source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Brennan Justice Stevens,

license: Public Domain

text:
    CHRISTIANSON et al. v. COLT INDUSTRIES OPERATING CORP.
    No. 87-499.
    Argued April 18, 1988
    Decided June 17, 1988

      BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 819.

      Stuart R. Lefstein argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Spiro Bereveskos and John C. McNett.

      Anthony M. Radice argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Joseph C. Markowitz, Kim J. Landsman, and Robert L. Harmon.

   Justice Brennan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires that we decide a peculiar jurisdictional battle between the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Each court has adamantly disavowed jurisdiction over this case. Each has transferred the case to the other. And each insists that the other’s jurisdictional decision is “clearly wrong.” 798 F. 2d 1051, 1056-1057 (CA7 1986); 822 F. 2d 1544, 1551, n. 7 (CA Fed. 1987). The parties therefore have been forced to shuttle their appeal back and forth between Chicago and the District of Columbia in search of a hospitable forum, ultimately to have the merits decided, after two years, by a Court of Appeals that still insists it lacks jurisdiction to do so.

HH

Respondent Colt Industries Operating Corp. is the leading manufacturer, seller, and marketer of M16 rifles and their parts and accessories. Colt’s dominant market position dates back to 1959, when it acquired a license for 16 patents to manufacture the M16’s precursor. Colt continued to develop the rifle, which the United States Army adopted as its standard assault rifle, and patented additional improvements. Through various devices, Colt has also maintained a shroud of secrecy around certain specifications essential to the mass production of interchangeable M16 parts. For example, Colt’s patents conceal many of the manufacturing specifications that might otherwise be revealed by its engineering drawings, and when Colt licenses others to manufacture M16 parts or hires employees with access to proprietary information, it contractually obligates them not to disclose specifications.

Petitioner Christianson is a former Colt employee who acceded to such a nondisclosure agreement. Upon leaving respondent’s employ in 1975, Christianson established petitioner International Trade Services, Inc. (ITS), and began selling M16 parts to various customers domestically and abroad. Petitioners’ business depended on information that Colt considers proprietary. Colt expressly waived its proprietary rights at least as to some of petitioners’ early transactions. The precise scope of Colt’s waiver is a matter of considerable dispute. In 1983, however, Colt joined petitioners as defendants in a patent-infringement lawsuit against two companies that had arranged a sale of M16’s to El Salvador. Evidence suggested that petitioners supplied the companies with certain M16 specifications, and Colt sought a court order enjoining petitioners from any further disclosures. When the District Court declined the motion, Colt voluntarily dismissed its claims against petitioners. In the meantime, Colt notified several of petitioners’ current and potential customers that petitioners were illegally misappropriating Colt’s trade secrets, and urged them to refrain from doing business with petitioners.

Three days after their dismissal from the lawsuit, petitioners brought this lawsuit in the District Court against Colt “pursuant to Section 4 ... (15 U. S. C. § 15) and Section 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U. S. C. § 26) for damages, injunctive and equitable relief by reason of its violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U. S. C. §§ 1 & 2). . . .” App. 7. The complaint alleged that Colt’s letters, litigation tactics, and “[o]the[r]. . . conduct” drove petitioners out of business. In that context, petitioners included the following obscure passage:

“18. The validity of the Colt patents had been assumed throughout the life of the Colt patents through 1980. Unless such patents were invalid through the wrongful retention of proprietary information in contravention of United States Patent Law (35 U. S. C. § 112), in 1980, when such patents expired, anyone ‘who has ordinary skill in the rifle-making art’ is able to use the technology of such expired patents for which Colt earlier had a monopoly position for 17 years.
“19. ITS and anyone else has the right to manufacture, contract for the manufacture, supply, market and sell the M-16 and M-16 parts and accessories thereof at the present time.” Id., at 9.

Petitioners later amended their complaint to assert a second cause of action under state law for tortious interference with their business relationships. Colt interposed a defense that its conduct was justified by a need to protect its trade secrets and countersued on a variety of claims arising out of petitioners’ alleged misappropriation of M16 specifications.

Petitioners’ motion for summary judgment raised only a patent-law issue obliquely hinted at in the above-quoted paragraphs — that Colt’s patents were invalid from their inception for failure to disclose sufficient information to “enable any person skilled in the art. . . to make and use the same” as well as a description of “the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.” 35 U. S. C. § 112. Since Colt benefited from the protection of the invalid patents, the argument continues, the “trade secrets” that the patents should have disclosed lost any state-law protection. Petitioners therefore argued that the District Court should hold that “Colt’s trade secrets are invalid and that [their] claim of invalidity shall be taken as established with respect to all claims and counterclaims to which said issue is material.” App. 58.

The District Court awarded petitioners summary judgment as to liability on both the antitrust and the tortious-interference claims, essentially relying on the § 112 theory articulated above. In the process, the District Court invalidated nine of Colt’s patents, declared all trade secrets relating to the M16 unenforceable, enjoined Colt from enforcing “any form of trade secret right in any technical information relating to the M16,” and ordered Colt to disgorge to petitioners all such information. 613 P. Supp. 330, 332 (CD Ill. 1985).

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which, after full briefing and argument, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and issued an unpublished order transferring the appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See 28 U. S. C. § 1631. The Seventh Circuit, however, raising the jurisdictional issue sna sponte, concluded that the Federal Circuit was “clearly wrong” and transferred the case back. 798 F. 2d, at 1056-1057. 1062. The Federal Circuit, for its part, adhered to its prior jurisdictional ruling, concluding that the Seventh Circuit exhibited “a monumental misunderstanding of the patent jurisdiction granted this court,” 822 F. 2d, at 1547, and was “clearly wrong,” id., at 1551, n. 7. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit proceeded to address the merits in the “interest of justice,” id., at 1559-1560, and reversed the District Court. We granted certiorari, 484 U. S. 985 (1987), and now vacate the judgment of the Federal Circuit.

hH

As relevant here, 28 U. S. C. § 1295(a)(1) grants the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over “an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States ... if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on [28 U. S. C.] section 1338 . . . ,” Section 1338(a), in turn, provides in relevant part that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . .” Thus, the jurisdictional issue before us turns on whether this is a case “arising under” a federal patent statute, for if it is then the jurisdiction of the District Court was based at least “in part” on § 1338.

A

In interpreting § 1338’s precursor, we held long ago that in order to demonstrate that a case is one “arising under” federal patent law “the plaintiff must set up some right, title or interest under the patent laws, or at least make it appear that some right or privilege will be defeated by one construction, or sustained by the opposite construction of these laws.” Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U. S. 255, 259 (1897). See Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1, 16 (1912). Our cases interpreting identical language in other jurisdictional provisions, particularly the general federal-question provision, 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”), have quite naturally applied the same test. See Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U. S. 109, 112 (1936) (the claim alleged in the complaint “must be such that it will be supported if the Constitution or laws of the United States are given one construction or effect, and defeated if they receive another”) (citations omitted). A district court’s federal-question jurisdiction, we recently explained, extends over “only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law,” Franchise Tax Board of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U. S. 1, 27-28 (1983), in that “federal law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded . . . claims,” id., at 13. Linguistic consistency, to which we have historically adhered, demands that § 1338(a) jurisdiction likewise extend only to those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims. See 822 F. 2d, at 1553-1556; 798 F. 2d, at 1059-1061.

The most superficial perusal of petitioners’ complaint establishes, and no one disputes, that patent law did not in any sense create petitioners’ antitrust or intentional-interference claims. Since no one asserts that federal jurisdiction rests on petitioners’ state-law claims, the dispute centers around whether patent law “is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded [antitrust] claims.” See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U. S. 804, 813 (1986). Our cases, again mostly in the § 1331 context, establish principles for both defining the “well-pleaded . . . claims” and discerning which elements are “necessary” or “essential” to them. Under the well-pleaded complaint • rule, as appropriately adapted to § 1338(a), whether a claim “arises under” patent law “‘must be determined from "what necessarily appears in the plaintiff’s statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation or avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.’” Franchise Tax Board, supra, at 10 (quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U. S. 74, 75-76 (1914)). See Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149 (1908). Thus, a case raising a federal patent-law defense does not, for that reason alone, “arise under” patent law, “even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue in the case.” Franchise Tax Board, supra, at 14. See also Merrell Dow, supra, at 808.

Nor is it necessarily sufficient that a well-pleaded claim alleges a single theory under which resolution of a patent-law question is essential. If “on the face of a well-pleaded complaint there are . . . reasons completely unrelated to the provisions and purposes of [the patent laws] why the [plaintiff] may or may not be entitled to the relief it seeks,” Franchise Tax Board, 463 U. S., at 26 (footnote omitted), then the claim does not “arise under” those laws. See id., at 26, n. 29. Thus, a claim supported by alternative theories in the complaint may not form the basis for § 1338(a) jurisdiction unless patent law is essential to each of those theories.

B

Framed in these terms, our resolution of the jurisdictional issue in this case is straightforward. Petitioners’ antitrust count can readily be understood to encompass both a monopolization claim under §2 of the Sherman Act and a group-boycott claim under § 1. The patent-law issue, while arguably necessary to at least one theory under each claim, is not necessary to the overall success of either claim.

Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . .” 15 U. S. C. § 2. The thrust of petitioners’ monopolization claim is that Colt has “embarked on a course of conduct to illegally extend its monopoly position with respect to the described patents and to prevent ITS from engaging in any business with respect to parts and accessories of the M-16.” App. 10. The complaint specifies several acts, most of which relate either to Colt’s prosecution of the lawsuit against petitioners or to letters Colt sent to petitioners’ potential and existing customers. To make out a § 2 claim, petitioners would have to present a theory under which the identified conduct amounted to a “willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U. S. 563, 570-571 (1966). Both the Seventh Circuit and Colt focus entirely on what they perceive to be “the only basis Christianson asserted in the complaint for the alleged antitrust violation,” 798 F. 2d, at 1061; see Brief for Respondent 32 — namely, that Colt made false assertions in its letters and pleadings that petitioners were violating its trade secrets, when those trade secrets were not protected under state law because Colt’s patents were invalid under § 112. Thus, Colt concludes, the validity of the patents is an essential element of petitioners’ prima facie monopolization theory and the case “arises under” patent law.

We can assume without deciding that the invalidity of Colt’s patents is an essential element of the foregoing monopolization theory rather than merely an argument in anticipation of a defense. But see 822 F. 2d, at 1547. The well-pleaded complaint rule, however, focuses on claims, not theories, see Franchise Tax Board, supra, at 26, and n. 29; Gully, 299 U. S., at 117, and just because an element that is essential to a particular theory might be governed by federal patent law does not mean that the entire monopolization claim “arises under” patent law.

Examination of the complaint reveals that the monopolization theory that Colt singles out (and on which petitioners ultimately prevailed in the District Court) is only one of several, and the only one for which the patent-law issue is even arguably essential. So far as appears from the complaint, for example, petitioners might have attempted to prove that Colt’s accusations of trade-secret infringement were false not because Colt had no trade secrets, but because Colt authorized petitioners to use them. App. 9-10 (“Contrary to the permission extended to ITS to sell Colt parts and accessories and in violation of the anti-trust laws . . . Colt has embarked upon a course of conduct... to prevent ITS from engaging in any business with respect to parts and accessories of the M-16”). In fact, most of the conduct alleged in the complaint could be deemed wrongful quite apart from the truth or falsity of Colt’s accusations. According to the complaint, Colt’s letters also (1) contained “copies of inapplicable court orders” and “suggested] that these court orders prohibited [the recipients] from doing business with” petitioners; and (2) “falsely stat[ed] that ‘Colt’s right’ to proprietary data had been ‘consistently upheld in various courts.’” Id., at 10. Similarly, the complaint alleges that Colt’s lawsuit against petitioners (1) was designed “to contravene the permission previously given”; (2) was “[p]ursued ... in bad faith by subjecting [petitioners] to substantial expense in extended discovery procedures”; and (3) was brought only to enable Colt “to urge customers and potential customers of [petitioners] to refrain from doing business with them.” Id., at 10-11. Since there are “reasons completely unrelated to the provisions and purposes” of federal patent law why petitioners “may or may not be entitled to the relief [they] see[k]” under their monopolization claim, Franchise Tax Board, supra, at 26 (footnote omitted), the claim does not “arise under” federal patent law.

The same analysis obtains as to petitioners’ group-boycott claim under §1 of the Sherman Act, which provides that “[e]very contract, combination ... , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... is declared to be illegal,” 15 U. S. C. § 1. This claim is set forth in the allegation that “virtually all suppliers of ITS and customers of ITS have agreed with Colt to refrain from supplying and purchasing M-16 parts and accessories to or from ITS, which has had the effect of requiring ITS to close its doors and no longer transact business.” App. 11. As this case unfolded, petitioners attempted to prove that the alleged agreement was unreasonable because its purpose was to protect Colt’s trade secrets from petitioners’ infringement and, given the patents’ invalidity under § 112, Colt had no trade secrets to infringe. Whether or not the patent-law issue was an “essential” element of that group-boycott theory, however, petitioners could have supported their group-boycott claim with any of several theories having nothing to do with the validity of Colt’s patents. Equally prominent in the complaint, for example, is a theory that the alleged agreement was unreasonable not because Colt had no trade secrets to protect, but because Colt authorized petitioners to use them. Once again, the appearance on the complaint’s face of an alternative, non-patent theory compels the conclusion that the group-boycott claim does not “arise under” patent law.

h — I I — I

Colt offers three arguments for finding jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit, notwithstanding the well-pleaded complaint rule. The first derives from congressional policy; the second is based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b); and the third is grounded in principles of the law of the case. We find none of them persuasive.

A

Colt correctly observes that one of Congress’ objectives in creating a Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over certain patent cases was “to reduce the widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exist[ed] in the administration of patent law.” H. R. Rep. No. 97-312, p. 23 (1981). Colt might be correct (although not clearly so) that Congress’ goals would be better served if the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction were to be fixed “by reference to the case actually litigated,” rather than by an ex ante hypothetical assessment of the elements of the complaint that might have been dispositive. Brief for Respondent 31. Congress determined the relevant focus, however, when it granted jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit over “an appeal from ... a district court... if the jurisdiction of that court was based ... on section 1338.” 28 U. S. C. § 1295(a)(1) (emphasis added). Since the district court’s jurisdiction is determined by reference to the well-pleaded complaint, not the well-tried case, the referent for the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction must be the same. The legislative history of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional provisions confirms that focus. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 97-312, supra, at 41 (cases fall within the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisdiction “in the same sense that cases are said to ‘arise under’ federal law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction”). In view of that clear congressional intent, we have no more authority to read § 1295(a)(1) as granting the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over an appeal where the well-pleaded complaint does not depend on patent law, than to read § 1338(a) as granting a district court jurisdiction over such a complaint. See Pratt, 168 U. S., at 259.

B

Colt suggests alternatively that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) we should deem the complaint amended to encompass a new and independent cause of action — “an implied cause of action under section 112 of the patent laws.” Brief for Respondent 28. Such a cause of action, which Colt finds in petitioners’ summary judgment papers, would plainly “arise under” the patent laws, regardless of its merit. See 822 F. 2d, at 1566 (Nichols, J., concurring and dissenting).

We need not decide under what circumstances, if any, a court of appeals could furnish itself a jurisdictional basis unsupported by the pleadings by deeming the complaint amended in light of the parties’ “express or implied consent” to litigate a claim. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(b). In this case there is simply no evidence of any consent among the parties to litigate the new patent-law claim that Colt imputes to petitioners. Colt points to nothing in petitioners’ summary judgment motion expressly raising such a new cause of action, much less anything in its own motion papers suggesting consent to one. See App. 57-58. True, the summary judgment papers focused almost entirely on the patent-law issues, which petitioners deemed “[bjasic and fundamental to the subject lawsuit.” Id., at 57. But those issues fell squarely within the purview of the theories of recovery, defenses, and counterclaims that the pleadings already encompassed. Petitioners recognized as much when they moved the District Court to hold that their “claim of [patent] invalidity shall be taken as established with respect to all claims and counterclaims to which said issue is material.” Id., at 58. Thus, the patent-law focus of the summary judgment papers hardly heralded the assertion of a new patent-law claim. See, e. g., Quillen v. International Playtex, Inc., 789 F. 2d 1041, 1044 (CA4 1986); 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1493, p. 466 (1971). Moreover, the District Court never intimated that the patent issues were relevant to any cause of action other than the antitrust and intentional-interference claims raised expressly in the complaint; the court four times linked its judgment to “liability on Counts I and II,” without any reference to the hypothetical Count III that Colt imputes to petitioners. 609 F. Supp. 1174, 1185 (CD Ill. 1985) See also 613 F. Supp., at 332.

C

Colt’s final argument is that the Federal Circuit was obliged not to revisit the Seventh Circuit’s thorough analysis of the jurisdictional issue, but merely to adopt it as the law of the case. See also 822 F. 2d, at 1565 (Nichols, J., concurring and dissenting). “As most commonly defined, the doctrine [of the law of the case] posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.” Arizona v. California, 460 U. S. 605, 618 (1983) (dictum). This rule of practice promotes the finality and efficiency of the judicial process by “protecting against the agitation of settled issues.” IB J. Moore, J. Lucas, & T. Currier, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶0.404[1], p. 118 (1984) (hereinafter Moore’s).

Colt is correct that the doctrine applies as much to the decisions of a coordinate court in the same case as to a court’s own decisions. See, e. g., Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 761 F. 2d 649, 657 (CA Fed.), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 902 (1985); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F. 2d 888, 900-901 (CA Fed.), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 857 (1984). Federal courts routinely apply law-of-the-case principles to transfer decisions of coordinate courts. See, e. g., Hayman Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F. 2d 162, 164-170 (CA3 1982) (transfer under 28 U. S. C. § 1406(a)); Skil Corp. v. Millers Falls Co., 541 F. 2d 554, 558-559 (CA6) (alternative holding) (transfer under 28 U. S. C. § 1404(a)), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976); IB Moore’s ¶¶0.404[4.-5], 0.404[8]. Cf. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U. S. 335, 340-341, n. 9 (1960) (res judicata principles did not limit power of Court of Appeals to reconsider transfer decision not upset by coordinate court). Indeed, the policies supporting the doctrine apply with even greater force to transfer decisions than to decisions of substantive law; transferee courts that feel entirely free to revisit transfer decisions of a coordinate court threaten to send litigants into a vicious circle of litigation. See Hayman, supra, at 169; Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co. v. United States, 574 F. 2d 926, 930 (CA7 1978). Cf. Blaski, supra, at 348-349 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

Colt’s conclusion that jurisdiction therefore lay in the Federal Circuit is flawed, however, for three reasons. First, the Federal Circuit, in transferring the case to the Seventh Circuit, was the first to decide the jurisdictional issue. That the Federal Circuit did not explicate its rationale is irrelevant, for the law of the case turns on whether a court previously “decide[d] upon a rule of law” — which the Federal Circuit necessarily did — not on whether, or how well, it explained the decision. Thus, the law of the case was that the Seventh Circuit had jurisdiction, and it was the Seventh Circuit, not the Federal Circuit, that departed from the law of the case. Second, the law-of-the-case doctrine “merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided, not a limit to their power.” Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U. S. 436, 444 (1912) (Holmes, J.) (citations- omitted). A court has the power to revisit prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule courts should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision was “clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.” Arizona v. California, supra, at 618, n. 8 (citation omitted). Thus, even if the Seventh Circuit’s decision was law of the case, the Federal Circuit did not exceed its power in revisiting the jurisdictional issue, and once it concluded that the prior decision was “clearly wrong” it was obliged to decline jurisdiction. Most importantly, law of the case cannot bind this Court in reviewing decisions below. A petition for writ of certiorari can expose the entire case to review. Panama R. Co. v. Napier Shipping Co., 166 U. S. 280, 283-284 (1897). Just as a district court’s adherence to law of the case cannot insulate an issue from appellate review, a court of appeals’ adherence to the law of the case cannot insulate an issue from this Court’s review. See Mes senger, supra, at 444; Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers & Co., 240 U. S. 251, 257-259 (1916).

HH <1

Our agreement with the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction, compels us to disapprove of its decision to reach the merits anyway “in the interest of justice.” 822 F. 2d, at 1559. “Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.” Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441, 449 (1850). See also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S. 368, 379-380 (1981). The statute confers on the Federal Circuit authority to make a single decision upon concluding that it lacks jurisdiction — whether to dismiss the case or, “in the interest of justice,” to transfer it to a court of appeals that has jurisdiction. 28 U. S. C. § 1631.

The age-old rule that a court may not in any case, even in the interest of justice, extend its jurisdiction where none exists has always worked injustice in particular cases. Parties often spend years litigating claims only to learn that their efforts and expense were wasted in a court that lacked jurisdiction. Even more exasperating for the litigants (and wasteful for all concerned) is a situation where, as here, the litigants are bandied back and forth helplessly between two courts, each of which insists the other has jurisdiction. Such situations inhere in the very nature of jurisdictional lines, for as our cases aptly illustrate, few jurisdictional lines can be so finely drawn as to leave no room for disagreement on close cases. See, e. g., K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U. S. 176 (1988); United States v. Hohri, 482 U. S. 64 (1987).

That does not mean, however, that every borderline ease must inevitably culminate in a perpetual game of jurisdictional ping-pong until this Court intervenes to resolve the underlying jurisdictional dispute, or (more likely) until one of the parties surrenders to futility. Such a state of affairs would undermine public confidence in our judiciary, squander private and public resources, and commit far too much of this Court’s calendar to the resolution of fact-specific jurisdictional disputes that lack national importance. “Surely a seemly system of judicial remedies . . . regarding controverted transfer provisions of the United States Code should encourage, not discourage, quick settlement of questions of transfer . . . Blaski, 363 U. S., at 349 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The courts of appeals should achieve this end by adhering strictly to principles of law of the case. See supra, at 816. Situations might arise, of course, in which the transferee court considers the transfer “clearly erroneous.” Arizona v. California, 460 U. S., at 618, n. 8. But as “[t]he doctrine of the law of the case is ... a heavy deterrent to vacillation on arguable issues,” IB Moore’s ¶0.404[1], at 124, such reversals should necessarily be exceptional; courts will rarely transfer cases over which they have clear jurisdiction, and close questions, by definition, never have clearly correct answers. Under law-of-the-case principles, if the transferee court can find the transfer decision plausible, its jurisdictional inquiry is at an end. See Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F. 2d 100, 109 (CA2 1981) (“The law of the case will be disregarded only when the court has ‘a clear conviction of error’ ”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 828 (1982). While adherence to the law of the case will not shield an incorrect jurisdictional decision should this Court choose to grant review, see supra, at 817-818, it will obviate the necessity for us to resolve every marginal jurisdictional dispute.

We vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and remand with instructions to transfer the case to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See 28 U. S. C. § 1631.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Blackmun joins, concurring.

In a seminal case construing federal-question jurisdiction, Justice Cardozo wrote that “[w]hat is needed is something of that common-sense accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations which characterizes the law in its treatment of problems of causation ... a selective process which picks the substantial causes out of the web and lays the other ones aside.” Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U. S. 109, 117-118 (1936). Although I agree with the Court’s conclusion in this case that appellate jurisdiction is in the Seventh Circuit rather than the Federal Circuit, I write separately to emphasize that a common-sense application of Justice Cardozo’s dictum requires that the answer to the question whether a claim arises under the patent laws may depend on the time when the question is asked. More specifically, if the question is asked at the end of a trial in order to decide whether the Federal Circuit has appellate jurisdiction, the answer may be different than if it had been asked at the outset to decide whether a federal district court has jurisdiction to try the case.

When Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act in 1982 and vested exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to resolve appeals of claims that had arisen under the patent laws in the federal district courts, it was responding to concerns about both the lack of uniformity in federal appellate construction of the patent laws and the forum-shopping that such divergent appellate views had generated. Nonetheless, its definition of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction did not embrace all cases in which a district court had decided a patent-law question. Instead, it adopted a standard that requires the appellate court to decide whether the jurisdiction of the district court was based, in whole or in part, on a claim “arising under” the patent laws.

The question whether a claim arises under the patent laws is similar to the question whether a claim arises under federal law. Although there is no single, precise, all-embracing definition of either body of law, the “vast majority” of cases that come within either “grant of jurisdiction are covered by Justice Holmes’ statement that a ‘suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.’ Thus, the vast majority of cases brought under the general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts are those in which federal law creates the cause of action.” Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U. S. 804, 808 (1986) (citation omitted). In this case it is clear that the causes of action asserted by petitioners were created by the antitrust laws and not the patent laws. Congress did not create an express cause of action to enforce § 112 of the patent laws, and I find no merit in respondent’s suggestion that we should recognize an implied cause of action under § 112. Accordingly, I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the issue of wrongful retention of proprietary information that became the focus of this case under § 112 of the patent laws could not confer appellate jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit, because the issue arose as a defense rather than as a claim.

To the extent that Part III-A of the Court’s opinion does nothing more than abjure the notion that the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over patent-law issues as well as claims, I am thus in complete agreement. However, in rejecting respondent’s contention that “Congress’ goals would be better served if the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction were to be fixed ‘by reference to the case actually litigated,’ rather than by an ex ante hypothetical assessment of the elements of the complaint that might have been dispositive,” ante, at 813, the Court’s opinion might be read as suggesting that whether patent claims are properly before the Federal Circuit on appeal should be determined by examining only the initial complaint and not by ascertaining whether a patent claim in fact was litigated in the case. Such an approach would assume that whether a case “arises under” the patent laws turns on the same considerations whether one is determining the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction or a federal district court’s original jurisdiction. But although 28 U. S. C. § 1338(a) provides the basis for both types of jurisdictional assessment, I think it clear that Congress could not have intended precisely the same analysis in both instances. Two simple examples will illustrate the point.

If a patentee should file a two-count complaint seeking damages (1) under the antitrust laws and (2) for patent infringement, the district court’s jurisdiction would unquestionably be based, at least in part, on § 1338(a). If, however, pretrial discovery convinced the plaintiff that no infringement had occurred, and Count 2 was therefore dismissed voluntarily in advance of trial, the case that would actually be litigated would certainly not arise under the patent laws for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. Even though the district court’s original jurisdiction when the complaint was filed had been based, in part, on § 1338(a), the case would no longer be one arising under the patent laws for purposes of Federal Circuit review when the district court’s judgment was entered. Conversely, if an original complaint alleging only an antitrust violation should be amended after discovery to add a patent-law claim, and if the plaintiff should be successful in proving that its patent was valid and infringed but unsuccessful in proving any basis for recovery under the antitrust laws, the district court’s judgment would sustain a claim arising under the patent laws even though the complaint initially invoking its jurisdiction had not mentioned it, and an appeal would properly lie in the Federal Circuit.

Whether the complaint is actually amended, as in the previous example, or constructively amended to conform to the proof, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(b), Congress’ goal of ensuring that appeals of patent-law claims go to the Federal Circuit would be thwarted by determining that court’s appellate jurisdiction only through an examination of the complaint as initially filed. That approach would enable an unscrupulous plaintiff to manipulate appellate court jurisdiction by the timing of the amendments to its complaint. The Court expressly leaves open the question whether a constructive amendment could provide the foundation for Federal Circuit patent-law jurisdiction, see ante, at 814-815, and says nothing on the subject whether actual amendments to the complaint can so suffice. But since respondent has asked us to rule in its favor on the ground that petitioners’ complaint added a patent-law claim through constructive amendment, I think we should make it perfectly clear that even though respondent’s approach to the jurisdictional question is sound, its application of that approach to this case fails because the claim that was actually litigated did not arise under the patent laws. Nevertheless, since what the Court has written is not inconsistent with this view, I join its opinion.

       Colt’s appeal to the Federal Circuit actually invoked 28 U. S. C. §§ 1292(a)(1) and (c)(1), which together grant the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from interlocutory orders “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving [an] injunctio[n],” § 1292(a)(1), “in any case over which the court would have jurisdiction over an appeal under section 1295,” § 1292(c)(1).

       Colt correctly points out that in this case our interpretation of § 1338(a)’s “arising under” language will merely determine which of two federal appellate courts will decide the appeal, and suggests that our “arising under” jurisprudence might therefore be inapposite. Since, however, § 1338(a) delineates the jurisdiction of the federal and state courts over cases involving patent issues, the phrase (like the identical phrase in § 1331) “masks a welter of issues regarding the interrelation of federal and state authority and the proper management of the federal judicial system.” See Franchise Tax Board of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U. S. 1, 8 (1983) (footnote omitted). See also Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U. S. 804, 810 (1986) (“[Djeter-minations about federal jurisdiction require sensitive judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal system”).

       On the other hand, merely because a claim makes no reference to federal patent law does not necessarily mean the claim does not “arise under” patent law. Just as “a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint,” Franchise Tax Board, supra, at 22 (citations omitted); see Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U. S. 394, 397, n. 2 (1981); id., at 408, n. 3 (Brennan, J., dissenting), so a plaintiff may not defeat § 1338(a) jurisdiction by omitting to plead necessary federal patent-law questions.

       Rule 15(b) provides in relevant part:
      “When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.”

       There is no reason to apply law-of-the-case principles less rigorously to transfer decisions that implicate the transferee’s jurisdiction. Perpetual litigation of any issue — jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional — delays, and therefore threatens to deny, justice. But cf. Potomac Passengers Assn. v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 171 U. S. App. D. C. 359, 363, n. 22, 520 F. 2d 91, 95, n. 22 (1975).

       Title 28 U. S. C. § 1295(a)(1) grants the Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction over final decisions of federal district courts whose jurisdiction “was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of this title.” Title 28 U. S. C. § 1338(a), in turn, grants the federal district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . .” As the Court correctly states, ante, at 807-810, § 1338 jurisdiction, like § 1331 jurisdiction, is over claims, not issues. See H. R. Rep. No. 97-312, p. 41 (1981) (“Cases will be within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the same sense that cases are said to ‘arise under’ federal law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction. Contrast, Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp., 604 F. 2d 179 (2d Cir., 1979) [Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals properly has jurisdiction over issues, not claims, arising under the Economic Stabilization Act]”).
      In this context, it is important to note that the “well-pleaded complaint” rule helps ferret out claims from issues, and says nothing about whether such separation should be made only on the basis of the original complaint.

       Indeed, since it seems plain that no implied cause of action exists under § 112 — which, after all, merely describes the nature of the specifications that must be included with a patent application — a plaintiff’s attempt at gaining federal-court jurisdiction through a claim arising under § 112 would be properly rejected under the “artful pleading” doctrine. See, e. g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U. S. 667, 673-674 (1950) (“To sanction suits for declaratory relief as within the jurisdiction of the District Courts merely because, as in this case, artful pleading anticipates a defense based on federal law would contravene the whole trend of jurisdictional legislation by Congress, disregard the effective functioning of the federal judicial system and distort the limited procedural purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act”); Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U. S. 394, 397, n. 2 (1981) (District Court properly found that respondents “had attempted to avoid removal jurisdiction by ‘artful[ly]’ casting their ‘essentially federal law claims’ as state-law claims”); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U. S. 386, 397 (1987) (“artful pleading” doctrine cannot be invoked by party attempting to justify removal on the basis of facts not alleged in the complaint); 14A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3722, pp. 266-276 (1985); see also Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U. S. 804 (1986) (incorporation of federal standard in state-law private action, when no cause of action, either express or implied, exists for violations of that federal standard, does not make the action one “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”).

       “Rule 15. Amended and Supplemental Pleadings.
      “(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. ...”

       “We need not decide under what circumstances, if any, a court of appeals could furnish itself a jurisdictional basis unsupported by the pleadings by deeming the complaint amended in light of the parties’ ‘express or implied consent’ to litigate a claim. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 16(b).”


author: Justice White Justice Kennedy,

text:
    MACKEY et al. v. LANIER COLLECTION AGENCY & SERVICE, INC.
    No. 86-1387.
    Argued April 19, 1988
    Decided June 17, 1988

      White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and BREnnan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, O’CONNOR, and Scalia, JJ., joined, post, p. 841.

      Ernest L. Mathews, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Thomas W. Gleason, Charles R. Goldburg, and Kevin Marrinan.

      Brian J. Martin argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Ayer, Christopher J. Wright, George R. Salem, Allen H. Feldman, and Carol A. De Deo.

      Maureen E. Mahoney, by invitation of the Court, 484 U. S. 809, argued the cause and filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below.

        Benna Ruth Solomon and Eric B. Amstutz filed a brief for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

        John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, Edmond B. Mamer, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Raymond B. Jue, Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of California as amicus curiae.

   Justice White

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue here is whether and to what extent the Georgia statutes bearing on the garnishment of funds due to participants in ERISA employee welfare benefit plans are preempted by the federal statute which governs such plans.

Petitioners are the trustees of an employee benefit plan that provides vacation and holiday benefits to eligible employees in several southeastern States. The covered workers draw their vacation benefits from the plan annually. The plan is an “employee welfare benefit plan” as defined by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U. S. C. § 1002(1).

Respondent is a collection agency. It sought and obtained money judgments against 23 plan participants who owed money to clients of respondent. To collect these money judgments, respondent instituted an action in a Georgia trial court seeking to garnish the debtors’ plan benefits. The trial court granted the garnishment request. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-21. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a Georgia statute, Ga. Code Ann. §18-4-22.1 (1982), barring the garnishment of “[f ]unds or benefits of [an]. . . employee benefit plan or program subject to . . . [ERISA],” exempted plan benefits from garnishment. 178 Ga. App. 467, 470, 343 S. E. 2d 492, 495 (1986).

The Georgia Supreme Court reversed. 256 Ga. 499, 350 S. E. 2d 439 (1986). It agreed that § 18-4-22.1 by its terms barred this garnishment action, but concluded that the section was pre-empted by ERISA “since it purports to regulate garnishment of ERISA funds and benefits, a matter specifically provided for” in the federal scheme. Id., at 501, 350 S. E. 2d, at 442. Through an analysis of ERISA’s preemption provisions, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that Congress had not barred garnishment of employee welfare benefits, even though employee pension benefits were so protected. See 29 U. S. C. § 1056(d) (1982 ed. and Supp. IV). Since §18-4-22.1 “prohibits that which the federal statute permits,” the Georgia Supreme Court held, the state law was “in conflict with” the federal scheme, and therefore pre-empted by it. 256 Ga., at 501, 350 S. E. 2d, at 442. Consequently, the plan was subject to garnishment under the general state garnishment law, Ga. Code Ann. § 18-4-20 et seq. (1982 and Supp. 1987).

Because of conflicting decisions among the courts on the questions presented here, we granted certiorari. 483 U. S. 1004 (1987). We now affirm the Georgia Supreme Court’s judgment.

II

ERISA § 514(a) pre-empts “any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan” covered by the statute. 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). We believe that under our precedents, Ga. Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1 is such a state law.

The Georgia statute at issue here expressly refers to— indeed, solely applies to — ERISA employee benefit plans. See n. 2, supra. “A law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 96-97 (1983) (emphasis added). On several occasions since our decision in Shaw, we have reaffirmed this rule, concluding that state laws which make “reference to” ERISA plans are laws that “relate to” those plans within the meaning of § 514(a). See, e. g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 47-48 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 739 (1985). In fact, we have virtually taken it for granted that state laws which are “specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans” are pre-empted under § 514(a). Cf. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, supra, at 47-48; Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., supra, at 98.

The possibility that § 18-4-22.1 was enacted by the Georgia Legislature to help effectuate ERISA’s underlying purposes — the view of the Georgia Court of Appeals below, see 178 Ga. App., at 467, 343 S. E. 2d, at 493 — is not enough to save the state law from pre-emption. “The pre-emption provision [of § 514(a)] . . . displaced] all state laws that fall within its sphere, even including state laws that are consistent with ERISA’s substantive requirements.” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, supra, at 739. The decision in Shaw particularly underscores this point. There, we found a New York antidiscrimination statute pre-empted under § 514(a), even though Congress had not expressed any intent in ERISA to approve of the employment practices that the State had banned by its statute. Shaw, supra, at 97, n. 15, 98-99. Legislative “good intentions” do not save a state law within the broad pre-emptive scope of § 514(a).

Consequently, adhering to our precedents in this area, we hold that Ga. Code Ann. §18-4-22.1, which singles out ERISA employee welfare benefit plans for different treatment under state garnishment procedures, is pre-empted under § 514(a). The state statute’s express reference to ERISA plans suffices to bring it within the federal law’s preemptive reach.

Ill

A more complex question is posed by the argument of petitioners, rejected by the Georgia Supreme Court, that the entire Georgia garnishment procedure is pre-empted by ERISA. We reserved decision on the issue in Franchise Tax Board of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California, 463 U. S. 1, 7, 26, n. 30 (1983); the question, which is one of federal law, is a close one. We believe, however, that petitioners’ contention misapprehends ERISA’s pre-emptive scope.

'A

Unlike the Georgia antigarnishment provision discussed above, Georgia’s general garnishment statute does not single out or specially mention ERISA plans of any kind. But as we have recognized, the pre-emptive force of § 514(a) is not limited to such state laws. See, e. g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, supra, at 47-48, and Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., supra, at 98. Consequently, we must decide whether § 514(a) pre-empts Georgia’s general garnishment law because it “relates to” the ERISA welfare benefit plans that petitioners direct.

In arguing for pre-emption, petitioners assert that when an employee welfare benefit plan is garnisheed under Georgia law by a creditor of a participant, plan trustees are served with a garnishment summons, become parties to a suit, and must respond and deposit the demanded funds due the beneficiary-debtor — funds that otherwise they are required to hold and pay out to those beneficiaries. At the very least, petitioners contend, benefit plans subjected to garnishment will incur substantial administrative burdens and costs. Because garnishment will involve and affect the plan and its trustees in these ways, petitioners submit the Georgia garnishment law necessarily “relates to” such ERISA welfare benefit plans and is therefore pre-empted by § 514(a).

Unfortunately, ERISA itself offers no express answer as to whether welfare benefit plan trustees must comply with garnishment orders like those respondent is seeking to enforce. In our view, however, certain ERISA provisions, and several aspects of the statute’s structure, indicate that Congress did not intend to forbid the use of state-law mechanisms of executing judgments against ERISA welfare benefit plans, even when those mechanisms prevent plan partid-pants from receiving their benefits. Consequently, we join the virtually unanimous view of federal and state courts which have faced this question, and hold that federal law does not bar a garnishment action like respondent’s.

At the outset, we consider the several types of civil suits that can be brought against ERISA welfare benefit plans. First, ERISA’s § 502 provides that civil enforcement actions may be brought by particular persons against ERISA plans, to secure specified relief, including the recovery of plan benefits. Suits for benefits or to enforce a participant’s rights under a plan may be brought in either federal or state court. 29 U. S. C. § 1132(e). Section 502, which provides that a plan may “sue or be sued” as an entity in §502 actions, 29 U. S. C. § 1132(d)(1), clearly contemplates the enforcement of money judgments against benefit plans, 29 U. S. C. § 1132(d)(2). See also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 327 (1974).

ERISA plans may be sued in a second type of civil action, as well. These cases — lawsuits against ERISA plans for run-of-the-mill state-law claims such as unpaid rent, failure to pay creditors, or even torts committed by an ERISA plan-are relatively commonplace. Petitioners and the United States (appearing here as amicus curiae) concede that these suits, although obviously affecting and involving ERISA plans and their trustees, are not pre-empted by ERISA § 514(a). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 11-12, 15.

ERISA does not provide an enforcement mechanism for collecting judgments won in either of these two types of actions. Thus, while § 502(d), the “sue and be sued” provision, contemplates execution of judgments won against plans in civil actions, it does not provide mechanisms to do so. Moreover, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a), which would apply when either type of civil suit discussed above is brought against an ERISA plan in federal court, defers to state law to provide methods for collecting judgments. Cf. also Huron Holding Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co., 312 U. S. 183, 188-194 (1941). Consequently, state-law methods for collecting money judgments must, as a general matter, remain undisturbed by ERISA;. otherwise, there would be no way to enforce such a judgment won against an ERISA plan. If attachment of ERISA plan funds does not “relate to” an ERISA plan in any of these circumstances, we do not see how respondent’s proposed garnishment order would do so.

It is thus clear enough that money judgments against ERISA welfare benefit plans, based on state or federal law, won in state or federal court, must be collectible in some way; garnishment is one permissible method. In fact, while petitioners’ brief argued that any garnishment of an ERISA plan was pre-empted, see Brief for Petitioners 14, under questioning at oral argument, petitioners conceded that garnishment is among the state-law enforcement mechanisms that may used in certain types of cases involving ERISA welfare benefit plans. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-7.

Nonetheless, petitioners and the United States insist that ERISA § 514(a) bars enforcement of the particular garnishment orders at issue here. The United States rests this claim on its view that § 514(a) prohibits ERISA welfare benefit plans from complying with state-law enforcement orders (like garnishment) only where these orders affect “whether benefits will be paid to a plan participant.” See Tr. of Oral Arg. 15-16. Under this view of § 514(a), state-law enforcement mechanisms can be used to collect judgments from plan funds when they are won by general creditors of the plan, but not by creditors of plan participants.

The problem with this proposed interpretation of § 514(a) is that it has no basis whatsoever in the language of the statute. Section 514(a) pre-empts State laws “insofar as they ... relate to . . . employee benefit plan[s]”: no distinction is made between plan funds generally and those funds due a particular participant at a particular time. As the amicus curiae appointed by this Court put it, “there is simply no logical way to construe the English language so that garnishment or attachment laws ‘relate to’ benefit plans when they are invoked by creditors of the beneficiaries, but not when they are invoked by beneficiaries or creditors of the [plan] itself.” Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below 24. If § 514(a) allows a creditor of a plan to employ state-law procedures to attach plan funds (to collect a judgment it has won against the plan) — if such an action does not “relate to” a benefit plan — we do not see how § 514(a) bars a participant’s creditor from employing the same state-law mechanisms.

Where Congress intended in ERISA to preclude a particular method of state-law enforcement of judgments, or extend anti-alienation protection to a particular type of ERISA plan, it did so expressly in the statute. Specifically, ERISA § 206(d)(1) bars (with certain enumerated exceptions) the alienation or assignment of benefits provided for by ERISA pension benefit plans. 29 U. S. C. § 1056(d)(1). Congress did not enact any similar provision applicable to ERISA welfare benefit plans, such as the one at issue in this case. Section 206(d)(1) is doubly instructive.

First, § 206(d)(1) expressly includes a distinction that the United States would have us read into § 514(a). Section 206(d)(1) bars the assignment or alienation of pension plan benefits, and thus prohibits the use of state enforcement mechanisms only insofar as they prevent those benefits from being paid to plan participants. As discussed above, § 514(a), by contrast, deals with state laws as they relate to plans. The United States asks us to read § 514(a) as protecting only benefits — but not plans as a whole — from state-law attachment orders (recognizing the numerous problems that would arise if we were to conclude that welfare benefit plans could in no way be subjected to state-law attachment). But by adopting § 206(d)(1), Congress demonstrated that it could, where it wished to, stay the operation of state law as it affects only benefits and not plans. The United States asks us to imply a limitation on a pre-emption provision in one portion of the statute that Congress made express in another portion of ERISA (§ 206(d)(1)). We see no basis for construing the statute in this manner and therefore, in light of § 206(d)(1), reject the United States’ suggested interpretation of § 514(a).

Section 206(d)(1) also supports our conclusion in another way. If we were to give ERISA § 514(a) the meaning which petitioners and the United States attribute to it — barring garnishment of all ERISA plan benefits — we would render § 206(d)(1) substantially redundant with § 514(a), as they concede. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9, 14. As our cases have noted in the past, we are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same law.

Ultimately, in examining §§ 206(d)(1) and 514(a) there is no ignoring the fact that, when Congress was adopting ERISA, it had before it a provision to bar the alienation or garnishment of ERISA plan benefits, and chose to impose that limitation only with respect to ERISA pension benefit plans, and not ERISA welfare benefit plans. In a comprehensive regulatory scheme like ERISA, such omissions are significant ones. Cf. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U. S. 134, 147 (1985). Once Congress was sufficiently aware of the prospect that ERISA plan benefits could be attached and/or garnisheed — as evidenced by its adoption of § 206(d)(1) — Congress’ decision to remain silent concerning the attachment or garnishment of ERISA welfare plan benefits "acknowledged and accepted the practice, rather than prohibiting it.” Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S. 504, 516 (1981). We therefore conclude that Congress did not intend to preclude state-law attachment of ERISA welfare plan benefits.

B

In support of its reading of § 514(a), the United States relies heavily on a 1984 amendment to ERISA, the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426. The 1984 Act included several changes in ERISA which Congress felt were necessary to guarantee that the Nation’s private retirement-income system provided fair treatment for women. See S. Rep. No. 98-575, p. 1 (1984); H. R. Rep. No. 98-655, p. 1 (1984). Among the Act’s provisions were amendments to ERISA which insured that the statute’s anti-garnishment and pre-emption provisions could not be used to block the enforcement of “qualified domestic relations orders” — generally, court orders providing for child support and alimony payments by ERISA plan participants. See 29 U. S. C. § 1056(d)(3) (1982 ed., Supp. IV); 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(7) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). While the primary focus of this portion of the 1984 Act was removing § 206(d)(l)’s anti-garnishment protection from pension plan benefits when spouses sought enforcement of domestic support orders, Congress at the same time also amended §514(a)’s pre-emption provision. It apparently adopted the latter amendments in response to lower court rulings that had interpreted § 514(a) to bar state-law garnishment for the purpose of enforcing domestic relations orders.

Petitioners and the United States argue that the 1984 amendment to § 514(a) makes clear that the section, as originally enacted, generally pre-empts state attachment and garnishment procedures. Otherwise, they contend, there would have been no necessity to amend § 514(a) to save domestic relation orders from pre-emption. There is, however, another plausible construction of Congress’ action in 1984, namely, that Congress thought that some courts had erroneously construed § 514(a) as pre-empting such orders. In this view, the 1984 amendment served the purpose of correcting the error, thus clarifying the original meaning of the section. Cf. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 585 (1988); United Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192, 218 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting.) Moreover, even if the United States is correct, and Congress in 1984 thought that § 514(a) as originally enacted pre-empted domestic relations orders directed at ERISA plans — and other state-law attachments and garnishments as well — the opinion of this later Congress as to the meaning of a law enacted 10 years earlier does not control the issue. United Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, supra, at 200, n. 7. “[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.” United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960).

Much the same is to be said about the sentence in the relevant House Committee Report on which the United States relies: “[T]he Committee reasserts that a state tax levy on employee welfare benefit plans is pre-empted by ERISA (see the holding of the 9th Circuit in Franchise Tax Board ...).” H. R. Rep. No. 98-655, pt. 1, supra, at 42. This statement does suggest that the House Committee in 1984 thought that § 514(a) foreclosed state-law attachment orders akin to those at issue here. But again, these views — absent an amendment to the original language of the section — do not direct our resolution of this case. Instead, we must look at the language of ERISA and its structure, to determine the intent of the Congress that originally enacted the provision in question. “It is the intent of the Congress that enacted [the section] . . . that controls.” Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 354, n. 39 (1977). This inquiry supports our reading of § 514(a), which is the reading given it by every other court that has considered the issue in this context (save the Ninth Circuit in a decision that was vacated by this Court).

rH <

Accordingly, we hold that ERISA does not forbid garnishment of an ERISA welfare benefit plan, even where the purpose is to collect judgments against plan participants. Moreover, since we agree with the Georgia Supreme Court that the Georgia antigamishment provision found in Ga. Code Ann. §18-4-22.1 (1982) is pre-empted by ERISA, the judgment below is

Affirmed.

Justice Kennedy,

mth whom Justice Blackmun, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Scalia join, dissenting.

When it enacted ERISA in 1974, Congress expressly preempted “any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate td any employee benefit plan,” and broadly defined “state law” to include “all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law.” ERISA § 514(a), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). The Court holds that these provisions pre-empt a Georgia statute, Ga. Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1 (1982), specifically exempting ERISA plans from the State’s garnishment laws. With this much I agree. The Court also holds, however* that § 514(a), ERISA’s preemption provision, does not prohibit the garnishment of funds due to participants in ERISA welfare benefit plans. I believe that this latter conclusion is inconsistent with both the statute and our precedents and, with all respect, I dissent.

hH

We have said with repeated emphasis that the reach of § 514(a) is not limited to state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1987); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 98 (1983). Further, the reach of § 514(a) is not limited to state laws that conflict with the substantive provisions of ERISA. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 739 (1985). On the contrary, the phrase “relate to” must be ‘“given its broad commonsense meaning, such that a state law “relate[s] to” a benefit plan “in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.”’” Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, supra, at 47, quoting Metropolitan Life, supra, at 739, in turn quoting Shaw, supra, at 99. In my view, state garnishment laws necessarily relate to employee benefit plans to the extent they require such plans to act as garnishees, which is a substantial and onerous obligation.

Compliance with the state garnishment procedures subjects the plan to significant administrative burdens and costs. Petitioners are required to confirm the identity of each of the 23 plan participants who owe money to respondent, calculate the participant’s maximum entitlement from the fund for the period between the service date and the reply date of the summons of garnishment, determine the amount that each participant owes to respondent, and make payments into state court of the lesser of the amount owed to respondent and the participant’s entitlement. Petitioners must also make decisions concerning the validity and priority of garnishments and, if necessary, bear the costs of litigating these issues. Further, as trustees of a multiemployer plan covering participants in several States, petitioners are potentially subject to multiple garnishment orders under varying or conflicting state laws. It is apparent that these effects of garnishment laws on employee benefit plans are not tenuous, remote, or peripheral, and that such laws are accordingly pre-empted. See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., supra, at 100, n. 21.

This common-sense reading of the language of § 514(a) is confirmed by Congress’ decision to exempt certain “domestic relations orders” from the pre-emptive reach of ERISA. See 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(7) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). As the majority acknowledges, this provision was intended to save from pre-emption certain garnishments designed to enforce domestic relations obligations. See ante, at 838. The majority disregards, however, the strong structural implication created by the limited scope of this exception. Surely Congress knew that similar questions concerning the validity of garnishment procedures would arise in other contexts. Indeed, the majority recognizes as much. See ante, at 840, citing H. R. Rep. No. 98-655, pt. 1, p. 42 (1984). Yet Congress decided to save from pre-emption only a limited class of garnishment orders, and then only upon specifically prescribed conditions. See 29 U. S. C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i) (1982 ed., Supp. IV) (defining “qualified domestic relations order”). The majority’s conclusion that ERISA does not bar garnishment of welfare plan benefits renders nugatory this carefully calibrated legislative choice.

It is no answer to say, as the majority does, that the “ ‘views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.’” Ante, at 840, quoting United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). For the views that the majority rejects are not the postenactment musings of a Member of Congress or congressional committee, but a positive expression of legislative will to which we are bound to give effect. In enacting § 514(b)(7) Congress dispelled any possible doubt concerning the circumstances under which welfare benefit plans are required to comply with state orders providing for the garnishment of plan benefits. The Court, which not infrequently calls upon Congress to manifest its intent more clearly, today disregards a clear answer given by Congress in a valid enactment.

II

In reaching its conclusion that Georgia’s garnishment statutes are not pre-empted in the circumstances of this case, the Court relies on two principal arguments. First, the Court notes that Congress contemplated that ERISA benefit plans would be subject to suit under certain circumstances. The majority notes, correctly, that civil enforcement actions are maintainable pursuant to 29 U. S. C. § 1132. The majority points further to certain suits that may be brought “against ERISA plans for run-of-the-mill state-law claims...Ante, at 833. The Court reasons that, as ERISA does not provide an enforcement mechanism for collecting judgments won in such suits, Congress must have intended that state-law methods of collection remain undisturbed.

This argument has no relevance to the issue before us. The question we face is not whether garnishment may be used to enforce a valid judgment obtained against an ERISA plan. When garnishment is so used, its process issues against some third party who owes the plan a debt or who has property in his possession in which the plan has an interest. The significant burdens of complying with the garnishment order fall on the plan’s debtor, not on the plan. The issue we face in this case is quite different: it is whether an ERISA benefit plan may be forced to act as a garnishee by creditors of the plan’s participants and beneficiaries. Because the Court fails to analyze the different contexts in which state garnishment laws may affect ERISA plans, its conclusion that such laws are never pre-empted is far too broad. And while the Court’s conclusion may be valid in garnishment proceedings where an ERISA plan is the debtor, it is plainly unwarranted in situations where, as here, the plan is a garnishee. For it is in the latter situation that plans face the repetitious and costly burden of monitoring controversies involving hundreds of beneficiaries and participants in various States.

Further, it assumes the point in issue to say that the Court’s conclusion is required by cases holding that a “sue- and-be-sued” clause creates a presumption of susceptibility to garnishment and other state-law procedures for enforcing judgments. See ante, at 834, n. 9, citing Franchise Tax Board of California v. USPS, 467 U. S. 512 (1984), and FHA v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242 (1940). The “sue-and-be-sued” clause in each of those cases was a waiver of the sovereign immunity that otherwise would have protected certain federal agencies from legal process, including writs of garnishment. In that context, it was perfectly sensible to “presum[e] that when Congress launched a governmental agency into the commercial world and endowed it with authority to ‘sue or be sued,’ that agency is no less amenable to judicial process than a private enterprise under like circumstances would be.” FHA v. Burr, supra, at 245. In the ERISA context, by contrast, § 514(a) substantively limits the States’ ability to treat employee benefit plans as they may treat any commercial enterprise. Our cases finding several state-law causes of action pre-empted establish at least this much. See, e. g., Pilot Life, 481 U. S., at 47-48 (holding that certain contract and tort laws, though otherwise generally applicable, may not be invoked against an employee benefit plan); Shaw, 463 U. S., at 103-106 (finding certain fair employment laws pre-empted).

The second argument on which the Court relies is that the conclusion that § 514(a) pre-empts the state statutes at issue in this case would render redundant the bar against alienation or assignment of pension benefits set forth in ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U. S. C. § 1056(d)(1). See ante, at 837. This provision prohibits any assignment, whether voluntary or involuntary, of pension plan assets. Under the view the Court rejects, § 514(a) would prohibit involuntary assignments of pension and welfare plan assets because such assignments necessarily would be effected by application of state laws, like the Georgia laws at issue in this case, that are preempted. I agree with the Court that ordinarily the partial redundancy of a statutory command, such as would result from the interpretation of § 514(a) that the Court rejects, is not lightly to be inferred. Nevertheless, I believe there are two reasons why this consideration is not weighty in the present context.

First, the alternative construction adopted by the Court results in the total redundancy of § 514(b)(7), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(7) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). It is preferable, in my view, to tolerate the partial overlap rejected by the Court than to construe § 514(a) so as to render another section of the statute surplus in its entirety. Second, the deliberate, expansive reach of § 514(a) necessarily encompasses many state laws that would be pre-empted even in the absence of its broad mandate, solely on the basis of their conflict with ERISA’s substantive requirements. Some degree of overlap is a necessary concomitant of the approach to pre-emption chosen by Congress. The partial redundancy which the Court strives to avoid is essentially analogous to a host of like overlaps that Congress must have foreseen. To suggest that this type of overlap is sufficient to call into question the applicability of § 514(a) is to defeat the very purpose for which it was enacted. I cannot agree with the Court’s conclusion that petitioners must comply with the garnishment orders at issue in this case.

       As defined in 29 U. S. C. § 1002(3), employee benefit plans are of two types: Welfare benefit plans provide health, legal, vacation, or training benefits. § 1002(1). Pension benefit plans provide retirement income. § 1002(2). The plan involved here is a welfare benefit plan.

       The Georgia law at issue here provides, in relevant part:
      “Funds or benefits of a pension, retirement, or employee benefit plan or program subject to the provisions of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, shall not be subject to the process of garnishment. . . unless such garnishment is based upon a judgment for alimony or for child support. . . .” Ga. Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1 (1982)

       Respondent elected not to appear in this Court, and we appointed an amicus curiae to defend the judgment below. 484 U. S. 809 (1987).

       This “different treatment” is illustrated, not only by the express reference to ERISA plans in the language of § 18-4-22.1, but also in the disparate treatment accorded to non-ERISA benefit plans under Georgia law. Under the State’s garnishment statutes, non-ERISA pension and retirement plans are exempted from garnishment, but no exemption is provided for non-ERISA employee welfare benefit plans. Compare Ga. Code Ann. §18-4-22 (Supp. 1987) with Ga. Code Ann. §18-4-22.1 (1982). Consequently, ERISA welfare benefit plans are protected from garnishment under Georgia law, but non-ERISA plans are not so protected.

       All of the litigants who argued before this Court agreed that federal law controls the resolution of this question. See Brief for Petitioners 11-13; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16-17 (filed Aug. 27, 1987); Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below 9.

       As far as we are aware, the only state or federal court decision in a case involving an employee welfare benefit plan to adopt the United States’ view (that § 514(a) pre-empts state-law attachments of welfare benefit plans) was the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Franchise Tax Board of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California, 679 F. 2d 1307 (1982). That decision was subsequently vacated by the Court, 463 U. S. 1 (1983).
      Since that action, decisions from the Ninth Circuit have abandoned the position taken by the panel majority in Franchise Tax Board, and have adopted the interpretation of § 514(a) that Judge Tang expressed in dissent in that case, 679 F. 2d, at 1310-1311. See, e. g., Misic v. Building Service Employees Health & Welfare Trust, 789 F. 2d 1374, 1376-1377 (1986); Arizona Laborers, Teamsters, and Cement Masons, Local 895 Pension Trust Fund v. Nevarez, 661 F. Supp. 365, 368-370 (Ariz. 1987).
      Other courts which have faced this question in this context have likewise concluded that ERISA does not pre-empt the application of state garnishment procedures to ERISA welfare benefit plans. See, e. g., Local Union 212, Int’l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Vacation Trust Fund v. Local 212, Int’l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Credit Union, 735 F. 2d 1010, 1011 (CA6 1984) (per curiam), aff’g 549 F. Supp. 1299, 1300-1302 (SD Ohio 1982); First Nat. Bank of Commerce v. Latiker, 432 So. 2d 293, 296 (La. App. 1983); Electrical Workers Credit Union v. IBEW-NECA Holiday Trust Fund, 583 S. W. 2d 154, 158-159 (Mo. 1979).

       The “sue and be sued” clause found in ERISA § 502 provides, in pertinent part:
      “(a) . . .
      “A civil action may be brought —
      “(1) by a participant or beneficiary—
      “(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan ....
      “(d) . . .
      “(1) An employee benefit plan may sue or be sued under this subchapter as an entity. . . .
      “(2) Any money judgment won under this subchapter against an employee benefit plan shall be enforceable only against the plan as an entity _” 29 U. S. C. § 1132.

       See, e. g., Morris v. Local 804, Delivery & Warehouse Employees Health & Welfare Fund, 116 Misc. 2d 234, 455 N. Y. S. 2d 517 (N. Y. City Civ. Ct. 1982) (suit against ERISA plan for unpaid rent); Luxemburg v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int’l Union Pension Fund, 91 Misc. 2d 930, 398 N. Y. S. 2d 589 (New York Cty. Ct. 1977) (suit against ERISA plan for unpaid attorneys’ fees); Abofreka v. Alston Tobacco Co., 288 S. C. 122, 341 S. E. 2d 622 (1986) (tort suit against ERISA plan).

       Our conclusion here is further supported by the interpretation we have adopted of “sue and be sued” clauses in previous cases involving other statutes. When Congress provides by law that an entity may “sue and be sued,” this includes “all civil processes] incident to . . . legal proceedings” including “[gjarnishment and attachment.” FHA v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242, 245-246 (1940). We have reaffirmed the view that a “sue and be sued” clause creates a presumption of susceptibility to garnishment and attachment in our more recent cases, as well. See, e. g., Franchise Tax Board of California v. USPS, 467 U. S. 512, 517-525 (1984). Even petitioners concede that our usual rule is that a “sue and be sued” clause makes a subject entity susceptible to garnishment. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7.

       Following this concession, petitioners later suggested (in a somewhat contradictory argument) that garnishment is not a state procedural device for collecting judgments obtained under some other substantive body of law, but rather, “substantive law . . . [that] creates rights and liabilities where none existed before.” See id., at 9. •
      We note, however, that under Georgia law (at least), garnishment is a “procedural” mechanism for the enforcement of judgments. Georgia’s statute that provides for garnishment creates no substantive causes of action, no new bases for relief, or any grounds for recovery; the Georgia garnishment law does not create the rule of decision in any case affixing liability. Rather under Georgia law, postjudgment garnishment is nothing more than a method to collect judgments otherwise obtained by prevailing on a claim against the garnishee. See Ga. Code Ann. § 18-4-60 (1982).
      This analysis is reinforced by the fact that, under the Georgia statute, a garnishor can obtain a writ of garnishment for the purpose of executing the judgments of either the state or federal courts sitting in Georgia, ibid., and by the Georgia Supreme Court’s description of postgarnishment actions as “procedural,” see, e. g., Antico v. Antico, 241 Ga. 294, 244 S. E. 2d 820, 821 (1978); Easterwood v. LeBlanc, 240 Ga. 61, 239 S. E. 2d 383, 383-384 (1977).
      Such is the usual understanding of garnishment. For example, garnishment in the federal system is available under the Federal Rule that provides the “[pjrocess to enforce a judgment.” See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 69(a) (emphasis added); see also, e. g.,1 J. Moore, J. Lucas, & K. Sinclair, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶69.04[3], p. 69-24 (1986).

       See, e. g., Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U. S. 134, 142 (1985); FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 U. S. 480, 486 (1985); Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 197 (1985); United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U. S. 453, 458-459 (1983); Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, 460 U. S. 103, 118 (1983).

       It is not incongruous to find that Ga. Code Ann. § 18-4-20 (Supp. 1987), which provides for garnishment of ERISA welfare benefit plans, escapes pre-emption under ERISA, while striking down § 18-4-22.1 — an exception to the general state-law provision — as pre-empted. While we believe that state-law garnishment procedures are not pre-empted by § 514 (a), we also conclude that any state law which singles out ERISA plans, by express reference, for special treatment is pre-empted. See Part II, supra. It is this “singling out” that pre-empts the Georgia antigamishment exception.

       «The courts are divided on the question of whether [ERISA’s] anti-assignment clause applies to State domestic relations orders and also on the question of whether the pre-emption clause [§ 514(a)] refers to State domestic relations laws and court orders.” H. R. Rep. No. 98-655, pt. 1, p. 30 (1984).

       For this reason we think the dissent’s suggestion that our reading of § 514(a) renders that provision “redundant” with § 514(b)(7) is unsound. Post, at 845-846. Section 514(b)(7) was enacted a decade after § 514(a) was adopted, in response to lower court interpretations of § 514(a) which were not of Congress’ liking. Consequently, even if (given the interpretation of § 514(a) which we adopt today) § 514(b)(7) overlaps with § 514(a), our decision does not suffer from the evil of rendering duplicative two statutory provisions simultaneously adopted by Congress.
      Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the dissent’s reading of § 206(d)(1) and § 514(a), which does render “redundant” two provisions of ERISA enacted at the same time. It is this sort of redundancy — i. e., the suggestion that Congress intentionally adopted, at a single time, two separate provisions having the same meaning — that calls a particular statutory interpretation into question. See n. 11, supra. Even the dissent concedes that this problem plagues its reading of § 514(a). Post, at 845.

       See also, e. g., Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Abbott Laboratories, 460 U. S. 150, 165, n. 27 (1983); Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 116-118, and n. 13 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, 758 (1979).
      The dissent claims that we are ignoring, in § 514(b)(7), "a positive expression of legislative will” that forecloses our interpretation of § 514(a). Post, at 843. But whatever else one can say about the relevance of § 514 (b)(7) to this case, one cannot say that that statutory provision amounts to a congressional enactment that controls here. Section 514(b)(7) has no direct bearing on this case, because it involves a type of garnishment order not at issue here. The most one can glean from § 514(b)(7) is a sense of what Congress, in 1984, understood the scope of § 514(a) to be — a sense that does not command our obedience here. Moreover, for the reasons we discuss above, we do not even think that it is clear that the 98th Congress actually read § 514(a) in the way that the dissent insists that it did.