author: Justice Marshall Justice Blackmun, Justice O’Connor,

text:
    BROWN et al. v. SOCIALIST WORKERS ’74 CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE (OHIO) et al.
    No. 81-776.
    Argued October 4, 1982
    Decided December 8, 1982
    MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, and Powell, JJ., joined, and in Parts I, III, and IV of which Blackmun, J., joined. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 102. O’Con-nor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Rehnquist and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 107.

      Gary Elson Brown, Assistant Attorney General of Ohio, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were William J. Brown, Attorney General, Thomas F. Staub, Assistant Attorney General, and James R. Rishel.

      Thomas D. Buckley, Jr., argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Gordon J. Beggs, Ben Sheerer, and Bruce Campbell.

   Justice Marshall

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether certain disclosure requirements of the Ohio Campaign Expense Reporting Law, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3517.01 et seq. (1972 and Supp. 1981), can be constitutionally applied to the Socialist Workers Party, a minor political party which historically has been the object of harassment by government officials and private parties. The Ohio statute requires every political party to report the names and addresses of campaign contributors and recipients of campaign disbursements. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), this Court held that the First Amendment prohibits the government from compelling disclosures by a minor political party that can show a “reasonable probability” that the compelled disclosures will subject those identified to “threats, harassment, or reprisals.” Id., at 74. Employing this test, a three-judge District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that the Ohio statute is unconstitutional as applied to the Socialist Workers Party. We affirm.

M

The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) is a small political party with approximately 60 members in the State of Ohio. The Party states in its constitution that its aim is “the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of a workers’ government to achieve socialism.” As the District Court found, the SWP does not advocate the use of violence. It seeks instead to achieve social change through the political process, and its members regularly run for public office. The SWP’s candidates have had little success at the polls. In 1980, for example, the Ohio SWP’s candidate for the United States Senate received fewer than 77,000 votes, less than 1.9% of the total vote. Campaign contributions and expenditures in Ohio have averaged about $15,000 annually since 1974.

In 1974 appellees instituted a class action in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio challenging the constitutionality of the disclosure provisions of the Ohio Campaign Expense Reporting Law. The Ohio statute requires every candidate for political office to file a statement identifying each contributor and each recipient of a disbursement of campaign funds. §3517.10. The “object or purpose” of each disbursement must also be disclosed. The lists of names and addresses of contributors and recipients are open to public inspection for at least six years. Violations of the disclosure requirements are punishable by fines of up to $1,000 for each day of violation. §3517.99.

On November 6, 1974, the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio entered a temporary restraining order barring the enforcement of the disclosure requirements against the class pending a determination of the merits. The case was then transferred to the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, which entered an identical temporary restraining order in February 1975. Accordingly, since 1974 appellees have not disclosed the names of contributors and recipients but have otherwise complied with the statute. A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2281. Following extensive discovery, the trial was held in February 1981. After reviewing the “substantial evidence of both governmental and private hostility toward and harassment of SWP members and supporters,” the three-judge court concluded that under Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), the Ohio disclosure requirements are unconstitutional as applied to appellees. We noted probable jurisdiction. 454 U. S. 1122 (1981).

r-H HH

The Constitution protects against the compelled disclosure of political associations and beliefs. Such disclosures “can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 64, citing Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U. S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958). “Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.” NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 462. The right to privacy in one’s political associations and beliefs will yield only to a “‘subordinating interest of the State [that is] compelling,’” NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 463 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 265 (1957) (opinion concurring in result)), and then only if there is a “substantial relation between the information sought and [an] overriding and compelling state interest.” Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., supra, at 546.

In Buckley v. Valeo this Court upheld against a First Amendment challenge the reporting and disclosure requirements imposed on political parties by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. 2 U. S. C. §431 et seq. 424 U. S., at 60-74. The Court found three government interests sufficient in general to justify requiring disclosure of information concerning campaign contributions and expenditures: enhancement of voters’ knowledge about a candidate’s possible allegiances and interests, deterrence of corruption, and the enforcement of contribution limitations. The Court stressed, however, that in certain circumstances the balance of interests requires exempting minor political parties from compelled disclosures. The government’s interests in compelling disclosures are “diminished” in the case of minor parties. Id., at 70. Minor party candidates “usually represent definite and publicized viewpoints” well known to the public, and the improbability of their winning reduces the dangers of corruption and vote-buying. Ibid. At the same time, the potential for impairing First Amendment interests is substantially greater:

“We are not unmindful that the damage done by disclosure to the associational interests of the minor parties and their members and to supporters of independents could be significant. These movements are less likely to have a sound financial base and thus are more vulnerable to falloffs in contributions. In some instances fears of reprisal may deter contributions to the point where the movement cannot survive. The public interest also suffers if that result comes to pass, for there is a consequent reduction in the free circulation of ideas both within and without the political arena.” Id., at 71 (footnotes omitted).

We concluded that in some circumstances the diminished government interests furthered by compelling disclosures by minor parties does not justify the greater threat to First Amendment values.

Buckley v. Valeo set forth the following test for determining when the First Amendment requires exempting minor parties from compelled disclosures:

“The evidence offered need show only a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party’s contributors’ names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties.” Id., at 74.

The Court acknowledged that “unduly strict requirements of proof could impose a heavy burden” on minor parties. Ibid. Accordingly, the Court emphasized that “[m]inor parties must be allowed sufficient flexibility in the proof of injury.” Ibid.

“The proof may include, for example, specific evidence of past or present harassment of members due to their associational ties, or of harassment directed against the organization itself. A pattern of threats or specific manifestations of public hostility may be sufficient. New parties that have no history upon which to draw may be able to offer evidence of reprisals and threats directed against individuals or organizations holding similar views.” Ibid.

Appellants concede that the Buckley test for exempting minor parties governs the disclosure of the names of contributors, but they contend that the test has no application to the compelled disclosure of names of recipients of campaign disbursements. Appellants assert that the State has a substantial interest in preventing the misuse of campaign funds. They also argue that the disclosure of the names of recipients of campaign funds will have no significant impact on First Amendment rights, because, unlike a contribution, the mere receipt of money for commercial services does not affirmatively express political support.

We reject appellants’ unduly narrow view of the minor-party exemption recognized in Buckley. Appellants’ attempt to limit the exemption to laws requiring disclosure of contributors is inconsistent with the rationale for the exemption stated in Buckley. The Court concluded that the government interests supporting disclosure are weaker in the case of minor parties, while the threat to First Amendment values is greater. Both of these considerations apply not only to the disclosure of campaign contributors but also to the disclosure of recipients of campaign disbursements.

Although appellants contend that requiring disclosure of recipients of disbursements is necessary to prevent corruption, this Court recognized in Buckley that this concededly legitimate government interest has less force in the context of minor parties. The federal law considered in Buckley, like the Ohio law at issue here, required campaign committees to identify both campaign contributors and recipients of campaign disbursements. 2 U. S. C. §§ 432(c) and (d), and 434(a) and (b). We stated that “by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity,” disclosure requirements “ten[d] to ‘prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections.’” Id., at 67 (emphasis added), quoting Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S. 534, 548 (1934). We concluded, however, that because minor party candidates are unlikely to win elections, the government’s general interest in “deterring the ‘buying’ of elections” is “reduced” in the case of minor parties. 424 U. S., at 70.

Moreover, appellants seriously understate the threat to First Amendment rights that would result from requiring minor parties to disclose the recipients of campaign disbursements. Expenditures by a political party often consist of reimbursements, advances, or wages paid to party members, campaign workers, and supporters, whose activities lie at the very core of the First Amendment. Disbursements may also go to persons who choose to express their support for an unpopular cause by providing services rendered scarce by public hostility and suspicion. Should their involvement be publicized, these persons would be as vulnerable to threats, harassment, and reprisals as are contributors whose connection with the party is solely financial. Even individuals who receive disbursements for “merely” commercial transactions may be deterred by the public enmity attending publicity, and those seeking to harass may disrupt commercial activities on the basis of expenditure information. Because an individual who enters into a transaction with a minor party purely for commercial reasons lacks any ideological commitment to the party, such an individual may well be deterred from providing services by even a small risk of harassment. Compelled disclosure of the names of such recipients of expenditures could therefore cripple a minor party’s ability to operate effectively and thereby reduce “the free circulation of ideas both within and without the political arena.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 71 (footnotes omitted). See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S., at 250-251 (plurality opinion) (“Any interference with the freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents”).

We hold, therefore, that the test announced in Buckley for safeguarding the First Amendment interests of minor parties and their members and supporters applies not only to the compelled disclosure of campaign contributors but also to the compelled disclosure of recipients of campaign disbursements.

Ill

The District Court properly applied the Buckley test to the facts of this case. The District Court found “substantial evidence of both governmental and private hostility toward and harassment of SWP members and supporters.” Appellees introduced proof of specific incidents of private and government hostility toward the SWP and its members within the four years preceding the trial. These incidents, many of which occurred in Ohio and neighboring States, included threatening phone calls and hate mail, the burning of SWP literature, the destruction of SWP members’ property, police harassment of a party candidate, and the firing of shots at an SWP office. There was also evidence that in the 12-month period before trial 22 SWP members, including 4 in Ohio, were fired because of their party membership. Although appellants contend that two of the Ohio firings were not politically motivated, the evidence amply supports the District Court’s conclusion that “private hostility and harassment toward SWP members make it difficult for them to maintain employment.”

The District Court also found a past history of Government harassment of the SWP. FBI surveillance of the SWP was “massive” and continued until at least 1976. The FBI also conducted a counterintelligence program against the SWP and the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), the SWP’s youth organization. One of the aims of the “SWP Disruption Program” was the dissemination of information designed to impair the ability of the SWP and YSA to function. This program included “disclosing to the press the criminal records of SWP candidates, and sending anonymous letters to SWP members, supporters, spouses, and employers.” Until at least 1976, the FBI employed various covert techniques to obtain information about the SWP, including information concerning the sources of its funds and the nature of its expenditures. The District Court specifically found that the FBI had conducted surveillance of the Ohio SWP and had interfered with its activities within the State. Government surveillance was not limited to the FBI. The United States Civil Service Commission also gathered information on the SWP, the YSA, and their supporters, and the FBI routinely distributed its reports to Army, Navy and Air Force Intelligence, the United States Secret Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

The District Court properly concluded that the evidence of private and Government hostility toward the SWP and its members establishes a reasonable probability that disclosing the names of contributors and recipients will subject them to threats, harassment, and reprisals. There were numerous instances of recent harassment of the SWP both in Ohio and in other States. There was also considerable evidence of past Government harassment. Appellants challenge the relevance of this evidence of Government harassment in light of recent efforts to curb official misconduct. Notwithstanding these efforts, the evidence suggests that hostility toward the SWP is ingrained and likely to continue. All this evidence was properly relied on by the District Court. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 74.

IV

The First Amendment prohibits a State from compelling disclosures by a minor party that will subject those persons identified to the reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals. Such disclosures would infringe the First Amendment rights of the party and its members and supporters. In light of the substantial evidence of past and present hostility from private persons and Government officials against the SWP, Ohio’s campaign disclosure requirements cannot be constitutionally applied to the Ohio SWP.

The judgment of the three-judge District Court for the Southern District of Ohio is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Blackmun,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join Parts I, III, and IV of the Court’s opinion and agree with much of what is said in Part II. But I cannot agree, with the Court or with the partial dissent, that we should reach the issue whether a standard of proof different from that applied to disclosure of campaign contributions should be applied to disclosure of campaign disbursements. See ante, at 94, n. 9; post, at 112-113, n. 7. Appellants did not suggest in the District Court that different standards might apply. Nor was the issue raised in appellants’ jurisdictional statement or in their brief on the merits in this Court. Consequently, I would merely assume for purposes of our present decision — as appellants apparently have assumed throughout this litigation and as the District Court clearly assumed — that the flexible proof rule of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), applies equally to forced disclosure of contributions and to forced disclosure of expenditures. I would leave for another day, when the issue is squarely presented, considered by the courts below, and adequately briefed here, the significant question that now divides the Court.

This Court’s Rule 15.1(a) states: “Only the questions set forth in the jurisdictional statement or fairly included therein will be considered by the Court.” Appellants’ jurisdictional statement presented a single question:

“Whether, under the standards set forth by this Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), the provisions of Sections 3517.10 and 3517.11 of the Ohio Revised Code, which require that the campaign committee of a candidate for public office file a report disclosing the full names and addresses of persons making contributions to or receiving expenditures from such committee, are consistent with the right of privacy of association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States when applied to the committees of candidates of a minority party which can establish only isolated instances of harassment directed toward the organization or its members within Ohio during recent years.” Juris. Statement i.

The question assumes the applicability of Buckley to the entire case, and asks this Court to decide only whether the evidence presented to and facts found by the District Court were sufficient to support that court’s conclusion that the Buckley test was satisfied.

Absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court does not decide issues beyond those it has agreed to review. Mayor v. Educational Equality League, 415 U. S. 605, 623 (1974); United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 339, n. 4 (1971); General Talking Pictures Co. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U. S. 175, 178-179 (1938). According to the Court, however, the issue whether the flexible standard of proof established in Buckley applies to recipients of expenditures is ‘“fairly included’ in the question presented.” Ante, at 94, n. 9. But appellants’ failure to present the issue was not a mere oversight in phrasing that question. That appellants did not invoke this Court’s jurisdiction to review specifically the proper standard for disclosure of campaign expenditures is also apparent from appellants’ arguments in their jurisdictional statement and their brief on the merits. In their jurisdictional statement, under the heading “The Question is Substantial,” appellants stated:

“The standards governing the resolution of actions involving challenges to reporting requirements by minority parties were set forth by this Court in the case of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976). In Buckley the Court held that in order to receive relief from reporting requirements such as those at issue in this action a minority party must establish ‘. . . a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party’s contributors’ names will subject them to threats, harassment or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties.’ 424 U. S. at 74.” Juris. Statement 10.

Appellants went on to state that the flexible standard of proof of injury established in Buckley applied to “disclosure requirements.” Juris. Statement 12-18. Similar assertions are found in appellants’ brief on the merits. See Brief for Appellants 12 (“Summary of Argument”); id., at 18 (“While refusing to grant minority parties a blanket exemption from financial disclosure requirements, the Court in Buckley established a standard under which they may obtain relief. . .”).

Thus, appellants’ exclusive theme in the initial presentation of their case here was that the District Court erred in finding that the Buckley standard was satisfied. They did not suggest that the standard was inapplicable, or applied differently, to campaign expenditure requirements. It was not until their reply brief, submitted eight years after this suit was instituted and at a time when appellees had no opportunity to respond in writing, that appellants sought to inject this new issue into the case. See Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 129 (1954) (plurality opinion of Jackson, J.). In my view, it simply cannot be said that it was “fairly included” in the jurisdictional statement.

Moreover, “[wjhere issues are neither raised before nor considered [by the court below], this Court will not ordinarily consider them.” Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 147, n. 2 (1970); Lawn v. United States, 355 U. S. 339, 362-363, n. 16 (1958). The District Court did not address the question whether some standard other than that developed in Buckley should apply to disclosure of campaign expenditures. The reason for this was that appellants conceded in the District Court, as they concede here, that the “flexibility in the proof of injury” applicable to disclosure of contributors governed the entire case. In their post-trial memorandum, for example, appellants did not even hint that a different standard should govern disclosure of the identities of recipients of expenditures. Instead, they quoted the Buckley test and granted that “evidence of past harassment may be presented by plaintiffs in cases such as the instant one.” Defendants’ Post-Trial Memorandum 4-5.

This case presents no extraordinary circumstances justifying deviation from this Court’s Rule 15.1(a) and its long-established practice respecting issues not presented below. We have deviated from the Rule when jurisdictional issues have been omitted by the parties and lower courts, see, e. g., United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192, 197 (1956), or when the Court has noticed “plain error” not assigned, see Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S. 395, 412 (1947). Obviously, the issue that divides the Court from the partial dissent is not jurisdictional. Nor, as the Court’s opinion persuasively demonstrates, is application of the Buckley test to disclosure of campaign disbursements “plain error.” Indeed, I consider it quite possible that, after full consideration, the Court would adopt the Buckley standard in this context for the reasons stated by the Court. I also consider it quite possible that, after full consideration, the Court might wish to revise the Buckley standard as applied to campaign disbursements — perhaps to take account of the different types of expenditures covered and their differing impacts on associational rights, or perhaps along the lines suggested in the partial dissent. But this significant constitutional decision should not be made until the question is properly presented so that the record includes data and arguments adequate to inform the Court’s judgment.

The Court’s apparent reliance on Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 560, n. 6 (1978), does not provide a rationale for deciding this issue at this time. The petitioner there had included in his petition for certiorari all the questions we eventually decided. Notwithstanding the fact that the Court limited its grant of the petition to a single question, the parties fully briefed the questions on which review had been denied. Deciding those questions, therefore, was neither unwise nor unfair. In this case, in contrast, appellants affirmatively excluded the point at issue in their jurisdictional statement and in their brief on the merits. By failing to raise it until their reply brief, appellants prevented appellees from responding to the argument in writing. There can be no question that, as the Court observes, ‘“our power to decide is not limited by the precise terms of the question presented.’” Ante, at 94, n. 9 (quoting Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S., at 560, n. 6) (emphasis supplied). But Rule 15.1(a) is designed, as a prudential matter, to prevent the possibility that such tactics will result in ill-considered decisions. It is cases like this one that show the wisdom of the Rule.

Thus, for purposes of this case, I would assume, as appellants’ jurisdictional statement and brief on the merits assume, that the Buckley standard applies to campaign expenditures just as it applies to contributions. Appellees presented “specific evidence of past or present harassment of members due to their associational ties, or of harassment directed against the organization itself,” sufficient under the rule in Buckley to establish a “reasonable probability” that the Ohio law would trigger “threats, harassment, or reprisals” against contributors. 424 U. S., at 74. On this basis, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court in its entirety.

Justice O’Connor,

with whom Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens join,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in the judgment that the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) has sufficiently demonstrated a reasonable probability that disclosure of contributors will subject those persons to threats, harassment, or reprisals, and thus under Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), the State of Ohio cannot constitutionally compel the disclosure. Further, I agree that the broad concerns of Buckley apply to the required disclosure of recipients of campaign expenditures. But, as I view the record presented here, the SWP has failed to carry its burden of showing that there is a reasonable probability that disclosure of recipients of expenditures will subject the recipients themselves or the SWP to threats, harassment, or reprisals. Moreover, the strong public interest in fair and honest elections outweighs any damage done to the associational rights of the party and its members by application of the State’s expenditure disclosure law.

I

Buckley upheld the validity of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, which requires the disclosure of names of both contributors to a campaign and recipients of expenditures from the campaign. Buckley recognized three major governmental interests in disclosure requirements: deterrence of corruption; enhancement of voters’ knowledge about a candidate’s possible allegiances and interests; and provision of the data and means necessary to detect violations of any statutory limitations on contributions or expenditures. The precise challenge that the Buckley Court faced, however, was the overbreadth of the Act’s requirements “insofar as they apply to contributions to minor parties and independent candidates.” Id., at 68-69 (emphasis added). Since the appellants in Buckley did not challenge the application to minor parties of requirements of disclosure of expenditures, the Court had no occasion to consider directly the First Amendment interests of a minor political party in preventing disclosure of expenditures, much less to weigh them against the governmental interests in disclosure. The test adopted by Buckley, quoted by the majority, ante, at 93, reflects this limitation, for it contemplates only assessing possible harassment of contributors, without a word about considering the harassment of recipients of expenditures if their names are disclosed or any effects this harassment may have on the party.

This is not to say that Buckley provides no guidance for resolving this claim. I agree with the majority that appellants have overstated their argument in declaring that Buckley has no application to the disclosure of recipients of expenditures. Certainly, Buckley enunciates the general governmental interest in regulating minor parties, who, although unlikely to win, can often affect the outcome of an election. 424 U. S., at 70. Buckley also emphasizes the sensitive associational rights of minor parties.

Nevertheless, there are important differences between disclosure of contributors and disclosure of recipients of campaign expenditures — differences that the Buckley Court had no occasion to address, but that compel me to conclude that the balance should not necessarily be calibrated identically. First, unlike the government’s interest in disclosure of contributions, its interest in disclosure of expenditures does not decrease significantly for small parties. The Court in Buckley recognized that knowing the identity of contributors would not significantly increase the voters’ ability to determine the political ideology of the minor-party candidate, for the stance of the minor-party candidate is usually well known. Ibid. Nor would identifying a minor party’s contributors further the interest in preventing the “buying” of a candidate, because of the improbability of the minor-party candidate’s winning the election. Ibid. Thus, these two major government interests in disclosure of contributions are significantly reduced for minor parties.

In sharp contrast, however, the governmental interest in disclosure of expenditures remains significant for minor parties. The purpose of requiring parties to disclose expenditures is to deter improper influencing of voters. Corruption of the electoral process can take many forms: the actual buying of votes; the use of “slush funds;” dirty tricks; and bribes of poll watchers and other election officials. Certainly, a “persuasive” campaign worker on election day can corral voters for his minor-party candidate with even a modest “slush fund.” Even though such improper practices are unlikely to be so successful as to attract enough votes to elect the minor-party candidate, a minor party, whose short-term goal is merely recognition, may be as tempted to resort to impermissible methods as are major parties, and the resulting deflection of votes can determine the outcome of the election of other candidates. The requirement of a full and verifiable report of expenditures is important in deterring such practices, for otherwise the party could hide the improper transactions through an accounting sleight of hand.

On the other side of the balance, disclosure of recipients of expenditures will have a lesser impact on a minority party’s First Amendment interests than will disclosure of contributors. As the majority states, ante, at 91, the First Amendment interest here is “[t]he right to privacy in one’s political associations and beliefs.” We have never drawn sharp distinctions between members and contributors, Buckley, 424 U. S., at 66. As we recognized in Buckley, the privacy rights of contributors are especially sensitive, since many seek to express their political views privately through their pocketbook rather than publicly through other means. Disclosure of contributors directly implicates the contributors’ associational rights.

The impact on privacy interests arising from disclosure of expenditures is of a quite different — and generally lesser— dimension. Many expenditures of the minority party will be for quite mundane purposes to persons not intimately connected with the organization. Payments for such things as office supplies, telephone service, bank charges, printing and photography costs would generally fall in this category. The likelihood that such business transactions would dry up if disclosed is remote at best. Unlike silent contributors, whom disclosure would reveal to the public as supporters of the party’s ideological positions, persons providing business services to a minor party are not generally perceived by the public as supporting the party’s ideology, and thus are unlikely to be harassed if their names are disclosed. Consequently, the party’s associational interests are unlikely to be affected by disclosure of recipients of such expenditures.

Other recipients of expenditures may have closer ideological ties to the party. The majority suggests that campaign workers receiving per diem, travel, or room expenses may fit in this category. Ante, at 97, n. 12. It is certainly conceivable that such persons may be harassed or threatened for their conduct. Laws requiring disclosure of recipients of expenditures, however, are not likely to contribute to this harassment. Once an individual has openly shown his close ties to the organization by campaigning for it, disclosure of receipt of expenditures is unlikely to increase the degree of harassment so significantly as to deter the individual from campaigning for the party. Further, in striking the balance, the governmental concerns are greatest precisely for the actions of campaign workers that might improperly influence voters. Thus, whatever marginal deterrence that may arise from disclosure of expenditures is outweighed by the heightened governmental interest.

In sum, the heightened governmental interest in disclosure of expenditures and the reduced marginal deterrent effect on associational interests demand a separately focused inquiry into whether there exists a reasonable probability that disclosure will subject recipients or the party itself to threats, harassment, or reprisals.

► — I HH

Turning to the evidence in this case, it is important to remember that, even though proof requirements must be flexible, Buckley, supra, at 74, the minor party carries the burden of production and persuasion to show that its First Amendment interests outweigh the governmental interests. Additionally, the application of the Buckley standard to the historical evidence is most properly characterized as a mixed question of law and fact, for which we normally assess the record independently to determine if it supports the conclusion of unconstitutionality as applied.

Here, there is no direct evidence of harassment of either contributors or recipients of expenditures. Rather, as the majority accurately represents it, the evidence concerns harassment and reprisals of visible party members, including violence at party headquarters and loss of jobs. I concur in the majority’s conclusion that this evidence, viewed in its entirety, supports the conclusion that there will be a reasonable probability of harassment of contributors if their names are disclosed. This evidence is sufficiently linked to disclosure of contributors in large part because any person publicly known to support the SWP’s unpopular ideological position may suffer the reprisals that this record shows active party members suffer, and the disclosure of contributors may lead the public to presume these people support the party’s ideology.

In contrast, the record, read in its entirety, does not suggest that disclosure of recipients of expenditures would lead to harassment of recipients or reprisals to the party or its members. Appellees gave no breakdown of the types of expenditures they thought would lead to harassment if disclosed. The record does contain the expenditure statements of the SWP, which itemize each expenditure with its purpose while usually omitting the name and address of the recipient. The majority of expenditures, both in number and dollar amount, are for business transactions such as office supplies, food, printing, photographs, telephone service, and books. There is virtually no evidence that disclosure of the recipients of these expenditures will impair the SWP’s ability to obtain needed services. Even if we assume that a portion of expenditures went to temporary campaign workers or others whom the public might identify as supporting the party’s ideology, these persons have already publicly demonstrated their support by their campaign work. There is simply no basis for inferring that such persons would thereafter be harassed or threatened or otherwise deterred from working for the party by virtue of inclusion of their names in later expenditure reports, or that if any such remote danger existed, it would outweigh the concededly important governmental interests in disclosure of recipients of expenditures.

It is plain that appellees did not carry their burden of production and persuasion insofar as they challenge the expenditure disclosure provisions. I would therefore uphold the constitutionality of those portions of the Ohio statute that require the SWP to disclose the recipients of expenditures.

       The plaintiff class as eventually certified includes all SWP candidates for political office in Ohio, their campaign committees and treasurers, and people who contribute to or receive disbursements from SWP campaign committees. The defendants are the Ohio Secretary of State and other state and local officials who administer the disclosure law.

       Section 3517.10 provides in relevant part:
      “(A) Every campaign committee, political committee, and political party which made or received a contribution or made an expenditure in connection with the nomination or election of any candidate at any election held in this state shall file, on a form prescribed under this section, a full, true, and itemized statement, made under penalty of election falsification, setting forth in detail the contributions and expenditures ....
      “(B) Each statement required by division (A) of this section shall contain the following information:
      “(4) A statement of contributions made or received, which shall include:
      “(a) The month, day, and year of the contribution;
      “(b) The full name and address of each person, including any chairman or treasurer thereof if other than an individual, from whom contributions are received. The requirement of filing the full address does not apply to any statement filed by a state or local committee of a political party, to a finance committee of such committee, or to a committee recognized by a state or local committee as its fund-raising auxiliary.
      “(c) A description of the contribution received, if other than money;
      “(d) The value in dollars and cents of the contribution;
      “(e) All contributions and expenditures shall be itemized separately regardless of the amount except a receipt of a contribution from a person in the sum of twenty-five dollars or less at one social or fund-raising activity. An account of the total contributions from each such social or fund-raising activity shall be listed separately, together with the expenses incurred and paid in connection with such activity. No continuing association which makes a contribution from funds which are derived solely from regular dues paid by members of the association shall be required to list the name or address of any members who paid such dues.
      “(5) A statement of expenditures which shall include:
      “(a) The month, day, and year of expenditure;
      “(b) The full name and address of each person to whom the expenditure was made, including any chairman or treasurer thereof if a committee, association, or group of persons;
      “(c) The object or purpose for which the expenditure was made;
      “(d) The amount of each expenditure.
      “(C) . . .
      “. . . All such statements shall be open to public inspection in the office where they are filed, and shall be carefully preserved for a period of at least six years.”
      If the candidate is running for a statewide office, the statement shall be filed with the Ohio Secretary of State; otherwise, the statement shall be filed with the appropriate county board of elections. § 3517.11(A).

       § 3517.10(B)(5)(c).

       The order restrained various state officials from “applying to or enforcing against plaintiffs ... the disclosure provisions of the Ohio Campaign Expense Reporting Law and the penalty provision of that law, the effect of which will be to postpone the beginning of any possible period of violation of that law by plaintiffs, . . . until such time as the case is decided by the three judge panel, which is hereby convened.” (Citations omitted.)

       Apparently none of the parties throughout the 6-year period questioned whether the extended duration of the temporary restraining order conformed to the requirements of Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

       Because it invalidated the Ohio statute as applied to the Ohio SWP, the District Court did not decide appellees’ claim that the statute was facially invalid. The Ohio statute requires disclosure of contributions and expenditures no matter how small the amount. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3517.10(B)(4)(e) (Supp. 1981). Appellees contended that the absence of a monetary threshold rendered the statute facially invalid since the compelled disclosure of nominal contributions and expenditures lacks a substantial nexus with any claimed government interest. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 82-84.
      The District Court’s opinion is unreported.

       Title 2 U. S. C. §§432, 434, and 438 (1976 ed., Supp. V) require each political committee to keep detailed records of both contributions and expenditures, including the names of campaign contributors and recipients of campaign disbursements, and to file reports with the Federal Election Commission which are made available to the public.

       The government interest in enforcing limitations is completely inapplicable in this case, since the Ohio law imposes no limitations on the amount of campaign contributions.

       We believe that the question whether the Buckley test applies to the compelled disclosure of recipients of expenditures is properly before us. Throughout this litigation Ohio has maintained that it can constitutionally require the SWP to disclose the names of both campaign contributors and recipients of campaign expenditures. In invalidating both aspects of the Ohio statute as applied to the SWP, the District Court necessarily held (1) that the Buckley standard, which permits flexible proof of the reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals, applies to both contributions and expenditures, and (2) that the evidence was sufficient to show a reasonable probability that disclosure would subject both contributors and recipients to public hostility and harassment. In their jurisdictional statement, appellants appealed from the entire judgment entered below and presented the following question for review:
      “Whether, under the standards set forth by this Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), the provisions of Sections 3517.10 and 3517.11 of the Ohio Revised Code, which require that the campaign committee of a candidate for public office file a report disclosing the full names and addresses of persons making contributions to or receiving expenditures from such committee, are consistent with the right of privacy of association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States when applied to the committees of candidates of a minority party which can establish only isolated instances of harassment directed toward the organization or its members within Ohio during recent years.” Juris. Statement i.
      We think that the correctness of both holdings of the District Court is “fairly included” in the question presented in the jurisdictional statement. This Court’s Rule 15.1(a). See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 559, n. 6 (1978) (“[0]ur power to decide is not limited by the precise terms of the question presented”).

       This is one of three government interests identified in Buckley. Appellants do not contend that the other two interests, enhancing voters’ ability to evaluate candidates and enforcing contribution limitations, support the disclosure of the names of recipients of campaign disbursements.

       The partial dissent suggests that the government interest in the disclosure of recipients of expenditures is not significantly diminished in the case of minor political parties, since parties with little likelihood of electoral success might nevertheless finance improper campaign activities merely to gain recognition. Post, at 109-110. The partial dissent relies on Justice White’s separate opinion in Buckley, in which he pointed out that “unlimited money tempts people to spend it on whatever money can buy to influence an election.” 424 U. S., at 265 (emphasis in original).
      An examination of the context in which Justice White made this observation indicates precisely why the state interest here is insubstantial. Justice White was addressing the constitutionality of ceilings on campaign expenditures applicable to all candidates. His point was that such ceilings “could play a substantial role in preventing unethical practices.” Ibid. In the case of minor parties, however, their limited financial resources serve as a built-in expenditure ceiling which minimizes the likelihood that they will expend substantial amounts of money to finance improper campaign activities. See id., at 71. For example, far from having “unlimited money,” the Ohio SWP has had an average of roughly $15,000 available each year to spend on its election efforts. Most of the limited resources of minor parties will typically be needed to pay for the ordinary fixed costs of conducting campaigns, such as filing fees, travel expenses, and the expenses incurred in publishing and distributing campaign literature and maintaining offices. Thus Justice White’s observation that “financing illegal activities is low on the campaign organization’s priority list,” id., at 265, is particularly apposite in the case of minor parties. We cannot agree, therefore, that minor parties are as likely as major parties to make significant expenditures in funding dirty tricks or other improper campaign activities. See post, at 110. Moreover, the expenditure by minor parties of even a substantial portion of their limited funds on illegal activities would be unlikely to have a substantial impact.
      Furthermore, the mere possibility that minor parties will resort to corrupt or unfair tactics cannot justify the substantial infringement on First Amendment interests that would result from compelling the disclosure of recipients of expenditures. In Buckley, we acknowledged the possibility that supporters of a major party candidate might channel money into minor parties to divert votes from other major party contenders, 424 U. S., at 70, and that, as noted by the partial dissent, post, at 110, and n. 5, occasionally minor parties may affect the outcomes of elections. We thus recognized that the distorting influence of large contributors on elections may not be entirely absent in the context of minor parties. Nevertheless, because we concluded that the government interest in disclosing contributors is substantially reduced in the case of minor parties, we held that minor parties are entitled to an exemption from requirements that contributors be disclosed where they can show a reasonable probability of harassment. 424 U. S., at 70. Because we similarly conclude that the government interest in requiring the disclosure of recipients of expenditures is substantially reduced in the ease of minor parties, we hold that the minor-party exemption recognized in Buckley applies to compelled disclosure of expenditures as well.

       For example, the expenditure statements filed by the SWP contain a substantial percentage of entries designated as per diem, travel expenses, room rental, and so on. The Ohio statute makes it particularly easy to identify these individuals since it requires disclosure of the purpose of the disbursements as well as the identity of the recipients. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3517.10(B)(5)(c) (Supp. 1981).

       “ ‘[Financial transactions can reveal much about a person’s activities, associations, and beliefs.’” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 66, quoting California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 78-79 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). The District Court found that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at least until 1976 routinely investigated the financial transactions of the SWP and kept track of the payees of SWP checks.

       The fact that some or even many recipients of campaign expenditures may not be exposed to the risk of public hostility does not detract from the serious threat to the exercise of First Amendment rights of those who are so exposed. We cannot agree with the partial dissent’s assertion that disclosures of disbursements paid to campaign workers and supporters will not increase the probability that they will be subjected to harassment and hostility. Post, at 111-112. Apart from the fact that individuals may work for a candidate in a variety of ways without publicizing their involvement, the application of a disclosure requirement results in a dramatic increase in public exposure. Under Ohio law a person’s affiliation with the party will be recorded in a document that must be kept open to inspection by any one who wishes to examine it for a period of at least six years. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3517.10(C) (Supp. 1981). The preservation of unorthodox political affiliations in public records substantially increases the potential for harassment above and beyond the risk that an individual faces simply as a result of having worked for an unpopular party at one time.

       See, e. g., Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 458 F. Supp. 895, 904 (SDNY 1978) (FBI interference with SWP travel arrangements and speaker hall rental), vacated on other grounds, 596 F. 2d 58 (CA2), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 903 (1979).

       Moreover, it would be hard to think of many instances in which the state interest in preventing vote-buying and improper campaign activities would be furthered by the disclosure of payments for routine commercial services.

       The District Court was quoting from Part I of the Final Report of Special Master Judge Breitel in Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General of the United States, 73 Civ. 3160 (TPG) (SDNY, Feb. 4, 1980), detailing the United States Government’s admissions concerning the existence and nature of the Government surveillance of the SWP.

       The District Court also found the following:
      “The Government possesses about 8,000,000 documents relating to the SWP, YSA . . . and their members. . . . Since 1960 the FBI has had about 300 informants who were members of the SWP and/or YSA and 1,000 nonmember informants. Both the Cleveland and Cincinnati FBI field offices had one or more SWP or YSA member informants. Approximately 21 of the SWP member informants held local branch offices. Three informants even ran for elective office as SWP candidates. The 18 informants whose files were disclosed to Judge Breitel received total payments of $358,648.38 for their services and expenses.” (Footnotes omitted.)

       After reviewing the evidence and the applicable law, the District Court concluded: “[T]he totality of the circumstances establishes that, in Ohio, public disclosure that a person is a member of or has made a contribution to the SWP would create a reasonable probability that he or she would be subjected to threats, harassment or reprisals.” The District Court then enjoined the compelled disclosures of either contributors’ or recipients’ names. Although the District Court did not expressly refer in the quoted passage to disclosure of the names of recipients of campaign disbursements, it is evident from the opinion that the District Court was addressing both contributors and recipients.

       Some of the recent episodes of threats, harassment, and reprisals against the SWP and its members occurred outside of Ohio. Anti-SWP occurrences in places such as Chicago (SWP office vandalized) and Pittsburgh (shot fired at SWP building) are certainly relevant to the determination of the public’s attitude toward the SWP in Ohio. In Buckley we stated that “[n]ew parties that have no history upon which to draw may . . . offer evidence of reprisals and threats directed against individuals or organizations holding similar views.” 424 U. S., at 74. Surely the Ohio SWP may offer evidence of the experiences of other chapters espousing the same political philosophy. See 1980 Illinois Socialist Workers Campaign v. State of Illinois Board of Elections, 531F. Supp. 915, 921 (ND Ill. 1981).
      Appellants point to the lack of direct evidence linking the Ohio statute’s disclosure requirements to the harassment of campaign contributors or recipients of disbursements. In Buckley, however, we rejected such “unduly strict requirements of proof” in favor of “flexibility in the proof of injury.” 424 U. S., at 74. We thus rejected requiring a minor party to “come forward with witnesses who are too fearful to contribute but not too fearful to testify about their fear” or prove that “chill and harassment [are] directly attributable to the specific disclosure from which the exemption is sought.” Ibid. We think that these considerations are equally applicable to the proof required to establish a reasonable probability that recipients will be subjected to threats and harassment if their names are disclosed. While the partial dissent appears to agree, post, at 112-113, n. 7, its “separately focused inquiry,” post, at 112, and n. 7, in reality requires evidence of chill and harassment directly attributable to the expenditure-disclosure requirement.

       Although the partial dissent agrees that this issue is not properly presented and therefore that the question should not be decided, post, at 112, n. 7, its result and reasoning endorse a different standard of proof. See n. 2, infra.

       The partial dissent says it agrees that “this is not the appropriate case to determine whether a different test or standard of proof should be employed in determining the constitutional validity of required disclosure of expenditures.” Post, at 112, n. 7. If that is so, however, appellees’ proof, which the partial dissent agrees established a reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals against contributors, likewise allowed the District Court to find a reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals against recipients of expenditures. The Buckley standard permits proof that a particular disclosure creates the requisite likelihood of harassment to be based on a showing of harassment directed at members of the party or at the organization itself. 424 U. S., at 74. Thus, I do not understand how the partial dissent’s “separately focused inquiry” can “plainly require a different result,” post, at 113, n. 7, or how it possibly can lead to the conclusion that “appellees did not carry their burden of production and persuasion insofar as they challenge the expenditure disclosure provisions,” post, at 115 — unless, despite the partial dissent’s uncertain disclaimer, post, at 113, n. 7, its “separate focus” alters Buckley’s “reasonable probability” and “flexible proof” standards in the context of expenditures.

       Of course, the plaintiffs in Buckley challenged many aspects of the federal Act, including expenditure limitations and the disclosure requirements for independent contributions and expenditures. The Court upheld all disclosure requirements, including disclosure of independent expenditures “for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” 424 U. S., at 80. The plaintiffs in Buckley did not challenge, however, the federal requirement that all political parties, including minor political parties, disclose the recipients of their expenditures.

       Certainly, that is true in this instance. The general political stance of the SWP and its candidates is readily discernible from the most cursory glance at its constitution or literature.

       The majority is obviously correct in noting that the third governmental interest articulated in Buckley — using disclosures to police limitations on contributions and expenditures — has no application to either contributions or expenditures in Ohio, since the Ohio statute sets no limitations on them.

       As Justice White noted in partial dissent in Buckley, 424 U. S., at 264-265, citing Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S. 534 (1934):
      “[T]he corrupt use of money by candidates is as much to be feared as the corrosive influence of large contributions. There are many illegal ways of spending money to influence elections. One would be blind to history to deny that unlimited money tempts people to spend it on whatever money can buy to influence an election.” (Emphasis in original.)

       Certainly the SWP could have this effect. For example, appellants noted at oral argument that the SWP candidate in the 1974 Ohio gubernatorial election received some 95,000 votes. The Republican candidate’s margin of victory over the Democratic candidate was only some 13,500 votes. Tr. of Oral Arg. 18. The impact of minor parties on elections in the United States is well documented. See generally W. Hesseltine, Third-Party Movements in the United States (1962).

       1 therefore disagree with the majority’s suggestion, ante, at 98-99, n. 16, that the government interest in deterring corruption is not furthered by disclosure of all expenditures, including those for commercial services. Even if improprieties are unlikely to occur in expenditures for commercial services, full and verifiable disclosure is needed to ensure that other, improper expenditures are not hidden in commercial accounts.

       According to the majority, “the question whether the Buckley test applies to the compelled disclosure of recipients of expenditures is properly before us.” Ante, at 94, n. 9. The majority declares that, in answering this question, “the District Court necessarily held (1) that the Buckley standard, which permits flexible proof of the reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals, applies to both contributions and expenditures, and (2) that the evidence was sufficient to show a reasonable probability that disclosure would subject both contributors and recipients to public hostility and harassment.” Ibid, (emphasis added).
      Justice Blackmun, ante, at 102, however, more accurately characterizes the District Court’s action as assuming that the Buckley standard applies to disclosure of expenditures and holding the evidence sufficient to meet this standard. The District Court’s assumption is understandable, since appellants did not question it below. Thus, this is not the appropriate case to determine whether a different test or standard of proof should be employed in determining the constitutional validity of required disclosure of expenditures.
      Even assuming the general applicability of the Buckley standard, though, the question presented here requires us to inquire whether the evidence of harassment establishes a “reasonable probability” that the Ohio law would trigger “threats, harassment, or reprisals” against recipients of expenditures that in turn may harm the party’s associational interests. This inquiry is necessarily distinct from the inquiry whether the evidence establishes a reasonable probability that disclosure would trigger threats, harassment, or reprisals against contributors. Although the proof requirements guiding this separate inquiry remain flexible, and direct proof of harm from disclosure is not required, ultimately the party must prove that the harm to it from disclosure of recipients outweighs the governmental interest in disclosure. This separately focused inquiry does not necessarily alter Buckley’s “reasonable probability” test or “flexible proof” standard. It does, however, plainly require a different result.

       See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 289, n. 19 (1982). The majority does not clearly articulate the standard of review it is applying. By determining that the District Court “properly concluded” that the evidence established a reasonable probability of harassment, ante, at 100, the majority seems to apply an independent-review standard.

       The District Court admitted Exhibit 129 into the record, which is a certified copy of findings of fact made by the Federal Election Commission pursuant to a 1977 court order in Socialist Workers 197h National Campaign Committee v. Jennings, No. 74-1338 (DC, stipulated judgment entered Jan. 3, 1979). The FEC in that case analyzed affidavits submitted by SWP members and other documentary evidence of public and private harassment of SWP members. In finding No. 126, the FEC accepted the SWP’s proposed finding that in 1971 a landlady in San Francisco rejected the application of two SWP members for an apartment, because the FBI had visited the landlady and warned her of the dangers of the SWP. In finding No. 127, the FEC accepted the SWP’s proposed finding that in 1974 a landlady in Chicago evicted a SWP member from her apartment. The landlady explained, “they told me all about you,” refusing to identify who “they” were.
      These two incidents are, of course, remote in time and place, and do not suggest that the party itself has had difficulty in finding office space. Nor do they suggest that the general public is likely to engage in similar activity. Moreover, the FBI’s actions against the SWP have long been ended, see Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, S. Rep. No. 94-755, Vol. 4-5, pp. 3-4 (1976), and Congress has since instituted more rigorous oversight of FBI and other intelligence activities, see 50 U. S. C. §413 (1976 ed., Supp. IV). An inference from these two incidents that disclosure of recipients of expenditures would increase any difficulty the party might have in obtaining office space would be tenuous, and is plainly outweighed by tfhe “substantial public interest in disclosure,” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 72.

       As the majority notes, ante, at 97, n. 12, some entries in the expenditure forms are designated as per diem, travel expenses, and room rental. At least until 1978, the expenditure statements gave the names of persons receiving per diem funds from the SWP. Apparently, party treasurers and party candidates received per diem payments. There is no evidence that filing these statements with the Ohio Secretary of State caused any harassment of the named persons, and indeed it is highly unlikely that this disclosure would increase the exposure of persons already so publicly identified with the party.

       In holding a state statute unconstitutional as applied, a court must sever and apply constitutional portions unless the legislature would not have intended to have applied ‘“those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not. . . Buckley, supra, at 108 (severing constitutional portions of Federal Election Campaign Act after holding other portions unconstitutional on their face), quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm’n of Okla., 286 U. S. 210, 234 (1932). Clearly, the expenditure disclosure requirements of the Ohio statute should be severed and applied even though the contribution disclosure requirements cannot be applied in this instance, for the two requirements are analytically and practically distinct.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Chief Justice Burger Justice Rehnquist,

license: Public Domain

text:
    LARKIN et al. v. GRENDEL’S DEN, INC.
    No. 81-878.
    Argued October 4, 1982
    Decided December 13, 1982
    BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 127.

      Gerald J. Caruso, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause pro hac vice for appellants. With him on the briefs for appellants Larkin et al. were Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, and Paul W. Johnson, Special Assistant Attorney General. David B. O’Connor and Birge Albright filed a brief for appellant Cambridge License Commission.

      Laurence H. Tribe argued the cause and filed briefs for appellee.

        Charles S. Sims and John Reinstein filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

   Chief Justice Burger

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented by this appeal is whether a Massachusetts statute, which vests in the governing bodies of churches and schools the power effectively to veto applications for liquor licenses within a 500-foot radius of the church or school, violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I

A

Appellee operates a restaurant located in the Harvard Square area of Cambridge, Mass. The Holy Cross Armenian Catholic Parish is located adjacent to the restaurant; the back walls of the two buildings are 10 feet apart. In 1977, appellee applied to the Cambridge License Commission for approval of an alcoholic beverages license for the restaurant.

Section 16C of Chapter 138 of the Massachusetts General Laws provides: “Premises . . . located within a radius of five hundred feet of a church or school shall not be licensed for the sale of alcoholic beverages if the governing body of such church or school files written objection thereto.”

Holy Cross Church objected to appellee’s application, expressing concern over “having so many licenses so near” (emphasis in original). The License Commission voted to deny the application, citing only the objection of Holy Cross Church and noting that the church “is within 10 feet of the proposed location.”

On appeal, the Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission upheld the License Commission’s action. The Beverages Control Commission found that “the church’s objection under Section 16C was the only basis on which the [license] was denied.”

Appellee then sued the License Commission and the Beverages Control Commission in United States District Court. Relief was sought on the grounds that § 16C, on its face and as applied, violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and the Sherman Act.

The suit was voluntarily continued pending the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in a similar challenge to §16C, Arno v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm’n, 377 Mass. 83, 384 N. E. 2d 1223 (1979). In Amo, the Massachusetts court characterized § 16C as delegating a “veto power” to the specified institutions, id., at 89, 384 N. E. 2d, at 1227, but upheld the statute against Due Process and Establishment Clause challenges. Thereafter, the District Court denied appellants’ motion to dismiss.

On the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court declined to follow the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Arno, supra. The District Court held that §16C violated the Due Process Clause and the Establishment Clause and held § 16C void on its face, Grendel’s Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 495 F. Supp. 761 (Mass. 1980). The District Court rejected appellee’s equal protection arguments, but held that the State’s actions were not immune from antitrust review under the doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). It certified the judgment to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292, and the Court of Appeals accepted certification.

A panel of the First Circuit, in a divided opinion, reversed the District Court on the Due Process and Establishment Clause arguments, but affirmed its antitrust analysis, Grendel’s Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 662 F. 2d 88 (1981).

Appellee’s motion for rehearing en banc was granted and the en banc court, in a divided opinion, affirmed the District Court’s judgment on Establishment Clause grounds without reaching the due process or antitrust claims, Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 662 F. 2d 102 (1981).

B

The Court of Appeals noted that appellee does not contend that § 16C lacks a secular purpose, and turned to the question of “whether the law ‘has the direct and immediate effect of advancing religion’ as contrasted with ‘only a remote and incidental effect advantageous to religious institutions,”’ id., at 104 (emphasis in original), quoting Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 783, n. 39 (1973). The court concluded that § 16C confers a direct and substantial benefit upon religions by “the grant of a veto power over liquor sales in roughly one million square feet... of what may be a city’s most commercially valuable sites,” 662 F. 2d, at 105.

The court acknowledged that § 16C “extends its benefits beyond churches to schools,” but concluded that the inclusion of schools “does not dilute [the statute’s] forbidden religious classification,” since § 16C does not “encompass all who are otherwise similarly situated to churches in all respects except dedication to ‘divine worship.’” Id., at 106-107 (footnote omitted). In the view of the Court of Appeals, this “explicit religious discrimination,” id., at 105, provided an additional basis for its holding that § 16C violates the Establishment Clause.

The court found nothing in the Twenty-first Amendment to alter its conclusion, and affirmed the District Court’s holding that § 16C is facially unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

We noted probable jurisdiction, 454 U. S. 1140 (1982), and we affirm.

II

A

Appellants contend that the State may, without impinging on the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, enforce what it describes as a “zoning” law in order to shield schools and places of divine worship from the presence nearby of liquor-dispensing establishments. It is also contended that a zone of protection around churches and schools is essential to protect diverse centers of spiritual, educational, and cultural enrichment. It is to that end that the State has vested in the governing bodies of all schools, public or private, and all churches, the power to prevent the issu-anee of liquor licenses for any premises within 500 feet of their institutions.

Plainly schools and churches have a valid interest in being insulated from certain kinds of commercial establishments, including those dispensing liquor. Zoning laws have long been employed to this end, and there can be little doubt about the power of a state to regulate the environment in the vicinity of schools, churches, hospitals, and the like by exercise of reasonable zoning laws.

We have upheld reasonable zoning ordinances regulating the location of so-called “adult” theaters, see Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 62-63 (1976); and in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 (1972), we recognized the legitimate governmental interest in protecting the environment around certain institutions when we sustained an ordinance prohibiting willfully making, on grounds adjacent to a school, noises which are disturbing to the good order of the school sessions.

The zoning function is traditionally a governmental task requiring the “balancing [of] numerous competing considerations,” and courts should properly “refrain from reviewing the merits of [such] decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality.” Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265 (1977). See also, e. g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1, 7-9 (1974). Given the broad powers of states under the Twenty-first Amendment, judicial deference to the legislative exercise of zoning powers by a city council or other legislative zoning body is especially appropriate in the area of liquor regulation. See, e. g., California v. LaRue, 409 U. S. 109 (1972); California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97, 106-110 (1980).

However, § 16C is not simply a legislative exercise of zoning power. As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded, § 16C delegates to private, nongovernmental entities power to veto certain liquor license applications, Arno v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm’n, 377 Mass., at 89, 384 N. E. 2d, at 1227. This is a power ordinarily vested in agencies of government. See, e. g., California v. LaRue, supra, at 116, commenting that a “state agency ... is itself the repository of the State’s power under the Twenty-first Amendment.” We need not decide whether, or upon what conditions, such power may ever be delegated to nongovernmental entities; here, of two classes of institutions to which the legislature has delegated this important decisionmaking power, one is secular, but one is religious. Under these circumstances, the deference normally due a legislative zoning judgment is not merited.

B

The purposes of the First Amendment guarantees relating to religion were twofold: to foreclose state interference with the practice of religious faiths, and to foreclose the establishment of a state religion familiar in other 18th-century systems. Religion and government, each insulated from the other, could then coexist. Jefferson’s idea of a “wall,” see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 164 (1879), quoting reply from Thomas Jefferson to an address by a committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (January 1,1802), reprinted in 8 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 113 (H. Washington ed. 1861), was a useful figurative illustration to emphasize the poncept of separateness. Some limited and incidental entanglement between church and state authority is inevitable in a complex modem society, see, e. g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 614 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U. S. 664, 670 (1970), but the concept of a “wall” of separation is a useful signpost. Here that “wall” is substantially breached by vesting discretionary governmental powers in religious bodies.

This Court has consistently held that a statute must satisfy three criteria to pass muster under the Establishment Clause:

“First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’” Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, supra, at 674.

See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 271 (1981); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 236 (1977). Independent of the first of those criteria, the statute, by delegating a governmental power to religious institutions, inescapably implicates the Establishment Clause.

The purpose of § 16C, as described by the District Court, is to “protec[t] spiritual, cultural, and educational centers from the ‘hurly-burly’ associated with liquor outlets.” 495 F. Supp., at 766. There can be little doubt that this embraces valid secular legislative purposes. However, these valid secular objectives can be readily accomplished by other means — either through an absolute legislative ban on liquor outlets within reasonable prescribed distances from churches, schools, hospitals, and like institutions, or by ensuring a hearing for the views of affected institutions at licensing proceedings where, without question, such views would be entitled to substantial weight.

Appellants argue that § 16C has only a remote and incidental effect on the advancement of religion. The highest court in Massachusetts, however, has construed the statute as conferring upon churches a veto power over governmental licensing authority. Section 16C gives churches the right to determine whether a particular applicant will be granted a liquor license, or even which one of several competing applicants will receive a license.

The churches’ power under the statute is standardless, calling for no reasons, findings, or reasoned conclusions. That power may therefore be used by churches to promote goals beyond insulating the church from undesirable neighbors; it could be employed for explicitly religious goals, for example, favoring liquor licenses for members of that congregation or adherents of that faith. We can assume that churches would act in good faith in their exercise of the statutory power, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 618-619, yet § 16C does not by its terms require that churches’ power be used in a religiously neutral way. “[T]he potential for conflict inheres in the situation,” Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U. S. 472, 480 (1973); and appellants have not suggested any “effective means of guaranteeing” that the delegated power “will be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and nonideological purposes.” Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 780. In addition, the mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by Church and State provides a significant symbolic benefit to religion in the minds of some by reason of the power conferred. It does not strain our prior holdings to say that the statute can be seen as having a “primary” and “principal” effect of advancing religion.

Turning to the third phase of the inquiry called for by Lemon v. Kurtzman, we see that we have not previously had occasion to consider the entanglement implications of a statute vesting significant governmental authority in churches. This statute enmeshes churches in the exercise of substantial governmental powers contrary to our consistent interpretation of the Establishment Clause; “[t]he objective is to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [Church or State] into the precincts of the other.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 614. We went on in that case to state:

“Under our system the choice has been made that government is to be entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction and churches excluded from the affairs of government. The Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and that while some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn.” Id., at 625 (emphasis added).

Our contemporary views do no more than reflect views approved by the Court more than a century ago:

“ ‘The structure of our government has, for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority.’” Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 730 (1872), quoting Harmon v. Dreher, 1 Speers Eq. 87, 120 (S. C. App. 1843).

As these and other cases make clear, the core rationale underlying the Establishment Clause is preventing “a fusion of governmental and religious functions,” Abington School Dis trict v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 222 (1963). See, e. g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U. S., at 674-675; Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 8-13 (1947). The Framers did not set up a system of government in which important, discretionary governmental powers would be delegated to or shared with religious institutions.

Section 16C substitutes the unilateral and absolute power of a church for the reasoned decisionmaking of a public legislative body acting on evidence and guided by standards, on issues with significant economic and political implications. The challenged statute thus enmeshes churches in the processes of government and creates the danger of “[pjolitical fragmentation and divisiveness on religious lines,” Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 623. Ordinary human experience and a long line of cases teach that few entanglements could be more offensive to the spirit of the Constitution.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

So ordered.

Justice Rehnquist,

dissenting.

Dissenting opinions in previous cases have commented that “great” cases, like “hard” cases, make bad law. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 400-401 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 505 (1977) (Burger, C. J., dissenting). Today’s opinion suggests that a third class of cases— silly cases — also make bad law. The Court wrenches from the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court the word “veto,” and rests its conclusion on this single term. The aim of this effort is to prove that a quite sensible Massachusetts liquor zoning law is apparently some sort of sinister religious attack on secular government reminiscent of St. Bartholomew's Night. Being unpersuaded, I dissent.

In its original form, § 16C imposed a flat ban on the grant of an alcoholic beverages license to any establishment located within 500 feet of a church or a school. 1954 Mass. Acts, ch. 569, § 1. This statute represented a legislative determination that worship and liquor sales are generally not compatible uses of land. The majority concedes, as I believe it must, that “an absolute legislative ban on liquor outlets within reasonable prescribed distances from churches, schools, hospitals, and like institutions,” ante, at 124 (footnote omitted), would be valid. See California v. LaRue, 409 U. S. 109, 120 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).

Over time, the legislature found that it could meet its goal of protecting people engaged in religious activities from liquor-related disruption with a less absolute prohibition. Rather than set out elaborate formulae or require an administrative .agency to make findings of fact, the legislature settled on the simple expedient of asking churches to object if a proposed liquor outlet would disturb them. Thus, under the present version of § 16C, a liquor outlet within 500 feet of a church or school can be licensed unless the affected institution objects. The flat ban, which the majority concedes is valid, is more protective of churches and more restrictive of liquor sales than the present § 16C.

The evolving treatment of the grant of liquor licenses to outlets located within 500 feet of a church or a school seems to me to be the sort of legislative refinement that we should encourage, not forbid in the name of the First Amendment. If a particular church or a particular school located within the 500-foot radius chooses not to object, the State has quite sensibly concluded that there is no reason to prohibit the issuance of the license. Nothing in the Court’s opinion persuades me why the more rigid prohibition would be constitutional, but the more flexible not.

The Court rings in the metaphor of the “wall between church and state,” and the “three-part test” developed in Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970), to justify its result. However, by its frequent reference to the statutory provision as a “veto,” the Court indicates a belief that § 16C effectively constitutes churches as third houses of the Massachusetts Legislature. See ante, at 125-126. Surely we do not need a three-part test to decide whether the grant of actual legislative power to churches is within the proscription of the Establishment Clause of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The question in this case is not whether such a statute would be unconstitutional, but whether §16C is such a statute. The Court in effect answers this question in the first sentence of its opinion without any discussion or statement of reasons. I do not think the question is so trivial that it may be answered by simply affixing a label to the statutory provision.

Section 16C does not sponsor or subsidize any religious group or activity. It does not encourage, much less compel, anyone to participate in religious activities or to support religious institutions. To say that it “advances” religion is to strain at the meaning of that word.

The Court states that §16C “advances” religion because there is no guarantee that objections will be made “in a religiously neutral way.” Ante, at 125. It is difficult to understand what the Court means by this. The concededly legitimate purpose of the statute is to protect citizens engaging in religious and educational activities from the incompatible activities of liquor outlets and their patrons. The only way to decide whether these activities are incompatible with one another in the case of a church is to ask whether the activities of liquor outlets and their patrons may interfere with religious activity; this question cannot, in any meaningful sense, be “religiously neutral.” In this sense, the flat ban of the original § 16C is no different from the present version. Whether the ban is unconditional or may be invoked only at the behest of a particular church, it is not “religiously neutral” so long as it enables a church to defeat the issuance of a liquor license when a similarly situated bank could not do the same. The State does not, in my opinion, “advance” religion by making provision for those who wish to engage in religious activities, as well as those who wish to engage in educational activities, to be unmolested by activities at a neighboring bar or tavern that have historically been thought incompatible.

The Court is apparently concerned for fear that churches might object to the issuance of a license for “explicitly religious” reasons, such as “favoring liquor licenses for members of that congregation or adherents of that faith.” Ante, at 125. If a church were to seek to advance the interests of its members in this way, there would be an occasion to determine whether it had violated any right of an unsuccessful applicant for a liquor license. But our ability to discern a risk of such abuse does not render § 16C violative of the Establishment Clause. The State can constitutionally protect churches from liquor for the same reasons it can protect them from fire, see Walz, supra, at 671, noise, see Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 (1972), and other harm.

The heavy First Amendment artillery that the Court fires at this sensible and unobjectionable Massachusetts statute is both unnecessary and unavailing. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

       Section 16C defines “church” as “a church or synagogue building dedicated to divine worship and in regular use for that purpose, but not a chapel occupying a minor portion of a building primarily devoted to other uses.” “School” is defined as “an elementary or secondary school, public or private, giving not less than the minimum instruction and training required by [state law] to children of compulsory school age.” Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann., ch. 138, §16C (1974).
      Section 16C originally was enacted in 1954 as an absolute ban on liquor licenses within 500 feet of a church or school, 1954 Mass. Acts, ch. 569, § 1. A 1968 amendment modified the absolute prohibition, permitting licenses within the 500-foot radius “if the governing body of such church assents in writing,” 1968 Mass. Acts, ch. 435. In 1970, the statute was amended to its present form, 1970 Mass. Acts, ch. 192.

       In 1979, there were 26 liquor licensees in Harvard Square and within a 500-foot radius of Holy Cross Church; 25 of these were in existence at the time Holy Cross Church objected to appellee’s application. See App. 69-72.

       Section 16C defines “church” as: “a church or synagogue building dedicated to divine worship”^ (emphasis added). Appellee argues that the statute unconstitutionally differentiates between theistic and nontheistic religions. We need not reach that issue. For purposes of this appeal, we assume, as did the original panel of the Court of Appeals, that the Massachusetts courts would apply the protections of § 16C to “any building primarily used as a place of assembly by a bona fide religious group,” 662 F. 2d, at 97, and thereby avoid serious constitutional questions that would arise concerning a statute that distinguishes between religions on the basis of commitment to belief in a divinity. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488, 495 (1961); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 15 (1947).

       This recent construction of the statute by the highest court in Massachusetts is controlling on the meaning of § 16C. See O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U. S. 524, 531 (1974).

       For similar reasons, the Twenty-first Amendment does not justify § 16C. The Twenty-first Amendment reserves power to states, yet here the State has delegated to churches a power relating to liquor sales. The State may not exercise its power under the Twenty-first Amendment in a way which impinges upon the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

       In this facial attack, the Court assumes that § 16C actually effectuates the secular goal of protecting churches and schools from the disruption associated with liquor-serving establishments. The fact that Holy Cross Church is already surrounded by 26 liquor outlets casts some doubt on the effectiveness of the protection granted, however.

       See California v. LaRue, 409 U. S. 109, 120 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
      Section 16C, as originally enacted, consisted of an absolute ban on liquor licenses within 500 feet of a church or school, see n. 1, supra; and 27 States continue to prohibit liquor outlets within a prescribed distance of various categories of protected institutions, with certain exceptions and variations: Ala. Code § 28-3-17 (1977); Alaska Stat. Ann. § 04.11.410 (1980); Ark. Stat. Ann. §48-345 (1977); Colo. Rev. Stat. §12-17-138 (1978); Ga. Code Ann. §3-3-21 (1982); Idaho Code §§23-303, 23-913 (1977); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, ¶ 127 (Supp. 1980); Ind. Code §7.1-3-21-11 (1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 41-710 (1981); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 26-280 (West 1975); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 2B, §§46B, 47, 52A, 52C (1981 and Supp. 1982); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 436.17a, 436.17c (1978 and Supp. 1982); Minn. Stat. Ann. §340.14 (1972 and Supp. 1982); Miss. Code Ann. §67-1-51 (Supp. 1982); Mont. Code Ann. § 16-3-306 (1981); Neb. Rev. Stat. §53-177 (1978); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 177:1 (1978); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 60-6B-10 (1981); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 18A-40 (1978) (schools); Okla. Stat., Tit. 37, § 534 (1981); R. I. Gen. Laws §3-7-19 (Supp. 1982); S. C. Code §61-3-440 (1976); S. D. Codified Laws §35-2-6.1 (Supp. 1982); Tex. Aleo. Bev. Code Ann., § 109.33 (1978); Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-13.5 (Supp. 1981); W. Va. Code § 11-16-12 (1974); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 125.68 (West Supp. 1982-1983). The Court does not express an opinion as to the constitutionality of any statute other than that of Massachusetts.

       Eleven States have statutes or regulations directing the licensing authority to consider the proximity of the proposed liquor outlet to schools or other institutions in deciding whether to grant a liquor license: Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Ann. § 23789 (West 1964); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-46 (1981); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 4, §543 (1974 and Supp. 1980); Haw. Rev. Stat. §281-56 (1976); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 436.17a, 436.17c (1978 and Supp. 1982-1983) (certain classes of licenses); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 18A-40 (1978) (churches); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §4303.26 (Supp. 1981); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 47, §§ 4-404, 4-432(d) (Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982); Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-105 (Supp. 1982); Va. Code § 4-31 (Supp. 1982); Vt. Liquor Control Bd. Regs. ¶39 (1976).

       Appellants argue that the Beverages Control Commission may reject or ignore any objection made for discriminatory or illegal reasons. This contention appears flatly contradicted by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s own interpretation of the statute, see Amo v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm’n, 377 Mass. 83, 90, 92, and n. 23, 384 N. E. 2d 1223, 1228, 1229, and n. 23 (1979). In any event, an assumption that the Beverages Control Commission might review the decisionmaking of the churches would present serious entanglement problems. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 619 (1971); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490 (1979).

       At the time of the Revolution, Americans feared not only a denial of religious freedom, but also the danger of political oppression through a union of civil and ecclesiastical control. B. Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 98-99, n. 3 (1967). See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618, 622-623 (1978). In 18th-century England, such a union of civil and ecclesiastical power was reflected in legal arrangements granting church officials substantial control over various occupations, including the liquor trade. See, e. g., 26 Geo. 2, ch. 31, § 2 (1753) (church officials given authority to grant certificate of character, a prerequisite for an alehouse license); S. Webb & B. Webb, The History of Liquor Licensing in England, Principally from 1700 to 1830, pp. 8, n. 1, 62-67, 102-103 (1903).

       Appellee also challenges the statute as a violation of due process. In light of our analysis we need not and do not reach that claim.

      1 doubt whether there exists a denomination that considers supporting the liquor license applications of its members to be a part of its theology. However else a church’s goal in objecting to issuance of a liquor license on such a basis might be characterized, it would certainly be strictly temporal. I note in passing that § 16C does not confer on any church any power to obtain a liquor license for anyone.