v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5479.
    McDonald v. Procunier, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5486.
    Barham v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.