author: Justice Powell Justice Stevens,

text:
    PENNSYLVANIA BUREAU OF CORRECTION v. UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE et al.
    No. 84-489.
    Argued October 15, 1985 —
    Decided November 18, 1985

      Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O’Con-nor, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 43.

      Leroy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Maria Parisi Vickers, Andrew S. Gordon, and Allen C. War-shaw, Senior Deputy Attorneys General.

      Mark I. Levy argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Fried, Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, and Barbara L. Herwig.

   Justice Powell

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is whether a United States district court may compel the United States Marshals Service to transport state prisoners to the federal courthouse to testify in an action brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 by a state prisoner against county officials.

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In June 1980, Richard Garland brought suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against various Philadelphia County officials in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that he had been beaten and harassed by the defendant deputy sheriffs and prison guards. At the time Garland filed this suit, he was incarcerated in the Philadelphia County jail, but was subsequently transferred to a state facility. The District Court assigned the action to a Magistrate for disposition on the merits.

In December 1982, the Magistrate issued writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum to produce five witnesses, including plaintiff Garland. At that time, Garland was in a state correctional facility in Huntingdon, approximately 220 miles from Philadelphia. The other four witnesses were all confined in state facilities over 100 miles from Philadelphia. The orders directed the Wardens of the state facilities to transport inmates from state prison to the county jail nearest the federal courthouse in Philadelphia. The orders then commanded the United States Marshals Service (Marshals) to transport the inmates from that county facility to the federal court and to maintain custody of them during trial. The Marshals unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of that portion of the order that directed them to transport the state prisoners from the county jail to the federal courthouse and to guard them during trial.

On the Marshals’ appeal from this denial, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed in part, holding that the All Writs Act did not confer power upon the District Court “to compel non-custodians to bear the expense of [the production of witnesses] simply because they have access to a deeper pocket.” Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F. 2d 1283, 1287 (1984) (emphasis in original). The Court of Appeals did find, however, that the District Court has the power to compel the Marshals to take custody of state prisoners while those prisoners are in the federal courthouse in connection with federal judicial proceedings. Ibid. Finally, the court held that the District Court could order the Marshals to take custody of state prisoners if the trial court made a specific finding that special security risks required that state prisoner-witnesses be in the Marshals’ custody away from the federal courthouse. Id., at 1289.

The Commonwealth Bureau of Correction (Commonwealth) petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari on the question whether a federal court can command the Marshals to share responsibility with state officials for transporting state inmates to the federal courthouse when neither the State nor any state official is a party. Because this case presents a recurrent problem on which the Circuits differ, we granted the writ. 469 U. S. 1206 (1985). We find that there is no statutory authority for a United States district court to command the Marshals to take custody of state prisoners outside the federal courthouse during the normal course of producing state prisoner-witnesses for trial, and accordingly affirm.

II

The Commonwealth argues that the Marshals have a statutory obligation to obey the lawful orders and writs of the federal courts, 28 U. S. C. § 569(b), and are statutorily authorized to expend funds for the specific purpose of transporting prisoners, § 567. It also contends that these provisions recognize the authority of the district courts to seek assistance from the Marshals. Two Circuits have summarily agreed. Ford v. Allen, 728 F. 2d 1369, 1370 (CA11 1984) (per curiam); Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F. 2d 476, 481 (CA5 1977). Two other Circuits have relied in part on these provisions in imposing the responsibility for transport upon the Marshals. Wiggins v. County of Alameda, 717 F. 2d 466 (CA9 1983), cert. denied sub nom. California Dept. of Corrections v. United States, 465 U. S. 1070 (1984); Ford v. Carballo, 577 F. 2d 404 (CA7 1978). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is the only Circuit to deny a district court authority to compel the Marshals to assist in transporting state prisoner-witnesses to the federal courthouse.

Sections 569(b) and 567 merely enumerate obligations of the Marshals. The Marshals must obey the mandates of federal courts and transport prisoners if the court so orders. The courts’ authority to issue such writs, however, must derive from some independent statutory source. We therefore must look to the habeas corpus statute or the All Writs Act to see if they authorize federal courts to order the transportation of state prisoners to the federal courthouse.

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The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Magistrate’s order amounted to a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum properly directed only to the custodian, and that there was no basis in the habeas corpus statute for the District Court’s authority to direct a writ ad testificandum to a noncustodian. We agree.

Since 1867, the writ of habeas corpus has incorporated the common-law command that the writ “shall be directed to the person in whose custody the party is detained.” Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 386 (emphasis added). See In re Thaw, 166 F. 71, 74-75 (CA3 1908). It was the custodian who then was to “make return of said writ and bring the party before the judge who granted the writ.” Ibid. Congress preserved this unambiguous directive throughout subsequent revisions, and the current habeas corpus statute states that the writ “shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained.” 28 U. S. C. §2243. Section 2243 also specifically provides that “the person to whom the writ is directed shall be required to produce at the hearing the body of the person detained.”

The language of the statute thus expressly commands the custodian to bring his prisoner to the court, but extends this duty to no other. See also Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 81(a)(2) (“The writ of habeas corpus . . . shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained”). We find no evidence in the language of §§ 2241 and 2243, in their legislative history, or in the common-law writ ad testificandum to suggest that courts are also empowered to cause third parties who are neither custodians nor parties to the litigation to bear the cost of producing the prisoner in a federal court. We therefore conclude that there is no basis in the habeas corpus statute for a federal court to order the Marshals to transport state prisoners to the federal courthouse.

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Finally, the Commonwealth argues that the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651, confers authority upon a district court to order the Marshals to transport state prisoners to and from the federal courthouse in connection with federal litigation. It argues that the “deluge of. . . civil rights actions” calls for “creative” use of federal judicial power to alleviate the drain on the States’ fiscs from the transport of inmates to and from federal courthouses.

It is true that this Court consistently has construed the All Writs Act to authorize a federal court “to issue such commands ... as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate and prevent the frustration of orders it has previously issued in its exercise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained.” United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U. S. 159, 172 (1977). This Court also has held that the supplemental powers of the Act are not limited to situations where it is “necessary” to issue the writ or order “in the sense that the court could not otherwise physically discharge its appellate duties.” Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 273 (1942). An examination of the language of the All Writs Act, its legislative history, and our decisions construing it convinces us, however, that the Act does not authorize a district court to order the Marshals to transport state prisoners from state prisons to the federal courthouse in the ordinary course of litigation in federal courts.

The All Writs Act originally was codified in § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 81-82, which provided that

“all the . . . courts of the United States, shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specifically provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law.”

Our early view of the scope of the all writs provision confined it to filling the interstices of federal judicial power when those gaps threatened to thwart the otherwise proper exercise of federal courts’ jurisdiction. McClung v. Silliman, 6 Wheat. 598 (1821); McIntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch 504 (1813). This limitation is especially significant in construing federal courts’ power to issue writs of habeas corpus ad testifican-dum: The Judiciary Act of 1789 codified the ad testificandum writ in the same section as the all writs provision.

The original phrase “not specifically provided for by statute” remained in the all writs section until 1948. Although the legislative history is scant, it appears that Congress then merely consolidated various provisions into § 1651 and made “necessary changes in phraseology” without substantive amendment. See H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A144 (1947); see also id., at 5. The legislative history did, however, state that the new section was “expressive of the construction recently placed upon [the all writs provision] by the Supreme Court in U. S. Alkali Export Assn. [v. United States, 325 U. S. 196 (1945)].” Id., at A145. In United States Alkali, the Court rejected use of the all writs provision to enable the Court to review a lower court’s determination where jurisdiction did not lie under an express statutory provision. Chief Justice Stone wrote:

“The writs may not be used as a substitute for an authorized appeal; and where, as here, the statutory scheme permits appellate review of interlocutory orders only on appeal from the final judgment, review by certiorari or other extraordinary writ is not permissible in the face of the plain indication of the legislative purpose to avoid piecemeal reviews.” 325 U. S., at 203.

Although Congress dropped the phrase “not specifically provided for by statute” in its 1948 consolidation, we conclude that it apparently intended to leave the all writs provision substantially unchanged. That intention and the favorable reference to United States Alkali convince us that the 1948 changes in phraseology do not mark a congressional expansion of the powers of federal courts to authorize issuance of any “appropriate” writ.

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth, relying on United States v. New York Telephone Co., supra, at 171, as well as Harris v. Nelson, 394 U. S. 286, 299 (1969), and Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 282 (1948), insists that under the All Writs Act the District Court can order the Marshals to transport state prisoners upon a mere statement that such an order would be “necessary or appropriate.” As summarized in the margin below, these cases are clearly distinguishable and lend little support to the Commonwealth’s argument.

The All Writs Act is a residual source of authority to issue writs that are not otherwise covered by statute. Where a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling. Although that Act empowers federal courts to fashion extraordinary remedies when the need arises, it does not authorize them to issue ad hoc writs whenever compliance with statutory procedures appears inconvenient or less appropriate. We need not categorically rule out reliance on the All Writs Act and the use of Marshals in procuring or safeguarding state prisoner-witnesses in the course of federal litigation. There may be exceptional circumstances in which a district court can show clearly the inadequacy of traditional habeas corpus writs, such as where there are serious security risks. In such circumstances, a district court may find it “necessary or appropriate” for Marshals to transport state prisoners. We therefore leave open the question of the availability of the All Writs Act to authorize such an order where exceptional circumstances require it.

V

We conclude, at least in the absence of an express finding of exceptional circumstances, that neither a magistrate nor a district court has authority to order the Marshals to transport state prisoners to the federal courthouse to testify in an action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against county officials. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

This is an exceptional case. It involves a dispute between the Marshals Service and a Federal District Court. Ordinarily, the marshals and the federal courts which they serve have a close and harmonious relationship. To be sure, the special responsibilities of the marshal — an office that serves both the Executive and Judicial Branches — can give rise to administrative problems. Customarily such problems are resolved on a voluntary, cooperative basis, either in the individual court or circuit, or in high-level discussions between the Executive and Judicial Branches. Open disputes between the marshals and the courts are rare, and appropriately so.

The question whether federal marshals should be required to transport state prisoners to testify in federal litigation is, however, a recurring problem that has not been resolved amicably, either between the federal courts and the marshals or between the marshals and the States. The majority notes that, in “exceptional circumstances,” ante, at 43, the district court may order marshals to transport state prisoners. I entirely agree. The majority’s holding, however, is that, absent such circumstances, the district court may not order marshals to do so because no statute expressly authorizes that action. In my view, this conclusion ignores the importance of history and tradition in defining the relationship between the Marshals Service and the Federal Judiciary.

History and tradition suggest that the court’s authority over the marshal is not so narrowly circumscribed as the Court suggests. In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress placed the marshal under the direction of the court. Because the office of the marshal was patterned after the office of the common-law sheriff, there was no need for Congress to define the judge’s authority to issue orders to the marshal with any particularity. Instead, § 27 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that a marshal should be appointed in each judicial district. The primary duty of the marshal, as expressed in that Act, was “to attend the district and circuit courts when sitting therein, and also the Supreme Court in the district in which that court shall sit.” In carrying out his duty to execute “all lawful precepts directed to him,” each marshal was given the power to appoint “one or more deputies,” but such deputies were removable at will by the appropriate federal judge. Read against the background of the relationship between the judge and the sheriff that had existed at common law, it is evident that the statute simply assumed that the judge had ample power to call upon the marshal for appropriate assistance in carrying out the duties of judicial office.

Although the marshal was subsequently given a variety of other duties, including some subject to direction from the Executive Branch it was not until 1861 that Congress gave the Attorney General any authority over United States marshals. Furthermore, it was not until 1969 that the Attorney General formalized his control over the marshals through the establishment of the Office of the Director of the Marshals Service.

Under the current statutory framework, the United States marshals owe obligations both to the Executive Branch and to the Judiciary. Thus, although as the majority points out, the Marshals Service is under the control of the Attorney General, ante, at 36, n. 1, marshals also remain subject to the instructions of the court. Indeed, Congress has considered, but not passed, legislation to lodge control of the marshals exclusively in the Executive Branch. Thus, Congress has not yet divested the Judiciary of the control of marshals that it has had since 1789, and that it has shared with the Attorney General since 1861.

Throughout our history, the marshals have played an important role in the administration of justice. Although their most dramatic exploits may be called to mind by references to names like Bat Masterson, Wyatt Earp, and David Neagle, or to events like the enforcement of civil rights legislation in the 1960’s, the primary assistance to the Federal Judiciary provided by the marshals has been in the area of protection of the trial process, including the courtroom itself, and the service of writs issued by the judges. The duty of the Marshals Service “to service the federal forum” does, however, encompass more than these two specific activities.

Many aspects of the court’s authority over the marshal are not set forth in detail in any Act of Congress. Thus, it is not the Congress that decided that formal proceedings in our courtroom shall be preceded by the Marshal’s cry of “Oyez, Oyez.” Nor is it Congress, or the United States Marshals Service, that has decided to use different language to call the court to order in other federal courthouses. Decisions of that kind concerning the administration of justice in federal courts are made by federal judges.

When a federal judge orders the marshal to open court at a particular time, or in a particular way, to provide appropriate security for a trial participant, or to escort a prisoner from the lockup in the federal building to the courtroom, the court is exercising judicial power in a manner that is certainly “agreeable to the usages and principles of law” as that phrase is used in the All Writs Act. In my judgment, however, such an order is not a “writ.” The court’s authority to issue such directives to the marshal is therefore not derived from the All Writs Act, but rather is simply one of the powers of the federal judicial office that has long been an aspect of the relationship between the court and its officers.

These daily instances of judicial authority over the marshal reflect the conventional relationship between the court and the marshal. The closeness of the relationship is derived, not from an assertion of judicial power over an unwilling marshal, but from the cooperative nature of the shared mission to administer justice. This case represents one of those unusual instances in which the ordinary mechanisms for addressing disagreements have apparently failed. The majority holds that the answer must be found in an explicit statutory delineation of each exercise of judicial authority. In my view, the nature of the shared mission of the federal courts and the federal marshals should provide the standard for resolving the dispute. Thus, the controlling question is whether the district court’s order is reasonably related to the administration of justice and is a sound exercise of judicial discretion.

As noted, the Court recognizes that there may be “exceptional circumstances” in which it would be appropriate for a trial court to order the marshal to transport a state prisoner to a federal courthouse. See ante, at 43. In my judgment, even with respect to an ordinary witness, special circumstances might make it appropriate to order the marshal to transport the witness to court, even though there may not be any common-law writ that would be available in a comparable situation. The question whether such an order to a marshal constitutes an appropriate exercise of the judge’s inherent power to control the course of proceedings in a particular trial should not, in my opinion, be answered by reference to the All Writs Act, but rather by reference to the traditional relationship between the court and the marshal and to the particular facts that may support the order in a particular case.

In this case, four factors suggest that ordering the federal marshal to transport the state prisoners was a sound exercise of judicial discretion. First, federal marshals have considerable expertise in transporting prisoners to federal courts; moreover, the marshals acknowledge that they have ample authority to transport state, as well as federal, prisoners when appropriate. Second, in this instance, the federal marshal will be responsible for the prisoners when they are in the federal courthouse. Third, federal marshals frequently house federal prisoners at state and local jails, and, indeed, have developed special programs to serve that end. Fourth, in this case, the District Court, through the Magistrate, specifically found that requiring the State to bear the entire responsibility of transporting the state prisoners for this federal litigation would impose an unfair financial hardship upon the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. This finding derives support, not only from the particular facts disclosed by this record, but also from the strong federal policy favoring cooperation with the States in the administration of civil rights litigation in the federal courts. Thus, I believe that it was an appropriate exercise of the District Court’s discretion to issue the order that it did in this case.

This is not the kind of confrontation that should arise between the marshals and the federal courts. There are a variety of mechanisms that should be used before the marshals and the courts engage in judicial combat. The district judges and the individual marshals should be able to resolve most difficulties. If they are unable to, the Circuit Conference should be asked to intervene. If the problem is a recurring, national disagreement, as this issue seems to be, the Marshals Service and the Judicial Conference can seek to address it. If these mechanisms fail, however, and if the district court issues an order to the marshal, then the historic relationship between the marshal and the courts, reflected in the current statutory framework, convinces me that the court’s order should be upheld if it is reasonably related to the administration of justice and is an appropriate exercise of the district court’s discretion.

Because I believe that the District Court’s order in this case was fully consistent with the historic relationship between the federal court and the federal marshal, I respectfully dissent.

       The Marshals are within the Executive Branch of the Federal Government. The Marshal for each district is appointed by the President, 28 U. S. C. § 561(a), is subject to the supervision and direction of the Attorney General, see, e. g., §§562, 567, 569(c), 571(a) and (d), and is funded through Department of Justice appropriations, e. g., §567.

       Judge Becker concurred in the judgment, believing the court to be bound by McClung v. Silliman, 6 Wheat. 598 (1821), and McIntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch 504 (1813). He hoped that this Court would “find that, because statutes can adapt to fit the needs of changing times, the All Writs Act now permits what, in the time of Mclntire and McClung it did not.” 737 F. 2d, at 1292 (footnote omitted). Judge Atkins, sitting by designation from the Southern District of Florida, concurred in part and dissented in part, believing that the Third Circuit could impose a duty on the Marshals to transport state prisoners. Ibid.

       The propriety of that part of the order commanding the Marshals to take custody of the state prisoners while they are in the federal courthouse is not specifically before us. The Marshals have conceded that they are responsible for the custody of state prisoners in the federal courthouse as witnesses or parties.

       The habeas corpus statute provides in pertinent part that the writ “shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained,” and that “the person to whom the writ is directed shall be required to produce at the hearing the body of the person detained.” 28 U. S. C. §2243.

        Carbo v. United States, 364 U. S. 611 (1961), does not support an expansive reading of the power conferred upon federal district courts by the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. In Carbo, the Court found that although § 2241 contained an express territorial limitation of “[w]rits of habeas corpus,” 28 U. S. C. § 2241(a), the limitation applied to habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, but not to habeas corpus ad prosequendum. The Commonwealth similarly argues that the provisions in § 2243 that direct the custodian to produce the prisoners in court do not apply to the writ ad testificandum but instead are limited to the Great Writ, habeas corpus ad subjiciendum.

        Carbo’s expansive reading of the statute was consistent with common-law procedure and requirements applied to the writ ad prosequendum and with the legislative history of § 2241(a). 364 U. S., at 615-618. But this ease involves the writ ad testificandum, which has been confined in its application to the actual custodian of the prisoners from before its initial codification in 1789 to the present. We therefore do not believe that Carbo justifies a more expansive view of the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum today.

       The All Writs Act provides in pertinent part:
      “The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”

       In United States v. New York Telephone Co., 484 U. S. 159 (1977), the Court held that a District Court could under the All Writs Act compel a third party, the New York Telephone Company, to assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation in installing devices under a warrant that would register the numbers dialed on certain telephones. In that case the All Writs Act filled a gap in federal statutes by granting the District Court jurisdiction over the only party capable of installing the devices. In the instant case, by contrast, the habeas corpus statute already expressly provides for the issuance of a writ “to the person having custody of the person detained.”
      In Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266 (1948), the Court held that a Court of Appeals could order a prisoner to be brought before it to argue his own appeal, finding that the All Writs Act was a mechanism to achieve the “rational ends of law. ” Id., at 282. In Price, however, there was no alternative way to bring the prisoner before the court. In the present ease, the traditional writ ad testificandum is sufficient. Similarly, Harris v. Nelson, 394 U. S. 286 (1969), held that the District Court in that case had no alternative means of providing an effective habeas corpus proceeding except by use of an extraordinary writ. New York Telephone, Price, and Harris afforded resort to the All Writs Act to fill statutory interstices. We do not find their reasoning controlling here, where a writ ad testifican-

        dum directed to the custodian indisputably provides a district court with a means of producing a prisoner-witness.

       See Report by the Comptroller General, U. S. Marshals’ Dilemma: Serving Two Branches of Government (1982).

       See, e. g., U. S. Marshals Service, Oversight Hearing before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1985) (citing agreement between the Attorney General and The Chief Justice regarding court security); id., at 26 (citing agreement between the Attorney General and The Chief Justice regarding contract guard program); Hearings on H. R. 7039 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 175 (1982) (citing agreement between the Attorney General and The Chief Justice regarding court security and the allocation of marshals).

       See Ford v. Allen, 728 F. 2d 1369 (CA11 1984) (per curiam); Wiggins v. County of Alameda, 717 F. 2d 466 (CA9 1983), cert. denied, 465 U. S. 1070 (1984); Ford v. Carballo, 577 F. 2d 404 (CA7 1978); Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F. 2d 476 (CA5 1977).

       See Wiggins v. County of Alameda, 717 F. 2d, at 469 (“We decry the inability of state and federal officials to resolve such matters fairly and equitably . . .”).

       See U. S. Dept, of Justice, United States Marshals Service-Then . . . and Now 3 (1978) (“the Marshal carried on the tradition of the English common law sheriff, possessing complete authority within his bailiwick”). Indeed, one of the objections expressed to the Judiciary Act of 1789 was that it would lead to conflicts between the federal marshals and the local sheriffs. 1 Annals of Cong. 826 (1789) (statement of Rep. Stone) (“in different tribunals, not connected, mischiefs may happen. Will a sheriff be justifiable in delivering up his prisoner to the marshal, or will it be a proper return by the marshal that the prisoner is kept by the State sheriff”). In 1792, moreover, Congress expressly provided that “the marshals of the several districts and their deputies, shall have the same powers in executing the laws of the United States, as sheriffs and their deputies in the several states have by law, in executing the laws of their respective states,” 1 Stat. 265 — a provision that, in substance, exists today, 28 U. S. C. § 570. On the power of the sheriff at English common law, see G. Atkinson, Sheriff-Law 5 (1861) (“The sheriff is the immediate officer to all the Courts at Westminster to execute writs. . . . [Wjhether a writ comes to him, by authority, or without authority, or is awarded against whom it does not lie, he cannot doubt, or dispute its validity”).
      The title for the marshals may have been derived from the example of the marshals to the British and colonial vice-admiralty courts. See L. Ball, The United States Marshals of New Mexico and Arizona Territories 3 (1978). See also C. Ubbelohde, The Vice-Admiralty Courts and the American Revolution 10 (1960) (In the colonial vice-admiralty courts, “[t]he marshals’ duties were similar to those of a sheriff: serving processes, taking custody of goods or people, and executing the decrees of the court”).

       “Sec. 27. And be it further enacted, That a marshal shall be appointed in and for each district for the term of four years, but shall be removable from office at pleasure, whose duty it shall be to attend the district and circuit courts when sitting therein, and also the Supreme Court in the district in which that court shall sit. And to execute throughout the district, all lawful precepts directed to him, and issued under the authority of the United States, and he shall have power to command all necessary assistance in the execution of his duty, and to appoint as there shall be occasion, one or more deputies, who shall be removable from office by the judge of the district court, or the circuit court sitting within the district, at the pleasure of either; and before he enters on the duties of his office, he shall become bound for the faithful performance of the same, by himself and by his deputies before the judge of the district court to the United States, jointly and severally, with two good and sufficient sureties, inhabitants and freeholders of such district, to be approved by the district judge, in the sum of twenty thousand dollars, and shall take before said judge, as shall also his deputies, before they enter on the duties of their appointment, the following oath of office: T, A. B., do solemnly swear or affirm, that I will faithfully execute all lawful precepts directed to the marshal of the district of under the authority of the United States, and true returns make, and in all things well and truly, and without malice or partiality, perform the duties of the office of marshal (or marshal’s deputy, as the case may be) of the district of , during my continuance in said office, and take only my lawful fees. So help me God.’ ” 1 Stat. 87.

       See U. S. Dept, of Justice, The Office of the United States Marshal 2-3 (1981).

       See Report by the Comptroller General, supra n. 1, at 8 (“On August 2,1861, an act of Congress (ch. 37,12 Stat. 285) placed U. S. attorneys and marshals under the general superintendence and direction of the Attorney General. The 1861 legislation neither explicitly repealed nor made reference to any prior statutes affecting marshals”).

        Id., at 10.

       See 28 U. S. C. § 569(a) (“The United States marshal of each district is the marshal of the district court and of the court of appeals when sitting in his district, . . . and may, in the discretion of the respective courts, be required to attend any session of court”).

       See Hearings on H. R. 7039, supra n. 2, at 141.

       «The raison d’etre of the Marshal Service is to service the federal forum in civil as well as criminal litigation.” Ballard v. Spradlev, 557 F. 2d, at 481.

       The statute’s original and present forms are both quoted by the Court, ante, at 40-41, and n. 6.

       Four of the five United States Courts of Appeals that have considered federal-court orders to transport state prisoners for their testimony in federal litigation have viewed the issue as a question of the District Court’s discretion, and located the authority for that discretion in a specific statutory provision. See eases cited in n. 3, swpra.

       The marshals transported more than 130,000 prisoners in fiscal year 1984. Oversight Hearing, swpra n.- 2, at 10.

       See Tr. of Oral Arg. 38-40.

       See ante, at 37, n. 3.

       Oversight Hearing, supra n. 2, at 16.

       See Magistrate’s opinion, App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a-59a. The Magistrate ordered the Marshals Service to transport the prisoners from the Philadelphia Detention Center to the federal courthouse in Philadelphia. The State, in contrast, remained responsible for transporting the prisoners from their prisons in other parts of the State to the Philadelphia Detention Center. Id., at 58a.

       The Magistrate found that the financial costs imposed by his requirement that the State transport the prisoners to the Philadelphia Detention Center were “significant,” id., at 59a. Determining that it was “equitable and reasonable,” ibid., to refrain from imposing additional costs on the State, he emphasized that the Marshal already made frequent trips from the Philadelphia Detention Center to the federal courthouse because federal prisoners were often housed at the Detention Center during their federal trials. Id., at 60a. According to the Magistrate’s findings, the Detention Center is “relatively close” to the federal courthouse. Id., at 59a-60a. At oral argument, the Federal Government reported that “the Marshal typically brings between six and twelve prisoners from the Philadelphia Detention Center to the Federal Courthouse on an average day.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 28.

       Cf. Remarks of Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States, at the Dedication of the National Center for State Courts 8 (1978) (“I would hope that there will be close cooperation and coordination between our two systems — close, I repeat, but voluntary. Our experience with the State-Federal Councils has shown us the value of cooperation”).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Rehnquist Justice White,

license: Public Domain

text:
    HILL v. LOCKHART, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION
    No. 84-1103.
    Argued October 7, 1985
    Decided November 18, 1985

      Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 60.

      Jack T. Lassiter, by appointment of the Court, 471 U. S. 1064, argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.

      John Steven Clark, Attorney General of Arkansas, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Alice Ann Burns, Deputy Attorney General.
   Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner William Lloyd Hill pleaded guilty in the Arkansas trial court to charges of first-degree murder and theft of property. More than two years later he sought federal ha-beas relief on the ground that his court-appointed attorney had failed to advise him that, as a second offender, he was required to serve one-half of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas denied relief without a hearing, and the en banc Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed by an equally divided court. We granted certiorari because of the difference between the result reached in the present case and that reached by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Strader v. Garrison, 611 F. 2d 61 (1979). 470 U. S. 1049 (1985). We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit because we conclude that petitioner failed to allege the kind of prejudice from the allegedly incompetent advice of counsel that would have entitled him to a hearing.

Under Arkansas law, the murder charge to which petitioner pleaded guilty carried a potential sentence of 5 to 50 years or life in prison, along with a fine of up to $15,000. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§41-1502(3), 41-901(l)(a), 41-1101(l)(a) (1977). Petitioner’s court-appointed attorney negotiated a plea agreement pursuant to which the State, in return for petitioner’s plea of guilty to both the murder and theft charges, agreed to recommend that the trial judge impose concurrent prison sentences of 35 years for the murder and 10 years for the theft. Petitioner signed a written “plea statement” indicating that he understood the charges against him and the consequences of pleading guilty, that his plea had not been induced “by any force, threat, or promise” apart from the plea agreement itself, that he realized that the trial judge was not bound by the plea agreement and retained the sole “power of sentence,” and that he had discussed the plea agreement with his attorney and was satisfied with his attorney’s advice. The last two lines of the “plea statement,” just above petitioner’s signature, read: “I am aware of everything in this document. I fully understand what my rights are, and I voluntarily plead guilty because I am guilty as charged.”

Petitioner appeared before the trial judge at the plea hearing, recounted the events that gave rise to the charges against him, affirmed that he had signed and understood the written “plea statement,” reiterated that no “threats or promises” had been made to him other than the plea agreement itself, and entered a plea of guilty to both charges. The trial judge accepted the guilty plea and sentenced petitioner in accordance with the State’s recommendations. The trial judge also granted petitioner credit for the time he had already served in prison, and told petitioner that “[y]ou will be required to serve at least one-third of your time before you are eligible for parole.”

More than two years later petitioner filed a federal habeas corpus petition alleging, inter alia, that his guilty plea was involuntary by reason of ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney had misinformed him as to his parole eligibility date. According to petitioner, his attorney had told him that if he pleaded guilty he would become eligible for parole after serving one-third of his prison sentence. In fact, because petitioner previously had been convicted of a felony in Florida, he was classified under Arkansas law as a “second offender” and was required to serve one-half of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole. Ark. Stat. Ann. §43-2829B(3) (1977). Petitioner asked the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas to reduce his sentence to a term of years that would result in his becoming eligible for parole in conformance with his original expectations.

The District Court denied habeas relief without a hearing. The court noted that neither Arkansas nor federal law required that petitioner be informed of his parole eligibility date prior to pleading guilty, and concluded that, even if petitioner was misled by his attorney’s advice, parole eligibility “is not such a consequence of [petitioner’s] guilty plea that such misinformation renders his plea involuntary.” The court also held that “even if an attorney’s advice concerning such eligibility is not wholly accurate, such advice does not render that attorney’s performance constitutionally inadequate.”

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that parole eligibility is a collateral rather than a direct consequence of a guilty plea, of which a defendant need not be informed, and that the District Court did not err in declining to hold a hearing on petitioner’s claims. 731 F. 2d 568, 570-573 (1984). One judge dissented, arguing that a hearing should have been held to determine whether the attorney’s alleged mistake in informing petitioner about “the applicable law” constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and warranted vacating the guilty plea. Id., at 573-574 (Heaney, J., dissenting). On rehearing, the en banc Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court by an equally divided court. 764 F. 2d 1279 (1985).

The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is “whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25, 31 (1970); see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 242 (1969); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U. S. 487, 493 (1962). Here petitioner does not contend that his plea was “involuntary” or “unintelligent” simply because the State through its officials failed to supply him with information about his parole eligibility date. We have never held that the United States Constitution requires the State to furnish a defendant with information about parole eligibility in order for the defendant’s plea of guilty to be voluntary, and indeed such a constitutional requirement would be inconsistent with the current rules of procedure governing the entry of guilty pleas in the federal courts. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(c); Advisory Committee’s Notes on 1974 Amendment to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11, 18 U. S. C. App., p. 22 (federal courts generally are not required to inform defendant about parole eligibility before accepting guilty plea). Instead, petitioner relies entirely on the claim that his plea was “involuntary” as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney supplied him with information about parole eligibility that was erroneous. Where, as here, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice “was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771 (1970). As we explained in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S. 258 (1973), a defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel “may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the standards set forth in McMann. Id., at 267.

Our concern in McMann v. Richardson with the quality of counsel’s performance in advising a defendant whether to plead guilty stemmed from the more general principle that all “defendants facing felony charges are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.” 397 U. S., at 771, and n. 14; see Reece v. Georgia, 350 U. S. 85, 90 (1955); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932). Two Terms ago, in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), we adopted a two-part standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. There, citing McMann, we reiterated that “[w]hen a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel’s assistance, the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 466 U. S., at 687-688. We also held, however, that “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id., at 694. This additional “prejudice” requirement was based on our conclusion that “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Id., at 691.

Although our decision in Strickland v. Washington dealt with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital sentencing proceeding, and was premised in part on the similarity between such a proceeding and the usual criminal trial, the same two-part standard seems to us applicable to ineffective-assistance claims arising out of the plea process. Certainly our justifications for imposing the “prejudice” requirement in Strickland v. Washington are also relevant in the context of guilty pleas:

“The government is not responsible for, and hence not able to prevent, attorney errors that will result in reversal of a conviction or sentence. Attorney errors come in an infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial. They cannot be classified according to likelihood of causing prejudice. Nor can they be defined with sufficient precision to inform defense attorneys correctly just what conduct to avoid. Representation is an art, and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another. Even if a defendant shows that particular errors of counsel were unreasonable, therefore, the defendant must show that they actually had an adverse effect on the defense.” Id., at 693.

In addition, we believe that requiring a showing of “prejudice” from defendants who seek to challenge the validity of their guilty pleas on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel will serve the fundamental interest in the finality of guilty pleas we identified in United States v. Timmreck, 441 U. S. 780 (1979):

“‘Every inroad on the concept of finality undermines confidence in the integrity of our procedures; and, by increasing the volume of judicial work, inevitably delays and impairs the orderly administration of justice. The impact is greatest when new grounds for setting aside guilty pleas are approved because the vast majority of criminal convictions result from such pleas. Moreover, the concern that unfair procedures may have resulted in the conviction of an innocent defendant is only rarely raised by a petition to set aside a guilty plea.’” Id., at 784 (quoting United States v. Smith, 440 F. 2d 521, 528-529 (CA7 1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).

We hold, therefore, that the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. In the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence already set forth in Tollett v. Henderson, supra, and McMann v. Richardson, supra. The second, or “prejudice,” requirement, on the other hand, focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process. In other words, in order to satisfy the “prejudice” requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.

In many guilty plea cases, the “prejudice” inquiry will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions obtained through a trial. For example, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination whether the error “prejudiced” the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial. Similarly, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the “prejudice” inquiry will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial. See, e. g., Evans v. Meyer, 742 F. 2d 371, 375 (CA7 1984) (“It is inconceivable to us . . . that [the defendant] would have gone to trial on a defense of intoxication, or that if he had done so he either would have been acquitted or, if convicted, would nevertheless have been given a shorter sentence than he actually received”). As we explained in Strickland v. Washington, supra, these predictions of the outcome at a possible trial, where necessary, should be made objectively, without regard for the “idiosyncrasies of the particular decisionmaker.” Id., at 695.

In the present case the claimed error of counsel is erroneous advice as to eligibility for parole under the sentence agreed to in the plea bargain. App. 31. We find it unnecessary to determine whether there may be circumstances under which erroneous advice by counsel as to parole eligibility may be deemed constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, because in the present case we conclude that petitioner’s allegations are insufficient to satisfy the Strickland v. Washington requirement of “prejudice.” Petitioner did not allege in his habeas petition that, had counsel correctly informed him about his parole eligibility date, he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial. He alleged no special circumstances that might support the conclusion that he placed particular emphasis on his parole eligibility in deciding whether or not to plead guilty. Indeed, petitioner’s mistaken belief that he would become eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sentence would seem to have affected not only his calculation of the time he likely would serve if sentenced pursuant to the proposed plea agreement, but also his calculation of the time he likely would serve if he went to trial and were convicted.

Because petitioner in this case failed to allege the kind of “prejudice” necessary to satisfy the second half of the Strickland v. Washington test, the District Court did not err in declining to hold a hearing on petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore

Affirmed.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Stevens joins, concurring in the judgment.

The only question properly before the Court is whether petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in a federal habeas proceeding where he has alleged that his guilty plea entered in state court was involuntary and resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel. I write separately to state why, under the particular facts of this case, petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his habeas claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

It is necessary, in my view, to focus on the “plea statement” signed by petitioner. The statement is a standardized form to be completed by defense counsel, in consultation with his client, and submitted to the court for consideration. The form calls for the insertion of specific information in the appropriate spaces. Among the items to be included are the crime with which the defendant is charged, whether that crime is a felony or a misdemeanor, and the maximum sentence and/or fine defendant could receive if found guilty of the offense. There is also a blank space in which to indicate the number of prior convictions which the defendant has suffered. App. 28.

As the majority indicates, petitioner signed such a written “plea statement” indicating that he understood the charges against him, the consequences of pleading guilty, and that he was “aware of everything in this document.” Ante, at 54; App. 28. In the space provided for disclosing the number of prior convictions, petitioner’s form reads “0.” Ibid.

Although it is unclear whether petitioner or his counsel filled out the form and inserted this number, there is no allegation that petitioner told his attorney about his previous Florida felony conviction. Indeed, it is incredible that the attorney would have filled in the “0” had he known there was a prior conviction. Petitioner thus has no factual basis for suggesting that his attorney’s advice was incompetent, or that he was affirmatively misled by counsel as to his earliest possible parole eligibility date. Without an allegation that the attorney knew of petitioner’s prior conviction, but failed to inform him of the applicability of the Arkansas “second offender” statute, there is no reason to provide petitioner with an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. None of his allegations, if proved, would entitle petitioner to relief, as there is nothing in the record to indicate “that [defense] counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687-688 (1984); see also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771 (1970).

Were it not for the misinformation in the plea statement— had petitioner’s attorney known of a prior conviction and still informed petitioner that he would be eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sentence — petitioner would be entitled to an evidentiary hearing and an opportunity to prove that counsel’s failure to advise of him of the effect of Ark. Stat. Ann. §43-2829B(3) (1977) amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. The failure of an attorney to inform his client of the relevant law clearly satisfies the first prong of the Strickland analysis adopted by the majority, as such an omission cannot be said to fall within “the wide range of professionally competent assistance” demanded by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland v. Washington, supra, at 690.

Moreover, an examination of the record reveals that petitioner alleged sufficient facts to “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Ante, at 59. In the first two paragraphs of his ha-beas petition, petitioner alleged, in pertinent part, as follows:

“I agreed to plead guilty with the understanding that I’d get 35 yrs. for 1st degree murder & 10 years concurrent for theft of property, and that I would only have 1/3 of my sentence to do, less good time. . . .
“My lawyer told me that a plea negotiation was binding to both sides and that the Court would impose the sentence agreed to by me and the prosecutor. I did not know that the Court could deviate from the concessions agreed to without informing me, nor that it could say to do 1/3 minimum enstead [sic] of just 1/3, until parole.” App. 8-9.

Later, petitioner made the following objections to the Magistrate’s proposed order:

“Petitioner’s first two arguments should be restated to allege that his guilty plea was involuntary in that his counsel improperly advised him as to his earliest possible parole eligibility date and as a result of that incorrect advice the Petitioner did not fully understand the consequences of his plea.” Id., at 40.
“The Petitioner contends that his counsel’s erroneous advice concerning his potential parole eligibility date was a critical factor in his decision to enter a guilty plea. It was an important consequence of his plea which he did not understand.” Id., at 41-42.
“It is Petitioner’s contention that he would not have entered the negotiated plea had his attorney correctly advised him that he would be required to serve one-half of his sentence less good time under Arkansas law.” Id., at 46-47.

In sum, because petitioner failed to allege that his attorney knew about his prior conviction but failed to inform him of the applicability of Ark. Stat. Ann. §43-2829B(3) (1977), I find that petitioner did not allege sufficient facts to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Had petitioner made such an allegation, however, he would be entitled to such a hearing, as he clearly alleged more than sufficient facts that, if proved, would show that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s error, and thus entitled to habeas relief.

      Several Courts of Appeals have adopted this general approach. See Thomas v. Lockhart, 738 F. 2d 304, 307 (CA8 1984); accord, United States v. Gavilan, 761 F. 2d 226, 228 (CA5 1985); Beans v. Black, 757 F. 2d 933, 936-937 (CA8 1985); Mitchell v. Scully, 746 F. 2d 951, 957 (CA2 1984); Evans v. Meyer, 742 F. 2d 371, 374-375 (CA7 1984).


author: Justice Rehnquist Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun,

text:
    GREEN et al. v. MANSOUR, DIRECTOR, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
    No. 84-6270.
    Argued October 7, 1985
    Decided December 3, 1985

      Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Powell, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 74. Marshall, J,, filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 79. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 81.

      William Burnham argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Paul D. Reingold.

      Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General of Michigan, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Thomas L. Casey, Erica Weiss Marsden, and Robert N. Rosenberg, Assistant Attorneys General.
   Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners brought two separate class actions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against respondent Director of the Michigan Department of Social Services, claiming that respondent’s calculations of benefits under the federal Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program violated certain provisions of that federal law. Before a final determination on the merits of either case could be made, Congress amended the relevant statutory provisions. It is undisputed that respondent’s calculations thereafter have conformed to federal law. Notwithstanding this fact, petitioners claim that they were entitled to have the District Court award them both “notice relief” and a declaration that respondent’s prior conduct violated federal law. The District Court denied petitioners both forms of relief, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. We now affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and applicable principles governing the issuance of declaratory judgments forbid the award of either form of relief.

The two class actions involved in this case were brought on behalf of recipients of benefits disbursed under the AFDC program. See 42 U. S. C. §§601-615. The AFDC program uses a person’s earned income in determining eligibility for, and the amount of, benefits. See §602. The complaints alleged that certain of respondent’s policies and regulations violated 42 U. S. C. § 1983 by inflating their respective class members’ earned income and thereby causing a reduction or termination of AFDC benefits contrary to the applicable federal law.

One putative class challenged respondent’s policy of prohibiting the deduction of child care costs in the calculation of earned income. While the case was pending in the District Court, Congress changed the relevant provisions of the AFDC program to expressly require participating States to deduct child care expenses up to a specified amount. Respondent thereafter brought state policy into compliance with this amendment and began deducting child care expenses in the calculation of earned income. There is no claim that respondent’s current child care deduction policy violates federal law.

The other putative class challenged respondent’s policy of automatically including stepparents’ income in the calculation of earned income. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction preventing respondent from enforcing its automatic inclusion policy. But again, while the matter was pending on the merits, Congress amended the relevant section of the AFDC program to expressly require States to include stepparent income in the calculation of earned income. The parties thereafter stipulated that the District Court should terminate its preliminary injunction as of the effective date of the amendment. Here, too, there is no claim that respondent has not complied with federal law since that time.

The District Court granted respondent’s motions to dismiss in each case. It held in each that the changes in federal law rendered moot the claims for prospective relief, and that the remaining claims for declaratory and notice relief related solely to past violations of federal law. Such retrospective relief, the court determined, is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in a consolidated appeal. Banas v. Dempsey, 742 F. 2d 277 (1984). It agreed that the changes in federal law rendered moot the claims for prospective relief. Id., at 281-283. It also agreed that because the sought-after notice and declaratory relief was retrospective in nature, the relief was barred by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). 742 F. 2d, at 286-288. It reasoned that when there is no prospective relief to which notice can be ancillary, even notice of the sort approved in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979), cannot escape the Eleventh Amendment bar. 742 F. 2d, at 287-288. Declaratory relief is similarly barred under such circumstances, it explained, because such relief could relate solely to past violations of federal law. Id., at 288.

We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Circuits over whether federal courts may order the giving of notice of the sort approved in Quern v. Jordan, supra, or issue a declaratory judgment that state officials violated federal law in the past when there is no ongoing violation of federal law. The decision by the Court of Appeals in this case agrees with the result in Colbeth v. Wilson, 554 F. Supp. 539 (Vt. 1982), aff’d, 707 F. 2d 57 (CA2 1983) (per curiam), but it conflicts with the decisions in Appleyard v. Wallace, 754 F. 2d 955, 959-963 (CA11 1985); Randall v. Lukhard, 729 F. 2d 966 (CA4) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 872 (1984); Beltran v. Myers, 701 F. 2d 91, 94 (CA9) (per curiam), cert. denied, 462 U. S. 1134 (1983); and Silva v. Vowell, 621 F. 2d 640, 650-654 (CA5 1980), which all allowed notice relief even though changes in state policy or federal law rendered moot any claim for injunctive relief stopping ongoing violations of federal law. We now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The Eleventh Amendment confirms that “the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III.” Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 98 (1984). Because of the Eleventh Amendment, States may not be sued in federal court unless they consent to it in unequivocal terms or unless Congress, pursuant to a valid exercise of power, unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate the immunity. Id., at 99. The landmark case of Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), created an exception to this general principle by asserting that a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state official’s action in enforcing state law is not one against the State. Id., at 159-160. The theory of Young was that an unconstitutional statute is void, id., at 159, and therefore does not “impart to [the official] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.” Id., at 160. Young also held that the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent federal courts from granting prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation of federal law. Id., at 155-156, 159. We have refused to extend the reasoning of Young, however, to claims for retrospective relief. See Pennhurst, supra, at 102-103; Quern v. Jordan, supra, at 337; Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 668.

Both prospective and retrospective relief implicate Eleventh Amendment concerns, but the availability of prospective relief of the sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause. Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law. See Pennhurst, supra, at 102. See also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267 (1977). But compensatory or deterrence interests are insufficient to overcome the dictates of the Eleventh Amendment. Petitioners concede that any claim they might have had for the specific type of injunctive relief approved in Ex parte Young was rendered moot by the amendments to the AFDC program. They nevertheless seek “notice relief” of the type approved in Quern v. Jordan, arguing that notice is an independent form of prospective relief protected against the Eleventh Amendment bar by Ex parte Young. In taking this position, we think petitioners misconceive our Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and our decision in Quern.

Quern was the last chapter in the litigation that initially gave rise to Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The plaintiffs in that litigation challenged a State’s administration of the federal-state program for Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled (AABD). The District Court issued a declaratory judgment that current state regulations governing the administration of the program violated federal regulations then in effect. It therefore permanently enjoined the state officials from continuing to violate federal law. Although the language of the declaratory judgment was no broader than necessary to complement the injunction against the current violation of federal law, it implied that the defendants had violated federal law in the past. The District Court therefore issued a second injunction ordering the defendants to release and remit all AABD benefits that they had wrongfully withheld on account of their past violations of federal law. The Court of Appeals affirmed, Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F. 2d 985 (CA7 1973), but we reversed, holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred the injunction ordering retroactive benefits because it was effectively an award of money damages for past violations of federal law. Edelman v. Jordan, 451 U. S., at 666-669.

On remand, the District Court ordered the defendants to send notice to the plaintiff class informing individual class members that they were wrongfully denied benefits in a particular amount, together with a returnable form for filing claims with the appropriate state agency. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court’s proposed notice violated the Eleventh Amendment because it would effectively result in a federal adjudication of state liability for past violations of federal law. Jordan v. Trainor, 563 F. 2d 873, 875 (CA7 1977) (en banc). At the same time, the Court of Appeals determined that the Eleventh Amendment would not bar an order requiring state officials to send “a mere explanatory notice to applicants advising them that there is a state administrative procedure available if they desire to have the state determine whether or not they may be eligible for past benefits.” Ibid.

We affirmed in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979), holding that although Edelman v. Jordan, supra, retained continuing vitality after Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978), see 440 U. S., at 338-345, the specific notice order approved by the Court of Appeals did not violate the Eleventh Amendment. Id., at 346-349. We explained that the appellate court’s particular notice order fell “on the Ex parte Young side of the Eleventh Amendment line rather than on the Edelman side.” Id., at 347. We reasoned that “unlike [the notice] ordered by the District Court, [this notice was] more properly viewed as ancillary to the prospective relief already ordered by the court,” id., at 349, and it did no more than “simply infor[m] class members that their federal suit is at an end, that the federal court can provide them with no further relief, and that there are existing state administrative procedures which they may wish to pursue.” Ibid. We also stressed that the state defendants had not objected to the expense of providing such notice, state agencies rather than federal courts would be the final arbiters of whether retroactive payments would be ordered, and the notice would not automatically lead to any particular action. Id., at 347-348.

Our review of the long, drawn-out Jordan litigation convinces us that neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court conceived of the requested notice allowed in that case to be an independent form of relief. We simply held that the specific order fell within the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment principle of sovereign immunity because it was ancillary to a valid injunction previously granted and was sufficiently narrow to retain its character as a mere case-management device. The notice in Quern v. Jordan did nothing other than inform a diverse and partially victorious class concerning the extent of the judgment in its favor, cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(d)(2), and that the federal courts could do no more for them. There was no suggestion that the notice itself would bind state officials in any way, or that such notice would be routinely available as a form of relief in other cases. Because “notice relief” is not the type of remedy designed to prevent ongoing violations of federal law, the Eleventh Amendment limitation on the Art. Ill power of federal courts prevents them from ordering it as an independent form of relief.

Measured by the standards of Quern, however, a request for a limited notice order will escape the Eleventh Amendment bar if the notice is ancillary to the grant of some other appropriate relief that can be “noticed.” Because there is no continuing violation of federal law to enjoin in this case, an injunction is not available. Therefore, notice cannot be justified as a mere case-management device that is ancillary to a judgment awarding valid prospective relief. Petitioners argue, however, that they are entitled to a declaratory judgment that respondent violated federal law in the past. Only if petitioners are correct in this assertion can they properly nlaim a right to “notice” of a judgment under the principles of Quern.

The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, 28 U. S. C. § 2201, permits a federal court to declare the rights of a party whether or not further relief is or could be sought, and we have held that under this Act declaratory relief may be available even though an injunction is not. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 462 (1974). But we have also held that the declaratory judgment statute “is an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant.” Public Service Comm’n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U. S. 237, 241 (1952). The propriety of issuing a declaratory judgment may depend upon equitable considerations, see Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66, 73 (1971), and is also “informed by the teachings and experience concerning the functions and extent of federal judicial power.” Wycoff, supra, at 243; cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 44-45 (1971).

In applying these principles, we have held that a declaratory judgment is not available in a number of instances. In Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293 (1943), we held that a declaratory judgment was not available to obtain a determination of the constitutionality of a state tax even though the relevant federal statute prohibited federal courts only from issuing injunctions against the collection of such taxes. Id., at 299. We held in Samuels v. Mackell, supra, that a declaratory judgment declaring a state criminal statute unconstitutional was unavailable where it would have much the same effect as an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the statute, and the latter was barred by traditional principles of equity, comity, and federalism. Id., at 69-73. In Wycoff, we held that it was inappropriate to issue a declaratory judgment deciding whether the plaintiff’s business was interstate commerce and therefore potentially immune from state regulation. 344 U. S., at 244, 247-249. We reasoned that if the federal judgment were res judicata in subsequent state proceedings, then the federal court will have lifted the case out of the state court before the state agency or court can hear it. Id., at 247. On the other hand, if the federal judgment would not have such an effect, then it would “serv[e] no useful purpose as a final determination of rights.” Ibid.

We think that these cases demonstrate the impropriety of the issuance of a declaratory judgment in this case. There is no claimed continuing violation of federal law, and therefore no occasion to issue an injunction. Nor can there be any threat of state officials violating the repealed law in the future. Cf. Steffel v. Thompson, supra, at 454. There is a dispute about the lawfulness of respondent’s past actions, but the Eleventh Amendment would prohibit the award of money damages or restitution if that dispute were resolved in favor of petitioners. We think that the award of a declaratory judgment in this situation would be useful in resolving the dispute over the past lawfulness of respondent’s action only if it might be offered in state-court proceedings as res judicata on the issue of liability, leaving to the state courts only a form of accounting proceeding whereby damages or restitution would be computed. But the issuance of a declaratory judgment in these circumstances would have much the same effect as a full-fledged award of damages or restitution by the federal court, the latter kinds of relief being of course prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. The teachings of Huffman, Samuels, and Wycoff are that a declaratory judgment is not available when the result would be a partial “end run” around our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974).

Justice Brennan’s dissent contends that because the injunction and declaratory judgment in Quern implied past violations of federal law, declaratory judgments expressly adjudicating the question of past violations are routinely available. We think he is mistaken. The District Court’s injunction and declaratory judgment against continuing and future violations of federal law in Quern implied that similar violations had occurred in the past because neither state nor federal policy had varied through the time of judgment. Here, by contrast, there are no present violations under the amended statute, and even if there were, an injunction against them would not imply that past practice violated the repealed federal law. Thus, a declaratory judgment that respondent violated federal law in the past would have to stand on its own feet as an appropriate exercise of federal jurisdiction in this case. This it cannot do for the reasons we have previously stated.

We hold that the District Court was correct in concluding that neither the “notice” proposed by petitioners nor a declaratory judgment should have issued in a case of this type. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore

Affirmed.

Justice Brennan,

with whpm Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens join, dissenting.

Last Term, in my dissent in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 257 (1985), I explained at length my view that the Court’s Eleventh Amendment doctrine “lacks a textual anchor [in the Constitution], a firm historical foundation, or a clear rationale.” Today’s decision demonstrates that the absence of a stable analytical structure underlying the Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence produces inconsistent decisions.

In Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979), the State of Illinois contended that the notice relief ordered by the Court of Appeals, which was identical in all significant respects to that requested in the instant case, offended the Eleventh Amendment because “giving the proposed notice [would] lead inexorably to the payment of state funds for retroactive benefits and therefore it, in effect, amounts to a monetary award.” Id., at 347. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, rejected that argument:

“[T]he chain of causation which petitioner seeks to establish is by no means unbroken; it contains numerous missing links, which can be supplied, if at all, only by the State and members of the plaintiff class and not by a federal court. The notice approved by the Court of Appeals simply apprises plaintiff class members of the existence of whatever administrative procedures may already be available under state law by which they may receive a determination of eligibility for past benefits. . . . The mere sending of that notice does not trigger the state administrative machinery. Whether a recipient of notice decides to take advantage of those available state procedures is left completely to the discretion of that particular class member; the federal court plays no role in that decision. And whether or not the class member will receive retroactive benefits rests entirely with the State, its agencies, courts, and legislature, not with the federal court.” Id., at 347-348.

In the present case, the Court turns around and accepts the argument made by the State of Illinois in Quern with respect to Green’s request for declaratory relief. Justice Rehnquist states that declaratory relief is barred by the Eleventh Amendment because

"the award of a declaratory judgment in this situation would be useful in resolving the dispute over the past lawfulness of respondent’s action only if it might be offered in state-court proceedings as res judicata on the issue of liability, leaving to the state courts only a form of accounting proceeding whereby damages or restitution would be computed. But the issuance of a declaratory judgment in these circumstances would have much the same effect as a full-fledged award of damages or restitution by the federal court, the latter kinds of relief being . . . prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment.” Ante, at 73.

What the Court ignores is that the declaration by the District Court in the Quern litigation that Illinois officials had violated federal law, combined with the notice relief we sanctioned, would have yielded the same result. The Court fails to explain adequately why declaratory relief should be analyzed differently than notice relief was in Quern, since use of the declaratory judgment in the State’s courts is also left completely to the discretion of individual notice recipients and the award of retroactive benefits “rests entirely with the State, its agencies, courts, and legislature, not with the federal court.” Quern, supra, at 348.

By way of explication, the Court retreats to the position that federal courts may grant relief prospectively, that is, against ongoing and future violations of federal law, but not retroactively, that is, against past violations of federal law. Basically what the Court is doing, as it admits in this case, is balancing the Eleventh Amendment and the Supremacy Clause. Ante, at 68. If relief is sought against continuing violations, the Court finds that the Supremacy Clause outweighs the Eleventh Amendment; but if relief is requested against past violations, the Court determines that the Eleventh Amendment outweighs the Supremacy Clause. The Court cites no constitutional authority for this balancing test and has not offered, and I suspect cannot offer, a satisfactory analytical foundation for it.

Furthermore, I strenuously disagree with the Court’s suggestion that the balance it has struck sufficiently protects the supremacy of federal law. It may be true that the availability of prospective relief of the sort awarded in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), gives, as the Court puts it, some “life” to the Supremacy Clause. Ante, at 68. That this rule saves the Clause from being completely moribund does not, however, alter the reality that it is insufficient to ensure that federal law is paramount. From this day forward, at least with regard to welfare programs, States may refuse to follow federal law with impunity, secure in the knowledge that all they need do to immunize themselves from accountability in federal courts is to conform their policies to federal law on the eve of judgment in a suit brought to secure “prospective” in-junctive relief. During the period of noncompliance, States save money by not paying benefits according to the criteria established by federal law, while needy individuals designated by Congress as the beneficiaries of welfare programs are cheated of their federal rights. Once again, the Court’s doctrine “require[s] the federal courts to protect States that violate federal law from the legal consequences of their conduct.” Atascadero, 473 U. S., at 258. Surely the Supremacy Clause requires a different result.

The foregoing reveals the fundamental incoherence of the Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. Before the Court can develop a coherent Eleventh Amendment doctrine, I believe that it must reassess a long line of our precedents, beginning with Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), and culminating in today’s decision, that have perpetuated an erroneous interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. As I demonstrated in Atascadero, supra, the Court’s constitutional doctrine of the sovereign immunity of States rests on a mistaken historical premise. Because I treated the subject exhaustively in that case, I will only restate my conclusions here. Recent scholarship indicates that the Framers never intended to constitutionalize the doctrine of state sovereign immunity; consequently the Eleventh Amendment was not an effort to reestablish, after Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), a limitation on federal judicial power contained in Article III. Nor, given the limited terms and context in which the Eleventh Amendment was drafted, could the Amendment’s narrow and technical language be understood to have instituted a broad new limitation on the federal judicial power in cases “arising under” federal law whenever an individual attempts to sue a State. Atascadero, 473 U. S., at 258-259. Rather, as the historical records and the language of the Constitution reveal, the Amendment was intended simply to remove federal-court jurisdiction over suits against a State where the basis for jurisdiction was that the plaintiff was a citizen of another State or an alien — suits which result in the abrogation of the state law of sovereign immunity in state-law causes of action. Id., at 259-280.

Because the disputes in the instant case are between citizens and their own State and because a federal question is the source of federal-court jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment, properly construed, is no bar to petitioners’ suits.

I respectfully dissent.

Justice Marshall,

with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens join, dissenting.

I concur in Justice Brennan’s and Justice Blackmun’s dissents. I contribute to this proliferation of opinions only to add a few words as to why, even under the view of the Eleventh Amendment accepted by the majority in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234 (1985), the majority reaches an incorrect result in this case.

M

Justice Brennan’s opinion cogently explains how the decision of the majority today repudiates Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979). The Court in that case did not approve notice relief as a “mere case-management device,” ante, at 71, nor does the majority suggest how informing class members of state administrative procedures serves a case-management function in federal-court litigation. Rather, the Quern Court, explicitly posing the question whether “the modified notice contemplated by the Seventh Circuit constitute^] permissible prospective relief or a ‘retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury,’ ” concluded that “this relief falls on the Ex parte Young side of the Eleventh Amendment line rather than on the Edelman side.” Quern, supra, at 346-347.

H HH

In abandoning the result it reached six years ago, the majority misapplies its own Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. The majority states that there are two kinds of remedies that can be sought against a state officer: prospective relief “designed to end a continuing violation of federal law,” and retrospective relief serving mere “compensatory or deterrence interests.” Ante, at 68. Only in the former class of relief, it concludes, do the federal interests involved outweigh the Eleventh Amendment interests implicated by a suit against a state officer in his official capacity. “Prospective” and “retrospective” labels, however, should be irrelevant to analysis of this case. The notice relief at issue here imposes no significant costs on the State, creates no direct liabilities against the State, and respects the institutions of state government. See Quern, supra, at 347-348. This Court has never held that the Eleventh Amendment poses any bar to such relief. Indeed, notice of the availability of possible relief through existing state administrative remedies, where the state agency and state courts would be the sole arbiters of what relief would be granted, assists in the vindication of state law by informing class members that they may have causes of action under that law. In the Eleventh Amendment balance set up by the majority opinion, it is thus hard to see what weight, if any, exists on the State’s side of the scale, and why that weight should overcome the interest in vindicating federal law.

I would hold that whether the Eleventh Amendment was intended simply to provide that a State cannot be sued in federal court where the basis of jurisdiction is that the plaintiff is a citizen of another State or an alien (as I believe), or was intended to constitutionalize a much broader principle of state sovereign immunity (as the majority believes), there is simply nothing offensive to that Amendment in an order that the State notify class members of the possibility that they may be entitled to relief through the state administrative process. Because that order neither imposes significant costs on the State nor creates any direct liabilities against it, the Quern Court properly placed it “on the Ex parte Young side of the Eleventh Amendment line.” 440 U. S., at 347.

Justice Blackmun,

with whom Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens join, dissenting.

I joined Justice Brennan’s dissent in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 247 (1985), and I join his dissent in this case. I fully agree that the Court’s Eleventh Amendment approach, as demonstrated by the difference between the result in this case and that in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979), is sterile, produces inconsistent decisions, and is in serious need of reconsideration. Cf. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 539, 546-547 (1985).

But I also would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case for the additional reason expressed in my dissent (joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens) in Atascadero, 473 U. S., at 302, namely, the waiver by Michigan, “as a willing recipient of federal funds,” id., at 304, of any Eleventh Amendment barrier that otherwise might exist. The State too easily avoids its responsibilities, and the Court by its decision today allows the State to go its way unimpeded and unburdened with any remedy for those who have been wronged during the period of Michigan’s noncompliance with federal law.

       The declaratory judgment was embodied in paragraph 4 of the District Court’s judgment, which stated:
      “Illinois Categorical Assistance Manual, Section 4004, and subsections thereunder, as applied to applicants for AABD are invalid insofar as they are inconsistent with the requirements of [federal law as construed in] paragraphs 1 and 2.” Jordan v. Weaver, No. 71 C 70, p. 3 (ND Ill., Mar. 15, 1972) (emphasis added).

       If, of course, petitioners would make no claim that the federal declaratory judgment was res judicata in later commenced state proceedings, the declaratory judgment would serve no purpose whatever in resolving the remaining dispute between the parties, and is unavailable for that reason. Wycoff, 344 U. S., at 247.

       Green asked the District Court to order that notices be sent out to other AFDC recipients advising them of the outcome of the litigation, i. e., of the declaratory judgment and telling them that state administrative proceedings might be available to them to obtain retroactive benefits. App. 132. Similarly, the notice approved in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S., at 349, “inform[ed] class members that their federal suit [was] at an end, that the federal court [could] provide them with no further relief, and that there [were] existing state administrative procedures which they may wish to pursue.” The class members were ‘“given no more . . . than what they would have gathered by sitting in the courtroom.’ ” Ibid., quoting Jordan v. Trainor, 563 F. 2d 873, 877-878 (CA7 1977). And, of course, what class members would have gathered by sitting in the courtroom was the substantive outcome of the litigation — a declaration that Illinois officials had violated federal law.

       It is not enough to distinguish the cases to observe that the notice relief in Quern, was “ancillary” to a prospective injunction because the “prospective” injunction had been moot for three years before the Court of Appeals fashioned the notice relief and for five years before this Court approved it — Congress abolished the federal program at issue in Quern in 1974.

       AFDC is a matching benefits program. States pay up to 60 percent of their benefit payments, the Federal Government pays the remainder. House Committee on Ways and Means, Background Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 292 (Comm. Print 1984).

      The distinction is hardly so neat as the majority implies. The majority cites Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267 (1977), as exemplifying permissible injunctive relief. Ante, at 68. That case involved a continuing federal duty to remedy the effects of past de jure segregation; the Court upheld against Eleventh Amendment attack an order that state officials pay costs attributable to a program “designed... to restore the schoolchildren of Detroit to the position they would have enjoyed absent constitutional violations by state and local officials,” 433 U. S., at 281, characterizing the relief both as “prospectiv[e]” and as “compensatory,” id., at 290. Yet petitioners here note that Congress has imposed on state agencies a continuing federal duty to “take all necessary steps to correct any . . . underpayment of aid under the State plan.” 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(22); see also 45 CFR § 205.10(a) (1984). The relief in this case too might therefore be described as related to a continuing federal duty, “part of a plan that operates prospectively to bring about the delayed benefits of a [constitutionally administered program].” Milliken, supra, at 290 (emphasis in original).