author:
      Justice Scalia
      Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens,

text:
    GRIFFIN v. WISCONSIN
    No. 86-5324.
    Argued April 20, 1987
    Decided June 26, 1987

      Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Powell, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, in Parts I-B and I-C of which Brennan, J., joined, and in Part I-C of which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 881. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 890.

      Alan G. Habermehl, by appointment of the Court, 479 U. S. 1053, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.

      Barry M. Levenson, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Donald J. Hanaway, Attorney General.

         Arthur Eisenberg filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

        Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Weld, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, Richard G. Taranto, and Kathleen A. Felton filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
      Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of California by John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, Steve White, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Ronald E. Niver and Stan M. Helfman, Deputy Attorneys General; and for the State of New York et al. by Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, O. Peter Sherwood, Solicitor General, Lawrence S. Kahn, Deputy Solicitor General, Judith T. Kramer, Assistant Attorney General, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, John J. Kelly, Chief State’s Attorney of Connecticut, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, James T. Jones, Attorney General of Idaho, Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Stephen E. Merrill, Attorney General of New Hampshire, E. Cary Edwards, Attorney General of New Jersey, Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina, and T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina.

   Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner Joseph Griffin, who was on probation, had his home searched by probation officers acting without a warrant. The officers found a gun that later served as the basis of Griffin’s conviction of a state-law weapons offense. We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. 1005 (1986), to consider whether this search violated the Fourth Amendment.

I

On September 4, 1980, Griffin, who had previously been convicted of a felony, was convicted in Wisconsin state court of resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and obstructing an officer. He was placed on probation.

Wisconsin law puts probationers in the legal custody of the State Department of Health and Social Services and renders them “subject . . . to . . . conditions set by the court and rules and regulations established by the department.” Wis. Stat. § 973.10(1) (1985-1986). One of the Department’s regulations permits any probation officer to search a probationer’s home without a warrant as long as his supervisor approves and as long as there are “reasonable grounds” to believe the presence of contraband — including any item that the probationer cannot possess under the probation conditions. Wis. Admin. Code HSS §§ 328.21(4), 328.16(1) (1981). The rule provides that an officer should consider a variety of factors in determining whether “reasonable grounds” exist, among which are information provided by an informant, the reliability and specificity of that information, the reliability of the informant (including whether the informant has any incentive to supply inaccurate information), the officer’s own experience with the probationer, and the “need to verify compliance with rules of supervision and state and federal law.” HSS §328.21(7). Another regulation makes it a violation of the terms of probation to refuse to consent to a home search. HSS § 328.04(3)(k). And still another forbids a probationer to possess a firearm without advance approval from a probation officer. HSS § 328.04(3)(j).

On April 5, 1983, while Griffin was still on probation, Michael Lew, the supervisor of Griffin’s probation officer, received information from a detective on the Beloit Police Department that there were or might be guns in Griffin’s apartment. Unable to secure the assistance of Griffin’s own probation officer, Lew, accompanied by another probation officer and three plainclothes policemen, went to the apartment. When Griffin answered the door, Lew told him who they were and informed him that they were going to search his home. During the subsequent search — carried out entirely by the probation officers under the authority of Wisconsin’s probation regulation — they found a handgun.

Griffin was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, which is itself a felony. Wis. Stat. §941.29(2) (1985-1986). He moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that no warrant was necessary and that the search was reasonable. A jury convicted Griffin of the firearms violation, and he was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 126 Wis. 2d 183, 376 N. W. 2d 62 (1985).

On further appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court also affirmed. It found denial of the suppression motion proper because probation diminishes a probationer’s reasonable expectation of privacy — so that a probation officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, search a probationer’s home without a warrant, and with only “reasonable grounds” (not probable cause) to believe that contraband is present. It held that the “reasonable grounds” standard of Wisconsin’s search regulation satisfied this “reasonable grounds” standard of the Federal Constitution, and that the detective’s tip established “reasonable grounds” within the meaning of the regulation, since it came from someone who had no reason to supply inaccurate information, specifically identified Griffin, and suggested a need to verify Griffin’s compliance with state law. 131 Wis. 2d 41, 52-64, 388 N. W. 2d 535, 539-544 (1986).

II

We think the Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly concluded that this warrantless search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. To reach that result, however, we find it unnecessary to embrace a new principle of law, as the Wisconsin court evidently did, that any search of a probationer’s home by a probation officer satisfies the Fourth Amendment as long as the information possessed by the officer satisfies a federal “reasonable grounds” standard. As his sentence for the commission of a crime, Griffin was committed to the legal custody of the Wisconsin State Department of Health and Social Services, and thereby made subject to that Department’s rules and regulations. The search of Griffin’s home satisfied the demands of the Fourth Amendment because it was carried out pursuant to a regulation that itself satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement under well-established principles.

A

A probationer’s home, like anyone else’s, is protected by the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be “reasonable.” Although we usually require that a search be undertaken only pursuant to a warrant (and thus supported by probable cause, as the Constitution says warrants must be), see, e. g., Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 586 (1980), we have permitted exceptions when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.” New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). Thus, we have held that government employers and supervisors may conduct warrantless, work-related searches of employees’ desks and offices without probable cause, O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709 (1987), and that school officials may conduct warrantless searches of some student property, also without probable cause, New Jersey v. T. L. O., swpra. We have also held, for similar reasons, that in certain circumstances government investigators conducting searches pursuant to a regulatory scheme need not adhere to the usual warrant or probable-cause requirements as long as their searches meet “reasonable legislative or administrative standards.” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 538 (1967). See New York v. Burger, 482 U. S. 691, 702-703 (1987); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594, 602 (1981); United States v. Biswell, 406 XJ. S. 311, 316 (1972).

A State’s operation of a probation system, like its operation of a school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents “special needs” beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements. Probation, like incarceration, is “a form of criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict, finding, or plea of guilty.” G. Killinger, H. Kerper, & P. Cromwell, Probation and Parole in the Criminal Justice System 14 (1976); see also 18 U. S. C. § 3651 (1982 ed. and Supp. III) (probation imposed instead of imprisonment); Wis. Stat. § 973.09 (1985-1986) (same). Probation is simply one point (or, more accurately, one set of points) on a continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory community service. A number of different options lie between those extremes, including confinement in a medium- or minimum-security facility, work-release programs, “halfway houses,” and probation — which can itself be more or less confining depending upon the number and severity of restrictions imposed. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. §3563 (1982 ed., Supp. III) (effective Nov. 1, 1987) (probation conditions authorized in federal system include requiring probationers to avoid commission of other crimes; to pursue employment; to avoid certain occupations, places, and people; to spend evenings or weekends in prison; and to avoid narcotics or excessive use of alcohol). To a greater or lesser degree, it is always true of probationers (as we have said it to be true of parolees) that they do not enjoy “the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 480 (1972).

These restrictions are meant to assure that the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by the probationer’s being at large. See State v. Tarrell, 74 Wis. 2d 647, 652-653, 247 N. W. 2d 696, 700 (1976). These same goals require and justify the exercise of supervision to assure that the restrictions are in fact observed. Recent research suggests that more intensive supervision can reduce recidivism, see Petersilia, Probation and Felony Offenders, 49 Fed. Probation 9 (June 1985), and the importance of supervision has grown as probation has become an increasingly common sentence for those convicted of serious crimes, see id., at 4. Supervision, then, is a “special need” of the State permitting a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large. That permissible degree is not unlimited, however, so we next turn to whether it has been exceeded here.

B

In determining whether the “special needs” of its probation system justify Wisconsin’s search regulation, we must take that regulation as it has been interpreted by state corrections officials and state courts. As already noted, the Wisconsin Supreme Court — the ultimate authority on issues of Wisconsin law — has held that a tip from a police detective that Griffin “had” or “may have had” an illegal weapon at his home constituted the requisite “reasonable grounds.” See 131 Wis. 2d, at 64, 388 N. W. 2d, at 544. Whether or not we would choose to interpret a similarly worded federal regulation in that fashion, we are bound by the state court’s interpretation, which is relevant to our constitutional analysis only insofar as it fixes the meaning of the regulation. We think it clear that the special needs of Wisconsin’s probation system make the warrant requirement impracticable and justify replacement of the standard of probable cause by “reasonable grounds,” as defined by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

A warrant requirement would interfere to an appreciable degree with the probation system, setting up a magistrate rather than the probation officer as the judge of how close a supervision the probationer requires. Moreover, the delay inherent in obtaining a warrant would make it more difficult for probation officials to respond quickly to evidence of misconduct, see New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S., at 340, and would reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create, see New York v. Burger, 482 U. S., at 710; United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S., at 316. By way of analogy, one might contemplate how parental custodial authority would be impaired by requiring judicial approval for search of a minor child’s room. And on the other side of the equation — the effect of dispensing with a warrant upon the probationer: Although a probation officer is not an impartial magistrate, neither is he the police officer who normally conducts searches against the ordinary citizen. He is an employee of the State Department of Health and Social Services who, while assuredly charged with protecting the public interest, is also supposed to have in mind the welfare of the probationer (who in the regulations is called a “client,” HSS § 328.03(5)). The applicable regulations require him, for example, to “[p]rovid[e] individualized counseling designed to foster growth and development of the client as necessary,” HSS § 328.04(2)(i), and “[m]onito[r] the client’s progress where services are provided by another agency and evaluate] the need for continuation of the services,” HSS §328.04(2)(o). In such a setting, we think it reasonable to dispense with the warrant requirement.

Justice Blackmun’s dissent would retain a judicial warrant requirement, though agreeing with our subsequent conclusion that reasonableness of the search does not require probable cause. This, however, is a combination that neither the text of the Constitution nor any of our prior decisions permits. While it is possible to say that Fourth Amendment reasonableness demands probable cause without a judicial warrant, the reverse runs up against the constitutional provision that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” Arndt. 4. The Constitution prescribes, in other words, that where the matter is of such a nature as to require a judicial warrant, it is also of such a nature as to require probable cause. Although we have arguably come to permit an exception to that prescription for administrative search warrants, which may but do not necessarily have to be issued by courts, we have never done so for constitutionally mandated judicial warrants. There it remains true that “[i]f a search warrant be constitutionally required, the requirement cannot be flexibly interpreted to dispense with the rigorous constitutional restrictions for its issue.” Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, 373 (1959). Justice Blackmun neither gives a justification for departure from that principle nor considers its implications for the body of Fourth Amendment law.

We think that the probation regime would also be unduly disrupted by a requirement of probable cause. To take the facts of the present case, it is most unlikely that the unauthenticated tip of a police officer — bearing, as far as the record shows, no indication whether its basis was firsthand knowledge or, if not, whether the firsthand source was reliable, and merely stating that Griffin “had or might have” guns in his residence, not that he certainly had them — would meet the ordinary requirement of probable cause. But this is different from the ordinary case in two related respects: First, even more than the requirement of a warrant, a probable-cause requirement would reduce the deterrent effect of the supervisory arrangement. The probationer would be assured that so long as his illegal (and perhaps socially dangerous) activities were sufficiently concealed as to give rise to no more than reasonable suspicion, they would go undetected and uncorrected. The second difference is well reflected in the regulation specifying what is to be considered “[i]n deciding whether there are reasonable grounds to believe ... a client’s living quarters or property contain contraband,” HSS §328.21(7). The factors include not only the usual elements that a police officer or magistrate would consider, such as the detail and consistency of the information suggesting the presence of contraband and the reliability and motivation to dissemble of the informant, HSS §§328.21(7) (c), (d), but also “[ijnformation provided by the client which is relevant to whether the client possesses contraband,” and “[t]he experience of a staff member with that client or in a similar circumstance.” HSS §§ 328.21(7)(f), (g). As was true, then, in O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709 (1987), and New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325 (1985), we deal with a situation in which there is an ongoing supervisory relationship —and one that is not, or at least not entirely, adversarial— between the object of the search and the decisionmaker.

In such circumstances it is both unrealistic and destructive of the whole object of the continuing probation relationship to insist upon the same degree of demonstrable reliability of particular items of supporting data, and upon the same degree of certainty of violation, as is required in other contexts. In some cases — especially those involving drugs or illegal weapons — the probation agency must be able to act based upon a lesser degree of certainty than the Fourth Amendment would otherwise require in order to intervene before a probationer does damage to himself or society. The agency, moreover, must be able to proceed on the basis of its entire experience with the probationer, and to assess probabilities in the light of its knowledge of his life, character, and circumstances.

To allow adequate play for such factors, we think it reasonable to permit information provided by a police officer, whether or not on the basis of firsthand knowledge, to support a probationer search. The same conclusion is suggested by the fact that the police máy be unwilling to disclose their confidential sources to probation personnel. For the same reason, and also because it is the very assumption of the institution of probation that the probationer is in need of rehabilitation and is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law, we think it enough if the information provided indicates, as it did here, only the likelihood (“had or might have guns”) of facts justifying the search.

The search of Griffin’s residence was “reasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted pursuant to a valid regulation governing probationers. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider whether, as the court below held and the State urges, any search of a probationer’s home by a probation officer is lawful when there are “reasonable grounds” to believe contraband is present. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court is

Affirmed.

Justice Blackmun,

with whom

Justice Marshall joins and, as to Parts I-B and I-C, Justice Brennan joins and, as to Part I-C, Justice Stevens joins, dissenting.

In ruling that the home of a probationer may be searched by a probation officer without a warrant, the Court today takes another step that diminishes the protection given by the Fourth Amendment to the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” In my view, petitioner’s probationary status provides no reason to abandon the warrant requirement. The probation system’s special law enforcement needs may justify a search by a probation officer on the basis of “reasonable suspicion,” but even that standard was not met in this case.

I

The need for supervision in probation presents one of the “exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 351 (1985) (opinion concurring in judgment), justify an application of the Court’s balancing test and an examination of the practicality of the warrant and probable-cause requirements. The Court, however, fails to recognize that this is a threshold determination of special law enforcement needs. The warrant and probable-cause requirements provide the normal standard for “reasonable” searches. “[0]nly when the practical realities of a particular situation suggest that a government official cannot obtain a warrant based upon probable cause without sacrificing the ultimate goals to which a search would contribute, does the Court turn to a ‘balancing’ test to formulate a standard of reasonableness for this context.” O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709, 741 (1987) (dissenting opinion). The presence of special law enforcement needs justifies resort to the balancing test, but it does not preordain the necessity of recognizing exceptions to the warrant and probable-cause requirements.

My application of the balancing test leads me to conclude that special law enforcement needs justify a search by a probation agent of the home of a probationer on the basis of a reduced level of suspicion. The acknowledged need for supervision, however, does not also justify an exception to the warrant requirement, and I would retain this means of protecting a probationer’s privacy. Moreover, the necessity for the neutral check provided by the warrant requirement is demonstrated by this case, in which the search was conducted on the basis of information that did not begin to approach the level of “reasonable grounds.”

A

The probation officer is not dealing with an average citizen, but with a person who has been convicted of a crime. This presence of an offender in the community creates the need for special supervision. I therefore agree that a probation agent must have latitude in observing a probationer if the agent is to carry out his supervisory responsibilities effectively. Recidivism among probationers is a major problem, and supervision is one means of combating that threat. See ante, at 875. Supervision also provides a crucial means of advancing rehabilitation by allowing a probation agent to intervene at the first sign of trouble.

One important aspect of supervision is the monitoring of a probationer’s compliance with the conditions of his probation. In order to ensure compliance with those conditions, a probation agent may need to search a probationer’s home to check for violations. While extensive inquiry may be required to gather the information necessary to establish probable cause that a violation has occurred, a “reasonable grounds” standard allows a probation agent to avoid this delay and to intervene at an earlier stage of suspicion. This standard is thus consistent with the level of supervision necessary to protect the public and to aid rehabilitation. At the same time, if properly applied, the standard of reasonable suspicion will protect a probationer from unwarranted intrusions into his privacy.

B

I do not think, however, that special law enforcement needs justify a modification of the protection afforded a probationer’s privacy by the warrant requirement. The search in this case was conducted in petitioner’s home, the place that traditionally has been regarded as the center of a person’s private life, the bastion in which one has a legitimate expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961) (“At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion”). The Court consistently has held that warrantless searches and seizures in a home violate the Fourth Amendment absent consent or exigent circumstances. See, e. g., United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705, 714-715 (1984); Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204 (1981) (arrest warrant inadequate for search of home of a third party); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980) (warrantless arrest of suspect in his home unconstitutional).

“It is axiomatic that the ‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’ United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on agents of the government who seek to enter the home for purposes of search or arrest. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Court has recognized, as ‘a “basic principle of Fourth Amendment law[,]” that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’ Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 586.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740, 748-749 (1984) (footnote and citation omitted).

The administrative-inspection cases are inapposite to a search of a home. Each of the cases that this Court has found to fall within the exception to the administrative-warrant requirement has concerned the lesser expectation of privacy attached to a “closely regulated” business. See, e. g., New York v. Burger, 482 U. S. 691 (1987) (vehicle dismantlers); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981) (mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (gun dealers). The reasoning that may justify an administrative inspection without a warrant in the case of a business enterprise simply does not extend to the invasion of the special privacy the Court has recognized for the home.

A probationer usually lives at home, and often, as in this case, with a family. He retains a legitimate privacy interest in the home that must be respected to the degree that it is not incompatible with substantial governmental needs. The Court in New Jersey v. T. L. O. acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment issue needs to be resolved in such a way as to “ensure that the [privacy] interests of students will be invaded no more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools.” 469 U. S., at 343. The privacy interests of probationers should be protected by a similar standard, and invaded no more than is necessary to satisfy probation’s dual goals of protecting the public safety and encouraging the rehabilitation of the probationer.

The search in this case was not the result of an ordinary home visit by petitioner’s probation agent for which no warrant is required. Cf. Wyman v. James, 400 U. S. 309 (1971). It was a search pursuant to a tip, ostensibly from the police, for the purpose of uncovering evidence of a criminal violation. There is nothing about the status of probation that justifies a special exception to the warrant requirement under these circumstances. If in a particular case there is a compelling need to search the home of a probationer without delay, then it is possible for a search to be conducted immediately under the established exception for exigent circumstances. There is no need to create a separate warrant exception for probationers. The existing exception provides a probation agent with all the flexibility the agent needs.

The circumstances of this case illustrate the fact that the warrant requirement does not create any special impediment to the achievement of the goals of probation. The probation supervisor, Michael T. Lew, waited “[t]wo or three hours” after receiving the telephone tip before he proceeded to petitioner’s home to conduct the search. App. 16. He testified that he was waiting for the return of petitioner’s official agent who was attending a legal proceeding, and that eventually he requested another probation agent to initiate the search. Id., at 16, 51. Mr. Lew thus had plenty of time to obtain a search warrant. If the police themselves had investigated the report of a gun at petitioner’s residence, they would have been required to obtain a warrant. There simply was no compelling reason to abandon the safeguards provided by neutral review.

The Court appears to hold the curious assumption that the probationer will benefit by dispensing with the warrant requirement. It notes that a probation officer does not normally conduct searches, as does a police officer, and, moreover, the officer is “supposed to have in mind the welfare of the probationer.” Ante, at 876. The implication is that a probation agent will be less likely to initiate an inappropriate search than a law-enforcement officer, and is thus less in need of neutral review. Even if there were data to support this notion, a reduced need for review does not justify a complete removal of the warrant requirement. Furthermore, the benefit that a probationer is supposed to gain from probation is rehabilitation. I fail to see how the role of the probation agent in “ 'fosterling] growth and development of the client,’” ibid., quoting Wis. Admin. Code HSS §328.04 (2)(i) (1981), is enhanced the slightest bit by the ability to conduct a search without the checks provided by prior neutral review. If anything, the power to decide to search will prove a barrier to establishing any degree of trust between agent and “client.”

The Court also justifies the exception to the warrant requirement that it would find in the Wisconsin regulations by stressing the need to have a probation agent, rather than a judge, decide how closely supervised a particular probationer should be. See ante, at 876. This argument mistakes the nature of the search at issue. The probation agent retains discretion over the terms of a probationer’s supervision — the warrant requirement introduces a judge or a magistrate into the decision only when a full-blown search for evidence of a criminal violation is at stake. The Court’s justification for the conclusion that the warrant requirement would interfere with the probation system by way of an analogy to the authority possessed by parents over their children is completely unfounded. The difference between the two situations is too obvious to belabor. Unlike the private nature of a parent’s interaction with his or her child, the probation system is a governmental operation, with explicit standards. Experience has shown that a neutral judge can best determine if those standards are met and a search is justified. This case provides an excellent illustration of the need for neutral review of a probation officer’s decision to conduct a search, for it is obvious that the search was not justified even by a reduced standard of reasonable suspicion.

C

The Court concludes that the search of petitioner’s home satisfied the requirements of the Fourth Amendment “because it was carried out pursuant to a regulation that itself satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement under well-established principles.” Ante, at 873. In the Court’s view, it seems that only the single regulation requiring “reasonable grounds” for a search is relevant to its decision. Ante, at 880, n. 8. When faced with the patent failure of the probation agents to comply with the Wisconsin regulations, the Court concludes that it “is irrelevant to the case before us” that the probation agents “may have violated Wisconsin state regulations.” Ibid. All of these other regulations, which happen to define the steps necessary to ensure that reasonable grounds are present, can be ignored. This conclusion that the existence of a facial requirement for “reasonable grounds” automatically satisfies the constitutional protection that a search be reasonable can only be termed tautological. The content of a standard is found in its application and, in this case, I cannot discern the application of any standard whatsoever.

The suspicion in this case was based on an unverified tip from an unknown source. With or without the Wisconsin regulation, such information cannot constitutionally justify a search. Mr. Lew testified that he could not recall which police officer called him with the information about the gun, although he thought it “probably” was Officer Pittner. App. 16. Officer Pittner, however, did not remember making any such telephone call. Id., at 39. From all that the record reveals, the call could have been placed by anyone. It is even plausible that the information did not come from the police at all, but from someone impersonating an officer.

Even assuming that a police officer spoke to Mr. Lew, there was little to demonstrate the reliability of the information he received from that unknown officer. The record does not reveal even the precise content of the tip. The unknown officer actually may have reported that petitioner “had” contraband in his possession, id., at 51, or he merely may have suggested that petitioner “may have had guns in his apartment.” Id., at 14. Mr. Lew testified to both at different stages of the proceedings. Nor do we know anything about the ultimate source of the information. The unknown officer’s belief may have been founded on a hunch, a rumor, or an informant’s tip. Without knowing more about the basis of the tip, it is impossible to form a conclusion, let alone a reasonable conclusion, that there were “reasonable grounds” to justify a search.

Mr. Lew failed completely to make the most rudimentary effort to confirm the information he had received or to evaluate whether reasonable suspicion justified a search. Conspicuously absent was any attempt to comply with the Wisconsin regulations that governed the content of the “reasonable grounds” standard. Wis. Admin. Code HSS § 328.21(7) (1981). No observations of a staff member could have been considered, as required by subsection (7)(a), for Mr. Lew did not consult the agent who had personal knowledge of petitioner’s case. When information was provided by an informant, subsections (7)(c) and (d) required evaluation of the reliability of the information relied upon and the reliability of the informant. Mr. Lew proceeded in violation of these basic requirements. Subsection (7)(f) referred to “information provided by the client” and the explanatory notes stated that “the client should be talked to before the search. Sometimes, this will elicit information helpful in determining whether a search should be made.” § 328.21 App., p. 250. This requirement, too, was ignored. Nor do any of the other considerations support a finding of reasonable grounds to conduct the search. There is no indication that there had been prior seizures of contraband from petitioner, or that his case presented any special need to verify compliance with the law. See §§ 328.21(7)(h) and (i).

The majority acknowledges that it is “most unlikely” that the suspicion in this case would have met the normal “probable cause” standard. Ante, at 878. It concludes, however, that this is not an “ordinary” case because of the need for supervision and the continuing relationship between the probationer and the probation agency. Ibid. In view of this con-timing relationship, the regulations mandated consideration of factors that go beyond those normally considered in determining probable cause to include information provided by the probationer and the experience of the staff member with the probationer. But unless the agency adheres to the regulations, it is sophistic to rely on them as a justification for conducting a search on a lesser degree of suspicion. Mr. Lew drew on no special knowledge of petitioner in deciding to search his house. He had no contact with the agent familiar with petitioner’s case before commencing the search. Nor, as discussed above, was there the slightest attempt to obtain information from petitioner. In this case, the continuing relationship between petitioner and the agency did not supply support for any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise, that would justify a search of petitioner’s home.

II

There are many probationers in this country, and they have committed crimes that range widely in seriousness. The Court has determined that all of them may be subjected to such searches in the absence of a warrant. Moreover, in authorizing these searches on the basis of a reduced level of suspicion, the Court overlooks the feeble justification for the search in this case.

I respectfully dissent.

Justice Stevens,

with whom

Justice Marshall joins, dissenting.

Mere speculation by a police officer that a probationer “may have had” contraband in his possession is not a constitutionally sufficient basis for a warrantless, nonconsensual search of a private home. I simply do not understand how five Members of this Court can reach a contrary conclusion. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

       HSS § 328 was promulgated in December 1981 and became effective on January 1, 1982. Effective May 1, 1986, HSS § 328.21 was repealed and repromulgated with somewhat different numbering and without relevant substantive changes. See 131 Wis. 2d 41, 60, n. 7, 388 N. W. 2d 535, 542, n. 7 (1986). This opinion will cite the old version of § 328.21, which was in effect at the time of the search.

       We have recently held that prison regulations allegedly infringing constitutional rights are themselves constitutional as long as they are “ ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U. S. 342, 349 (1987) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 89 (1987)). We have no occasion in this case to decide whether, as a general matter, that test applies to probation regulations as well.

       If the regulation in question established a standard of conduct to which the probationer had to conform on pain of penalty — e. g., a restriction on his movements — the state court could not constitutionally adopt so unnatural an interpretation of the language that the regulation would fail to provide adequate notice. Cf. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 357-358 (1983); Lambert v. California, 355 U. S. 225, 228 (1957). That is not an issue here since, even though the petitioner would be in violation of his probation conditions (and subject to the penalties that entails) if he failed to consent to any search that the regulation authorized, see HSS §328.04(3)(k), nothing in the regulation or elsewhere required him to be advised, at the time of the request for search, what the probation officer’s “reasonable grounds” were, any more than the ordinary citizen has to be notified of the grounds for “probable cause” or “exigent circumstances” searches before they may be undertaken.

         In the administrative search context, we formally require that administrative warrants be supported by “probable cause,” because in that context we use that term as referring not to a quantum of evidence, but merely to a requirement of reasonableness. See, e. g., Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 320 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967). In other contexts, however, we use “probable cause” to refer to a quantum of evidence for the belief justifying the search, to be distinguished from a lesser quantum such as “reasonable suspicion.” See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709, 724 (1987) (plurality); New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 341-342 (1985). It is plainly in this sense that the dissent uses the term. See, e. g., post, at 881-883 (less than probable cause means “a reduced level of suspicion”).
      5 See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., supra, at 307 (“We hold that. . . the Act is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to authorize inspections without warrant or its equivalent”). The “neutral magistrate,” Camara, supra, at 532, or “neutral officer,” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., supra, at 323, envisioned by our administrative search cases is not necessarily the “neutral judge,” post, at 887, envisioned by the dissent.

       It is irrelevant whether the probation authorities relied upon any peculiar knowledge which they possessed of petitioner in deciding to conduct the present search. Our discussion pertains to the reasons generally supporting the proposition that the search decision should be left to the expertise of probation authorities rather than a magistrate, and should be supportable by a lesser quantum of concrete evidence justifying suspicion than would be required to establish probable cause. That those reasons may not obtain in a particular case is of no consequence. We may note, nonetheless, that the dissenters are in error to assert as a fact that the probation authorities made no use of special knowledge in the present case, post, at 890. All we know for certain is that the petitioner’s probation officer could not be reached; whether any material contained in petitioner’s probation file was used does not appear.

       The dissenters speculate that the information might not have come from the police at all, “but from someone impersonating an officer.” Post,
        at 888. The trial court, however, found as a matter of fact that Lew received the tip on which he relied from a police officer. See 131 Wis. 2d, at 62, 388 N. W. 2d, at 543. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed that finding, ibid., and neither the petitioner nor the dissenters assert that it is clearly erroneous.

       The dissenters assert that the search did not comport with all the governing Wisconsin regulations. There are reasonable grounds on which the Wisconsin court could find that it did. But we need not belabor those here, since the only regulation upon which we rely for our constitutional decision is that which permits a warrantless search on “reasonable grounds.” The Wisconsin Supreme Court found the requirement of “reasonable grounds” to have been met on the facts of this case and, as discussed earlier, we hold that such a requirement, so interpreted, meets constitutional minimum standards as well. That the procedures followed, although establishing “reasonable grounds” under Wisconsin law, and adequate under federal constitutional standards, may have violated Wisconsin state regulations, is irrelevant to the ease before us.

       There is no need to deny the protection provided by the warrant requirement simply because a search can be justified by less than probable cause. The Court recognizes that administrative warrants are issued on less than probable cause, but it concludes that this has never been the ease for “judicial warrants.” Ante, at 877-878. This conclusion overlooks the fact that administrative warrants are issued by the judiciary. See, e. g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 532 (1967) (“These are questions which may be reviewed by a neutral magistrate”); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 316 (1978) (warrant requirement for inspection will not “impose serious burdens on . . . the courts”); id., at 323 (warrant “would provide assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitution”).

       I find curious, however, the Court's reference to the constitutional standard of review for prison regulations, which neither party argued was applicable to this case. There is plainly no justification for importing automatically into the probation context these special constitutional standards, which are necessitated by the “essential goals” of “maintaining institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline” inside the walls of a prison. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 546 (1979). A probationer is not in confinement.

       The version of the regulations cited by the Court provided:
      “(7) In deciding whether there are reasonable grounds to believe a client possesses contraband, or a client’s living quarters or property contain contraband, a staff member should consider:
      “(a) The observations of a staff member;
      “(b) Information provided by an informant;
      “(c) The reliability of the information relied on; in evaluating reliability, attention should be given to whether the information is detailed and consistent and whether it is corroborated;
      “(d) The reliability of an informant; in evaluating reliability, attention should be given to whether the informant has supplied reliable information in the past, and whether the informant has reason to supply inaccurate information;
      “(e) The activity of the client that relates to whether the client might possess contraband;
      “(f) Information provided by the client which is relevant to whether the client possesses contraband;
      “(g) The experience of a staff member with that client or in a similar circumstance;
      “(h) Prior seizures of contraband from the client; and
      “(i) The need to verify compliance with rules of supervision and state and federal law.” Wis. Admin. Code HSS § 328.21(7) (1981).
      The regulations governing the administration of Wisconsin’s probation system have been amended recently. See ante, at 871, n. 1. Under the new rule the word “should” has been changed to “shall” throughout this subsection. See Wis. Admin. Code HSS § 328.21(6) (1986).


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    June 22, 1987
    No. 86-1843.
    Lane, Director, Illinois Department of Corrections, et al. v. Rios.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    No. 86-1528.
    Harsh Investment Corp. v. City and County of Denver et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Colo, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 86-1727.
    Connor v. Sachs et al.
   Appeal from Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div., dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 86-1736.
    Drews, by his Guardian, Drews v. Drews.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5678.
    Hill v. City of Houston, Texas.
   Appeal from C. A. 5th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6816.
    Moore v. American Savings & Loan Assn. et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6844.
    Foreman v. Merit Systems Protection Board.
   Appeal from C. A. Fed. Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1823.
    Waddell v. Michigan.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Mich, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 85-98.
    Anschuetz & Co., GmbH. v. Mississippi River Bridge Authority et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated; and case remanded for further consideration in light of Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U. S. 522 (1987).


text:
    No. 85-99.
    Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH. v. Walker et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U. S. 522 (1987).


text:
    No. 86-1738.
    Lacina et al. v. G-K Trucking et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of West v. Conrail, 481 U. S. 35 (1987).

Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. D-622.
    In re Disbarment of Pasternak.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 480 U. S. 944.]


text:
    No. D-643.
    In re Disbarment of Rosenbleet.
   It is ordered that Charles Rosenbleet, of Bethesda, Md., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 108, Orig.
    Nebraska v. Wyoming et al.
   It is ordered that Owen Olpin, Esquire, of Los Angeles, Cal., be appointed Special Master in this case with authority to fix the time and conditions for the filing of additional pleadings and to direct subsequent proceedings, and with authority to summon witnesses, issue subpoenas, and take such evidence as may be introduced and such as he may deem necessary to call for. The Master is directed to submit such reports as he may deem appropriate.

The compensation of the Special Master, the allowances to him, the compensation paid to his legal, technical, stenographic, and clerical assistants, the cost of printing his report, and all other proper expenses, including travel expenses, shall be charged against and be borne by the parties in such proportion as the Court may hereafter direct.

Motions of Basin Electric Power Cooperative, Platte River Trust, National Audubon Society, and Nebraska Public Power District et al. for leave to intervene referred to the Special Master. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 481 U. S. 1011.]


text:
    No. 86-622.
    No. 86-737.
    Traynor v. Turnage, Administrator, Veterans’ Administration, et al. McKelvey v. Turnage, Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 480 U. S. 916]; and C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 480 U. S. 916.] Motion of petitioners for divided argument denied. Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 86-939.
    No. 86-941.
    ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri et al.; and Hodel, Secretary of the Interior, et al. v. Missouri et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 480 U. S. 905.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument denied. Motion of respondents for divided argument denied. Motion of Montana et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae, for additional time for oral argument, and for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 86-1329 (A-894).
    Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 481 U. S. 1068.] Motion of petitioner to expedite oral argument denied. Application for stay, presented to Justice O’Connor, and by her referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 86-1659.
    Continental Can Co. v. Gavalik et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 86-6835.
    Wrenn v. Capstone Medical Center et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until July 13, 1987, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.

Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

For the reasons expressed in Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U. S. 928 (1983), we would deny the petition for writ of certiorari without reaching the merits of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.


text:
    No. 86-6767.
    In re Caldwell.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 86-6783.
    In re Phillips.
   Petition for writ of prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 86-935.
    Regents of the University of California v. Public Employment Relations Board et al.
   Appeal from

Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 86-1172.
    Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ohio. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 86-1387.
    Mackey et al. v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 86-1431.
    Loeffler v. Tisch, Postmaster General of the United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 86-958.
    Norwest Bank Worthington et al. v. Ahlers et ux.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of American Bankers Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 86-6139.
    Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 86-6867.
    Lowenfield v. Phelps, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted limited to Questions 1 and 2 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 86-1400.
    Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1416.
    Motto v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1417.
    Collins et al. v. County of Kendall, Illinois, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1429.
    Securities Industry Assn. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1436.
    Yankton Sioux Tribe of Indians v. South Dakota et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1474.
    Rubin v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1480.
    Alexander et al. v. Chevron U. S. A.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1493.
    State Bank of India v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1514.
    Callahan v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1527.
    McClellan Realty Co. et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1543.
    Peterson Painting, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1553.
    No. 86-1579.
    Cohen v. United States; and Ianniello et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1577.
    Fernandez v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1589.
    Price v. Tampa Electric Co.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1594.
    Small v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1689.
    Kin Sun Yuen v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1721.
    New Jersey Transit Policemen’s Benevolent Assn., Local 304 v. New Jersey Transit Corporation.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1724.
    O’Malley v. Xerox Corp. et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1731.
    Behrman v. Behrman.
   App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1745.
    Moore et al. v. Frost et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1749.
    Benzies v. Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1752.
    Illinois v. Gibons et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1755.
    WMBIC Indemnity Corp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Short, Real Party in Interest).
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1759.
    Wood et al. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, Local 406, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1763.
    Walker v. Thielen Motors, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1768.
    Tobin v. Petrillo et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1769.
    City of Lawton, Oklahoma v. Turner.
   Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1770.
    Oklahoma Corporation Commission v. Harry R. Carlile Trust (Arthurs, Trustee).
   Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1777.
    Szopko v. Kinsman Marine Transit Co.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1809.
    Peregoff v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company of Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1819.
    No. 86-1820.
    No. 86-1821.
    No. 86-6810.
    Borelli v. United States; Ustica v. United States; Rendini v. United States; and Turekian v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1835.
    Rochman v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1844.
    Cavanaugh et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-5590.
    Dettmer v. Murray, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6447.
    Plaisance v. Louisiana.
   Ct. App. La., 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6500.
    No. 86-6522.
    Davis v. United States; Ransom v. United States; Davis v. United States; and Davis v. United States.
    No. 86-6530.
    No. 86-6792.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6505.
    Redfern v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6524.
    Crutchfield v. Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6565.
    Felton v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6587.
    Tosch v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6598.
    Langford v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6631.
    Thibodeaux v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6633.
    Towles v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6788.
    Mack v. Chicago Allied Warehouses, Inc., et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6797.
    Baker v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6798.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6802.
    Linder v. Linder.
   Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6803.
    Fahey v. James E. Beckley & Associates.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6805.
    Simpson v. Bowers et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6806.
    Fransaw v. Lynaugh, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6807.
    Groff v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6815.
    Moore v. Blackburn, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6829.
    Hairston v. Tingen et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6830.
    Campbell v. Montana.
   Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6831.
    Burks v. Holiday Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6852.
    Villanueva v. Lynaugh, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6861.
    Akudigwe v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6869.
    DiGregorio v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6870.
    Gordon v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6874.
    Halbleib v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6877.
    London v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6888.
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6892.
    Vanover v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6916.
    Maker v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6917.
    Scutari v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1115.
    Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. v. Texaco Inc.
   Sup. Ct. La. Motions of Louisiana Landowners Association, Inc., and National Association of Royalty Owners, Inc., for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1572.
    Kemp, Warden v. Brooks.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1765.
    Fairman, Warden v. Espinoza.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1575.
    Department of Banking and Consumer Finance of the State of Mississippi v. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency of the United States, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 86-1599.
    No. 86-1754.
    No. 86-6436.
    No. 86-6491.
    No. 86-6654.
    No. 86-6823.
    No. 86-6944.
    No. 86-6984.
    Sanchez v. Illinois. Evans v. Bair, Warden. DeHart v. Pennsylvania. Jackson v. Florida. Guest v. Illinois. Jackson v. Alabama. Bannister v. Missouri. Ritter v. Smith, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill.; Cir. Ct. Alexandria, Va.; Sup. Ct. Pa.; Sup. Ct. Fla.; Sup. Ct. Ill.; Ct. Crim. App. Ala.; Ct. App. Mo., Southern Dist.; and C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 86-1638.
    Lee Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. Sible.
   Sup. Ct. Mont. Motion of American Newspaper Publishers Association et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1686.
    Ford Motor Co. v. Andersen et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of Chamber of Commerce of the United States for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and this petition.


text:
    No. 86-1761.
    Pratt et al. v. Shoemate, Superintendent of the Osage Indian Agency, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of petitioners to strike brief of federal respondents denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1964 (A-896).
    Wallace v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice O’Connor, and by her referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant the application for stay of execution and the petition for writ of certiorari and would vacate the death sentence in this case.


text:
    No. 86-6821.
    Jroe v. Carhart et al.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-2169.
    No. 86-1510.
    No. 86-1597.
    No. 86-5026.
    No. 86-5292.
    Saint Francis College et al. v. Al-Khazraji, aka Allan, Tyrakowski v. Tyrakowski, Chetister v. Douglas, Justice, Supreme Court of Ohio, et al., Wingo v. Blackburn, Warden, Loyd v. Louisiana, Watson v. Blackburn, Warden, Brogdon v. Blackburn, Warden, Glass v. Blackburn, Warden, Welcome v. Blackburn, Warden, Berry v. Phelps, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Corrections, et al., Rault v. Blackburn, Warden, Moore v. Blackburn, Warden, Pierre, aka Selby v. Shulsen, Warden, et al., Ross v. Zimmerman, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution and Diagnostic and Classification Center at Graterford, et al., Stickles v. Veterans Administration, Lopez v. United States, Ramirez v. Illinois, Dobbs v. Kemp, Warden, Carpenter v. Heeter, Judge, Municipal Court of Lima, Ohio, et al., Lovingood v. United States,
   481 U. S. 604; 481 U. S. 1044; 481 U. S. 1069; 481 U. S. 1042; 481 U. S. 1042; 481 U. S. 1042; 481 U. S. 1042; 481 U. S. 1042; 481 U. S. 1042; 481 U. S. 1042; 481 U. S. 1042; 481 U. S. 1042; 481 U. S. 1033; 481 U. S. 1052; 481 U. S. 1053; 481 U. S. 1030; 481 U. S. 1053; 481 U. S. 1059; 481 U. S. 1040; and 481 U. S. 1057. Petitions for rehearing denied.

No. 86-5379.

No. 86-5426.

No. 86-5436.

No. 86-5544.

No. 86-5800.

No. 86-6043.

No. 86-6188.

No. 86-6303.

No. 86-6322.

No. 86-6364.

No. 86-6397.

No. 86-6473.

No. 86-6603.

No. 86-6609.

No. 86-6686.


text:
    No. 85-5402.
    Grady v. Missouri,
   474 U. S. 951. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 86-1366.
    Duquesne Light Co. et al. v. State Tax Department of West Virginia et al.,
   481 U. S. 1044. Petition for rehearing denied.

Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 86-5769 (A-871).
    Thompson v. Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections,
   481 U. S. 1042. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, addressed to Justice Stevens and referred to the Court, denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant the application. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    June 23, 1987
    No. A-936 (86-1970).
    Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Pittman, Attorney General, et al.
   Application for stay of the Order Granting Mandatory Temporary Restraining Order and Setting Aside Chancery Court Order of June 18, 1987, issued by the Supreme Court of Mississippi on June 19, 1987, presented to Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, is hereby granted pending further order of the Court.


text:
    No. A-944.
    Johnson v. Lynaugh, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant the application for stay of execution in order to give the applicant time to file a petition for writ of certiorari and would grant the petition and vacate the death sentence in this case.


text:
    June 26, 1987
    No. 86-1722.
    Heublein, Inc. v. Georgia et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ga. dismissed for want of properly presented federal question.

Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 86-1787.
    L. L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 1st Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1948.
    Anderson v. Oregon State Bar et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1828.
    Albertos et al. v. State Tax Commission of Missouri et al.
   Appeal from Sup.- Ct. Mo. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 86-358.
    American Trucking Assns., Inc., et al. v. Gray, Director, Arkansas Highway and Transportation Department, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ark. Motion of Yellow Freight System et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, ante, p. 266.


text:
    No. 86-415.
    No. 86-744.
    Reivitz, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services v. Lesko et al.; and Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Lesko et al.
   Appeals from D. C. E. D. Wis. Motion of appellees for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Judgment vacated and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Bowen v. Gilliard, ante, p. 587.


text:
    No. 86-1140. No. 86-1161.
    Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Baldwin et al.; and Ledbetter, Commissioner, Georgia Department of Human Resources v. Baldwin.
   Appeals from D. C. N. D. Ga. Judgment vacated and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Bowen v. Gilliard, ante, p. 587.


text:
    No. 86-364.
    Blair, Secretary of Health of South Dakota, et al. v. Freeman et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Anderson v. Creighton, ante, p. 635, and New York v. Burger, 482 U. S. 691 (1987).


text:
    No. 86-632.
    McMahan et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of McNally v. United States, ante, p. 350.


text:
    No. 86-700.
    Vodila v. Clelland et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U. S. 656 (1987), and Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U. S. 604 (1987).


text:
    No. 86-905.
    Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Black Grievance Committee et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, ante, p. 711.


text:
    No. 86-1490.
    McWherter, Governor of Tennessee, et al. v. Brooks.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, ante, p. 711.

Justice Blackmun dissents and would deny certiorari.


text:
    No. 86-1628.
    Tellis v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., ante, at 156.


text:
    No. ---.
    No. ---.
    Great American First Savings Bank v. United States; and Rogers v. Platt et al.
   Motions to direct the Clerk to file the petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.


text:
    No. A-2.
    Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections v. Agan.
   Application of the Attorney General of Florida for an order to vacate the stay of execution of sentence of death entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, presented to Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-580.
    In re Disbarment of Sisk.
   Mary Neal Sisk, of New York, N. Y., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that her name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on October 20, 1986 [479 U. S. 912], is hereby discharged.


text:
    No. D-581.
    In re Disbarment of Hybsha.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 479 U. S. 926.]


text:
    No. D-589.
    In re Disbarment of Benedict.
   Mark J. Benedict, of Austin, Tex., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on November 17, 1986 [479 U. S. 958], is hereby discharged.


text:
    No. D-611.
    In re Disbarment of Brickle,
   480 U. S. 902. Motion for reconsideration of order of disbarment denied.


text:
    No. D-621.
    In re Disbarment of Folan.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 480 U. S. 943.]


text:
    No. D-628.
    In re Disbarment of Brumfield.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 481 U. S. 1010.]


text:
    No. D-632.
    In re Disbarment of Whitted.
   Earl Whitted, Jr., of Goldsboro, N. C., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on May 4, 1987 [481 U. S. 1035], is hereby discharged.


text:
    No. D-637.
    In re Disbarment of Hoagland.
   Robert D. Hoagland, of Charlotte, N. C., having requested to. resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on June 1, 1987 [482 U. S. 903], is hereby discharged.


text:
    No. D-640.
    In re Disbarment of Oxfeld.
   Emil Oxfeld, of South Orange, N. J., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on June 1, 1987 [482 U. S. 903], is hereby discharged.


text:
    No. D-644.
    In re Disbarment of Jafree.
   It is ordered that Syed M. J. Igbal Jafree, of San Diego, Cal, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-645.
    In re Disbarment of Freudenberg.
   It is ordered that Robert Edwin Freudenberg, of San Luis Obispo, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-646.
    In re Disbarment of Madsen.
   It is ordered that Harry A. Madsen, of Park Ridge, Ill., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 85-1551.
    Karcher, Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly, et al. v. May et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 479 U. S. 1062.] Motion of Ronald Sokalski et al. for leave to intervene as appellants denied. Alternative request for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 86-228.
    Kungys v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 479 U. S. 947.] Case restored to calendar for reargument. The parties are directed to file supplemental briefs addressing the following questions:

“(1). Whether petitioner is subject to denaturalization for want of good moral character under 8 U. S. C. §§ 1451(a), 1427(a), and 1101(f)(6), with particular attention to:
“(a) whether the ‘false testimony’ provision of 8 U. S. C. § 1101(f)(6) should be interpreted to include a requirement that the false testimony concern a material fact;
“(b) what standards should govern the determination under 8 U. S. C. § 1101(f)(6) whether ‘false testimony’ has been given ‘for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under this chapter ....’; and
“(c) whether the latter determination is one of law or fact.
“(2)(a) Should the materiality standard articulated in Chaunt v. United, States, 364 U. S. 350 (1960), be abandoned and, if so, what standard should govern the materiality inquiry under 8 U. S. C. § 1451(a); and
“(b) is the determination of materiality under 8 U. S. C. § 1451(a) one of law or fact.
“(3) When a misrepresentation has been established as ‘material’ within the meaning of 8 U. S. C. § 1451(a), must any further showing be made to establish that citizenship was ‘procured by’ that misrepresentation.”

The parties also may address the questions presented in the petition for certiorari. The parties are directed to file opening briefs on or before August 3, 1987. Closing briefs are to be filed on or before August 24, 1987.


text:
    No. 86-327.
    Mullins Coal Co., Inc. of Virginia, et al. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 479 U. S. 1029.] Motion of respondent Luke R. Ray for divided argument denied. Motion of respondent Gerald Stapleton for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted. Motion of respondent Gerald Stapleton for leave to file a brief on the merits out of time granted.


text:
    No. 86-810.
    No. 86-811.
    Mosley v. Bartman et al., Mosley v. Noel et al.,
   479 U. S. 1054; and 479 U. S. 1054. Motions of petitioner to direct the Clerk to file petitions for rehearing out of time denied.


text:
    No. 86-1278.
    Hustler Magazine, Inc., et al. v. Falwell.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 480 U. S. 945.] Motions for leave to file briefs as amici curiae filed by the following are granted: Law and Humanities Institute, Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, Inc., Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al., American Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al., Richmond Newspapers, Inc., et al., American Editorial Cartoonists et al., Association of American Publishers, Inc., and Home Box Office, Inc.


text:
    No. 86-1552.
    Department of the Navy v. Egan.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 481 U. S. 1068.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 86-1672.
    Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bollinger et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 482 U. S. 913.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 86-1786.
    United Metal Products Corp. v. National Bank of Detroit.
   C. A. 6th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 86-6757.
    Coy v. Iowa.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Iowa. Motion of appellant for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 86-684.
    California v. Greenwood et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Motions of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 85-1437.
    Wilkins v. Sayres et al.; and Wilkins v. Rousch et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-1519.
    Hooper et al. v. Donta.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-1691.
    Bernstein v. Pennsylvania et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-1892.
    No. 85-1901.
    No. 85-1902.
    No. 85-1949.
    Paone v. United States; Russotti v. United States; Piccarreto v. United States; and Marino et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d

Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-11.
    Frantz et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-69.
    American Trucking Assns., Inc., et al. v. Conway, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, et al. (two cases); and Conway, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, et al. v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., et al. (two cases).
    No. 86-276.
   Sup. Ct. Vt. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-443.
    Board of Regents of the University of Maryland et al. v. Stanley et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-570.
    County of Fresno et al. v. Superior Court of the County of Fresno (Motsenbocker, Real Party in Interest).
   Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-815.
    Duffy, Sheriff, County of San Diego, California v. Ward.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-934.
    Puskaric v. United States; and Jenkins v. United States.
   Ct. Mil. App. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-953.
    Abell v. United States.
   Ct. Mil. App. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1121.
    County of Monroe et al. v. Weber et vir.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1141.
    Vakalis v. Kagan et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1144.
    City of Montgomery et al. v. Eiland.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1432.
    Gobla v. Crestwood School District et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1508.
    Hankins v. California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1542.
    Olson et al. v. Exkano et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1600.
    Botero v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1601.
    Azurin et al. v. Von Raab, Commissioner of Customs of the United States Customs Service.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1603.
    Singh v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1713.
    Caporale et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1756.
    Harry R. Carlile Trust (Arthurs, Trustee) v. Cotton Petroleum Corp. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1762.
    Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1766.
    Caudill v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1771.
    Roe, a Minor, by her Next Friend and Natural Guardian, Roe v. Pennsylvania et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1774.
    Ramirez v. Nevada.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1776.
    Gagne, Administrator of the Estate of Gagne, et al. v. Putnal.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1778.
    Nassau County Republican Committee et al. v. Cullen et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1779.
    Dunkle, Clerk, Circuit Court, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, et al. v. Camden I Condominium Assn., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1780.
    Angi, fka Nerat v. Swacker et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1789.
    Chongris et al. v. Board of Appeals of the Town of Andover, Massachusetts, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1795.
    Kondrat v. Byron et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1798.
    Atchison v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1799.
    International Sound Technicians, Cinetechnicians & Television Engineers of the Motion Picture & Television Industries, Local 695, et al. v. Motion Picture & Videotape Editors Guild et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1801.
    Huntzinger v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1808.
    Costigan v. Pennsylvania.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1811.
    Anest et al. v. Lake County, Illinois, et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1814.
    Pinner v. Schmidt et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1832.
    Tata v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1848.
    Shelton et ux., dba University Village Music Center v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1859.
    Proctor Hopson Post Memorial Assn., Inc. v. City of New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1881.
    Barcelona v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1886.
    Cooper Stevedoring Co., Inc., et al. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1897.
    Finn v. Finn.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1907.
    Paul v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1916.
    Flahive v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-1928.
    Mims, Individually and dba The Edgefield Advertiser v. Edgefield County Communications, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6183.
    Vitatoe v. Jones, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6221.
    Jones v. First American Title Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6331.
    Kelly v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6445.
    Kimberlin v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6523.
    Hamilton v. Nix, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6672.
    Gregory v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6759.
    Jones v. Howard et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6763.
    Patton v. Pennsylvania et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6826.
    Freeman v. Hartigan, Attorney General of Illinois.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6836.
    Wallace et al. v. Phelps, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6840.
    Brasier v. Douglas, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6842.
    Flowers v. Morris, Superintendent, Southern Ohio Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6843.
    Jerry-El v. Petsock, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution and Diagnostic and Classification Center at Pittsburgh.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6850.
    Currington v. Duncan et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6851.
    Allen v. Ashcroft, Governor of Missouri, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6853.
    Ruebke v. Kansas.
   Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6856.
    Marshall, aka Mustafa v. Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6857.
    Knight v. Lynaugh, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6860.
    Yuhas v. Stroud.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6866.
    Dennis v. Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6868.
    Elliott v. Stagner, Superintendent, Correctional Training Facility, Soledad, California, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6871.
    Kehoe v. Petsock, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution and Diagnostic and Classification Center at Pittsburgh, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6872.
    Foreman v. National Treasury Employees Union et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6873.
    Carroll v. White, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6876.
    Harrison v. Lynaugh, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6882.
    Vesay v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6883.
    Martin v. Seiter.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6885.
    Schmidt v. Schmidt et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6893.
    Swink v. City of Pagedale et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6898.
    Spann v. LeFevre, Superintendent, Clinton Correctional Facility, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6918.
    Shibuya v. Court of Appeals of New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6926.
    Hepperle v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6927.
    Aaron v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6928.
    Timmons v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6939.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6940.
    Coghlan v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6943.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6945.
    Cordoba v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6961.
    Conklin v. Tard et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6962.
    Buitrago v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6972.
    Collins v. Brown, Director, Michigan Department of Corrections.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86-6980.
    Jackson v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.