text:
    No. 84-5088.
    Birges v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 84-5089.
    Baig v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5090.
    Gatewood v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5091.
    Gann v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5094.
    Bankhead v. Walters et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5095.
    Harris v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5096.
    Groth v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5097.
    Doak v. Garrison, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5098.
    Lobue v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5099.
    Brady v. Smith, Attorney General.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5100.
    King v. Reed et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5101.
    Cover v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5102.
    Agresti v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5103.
    Baker v. Williams.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5105.
    Jenkins v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5106.
    Humphrey v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5107.
    Fusi v. Brooklyn Center School District No. 286.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5111.
    Stump v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5112.
    Washington v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5113.
    Crews v. Petrosky, Clerk of Courts, Washington County, Pennsylvania, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5114.
    Martinez et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5115.
    Burgett v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Lorain County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5117.
    Smith v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5118.
    Echols v. Michigan Civil Rights Commission et al.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5121.
    Beckett v. Holland, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5122.
    Torres et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5124.
    Harris v. Rees, Superintendent, Kentucky State Reformatory, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5127.
    Forrester v. United States Air Force.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5128.
    Ferrara v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5130.
    Santana v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5131.
    Smith v. Cupp, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5136.
    Mosley v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5137.
    Workman v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5138.
    Teegardin v. Solem, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5139.
    Carter v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5140.
    Mosley v. North Carolina et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5141.
    Hair v. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5143.
    Curry-Lee v. Lee.
   Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5144.
    Hardaway v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5145.
    Cavallaro v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5146.
    Jones v. Howard.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5148.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5149.
    Bethea v. Swiggett et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5150.
    Maviglia, dba Joe’s Sewer Service v. Central Telephone Co. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5151.
    Anker v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5152.
    Brooks v. Engle, Superintendent, Chillicothe Correctional Institute.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5153.
    Byrd v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5155.
    Lightsey v. Murphy, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5156.
    Weatherly v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5158.
    Brown v. Jones et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5159.
    Thomas v. Strawn et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5160.
    Smith v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5162.
    Cooper v. Randall et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5165.
    Hoffman v. New Mexico.
   Ct. App. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5166.
    Taylor v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5168.
    Sosa v. Louisiana.
   Ct. App. La., 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5169.
    Hartley v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5171.
    McCrary v. Franklin State Bank Corp. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5172.
    Verost v. Board of Education of Village of Ridgewood.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5177.
    Hawks v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5181.
    Turner v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5182.
    Groce v. Board of Prison Terms and Paroles et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5184.
    Petway v. Carlson et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5186.
    Benson v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5187.
    Hamilton v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5188.
    Covelli v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5189.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5190.
    Rumph v. White.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5192.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5193.
    Perry v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5196.
    Martin-Trigona et al. v. Coan et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5199.
    Otero v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5202.
    Lanigan v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5203.
    McLaine v. Agnew et al.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5207.
    Hoyett v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5211.
    Bigelow v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5215.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5216.
    Hanson v. Sanford et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. D. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5218.
    Oduwole v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5223.
    Faymore v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5226.
    Anderson v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5233.
    Heirens v. Irving, Chairman, Illinois Prison Review Board, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5234.
    Lane v. Lacy, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5236.
    Smiddy v. Anderson, Judge, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5239.
    Price v. Booker, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5242.
    Foy v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5244.
    Attwell et ux. v. U. S. Postal Service et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5252.
    Martin v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5263.
    Simpson v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5267.
    Dennis v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5273.
    Payne v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5278.
    Jorge-Salon v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5279.
    Jackson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5286.
    Dukes v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5301.
    Pleasant v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5302.
    Wiggins v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5305.
    Tsirizotakis, aka Alaska v. LeFevre, Superintendent, Clinton Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5306.
    Orjuela v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5313.
    Jordan v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5325.
    Tapia v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5328.
    Lopez v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1267.
    Powers et al. v. City of Huntsville.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Motion of Albertsons, Inc.—Southco Division for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1534.
    Gray et al. v. Sherrills.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1693.
    Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. v. Byrd.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1875.
    Smith, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al. v. Ritter.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1914.
    Jefferson County, Kentucky, et al. v. Buchanan.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-7.
    Leeke et al. v. Thomas.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-60.
    Balkcom, Warden v. House.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1616.
    Foreman et al. v. Collins et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondent Howard V. Collins for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1619.
    Chemical Bank et al. v. Asson et al.
   Sup. Ct. Idaho. Motion of petitioners to defer consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1654.
    Mehrens v. Arizona.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan would grant certiorari. Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 83-1659.
    No. 84-89.
    McDonald et al. v. Johnson & Johnson; and Johnson & Johnson v. McDonald et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Reported below: 722 F. 2d 1370.

Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.


text:
    No. 83-1793.
    Givens et al. v. United States Railroad Retirement Board.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion to substitute Estate of Jack C. Givens as party petitioner in place of Jack C. Givens, deceased, granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1817.
    Harkins et al. v. Interstate Motor Freight Systems et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondents to defer consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1839.
    Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of respondent for damages denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1872.
    South Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America, Inc., et al. v. Metropolitan Dade County, Florida, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motions of Associated General Contractors of America, Inc., and Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc., for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1879.
    Arizona Western College District Governing Board et al. v. Cooper et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 83-1948.
    Bethlehem Steel Corp. et al. v. Boileau et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 83-6862.
    Mack v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 83-1880.
    Piher International Corp. et al. v. CTS Corp.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 83-1904.
    Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S. A. L. v. Tamari et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of Futures Industry Association, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1912.
    Reed v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner to consolidate this case with No. 83-1590, Francis v. Franklin [certiorari granted, 467 U. S. 1225], denied.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1918.
    Eubank v. Lee Lumber Co., Ltd., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondent International Paper Co. for damages denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1943.
    Cavanaugh v. Western Maryland Railway Co. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of United Transportation Union for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1989.
    Sullivan v. Georgia Department of Natural Resources et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed as a seaman granted. Certiorari denied.

Justice White and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 83-1990.
    Lukhard, Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Social Services, et al. v. Randall et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

Justice Powell would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 83-2001.
    Paschall et al. v. Kansas City Star Co.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of Small Business Legal Defense Committee for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan, Justice White, and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 83-2041.
    Billmeyer et al. v. Tovar et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari denied as untimely.

Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens would deny the petition.


text:
    No. 83-2084.
    Case v. CPC International, Inc., et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of Wendell S. Miller for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae denied.

Justice Stevens would grant this motion. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-2086.
    Foster v. Fillinger.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 83-6555.
    No. 83-6580.
    No. 83-6623.
    No. 83-6660.
    No. 83-6690.
    No. 83-6694.
    No. 83-6699.
    No. 83-6708.
    No. 83-6740.
    No. 83-6748.
    No. 83-6763.
    No. 83-6802.
    No. 83-6806.
    No. 83-6811.
    No. 83-6829.
    No. 83-6833.
    No. 83-6855.
    No. 83-6882.
    No. 83-6895.
    No. 83-6912.
    No. 84-85.
    No. 84-5001.
    No. 84-5007.
    No. 84-5049.
    No. 84-5092.
    No. 84-5125.
    No. 84-5129.
    No. 84-5185.
    No. 84-5228.
    Bottoson v. Florida. Skillern v. Procunier, Director, Texas Department of Corrections. Griffin v. Missouri. Celestine v. Louisiana. Matson v. Tennessee. Rault v. Louisiana. Agan v. Florida. Deutscher v. Wolff, Director, Department of Prisons, et al. Colvin v. Maryland. Workman v. Tennessee. Hochstein v. Nebraska. Anderson v. Nebraska. Guinan v. Missouri. Silagy v. Illinois. Palmes v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. Jones v. Francis, Warden. Hopkinson v. Wyoming. Roberts v. Georgia. Lusk v. Florida. Lashley v. Missouri. Felker v. Georgia. Stockton v. Virginia. Castell v. Georgia. Shaw v. Martin, Warden. Booker v. Mississippi. Wilcher v. Mississippi. Resnover v. Indiana. Caldwell v. Tennessee. Jones v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Fla.;

C. A. 5th Cir.;

Sup. Ct. Mo.;

Sup. Ct. La.;

Sup. Ct. Tenn.;

Sup. Ct. La.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

C. A. 9th Cir.;

Ct. App. Md.;

Sup. Ct. Tenn.;

Sup. Ct. Neb.;

Sup. Ct. Neb.;

Sup. Ct. Mo.;

Sup. Ct. Ill.;

C. A. 11th Cir.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. Wyo.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. Mo.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. Va.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

C. A. 4th Cir.;

Sup. Ct. Miss.;

Sup. Ct. Miss.;

Sup. Ct. Ind.;

Sup. Ct. Tenn.; and

Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 83-6555, 443 So. 2d 962; No. 83-6580, 720 F. 2d 839; No. 83-6623, 662 S. W. 2d 854; No. 83-6660, 443 So. 2d 1091; No. 83-6690, 666 S. W. 2d 41; No. 83-6694, 445 So. 2d 1203; No. 83-6699, 445 So. 2d 326; No. 83-6708, 720 F. 2d 1108; No. 83-6740, 299 Md. 88, 472 A. 2d 953; No. 83-6748, 667 S. W. 2d 44; No. 83-6763, 216 Neb. 515, 344 N. W. 2d 469; No. 83-6802, 216 Neb. 521, 344 N. W. 2d 473; No. 83-6806, 665 S. W. 2d 325; No. 83-6811, 101 Ill. 2d 147, 461 N. E. 2d 415; No. 83-6829, 725 F. 2d 1511; No. 83-6833, 252 Ga. 60, 312 S. E. 2d 300; No. 83-6855, 679 P. 2d 1008; No. 83-6882, 252 Ga. 227, 314 S. E. 2d 83; No. 83-6895, 446 So. 2d 1038; No. 83-6912, 667 S. W. 2d 712; No. 84-85, 252 Ga. 351, 314 S. E. 2d 621; No. 84-5001, 227 Va. 124, 314 S. E. 2d 371; No. 84-5007, 252 Ga. 418, 314 S. E. 2d 210; No. 84-5049, 733 F. 2d 304; No. 84-5092, 449 So. 2d 209; No. 84-5125, 448 So. 2d 927; No. 84-5129, 460 N. E. 2d 922; No. 84-5185, 671 S. W. 2d 459; No. 84-5228, 450 So. 2d 171.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 83-6801.
    Bermudez v. Reid, Superintendent, Fishkill Correctional Facility, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York County, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6830.
    Birt v. Montgomery, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 84-3.
    Swaida v. IBM Retirement Plan et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun and Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 84-72.
    AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Blim et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Powell and Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 84-99.
    Cohen v. President and Fellows of Harvard University et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 84-105.
    Fine et al. v. Bellefonte Underwriters Insurance Co.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of Municipal Art Society of New York for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-106.
    Rhode Island v. Von Bulow.
   Sup. Ct. R. I. Motions of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. and Annie Laurie Kneissel et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5082.
    Brown v. Pennsylvania et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of Harvey Kudler for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    October 4, 1984
    No. 83-2106.
    Louisiana v. Sorina.
   Ct. App. La., 4th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    October 9, 1984
    No. 84-138.
    South Carolina v. United States et al.
   Appeal from D. C. D. C. dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    No. 83-1816.
    Jibson v. White Cloud Education Assn.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Mich, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice Blackmun, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 83-7039.
    Chambers v. Vermont.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Vt. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-245.
    Pellegrino et al. v. O’Neill et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Conn, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-293.
    Ferneding v. Consolidated Rail Corporation et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5217.
    Robinson v. Thompson, Governor of Illinois, et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 7th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-278.
    Stagner, dba West Route Trading Co. v. Wyoming State Tax Commission et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wyo. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. - - -.
    No. - - -.
    Onett v. United States; and Tropigas, S. A. v. Anderson et al.
   Motions to direct the Clerk to file the petitions for writs of certiorari that do not comply with the Rules of this Court denied.


text:
    No. - - -.
    National Association for the Advancement of Colored People et al. v. Town of Hilton Head et al.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file the jurisdictional statement that does not comply with the Rules of this Court denied.

Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor would grant the motion.


text:
    No. A-169 (84-372).
    Friedrich v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Powell and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-178.
    Ruckelshaus, Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., Inc., et al.
   D. C. S. D. N. Y. Application for stay, presented to Justice Marshall, and by him referred to the Court is granted, and the District Court’s judgment in 79 Civ. 2913(RO) enjoining operation of § 3(c)(1)(D) [of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act] is stayed pending disposition of the appeal.


text:
    No. A-200 (83-1836).
    Burton v. Board on Professional Responsibility of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
   Ct. App. D. C. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Blackmun and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-214.
    Walters, Administrator of Veteran’s Affairs, et al. v. National Association of Radiation Survivors et al.
   D. C. N. D. Cal. Motion to vacate the stay entered by Justice Rehnquist on September 27, 1984 [468 U. S. 1323], denied.

Justice Stevens would grant the motion.


text:
    No. D-444.
    In re Disbarment of Sherr.
    [For earlier order herein, see 468 U. S. 1223.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. 82-1922.
    Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 467 U. S. 1240.] Motion of National Industrial Transportation League for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 83-703.
    No. 83-1031.
    Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, dba Center for Nuclear Responsibility, et al.; and United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission et al. v. Lorion et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 466 U. S. 903.] Motion of the Solicitor General to permit Charles A. Rothfeld, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hoc vice granted.


text:
    No. 83-1020.
    Ohio v. Kovacs, dba B & W Enterprises et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 465 U. S. 1078.] Motion of Thomas J. O’Neill, Trustee in Bankruptcy of Quanta Resources Corp., Debtor, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae out of time denied.

Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 83-1035.
    No. 83-1070.
    Tennessee v. Garner et al. Memphis Police Department et al. v. Garner et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 465 U. S. 1098]; and

C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 465 U. S. 1098.] Motion of appellant in No. 83-1035 and petitioners in No. 83-1070 for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 83-1097.
    Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Turner et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 465 U. S. 1064.] Motion of state respondents for leave to file reply brief in support of petitioner denied.


text:
    No. 83-2076.
    No. 84-322.
    Pollard v. Board of Police Commissioners et al. Reminick et al. v. Maltz et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mo.; and

Ct. App. N. Y. The Solicitor General is invited to file briefs in these cases expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 84-5266.
    No. 84-5340.
    Chambers v. American Greetings Corp. Cummings v. Merit Systems Protection Board.
   C. A. 8th Cir.; and

C. A. Fed. Cir. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until October 30, 1984, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.

Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

For the reasons expressed in Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U. S. 928 (1983), we would deny the petitions for writs of certiorari without reaching the merits of the motions to proceed informa pauperis.


text:
    No. 84-5294.
    No. 84-5382.
    In re Cooper; and In re Thaper.
   Petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 84-5310.
    In re Forrester.
   Petition for writ of prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 84-76.
    Hunter et al. v. Underwood et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 11th Cir. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 84-231.
    Hooper et al. v. Bernalillo County Assessor.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. M. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 84-237.
    No. 84-238.
    No. 84-239.
    Aguilar et al. v. Felton et al.; Secretary of the United States Department of Education v. Felton et al.; and Chancellor of the Board of Education of the City of New York v. Felton et al.
   Appeals from C. A. 2d Cir. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of cases on the merits. Cases consolidated and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 739 F. 2d 48.


text:
    No. 83-2148.
    Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife et al. v. Klamath Indian Tribe.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 84-68.
    Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 84-249.
    Spencer et ux. v. South Carolina Tax Commission et al.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 84-233.
    Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts et al.
   Sup. Ct. Kan. Motions of Legal Foundation of America and National Association of Independent Insurers for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions and this petition.


text:
    No. 84-262.
    Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motions of Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. and Public Service Company of New Mexico for leave to file briefs as amid curiae granted. Certiorari granted. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this casé expressing the views of the United States.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions and this petition.


text:
    No. 83-6607.
    Caldwell v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-1803.
    California v. Cohen et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1890.
    McKeel et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1891.
    No. 83-1892.
    Jannotti v. United States; and Schwartz v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 F. 2d 213.


text:
    No. 83-2000.
    AWECO, Inc., et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-2005.
    Zweibon et al. v. Mitchell.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-2010.
    Gutman v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-2018.
    Ruiz v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-2085.
    Champeau v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-2134.
    No. 83-6876.
    Bockoven et al. v. Marsh, Secretary of the Army, et al.; and Gelber v. Marsh, Secretary of the Army.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 F. 2d 1558.


text:
    No. 83-2162.
    Belland et al. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-2164.
    Angleton et al. v. Pierce, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6666.
    Beck v. Zimmerman, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6793.
    Armon v. Jones et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6922.
    Fly et vir v. Cella et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6934.
    Thurman v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-35.
    Kostadinov v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-39.
    Young Brothers, Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-41.
    Moore, dba Log Mountain Mining Co. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-47.
    Persinger et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-50.
    Teachers Insurance & Annuity Assn. et al. v. Spirt et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-64.
    Cryts et al. v. French, Trustee, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-78.
    Campbell et al. v. Department of Transportation et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-81.
    Morgan v. Colorado.
   Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-86.
    Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. et al. v. Barber et ux.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Stark County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-92.
    El Paso County Community College District et al. v. Professional Association of College Educators, TSTA/NEA, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-93.
    Fine v. Barry & Enright Productions et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-100.
    Kupferstein v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-101.
    Brontel, Ltd., et al. v. City of New York et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-142.
    Republic of Colombia v. Fonseca et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-162.
    An Article of Device: “Toftness Radiation Detector” et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-166.
    Windrush Partners, Ltd., dba Windrush Apartments, et al. v. Metro Fair Housing Services.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-181.
    Superior West Sixth Corp. v. Cuyahoga County Board of Review et al.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-187.
    Chaplain et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-192.
    Bradley et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-203.
    Behrend et al. v. Godwin et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-204.
    Tobriner et al. v. Redevelopment Agency of the City of Concord.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-212.
    International Harvester Co. v. Wasson et al.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-219.
    Morris et al. v. Providence Hospital.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-220.
    Dunlap v. Washington.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-222.
    Strachan Shipping Co. et al. v. Bankers & Shippers Insurance Company of New York et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-228.
    Shaheen Natural Resources Co., Inc. v. La Societe Nationale pour la Recherche, la Production, le Transport, la Transformation et la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-234.
    Wilkinson v. Hampers.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-235.
    Showcase Cinemas Concessions of Dedham, Inc., et al. v. Silva et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-242.
    Heghmann et ux. v. Connecticut Savings Bank.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-246.
    Angel et ux. v. Renn.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-250.
    Chic Magazine, Inc. v. Braun et ux.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-251.
    Edwards et al. v. Consolidated Rail Corporation.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-253.
    Hsiung v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-255.
    Garlam Enterprises Corp. v. Autoridad de Carreteras de Puerto Rico.
   Sup. Ct. P. R. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-257.
    City of Los Angeles et al. v. Buttler et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-264.
    Chemical Bank et al. v. Arthur Andersen & Co.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-280.
    City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-282.
    Knowles et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-286.
    Konik v. Champlain Valley Physicians Hospital Medical Center et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-299.
    Jones v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 3d Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-300.
    Besser v. Greenfield.
   Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-301.
    Lanning et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-302.
    Hastings v. Investigating Committee of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-376.
    Sadosky v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-377.
    Glomb v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5044.
    Craney v. Iowa.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5064.
    Mayoral et al. v. Jeffco American Baptist Residences, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5067.
    Frazier v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5109.
    Arnett v. Parke, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5142.
    Garay v. Scully, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5194.
    Tennart v. Maggio, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5198.
    Tarkowski v. Pennzoil Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5209.
    Hughes v. Florida; and Taylor, aka Kuebler v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5212.
    Gregory v. Wyrick, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5222.
    Dock v. Latimer et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5225.
    Lamacki v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5229.
    Hornick v. Pennsylvania et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5230.
    Barshai v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5231.
    Jones v. Wolverine Bolt Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5232.
    Bethea v. J. A. Jones Construction Services Co.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5246.
    Staples v. Scheralla et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5248.
    Ferenc, aka Rowe v. Paite et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5250.
    John v. Silverlight et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5253.
    Petrofsky v. Richards.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5255.
    Borrelli v. Anderson et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5259.
    Shemerdiak v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board of California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5272.
    Ross v. Henderson, Superintendent, Auburn Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5275.
    Stinson v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5277.
    LaRose v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5281.
    McCrary v. Cohen et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5283.
    Fells v. Maben et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5284.
    Fuentes v. Ross et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5285.
    Heck v. Communications Satellite Corp.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5289.
    Booker v. Mitchell, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5290.
    Golden v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5292.
    Hatch v. Mason et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5293.
    Laskaris et al. v. Thornburgh, Governor of Pennsylvania, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5295.
    Freeman v. White, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5296.
    Cooper v. Davis, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5299.
    Kuster v. McCarthy, Director, California Department of Corrections.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5311.
    Harrison v. Maryland.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5312.
    Cole v. Frye, Superintendent, Missouri Eastern Correctional Center.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5337.
    Demos v. McNichols et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5341.
    Kakley v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5345.
    Aguilar, aka Palacios v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5355.
    Staples v. Israel, Superintendent, Waupun Correctional Institution.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5358.
    Fisherman v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5365.
    Cabezas v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5381.
    Martinez et al. v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5391.
    Gabrish v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5393.
    Locosale v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice White,

text:
    No. 83-1755.
    Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local No. 70 v. California Consolidators, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

with whom Justice O’Connor joins,

dissenting.

In South Prairie Construction Co. v. Operating Engineers, 425 U. S. 800 (1976) (per curiam), this Court held that a Federal Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to decide the appropriateness of a bargaining unit in the first instance, but should have allowed the National Labor Relations Board to make an initial determination. Because two Courts of Appeals have adopted inconsistent interpretations of South Prairie, I dissent from the denial of certiorari.

In South Prairie, a union that represented the employees of one company had filed a complaint with the Board contending that its collective-bargaining agreement should cover the employees of a second company because the two companies actually constituted a “single employer” within the National Labor Relations Act. The Board concluded that the two companies were in fact separate employers, and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit set aside this determination. It then went on to reach and decide a second question, which had not been passed on by the Board: whether the employees of the two companies constituted the appropriate unit under § 9(b) of the Act for purposes of collective bargaining. Section 9(b) directs the Board to “decide in each case whether . . . the unit-appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof.” 61 Stat. 143, 29 U. S. C. § 159(b). We held that the Court of Appeals had erred when it took upon itself the initial determination of this issue:

“In foreclosing the Board from the opportunity to determine the appropriate bargaining unit under §9, the Court of Appeals did not give ‘due observance [to] the distribution of authority made by Congress as between its power to regulate commerce and the reviewing power which it has conferred upon the courts under Article III of the Constitution.’ FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 141 (1940).” 425 U. S., at 806.

In the present case, the Court of Appeals interpreted this language to mean that a federal court is precluded from deciding the appropriateness of a bargaining unit even when the question has never been presented to the Board. The union in this case had proceeded directly into federal court under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 185(a). It alleged that the company whose employees it represented and another company constituted a “single employer,” and sought a declaratory judgment that the second company was bound by the union’s collective-bargaining agreement with the first company. The District Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate this complaint. The Court of Appeals held that South Prairie necessarily implied that “single employer questions comprise two subsidiary issues”: whether two companies constitute a single employer, and whether the employees form a single or appropriate bargaining unit. 693 F. 2d 81, 82 (1982). Section 301 granted district courts jurisdiction to determine the first of these questions, but not the second. The appropriateness of a bargaining unit was a “representational question reserved in the first instance to the Board.” Id., at 84. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals remanded to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing on the single employer issue only.

Two days later, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached a contrary conclusion in a similar case. Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F. 2d 489 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 932 (1983). The Fifth Circuit read South Prairie as being limited to the situation in which two claims are initially presented to the Board and only one of them is decided there. In the Fifth Circuit’s view, South Prairie did not preclude a federal court with jurisdiction under § 301 from determining whether a bargaining unit is appropriate, where such a determination was necessary to a resolution of the underlying breach-of-contract issue. Because neither party had petitioned the Board to determine the appropriateness of the bargaining unit in Pratt-Farnsworth, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court for consideration of the question. The Court of Appeals found support for this disposition in decisions of this Court upholding the jurisdiction of federal courts under § 301 even in the face of the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction to consider allegations of unfair labor practices. The bargaining unit issue, the Fifth Circuit concluded, was a “collateral issue” that was essential to the determination of a breach-of-contract claim under § 301. Cf. Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, 421 U. S. 616, 626 (1975) (federal courts may decide unfair labor practice questions that emerge as collateral issues under the antitrust laws).

These two decisions are in square conflict. Although the conflict is now limited to two Circuits, these Circuits are very large Circuits indeed, and the issue will surely arise elsewhere. The Eighth Circuit, addressing the narrower question whether a federal court may determine the appropriateness of a bargaining unit under §301 after the Board has made such a determination in a prior administrative proceeding, has read South Prairie broadly, as did the Ninth Circuit in this case. Local Union 204 of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Affiliated with AFL-CIO v. Iowa Electric Light and Power Co., 668 F. 2d 413 (1982). The Eighth Circuit drew the line “between those cases where the district court has jurisdiction under section 301 and those in which it does not” by “examining the major issues to be decided as to whether they can be characterized as primarily representational or primarily contractual.” Id., at 419. It characterized the determination of an appropriate bargaining unit as a representational question committed to the jurisdiction of the Board.

I would grant certiorari to resolve the conflict between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, and to avert the wider conflict that will likely arise in the wake of these inconsistent decisions.


text:
    No. 83-1759.
    Rohrer, Hibler & Replogle, Inc. v. Perkins.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Blackmun joins,

dissenting.

In 1977, respondent, Dr. Robert Perkins, signed a contract of employment with petitioner Rohrer, Hibler & Replogle, Inc. The contract provided that the Circuit Court of Cook County, 111., would have jurisdiction over any disputes that might arise between the parties. In 1983, such a dispute arose, and petitioner filed suit against respondent in the Cook County Circuit Court. Respondent removed the suit to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on grounds of diversity. Arguing that the contract required that the dispute be adjudicated in the Cook County court, petitioner filed a motion to remand to the state court. The District Court denied the motion on the ground that the contractual provision was not a mandatory forum selection clause, and petitioner attempted to appeal the ruling.

The Seventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal from the denial of the motion to remand. 728 F. 2d 860. The court rejected petitioner’s theory that the order was appealable under 28 U. S. C. § 1291 because it fell into “that small class [of orders] which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949). The court noted that there was no reason to believe that the order would be effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment. The court also declined to hold the order reviewable under the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651, on the ground that a petition for a writ of mandamus may not be used as a substitute for an appeal. Finally, the court held that the order was not reviewable under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(a) (1), which allows appeals from interlocutory orders “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions.” Petitioner contended that this provision was applicable by virtue of Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U. S. 379 (1935), and Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U. S. 188 (1942), which hold that a stay issued to allow consideration of an equitable defense is an “injunction” for purposes of § 1292(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit pointed out, however, that remanding a case to a state court was not the equivalent of issuing a stay; accordingly, the denial of the motion was not appealable under § 1292(a)(1).

In short, the Seventh Circuit held that a district court’s interlocutory order declining to give effect to a contractual forum selection clause is not an appealable order under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. This holding appears to place the Seventh Circuit in direct conflict with the Third Circuit, which held a similar order appealable in Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F. 2d 190, cert. denied, 464 U. S. 938 (1983). In Coastal Steel, the District Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss a contract action on the basis of a contractual provision calling for litigation of any claims under the contract in an English court. The Third Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under either the Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. exception to § 1291’s finality requirement, the All Writs Act, or § 1292(a)(1) as interpreted in Enelow and Ettelson, supra.

There is no meaningful distinction between this case and Coastal Steel. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit recognized as much when it declined even to attempt to distinguish the holding of the Coastal Steel majority. That the forum selection clause in Coastal Steel specified a foreign court while the one at issue here designates a domestic forum is of little moment: in both cases, denying immediate review would simply postpone the decision whether the contract requires litigation in another forum until after a trial on the merits. In neither case is the order more or less meaningfully reviewable on appeal from final judgment than in the other. The conflict created by the Third Circuit’s decision in this case is inescapable, and this petition should be granted to resolve it. Accordingly, I dissent from the denial of certiorari.


text:
    No. 83-1829.
    Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 83-1902.
    Simpson v. Beeler et ux.
   Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 83-6920.
    Lewis v. Procunier, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 83-2102.
    Texas et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of Alabama Public Service Commission et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-2145.
    Navios Corp. et al. v. United States, as Owner of the United States Coast Guard Buoy Tender Blackthorn.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 83-6704.
    No. 83-7013.
    No. 83-7014.
    No. 83-7021.
    No. 84-5200.
    No. 84-5206.
    Lambright v. Arizona. Fields v. California. Wicker v. Texas. Dicks v. Tennessee. Squires v. Florida. Albanese v. Illinois. McQueen v. Kentucky. Preston v. Missouri. Jones v. Florida. Briley v. Bass, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz.;

Sup. Ct. Cal.;

Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;

Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. Ill.;

No. 84-5261.

No. 84-5265.

No. 84-5269.

No. 84-5505.

Sup. Ct. Ky.;

Sup. Ct. Mo.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.; and

C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 83-6704, 138 Ariz. 63, 673 P. 2d 1; No. 83-7013, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 673 P. 2d 680; No. 83-7014, 667 S. W. 2d 137; No. 84-5200, 450 So. 2d 208; No. 84-5206, 102 Ill. 2d 54, 464 N. E. 2d 206; No. 84-5261, 669 S. W. 2d 519; No. 84-5265, 673 S. W. 2d 1; No. 84-5269, 449 So. 2d 253; No. 84-5505, 742 F. 2d 155.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 83-6814.
    Williford v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

dissenting.

Petitioner Phillip Williford was convicted of wire fraud in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1343 and of making a false statement in a loan application in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1014. The original indictment charging him was returned on May 4, 1982. A superseding indictment was filed on August 17, 1982, and a second superseding indictment was filed on April 21, 1983. This final indictment omitted one paragraph describing a fraudulent transaction contained in its predecessor.

Petitioner sought a postponement of the scheduled trial date under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U. S. C. § 3161(c)(2). That provision guarantees an adequate time to prepare a defense to the charge by preventing trial commencement until 30 days from the defendant’s first appearance, unless the defendant consents in writing to an earlier date. Petitioner argued that § 3161(c)(2) precluded commencement of his trial until 30 days elapsed following the return of the last indictment. The District Court disagreed, and petitioner’s trial began on May 3, 1983, only 12 days after the final indictment was returned.

When an indictment is dismissed on the motion of a defendant, under 18 U. S. C. § 3161(d)(1) any reindictment for the same offense renews the 30-day period of § 3161(c)(2). In this case, however, the Fifth Circuit upheld petitioner’s conviction, finding that a different rule applies when the prior indictment is dismissed on the motion of the Government: The minimum time limit runs from the original, not superseding, indictment, and any continuance is left to the discretion of the district judge. This holding is consistent with the view of the Seventh Circuit, United States v. Horton, 676 F. 2d 1165, 1169 (1982), the Second Circuit, United States v. Todisco, 667 F. 2d 255, 260 (1981), and the Eighth Circuit, United States v. Dennis, 625 F. 2d 782, 793 (1980). It conflicts, however, with the rule in the Ninth Circuit. In United States v. Harris, 724 F. 2d 1452 (1984), the Ninth Circuit held that the 30-day period applies even when the Government obtains an overlapping, superseding indictment. The court explained:

“We read section 3161(c)(2) as guaranteeing that the defendant is not forced to trial less than thirty days from the date on which the defendant first appears on the indictment on which the defendant ultimately goes to trial. Such a construction is necessary to implement the protective purpose underlying section 3161(c)(2).” Id., at 1455 (emphasis in original).

Accord, United States v. Arkus, 675 F. 2d 245, 247-248 (CA9 1982); see also United States v. Wooten, 688 F. 2d 941, 951 (CA4 1982) (“[Sjection 3161(c)(2) . . . guarantee[s] to the criminal defendant the right to a delay of at least 30 days between arraignment and trial in any circumstances”).

Section 3161(c) was designed to protect the basic due process right of having adequate time to prepare a defense without allowing defendants to delay their scheduled trials unduly. S. Rep. No. 96-212, p. 32 (1979). There is a direct conflict among the Circuits over how that command will be put into effect. Congress intended the Speedy Trial Act to provide a uniform national rule regarding trial scheduling and delay. Yet, because of the conflicting interpretations of the various Circuits, a defendant’s right to a 30-day preparation period after a superseding indictment now depends almost as much on the happenstance of geography as it does on the will of the Legislative Branch.

Accordingly, I dissent from the denial of certiorari.


author: Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 83-6832.
    Eddmonds v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall,

with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

I would grant certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty statute, which vests in the prosecutor the unlimited and unguided discretion to trigger death sentencing proceedings. Under the statute, a death sentencing proceeding will follow a conviction for a crime punishable by death only “[wjhere requested by the State.” Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 9.1(d) (Supp. 1984). If the prosecutor chooses not to request such a proceeding, the defendant cannot be sentenced to death.

Yet the prosecutor’s decision whether to make this request is not guided by any legislative standard. Thus, the Illinois scheme introduces unbridled discretion at a stage at which “discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 189 (1976) (joint opinion announcing the judgment of the Court). Accordingly, a substantial question is presented as to the constitutionality of the statute.

I

At the outset, it is important to state clearly what this case is not about. It is not about prosecutorial discretion in an area traditionally committed to such discretion. The discretion at issue here is fundamentally different from the discretion a prosecutor exercises in determining whether to seek an indictment for an offense punishable by death, or to accept a plea of guilty to a lesser included offense. What is at stake, instead, is standardless discretion at the postconviction phase of capital cases — the phase in which this Court has repeatedly emphasized that discretion must be carefully guided.

The joint opinion announcing the Court’s judgment in Gregg v. Georgia, supra, carefully distinguishes preconviction discretion— which it deems permissible — from postconviction discretion— which, it states, can render a scheme unconstitutional. That opinion makes clear that unguided discretion at the latter stage is impermissible: “[T]he decision to impose the death sentence on a specific individual who ha[s] been convicted of a capital offense” must be guided by standards and cannot be imposed on a “capriciously selected group of offenders.” Id., at 199 (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).

II

In my mind, there are serious questions about the constitutionality of a scheme that gives the prosecutor the unbridled discretion to select, from the group of individuals convicted of an offense punishable by death, the subgroup that will be considered for death. The Court has focused its concern in death penalty cases on the decision of which defendants, among the many convicted of offenses punishable by death, will actually receive the death penalty. See, e. g., Pulley v. Harris, 465 U. S. 37, 44 (1984); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 600-601 (1978). It is at this stage — in which the focus of the proceedings shifts from the nature of the crime to the nature of the defendant — that arbitrariness, discrimination, and irrationality are most likely to infect the decision whether a defendant will live or die. To minimize the potential for these abuses, the Court has consistently required that, following conviction of an offense punishable by death, discretion in determining who will receive the death penalty be limited by statutory standards.

The Illinois scheme differs from schemes this Court has approved in that capital sentencing proceedings in Illinois do not inexorably follow conviction for a crime punishable by death. Instead, the prosecutor has the authority — and the duty — to narrow down the class of convicted defendants. Yet the Illinois statute does not set any standards to guide that decision. Such unguided discretion cannot help but produce the sort of arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory application of the death penalty that is simply intolerable under Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972). Because the prosecutor has no standards to guide his postconviction decision, the Illinois scheme eliminates any “meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” Id., at 313 (White, J., concurring).

The potential for arbitrariness in the imposition of the death penalty is further exacerbated because the discretion to initiate sentencing proceedings is not vested in one individual, but in the State’s Attorneys of each of the State’s 102 counties. Each of these 102 individuals, subject to the different political pressures of his own constituency, can establish his own policy — or no policy at all — on how to narrow the group of individuals convicted of crimes punishable by death, and in this endeavor he is not aided by any legislatively imposed standard or limited by any legislatively imposed constraint. People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins, 77 Ill. 2d 531, 557-558, 397 N. E. 2d 809, 822 (1979) (Ryan, J., dissenting); see People v. Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d 129, 192, 430 N. E. 2d 1346, 1376-1377 (1981) (Simon, J., dissenting). In such a system, there will often be no rational distinction between an individual who receives the death penalty and one who does not.

Ill

The postconvietion discretion that the Illinois statute vests in prosecutors is particularly pernicious because it is coupled with the absence of a clear requirement of comparative proportionality review of death sentences on appeal. The Illinois death penalty statute does not mandate such review, and the Illinois Supreme Court has been ambiguous about whether it would ever engage in analysis of this type. See People v. Kubat, 94 Ill. 2d 437, 502-504, 447 N. E. 2d 247, 277-278 (1983); People v. Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d 508, 541-544, 404 N. E. 2d 181, 198-199 (1980). Thus, the scheme does not at any stage assure that like cases in Illinois are treated alike, and provides no mechanism to protect against arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory winnowing of defendants convicted of crimes punishable by death.

Central to the Court’s decision in Pulley v. Harris, supra, that comparative proportionality review is not in all capital cases constitutionally required was the fact that the scheme provided adequate standards to guide the decision whether individuals convicted of first-degree murder should be sentenced to death. Given such standards, the Court did not see much potential for arbitrary and capricious action. Id., at 53. But the Court did state clearly that comparative proportionality review is a safeguard, id., at 50, and that it might be constitutionally required in a scheme that did not contain sufficient other adequate safeguards, id., at 51.

Under the Illinois scheme, there are no standards to guide an important part of the decision as to which defendants, among those convicted of crimes punishable by death, are actually sentenced to death. Thus, even if prosecutors try to act responsibly — whatever this might mean under the scheme — consistency is unattainable because they have no standards to guide their actions. The safeguards identified in Pulley might adequately protect the rationality of the death sentencing process once the prosecutor has initiated that process, but they in no way assure consistency across the spectrum of defendants who are convicted of offenses punishable by death. Thus, without comparative proportionality review, there is absolutely no guarantee that similarly situated defendants, charged and convicted for similar crimes, will not be.treated differently. Irrationality and arbitrariness, even discrimination, are likely to be the norm.

IV

I continue to adhere to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring).' The issue in this case, however, is such that I would grant review of the sentence even if I accepted the prevailing view that the death penalty may be constitutionally imposed under certain circumstances. The Illinois death penalty statute vests in the prosecutor unbridled discretion at a stage in the proceedings at which the Court has consistently stated that discretion must be channelled to prevent the arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory application of the death penalty. The consideration of the constitutionality of this statute is, I believe, worthy of the attention of this Court. For that reason, I respectfully dissent.


text:
    No. 83-6839.
    Stuckett v. United States Postal Service.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Rehnquist joins,

dissenting.

In Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385 (1982), we held that the timely filing of an employment discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against a private employer. The time limit on the filing of a charge is therefore subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. In so holding, we settled a conflict among the Courts of Appeals. This case presents a similar question, against the background of a similar conflict, regarding Title VII suits against the Federal Government.

After being fired by respondent, petitioner filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging racial discrimination. The Commission denied relief, and petitioner then filed suit in Federal District Court. Under 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(c), the complaint was due within 30 days of petitioner’s receipt of notice of the EEOC’s final action. The District Court determined that petitioner had missed this deadline and dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1). The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that “the time limits for filing Title VII actions against the federal government are jurisdictional.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 2. The court relied on Sims v. Heckler, 725 F. 2d 1143 (CA7 1984), which held that a federal employee’s failure to file a timely administrative charge barred a later suit. Sims concluded that considerations of sovereign immunity made the principles underlying Zipes inapplicable when the defendant is the Federal Government.

The position of the Seventh Circuit directly conflicts with that of three other Courts of Appeals. See Martinez v. Orr, 738 F. 2d 1107 (CA10 1984); Milam v. United States Postal Service, 674 F. 2d 860 (CA11 1982); Saltz v. Lehman, 217 U. S. App. D. C. 354, 672 F. 2d 207 (1982) (time limit for filing with EEOC). The Ninth Circuit might be added to this list, though its position is unclear. See Cooper v. Bell, 628 F. 2d 1208, 1213, and n. 10 (1980); Ross v. United States Postal Service, 696 F. 2d 720 (1983); Rice v. Hamilton Air Force Base Commissary, 720 F. 2d 1082, 1083-1084, and n. 1 (1983).

Whether tolling would be appropriate in this case if the time limit is not jurisdictional was neither argued nor considered below. Because the complaint was dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1), the question of the jurisdictional significance of the 30-day limit is squarely presented. In light of the conflict among the lower courts, I would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 84-229.
    No. 84-5052.
    Accardi et al. v. Davidson et al.; and Zahn, Administratrix of the Estate of Zahn v. Davidson et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.


text:
    No. 84-240.
    Freedman et al. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 84-263.
    Double H Plastics, Inc. v. Sonoco Products Co.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 84-5287.
    David v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 84-284.
    Null Manufacturing Co. v. Littlejohn.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 84-5079.
    Stebbing v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 158, 227 (1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

The issue presented by this petition is the constitutionality of the Maryland capital punishment statute, which (1) bars consideration of certain mitigating evidence when the sentencer decides whether to impose a life or death sentence; (2) prevents the sentencer from making an independent determination as to whether death is a proper penalty; and (3) may easily be understood to impose on the defendant the burden of proving that death is not appropriate in his case. Because these three aspects of the Maryland death penalty statute raise profound questions of compliance with this Court’s holdings in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982), and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), I would grant the petition to review the constitutionality of the statute.

I

In Lockett v. Ohio, Chief Justice Burger, writing for a plurality of the Court, stated:

“[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” Id., at 604 (emphasis in original).

The opinion recognized that “the imposition of death by public authority is . . . profoundly different from all other penalties,” and that the sentencer therefore must be free to give “independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s character and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation.” Id., at 605. As we later said: “By holding that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor, the rule in Lockett recognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring individual differences is a false consistency.” Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra, at 112.

In Eddings, this Court reaffirmed that a sentencer may not be barred from considering all evidence of mitigating factors when it renders its decision on sentencing. The trial judge there had declined to consider the fact of Eddings’ violent background, on which evidence had been introduced, as a mitigating circumstance. In reversing Eddings’ death sentence, the Court observed,

“Just as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence. In this instance, it was as if the trial judge had instructed a jury to disregard the mitigating evidence Eddings proffered on his behalf. The sentencer, and the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from their consideration.” 455 U. S., at 113-115 (emphasis in original).

It therefore is now well established that the Constitution requires that the sentencing body in a capital case not be precluded by statute from considering all relevant mitigating evidence and inferences. Put another way, a jury must be free to conclude that any relevant mitigating evidence amounts to a factor that mitigates the severity of the punishment a defendant ought to suffer. Yet the Maryland statute denies the sentencer the constitutionally required latitude.

II

Like most death penalty statutes, the Maryland statute begins by requiring the sentencing authority — either a judge or a jury— first to consider whether the prosecutor has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of any of 10 statutory aggravating circumstances. Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 413(d) (1982 and Supp. 1983). If the sentencer does not find at least one aggravating factor, the sentence must be life imprisonment. § 413(f). If the sentencer finds that one or more aggravating factors exist, it then must determine whether the defendant has proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that any of eight statutory mitigating factors exist. § 413(g); 299 Md. 331, 361, 473 A. 2d 903, 918 (1984). If no mitigating factors are found, the sentencer must impose death. If, instead, the sentencer has found at least one mitigating factor, it must determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the proven mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating circumstances. § 413(h). If they do, the sentencer must impose a life sentence. If the mitigating factors do not outweigh aggravating factors, the jury must impose a death sentence. The statute states that the Court of Appeals shall consider whether “the evidence supports the jury’s or court’s finding that the aggravating circumstances are not outweighed by mitigating circumstances.” § 414(e)(3).

A

My initial concern is with the statute’s treatment of mitigating factors. Under the statutory scheme, the sentencer can consider a mitigating factor only after the defendant has established its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. But the mitigating factors set out in the statute are not matters of historical fact— they are matters of legal and moral judgment. These factors do not “exist,” and thus, unlike matters of historical fact, they are not easily proved or disproved. Each one rests on evidence that easily might influence the conclusion that death is proper, even if that evidence does not conclusively prove the statutory mitigating factor. For example, the sentencer might be influenced by evidence tending to demonstrate that the defendant acted under substantial duress, or it might even find that the defendant acted under moderate duress. Yet it would not necessarily find that the defendant had proved that he “acted under substantial duress.” Similarly, the sentencer might find that the defendant was of impaired mental capacity, but it might not believe that the impairment was substantial at the time of death. Under the statute, the sentencer would find that the defendant had not proved these mitigating factors. As a result, the sentencer would be prevented from considering any of the evidence adduced in an effort to meet the burden of proof, because the statute permits consideration only of the factors proved by a preponderance of the evidence. To preclude the sentencer from considering such potentially influential evidence — as does the statute by denying any weight to evidence if the defendant does not convince the jury that a factor “exists” by a preponderance of the evidence — is to bar, as a matter of law, consideration of all mitigating evidence and influence and thus to violate Lockett and Eddings. Such a result can only enhance “the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty.” 438 U. S., at 605.

The manner in which Maryland applies the statute exacerbates the problem. The petitioner here was 19 years old at the time of the crime in question. She had previously been found to be mildly retarded, and had been described as immature, impressionable, and as an abuser of a variety of drugs. The trial judge, who acted as sentencer, nevertheless found that petitioner had not borne her burden of proving, as mitigating factors, either (1) “the youthful age of the defendant”; or (2) that her mental incapacity, disorder, or disturbance inhibited her capacity to appreciate the criminality of her conduct or to conform to the requirements of law. Affirming the trial court on this matter, the Court of Appeals viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and held that a rational sentencer could have concluded that the accused failed to prove the claimed mitigating factors. Because of that failure of proof, the sentencer could not consider the fact that the defendant was 19 and had a certain mental history. Since the statute permits only that “these mitigating circumstances” — those outlined in the statute — shall be considered, the statute both on its face and in its application to petitioner denies her the full consideration that has become one of the keystones of reliability in the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence.

B

In addition to compressing the sentencer’s wealth of information on mitigation into a rigidly compartmentalized analysis, the statute also prevents a sentencer from answering the basic question: is death the proper sentence? The statute requires that death be imposed whenever mitigating circumstances do not outweigh aggravating circumstances. It leaves to the jury no room to consider whether death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case. And the sentencer is asked to fill out a form that expressly precludes such discretion. As Justice Stevens has written in a similar context:

“Literally read, however, those instructions may lead the jury to believe that it is required to make two entirely separate inquiries: First, do the aggravating circumstances, considered apart from the mitigating circumstances, warrant the imposition of the death penalty? [Under the Maryland scheme, the legislature has rendered this judgment.] And second, do the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors? It seems to me entirely possible that a jury might answer both of those questions affirmatively and yet feel that a comparison of the totality of the aggravating factors with the totality of mitigating factors leaves it in doubt as to the proper penalty. But the death penalty can be constitutionally imposed only if the procedure assures reliability in the determination that ‘death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.”’ Smith v. North Carolina, 459 U. S. 1056 (1982) (opinion respecting the denial of the petition for certiorari) (quoting Lockett, 438 U. S., at 601).

The Maryland statute unambiguously poses the problem to which Justice Stevens alluded; given that this statutory scheme explicitly bars the jury from considering whether it thinks death is a proper result in a given case, for whatever reason, the constitutionality of the statute is seriously in doubt.

C

Finally, the statute, the sentencing form, and the statutory standard of appellate review all focus on whether the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors, rather than vice versa. This language inevitably would lead a sentencing body to believe that the burden of proof rests on the defendant — who must prove mitigating factors — to prove that mitigating factors outweigh aggravating ones. This is especially so in that the statute is silent as to which party bears the burden of proof on this point. As a result, the criminal defendant faces a mandatory death sentence if he is unable to prove that the mitigating circumstances that he has been able to prove outweigh the aggravating factors previously found. This burden places the risk of error squarely on the defendant’s shoulders, and on the side of execution. I had not understood the Constitution to permit the State to transfer such an excruciating burden to a defendant.

D

The State contends that this case presents the same constitutional issue raised by other petitioners to whom review was denied, and that certiorari is therefore inappropriate. Brief in Opposition 5. Were it a rule of thumb not to hear cases presenting issues that we had previously declined to hear, our caseload would no doubt be considerably lightened. That argument has never been, and surely could never be, dispositive. But of far greater import is the fact that the opinion to which the State refers, Tichnell v. State, 297 Md. 432, 468 A. 2d 1 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U. S. 993 (1984), did not address these issues directly; in an earlier opinion in that same case, Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 415 A. 2d 830 (1980), the court had addressed, although only in dictum, the issue actually presented here. The fact that the Court of Appeals relied on the reasoning in the earliest Tichnell to dispose of Stebbing’s claim does not diminish the possibility that certiorari was denied in the last Tichnell because this issue was not addressed in that opinion. But, in any event, it is axiomatic that denials of writs of certiorari have no precedential value. Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U. S. 363, 366, n. 1 (1973); Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U. S. 912, 919 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.). The fact that we might have made a mistake in Tichnell should not compel us to make a mistake here too.

Ill

I continue to adhere to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). But even if I did not, I would dissent from denial of certiorari in this case. A statute that poses any one of the issues sketched above would, to my mind, warrant review by this Court because of its inconsistency with our precedent. When a single capital sentencing scheme raises the number of serious questions that this one does, and when it so threatens to undermine the very reliability that this Court has identified as the keystone to the constitutionality of the death penalty, it seriously suggests that the State is arbitrarily sentencing defendants to death. To avoid that result, I would grant the petition. I respectfully dissent from the Court’s refusal to do so.

       Under Rule 772A of the Maryland Rules of Procedure, which applies to all capital cases, the sentencer must make written findings. Section I of the verdict form asks, factor by factor, which, if any, of the aggravating factors the sentencer has found. Section II of the form similarly asks whether the sentencer has found each of the listed mitigating factors. At the end of Section II, in parentheses, the form states: “If one or more of the above in Section II have been marked 'yes,’ complete Section III. If all of the above in Section II are marked ‘no,’ you do not complete Section III.” Section III asks the sentencer to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors. Later, the verdict form states: “If Section II was completed and all of the answers were marked ‘no’ then enter ‘Death.’”

       The mitigating factors are: no prior criminal conviction or plea of guilty or nolo contendere for a crime of violence; the victim was a participant in the defendant’s conduct or consented to the act that caused the victim’s death; the defendant acted under substantial duress, domination, or provocation of another person, but not so substantial as to constitute a complete defense to the prosecution; the murder was committed while the defendant’s capacity to appreciate its criminality, or conform his conduct, was substantially impaired because of mental incapacity, mental disorder, emotional disturbance, or intoxication; the youthful age of the defendant at the time of the crime; the act of the defendant was not the sole proximate cause of the death; it is unlikely the defendant will engage in further criminal activity that would constitute a threat to society; and any other fact the jury or court specifically sets forth in writing that it finds as mitigating circumstances in the ease. § 413(g).

       Nor does the mere fact that the sentencer may find other mitigating circumstances to include in the balance, so long as it sets them forth in writing, salvage the statute. Initially, no sentencer, who has been told he may consider certain factors only if they are proved to him, will presume he is able to consider them if they are not proved. That result would render the burden of proof provision of the statute wholly meaningless, and cannot be presumed to be what the legislature had in mind. Additionally, it is wholly plausible that jurors will “intuit perfectly legitimate mitigating circumstances which they cannot articulate,” see Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 S. Ct. Rev. 305, 373, n. 262. A juror convinced that the evidence amounts to a mitigating factor “might stand mute, haunted by the defendant’s look but unable to manufacture a reason for life.” Ledewitz, The Requirement of Death: Mandatory Language in the Pennsylvania Death Penalty Statute, 21 Duquesne L. Rev. 103, 155 (1982). The statute requires that the jury conceptualize mitigation as a historical fact to be proved, rather than as the complex legal and moral judgment that our cases require it to be. As a result, those mitigating circumstances that might be too “intangible” for a legislature to define and include in a death statute must be ignored, unless the sentencer somehow can articulate that which the legislature could not. Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 222 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that the Georgia statute permitted the jury to dispense mercy “on the basis of factors too intangible to write into a statute”).

       The statute requires the sentencer to return a sentence of death if no mitigating factors are proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Otherwise, the verdict form asks only one simple question: “ ‘Based on the evidence we unanimously find that it has been proved by A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE that the mitigating circumstances marked “yes” in Section II outweigh the aggravating circumstances marked “yes” in Section I.’ ” Pet. for Cert. 13 (quoting Rule 772A). The sentencer must answer “yes” or “no.” The verdict form then tells the sentencer how to fill out the sentence recommendation blanks based solely on that “yes” or “no” answer; much like directions to an income tax form, the instructions do not make clear precisely why a given answer in one section requires a certain response elsewhere.

       Moreover, if we assume that this balancing process permits the sentencer to determine whether death is the proper result given the totality of the circumstances, this subsection of the statute is strikingly infirm. Since the sentencer need find that mitigating factors outweigh aggravating factors in order to be freed from the mandate of imposing a death sentence, if a sentencer merely finds that mitigating factors equal aggravating factors — that is, if it finds that death may or may not be the appropriate sentence — death shall be imposed. To permit a State to require a death sentence when the jury or court is not certain that the death sentence is appropriate simply undermines every precept this Court has enunciated in its quest for reliability in capital sentencing.

       The state court has not made clear that the contrary is true. In Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 415 A. 2d 830 (1980), the Court of Appeals wrote: “Because the State is attempting to establish that the imposition of the death penalty is an appropriate sentence, the statute places the risk of nonper-suasion on the prosecution with respect to whether the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors.” Id., at 730, 415 A. 2d, at 849. This statement, made in dictum, curiously flips the statutory order of the words “aggravating” and “mitigating.” The court implicitly recognized that the burden of proof was not immediately consistent with the wording of the statute. Yet this remark can hardly be read to require courts to place the burden'on the prosecution on this issue, or to reverse the statutory order when addressing the jury. Indeed, the Court of Appeals has subsequently referred to the section as written in the statute. In this case, the court noted that it had met the statutory mandate of reviewing to assure that the evidence “supports the trial court’s finding that the aggravating circumstance is not outweighed by the mitigating circumstance.” 299 Md. 331, 374, 473 A. 2d 903, 924 (1984). Similarly, in an appeal after remand in the Tichnell case, the court discussed the final weighing phase of the sentencer’s decision and wrote: “To persuade the jury to impose a life rather than a death sentence, Tichnell wanted to convince it that the mitigating, circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances.” Tichnell v. State, 290 Md. 43, 61, 427 A. 2d 991, 1000 (1981); see also id., at 62, 427 A. 2d, at 1000. It thus seems clear that the court has in no respect required that the statutory order of the two words be reversed, or that the sentencer expressly be informed that the prosecution bears the burden of proof on the point. The jury or court is left on its own to guess at the burden of proof on the ultimate question.