author: Justice Rehnquist Justice Blackmun,

text:
    WEINBERGER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et al. v. CATHOLIC ACTION OF HAWAII/PEACE EDUCATION PROJECT et al.
    No. 80-1377.
    Argued October 13, 1981
    Decided December 1, 1981

      Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 147.

      Solicitor General Lee argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Dinkins, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, Harlon L. Dalton, Peter R. Steenland, Jr., Raymond N. Zagone, and Martin Green.

      Nancy Steams argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief was Robert L. Boehm.

        Ronald A. Zambrun and Raymond M. Momboisse filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal.

        Ronald J. Wilson filed a brief for the National Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

        Doron Weinberg filed a brief for the Fellowship of Reconciliation et al. as amici curiae.

   Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that § 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 853, 42 U. S. C. §4332(2)(C), requires the Navy to prepare and release to the public a “Hypothetical Environmental Impact Statement” with regard to the operation of a facility capable of storing nuclear weapons. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project v. Brown, 643 F. 2d 569, 572 (1980). Because we conclude that the “Hypothetical Environmental Impact Statement” is a creature of judicial cloth, not legislative cloth, and that it is not mandated by any of the statutory or regulatory provisions upon which the Court of Appeals relied, we reverse its decision.

The facts relevant to our decision are not seriously controverted. Pursuant to a decision by the Navy to transfer ammunition and weapons stored at various locations on the island of Oahu, Hawaii, to the West Loch branch of the Lualualei Naval Magazine, the Navy prepared an Environmental Impact Assessment (ElA) concerning how the plan would affect the environment. The assessment concluded that the necessary construction of 48 earth-covered magazines and associated structures would have no significant environmental impact, and therefore no Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was prepared at the construction stage. Construction contracts were let in March 1977 and in April 1978. Construction of the West Loch facilities has been completed and the magazines are now in use. It is stipulated that the magazines are capable of storing nuclear weapons. Because the information is classified for national security reasons, the Navy’s regulations forbid it either to admit or to deny that nuclear weapons are actually stored at West Loch.

In 1978, the Navy prepared a Candidate Environmental Impact Statement (CEIS). This CEIS deals generally with the environmental hazards associated with the storage, handling, and transporation of nuclear weapons, but does not refer to any specific site or storage facility. It concludes that no significant hazards to the environment are present.

In March 1978, respondents brought this action seeking an injunction against the building of the new facilities at West Loch until an EIS had been filed. Their principal complaint was that the Navy’s EIA had ignored the enhanced risk of a nuclear accident resulting from West Loch’s proximity to three nearby air facilities, the effects of such an accident on the population and environment of Hawaii, and the effects of radiation from the storage of nuclear weapons in a populated area. The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii concluded that the “construction and use of the storage facilities at West Loch is a major federal action” within the meaning of § 102(2)(C). 468 F. Supp. 190, 193 (1979). But given certain national security provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U. S. C. §2011 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), and the Navy’s own regulations concerning nuclear weapons, the District Court concluded that petitioners had complied with NEPA “to the fullest extent possible.” 468 F. Supp., at 193. We find it unnecessary to reach the question posed by the District Court’s reliance on the security provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, since respondents have made no showing in this case that the Navy has failed to comply, or even need comply, with NEPA’s requirements regarding the preparation and public disclosure of an EIS.

Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U. S. C. §4332(2)(C), provides that, “to the fullest extent possible,” all federal agencies shall “include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement” discussing, inter alia, the environmental impact of the proposed action and possible alternatives. Section 102(2)(C) also requires that the EIS be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), and the public, subject to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U. S. C. § 552 (1976 ed. and Süpp. V).

We have previously noted: “The thrust of § 102(2)(C) is . . . that environmental concerns be integrated into the very process of agency decisionmaking. The ‘detailed statement’ it requires is the outward sign that environmental values and consequences have been considered during the planning stage of agency actions.” Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U. S. 347, 350 (1979). Section 102(2)(C) thus serves twin aims. The first is to inject environmental considerations into the federal agency’s decisionmaking process by requiring the agency to prepare an EIS. The second aim is to inform the public that the agency has considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process. Through the disclosure of an EIS, the public is made aware that the agency has taken environmental considerations into account. Public disclosure of the EIS is expressly governed by FOIA. 42 U. S. C. §4332(2)(C).

The decisionmaking and public disclosure goals of §102 (2)(C), though certainly compatible, are not necessarily coextensive. Thus, § 102(2)(C) contemplates that in a given situation a federal agency might have to include environmental considerations in its decisionmaking process, yet withhold public disclosure of any NEPA documents, in whole or in part, under the authority of an FOIA exemption. That the decisionmaking and disclosure requirements of NEPA are not coextensive has been recognized by the Department of Defense’s regulations, both at the time the West Loch facility was constructed and today.

In an apparent attempt to balance what it considered to be the disclosure requirements of NEPA with national security interests, the Court of Appeals concluded that petitioners could prepare and disclose an EIS that would assess the impact of the storage of nuclear weapons at West Loch without revealing specific information regarding the number and type of nuclear weapons to be stored at the facility. 643 F. 2d, at 572. The EIS could hypothesize, but not concede, that the facility will be used for the purpose for which it has been made capable. Ibid. But in inventing the “Hypothetical Environmental Impact Statement,” the Court of Appeals departed from the express intent of Congress manifested by the explicit language in §102(2)(C). That language provides that public disclosure of the EIS shall be governed by FOIA. As we concluded in EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73, 80 (1973), FOIA was intended by Congress to balance the public’s need for access to official information with the Government’s need for confidentiality. Of the nine exemptions in Subsection (b) of FOIA, we think two are relevant in determining whether the Navy must release an EIS. Exemption 3, 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(3), which authorizes the withholding of documents “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute,” arguably exempts the publication of an EIS under the Atomic Energy Act. But we find it unnecessary to decide this question, because to us it is clear that Exemption 1, 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(1), is applicable.

Exemption 1 exempts from disclosure matters that are “(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.” Executive Order No. 12065, 3 CFR 190 (1978-1979 Comp.), confers upon specified officials the power to classify information if its release would pose a threat to national security. Virtually all information relating to the storage of nuclear weapons is classified. Thus, any material properly classified pursuant to Executive Order No. 12065 is exempt from disclosure under Exemption 1, and therefore is exempt from the public disclosure requirements of NEPA.

Congress has thus effected a balance between the needs of the public for access to documents prepared by a federal agency and the necessity of nondisclosure or secrecy. The Court of Appeals in this case should have accepted the balance struck by Congress, rather than engrafting onto the statutory language unique concepts of its own making. By requiring the Navy to prepare a “hypothetical” EIS, the Court of Appeals required the production of a document that would not exist save for what that court thought to be NEPA’s public disclosure requirements. But NEPA’s public disclosure requirements are expressly governed by FOIA. In NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S. 132, 161-162 (1975), we held that FOIA “does not compel agencies to write opinions in cases in which they would not otherwise be required to do so. It only requires disclosure of certain documents which the law requires the agency to prepare or which the agency has decided for its own reasons to create.” See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U. S. 169, 185-186 (1980); Kissinger v. Reporters Committee, 445 U. S. 136, 152 (1980). It follows that if the Navy would not be required by FOIA to release an EIS were one already prepared, it is obviously not required to prepare a “hypothetical” EIS nowhere mentioned in NEPA.

Since the public disclosure requirements of NEPA are governed by FOIA, it is clear that Congress intended that the public’s interest in ensuring that federal agencies comply with NEPA must give way to the Government’s need to preserve military secrets. In the instant case, an EIS concerning a proposal to store nuclear weapons at West Loch need not be disclosed. As we indicated earlier, whether or not nuclear weapons are stored at West Loch is classified information exempt from disclosure to the public under Exemption 1.

If the Navy proposes to store nuclear weapons at West Loch, the Department of Defense’s regulations can fairly be read to require that an EIS be prepared solely for internal purposes, even though such a document cannot be disclosed to the public. The Navy must consider environmental consequences in its decisionmaking process, even if it is unable to meet NEPA’s public disclosure goals by virtue of FOIA Exemption 1.

it does not follow, however, that the Navy is required to prepare an EIS in this case. The Navy is not required to prepare an EIS regarding the hazards of storing nuclear weapons at West Loch simply because the facility is “nuclear capable.” As we held in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 405-406 (1976), an EIS need not be prepared simply because a project is contemplated, but only when the project is proposed. To say that the West Loch facility is “nuclear capable” is to say little more than that the Navy has contemplated the possibility that nuclear weapons, of whatever variety, may at some time be stored here. It is the proposal to store nuclear weapons at West Loch that triggers the Navy’s obligation to prepare an EIS. Due to national security reasons, however, the Navy can neither admit nor deny that it proposes to store nuclear weapons at West Loch. In this case, therefore, it has not been and cannot be established that the Navy has proposed the only action that would require the preparation of an EIS dealing with the environmental consequences of nuclear weapons storage at West Loch.

Ultimately, whether or not the Navy has complied with NEPA “to the fullest extent possible” is beyond judicial scrutiny in this case. In other circumstances, we have held that “public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated.” Totten v. United States, 92 U. S. 105, 107 (1876). See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1 (1953). We confront a similar situation in the instant case.

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to reinstate the judgment of dismissal entered by the District Court.

It is so ordered.

Justice Blackmun,

with whom Justice Brennan joins,

concurring in the judgment.

The law to be applied in this case is relatively simple and straightforward. If the Navy proposes to engage in a major action that will have a significant environmental effect, it must prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) addressing the consequences of the proposed activity. If disclosing the contents, or even the existence, of the EIS will reveal properly classified materials, the Navy need not publish the document. If nonclassified data is segregable and properly disclosable under Executive Order No. 12065, it must be released to the public. I write separately because I believe that the Court understates the first and third of these points, and overstates the second.

The Court states rather obliquely that if the Navy proposes to store nuclear weapons, “the Department of Defense regulations can fairly be read to require that an EIS be prepared solely for internal [Navy] purposes.” Ante, at 146 (footnote omitted). In fact, the Defense Department regulations explicitly declare that “[t]he fact that a proposed action is of a classified nature does not relieve the proponent of the action from complying with the NEPA,” although in such a circumstance the required EIS “shall be prepared, safeguarded and disseminated .in accordance with the requirements applicable to classified information.” 46 Fed. Reg. 22892, 22894 (1981) (to be codified in 32 CFR §775.5). In this, the Defense regulations simply echo the statutory language: NEPA flatly requires that, “to the fullest extent possible,” all federal agencies “include in every recommendation or report on . . . major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed [environmental impact] statement.” 42 U. S. C. §4332(C) (emphasis added). No exception is made for a confidential or classified proposal. Similarly, regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality provide simply that “environmental impact statements which address classified proposals may be safeguarded and restricted from public dissemination,” 40 CFR § 1507.3(c) (1981); the regulations do not — and could not, consistently with the statute — suggest that classified proposals are exempt from NEPA’s EIS requirement.

It seems to me that this follows necessarily from the function of the EIS. One of its purposes — if not its principal purpose — is to guarantee that “environmental concerns are . . . interwoven into the fabric of agency planning.” Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U. S. 347, 351 (1979). The CEQ has recognized:

“The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to serve as an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in [NEPA] are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government. ... An environmental impact statement is more than a disclosure document. It shall be used by Federal officials in conjunction with other relevant material to plan actions and make decisions.” 40 CFR §1502.1 (1981).

This is no less true when the public is unaware of the agency’s proposals. Indeed, the public’s inability to participate in military decisionmaking makes it particularly important that, in cases such as the one before us, the EIS “serve practically as an important contribution to the decisionmaking process.” § 1502.5.

The Court obviously is quite correct in holding that properly classified materials need not be disclosed under NEPA; even information concerning the existence of an EIS may be withheld when publication would divulge sensitive military information. It remains true, however, that the statute is in part intended to inform the public, see ante, at 143, and this informational purpose does not entirely lose its vitality when classified documents are involved. Again, the Defense regulations specifically direct that “[w]hen feasible, [EIS’s] shall be organized in such a manner that classified portions are included as annexes so that the unclassified portions can be made available to the public,” 46 Fed. Reg. 22892, 22894 (1981); further, the CEQ agrees that EIS’s may be organized in such a way “that the unclassified portions can be made available to the public,” 40 CFR § 1507.3(c) (1981). In a given case, then, the military must determine whether the information at issue, consistent with the dictates of the relevant Executive Orders, can be released. That principle is applicable in this and in every other case involving classified military material; I must assume that the Court does not hold differently.

It seems to me that the Court need not go beyond these relatively straightforward principles. FOIA’s first exemption, 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(1), defeats respondents’ attempt to obtain classified material; it therefore is unnecessary to address the applicability or vitality of Totten v. United States, 92 U. S. 105 (1876), which suggested as a matter of “public policy” that certain suits involving confidential data could not be maintained. Id., at 107. Similarly, it is unnecessary to address the applicability of NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S. 132 (1975), to this case. Petitioners convincingly argued that publishing a hypothetical EIS would itself disclose confidential material, and would therefore run afoul of the FOIA’s first exemption. And, in any event, as the Court properly notes, ante, at 146, the respondents have yet to establish that any EIS need be prepared for the West Loch project. That is enough to dispose of the question of a hypothetical EIS.

Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

       An Environmental Impact Assessment is a document prepared by a federal agency in order to determine whether a formal Environmental Impact Statement should be prepared. See 40 CFR § 1508.9 (1981).

       Navy Security Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapons, Navy SWOP 55-1 (1974); Dept, of Navy, OPNAV Instruction 5721.1C (1975).

       42 U. S. C. §§2014(y), 2161, 2162, 2271.

       32 CFR §214.8 (1978) (repealed).

       32 CFR §214.6 (1980).

       Executive Order No. 12065 superseded Executive Order No. 11652, 3 CFR 678 (1971-1975 Comp.), which in turn superseded Executive Order No. 10501, 3 CFR 979 (1949-1953 Comp.). Our decision in EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73 (1973), rested on an application of Executive Order No. 10501. 410 U. S., at 81, and n. 7, 84, and n. 9.

       See 32 CFR §214.8 (1978) (repealed); 32 CFR §214.6 (1980).

      The Court properly notes that Sears held that the FOIA ‘“does not compel agencies to write opinions in cases in which they would not otherwise be required to do so.’” Ante, at 145, quoting 421 U. S., at 161-162. The Court goes on to suggest that the Court of Appeals’ analysis runs afoul of Sears, because that court “required [the Navy] to prepare a ‘hypothetical’ EIS nowhere mentioned in NEPA.” Ante, at 145. But the Court of Appeals did not explicitly require the preparation of a series of hypothetical documents; instead, it stated that “factual information . . . [used in the EIS] can be based on a series of hypotheses,” Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project v. Brown, 643 F. 2d 569, 572 (CA9 1980) (emphasis added), thus authorizing the Navy to prepare advisory studies as a “smokescreen” if it wished to do so.
      This does not raise quite the same issue as that involved in Sears. There, the Court held that a plaintiff could not compel the preparation of a document in order to obtain information not yet reduced to documentary form; here, respondents are trying to obtain data which they presume are contained in an existing study, with the Court of Appeals suggesting the production of new documents for the independent purpose of protecting national security. And there is, as well, another distinction between the cases: while it makes use of FOIA’s disclosure provisions, NEPA is in essence an “action-forcing” statute. FOIA itself, however, is not.
      It could be argued that the Court of Appeals’ analysis violates the holding of Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 405-406 (1976), where this Court concluded that an EIS need be prepared only when a project is actually proposed; in seeming contradiction of that holding, the Court of Appeals stated that an EIS must be developed “[i]f nuclear storage is a, potential choice.” 643 F. 2d, at 571 (emphasis added). But it is less clear to me that the strictures of Sears are relevant here, and I would not reach the question.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice O’Connor

license: Public Domain

text:
    WATT, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al. v. ENERGY ACTION EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION et al.
    No. 80-1464.
    Argued October 5, 1981
    Decided December 1, 1981

      O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, former Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney

      General Dinkins, Harriet S. Shaprio, Anne S. Almy, Edward J. Schawaker, and Bruce C. Rashkow.

      John Silard argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Joseph L. Rauh, Jr

        E. Edward, Bruce filed a brief for Atlantic Richfield Co. et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

   Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We are asked to review a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit compelling the Secretary of the Interior to experiment with the use of certain statutorily defined bidding systems in awarding leases for oil and gas exploration and development on the Outer Continental Shelf. Because the decision below incorrectly construes the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 92 Stat. 629, 43 U. S. C. § 1331 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), we reverse.

HH

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (OCS Lands Act), 67 Stat. 462, as amended, 92 Stat. 629, 43 U. S. C. § 1331 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to lease tracts of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) for the exploration and development of mineral resources, including oil and gas. As originally passed, the OCS Lands Act authorized the Secretary to solicit sealed bids either by fixing a royalty rate of not less than 1272%, and requiring bids on the amount of an initial “cash bonus” to be paid at the time the lease was awarded, or by fixing the amount of the cash bonus, and requiring bids on the royalty rate. 43 U. S. C. § 1337(a). The OCS Lands Act vested complete discretion in the Secretary to choose between these two bidding systems. In practice, prior to 1978 virtually all tracts were leased on the basis of a fixed royalty of 16%% of the gross value of production, with bidding on the amount of the cash bonus. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-590, p. 138 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-284, p. 72 (1977).

During the mid-1970’s, the Nation’s increasing dependence on imported oil focused public attention on the OCS as a potential source, of domestic petroleum and natural gas. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-590, supra, at 53-54. At the same time, the traditional OCS bidding procedures came under close scrutiny because dramatic increases in petroleum prices made existing cash bonuses seem miserly relative to the revenues generated from wells on OCS leaseholds. Members of Congress began to express reservations about the ability of the traditional cash bonus, fixed royalty system to assure a fair return to the Government, principally because it appeared that only the major oil companies could risk paying a large cash bonus to lease a tract of unknown value. Because the number of bidders was often limited to a handful of giant concerns, competition for the leases seemed tepid, and there was no assurance that the ultimate return to the Government was adequate. See, e. g., id., at 47, 54.

Responding to these and other pressures for modernization of the OCS Lands Act, Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 (1978 Amendments), Pub. L. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629. Through the 1978 Amendments, Congress sought to experiment with alternatives to the traditional bidding system. To this end, it increased the number of authorized bidding systems from 2 to 10, 43 U. S. C. § 1337(a)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), and directed the Secretary of the Interior to develop a 5-year plan of experimentation with the new systems. §§ 1337(a)(5)(B), 1344. Four of the newly authorized systems use a cash bonus bid (including the cash bonus, fixed royalty system, which was specifically retained in § 1337(a)(1)(A)), three use a royalty rate bid, one uses a “profit-share” bid, and two use a “work-commitment” bid.

Although the 1978 Amendments, like the original OCS Lands Act, give the Secretary of the Interior the discretion to select among the various authorized bidding systems, that discretion is no longer total. The statute now requires the Secretary to experiment with the nine nontraditional systems in “not less than 20 per centum and not more than 60 per centum of the total area offered for leasing each year,” § 1337(a)(5)(B), unless he determines that those percentage requirements are “inconsistent with the purposes and policies” of the 1978 Amendments.

The 1978 Amendments assure ongoing congressional oversight of the Secretary of the Interior’s leasing activities by requiring frequent reports to Congress on the operation of the bidding systems. For example, the Secretary of Energy, who has responsibility for issuing regulations governing OCS bidding, must report within six months of the end of each fiscal year “with respect to the use of [the] various bidding options,” including, “if applicable, the reasons why a particular bidding system has not been or will not be utilized.” § 1337(a)(9). In addition, the Secretary of the Interior must submit each fiscal year a report that includes “an evaluation of the competitive bidding systems permitted under [the 1978 Amendments], and, if applicable, the reasons why a particular bidding system has not been utilized,” as well as “an evaluation of alternative bidding systems not permitted under [the 1978 Amendments], and why such system or systems should or should not be utilized.” §§ 1343(2)(A) and (B).

To date, the Secretary of Energy has issued regulations for a number of the bidding systems, including three of the four systems using cash bonus bidding, 10 CFR §§375, 376 (1981) (the cash bonus bid, fixed royalty system and the cash bonus bid, fixed sliding-scale royalty system); §§376, 390 (the cash bonus bid, fixed net profit-share system), as well as the royalty bid, fixed cash bonus system, §§375, 376, the net profit-share bid, fixed cash bonus system, §§376, 390, and the work-commitment bid, fixed cash bonus and fixed royalty system, 46 Fed. Reg. 35614 (1981) (to be codified in 10 CFR §§376, 390). For his part, the Secretary of the Interior has prepared a 5-year program for the period from June 1980 to May 1985, calling for 36 sales, each involving a number of tracts. Brief for Petitioners 7. The Secretary of the Interior has so far used the nontraditional bidding systems in leases covering 49% of the total area offered, but has experimented with only two of the nine authorized alternative bidding systems: the cash bonus bid, fixed profit-share system, and the cash bonus bid, fixed sliding-scale royalty system. Id., at 8, and n. 12. The Secretary of the Interior has not experimented, however, with any of the systems using a factor other than the size of a cash bonus as the bidding variable.

II

This litigation grows out of the Secretary of the Interiors continued reliance on cash bonus bidding systems. The respondents here, nine consumer groups, two state governmental entities, and three private citizens, brought suit against the United States, the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Energy, alleging that the Secretaries had abused their discretion by failing to experiment with bidding systems that do not use the size of a cash bonus as the bidding variable. In essence, they complained that bonus bidding cannot generate adequate competition to yield a fair market return for OCS oil and gas as required by the 1978 Amendments. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting further lease sales until the Secretary of Energy promulgated regulations for each of the alternative bidding systems, and prohibiting the further use of the cash bonus, low royalty bidding systems.

Three days after they filed suit and four days before a planned lease sale, the respondents filed a motion for a preliminary injunction barring all further lease sales until regulations had been promulgated for each of the bidding options contained in the 1978 Amendments. The District Court denied the motion because the respondents had not shown a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, and because the pace at which the Secretary of Energy was issuing regulations was not unlawfully slow in light of the complexity involved in preparing such regulations. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. Energy Action Educational Foundation v. Andrus, 203 U. S. App. D. C. 169, 631 F. 2d 751 (1979).

On remand, both parties moved for summary judgment, and the respondents renewed their motion for a preliminary injunction barring future lease sales until additional bidding system regulations had been issued. The District Court denied all motions for summary judgment as well as the respondents’ motion for a preliminary injunction, 516 F. Supp. 90 (DC 1980), and the respondents once more appealed.

This time, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court only to the extent that it refused to enjoin lease sales scheduled for September, October, and November 1980. Turning to the underlying dispute, the court concluded both that the 1978 Amendments require the Secretary of the Interior to experiment with at least some of the bidding systems that do not use the size of a cash bonus as the bidding variable, and that the Secretary of Energy must issue appropriate regulations for the alternative bidding systems. Energy Action Educational Foundation v. Andrus, 210 U. S. App. D. C. 20, 654 F. 2d 735 (1980).

We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari to review this construction of the 1978 Amendments. 450 U. S. 1040.

Ill

Before examining the merits, we must consider the petitioners’ contention that the respondents do not have standing to challenge the Secretary of the Interior’s choice of bidding systems.

There are three groups of plaintiffs in this litigation: (1) the State of California, which claims standing as an involuntary “partner” with the Federal Government in the leasing of OCS tracts in which the underlying pool of gas and oil lies under both the OCS and the 3-mile coastal belt controlled by California; (2) California and the city of Long Beach, which compete with the Federal Government in the leasing of off-shore oil and gas properties; and (3) consumers of oil and gas and of oil- and gas-derived products. Because we find California has standing, we do not consider the standing of the other plaintiffs. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 264, and n. 9 (1977); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 12 (1976) (per curiam).

The 1978 Amendments require the Federal Government to turn over a fair share of the revenues of an OCS lease to the neighboring coastal State whenever the Federal Government and the State own adjoining portions of an OCS oil and gas pool. See 43 U. S. C. § 1337(g)(4) (1976 ed., Supp. III). California thus has a direct financial stake in federal OCS leasing off the California coast. In alleging that the bidding systems currently used by the Secretary of the Interior are incapable of producing a fair market return, California clearly asserts the kind of “distinct and palpable injury,” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 501 (1975), that is required for standing.

To demonstrate that it has standing, however, California must also show that there is a “fairly traceable” causal connection between the injury it claims and the conduct it challenges, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., supra, at 261, so that if the relief sought is granted, the injury will be redressed, Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 41-46 (1976). The petitioners argue that the relief California seeks — experimental use on some OCS lease tracts of non-cash-bonus bidding systems — will not ensure that the Secretary will try these systems on parcels leased off the California coast. According to the petitioners, even if California were to win its suit, cash bonus systems might nevertheless still be used to lease tracts overlying California’s pools. The petitioners assert that California therefore lacks standing because it has failed to show that the relief requested would cause the Secretary of the Interior to use non-cash-bonus bidding systems on California’s parcels.

The essence of California’s complaint, however, is that the Secretary of the Interior, by failing to test non-cash-bonus systems, has breached a statutory obligation to determine through experiment which bidding system works best. According to California, only by testing non-cash-bonus systems can the Secretary of the Interior carry out his duty to use the best bidding systems and thereby assure California a fair return for its resources. The petitioners’ argument, California contends, improperly assumes that the Secretary of the Interior would perversely refuse to adopt a non-cash-bonus bidding system proved by experiment to be superior to the cash bonus alternatives.

We share California’s confidence that, after experimentation, the Secretary would use the' most successful bidding system on all suitable OCS lease tracts, including those off the California coast. For this reason, we agree with California that it has standing to challenge the Secretary of the Interior’s refusal to experiment with non-cash-bonus bidding systems. Therefore, we proceed to the merits.

> HH

In passing the 1978 Amendments, Congress committed the Government to the goal of obtaining fair market value for OCS oil and gas resources. The 1978 Amendments themselves proclaim this intention, and the legislative history is replete with references to this purpose. The respondents urge that non-cash-bonus bidding systems are more likely to achieve the statutory objectives than the cash bonus systems used to date, so that the Secretary of the Interior’s continued reliance on cash bonus bidding violates the statutory scheme.

A

We begin, as always in a case in which the meaning of a statute is at issue, by examining Congress’ language. If Congress meant to restrain the Secretary of the Interior’s discretion in experimenting with the various alternative bidding systems, we can expect the statute to reflect that intent. But it does not.

Despite the various reservations concerning the traditional cash bonus bidding system recorded in the legislative history of the 1978 Amendments, Congress not only failed to repudiate the traditional cash bonus, fixed royalty system specified in § 1337(a)(1)(A), but affirmatively directed that the Secretary of the Interior use that system in the bidding for tracts covering at least 40% of the total area leased in each year of the 5-year plan. § 1337(a)(5)(B). The only express limitation Congress put on the use of the traditional system was that it not be used on more than 80% of the total area offered each year. Ibid. In short, Congress can hardly be said to have rejected even the traditional cash bonus system. Moreover, among the experimental bidding alternatives listed in the 1978 Amendments, Congress expressly specified cash bonus as the bid variable in three systems. Most significantly, Congress left to “the discretion of the Secretary,” § 1337(a)(1), the choice among the various nontraditional alternatives, evidently leaving to his expert administrative determination the complex, technical problem of deciding which alternative bidding systems are more likely to further the statute’s objectives. In addition, Congress granted the Secretary further discretion to abandon the statutory requirements for the percentage use of the nontraditional alternatives, should he determine that those requirements are inconsistent with the statutory purposes and policies. § 1337(a)(5)(B).

The respondents argue that the Secretary’s discretion is limited by § 1344(a)(4), which directs that “[l]easing activities shall be conducted to assure receipt of fair market value for the lands leased and the rights conveyed by the Federal Government.” According to the respondents, the Secretary is violating § 1344(a)(4) by refusing to try non-cash-bonus bidding, because cash bonus bidding allegedly does not assure that fair market value is received for the Government’s resources.

Section 1344(a)(4) cannot support the weight the respondents attach to it. Section 1344 directs the Secretary of the Interior to “prepare and periodically revise, and maintain an oil and gas leasing program” consistent with the “principles” enumerated in §§ 1344(a)(l)-(4). The receipt of fair market value, the fourth listed principle, is only one of many general considerations commended to the Secretary’s attention. The section directs that the Secretary’s entire leasing program be consistent with the principles enumerated. Yet elsewhere the statute requires the Secretary’s program to use the traditional cash bonus, fixed royalty system on as much as 80%, and on no less than 40%, of the acreage leased. § 1337(a)(5)(B). So Congress cannot have considered the traditional cash bonus system incapable of providing a fair market return, for that is the one system Congress required the Secretary to use. We therefore conclude that §1344 (a)(4) cannot fairly be read to constrain indirectly the Secretary’s discretion in choosing to use the alternative cash bonus bidding systems.

The only express statutory check on the Secretary of the Interior’s discretion is the requirement that he periodically report to the Congress his reasons for failing to use any of the alternative bidding systems. The statute thus recognizes that, in appropriate circumstances, some of the alternative bidding systems may not be used. Plainly, Congress considered close congressional scrutiny to be sufficient restraint on the Secretary’s discretion to choose among the statutory options.

In short, nothing in the statute suggests that Congress intended to channel the Secretary of the Interior’s discretion in choosing among the alternative bidding systems, and nothing in the statute singles out the non-cash-bonus systems for special consideration. Therefore, we conclude that the language of the 1978 Amendments requires experimentation with at least some of the new bidding systems, but leaves the details to the Secretary’s discretion.

B

According to the respondents, however, the legislative history of the 1978 Amendments mandates constraints on the Secretary of the Interior’s discretion not expressly stated in the statute. In particular, the respondents cite the repeated, unfavorable references to “cash bonus” bidding found throughout the legislative history to support their contention that Congress intended to direct the Secretary of the Interior to experiment with bidding systems in which the bidding variable is not the size of a cash bonus.

What clearly emerges from the legislative history, however, is not congressional dissatisfaction with all forms of cash bonus bidding, but rather with large front-end payments. Plainly, Congress intended to encourage more competitive bidding by requiring experimentation with bidding alternatives, regardless of the bid variable involved, that would reduce the size of the front-end payments associated with the traditional cash bonus bid, fixed royalty system. Such a reduction of the front-end payments can be achieved, however, with any bidding system that increases the amount of the payments made throughout the life of a lease, since a bidder wall be willing to pay less “up front” if he expects to pay more “downstream.” This inverse relationship between the size of up-front and downstream payments holds true, of course, regardless of which factor is used as a bidding variable. Congress plainly understood this relationship, because it expressly included three new cash bonus bid systems among the experimental alternatives intended to reduce large front-end payments.

Contrary to the respondents’ suggestions, Congress’ references to “bonus bidding” and the “cash bonus system,” when seen in context, are merely a shorthand description of the traditional cash bonus bid, fixed royalty system that was the only system that had been extensively used at the time the 1978 Amendments were under consideration. That the term “bonus bidding” in context refers only to the traditional system is evident because Congress pointedly and repeatedly contrasted the perceived disadvantages of “bonus bidding” with its hopes for the alternatives listed in §§ 1387(a) (1)(B)-(G), although three of those enumerated alternatives retain the size of a cash bonus as the bidding variable. Congressional references to the “cash bonus system” thus implicate only the traditional system described in § 1337(a) (1)(A).

V

In sum, we are unable to find anything, either in the legislative history or in the 1978 Amendments themselves, that compels the conclusion that the Congress as a whole intended to limit the Secretary of the Interior’s discretion to choose among the various experimental bidding systems. It is not for us, or for the Court of Appeals, to decide whether the Secretary of the Interior is well advised to forgo experimentation with the non-cash-bonus alternatives. That question is for Congress alone to answer in the exercise of its oversight powers.

For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals compelling the use of non-cash-bonus bidding systems is hereby reversed.

It is so ordered.

       The Outer Continental Shelf is defined by statute to mean “all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of lands beneath navigable waters . . . and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control.” 43 U. S. C. § 1331(a). The term “lands beneath navigable waters” is itself given an extensive definition in 43 U. S. C. § 1301, but generally means the undersea lands within three miles of the coastline.

       The “basic purpose” of the 1978 Amendments was to “promote the swift, orderly and efficient exploitation of our almost untapped domestic oil and gas resources in the Outer Continental Shelf,” H. R. Rep. No. 95-590, p. 53 (1977), and the Amendments were broadly designed to achieve that aim. We are concerned here, however, only with those provisions of the 1978 Amendments having to do with bidding systems for OCS leases.

       Title 43 U. S. C. § 1337(a)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill) authorizes: (1) a “cash bonus bid with a royalty at not less than 1272 per centum fixed by the Secretary in amount or value of the production saved, removed, or sold,” § 1337(a)(1)(A); (2) a “cash bonus bid . . . and a diminishing or sliding royalty based on such formulae as the Secretary shall determine as equitable to encourage continued production from the lease area as resources diminish, but not less than 12V2 per centum at the beginning of the lease period in amount or value of the production saved, removed, or sold,” § 1337(a) (1)(C); (3) a “cash bonus bid with a fixed share of the net profits of no less than 30 per centum to be derived from the production of oil and gas from the lease area,” § 1337(a)(1)(D); and (4) a “cash bonus bid with a royalty at no less than 1272 per centum fixed by the Secretary in amount or value of the production saved, removed, or sold and a fixed per centum share of net profits of no less than 30 per centum to be derived from the production of oil and gas from the lease area,” § 1337(a)(1)(F).

       Section 1337(a)(1)(B) authorizes: a “variable royalty bid based on a per centum in amount or value of the production saved, removed, or sold, with either [1] a fixed work commitment based on dollar amount for exploration or [2] a fixed cash bonus as determined by the Secretary, or [3] both.”

       Section 1337(a)(1)(E) authorizes a “fixed cash bonus with the net profit share reserved as the bid variable.”

       Section 1337(a)(1) authorizes: (1) a “work commitment bid based on a dollar amount for exploration with a fixed cash bonus, and a diminishing or sliding scale royalty based on such formulae as the Secretary shall determine as equitable to encourage continued production from the lease area as resources diminish, but not less than 12V2 per centum at the beginning of the lease period in amount or value of the production saved, removed, or sold,” § 1337(a)(1)(C); and (2) a “work commitment bid based on a dollar amount for exploration with a fixed cash bonus and a fixed royalty in amount or value of the production saved, removed, or sold,” § 1337(a) (1)(G).

       Section 1337(a)(9)(E) requires that his determination be explained to Congress.

       Under the 1978 Amendments, the Secretaries of the Interior and of Energy work together on the OCS leasing program. Competitive bidding for OCS leases is to be carried out pursuant to “regulations promulgated in advance,” § 1337(a)(1), and the Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 7152(b), 7153 (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), gives the Secretary of Energy the responsibility for issuing such regulations in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior. The Secretary of Energy also has authority to develop bidding systems other than the 10 specifically enumerated in § 1337(a)(1), provided any new system has no more than one bidding variable and is not disapproved by Congress. §§ 1337(a)(1)(H), (a)(4)(A).

       During the course of the present litigation, the Secretary of the Interior filed an affidavit with the District Court stating that he does not intend to use either profit-share or work-commitment bidding because he does “not believe the purposes of the OCS Lands Act or the best interests of the nation would be served by the use” of either system. Affidavit of James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior, Energy Action Educational Foundation v. Watt, No. 79-1633 (DC) (sworn May 8, 1981), reprinted in App. to Brief for Respondents 2a-3a. The Department of the Interior is on record as disfavoring royalty-share bidding as well. See Energy Action Educational Foundation v. Andrus, 210 U. S. App. D. C. 20, 28, and n. 44, 654 F. 2d 735, 743, and n. 44 (1980).

        As reported to Congress, the bidding systems used during fiscal years 1978 through 1980 were as follows. In fiscal year 1978, three lease sales were held, with 218 tracts leased. Of those, 30 tracts were leased under the fixed cash bonus, royalty bid system, 41 under the cash bonus bid, sliding-scale royalty system, and the remainder under the traditional cash bonus bid, fixed 16%% royalty system. Department of the Interior, OCS Oil and Gas Leasing: An Annual Report on the Leasing and Production Program, Fiscal Year 1978. In fiscal year 1979, five lease sales were held, with 290 tracts leased. Of those, 161 were leased under the traditional cash bonus bid, 16%% royalty system, and 129 under the cash bonus bid, sliding-scale royalty system. Department of the Interior, OCS Oil and Gas Leasing: An Annual Report on the Leasing and Production Program, Fiscal Year 1979. In fiscal year 1980, four lease sales were held, with 293 tracts leased. Of those, 136 tracts were leased under the traditional cash bonus bid, 16%% royalty system, 120 under the cash bonus bid, sliding-scale royalty system, 23 under the cash bonus bid, fixed net profit-share system, and 14 under a cash bonus bid, fixed 33%% royalty system. Department of the Interior, Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing and Production Program, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1980.

       479 F. Supp. 62 (DC 1979).

       On remand to the District Court, the parties stipulated to the entry of an order requiring the Department of Energy to issue final regulations for the net profit-share bid, fixed cash bonus system and the work-commitment bid, fixed cash bonus and fixed royalty system. Brief for Petitioners 9; Brief for Respondents 5, n. 1; see also 46 Fed. Reg. 35614, 35615 (1981) (to be codified in 10 CFR §§ 376, 390). Thus, no question is now presented concerning the Secretary of Energy's duty to issue these regulations. The Court of Appeals and the respondents based their conclusion that the Secretary of Energy must issue regulations for the alternative systems on the theory that the Secretary of the Interior must use them, the issue under consideration here.

       In their initial complaint, the individual respondents also claimed standing as taxpayers, but have not pressed that claim here. The 1978 Amendments contain a provision which permits suit by those having “a valid legal interest.” § 1349(a)(1).

       Section 1344(a)(4) states that “[l]easing activities shall be conducted to assure receipt of fair market value for the lands leased and the rights conveyed by the Federal Government.”

       See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 95-590, pp. 47, 54 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-284, pp. 46, 73 (1977).

       Those three are the cash bonus bid, diminishing or sliding-scale royalty system, § 1337(a)(1)(C), the cash bonus bid, fixed net profit-share system, § 1337(a)(1)(D), and the cash bonus bid, fixed royalty and fixed net profit-share system, § 1337(a)(1)(F).

       Also included, for example, are the “economic, social, and environmental values of the renewable and nonrenewable resources contained in the outer Continental Shelf.” § 1344(a)(1). In addition, the Conference Report indicates that providing a fair return to the Federal Government is only one of many considerations the Secretary of the Interior is to weigh:
      “The conferees intend that in utilizing the new bidding alternatives, a variety of considerations should be taken into account, including but not limited to: (i) Providing a fair return to the Federal Government; (ii) increasing competition; (iii) assuring competent and safe operations; (iv) avoiding undue speculation; (v) avoiding unnecessary delays in exploration, development, and production; (vi) discovering and recovering oil and gas; (vii) developing new oil and gas resources in an efficient and timely manner; and (viii) limiting administrative burdens on government and industry.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1474, p. 92 (1978).
      The House Report reiterates the point, emphasizing that striking the proper balance among the factors is up to the Secretary of the Interior:
      “One purpose of [the 1978 Amendments] is to authorize alternative leasing arrangements and require experimentation with them. It will enable the Secretary of the Interior, who administers the federal leasing program, to strike a proper balance between securing a fair return to the Federal Government for the lease of its lands, increasing competition in exploitation of resources, and providing the incentive of a fair profit to the oil companies, which must risk their investment capital.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-590, p. 54 (1977).

       Section 1337(a)(9)(D) requires the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior, to report to Congress “why a particular bidding system has not been or will not be utilized.” Section 1343(2)(A) requires the Secretary of the Interior to report to Congress “the reasons why a particular bidding system has not been utilized.”

       The Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 95-284, pp. 46-47, 73 (1977), put it this way:
      “S. 9 authorizes a wide variety of new bidding systems. These are designed to reduce the front end cash bonus, increase the government’s return on actual production of oil or gas, make it easier for smaller companies to enter the OCS development business, and increase the availability of funds for exploration.
      “In order to assure that these alternatives will be used, the bill limits the Secretary’s authority to use the cash bonus-fixed royalty system which has been the historical method of OCS bidding ....
      “The basic thrust of all these new options is to reduce the reliance on large front-end cash bonuses as the means of obtaining a fair price for the public’s property. The committee wants to authorize lease allocation systems that would encourage the widest possible participation in competitive lease sales consistent with receipt by the public of fair market value for its resources. The committee believes that net profits share and other arrangements can be effective in shifting Government revenue away from initial bonuses and into deferred payments made out of a leaseholder’s profits based on actual production of oil or gas.”
      The House Report, H. Rep. No. 95-590, pp. 47, 138-139 (1977), echoes the Senate’s conclusions:
      “At present, the cash bonus system is used almost exclusively. Under that system, in order to win a lease, a company must have vast amounts of capital, and the price to the company is set without full knowledge of the value of the oil and gas in the area. This may reduce competition for offshore leases to the major oil companies and reduce the public return for resources. To increase competition for off-shore leases and secure higher returns to the public Treasury, section 8 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act has been amended to allow the Secretary to use other bidding methods based on net profits; royalty; or work commitments stated in dollar amounts.
      “Witnesses before the committee indicated that the high front-end bonus bids may have created a barrier to the entry of small and medium-sized oil firms as well as other potential exploiters, to the OCS activity, and that these types of bids do not, after the completion of exploitation of a lease area, provide a fair return to the Government.
      “[T]he 1977 amendments authorizes [sic] new bidding options. The basic thrust of all these new options is to reduce the reliance on large front-end cash bonuses as the means of obtaining a fair price for the public’s property. . . .
      “In order to assure that these new bidding alternatives are used, the 1977 amendments limit the Secretary’s authority to use the cash bonus— fixed royalty system, which has been the historical method of OCS bidding.”

       Of many possible, a single example drawn from the Conference Report, H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1474, p. 92 (1978), suffices to demonstrate this point. The Conference Report summarizes the statutory requirement in § 1337(a)(5)(B) that the Secretary of the Interior experiment with the enumerated alternative bidding systems as follows:
      “Bidding systems other than bonus bidding, including royalty, net profit, work commitment, and nonenumerated systems, are to be utilized in at least 20 percent and not more than 60 percent of the tracts offered for leasing in all OCS areas during each of the next 5 years.” (Emphasis in original.)
      Plainly, the reference to “bonus bidding” is to the traditional system specified in § 1337(a)(1)(A). Otherwise, the summary is simply wrong, because three of the enumerated alternatives retain the size of a cash bonus as the bidding variable. Similar examples are found throughout the legislative history. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-590, pp. 47, 138-139, 141 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-284, pp. 46-47 (1977); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1474, supra, at 93.