author: Justice Stewart Justice Blacicmun, Justice Stevens,

text:
    EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. ASSOCIATED DRY GOODS CORP.
    No. 79-1068.
    Argued November 3, 1980
    Decided January 26, 1981

      Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and BreNNAN, White, and Marshall, JJ., joined. BlacKmuN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 604. SteveNS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 606. Powell, J., took no part in the decision of the case. RehNQüist, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

      Barry Sullivan argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Leroy D. Clark, Joseph T. Eddins, Lutz Alexander Prager, and Vella M. Fink.

      Roger S. Kaplan argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Robert Lewis, Joel L. Finger, and Thomas C. Greble.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Leonard Rovins and Alan D. Gallay for the American Retail Federation; and by Robert E. Williams and Douglas S. McDowell for the Equal Employment Advisory Council.

   Justice Stewart

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 limits the authority of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to make public disclosure of information it has obtained in investigating and attempting to resolve a claim of employment discrimination. We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was correct in holding that a prelitigation disclosure of information in a Commission file to the employee who filed the Title YII claim is a “public” disclosure within the meaning of the statutory restrictions. 445 U. S. 926.

I

This case arose when the Commission sought evidence with respect to discrimination charges filed against the Joseph Horne Co., a division of the respondent, Associated Dry Goods Corp. Horne operates retail department stores in Pennsylvania. Between 1971 and 1973, seven Home employees filed employment discrimination charges with the Commission, six alleging sex discrimination and one alleging racial discrimination. The Commission began its investigation by requesting Horne to provide the employment records of the complainants, and statistics, documents, and other information relating to Horne’s general personnel practices. Horne refused to provide the information unless the Commission agreed beforehand not to disclose any of the requested material to the charging parties. The Commission refused to give this assurance, explaining its practice of making limited disclosure to a charging party of information in his and other files when he needs that information in connection with a potential lawsuit. When Horne continued to refuse to provide the information without an assurance of absolute secrecy, the Commission subpoenaed the material. After the Commission rejected Horne’s petition for revocation of the agency subpoena, the respondent filed this suit, asking the District Court to declare that the Commission’s limited disclosure practices violated Title VII, and to enjoin the Commission from enforcing the subpoena.

The District Court, concluding that the Commission’s disclosure of confidential information to charging parties upsets Title VII’s scheme of negotiation and settlement, held that the regulations and the provisions in the Compliance Manual covering special disclosure to charging parties violate Title VII. Accordingly, the court enforced the subpoena only on the condition that the Commission treat charging parties as members of the “public” to whom it cannot disclose any information in its files. 454 F. Supp. 387 (ED Va.). The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s judgment. EEOC v. Joseph Horne Co., 607 F. 2d 1075.

II

In enacting Title VII, Congress combined administrative and judicial means of eliminating employment discrimination. A person claiming to be the victim of discrimination must first file a charge with the Commission. The Commission must then serve notice of the charge on the employer, and begin an investigation to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe the charge is true. 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(b). If it finds no such reasonable cause, the Commission must dismiss the charge. Ibid. If it does find reasonable cause, it must try to eliminate the alleged discriminatory practice “by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” Ibid. If its attempts at conciliation fail, the Commission may bring a civil action against the employer. § 2000e-5 (f) (1). But Title VII also makes private lawsuits by aggrieved employees an important part of its means of enforcement. If the Commission dismisses the charge, the employee may immediately file a private action. Ibid. And regardless of whether the Commission finds reasonable cause, the employee may bring an action 180 days after filing the charge if by that time the Commission has not filed its own lawsuit. Ibid.

Title VII gives the Commission two formal means of obtaining information when it investigates a charge: The Commission may examine and copy evidence in the possession of the respondent employer, § 2000e-8 (a), and subpoena evidence and documents, § 2000e-9. Congress imposed on the Commission a duty to maintain this information in. confidence. Section 706 (b) of Title VII directs that “[c]harges shall not be made public by the Commission.” If the Commission attempts informally to resolve a charge for which it has found reasonable cause, it cannot make “public” anything said or done in the course of the negotiations between the Commission and the parties; any Commission employee violating this prohibition faces criminal penalties. Ibid. Section 709 (e) of the statute supplements these prohibitions by making it a misdemeanor for any officer or employee of the Commission “to make public in any manner whatever any information” the Commission obtains through its investigative powers before the institution of any proceeding involving this information.'

Title VII nowhere defines “public.” In its regulation governing disclosure, the Commission has construed the statute’s prohibition of “public” release of information to permit pre-litigation disclosure of charges and of investigative information to the parties where such disclosure “is deemed necessary for securing appropriate relief.” 29 CFR § 1601.22 (1979). Specifically, the Commission has also created special disclosure rules permitting release of information in its files to charging parties or their attorneys, aggrieved persons in whose behalf charges have been filed and the persons or organizations who have filed the charges in their behalf, and respondents and their attorneys, so long as the request for the information is made in connection with contemplated litigation. Though normally a person can see information in the file only for the case in which he is directly involved, the Commission sometimes allows a prospective litigant to see information in files of cases brought by other employees against the same employer where that information is relevant and material to the litigant’s case. EEOC Compliance Manual § 83.7 (c). Before disclosing any information, however, the Commission expunges the names, identifying characteristics, and statements of any witnesses who have been promised anonymity, as well as the names of any other respondents. Moreover, any person requesting confidential information must execute a written agreement not to disclose the information to any other person, except as part of the normal course of litigation after a suit is filed.

Ill

For the reasons that follow, we have concluded that Congress did not include charging parties within the “public” to whom disclosure of confidential information is illegal under the provisions of Title VII here at issue. Section 706 (b) states that “[c]harges shall not be made public.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(b). The charge, of course, cannot be concealed from the charging party. Nor can it be concealed from the respondent, since the statute also expressly requires the Commission to serve notice of the charge upon the respondent within 10 days of its filing. Ibid. Thus, the “public” to whom the statute forbids disclosure of charges cannot logically include the parties to the agency proceeding. And we must infer that Congress intended the same distinction when it used the word “public” in § 709 (e), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-8 (e). The two statutory provisions treat essentially the same subject, and, absent any congressional indication to the contrary, we must assume that “public” means the same thing in the two sections.

The very limited legislative history of the disclosure provisions supports this reading. The bill passed by the House contained no restrictions on public disclosure. See H. It. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1963). The disclosure provisions were made part of the substitute bill which Senators Dirksen and Humphrey introduced in the Senate, and which the House later passed without amendment. See 110 Cong. Rec. 12819 (1964). Senator Humphrey, the cosponsor of the bill, explained that the purpose of the disclosure provisions was to prevent wide or unauthorized dissemination of unproved charges, not limited disclosures necessary to carry out the Commission’s functions: “[T]his is a ban on publicizing and not on such disclosure as is necessary to the carrying out of the Commission’s duties under the statute. . .. The amendment is not intended to hamper Commission investigations or proper cooperation with other State and Federal agencies, but rather is aimed at the making available to the general public of unproven charges.” Id., at 12723 (emphasis added). The parties to an agency proceeding are hardly members of the “general public,” especially since, as common sense and the express language of § 706 (b) show, see supra, at 598, they always have available to them the charge — proved or unproved — in the case to which they are parties.

This reading of the statute, moreover, is consistent with the coordinated scheme of administrative and judicial enforcement which Congress created to enforce Title VII. See supra, at 595. First, limited disclosure to the parties can speed the Commission’s required investigation: the Commission can more readily obtain information informally — rather than through its formal powers under 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-9— if it can present the parties with specific facts for them to corroborate or rebut. Second, limited disclosure enhances the Commission’s ability to carry out its statutory responsibility to resolve charges through informal conciliation and negotiation : A party is far more likely to settle when he has enough information to be able to assess the strengths and weaknesses of his opponent’s case as well as his own.

The respondent argues vigorously that the disclosure of investigative information to charging parties may encourage many lawsuits that would not otherwise be filed, and thus contravene the congressional policy of relying on administrative resolution and settlement. But the effect of limited disclosure may be just the opposite. The employee has little to gain from filing a futile lawsuit, and indeed faces the possibility of an adverse fee award if the suit is frivolous. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 421. Pointless litigation burdens both the parties and the federal courts, and it is in the interest of all concerned that the charging party have adequate information in assessing the feasibility of litigation. Under the respondent’s view of the statute, however, the charging party would be able to obtain that information only after filing a lawsuit. • See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-8 (e). Thus, a charging party would have to file suit in a hopeless case in order to discover that the case was hopeless. The Commission’s disclosure practice may therefore help fulfill the statutory goal of maximum possible reliance upon voluntary conciliation and administrative resolution of claims.

In any event, even if disclosure may encourage litigation in some instances, that result is not inconsistent with the ultimate purposes of Title VII. The private right of action remains an important part of Title VII’s scheme of enforcement, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 45. Congress considered the charging party a “private attorney general,” whose role in enforcing the ban on discrimination is parallel to that of the Commission itself. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, supra, at 421. The private litigant could hardly play that role without access to information needed to assess the feasibility of litigation.

IV

Nevertheless, though Congress allowed disclosure of investigative information in a charging party’s file to that party himself, nothing in the statute or its legislative history reveals any intent to allow the Commission to reveal to that charging party information in the files of other charging parties who have brought claims against the same employer. See EEOC Compliance Manual § 83.7 (c). As noted earlier, the charging party cannot logically be a member of the “public” to whom disclosure is forbidden by § 706 (b) of Title VII, and, by extension, cannot be a member of the public under § 709 (e). See supra, at 598. The reason, however, is that the charging party is obviously aware of the charge he has filed, and so cannot belong to the public to which Congress referred when it directed that “[c]harges shall not be made public.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (b).

But there is no reason why the charging party should know the content of any other employee’s charge, and he must be considered a member of the public with respect to charges filed by other people. With respect to all files other than his own, he is a stranger.

The Commission notes that it often consolidates substantially similar charges for investigation, and in other instances draws upon information generated in an earlier investigation of the same employer. The Commission therefore argues that because information in one party’s file may be directly relevant to another party’s charge, it would be burdensome for it to have to reproduce the generally relevant information for each file, and unfair to a charging party to deny him access to generally relevant information that, by chance of timing, appears first and fully in another party’s file.

But the Commission’s argument is merely one of administrative convenience, and such convenience cannot override the prohibitions in the statute. Statistics and other information about an employer’s general practices may certainly be relevant to individual charges of discrimination, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 804-805, but by including such information, in full or summary form, in each individual charging party’s file, the Commission can fully comply with the statute while giving each party the information he needs to weigh the strength of his own case.

V

The Court of Appeals erred, therefore, in holding that the respondent had a categorical right to refuse to comply with the EEOC subpoena unless the Commission assured it that the information supplied would be held in absolute secrecy. The respondent was entitled only to assurance that each employee filing a charge against Horne would see information in no file other than his or her own. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Powell took no part in the decision of this case. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Justice Blacicmun,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

In my view, the proper standard for evaluating disclosures of information by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was expressed by Senator Humphrey, the cosponsor of the bill that became Title VII. As the Court notes, ante, at 598-600, Senator Humphrey stated that the prohibitions against public disclosure in §§ 706 (b) and 709 (e) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e-5 (b) and 2000e-8 (e), do not forbid “such disclosure as is necessary to the carrying out of the Commission’s duties under the statute.” 110 Cong.’ Rec. 12723 (1964). I would adhere to this standard and require the Commission to justify any disclosure of its investigative files by demonstrating that the disclosure is “necessary to the carrying out of [its] duties.” Because the Commission must communicate charges to respondents, investigate the charges that have been filed, determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the charges are true, inform the parties of its determination, and attempt to settle charges, see § 706 (b), there undoubtedly are many occasions when it must disclose some of its information to the parties and to witnesses. The Court of Appeals erred, therefore, when it held that no disclosure to parties and witnesses is permitted before a suit is filed.

The Commission, however, has not pointed to any provision of Title VII imposing a duty upon it to allow charging parties access to its records “for the purpose of reviewing information in the case file in connection with pending or contemplated litigation.” EEOC Compliance Manual § 83.3 (a). I do not find it necessary to resolve the disagreement between the Commission and respondent over whether the Commission’s prelitigation disclosure rules are a help or a hindrance to the effective enforcement of Title VII. I simply find no provision of the statute authorizing the Commission to assist charging parties who are trying to decide whether to file a suit.

The Court of Appeals held that the prelitigation disclosure rules are invalid. I would affirm that part of its judgment.

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

The Court construes a prohibition against public disclosure as an authorization for prelitigation discovery. A principal basis for the Court’s unusual construction of rather plain statutory language is that because a charging party must know the contents of a charge, that party cannot be a member of the public to which disclosure is prohibited. In my view, the reason that the statute is not violated by the charging party’s knowledge of the contents of a charge is that he is the source of the information contained in the charge; no disclosure occurs when he reads what he has written, regardless of whether he is a member of the public.

To encourage prompt and full disclosure of relevant information to a neutral conciliator, Congress assured employees and employers alike that no public disclosure of such information would occur prior to the institution of formal proceedings. To enforce this assurance, the statute imposes criminal penalties on Commission personnel who disclose information to the public. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-8 (e). It seems fanciful to me to conclude that Congress intended to prohibit direct disclosure while permitting indirect disclosure. That result, however, is the consequence of the Court’s view that direct disclosure may be made to a fairly large group of persons who can then pass the information along to others. Although Commission rules do provide that such persons shall agree not to make disclosed information public to others, neither the statutes nor the regulations contain any sanction for the violation of that sort of agreement. If Congress had regarded this group as members of some nonpublic category, I believe that Congress would have expressly prohibited them from making any public disclosure of the confidential information they receive from the Commission. The Court’s reading of the statute shows little respect for the drafting ability of Congress.

I therefore agree with the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that the statute should be interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

       Section 706 (b) of Title VII, 78 Stat. 259, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5 (b), provides in relevant part:
      “Charges shall be made in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as the Commission requires. Charges shall not be made public by the Commission. ... If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing said or done during and as part of such informal endeavors may be made public by the Commission, its officers or employees, or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the consent of the persons concerned. Any person who makes public information in violation of this subsection shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. . .
      Section 709 (e) of Title VII, 78 Stat. 264, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-8 (e), provides:
      “It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the Commission to make public in any manner whatever any information obtained by the Commission pursuant to its authority under this section prior to the institution of any proceeding under this title involving such information. Any officer or employee of the Commission who shall make public in any manner whatever any information in violation of this subsection shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year.”

       The decision of the Court of Appeals in this ease that the Commission lacks the authority to make such a disclosure, EEOC v. Joseph Horne Co., 607 F. 2d 1075 (CA4), conflicts with that of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 472 F. 2d 1147. The Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits have construed the “public” disclosure provisions of the statute in virtually the same way as did the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the present case, though in the somewhat different context of the Commission’s disclosure to individual charging parties of materials emerging from a systemwide investigation of an employer’s practices after the Commission itself has brought a charge. Burlington Northern, Inc, v. EEOC, 582 F. 2d 1097 (CA7); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, 189 U. S. App. D. C. 163, 581 F. 2d 941. Since the Commission itself brought no charge in this case, the question of how the disclosure provisions apply in that context is not before the Court.

       The Commission’s general policy on disclosure is set out in 29 CFR §1601.22 (1979):
      “Neither a charge, nor information obtained pursuant to section 709 (a) of Title VII, nor information obtained from records required to be kept or reports required to be filed pursuant to section 709 (e) and (d) of Title VII, shall be made matters of public information by the Commission prior to the institution of any proceedings under this Title involving such charge or information. This provision does not apply to such earlier disclosures to charging parties, or their attorneys, respondents or their attorneys, or witnesses where disclosure is deemed necessary for securing appropriate relief. This provision also does not apply to such earlier disclosures to representatives of interested Federal, State, and local authorities as may be appropriate or necessary to the carrying out of the Commission's function under Title VII, nor to the publication of data derived from such information in a form which does not reveal the identity of charging parties, respondents, or persons supplying the information.”
      The Commission also has created very specific “special disclosure” rules governing the form and scope of disclosure to those persons whom the Commission treats as being separate from the “public” to whom the statute forbids any disclosure. 29 CFR § 1610.17 (d) (1979); EEOC Compliance Manual § 83 et seq.

       The complaint also alleged that the EEOC disclosure rules violate the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §§ 551, 553, the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1905, and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552. In addition, it alleged that the rules were substantive, rather than procedural, and therefore exceeded the Commission’s statutory authority to issue rules of the latter type only. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-12. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals addressed any of these allegations, and the issues they raise are not now before us.

       In most cases, the Commission actually begins its attempt to achieve a negotiated settlement before it makes a reasonable-cause determination. 29 CFR § 1601.20 (1979); EEOC Compliance Manual §15. If it does achieve an early settlement, the agreement states that the Commission has made no judgment on the merits of the claim. Ibid. To investigate a charge as quickly as possible and to improve the chances of an early informal resolution, the Commission holds a factfinding conference well before it makes a reasonable-cause decision, with each party presenting its version of the facts. 29 CFR § 1601.15 (c) (1979).

       Under Commission regulations, the employee may obtain a right-to-sue letter upon request once 180 days have passed from the filing of the charge, 29 CFR § 1601.28 (a) (1) (1979), but the Commission may issue a right-to-sue letter earlier if it finds that it cannot complete its consideration of a charge within 180 days of filing, § 1601.28 (a)(2). The statute gives the employee 90 days from the Commission's notice of right to sue to file a private lawsuit. 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5 (f)(1).

       See n. 1, supra.

       See n. 1, supra.

       A charging party, however, cannot obtain information under these rules until his right to sue has attached, unless he can demonstrate a compelling need for earlier disclosure. EEOC Compliance Manual § 83.3 (a).

       The Commission defines “relevant and material” as follows:
      “Information in other case files is relevant or material when other case files contain charges, investigations or determinations involving the same basis (e. g., sex, religion, national origin, race) with limited exceptions such as when the private litigant’s case alleged discrimination in promotion against females and the other case file involved a male’s claim that he was not hired because of respondent’s policy of not hiring long haired males. Other case files may be relevant or material if they involve a different basis only when the treatment afforded one protected class is probative of treatment afforded the private litigant’s class (e. g., systemic discrimination against Spanish Sumamed Americans is often probative as to treatment accorded Blacks and vice versa).” EEOC Compliance Manual § 83.7(c) (2).
      However, whenever the Commission discloses to a charging party information from other case files, it does not reveal the identity of the other employees who brought charges against the employer. § 83.7 (c) (4).

       The Commission also expunges any records of or statements obtained in its informal settlement negotiations, except for information which the Commission can otherwise obtain under its statutory power to copy or subpoena evidence. See 42 U. S. C. §§2000e-8 (a), 2000e-9.

       “Information in case files may be disclosed only on the condition that the person requesting disclosure agree in writing not to make the information obtained public except in the normal course of a civil action or other proceeding instituted under Title VII.” EEOC Compliance Manual §83.3 (b).

       The statute also forbids public disclosure of any matters arising in informal conciliation “without the written consent of the persons concerned.” § 2000-e (5) (b). This phrase suggests that the parties, the “persons” whose consent would most obviously be necessary, are not members of the “public” to whom disclosure is forbidden.

       The language in § 709 (e) forbidding disclosure “in any manner whatever,” seems clearly to refer to the means of publication, and not to the persons to whom disclosure is forbidden.

       The House bill, however, did incorporate by reference the provisions of § 10 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 723, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 50, which prohibit FTC employees from mating “public any information obtained from the Commission without its authority . . . See H. R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., § 710 (a) (1963). Under FTC rules construing § 10, the ban on disclosure applies only to unauthorized release of information, and does not prevent disclosure to parties to FTC proceedings. 16 CFR §§ 1.41, 1.133, 1.134 (1964) (current version at 16 CFR §§3.36, 4.10 (c) (1980)). Thus, in passing the substitute bill without amendment, the House may well have assumed that the express disclosure provisions in the Senate bill gave the Commission powers of disclosure similar to those under the FTC Act.

       The other cosponsor of the Senate bill, Senator Dirksen, explained § 706 (b) ’s prohibition of any “public” disclosure of matters' revealed during informal conciliation attempts as follows: “The maximum results from the voluntary approach will be achieved if the investigation and conciliation are carried on in privacy. If voluntary compliance with this title is not achieved, the dispute will be fully exposed to public view when a court suit is filed.” 110 Cong. Rec. 8193 (1964). Senator Dirksen’s explanation strongly suggests that the parties are considered part of the private efforts at conciliation, not members of the general public to whom the dispute will be “fully exposed” after litigation begins.

       The principle that courts should respect an agency’s contemporaneous construction of its founding statute, Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U. S. 396, 408, also supports this view of Title VII, since the Commission first issued its rule permitting disclosure to the charging party shortly after Congress created the EEOC in 1966. 30 Fed. Reg. 8407 (1965). Moreover, such a contemporaneous construction deserves special deference when it has remained consistent over a long period of time. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205, 210. The Commission’s current regulation permitting such disclosure, 29 CFR § 1601.22 (1979), reflects no significant change from the original regulation. The original regulation permitted disclosure to the charging party “as may be appropriate or necessary to the carrying out of the Commission’s functions . . . .” 30 Fed. Reg. 8409 (1965). The regulation was changed in 1977 to allow disclosure to the charging party’s attorney as well as to the party himself, and to rephrase the controlling condition for disclosure as “where such disclosure is deemed necessary for securing appropriate relief.” 42 Fed. Reg. 42024 (1977) (codified at 29 CFR § 1601.22 (1979)). In the 15 years during which the Commission has consistently allowed limited disclosure to the charging party, Congress has never expressed its disapproval, and its silence in this regard suggests its consent to the Commission’s practice. United States v. Jackson, 280 U. S. 183, 196-197. In 1972 Congress made major changes in Title VII, but the only change in the disclosure provisions was a very minor one in § 706 (b): Congress amended the provision requiring consent before disclosure of conciliation matters by replacing “consent of the parties” with “consent of the persons concerned.” Section 706 (b) was also amended to permit charges to be filed “on behalf of” as well as by aggrieved parties, and the new phrase “persons concerned” .was probably intended to conform to that change. See 118 Cong. Rec. 4941 (1972).

       When the Commission issues its decision on whether there is probable cause to believe the charge is true, it explains the factual bases for its conclusion. EEOC Compliance Manual §40.7. A positive finding may thereby be a spur to settlement; a negative finding may deter the employee from filing a frivolous lawsuit. If the Commission were not allowed to disclose to the parties essential facts it obtained during its investigation, it would be able to announce no more than its bare conclusion on reasonable cause, and these important benefits of the reasonable-cause determination would be lost.
      Moreover, a charging party who consents to a settlement negotiated by the Commission waives his right to file a civil action. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1); see Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355, 364. Of course, anyone who settles a case gives up the right to litigate it. But Title VII places employment discrimination claimants in an especially difficult position by forcing them to yield initial control of their potential lawsuits to the Commission, which, in reaching agreement with the employer, might have interests different from those of the employee. It seems unlikely that Congress would force a Title VII charging party, who would have difficulty resisting the opportunity to enter the agreement negotiated by the Commission, to waive his statutory right to litigate when he cannot know the essential facts obtained in the Commission’s investigations.

       An impecunious employee would be unlikely to be able to conduct a thorough investigation of his own after he filed a charge, and therefore would be tempted to file a lawsuit so that he could request appointed counsel, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f)(1), if the statute did not allow the Commission to give him essential investigative information before he filed suit.

       The filing of a private lawsuit may actually encourage settlement. See Young v. International Telephone & Telegraph Co., 438 F. 2d 757, 764 (CA3).

       The legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII reflects a strong reaffirmation of the importance of the private right of action in the Title VII enforcement scheme:
      “The retention of the private right of action , . is intended to make clear that an individual aggrieved by a violation of Title VII should not be forced to abandon the claim merely because of a decision by the Commission or the Attorney General as the case may be, that there are insufficient grounds for the Government to file a complaint. . . .
      “It is hoped that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception and not the rule. . . . However, as the individual’s rights to redress are paramount under the provisions of Title VII it is necessary that all avenues be left open for quick and effective relief.” 118 Cong. Rec. 7565 (1972) (Section-by-Section analysis).

       See n. 10, supra.

      As the Coitrt notes, the agency adopted precisely this standard as a contemporaneous construction of the statute. Its first disclosure rules, issued in 1965, authorized disclosure to the charging party “as may be appropriate or necessary to the carrying out of the Commission’s function.” 30 Fed. Reg. 8409 (1965). This regulation remained unchanged until 1977, when it was amended to state a broader standard, although the agency disclaimed an intent to do so. See 42 Fed. Reg. 42024 (1977). Disclosure to a charging party, his or her attorney, and certain others is now permitted when it “is deemed necessary for securing appropriate relief.” 29 CFR § 1601.22 (1979). That this is a departure from the previous standard is clear, since the Commission retained the “necessary to the carrying out of the Commission’s function” language for disclosures of information to interested federal, state, or local authorities. Ibid.

      The Regulations in the EEOC Compliance Manual which set forth thé agency’s prelitigation disclosure program were first adopted in 1975. They hardly can be called a contemporaneous construction of Title VII.

       A violation of the disclosure prohibition contained in § 2000e-8 (e) is a misdemeanor punishable by 1-year imprisonment and a $1,000 fine.

       The persons to whom special disclosure is permitted, as described by the Court, include parties or their attorneys, aggrieved persons in whose behalf charges have been filed, and the persons or organizations who have filed the charges in their behalf, and respondents and their attorneys. See ante, at 596-597.

       The consequences of a violation surely do not include the criminal penalties that the statute expressly authorizes when Commission personnel make public disclosure.

       The Commission argues that it could prevent further disclosure by seeking injunctive and compensatory relief for breach of the agreement not to disclose the information to others. Brief for Petitioner 37-38, n. 24. This remedy may ameliorate the practical consequences of the Commission’s regulation, but the existence of such a remedy does not answer the question of why Congress provided no express sanction for further disclosure by this nonpublic category.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    WALTER FLEISHER CO., INC. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al.
    No. 79-700.
    Argued November 4, 1980
    Decided January 26, 1981

      Gerald T. Manpearl argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.

      Philip H. Hickok argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were John H. Larson and DeWitt W. Clinton

        Jomne M. Garvey, Michael Wells, and Roy E. Crawford filed a brief for the Committee on Unitary Tax as amicus curiae.

   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.

Justice Stewart took no part in the decision of this case.


text:
    CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION et al. v. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF RECYCLING INDUSTRIES, INC., et al.
    No. 80-568.
    Decided January 26, 1981
   Per Curiam.

Section 204 of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory-Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-210, 90 Stat. 40, note following 45 U. S. C. § 793, directed the Interstate Commerce Commission to conduct an investigation to determine whether the rail rate structure for recyclable and competing virgin materials unjustly discriminates against recyclables or whether such rates are unreasonable, and, if found to be so, to require the removal of any such defect from the structure. The Act demonstrated congressional concern that rail rates may have been unjustly impeding the movement of recycled materials in a market of diminishing virgin resources. S. Rep. No. 94-499, p. 51 (1975).

After conducting the investigation required by §§204 (a) (1) and (2), the Commission concluded that the rail rate structure was neither discriminatory with respect to recyclable materials, nor, with few exceptions, unreasonable. Investigation of Freight Rates for the Transportation of Recyclable or Recycled Commodities, 356 I. C. C. 114 (1977). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, finding that the Commission had applied an overly restrictive definition of “competitive” in assessing whether particular commodities were comparable for purposes of determining discrimination, and that the Commission had improperly shifted the burden of proof from the railroads. National Association of Recycling Industries, Inc. v. ICC, 190 U. S. App. D. C. 118, 585 F. 2d 522 (1978). The case was remanded with orders to the Commission to conduct an expedited investigation which would remedy these errors.

On remand, the Commission found that certain recyclable materials were being discriminated against in the rate structure and concluded that, in general, rates for transportation of recyclables were unreasonably high if they produced a revenue-to-variable cost ratio exceeding 180%. The Commission ordered the elimination of all rate discrimination and ordered that rates for recyclable materials which produced revenue in excess of the 180% ratio be reduced accordingly. Investigation of Freight Rates for Transportation of Recyclable or Recycled Commodities, 361 I. C. C. 238 (1979). In eliminating the discrimination, the railroads were free to use any combination of raising or lowering rates which would equalize rates for recyclable and competing virgin materials, so long as the resulting rate would not be unreasonable. Investigation of Freight Rates for Transportation of Recyclable or Recycled Commodities, 361 I. C. C. 641 (1979). Under this approach, the railroads could raise the rates for recyclable material and competing virgin material to a level above the previous levels for either commodity, if the new rate did not produce revenue in excess of the 180% ratio.

The Court of Appeals affirmed with respect to the Commission’s findings on discrimination. National Association of Recycling Industries, Inc. v. ICC, 201 U. S. App. D. C. 342, 627 F. 2d 1328 (1980). However, the court found fault with the scope of the Commission’s remedy for eliminating discrimination and with the Commission’s failure adequately to justify the 180% ratio as indicative of reasonableness. The court revoked all rate increases for recyclable material put into effect pursuant to those perceived errors and remanded for further proceedings. In a supplementary order, the court made it clear that the central task on remand would be to determine whether the 180% ratio, or some other formula, provided the appropriate standard for determining reasonableness. Until such a standard had been adequately justified, the court enjoined implementation of any rate increase for recyclable material, excepting one caused by a general rate increase.

The railroads sought certiorari, challenging only those aspects of the Court of Appeals’ decision which revoked or enjoined rate increases. The argument is that the lower court was without authority to enter such orders. We agree. The authority to determine when any particular rate should be implemented is a matter which Congress has placed squarely in the hands of the Commission. Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. Co., 372 U. S. 658, 662-672 (1963). While the Court of Appeals was not without power to order further proceedings to determine the propriety of the 180% ratio standard, the court stepped beyond the proper exercise of its power when it revoked rates implemented under the standard and enjoined any further increases toward the 180% level. The basis for these remedies was the court’s conclusion that the Commission had failed to adequately support the choice of the 180% figure. That standard was not rejected outright; the court’s opinion leaves open the possibility that the 180% ratio may eventually prevail.

Under the above circumstances, there is no basis in our prior decisions for the revocation order or for the injunction against further increases. “If a reviewing court cannot discern [the Commission’s] policies, it may remand the case to the agency for clarification and further justification of the departure from precedent. . . . When a case is remanded on the ground that the agency’s policies are unclear, an injunction ordinarily interferes with the primary jurisdiction of the Commission.” Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wichita Board of Trade, 412 U. S. 800, 822 (1973); see United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669, 690-698 (1973); Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. Co., supra; see also Southern R. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U. S. 444 (1979). Here, the court was dissatisfied with the Commission’s justification for adopting the 180% standard, and the case was remanded for further proceedings which could either produce a new standard or clarify the basis for the 180% ratio. Such a posture provides no basis for either revoking or enjoining rate increases under the above authorities. Accordingly, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, those portions of the Court of Appeals decision revoking or enjoining rate increases are vacated, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with the immediate disposition.

So ordered.

Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

      On October 14, 1980, the President signed into law the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895. Section 204 of the Act amends 49 U. S. C. § 10731 (1976 ed, Supp. III) so as to provide guidelines under which the Commission must develop a new revenue-to-variable cost standard for all reeydables excepting iron and steel scrap. Congress has estimated that that ratio would not exceed 160%. S. Rep. No. 96-470, p. 34 (1979). Although the Act may result in the Commission’s adoption of a standard lower than 180%, that factor has no bearing on the Court of Appeals’ power to revoke or enjoin the rate increases at issue here.


text:
    October 6, 1980
    No. 79-1483.
    Supermarkets General Corp., t/a Hochschild Kohn Department Store v. Maryland.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Md. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-1594.
    Bowen v. Bowen.
   Appeal from Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 11th Sup. Jud. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-1703.
    Fulkerson v. State Bar of California.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Cal. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-1772.
    Calderone v. Ferrigno, Administrator, Board of Education of the City School District of New York City, et al.
   Appeal from App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-1776.
    Harding v. Melton, Commissioner of New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-1819.
    United Illuminating Co. et al. v. City of New Haven et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Conn, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-1880.
    Lake Lawrence, Inc. v. Thurston County et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wash, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-1989.
    Citizens Party et al. v. Manchin, Secretary of State of West Virginia.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-2028.
    Aldens, Inc. v. Tully et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-2066.
    Beer et al. v. Austin, Secretary of State of Michigan, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Mich, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-6281.
    In re Adoption of E. M. A. (Dixon, Appellant).
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Pa. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-6825.
    Cater v. Illinois.
   Appeal from App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 80-21.
    Heart Ministries, Inc., et al. v. Kansas ex rel. O'Sullivan, County Attorney, Reno County, Kansas.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Kan. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 80-32.
    Hynning v. DuFief Mortgage, Inc., et al.
   Appeal from Cir. Ct. Arlington County, Va., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 80-51.
    Bridges v. Virginia Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Va. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 80-61.
    Fultz v. Kentucky.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ky. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 80-90.
    No. 80-98.
    National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources et al.; and Rogers et ux. v. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources et al.
   Appeals from Sup. Ct. Pa. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 489 Pa. 221, 414 A. 2d 37.


text:
    No. 80-144.
    United Federation of Teachers Welfare Fund v. State Human Rights Appeal Board et al.
   Appeal from App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 80-5065.
    Jerokovitch v. Ricciuti et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Pa. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-1530.
    Town v. Reno, State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Fla. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1889.
    Rivera v. Oregon State Employees Assn. et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Ore. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5093.
    Payne v. Texas.
   Appeal from Ct. Crim. App. Tex. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-1969.
    No. 79-1972.
    Ackerley Communications, Inc., et al. v. City of Seattle et al.; and Diamond Parking, Inc. v. City of Seattle.
   Appeals from Sup. Ct. Wash, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeals were taken as petitions for writs of certiorari, certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 Wash. 2d 905, 602 P. 2d 1177.


text:
    No. 79-2026.
    Salorio et al. v. Glaser, Director, Division of Taxation, Department of the Treasury of New Jersey.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. J. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6626.
    Williams v. Mississippi.
   Appeal from C. A. 5th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6634.
    Linden v. St. Martin’s Press et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 2d Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6678.
    Donnelly v. Middlesex Superior Court et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Mass, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6646.
    Prenzler v. Reed.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6652.
    Rodriguez v. United States Army et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 2d Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6672.
    Casey v. Ault, Corrections Director.
   Appeal from C. A. 10th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6820.
    Brackett v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   Appeal from C. A. 5th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6847.
    Harshfield v. Ricketts, Corrections Director, et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 10th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6866.
    Masone v. Masone.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6898.
    Grady et al. v. McLean.
   Appeal from App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-138.
    Vanderlinden, Executor v. Vanderlinden, Executor.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Iowa dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-80.
    Prince George's Properties, Inc. v. Prince George's County, Maryland, et al.
   Appeal from Ct. Sp. App. Md. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5018.
    Bressler v. First Appellate Court of California, District One, et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5079.
    Reed v. Schwab et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ore. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1720.
    Dove et al. v. Indiana.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ind. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 79-1846.
    New Hampshire et al. v. Marshall, Secretary of Labor, et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 1st Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

Justice Powell would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 79-1722.
    Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Md. Motion of appellee for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-1865.
    Ostrager v. State Board of Control et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set ease for oral argument.


text:
    No. 79-1939.
    Vara et al. v. City of Houston et al.
   Appeal from Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 14th Sup. Jud. Dist., dismissed for want of properly presented federal question.


text:
    No. 79-2041.
    Clayton v. Central School District No. 1 of the Towns of Conklin et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of properly presented federal question.


text:
    No. 79-6519.
    Zackai v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities for Chicago State University.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of properly presented federal question.


text:
    No. 79-2033.
    Woodward, Administrator v. Burnham City Hospital et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice Blackmun would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 80-14.
    Fayetteville Street Christian School et al. v. North Carolina et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. C. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 79-6630.
    Roche v. Big Moose Oil Field Truck Service et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. La. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice Blackmun would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 79-6719.
    Conrad v. Penn et al.
   Appeal from D. C. D. C. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 79-2044.
    National Coalition for Public Education and Religious Liberty et al. v. Hufstedler, Secretary of Education, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 80-77.
    Lopez, Guardian v. City of Dayton, Ohio, et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ohio, Montgomery County, dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 80-125.
    Meads et al. v. Carter, President of the United States, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. D. C. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 79-1938.
    Mitchell, Director, Department of Social Services of Utah, et al. v. D. R.
   Appeal from C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of appellee for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297 (1980), and Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U. S. 358 (1980).

Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, would affirm the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

He therefore dissents and does so for the reasons set forth in the respective dissenting opinions filed by him and Justice Brennan in Harris v. McRae and its companion cases, 448 U. S., at 348 and 329.


text:
    No. 79-1557.
    Massachusetts v. Hurley.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335 (1980).


text:
    No. 79-1602.
    Missouri v. Morgan.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S. 684 (1980).


text:
    No. 79-1751.
    New York v. Conyers.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U. S. 231 (1980).


text:
    No. 79-1789.
    Cotton Warehouse Assn. et al. v. Marshall, Secretary of Labor, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S. 607 (1980).


text:
    No. 79-1796.
    Freeman, Director, Missouri Department of Social Services, et al. v. Reproductive Health Services et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S 297 (1980); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U. S. 358 (1980); and Maher v. Gagne, 448 U. S. 122 (1980).

Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, dissents and does so for the reasons set forth in the respective dissenting opinions filed by him and Justice Brennan in Harris v. McRae and its companion cases, 448 U. S., at 348 and 329.


text:
    No. 79-2003.
    California v. Lanphear.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Adams v. Texas, 448 U. S. 38 (1980).


text:
    No. 79-2004.
    Franzen et al. v. Smith.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U. S. 231 (1980).


text:
    No. 79-6514.
    Lewis v. Louisiana State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335 (1980).


text:
    No. 79-6770.
    Gavin v. Anderson, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of the position presently asserted by the Attorney General of Michigan in his memorandum filed September 2, 1980.

Justice Rehnquist dissents.


text:
    No. 80-5006.
    Coon v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625 (1980).


text:
    No. 79-1996.
    District Attorney of Sacramento County v. Sacramento County Civil Service Commission et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari dismissed as moot.


text:
    No. 80-5122.
    Brownell v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. A-1020 (O. T. 1979).
    Giovinazzi v. New Jersey.
   Application for stay, addressed to The Chief Justice and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-1177 (O. T. 1979).
    Jaffer v. City of Miami et al.
   Cir. Ct. Fla., Dade County. Application for stay, addressed to Justice White and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-161.
    Von Medlin et al. v. Superior Court of California, County of Santa Cruz (County of Santa Cruz, Real Party in Interest).
   Application for stay, addressed to Justice Powell and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-232.
    Mobley et al. v. Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.
   Application for stay of adoption, addressed to Justice Marshall and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-238.
    Rapides Parish School Board et al. v. Valley et al.
   D. C. W. D. La. Application for stay, addressed to The Chief Justice and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 5,
    Orig.
    United States v. California.
    [For earlier decision herein, see, e. g., 447 U. S. 1.]
   The Solicitor General is requested to file a response to the petition for rehearing within 30 days.

Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this order.


text:
    No. 1,
    No. 2,
    No. 3,
    Orig.
    Orig.
    Orig.
    Wisconsin et al. v. Illinois et al.; Michigan v. Illinois et al.; and New York v. Illinois et al.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 441 U. S. 921.]
   Report of the Special Master received and ordered filed. Exceptions, if any, to the report may be filed within 14 days. Replies, if any, to the exceptions may be filed within seven days. Report of the Special Master with respect to costs received and ordered filed.

Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these orders.


text:
    No. 83,
    Orig.
    Maryland et al. v. Louisiana.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 447 U. S. 902.]
   Report of the Special Master on Motions of the Plaintiffs for Judgment on the Pleadings and of the Defendant for Dismissal of the Complaint received and ordered filed. Report of the Special Master filed May 14, 1980, and Report of the Special Master filed October 6, 1980, are set for oral argument in due course.


text:
    No. 78-1841.
    Cuyler, Correctional Superintendent, et al. v. Adams.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 444 U. S. 1069.] Motion of respondent for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted.


text:
    No. 79-395.
    United States v. Morrison.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 448 U. S. 906.] Motion of respondent for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Salvatore J. Cucinotto, Esquire, of Philadelphia, Pa., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 79-770.
    Environmental Protection Agency v. National Crushed Stone Assn. et al.; and Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency v. Consolidation Coal Co. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 444 U. S. 1069.] Motion of the Solicitor General to permit Andrew J. Levander, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hac vice granted.


text:
    No. 79-408.
    City of Milwaukee et al. v. Illinois et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 445 U. S. 926.] Motion of the Solicitor General to permit Andrew J. Levander, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hac vice granted.


text:
    No. 79-900.
    Federal Trade Commission et al. v. Standard Oil Company of California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 445 U. S. 903.] Motion of Washington Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 79-983.
    No. 79-1689.
    United States v. Will et al. United States v. Will et al.
   D. C. N. D. Ill. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 444 U. S. 1068]; and

D. C. N. D. Ill. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 447 U. S. 919.] Motion of appellees for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 79-1260.
    Chandler et al. v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 446 U. S. 907.] Motion of CBS, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion of Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 79-1266.
    Steadman v. Securities and Exchange Commission.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 446 U. S. 917.] Motions of Securities Industry Association and National Committee of Discount Security Brokers for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae denied.


text:
    No. 79-1356.
    Johnson et al. v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 448 U. S. 910.] Motion of Pacific Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae granted, and 15 additional minutes allotted for that purpose. Respondents also allotted 15 additional minutes for oral argument.


text:
    No. 79-1336.
    Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.
   Ct. App. Iowa. [Certiorari granted, 446 U. S. 951.] Motion of the Solicitor General for additional time for oral argument as amicus curiae granted, and five additional minutes allotted for that purpose. Respondent also allotted an additional five minutes for oral argument.


text:
    No. 79-1404.
    No. 79-1408.
    No. 79-1414.
    No. 79-1415.
    No. 79-1489.
    Pennhurst State School and Hospital et al. v. Halderman et al.; Mayor of Philadelphia et al. v. Halderman et al.; Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens et al. v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital et al.; Commissioners and Mental Health/Mental Retardation Administrator for Bucks County et al. v. Halderman et al.; and Pennhurst Parents-Staff Assn. v. Halderman et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 447 U. S. 904.] Motion of petitioners to dispense with printing appendix denied.


text:
    No. 79-1515.
    United States v. Swank et al.
   Ct. Cl. [Certiorari granted, 446 U. S. 934.] Motions of respondents for additional time for oral argument and for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 79-1896.
    Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall et al.
   Ct. App. La., 2d Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.

Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this order.


text:
    No. 79-6436.
    Ray v. Sowders, Reformatory Superintendent,
   446 U. S. 969. Respondent is requested to file a response to the petition for rehearing within 30 days.


text:
    No. 79-1601.
    Sumner, Warden v. Mata.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 448 U. S. 910.] Motion of petitioner to dispense with printing appendix denied. Motion of respondent for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Ezra Hendon, Esquire, of San Francisco, Cal., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 79-1841.
    No. 79-1856.
    No. 79-1922.
    No. 79-1953.
    No. 79-2059.
    No. 80-60.
    No. 80-146.
    Granddad Bread, Inc. v. Continental Baking Co. Eaton Corp. v. Fox. Central of Georgia Railroad Co. v. Hendley. Freeman, Director, Missouri Department of Social Services, et al. v. Chambly et al. American Electric Power Co., Inc., et al. v. City of Mishawaka, Indiana, et al. Herweg et vir v. Ray, Governor of Iowa, et al. Shiffrin et al. v. Bratton et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir.;

C. A. 6th Cir.;

C. A. 5th Cir.;

C. A. 8th Cir.;

C. A. 7th Cir.;

C. A. 8th Cir.; and

C. A. 7th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file briefs in these cases expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 79-1835.
    Roberts v. Randall, U. S. Circuit Judge, et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari and/or other relief denied.


text:
    No. 79-6689.
    No. 79-6896.
    No. 80-5196.
    Steelman v. Ricketts, Corrections Director, et al.; Steelman v. Ricketts, Corrections Director, et al.; and In re Oliver.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 79-1527.
    Alaska et al. v. McGlynn, U. S. District Judge.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 79-1787.
    No. 79-6742.
    No. 79-6748.
    No. 80-163.
    No. 80-5181.
    No. 80-5185.
    Leonard M. v. Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District (California, Real Party in Interest); Reiner v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan et al.; White v. Lively, U. S. Circuit Judge, et al.; In re Chestnutt Management Corp.; In re Green; and In re Green
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 79-6648.
    Wright v. United States.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 79-6804.
    Jackson et al. v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 79-6699.
    No. 80-5155.
    No. 80-5164.
    Paul v. Stafford, U. S. District Judge; In re Hernandez; and In re Allen.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 79-2018.
    Maroulis v. County Court of Dutchess County et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of

prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 79-1740.
    Ball et al. v. James et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 80-231.
    Andrus, Secretary of the Interior, et al. v. Indiana et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. Ind. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 79-1423.
    Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization of California.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 79-1538.
    No. 79-1596.
    Andrus, Secretary of the Interior v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., et al.; and Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., et al. v. Andrus, Secretary of the Interior.
   Appeals from D. C. W. D. Va. Probable jurisdiction noted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 483 F. Supp. 425.


text:
    No. 79-6779.
    Little v. Streater.
   Appeal from App. Sess., Super. Ct. Conn., New Haven Jud. Dist. Motion of appellant for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 79-1952.
    California Medical Assn. et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits.


text:
    No. 79-1429.
    No. 79-1583.
    American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc., et al. v. Marshall, Secretary of Labor, et al.; and National Cotton Council of America v. Marshall, Secretary of Labor, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari in No. 79-1429 granted limited to Questions 1, 2, and 4 presented by the petition. Certiorari in No. 79-1583 granted. Cases consolidated and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 199 U. S. App. D. C. 54, 617 F. 2d 636.


text:
    No. 79-1252.
    No. 79-1502.
    California et al. v. Sierra Club et al.; and Kern County Water Agency et al. v. Sierra Club et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 610 F. 2d 581.


text:
    No. 79-1890.
    No. 79-1904.
    Andrus, Secretary of the Interior, et al. v. Alaska et al.; and Kenai Peninsula Borough v. Alaska et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 612 F. 2d 1210.


text:
    No. 79-1977.
    Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., Ltd., et al.; Perez v. Arya National Shipping Line, Ltd.; and Barulec v. Ove Skou, R. A.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Questions 1, 2, and 3 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 80-45.
    Johnson v. J. O. L.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari granted and case set for oral argument in tandem with No. 79-5932, Doe et al. v. Delaware [probable jurisdiction noted, 445 U. S. 942].


text:
    No. 80-83.
    Muskie, Secretary of State v. Agee.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted. Motion of respondent to vacate the stay heretofore entered by The Chief Justice denied.


text:
    No. 79-1709.
    Albernaz et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-1907.
    Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Portland Cement Company of Utah.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-1944.
    J. Truett Payne Co., Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-2006.
    Barrentine et al. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondents to dismiss the memorandum for the United States as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-6423.
    Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County.
   Ct. App. N. C. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-6740.
    Bullington v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-6853.
    Webb v. Webb.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 80-5060.
    Carter v. Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-6624.
    Rosales-Lopez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris granted. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 79-6777.
    Steagald v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 80-11.
    No. 80-15.
    Merrion et al., dba Merrion & Bayless, et al. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe et al.; and Amoco Production Co. et al. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument.

Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.

Reported below: 617 F. 2d 537.


text:
    No. 79-1362.
    American Fidelity Life Insurance Co. et al. v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance Co., Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1376.
    Pliss v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1389.
    Reine v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1406.
    City of Los Angeles v. Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1410.
    Dupart et al. v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1494.
    Clark v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1522.
    Potashnick et al. v. Port City Construction Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1534.
    Butler v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1544.
    Moore v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1552.
    Department of Revenue of Alabama et al. v. Fox, formerly dba Cherokee Construction Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1560.
    Garrett v. Illinois.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1570.
    Smith v. Cotton Brothers Baking Co., Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1580.
    Wooten v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1586.
    Roberts v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1592.
    West v. Bergland, Secretary of Agriculture, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1595.
    Sharpe v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1599.
    SCM Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1610.
    Drobena et al. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1611.
    Metz v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1628.
    Rubin v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1635.
    South Dakota v. Andrus, Secretary of the Interior, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1641.
    Carter et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1643.
    Bosco v. Beck, Region II Administrator, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1646.
    West Gulf Maritime Assn. v. Federal Maritime Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1647.
    Kowalik et ux. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1652.
    Miller v. Landrieu, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1653.
    Wearly et al. v. Federal Trade Commission et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1655.
    Heavy Lift Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1661.
    Kearney-National, Inc. v. Burndy Corp.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1667.
    Hannahville Indian Community et al. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1672.
    Lea v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1673.
    Acavino v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1675.
    Vicknair et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1685.
    Breitner et al. v. Harris, dba Richard Harris Builders.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1686.
    Riley v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1687.
    Knight et al. v. Heaney, U. S. Circuit Judge, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1688.
    Marcello v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1691.
    Subaitani v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1696.
    Arnold et al. v. Elk Grove Village.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1697.
    Rowan Drilling Co. et al. v. Wink.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1704.
    Grcich v. Jogoda et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1705.
    Independent Bankers Association of America v. Heimann, Comptroller of the Currency, United States Department of the Treasury.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1706.
    Andrews v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1707.
    DaCosta et al. v. DaCosta et al.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1710.
    Kondrat v. Byron.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Lake County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1712.
    Carpenters District Council of Southern Colorado et al. v. Reid Burton Construction, Inc.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1717.
    Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., et al. v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1721.
    Carle Foundation v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1724.
    Yeh v. System Development Corp.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1725.
    City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp. et al.; and City of Boca Raton v. Arvida Corp.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1726.
    Lefkowitz v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1728.
    Hot Springs County School District Number One et al. v. Washakie County School District Number One et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1727.
    Dillon v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1729.
    McBride v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1730.
    County of Santa Barbara v. Collins.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1731.
    Sturgis v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1736.
    Darneille et al. v. Caro.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1737.
    Ogle v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1741.
    No. 79-1744.
    No. 79-1779.
    Wilson et al. v. Omaha Indian Tribe et al.; RGP, Inc., et al. v. Omaha Indian Tribe et al.; and Iowa et al. v. Omaha Indian Tribe et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 614 F. 2d 1153.


text:
    No. 79-1742.
    No. 79-1916.
    American Sterilizer Co. v. Sybron Corp. et al.; and Sybron Corp. et al. v. American Sterilizer Co.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 614 F. 2d 890.


text:
    No. 79-1746.
    Kilroy v. Costle, Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1748.
    General Committee of Adjustment, United Transportation Union E v. Burlington Northern, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1752.
    Adams et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1753.
    Conway et al. v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1755.
    Gullo v. Lambert et al.
   Cir. Ct. Arlington County, Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1756.
    Keenan Motors, Inc. v. A. R. D. Corp.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1759.
    Eliason Corp. v. National Sanitation Foundation et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1761.
    Seay v. North Carolina.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1762.
    Tower Loan of Mississippi, Inc. v. Harris.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1763.
    Chlorine Institute, Inc., et al. v. Occupational Safety and Health Administration et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1765.
    Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Stewart et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1768.
    Myers v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1767.
    Wilmington United Neighborhoods et al. v. U. S. Department of Health and Human Services et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1769.
    Sanders v. Oliver et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1770.
    Swinehart v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1771.
    Trio Process Corp. et al. v. L. Goldstein's Sons, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1774.
    Look v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1775.
    Kondrat v. Mitrovich et al.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Lake County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1778.
    Flisk, Receiver v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1781.
    Morejon-Pacheco v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1782.
    Shoemaker v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1783.
    Smith v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1785.
    Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Premier Resources, Ltd.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1786.
    Shaffer v. Bond.
   Ct. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1788.
    Justak v. Bochnowski et al.
   Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1790.
    Watson et ux. v. Collex, Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1792.
    McAlester Corp., dba Alridge Hotel, et al. v. Marshall, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1793.
    Harrison v. United States et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1797.
    Donovan Wire & Iron Co. v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1799.
    Laufgas v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1801.
    Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. Eirhart et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1803.
    No. 79-2045.
    Green et al. v. Louisiana; and Dupuis et al. v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 378 So. 2d 934.


text:
    No. 79-1804.
    Garcia-Jaramillo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1807.
    National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1806.
    Bisso Towboat Co. v. Bazile.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1808.
    Bonfoey v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1811.
    Doe et al. v. Irwin et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1813.
    No. 79-6782.
    Webb et al. v. United States; and Johns v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 615 F. 2d 672.


text:
    No. 79-1815.
    Salob v. Ambach, Commissioner of Education of New York, et al.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1817.
    Nelipowitz v. Christo et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1818.
    Beacon National Insurance Co. et al. v. Texas State Board of Insurance et al.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 3d Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1821.
    Kesler v. Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1823.
    Northfield Cheese Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1824.
    Mallow et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1828.
    Pavilonis v. King, Governor of Massachusetts, et al.; and Pavilonis v. Secretary of Education.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1831.
    Hecker v. Township of Dover.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1833.
    Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co. et al. v. Interstate Commerce Commission et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1836.
    Fowler et ux. v. General Development Corp.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1837.
    Robinson v. Grievance Committee of the Seventh Judicial District.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1839.
    Fazio et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1842.
    D. J. McDuffie, Inc., et al. v. Old Reliable Fire Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1843.
    Mason et al. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1844.
    Department of Natural Resources of Washington et al. v. Thurston County et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1845.
    Castagna v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1847.
    Mason v. McDowell.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1848.
    Retail Store Employees Union, Local No. 919, et al. v. United Food & Commercial Workers International Union et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1849.
    Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., et al. v. New York State Tax Commission et al.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1850.
    Marten et al. v. Thies, Director, San Bernardino County Department of Public Social Services.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1851.
    Barndt v. Wissahickon School District et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1854.
    Lange et al. v. Nature Conservancy, Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1855.
    Eastalco Aluminum Co. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland et al.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1858.
    Caston v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1859.
    Greyhound Corp. et al. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., dba Pacific Trailways.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tioari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1860.
    Goings v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1861.
    Epp et al. v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1864.
    Fiumara et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1866.
    Skalicky v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1867.
    Jones v. Alexander, Secretary of the Army.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1868.
    Potter v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1869.
    S & M Materials Co. v. Southern Stone Co., Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1871.
    Castillo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1872.
    Hood v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1873.
    No. 79-6673.
    No. 79-6674.
    No. 79-6688.
    Herthel v. United States; Holt v. United States; Johnson v. United States; and Ahlbrand v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 620 F. 2d 305.


text:
    No. 79-1875.
    Energy Consumers & Producers Assn., Inc. v. Department of Energy.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1876.
    Blake et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1877.
    Union Oil Company of California v. Evanson et al.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1879.
    Bohack Corp. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1882.
    Boylan v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1884.
    Wisconsin et al. v. Reese, Trustee in Bankruptcy, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No 79-1885.
    Law et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1888.
    Orion Research Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1893.
    Freedom Institute of America et al. v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1894.
    Pagniello v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1897.
    G. G. S., Inc. v. Linolex Systems, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1898.
    L’Hoste et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1899.
    Louisiana v. Menne.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1900.
    Freeman v. O’Neal Steel, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1902.
    Rosenbaum v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1903.
    Beeler v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1905.
    Sea Island Broadcasting Corporation of South Carolina v. Federal Communications Commission.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1906.
    Mayor of Baltimore et al. v. Barger et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1911.
    Ruth v. Pennsylvania.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1912.
    Fultz v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1914.
    Harbour v. Harbour.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 14th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1915.
    City of Cleveland v. Krupansky, U. S. District Judge, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1917.
    Chaplain v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1919.
    Huwaldt v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1921.
    Treasurer, Prince George’s County, Maryland v. Washington National Arena Limited Partnership et al.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1923.
    Agapito et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1924.
    Independent Order of Foresters v. Bier et al.
   Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1925.
    Mountaineer Excavating Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1926.
    Union Camp Corp. v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1927.
    No. 80-292.
    Francis v. United States; and DeLillo v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 620 F. 2d 939.


text:
    No. 79-1928.
    Tully Corporation of Virginia v. Winter, a minor by Winter.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1929.
    Banks et ux. v. Phillips.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1930.
    Albernaz et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1931.
    Sander v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1932.
    Thornton v. Equifax, Inc.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1933.
    Wesley v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1934.
    Daniels v. Southern California Rapid Transit District et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1935.
    Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Bailey et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1936.
    Mareno, a minor by Mareno v. Walker et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1937.
    Walnut Properties, Inc. v. Long Beach City Council.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1940.
    U. S. Cablevision Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1942.
    Shaffer v. Cook, Judge.
   Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1945.
    Roncketti et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1947.
    Schaffan et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1948.
    Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray, District Engineer, United States Army Corps of Engineers, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1949.
    Kain v. S.S. Vjazma et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1950.
    Berk, Executrix v. County of Los Angeles et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1951.
    Puckett v. Paulding County, Georgia, by its Board of Commissioners.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1954.
    Thompson v. J. S. Young Co.; and Thompson v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1955.
    Hays v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1956.
    Clean Land Air Water Corp. v. Waste Systems, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1957.
    Pisel et ux. v. ITT Continental Baking Co. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1958.
    Indiana Refrigerator Lines, Inc. v. Wisconsin Packing Co., Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1960.
    Powers v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1961.
    Bearce, Administrator, et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1962.
    Murray v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1963.
    Presidio Bridge Co. v. Muskie, Secretary of State, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1965.
    No. 80-72.
    County of Los Angeles et al. v. Marshall, Secretary of Labor, et al; and Marshall, Secretary of Labor, et al. v. County of Los Angeles et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 U. S. App. D. C. 185, 631 F. 2d 767.


text:
    No. 79-1966.
    Colonial Penn Insurance Co. v. Shockley.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1968.
    Gordon v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1971.
    Jacobsen v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1973.
    Molly Murphy’s, Inc., et al. v. Masters.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1974.
    Letts Industries, Inc. v. Wiersema.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1975.
    No. 79-2001.
    No. 79-2067.
    No 80-99.
    No. 80-115.
    No. 80-129.
    Metropolitan School District of Perry Township, Marion County, Indiana v. Buckley et al.; Bowen, Governor of Indiana, et al. v. Buckley et al.; Metropolitan School District of Lawrence, Warren and Wayne Townships, Marion County, Indiana, et al. v. Buckley et al.; School Town of Speedway, Indiana, et al. v. Buckley et al.; Housing Authority of the City of Indianapolis, Indiana v. Board of School Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis, Indiana, et al.; and Board of School Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis, Indiana, et al. v. Metropolitan School District of Perry Township, Indiana, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 637 F. 2d 1101.


text:
    No. 79-1976.
    Raymer v. Doubleday & Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1978.
    Weeren et al. v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1979.
    Garrahy, Governor of Rhode Island, et al. v. Palmigiano et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1980.
    Thomas, dba J & J Exxon, et al. v. City of Marietta, Georgia, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1981.
    Arrigale et ux. v. International Fidelity Insurance Co.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1982.
    Fulcher v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1983.
    Local 13889, United Steelworkers of America v. Smith et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1985.
    Jourdain et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1986.
    Appleman et al. v. Beach, Assessor of Bernalillo County, et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1987.
    Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1990.
    Archer v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1991.
    Lowenschuss v. Bluhdorn et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.