text:
    April 4, 1983
    No. 82-927.
    No. 82-936.
    Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts v. Connolly, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, et al.; and Langone et al. v. Connolly, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, et al.
   Appeals from Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeals were taken as petitions for writs of certiorari, certiorari denied. Reported below: 388 Mass. 185, 446 N. E. 2d 43.

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor join, dissenting.

These appeals present substantial, unresolved questions regarding the accommodation of competing First Amendment values: the interests of would-be candidates and voters in eligibility for the ballot, and the interests of party members in political association without undue governmental intrusion. Massachusetts law requires that a person seeking to be placed on the party primary ballot for a statewide office must be an enrolled member of that party and must file certain documents, including nominating papers signed by a specified number of voters. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 53, §§ 9, 44, 45, and 48 (West Supp. 1982-1983). The statute itself contains no other express requirements for access to the ballot, but the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that these rules are “supplemented by” a rule — the “15% rule” — adopted by the Massachusetts Democratic Party. This rule permits an individual to run in the party primary only if he or she has received 15% of the votes on any ballot at the state party’s convention to endorse candidates, which is held before the primary. According to the Massachusetts court, the 15% rule is designed to assure that primary candidates have a “modicum of support from members with substantial affiliation with the party.” Langone v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 388 Mass. 185, 194, 446 N. E. 2d 43, 47 (1983).

Frederick C. Langone, who wished to be a candidate in the Democratic primary for Lieutenant Governor in 1982, satisfied all of the requirements for ballot eligibility that were expressly set forth in the statute, including the submission of 10,000 certified signatures. Nevertheless, the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts excluded him from the primary ballot because he had not obtained at least 15% of the votes cast at the party convention, as the 15% rule required. He filed suit in state court seeking an injunction requiring the Secretary to place his name on the primary ballot. The Attorney General of Massachusetts intervened as a plaintiff and filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunc-tive relief. Two questions of law were reserved and reported to the full Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which rendered its decision in favor of the Secretary’s implementation of the statute.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court construed Chapter 53 to recognize the Democratic Party’s 15% rule because it believed that such a construction was required by the United States Constitution in order to avoid an impermissible infringement of the associational rights of party members. It noted that nomination papers may be signed by voters who are not members of the party, and that persons may vote in a party primary even if they have not enrolled in the party until immediately before they vote. Therefore, the court reasoned, additional restrictions serve the political party’s “legitimate — indeed, compelling — interest in ensuring that its selection process accurately reflects the collective voice of those who, in some meaningful sense, are affiliated with it.” Id., at 193, 446 N. E. 2d, at 47. If Chapter 53 were construed to nullify the 15% rule, the Massachusetts court believed that it would “as effectively eliminat[e] that party’s control of who its candidates in general elections will be as did the Wisconsin statute held unconstitutional in Democratic Party of U. S. v. Wisconsin [450 U. S. 107 (1981)].” Id., at 194, 446 N. E. 2d, at 47. That burden would necessitate “strict scrutiny, which it does not survive.” Id., at 191, 446 N. E. 2d, at 46. In essence, the Massachusetts court held that the United States Constitution prevents a State from enforcing a statute that gives a place on the primary ballot to any party member who satisfies the State’s own eligibility requirements.

The Massachusetts court rejected appellants’ contentions that the statute, as construed to recognize the 15% rule, would defeat the legislative purpose in providing for primary elections and would violate the constitutional rights of candidates and voters. It recognized that the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution guarantee the rights of free speech and association of candidates and voters. It further acknowledged that, because the 15% rule was enforced through the State’s supervision of the primary election process, the 15% rule should be treated “as though it were expressly contained in G. L. c. 53.” Id., at 195, 446 N. E. 2d, at 48. But it concluded that the burden on candidacy and voting rights imposed by enforcement of the 15% rule was insufficient to warrant strict scrutiny. Although the rule restricts access to the primary ballot, it allows each person the same opportunity to gather the necessary signatures and convention support. In addition, a candidate for statewide office may appear on the general election ballot as an independent. To the extent that voters wish to associate and express their ideas as Democrats, the Massachusetts court reasoned, they could be represented by the several candidates who obtained the requisite convention support. Further, the state court found that the rule was rationally related to the furtherance of legitimate state interests — maintaining the integrity and stability of existing political parties, and assuring that party nominees are “truly representative of the party.” Id., at 198, 446 N. E. 2d, at 50.

The appeal in No. 82-927 has been filed by the Attorney General of Massachusetts, seeking to vindicate the State’s interest in regulating the primary election ballot; his jurisdictional statement also asserts that the decision below improperly elevates the associational rights of party regulars over those of other party members. The appeal in No. 82-936 has been filed by would-be candidate Langone and several of his supporters, contending, inter alia, that enforcement of the 15% rule infringed their fundamental constitutional rights.

The case is properly before this Court on appeal. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the highest court in the Commonwealth, expressly construed Chapter 53 “not to exclude, but rather, to accommodate the 15% rule.” Id., at 200, 446 N. E. 2d, at 51. It explained that the statute was to be “augmented” or “supplemented” by the 15% rule and acknowledged that the enforcement of the rule is “State action.” “For the purpose of evaluating the plaintiffs’ claims that the 15% rule violates rights guaranteed to them by the Federal and State Constitutions,” the court wrote, “we treat the rule as though it were expressly contained in G. L. c. 53.” Id., at 195, 446 N. E. 2d, at 48. Its opinion then rejected appellants’ constitutional challenges to the statute so construed. We therefore have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2). See Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., ante, at 43, n. 5; Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U. S. 209, 214-215, and n. 7 (1977) (appellate review of a state-court decision upholding the validity of a state statute authorizing the negotiation of agency shop agreements).

Unquestionably the issues presented by these appeals are substantial. Appellant Bellotti, the Attorney General, asserts the interests of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in regulating the primary election process. As his jurisdictional statement contends:

“This case deserves plenary consideration because this issue is of substantial importance to every state which has adopted the primary system as the means by which political parties choose their nominees. The challenged decision can permit the virtual nullification of the primary process; if the parties have the absolute right to set minimum ballot access qualifications, then a state may not be able to retain control of the political process to ensure an open and fair selection of primary candidates.” Juris. Statement in No. 82-927, pp. 14 — 15 (footnote omitted).

In addition, appellant Langone and his supporters seek to vindicate their First Amendment associational and voting rights. We have recognized that these rights extend to candidates and voters in primary elections as well as general elections. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51 (1973). In this case, Langone satisfied the Commonwealth’s express statutory requirements for the primary election ballot. Yet he was excluded by the application of an additional prerequisite imposed by the Democratic Party; his supporters were thereby prevented from associating in support of his candidacy and his ideas in the primary campaign. Of course, our cases also establish that the interests of a would-be candidate and his supporters in ballot access are limited by legitimate state interests. But none of our previous cases has decided whether the interests recognized by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in this case are sufficient to justify enforcement of the 15% rule to exclude candidates from the ballot.

Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U. S. 107 (1981), does not control this case. There this Court rejected Wisconsin’s requirement that delegates to the party’s Presidential nominating convention, selected in a primary open to nonparty voters, must cast their convention votes in accordance with the primary election results. In our view, the interests advanced by the State— preserving the overall integrity of the electoral process, providing secrecy of the ballot, increasing voter participation in primaries, and preventing harassment of voters — did not justify its substantial intrusion into the associational freedom of members of the National Party. But Wisconsin’s requirement constituted a more significant intrusion on the associational rights of party members than the interpretation of the Massachusetts statute rejected by the Supreme Judicial Court under the perceived compulsion of our Democratic Party decision. Wisconsin required convention delegates to cast their votes for candidates who might have drawn their support from nonparty members. The results of the party’s decisionmaking process might thereby have been distorted. Here, if Chapter 53 nullified the 15% rule, Massachusetts would require only that enrolled party members be given a chance to vote for candidates whose nominating papers were signed by some nonparty members and who have drawn less than 15% of the votes at the party convention. If these candidates have only minimal support from the enrolled party members who vote in the primary, they will simply be ignored. Further, Wisconsin’s asserted interests were less weighty than those set forth by the Massachusetts Attorney General. Surely the Commonwealth has a significant interest in protecting the First Amendment associational and voting rights of its citizens. Finally, unlike Wisconsin’s attempt to control delegates in a nationwide party contest, the Massachusetts rule applies to campaigns for statewide office.

I would note probable jurisdiction in No. 82-936, the appeal by candidate Langone and his supporters, and would hold the appeal in No. 82-927 for resolution in light of our disposition of No. 82-936. After plenary consideration we might decide that the Commonwealth may constitutionally enforce the 15% rule, or we might not; but plainly we should not dismiss these appeals for want of a substantial federal question.

       The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court made this position explicit in a recent advisory opinion to the Governor. A bill pending before the Governor would have provided: “Notwithstanding the charter, rule or by-law of a political party, any candidate, who is enrolled in such political party, submitting nomination papers subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be a candidate for nomination at the state primary.” The proposed language would have nullified the 15% rule. According to the court’s opinion, the proviso would violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution because it would “abridge the constitutional rights of the Democratic party and its members to associate by allowing candidates to be placed on the Democratic State primary ballot in contravention of the party’s charter.” Opinion of the Justices, 385 Mass. 1201, 1207-1208, 434 N. E. 2d 960, 964 (1982).

       The second question reported by the single Justice to the Supreme Judicial Court asked:
      “Whether the decision by the Secretary of the Commonwealth that he will not place upon the Democratic state primary ballots those candidates who failed to obtain at least fifteen percent of the vote on any ballot of the Democratic Convention pursuant to Article Six, Section III of the ‘Charter of the Democratic Party of the Commonwealth’, but otherwise complied with the statutory requirements to have their names placed upon the ballots violated the constitutional or statutory rights of the voters, the candidate, or their supporters?”
      On July 6, 1982, the court issued an order answering this question in the negative. It stated: “Upon consideration of the argument and briefs of the parties, we interpret the State statutes in light of the State and Federal constitutions and rule that the Secretary must give effect to the relevant charter provision.”

       Similarly, our decision in Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U. S. 477 (1975), invalidated a state court’s determination that, despite a contrary determination by the Credentials Committee, a certain slate of delegates should be seated at the Democratic National Convention in 1972.

       Appellants in No. 82-936 assert their own constitutional rights as a candidate and voters. If appellant in No. 82-927, the Attorney General of Massachusetts, is in fact challenging the constitutionality of the statute as construed, he appears to be championing the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of third parties — candidates and voters — who are capable of presenting their own claims in litigation. His jurisdictional statement may also be read, however, as asserting that the Supreme Judicial Court incorrectly interpreted the constitutional right of freedom of association and as a result unnecessarily required the Commonwealth to enforce the 15% rule. It is not clear that this claim, standing by itself, would be within this Court’s appellate jurisdiction, although I believe that it would be sufficiently important to warrant review on certiorari.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 82-1093.
    Able, dba Criminal Defense Clinic et al. v. Texas et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Tex., 1st Sup. Jud. Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6238.
    Jones et al. v. Mitchell et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 5th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6239.
    Jones et al. v. Jefferson Parish School Board.
   Appeal from C. A. 5th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1153.
    Motor Club of America Insurance Co. v. New Jersey et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. J. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-1281.
    Shelly & Sands, Inc., et al. v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Pa. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-6203.
    Wakeman et al. v. South Dakota.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. S. D. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 81-1278.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Florida v. Royer, ante, p. 491.


text:
    No. 82-397.
    State Bar of Texas v. Howell.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, ante, p. 462.


text:
    No. 82-1360.
    Cross et al. v. Baxter et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973, as amended in 1982.


text:
    No.-.
    Bouma et ux. v. Larry C. Iverson, Inc.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file the petition for writ of certiorari granted.


text:
    No. A-725.
    Cavanaugh v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice O’Connor and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-758 (82-540).
    Mississippi v. Smith, Attorney General.
   D. C. D. C.

Application for stay of proceedings, addressed to Justice Rehnquist and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-311.
    In re Disbarment of Mason.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 459 U. S. 1141.]


text:
    No. D-312.
    In re Disbarment of Ergazos.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 459 U. S. 1141.]


text:
    No. D-331.
    In re Disbarment of Bishop.
   It is ordered that Brian Alan Bishop, of Nevada City, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 80-1158.
    Florida v. Rodriquez,
   451 U. S. 1022. Respondent is requested to file a response to the petition for rehearing within 30 days.


text:
    No. 81-1889.
    No. 81-1958.
    No. 81-2042.
    No. 82-19.
    Public Service Commission of the State of New York v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. et al.; Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. et al.; Michigan v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. et al.; and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 820.] Motion of Public Service Commission of New York for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 81-2110.
    United Building & Construction Trades Council of Camden County and Vicinity v. Mayor and Council of the City of Camden et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 1021.] Motion of appellant to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 81-2147.
    No. 81-2188.
    Arizona et al. v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona et al.; Arizona et al. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians et al.; and Montana et al. v. Northern Cheyenne Tribe of the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 821.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted. Motion of petitioners in No. 81-2147 for leave to file a response to the supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 82-486.
    United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 610, AFL-CIO, et al. v. Scott et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 1034.] Motion of American Civil Liberties Union for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-647.
    Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. Tex., 11th Sup. Jud. Dist. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 1145.] Motion of Texas for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 82-1066.
    United States v. Ptasynski et al.
   D. C. Wyo. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 459 U. S. 1199.] Motion of Texas for divided argument and for additional time for oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 82-1325.
    I.A.M. National Pension Fund v. Elser et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 82-6080 (A-773).
    Barefoot v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 1169.] Motion of petitioner for divided argument to permit NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., to present oral argument as amicus curiae granted. Application of counsel for petitioner to stay further proceedings in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, case No. 82-1680, pending the sending down of the judgment of this Court, presented to JUSTICE White, and by him referred to the Court, granted. Request for stay of further proceedings in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied.


text:
    No. 82-6208.
    Green v. White, Superintendent, Missouri Training Center for Men.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until April 25, 1983, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 82-6342.
    No. 82-6353.
    In re Maxwell; and In re Gray.
   Petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 82-6264.
    In re Prewitt.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 82-1313.
    In re Doan.
   Petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 82-1273.
    Maine v. Thornton.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Case is consolidated with No. 82-15, Oliver v. United States [certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 1168], and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument.


text:
    No. 81-1595.
    Connecticut et al. v. Cuisinarts, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2239.
    Black v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5181.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6746.
    Medina-Pena v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-587.
    Moore v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-882.
    Falco v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-972.
    No. 82-984.
    Gibson et al. v. Federal Trade Commission; and Gibson et ux. v. Federal Trade Commission.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 682 F. 2d 554.


text:
    No. 82-1052.
    Old Ben Coal Co. v. Blaize et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1076.
    Louisiana et al. v. Department of Energy et al.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1079.
    Dickinson v. Securities and Exchange Commission et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1155.
    Otasco, Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1172.
    No. 82-1225.
    Bratton v. United States; and Greenleaf v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 692 F. 2d 182.


text:
    No. 82-1173.
    No. 82-1356.
    Underwriters at Lloyds v. Ope Shipping, Ltd., et al.; and Ope Shipping, Ltd., et al. v. Allstate Insurance Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 687 F. 2d 639.


text:
    No. 82-1209.
    Brewton Fashions, Inc., a Division of Judy Bond v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1339.
    Town of Huntington, New York, et al. v. Huntington Branch, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1341.
    Diamond M Drilling Co. et al. v. Wood.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1342.
    Williams et al. v. Milonas et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1344.
    Cele v. Kinney et al.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1348.
    Stovall v. Continental Federal Savings & Loan Assn.
   Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1353.
    White et al. v. Houghton et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1361.
    Maier v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1363.
    Silver, dba Allied Bond & Collection Agency v. Woolf, Acting Banking Commissioner of Connecticut.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1364.
    Aquatic Technical Services, Inc. v. County of Nassau et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1372.
    Cullen v. BMW of North America, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1374.
    Rivinius et al. v. North Dakota.
   Sup. Ct. N. D. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1416.
    Tassone v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1452.
    Errante v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1454.
    Coward et al. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1463.
    Huckaby v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1467.
    Frost v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1476.
    Innella v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1485.
    Reed v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5944.
    Bishop v. Stephenson, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5965.
    Malloy v. Purvis, Sheriff, Mobile County, Alabama, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6011.
    Laird v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6031.
    Gedraitis et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6160.
    Brekke v. Powell.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6176.
    Williams v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6191.
    Stastny v. Board of Trustees of Central Washington University.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6200.
    Maras v. Ammerman.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6201.
    Mott v. John Deere Dubuque Works of Deere & Co.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6202.
    Mintz v. Director, Department of Motor Vehicles of California, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6209.
    Jones v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6211.
    United States ex rel. Blackwell v. Franzen, Director, Illinois Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6213.
    Ash v. Cvetkov et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6217.
    Ashley v. Garrison et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6218.
    Cummings v. United States et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6222.
    Harvey v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6225.
    Holsey v. Baylor et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6228.
    Brim, aka Mertz v. Solem, Warden, South Dakota State Penitentiary, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6233.
    Grief v. Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6237.
    Miller v. Atlanta Board of Education.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6253.
    Broadway v. Bogan.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6275.
    Evans v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6279.
    McDonald v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6302.
    Dancy v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6303.
    Brooks v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6311.
    Llorens v. Merit Systems Protection Board.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6315.
    Mullins v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6316.
    Wilson et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6317.
    Yates v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6320.
    Martin v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6326.
    Meagher v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6340.
    Tavolino v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6341.
    Riola v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6349.
    Calabrese v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6356.
    Nicks v. Hazlett et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6357.
    McCord v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6198.
    Duvallon v. Florida.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of the petition for certiorari denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5719.
    No. 82-6028.
    Clarkson v. United States, Greisinger v. Davis, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
   ante, p. 1013; and 459 U. S. 1221. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    April 6, 1983
    No. 82-1228.
    Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    April 8, 1983
    No. 82-1388.
    Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Gerdom et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    April 9, 1983
    No. 82-1457.
    Parliament Insurance Co. v. Lefcoe.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    April 12, 1983
    No. 82-647.
    Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. Tex., 11th Sup. Jud. Dist. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 1145.] The Court has considered the memorandum filed by petitioner in response to the representations of the State of Texas in its brief before this Court which bring to light a question of state law not passed upon or relied upon below. The resolution of this question may establish that petitioner is entitled to the relief he seeks as a matter of Texas statutory law. If this is so, a decision of the constitutional question on which we granted certiorari would be unnecessary. See Paschall v. Christie-Stewart, Inc., 414 U. S. 100 (1973); Musser v. Utah, 333 U. S. 95 (1948). Accordingly, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings to determine whether, under Texas law, petitioner could have obtained and may still obtain a decree designating him as the father of his child pursuant to the provisions of Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 13.01-13.09 (Supp. 1982-1983). The Clerk is directed to issue the mandate forthwith.


text:
    No. 82-486.
    United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 610, AFL-CIO, et al. v. Scott et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 1034.] This case is hereby scheduled for argument on April 26, 1983, in place of No. 82-647, Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., et al.


text:
    April 18, 1983
    No. 82-6257.
    Fulk et al. v. Moritz et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ohio. Motion of appellant for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Judgment affirmed.

Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor would dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, treat the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, and deny certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-905.
    Sooner Federal Savings & Loan Assn. et al. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Okla. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-1382.
    Tolub et al. v. Evans, as Chief Administrative Judge of the State of New York, et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-1420.
    Sanford et al. v. Dumas.
   Appeal from Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-983.
    Duncan v. Peck.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1237.
    Stella v. Mercy Hospital et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 6th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6249.
    Velilla v. UTC/Hamilton Standard Division et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Conn, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1243.
    Bunker v. National Gypsum Co.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ind. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 82-1293.
    Temple et al. v. Alabama Public Service Commission et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ala. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 82-1386.
    Fields v. Summit Engineering.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Mont, dismissed for want of properly presented federal question.


text:
    No. 82-1445.
    The Don’t Bankrupt Washington Committee v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Company of Chicago et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction it appearing appellant lacks standing to bring this appeal.

696 F. 2d 692.


text:
    No. 82-1477.
    Pacific Standard Life Insurance Co. et al. v. Committee to Save Nukolii et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Haw. Motions of National Association of Home Builders et al. and National Association of Realtors for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-1399.
    Alessi et al. v. Committee on Professional Standards, Third Judicial Department.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of In re R. M. J., 455 U. S. 191 (1982).


text:
    No. 82-25.
    Jones, a Minor Child, by his Mother and Next Friend, Jones, et al. v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certio-rari granted, 459 U. S. 965.] Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Miss. Code Ann. §91-1-15 (Supp. 1982), as to the Jones petitioners, and in light of Adkins v. McEldowney,-W. Va.-, 280 S. E. 2d 231 (1981), as to the Simms petitioners.


text:
    No. D-319.
    In re Disbarment of Feder.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1009.]


text:
    No. D-327.
    In re Disbarment of Stevens.
   Harry J. Stevens, Jr., of Short Hills, N. J., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on March 7, 1983 [ante, p. 1019], is hereby discharged. \


text:
    No. D-332.
    In re Disbarment of Parsons.
   It is ordered that Edward Parsons, of Chicago, Ill., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 81-2332.
    Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 1145.] Motions of National Institute of Municipal Law Officers and United States Conference of Mayors et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.

Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions.


text:
    No. 82-91.
    Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Phinpathya.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 965.] Motion of respondent to enlarge record, suggestion of mootness, and motion to stay further proceedings pending administrative action denied.


text:
    No. 82-585.
    No. 82-586.
    Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation of Hawaii; and Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation of Hawaii.
   Sup. Ct. Haw. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 459 U. S. 1101.] Motion of appellee for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 82-862.
    Consolidated Rail Corporation v. LeStrange.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 1199.] Motion to substitute Lee Ann LeStrange Darrone, as Administratrix of Estate of Thomas LeStrange, in place of respondent Thomas LeStrange, deceased, granted.


text:
    No. 82-6080.
    Barefoot v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certio-rari granted, 459 U. S. 1169.] Motion of Washington Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion of Florida for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for additional time for argument denied.


text:
    No. 82-6204.
    Tolbert v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-6472.
    In re Lipscomb.
   Petition for writ of ha-beas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 82-6288.
    In re Tyler.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 82-1378.
    No. 82-1385.
    In re Comeaux; and In re International Harvester Co. et al.
   Petitions for writs of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 82-1248.
    No. 82-1278.
    Schall, Commissioner of New York City Department of Juvenile Justice v. Martin et al.; and Abrams, Attorney General of New York v. Martin et al.
   Appeals from C. A. 2d Cir. Probable jurisdiction noted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 689 F. 2d 365.


text:
    No. 82-1295.
    Escambia County, Florida, et al. v. McMillan et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of State Association of County Commissioners of Florida et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 82-1401.
    Calder et al. v. Jones et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits.


text:
    No. 82-1256.
    Lynch, Mayor of Pawtucket, et al. v. Donnelly et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-1448.
    United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-1150.
    Ellis et al. v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station Employes, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of William L. Dickinson for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 81-1438.
    Hammermill Paper Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2162.
    Pioneer Finishing Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2202.
    Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tribble.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-809.
    Tabeling v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-929.
    Burks v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-964.
    Dunne et al. v. Hansen et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-978.
    Tonubbee v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-990.
    Marvin v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1016.
    South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1024.
    Boeing Co. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1033.
    Ohio v. Wilmoth.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1070.
    Benedetto v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1088.
    Gumm, dba Desert-Aire Mobile Home Styling & Sales, Inc. et al. v. Turner et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1090.
    Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Oil Products Corp.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1092.
    Continental Manors, Inc. v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1103.
    Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1121.
    Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1148.
    Queen et al. v. Tennessee Valley Authority et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1162.
    George Banta Co., Inc., Banta Division v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1169.
    No. 82-1347.
    CPC International Inc. v. Dimmitt Agri Industries, Inc.; and Dimmitt Agri Industries, Inc. v. CPC International, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 679 F. 2d 516.


text:
    No. 82-1184.
    Cicale v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1191.
    No. 82-1207.
    No. 82-1208.
    Stephens v. United States; Vadino v. United States; and Natale v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 680 F. 2d 1329.


text:
    No. 82-1198.
    Plant et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1203.
    Scales, as Next Friend of Scales v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1216.
    Worldwide Church of God v. Superior Court of California, Orange County (Gipe, Real Party in Interest).
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1220.
    Union National Bank of Little Rock v. Paxton et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1222.
    Illinois et al. v. Interstate Commerce Commission et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1230.
    Moore v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1261.
    Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Carpet Yarn Division, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1267.
    Rock v. Coombe, Superintendent, Eastern New York Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1270.
    Lomas Santa Fe, Inc., et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1287.
    Randolph Associates v. Wakefern Food Corp. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1290.
    Roth’s IGA Foodliner, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1354.
    Newman et al. v. Alabama et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1362.
    Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Ebanks et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1376.
    Freeman v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1379.
    Jones v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1380.
    Rooney v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1387.
    Zack v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1394.
    Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1396.
    Michigan v. Jones.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1397.
    Lanigan v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1398.
    M/V POLLUX et al. v. Goodpasture, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1402.
    Local Division 1028, Amalgamated Transit Union v. City of Aurora.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1405.
    Carrione v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1406.
    Lukovsky et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1407.
    Niggle et ux. v. Old Kent Bank & Trust Co.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1411.
    Kondrat v. Martinet.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Lake County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1412.
    Moench Investment Co., Ltd., et al. v. Union Pacific Land Resources Corp. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1415.
    Edmundson Investment Co. et al. v. Florida Treco, Inc.
   Ct. App. Tex., 14th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1418.
    Chapman Industries Corp. v. N.A. Sales Co., Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1419.
    Hayes v. Supreme Court Justices of Nevada.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1422.
    Adams et al. v. Gould, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1425.
    Braquet et al. v. Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund.
   Ct. App. La., 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1429.
    Trout v. Lehman, Secretary of the Navy, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1430.
    Zoslaw et ux., dba Marin Music Centre v. MCA Distributing Corp. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1435.
    Contra Costa Theatre, Inc. v. City of Concord et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1440.
    Tilley v. Anderson, Regional Administrator of State Prison of Southern Michigan.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1441.
    Kinney et ux. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1459.
    Buckley et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1468.
    Reminga, Executrix of the Estate of Reminga, et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1475.
    Wyllie et al. v. Dunn.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1494.
    Surgent v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1503.
    Evans v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1505.
    Grindrod v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1520.
    Landsberger v. Commissioner of Revenue of Minnesota.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1535.
    Garling v. Secretary of Department of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1550.
    Mason et al. v. Panama Canal Co. et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1552.
    Grigsby v. Department of Energy et al.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1553.
    Lanzieri v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1567.
    Swiatek v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5649.
    No. 82-5769.
    Paul v. Maggio, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary; and Barkley v. Maggio, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5864.
    Acker v. Administrator, General Services Administration, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5881.
    Walker v. Morris, Superintendent, Mecklenburg Correctional Center.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5915.
    Jennings v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5926.
    Farrell v. Oregon ex rel. Juvenile Department of Multnomah County.
   Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5929.
    Warren v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5936.
    Holmes v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5948.
    Morgan v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5961.
    Rhodes v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5968.
    Craft v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5971.
    Howard v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6003.
    McCree v. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6005.
    Gayle, aka Waiters v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6023.
    Burton v. Michigan.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6034.
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6103.
    Gresham v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6116.
    Faltico v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6146.
    Rivers, by his Mother and Natural Guardian, Rivers, et al. v. Blum, Commissioner, New York State Department of Social Services, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6156.
    Stamps v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6184.
    Moore v. United States (four cases).
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6189.
    Smart v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6199.
    Wise v. Engle et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6216.
    Tietbohl v. Woods et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6226.
    Harvey v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6227.
    Garrett v. Oklahoma et al.
   Ct. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6229.
    Harris v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6232.
    Hereford v. Brittain.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6236.
    White v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6240.
    Coleman v. Lloyds Bank of California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6242.
    Sprogis-Mastins v. New York.
   App. Term, Sup. Ct. N. Y., 9th and 10th Jud. Dists. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6244.
    Gray v. Jago et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6246.
    Dinkens v. Wainwright et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6247.
    Murphy v. Stephenson et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6248.
    Young v. County of Sauk, Wisconsin.
   Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6258.
    Dabon v. Maggio, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6260.
    Harrison v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6265.
    Simmons v. Rouse, Superintendent, Lake Correctional Institution.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6266.
    Clark v. Solem, Warden, South Dakota State Penitentiary, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6268.
    Jackson v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6269.
    Barnes v. Henry.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6270.
    Brungs v. Public Library of Columbus et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6272.
    Covington v. Osborne et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6273.
    Becker v. Arcadian Gardens.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6277.
    Subilosky v. Callahan, Superintendent, MCI-Norfolk, Massachusetts.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6280.
    Swanson v. Davis, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6281.
    Zarrilli v. Randall et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6282.
    Schuman v. Duckworth, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6283.
    Thaper v. New Jersey Department of Education et al.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6285.
    Perron v. Perron.
   Sup. Ct. P. R. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6289.
    Real v. Clarke et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6292.
    Walker v. Solem, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6295.
    Tanner v. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6298.
    Johnson v. Griffin, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6307.
    Green v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6309.
    Hurns v. Cleveland Police Department et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6310.
    Hamm v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6312.
    Lyons v. Walters, Administrator, Veterans Administration, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6319.
    Sartore v. Adams et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6322.
    Bastanipour v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6325.
    Hazra v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6329.
    Burton v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6339.
    Levy v. Fairfax County Government.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6346.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6355.
    Alfaro-Gonzalez v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6364.
    Underwood-Nunez v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6369.
    PUCHALA ET AL. V. COINTELPRO ET AL.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6374.
    No. 82-6376.
    Conerly et al. v. United States; and Dickens et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6385.
    Kimberlin v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6392.
    Parker v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6393.
    Capo v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6395.
    Cowhig v. Marsh, Secretary of the Army.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6397.
    Marquardt v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6403.
    Cotner v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6404.
    Lewis v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6416.
    Bethea v. Leeke et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6418.
    Phillips v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6420.
    Morris v. United States Department of Justice et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6421.
    Boyd v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6422.
    Callahan v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6427.
    Bedoya v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6430.
    Johnson v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6431.
    Wham v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-665.
    Spalding et al. v. Aiken.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun would grant certio-rari.

Statement of Chief Justice Burger concerning the denial of certiorari.

The time has come to consider limitations on the availability of the writ of habeas corpus in federal courts, especially for prisoners pressing stale claims that were fully ventilated in state courts. Others have expressed frustration in coping with stale cases, see, e. g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337, 351, 357 (1970) (Douglas, J., concurring); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 773 (1970), and this petition underscores the views of those who have expressed concern as to the misuse and abuse of the writ. Relief on claims presented many years after conviction should be limited to cases in which the petitioner can demonstrate a miscarriage of justice or a colorable claim of innocence. The astonishing facts underlying this petition are illustrative and instructive.

On October 14, 1965, a jury in King County, Wash., found Arthur Aiken and his codefendant guilty of murder in the first degree for the robbery and slayings of three gas station attendants in separate incidents within one month. Each victim was shot several times. The jury imposed the death penalty. On direct appeal, Aiken advanced numerous challenges to his conviction. Following a remand to the trial court, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the sentence, State v. Aiken, 72 Wash. 2d 306, 434 P. 2d 10 (1967). On petition for certiorari to this Court, the conviction was vacated and the case remanded for reconsideration in light of Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968). 392 U. S. 652 (1968). After a second petition for certiorari, the conviction was again vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U. S. 262 (1970), Boulden v. Holman, 394 U. S. 478 (1969), and Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (1968). 403 U. S. 946 (1971). The state trial court then resentenced Aiken to three consecutive life prison terms.

On July 26, 1979, fourteen years after his original conviction and eight years after his resentencing, Aiken filed this petition in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington under 28 U. S. C. § 2254. He raised claims concerning pretrial publicity, the voluntariness of his confession, and the trial court’s failure to grant severance— all claims that had been raised and decided a decade earlier in his first appeal to the Washington Supreme Court. All but the pretrial publicity issue had been presented in his original petition for review here.

On February 22, 1980, the District Court denied the ha-beas petition because Aiken had prejudiced the State by waiting more than five years before filing his petition, see Habeas Corpus Rule 9(a). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that prejudice may not be presumed. On remand, the State presented evidence that it could locate only 30 of the 87 witnesses who testified at trial and that 136 of the State’s 138 exhibits were lost or destroyed. Finding that the evidence demonstrated that it would be difficult to retry Aikens should his petition for relief be granted, the District Court again dismissed the petition, concluding that prejudice as to retrial was also a ground for dismissal under Rule 9(a). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit again reversed, reasoning that Rule 9(a) allows consideration only of the State’s difficulty in “respond [ing] to the [habeas] petition,” and not consideration of the difficulty in retrying the petitioner. 684 F. 2d 632, 634 (1982). The District Court was ordered to entertain further proceedings pursuant to § 2254(d).

The privileges of the writ of habeas corpus are not unlimited. Rather the doctrine of laches should apply to habeas actions as it applies to other actions for relief. Alternatively, Rule 9(a) should be changed to bar relief when delay has prejudiced the state’s ability to retry the petitioner.

The scope of habeas corpus as an avenue for repeated collateral attacks on criminal convictions has expanded enormously through decisions of this Court in the last three decades, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 474-482 (1976). As the ability to attack criminal convictions collaterally has expanded, so too has the range of costs to the judicial system grown. As we noted last Term, collateral review undermines the interest in repose that underlies the principle of res judicata, degrades the importance of the trial, frustrates penological goals and drains the resources of the judicial system, Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 124-129 (1982). See also Stone v. Powell, supra, at 491, n. 31; Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 532-548 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 259-266 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). See Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 146-148 (1970).

Claims presented by way of habeas corpus petitions many years after conviction impose especially heavy burdens on the prison system, on society, and on the administration of justice. Our willingness to entertain these late claims tells prisoners that they need never reconcile themselves to what has happened: they need never “make peace” with society, learn a new way of life, or attempt to build a realistic future. Our society’s constant willingness to reopen cases long closed tells the public that we have no confidence that the laws are administered justly. Because reprosecution becomes increasingly difficult, and sometimes impossible, as time from the original conviction elapses, such relief on the basis of stale claims often results in the permanent release of dangerous individuals without supervision of any sort.

Inmates exploit society’s misplaced sentiment. When reexamination of the circumstances surrounding the detention comes late in the day, there is always a danger that process will be abused. A prisoner has an incentive to “store up” technical challenges to his conviction and then press his claims seriatim when reconsideration of his allegations is difficult and when reprosecution is impossible because key witnesses and exhibits have disappeared. Cf. Del Vecchio v. United States, 556 F. 2d 106, 109, and n. 6 (CA2 1977).

“One form of abuse said to exist is that of a prisoner, knowing he or she has a valid claim for relief, intentionally forgoing presenting that claim until evidence of guilt has dissipated so that reconviction would be impossible.” ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, commentary following Standard 22-2.4 (2d ed. 1980).

I would allow summary dismissal of habeas petitions when the state can prove that the lapse of time has made re-prosecution impossible. Exceptions should be limited to cases where the petitioner can make a colorable claim of innocence, demonstrate that a significant miscarriage of justice has occurred, or show that his claim is based on grounds that, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered earlier.

       That measure provides:
      “A petition may be dismissed if it appears that the state of which the respondent is an officer has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition by delay in its filing unless the petitioner shows that it is based on grounds of which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the state occurred.”
      As originally drafted, Rule 9(a) would have provided that a 5-year delay creates a presumption of prejudice rather than the present standard which requires the state to prove prejudice in every case, see Advisory Committee’s Note to Habeas Corpus Rule 9, 28 U. S. C., p. 272. The 5-year presumption was deleted by Congress, 90 Stat. 1335, see H. R. Rep. No. 94-1471, pp. 4-5 (1976), on the grounds that it was “unsound policy to require the defendant to overcome a presumption of prejudice and that the legislation brings Rule 9(a) into conformity with other provisions of law,” id., at 5 (footnotes omitted), and “into conformity with case law,” id., at 5, n. 9. See also 122 Cong. Rec. 30222-30223 (1976).

       In so holding, the court relied on a comment in the Advisory Committee Note to the identical provision (Rule 9(a)) governing 28 U. S. C. §2255 proceedings. That comment states:
      “Subdivision (a) provides a flexible, equitable time limitation based on laches to prevent movants from withholding their claims so as to prejudice the government both in meeting the allegations of the motion and in any possible retrial.” (Emphasis added.) 28 U. S. C., p. 286.

       See also United States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152 (1982) (19-year delay in asserting claim). In Marshall v. Fowler, No. 82-876, cert. denied, post, p. 1098, a petition presenting a claim of coerced confession was filed eight years after petitioner’s original conviction. In May 1974, an Ohio trial court held a 4-day hearing on this claim, hearing 18 witnesses and generating 600 pages of transcript. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit nevertheless remanded the habeas petition for an eviden-tiary hearing. The petition raises a purely factual contention. I cannot imagine how the evidence that is received now could possibly be more probative than the evidence received eight years ago, when memories were fresh. Thus, the views expressed herein apply equally to Marshall v. Fowler.


text:
    No. 82-666.
    Miller Brewing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 82-876.
    Marshall, Superintendent, Southern Ohio Correctional Facility v. Fowler et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

For The Chief Justice’s views concerning this case, see Spalding v. Aiken, ante, p. 1093.


text:
    No. 82-986.
    Maryland v. Diehl.
   Ct. App. Md. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1409.
    Balkcom, Warden, Georgia State Prison v. Goodwin.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1051.
    Bendetti v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to file supplement to petition for writ of certiorari granted. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    No. 82-1157.
    Meachum et al. v. Longval.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

Justice Rehnquist,

with whom The Chief Justice and Justice O’Connor join, dissenting.

Respondent Norman Longval robbed a drugstore in Swampscott, Mass. Longval, who had a previous record for larcenies and had served time for armed robbery, stole the getaway car and carried a shotgun during the robbery.

One of Longval’s codefendants, Richard Ellard, pleaded guilty. Ellard stated that he was drunk at the time and did not carry the gun. The sentencing judge noted that Ellard had not been in serious trouble before, and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment and three years’ probation with a special term of probation requiring him to obtain treatment for alcoholism.

Longval stood trial for armed robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and unlawfully carrying a sawed-off shotgun, and was convicted. The trial judge sentenced Longval to 40-50 years in prison. The state appellate court later reduced this sentence to 30-40 years.

Longval sought a writ of error from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, claiming that the trial judge had improperly threatened him in an effort to coerce him into pleading guilty. The Supreme Judicial Court appointed a Special Master, who found that during the presentation of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, the trial judge told Longval’s defense attorney, in substance, that The Special Master did not construe this statement as a threat. Rather, he thought the judge made “a statement to a young lawyer of the judge’s then general impression of the evidence as it had developed to that point.”

“the evidence in this case as it is coming in is very serious — robbery of a drug store, taking [i. e. theft of] drugs, use of a shot-gun. I am wondering if you and the Commonwealth have had any discussion regarding a plea [of guilty]. I strongly suggest that you ask your client to consider a plea, because, if the jury returns a verdict of guilty, I might be disposed to impose a substantial prison sentence. You know that I am capable of doing that because you know of the sentences in a previous trial.” 693 F. 2d 236, 237 (CA1 1982).

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Longval’s conviction. Commonwealth v. Longval, 378 Mass. 246, 390 N. E. 2d 1117 (1979). It found that the judge had merely advised Long-val’s attorney of the sentences he had imposed in other cases and of the seriousness of the offense described in the evidence that had been presented, and advised him “not to forgo any advantage that might accrue to [him] by means of plea bargaining.” Id., at 251-252, 390 N. E. 2d, at 1120.

Longval unsuccessfully petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. 651 F. 2d 818 (CA11981). We granted a petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Goodwin, 457 U. S. 368 (1982). 458 U. S. 1102 (1982).

On remand, the Court of Appeals adhered to its original view. 693 F. 2d 236 (1982). It held that the trial judge’s comments led to “a reasonable apprehension of vindictiveness,” id., at 237, that requires resentencing before a different judge. The Court of Appeals thought that a judge may not make “a forceful recommendation to consider pleading [guilty], ending on a note of the judge’s power to impose a substantial sentence if [the recommendation is] not complied with.” Id., at 238. Thus, the Court of Appeals adopted a per se rule that requires resentencing whenever a state trial judge makes any statement that is “susceptible of appearing from the defendant’s perspective to be an attempt to coerce him to plead.” Id., at 237.

The Court of Appeals relied upon North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969), and Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U. S. 21 (1974). The respondents in Pearce had obtained reversal of their criminal convictions on federal constitutional grounds. They were retried, convicted, and then given sentences that were up to two and a half times as long as their original sentences. This Court held that the harsher sentences suggested that the States were punishing criminal defendants for exercising their federal constitutional rights. We stated that the sentencing authority could only impose longer sentences if it explained its reasons on the record. Blackledge extended Pearce to establish a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in cases where prosecutors press more serious charges on defendants who obtain reversals of their convictions.

I think the decision below is quite problematic. First, in this case, unlike Pearce and Blackledge, there is a fully credible alternative explanation for the trial judge’s behavior, one that was credited by the state court. The Supreme Judicial Court construed the judge’s comments simply to inform Longval of the facts of life in his courtroom. This Court has often stressed the importance of providing criminal defendants with full information. For example, in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (1969), we reversed a conviction on a guilty plea because we were not certain that the defendant had “a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.” Id., at 244. Surely defendants should be as well informed of the possible consequences of a not-guilty plea. If this judge routinely handed out long sentences after convictions of serious crimes, it would be in Longval’s interest to know that; certainly the prosecutor with whom Long-val and his counsel had engaged in plea-bargaining negotiations already knew the judge’s sentencing habits. It seems incongruous at best to want defendants to be fully informed and then to adopt a per se rule condemning judges who provide them with information.

Second, in Goodwin, supra, we held that the Pearce-Blackledge presumption does not apply where a prosecutor presses more serious charges in a plea-bargaining situation. The rationale of the decision is that vindictiveness is less likely during pretrial plea bargaining than after a trial and an appeal. The Court of Appeals sought to distinguish Good win on the ground that this case involves a judge rather than a prosecutor, and judges are expected to be impartial. I believe the Goodwin rationale is fully applicable in this case. If anything, the impartial position of the judge suggests that we should be more reluctant to apply a presumption of vindictiveness to judges than to prosecutors.

Guilty pleas result from discussions and negotiations between opposing advocates and require them to predict the probability of conviction and the severity of the sentence that is likely to be imposed. It is at least arguable that this process is made fairer when the accused has complete information concerning the sentence he is likely to receive. Because I doubt whether a per se presumption of judicial vindictiveness is warranted in cases such as this, I would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-1177.
    Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioners to defer consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1426.
    Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


author: Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 82-5950.
    Spencer v. Israel, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall,

with whom Justice Brennan joins, dissenting.

A defendant’s right to due process is violated when the trial judge, in charging the jury on the issue of criminal intent, “require[s] the jury, if satisfied as to [specified] facts ... , to find intent unless the defendant offer[s] evidence to the contrary.” Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510, 515 (1979). Such a presumption is inconsistent with the constitutional requirement that the State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970).

At petitioner’s trial on the charge of first-degree murder, the trial judge twice instructed the jury as follows:

“When there are no circumstances to prevent or rebut the presumption, the law presumes that a reasonable person intends all of the natural, probable and usual consequences of his deliberate acts. If one person assaults another violently with a dangerous weapon likely to kill, and the person thus assaulted dies therefrom, then when there are no circumstances to prevent or rebut the presumption, the legal and natural presumption is that death was intended.”

For reasons fully elaborated by three federal judges who have considered the constitutionality of an identical instruction, the instruction in this case was impermissible because it described a mandatory presumption of intent. See Pigee v. Israel, 670 F. 2d 690, 697-699 (CA7) (Baker, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 846 (1982); Austin v. Israel, 516 F. Supp. 461 (ED Wis. 1981); Harris v. Israel, 515 F. Supp. 568 (ED Wis. 1981). The decision below, which denied petitioner’s request for the issuance of a certificate of probable cause to appeal, therefore cannot be squared with Sand-strom. I would grant certiorari to correct the lower court’s clear departure from this Court’s precedents.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 82-6187.
    No. 82-6194.
    No. 82-6206.
    No. 82-6210.
    No. 82-6262.
    No. 82-6284.
    No. 82-6306.
    Stewart v. Florida. Copeland v. South Carolina. Taylor v. Louisiana. Burden v. Georgia. Wallace v. Zant, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center. Briley v. Mitchell, Superintendent, Virginia State Penitentiary. Raines v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Fla.; Sup. Ct. S. C.; Sup. Ct. La.; Sup. Ct; Ga.; Super. Ct. Ga., Butts County; Sup. Ct. Va.; and Sup. Ct. Ala. Cer-tiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 82-835.
    No. 82-949.
    No. 82-1011.
    No. 82-1075.
    No. 82-1104.
    No. 82-1108.
    No. 82-1296.
    No. 82-5417.
    No. 82-5433.
    No. 82-5867.
    No. 82-5883.
    No. 82-5884.
    No. 82-5897.
    No. 82-5918.
    Thompson et al. v. Peoples Liberty Bank, Fricke v. United States, Fleming v. Virginia, CPG Products Corp. et al. v. Anti-Monopoly, Inc., General Atomic Co. v. United Nuclear Corp., Siegel v. New York et al., Stroom v. Carter, Angle, aka McClure v. Bowen et al., Cavanaugh, dba Tot College v. Colorado Department of Social Services, Piatkowska v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, Feng-ming Tung v. Brewster, Smith v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., Reese v. Sister Suzanne Marie et al., Atherton v. Falcone, Gary & Rosenfeld, Ltd., et al.,
   459 U. S. 1191; ante, p. 1011; 459 U. S. 1206; 459 U. S. 1227; ante, p. 1017; 459 U. S. 1209; ante, p. 1007; 459 U. S. 1210; 459 U. S. 1011; 459 U. S. 1213; 459 U. S. 1214; 459 U. S. 1214; 459 U. S. 1215; and 459 U. S. 1215. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 82-5949.
    No. 82-5955.
    No. 82-5990.
    No. 82-5994.
    No. 82-6015.
    No. 82-6032.
    No. 82-6182.
    Sims v. Maryland, Barker v. Marine Transportation Lines, Inc., et al., Johl v. Johl et al., Morris v. United States, Nurse v. Department of the Air Force, Miller v. California, In re Patterson,
   459 U. S. 1217; 459 U. S. 1217; 459 U. S. 1219; 459 U. S. 1219; 459 U. S. 1220; ante, p. 1015; and ante, p. 1010. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 81-827.
    Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Assn., Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories et al.,
   ante, p. 150. Petition for rehearing denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 82-5148.
    No. 82-5395.
    No. 82-5853.
    Williams v. United States, Langone v. Smith, Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facility, Fitzgerald v. Virginia,
   459 U. S. 916; 459 U. S. 1110; and 459 U. S. 1228. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.