author: Justice Brennan Justice O’Connor,

text:
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. CITY DISPOSAL SYSTEMS, INC.
    No. 82-960.
    Argued November 7, 1983
    Decided March 21, 1984

      Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, post, p. 841.

      Norton J. Come argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Carter G. Phillips, Linda Sher, and Elinor Hadley Stillman.

      Robert P. Ufer argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Thomas G. Kienbaum and Theodore R. Opperwall.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and George Kaufmann; and for Teamsters for a Democratic Union by Paul Alan Levy and Alan B. Morrison.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Edward B. Miller and Stephen A. Bokat; for the Legal Foundation of America by David Crump; and for Roadway Express, Inc., by Michael C. Towers and Mark E. Edwards.

   Justice Brennan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

James Brown, a truckdriver employed by respondent, was discharged when he refused to drive a truck that he honestly and reasonably believed to be unsafe because of faulty brakes. Article XXI of the collective-bargaining agreement between respondent and Local 247 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, which covered Brown, provides:

“The Employer shall not require employees to take out on the streets or highways any vehicle that is not in safe operating condition or equipped with the safety appli-anees prescribed by law. It shall not be a violation of this Agreement where employees refuse to operate such equipment unless such refusal is unjustified.”

The question to be decided is whether Brown’s honest and reasonable assertion of his right to be free of the obligation to drive unsafe trucks constituted “concerted activity]” within the meaning of §7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 157. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) held that Brown’s refusal was concerted activity within § 7, and that his discharge was, therefore, an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(1) of the Act, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 158(a). 256 N. L. R. B. 451 (1981). The Court of Appeals disagreed and declined enforcement. 683 F. 2d 1005 (CA6 1982). At least three other Courts of Appeals, however, have accepted the Board’s interpretation of “concerted activities” as including the assertion by an individual employee of a right grounded in a collective-bargaining agreement. We granted certio-rari to resolve the conflict, 460 U. S. 1050 (1983), and now reverse.

I

The facts are not in dispute in the current posture of this case. Respondent, City Disposal Systems, Inc. (City Disposal), hauls garbage for the city of Detroit. Under the collective-bargaining agreement with Local Union No. 247, respondent’s truckdrivers haul garbage from Detroit to a landfill about 37 miles away. Each driver is assigned to operate a particular truck, which he or she operates each day of work, unless that truck is in disrepair.

James Brown was assigned to truck No. 245. On Saturday, May 12, 1979, Brown observed that a fellow driver had difficulty with the brakes of another truck, truck No. 244. As a result of the brake problem, truck No. 244 nearly collided with Brown’s truck. After unloading their garbage at the landfill, Brown and the driver of truck No. 244 brought No. 244 to respondent’s truck-repair facility, where they were told that the brakes would be repaired either over the weekend or in the morning of Monday, May 14.

Early in the morning of Monday, May 14, while transporting a load of garbage to the landfill, Brown experienced difficulty with one of the wheels of his own truck — No. 245 — and brought that truck in for repair. At the repair facility, Brown was told that, because of a backlog at the facility, No. 245 could not be repaired that day. Brown reported the situation to his supervisor, Otto Jasmund, who ordered Brown to punch out and go home. Before Brown could leave, however, Jasmund changed his mind and asked Brown to drive truck No. 244 instead. Brown refused, explaining that “there’s something wrong with that truck. . . . [Something was wrong with the brakes . . . there was a grease seal or something leaking causing it to be affecting the brakes.” Brown did not, however, explicitly refer to Article XXI of the collective-bargaining agreement or to the agreement in general. In response to Brown’s refusal to drive truck No. 244, Jasmund angrily told Brown to go home. At that point, an argument ensued and Robert Madary, another supervisor, intervened, repeating Jasmund’s request that Brown drive truck No. 244. Again, Brown refused, explaining that No. 244 “has got problems and I don’t want to drive it.” Madary replied that half the trucks had problems and that if respondent tried to fix all of them it would be unable to do business. He went on to tell Brown that “[w]e’ve got all this garbage out here to haul and you tell me about you don’t want to drive.” Brown responded, “Bob, what you going to do, put the garbage ahead of the safety of the men?” Finally, Madary went to his office and Brown went home. Later that day, Brown received word that he had been discharged. He immediately returned to work in an attempt to gain reinstatement but was unsuccessful.

On May 15, the day after the discharge, Brown filed a written grievance, pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement, asserting that truck No. 244 was defective, that it had been improper for him to have been ordered to drive the truck, and that his discharge was therefore also improper. The union, however, found no objective merit in the grievance and declined to process it.

On September 7,1979, Brown filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB, challenging his discharge. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Brown had been discharged for refusing to operate truck No. 244, that Brown’s refusal was covered by § 7 of the NLRA, and that respondent had therefore committed an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(1) of the Act. The ALJ held that an employee who acts alone in asserting a contractual right can nevertheless be engaged in concerted activity within the meaning of §7:

“‘[Wjhen an employee makes complaints concerning safety matters which are embodied in a contract, he is acting not only in his own interest, but is attempting to enforce such contract provisions in the interest of all the employees covered under that contract. Such activity we have found to be concerted and protected under the Act, and the discharge of an individual for engaging in such activity to be in violation of Section 8(a)(1) [of the Act].”’ 256 N. L. R. B., at 454 (quoting Roadway Express, Inc., 217 N. L. R. B. 278, 279 (1975)).

The NLRB adopted the findings and conclusions of the ALJ and ordered that Brown be reinstated with backpay.

On a petition for enforcement of the Board’s order, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the ALJ and the Board. Finding that Brown’s refusal to drive truck No. 244 was an action taken solely on his own behalf, the Court of Appeals concluded that the refusal was not a concerted activity within the meaning of § 7. This holding followed the court’s prior decision in ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F. 2d 713 (CA6 1979), in which the Court of Appeals had held:

“For an individual claim or complaint to amount to concerted action under the Act it must not have been made solely on behalf of an individual employee, but it must be made on behalf of other employees or at least be made with the object of inducing or preparing for group action and have some arguable basis in the collective bargaining agreement.” Id., at 718.

I — I I — I

Section 7 of the NLRA provides that “[ejmployees shall have the right to ... join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U. S. C. § 157. The NLRB’s decision in this case applied the Board’s longstanding “Interboro doctrine,” under which an individual’s assertion of a right grounded in a collective-bargaining agreement is recognized as “concerted activit[yj” and therefore accorded the protection of § 7. See Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N. L. R. B. 1295, 1298 (1966), enf’d, 388 F. 2d 495 (CA2 1967); Bunney Bros. Construction Co., 139 N. L. R. B. 1516, 1519 (1962). The Board has relied on two justifications for the doctrine: First, the assertion of a right contained in a collective-bargaining agreement is an extension of the concerted action that produced the agreement, Bunney Bros. Construction, supra, at 1519; and second, the assertion of such a right affects the rights of all employees covered by the collective-bargaining agreement. Interboro Contractors, supra, at 1298.

We have often reaffirmed that the task of defining the scope of § 7 “is for the Board to perform in the first instance as it considers the wide variety of cases that come before it,” Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 556, 568 (1978), and, on an issue that implicates its expertise in labor relations, a reasonable construction by the Board is entitled to considerable deference, NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U. S. 335, 350 (1978); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111, 130-131 (1944). The question for decision today is thus narrowed to whether the Board’s application of § 7 to Brown’s refusal to drive truck No. 244 is reasonable. Several reasons persuade us that it is.

A

Neither the Court of Appeals nor respondent appears to question that an employee’s invocation of a right derived from a collective-bargaining agreement meets §7’s requirement that an employee’s action be taken “for purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” As the Board first explained in the Interboro case, a single employee’s invocation of such rights affects all the employees that are covered by the collective-bargaining agreement. Interboro Contractors, Inc., supra, at 1298. This type of generalized effect, as our cases have demonstrated, is sufficient to bring the actions of an individual employee within the “mutual aid or protection” standard, regardless of whether the employee has his own interests most immediately in mind. See, e. g., NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U. S. 251, 260-261 (1975).

The term “concerted activity]” is not defined in the Act but it clearly enough embraces the activities of employees who have joined together in order to achieve common goals. See, e. g., Meyers Industries, Inc., 268 N. L. R. B. 493, 494-495 (1984). What is not self-evident from the language of the Act, however, and what we must elucidate, is the precise manner in which particular actions of an individual employee must be linked to the actions of fellow employees in order to permit it to be said that the individual is engaged in concerted activity. We now turn to consider the Board’s analysis of that question as expressed in the Interboro doctrine.

Although one could interpret the phrase, “to engage in other concerted activities,” to refer to a situation in which two or more employees are working together at the same time and the same place toward a common goal, the language of § 7 does not confine itself to such a narrow meaning. In fact, § 7 itself defines both joining and assisting labor organizations — activities in which a single employee can engage— as concerted activities. Indeed, even the courts that have rejected the Interboro doctrine recognize the possibility that an individual employee may be engaged in concerted activity when he acts alone. They have limited their recognition of this type of concerted activity, however, to two situations: (1) that in which the lone employee intends to induce group activity, and (2) that in which the employee acts as a representative of at least one other employee. See, e. g., ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F. 2d, at 717; NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F. 2d 881, 884 (CA3 1971). The disagreement over the Interboro doctrine, therefore, merely reflects differing views regarding the nature of the relationship that must exist between the action of the individual employee and the actions of the group in order for § 7 to apply. We cannot say that the Board’s view of that relationship, as applied in the Interboro doctrine, is unreasonable.

The invocation of a right rooted in a collective-bargaining agreement is unquestionably an integral part of the process that gave rise to the agreement. That process — beginning with the organization of a union, continuing into the negotiation of a collective-bargaining agreement, and extending through the enforcement of the agreement — is a single, collective activity. Obviously, an employee could not invoke a right grounded in a collective-bargaining agreement were it not for the prior negotiating activities of his fellow employees. Nor would it make sense for a union to negotiate a collective-bargaining agreement if individual employees could not invoke the rights thereby created against their employer. Moreover, when an employee invokes a right grounded in the collective-bargaining agreement, he does not stand alone. Instead, he brings to bear on his employer the power and resolve of all his fellow employees. When, for instance, James Brown refused to drive a truck he believed to be unsafe, he was in effect reminding his employer that he and his fellow employees, at the time their collective-bargaining agreement was signed, had extracted a promise from City Disposal that they would not be asked to drive unsafe trucks. He was also reminding his employer that if it persisted in ordering him to drive an unsafe truck, he could rehamess the power of that group to ensure the enforcement of that promise. It was just as though James Brown was reassembling his fellow union members to reenact their decision not to drive unsafe trucks. A lone employee’s invocation of a right grounded in his collective-bargaining agreement is, therefore, a concerted activity in a very real sense.

Furthermore, the acts of joining and assisting a labor organization, which § 7 explicitly recognizes as concerted, are related to collective action in essentially the same way that the invocation of a collectively bargained right is related to collective action. When an employee joins or assists a labor organization, his actions may be divorced in time, and in location as well, from the actions of fellow employees. Because of the integral relationship among the employees’ actions, however, Congress viewed each employee as engaged in concerted activity. The lone employee could not join or assist a labor organization were it not for the related organizing activities of his fellow employees. Conversely, there would be limited utility in forming a labor organization if other employees could not join or assist the organization once it is formed. Thus, the formation of a labor organization is integrally related to the activity of joining or assisting such an organization in the same sense that the negotiation of a collective-bargaining agreement is integrally related to the invocation of a right provided for in the agreement. In each case, neither the individual activity nor the group activity would be complete without the other.

The Interboro doctrine is also entirely consistent with the purposes of the Act, which explicitly include the encouragement of collective bargaining and other “practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions.” 29 U. S. C. § 151. Although, as we have said, there is nothing in the legislative history of § 7 that specifically expresses the understanding of Congress in enacting the “concerted activities” language, the general history of § 7 reveals no inconsistency between the Interboro doctrine and congressional intent. That history begins in the early days of the labor movement, when employers invoked the common-law doctrines of criminal conspiracy and restraint of trade to thwart workers’ attempts to unionize. See Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (Briggs & Stratton), 336 U. S. 245, 257-258 (1949). As this Court recognized in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 33 (1937), a single employee at that time “was helpless in dealing with an employer; ... he was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family;... if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; . . . union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer.”

Congress’ first attempt to equalize the bargaining power of management and labor, and its first use of the term “concert” in this context, came in 1914 with the enactment of §§6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, which exempted from the antitrust laws certain types of peaceful union activities. 15 U. S. C. § 17; 29 U. S. C. §52. There followed, in 1932, the Norris-La Guardia Act, which declared that “the individual . . . worker . . . shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion, of employers ... in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U. S. C. § 102 (emphasis added). This was the source of the language enacted in § 7. It was adopted first in § 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act and then, in 1935, in § 7 of the NLRA. See generally Gorman & Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of “Concert” Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 286, 331-346 (1981).

Against this background, it is evident that, in enacting § 7 of the NLRA, Congress sought generally to equalize the bargaining power of the employee with that of his employer by allowing employees to band together in confronting an employer regarding the terms and conditions of their employment. There is no indication that Congress intended to limit this protection to situations in which an employee’s activity and that of his fellow employees combine with one another in any particular way. Nor, more specifically, does it appear that Congress intended to have this general protection withdrawn in situations in which a single employee, acting alone, participates in an integral aspect of a collective process. Instead, what emerges from the general background of §7— and what is consistent with the Act’s statement of purpose— is a congressional intent to create an equality in bargaining power between the employee and the employer throughout the entire process of labor organizing, collective bargaining, and enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements.

The Board’s Interboro doctrine, based on a recognition that the potential inequality in the relationship between the employee and the employer continues beyond the point at which a collective-bargaining agreement is signed, mitigates that inequality throughout the duration of the employment relationship, and is, therefore, fully consistent with congressional intent. Moreover, by applying § 7 to the actions of individual employees invoking their rights under a collective-bargaining agreement, the Interboro doctrine preserves the integrity of the entire collective-bargaining process; for by invoking a right grounded in a collective-bargaining agreement, the employee makes that right a reality, and breathes life, not only into the promises contained in the collective-bargaining agreement, but also into the entire process envisioned by Congress as the means by which to achieve industrial peace.

To be sure, the principal tool by which an employee invokes the rights granted him in a collective-bargaining agreement is the processing of a grievance according to whatever procedures his collective-bargaining agreement establishes. No one doubts that the processing of a grievance in such a manner is concerted activity within the meaning of §7. See, e. g., NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 683 F. 2d 156, 159 (CA6 1982); Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB, 430 F. 2d 724, 729 (CA5 1970). Indeed, it would make little sense for § 7 to cover an employee’s conduct while negotiating a collective-bargaining agreement, including a grievance mechanism by which to protect the rights created by the agreement, but not to cover an employee’s attempt to utilize that mechanism to enforce the agreement.

In practice, however, there is unlikely to be a bright-line distinction between an incipient grievance, a complaint to an employer, and perhaps even an employee’s initial refusal to perform a certain job that he believes he has no duty to perform. It is reasonable to expect that an employee’s first response to a situation that he believes violates his collective-bargaining agreement will be a protest to his employer. Whether he files a grievance will depend in part on his employer’s reaction and in part upon the nature of the right at issue. In addition, certain rights might not be susceptible of enforcement by the filing of a grievance. In such a case, the collective-bargaining agreement might provide for an alternative method of enforcement, as did the agreement involved in this case, see supra, at 825, or the agreement might be silent on the matter. Thus, for a variety of reasons, an employee’s initial statement to an employer to the effect that he believes a collectively bargained right is being violated, or the employee’s initial refusal to do that which he believes he is not obligated to do, might serve as both a natural prelude to, and an efficient substitute for, the filing of a formal grievance. As long as the employee’s statement or action is based on a reasonable and honest belief that he is being, or has been, asked to perform a task that he is not required to perform under his collective-bargaining agreement, and the statement or action is reasonably directed toward the enforcement of a collectively bargained right, there is no justification for overturning the Board’s judgment that the employee is engaged in concerted activity, just as he would have been had he filed a formal grievance.

The fact that an activity is concerted, however, does not necessarily mean that an employee can engage in the activity with impunity. An employee may engage in concerted activity in such an abusive manner that he loses the protection of §7. See, e. g., Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 729; Yellow Freight System, Inc., 247 N. L. R. B. 177, 181 (1980). Cf. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 556 (1978); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105 (1956). Furthermore, if an employer does not wish to tolerate certain methods by which employees invoke their collectively bargained rights, he is free to negotiate a provision in his collective-bargaining agreement that limits the availability of such methods. No-strike provisions, for instance, are a common mechanism by which employers and employees agree that the latter will not invoke their rights by refusing to work. In general, if an employee violates such a provision, his activity is unprotected even though it may be concerted. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U. S. 270 (1956). Whether Brown’s action in this case was unprotected, however, is not before us.

B

Respondent argues that the Interboro doctrine undermines the arbitration process by providing employees with the possibility of provoking a discharge and then filing an unfair labor practice claim. Brief for Respondent 34-42. This argument, however, misses the mark for several reasons. First, an employee who purposefully follows this route would run the risk that the Board would find his actions concerted but nonetheless unprotected, as discussed above.

Second, the Interboro doctrine does not shift dispute resolution from the grievance and arbitration process to NLRB adjudication in any way that is different from the alternative position adopted by the Court of Appeals, and pressed upon us by respondent. As stated above, see supra, at 828, the Court of Appeals would allow a finding of concerted activity if two employees together invoke a collectively bargained right, if a lone employee represents another employee in addition to himself when he invokes the right, or if the lone employee invokes the right in a manner that is intended to induce at least one other employee to join him. In each of these situations, however, the underlying substance of the dispute between the employees and the employer is the same as when a single employee invokes a collectively bargained right by himself. In each case the employees are claiming that their employer violated their collective-bargaining agreement, and if the complaining employee or employees in those situations are discharged, their unfair labor practice action would be identical to an action brought by an employee who has been discharged for invoking a collectively bargained right by himself. Because the employees in each of these situations are equally well positioned to go through the grievance and arbitration process, there is no basis for singling out the Interboro doctrine as undermining that process any more than would the approach of respondent and the Courts of Appeals that have rejected the doctrine.

Finally, and most importantly, to the extent that the factual issues raised in an unfair labor practice action have been, or can be, addressed through the grievance process, the Board may defer to that process. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N. L. R. B. 837 (1971); Spielberg Manufacturing Co., 112 N. L. R. B. 1080 (1955). There is no reason, therefore, for the Board’s interpretation of “concerted activity]” in §7 to be constrained by a concern for maintaining the integrity of the grievance and arbitration process.

HH I — I * — (

In this case, the Board found that James Brown’s refusal to drive truck No. 244 was based on an honest and reasonable belief that the brakes on the truck were faulty. Brown explained to each of his supervisors his reason for refusing to drive the truck. Although he did not refer to his collective-bargaining agreement in either of these confrontations, the agreement provided not only that “[t]he Employer shall not require employees to take out on the streets or highways any vehicle that is not in safe operating condition,” but also that “[i]t shall not be a violation of this Agreement where employees refuse to operate such equipment, unless such refusal is unjustified.” See supra, at 825. There is no doubt, therefore, nor could there have been any doubt during Brown’s confrontations with his supervisors, that by refusing to drive truck No. 244, Brown was invoking the right granted him in his collective-bargaining agreement to be free of the obligation to drive unsafe trucks. Moreover, there can be no question but that Brown’s refusal to drive the truck was reasonably well directed toward the enforcement of that right. Indeed, it would appear that there were no other means available by which Brown could have enforced the right. If he had gone ahead and driven truck No. 244, the issue may have been moot.

Respondent argues that Brown’s action was not concerted because he did not explicitly refer to the collective-bargaining agreement as a basis for his refusal to drive the truck. Brief for Respondent 21-22. The Board, however, has never held that an employee must make such an explicit reference for his actions to be covered by the Interboro doctrine, and we find that position reasonable. We have often recognized the importance of “the Board’s special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life.” NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 236 (1963). As long as the nature of the employee’s complaint is reasonably clear to the person to whom it is communicated, and the complaint does, in fact, refer to a reasonably perceived violation of the collective-bargaining agreement, the complaining employee is engaged in the process of enforcing that agreement. In the context of a workplace dispute, where the participants are likely to be unsophisticated in collective-bargaining matters, a requirement that the employee explicitly refer to the collective-bargaining agreement is likely to serve as nothing more than a trap for the unwary.

Respondent .further argues that the Board erred in finding Brown’s action concerted based only on Brown’s reasonable and honest belief that truck No. 244 was unsafe. Brief for Respondent 38. Respondent bases its argument on the language of the collective-bargaining agreement, which provides that an employee may refuse to drive an unsafe truck “unless such refusal is unjustified.” In the view of respondent, this language allows a driver to refuse to drive a truck only if the truck is objectively unsafe. Regardless of whether respondent’s interpretation of the agreement is correct, a question as to which we express no view, this argument confuses the threshold question whether Brown’s conduct was concerted with the ultimate question whether that conduct was protected. The rationale of the Interboro doctrine compels the conclusion that an honest and reasonable invocation of a collectively bargained right constitutes concerted activity, regardless of whether the employee turns out to have been correct in his belief that his right was violated. See Part II, supra. No one would suggest, for instance, that the filing of a grievance is concerted only if the grievance turns out to be meritorious. As long as the grievance is based on an honest and reasonable belief that a right had been violated, its filing is a concerted activity because it is an integral part of the process by which the collective-bargaining agreement is enforced. The same is true of other methods by which an employee enforces the agreement. On the other hand, if the collective-bargaining agreement imposes a limitation on the means by which a right may be invoked, the concerted activity would be unprotected if it went beyond that limitation. See supra, at 837.

In this case, because Brown reasonably and honestly invoked his right to avoid driving unsafe trucks, his action was concerted. It may be that the collective-bargaining agreement prohibits an employee from refusing to drive a truck that he reasonably believes to be unsafe, but that is, in fact, perfectly safe. If so, Brown’s action was concerted but unprotected. As stated above, however, the only issue before this Court and the only issue passed upon by the Board or the Court of Appeals is whether Brown’s action was concerted, not whether it was protected.

> I — I

The NLRB’s Interboro doctrine recognizes as concerted activity an individual employee’s reasonable and honest invocation of a right provided for in his collective-bargaining agreement. We conclude that the doctrine constitutes a reasonable interpretation of the Act. Accordingly, we accept the Board’s conclusion that James Brown was engaged in concerted activity when he refused to drive truck No. 244. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including an inquiry into whether respondent may continue to defend this action on the theory that Brown’s refusal to drive truck No. 244 was unprotected, even if concerted.

It is so ordered.

Justice O’Connor,

with whom The Chief Justice, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist join, dissenting.

Under the Interboro doctrine, an individual employee is deemed to have engaged in “concerted activity],” within the meaning of §7 of the National Labor Relations Act (Act), 29 U. S. C. § 157, if the right he reasonably and in good faith asserts is grounded in his employer’s collective-bargaining agreement. On this view, the reasonable, good-faith assertion of a right contained in the collective-bargaining agreement is said to be an extension of the concerted action that produced the agreement; alternatively, the reasonable, good-faith assertion of the contract right is said to affect the rights of all the other employees in the work force. See ante, at 829. Thus, if the employer “interfered with, restraints], or coerced” the employee in response to the latter’s assertion of the alleged contract right, the Inter-boro doctrine enables the employee to file a § 8(a)(1) unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board (Board). See 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(1). Although the concepts of individual action for personal gain and “concerted activity” are intuitively incompatible, the Court today defers to the Board’s judgment that the Interboro doctrine is necessary to safeguard the exercise of rights previously won in the collective-bargaining process. Since I consider the Interboro doctrine to be an exercise in undelegated legislative power by the Board, I respectfully dissent.

In my view, the fact that the right the employee asserts ultimately can be grounded in the collective-bargaining agreement is not enough to make the individual’s self-interested action concerted. If it could, then every contract claim could be the basis for an unfair labor practice complaint. But the law is clear that an employer’s alleged violation of a collective agreement cannot, by itself, provide the basis for an unfair labor practice complaint. See NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U. S. 421, 427-428 (1967); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502, 509-513 (1962). Congress once considered a proposal that would have given the Board “general jurisdiction over all alleged violations of collective bargaining agreements.” NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U. S., at 427. But it realized that “[t]o have conferred upon the National Labor Relations Board generalized power to determine the rights of parties under all collective agreements would have been a step toward governmental regulation of the terms of those agreements.” Ibid. Thus, Congress expressly decided that, “[o]nce [the] parties have made a collective bargaining contract^] the enforcement of that contract should be left to the usual processes of the law and not to the . . . Board.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 42 (1947). By basing the determination whether activity is “concerted” on the assertion’s ultimate grounding in the collective-bargaining agreement, the Interboro doctrine’s extension of the concerted activity proviso transfers the final authority for interpreting all contracts and for resolving all contract disputes back to the Board. This arrogation of power violates Congress’ decision to the contrary.

Of course, the Board has considerable discretion to act on contractual matters which are incident to unfair labor practice proceedings. See NRLB v. C & C Plywood, supra. But the fact that the Board can resolve contractual matters incident to unfair labor practice disputes does not give it authority to make unfair labor practice claims out of the contractual disputes themselves. The statutory authority to interpret some contract provisions is not authority to resolve all labor contract disputes. Congress’ decision not to give the Board this broad power indicates that it considered the difference between individual and concerted activity to be a meaningful one. Indeed, when viewed in light of the scheme Congress created for enforcing labor contract rights, the Interboro doctrine turns out to be nothing less than a Trojan horse dressed up in legal form.

This Court has previously recognized that the labor laws were designed to encourage employees to act together. See, e. g., NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U. S. 251, 260-264 (1975). Even a single employee acting in good faith and asserting a right contained in the collective-bargaining agreement may be too fearful, inarticulate, or lacking in skill to relate accurately either the event being investigated or the relevant extenuating factors. Other disinterested employees, especially knowledgeable union stewards, can assist the employee and the employer in eliciting the relevant facts and in preventing misunderstandings and hard feelings. The participation of other employees may save production time, reduce administrative expenses, and avoid unnecessary discharges and disciplinary action. By providing an increased degree of statutory coverage to employees participating in that process, the labor laws encourage and preserve the “practice and procedure of collective bargaining.” Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U. S. 50, 62 (1975). The fact that two employees receive coverage where one acting alone does not is therefore entirely consistent with the labor laws’ emphasis on collective action. See NRLB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co, 388 U. S. 175, 180 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U. S. 650, 653 (1965).

The Court and the Board insist that, because the group has previously expressed interest in the right now being asserted, the individual’s self-interested expression must be treated as “concerted” to ensure that meaning is given to the contract rights. This argument is mistaken. It confuses the employees’ substantive contract entitlements with the process by which those entitlements are to be vindicated. When employees act together in expressing a mutual concern, contractual or otherwise, their action is “concerted” and the statute authorizes them to seek vindication through the Board’s administrative processes. In contrast, when an employee acts alone in expressing a personal concern, contractual or otherwise, his action is not “concerted”; in such cases, the statute instructs him to seek vindication through his union, and where necessary, through the courts. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, supra; Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U. S. 554 (1976). Under either scenario, the integrity of the rights won in the collective-bargaining process and the rights of all other employees are preserved. The question is whether these rights will be vindicated by administrative or by private and judicial processes. It is clear that Congress believes “day-to-day adjustments in the contract and other working rules, resolutions of new problems not covered by existing agreements, and the protection of employee rights already secured by contract,” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 46 (1957) (emphasis added), are more suitably handled, not by the Board, but by the employees’ collective representative and, if necessary, the courts. See supra, at 842-843. The Interboro doctrine is therefore against Congress’ judgment as to how contract rights are best vindicated.

Finally, the Interboro doctrine makes little sense when applied to the facts of this case. There is no evidence that employee James Brown discussed the truck’s alleged safety problem with other employees, sought their support in remedying the problem, or requested their or his union’s assistance in protesting to his employer. He did not seek to warn others of the problem or even initially to file a grievance through his union. He simply asserted that the truck was not safe enough for him to drive. James Brown was not engaging in “concerted activity” in any reasonable sense of the term, and therefore his employer could not have violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act when it discharged him. The fact that the right asserted can be found in the collective-bargaining agreement may be relevant to whether activity of that type should be “protected,” but not to whether it is “concerted.” The Interboro doctrine is, in my view, unreasonable in concluding otherwise.

I do not mean to imply by this dissent that conduct should not be considered “concerted” because it is engaged in by only a single employee. The crucial issue is, as the Court notes, the precise nature of the relationship that must exist between the action of an individual employee and the actions of the group. See ante, at 830-831. An employee certainly engages in “concerted activity” when he acts with or expressly on behalf of one or more of the other employees. And, as several of the Courts of Appeals have concluded, the statutory language can even be stretched to cover an individual who takes action with the proven object of inducing, initiating, or preparing for group action. See, e. g., ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F. 2d 713, 717 (CA6 1979); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F. 2d 881, 884 (CA3 1971); see also Kohls v. NLRB, 203 U. S. App. D. C. 139, 142-143, 629 F. 2d 173, 176-177 (1980). But it stretches the language past its snapping point to cover an employee’s action that is taken solely for personal benefit.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

       App. 64. Article XXI also provides that “[t]he Employer shall not ask or require any employee to take out equipment that has been reported by any other employee as being in an unsafe operating condition until same has been approved as being safe by the mechanical department.”

       Section 7 provides:
      “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 61 Stat. 140.

       Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA provides:
      “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
      “(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.” 61 Stat. 140.

       See, e. g., NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F. 2d 205 (CA7 1971); NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Manufacturing Corp., 428 F. 2d 217, 221 (CA8 1970); NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F. 2d 495 (CA2 1967). At least four Circuits share the position of the Sixth Circuit on this question. See, e. g., Royal Development Co., Ltd. v. NLRB, 703 F. 2d 363, 374 (CA9 1983); Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 700 F. 2d 687, 693-694 (CA11 1983); NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F. 2d 714 (CA5 1973) (dictum); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F. 2d 881 (CA3 1971). See also Kohls v. NLRB, 203 U. S. App. D. C. 139, 142-143, 629 F. 2d 173, 176-177 (1980) (expressing doubt about the validity of the Interioro doctrine). In Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 532 F. 2d 751 (1976), the Fourth Circuit enforced, without opinion, a decision of the Board applying the Interboro doctrine, Roadway Express, Inc., 217 N. L. R. B. 278 (1975), but in Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F. 2d 304, 308-310 (1980), the court indicated that it remained an open issue whether the Interioro doctrine would be followed in that Circuit.

       Respondent argued below that the Board erred in concluding that James Brown was motivated by an honest belief in the factual validity of his claim. That issue, however, is not before us.

       The NLRB has recently held that, where a group of employees are not unionized and there is no collective-bargaining agreement, an employee’s assertion of a right that can only be presumed to be of interest to other employees is not concerted activity. Meyers Industries, Inc., 268 N. L. R. B. 493 (1984). The Board, however, distinguished that case from the cases involving the Interboro doctrine, which is based on the existence of a collective-bargaining agreement. The Meyers case is thus of no relevance here.

       Respondent argues that because “the scope of the ‘concerted activities’ clause in Section 7 is essentially a jurisdictional or legal question concerning the coverage of the Act,” we need not defer to the expertise of the Board. Brief for Respondent 13. We have never, however, held that such an exception exists to the normal standard of review of Board interpretations of the Act; indeed, we have not hesitated to defer to the Board’s interpretation of the Act in the context of issues substantially similar to that presented here. E. g., NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U. S. 251, 266-267 (1975) (right under § 7 to have union representative present at investigatory interview of employee). See also Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U. S. 298, 302-303 (1977) (definition of agricultural workers).

       Section 7 lists these and other activities initially and concludes the list with the phrase “other concerted activities,” thereby indicating that the enumerated activities are deemed to be “concerted.” See n. 1, supra.

       As this Court noted in a different context in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 46 (1957): “Collective bargaining is a continuing process. Among other things, it involves day-to-day adjustments in the contract and other working rules, resolution of new problems not covered by existing agreements, and the protection of employee rights already secured by contract.” (Emphasis added.)

       Of course, at some point an individual employee’s actions may become so remotely related to the activities of fellow employees that it cannot reasonably be said that the employee is engaged in concerted activity. For instance, the Board has held that if an employer were to discharge an employee for purely personal “griping,” the employee could not claim the protection of §7. See, e. g., Capital Ornamental Concrete Specialties, Inc., 248 N. L. R. B. 851 (1980).
      In addition, although the Board relies entirely on its interpretation of § 7 as support for the Interboro doctrine, it bears noting that under § 8(a)(1) an employer commits an unfair labor practice if he or she “interfere[s] with, [or] restraints]” concerted activity. It is possible, therefore, for an employer to commit an unfair labor practice by discharging an employee who is not himself involved in concerted activity, but whose actions are related to other employees’ concerted activities in such a manner as to render his discharge an interference or restraint on those activities. In the context of the Interboro doctrine, for instance, even if an individual’s invocation of rights provided for in a collective-bargaining agreement, for some reason, were not concerted activity, the discharge of that individual would still be an unfair labor practice if the result were to restrain or interfere with the concerted activity of negotiating or enforcing a collective-bargaining agreement.

       In § 20 of the Clayton Act, Congress provided that “no . . . injunction shall prohibit any person or persons, whether singly or in concert, from . . . ceasing to perform any work [or other specified activities].” 29 U. S. C. § 52 (emphasis added).

       See Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N. L. R. B. 1295, 1298 (1966), enf’d, 388 F. 2d 495 (CA2 1967); see also Bunney Bros. Construction Co., 139 N. L. R. B. 1516, 1519 (1962).

       The Court and the Board agree that the Act cannot be read to cover, or to give the Board jurisdiction over, purely personal, though work-related, claims of individual employees. See ante, at 833, n. 10; Brief for Petitioner 16, and n. 9. They also agree that the mere fact that an asserted right can be presumed to be of interest to other employees is not a sufficient basis for labeling it “concerted.” See ante, at 829, n. 6; Meyers Industries, Inc., 268 N. L. R. B. 493 (1984).

       The Interboro doctrine is especially disturbing in this respect, since it does not require the individual expressly to refer to the contract provision supporting the claim or even to be aware of the existence of the agreement. See ante, at 839-841; accord, 256 N. L. R. B. 451, 454 (1981). One would think that a rule defining “concerted activity” would require the employee to have some idea that he is engaging in it.

       The Court rather glibly suggests that, to the extent factual issues raised in an unfair labor practice proceeding have been, or can be, addressed through the grievance process, the Board will defer to that process. See ante, at 838-839. Yet the Court does not discuss why the Board did not defer to that process in this case, where the union determined that there was no objective basis to the grievance. Ante, at 827. Moreover, as I have discussed at some length elsewhere, the Board hardly applies its deferral criteria evenhandedly or consistently. See Schaefer v. NLRB, 464 U. S. 945 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Finally, the question whether deferral will occur or is appropriate is relevant only if the Board has jurisdiction in the first place, and that is precisely the issue the Court must decide today.

       The Board may, of course, require the employees to first seek satisfaction from contractual arbitration and grievance procedures. See William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters, 417 U. S. 12 (1974). But that deferral decision can properly be made only after an unfair labor practice is properly filed, which requires a determination whether “concerted activity” is involved in the first instance.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Marshall Justice Stevens,

license: Public Domain

text:
    KOSAK v. UNITED STATES
    No. 82-618.
    Argued November 7, 1983
    Decided March 21, 1984
    Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 862.

      Jeffrey L. Naftulin argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.

      Kathryn A. Oberly argued the cause for the United States. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, and Marc Richman.

   Justice Marshall

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented in this case is whether 28 U. S. C. § 2680(c), which exempts from the coverage of the Federal Tort Claims Act “[a]ny claim arising in respect of . . . the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs,” precludes recovery against the United States for injury to private property sustained during a temporary detention of the property by the Customs Service.

HH

While a serviceman stationed in Guam, petitioner assembled a large collection of oriental art. When he was transferred from Guam to Philadelphia, petitioner brought his art collection with him. In his customs declaration, petitioner stated that he intended to keep the contents of the collection for himself. Subsequently, acting upon information that, contrary to his representations, petitioner planned to resell portions of his collection, agents of the United States Customs Service obtained a valid warrant to search petitioner’s house. In executing that warrant, the agents seized various antiques and other objects of art.

Petitioner was charged with smuggling his art collection into the country, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 545. After a jury trial, he was acquitted. The Customs Service then notified petitioner that the seized objects were subject to civil forfeiture under 19 U. S. C. § 1592, which at the time permitted confiscation of goods brought into the United States “by means of any false statement.” Relying on 19 U. S. C. § 1618, petitioner filed a petition for relief from the forfeiture. The Customs Service granted the petition and returned the goods.

Alleging that some of the objects returned to him had been injured while in the custody of the Customs Service, petitioner filed an administrative complaint with the Service requesting compensation for the damage. The Customs Service denied relief. Relying on the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976 ed. and Supp. V), petitioner then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking approximately $12,000 in damages for the alleged injury to his property. The Government moved for a dismissal of the complaint or for summary judgment on the ground that petitioner’s claim was barred by § 2680(c). The District Court granted the Government’s motion.

The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, affirmed. 679 F. 2d 306 (CA3 1982). The Court of Appeals reasoned that the United States may be held liable for torts committed by its employees only on the basis of a statutory provision evincing a “‘clear relinquishment of sovereign immunity.’” Id., at 309 (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 31 (1953)). In the court’s view, the Federal Tort Claims Act, as qualified by § 2680(c), fails to provide the necessary relinquishment of governmental immunity from suits alleging that customs officials damaged or lost detained property. On the contrary, the court observed, the “clear language” of § 2680(c) shields the United States from “all claims arising out of detention of goods by customs officers and does not purport to distinguish among types of harm.” 679 F. 2d, at 308. On that basis, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted.

We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Circuits regarding the liability of the United States for injuries caused by the negligence of customs officials in handling property in their possession. 459 U. S. 1101 (1983). We now affirm.

II

A

The Federal Tort Claims Act, enacted in 1946, provides generally that the United States shall be liable, to the same extent as a private party, “for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b); see also 28 U. S. C. §2674. The Act’s broad waiver of sovereign immunity is, however, subject to 13 enumerated exceptions. 28 U. S. C. §§2680(a)-(f), (h)-(n). One of those exceptions, § 2680(c), exempts from the coverage of the statute “[a]ny claim arising in respect of . . . the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs . . . .” Petitioner asks us to construe the foregoing language to cover only claims “for damage caused by the detention itself and not for the negligent. . . destruction of property while it is in the possession of the customs service.” By “damage caused by the detention itself,” petitioner appears to mean harms attributable to an illegal detention, such as a decline in the economic value of detained goods (either because of depreciation or because of a drop in the price the goods will fetch), injury resulting from deprivation of the ability to make use of the goods during the period of detention, or consequential damages resulting from lack of access to the goods. The Government asks us to read the exception to cover all injuries to property sustained during its detention by customs officials.

The starting point of our analysis of these competing interpretations must, of course, be the language of § 2680(c). “[W]e assume ‘that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.’” American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 68 (1982) (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 (1962)). At first blush, the statutory language certainly appears expansive enough to support the Government’s construction; the encompassing phrase, “arising in respect of,” seems to sweep within the exception all injuries associated in any way with the “detention” of goods. It must be admitted that this initial reading is not ineluctable; as Judge Weis, dissenting in the Court of Appeals, pointed out, it is possible (with some effort) to read the phrase, “in respect of” as the equivalent of “as regards” and thereby to infer that “the statutory exception is directed to the fact of detention itself, and that alone.” 679 F. 2d, at 310. But we think that the fairest interpretation of the crucial portion of the provision is the one that first springs to mind: “any claim arising in respect of” the detention of goods means any claim “arising out of” the detention of goods, and includes a claim resulting from negligent handling or storage of detained property.

Relying on the analysis of the Second Circuit in Alliance Assurance Co. v. United States, 252 F. 2d 529 (1958), petitioner argues that the foregoing reading of the plain language of § 2680(c) is undercut by the context in which the provision appears.

“That the exception does not and was not intended to bar actions based on the negligent destruction, injury or loss of goods in the possession or control of the customs authorities is best illustrated by the fact that the exception immediately preceding it expressly bars actions ‘arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission’ of mail. 28 U. S. C. A. § 2680(b). If Congress had similarly wished to bar actions based on the negligent loss of goods which governmental agencies other than the postal system undertook to handle, the exception in 28 U. S. C. A. § 2680(b) shows that it would have been equal to the task. The conclusion is inescapable that it did not choose to bestow upon all such agencies general absolution from carelessness in handling property belonging to others.” Id., at 534.

We find the conclusion reached by petitioner and the Second Circuit far from “inescapable.” The specificity of § 2680(b), in contrast with the generality of § 2680(c), suggests, if anything, that Congress intended the former to be less encompassing than the latter. The motivation for such an intent is not hard to find. One of the principal purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act was to waive the Government’s immunity from liability for injuries resulting from auto accidents in which employees of the Postal System were at fault. In order to ensure that § 2680(b), which governs torts committed by mailmen, did not have the effect of barring precisely the sort of suit that Congress was most concerned to authorize, the draftsmen of the provision carefully delineated the types of misconduct for which the Government was not assuming financial responsibility — namely, “the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter” — thereby excluding, by implication, negligent handling of motor vehicles. The absence of any analogous desire to limit the reach of the statutory exception pertaining to the detention of property by customs officials explains the lack of comparable nicety in the phraseology of § 2680(c).

B

The legislative history of § 2680(c), though meager, supports the interpretation of the provision that we have derived from its language and context. Two specific aspects of the evolution of the provision are telling. First, the person who almost certainly drafted the language under consideration clearly thought that it covered injury to detained property caused by the negligence of customs officials. It appears that the portion of § 2680(c) pertaining to the detention of goods was first written by Judge Alexander Holtzoff, one of the major figures in the development of the Tort Claims Act. In his report explicating his proposals, Judge Holtzoff explained:

“[The proposed provision would exempt from the coverage of the Act] [c]laims arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty. This exception appears in all previous drafts. It is expanded, however, so as to include immunity from liability in respect of loss in connection with the detention of goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise. The additional proviso has special reference to the detention of imported goods in appraisers’ warehouses or customs houses, as well as seizures by law enforcement officials, internal revenue officers, and the like.” A. Holtzoff, Report on Proposed Federal Tort Claims Bill 16 (1981) (Holtzoff Report) (emphasis added).

Though it cannot be definitively established that Congress relied upon Judge Holtzoff’s report, it is significant that the apparent draftsman of the crucial portion of § 2680(c) believed that it would bar a suit of the sort brought by petitioner.

Second, the congressional Committees that submitted Reports on the various bills that ultimately became the Tort Claims Act suggested that the provision that was to become § 2680(c), like the other exceptions from the waiver of sovereign immunity, covered claims “arising out of” the designated conduct. Thus, for example, the House Judiciary Committee described the proposed exceptions as follows:

“These exemptions cover claims arising out of the loss or miscarriage of postal matter; the assessment or collection of taxes or assessments; the detention of goods by customs officers; admiralty and maritime torts; deliberate torts such as assault and battery; and others.” H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1945).

The Committees’ casual use of the words, “arising out of,” with reference to the exemption of claims pertaining to the detention of goods substantially undermines petitioner’s contention that the phrase, “in respect of,” was designed to limit the sorts of suits covered by the provision.

Of perhaps greater importance than these two clues as to the meaning of the prepositional phrase contained in § 2680(c) is the fact that our interpretation of the plain language of the provision accords with what we know of Congress’ general purposes in creating exceptions to the Tort Claims Act. The three objectives most often mentioned in the legislative history as rationales for the enumerated exceptions are: ensuring that “certain governmental activities” not be disrupted by the threat of damages suits; avoiding exposure of the United States to liability for excessive or fraudulent claims; and not extending the coverage of the Act to suits for which adequate remedies were already available.

The exemption of claims for damage to goods in the custody of customs officials is certainly consistent with the first two of these purposes. One of the most important sanctions available to the Customs Service in ensuring compliance with the customs laws is its power to detain goods owned by suspected violators of those laws. Congress may well have wished not to dampen the enforcement efforts of the Service by exposing the Government to private damages suits by disgruntled owners of detained property.

Congress may also have been concerned that a waiver of immunity from suits alleging damage to detained property would expose the United States to liability for fraudulent claims. The Customs Service does not have the staff or resources it would need to inspect goods at the time it seizes them. Lacking a record of the condition of a piece of property when the Service took custody of it, the Government would be in a poor position to defend a suit in which the owner alleged that the item was returned in damaged condition. Congress may have reasoned that the frequency with which the Government would be obliged to pay undeserving claimants if it waived immunity from such suits offset the inequity, resulting from retention of immunity, to persons with legitimate grievances.

To a lesser extent, our reading of § 2680(c) is consistent with the third articulated purpose of the exceptions to the Tort Claims Act. At common law, a property owner had (and retains) a right to bring suit against an individual customs official who negligently damaged his goods. Title 28 U. S. C. §2006 provides that judgments in such suits shall be paid out of the Federal Treasury if a court certifies that there existed probable cause for the detention of the goods and that the official was acting under the directions of an appropriate supervisor. Congress in 1946 may have concluded that this mode of obtaining recompense from the United States (or from an individual officer) was “adequate.” To be sure, there are significant limitations to the common-law remedy, the most important of which is the apparent requirement that the plaintiff prove negligence on the part of a particular customs official. Such proof will often be difficult to come by. But Congress may well have concluded that exposing the United States to liability for injury to property in the custody of the Customs Service under circumstances in which the owner is not able to demonstrate such specific negligence would open the door to an excessive number of fraudulent suits.

rH HH HH

Petitioner and some commentators argue that § 2680(c) should not be construed in a fashion that denies an effectual remedy to many persons whose property is damaged through the tortious conduct of customs officials. That contention has force, but it is properly addressed to Congress, not to this Court. The language of the statute as it was written leaves us no choice but to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals that the Tort Claims Act does not cover suits alleging that customs officials injured property that had been detained by the Customs Service.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

The Government’s construction of 28 U. S. C. § 2680(c) is not the one that “first springs” to my mind. Ante, at 854. Rather, I read the exception for claims arising “in respect of . . . the detention of any goods” as expressing Congress’ intent to preclude liability attributable to the temporary interference with the owner’s possession of his goods, as opposed to liability for physical damage to his goods. That seems to me to be the normal reading of the statutory language that Congress employed, and the one that most Members of Congress voting on the proposal would have given it. Moreover, my reading, unlike the Court’s, is supported by an examination of the language used in other exceptions. Congress did not use the words “arising out of” in § 2680(c) but did use those words in three other subsections of the same section of the Act. See §§ 2680(b), (e), and (h). Absent persuasive evidence to the contrary, we should assume that when Congress uses different language in a series of similar provisions, it intends to express a different intention.

The language of the statute itself is thus clear enough to persuade me that Congress did not intend to exempt this property damage claim from the broad coverage of the Act. I would, of course, agree that if there were legislative history plainly identifying a contrary congressional intent, that history should be given effect. I do not believe, however, that it is proper for the Court to attach any weight at all to the kind of “clues” to legislative intent that it discusses, or to its concept of the “general purposes” that motivated various exceptions to the statute. Because the Court has done so, however, I shall respond to both parts of its rather creative approach to statutory construction.

HH

In the entire 15-year history preceding the enactment of the Tort Claims Act in 1946, the Court finds only two “clues” that it believes shed any light on the meaning of § 2680(c). The first — the so-called “Holtzoff Report” — is nothing but an internal Justice Department working paper prepared in 1931 and never even mentioned in the legislative history of the 1946 Act. There is no indication that any Congressman ever heard of the document or knew that it even existed. The position of the majority — that it is “significant” that the “apparent draftsman” of the relevant language himself “believed that it would bar a suit of the sort brought by petitioner,” ante, at 856-857 — is manifestly ill-advised. The intent of a lobbyist — no matter how public spirited he may have been— should not be attributed to the Congress without positive evidence that elected .legislators were aware of and shared the lobbyist’s intent.

Unless we know more about the collective legislative purpose than can be gleaned from an internal document prepared by a person who was seeking legislative action, we should be guided by the sensible statement that “in construing a statute . . . the worst person to construe it is the person who is responsible for its drafting. He is very much disposed to confuse what he intended to do with the effect of the language which in fact has been employed.” Hilder v. Dexter, [1902] A. C. 474, 477 (Halsbury, L. C., abstaining). If the draftsman of the language in question intended it to cover such cases as this one, he failed.

The second “clue” relied upon by the majority consists of a brief summary in the House Committee Report which casually uses the prepositional phrase “arising out of” to introduce a truncated list of the exceptions. Ante, at 857. But the “casual” use of the latter phrase in the Committee Report is as understandable as it is insignificant. It is nothing more than an introduction. In such an introduction, precision of meaning is naturally and knowingly sacrificed in the interest of brevity.

II

The Court’s reliance on the “general purposes” for creating exceptions does nothing more than explain why Congress might reasonably have decided to create this exception. Those purposes are no more persuasive than the general purposes motivating the enactment of the broad waiver of sovereign immunity effected by the statute itself.

The hypothetical rationales attributed to Congress by the majority are also internally inconsistent. If Congress, as a matter of public policy, determined that these claims should not be entertained because of the possibility for fraud, the majority’s suggestion that petitioner may have a remedy under the Tucker Act is quite inexplicable. Similarly, if Congress “may well have wished not to dampen the enforcement efforts of the Service by exposing the Government to private damages suits by disgruntled owners of detained property,” ante, at 859 (emphasis added), its failure to abrogate the common-law remedy against the individual customs officer is inexplicable. For I would assume that customs officers’ enforcement efforts would be dampened far more by a threat of personal liability than by a threat of governmental liability. Reliance on an assumed reluctance to waive immunity regarding claims for which “adequate” remedies were already available simply begs the question. A basic reason for the Tort Claims Act was, of course, the inadequacy of the existing remedies, and there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress considered the previous remedies in this specific area adequate.

A discussion of the general reasons for drafting exceptions to the Act is no more enlightening regarding the specific exception at issue here than a consideration of the principal purpose that Congress sought to achieve by enacting this important reform legislation.

Tort claims bills had floundered on legislative shoals for nearly two decades. A general waiver of sovereign immunity for torts was finally propelled into law by the legislative reform movement which culminated in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. E. g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543, 549-550 (1951). The “overwhelming purpose” of the Congress which enacted the Tort Claims Act was to remove the burden of dealing with tort claims from Congress which had adjudicated these claims in the form of passing private bills, and the “reports at that session omitted previous discussions which tended to restrict the scope of the Tort Claims bill.” Ibid. Hence, the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress recommended that “Congress delegate authority to the Federal Courts and to the Court of Claims to hear and settle claims against the Federal Government,” explaining its recommendation, and the shortcomings of resolving such claims through consideration of private bills, as follows:

“Congress is poorly equipped to serve as a judicial tribunal for the settlement of private claims against the Government of the United States. This method of handling individual claims does not work well either for the Government or for the individual claimant, while the cost of legislating the settlement in many cases far exceeds the total amounts involved.
“Long delays in consideration of claims against the Government, time consumed by the Claims Committees of the House and Senate, and crowded private calendars combine to make this an inefficient method of procedure.
“The United States courts are well able and equipped to hear these claims and to decide them with justice and equity both to the Government and to the claimants....” Report of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress pursuant to H. Con. Res. 18, S. Rep. No. 1011, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 25 (1946), H. R. Rep. No. 1675, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 25 (1946).

If our construction of the narrow provision before us is to be determined by reference to broad purposes, in the context of the 1946 Act the exceptions are best rationalized by reference to Congress’ central purpose. Absent specific legislative history pertaining to the sort of claims involved in this case, the general bases for exceptions relied upon by the majority are surely less persuasive than the overwhelming purpose of the statute. Courts of law have been up to the task of discovering fraud for centuries; it is completely unrealistic to suggest that Congress did not think the judiciary up to this task, or that it wanted to reserve such cases for its own adjudication because it is better equipped to weed out fraudulent claims.

In the final analysis, one must conclude that the legislative history provides only the most general guidance on resolving the issue in this case. For any basic policy argument in favor of making an exception will support a broad construction of the provision in question, just as any basic policy argument in favor of the Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity will support a narrow construction of this or any other exception. The Government’s policy arguments respecting the administrative burden on the Customs Service and the potential for fraudulent claims, like petitioner’s policy arguments, are “properly addressed to Congress, not to this Court.” Ante, at 862.

Ill

Therefore, this is “a case for applying the canon of construction of the wag who said, when the legislative history is doubtful, go to the statute.” Greenwood v. United States, 350 U. S. 366, 374 (1956). I would acknowledge — indeed I do acknowledge — that the Court’s reading of the statutory language is entirely plausible. I would, however, tilt the scales in favor of recovery by attaching some weight to the particular language used in § 2680(c). And I must disagree with the Court’s reliance on the general purposes underlying exceptions when no consideration is given to the general purpose of the statute itself. But most importantly, I would eschew any reliance on the intent of the lobbyist whose opinion on the question before us was not on the public record.

I therefore respectfully dissent.

       Because Guam is outside the customs territory of the United States, all goods imported therefrom are subject to duties. 19 U. S. C. § 1202.

       Section 1618 permits the Secretary of the Treasury to remit or mitigate a forfeiture “if he finds that such . . . forfeiture was incurred without willful negligence or without any intention on the part of the petitioner to defraud the revenue or to violate the law, or finds the existence of such mitigating circumstances as to justify the remission or mitigation of such . . . forfeiture . . . .”

       Petitioner also requested damages for two other alleged injuries related to the seizure and detention of his property: the destruction of a cork pagoda by customs officials during the search of petitioner’s house, and the accidental seizure of a sales receipt for a stereo receiver (without which petitioner was unable to obtain warranty repairs). App. 6-7. In his brief, petitioner argues that these two claims are segregable from his primary claim for damages resulting from the injury to the detained goods and merit separate analysis. Because petitioner did not present this argument to the Court of Appeals, we decline to consider it. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U. S. 783, 788, n. 7 (1977).

       Civil Action No. 81-2054 (ED Pa. Oct. 15, 1981). The District Court did not identify the grounds for its ruling. We see no reason to doubt the inference drawn by the Court of Appeals that the District Court was persuaded by the Government’s argument that § 2680(c) barred the suit. 679 F. 2d 306, 307, and n. 2. It would have been better practice, however, for the District Court to have noted the reasons for its judgment.

       In three cases, Courts of Appeals have construed § 2680(c) in ways that would not bar petitioner’s suit. A & D International, Inc. v. United States, 665 F. 2d 669 (CA5 1982); A-Mark, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 593 F. 2d 849 (CA9 1978); Alliance Assurance Co. v. United States, 252 F. 2d 529 (CA2 1958). In two other cases, Courts of Appeals have read the provision as did the Third Circuit in this case. United States v. One (1) Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 662 F. 2d 1372 (CA11 1981); United States v. One (1) 1972 Wood, 19 Foot Custom Boat, FL 8443 AY, 501 F. 2d 1327 (CA5 1974). In Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U. S. 460, 462, n. 3 (1980), we acknowledged the divergence in the views of the Circuits but expressly declined to decide the issue.

       The full text of § 2680(c) provides:
      “The provisions of [28 U. S. C. §§ 2671-2679] and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to—
      “(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise or any other law-enforcement officer.”
      We have no occasion in this case to decide what kinds of “law-enforcement officer[s],” other than customs officials, are covered by the exception.

       In view of the fact that the Tort Claims Act permits recovery only of “money damages ... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death,” 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b), it is unclear whether, even in the absence of § 2680(c), any of the foregoing sorts of damage would be recoverable under the Act. Cf., e. g., Idaho ex rel. Trombley v. United States Dept. of Army, Corps of Engineers, 666 F. 2d 444 (CA9) (adopting a restrictive interpretation of the language of § 1346(b)), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 823 (1982). If the sorts of damages that, under petitioner’s theory, are covered by § 2680(c) would not be recoverable in any event because of the limitation built into § 1346(b), § 2680(c) would be mere surplusage. The unattractiveness of such a construction of the statute, see Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 392 (1979), would cast considerable doubt on petitioner’s position. However, because the question of the scope of § 1346(b) has not been briefed or argued in this case, we decline to rely on any inferences that might be drawn therefrom in our decision today.

       Because petitioner conceded below that the injuries to his property occurred after it had been lawfully detained by customs officers, we need not consider the meaning of the term “detention” as used in the statute.

       The Court of Appeals, while properly emphasizing the plain language of § 2680(c) as the basis for its ruling, suggested that the structure of the Tort Claims Act should affect how that language is read. Relying on the principles that “sovereign immunity is the rule, and that legislative departures from the rule must be strictly construed,” the Court of Appeals suggested that § 2680(c), as an exception from a statute waiving sovereign immunity, should be broadly construed. 679 F. 2d, at 308-309. We find such an approach unhelpful. Though the Court of Appeals is certainly correct that the exceptions to the Tort Claims Act should not be read in a way that would “‘nullif[y them] through judicial interpretation,’” id., at 309, unduly generous interpretations of the exceptions run the risk of defeating the central purpose of the statute. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543, 548, n. 5 (1951); cf. Block v. Neal, 460 U. S. 289, 298 (1983) (“‘The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been announced’ ”) (quoting Anderson v. Hayes Construction Co., 243 N. Y. 140, 147, 153 N. E. 28, 29-30 (1926) (Cardozo, J.)). We think that the proper objective of a court attempting to construe one of the subsections of 28 U. S. C. § 2680 is to identify “those circumstances which are within the words and reason of the exception” — no less and no more. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 31 (1953).

       For reiterations of this argument, see A & D International, Inc. v. United States, 665 F. 2d, at 672; A-Mark, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 593 F. 2d, at 850.

       See General Tort Bill: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Claims, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1932) (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Rugg).

       Judge Holtzoff went on to explain that “[t]his provision is suggested in the proposed draft of the bill submitted by the Crown Proceedings Committee in England in 1927. ...” Holtzoff Report, at 16. The relevant portion of the bill to which Holtzoff referred was even more explicit:
      “No proceedings shall lie under this section—
      “(c) for or in respect of the loss of or any deterioration or damage occasioned to, or any delay in the release of, any goods or merchandise by reason of anything done or omitted to be done by any officer of customs and excise acting as such . . . .” Report of Crown Proceedings Committee §ll(5)(c), pp. 17-18 (Apr. 1927). (It appears that this bill was never enacted into law in England.)

       Mr. Holtzoff wrote his report while serving as Special Assistant to the Attorney General. He had been “assigned by Attorney General Mitchell to the special task of co-ordinating the views of the Government departments” regarding the proper scope of a tort claims statute. See Borchard, The Federal Tort Claims Bill, 1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, n. 2 (1983). Holtzoff submitted his report, in which his draft bill was contained, to Assistant Attorney General Rugg, who in turn transmitted it to the General Accounting Office of the Comptroller General. Insofar as Holtzoff’s report embodied the views of the Executive Department at that stage of the debates over the tort claims bill, it is likely that, at some point, the report was brought to the attention of the Congressmen considering the bill. We agree with the dissent that, because the report was never introduced into the public record, the ideas expressed therein should not be given great weight in determining the intent of the Legislature. See post, at 863-864. But, in the absence of any direct evidence regarding how Members of Congress understood the provision that became § 2680(c), it seems to us senseless to ignore entirely the views of its draftsman.

       See also S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 33 (1946); S. Rep. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1942); H. R. Rep. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1942).

       Cf. 679 F. 2d, at 809 (Weis, J., dissenting) (discussed, supra, at 854).

       The dissent objects to our effort to test our interpretation of § 2680(c) for conformity with the legislative purposes that underlie § 2680 as a whole, principally on the ground that we take inadequate account of the “central purpose” of the Tort Claims Act. Post, at 866-869. The dissent mistakes the nature of our analysis. Our view is that the language of § 2680(c) is inclusive enough to exempt the United States from liability for negligence in the handling or storage of goods detained by the Customs Service, see supra, at 854. Our purpose in looking to the legislative history is merely to ensure that our construction is not undercut by any indication that Congress meant the exception to be read more narrowly. Because of the sparseness of the evidence regarding the purpose of § 2680(c) itself, see supra, at 855-858, we consider it advisable to consider Congress’ more general objectives in excluding certain kinds of claims from the broad waiver of sovereign immunity effected by the Tort Claims Act. Because we find that our reading of § 2680(c) is consistent with those objectives, we see no need to throw our analytical net any wider.

       For a variety of expressions of these three purposes, see S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 33 (1946); Tort Claims: Hearings on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463 before the House Judiciary Committee, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 33 (1942) (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Shea); Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on H. R. 7236 before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Judiciary Committee, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 22 (1940) (testimony of Alexander Holtzoff); Hearings, supra n. 11, at 17 (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Rugg); Holtzoff Report, at 15. To our knowledge, the only arguably relevant specific statement as to the purpose of § 2680(c) appears in the testimony of Alexander Holtzoff before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Holtzoff emphasized the adequacy of existing remedies as a justification for the portion of the provision pertaining to the recovery of improperly collected taxes; he did not proffer an explanation for the portion of the provision pertaining to the detention of goods. Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on S. 2690 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 38 (1940).

       See, e. g., 19 U. S. C. § 1594 (authorizing seizure of “a vessel or vehicle” to force payment of assessed penalties); 19 U. S. C. § 1595a(a) (authorizing seizure of property used to facilitate the illegal importation of other goods).

       The Government’s vulnerability to fraudulent claims would be especially great in a case in which the Customs Service took custody of the goods from a shipper rather than from the owner. The shipper would contend that it exercised due care in the handling of the goods. The owner would demonstrate that he received the goods in damaged condition. In the absence of an extensive system for accounting for the movements and treatment of property in its custody, the Customs Service would be hard pressed to establish that its employees were not at fault. We do not suggest that such a dilemma would automatically give rise to liability on the part of the United States; that of course would depend upon the substance of the pertinent state tort law. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b), 2674. But uneasiness at the prospect of such scenarios may have influenced Congress when it carved out this exception to the Tort Claims Act.

       See, e. g., States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F. 2d 1146, 1149 (CA4 1974); Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F. 2d 774, 775 (CA2 1944); J. Story, Commentaries on the Law of Bailments §§ 613, 618, pp. 387, 390 (1832).

       See States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, supra, at 1149-1150.

       We note that there exists at least one other remedial system that might enable someone in petitioner’s position to obtain compensation from the Government. If the owner of property detained by the Customs Service were able to establish the existence of an implied-in-fact contract of bailment between himself and the Service, he could bring suit under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491 (1976 ed., Supp. V). See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U. S. 460 (1980).

       At oral argument, the Government contended that a property owner could recover against the United States under this theory by bringing suit against the relevant District Director of the Customs Service and would not be obliged to prove negligence on the part of any specific customs official. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29. Though we do not decide the issue, such an interpretation of the common-law doctrine appears questionable to us. Except in cases in which the property owner could demonstrate that the Director expressly authorized tortious conduct by a subordinate, it seems likely that the owner would be obliged to identify and bring suit against the individual whose malfeasance caused the injury to his goods.

       The dissent finds “internally inconsistent” the foregoing “hypothetical rationales” for § 2680(c). Post, at 865. Thus, the dissent suggests that the fact that an owner of goods damaged by the Customs Service might recover from the United States under the Tucker Act, see n. 22, supra, makes it unlikely that Congress would have been chary of creating a remedy under the Tort Claims Act because of the risk of exposing the Government to an excessive number of fraudulent suits. Post, at 865-866. But the requirement that an owner, to recover under the Tucker Act, prove that the Service entered into an implied-in-fact contract of bailment would operate to screen out many fraudulent claims; Congress rationally could have concluded that, in view of the absence of any comparable filter in the Tort Claims Act, it was inadvisable to extend the coverage of the latter to owners of detained goods. Similarly, the dissent finds it implausible that Congress might have feared that the creation of a remedy against the United States under the Tort Claims Act would inhibit vigorous enforcement of the customs laws, see supra, at 859, when there already existed a common-law remedy against customs officials for negligence in the handling of goods, see supra, at 860-861. Post, at 866. But, as explained above, the apparent requirement that the owner, to recover under the common law, prove negligence on the part of a specific customs official, see supra, at 860-861, and n. 23, combined with the obligation of the United States to indemnify the official if he acted under proper authority, see supra, at 860, would have minimized the effect of the extant remedies on the willingness of the Service to adopt vigorous enforcement policies and the willingness of its officials to implement those policies. Congress might well have feared that the creation of a remedy under the Tort Claims Act would have increased the liability of the United States to such a degree as to curtail the exercise by the Service of its authority to detain goods.

       Comment, Governmental Liability for Customs Officials’ Negligence: Kosak v. United States, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 1040 (1983); Note, Using the Federal Tort Claims Act to Remedy Property Damage Following Customs Service Seizures, 17 U. Mich. J. of L. Ref. 83 (1983).

       The majority maintains that “ ‘any claim arising in respect of’ the detention of goods means any claim ‘arising out of’ the detention of goods, and includes a claim resulting from negligent handling or storage of detained property.” Ante, at 854.

       The majority’s analysis, it should be observed, puts the cart before the horse.
      “The essence of bill drafting is placing a legislative proposal in the proper legal phraseology and form to achieve congressional intent. It is primarily a task of legal analysis and research rather than of composition. . . .Framing the legal language to embody congressional purpose is not as difficult as ascertaining what that purpose is in its entirety. While a committee (or individual member of Congress, as the case may be) is in the process of working out what it wants to do, the legislative counsel assist it by explaining the effect of alternative proposals. Even after the committee (or Congressman) has settled upon the major outlines of a measure, subsidiary policy questions seem to unfold endlessly. The legislative counsel must point up all of those for the committee (or Congressman) to decide. To accomplish that, the legislative counsel must envisage the broad application of the proposed law in all of its ramifications.” K. Kofmehl, Professional Staffs of Congress 189 (3d ed. 1977) (footnote omitted).
      Many bills are of course initially drafted in the Executive Branch. After today’s decision, we can anticipate executive agencies searching long dormant files for documents similar to the Holtzoff Report. We can also anticipate that private parties will attempt to capitalize on this new reservoir of “legislative” history as well, through discovery and perhaps the Freedom of Information Act. In light of the Government’s reliance on the Holtzoff Report, presumably it will not assert that this kind of material is privileged when private parties are in search of “legislative” intent.
      Finally, the language in some bills is initially drafted by private lobbyists. One doubts that the majority would find “significant” the intention of such a draftsman when that intention was not shared with the Congress.

       Some of the majority’s ipse dixit about the Customs Service does merit response. We are told, for example, without citation to any authority, much less any statements in the legislative history, that the Customs Service does not have the staff or resources to inspect the goods it detains. Ante, at 859. Notwithstanding the fact that it appears the Service undertakes such inspections now to some extent, see U. S. Customs Service, Customs Inspector Handbook, §§ 3.55(b), 5.72 (1982); see generally 19 CFR §§ 158.21-158.30 (1983), one wonders what the staff which detain the items are doing with them if not inspecting them, why they cannot make a record of the condition of the goods, why this burden would be onerous, and why the Congress would want Government officials charged -with custody of a citizen’s property to be free from this burden that any reasonably prudent person under the circumstances would undertake. The answer, or so it would seem, is that the “Government, as a defendant, can exert an unctuous persuasiveness because it can clothe official carelessness with a public interest. Hence, one of the unanticipated consequences of the Tort Claims Act has been to throw the weight of government influence on the side of lax standards of care in the negligence cases which it defends.” Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 50 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).

       Cf. Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 136, 139 (1950) (“This Act, however, should be construed to fit, so far as will comport with its words, into the entire statutory system of remedies against the Government to make a workable, consistent and equitable whole. The Tort Claims Act was not an isolated and spontaneous flash of congressional generosity. It marks the culmination of a long effort to mitigate unjust consequences of sovereign immunity from suit”).

       The majority largely relies on the legislative history of bills which were never enacted into law. All legislation has it germinal period, but the intentions of the proponents of previous legislation which was never enacted are at most a secondary aid to construing the intent of those that enacted a descendant of it. The earlier legislation may have failed to be enacted for a variety of reasons, of course, but one reason for failure is that the reasons offered by the proponents were unconvincing to the majority of the Congress. The same proposal may be justified on different rationales, however, and it is the rationale of the Congress which enacts a measure which defines congressional purpose and intent. In the context of the Federal Tort Claims Act, we have recognized the extremely limited utility, and sometimes misleading nature, of reliance upon the legislative history of the plethora of earlier tort claims bills which failed to command a consensus, acknowledging that the measure ultimately enacted was presented to the Congress in a “new aspect” when it become Part IV of the proposed Legislative Reorganization Act. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543, 550-552, and n. 8 (1951).

       See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 29-31 (1946); see also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S., at 24-25; United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S., at 548-550 (The Federal Tort Claims Act “merely substitutes the District Courts for Congress as the agency to determine the validity and amount of [tort] claims.” Id., at 549); Feres v. United States, supra, at 140.
      The Tort Claims Act was one part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. The Legislative Reorganization Act was the product of a year of work by the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress. E. g., S. Rep. No. 1400, supra, at 1. The Joint Committee, however, was not empowered to report legislation. See H. Con. Res. 18, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). The bill embodying its work, S. 2177, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., sponsored by Senator La Follette (the Chairman of the Joint Committee) was referred to a Special Committee on the Organization of the Congress in the Senate, chaired by Senator La Follette, created for the purpose of reporting the bill. See S. Res. 260, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). In the House, the Committee on Rules simply reported a rule permitting floor consideration of S. 2177, as passed in the Senate, and a substitute proposed by Representative Monroney (the Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee). See H. Res. 717, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).