author: Justice Stewart Chief Justice Burger,

text:
    MONROE v. STANDARD OIL CO.
    No. 80-298.
    Argued March 4, 1981
    Decided June 17, 1981

      Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Marshall, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., joined, post, p. 566.

      Alan I. Horowitz argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Daniel, Robert E. Kopp, Beate Bloch, Lois G. Williams, Kerry L. Adams, and William Taylor.

      Paul S. McAuliffe argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

        Martin J. Klaper and David L. Gray filed a brief for Cummins Engine Co., Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

   Justice Stewart

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that 38 U. S. C. § 2021 (b) (3), a provision of the Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, does not require an employer to provide preferential scheduling of work hours for an employee who must be absent from work to fulfill his military reserve obligations. 613 F. 2d 641. We granted certiorari to consider the petitioner’s contention that an employer has a statutory duty to make work-scheduling accommodations for reservist-employees not made for other employees, whenever such accommodations reasonably can be accomplished. 449 U. S. 949.

I

In 1975 and 1976, the years pertinent to this litigation, the petitioner was a full-time employee in the respondent’s continuous process refinery in Lima, Ohio. The refinery was operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. To insure that the burdens of weekend and shift work would be equitably divided among its employees over the course of a year, the respondent scheduled its employees to work five 8-hour days in a row weekly, but in a different 5-day sequence each week. Under the respondent’s collective agreement with its union, however, an employee could, with .the acquiescence of his foreman and if the change did not require the payment of overtime, exchange shifts with another employee.

During the same period, the petitioner was a military reservist, and had to attend training with his unit one weekend a month and for two weeks each summer. On a number of weekends, the petitioner was required to attend training on days when he was scheduled to work at the refinery. Although the petitioner was able on four of these occasions to exchange shifts with other employees, he was unable to make such an exchange in most instances. The respondent provided him with leaves of absence to attend training, as 38 U. S. C. § 2024 (d) required it to do, but it did not pay him for the hours he did not work, nor did it take steps to permit him to make up those hours by working outside his normal schedule. When the petitioner was on a leave of absence and could not arrange a switch with another employee, the respondent would make arrangements to fill the vacancy created by the petitioner’s absence, arrangements often requiring the payment of overtime wages to the substitute.

In 1976, the petitioner brought this action against the respondent alleging that it had violated the provisions of 38 U. S. C. §§2021 (b)(3) and 2024(d). Noting that the first of these sections provides that an employer may not deny a military reservist in his employ any “incident or advantage of employment” because of the employee’s obligations to the Reserves, and finding that “being scheduled for a full forty hour week at the [respondent’s] refinery constitutes an incident or advantage of employment,” the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted summary judgment to the petitioner. 446 F. Supp. 616, 618, 619. The court awarded petitioner $1,086.72 for wages lost on those “work dates when an accommodation should have been made.” Id., at 619.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. 613 F. 2d 641. First, it determined that the respondent had met the requirements of § 2024(d). It noted that this section “guarantees terms and conditions of reemployment to reservists returning from inactive duty training,” but found that “[i]t does not, however, protect reservists from discrimination by their employers between training assignments.” Id., at 643-644.

Next, the Court of Appeals rejected the District Court’s interpretation of §2021 (b)(3). It held that this section “merely requires that reservists be treated equally or neutrally with their fellow employees without military obligations.” Id., at 646. The appellate court then concluded that the respondent had taken no discriminatory action that is proscribed by § 2021 (b)(3):

“The requirement of equal treatment was met in the present case. The parties agreed that appellee was regularly scheduled for forty-hour workweeks, as were his fellow employees. Further, Monroe was scheduled for weekend work in accordance with Sohio’s established practice of rotating shifts to insure that all employees would work approximately an equal number of weekend days. Finally, he was treated the same as his coworkers with regard to the right to exchange shifts with other employees.” Id., at 646.

II

This case presents the first occasion this Court has had to address issues arising from the statutory provisions, codified at 38 U. S. C. § 2021 et seq., specifically dealing with military reservists. We have, however, frequently interpreted the somewhat analogous statutory provisions entitling the returning regular veteran to reinstatement with his “seniority, status and pay” intact, 38 U. S. C. § 2021 (a), most recently in Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 447 U. S. 191, and Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U. S. 581.

A

Statutory re-employment rights for veterans date from the Nation’s first peacetime draft law, passed in 1940, which provided that a veteran returning to civilian employment from active duty was entitled to reinstatement to the position that he had left or one of “like seniority, status, and pay.” 38 U. S. C. § 2021 (a). In 1951, in order to strengthen the Nation’s Reserve Forces, Congress extended reinstatement rights to employees returning from training duty. See Pub. L. 51, ch. 144, § 1 (s), 65 Stat. 75, 86-87. Thereafter, the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, Pub. L. 305, ch. 665, § 262 (f), 69 Stat. 598, 602, provided that employees returning from active duty of more than three months in the Ready Reserve were entitled to the same employment rights as inductees, with limited exceptions. In 1960, these re-employment rights were extended to National Guardsmen, Pub. L. 86-632, 74 Stat. 467. See 38 U. S. C. § 2024 (c). In addition, a new section, now codified at 38 U. S. C. § 2024 (d), was enacted in 1960 to deal with problems faced by employees who had military training obligations lasting less than three months. This section provides that employees must be granted a leave of absence for training and, upon their return, be restored to their position “with such seniority, status, pay, and vacation” as they would have had if they had not been absent for training.

Section 2024 (d) closely paralleled 38 U. S. C. § 2021 (a), the latter section ensuring the reinstatement of regular veterans returning from active duty. But § 2024 (d) did not provide reservists with protection against discharges, demotions, or other discriminatory conduct once reinstated. Section 2021 (b)(2), on the other hand, provided regular veterans returning from active duty one year’s “protection . . . against certain types of discharges or demotions that might rob the veteran’s reemployment of its substance.” Oakley v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 338 U. S. 278, 285. The legislative history of § 2021 (b) (3) indicates that it was designed to provide similar protection to employee-reservists.

B

Section 2021 (b)(3) provides in pertinent part:

“Any person who [is employed by a private employer] shall not be denied retention in employment or any promotion or other incident or advantage of employment because of any obligation as a member of a Reserve component of the Armed Forces.”

The Senate Report on the bill that became §2021 (b)(3), stated that the purpose of the enactment was “to prevent reservists and National Guardsmen not on active duty who must attend weekend drills or summer training from being discriminated against in employment because of their Reserve membership . . . .” S. Rep. No. 1477, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2 (1968). The Report explained that “[e]mployment practices that discriminate against employees with Reserve obligations have become an increasing problem in recent years. Some of these employees have been denied promotions because they must attend weekly drills or summer training and others have been discharged because of these obligations. . . . [T]he bill is intended to protect members of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces from such practices.” Id., at 2. The protection was to be accomplished by entitling reservists “to the same treatment afforded their coworkers not having such military obligations . . . .” Ibid.

The House Report announced the same motivation. The bill was described as providing “job protection for employees with obligations as members of a reserve component.” H. R. Rep. No. 1303, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1968). The House Report elaborated as follows:

“Section (1) amplifies existing law to make clear that reservists not on active duty, who have a remaining Reserve obligation, whether acquired voluntarily or involuntarily, will nonetheless not be discriminated against by their employees [sic] soley [sic] because of such Reserve affiliation.
“It assures that these reservists will be entitled to the same treatment afforded their coworkers u)ithout such military obligation.
“The law does not now protect these reservists against discharge without cause, as it does with inductees and enlistees, who have 1-year protection, and initial active duty for training reservists, who have 6 months’ protection.” Ibid, (emphasis added).

The legislation was originally proposed by the Department of Labor. Accordingly, the testimony of Hugh W. Bradley, Director of the Office of Veterans’ Reemployment Rights of the Labor Department, who was the chief administration spokesman for the provision, is instructive. He described the relevant portions of the legislation to the House Committee on Armed Services:

“The first provision of the bill deals with a problem that has been increasingly difficult in the past few years. It is designed to enable reservists and guardsmen who leave their jobs to perform training in the Armed Forces, to retain their employment and to enjoy all of the employment opportunities and benefits accorded their coworkers who do not have military training obligations. The law does not now protect them against discharge without cause as it does inductees and enlistees, who have 1-year protection, and initial active duty for training reservists, who have 6 months’ protection.” 1966 House Hearings, at 5312 (emphasis added).

See also 1968 House Hearings, at 7471.

Testimony by Rear Admiral Burton H. Shupper, U. S. N., appearing on behalf of the Department of Defense, also reflected the purposes behind the enactment:

“The other aspect of H. R. 11509 is the provision that employees shall not be denied retention in employment or advantages of employment because of any obligation as a member of a Reserve component of the Armed Forces. After the Berlin and Cuba callups, we received information from our Reserve community that a significant number of reservists were receiving indications that opportunities for advancement and retention in civilian employment would favor those who appear to offer their employers more continuity of services, namely those in the Standby Reserve or those with no Reserve status. In fairness, we must emphasize that this reaction on the part of employers appears to be the exception not the rule and, we believe, is generally not based upon unpatriotic motives but rather on the competitive spirit of business.” 1966 House Hearings, at 5315.

The legislative history thus indicates that § 2021 (b)(3) was enacted for the significant but limited purpose of protecting the employee-reservist against discriminations like discharge and demotion, motivated solely by reserve status. Congress wished to provide protection to reservists comparable to that already protecting the regular veteran from “discharge without cause” — to insure that employers would not penalize or rid themselves of returning reservists after a mere pro forma compliance with § 2024 (d). And the consistent focus of the administration that proposed the statute, and of the Congresses that considered it, was on the need to protect reservists from the temptation of employers to deny them the same treatment afforded their co-workers without military obligations. The petitioner’s contention that his employer was obliged to provide work-schedule preferences not available to other employees must be considered against this legislative background.

C

The petitioner’s argument is that the respondent corporation was obligated to make special efforts to schedule his work hours so he would avoid any lost time by reason of his reserve obligations. He does not allege that the respondent singled him out unfairly, or in any other way discriminated against him vis-á-vis other employees in the scheduling of work. Indeed, the petitioner’s argument would require work-assignment preferences not available to any nonreservist employee at the respondent’s refinery.

The problem with the petitioner’s position is that there is nothing in § 2021 (b) (3) or its legislative history to indicate that Congress ever even considered imposing an obligation on employers to provide a special work-scheduling preference. Indeed, the legislative history, set out above, strongly suggests that Congress did not intend employers to provide special benefits to employee-reservists not generally made available to other employees. Congress, and the administration spokesman for the legislation, stated explicitly that reservists were to be entitled “to the same treatment afforded their coworkers not having such military obligations . . . .” S. Rep. No. 1477, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1968); see also H. R. Rep. No. 1303, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1966); 1968 House Hearings, at 7471 (testimony of Hugh W. Bradley).

The strongest language culled by the petitioner from the legislative history to support his argument is a single passage in the 1966 House Report on H. R. 11509: “If these young men are essential to our national defense, then certainly our Government and employers have a moral obligation to see that their economic well being is disrupted to the minimum extent possible.” H. R. Rep. No. 1303, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1966). But this generalized statement appears only in the 1966 House Report; it is not contained in either the House or the Senate Report that accompanied the bill as finally enacted in the 90th Congress. Compare ibid, with H. R. Rep. No. 1303, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 3, 8 (1968), and S. Rep. No. 1477, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1968). Moreover, language in the same 1966 House Report specifically indicated that only a nondiscrimination measure was intended: “It should be noted that the only substantive changes in existing law relate to . . . the prohibition against employer discrimination against reservists who participate in the Reserve or National Guard programs.” H. R. Rep. No. 1303, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1966).

It appears that the origin of the passage the petitioner relies on is a statement by Hugh W. Bradley before the House Committee in 1966. See 1966 House Hearings, at 5313. Yet this passage disappeared from Bradley’s presentation to both the House and Senate Committees in the subsequent Congress. See 1968 House Hearings, at 7471, 7472; 1968 Senate Hearings, at 2, 3. And in all three of his congressional appearances, Bradley made it abundantly clear that the purpose of the legislation was to protect employee reservists from discharge, denial of promotional opportunities, or other comparable adverse treatment solely by reason of their military obligations; there was never any suggestion of employer responsibility to provide preferential treatment. In any case, the language relied on by the petitioner hardly supports a finding that Congress intended §2021 (b)(3) to convert a generalized moral obligation into a specific legal duty.

D

Aside from a lack of support in legislative history, the petitioner’s argument suffers other flaws. While the present case involves absences for weekend duty, the statutory language is not so limited; it refers to “any obligation as a member of a Reserve component . . . .” Section 2021 (b)(3) has been applied, for example, to 2-week summer camps, Carney v. Cummins Engine Co., 602 F. 2d 763 (CA7); 6-week training sessions, Carlson v. New Hampshire Dept. of Safety, 609 F. 2d 1025 (CA1); and 2-month training sessions, Peel v. Florida Dept. of Transportation, 443 F. Supp. 451 (ND Fla.), aff’d, 600 F. 2d 1070 (CA5). Accordingly, there is no principled way of distinguishing between an employer’s obligation to make scheduling accommodations for weekends as opposed to, for example, annual 2-week training periods, or even longer periods of training or duty. And certainly there is nothing in the legislative history that would indicate Congress intended that reservists were to be entitled to all “incidents and advantages of employment” accorded during their absence to working employees, including regular time and overtime pay.

The petitioner concedes that it might be impossible, or at least unduly burdensome, to accommodate a reservist’s absences for periods as long as the mandatory 2-week summer training session. Perhaps for this reason, he attempts to limit the obvious implications of his theory by arguing that “the statute only requires an employer to take reasonable steps to accommodate the reservists.” But, as is true of the petitioner’s more general affirmative obligation theory, there is nothing in the statute or its history to support such a notion.

Indeed, a “reasonable accommodation” to employee-reservists because of missed worktime has already been made by Congress in § 2024 (d). There, Congress decided what allowance employers should make to reservists whose duties force them to miss time at work: provide them a leave of absence. If Congress had wanted to impose an additional obligation upon employers, guaranteeing that employee-reservists have the opportunity to work the same number of hours, or earn the same amount of pay that they would have earned without absences attributable to military reserve duties, it could have done so expressly. By contrast, there is no evidence that the Congress that enacted § 2021 (b)(3) showed any concern with the problem of missed work hours, let alone imposed any duty to “take reasonable steps to accommodate the reservists” in this or any other respect.

The petitioner makes no suggestion why his theory of “reasonable accommodation” should apply only to “incidents or advantages of employment,” and not to the other provisions of §2021 (b)(3): retention and promotion. Presumably, if it applies to one provision of the section, it should apply to them all. But if an employer could, for example, defend a denial of promotion to an employee-reservist because the promotion could not be “reasonably accommodated,” the protection afforded by § 2021 (b)(3) would clearly be reduced, if not altogether eliminated.

Finally, the petitioner suggests that §2021 (b)(3) must have the meaning he attributes to it, because the section would otherwise be of little significance. But the nondiscrimination requirements of the section impose substantial obligations upon employers. The frequent absences from work of an employee-reservist may affect productivity and cause considerable inconvenience to an employer who must find alternative means to' get necessary work done. Yet Congress has provided in § 2021 (b) (3) that employers may not rid themselves of such inconveniences and productivity losses by discharging or otherwise disadvantaging employee-reservists solely because of their military obligations.

Ill

This Court does not sit to draw the most appropriate balance between benefits to employee-reservists and costs to employers. That is the responsibility of Congress. If Congress desires to amend § 2021 (b) (3) to require special work-hour scheduling for military reservists where it is reasonably possible, it is free to do so. But we must deal with the law as it is.

The respondent did not deny the petitioner anything that he would have received had he not been a reservist; He was scheduled for 40 hours work a week, as all other employees in the refinery were. He was assigned the same burden of weekend and shift work as were his fellow employees. And he was allowed to exchange shifts in the manner accepted by his union and the respondent, just as all other employees were. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Chief Justice Burger,

with whom Justice Brennan, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Powell join,

dissenting.

The Court today unduly restricts the employment protections accorded Ready Reservists and National Guardsmen by Congress. In my view, the Court’s decision is based upon an erroneous interpretation of 38 U. S. C. § 2021 (b) (3) and, in effect, allows employees to be penalized for their service in the military contrary to congressional intent.

I

A

As in any case involving statutory construction, “our starting point must be the language employed by Congress.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 337 (1979). Title 38 U. S. C. § 2021 (a) requires that a veteran returning to civilian employment after military duty be restored to the position he previously held or to “a position of like seniority, status, and pay.” In addition, 38 U. S. C. §2021 (b)(1) provides that the veteran’s reinstatement must be “without loss of seniority” and that he “shall not be discharged from such position without cause within one year after such restoration or reemployment.” See Oakley v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 338 U. S. 278, 28A-285 (1949). Similar safeguards are granted in 38 U. S. C. § 2024 (e) to members of “a Reserve component of the Armed Forces” who have military obligations lasting more than three months. As to reservists whose commitments are less than three months, 38 U. S. C. § 2024 (d) provides in pertinent part:

“Any employee . . . shall upon request be granted a leave of absence by such person’s employer for the period required to perform active duty for training or inactive duty training in the Armed Forces of the United States. Upon such employee’s release from a period of such active duty for training or inactive duty training, or upon such employee’s discharge from hospitalization incident to that training, such employee shall be permitted to return to such employee’s position with such seniority, status, pay, and vacation as such employee would have had if such employee had not been absent for such purposes.”

Additional guarantees for reservists are contained in 38 U. S. C. §2021 (b)(3), on which petitioner bases his claim for nonconflicting work hours. Section 2021 (b)(3) states:

“Any person who [is employed by the Federal Government, a state government, or a private employer] shall not he denied retention in employment or any promotion or other incident or advantage of employment because of any obligation as a member of a Reserve component of the Armed Forces.” (Emphasis added.)

The Court concludes that “§ 2021 (b) (3) was enacted for the . . . limited purpose of protecting the employee-reservist against discriminations like discharge and demotion, motivated solely by reserve status.” Ante, at 559. Yet the plain language of the statute belies such a narrow interpretation. Although § 2021 (b) (3) proscribes the termination of a reservist because of his military obligations, it also expressly prohibits the denial of “any promotion or other incident or advantage of employment.” Such protection is clearly broader than that enjoyed by returning veterans under § 2021 (b)(1), but is understandable because the reservist has continuing military commitments requiring his absence that may disadvantage him in his employment.

B

Just as the language of § 2021 (b) (3) does not demonstrate a congressional intent to confine the statute’s application to “discriminations like discharge and demotion,” neither does the legislative history. When the bill, H. R. 11509, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), that included what eventually became 38 U. S. C. § 2021 (b) (3) was first introduced, Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on Armed Services held hearings and the full Committee thereafter reported favorably on the bill. The Committee’s Report, which reflected the hearing testimony of Hugh W. Bradley, Director of the Office of Veterans’ Reemployment Rights of the Department of Labor, stated:

“Employment practices which disadvantage employees with Reserve obligations have become, an increasing problem in recent years. Paragraph 1 of the bill will protect members of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces, including the National Guard, from such practices. It is designed to enable reservists and guardsmen who leave their jobs to perform training in the Armed Forces to retain their employment and to enjoy all of the employment opportunities and benefits accorded their coworkers who do not . . . have a Reserve obligation.
“It assures that these reservists will be entitled to the same treatment afforded their coworkers without such military obligations ....
“The law does not now protect these reservists against discharge without cause as it does with inductees and enlistees, who have 1-year protection, and initial active duty for training reservists, who have 6 months’ protection.
“To give the reservist a specific period of protection after each tour of training duty would be to perpetuate him in his position indefinitely. The new section . . . would not follow this approach but instead provides that an employee shall not be denied retention in his employment or any promotion or other incident or advantage of employment solely because of any obligation as a member of a Reserve component of the Armed Forces.
“If these young men are essential to our national defense, then certainly our Government and employers have a moral obligation to see that their economic well being is disrupted to the minimum extent possible.” H. R. Rep. No. 1303, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1966) (emphasis added).

Although the bill was passed by the House, 112 Cong. Rec. 5017 (1966), the Senate took no action on the measure during the 89th Congress.

The bill was reintroduced in the 90th Congress. H. R. 1093, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 2561, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Hearings again were held before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on Armed Services, at which a statement expressing the view of the American Legion was entered on the record:

“The American Legion feels very strongly that employees with reserve obligations who are members of the National Guard and the Reserves . . . should be afforded all the employment opportunities and benefits as those who do not have training obligations. . . .
“[The new section] would prevent discharge from employment without cause because of membership in the National Guard or Reserves, and would also prevent discrimination in such areas as promotion, training opportunities and pay increases.” Hearings on H. R. 1093 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on Armed Services, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 7477 (1968) (emphasis added).

Noting that protection of “reservists and guardsmen from being disadvantaged in employment because of their military obligations” was one of the purposes of the bill, the full Committee’s favorable Report explained that “[s]ection (1) amplifies existing law to make clear that reservists not on active duty, who have a remaining Reserve obligation, whether acquired voluntarily or involuntarily, will nonetheless not be discriminated against by their employees [sic] soley [sic] because of such Reserve affiliation.” H. R. Rep. No. 1303, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1968) (emphasis added).

Following passage of the bill by the House, 114 Cong. Rec. 11779 (1968), the Senate Committee on Armed Services held hearings and issued a Report recommending enactment. The Report repeated the themes which run through every congressional expression on the statutory proposal:

“This bill is intended ... to prevent reservists and National Guardsmen not on active duty who must attend weekly drills or summer training from being discriminated against in employment because of their Reserve membership ....
“Employment practices that discriminate against employees with Reserve obligations have become an increasing problem in recent years. Some of these employees have been denied promotions because they must attend weekly drills or summer training and others have been discharged because of these obligations. Section 1 of the bill is intended to protect members of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces from such practices. It provides that these reservists will be entitled to the same treatment afforded their coworkers not having such military obligations by requiring that employees with Reserve obligations 'shall not be denied retention in employment or other incident or advantage of employment because of any obligation as a member of a Reserve component of the Armed Forces of the United States.’ ” S. Rep. No. 1477, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2 (1968).

The bill passed the Senate, 114 Cong. Rec. 24017 (1968), and became law on August 17, 1968. Pub. L. 90-491, 82 Stat. 790.

The legislative history of § 2021 (b) (3) admittedly reveals an intent to protect reservists from discharge because of their short-term absences, just as §§ 2021 (b)(1) and 2024 (c) safeguard returning veterans and reservists who are absent for more than three months. Yet the legislative history also indicates a more expansive congressional purpose of ensuring that reservists are not deprived of any employment benefit solely because of their willingness to serve their country.

II

The benefit at issue here is the opportunity to work a full 40-hour week. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that being scheduled to work 40 hours per week is an “incident or advantage” of employment established by the custom and practice at respondent’s refinery. 446 F. Supp. 616, 619 (ND Ohio 1978); 613 F. 2d 641, 645 (CA6 1980). Petitioner was treated no different from other employees in terms of work scheduling, and he was given the right to exchange shifts with willing fellow employees pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement. Nevertheless, during those weeks when his scheduled work hours conflicted with his military commitments and he was unable to arrange an exchange of shifts, the opportunity granted him to work a full 40 hours was illusory since respondent “took no steps to provide [him] with substituted hours.” App. 26. Thus, petitioner asserts that respondent violated 38 U. S. C. § 2021 (b)(3) by refusing to rearrange his work schedule to allow him to work 40 hours during those weeks when his military obligations otherwise precluded him from doing so. I agree.

The Court inaccurately characterizes petitioner’s claim as seeking “work-schedule preferences not available to other employees.” Ante, at 560. Respondent’s policy is not to readjust the work schedule to accommodate absences for personal reasons, and petitioner alleges no right to special consideration regarding absences unrelated to military service. But if petitioner is to be placed on an equal footing with his co-workers, his military absences cannot be treated simply as personal leaves of absence. See Carlson v. New Hampshire Dept. of Safety, 609 F. 2d 1024, 1027 (CA1 1979), cert. denied, 446 U. S. 913 (1980); Lott v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 395 F. Supp. 866, 869-870 (ND Ohio 1975). A reservist’s absences for training result from obligations vital to our national defense that other employees have not assumed, and the primary purpose of the re-employment rights statutes is to protect reservists against disadvantages in employment caused by these obligations. Indeed, the essence of the statutory guarantees provided by Congress is that employers must give special treatment to the military absences of veterans and reservists.

The Court emphasizes that “respondent did not deny the petitioner anything that he would have received had he not been a reservist” since he was scheduled for 40 hours of work per week, was assigned the same burden of weekend and shift work as other employees, and was allowed to exchange shifts. Ante, at 565. In substance, the Court embraces the Court of Appeals’ holding that § 2021 (b) (3) “merely requires that reservists be treated equally or neutrally with their fellow employees without military obligations.” 613 F. 2d, at 646. However, unless the statute is read as safeguarding reservists from the adverse effects of facially neutral rules, much of its practical significance is lost. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed in West v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 609 F. 2d 147, 149 (1980): “The essence of reserve duty in this context is absence from work. If employers could . . . require that workers be present in order to receive certain benefits, then reservists could never secure the benefits or advantages of employment which the Act was designed to protect.” See also Carney v. Cummins Engine Co., 602 F. 2d 763 (CA7 1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1073 (1980).

Petitioner is not attempting to gain an advantage over his co-workers as a result of his reserve membership. He does not assert a right to be paid for hours he does not work, but asks only that he be given the same meaningful chance as other employees without military commitments to work full time in order to earn a living wage. Moreover, the record contains no evidence that it would be unduly burdensome for respondent, if given adequate notice, to accommodate petitioner’s weekend military commitments in scheduling his work hours. In fact, counsel for respondent acknowledged at oral argument that petitioner “could be scheduled with the number of . . . Saturdays and Sundays off to accommodate his reserve obligation, without requiring any other employee in the plant to work any more Saturdays and Sundays than they now have to work under the regular routine.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. See also App. 41-43 (proposed revision of work schedule).

The Court states that one of the flaws in petitioner’s argument is that “there is no principled way of distinguishing between an employer’s obligation to make scheduling accommodations for weekends as opposed to, for example, annual 2-week training periods, or even longer periods of training or duty.” Ante, at 563. However, petitioner does not claim a right to make up hours, only to work full time during those weeks when he is available to work 40 hours apart from his reserve duties. Far from asking respondent to do the impossible, petitioner contends only that “reasonable steps” must be taken to accommodate him. Brief for Petitioner 24. Yet it is undisputed that respondent made no effort to do so. See App. 26. Cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63 (1977). I cannot accept the Court’s conclusion that such total indifference is in keeping with the underlying purposes and express guarantees of §2021 (b)(3).

The Court’s suggestion that respondent need go no further than the requirements of 38 U. S. C. § 2024 (d) in accommodating petitioner — i. e., he must simply be provided “a leave of absence,” ante, at 564 — ignores the separate, broader protections of § 2021 (b)(3), which was enacted because § 2024 (d) was found to be inadequate. In the Court’s view, “[i]f Congress had wanted to impose an additional obligation upon employers, guaranteeing that employee-reservists have the opportunity to work the same number of hours, or earn the same amount of pay that they would have earned without absences attributable to military reserve duties, it could have done so expressly.” Ante, at 564. But it was respondent that conferred on its employees the benefit of 40 hours of work per week, and Congress has provided unequivocally that such a benefit cannot be refused a reservist,' as it was here, solely because of his military commitments. The plain language of § 2021 (b) (3) does not differentiate among employment benefits, but “makes it . . . explicit that a reservist or guardsman cannot be . . . denied any promotion or other employment benefit or advantage, because of any obligation arising out of his membership in the reserves [or Guard], or because of his absences from work that result from such obligation.” U. S. Dept, of Labor, Office of Veterans’ Reemployment Rights, Veterans’ Reemployment Rights Handbook 114-115 (1970) (emphasis added).

Ill

We have held that the re-employment rights statutes are “to be liberally construed for the benefit of those who . . . serve their country/’ Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U. S. 275, 285 (1946). Accord, Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 447 U. S. 191, 196 (1980); Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U. S. 581, 584 (1977). It is unfortunate, I think, that the Court’s decision today undermines that sound principle. The clear purpose of Congress in enacting § 2021 (b) (3) was to expand employment safeguards for reservists and thereby encourage participation in the Ready Reserves and the National Guard so as to strengthen our national defense effort without increased reliance on active duty personnel through mandatory military service. Yet that aim is severely frustrated if employers can deprive reservists of “an incident or advantage of employment” as important as the opportunity for full-time work undiminished by weekend absences for military training. Congress surely did not intend that petitioner be put to the choice of quitting the Reserves or forgoing the chance to earn the same wages as other employees who do not have military obligations. Section 2021 (b) (3) was enacted to prevent the very type of disadvantage that petitioner has suffered. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

       There is an apparent intercircuit conflict on this issue. Compare the case under review with West v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 609 F. 2d 147 (CA5).

       In oral argument, counsel for the respondent indicated that the petitioner was a member of the Ohio National Guard. This is not apparent in the record, but both Ready Reservists and National Guardsmen are equally entitled to the protection of 38 U. S. C. §2021 (b)(3). See S. Rep. No. 1477, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1, 5 (1968); H. R. Rep. No. 1303, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 3, 6 (1968).

       Title 38 U. S. C. §2024 (d) provides in pertinent part:
      “Any employee . . . shall upon request be granted a leave of absence by such person’s employer for the period required to perform active duty for training or inactive duty for training in the Armed Forces of the United States. Upon such employee’s release from a period of such active duty for training or inactive duty for training, . . . such employee shall be permitted to return to such employee’s position with such seniority, status, pay, and vacation as such employee would have had if such employee had not been absent for such purposes. . . .”

       The Department of Justice represents the petitioner pursuant to 38 U. S. C. § 2022.

       Section 2021 (b)(3) provides:
      “Any person who holds a position described in clause (A) or (B) of subsection (a) of this section shall not be denied retention in employment or any promotion or other incident or advantage of employment because of any obligation as a member of a Reserve component of the Armed Forces.”

       The petitioner does not urge here that he had to be paid for hours not worked.

       There is no dispute that the respondent has complied with all relevant requirements of § 2024 (d). See n. 3, supra. This section compels employers to grant leaves of absence to employees who must attend reserve training, and entitles a reservist who has been absent for inactive reserve training to benefits upon his return, such as wage rates and seniority, which automatically would have accrued if he had remained in the continuous service of his employer. See Aiello v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 570 F. 2d 145, 148 (CA6). It does not entitle a reservist to benefits that are conditioned upon work requirements demanding actual performance on the job. See ibid. See also Foster v. Dravo Corp., 420 U. S. 92. Thus, it is not contended that § 2024 (d) requires employers to pay absent reservists for hours not worked.

       Before their recodification in 1974, the veterans’ re-employment rights provisions were codified at 50 U. S. C. App. § 459 (1970 ed.) (§ 9 of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967). See Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 447 U. S. 191, 194, n. 2.

       Section 2021 (a) provides as follows:
      “In the case of any person who is inducted into the Armed Forces of the United States under the Military Selective Service Act [50 U. S. C. App. §§451-473] (or under any prior or subsequent, corresponding law) for training and service and who leaves a position (other than a temporary position) in the employ of any employer in order to perform such training and service; and (1) receives a certificate described in section 9 (a) of the Military Selective Service Act [50 U. S. C. App. §459 (a)] (relating to the satisfactory completion of military service), and (2) makes application for reemployment within ninety days after such person is relieved from such training and service or from hospitalization continuing after discharge for a period of not more than one year—
      “(A) if such position was in the employ of the United States Gov-eminent, its territories, or possessions, or political subdivisions thereof, or the District of Columbia, such person shall—
      “(i) if still qualified to perform the duties of such position, be restored to such position or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay; or
      “(ii) if not qualified to perform the duties of such position, by reason of disability sustained during such service, but qualified to perform the duties of any other position in the employ of the employer, be offered employment and, if such person so requests, be employed in such other position the duties of which such person is qualified to perform as will provide such person like seniority, status, and pay, or the nearest approximation thereof consistent with the circumstances in such person’s case;
      “(B) if such position was in the employ of a State, or political subdivision thereof, or a private employer, such employee shall—
      “(i) if still qualified to perform the duties of such position, be restored by such employer or the employer’s successor in interest to such position or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay; or
      “(ii) [as in (A)(ii), supra, except for references to the 'employer’s successor in interest’].”

       The bill that included what became 38 U. S. C. § 2021 (b) (3) was introduced in the 89th Congress. H. R. 11509, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). Hearings were held before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on Armed Services in February 1966. Hearings on H. R. 11509 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on Armed Services, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1966) (hereafter 1966 House Hearings). The bill was favorably reported by the full Committee, H. R. Rep. No. 1303, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), and was passed by the House on March 7, 1966, 112 Cong. Rec. 5016 (1966). No action, however, was taken on the measure by the Senate in the 89th Congress.
      The bill was reintroduced in the 90th Congress. H. R. 1093, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 2561, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Hearings were again held before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee, on March 20, 1968. Hearings on H. R. 1093 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on Armed Services, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1968) (hereafter 1968 House Hearings). The bill was favorably reported by the full Committee on April 24, 1968, H. R. Rep. No. 1303, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), and initially passed by the House on May 6, 1968, 114 Cong. Rec. 11779 (1968). Hearings were held by the Senate Committee on Armed Services on July 25, 1968. Hearings on H. R. 1093 before Senate Committee on Armed Services, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) (hereafter 1968 Senate Hearings). The bill was favorably reported by the Committee, S. Rep. No. 1477, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), on July 26, 1968, and passed the Senate on July 29, 1968, 114 Cong. Rec. 24017 (1968). The Senate concurred in the House amendment. Id., at 24999. The bill was signed into law on August 17, 1968. Pub. L. 90-491, 82 Stat. 790.
      The language of that portion of the bill which became §2021 (b)(3) was unchanged throughout its legislative consideration. There was no substantive discussion of the measure on the floor of either chamber. Accordingly, the key portions of the legislative history are the three hearings held on the proposed measure and the three Committee Reports.

       This same purpose was reflected in. a statement in support of the legislation by Austin E. Kerby, the Director of the National Economic Commission of the American Legion:
      “The American Legion feels very strongly that employees with reserve obligations who are members of the National Guard and the Reserves should not be denied retention in employment or promotional opportunities solely because of their participation in the Reserve Training Program. They should be afforded all the employment opportunities and benefits as those who do not have training obligations. The Reemployment Rights Statutes do not now protect National Guard members, and Reservists as it does inductees and enlistees, who have one-year protection, and initial active duty for training reservists who have six-months protection.
      “H. R. 1093 [H. R. 11509 as reintroduced in the 90th Congress, see n. 10, supra] would add a new section, 9 (c)(3), under the reemployment provisions of the Universal Military Training and Service Act which would prevent discharge from employment without cause because of membership in the National Guard or Reserves, and would also prevent discrimination in such areas as promotion, training opportunities and pay increases.” 1968 Hearings, at 7477 (emphasis added).

       One could argue, of course, that “protection . . . against certain types of discharges or demotions that might rob the veteran’s reemployment of its substance,” Oakley v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 338 U. S. 278, 285 (in reference to § 2021 (b) (2) but equally relevant here) amounts to preferential treatment. But this sort of treatment, clearly intended by the statute and its legislative history, is better understood as protection against discrimination that would not have occurred were it not for reserve obligations, than as preferential treatment accorded solely because of reserve status.

       The legislative history is barren of any indication that Congress intended employers to compensate employees for work hours missed while fulfilling militar}? reserve obligations, which would of course amount to employee receipt of double compensation for such periods.

       The Veterans’ Reemployment Rights Handbook, published by the Office of Veterans’ Reemployment Rights in 1970 and still in use today, notes that “[t]he law does not require the employer to' pay the employee for the time he is absent for military training duty, or even to make up the difference between his military pay and his regular earnings for that period. In this respect, of course, many employers have adopted voluntary policies or contractual obligations, or are subject to State statutes, which give reservists and guardsmen more than the statute [38 U. S. C. § 2021 et seq.] requires.” Id., at 113. And in the many examples in the Handbook addressed to typical problems an employer may confront because of employee military obligations, there is not so much as a hint that an employer has an obligation to adjust an employee’s work schedule to make up for time lost because of military obligations.

       Section 403 of the Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-508, 88 Stat. 1594, for example, made specific revisions to the existing provisions of the veterans’ re-employment rights laws that impose explicit obligations upon employers with respect to certain disabled veterans of the Vietnam era. 38 U. S. C. §2012. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1107, p. 34 (1974). See also S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1240, p. 34 (1974); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1303, p. 34 (1974); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1435, p. 35 (1974). Cf. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397, 410-411.

       We note that the collective agreement between the respondent and the petitioner’s union stated that it “defines the normal hours of work and shall not be construed as a guarantee of hours of work per day or per week or of days of work per week.”

       Of course, nothing in this opinion prevents an employer from providing special scheduling accommodation to employee-reservists. See n. 14, supra.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice White

license: Public Domain

text:
    UNITED STATES v. TURKETTE
    No. 80-808.
    Argued April 27, 1981
    Decided June 17, 1981

      White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 593.

      Mark I. Levy argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, and Joel M. Gershowitz.

      John Wall argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Harry C. Mezer.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Harvey A. Silverglate for the Boston Bar Association et al.; and by Barry Tarlow for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice et al.

   Justice White

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U. S. C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), entitled Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), was added to Title 18 by Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941. The question in this case is whether the term “enterprise” as used in RICO encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises or is limited in application to the former. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that Congress did not intend to include within the definition of “enterprise” those organizations which are exclusively criminal. 632 F. 2d 896 (1980). This position is contrary to that adopted by every other Circuit that has addressed the issue. We granted cer-tiorari to resolve this conflict. 449 U. S. 1123 (1981).

I

Count Nine of a nine-count indictment charged respondent and 12 others with conspiracy to conduct and participate in the affairs of an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activities, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1962 (d). The indictment described the enterprise as “a group of individuals associated in fact for the purpose of illegally trafficking in narcotics and other dangerous drugs, committing arsons, utilizing the United States mails to defraud insurance companies, bribing and attempting to bribe local police officers, and corruptly influencing and attempting to corruptly influence the outcome of state court proceedings . . . The other eight counts of the indictment charged the commission of various substantive criminal acts by those engaged in and associated with the criminal enterprise, including possession with intent to distribute and distribution of controlled substances, and several counts of insurance fraud by arson and other means. The common thread to all counts was respondent’s alleged leadership of this criminal organization through which he orchestrated and participated in the commission of the various crimes delineated in the RICO count or charged in the eight preceding counts.

After a 6-week jury trial, in which the evidence focused upon both the professional nature of this organization and the execution of a number of distinct criminal acts, respondent was convicted on all nine counts. He was sentenced to a term of 20 years on the substantive counts, as well as a 2-year special parole term on the drug count. On the RICO conspiracy count he was sentenced to a 20-year concurrent term and fined $20,000.

On appeal, respondent argued that RICO was intended solely to protect legitimate business enterprises from infiltration by racketeers and that RICO does not make criminal the participation in an association which performs only illegal acts and which has not infiltrated or attempted to infiltrate a legitimate enterprise. The Court of Appeals agreed. We reverse.

II

In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language. If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of “a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 108 (1980). Of course, there is no errorless test for identifying or recognizing “plain” or “unambiguous” language. Also, authoritative administrative constructions should be given the deference to which they are entitled, absurd results are to be avoided and internal inconsistencies in the statute must be dealt with. Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U. S. 631, 643 (1978); Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U. S. 563, 571 (1965). We nevertheless begin with the language of the statute.

Section 1962 (c) makes it unlawful “for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” The term “enterprise” is defined as including “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” § 1961 (4). There is no restriction upon the associations embraced by the definition: an enterprise includes any union or group of individuals associated in fact. On its face, the definition appears to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises within its scope; it no more ex-eludes criminal enterprises than it does legitimate ones. Had Congress not intended to reach criminal associations, it could easily have narrowed the sweep of the definition by inserting a single word, “legitimate.” But it did nothing to indicate that an enterprise consisting of a group of individuals was not covered by RICO if the purpose of the enterprise was exclusively criminal.

The Court of Appeals, however, clearly departed from and limited the statutory language. It gave several reasons for doing so, none of which is adequate. First, it relied in part on the rule of ejusdem generis, an aid to statutory construction problems suggesting that where general words follow a specific enumeration of persons or things, the general words should be limited to persons or things similar to those specifically enumerated. See 2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §47.17 (4th ed. 1973). The Court of Appeals ruled that because each of the specific enterprises enumerated in § 1961 (4) is a “legitimate” one, the final catchall phrase— “any union or group of individuals associated in fact”— should also be limited to legitimate enterprises. There are at least two flaws in this reasoning. The rule of ejusdem generis is no more than an aid to construction and comes into play only when there is some uncertainty as to the meaning of a particular clause in a statute. Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 588 (1980); United States v. Powell, 423 U. S. 87, 91 (1975); Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124, 128 (1936). Considering the language and structure of § 1961 (4), however, we not only perceive no uncertainty in the meaning to be attributed to the phrase, “any union or group of individuals associated in fact” but we are convinced for another reason that ejusdem generis is wholly inapplicable in this context.

Section 1961 (4) describes two categories of associations that come within the purview of the “enterprise” definition. The first encompasses organizations such as corporations and partnerships, and other “legal entities.” The second covers “any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” The Court of Appeals assumed that the second category was merely a more general description of the first. Having made that assumption, the court concluded that the more generalized description in the second category should be limited by the specific examples enumerated in the first. But that assumption is untenable. Each category describes a separate type of enterprise to be covered by the statute — those that are recognized as legal entities and those that are not. The latter is not a more general description of the former. The second category itself not containing any specific enumeration that is followed by a general description, ejusdem generis has no bearing on the meaning to be attributed to that part of § 1961 (4)

A second reason offered by the Court of Appeals in support of its judgment was that giving the definition of “enterprise” its ordinary meaning would create several internal inconsistencies in the Act. With respect to § 1962 (c), it was said:

“If ‘a pattern of racketeering’ can itself be an ‘enterprise’ for purposes of section 1962 (e), then the two phrases ‘employed by or associated with any enterprise’ and ‘the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through [a pattern of racketeering activity]’ add nothing to the meaning of the section. The words of the statute are coherent and logical only if they are read as applying to legitimate enterprises.” 632 F. 2d, at 899.

This conclusion is based on a faulty premise. That a wholly criminal enterprise comes within the ambit of the statute does not mean that a “pattern of racketeering activity” is an “enterprise.” In order to secure a conviction under RICO, the Government must prove both the existence of an “enterprise” and the connected “pattern of racketeering activity.” The enterprise is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. The pattern of racketeering activity is, on the other hand, a series of criminal acts as defined by the statute. 18 U. S. C. § 1961 (1) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The former is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit. The latter is proved by evidence of the requisite number of acts of racketeering committed by the participants in the enterprise. While the proof used to establish these separate elements may in particular cases coalesce, proof of one does not necessarily establish the other. The “enterprise” is not the “pattern of racketeering activity”; it is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages. The existence of an enterprise at all times remains a separate element which must be proved by the Government.

Apart from § 1962 (c)’s proscription against participating in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activities, RICO also proscribes the investment of income derived from racketeering activity in an enterprise engaged in or which affects interstate commerce as well as the acquisition of an interest in or control of any such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 TJ. S. C. §§ 1962 (a) and (b). The Court of Appeals concluded that these provisions of RICO should be interpreted so as to apply only to legitimate enterprises. If these two sections are so limited, the Court of Appeals held that the proscription in § 1962 (c), at issue here, must be similarly limited. Again, we do not accept the premise from which the Court of Appeals derived its conclusion. It is obvious that §§ 1962 (a) and (b) address the infiltration by organized crime of legitimate businesses, but we cannot agree that these sections were not also aimed at preventing racketeers from investing or reinvesting in wholly illegal enterprises and from acquiring through a pattern of racketeering activity wholly illegitimate enterprises such as an illegal gambling business or a loan-sharking operation. There is no inconsistency or anomaly in recognizing that § 1962 applies to both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. Certainly the language of the statute does not warrant the Court of Appeals’ conclusion to the contrary.

Similarly, the Court of Appeals noted that various civil remedies were provided by § 1964, including divestiture, dissolution, reorganization, restrictions on future activities by violators of RICO, and treble damages. These remedies it thought would have utility only with respect to legitimate enterprises. As a general proposition, however, the civil remedies could be useful in eradicating organized crime from the social fabric, whether the enterprise be ostensibly legitimate or admittedly criminal. The aim is to divest the association of the fruits of its ill-gotten gains. See infra, at 591-593. Even if one or more of the civil remedies might be inapplicable to a particular illegitimate enterprise, this fact would not serve to limit the enterprise concept. Congress has provided civil remedies for use when the circumstances so warrant. It is untenable to argue that their existence limits the scope of the criminal provisions.

Finally, it is urged that the interpretation of RICO to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises will substantially alter the balance between federal and state enforcement of criminal law. This is particularly true, so the argument goes, since included within the definition of racketeering activity are a significant number of acts made criminal under state law. 18 U. S. C. § 1961 (1) (1976 ed., Supp. III). But even assuming that the more inclusive definition of enterprise will have the effect suggested, the language of the statute and its legislative history indicate that Congress was well aware that it was entering a new domain of federal involvement through the enactment of this measure. Indeed, the very purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was to enable the Federal Government to address a large and seemingly neglected problem. The view was that existing law, state and federal, was not adequate to address the problem, which was of national dimensions. That Congress included within the definition of racketeering activities a number of state crimes strongly indicates that RICO criminalized conduct that was also criminal under state law, at least when the requisite elements of a RICO offense are present. As the hearings and legislative debates reveal, Congress was well aware of the fear that RICO would “mov[e] large substantive areas formerly totally within the police power of the State into the Federal realm.” 116 Cong. Rec. 35217 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt). See also id., at 35205 (remarks of Rep. Mikva); id.,' at 35213 (comments of the American Civil Liberties Union); Hearings on Organized Crime Control before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 329, 370 (1970) (statement of Sheldon H. Eisen on behalf of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York). In the face of these objections, Congress nonetheless proceeded to enact the measure, knowing that it would alter somewhat the role of the Federal Government in the war against organized crime and that the alteration would entail prosecutions involving acts of racketeering that are also crimes under state law. There is no argument that Congress acted beyond its power in so doing. That being the case, the courts are without authority to restrict the application of the statute. See United States v. Culbert, 435 U. S. 371, 379-380 (1978).

Contrary to the judgment below, neither the language nor structure of RICO limits its application to legitimate “enterprises.” Applying it also to criminal organizations does not render any portion of the statute superfluous nor does it create any structural incongruities within the framework of the Act. The result is neither absurd nor surprising. On the contrary, insulating the wholly criminal enterprise from prosecution under RICO is the more incongruous position.

Section 904 (a) of RICO, 84 Stat. 947, directs that “ft]he provisions of this Title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.” With or without this admonition, we could not agree with the Court of Appeals that illegitimate enterprises should be excluded from coverage. We are also quite sure that nothing in the legislative history of RICO requires a contrary conclusion.

Ill

The statement of findings that prefaces the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 reveals the pervasiveness of the problem that Congress was addressing by this enactment:

“The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America’s economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation’s economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.” 84 Stat. 922-923.

In light of the above findings, it was the declared purpose of Congress “to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.” Id., at 923. The various Titles of the Act provide the tools through which this goal is to be accomplished. Only three of those Titles create substantive offenses, Title VIII, which is directed at illegal gambling operations, Title IX, at issue here, and Title XI, which addresses the importation, distribution, and storage of explosive materials. The other Titles provide various procedural and remedial devices to aid in the prosecution and incarceration of persons involved in organized crime.

Considering this statement of the Act’s broad purposes, the construction of RICO suggested by respondent and the court below is unacceptable. Whole areas of organized criminal activity would be placed beyond the substantive reach of the enactment. For example, associations of persons engaged solely in “loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs,” id., at 922-923, would be immune from prosecution under RICO so long as the association did not deviate from the criminal path. Yet these are among the very crimes that Congress specifically found to be typical of the crimes committed by persons involved in organized crime, see 18 TJ. S. C. § 1961 (1) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), and as a major source of revenue and power for such organizations. See Hearings on S. 30 et al. before the' Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1969). Along these same lines, Senator McClellan, the principal sponsor of the bill, gave two examples of types of problems RICO was designed to address. Neither is consistent with the view that substantive offenses under RICO would be limited to legitimate enterprises: “Organized criminals, too, have flooded the market with cheap reproductions of hit records and affixed counterfeit popular labels. They are heavily engaged in the illicit prescription drug industry.” 116 Cong. Rec. 592 (1970). In view of the purposes and goals of the Act, as well as the language of the statute, we are unpersuaded that Congress nevertheless confined the reach of the law to only narrow aspects of organized crime, and, in particular, under RICO, only the infiltration of legitimate business.

This is not to gainsay that the legislative history forcefully supports the view that the major purpose of Title IX is to address the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime. The point is made time and again during the debates and in the hearings before the House and Senate. But none of these statements requires the negative inference that Title IX did not reach the activities of enterprises organized and existing for criminal purposes. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 774-775 (1979); United States v. Culbert, 435 U. S., at 377.

On the contrary, these statements are in full accord with the proposition that RICO is equally applicable to a criminal enterprise that has no legitimate dimension or has yet to acquire one. Accepting that the primary purpose of RICO is to cope with the infiltration of legitimate businesses, applying the statute in accordance with its terms, so as to reach criminal enterprises, would seek to deal with the problem at its very source. Supporters of the bill recognized that organized crime uses its primary sources of revenue and power— illegal gambling, loan sharking and illicit drug distribution— as a springboard into the sphere of legitimate enterprise. Hearings on S. 30, supra, at 1-2. The Senate Report stated:

“What is needed here, the committee believes, are new approaches that will deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their source of economic power itself, and the attack must take place on all available fronts.” S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 79 (1969) (emphasis supplied).

Senator Byrd explained in debate on the floor, that “loan sharking paves the way for organized criminals to gain access to and eventually take over the control of thousands of legitimate businesses.” 116 Cong. Rec. 606 (1970). Senator Hruska declared that “the combination of criminal and civil penalties in this title offers an extraordinary potential for striking a mortal blow against the property interests of organized crime.” Id., at 602. Undoubtedly, the infiltration of legitimate businesses was of great concern, but the means provided to prevent that infiltration plainly included striking at the source of the problem. As Representative Poff, a manager of the bill in the House, stated: “[T]itle IX . . . will deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their source of economic power itself ...” Id., at 35193.

As a measure to deal with the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime, RICO was both preventive and remedial. Respondent’s view would ignore the preventive function of the statute. If Congress had intended the more circumscribed approach espoused by the Court of Appeals, there would have been some positive sign that the law was not to reach organized criminal activities that give rise to the concerns about infiltration. The language of the statute, however — the most reliable evidence of its intent — reveals that Congress opted for a far broader definition of the word “enterprise,” and we are unconvinced by anything in the legislative history that this definition should be given less than its full effect.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly

Reversed.

Justice Stewart agrees with the reasoning and conclusion of the Court of Appeals as to the meaning of the term “enterprise” in this statute. See 632 F. 2d 896. Accordingly, he respectfully dissents.

      See United States v. Sutton, 642 F. 2d 1001, 1006-1009 (CA6 1980) (en banc), cert. pending, Nos. 80-6058, 80-6137, 80-6141, 80-6147, 80-6253, 80-6254, 80-6272; United States v. Errico, 635 F. 2d 152, 155 (CA2 1980); United States v. Provenzano, 620 F. 2d 985, 992-993 (CA3), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 899 (1980); United States v. Whitehead, 618 F. 2d 523, 525, n. 1 (CA4 1980); United States v. Aleman, 609 F. 2d 298, 304-305 (CA7 1979), cert. denied, 445 U. S. 946 (1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F. 2d 564, 568-569 (CA9 1979), cert. denied, 445 U. S. 946 (1980); United States v. Swiderski, 193 U. S. App. D. C. 92, 94-95, 593 F. 2d 1246, 1248-1249 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U. S. 933 (1979); United States v. Elliott, 571 F. 2d 880, 896-898 (CA5), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 953 (1978). See also United States v. Anderson, 626 F. 2d 1358, 1372 (CA8 1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 912 (1981). But see United States v. Sutton, 605 F. 2d 260, 264-270 (CA6 1979), vacated, 642 F. 2d 1001 (1980); United States v. Rone, supra, at 573 (Ely, J., dissenting); United States v. Altese, 542 F. 2d 104, 107 (CA2 1976) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1039 (1977).

       Title 18 U. S. C. § 1961 (4) provides:
      “ 'enterprise’ includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”

       Title 18 U. S. C. § 1962 (d) provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.” Pertinent to these charges, subsection (c) provides:
      “It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.”

       The Court of Appeals’ application of ejusdem generis is further flawed by the assumption that “any individual, partnership, corporation, association or other legal entity” could not act totally beyond the pale of the law. The mere fact that a given enterprise is favored with a legal existence does not prevent that enterprise from proceeding along a wholly illegal course of conduct. Therefore, since legitimacy of purpose is not a universal characteristic of the specifically listed enterprises, it would be improper to engraft this characteristic upon the second category of enterprises.

       The Government takes the position that proof of a pattern of racketeering activity in itself would not be sufficient to establish the existence of an enterprise: “We do not suggest that any two sporadic and isolated offenses by the same actor or actors ipso facto constitute an ‘illegitimate’ enterprise; rather, the existence of the enterprise as an independent entity must also be shown.” Reply Brief for United States 4. But even if that were not the case, the Court of Appeals’ position on this point is of little force. Language in a statute is not rendered superfluous merely because in some contexts that language may not be pertinent.

      Title 18 U. S. C. §§ 1962 (a) and (b) provide:
      “(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.

        “ (b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.”

       Title 18 U. S. C. §§ 1964 (a) and (c) provide:
      “(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
      “(e) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”

       In discussing these civil remedies, the Senate Report on the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 specifically referred to two state cases in which equitable relief had been granted against illegitimate enterprises. S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 79, n. 9, p. 81, n. 11 (1969). These references were in the context of a discussion on the need to expand the remedies available to combat organized crime.

       RICO imposes no restrictions upon the criminal justice systems of the States. See 84 Stat. 947 (“Nothing in this title shall supersede any provision of Federal, State, or other law imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addition to those provided for in this title”). Thus, under RICO, the States remain free to exercise their police powers to the fullest constitutional extent in defining and prosecuting crimes within their respective jurisdictions. That some of those crimes may also constitute predicate acts of racketeering under RICO, is no restriction on the separate administration of criminal justice by the States.

       We find no occasion to apply the rule of lenity to this statute. “[T]hat 'rule/ as is true of any guide to statutory construction, only serves as an aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one. . . . The rule comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.” Callanan v. United States, 364 U. S. 587, 596 (1961) (footnote omitted). There being no ambiguity in the RICO provisions at issue here, the rule of lenity does not come into play. See United States v. Moore, 423 U. S. 122, 145 (1975), quoting United States v. Brown, 333 U. S. 18, 25-26 (1948) (“ ‘The canon in favor of strict construction [of criminal statutes] is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose. ... Nor does it demand that a statute be given the “narrowest meaning”; it is satisfied if the words are given their fair meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the lawmakers’ ”); see also Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55, 60-61 (1980).

       See also 116 Cong. Rec. 602 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Yarborough) (“a full scale attack on organized crime”); id., at 819 (remarks of Sen. Scott) (“purpose is to eradicate organized crime in the United States”); id., at 35199 (remarks of Rep. Rodino) (“a truly full-scale commitment to destroy the insidious power of organized crime groups”); id., at 35300 (remarks of Rep. Mayne) (organized crime “must be sternly and irrevocably eradicated”).

       See also id., at 601 (remarks of Sen. Hruska); id., at 606-607 (remarks of Sen. Byrd); id., at 819 (remarks of Sen. Seott); id., at 962 (remarks of Sen. Murphy); id., at 970 (remarks of Sen. Bible); id., at 18913, 18937 (remarks of Sen. McClellan); id., at 35199 (remarks of Rep. Rodino); id., at 35216 (remarks of Rep. McDade); id., at 35300 (remarks of Rep. Mayne); id., at 35312 (remarks of Rep. Brock); id., at 35319 (remarks of Rep. Anderson of California); id., at 35326 (remarks of Rep. Vanik); id., at 35328 (remarks of Rep. Meskill); Hearings on S. 30 et al. before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 108 (1969) (statement of Attorney General Mitchell); H. R. Rep. No. 1574, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1968).

       116 Cong. Rec. 591 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) (“title IX is aimed at removing organized crime from our legitimate organizations”); id., at 602 (remarks of Sen. Hruska) (“Title IX of this act is designed to remove the influence of organized crime from legitimate business by attacking its property interests and by removing its members from control of legitimate businesses which have been acquired or operated by unlawful racketeering methods”); id., at 607 (remarks of Sen. Byrd) (“alarming expansion into the field of legitimate business”); id., at 953 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond) (“racketeers . . . gaining inroads into legitimate business”); id., at 845 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) (“title IX . . . may provide us with new tools to prevent organized crime from taking over legitimate businesses and activities”); S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 76 (1969).

       See also, e. g., 115 Cong. Rec. 827 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) (“Organized crime . . . uses its ill-gotten gains ... to infiltrate and secure control of legitimate business and labor union activities”); 116 Cong. Rec. 591 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) (“illegally gained revenue also makes it possible for organized crime to infiltrate and pollute legitimate business”); id., at 603 (remarks of Sen. Yarborough) (“[RICO] is designed to root out the influence of organized crime in legitimate business, into which billions of dollars of illegally obtained money is channeled”) ; id., at 606 (remarks of Sen. Byrd) (“loan sharking paves the way for organized criminals to gain access to and eventually take over the control of thousands of legitimate businesses”); id., at 35193 (remarks of Rep. Poff) (“[T]itle IX . . . will deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their source of economic power itself . . .”) ; S. Rep. No. 91-617, supra, at 78-80; H. R. Rep. No. 1574, supra, at 5 (“The President’s Crime Commission found that the greatest menace that organized crime presents is its ability through the accumulation of illegal gains to infiltrate into legitimate business and labor unions”); Hearings on Organized Crime Control before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 170 (1970) (Department of Justice Comments) (“Title IX is designed to inhibit the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime, and, like the previous title, to reach the criminal syndicates’ major sources of revenue”) (emphasis supplied).