text:
    No. 85-805.
    Vizbaras, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Vizbaras, et ux. v. Prieber et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 85-825.
    Day v. South Park Independent School District.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-858.
    De Nardo v. Cook et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-868.
    Hurwitz v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-877.
    Swan v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 11th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-883.
    Park, dba Action Real Estate v. El Paso Board of Realtors et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-895.
    Ratepayers Fight Back v. Middle South Energy, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-896.
    Johnson v. Linden Shore District.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-918.
    Mother Goose Nursery Schools, Inc. v. Sendak, Individually and as Former Attorney General of Indiana.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-925.
    Christensen v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-928.
    Insurance Company of North America et al. v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-934.
    Shockley v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-936.
    Moran v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-941.
    Jones et al. , Individually and as Co-Administrator for the Estate of Clark v. Wells, Sheriff of Marion County, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-945.
    Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation v. South Dakota et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-948.
    Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. Beachley Investments, N. V., et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-952.
    Grason Electric Co. et al. v. Sacramento Municipal Utility District.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5242.
    Muhammad v. Semicole Allied Van Lines et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5552.
    Hawkins v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5626.
    Hamm v. Parker, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5634.
    Bernard v. Bernard et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5635.
    Hauptmann v. Wilentz et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5649.
    Waggoner v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5681.
    Ogberaha v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5683.
    Robinson v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5733.
    Stewart, aka White v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5750.
    Rhodes v. United States Department of the Interior.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5890.
    Baig v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5891.
    Antonelli v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5892.
    Moyer v. District Director of the Internal Revenue Service.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5893.
    Nickens v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5894.
    Triplett v. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5895.
    Mickens v. United States et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5896.
    Rubin v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities (Western Illinois University).
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5897.
    Reid v. United States et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5898.
    Zurica v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5899.
    Trichell v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5903.
    Bernard v. Warden et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5904.
    Darwin v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5905.
    Leek v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5910.
    Pierce v. United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund for 1950 and 1974 et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5916.
    Smith v. Nevada.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5941.
    Hanrahan v. Welborn, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5942.
    Cotton v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5956.
    Largo v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5959.
    Wham v. United States et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-5963.
    Calver v. Owners of Ridgecrest Mobile Home Park et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-6006.
    Lepiscopo v. York.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 85-6049.
    Gallentine v. United States et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 85-429.
    No. 85-430.
    No. 85-432.
    No. 85-440.
    No. 85-444.
    Exxon Corp. v. United States et al.; Marathon Petroleum Co. et al. v. United States et al.; Air Transport Association of America et al. v. United States et al.; Philadelphia Electric Co. v. United States et al.; and National Freight, Inc., et al. v. United States et al.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Motion of Chamber of Commerce of the United States for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in No. 85-429 granted. Motion of American Petroleum Institute for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in Nos. 85-429 and 85-430 granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 773 F. 2d 1240.


text:
    No. 85-720.
    Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


author: Justice White,

text:
    No. 85-794.
    Preuit & Mauldin et al. v. Jones.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

dissenting.

In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261 (1985), we held that an action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 should be considered a personal injury action for purposes of borrowing an appropriate state statute of limitations. The present case presents the question of what to do when more than one state statute of limitations applies to personal injury actions.

Respondent in this case is an Alabama farmer who brought a § 1983 action against petitioners for allegedly violating his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by causing his equipment to be seized pursuant to prejudgment attachment writs that petitioners obtained without notice or a hearing. The only significant issue on appeal was the appropriate statute of limitations to borrow from the Alabama Code. 763 F. 2d 1250 (CA11 1985). The Eleventh Circuit explained that its task of applying Wilson v. Garcia, supra, was complicated by the fact that Alabama has not one but two personal injury statutes of limitations. Alabama Code §6-2-34(1) (1975) governs actions for “any trespass to person or liberty, such as false imprisonment or assault and battery,” and has been interpreted by the Alabama courts as applying to actions for trespass. Alabama Code § 6-2-39(a)(5) (1975) governs “[ajctions for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising from contract and not specifically enumerated in this section,” and has been interpreted by the Alabama courts as applying to actions for trespass on the case. The Eleventh Circuit resolved its seeming dilemma in applying Wilson v. Garcia by reasoning that while not all § 1983 actions involve trespass, trespass is “the particular type of wrong that was most paradigmatic, the one category of wrongs that the legislators [who enacted § 1983] intended first and foremost to address.” 763 F. 2d, at 1255. Accordingly, the court held that the 6-year statute of limitations provided by § 6-2-34(1), rather than the then 1-year statute of limitations provided by § 6-2-39(a)(5), should govern § 1983 actions in Alabama.

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in this case conflicts with three en banc decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, all of which were companion cases to the decision we affirmed in Wilson v. Garcia, supra. In Hamilton v. City of Overland Park, Kansas, 730 F. 2d 613, 614 (1984) (en banc), cert, denied, 471 U. S. 1052 (1985), the Tenth Circuit rejected, for § 1983 purposes, use of the 1-year Kansas statute of limitations governing “ ‘[a]n action for assault, battery, malicious prosecution, or false imprisonment,’” and instead chose the 2-year limitations period for “ ‘[a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated.’” In Mismash v. Murray City, 730 F. 2d 1366, 1367 (1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U. S. 1052 (1985), the Tenth Circuit similarly rejected use of the 1-year Utah statute of limitations governing “ ‘[a]n action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment or seduction,’” and, in the absence of an express Utah statute of limitations governing actions for injury to the rights of another, opted for the 4-year limitations period for “‘[a]n action for relief not otherwise provided by law.’” Finally, in McKay v. Hammock, 730 F. 2d 1367, 1370 (1984) (en banc), a case in which certiorari was not sought, the Tenth Circuit noted that Colorado had distinct statutes of limitations for actions for trespass (one year) and trespass on the case (six years), and, finding the distinction between trespass and trespáss on the case irrelevant to § 1983, opted instead to use the residuary 3-year period for ‘“[a]ll other actions of every kind for which no other period of limitation is provided by law.’”

As the foregoing cases demonstrate, the Tenth Circuit finds it inappropriate to borrow for § 1983 purposes a statute of limitations governing common-law trespasses, preferring instead to look for a statute more compatible with its characterization of a § 1983 action as “in essence an action for injury to personal rights.” Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F. 2d 640, 651 (1984), aff’d, 471 U. S. 261 (1985). The conflict between the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits is evidenced with particular clarity in Hamilton, supra, where the statutes of limitations chosen and rejected are virtual mirror images of the statutes of limitations chosen and rejected in this case.

The conflict regarding the appropriate criteria for choosing a statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is not limited to the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits. In Gates v. Spinks, 771 F. 2d 916 (1985), the Fifth Circuit, expressly following the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in this case, rejected a 6-year Mississippi residuary statute of limitations which governs negligence and strict-liability personal injury actions in that State, and instead decided that § 1983 cases should be governed by the 1-year limitations period governing “most, if not all, common law intentional torts.” Id., at 919. Gates v. Spinks is worth noting, not only because it is clearly inconsistent with the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Mismash v. Murray City, supra, but also because it highlights an effect of following the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in this case which is not obvious from the present decision: The § 1983 statute of limitations will as a rule be shorter if based on a statute of limitations governing intentional torts than it would if based on a more general statute of limitations governing other personal injury actions.

It will not do to argue, as respondent does in his Brief in Opposition 5-8, that no conflict is possible because each state statutory scheme is sui generis. It is conflicting principles, not variations in state statutory schemes, that have determined the statutes of limitations chosen for § 1983 actions in the Tenth Circuit on the one hand and the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits on the other.

The conflict between the Circuits presented by this case is not likely to disappear without guidance from this Court. While the Tenth Circuit’s characterization of a § 1983 action as one for injury to personal rights is arguably somewhat different from the personal injury characterization we adopted in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261 (1985), it seems doubtful that the Tenth Circuit will soon overrule its en banc decisions in Hamilton, supra, and Mismash, supra, in view of the fact that we denied certiorari in those cases after Wilson v. Garcia was decided. Had we considered those decisions inconsistent with Wilson, our normal course would have been to grant certiorari in order to vacate the decisions below and remand for reconsideration in light of Wilson. Since we did not see fit to call for the Tenth Circuit to reconsider those decisions, it is predictable that it will adhere to them, notwithstanding the conflicting decisions by the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits.

It is clear to me that the Court should provide further guidance to the lower courts on the issue here presented, and I see no benefit in delaying its resolution. While I understand the Court’s reluctance to return so quickly to the issue that we had hoped to lay to rest in Wilson v. Garcia, supra, I must respectfully dissent.

       Section 6-2-39(a)(5) has been recodified as §6-2-38(1) (Supp. 1985) and now provides a 2-year statute of limitations, pursuant to an amendment effective January 9, 1985.

       The following is a sampling, which does not purport to be exhaustive, of statutes of limitations akin to those at issue in the present case. For each State, the first, longer statute of limitations governs actions described in language virtually identical to Ala. Code § 6-2-39(a)(5) (1975), and the second, shorter statute of limitations governs all of the following intentional torts: libel, slander, assault, battery, and false imprisonment. Minn. Stat. §§541.05 (6 years), 541.07 (2 years) (Supp. 1985); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§516.120 (5 years), 516.140 (2 years) (1978); N. C. Gen. Stat. §§1-52(5) (3 years), 1-54(3) (1 year) (1983); Okla. Stat., Tit. 12, §§ 95 (Third) (2 years), 95 (Fourth) (1 year) (1981); S. C. Code § 15-3-530(5) (6 years) (Supp. 1985), § 15-3-550(1) (2 years) (1976).

       Uniformity could also be achieved, of course, by congressional enactment of a uniform period of limitations for § 1983 actions. That course has much to commend it, but it is unacceptable, in my view, to delay resolving a conflict among the Circuits in the hopes that Congress will intervene.


text:
    No. 85-878.
    Pan American World Airways, Inc., et al. v. Cook et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

with whom Justice O’Connor joins,

dissenting.

This petition presents the issue whether an integrated employee seniority list that was adopted by an airline pursuant to a merger plan that the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) approved as “fair and equitable” can be attacked collaterally by the airline’s employees in an action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that respondents are entitled to bring such a collateral ADEA action. 771 F. 2d 635 (1985). This decision squarely conflicts with Carey v. O’Donnell, 165 U. S. App. D. C. 46, 506 F. 2d 107 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1110 (1975). Carey holds that § 1006 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U. S. C. App. § 1486, which vests exclusive jurisdiction in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to review CAB orders, precludes a collateral ADEA action of the type allowed by the Second Circuit in the present case. I would grant certiorari to resolve this conflict.


text:
    No. 85-888.
    Adkins et al. v. Times-World Corp. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held in this case that it had jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(a)(1) to hear respondents’ appeal of a District Court order staying arbitration proceedings to which respondents were parties. 771 F.. 2d 829 (1985). This holding conflicts with the decisions in Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 297 F. 2d 80 (CA2 1961), cert. denied, 368 U. S. 986 (1962), and Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Industries, Inc., 516 F. 2d 975 (CA2), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 913 (1975). I would grant certiorari to resolve this conflict.


text:
    No. 85-5360.
    Darwin v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 85-5365.
    Khaliq v. Brown et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 85-5533 (A-521).
    Williams v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death scheduled for February 18, 1986, presented to Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.


text:
    No. 85-5687.
    No. 85-5825.
    No. 85-5946.
    Cannon v. Texas. Nethery v. Texas. Perez v. Illinois.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;

Ct. Crim. App. Tex.; and

Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 85-5687, 691 S. W. 2d 664; No. 85-5825, 692 S. W. 2d 686; No. 85-5946, 108 Ill. 2d 70, 483 N. E. 2d 250.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentehces in these cases.


author: Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 85-5776.
    Bracy v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Petitioner William Bracy was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death. He claims that the state trial court improperly barred him from pursuing, in his cross-examination of a prosecution witness, the only line of questioning that could have revealed that witness’ motivation to shade his testimony in favor of the prosecution. He argues that he was thus denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront the State’s witnesses against him. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308 (1974). I believe that petitioner’s claim may be substantial, requiring that his conviction be vacated.

In the pending case of Delaware v. Van Arsdall (No. 84-1279), cert. granted, 473 U. S. 923 (1985), this Court is to decide whether an absolute denial of cross-examination of a prosecution witness concerning potential bias can ever be harmless error. The Court denies certiorari in this case without even waiting to consider what light the Van Arsdall case will shed on the issues here. Because I consider such haste inappropriate, especially when a man’s life is hanging in the balance, I dissent from the denial of certiorari.


text:
    No. 84-5630.
    No. 84-6270.
    No. 84-6910.
    No. 85-394.
    No. 85-503.
    No. 85-527.
    No. 85-600.
    No. 85-672.
    No. 85-5573.
    Thomas v. Arn, Superintendent, Ohio Reformatory for Women, Green et al. v. Mansour, Director, Michigan Department of Social Services, Etheridge v. Mitchell, Superintendent, Virginia State Penitentiary, In re Tracey, Sparrow v. Hajimaholis et al., Faith Center, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission et al., Sloan et al. v. Hicks, Trustee in Bankruptcy of Becknell & Crace Coal Co., Inc., Bankrupt, Cohran v. Carlin et al., Turner v. North Carolina Department of Human Resources, Division of Services for the Blind, et al.,
   ante, p. 140;

ante, p. 64;

ante, p. 1019;

ante, p. 899;

ante, p. 1006;

ante, p. 1006;

ante, p. 1006;

ante, p. 1033; and

ante, p. 1011. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 85-5583.
    No. 85-5584.
    Burton v. Sargent, Warden, Burton v. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction,
   ante, p. 1011; and

ante, p. 1011. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 85-5382.
    Wallace v. United States,
   ante, p. 908. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    February 10, 1986
    No. A-593.
    Rook v. Rice, Warden.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death scheduled for Friday, February 14, 1986, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, is granted pending the timely filing and disposition by this Court of a petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay terminates automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, this stay shall continue pending the sending down of the judgment of this Court.


text:
    February 13, 1986
    No. 85-5989.
    Horan v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    February 14, 1986
    No. 85-6119.
    In re O’Dell.
   Petition for writ of mandamus dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    No. A-622.
    Kennedy v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death scheduled for Tuesday, February 18, 1986, presented to Justice Powell, and by him referred to the Court, is granted pending the timely filing and disposition by this Court of a petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay terminates automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, this stay shall continue pending the issuance of the mandate of this Court.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.


text:
    February 21, 1986
    No. 85-995.
    Western Union International, Inc., et al. v. Amato et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    No. 85-6372 (A-609).
    Moore v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens would grant the application for stay. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant the application for stay and the petition for writ of certiorari and would vacate the death sentence in this case.


author: Justice Rehnquist, Circuit Justice.

text:
    REPUBLICAN PARTY OF HAWAII et al. v. MINK et al.
    No. A-428.
    Decided November 29, 1985
   Justice Rehnquist, Circuit Justice.

Applicants, two recalled City Councilmen of the city of Honolulu and the Republican Party of Hawaii, ask me to stay an order of the Supreme Court of Hawaii, or to affirmatively enjoin the conduct of respondent Pua, the City Clerk of the city of Honolulu. They claim that the following provision of the Honolulu City Charter violates the United States Constitution as interpreted by this Court in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780 (1983):

“No person, who has been removed from his elected office or who has resigned from such an office after a recall petition directed to him has been filed, shall be eligible for election or appointment to any office of the city within two years after his removal or resignation.”

Applicants Matsumoto and Paccaro were recalled in an election held October 5. They seek to run in a special election called to fill the vacancies caused by the recall which is scheduled for tomorrow, Saturday, November 30. The stay application was presented to me about 1 p.m., eastern standard time, today, Friday, November 29. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the City Charter provision as it construed it was unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court of Hawaii has now adopted a narrowing construction, which nonetheless prevents Matsumoto and Paccaro from appearing on the ballot, and ordered the City Clerk to enforce the provision in tomorrow’s election.

It is almost impossible in the length of time available to me to ascertain whether four Justices of this Court would vote to note probable jurisdiction of an appeal from the decision of the Supreme Court of Hawaii, or whether a majority of this Court would be likely to reverse the decision of that court. The City Charter provision as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Hawaii is not, in my judgment, clearly unconstitutional under our decision in Anderson v. Celebrezze, supra. Under these circumstances, the “stay equities” of the case and the usual presumption of constitutionality accorded to state and local laws lead me to deny the application.