text:
    UNITED STATES v. ERIKA, INC.
    No. 80-1594.
    Argued March 1, 1982
    Decided April 20, 1982

      Powell, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous court.

      Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Acting Solicitor General Wallace, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, David M. Cohen, Dwight D. Meier, and Robert P. Jaye.

      Stephen H. Oleskey argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Timothy H. Gailey.

        Frederick B. Bellamy and Alan G. Gilchrist filed a brief for the American Academy of Family Physicians as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

   Justice Powell

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question is whether the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to review determinations by private insurance carriers of the amount of benefits payable under Part B of the Medicare statute.

I

Part B of the Medicare program, 79 Stat. 301, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1395j et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), is a federally subsidized, voluntary health insurance system for persons who are 65 or older or who are disabled. The companion Part A Medicare program covers institutional health costs such as hospital expenses. Part B supplements Part A’s coverage by insuring against a portion of some medical expenses, such as certain physician services and X-rays, that are excluded from the Part A program. Eligible individuals pay monthly premiums if they choose to enroll in Part B. These premiums, together with contributions from the Federal Government, are deposited in the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund that finances the Part B program. See §§ 1395j, 1395r, 1395s, 1395t, and 1395w (1976 ed. and Supp. IV).

The Secretary of Health and Human Services administers the Medicare program. “In order to provide for the administration of the benefits . . . with maximum efficiency and convenience for individuals entitled to benefits,” the Secretary is authorized to assign the task of paying Part B claims from the Trust Fund to private insurance carriers experienced in such matters. § 1395u. See H. R. Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 46 (1965); S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 53 (1965). After Part B enrollees receive medical care, they (or, after their assignment, their medical providers) bill the private insurance carrier.

If the carrier determines that a claim meets all Part B coverage criteria such as medical necessity and reasonable cost, the carrier pays the claim out of the federal funds. See 42 U. S. C. § 1395u; Schweiker v. McClure, ante, p. 188. If the carrier decides that reimbursement in full is not warranted, the statute and the regulations designate an appeal procedure available to dissatisfied claimants. All may request a “review determination,” which is a de novo written review hearing before a carrier employee different from the one who initially decided the claim. Claimants who remain dissatisfied and whose appeal involves more than $100 then may petition for an oral hearing before a hearing officer designated by the carrier. See 42 U. S. C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C); 42 CFR § 405.820 (1980). Unless the carrier or the hearing officer decides to reopen the proceeding, the hearing officer’s decision is “final and binding upon all parties to the hearing . . . .” § 405.835. Neither the statute nor the Secretary’s regulations make further provision for review of hearing officer decisions.

II

Respondent, a major distributor of kidney dialysis supplies, sold its products to institutions and individuals. About half of such sales were covered by the Part B program. Persons purchasing dialysis supplies assigned their Medicare Part B claims to respondent. See 42 U. S. C. § 426(e); § 426-1 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (establishing Part B coverage for renal disease). Respondent in turn billed the Prudential Insurance Company of America, the private insurance carrier for the New Jersey area in which it is based. According to its contract with the Secretary, Prudential was required to reimburse 80% of what it determined to be a “reasonable charg[e]” for these supplies. See § 1395l(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV).

Prudential interpreted the relevant statute and regulations to define the “reasonable charges” for respondent’s products to be their catalog price as of July 1 of the preceding calendar year. For example, Prudential reimbursed respondent’s Part B invoices from July 1, 1975, to June 30, 1976, on the basis of prices contained in respondent’s July 1,1974, catalog.

Prudential began reimbursing respondent on this basis in 1974. Early in 1976 the respondent learned about the grounds for Prudential’s partial reimbursement of its invoices. At that time it requested Prudential to adjust past and future reimbursements to reflect price increases effective after July 1, 1974. Prudential agreed to adjust prospectively the basis for payment for the drug heparin, the price of which apparently had increased sharply. Cf. U. S. Dept. of HEW, Medicare Part B Carriers Manual § 5010.2 (1980) (permitting adjustments to customary charges in “highly unusual situations where equity clearly indicates that the increases are warranted”)- But the carrier refused to make either retroactive adjustments for heparin or any adjustments at all for other products.

Respondent sought review of this refusal before one of Prudential’s hearing officers pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1395 u(b)(3)(C). The hearing officer affirmed Prudential’s decision. Respondent then brought the instant action against the United States in the Court of Claims seeking reimbursement on the basis of its current charges, asserting that Prudential’s refusal to set “reasonable charges” on the basis of respondent’s interim price increases contravened the Fifth Amendment as well as the Social Security Act and applicable regulations. The Court of Claims ruled that respondent’s suit was within the jurisdictional grant of the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491, which permits the Court of Claims to hear “any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department.” 225 Ct. Cl. 252, 256-262, 634 F. 2d 580, 584-588 (1980) (en banc), opinion clarified, 225 Ct. Cl. 273, 647 F. 2d 129 (1981). On the merits, the court decided that Prudential’s calculation of respondent’s maximum allowable charge erred in several respects. 225 Ct. Cl., at 262-268, 634 F. 2d, at 588-590. The court remanded the case to Prudential for redetermination of these matters. We granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Claims has jurisdiction over suits of this kind. 451 U. S. 982 (1981). We now reverse.

H — I H — I H-t

The United States argues that Congress, by enacting the Medicare statute, 42 U. S. C. § 1395j et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), specifically precluded review in the Court of Claims of adverse hearing officer determinations of the amount of Part B payments. We agree.

Our lodestar is the language of the statute. Congress has specified in the Medicare statute that disputed carrier Part B determinations are to be subject to review in “a fair hearing by the carrier, in any case where the amount in controversy is $100 or more . . . 42 U. S. C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C) (emphasis added). See Schweiker v. McClure, ante, p. 188. Congress also provided explicitly for review by the Secretary of “determination[s] of whether an individual is entitled to benefits under part A or part B, and [of] the determination of the amount of benefits under part A § 1395ff(a) (emphasis added). Individuals dissatisfied with the Secretary’s decision on such matters are granted the right to additional administrative review, together with a further option of judicial review, in two instances only: when the dispute relates to their eligibility to participate in either Part A or Part B, and when the dispute concerns the amount of benefits to which they are entitled under Part A. § 1395ff(b).

Section 1395ff thus distinguishes between two types of administrative decisions: eligibility determinations (that decide whether an individual is 65 or over or “disabled” within the meaning of the Medicare program) and amount determinations (that decide the amount of the Medicare payment to be made on a particular claim). Conspicuously, the statute fails to authorize further review for determinations of the amount of Part B awards. In the context of the statute’s precisely drawn provisions, this omission provides persuasive evidence that Congress deliberately intended to foreclose further review of such claims. See, e. g., Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, 162-163 (1981); Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U. S. 490, 512-513 (1981).

IV

The legislative history confirms this view and explains its logic. The Committee Reports accompanying the original enactment of the Medicare program stated that the supplemental payments under the Part B program generally were expected to be smaller than those under the primary Part A program. Apparently, it was for this reason that the proposed bill did not provide for judicial review of “a determination concerning the amount of benefits under [P]art B . . . .” S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 55 (1965).

This intent to limit the review of the generally smaller Part B awards was reiterated when Congress amended § 1395ff(b) in 1972. When introducing this amendment, Senator Bennett stated that it was intended to clarify the intent of existing law, which “greatly restricted” the appealability of Medicare decisions “in order to avoid overloading the courts with quite minor matters.” 118 Cong. Rec. 33992 (1972). The Senator explained that the amendment would assure that judicial review would be available as to questions of “eligibility to any benefits of medicare but not [as] to decisions on a claim for payment for a given service.” Ibid.

The Conference Committee advanced an identical explanation for this amendment:

“CLARIFICATION OF MEDICARE APPEAL PROCEDURES
“Amendment No. 561: The Senate amendment added a new section to the House bill which would make clear that there is no authorization for an appeal to the Secretary or for judicial review on matters solely involving amounts of benefits under Part B, and that insofar as Part A amounts are concerned, appeal is authorized only if the amount in controversy is $100 or more and judicial review only if the amount in controversy is $1,000 or more.
“The House recedes.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1605, p. 61 (1972).

These expressions of legislative intent unambiguously support our reading of the statutory language. Respondent advances no persuasive evidence of contrary congressional will. In such circumstances, our task is at an end.

The judgment of the Court of Claims is reversed.

So ordered.

       For example, the private insurance carrier involved in this suit is the Prudential Insurance Company of America.

       Claimants’ reimbursable “reasonable charge” cannot exceed the “prevailing charge” calculated for “the locality.” 42 U. S. C. § 1395u(b)(3) (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). In an effort to control the extent to which the Medicare program contributes to the inflation of medical costs, the “prevailing charge” formula is based on typical local rates for the preceding year. See 42 CFR § 405.504(a)(2)(i) (1980) (defining “prevailing charge” as the fee that “would cover 75 percent of the customary charges made for similar services in the same locality during the calendar year preceding the start of the 12-month period (beginning July 1 of each year) in which the claim is submitted or the request for payment is made”) (emphasis added). Prudential defined respondent’s own catalog price as the relevant “prevailing charge” because respondent was virtually the only provider of dialysis supplies within Prudential’s locality.

       Respondent claimed that its July 1, 1974, catalog contained a substantial printing error for one product. This claim has been settled and is no longer at issue.

       The court added: “The plaintiff also asserts we have jurisdiction under section 10(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 703. In view of our holding that we have jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, we find it unnecessary to consider this additional basis of jurisdiction. But cf. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99 (1977).” 225 Ct. Cl., at 256, n. 5, 634 F. 2d, at 585, n. 5.
      Respondent’s arguments were directed in large measure against the actions of Prudential. Prudential, however, was not made a party to this litigation. The Secretary’s regulations specify that the Administrator of the Health Care Financing Administration “is the real party of interest in any litigation involving the administration of the [Medicare] program.” 42 CFR § 421.5(b) (1980).

       The court found respondent’s constitutional claims “insubstantial,” citing Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U. S. 170 (1978); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976); and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). 225 Ct. Cl., at 268, 634 F. 2d, at 591. One judge wrote separately to express regret regarding the “short shrift” that the majority gave these claims. Id., at 272, 634 F. 2d, at 593. He reasoned that “Erika may have, probably has, made its constitutional allegations mostly to aid our jurisdiction, and we should not spurn this aid.” Id., at 272, 634 F. 2d, at 594 (Nichols, J., concurring). Respondent does not press these constitutional claims before us.

       As we find the language of the statute dispositive, we do not reach the Government’s alternative contentions that 42 U. S. C. § 405(h) controls or that the respondent has failed to show that the United States unequivocally has waived sovereign immunity.

       Although the statute in terms affords this right of review only to an “individual enrolled under [Part B],” 42 U. S. C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C), the Secretary’s regulations make clear this right extends to suppliers of Part B services to whom individual beneficiaries have assigned their claims. 42 CFR § 405.801(a) (1980).

       See 42 U. S. C. § 405(b); 20 CFR part 404, subpart J (1981).

       See 42 U. S. C. § 405(g).

       “§ 1395ff. Determinations of Secretary
      “(a) Entitlement to and amount of benefits
      “The determination of whether an individual is entitled to benefits under part A or part B, and the determination of the amount of benefits under part A, shall be made by the Secretary in accordance with regulations prescribed by him.
      “(b) Appeal by individuals
      “(1) Any individual dissatisfied with any determination under subsection (a) of this section as to—
      “(A) whether he meets the conditions of section 426 or section 426a of this title [which set forth eligibility requirements to be satisfied before an individual is permitted to participate in Part A of the Medicare program], or
      “(B) whether he is eligible to enroll and has enrolled pursuant to the provisions of part B of [the Medicare program] ... , or,
      “(C) the amount of the benefits under part A (including a determination where such amount is determined to be zero)

        shall be entitled to a hearing thereon by the Secretary to the same extent as is provided in section 405(b) of this title and to judicial review of the Secretary’s final decision after such hearing as is provided in section 405(g) of this title.”

       With respect to “Appeals” the Senate Committee Report stated:
      “The committee’s bill provides for the Secretary to make determinations, under both the hospital insurance plan [Part A] and the supplementary plan [Part B], as to whether individuals are entitled to [Part A] hospital insurance benefits or [Part B] supplementary medical insurance benefits and for hearings by the Secretary and judicial review where an individual is dissatisfied with the Secretary’s determination. Hearings and judicial review are also provided for where an individual is dissatisfied with a determination as to the amount of benefits under the [Part A] hospital insurance plan if the amount in controversy is $1,000 or more. (Under the supplementary plan [Part B], carriers, not the Secretary, would review beneficiary complaints regarding the amount of benefits, and the bill does not provide for judicial review of a determination concerning the amount of benefits under part B where claims will probably be for substantially smaller amounts than under part A.) Hospitals, extended care facilities, and home health agencies would be entitled to hearing and judicial review if they are dissatisfied with the Secretary’s determination regarding their eligibility to participate in the program. It is intended that the remedies provided by these review procedures shall be exclusive.” S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 54-55 (1965) (emphasis added). See also H. R. Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 47 (1965).
      Congressional limitation of the amount of procedure available to Part B claimants must be understood in light of the magnitude of the Part B program. In 1980, for instance, 158 million Part B claims were processed. Schweiker v. McClure, ante, at 190.

       As originally enacted, this section provided:
      “Any individual dissatisfied with any determination under subsection (a) of this section as to entitlement under part A or part B, or as to amount of benefits under part A where the matter in controversy is $100 or more, shall be entitled to a hearing thereon by the Secretary to the same extent as is provided in section 405(b) of this title, and, in the case of a determination as to entitlement or as to amount of benefits where the amount in controversy is $1,000 or more, to judicial review of the Secretary’s final decision after such hearing as is provided in section 405(g) of this title.” 79 Stat. 330, as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 1395ff(b) (1970 ed.) (emphasis added).
      The 1972 amendment replaced the emphasized language, including the first word “entitlement,” to create the current wording quoted in n. 10, supra.

       Senator Bennett’s entire opening statement was as follows:
      “. . . Mr. President, the purpose of the amendment is to make sure existing law, which gives the right of a person to go to court on the question of eligibility to receive welfare, is not interpreted to mean he can take the question of the Federal claim to court. If he did we would never have an end to it. This is to reconfirm the original intention of the law that the courts can determine only eligibility.
      “The situations in which medicare decisions are appealable to the courts were intended in the original law to be greatly restricted in order to avoid overloading the courts with quite minor matters. The law refers to ‘entitlement’ as being an issue subject to court review and the word was intended to mean eligibility to any benefits of medicare but not to decisions on a claim for payment for a given service.
      “If judicial review is made available where any claim is denied, as some court decisions have held, the resources of the Federal court system would be unduly taxed and little real value would be derived by the enrollees. The proposed amendment would merely clarify the original intent of the law and prevent the overloading of the courts with trivial matters because the intent is considered unclear.” 118 Cong. Rec. 33992 (1972).
      The Senate agreed to the amendment without further discussion. Ibid.

       In addition to its substantive money claim assertedly arising under the Medicare statute, respondent argues that it derives such a substantive claim from an implied-in-faet contract with the United States, or as a third-party beneficiary to Prudential’s contract with the United States. These arguments fail because any such contracts with the United States necessarily would include the statutory preclusion of review of hearing officers’ determinations regarding the amount of Part B benefits.
      In response to questioning at oral argument, respondent’s counsel answered that it was asserting a constitutional right to judicial review of Prudential’s Part B determination. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39. Respondent, however, neither argued this ground in the Court of Claims, included it among the questions presented to this Court in its brief in opposition or in its brief on the merits, nor devoted any substantial briefing to it. We consequently do not address the issue. See this Court’s Rules 34.2 and 22.1; cf. Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., Inc., 386 U. S. 317, 330 (1967).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Powell

license: Public Domain

text:
    INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO, et al. v. ALLIED INTERNATIONAL, INC.
    No. 80-1663.
    Argued January 18, 1982
    Decided April 20, 1982

      Powell, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous court.

      Ernest L. Mathews, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Thomas W. Gleason and Charles R. Goldburg.

      Duane R. Batista argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Danielle E. DeBenedictis, David M. Saltiel, and Steven R. Berger.

      Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Harriet S. Shapiro, Norton J. Come, Joseph E. Mayer, and James Holcomb.

        J. Albert Woll and Laurence Gold filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging reversal.
      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Kenneth C. McGuiness, Robert E. Williams, Allen A. Lauterbach, and C. David May-field for the American Farm Bureau Federation; and by Thomas P. Gies for Occidental Chemical Co.

   Justice Powell

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question for our decision is whether a refusal by an American longshoremen’s union to unload cargoes shipped from the Soviet Union is an illegal secondary boycott under § 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 61 Stat. 141, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(4).

I — I

On January 9, 1980, Thomas Gleason, president of the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA), ordered ILA members to stop handling cargoes arriving from or destined for the Soviet Union. Gleason took this action to protest the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. In obedience to the order, longshoremen up and down the east and gulf coasts refused to service ships carrying Russian cargoes.

Respondent Allied International, Inc. (Allied), is an American company that imports Russian wood products for resale in the United States. Allied contracts with Waterman Steamship Lines (Waterman), an American corporation operating ships of United States registry, for shipment of the wood from Leningrad to ports on the east and gulf coasts of the United States. Waterman, in turn, employs the steve-doring company of John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc. (Clark), to unload its ships docking in Boston. Under the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement between ILA Local 799 and the Boston Shipping Association, of which Clark is a member, Clark obtains its longshoring employees through the union hiring hall.

As a result of the boycott, Allied’s shipments were disrupted completely. Ultimately, Allied was forced to renegotiate its Russian contracts, substantially reducing its purchases and jeopardizing its ability to supply its own customers. App. 24a-28a. On March 31, 1980, after union offlcals informed Allied that ILA members would continue to refuse to unload any Russian cargo, Allied brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Claiming that the boycott violated the prohibition against secondary boycotts in § 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(4), Allied sued for damages under §303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 61 Stat. 158, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 187, which creates a private damages remedy for the victims of secondary boycotts. At about the same time, Allied filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board under § 10(b) of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 160(b).

Finding that Allied had not alleged a violation of §8(b) (4)(B), the District Court dismissed Allied’s complaint. 492 F. Supp. 334 (1980). The court characterized the ILA boycott as a purely political, primary boycott of Russian goods. So described, the boycott was not within the scope of § 8(b)(4).

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the dismissal of Allied’s complaint and remanded for further proceedings. 640 F. 2d 1368 (1981). As an initial matter, and in agreement with the District Court, the court found that the effects of the ILA boycott were “in commerce” within the meaning of the NLRA as interpreted by a long line of decisions of this Court. The court held further that the ILA boycott, as described in Allied’s averments, was within § 8(b)(4)’s prohibition of secondary boycotts, despite its political purpose, and that resort to such behavior was not protected activity under the First Amendment.

We granted certiorari to determine the coverage of the secondary boycott provisions of the NLRA in this setting. 454 U. S. 814 (1981). We affirm.

II

Our starting point in a case of this kind must be the language of the statute. By its exact terms the secondary boycott provisions of § 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA would appear to be aimed precisely at the sort of activity alleged in this case. Section 8(b)(4)(B) governs activities designed to influence individuals employed by “any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce.” Certainly Allied, Waterman, and Clark were engaged “in commerce,” and Allied alleges that the effect of the ILA action was to obstruct commerce up and down the east and gulf coasts. Just as plainly, it would appear that the ILA boycott fell within § 8(b)(4)(B)’s prohibition of secondary boycotts. Allied alleges that by inducing members of the union to refuse to handle Russian cargoes, the ILA boycott was designed to force Allied, Waterman, and Clark “to cease doing business” with one another and “to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in” Russian products.

Notwithstanding the language of the statute, petitioners argue that their conduct was not “in commerce” as our decisions have interpreted that term. They argue as well that even if the ILA activity were within the jurisdictional scope of § 8(b)(4), the boycott was not the sort of secondary boycott Congress intended to proscribe. We address these arguments in turn.

A

In a line of cases beginning with Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U. S. 138 (1957), the Court has held that the “maritime operations of foreign-flag ships employing alien seamen are not in ‘commerce’ ” as this term is used in the NLRA. Thus, in Benz the Court held that picketing by an American union in support of striking foreign crew-members of a foreign-flag vessel was not governed by the Act. Relying upon the legislative history of the NLRA and the longstanding principles of comity in the treatment of foreign vessels, the Court held that the labor laws were not designed “to resolve labor disputes between nationals of other countries operating ships under foreign laws.” Id., at 143.

More recently in Windward Shipping, Ltd. v. American Radio Assn., 415 U. S. 104 (1974), and American Radio Assn. v. Mobile S.S. Assn., 419 U. S. 215 (1974), the Court again identified the limits to the jurisdictional reach of the labor laws in the context of foreign vessels. In Windward, American maritime unions picketed foreign-flag vessels to call attention to the lower wages paid to foreign seamen and to the adverse effect of these lower wages on American seamen. Finding that the picketing was designed to raise the operating costs of foreign vessels and that it had “more than a negligible impact on the ‘maritime operations’ of these foreign ships,” 415 U. S., at 114, the Court held that the union’s activity was not “in commerce” under the labor laws. Id., at 115.

Facing the identical activity by maritime unions in Mobile, the Court reached the same conclusion. The complainants in Mobile were not foreign shipowners, as in Windward, but parties feeling the secondary effects of the union’s protest— American stevedoring companies and an American shipper. The Court held that this change in complaining parties did not alter the jurisdictional reach of the Act. The Benz line of cases did not permit “a bifurcated view of the effects of a single group of pickets at a single site.” Mobile, supra, at 222. The refusal of American stevedores to cross the picket lines “was a crucial part of the mechanism by which the maritime operations of the foreign ships were to be affected.” 419 U. S., at 224.

Applying the principles developed in these cases to the circumstances here, we find that the ILA’s activity was “in commerce” and within the scope of the NLRA. Unlike the situation in every case from Benz through Mobile, the ILA’s refusal to unload Allied’s shipments in no way affected the maritime operations of foreign ships. The boycott here did not aim at altering the terms of employment of foreign crews on foreign-flag vessels. It did not seek to extend the bill of rights developed for American workers and American employers to foreign seamen and foreign shipowners. The longstanding tradition of restraint in applying the laws of this country to ships of a foreign country — a tradition that lies at the heart of Benz and every subsequent decision — therefore is irrelevant to this case. As the Court of Appeals explained, this drama was “played out by an all-American cast.” 640 F. 2d, at 1374. “[A]n American union has ordered its members not to work for an American stevedore which had contracted to service an American ship carrying goods of an American importer.” Id., at 1372. In these circumstances, the clear language of the statute needs no further explication.

B

The secondary boycott provisions in § 8(b)(4)(B) prohibit a union from inducing employees to refuse to handle goods with the object of forcing any person to cease doing business with any other person. By its terms the statutory prohibition applies to the undisputed facts of this case. The ILA has no dispute with Allied, Waterman, or Clark. It does not seek any labor objective from these employers. Its sole complaint is with the foreign and military policy of the Soviet Union.. As understandable and even commendable as the ILA’s ultimate objectives may be, the certain effect of its action is to impose a heavy burden on neutral employers. And it is just such a burden, as well as widening of industrial strife, that the secondary boycott provisions were designed to prevent. As the NLRB explained in ruling upon the Regional Director’s complaint against the ILA:

“It is difficult to imagine a situation that falls more squarely within the scope of Section 8(b)(4) than the one before us today. Here, the Union’s sole dispute is with the USSR over its invasion of Afghanistan. Allied, Waterman, and Clark have nothing to do with this dispute. Yet the Union’s actions in furtherance of its disagreement with Soviet foreign policy have brought direct economic pressure on all three parties and have resulted in a substantial cessation of business. Thus, the conduct alleged in this case is precisely the type of conduct Congress intended the National Labor Relations Act to regulate.” International Longshoremen’s Assn., AFL-CIO (Allied International, Inc.), 257 N. L. R. B. 1075, 1078-1079 (1981) (footnote omitted).

Nor can it be argued that the ILA’s action was outside of the prohibition on secondary boycotts because its object was not to halt business between Allied, Clark, and Waterman with respect to Russian goods, but simply to free ILA members from the morally repugnant duty of handling Russian goods. Such an argument misses the point. Undoubtedly many secondary boycotts have the object of freeing employees from handling goods from an objectionable source. Nonetheless, when a purely secondary boycott “reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin or substantial loss,” NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, 447 U. S. 607, 614 (1980), the pressure on secondary parties must be viewed as at least one of the objects of the boycott or the statutory prohibition would be rendered meaningless. The union must take responsibility for the “foreseeable consequences” of its conduct. Id., at 614, n. 9; see NLRB v. Operating Engineers, 400 U. S. 297, 304-305 (1971). Here the union was fully aware of the losses it was inflicting upon Allied. It is undisputed that Allied officials endeavored to persuade ILA leaders to allow it to fulfill its Russian contracts. On the basis of the record before it, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that Allied had alleged a violation of § 8(b)(4).

Neither is it a defense to the application of § 8(b)(4) that the reason for the ILA boycott was not a labor dispute with a primary employer but a political dispute with a foreign nation. Section 8(b)(4) contains no such limitation. In the plainest of language it prohibits “forcing . . . any person to cease . . . handling . . . the products of any other producer ... or to cease doing business with any other person.” The legislative history does not indicate that political disputes should be excluded from the scope of § 8(b)(4). The prohibition was drafted broadly to protect neutral parties, “the helpless victims of quarrels that do not concern them at all.” H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (1947). Despite criticism from President Truman as well as from some legislators that the secondary boycott provision was too sweeping, the Congress refused to narrow its scope. Recognizing that “[ijllegal boycotts take many forms,” id., at 24, Congress intended its prohibition to reach broadly.

We would create a large and undefinable exception to the statute if we accepted the argument that “political” boycotts are exempt from the secondary boycott provision. The distinction between labor and political objectives would be difficult to draw in many cases. In the absence of any limiting language in the statute or legislative history, we find no reason to conclude that Congress intended such a potentially expansive exception to a statutory provision purposefully drafted in broadest terms.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that it is “more rather than less objectionable that a national labor union has chosen to marshal against neutral parties the considerable powers derived by its locals and itself under the federal labor laws in aid of a random political objective far removed from what has traditionally been thought to be the realm of legitimate union activity.” 640 F. 2d, at 1378. In light of the statutory language and purpose, we decline to create a far-reaching exemption from the statutory provision for “political” secondary boycotts.

Ill

Application of § 8(b)(4) to the ILA’s activity in this case will not infringe upon the First Amendment rights of the ILA and its members. We have consistently rejected the claim that secondary picketing by labor unions in violation of § 8(b)(4) is protected activity under the First Amendment. See, e. g., NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, supra, at 616; American Radio Assn. v. Mobile S.S. Assn., 419 U. S., at 229-231. Cf. NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U. S. 58, 63 (1964). It would seem even clearer that conduct designed not to communicate but to coerce merits still less consideration under the First Amendment. The labor laws reflect a careful balancing of interests. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, 447 U. S., at 617 (Blackmun, J., concurring). There are many ways in which a union and its individual members may express their opposition to Russian foreign policy without infringing upon the rights of others.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

       The directive provided:
      “In response to overwhelming demands by the rank and file members of the Union, the leadership of ILA today ordered immediate suspension in handling all Russian ships and all Russian cargoes in ports from Maine to Texas and Puerto Rico where ILA workers are employed.
      “This order is effective across the board on all vessels and all cargoes. Grain and other foods as well as high valued general freight. However, any Russian ship now in process of loading or discharging at a waterfront will be worked until completion.
      “The reason for this action should be apparent in light of international events that have affected relations between the U. S. and the Soviet Union.

        “However, the decision by the Union leadership was made necessary by the demands of the workers.
      “It is their will to refuse to work Russian vessels and Russian cargoes under present conditions in the world.
      “People are upset and they refuse to continue the business as usual policy as long as the Russians insist on being international bully boys. It is a decision in which the Union leadership concurs.” App. 10a-11a.

       Several lawsuits have resulted from the ILA’s Russian boycott. See Baldovin v. International Longshoremen’s Assn., 626 F. 2d 445 (CA5 1980); New Orleans S.S. Assn. v. General Longshore Workers, ILA, 626 F. 2d 455 (CA5 1980), cert. granted sub nom. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Longshoremen, 450 U. S. 1029 (1981).

       Article 40 of the collective-bargaining agreement contains a broad no-strike, no-lockout clause:
      “The Employers agree that there shall be no lockout or work stoppage by the Employers, and the Union agrees that there shall be no strike or work stoppage by the employees. The right of the employees not to cross a bona-fide picket line is recognized by the Employers.” App. 29a.

       Section 8(b) provides in relevant part:
      “It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
      (4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is—
      “(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person . . . .”

       Section 303 of the LMRA, 61 Stat. 158, as amended and as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 187, provides in pertinent part:
      “(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this section only, in an industry or activity affecting commerce, for any labor organization to engage in any activity or conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in section 158(b)(4) of this title.
      “(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason [of] any violation of subsection (a) of this section may sue therefor in any district court of the United States . . . and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit.”

       Allied also alleged that the ILA boycott violated the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1, and amounted to a tortious interference with Allied’s business relationships in violation of admiralty law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of these claims, and they are not before us now. See 640 F. 2d 1368, 1379-1382 (CA1 1981).

       On March 26, 1980, the Regional Director issued an unfair labor practice complaint against the ILA and filed a request for a preliminary injunction in Federal District Court. Finding that the ILA boycott was a political dispute outside the scope of § 8(b)(4)(B), the District Court denied the request for a preliminary injunction. Walsh v. International Longshoremen’s Assn., 488 F. Supp. 524 (Mass. 1980). The Court of Appeals affirmed on a different theory. Walsh v. International Longshoremen’s Assn., 630 F. 2d 864 (CA1 1980). It found that the denial of the Board’s earlier request for injunctive relief against the boycott in Baldovin v. International Longshoremen’s Assn., Civ. No. 80-259 (SD Tex. Feb. 15, 1980), aff’d, 626 F. 2d 445 (CA5 1980), had preclusive effect.

       Allied’s suit for damages was consolidated with Walsh v. International Longshoremen’s Assn., supra. In dismissing Allied’s claim for damages, the District Court relied upon its characterization of the ILA boycott in Walsh as the law of the case. 492 F. Supp., at 336.

       “ ‘The ILA had not induced a strike against Allied, Waterman, or Clark . . . ; nor does it seek to pressure those employers not to deal with one another. No picket lines have been established and no other employees have been prevented from work. . . . This is a primary boycott of Russian goods, with incidental effects upon those employers who deal in such goods. As such, the actions of the respondents may not be prohibited by §§8(b)(4)(i), (ii)(b).’” Ibid., quoting Walsh v. International Longshoremen’s Assn., 488 F. Supp., at 530-531.

       In so holding, the court differed with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Baldovin v. International Longshoremen’s Assn., supra.

       The NLRB reached the same conclusion in its decision upon the Regional Director’s complaint against the ILA. See n. 7, supra. The Board held that the ILA’s refusal to unload Allied’s shipments was “in commerce” and amounted to a secondary boycott in violation of §§ 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B). The Board issued a cease-and-desist order to Local 799 requiring it to unload Allied’s shipments. International Longshoremen’s Assn., AFL-CIO (Allied International, Inc.), 257 N. L. R. B. 1075 (1981). Petitions to review the Board’s decision and order were filed by both the ILA and Allied and are now pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

       The terms “commerce” and “affecting commerce” are defined in §§ 2(6) and (7), 29 U. S. C. §§ 152(6) and (7), as amended by the LMRA, as follows:
      “(6) The term ‘commerce’ means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or within the District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the same State but through any other State or any Territory or the District of Columbia or any foreign country.
      “(7) The term ‘affecting commerce’ means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.”

       “At first blush, it might appear too plain for discussion that the ILA’s refusal to unload Allied’s goods affects both commerce and a person engaged in commerce. Allied, Waterman and Clark are American companies and the ILA is an American union. All engage regularly in business affecting the transportation of goods among the several states. Indeed, the instant dispute arose when the ILA’s actions allegedly impeded Allied’s ability to move its wood products from Boston to other ports along the East coast, and Allied contends that the ILA continues to frustrate its ability to transport its goods into this country.” 640 F. 2d, at 1371.

       See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U. S. 10 (1963); Incres S.S. Co. v. Maritime Workers, 372 U. S. 24 (1963); Longshoremen v. Ariadne

        Co., 397 U. S. 195 (1970); Windward Shipping, Ltd. v. American Radio Assn., 415 U. S. 104 (1974); American Radio Assn. v. Mobile S.S. Assn., 419 U. S. 215 (1974).

        Incres S.S. Co. v. Maritime Workers, supra, at 27. The Court noted in a later case that the “term ‘in commerce,’ as used in the LMRA, is obviously not self-defining.” Windward Shipping, Ltd. v. American Radio Assn., supra, at 112.

       The Court adhered to a similar approach in the companion cases of McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, supra, and Incres S.S. Co. v. Maritime Workers, supra. In McCulloch the Court held that the National Labor Relations Board did not have jurisdiction to determine the union representation of a foreign crew aboard a foreign vessel. In lucres the Court held that organizational picketing by an American union seeking to organize foreign seamen on a foreign-flag vessel also was outside the Board’s jurisdiction.

       Jurisdiction in the NLRA over the ILA boycott is consistent with two further considerations. The ILA boycott is a national boycott affecting ports throughout the United States. Were the effects of this boycott not “in commerce,” complaining parties such as Allied could seek relief in state courts. The possibility of conflicting decisions by a multitude of state courts frustrates one of the basic purposes of the NLRA — to establish a uniform national labor policy. Moreover, the ILA boycott commenced just a few days after President Carter ordered a boycott on exports to the Soviet Union. It differed in significant respects from that embargo. See 16 Weekly Comp, of Pres. Doc. 42 (1980). On February 16, 1980, the Legal Adviser of the State Department informed the Attorney General “that the Department of State believes that the action of the ILA conflicts with significant U. S. foreign policy interests.” Supplementary Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Attachment A. Federal jurisdiction is supported by the national interests affected by the ILA boycott. See International Longshoremen’s Assn., AFL-CIO (Allied International, Inc.), 257 N. L. R. B., at 1077 (“this case presents the novel situation of a labor union establishing a national boycott contravening a Federal policy”).

       In Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U. S. 93, 98 (1958), the Court described the elements of a § 8(b)(4) violation as threefold: “Employees must be induced; they must be induced to engage in a strike or concerted refusal; an object must be to force or require their employer or another person to cease doing business with a third person.”

       “We think it plain that the ILA was not engaged in primary activity and that the boycott against Allied’s goods was ‘calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere.’ The ILA concedes it has no dispute with Clark, Waterman or Allied, and there is no suggestion that it seeks to affect the labor relations of any of these employers. It is also plain that these ‘unoffending employers’ have been embroiled in a ‘controversy not their own’ as a result of union action which ‘reasonably could be expected’ to ‘threaten a neutral party with ruin or substantial loss.’” 640 F. 2d, at 1377.

       Justice Frankfurter explained that Congress “aimed to restrict the area of industrial conflict insofar as this could be achieved by prohibiting the most obvious, widespread, and, as Congress evidently judged, dangerous practice of unions to widen that conflict: the coercion of neutral employers.” Carpenters v. NLRB, supra, at 100.
      The Court frequently has described the purpose of the secondary boycott provisions as twofold: the preservation of the right of labor organizations to place pressure on employers with whom there is a primary dispute as well as the protection of neutral employers and employees from the labor disputes of others. See, e. g., NLRB v. Denver Building Trades Council, 341 U. S. 675, 692 (1951) (noting the “dual congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending employers and others from pressures in controversies not their own”). In the circumstances of this ease, however, only the second of these objectives has any relevance. The ILA had no dispute with Allied, Waterman, or Clark. See n. 19, supra.

       “It is not necessary to find that the sole object” of the boycott was the disruption of business of neutral parties. NLRB v. Denver Building Trades Council, supra, at 689.

       As both the Court of Appeals and the NLRB noted, such a result is particularly appropriate in this case since it is not even arguable that Allied was feeling the secondary effects of a primary dispute protected by the Act. See 640 F. 2d, at 1376, n. 6; 257 N. L. R. B., at 1082. We are not faced in this case with the often difficult task of characterizing union activity as either protected primary or prohibited secondary activity. See Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U. S. 667, 673-674 (1961).

       Responding to the claim that there were “good secondary boycotts and bad secondary boycotts,” Senator Taft stated: “Our committee heard evidence for weeks and never succeeded in having anyone tell us any difference between different kinds of secondary boycotts. So we have so broadened the provision dealing with secondary boycotts as to make them an unfair labor practice.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4198 (1947).
      In NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U. S. 58, 63 (1964), the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to bar “all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites” (emphasis added).

       Cf. Plumbers & Pipefitters v. Plumbers & Pipefitters, 452 U. S. 615 (1981) (rejecting view that § 801(a) of the LMRA applies only to disputes between local and parent unions concerning labor-management relations).

       In Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 341 U. S. 694, 705 (1951), the Court held: “The prohibition of inducement or encouragement of secondary pressure by § 8(b)(4)(A) carries no unconstitutional abridgement of free speech. The inducement or encouragement in the instant case took the form of picketing .... [W]e recently have recognized the constitutional right of states to proscribe picketing in furtherance of comparably unlawful objectives. There is no reason why Congress may not do likewise” (footnote omitted).

       Cf. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, 447 U. S. 607, 619 (1980) (“The statutory ban in this case affects only that aspect of the union’s efforts to communicate its views that calls for an automatic response to a signal, rather than a reasoned response to an idea”) (Stevens, J., concurring); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376 (1968) (“This Court has held that when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms”).