text:
    No. 80-5224.
    Johnson v. Hamilton, Judge.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 80-5231.
    Pruitt v. South Carolina et al.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5321.
    Johnson v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5457.
    Quinones v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5466.
    Henriksen v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5471.
    Whitehead v. Mitchell, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5530.
    Moore v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5538.
    Corley v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5540.
    Grinan v. Trespalacios.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5547.
    Blue v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5556.
    Hamlet v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5557.
    Robinson v. McCall et al.; Robinson v. Woodard et al.; Robinson v. North Carolina et al.; Robinson v. Salmon et al.; and Robinson v. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5562.
    Buchanan v. Sowders et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5564.
    Mobley et al. v. Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5575.
    Jenkins v. West Virgina Board of Probation and Parole.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5587.
    Smith v. Bordenkircher, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5598.
    Goolsby v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5601.
    Dillard v. Bordenkircher, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5609.
    Vader v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5620.
    Fleming v. United States Supreme Court et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5648.
    No. 80-5656.
    Fennell v. United States; and Wright v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below r 626 F. 2d 494.


text:
    No. 80-5651.
    Williams v. Bordenkircher, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5668.
    Batimana v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5669.
    Thornhill v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5670.
    No. 80-5680.
    Taylor v. United States; and Mauldin v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 636 F. 2d . 1204.


text:
    No. 80-5673.
    DeVincent v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5676.
    Hampton v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5690.
    Tiernan v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5695.
    Bancroft et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5701.
    Montgomery v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-416.
    Merck & Co., Inc. v. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari before judgment denied.

Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 80-434.
    SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari before judgment denied.

Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


author: Justice White,

text:
    No. 80-458.
    City of South Lake Tahoe et al. v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Marshall joins,

dissenting.

In Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968), this Court held that members of a local school board had standing to challenge in federal court the constitutionality of a state statute that required them to lend books to parochial school students. Addressing the constitutional requirement that the parties have a “personal stake in the outcome” of the litigation, the Court found such a “stake” in the dilemma that the appellants confronted: a choice between violating their oaths of office to support the United States Constitution or refusing to comply with the statutory requirements, a step which was “likely to bring their expulsion from office and also a reduction in state funds for their school district.” Id., at 241, n. 5. The Court of Appeals in the present case stated that

“[w]ere Allen the last word from the Supreme Court on standing, we could simply adopt [its] rationale . . . and determine that the councilmembers in the case before us have standing on the basis that they believe that enforcing the . . . ordinances would violate their oaths of office.” 625 F. 2d 231, 236 (1980).

The court declined to follow Allen, however, holding instead that our subsequent cases have effectively overruled Allen. I do not believe that we have sub silentio overruled Allen. The Courts of Appeals, however, are in conflict over its continuing validity. Compare Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F. 2d 352, 363-364 (CA8 1977), and Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F. 2d 1090, 1100 (CA2 1973), with Finch v. Mississippi State Medical Assn., Inc., 585 F. 2d 765 (CA5 1978). If the Allen doctrine is to be reconsidered, it should be done by this Court, and not by the various Courts of Appeals. I therefore dissent from the denial of certiorari.

The California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (CTRPA) is a political subdivision of the State of California, exercising responsibility for the development and enforcement of plans for land and resource development in the Lake Tahoe region of California. Cal. Gov’t Code Ann. § 67040 et seq. (West Supp. 1980). The city of South Lake Tahoe lies within the geographic area regulated by the CTRPA. Petitioners, the city, its Mayor and four council members, are required by law to enforce CTRPA regulations, Cal. Gov’t Code Ann. §§67072, 67102 (West Supp. 1980). A willful failure of a state official to perform his duty is a misdemeanor, Cal. Gov’t Code Ann. § 1222 (West 1980), which may result in removal from office. Cal. Penal Code. Ann. § 661 (West 1970).

In August 1975, the CTRPA enacted the plan of land-use and transportation regulations that is the subject of this lawsuit. Petitioners, believing that enforcement of these regulations would be unconstitutional on a number of grounds, brought suit in Federal District Court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The District Court dismissed the action, believing that federal-court abstention was appropriate. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that petitioners did not have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts.

The Court of Appeals relied primarily on Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208 (1974), and United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974), to support its conclusion that petitioners could no longer claim standing under Allen. Those cases held that Art. Ill requires that a party assert more than “the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance” to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts. I do not doubt the validity of this principle. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, ante, p. 934 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Allen, however, was not, nor could it have been, an exception to this constitutional requirement. Therefore, I do not believe that Schlesinger and Richardson have had the effect the lower court ascribed to them.

Appellants in Allen did not simply express abstract disapproval of a government policy; rather, they were required by their position to act to implement that policy and a failure to act would have threatened immediate injury. At the same time, however, appellants were bound by their oaths to act in a contrary manner. It was this dilemma that created a personal stake in the controversy and that distinguishes their situation from that of the parties in either Schlesinger or Richardson. Nor is it sufficient to argue that this dilemma could be avoided simply by resignation, as suggested by the concurring opinion below: this alternative only further distinguishes the plaintiffs from other citizens and demonstrates their concrete interests in the controversy. Petitioners in this case face exactly the same kind of dilemma. Therefore, as the Court of Appeals noted, Allen controls this situation if it is still good law.

The Court of Appeals also held that the city had no standing because a political subdivision of a State may not raise constitutional objections to the validity of a state statute, citing, Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U. S. 36, 40 (1933); Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 192, 196 (1923); Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 188 (1923); City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F. 2d 923, 929 (CA2 1973); Aguayo v. Richardson, supra, at 1100-1101. Such a per se rule is inconsistent with Allen, in which one of the appellants was a local board of education. Furthermore, there is a conflict in the Circuits over the validity of such a rule. Cf. Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F. 2d 1057, 1067-1071 (CA5 1979), and City of New York v. Richardson, supra.

Because the jurisdictional questions raised by this case are important and have received conflicting answers in the Courts of Appeals and because the case raises a question of the continuing validity of our own precedent, I would grant cer-tiorari and set the case for plenary consideration.

Justice Brennan would also grant the petition for writ of certiorari.

       Specifically, petitioners alleged that enforcement of the challenged regulations would (1) take property for public use without just compensation and without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) deprive persons subject to the regulations of equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) unreasonably infringe the right to travel, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (4) conflict with and frustrate the land-use ordinance and transportation plan of the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, which was approved by Congress, in violation of the Supremacy Clause of Art. VI.

        Allen also suggested, as an alternative ground, that appellants had standing because a refusal to enforce the statute could bring about a reduction in the state funds for their school districts. On this theory, appellants had standing to represent the interests of their institution and the larger group of people that would be adversely affected by the reduction in funding. Similarly, petitioners in this case alleged that the city would suffer a loss of funds, through a decrease in property values and thereby tax revenues, and sought standing as the representatives of this larger group of residents that would be adversely affected by the statute.


text:
    No. 80-574.
    Attorney General of New Jersey v. Bisaccia.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-482.
    No. 80-483.
    Lead Industries Assn., Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency; and St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions. Reported below: 208 U. S. App. D. C. 1 and 55, 647 F. 2d 1130 and 1184.


text:
    No. 80-609.
    Johnson v. Nordstrom-Larpenteur Agency, Inc.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 80-515.
    York v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motions of National Association of State Savings and Loan Supervisors and North Carolina Savings and Loan League for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 80-5058.
    David Levell W. v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Petitioner, a 13-year-old minor, was taken from his home to a police station for questioning by police officers who had neither an arrest warrant nor probable cause for his arrest. The court below held that there was no violation of petitioner’s constitutional rights because the officers acted on instructions from his mother. Because I believe the case presents an important question concerning a parent’s authority to waive her minor child’s right under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free from “unreasonable seizures,” I dissent from denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari.

I

On March 8, 1979, an investigator with the Los Angeles Police Department told two of his subordinates that he had been in contact with a mother about one of her children who allegedly had been involved in a burglary. He told the officers that the mother had agreed to bring the minor to the police station the previous day but had failed to do so, and he instructed the officers to go to the woman’s house and find out when she would bring her son to the station.

At the house, the officers were invited into a bedroom where they saw petitioner’s mother lying in bed. The officers informed her of the reason for their visit and asked why she had not brought her son to the police station the previous day as she had promised. Petitioner’s mother explained that her car had broken down, and when the officers asked her if she could bring the boy in that day, she told them that her car was still not working. The officers next inquired where her son was. The mother pointed to petitioner, who was lying in another bed in the same room, and told him to wake up. The officers then asked her when she would be able to bring her son in and she replied: “Well, you officers are here. You can take him down.” She told the officers that she had been having trouble with her son and wanted to know if he had been involved in a burglary so she could notify his probation officer. She then told petitioner to get out of bed and get dressed because the officers were waiting for him. Petitioner dressed and left the house with the officers, who placed him in handcuffs before driving him to the police station. At the station, petitioner was given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). He indicated that he understood them, waived his rights, and confessed to the burglary.

A petition was filed against petitioner in juvenile court charging him with burglary in violation of § 459 of the Cal. Penal Code Ann. (West Supp. 1980). Petitioner filed a motion to suppress the confession he made at the police station as the fruit of an illegal arrest. At the combined suppression and adjudication hearing, the State conceded that the police officers had neither an arrest warrant nor probable cause to arrest petitioner at the time he was taken to the station for questioning. Nonetheless, the court. denied the suppression motion and relied on the confession in sustaining the charge against petitioner. At the dispositional hearing, the court ordered that petitioner be removed from the custody of his mother. Physical confinement was set at a maximum period of two years.

On appeal, a divided California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court. The majority found no proof that petitioner had agreed to accompany the officers to the station. But relying on California cases that had “recognized and acknowledged the supervisorial authority and control of parents over their children,” the majority held that petitioner’s constitutional rights were not violated because both petitioner and the police officers complied with his mother’s request that he be taken to the station for questioning. The Supreme Court of California denied a petition for a hearing without opinion.

II

If petitioner had been five years older when the arrest occurred, there would be no question that the judgment below must be reversed. In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 216 (1979), we held that “detention for custodial interrogation — regardless of its label — intrudes so severely on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal arrests.” Here, the court below specifically found that petitioner did not personally consent to accompany the officers to the station. The officers did not ask petitioner if he was willing to accompany them to the station. And the officers did not believe that petitioner was accompanying them voluntarily, for they placed him in handcuffs to prevent him escaping en route to the station. Moreover, as respondent concedes, the officers had neither a warrant nor probable cause to arrest petitioner when they took him to the station for questioning. If he were an adult, petitioner’s subsequent confession would have to be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal arrest. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963).

The court below reached a different result solely because petitioner is a minor. Thus, the case squarely presents the question whether a constitutional violation occurred when petitioner, a minor, was taken from his home to a police station for questioning by police officers who, although they had his mother’s consent to their action, had neither an arrest warrant nor probable cause for petitioner’s arrest. I believe that the Court should consider this issue.

The Court has never previously considered the scope of Fourth Amendment protections when asserted by a minor. Indeed, we have never attempted to define the “totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state.” In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 13 (1967). Nonetheless our cases have established that minors “are 'persons’ under our Constitution . . . possessed of fundamental rights which the state must respect . . . .” Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 511 (1969). As we explained in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 74 (1976): “Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of maturity. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.”

Moreover, our cases have exhibited particular sensitivity to minors’ claims to constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty by the State. Because loss of liberty is no less a deprivation for a child than for an adult, In re Gault, 387 U. S., at 27, we have held that a minor’s right with respect to many of these claims is virtually coextensive with an adult’s. Thus, we have extended the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee against deprivation of liberty without due process of law to minors involved in juvenile proceedings. We have held that a minor facing juvenile charges is entitled to notice, counsel, and confrontation of witnesses. Id., at 33, 36-37, 57. 'Neither man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by methods which flout constitutional requirements of due process of law.’ ” Id., at 13, quoting with approval Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 601 (1948) (Douglas, J., plurality opinion). Similarly, our cases have accorded minors the right against self-incrimination, In re Gault, supra, protection against coerced confessions, Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U. S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, supra, guarantees against double jeopardy, Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975), and the presumption of innocence implemented by the government’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970).

I believe that if the Court examined this issue, we would be hard-pressed to find reasons to distinguish these rights, which clearly apply to minors, from the Fourth Amendment right invoked by petitioner. No less than due process protections, the guarantee against unreasonable governmental searches and seizures “defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state may exercise.” In re Gault, supra, at 20 (footnote omitted). As the Court has stated, the Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police . . . .” Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27 (1949). Neither the court below nor respondent goes so far as to suggest that minors enjoy no protection of this personal privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Instead, respondent argues that the court below correctly held that petitioner’s mother had lawful authority to instruct the police officers to take her son to the station for questioning. Respondent contends that inasmuch as petitioner’s mother could have brought him to the station herself, she merely authorized the officers to do what she could have done herself.

Essential to this claim is the assumption that a parent’s right to guide her child’s upbringing includes the authority to waive a constitutional right that the child may have. I find this assumption extremely disturbing for I see no way to cabin its implications. If a parent may, without even consulting the child, waive his constitutional rights, then the police may constitutionally coerce confessions from minors so long as the officers have the parents’ consent to their action. Even more troubling, there is nothing in respondent’s reasoning to preclude a juvenile court from finding a minor guilty upon proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt, as long as the parent waives that critical due process requirement. The view of parental authority advanced by respondent and adopted by the court below suggests no reason to bar these actions.

But even assuming that the view of parental authority espoused by the court below is correct, there is a major inconsistency in the court’s reasoning. The court’s view of parental authority rests on the supposition that petitioner was too immature to make the decision about whether to go to the station with the police officers for himself. But if that is the case, I find it hard to discern the logic of the same court’s conclusion that petitioner was capable of making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights, whose application to a minor are not in doubt. Surely, if a minor in his home lacks the capacity to decide whether to accompany police officers to the station for questioning, there must be some question about the same minor’s capacity to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights at the police station. A coherent view, fully adopting the court’s theory of a minor’s incapacity, would result in the exclusion of petitioner’s confession because he would be deemed incapable of waiving his Miranda rights. And his conviction would be reversed because it was based on the confession.

Because I believe that the case raises important questions that were not adequately addressed by the court below, I would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and set the case for plenary consideration.

Justice Brennan and Justice White, agreeing for the most part with Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion, would also grant certiorari.

       This statement of facts is from the opinion of the court below which was originally published at 103 Cal. App. 3d 469 (1980) (advance sheets) and included as petitioner’s appendix to his petition for certiorari before this Court. On July 18, 1980, the California Supreme Court ordered that the opinion not be published in the official California Appellate Reports.

       App. to Pet. for Cert. 6.

       On this issue, the dissenting judge argued that the police officers violated petitioner’s constitutional right by detaining him for custodial interrogation at a time when they had neither a warrant nor probable cause for his arrest. Id., at 15-20 (Jefferson, J., dissenting).

       Two judges of that court indicated that they would have granted the petition for a hearing.

        Id., at 5.

       There is no suggestion that the causal connection between petitioner’s detention and his confession was broken in a manner which might purge the taint of the arrest.

       The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961).

       We have held that minors are entitled to constitutional protection for freedom of speech, Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 603 (1969); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943), equal protection against racial discrimination, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1964), and due process in civil proceedings, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975).

       Many state and lower federal courts have extended Fourth Amendment guarantees to minors involved in juvenile proceedings. See, e. g., Brown v. Fauntleroy, 143 U. S. App. D. C. 116, 442 F. 2d 838 (1971); Cooley v. Stone, 134 U. S. App. D. C. 317, 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969); In re Scott K., 24 Cal. 3d 395, 595 P. 2d 105 (1979); In re Harvey, 222 Pa. Super. 222, 229, 295 A. 2d 93, 96-97 (1972); In re Morris, 29 Ohio Misc. 71, 278 N. E. 2d 701 (Columbiana Cty. Common Pleas Ct. 1971); Ciulla v. State, 434 S. W. 2d 948, 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); State v. Lowry, 95 N. J. Super. 307, 313-317, 230 A. 2d 907, 910-912 (1967); In re Williams,
        49 Misc. 2d 154, 169-170, 267 N. Y. S. 2d 91, 109-110 (Ulster Cty. Family Ct. 1966); Urbasek v. People, 76 Ill. App. 2d 375, 222 N. E. 2d 233 (1966).

       See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S, 205, 232 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 (1925).

       The Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable-cause requirements impose limits on the actions of the police. Respondent concedes that the police had neither a warrant nor probable cause for petitioner’s detention. His mother’s consent could not and did not supply the requisite probable cause or warrant. Even though petitioner’s mother could have taken him to the station herself, it does not follow from this that she had the authority to waive petitioner’s Fourth Amendment right and permit the police to detain him without complying with constitutional requirements.
      The Supreme Court of California rejected a similar claim by the State in another case that also involved a minor’s Fourth Amendment right. In re Scott K., supra. In that case a police officer obtained permission from a parent to search a box that belonged to his minor son. The court rejected the State’s suggestion that because the father could have searched the box himself, he had the authority to permit the police to search it.

       Alternatively, if petitioner is presumed capable of making a knowing and intelligent decision, as the court below assumed in connection with his waiver of his Miranda rights, then petitioner could object to being taken, handcuffed, to the police station. And he would here be permitted to claim violation of the Fourth Amendment’s probable-cause and warrant requirements by the police. This view is perhaps more consistent with decisions by this Court that have recognized the rights of minors faced with decisions that critically affect their own lives. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976) (upholding pregnant minor’s right to make an abortion decision without parental consent).


text:
    No. 80-5123.
    McKenzie v. Montana.
   Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall,

with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

On two prior occasions, this Court has vacated decisions of the Supreme Court of Montana in this death penalty case and remanded the case for further consideration. McKenzie v. Montana, 443 U. S. 903 (1979); McKenzie v. Montana, 433 U. S. 905 (1977). In both instances, we directed the Supreme Court of Montana to reconsider the case in light of intervening decisions of this Court establishing that due process prohibits a State from placing on a defendant the burden to disprove an element of the offense charged. McKenzie v. Montana, 443 U. S. 903 (1979) (directing reconsideration in light of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510 (1979)); McKenzie v. Montana, 433 U. S. 905 (1977) (directing reconsideration in light of Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977)). On each remand, the state court reaffirmed the conviction and reinstated the death penalty. - Mont. -, 608 P. 2d 428 (1980); 177 Mont. 280, 581 P. 2d 1205 (1978). In its most recent decision in this case, the State Supreme Court conceded that the jury instructions unconstitutionally shifted to petitioner the burden to disprove that he had the criminal intent necessary to support conviction. - Mont., at -, 608 P. 2d, at 457-458. The court nonetheless avoided granting petitioner a new trial by deeming this constitutional violation “harmless error.” Id., at -, 608 P. 2d, at 458-459. A state court’s analysis of harmless error in a typical case may not present a question worthy of full review by this Court, yet, where, as here, the death penalty is the result, close scrutiny is required. Because I find the court’s analysis of harmless error lacking of evenhanded treatment, I dissent from this Court’s denial of certiorari.

Petitioner was charged with two counts of deliberate homicide, two counts of aggravated kidnaping, one count of sexual intercourse without consent, and two counts of aggravated assault, all arising from the death of one woman. A major element in petitioner’s defense was that he was incapable of “knowingly” or “purposely” committing the homicide. Petitioner and the prosecutor produced conflicting psychiatric and psychological testimony at trial concerning petitioner’s ability to understand the criminal nature of his conduct and to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. Although petitioner’s capacity to form the required criminal intent was thus put directly in issue, over petitioner’s specific objection, the judge repeatedly directed the jury that “the law also presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act” and that “an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent.” The trial court essentially instructed the jury that it could presume the necessary criminal intent if it found petitioner had committed the acts charged. Petitioner was convicted of deliberate homicide and aggravated kidnap-ing, and sentenced to death.

In Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, we explicitly held that instructions of the kind challenged by petitioner violate due process because they shift to the defendant the burden to persuade the jury that he lacked the requisite criminal intent. On remand of the instant case in light of Sandstrom, the Montana court agreed that the challenged instructions unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proving the intent element of the crime from the State to the defendant. - Mont., at -, 608 P. 2d, at 457. The court, however, reasoned that not all such constitutional errors are prejudicial and concluded that this Court has never mandated which of three possible standards for evaluating the harmlessness of a constitutional error must be used. The court then selected the standard that permits a court to sustain the conviction despite the constitutional error where there is “overwhelming evidence” of guilt. Id., at -, 608 P. 2d, at 458. Finally, the court found such overwhelming evidence was present in this case.

But what evidence did the court find sufficient to overcome the constitutional error of directing the jury to presume the presence of the requisite criminal intent from the nature of the acts committed? The Montana court itself relied solely on “the vicious manner in which the crimes were committed” in concluding that petitioner “purposely and knowingly intended” to commit the crimes. Id., at -, 608 P. 2d, at 459. I cannot help but be shocked that in taking this approach, the Montana court simply applied the forbidden presumption. In so doing, the court neglected to perform its task on review: it failed to examine whether the disapproved instructions could have infected the jury verdict. Instead, the court served as another factfinder, again impermissibly placing the burden on petitioner to disprove that the nature of his acts established the requisite criminal intent. It surely cannot be that a verdict following an unconstitutional instruction permitting the jury to presume criminal intent can be immunized from reversal because the reviewing court also im-permissibly presumes criminal intent.

This result was perhaps inevitable once the state court selected the “overwhelming evidence” of guilt standard to analyze whether the constitutional error was harmless. For whatever value that standard may have in reviewing a verdict following introduction of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional guarantees, see, e. g., Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U. S. 371 (1972), use of the standard actually precludes effective review of the prejudicial impact of unconstitutional jury instructions. Where isolated, tainted evidence is at issue, the reviewing court may exclude that evidence from its assessment of whether the remaining evidence supports the conviction. But where the constitutional error occurred in the jury instructions, no isolated portion of the record can be eliminated from the judicial assessment. Nor can the effect of the instructions be evaluated by examining the evidence alone, and ignoring the unconstitutional instructions. For the precise issue in such cases is the manner in which the jury could have assessed the evidence as a whole, not the importance of any particular piece of evidence to sustain the verdict. In selecting the “overwhelming evidence” standard on the theory that “an appellate court should view the case as a whole in assessing harmless or prejudicial error,” - Mont., at -, 608 P. 2d, at 458, the state court neglected to review the possible effect of the unconstitutional instructions on the jury’s verdict.

The possibility that a constitutional error in jury instructions was harmless must be evaluated on the premise that the jury acted lawfully and reasonably followed the erroneous instruction. Then the court must ask whether the defective instruction may have contributed to the jury verdict. And, before finding the error harmless, the reviewing court must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not so contribute. Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). Indeed, on remand in State v. Sandstrom, - Mont. -, -, 603 P. 2d 244, 245 (1979), the Supreme Court of Montana followed just this analysis. We had remanded Sandstrom for consideration of questions such as whether the use of the disapproved instruction was harmless error in that case, and whether such error could ever be harmless. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S., at 526-527. In response, the State Supreme Court correctly applied Chapman in reasoning that it could find harmless error only upon concluding:

“[T]he offensive instruction could not reasonably have contributed to the jury verdict. In considering the instruction, and the fact that intent was the main issue in the District Court trial, we cannot make that assertion. The erroneous instruction goes to a vital element of the proof of the crime, namely the intent of the defendant Sandstrom in committing the homicide. If the jury followed the instruction, it could have presumed the intent without proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” — Mont., at —, 603 P. 2d, at 245.

Therefore, the court ordered a new trial for Sandstrom. The Montana court subsequently applied the same reasoning in State v. Hamilton, - Mont. -, -, 605 P. 2d 1121, 1132 (1980) (appellate court must determine impact of instruction upon a reasonable jury).

It appears that only in petitioner’s case is the Montana court unwilling to apply this analysis. This seems to be yet another case in which a court sanctions “egregious violations of the constitutional rights of criminal defendants by blandly reciting the formula 'harmless error.’ ” Briggs v. Connecticut, 447 U. S. 912, 915 (1980) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting). However unpleasant the facts of this or other cases may be, the courts are obligated to protect the constitutional rights of the defendant. Due to concern that petitioner’s rights have not been preserved, this Court has already remanded this case twice. I can understand the Court’s reluctance to entertain this case yet again, for we presume that lower courts adhere to the purposes of remands from this Court. Yet the Montana court has failed to fulfill its obligation to carry out the mandate of our decisions. Therefore, I would grant certiorari and set the case for plenary-consideration.

I also adhere to my view that the death penalty is, under all circumstances, a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 314-371 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231-241 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 619-621 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment), and on that basis alone I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

       Instruction 31 gave general directions on methods of proof about mental state. It stated that “the law expressly directs the jury to reason: That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent and also that a person is presumed to intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act,” but Instruction 32 noted that a “particular purpose” may be inferred but not assumed. App. to Pet. for Cert. 20g-21g. Instruction 33 concerned the method of proof applicable to the offense of deliberate homicide. That instruction directed that if the jury found that petitioner committed an illegal act on the victim, “the law presumes that an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent; that is, the law expressly directs you to reason from such unlawful act that the defendant acted with a-n unlawful intent, or purpose.” Id., at 22g. Instruction 35 described the method of proof applicable to kidnaping. It provided that because no particular purpose was required as an element of the offense, the requisite mental state could be established presumptively. Thus, if the jury found that petitioner restrained the victim “either by secreting her in a place of isolation, or by using physical force, or by threatening to use physical force to hold her, the law presumes that he acted therein with unlawful intent, purpose or knowledge, and expressly directs you to so reason.” Id., at 26g-27g. Instruction 37 provided that proof of the mental state requisite for sexual intercourse without consent “can be made by presumption.” Id., at 28g. Similarly, Instruction 38 specified that the mental state necessary for aggravated assault could be proved by the presumption that “ '[a]n unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent, and the legal presumption that a person is presumed to intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act’ can be used to prove the mental state of knowingly.” Id., at 30g.

       This Court has not decided whether it can ever be harmless to instruct a jury that it may presume criminal intent from the fact of the criminal act. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510, 526-527 (1979) (remanding on that issue).

       The court reasoned:
      “At least three definable approaches appear in the United States Supreme Court cases: (1) Focusing on the erroneously admitted evidence or other constitutional error to determine whether it might have contributed to the conviction[,] e. g., Fahy v. Connecticut (1963), 375 U. S. 85 . . . ; (2) excluding the constitutional infirmity where overwhelming evidence supports the conviction [,] e. g., Milton v. Wainwright (1972), 407 U. S. 371 . . . ; (3) determining whether the tainted evidence is merely cumulative or duplicates properly admitted evidence [,] e. g., Harrington v. California (1969), 395 U. S. 250...." - Mont., at -, 608 P. 2d, at 458.

       The Montana court acknowledged “criticism of this standard by text-writers and legal commentators.” Id., at -, 608 P. 2d, at 458. See, e. g., Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error—A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 15, 32-36 (1976).

       See generally R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 73-74 (1970).

       Before this Court, Montana argues that even if petitioner’s conviction for deliberate homicide resulted from the unconstitutional presumption of intent, his conviction for aggravated kidnaping is untainted by the error. Montana claims that because this is the case, the death penalty can stand, as only one sentence was imposed, despite petitioner’s conviction on both the homicide and kidnaping counts. This argument, which was never adopted by the state court, is fatally flawed because instructions on the kidnaping charge also included the disapproved presumption of criminal intent. As Montana itself acknowledges, “the jury was then informed that they could employ the Sandstrom presumption to find that [kid-naping] was done ‘purposely’ or ‘knowingly.’ ” Brief in Opposition 7. Montana argues that any error from this instruction was cured by the additional instructions on aggravated kidnaping. These instructions directed that after finding that petitioner committed the kidnaping, the jury could infer, but not presume, he also had particular criminal purposes to inflict bodily injury, to terrorize, or to facilitate the commission of other crimes. These additional requirements could not, however, eliminate the role of the forbidden instruction in the initial finding of a kidnaping.

       Petitioner is also the only person on whom Montana imposed the death sentence under a statute enacted in 1973 before it was amended to provide different procedures for deliberate homicide and aggravated kid-naping, the offenses relevant here. See Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-5-304 (Supp. 1974), Mont. Code Ann. §§45-2-101 (52), 46-18-101, 46-18-111 to 46-18-112 (1979).

       For this reason, this case seems a particularly apt one for seeking federal habeas corpus relief. The dissenting judge in the Montana court found the majority’s decision unsupportable. - Mont., at -, -, -, 608 P. 2d, at 459, 462, 465 (Shea, J., dissenting).


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 80-5488.
    No. 80-5602.
    Swindler v. Arkansas. Davis v. Georgia et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ark.; and

Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 80-5488, 267 Ark. 418, 592 S. W. 2d 91; No. 80-5602, 246 Ga. 200, 269 S. E. 2d 461.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 80-91.
    No. 80-194.
    No. 80-217.
    No. 80-285.
    No. 80-5268.
    Dick v. Harris, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al., Ramirez v. United States, Howell v. Thomas, Sheriff, Chvosta v. Pierre et al., Antone v. Florida,
   ante, p. 872;

ante, p. 900;

ante, p. 901;

ante, p. 921; and

ante, p. 913. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    December 15, 1980
    No. 80-636.
    MacKinney et al. v. Gelfgren et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. A-490.
    Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce, et al. v. Shapiro, Essex County Executive.
   D. C. N. J. The order entered December 4, 1980, by Justice Brennan is continued pending the timely filing and final disposition of a petition for writ of certiorari.

Justice Stewart and Justice Stevens dissent.


text:
    No. A-504.
    Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church and State v. City and County of Denver.
   Application to vacate the order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, entered December 3, 1980, presented to Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Justice Brennan, Justice White, and Justice Stevens dissent.


text:
    No. 83,
    Orig.
    Maryland et al. v. Louisiana.
   Motions of Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. et al. for leave to file Exceptions to the Report of the Special Master and for leave to reply to the Exceptions of Louisiana are granted. Exceptions to the Report of the Special Master are set for oral argument. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 1031.]


text:
    No. 79-700.
    Walter Fleisher Co., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. [Cer-tiorari granted, 446 U. S. 917.] Motion of petitioner for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 79-1429.
    No. 79-1583.
    American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc., et al. v. Marshall, Secretary of Labor, et al.; and National Cotton Council of America v. Marshall, Secretary of Labor, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 817.] Joint motion of the Solicitor General and union respondents for additional time for oral argument denied. ' Motion of the Solicitor Generál and union respondents for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 79-1711.
    No. 79-1754.
    No. 79-1760.
    No. 80-12.
    Middlesex County Sewerage Authority et al. v. National Sea Clammers Assn. et al.; Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties v. National Sea Clammers Assn. et al.; City of New York et al. v. National Sea Clammers Assn. et al.; and Environmental Protection Agency et al. v. National Sea Clammers Assn. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 917.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 79-1794.
    Michigan v. Summers.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 898.] Motion of John B. Holmes, Jr., et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 79-1977.
    Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., Ltd., et al.; Perez v. Arya National Shipping Line, Ltd.; and Barulec v. Ove Skou, R. A.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 818.] Motion of respondent Ove Skou, R. A., for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 80-5.
    McCarty v. McCarty.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, ante, p. 917.] Motion of Non-Commissioned Officers Association of the United States et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 79-6423.
    Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County.
   Ct. App. N. C. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 819.] Motion of National Legal Aid and Defender Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion of Gregory C. Malhoit, Esquire, to permit Leowen Evans, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hac vice granted. Motion of the Attorney General of North Carolina for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 80-169.
    United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 898.] Motions of American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations and International Brotherhood of Teamsters for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 80-332.
    Rhodes, Governor of Ohio, et al. v. Chapman et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 951.] Motion of petitioners to be excused from supplementing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 80-5713.
    In re Clifton.
   Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 80-396.
    City of Newport et al. v. Fact Concerts, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 79-1679.
    Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Fokakis.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6799.
    Morris v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-295.
    National Association of Minority Contractors et al. v. Associated General Contractors of California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-330.
    United Beef Packers, Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-347.
    De Jong Packing Co. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-406.
    No. 80-614.
    Personnel Board of Jefferson County, Alabama v. United States et al.; and Martin et al. v. Personnel Board of Jefferson County, Alabama.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 616 F. 2d 812.


text:
    No. 80-439.
    Melli v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-454.
    Parfitt et al. v. Columbus Correctional Facility et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-465.
    Papago Tribal Utility Authority v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-471.
    Sun Petroleum Products Co. v. Marshall, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-487.
    Harper et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-588.
    Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, Ltd., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-592.
    Shaw v. Kansas.
   Ct. App. Kan. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-597.
    Martin Painting & Coating Co. v. Marshall, Secretary of Labor, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-606.
    Ruhlander et al. v. District Court of Hampshire et al.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-612.
    Berger v. North Carolina.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-615.
    Besase et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-623.
    Winfield v. Walgreen Co.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-627.
    A Juvenile v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-652.
    John T. Brady & Co. v. Form-Eze Systems, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-654.
    Gowan v. St. Francis Community Hospital.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-666.
    Barry v. American Financial Enterprises, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-668.
    Western Air Lines, Inc. v. International Travel Arrangers, Inc.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-671.
    Nageotte et al. v. County of Stafford, Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-705.
    Grant et al. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5057.
    Hall v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5139.
    Henderson, aka Collier v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5168.
    Haar v. New Mexico.
   Ct. App. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5226.
    Carter v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5230.
    Gaul v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5236.
    Johnson v. Perini, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5241.
    Hicks v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5245.
    Payne v. Thompson, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5281.
    Ricardo et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5283.
    McClain v. Oklahoma et al.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5297.
    Derrico v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5310.
    Nash v. Reedel et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5316.
    Young v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5351.
    Blake v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5387.
    Newkirk v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5411.
    Green v. United States et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5478.
    Crute v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5506.
    Sauter v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5566.
    Rawls v. Mabry, Correction Commissioner.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5567.
    Doerr v. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offender Rehabilitation of Florida, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5571.
    Cooper v. Mitchell, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5572.
    Douthit v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5576.
    Watkins v. Thomas, Sheriff, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5580.
    Euge v. United States et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5585.
    Papp v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5588.
    Groft v. Connell Chevrolet Co., Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5590.
    Wells v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5597.
    Lydon v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5616.
    Frisch v. Frisch.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5625.
    Jenkins v. Bordenkircher, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5681.
    Boyd v. Bordenkircher, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5683.
    Mahler v. Garrison, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5702.
    Morris v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5705.
    Jones v. United States et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5712.
    Clifton v. Cuyler et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5722.
    Hughes v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5724.
    Duncan v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5728.
    Saunders v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5729.
    Cornwell v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5730.
    Frank v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-418.
    United Business Communications, Inc. v. Milgo Electronic Corp.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 80-530.
    Hudson v. International Business Machines Corp. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens took., no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 80-565.
    Heyl, as Personal Representative of Zimmerman’s Estate and as Guardian v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 80-582.
    Zachary et al. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 80-691.
    Arkansas v. Haynes.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 80-659.
    Adams v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 80-5179.
    Johnson v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 80-5561.
    No. 80-5632.
    No. 80-5645.
    Hance v. Georgia. Clark v. Arizona. Witt v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. Ariz.; and

Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 80-5561, 245 Ga. 856, 268 S. E. 2d 339; No. 80-5632, 126 Ariz. 428, 616 P. 2d 888; No. 80-5645, 387 So. 2d 922.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 79-1735.
    No. 79-6580.
    No. 79-6857.
    No. 79-6888.
    No. 80-45.
    No. 80-250.
    No. 80-5186.
    No. 80-5202.
    Jarrett v. Jarrett, Houston v. Tennessee, Crosby v. United States Department of the Air Force et al., Theriault v. Charles Colson Prison Fellowship et al., Johnson v. J. O. L., Cramer v. Metropolitan Federal Savings & Loan Assn. et al., Patterson v. Garrington, Warden, In re MaGee,
   ante, p. 927;

ante, p. 891;

ante, p. 866;

ante, p. 952;

ante, p. 989;

ante, p. 876;

ante, p. 922; and

ante, p. 949. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 80-5217.
    No. 80-5274.
    No. 80-5276.
    No. 80-5401.
    Brown v. Jernigan, Warden, Twyman v. Hess, Warden, et al., Landi v. California, Dankert v. Georgia,
   ante, p. 958;

ante, p. 959;

ante, p. 959; and

ante, p. 986. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 79-972.
    Westvaco Corp. et al. v. Adams Extract Co. et al.,
   ante, p. 915. Petition of Georgia-Pacific Corp. and Packaging Corporation of America for rehearing and for further relief denied.

Justice Stewart and Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 80-5272.
    Brown v. Kansas Workmen’s Compensation Fund,
   ante, p. 914. Petition for rehearing denied.

Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    December 30, 1980
    No. A-567.
    Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce, et al. v. Carey, Governor of New York, et al.
   The application of the Solicitor General for a stay pending appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was presented to Justice Marshall as Circuit Justice, and by him referred to the Court. The application was directed to that portion of the judgment entered December 29, 1980, by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, case No. 80 Civ. 4550, that precludes the Bureau of the Census from certifying to the President the population totals for New York and the state-by-state census tabulations, on December 31, 1980, as mandated by 13 U. S. C. § 141 (b). The application is hereby granted. This order shall remain in effect pending disposition of the appeal by the Court of Appeals.

Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

In this case, applicant Secretary of Commerce and others seek a stay pending appeal, of an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, enjoining the Census Bureau from certifying the official tabulation of New York State’s population to the President as required by 13 U. S. C. § 141 (b). Respondents include the City of New York and its Mayor; the Governor of the State; and several voters and taxpayers in various city, congressional, and state senatorial and assembly districts who filed suit in District Court alleging that the 1980 census was conducted in a manner that will inevitably result in an undercount, largely in low-income areas populated by members of minority groups. Specifically, respondents alleged that the master address registers used by the Census Bureau were grossly inadequate and that the followup check of the master address registers by Postal Service and census workers was grossly inadequate. Respondents’ ultimate contentions were that the resulting undercount not only will cause New York to lose at least one congressional seat to which it is entitled when reapportionment is made pursuant to the 1980 census, but that it will also result in the dilution of the votes of New York residents vis-a-vis those of residents of other States, and will cost New York City and the State vast sums of money distributed under federal revenue sharing and other programs with statutory formulas tied to the census.

The District Court initially entered a preliminary injunction against the Census Bureau: It found that respondents had established a clear possibility of irreparable harm to the efficacy of their votes, and that respondents were likely to succeed because they had submitted significant evidence concerning Census Bureau mismanagement and had raised serious questions as to whether some of the Bureau’s policies and procedures were carried out in an arbitrary and irrational manner. The District Court declined to stay the preliminary injunction, and on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of a stay. The Court of Appeals found that respondents had demonstrated a possibility of irreparable harm and had also shown sufficient prospect of success on the merits to justify a preliminary injunction, and that the District Court did not disregard traditional equitable principles in issuing the preliminary injunction.

On December 22, 1980, the District Court entered final judgment in favor of respondents. The court found that the Bureau’s implementation of the census was improper in several respects and that the Bureau’s mismanagement of the census had resulted in a significant undercount in New York. The District Court ordered the Bureau to adjust the actual census data regarding New York in a reasonable and scientific manner to compensate for the disproportionate undercount, and it enjoined the Bureau from certifying New York’s population totals to the President on December 31, 1980, as required by statute. Applicants then brought this stay application.

Most of applicants’ memorandum in support of their stay application is devoted to arguing that the respondents are unlikely to succeed on the merits of the case. On the sparse record before this Court, I am not prepared to conclude that respondents cannot prevail on the merits. The Court of Appeals rejected applicants’ claim that respondents cannot prevail on the merits and, as noted, the District Court has ruled against applicants as has at least one other District Court. For me, the crucial issue in ruling on this application is applicants’ inability to show that there is a substantial likelihood that they will suffer irreparable harm if a stay is not issued. The only thing applicants point to is that the Census Bureau will be unable to comply with the December 31 deadline if the District Court’s order is not stayed. But as the Court of Appeals pointed out, there is nothing sacrosanct about the December 31 deadline. If the District Court’s conclusion is correct, the inability to meet the deadline is the Bureau’s own fault. Moreover, the actual reapportionment of seats based on the 1980 census will not commence until some later date and there is nothing about the District Court’s order that prevents this reapportionment from taking place well in advance of the 1982 congressional elections.

Applicants’ failure to prove irreparable harm from denial of their stay application stands in marked contrast to the irreparable harm that will be inflicted on respondents if the Census Bureau is allowed to certify inaccurate (at least according to the District Court) results to the President. Applicants have not suggested that there is any procedure for correcting these “inaccurate” figures once they are reported to the President and he transmits them to Congress as required by statute, and these figures will presumably be the basis for the reapportionment of congressional seats and a variety of federal revenue grants. The members of minority groups and other residents of low-income areas who were not counted by the Census Bureau will therefore suffer the irreparable injury stemming from the undercount. Thus, it appears that granting the application not only fails to preserve the status quo, it may actually moot the underlying controversy. In these circumstances, I cannot agree that a stay must issue.

       Applicants also rely on Justice Stewart’s stay of the District Court’s decision in Young v. Klutznick, 497 F. Supp. 1318 (ED Mich. 1980). In that case, the District Court enjoined the Census Bureau from certifying population totals for any States by December 31, 1980. But in this case, unlike in Young, the District Court order only applies to New York’s population totals. Thus, applicants cannot rely on the alleged interest of various States in using the census figures for redistricting purposes for state legislatures.


text:
    January 12, 1981
    No. 80-576.
    Laclede Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission of Missouri.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 80-593.
    Bishop v. Burton.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ga. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 80-5554.
    Herrera v. Hernandez.
   Appeal from Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 13th Sup. Jud. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 80-5355.
    Whittemore v. Circuit Court of Kenosha County.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wis. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Justice Blackmun would dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, treat the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, and deny certiorari.


text:
    No. 80-5551.
    Conrad v. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. D. C. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 80-5725.
    Gooden v. Texas.
   Appeal from Ct. Crim. App. Tex. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5781.
    Prenzler v. Manlin Service Corp.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5816.
    Bin-Rilla, aka Preston v. Israel, Warden.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wis. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-444.
    Foley, Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts v. Carter, President of the United States, et al.
   Certificate from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed.


text:
    No. A-420.
    Royse v. Washington et al.
   Application for bail and/or writ of habeas corpus, addressed to Justice Marshall and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-484 (80-5808).
    Oliver v. Marks, Correction Commissioner, et al.
   D. C. E. D. Pa. Application for stay, addressed to The Chief Justice and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-521.
    Noe v. United States.
   Application for bail pending appeal, addressed to Justice Brennan and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-530.
    Arizona et al. v. Planned Parenthood of Central and Northern Arizona et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Application for stay, presented to Justice Rehnquist, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 79-1252.
    No. 79-1502.
    California et al. v. Sierra Club et al.; and Kern County Water Agency et al. v. Sierra Club et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 818.] Motion of Contra Costa County Water Agency et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 79-1423.
    Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization of California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 817.] Motion of American Council of Life Insurance for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 79-1538.
    No. 79-1596.
    Andrus, Secretary of the Interior v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., et al.; and Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., et al. v. Andrus, Secretary of the Interior.
   D. C. W. D. Va. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 817.] Motions of Pike County, Kentucky, and Coal Operators & Associates, Inc., for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae denied.


text:
    No. 79-1734.
    Parratt et al. v. Taylor.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 917.] Motion of respondent to dismiss the writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1794.
    Michigan v. Summers.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 898.] Motion of the Solicitor General for additional time for oral argument granted, and 10 additional minutes allotted for that purpose. Respondent also allotted an additional 10 minutes for oral argument.


text:
    No. 79-1943.
    No. 80-193.
    Alessi et al. v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., et al. Buczynski et al. v. General Motors Corp. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 949]; and

C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 950.] Joint motion of appellees in No. 79-1943 and respondent General Motors Corp. in No. 80-193 for divided argument granted. Request for additional time for oral argument denied. Motion of American Association of Retired Persons et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Motions of Merl D. Stong et al. and Gray Panthers for leave to file briefs as amici curiae in No. 80-193 granted.


text:
    No. 80-54.
    No. 80-5049.
    ITT Gilfillan v. Clayton; and Clayton v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 950.] Motion of respondents International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America and its Local 509 for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 80-231.
    Andrus, Secretary of the Interior, et al. v. Indiana et al.
   D. C. S. D. Ind. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 816.] Motion of appellees for additional time for oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 80-317.
    University of Texas et al. v. Camenisch.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 950.] Motions of American Council on Education et al. and Equal Employment Advisory Council for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 80-456.
    Thompson, Secretary, Department of Social and Health Services of Washington, et al. v. Berry et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 80-922.
    Marshall, Secretary of Labor v. Alabama et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motions of Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod and Grace Baptist Temple, Prattville, Alabama, et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Motion of respondents to expedite consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5700.
    No. 80-5769.
    No. 80-5770.
    In re Payton; In re Robinson; and In re Jackson.
   Petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 80-5780.
    In re Beach.
   Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 80-608.
    United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns. et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 80-202.
    American Express Co. v. Koerner.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 80-544.
    First National Maintenance Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-1180.
    Duplantier et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1841.
    Granddad Bread, Inc. v. Continental Baking Co.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-2065.
    Horwitz v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-227.
    Cole v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-302.
    Kimpel v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-304.
    Massarella v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-343.
    Lewin v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-356.
    Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc., et al. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-387.
    Harding, Dahm & Co., Inc. v. Lightsey.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-388.
    Stepney v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-402.
    J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-403.
    Gould, dba Brokers for Agricultural Cooperative Assns. v. Interstate Commerce Commission.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-428.
    Manges et al. v. County of Duval et al.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 4th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-436.
    Turkish v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-437.
    Arshal v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-443.
    Reeves v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-459.
    Duncan et al. v. Peninger.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-486.
    No. 80-490.
    Karas v. United States; and Pecora v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 624 F. 2d 500.


text:
    No. 80-496.
    Burns et al. v. Gulf Oil Corp.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-497.
    Towry v. United States et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-528.
    Savarese v. Harris, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-535.
    Concerned Parents & Citizens for the Continuing Education at Malcolm X (P. S. 79) et al. v. New York City Board of Education et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-541.
    County of Fairfax, Virginia, et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-573.
    Smith, Administratrix v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-583.
    Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-594.
    No. 80-605.
    Amerada Hess Corp. v. United States; and Kayo Oil Co. et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 624 F. 2d 461.


text:
    No. 80-598.
    Joly v. Creedon.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-599.
    Jeffers v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-611.
    Cianciulli et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-618.
    Refrigerated Transport Co., Inc., et al. v. Interstate Commerce Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-625.
    Shapiro et al. v. Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Co. et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-630.
    No. 80-770.
    Garber v. United States; and Denucci v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 626 F. 2d 1144.


text:
    No. 80-635.
    Michael Reese Physicians & Surgeons et al. v. Quern, Director, Illinois Department of Public Aid.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-637.
    Sunnyside Valley Irrigation District v. Kittitas Reclamation District et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-643.
    Stratos v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-646.
    Connor v. Warren, Administrator, et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-648.
    European Trade Specialists, Inc., et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-650.
    Connor v. Flynn.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-655.
    Nickolaou et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-661.
    George Banta Co., Inc., Banta Division v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-670.
    Widmer v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-672.
    Foxx v. District Court of the State of Nevada for the Eighth Judicial District (Foxx, Real Party in Interest).
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-674.
    Laredo Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-680.
    Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-683.
    Consolidated Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. et al. v. Anchor Savings Assn. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-684.
    Perluss v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-686.
    Morrison v. Pennsylvania.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-688.
    Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Merban Corp. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-690.
    Hatten et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-694.
    Wood v. Wood.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-695.
    Payne v. Weinstock.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-700.
    Rowry v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-703.
    Lauchli v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-706.
    Industrial Tile, Inc. v. Stewart et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-707.
    Brady v. Doe.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 14th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-708.
    Catena v. Capitol Industries, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-711.
    Rittenhouse Consulting Enterprises, Ltd., et al. v. New Jersey State Commission of Investigation.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-712.
    Abdella v. Wisconsin.
   Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-713.
    Huron Die Casting, Inc., et al. v. Creditors’ Committee of Huron Die Casting, Inc.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-718.
    Hewitt et al. v. City of Escondido.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-721.
    Elder, dba Vorpal Galleries v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-723.
    Patricelli v. Mecca Ltd. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-724.
    McCutcheon v. Board of Education of Chicago et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-729.
    Owen, Administrator v. Meserve et al., Trustees.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-736.
    Spence v. Securities and Exchange Commission.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-740.
    No. 80-5484.
    No. 80-5491.
    Eckman v. United States; Blum v. United States; and Machi v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 80-740, 631 F. 2d 725; Nos. 80-5484 and 80-5491, 631 F. 2d 726.


text:
    No. 80-743.
    Shapiro et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-744.
    Arciniega v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-748.
    Root v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-755.
    DeSimone v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-774.
    Hughes Aircraft Co. et al. v. Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm, GmbH.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-775.
    Ciaffoni et al. v. Cowden et al.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-787.
    Dinkin v. Ganea et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-790.
    Hazard v. Hazard.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-796.
    Zicarelli v. Dietz, Chairman, New Jersey Parole Board, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-799.
    Maselli v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-800.
    Biometric Affiliated Research Laboratories, Inc., et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-803.
    Greenawalt et al. v. Pawlak et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-807.
    Blumberg et al. v. Prince George’s County, Maryland, et al.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-811.
    Long et al. v. Arcell et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-825.
    Bithoney v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-826.
    Tinari v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-829.
    Del Genio v. United States Bureau of Prisons et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-855.
    Anton v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-856.
    Murrell v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-867.
    Jackstadt v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-882.
    Edler Industries, Inc., et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-888.
    Rowbotham v. American Airlines, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-899.
    Perlstein v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-909.
    Tercero v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-910.
    Calavo Growers of California v. Generali Belgium et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-912.
    No. 80-917.
    Sisk v. United States; and Benson et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-916.
    DiNardi v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5136.
    Perez v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5219.
    Mims v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5232.
    Hirtzer v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5269.
    Boulware v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5282.
    Mitchell v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5306.
    Brewer v. Overberg, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5324.
    Park v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5327.
    Baxter v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5338.
    Sparks v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5339.
    Devine v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5353.
    Barth v. Wisconsin.
   Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5379.
    Walker v. Lockhart, Correction Director.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5381.
    Copeland v. Iowa.
   Ct. App. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5388.
    Tinsley v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5398.
    Wilks v. Israel, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5405.
    Soto-Matos v. Fauver, Corrections Commissioner, et al.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5410.
    Burgos v. Follette, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5429.
    DeGideo v. Altemose Construction Co.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5470.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5481.
    Wilkins v. Hinton et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5494.
    Bryant v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5498.
    Whitfield v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5499.
    Keith v. Bordenkircher, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5504.
    Frazier v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5510.
    Arrington v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5511.
    Sullivan v. Blackburn, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5516.
    Elcan v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5517.
    Scott v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5518.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5531.
    Yost v. Bordenkircher, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5570.
    Lyles v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5577.
    Wiley v. Kansas.
   Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5606.
    Edwards v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5610.
    Less v. Bordenkircher, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5612.
    In re Gambara.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5622.
    Hoover v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5623.
    Pena v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5624.
    Watson v. Michael I. Schaffer Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5626.
    Alexander v. West Virginia Board of Probation and Parole.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5627.
    Miles v. Thompson, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5629.
    Barnes v. Cupp, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5634.
    Henderson v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5636.
    Mitchell v. Smith, Correctional Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5639.
    Hammitt v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5641.
    Doe v. West et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5646.
    Smith v. Woodard et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5650.
    Gonzalez v. Hammock, Chairman, New York State Board of Parole.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5652.
    Arthur v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5654.
    Williams v. Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5657.
    Barner v. Stephenson, Correctional Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5666.
    Pharr v. Israel, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5667.
    Gray v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5678.
    Hyden v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5679.
    Thomas v. Cardwell, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5682.
    McNeal v. Bordenkircher, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5684.
    Beaven v. Bordenkircher, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5685.
    White v. Bloom et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5686.
    Archie v. Wisconsin.
   Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5687.
    Plies v. Pine Tree Motel, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5691.
    Gibson v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5692.
    Boyd v. City and County of Denver, Colorado, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5698.
    Williamson v. Davis, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5703.
    McGugan v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5704.
    McGee v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5706.
    Cochran v. City of Akron.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Summit County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5709.
    Wilson v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5710.
    Aillon v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5714.
    Evans v. Anderson, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5716.
    Baloun et al. v. General Motors Corp.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5720.
    Stover v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5721.
    Meredith v. Smith, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5731.
    Norris v. Michigan.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5732.
    Roseman v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5733.
    Hudson v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5734.
    Johnson v. Cuyahoga County, Inc., Ohio, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5735.
    Buchanan v. Searcy et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5736.
    Johnson v. United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5737.
    Paro v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5738.
    Napoleon v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5739.
    Amos v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5744.
    Frazier, aka Beachum v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5745.
    Atkins v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5749.
    Martinez v. Smith, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5753.
    No. 80-5754.
    Rouse v. United States; and Adderly et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 80-5753, 633 F. 2d 212; No. 80-5754, 633 F. 2d 211.


text:
    No. 80-5756.
    Ford v. Bordenkircher, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5759.
    Berzito v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5760.
    Roberts v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5761.
    Gray v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5766.
    Sims v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5771.
    Chipman v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5772.
    Dukes v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5774.
    Thomas v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5776.
    Hammork v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5784.
    Bingham v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5786.
    Dozier v. Sowders, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5788.
    Bennett v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5792.
    Johl v. Town of Groton et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5797.
    Ulmer v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5804.
    Eyrich v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5806.
    Emassas v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5832.
    Allen v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5837.
    Iqbal v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5838.
    Ferrell v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5843.
    Hines v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5844.
    Zitek v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5866.
    Proca v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5867.
    Vasquez-Morales v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1922.
    Central of Georgia Railroad Co. v. Hendley.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of National Railway Labor Conference for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-2014.
    Anderson et al. v. Winsett.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment summarily.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Rehnquist joins,

dissenting.

In Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 12 (1979), we held that a Nebraska statute created an “expectancy of release [on parole]” that was “entitled to some measure of constitutional protection.” The Nebraska statute provided in part:

“Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed offender who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the opinion that his release should be deferred because:
“(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of parole;
“(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote disrespect for law;
“(c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline; or
“(d) His continued correctional treatment, medical care, or vocational or other training in the facility will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a law-abiding life when released át a later date.”

We emphasized that oúr decision rested on the “unique structure and language” of the Nebraska statute and cautioned that whether any other state statute created a liberty interest would have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Ibid.

In this case respondent, a Delaware state prisoner, filed suit against petitioners, state prison officials, alleging that petitioners violated his due process rights when they denied him work release. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit examined the Delaware statutory provisions and regulations governing work release programs in light of Greenholtz and concluded that a liberty interest was implicated when respondent was denied work release. The court conceded that Delaware prison officials exercise substantial discretion in making work release decisions but concluded that their discretion is not unbounded. It determined that under Delaware law prison officials must exercise their discretion “consistently with the purpose and policy behind work release.” The court also observed that the State had established “an elaborate institutional system” for processing work release applications. Two separate committees must evaluate the inmate’s fitness for work release and recommend that work release be granted before the inmate’s application may be submitted to the prison superintendent. In light of this three-tier review system, the court concluded that the superintendent could not reject work release applications for reasons that were unrelated to the purposes of the work release program. Since Delaware prison officials do not have unlimited discretion to deny work release to an inmate who meets the basic criteria for eligibility, the Court of Appeals held that under Greenholtz respondent had established an “expectancy of [work] release” that was entitled to constitutional protection. The court clearly rejected the view expressed in the dissenting opinion that respondent could not prevail under the standard established in Greenholtz since Delaware law does not provide that an eligible inmate shall be granted work release unless prison authorities determine, based on certain statutory criteria, that work release ought to be denied.

We did not expressly state in Greenholtz that the “shall. . . unless” language of the Nebraska statute was the critical factor underlying our determination that the statute created a liberty interest. However, other Courts of Appeals have examined parole release statutes lacking mandatory language and have concluded in light of Greenholtz that those statutes do not create liberty interests. See Wagner v. Gilligan, 609 F. 2d 866 (CA6 1979); Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F. 2d 661 (CA2 1979); Shirley v. Chestnut, 603 F. 2d 805 (CA10 1979).

I believe this Court should grant certiorari to clarify the implications of the Greenholtz decision by considering whether the Delaware statute and regulations involved in this case created a constitutionally protected liberty interest.

       Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,114 (1) (1976) (emphasis added). See Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S., at 11.

         Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F. 2d 996, 1007 (1980) (en banc).

         Id., at 1006.

       The court distinguished this case from Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976), in which we rejected the respondent state prisoners’ argument that they had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in remaining in particular prisons. The state statute involved in Meachum permitted prison officials to transfer prisoners to other state correctional institutions “for whatever reason or for no reason at all.” Id., at 228.

       The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has stated that the presence of mandatory language is an important factor to be considered in determining whether a statute creates a liberty interest. Bowles v. Tennant, 613 F. 2d 776, 778 (1980).


text:
    No. 79-2059.
    American Electric Power Co., Inc., et al. v. City of Mishawaka, Indiana, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 80-174.
    California v. Patrick Steven W.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 80-233.
    Michigan v. Walton.
   Ct. App. Mich. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.