text:
    No. 84-6158.
    Ferrara v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until April 8, 1985, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

For the reasons expressed in Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U. S. 928 (1983), we would deny the petition for writ of certiorari without reaching the merits of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 84-5543.
    In re Johnson.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Petition for writ of common-law certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1282.
    In re Murgo.
   Petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 84-1312.
    In re Kaczmarek.
   Petition for writ of prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 84-1103.
    Hill v. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-2125.
    McMahon, Director, Department of Social Services of California v. Vaessen et al.
    (See also Nos. 84-6081, 84-6227, and 84-5543, supra.)

   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-2165.
    Jones et al. v. Petit, Commissioner, Maine Department of Human Services.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6168.
    James v. Cohen, Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6269.
    Bell v. Massinga, Secretary, Maryland Department of Human Resources, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6769.
    Dickenson et al. v. Petit, Commissioner, Maine Department of Human Services, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6870.
    Matlock v. Rose, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-444.
    Connor et al. v. Aerovox Inc. et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-626.
    McGaffin v. Roberts.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 84-770.
    Save Mart of Modesto, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 126.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-783.
    Murray v. Gardner, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-798.
    McLean v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-850.
    Vitello v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-852.
    Ernst & Whinney et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-853.
    Asherman v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-855.
    Basham et al. v. Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-858.
    Tarter et al. v. Raybuck et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-917.
    No. 84-1131.
    Hansen, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Hansen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. et al.; and Johns-Manville Sales Corp. et al. v. Hansen et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-941.
    Oklahoma v. Eddings.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-979.
    Cross v. United States Parcel Service et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-989.
    Newspaper Drivers & Handlers, Local No. 372, Affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-990.
    Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad Co. v. Illinois Department of Transportation et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-992.
    Asociacion de Reclamantes et al. v. United Mexican States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-997.
    Lahodny v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1004.
    International Longshoremen’s Association Locals 329 and 851, AFL-CIO, et al. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1050.
    Jolley v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1051.
    McColgan et al. v. United Mine Workers of America et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1065.
    Kravitz v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1102.
    Philibosian, District Attorney for the County of Los Angeles, et al. v. Feminist Women’s Health Center, Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1132.
    Eastway Women’s Clinic, Inc. v. Eastway General Hospital, Ltd.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1137.
    Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1146.
    Pravda v. Hall et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1149.
    Litchfield v. Spielberg et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1154.
    Quinn v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1156.
    No. 84-1186.
    Cox Enterprises, Inc., dba Austin American-Statesman v. Hardy, Judge, 130th District Court, Matagorda County, Texas; and Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Hardy, Judge, 130th District Court, Matagorda County, Texas.
   Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1159.
    Jensen, Administratrix of the Estates of Brown et al. v. Conrad et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1161.
    Campbell v. Pierce County, Georgia, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1163.
    Aguilar v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 10th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1170.
    20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1172.
    Gress v. Michigan.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1174.
    Monzello v. Automobile Club of Southern California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1175.
    Nelson v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 12th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1182.
    Boeing Co. et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1183.
    Self v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1184.
    City of Montgomery et al. v. Williams.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1195.
    Nestier Corp. v. Menasha Corp. (Lewisys-tEms Division).
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1197.
    Deak-Perera Hawaii, Inc. v. Department of Transportation of Hawaii et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1199.
    Moore v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1201.
    Teichner v. Administrator of the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary System.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1202.
    Rig Hammers, Inc. v. Odeco Drilling, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1205.
    International Woodworkers of America, Local 3-261 v. Kuhn, Personal Representative of the Estate of Kuhn.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1211.
    Norminton et al. v. Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1213.
    Car Carriers, Inc., et al. v. Ford Motor Co. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1232.
    Jackson v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1242.
    Puckett v. City of Emmett, Idaho.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1243.
    Rodgers v. Fisher Body Division, General Motors Corp.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1245.
    Burke et al. v. Atlantic Research Corp. et al.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1264.
    Nova University v. Educational Institution Licensure Commission.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1269.
    DeWitt v. Department of the Navy.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1286.
    Crosson v. Conlee, Executor of the Estate of Via.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1323.
    Perry v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1334.
    Snyder v. Ohio State Medical Board.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Summit County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5426.
    Hatcher v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5599.
    McQueen v. Massey, Superintendent, Union Correctional Institution.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5607.
    Lisk v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5614.
    Scriber v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5668.
    Clark v. Maggio, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5702.
    Zarinsky v. Fenton, Superintendent, Rahway State Prison.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5739.
    Phelps v. Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5801.
    Austin v. Young, Superintendent, Waupun Correctional Institution, Waupun, Wisconsin.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5837.
    DeVincent v. United States et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5879.
    Brown v. Balkcom, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5914.
    Henry v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5922.
    Slater v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6055.
    Hanson v. Rutherford et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6060.
    Ross v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6062.
    Geidel v. Fulcomer et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6063.
    Lee v. Stephenson et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6078.
    Wilkins v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6083.
    Bouta v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6084.
    Covington v. Winger et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6087.
    Lankford v. Superior Court of California, County of Alameda.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6088.
    Branch v. Cupp, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6092.
    Berkson v. Del Monte Corp. et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6094.
    Tryon v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6097.
    Mitchell v. Scully, Superintendent, Greenhaven Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6101.
    Best v. Holbrook, Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6105.
    Costello v. Holmes et al.

   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6107.
    Howell v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6109.
    Geidel v. Fulcomer et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6110.
    Gardner v. City of Detroit Police Department et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6111.
    Holsey v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6112.
    Holsey v. Ward et al.
   Ct. App. Md. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6115.
    Turner v. Bosse, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6116.
    Tyler v. Harper et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6117.
    Zani v. Sixth Supreme Judicial District Court of Appeals of Texas et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6118.
    Zani v. Procunier, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6124.
    Kuang Hung Hu v. Morgan et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6125.
    Borges v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6133.
    Hayes v. Roadway Express, Inc.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6138.
    Milby v. North Carolina Department of Correction.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6141.
    Barron v. Aiken, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6143.
    Greene v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6148.
    Jamal v. Greer, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6149.
    Estrada v. Phelps et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6152.
    Friedman v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6192.
    Bertulfo v. Office of Personnel Management.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6197.
    Lee v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6200.
    Roberts v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6202.
    Copeland v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6203.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6204.
    Ray v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6209.
    Ramirez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6214.
    Bush v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6215.
    Bonnetts v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6217.
    Martell v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6218.
    Buchwald v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6219.
    Gates v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6220.
    Banks v. Vasquez, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6228.
    Schaflander et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6229.
    North v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6232.
    Jardina v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6237.
    Malone v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6247.
    Kimberlin v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6248.
    Vickers v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6260.
    Buide-Gomez et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6273.
    Mullins v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 83-6493.
    No. 84-6051.
    No. 84-6170.
    Irving v. Mississippi. Allen v. Georgia. Gillies v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Miss.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.; and

Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari

denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 84-826.
    Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections v. Boykins.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-839.
    Kemp, Warden v. Spraggins.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-875.
    Arizona Public Service Co. et al. v. Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community.

      See also note, swpra, p. 1046.

   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 84-939.
    Japan Air Lines Co., Ltd. v. Abramson.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 84-1002.
    United Telecommunications, Inc., et al. v. Saffels, United States District Judge for the District of Kansas.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1166.
    No. 84-1187.
    Weiss v. York Hospital et al.; and Medical and Dental Staff of York Hospital v. Weiss.

      See also note, supra, p. 1046.

   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.


author: Justice White,

text:
    No. 84-5548.
    Smith v. Jago, Superintendent, London Correctional Institution.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Brennan join,

dissenting.

Despite his claim that he was in Florida at the time of the crime, extensive evidence linked petitioner Smith to a rape he was charged with committing in Ohio. Pursuant to Rule 16(C) of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure, the State requested reciprocal discovery from the defense, and the trial court ordered petitioner to provide full discovery by October 30, 1981. On November 11, 1981, shortly after petitioner was returned from another prison to the jail of the county where he was to be tried, petitioner met with his defense attorney to discuss his case, which would be heard the next day. Petitioner then told his attorney that there were three alibi witnesses he wished to call at the trial, and the attorney orally informed the prosecutor’s office of the name of one of these witnesses. The day of trial, petitioner formally filed discovery listing all three witnesses. The trial court allowed the testimony of the first witness, a convicted felon who testified that petitioner was in Florida, not Ohio, shortly before and after the rape. But the trial judge excluded the testimony of the other two witnesses because of petitioner’s failure to inform the prosecutors of their testimony earlier. According to the proffer of testimony, the excluded witnesses would testify that petitioner had called them repeatedly from Florida, where he was living during the month the rape occurred, and that the telephone calls could be substantiated by phone company records.

Petitioner was convicted of rape, and he subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. Habeas relief was denied by the District Court, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 740 F. 2d 969 (1984), finding that the trial court’s exclusion of the alibi witnesses’ testimony was a constitutionally permissible sanction for petitioner’s failure to timely comply with the reciprocal discovery request.

The exclusion of defense witnesses because a defendant failed to produce their names before a procedural deadline raises a substantial question implicating the Sixth Amendment right of the accused to present witnesses on his own behalf. We have twice left this question open, Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U. S. 470, 472, n. 4 (1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78, 83, n. 14 (1970), and there are those who have found arguable constitutional infirmity in such exclusionary sanctions. See, e. g., 2 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 11-4.7(a) and accompanying commentary (2d ed. 1980); Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 711, 838-839 (1976); Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 137-139 (1974); Note, 81 Yale L. J. 1342 (1972). Another Federal Court of Appeals has explicitly ruled that “the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment forbids the exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence solely as a sanction to enforce discovery rules or orders against criminal defendants.” United States v. Davis, 639 F. 2d 239, 243 (CA5 1981). Accord, Hackett v. Mulcahy, 493 F. Supp. 1329 (NJ 1980). See also Ronson v. Commissioner of Correction of State of N. Y., 604 F. 2d 176 (CA2 1979). Similar provisions allowing the sanction of testimony exclusion for failure to comply with a discovery request exist in many, if not most, other States. See Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 387, 456 A. 2d 29, 35, cert. denied, 461 U. S. 948 (1983).

This case thus presents a constitutional issue of widespread importance, one we have left unresolved, and one over which the Courts of Appeals are divided. I would grant certiorari and resolve this issue, which will surely not disappear of its own accord.


text:
    No. 84-5716.
    Linell v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certio-rari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


author: Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 84-5736.
    White v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall,

with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death sentence imposed in this case. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). However, even if I believed that the death penalty could constitutionally be imposed under certain circumstances, I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence imposed here.

The petitioner was sentenced pursuant to a statute that requires that a death sentence be imposed whenever the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances. Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 413(h) (1982). The statute leaves no room for the jury to consider whether death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case. For the reasons I stated earlier this Term in Stebbing v. Maryland, 469 U. S. 900 (1984) (dissenting from denial of certiorari), I believe that such a statute is unconstitutional. The question presented here, which is also presented by other state statutes, is clearly worthy of this Court’s attention. See, e. g., Maxwell v. Pennsylvania, 469 U. S. 971 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Smith v. North Carolina, 459 U. S. 1056 (1982) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). I therefore dissent from the Court’s refusal to hear this case.


text:
    No. 84-5770.
    Stull v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 84-6089.
    Jones v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall,

with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

I continue to adhere to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). I also continue to believe that the death penalty’s cruel and unusual nature is made all the more arbitrary and freakish when it is imposed by a judge in the face of a jury determination that death is an inappropriate punishment. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447, 467 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. Heiney v. Florida, 469 U. S. 920 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

In Spaziano v. Florida, this Court upheld the constitutionality of a state sentencing scheme under which, if the judge could make certain specified findings, he was given authority to override a jury decision for life imprisonment. This case, however, presents the problem of a State’s decision to give its judges unguided discretion to overturn such jury decisions. I see this as an important issue of capital sentencing law, and so would grant the petition.

In Spaziano, as in this case, after a full hearing, a jury determined that death was not the appropriate punishment. Nevertheless, as in this case, the trial judge overrode that determination and sentenced the defendant to die. In rejecting Spaziano’s argument that his death sentence had been meted out in an unconstitutionally arbitrary manner, this Court noted that, under Florida law, the trial judge could not exercise free-wheeling discretion. To the contrary, Florida had forbidden its trial judges to reject such jury decisions unless the evidence favoring death was “so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.” Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975). This Court rejected Spaziano’s allegation of arbitrariness and emphasized “the significant safeguard the Tedder standard affords a capital defendant.” Spaziano, 468 U. S., at 465. “We are satisfied,” the Court declared, “that the Florida Supreme Court takes that standard seriously.” Ibid.

In the opinion below, 456 So. 2d 380 (1984), however, the Alabama Supreme Court has made clear that under that State’s system a trial judge need make no finding with respect to a jury verdict of life comparable to that which Tedder requires of Florida judges. The Alabama trial judge must simply “consider” the jury’s “advisory” sentence. Ala. Code § 13A-5-47(e) (1982). This duty to “consider” may apparently add up to little more than the authority to reject a jury sentence when a judge disagrees with it. Such simple disagreement is illustrated by this case, where the trial judge independently reviewed the evidence, made findings, weighed aggravating and mitigating circumstances (all of which had previously been done by the jury), and then determined that the jury had simply been wrong — for in the judge’s view death was appropriate “beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty.” 456 So. 2d 366, 379 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983). But the jury was not criticized for irresponsibility or irrationality; to the contrary, the trial judge explicitly stated that it was “not chastising or inferring that the jury was lax in their responsibility.” Ibid. The judge simply stated that “society must be protected and that an example must be set forth and made apparent so that our citizens may be secure in their homes and businesses.” Ibid. Most glaring is the fact that the judge made absolutely no effort to ascertain on what basis the jury reached the contrary conclusion. Rather, the judge wrote that “the Court must follow the dictates of its own conscience.” Ibid.

This system is quite different from a system where there is no jury, for here there has been a life sentence determination by a properly selected and instructed jury which has been witness to all the evidence and arguments. Where such a determination has been made, it must at least account for something. Under Florida’s Tedder rule, a judge must at least engage in the awesome task of determining whether he can say, in spite of a jury’s rejection of death, that death was so clearly appropriate that the jury determination was virtually beyond reason. Under Alabama’s approach, however, the judge is called on to decide little more than whether he agrees with the jury determination. Alabama asks the trial judge to make an inquiry no different than the one it asks of each juror, and like any “juror,” he may express his views of the case. But, under the statute, he plays the role of a “juror” with the exclusive power of decision, so the views of the real jurors become legally irrelevant once he reaches his conclusion. Although he must “consider” the jury’s determination, he can reject it without explanation, on no more basis than “considered” disagreement. It approaches the most literal sense of the word “arbitrary” to put one to death in the face of a contrary jury determination where it is accepted that the jury had indeed responsibly carried out its task.

The Eighth Amendment at least mandates that an execution only be the consequence of a “process that will guarantee, as much as is humanly possible, that the sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake.” Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 118 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Here, the judge based the death sentence on his understanding of the evidence and his evaluation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. But the jury had previously examined the same facts, made findings, evaluated all aggravating and mitigating factors, and reached a determination that death would be inappropriate. Where such a jury finding has been made, the Eighth Amendment requires more than that the trial judge declare that he has considered but disagrees with the conclusion of that admittedly responsible and informed jury.


text:
    No. 84-6316 (A-654).
    De La Rosa v. Texas.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant the application for stay and the petition for writ of certiorari and would vacate the death sentence in this case.


text:
    No. 83-1153.
    No. 83-1378.
    No. 84-452.
    No. 84-820.
    No. 84-5798.
    No. 84-5848.
    Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder et al., Evitts, Superintendent, Blackburn Correctional Complex, et al. v. Lucey, Todd v. United States, Polyak v. Hulen et al., Demoran v. California, In re Tyler,
   469 U. S. 153;

469 U. S. 387;

469 U. S. 1189;

469 U. S. 1190;

469 U. S. 1194; and

469 U. S. 1206. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 84-5921.
    Williams v. Procunier, Director, Texas Department of Corrections,
   469 U. S. 1222. Petition for rehearing denied.


author: Justice Brennan,

text:
    March 19, 1985
    No. A-705.
    Young v. Kemp, Warden.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death scheduled for Wednesday, March 20, 1985, presented to Justice Rehnquist, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Justice Stevens would grant the application. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.

Justice Brennan,

with whom Justice Marshall joins,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), I would grant Young’s application for a stay of execution. But even if I believed otherwise, I would stay this execution. When Young’s jury was selected, jurors opposed to the death penalty were excluded in accordance with the currently permissible voir dire process in capital cases. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412 (1985). Young claims that this exclusion rendered the resulting jury biased in favor of conviction, thus violating his right to an impartial jury and his right to a jury from which an identifiable segment of the community has not been excluded. Although the Eleventh Circuit has rejected this claim, Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F. 2d 582, 583-596 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U. S. 976 (1979), the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc has recently held in identical circumstances that the defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to an impartial jury were violated.. Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F. 2d 226 (1985). This Court is certain to grant certiorari in the immediate future to resolve the conflict between the Circuits.

Young alleged that his jury was conviction-prone in his first petition for habeas corpus in 1982. Relying on Eleventh Circuit precedent, the District Court denied the claim, and Young did not press the issue before the Eleventh Circuit. This habeas petition was fully litigated prior to the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Grigsby. Young now pleads in his second federal habeas petition that the jury at his trial was “stacked” against him in precisely the way condemned by the en banc Eighth Circuit in Grigsby. For the reasons stated by Justice Marshall in Witt v. Wainwright, ante, p. 1039 (Marshall, J., dissenting), Young’s argument that a stay should be granted is compelling. Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 17 (1963), left no doubt that a claim raised for the first time in a second or later habeas petition should receive full consideration if “the ends of justice” demand. There is no justice in sending Young to his death without the benefit of the full consideration of his claim that will surely come when this Court grants certiorari to decide the Grigsby issue.


text:
    March 25, 1985

    No. 83-1868.
    White v. Dougherty County Board of Education et al.

       Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the orders announced on this date, with the exception of No. 84-18, Talamini, Administratrix of the Estate of Talamini v. Allstate Insurance Co., infra, this page.

   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. M. D. Ga. Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


author: Justice Stevens, Chief Justice Burger,

text:
    No. 84-18.
    Talamini, Administratrix of the Estate of Talamini v. Allstate Insurance Co.
   Appeal from C. A. 3d Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. Justice White, believing that there is no final judgment to review, would dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun join,

concurring.

Appellant filed a two-count complaint against appellee seeking to recover damages under two Pennsylvania statutes. The District Court granted a motion to dismiss Count II and appellant tried to appeal from that order under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed the appeal, presumably because the District Court’s dismissal of only one count of the complaint was not a final order. Appellant has invoked our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1254, arguing that Pennsylvania courts would treat the District Court’s dismissal as a final order and that the federal courts should also treat the dismissal as final under the collateral-order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949). I find no merit to that argument and agree that the appeal should be dismissed; treating it as a petition for a writ of certiorari, the petition should be denied.

Appellee filed a nine-page motion to dismiss or affirm in which it correctly pointed out that a court of appeals does not have jurisdiction over an appeal from a district court order dismissing less than all of the claims alleged in a complaint unless the district court has made the express determination that Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires. In the concluding section of its printed motion, appellee requests the Court to award it “double costs and attorneys fees incurred.” Because three Members of the Court have expressed the opinion that the request should be treated as a formal motion and that it should be granted “to the extent of awarding appellee $1,000 against Brace Martin Ginsburg, Esq., appellant’s counsel, pursuant to this Court’s Rule 49.2,” post, at 1073, it is appropriate to explain briefly why the request should be denied.

Appellee is entirely correct in pointing to the jurisdictional defect in this appeal. Moreover, it is a defect that competent counsel should readily recognize. Nevertheless, this procedural error is one that has been frequently overlooked by a large number of experienced attorneys and judges in other cases. It is not the kind of egregious error that may properly provide the basis for sanctions against an attorney. There are, moreover, two additional reasons why it would be unwise judicial administration to grant a motion of this kind.

Because of the large number of applications for review that are regularly filed in this Court, the public interest in the efficient administration of our docket requires that we minimize the time devoted to the disposition of applications that are plainly without merit. Any evenhanded attempt to determine which of the un-meritorious applications should give rise to sanctions, and which should merely be denied summarily, would be a time-consuming and unrewarding task. It would require us either to adopt a procedure for assessing a fair compensatory damages award in particular cases, or to impose a somewhat arbitrary penalty whenever such a motion is granted. Unless there has been a gross abuse of the judicial process, or demonstrable and significant harm to a litigant, such action is unwarranted.

Of greater importance than the practical problems associated with the processing of motions of this kind is the symbolic significance of the action that The Chief Justice proposes. Freedom of access to the courts is a cherished value in our democratic society. Incremental changes in settled rules of law often result from litigation. The courts provide the mechanism for the peaceful resolution of disputes that might otherwise give rise to attempts at self-help. There is, and should be, the strongest presumption of open access to all levels of the judicial system. Creating a risk that the invocation of the judicial process may give rise to punitive sanctions simply because the litigant’s claim is unmeritorious could only deter the legitimate exercise of the right to seek a peaceful redress of grievances through judicial means. This Court, above all, should uphold the principle of open access.

This is not, of course, to suggest that courts should tolerate gross abuses of the judicial process. If there is reason to believe that counsel have pursued unmeritorious litigation merely in order to generate fees for themselves, for example, judges should bring the matter to the attention of the appropriate disciplinary authorities. Or if it appears that unmeritorious litigation has been prolonged merely for the purposes of delay, with no legitimate prospect of success, an award of double costs and damages occasioned by the delay may be appropriate. But the strong presumption is against the imposition of sanctions for invoking the processes of the law.

If the Court has treated appellee’s request as a motion under our Rule 49.2, the Court has correctly denied the motion.

Chief Justice Burger,

with whom Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor join.

I agree that we should dismiss this appeal, but I would go beyond that. This appeal is an attempt to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction on an utterly frivolous claim. Such efforts should subject the attorney who filed the jurisdictional statement to the sanction of Rule 49.2 of this Court, at least where, as here, the appellee has moved for an award of costs and fees.

Appellant, the administratrix of her husband’s estate, filed a complaint in state court seeking insurance benefits from appellee. Count I of the complaint sought benefits under Pennsylvania’s No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 40, §§1009.101-701 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985) (repealed 1984). Count II alleged that appellee had violated Pennsylvania’s Unfair Insurance Practices Act, id., § 1171.1 et seq., and sought statutory penalties under Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 73, §201-9.2 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).

Appellee removed the suit to Federal District Court based on the parties’ diversity of citizenship. On appellee’s motion, the District Court dismissed Count II for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, holding that the Pennsylvania laws upon which appellant relied do not provide any private right of action. Appellant immediately appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Court of Appeals granted appellee’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the District Court decision was not a final judgment and that the Court of Appeals thus lacked jurisdiction. Appellant then filed a jurisdictional statement with this Court, asserting that the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of her appeal was erroneous and a violation of due process.

The Court of Appeals’ action was unquestionably correct. See 28 U. S. C. § 1291; Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(b). Not only is appellant’s appeal to this Court completely frivolous on the merits, but also her attempt to bring the case here by way of appeal is totally improper; appellate jurisdiction is plainly lacking. See 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2).

Appellee has moved for an award of costs and fees for its expense in responding to this frivolous appeal. We afforded appellant the opportunity to respond to this motion; appellant’s response provided nothing to meet the claim that the appeal is demonstrably frivolous. I would grant the motion to the extent of awarding appellee $1,000 against Bruce Martin Ginsburg, Esq., appellant’s counsel, pursuant to this Court’s Rule 49.2.

It is suggested that two objectives justify the Court’s refusal to apply Rule 49.2 in this and similar cases: (a) efficient use of the Court’s time, and (b) affirmance of the principle of free access to the courts. Both objectives unquestionably are commendable, but the perspective is too narrow. Judicious use of the sanction of Rule 49.2 in egregious cases — and this is an egregious case— should discourage many of the patently meritless applications that are filed here each year. In the long run, this is the more effective way to “minimize the time devoted to the disposition of applications that are plainly without merit,” ante, at 1069; after all, that is the whole purpose of Rule 49.2. Further, while freedom of access to the courts is indeed a cherished value, every misuse of any court’s time impinges on the right of other litigants with valid or at least arguable claims to gain access to the judicial process. The time this Court expends examining and processing frivolous applications is very substantial, and it is time that could be devoted to considering claims which merit consideration.

Rule 49.2 has a purpose which has too long been ignored; it is time we applied it. I would apply it here.

       Count I sought recovery under Pennsylvania’s No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 40, §§ 1009.101-1009.701 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985) (repealed 1984). Count II sought recovery under Pennsylvania’s Unfair Insurance Practices Act, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 40, §§1171.1-1171.15, and Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 73, § 201-9.2 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985). The complaint was originally filed in the state court and removed by appellee to the Federal District Court because of the parties’ diverse citizenship.

       Rule 54(b), entitled “Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple PARTIES,” provides:
      “When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.”

       Motion to Dismiss or Affirm 9.

       The desire for similar action has been expressed in several cases in recent years. See, e. g., Potamkin Cadillac Corp. v. United States, 462 U. S. 1144 (1983) (Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist and O’Connor, JJ.); Escofil v. Pennsylvania, 462 U. S. 1117 (1983) (Rehnquist and O’Connor, JJ.); In re Rush, 462 U. S. 1117 (1983) (Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist and O’Connor, JJ.); Garcia v. United States, 462 U. S. 1116 (1983) (Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist and O’Connor, JJ.); Gullo v. McGill, 462 U. S. 1101 (1983) (Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist and O’Connor, JJ.).

       See, e. g., Burney v. Pawtucket, 728 F. 2d 647, 549 (CA1 1984) (per curiam); Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, S. A., 721 F. 2d 660, 661-662 (CA9 1983); Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F. 2d 314, 321 (CA6 1983); Sandoz v. Crain Brothers, Inc., 694 F. 2d 88, 89 (CA5 1982) (per curiam); cf. 10 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2657, pp. 60-61 (1983) (“Unfortunately, it is not always easy to tell whether a case involves multiple claims (to which Rule 54(b) is applicable) or a single claim supported by multiple grounds (to which Rule 54(b) is not applicable). The line between deciding one of several claims and deciding only part of a single claim is sometimes very obscure”) (footnote omitted).

       Cf. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U. S. 752, 757, n. 4 (1980) (“The glacial pace of much litigation breeds frustration with the federal courts and, ultimately, disrespect for the law”).

       The earliest version of this Court’s Rule 49.2, enacted in 1803, provided:
      “In all cases where a writ of error shall delay the proceedings on the judgment of the circuit court, and shall appear to have been sued out merely for delay, damages shall be awarded at the rate of ten per centum per annum, on the amount of the judgment.” Rules and Orders of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1 Cranch xvi, xviii (1803) (Rule XVII) (emphasis in original). Since that time the Rule has been revised and renumbered numerous times. See Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, Revised and Corrected at December Term, 1858, 21 How. v, xm (1858) (Rule 23.3); Rules of the Supreme Court Announced January 7, 1884, 108 U. S. 573, 586 (1884) (Rule 23.2); Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 266 U. S. 653, 674 (1925) (Rule 28.2); Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 275 U. S. 595, 617 (1928) (Rule 30.2); Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 346 U. S. 951, 1006 (1954) (Rules 56.2 and 56.4). However, despite the 182-year existence of Rule 49.2 and its predecessors, it appears that they have rarely been invoked. See, e. g., Tatum v. Regents of University of Nebraska, 462 U. S. 1117 (1983); Bohn v. Bohn, 316 U. S. 646, 647 (1942) (per curiam) (“it appearing that the appeal was frivolous and taken merely for delay”); Roe v. Kansas, 278 U. S. 191, 193 (1929); Slaker v. O’Connor, 278 U. S. 188, 190 (1929); Wagner Electric Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U. S. 226, 232 (1923) (“We are asked by counsel for appellees to impose a penalty on the appellant for delay. The history of the case and the conduct of the Wagner Company leave no doubt that the litigation in the federal jurisdiction and the successive appeals have been prosecuted solely for delay”); Deming v. Carlisle Packing Co., 226 U. S. 102, 106 (1912) (“That the unsubstantial and frivolous character of the only Federal question relied upon of necessity embraces the conclusion that the writ was prosecuted for delay is.in our opinion indubitable”); cf. Gibbs v. Diekma, 131 U. S. App. clxxxvi, clxxxvii (1880) (“[I]t is so apparent the appeal was vexatious and for delay only, that we adjudge to the appellees five hundred dollars as just damages for their delay”).

       See, e. g., Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 (1975); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949).

       Justice Field eloquently penned this point on the occasion of the announcement of his retirement:
      “As I look back over the more than a third of a century that I have sat on this bench, I am more and more impressed with the immeasurable importance of this court. Now and then we hear it spoken of as an aristocratic feature of a Republican government. But it is the most Democratic of all. Senators represent their States, and Representatives their constituents, but this court stands for the whole country, and as such it is truly ‘of the people, by the people, and for the people.’ It has indeed no power to legislate. It cannot appropriate a dollar of money. It carries neither the purse nor the sword. But it possesses the power of declaring the law, and in that is found the safeguard which keeps the whole mighty fabric of government from rushing to destruction. This negative power, the power of resistance, is the only safety of a popular government. . . .” Letter of Resignation of Justice Stephen J. Field, 168 U. S. App. 716 (1897) (emphasis added).

       See Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 1.5 (1983) (“A lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable”).

       This Court’s Rule 49.2 provides:
      “When an appeal or petition for writ of certiorari is frivolous, the Court may award the appellee or the respondent appropriate damages.”
      This Court’s Rule 50.7 states that “[i]n an appropriate instance, the Court may adjudge double costs.” Cf. Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 3.2 (1983) (“A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of his client”). The comment following this rule states:
      “Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Delay should not be indulged merely for the convenience of the advocates, or for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party’s attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. It is not a justification that similar conduct is often tolerated by the bench and bar. The question is whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action as having some substantial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client.”
      See also id., Rule 3.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law”). The comment to that rule, in pertinent part, states:
      “[T]he law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law’s ambiguities and potential for change. . . . [An] action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client’s position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the client desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person or if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.”

      Rule 49.2 provides: “When an appeal or petition for writ of certiorari is frivolous, the Court may award the appellee or the respondent appropriate damages.”


author: Chief Justice Burger.

text:
    No. 84-337.
    Crumpacker v. Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission.
   Chief Justice Burger.

I agree that we should dismiss this appeal for want of a substantial federal question, but I would go beyond that. This effort to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction on an utterly frivolous claim should subject the attorney who filed the jurisdictional statement to the sanction of Rule 49.2 of this Court.

Appellant Owen W. Crumpacker, formerly a licensed attorney in a Hammond, Indiana, law firm was disbarred by order of the Indiana Supreme Court on November 29,1978. In re Crumpacker, 269 Ind. 630, 383 N. E. 2d 36 (1978), cert. denied 444 U. S. 979 (1979). Appellant continued to practice law despite”^ disbarment. On February 11, 1982, following a hearing, the I lana Supreme Court held appellant in contempt for defying the 78 disbarment order; appellant was also held in contempt as a resi1+1 of his disruptive behavior during the hearing and served a 9(K- j sentence for the contempt. In re Crumpacker, 431 N. E. 2d 91. His appeal was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 459 U. S. 803 (1982).

On release, appellant continued to ignore the Indiana Supreme Court’s disbarment order. On July 25, 1983, the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission filed another complaint against appellant, alleging that he was again practicing law without a license. After appellant failed to appear at the hearing scheduled for November 15, 1983, despite being duly notified, the Indiana Supreme Court ordered that a warrant issue for appellant’s arrest. Appellant was apprehended on April 4, 1984, and brought before the Indiana Supreme Court to show cause why he should not be found in contempt for his failure to appear. After a hearing, in which appellant offered no reasonable explanation for his failure to abide by the disbarment order, the Indiana Supreme Court once again found appellant in contempt and ordered him confined to 30 days in prison.

Appellant’s jurisdictional statement filed in this Court launches an utterly frivolous constitutional attack on the Indiana Supreme Court’s power to hold him in contempt for ignoring its orders and for disbarring him in 1978. The Indiana Supreme Court’s authority over unauthorized practitioners of law is beyond dispute. See, e. g., Ind. Code §§ 33-2 — 3-1 and 34-<U-7-3 (1982). On this record there is no conceivable basis for raising any challenge to the order of the Indiana Supreme Court holding appellant in contempt for failing to appear at the November 15 hearing.

I would award appellee $1,000 against Andrew G. Kohlan, Esq., appellant’s attorney, pursuant to this Court’s Rule 49.2.

      Rule 49.2 provides: “When an appeal or petition for writ of certiorari is frivolous, the Court may award the appellee or respondent appropriate damages.”


text:
    No. 84-1155.
    Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. King, Commissioner of Revenue of Tennessee.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Tenn. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 84-1303.
    Caddo Parish School Board v. Bryan et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. La., 2d Cir., dismissed for want of substantial federal q.. -¡stion.


text:
    No. 84-6164
    Rider v. Florida.
   Appeal from Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 84-1176.
    Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of the State of New York et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. Motion of Edison Electric Institute for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Request of counsel for appellant to delete Brooklyn Union Gas Co. as a party to this proceeding denied. Appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Blackmun joins,

dissenting.

The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (PURPA), is part of a broad congressional response to the energy crisis. One of its provisions, § 210 of Title II, 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3, is designed to promote the development of alternative energy resources by overcoming the historical reluctance of electric utilities to purchase power from nontraditional facilities. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 750 (1982). Section 210(a) authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to promulgate “such rules as it determines necessary to encourage cogeneration and small power production,” including rules requiring utilities to offer to purchase electricity from qualifying small power production facilities. Section 210(b) requires that the rates for such purchases be “just and reasonable” and nondiscriminatory, and that no FERC rule “shall provide for a rate which exceeds the incremental cost to the electric utility of alternative electric energy.”

Pursuant to § 210(a), FERC requires utilities to purchase electricity from qualifying facilities. See 18 CFR §292.303(a)(1984). In an apparent effort to encourage decentralized power production as much as possible, FERC adopted the maximum rate allowed by the statute — the incremental, or “full avoided cost,” standard — for such purchases. See § 292.304(b)(2); see also 45 Fed. Reg. 12214, 12222 (1980). We upheld its choice in American Paper Institute, Inc. v. American Electric Power Service Corp., 461 U. S. 402 (1983).

Though PURPA is a federal statute whose administration lies with FERC, “implementation” of the statute is left in large measure to the States. See § 210(f), 16 U. S. C. §824a-3(f); 18 CFR §292.401(1984). Thus, a State can, under certain circumstances, set rates that are lower than full avoided costs, 18 CFR §292.304(b)(3)(1984); a qualifying facility and a utility can negotiate for lower rates( § 292.301(b)(1); and the state regulatory authority or any nonregulated utility may apply to FERC for a waiver, § 292.403. The question in the present case is just how far a State can go in the other direction. In particular, the question is whether a State can require utilities to pay more than the full avoided cost rate for their mandatory purchases.

New York has set a minimum rate of six cents per kilowatt hour for utility purchases from qualifying facilities. N. Y. Pub. Serv. Law §66-c (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). Appellant challenged the law, arguing that it could not be required to pay six cents per kilowatt hour for the times when its avoided costs fell below that amount. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court agreed. 98 App. Div. 2d 377, 471 N. Y. S. 2d 684 (1983). It held the six cent per kilowatt hour minimum invalid to the extent it exceeded the federally mandated avoided cost rate. In its view, PURPA, coupled with the Federal Power Act, occupied the field of energy regulation, and FERC had exclusive ratesetting jurisdiction. It also relied on the statute’s “just and reasonable” provision, which requires “consideration of potential rate savings to consumers,” American Paper Institute, supra, at 415, n. 9, and on a statement in the legislative history that incremental cost was to be “an upper limit on the price at which utilities can be required under this section to purchase electric energy,” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1750, p. 98 (1978).

The New York Court of Appeals reversed, 63 N. Y. 2d 424, 472 N. E. 2d 981 (1984), viewing the state and federal laws as complementary rather than conflicting. The court read both the statute and the legislative history to intend a cap only on rates set by FERC, and noted that the New York statute was consistent with the federal Act’s overall purpose. It also pointed out that FERC, in explaining its regulations, had said that “the States are, free under their own authority, to enact laws or regulations providing for rates which would result in even greater encouragement of these technologies,” and that only state rates below the federal rate would have to “yield to federal law.” 45 Fed. Reg., at 12221.

In upholding the New York statute, the Court of Appeals reached a conclusion in conflict with the Kansas Supreme Court. See Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Kansas Corporation Comm’n, 234 Kan. 1052, 676 P. 2d 764 (1984). Relying on the statement in American Paper Institute that the avoided cost rate “applies in the absence of a waiver or a specific contractual agreement,” 461 U. S., at 416, the Kansas court held that the state regulatory commission could not set rates for purchases from cogenerators that were higher than avoided cost.

There is no reconciling the decisions of these two state courts of last resort. Both rest on plausible arguments. The question over which they are divided, and which, in the posture of this case, falls within our mandatory jurisdiction, is substantial. Moreover, it has arisen in other proceedings, see Lock, Statewide Purchase Rates Under Section 210 of PURPA, 3 Solar L. Rep. 419, 445 (1981), and should be expected to recur. Appellant points to 10 other States besides New York that have authorized or required payments to qualifying facilities in excess of avoided cost. Juris. Statement 12, n. Oregon, for example, has established a rate said to be “well in excess of avoided costs” on the theory that the statutory ceiling applies only to FERC. Hagler, Utility Purchases of Decentralized Power: The PURPA Scheme, 5 Stan. Envtl. L. Ann. 154, 163 (1983). Overall, the States have taken a variety of approaches to ratesetting under PURPA. See generally Lock & Van Kuiken, Cogeneration and Small Power Production: State Implementation of Section 210 of PURPA, 3 Solar L. Rep. 659 (1981). The effective, orderly, and consistent administration of PURPA requires that the extent of their authority to do so be settled.

The federal question here is thus “substantial” in two senses — it is both open to debate and important. I dissent from the Court’s conclusion to the contrary.

      Commentator8 have relied on these statements to conclude that the States can set higher rates. E. g., Cornell, A PURPA Primer, 3 Solar L. Rep. 31, 53 (1981); Lock, Statewide Purchase Rates Under Section 210 of PURPA, 3 Solar L. Rep. 419, 445-450 (1981).


text:
    No. 84-1293.
    Kelley v. Texas Real Estate Commission.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Tex., 14th Sup. Jud. Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 84-1082.
    Oppenheimer & Co., Inc. v. Young.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Fla. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, ante, p. 213. Justice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 83-2101.
    Daniel v. Office of Personnel Management.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, ante, p. 768.


text:
    No. 83-6034.
    Swanson v. Merit Systems Protection Board et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, ante, p. 768.


text:
    No. 88-6093.
    Gates v. U. S. Postal Service.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, ante, p. 768.


text:
    No. 83-6440.
    Smith v. Office of Personnel Management.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, ante, p. 768.


author: Justice O’Connor,

text:
    No. 83-7032.
    Bowden v. Francis, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Ake v. Oklahoma, ante, p. 68.

Justice O’Connor,

with whom Justice White and Justice Rehnquist join,

dissenting.

By its action today, the Court vacates the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remands this case for reconsideration in light of Ake v. Oklahoma, ante, p. 68. Because I believe that Ake is not applicable to the present case, I respectfully dissent.

Petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Before trial, defense counsel filed a special plea of insanity and requested the appointment of a psychiatrist to examine petitioner. The trial court, after a hearing, found that the evidence suggesting petitioner’s incompetency was insufficient to warrant a psychiatric examination. The court then advised defense counsel that it would proceed to summon a jury to try petitioner on the issue of competence to stand trial if petitioner wished to litigate his special plea of insanity. Counsel rejected the offer and withdrew the special plea. Petitioner subsequently took the stand at trial and testified coherently in his own behalf. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, petitioner sought federal habeas relief arguing that the trial court should have granted the requested psychiatric examination to determine his competency and that he also should have received the assistance of a psychiatrist to gather mitigating evidence.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s denial of habeas relief. 733 F. 2d 740 (CA11 1984). With respect to the trial court’s refusal to order a pretrial examination, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Federal District Court and the state courts that petitioner had failed to present evidence raising a bona fide doubt as to his competency. As to psychiatric assistance to gather mitigating evidence, the Court of Appeals found no constitutional error because petitioner had not requested the state trial court to appoint a psychiatrist for that purpose. The petition before this Court renews the contentions that the trial court erred in not ordering a pretrial psychiatric examination and that petitioner was entitled to the assistance of a psychiatrist to present mitigating evidence. The Court of Appeals will be understandably confused by the Court’s action in vacating the judgment and remanding for reconsideration in light of Ake. Because Ake does not suggest that the Court of Appeals erred in its disposition of this case, I would deny the petition for certiorari.


text:
    No. 84-244.
    Florida v. Nease, aka Colwell.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U. S. 1 (1984).


text:
    No.-.
    Lynn v. Illinois.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file a petition for writ of certiorari without the affidavit of indigency executed by petitioner denied.


text:
    No. A-695.
    Drape v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Application to recall and stay pending timely filing of a petition for writ of certiorari, addressed to Justice White and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-452.
    In re Disbarment of Shankman.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 469 U. S. 808.]


text:
    No. D-454.
    In re Disbarment of West.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 469 U. S. 808.]


text:
    No. D-461.
    In re Disbarment of Powers.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 469 U. S. 978.]


text:
    No. D-468.
    In re Disbarment of DiAngelus.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 469 U. S. 1088.]


text:
    No. D-469.
    In re Disbarment of Utermahlen.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 469 U. S. 1102.]


text:
    No. D-484.
    In re Disbarment of Wollrab.
   It is ordered that James Edward Wollrab, of St. Louis, Mo., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-485.
    In re Disbarment of Logan.
   It is ordered that Alex Gerhart Logan III, of Tustin, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-486.
    In re Disbarment of Delk.
   It is ordered that Leonard Adolph Delk, of San Diego, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-487.
    In re Disbarment of Tabman.
   It is ordered that Irving Tabman, of Island Park, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 83-1894.
    Pattern Makers’ League of North America, AFL-CIO, et al. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 469 U. S. 814];


text:
    No. 83-2161.
    Montana et al. v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 469 U. S. 815]; and


text:
    No. 84-9.
    Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. et al. v. Russell.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 469 U. S.

816.] Cases restored to calendar for reargument.


text:
    No. 84-435.
    Russell v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 469 U. S. 1206.] Motion of the Solicitor General to permit Christopher J. Wright, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hac vice granted.


text:
    No. 84-518.
    No. 84-710.
    Johnson et al. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore et al.; and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 469 U. S. 1156.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 84-786.
    Maine v. Moulton.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. [Cer-tiorari granted, 469 U. S. 1206.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Anthony Whitcomb Beardsley, Esquire, of Ellsworth, Me., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 84-801.
    No. 84-805.
    Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection; and O’Neill, Trustee in Bankruptcy of Quanta Resources Corp., Debtor v. City of New York et al; and O’Neill, Trustee in Bankruptcy of Quanta Resources Corp., Debtor v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 469 U. S. 1207.] Motion of the parties to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 84-822.
    American National Bank & Trust Company of Chicago et al. v. Haroco, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 469 U. S. 1157.] Motion of petitioners to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 84-5636.
    Alcorn v. Smith, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1003.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Mary Gail Robinson, of Frankfort, Ky., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case.


text:
    No. 84-6315.
    In re McDonald.
   Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 84-6168.
    No. 84-6179.
    In re Carter; and In re Strager.
   Petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 84-1044.
    Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Cal. Probable jurisdiction noted. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

      See also note *, supra, p. 1067.


text:
    No. 84-1076.
    Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Board of Mississippi et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Miss. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 84-1244.
    Davis et al. v. Bandemer et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. Ind. Motion of appellees to strike the brief of Members of the California Democratic Congressional Delegation as amicus curiae denied. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 84-1240.
    Lake Coal Co., Inc. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 84-1273.
    Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-1275.
    Oregon Department of Commerce v. Payne.
    (See also No. 84-18, supra.)

   Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1629.
    Miller v. Mercy Hospital.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-808.
    Nevada et al. v. Hodel, Secretary of the Interior, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-944.
    Heimbach, County Executive of Orange County v. Chu, Commissioner of New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-950.
    Myers v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-988.
    City of New York Municipal Broadcasting System (WNYC) v. Federal Communications Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1058.
    Office & Professional Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, et al. v. Bowman et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1139.
    Brennan et al. v. Hobson et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1204.
    Mims v. Internal Revenue Service.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1217.
    Sterling Drug Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1219.
    Klimek v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1221.
    Rollform Inc. et al. v. Weinar et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1226.
    Badham et al. v. Secretary of State of California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1228.
    Holmes et al. v. Ross, Independent Executor of the Estate of Ross.
   Ct. App. Tex., 11th. Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1246.
    Dahlberg v. Becker et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1251.
    Ohio v. Luck.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1254.
    Local Union No. 2812, Lumber, Production & Industrial Workers v. Missoula White Pine Sash Co.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1315.
    Capps v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1318.
    Pipeline Local Union No. 38, Affiliated With the Laborers’ International Union of North America, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1327.
    Soto et al. v. Dickey et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1331.
    No. 84-1342.
    Rodgers v. United States; and Sargent Electric Co. et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1333.
    Cutaia v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1335.
    Shnurman v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1337.
    Mandalay Shores Cooperative Housing Assn., Inc., et al. v. Pierce, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5195.
    Berna v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5597.
    Monaghan v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5662.
    Wright v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5742.
    Galloway v. Allsbrook et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5904.
    Ballard v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5951.
    Neal v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-5955.
    Goetz v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6067.
    James v. Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6144.
    Day v. Amoco Chemicals Corp.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6147.
    McNeair v. Suburban Hospital Assn., Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6155.
    Hill v. State Bar of Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6157.
    Moore v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6172.
    Coker v. Williams, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6173.
    Dingle v. Simpkins, Administrator of the Estate of Dingle.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6175.
    Sibiga et ux. v. Hettleman et al.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6180.
    Currie v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6188.
    Flores v. Procunier, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6193.
    Klayer v. Avery Federal Savings & Loan Assn. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6201.
    Brodis v. Detroit Board of Education.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6206.
    Stuckey v. Superior Court of California, County of Fresno (California, Real Party in Interest).
   Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6207.
    Solomon v. Harris, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6208.
    Williams v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6225.
    Provow v. Mintzes, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6243.
    Betka v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6281.
    Lott v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6282.
    Gonzalez v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6291.
    Rodriguez v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6323.
    Fabian v. Ryan.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6330.
    Jaques v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-6334.
    Karabinas v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1047.
    Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections v. Smith.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1099.
    Southwest Security Equipment Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 84-1110.
    40 Eastco v. City of New York.

      See also note *, supra, p. 1067.

   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 84-5870.
    No. 84-6139.
    No. 84-6153.
    No. 84-6255.
    No. 84-6275.
    Finney v. Georgia. Smith v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. Parker v. Florida. Briley v. Bass, Warden. Welcome v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ga.;

C. A. 11th Cir.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

C. A. 4th Cir.; and

Sup. Ct. La. Certio-rari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 84-5943.
    Thomas v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall,

with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is under all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would vacate the judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals insofar as it left undisturbed the death sentence imposed in this case. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). However, even if I believed that the death penalty could constitutionally be imposed under certain circumstances, I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence imposed here.

To my mind, the Constitution requires that the State bear the burden of proving that a death sentence is appropriate in a given case. In two ways, the Maryland statute precludes this allocation of the burden of proof. First, it places on the defendant the burden of convincing the sentencer that mitigating evidence outweighs aggravating evidence, and it requires that a death sentence be imposed whenever aggravating factors are not outweighed. Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 413(h)(1982). The statute thereby places on the defendant the burden of proving that which is, under the existing statute, the ultimate question.

Second, by requiring that death be the sentence whenever aggravating factors are not outweighed, the statute prevents the sentencer from making what to my mind must be the ultimate inquiry: whether death is the appropriate sentence in a given defendant’s case. For the reasons I stated earlier this Term in Stebbing v. Maryland, 469 U. S. 900 (1984) (dissenting from denial of certiorari), I believe that such a statute is unconstitutional, and I therefore dissent from the Court’s refusal to hear this case.


text:
    No. 84-6174.
    Mitchell v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.

Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 84-695.
    No. 84-5783.
    No. 84-5901.
    King v. United States District Court for the Central District of California et al. (Integrity Home Loan Co., Inc., et al., Real Parties in Interest), Billiot v. Mississippi, Chaney v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation,
   469 U. S. 1100;

469 U. S. 1230; and

469 U. S. 1221. Petitions for rehearing denied.