author: Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 80-6519.
    Johnson v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Cer-

tiorari denied.

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Petitioner, who was convicted of murder in a Virginia trial court, argues that his confession should not have been admitted into evidence. The confession was made during a police interrogation, at the outset of which petitioner waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). Earlier that same day, however, petitioner had stated that he wished to confer with an attorney. The interrogation took place before he had an opportunity to do so. The Virginia Supreme Court ruled that there had been a valid waiver, and thus that the confession was admissible. In my view, the decision to admit the confession was contrary to the spirit — if not the letter — of our recent decision in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), which was handed down after the State Supreme Court’s ruling in this case. I would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, vacate the judgment of the State Supreme Court, and remand the case for reconsideration in light of Edwards.

In Edwards v. Arizona, the petitioner was arrested on charges of robbery, burglary, and murder. After he was informed of his Miranda rights, he was questioned by police. Edwards denied involvement in the crime and presented an alibi defense. He then told police that he wanted to “make a deal.” He stated, however, that he wanted to consult with an attorney first. Although questioning then ceased, police detectives visited Edwards the next day and told him that they wished to ask him some questions. Petitioner replied that he did not want to talk to anyone. After being told that he “had to” talk to the detectives, he acquiesced. The officers read Edwards his Miranda rights and began a new interrogation session. Shortly after the session began, petitioner implicated himself in the crime.

We reversed the Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling that this confession was admissible, holding:

“[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. [Moreover,] an accused, . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S., at 484-485.

We recognized that a person in custody who had expressed a desire to have a lawyer might change his mind and even welcome an opportunity to talk. Id., at 485-486. Where the accused did not himself renew discussions with the police, however, we decided that it was unsafe to assume that he had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel.

The facts of this case are remarkably similar to those of Edwards v. Arizona. On December 12, 1977, petitioner was arrested by Virginia authorities and charged with robbery, premeditated murder in the commission of armed robbery, and use of a firearm in the commission of murder. At his arraignment the next day, petitioner asked the court to appoint counsel. An attorney was appointed. That afternoon, however, before petitioner had an opportunity to confer with his lawyer, a local police detective visited him in jail. This detective later testified that he neither knew nor cared whether petitioner had requested an attorney. The detective informed petitioner of his Miranda rights and obtained petitioner’s signature on a waiver form. He then initiated an interrogation session. During the course of this interrogation, petitioner confessed. Before his trial, petitioner moved to suppress the confession, arguing that he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. The trial court ruled the confession admissible and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioner was subsequently convicted.

Under the circumstances, I think it clear that Edwards bars the use of petitioner’s confession. Having exercised his right to consult with an attorney, petitioner should not have been subjected to interrogation by the authorities until counsel had been made available. The State attempts to distinguish Edwards on two grounds. First, it points out that Edwards clearly expressed his desire to deal with police only through counsel, whereas petitioner here simply asked that an attorney be appointed. However, an accused is under no obligation to state precisely why he wants a lawyer. If we were to distinguish cases based on the wording of an accused’s request, the value of the right to counsel would be substantially diminished. As we stated in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 719 (1979), “an accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, requiring that all interrogation cease.”

Second, the State notes that Edwards informed the police of his desire for an attorney, whereas petitioner only informed the judge at his arraignment. The State suggests that since the police did not know about petitioner’s request, the interrogation was not improper. However, the police could easily have determined whether petitioner had already exercised his right to counsel; presumably, a prosecutor was present at the arraignment. They did not know about petitioner’s request for a lawyer only because they made no effort to determine whether such a request had been made. But even if the police could not have discovered that petitioner had expressed a desire for an attorney, I would hold that the confession should not have been admitted. The key question in this case is whether petitioner’s waiver of his right to counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. In determining whether these conditions were satisfied, the fact that the police were unaware of a prior request for counsel is only tangentially relevant. What is important, rather, is the state of mind of the accused. I think it is no more safe to assume that a waiver is valid when an accused has made a prior request to the judge at his arraignment than when he has made the request to police. In both cases, the accused informs an individual in authority that he would like an attorney — and yet shortly thereafter, state officials, apparently disregarding his request, ask him to waive his rights.

       The trial court ruled that the confession was admissible after conducting a suppression hearing. Petitioner was tried before a jury and found guilty of murder. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court sustained the trial court’s ruling on the suppression motion. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 146, 255 S. E. 2d 525 (1979). The conviction was reversed on other grounds, however. A new trial was held, and petitioner renewed his motion to suppress the confession. This motion was denied. Petitioner was once again found guilty of murder. On appeal from this conviction, he asked the Virginia Supreme Court to reconsider its prior holding, but the court refused to grant a writ of error on this issue.

       This petition was not timely filed under Rule 20.1 of the Rules of this Court, which provides that a petition for certiorari to review a state court’s judgment in a criminal case “shall be deemed in time when it is filed with the Clerk within 60 days after the entry of such judgment.” However, this time requirement is not jurisdictional and may be waived by the Court “in the exercise of its discretion when the ends of justice so require.” Schacht v. United States, 398 U. S. 58, 64 (1970) (interpreting predecessor to Rule 20.1, old Rule 22(2)); see also Sanabria v. United States, 437 U. S. 54, 62, n. 12 (1978) (same). I believe that waiver would be appropriate here because the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision is so clearly in conflict with Edwards.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice White,

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 80-6704.
    No. 80-6759.
    White v. United States; and Anderson v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 208 U. S. App. D. C. 289, 648 F. 2d 29.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

Two Terms previous, I dissented from a denial of certiorari that left the state and lower federal courts in conflict and confusion over whether an anonymous tip may furnish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory detention. Jernigan v. Louisiana, 446 U. S. 958 (1980). Because it remains apparent that this difficult issue of everyday importance to law enforcement officials and citizens on the street alike requires resolution here, I am again moved to note my dissent.

The District of Columbia Police received an anonymous telephone call informing them that a young black man known as “Nicky” and wearing a blue jumpsuit had parked his 1971 Ford at No. 115th Street, N. E., entered a 1974 Oldsmobile, and driven away. The caller, who further identified the cars by color and license number, said that “Nicky” and the unidentified driver of the' Oldsmobile were involved in narcotics traffic and would be “dirty” with drugs when they returned. The caller refused to identify himself or how he obtained this information.

Upon receipt of the tip, two police officers, working out of uniform, established surveillance at the address given. They observed the Oldsmobile returning with a black male passenger in a blue sweatsuit, but saw no suspicious activity. The officers pulled their unmarked cruiser alongside the Oldsmobile partially blocking its access, displayed -police identification, approached the car with guns drawn, and ordered the men, the petitioners in these cases, out of their automobile. Heroin and narcotics paraphernalia were subsequently discovered, leading to the men’s arrest and conviction for possession of and intent to distribute heroin.

A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the trial court’s denial of petitioners’ motion to suppress the evidence seized from the Oldsmobile as the fruit of an invalid investigatory-stop. 208 U. S. App. D. C. 289, 648 F. 2d 29 (1981). The majority first determined that the actions of the police should be treated as a brief investigatory detention, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), instead of an arrest. It then concluded that the stop was valid because of the specificity of the descriptions provided and the verification of that information by the police. Judge Edwards strongly dissented on both points. The majority admitted that “[t]he question whether an anonymous tip corroborated only by observation of innocent details justifies a Terry stop is a live and disputed one,” 208 U. S. App. D. C., at 303, 648 F. 2d, at 43.

Arguably, the decision of the Court of Appeals is inconsistent with our prior cases which require that reasonable suspicion be based on a sufficiently reliable informant’s tip. In Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972), we not only recognized that “[s]ome tips, completely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either warrant no police response or require further investigation before a forcible stop of the suspect would be authorized,” id., at 147, but also explicitly noted that Adams presented a stronger case “than obtains in the case of an anonymous telephone tip,” id., at 146. Informers who have provided accurate tips in the past, e. g., Terry, supra, or who offer tips that can be immediately confirmed on the scene, e. g., Adams, supra, stand on a much firmer ground of reliability than anonymous telephone callers.

Other Federal Courts of Appeals have taken widely divergent positions on the reliability of an unidentified tipster. Compare United States v. McLeroy, 584 F. 2d 746 (CA5 1978), and United States v. Robinson, 536 F. 2d 1298 (CA9 1976) (no reasonable suspicion), with United States v. Rodriguez Perez, 626 F. 2d 1021 (CA1 1980), and United States v. Andrews, 600 F. 2d 563 (CA6) (reasonable suspicion), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 878 (1979). Compare United States v. DeVita, 526 F. 2d 81 (CA9 1975) (per curiam) (known but untested informant; no reasonable suspicion), with United States v. Gorin, 564 F. 2d 159 (CA4 1977) (known informer but no proof of reliability; reasonable suspicion found), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1080 (1978). The state courts are in similar disarray.

While I find the conflict in the federal and state courts sufficient reason to grant certiorari, the argument for doing so is especially strong when such uncertainty involves a fundamental aspect of law enforcement operations. Similar investigatory stops are conducted daily on the Nation’s streets. Moreover, because of the lesser quantum of evidence required, Terry stops are likely to involve innocent citizens. Here, where not only is the detention on the “outermost perimeters of the Terry doctrine,” 208 U. S. App. D. C., at 303, 648 F. 2d, at 43, but also at the very intersection between brief stops and full-scale arrests, the overall judgment of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is very seriously drawn into question. Conversely, the “Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.” Adams v. Williams, supra, at 145. Because clarification of the boundaries of legitimate police activity under the Constitution is ultimately this Court’s responsibility, I would grant certiorari.

       The Government concedes that the tip did not provide probable cause for arrest at the time the officers approached the car. 208 U. S. App. D. C., at 292, 648 F. 2d, at 32. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964).

       For cases finding that an anonymous tip with corroboration of innocent details does not establish reasonable suspicion, see Jackson v. State, 157 Ind. App. 662, 301 N. E. 2d 370 (1973); Commonwealth v. Cruse, 236 Pa. Super. 85, 344 A. 2d 532 (1975); State v. Wilson, 366 So. 2d 1328 (La. 1978); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 481 Pa. 292, 393 A. 2d 1298 (1978); Conor v. State, 260 Ark. 172, 538 S. W. 2d 304 (1976); Ebarb v. State, 598 S. W. 2d 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); State v. Sieler, 95 Wash. 2d 43, 621 P. 2d 1272 (1980) (en banc).
      For decisions finding reasonable suspicion, see State v. Hobson, 95 Idaho 920, 523 P. 2d 523 (1974); People v. Taggart, 20 N. Y. 2d 335, 229 N. E. 2d 581 (1967), appeal dism’d, 392 U. S. 667 (1968); State v. Barton, 92 N. M. 118, 584 P. 2d 165 (1978); State v. Kea, 61 Haw. 566, 606 P. 2d 1329 (1980); Radowick v. State, 145 Ga. App. 231, 244 S. E. 2d 346 (1978); Henighan v. United States, Crim. No. 80-169 (D. C. Ct. App., June 10, 1981); State v. Webb, 398 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1981); State v. Hasenbank, 425 A. 2d 1330 (Me. 1981); Mann v. State, 525 S. W. 2d 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); People v. Tooks, 403 Mich. 568, 271 N. W. 2d 503 (1978).
      While the determination of reasonable suspicion is heavily dependent on the specificity of the information, the amount of verification, and the urgency of a particular situation, the conflicting results cannot be explained as accounting for different factual patterns. Compare People v. De Bour, 40 N. Y. 2d 210, 352 N. E. 2d 562 (1976) (anonymous call that black man in bar wearing red shirt had gun; no reasonable suspicion), with State v. Jernigan, 377 So. 2d. 1222 (La. 1979) (anonymous call that black man in bar wearing yellow shirt and blue pants had gun; reasonable suspicion), cert. denied, 446 U. S. 958 (1980). Also compare Jackson v. State, supra (anonymous call that man in car, precisely located, had gun; no reasonable suspicion), with People v. Taggart, supra (anonymous call that man on corner, precisely located, had gun; reasonable suspicion).


text:
    No. 81-167.
    Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Powell and Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


author: Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    No. 81-191.
    Needham v. White Laboratories, Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Rehnquist,

dissenting.

Because I believe that the Court of Appeals in this case misapplied the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and this Court’s decision in Thompson v. INS, 375 U. S. 384 (1964), I dissent from the denial of certiorari.

In 1952, petitioner’s mother took dienestrol, a synthetic estrogen, during her pregnancy with petitioner. In early 1974, petitioner’s physician informed her that she had a vaginal cancer. Alleging that her mother’s use of dienestrol was the proximate cause of her cancer, petitioner brought this diversity suit under Illinois tort law. After trial, the jury returned a verdict and awarded petitioner $800,000 in damages.

Within 10 days of this judgment, respondent filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). The timely filing of this post-trial motion tolled the 30-day period in which to file a notice of appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4). The District Court denied the motion on January 14, 1980. Thus, the 30-day period began to run anew, terminating on February 14, 1980. On February 4, 1980, respondent filed a motion styled as a “motion for reconsideration” of the January 14 order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. At a subsequent hearing, the District Court erroneously informed counsel that respondent’s “motion to reconsider” tolled the time for appeal. Respondent did not move for, and the District Court did not grant, an extension of time within which to appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5). The District Court denied the “motion to reconsider” on March 20, 1980. Respondent filed notice of appeal on April 21, 1980, 99 days subsequent to the order of January 14 denying respondent’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

A divided Court of Appeals held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 639 F. 2d 394 (CA7 1981). After conceding that respondent’s “motion to reconsider” did not toll the 30-day period that began to run when the Rule 50(b) motion was denied, the court held that this case fell within “the narrow exception recognized” in Thompson v. INS, supra. The court held that Thompson applied because respondent “should not be penalized for relying on the district court assurance that notice of appeal filed within thirty days of its disposition of the motion to reconsider would be timely.” 639 F. 2d, at 398.

Chief Judge Fairchild dissented. Following entry of an order denying respondent’s Rule 50(b) motion, he argued, an extension of time under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) was the sole method by which the running of the time for appeal could be extended. Moreover, the Thompson exception was “too narrow” to fit the situation in the instant case. “In Thompson, the Court predicated its holding not only on reliance on the district court’s conclusion that a motion had been properly filed, but also upon appellant’s performing ‘an act which, if properly done, postponed the deadline for the filing of his appeal.’” 639 F. 2d, at 404 (emphasis added). In Thompson, the appellant filed an untimely but unchallenged post-trial motion. In contrast, respondent’s filing of the “motion to reconsider” was not an act which, if properly done, would postpone the deadline for appeal. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied rehearing with three judges dissenting.

The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, promulgated in 1967, are quite simple and explicit in setting forth the procedures with which a litigant must comply in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. An appeal is taken by filing a timely notice of appeal with the District Court. Fed. Rule App. Proc. 3. Notice must be filed within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1). Four, and only four, timely post-trial motions will toll the running of the 30-day period until disposition by the District Court: (1) a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b); (2) a motion under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact; (3) a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e); (4) a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a). Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(4). Compliance with Rule 4 is mandatory and jurisdictional. Brow- der v. Director, Ill. Dept. of Corrections, 434 U. S. 257, 264 (1978) (citing cases). The clear purpose of Rule 4(a) is to set a definite point in time when litigation shall be at an end, so that the prospective appellee will know that he is freed of the appellant’s demands. Ibid. The purposes behind the 30-day rule are so important that a Court of Appeals is barred from extending the time period. Fed. Rule App. Proc. 26(b). The barrier of the 30-day rule is not impenetrable, however, for the Rules provide that the District Court may, “upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause,” extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(5). But even then, a District Court may grant such a motion only up to 30 days after the expiration of the time period. Ibid.

It is thus clear that respondent could not extend its time for filing a notice of appeal by its “motion to reconsider” the District Court’s order denying respondent’s previous motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. A “motion to reconsider” is not recognized by Rule 4(a)(4) as one that will extend the filing period. The Court of Appeals correctly recognized this fact, as has this Court. Browder v. Director, Ill. Dept. of Corrections, supra, at 264-265.

The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Thompson v. INS, supra, however, is misplaced. In that case, the appellant filed an untimely but otherwise proper post-trial motion with the District Court. The appellee raised no objection to the timeliness of the motion and the District Court erroneously determined that the post-trial motion was filed “in ample time.” Appellant filed his notice of appeal within 60 days of the denial of the post-trial motion, but not within 60 days of the original entry of judgment by the District Court. Appel-lee moved to dismiss the appeal because the untimely motion could not serve to toll the running of the time for appeal. Over four dissents, this Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the appeal. “Here . . . petitioner did an act which, if properly done, postponed the deadline for the filing of his appeal. Here . . . the District Court concluded that the act had been properly done. Here . . . the petitioner relied on the statement of the District Court and filed the appeal within the assumedly new deadline beyond the old deadline.” 375 U. S., at 387.

Thus, in order to invoke the Thompson exception, the appellant must satisfy two prerequisites: (1) he must rely on a statement by the District Court and (2) he must perform an act which, if timely done, would toll the time period. Even if the first element has been met in this case, it is clear that respondent’s “motion to reconsider” could not, under any circumstances, toll the 30-day period. In contrast to the expressly authorized but untimely motion in Thompson, respondent’s “motion to reconsider” in this case is not recognized by the Rules as one which, if timely filed, would toll the period for appeal. Rule 4(a)(4) clearly contemplates that only the initial motion of the type specified will toll the time for appeal until the motion is disposed of by the District Court. Wansor v. George Hantscho Co., 570 F. 2d 1202, 1206 (CA5 1978), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 953 (1979). 9 J. Moore, B. Ward, & J. Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 204.12[1] (2d ed. 1980). Thus, respondent’s reliance on an erroneous assertion by the District Court is insufficient to invoke an implied exception to Rule 4’s explicit and simple commands.

Under the 1979 amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, respondent had a means by which it could extend the filing period so that the District Court could “reconsider” the initial post-trial motion without depriving respondent of an appeal. Rule 4(a)(5) authorizes the District Court to grant an extension of time in which to file notice of appeal. Respondent could have made such a request up to 60 days after the District Court had initially denied respondent’s post-trial motion. Since the Rules provide one means by which respondent could preserve its time to appeal, there was no justification for the Court of Appeals to imply a different one in this situation.

Although it is unfortunate that respondent may have been misled by the District Court, a litigant is bound by the rules of procedure, just as he is by the rules of substantive law. A litigant is no more entitled to conclusively rely on a District Court’s view of a rule of procedure than he is as to its view on matters of substantive law.

I would therefore grant a writ of certiorari in this case and reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure govern all cases on appeal in the federal system, and patchwork exceptions to them will do far greater harm to the system than an occasional random departure on a point of substantive law.

       Such a motion is not recognized by any of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

       At the time, appeals to the Court of Appeals were governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, the predecessor to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4. That Rule allowed for a 60-day period in which to file a notice of appeal with the District Court.


text:
    No. 81-260.
    Exxon Corp. v. Georgia Association of Petroleum Retailers.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of Georgia Oilmen’s Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-319.
    Kimmel v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Cer-tiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 81-5038.
    No. 81-5169.
    No. 81-5192.
    No. 81-5271.
    No. 81-5336.
    Demps v. Florida. Jacobs v. Florida. Dicks v. Tennessee. Swindler v. Arkansas. Martin v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. Tenn.;

Sup. Ct. Ark.; and

Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 81-5038, 395 So. 2d 501; No. 81-5169, 396 So. 2d 1113; No. 81-5192, 615 S. W. 2d 126; No. 81-5271, 272 Ark. 340, 617 S. W. 2d 1; No. 81-5336, 303 N. C. 246, 278 S. E. 2d 214.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 81-5189.
    Mercer v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Motion of ACLU of Western Missouri for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.


text:
    No. 81-5296.
    Fierro v. MacDougall, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    October 19, 1981
    No. 81-240.
    Morris, Maryland State Administrator of Election Laws, et al. v. Mathers et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 4th Cir. The order dismissing the appeal for want of substantial federal question is hereby vacated [see Reporter’s Note, ante, p. 884]. The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    No. 81-268.
    Scott et al. v. Dumas et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. La., 1st Cir., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 81-317.
    Weinberger v. Florida Bar.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Fla. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 81-342.
    Casillas v. S.W.I.G. et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. M. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 80-1816.
    Parratt, Warden v. Ford.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539 (1981).


text:
    No. 81-397.
    Bureau of Economic Analysis, United States Department of Commerce v. Long et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Section 701, 95 Stat. 340, Pub. L. 97-34.


text:
    No. A-21.
    Sayles v. Hart, Judge, United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Application to recall and stay the mandate, addressed to Justice White and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-216.
    Boyd v. United States.
   Application for bail, addressed to Justice O’Connor and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-228.
    In re Disbarment of Fry.
    [For earlier order herein, see 450 U. S. 1038.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-232.
    In re Disbarment of McClellan.
    [For earlier order herein, see 450 U. S. 1038.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-234.
    In re Disbarment of Fontaine.
    [For earlier order herein, see 451 U. S. 967.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-235.
    In re Disbarment of Williams.
    [For earlier order herein, see 451 U. S. 967.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-236.
    In re Disbarment of Rosenblum.
    [For earlier order herein, see 451 U. S. 967.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-238.
    In re Disbarment of Natale.
    [For earlier order herein, see 451 U. S. 979.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-240.
    In re Disbarment of Walsh.
    [For earlier order herein, see 452 U. S. 902.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-242.
    In re Disbarment of Caskey.
    [For earlier order herein, see 452 U. S. 935.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-244.
    In re Disbarment of Ivler.
   It is ordered that George Ivler, of Paterson, N. J., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-245.
    In re Disbarment of Pressman.
   It is ordered that Robert M. Pressman, of Philadelphia, Pa., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-246.
    In re Disbarment of Kahn.
   It is ordered that Richard Stephen Kahn, of Essex, Md., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-247.
    In re Disbarment of Costello.
   It is ordered that Thomas M. Costello, Sr., of Southfield, Mich., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-248.
    In re Disbarment of Holober.
   It is ordered that Dennis Holober, of Miami, Fla., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 80-1285.
    Brown v. Hartlage.
   Ct. App. Ky. [Certiorari granted, 450 U. S. 1029.] L. Stanley Chau-vin, Jr., Esquire, of Louisville, Ky., a member of the Bar of this Court, is invited to brief and argue this case as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below.


text:
    No. 80-1417.
    Mills et al. v. Rogers et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted sub nom. Okin v. Rogers, 451 U. S. 906.] Motion of respondents to dismiss the writ of cer-tiorari or in the alternative to certify certain questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts denied.


text:
    No. D-249.
    In re Disbarment of Beatty.
   It is ordered that Elmer S. Beatty, Jr., of Verona, Pa., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-250.
    In re Disbarment of Donovan.
   It is ordered that Robert C. Donovan, of San Jose, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 80-5861.
    Williams v. Lucky.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 5th Sup. Jud. Dist. Motion of petitioner to consolidate this case with No. 80-6298, Mills v. Habluetzel [probable jurisdiction noted, 451 U. S. 936], denied.


text:
    No. 86,
    Orig.
    Louisiana v. Mississippi et al.
    [For earlier order herein, see 445 U. S. 957.1
   It is ordered that Charles J. Meyers, Esquire, of Denver, Colo., be, and he is hereby, appointed Special Master in this case with authority to fix the time and conditions for filing of additional pleadings and to direct subsequent proceedings, and with authority to summon witnesses, issue subpoenas, and take such evidence as may be introduced and such as he may deem it necessary to call for. The Master is directed to submit such reports as he may deem appropriate.

The compensation of the Special Master, the allowances to him, the compensation paid to his technical, stenographic, and clerical assistants, the cost of printing his report, and all other propel1 expenses shall be charged against and be borne by the parties in such proportion as the Court hereafter may direct.

It is further ordered that if the position of Special Master becomes vacant during a recess of Court,

The Chief Justice shall have authority to make a new designation which shall have the same effect as if originally made by the Court herein.


text:
    No. 80-1925.
    United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad Co. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 452 U. S. 960.] Motion of American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion of American Public Transit Association for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. D-251.
    In re Disbarment of Gold.
   It is ordered that Frederick B. Gold, of Birmingham, Mich., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 81-656.
    Consolidated Foods Corp. v. Unger.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioner to consolidate this case with No. 80-6045, Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp. [certiorari granted, 452 U. S. 960], denied.


text:
    No. 81-5332.
    In re Baxley.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 81-244.
    Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 81-328.
    Rodriguez et al. v. Popular Democratic Party et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. P. R. Probable jurisdiction noted. Reported below:-P. R. R.-.


text:
    No. 81-341.
    Greene et al. v. Lindsey et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 6th Cir. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 81-280.
    No. 81-330.
    No. 81-331.
    No. 81-332.
    No. 81-333.
    General Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania et al.; United Engineers & Constructors, Inc. v. Pennsylvania et al.; Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania et al. v. Pennsylvania et al.; Glasgow, Inc. v. Pennsylvania et al.; and Bechtel Power Corp. v. Pennsylvania et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 648 F. 2d 923.


text:
    No. 81-5321.
    Enmund v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 80-2083.
    Shepherd v. Shepherd.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-2156.
    General Development & Shipping Enterprises Co., Ltd. v. Morewitz, Administrator, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6812.
    Scruggs v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6883.
    Pitts v. Sparks, Assistant District Attorney.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-86.
    Little Motor Co. v. Suits.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-106.
    Ehrlich et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-114.
    DeFelice v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-117.
    Porter v. Guam Publications, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-119.
    Morrow et al. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-183.
    Magma Copper Co. v. Secretary of Labor et al.
   C. A. • 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-192.
    Gannon v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-242.
    Fischer v. Vonck.
   Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-250.
    Childers et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-254.
    Horowitz et al. v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-264.
    Presbyterian Hospital of Dallas v. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-266.
    Bradley v. Computer Sciences Corp., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-304.
    Campo Slacks, Inc., et al. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-318.
    Dent v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-338.
    Inman et al. v. Brock et al.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-344.
    Hernandez v. Fair.
   Ct. App. Cal, 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-346.
    Seattle Crescent Container Service v. Port of Seattle.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-366.
    Sun Ship, Inc. v. Murphy et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-368.
    Radio Broadcasting Co. v. Franklin Town Corp. et al.
   Pa. Commw. Ct. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-372.
    White v. Office of Personnel Management et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-375.
    Dowell Division of Dow Chemical Co. v. Franconia Sea Transport, Ltd.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-382.
    Bucio-Reyes v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-387.
    Morris v. City of Midland, Texas, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-392.
    No. 81-393.
    Kenealy v. United States; and Kenealy et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 646 F. 2d 699.


text:
    No. 81-407.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-414.
    Troia v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-427.
    Davis v. District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-443.
    Nicholls v. Nash et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-448.
    Wilson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-453.
    LaBriola v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5129.
    DeFalco v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5156.
    Masiello v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5177.
    Bagley v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5188.
    Reid v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5279.
    Davis v. G.M.C. Oldsmobile Division.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5319.
    Bonner et al. v. Wyrick, Warden, Missouri State Penitentiary, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5320.
    Settle v. Settle.
   Sup. Ct. N. H. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5325.
    Zatko v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5326.
    Easter v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5330.
    Zatko v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5331.
    Vanderdoes v. St. Claude General Hospital et al.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5334.
    Monroe v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5335.
    Owens v. Koehler, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5339.
    Holmes v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5341.
    Welch v. Garrison et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5342.
    Zatko v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5343.
    Covington v. Davis.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5347.
    Gonzales v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5375.
    Scott v. LaFoy et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5377.
    Couch v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5397.
    Carter v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5419.
    Kubasiak v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5430.
    Howard v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5437.
    Combs v. Duckworth, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5440.
    Green v. Carlson, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5445.
    Nickerson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5450.
    Warden v. United States Parole Commission et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5460.
    Red Horse v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5467.
    Woods v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5468.
    Sprecher v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5473.
    Bradford et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5477.
    Berry v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1494.
    United Air Lines, Inc. v. Division of Industrial Safety of the Department of Industrial Relations of California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.

Justice White,

dissenting.

Petitioner maintains operations and maintenance facilities for its aircraft at San Francisco International Airport. Respondent, the Division of Occupational Safety and Health (formerly Division of Industrial Safety) of the Department of Industrial Relations of the State of California (Cal/OSH), is responsible for a state occupational safety and health enforcement program, approved by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration under 29 U. S. C. § 667(c). The state enforcement plan applies to all places of employment in California “except a place the health and safety jurisdiction over which is vested by law in, and actively exercised by, any state or federal agency other than [Cal/OSH].” Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 6303(a) (West Supp. 1981). Under § 606(b) of the Federal Aviation Act, 72 Stat. 778, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 1425(b), the Federal Aviation Administrator is required to

“employ inspectors who shall be charged with the duty (1) of making such inspections of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, and appliances designed for use in air transportation, during manufacture, and while used by an air carrier in air transportation, as may be necessary to enable the Secretary of Transportation to determine that such aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, and appliances are in safe condition and are properly maintained for operation in air transportation . . . .”

Petitioner contends that the operation of the federal scheme of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) supervision preempts enforcement of the state scheme by Cal/OSH.

Between June 1976 and August 1978, Cal/OSH conducted a number of inspections of petitioner’s San Francisco facilities. As a result of these inspections, a number of citations were issued, alleging violations of various health and safety standards. In each instance, United contested the citations, arguing that Cal/OSH lacked jurisdiction over its facilities because of pre-emption by the FAA. Prior to the completion of litigation in the state agencies and courts, United filed a complaint in Federal District Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against further Cal/OSH inspections and citations. Specifically, United alleged that the actions of the defendants were “beyond their jurisdictional authority, interfered] with and disrupted] the federal statutory scheme with respect to safety . . . and violate[d] United’s right to due process of law.” The District Court granted petitioner a preliminary injunction prohibiting further enforcement by Cal/OSH or the Appeals Board. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 633 F. 2d 814 (1980).

The Court of Appeals confused two distinct lines of reasoning. One of these lines I find unobjectionable, although improperly applied in this case; the other, however, substantially misread our previous cases on when the “defensive” character of a federal question is insufficient to create federal-court jurisdiction. The first argument noted simply that the mere fact that California has incorporated a body of federal law as the basis for a state-law distinction does not necessarily cause a case under the state law to be also a case under the law of the United States. Had United raised only the question of the meaning of the limits on § 6303(a)’s grant of authority to Cal/OSH, this would have been correct and sufficient to dispose of the case. United’s complaint, however, was not so limited. Petitioner alleged that the state action interfered with and disrupted the federal statutory scheme. This can only be read as a claim of federal preemption. The Court of Appeals responded, erroneously in my view, to this issue of pre-emption by characterizing it as defensive and an inadequate basis for federal-court jurisdiction:

“In the instant case, United is a defendant in the state court action to enforce citations issued by the Division, and has stated that it has asserted and will continue to assert jurisdictional defenses in that action. Therefore, United’s allegations of federal question jurisdiction in this appeal remain defensive in nature, and it cannot assert its jurisdictional objections to the state court action as a basis for jurisdiction in the federal courts.” 633 F. 2d, at 817.

In Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149 (1908), the plaintiff in Federal District Court had settled a claim against a railroad in exchange for a continuing free pass, a contract which the railroad, it was alleged, would no longer honor because of a recently passed federal statute. The plaintiff sought a judgment as to whether the Act forbade the free pass and, if it did, whether it was constitutional as applied in the circumstances. This Court held that the case was not a suit arising under the laws of the United States: “It is not enough that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action and asserts that the defense is invalidated by some [federal law].” Id., at 152. Other cases are to the same effect. Tennessee v. Union & Planters Bank, 152 U. S. 454 (1894); Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U. S. 586 (1888).

In each of the above cases, the federal plaintiff’s cause of action against the defendant was not grounded in federal law; he merely sought to adjudicate the validity of an anticipated defense to his action. Here, United’s complaint, as I read it, included the claim that under federal law the FAA had exclusive jurisdiction to oversee safety at airline maintenance facilities and therefore, under the Supremacy Clause, state regulation was foreclosed. No part of this claim was grounded in state law.

In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218 (1947), the Illinois Commerce Commission set for hearing a complaint that a warehouseman was charging illegal rates under state law. The Commission denied the warehouseman’s claim that the United States Warehouse Act superseded the authority of the Commission to regulate in the manner sought by the complaint. The warehouseman then filed a complaint in the United States District Court seeking an injunction against further state proceedings on the ground that the federal statute pre-empted state regulation. The Court of Appeals sustained this claim, and this Court affirmed. Federal jurisdiction, which was unchallenged, was grounded on 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331 and 1337; federal jurisdiction, of course, could not have existed if foreclosed by the fact that the federal claim could be and was presented as a defense in the state proceedings. Rice is but a significant example of a familiar pattern: the person or concern threatened by or involved in state enforcement proceedings repairs to the federal court claiming that the state law and the state proceedings have been pre-empted by congressional enactment. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519 (1977); Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U. S. 624 (1973); Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (1941). That the complaint in this case, in addition to claiming federal pre-emption, may also have claimed that the state law should not be construed to reach airline maintenance facilities does not defeat federal jurisdiction based on the pre-emption claim.

The suggestion that a defendant in a pending or threatened state action based on state law is foreclosed on jurisdictional grounds from seeking a federal declaratory judgment or an injunction based on the claim that the state action is barred by a federal statute or the Federal Constitution makes little sense in light of the holdings of this Court. Under the Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), line of cases, comity and federalism require a federal court to hold its hand and dismiss rather than interfere with a pending state criminal proceeding, by adjudicating a federal defense that has been or might be raised in that proceeding. Certain civil proceedings are subject to the same rule. But these holdings do not rest on jurisdictional grounds, and they do not apply when a state proceeding is not pending and in any event do not apply to all civil proceedings. Furthermore, if there is never federal jurisdiction when a state defendant has a dispositive defense grounded in federal law, the Anti-Injunction Act would be surplusage. Under this theory, all such litigants would be required to pursue their federal claims in state court. Perhaps they should, but that is not what the present jurisdictional statutes and our cases construing them require.

The Court of Appeals relied on Public Service Comm’n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U. S. 237, 248 (1952), where the federal plaintiff sought to preclude regulatory action by a State Public Service Commission on the grounds that his shipments were in interstate commerce. This Court held that the action should be dismissed because the federal claim was too abstract, anticipatory, and not ripe for decision. The Court also said:

“Where the complaint in an action for declaratory judgment seeks in essence to assert a defense to an impending or threatened state court action, it is the character of the threatened action, and not of the defense, which will determine whether there is federal-question jurisdiction in the District Court. If the cause of action, which the declaratory defendant threatens to assert, does not itself involve a claim under federal law, it is doubtful if a federal court may entertain an action for a declaratory judgment establishing a defense to that claim. This is dubious even though the declaratory complaint sets forth a claim of federal right, if that right is in reality in the nature of a defense to a threatened cause of action. Federal courts will not seize litigations from state courts merely because one, normally a defendant, goes to federal court to begin his federal-law defense before the state court begins the case under state law.” Ibid.

But the Court did no more than raise doubts about federal jurisdiction in such a case; indeed, it went on to say:

“[I]t is not necessary to determine whether, on this record, the alleged controversy over an action that may be begun in state court would be maintainable under the head of federal-question jurisdiction. But we advert to doubts upon that subject to indicate the injury that would be necessary if the case clearly rested merely on threatened suit in state court, as, for all we can learn, it may.” Id., at 248-249.

In my view, the holding below is wrong. In any event, it is an extraordinarily important jurisdictional holding and should be reviewed in this Court. I therefore dissent from the denial of certiorari.

       Petitioner also sought to enjoin the Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board of the State of California from conducting further proceedings related to enforcement of the citations already issued.


text:
    No. 81-112.
    Michael v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Powell join,

dissenting.

The District Court in this criminal case sustained petitioner’s motion to suppress on the ground that the evidence in question was obtained by Drug Enforcement Administration agents with the aid of an electronic tracking device or “beeper” which was installed on the exterior of petitioner’s rented van and for which no warrant was obtained.

Without reaching the issue of whether the installation of the device was a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the Court of Appeals, en banc, in a 16-to-8 decision, concluded that the installation was permissible even if it were assumed to constitute a search. 645 F. 2d 252 (1981). It held that reasonable suspicion is adequate to support war-rantless installation of a beeper because of the limited expectation of privacy in an automobile, because the intrusion occasioned by the placement of the beeper is minimal, and because the important Government interest in eliminating illegal drug manufacture outweighs the slight infringement of any expectation of privacy.

Courts of Appeals are divided on the legality of a warrant-less installation of a beeper. The First Circuit has held that no warrant is required for the attachment and monitoring of beepers but that probable cause must exist to justify the intrusion. United States v. Moore, 562 F. 2d 106 (1977). The court saw no merit in the Government counterargument that a lower standard was justified because the case involved a dangerous drug which the public would not want to go undetected. The Sixth Circuit requires a warrant and probable cause for the installation of a beeper. United States v. Bailey, 628 F. 2d 938 (1980).

Despite these conflicts, the Solicitor General opposes the petition, arguing that if petitioner is acquitted following a trial on the merits, his claims will be moot. But this would leave the conflicts among the Circuits unresolved, conflicts that are now ripe for our attention. Where there is an important and clear-cut issue of law which is fundamental to the further conduct of the case and which would otherwise qualify as a basis for certiorari, interlocutory status need not preclude review. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 377 (1945); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U. S. 148, 153 (1964); Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731, 734, n. 2 (1947); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 685, n. 3 (1949).

This is such a case. The law of the Fifth Circuit is now settled. The announced rule will influence, if not determine, the disposition of this case. More importantly, granting cer-tiorari will enable us to resolve the clear conflicts in the Circuits over the use of beepers. This case presents the very set of facts necessary to decide whether warrantless installation of such devices is permissible and, if so, whether reasonable suspicion is adequate justification. Here DEA agents did not have probable cause to support warrantless installation. The panel opinion stated that “only reasonable suspicion existed — at the time the beeper was installed — to believe that the defendant was connected with the criminal activity of another suspect (for whom probable cause did exist).” 622 F. 2d 744, 745 (1980) (footnote omitted). The en banc court agreed, but found such a level of suspicion to be adequate. 645 F. 2d 252 (1981).

Failure to exercise our jurisdiction at this time will not resolve this recurring issue or enhance the factual record. I would grant the petition.

      When Justice Reiinquist, acting in his capacity of Circuit Justice, denied a motion for a stay in a case from the Ninth Circuit raising this issue, he observed that “in all probability this Court may eventually feel bound to decide whether Government agencies must have probable cause to install tracking devices on motor vehicles” because “the question is an important and recurring one.” Thus Justice Reiinquist thought that the Court would grant certiorari if “such an action would appear to offer the strong-likelihood of deciding an issue on which a square conflict exists.” Miroyan v. United States, 439 U. S. 1338, 1342-1343 (1978). With this case the square conflict has emerged.
      Other Circuits have reserved the issue because judicial authorization, consent, or exigent circumstances justified the installation. E. g., United States v. Chavez, 603 F. 2d 143, 145-146 (CA10 1979); United States v. Brunean. 594 F. 2d 1190, 1194 (CA8 1979).


text:
    No. 81-365.
    EA Industries, Inc. v. AMI Industries, Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of the petition for certiorari denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-403.
    Texas v. Green.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5009.
    Crouch et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

This case raises the question of how “plain” objects in “plain view” must be in order to justify a warrantless search. Specifically, it raises the question whether documents that must be read before their incriminating nature becomes evident are in plain view.

Petitioners are Mary Crouch and her son, Gary. On July 3, 1978, Gary Crouch was released for a 3-day furlough from Goodman Correctional Institute, where he was an inmate. Prior to his release, agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration had received information that indicated that Gary and Mary Crouch might be engaged in the manufacture of methamphetamine. On July 3, agents obtained a warrant authorizing a search of the Crouch residence for “chemicals, laboratory equipment, and other paraphernalia, which are used in the illegal manufacture of methamphetamines in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1).” The warrant was executed on the afternoon of July 6. The officers found chemicals, laboratory equipment, and empty gelatin capsules, but no methamphetamine. During the course of the search, agents discovered, in a drawer of a desk, a bundle of letters in open envelopes addressed to Gary at the state penitentiary from Mary. The agents removed the letters, examined their contents and found that they contained information concerning the manufacture of methamphetamine. Subsequently, the agents found another batch of letters, from Gary to Mary, in Mary’s purse (the purse does not seem to have been in her possession). These letters contained additional incriminating evidence. Both sets of letters were seized as evidence.

Petitioners unsuccessfully moved to suppress the letters at trial. Both were convicted of attempting to manufacture methamphetamine and of conspiring to manufacture and distribute that substance.

Petitioners appealed the failure to suppress the letters to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. That court held the seizure of the letters to have been proper under the plain-view doctrine. 648 F. 2d 932 (1981). It found that the agents acted within the scope of the search warrant in removing the letters from the envelopes to search for the chemicals and paraphernalia named in the warrant. The writings were thereby exposed and, the court concluded, they were “clearly and immediately incriminating.” By this, however, the court did not mean that it was not necessary to read the letters in order to establish their incriminating nature. Rather, it held that the “brief perusal” of an item does not render its incriminating nature any the less immediately apparent. Id,., at 933.

Although the Solicitor General argues in his response to the petition for certiorari that the search/reading of the letters was within the scope of the term “paraphernalia” as used in the warrant, the Court of Appeals did not rely on this reasoning. I find this argument sufficiently strained that I would not accept it without further development in the lower courts. Therefore, the case, as it comes here, presents only the question of whether a warrantless reading of documents is permissible under the plain-view doctrine; this is the basis upon which the Court of Appeals approved of the search.

Regardless of other disputes as to the scope of the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 510 (1971) (White, J., concurring and dissenting), it is common ground that the doctrine may justify the search and seizure of items only if the incriminating character of the items is immediately apparent:

“Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the ‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.” Id., at 466 (plurality opinion).

Since Coolidge, this Court has not had occasion to develop the limits of the concept “immediately apparent.” In the absence of authoritative direction from this Court, a number of Courts of Appeals have held that a plain-view seizure of certain documents is permissible even though their incriminating nature is not apparent absent some reading of their contents. United States v. Ochs, 595 F. 2d 1247 (CA2 1979) (loansharking records contained on loose ledger sheets and index cards); United States v. Pugh, 566 F. 2d 626 (CA8 1977) (stationery containing drug weight and price quotations, and a calendar book containing a log of drug distributions); United States v. Gargotto, 476 F. 2d 1009 (CA6 1973) (betting records); United States v. Damitz, 495 F. 2d 50 (CA9 1974) (notebook used for recording weights of marihuana bricks); United States v. Smith, 462 F. 2d 456 (CA8 1972) (lease); United States v. Maude, 156 U. S. App. D. C. 378, 481 F. 2d 1062 (1973) (identification cards). Although in each of these cases the incriminating character of the evidence was a function of the written message on the object, there are obvious differences in the quality of the perusal required to perceive that character. Some writings may be so obviously incriminating on their face that even a casual glance would reveal this character; others may require extensive reading. I do not believe that any of these cases went as far as the lower court here: permitting perusal of personal letters under the plain-view doctrine.

To extend, by means of the plain-view doctrine, a search authorized by a warrant to the reading of personal papers not included within the terms of that warrant raises extraordinarily important questions. One of the historical purposes of the Fourth Amendment was to bar the indiscriminate search/reading of personal papers under the authority of general warrants. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717, 724-729 (1961). To include perusal of letters or documents enclosed in envelopes within the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement may threaten to expand the bounds of legitimate search warrants and legitimate warrantless searches so far as to authorize in effect general searches. Furthermore, petitioners strongly urge the analogy between the facts of this case and those of Walter v. United States, 447 U. S. 649 (1980). Walter held unconstitutional the unauthorized viewing by the police of films properly in their possession. Exposure of the contents of the film, which we held to require previous judicial authorization despite the presence of probable cause, is not very different from exposure of the written contents of the letters here — an exposure not even supported by probable cause. Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 569 (1969) (Stewart, J., joined by Brennan and White, JJ., concurring in result).

At the very least, this case raises important questions that should be settled, and I would grant the petition and set the case for plenary consideration.

       The information was to the effect that petitioners had ordered laboratory equipment and precursor chemicals that could be used to manufacture methamphetamine.

       On July 6, prior to execution of the warrant the DEA agents submitted an addendum to the affidavit in support of the search warrant. That addendum contained information concerning the activities of petitioners since July 3. These activities included visits to the public library to consult chemical reference books and the photocopying of some information from those books. The Federal Magistrate does not seem to have taken any additional action in response to the addendum.

       Petitioners argue that the letters should be suppressed under Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927), in which the Court held that a warrant authorizing the seizure of “intoxicating liquors and articles for their manufacture” did not authorize the seizure of ledgers and bills found during the search. Id., at 193. The Solicitor General responds that this case is distinguishable from Marran on the ground that the term “paraphernalia,” as used in the warrant here, was correctly interpreted by the officers to include the formula necessary to synthesize the drug from precursor chemicals. The officers had reason to believe, and had informed the Magistrate, that the petitioners had photocopied chemical information at the library. The warrant, therefore, could reasonably be interpreted to cover documents. Obviously, this argument relies on the relevance of the July 6 addendum to the earlier affidavit. As the case comes here, however, it is not clear what purpose this addendum was designed to serve or whether it can even be relied upon to interpret the scope of a warrant issued — and not subsequently changed — prior to its submission to the Magistrate.


text:
    No. 81-5086.
    No. 81-5329.
    No. 81-5372.
    Booker v. Florida. Funchess v. Florida. Barfield v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.; and

Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 81-5086, 397 So. 2d 910; No. 81-5329, 399 So. 2d 356.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    October 30, 1981
    No. A-337.
    Canady et al. v. Lumberton City Board of Education et al.
   Application for an injunction, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, preventing the Board of Education and the Board of Elections from permitting residents of the three annexed areas involved in this case to vote in the school board election is granted, pending the timely filing and disposition of a jurisdictional statement, or until appellees demonstrate compliance with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.

The Chief Justice, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist dissent.


text:
    November 2, 1981
    No. 80-1894.
    Ben-Levi v. Ben-Levi.
   Appeal from Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 81-35.
    Van Hyning v. University of Alaska.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Alaska dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-354.
    Pickering v. City of Buffalo, New York.
   Appeal from C. A. 2d Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-441.
    Marsa v. Wernik, Mayor of Metuchen, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. J. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-454.
    Barsness v. Idaho.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Idaho dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-503.
    Stolberg v. Davidson et al.
   Appeal from Super. Ct. Conn., New Haven County, dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 81-226.
    Town of Hardenburgh, New York, et al. v. New York et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 81-462.
    Spiegel, Inc. v. Whitaker et ux.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wash, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 81-537.
    Beechwood Sanitarium, aka Beechwood Nursing Home v. Axelrod, Commissioner of Health of New York, et al.
   Appeal from App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 81-5386.
    Rogers v. Jinks et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5400.
    Stanley v. Stanley.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. C. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. Justice Blackmun would dismiss the appeal for want of a properly presented federal question.


text:
    No. 81-5383.
    May v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Adams v. Texas, 448 U. S. 38 (1980).


text:
    No.-.
    Williams et al. v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Arlington et al.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file the petition for writ of certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun would deny the motion as out of time.


text:
    No. 78-1545. No. 80-951.
    Zipes et al. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.; and Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 450 U. S. 979.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument denied.

Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 80-203.
    Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 451 U. S. 906.] Motion of Rosenthal & Co. for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 80-1464.
    Watt, Secretary of the Interior, et al. v. Energy Action Educational Foundation et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 450 U. S. 1040.] Motion of respondents for leave to file affidavits from officers of independent oil companies after argument denied.


text:
    No. 80-5889.
    Santosky et al. v. Kramer, Commissioner, Ulster County Department of Social Services, et al.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. [Certiorari granted, 450 U. S. 993.] Motion of the Attorney General of New York for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 81-5634.
    Tison et al. v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Motion of petitioners to expedite consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari and to consolidate this case with No. 81-5321, Enmund v. Florida [certiorari granted, ante, p. 939], denied.


text:
    No. 81-325.
    Blanding et al. v. DuBose et al.
   D. C. S. C. Motion of the Sumter County appellees to strike the brief of the United States is denied with leave of the Sumter County appellees to file a brief in response to the brief of the Solicitor General on or before November 16, 1981.


text:
    No. 81-752.
    Carey, Governor of New York, et al. v. Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of petitioners to expedite consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari and to consolidate this case with No. 80-1436, Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce v. Shapiro, Essex County Executive [certiorari granted, 451 U. S. 936], and with No. 80-1781, McNichols, Mayor of Denver v. Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce [certiorari granted, 452 U. S. 937], denied.


text:
    No. 80-6298.
    Mills v. Habluetzel.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 13th Sup. Jud. Dist. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 451 U. S. 936.] Motion of appellee to dismiss the appeal as moot denied.


text:
    No. 81-5525.
    In re Booker.
   Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 80-6934.
    No. 81-5438.
    In re Reiter; and In re Kulwiec.
   Petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 81-31. No. 81-228. No. 81-455.
    California et al. v. Grace Brethren Church et al.; United States et al. v. Grace Brethren Church et al.; and Grace Brethren Church et al. v. United States et al.
   Appeals from D. C. C. D. Cal. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of cases on the merits. Cases consolidated and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument.


text:
    No. 80-1002.
    Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, Westchester County, et al. v. Rowley, by her parents, Rowley et ux.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 81-225.
    Blue Shield of Virginia et al. v. McCready.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 81-395.
    United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Sadlowski et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 81-412.
    Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., dba WMC TV Channel 5.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari granted.


text:
    No. 81-460.
    Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Assn. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-rari granted.


text:
    No. 80-2070.
    No. 81-24.
    Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avigliano et al.; and Avigliano et al. v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in these cases expressing the views of the United States. Reported below: 638 F. 2d 552.


text:
    No. 80-2205.
    Finley, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois v. Murray.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 81-406.
    Mississippi University for Women et al. v. Hogan.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of Mississippi University for Women Alumnae Association for leave to file a

brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 81-450.
    United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 81-440.
    Insurance Corporation of Ireland, Ltd., et al. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 81-5114.
    Tibbs v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis and cer-tiorari granted.


text:
    No. 81-5152.
    Taylor v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 80-1947.
    First National Bank of Tulsa et al. v. Layon, Executrix.
   Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1961.
    Queen v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1997.
    International Association of Fish & Wildlife Agencies v. Defenders of Wildlife, Inc., et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6703.
    Gomez v. Idaho.
   Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6841.
    Valenzuela et al. v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6933.
    Evans v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5.
    Allen Archery, Inc. v. Precision Shooting Equipment Co. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-19.
    Leppo v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-44.
    Lopez v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-51.
    Abrams v. Mississippi State Board of Health et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-137.
    Donohue v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-157.
    Pledger et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-173.
    No. 81-422.
    Washington Post Co. v. Rebozo; and Rebozo v. Washington Post Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 637 F. 2d 375.


text:
    No. 81-188.
    Center for Laboratory Medicine, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-196.
    Giacalone v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-206.
    Akmakjian v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-231.
    Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. et al. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-236.
    Grindstone Butte Project et al. v. Watt, Secretary of the Interior, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-239.
    Broad v. Rockwell International Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-253.
    Universal Security Instruments, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-265.
    Carnation Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-279.
    Berman Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. Local 333, United Marine Division, International Longshoremen’s Assn., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-287.
    Air Canada v. National Mediation Board et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-302.
    Jones et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-309.
    Washington Department of Revenue v. Wofford.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-314.
    No. 81-475.
    Sine et al. v. Mitchell Transport, Inc., et al.; and Eastern Conference of Teamsters v. Sine et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-320.
    Jeter et al. v. Associated Rack Corp.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 6th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-348.
    Holgerson et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-355.
    Russo et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-369.
    Berry v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-377.
    Myhrvold v. Sullivan, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-380.
    Bernstein v. Allstate Insurance Co.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-385.
    Ore Sea Transport v. Burmah Oil Tankers, Ltd., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-386.
    Johnson v. Sweetwater Carpet Corp.
   Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-388.
    Alpha Standard Investment Co. v. County of Los Angeles.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-401.
    International Longshoremen’s Assn., AFL-CIO, et al. v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-408.
    National Fidelity Life Insurance Co. et al. v. Mattes, Executor.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-409.
    Canlis, Sheriff-Coroner, et al. v. San Joaquin Sheriff’s Posse Comitatus et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-410.
    New York v. Pepper.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-413.
    Ohler v. Nebraska.
   Sup. Ct. Neb. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-418.
    Brew et al., Trustees v. First Wall Street Settlement Corp. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-426.
    Foremost International Tours, Inc. v. Qantas Airways Ltd.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-428.
    Schreiber v. Liva et al.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-429.
    Bushelman v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-434.
    Molina v. Popular Democratic Party et al.
   Sup. Ct. P. R. Certiorari denied. Reported below: -p. R. R.-.


text:
    No. 81-436.
    Hurley v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-439.
    Winzer v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 9th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-444.
    Modin v. New York Central Co. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-445.
    Broadway Delivery Corp. et al. v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-446.
    Murray v. Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.
   Sup. Ct. P. R. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-449.
    Falstaff Brewing Corp. et al. v. Dependahl et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-456.
    Prince v. Grievance Committee for the Second & Eleventh Judicial Districts.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-457.
    Oden et al. v. Anderson et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-459.
    Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Dietz et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-461.
    Alexander v. Chrysler Corp.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-470.
    Daniello v. Oliveti.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-479.
    Greaves v. Oregon.
   Ct. App. Ore. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-482.
    Cahill et ux. v. City of Chesapeake.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-491.
    Roy v. Civil Service Commission, City of Wyoming, Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-493.
    Murphy v. Lehman, Secretary of the Navy.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-495.
    Kaeli v. McKenzie et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-498.
    International Harvester Co. v. Deere & Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-500.
    Worrell v. B. F. Goodrich Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-502.
    Bush v. Cumberland Engineering.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-506.
    Soto v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-507.
    Jewett v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-512.
    Teletype Corp. v. Taylor et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-514.
    Skaggs Drugs Centers, Inc., et al. v. Baseline Liquors.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-527.
    Liberman v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-528.
    Celano v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-541.
    Martin v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-556.
    Garcia v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-564.
    Sutherland v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-566.
    Diggs v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-575.
    Ruiz et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-599.
    Horton v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-610.
    DiMola v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-619.
    Bascaro v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-620.
    Sibert v. Merit Systems Protection Board et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5029.
    Moore v. Tennessee.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5039.
    Daye v. Newkirk et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5089.
    Galvan-Serna v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5097.
    Harden v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5105.
    Greene v. Griffin, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5117.
    Coades v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5132.
    Busse v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5145.
    Doyle v. Gill et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5166.
    Matthew et al. v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5178.
    Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, United States Marshal.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5222.
    Wojciechowski v. Horowitz.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5228.
    Hunter v. Delaware.
   Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5278.
    Gurley v. Metz, Superintendent, Great Meadow Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5313.
    Boggins v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5340.
    Woods v. Henderson, Superintendent, Auburn Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5349.
    Steinsvik v. Morris.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5350.
    Reliford v. Ricketts et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5353.
    Zatko v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5354.
    Veneri v. Delaware County Common Pleas Court et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5355.
    Kinnell v. Theis, U. S. District Judge, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5357.
    Haymon v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5363.
    Dorsey v. Curtin & Johnson, Inc., et al.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5364.
    Garcia v. Anderson, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5365.
    Preble v. Maine.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5366.
    Evans v. Delaware; and Young v. Delaware.
   Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5369.
    Powell v. Offshore Navigation, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5370.
    Zatko v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5374.
    Higgins v. Character and Fitness Committee, Fourth Department, New York Supreme Court.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5378.
    Long v. Maryland.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5380.
    Charles v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5381.
    White v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5382.
    Sanders v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5384.
    Roberts v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5387.
    Paolo v. Oregon.
   Ct. App. Ore. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5389.
    United States ex rel. Lewis v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County et al.
   Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5391.
    Martinez v. Deauville Hotel et al.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5392.
    Rivera v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5399.
    Rubasky v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5401.
    Sabel v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5404.
    Boldt v. Wisconsin.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5405.
    Boles v. Johnson, Director, Michigan Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5413.
    Zurek v. Hasten et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5431.
    In re Campbell.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5434.
    Allard v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5449.
    Oliver v. Pennsylvania et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5474.
    Paul v. Stafford, U. S. District Judge, Northern District of Florida.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5475.
    Presley v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5487.
    Orton v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5502.
    McConnell v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5503.
    Gray v. Bordenkircher, Warden, West Virginia Penitentiary.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5505.
    Phillippi v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5510.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5511.
    Bierman v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5512.
    Lewis v. Petrovsky, Warden, United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5513.
    Swan v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5514.
    Biondich v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5522.
    Moore v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5529.
    Hester v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5538.
    Burns v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1829.
    Austin, State Attorney, Fourth Judicial Circuit of Florida, et al. v. Roberts et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Motion of Florida for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae out of time denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1876.
    Michigan v. Plantefaber.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.