text:
    No. 81-2296.
    National Football League et al. v. North American Soccer League et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Rehnquist,

dissenting.

This lawsuit is an attack under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat., as amended, 15 U. S. C. §1, by the North American Soccer League (NASL) and most of its member teams on the cross-ownership rule imposed by the National Football League (NFL) on the owners of its member teams. The rule, in essence, prohibits NFL owners from obtaining a controlling interest in any other major league professional sports team. The Court of Appeals found that the rule violates § 1 under the Rule of Reason, and enjoined the NFL from enforcing it.

The NASL’s complaint alleged that the cross-ownership rule excludes it from a substantial share of the market for “professional sports capital and entrepreneurial skill.” The NFL contended that the relevant market was for capital generally, and that the rule does not exclude anyone from a significant share of the capital market. The District Court decided that the relevant market is in between — a market for “sports capital” — but did not define precisely the extent of this market. It then decided that any competition between the NFL and the NASL in that market is competition between two single economic entities. 505 F. Supp. 659 (SDNY 1980). It thus held that § 1 of the Sherman Act does not apply because the NFL is a single economic entity that cannot combine or conspire with itself. Id., at 689.

The Court of Appeals rejected this view. 670 F. 2d 1249 (CA2 1982). It thought “[t]he characterization of NFL as a single economic entity does not exempt from the Sherman Act an agreement between its members to restrain competition.” Id., at 1257. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 141-142 (1968); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U. S. 593, 598 (1951). The Court of Appeals thought the objective of the cross-ownership rule is to protect individual teams as well as the league from competition.

At this point, the Court of Appeals had dealt with the District Court’s entire holding. The District Court expressly declined to consider whether the cross-ownership rule violates the Rule of Reason. 505 F. Supp., at 689. The application of the Rule of Reason is to be made by “the factfinder [who] weighs all of the circumstances of a case.” Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 49 (1977). See, e. g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F. 2d 263, 302 (CA2 1979). The proper course for the Court of Appeals thus would have been to remand for findings by the District Court. However, it proceeded to decide the merits on its own.

The Court of Appeals first decided that there is a market for “sports capital and skill,” which is a submarket of the capital market. 670 F. 2d, at 1260. “[A]n owner may in practice sell his franchise only to a relatively narrow group of eligible purchasers, not to any financier.” Ibid. It did not define this market except to say that it is “not limited to existing or potential major sports team owners,” but “is relatively limited in scope and is only a small fraction of the total capital funds market.” Ibid. It is not clear whether the Court of Appeals was attempting to define the relevant market differently than did the District Court. If it was, it should have applied the clearly-erroneous standard to the District Court’s finding rather than substituting its own judgment. Associated Radio Service Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624 F. 2d 1342, 1348-1349 (CA5 1980); Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F. 2d 72, 82, n. 18 (CA3 1977); Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 510 F. 2d 894, 915 (CA10 1975) (per curiam). See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 287 (1982).

The Court of Appeals then proceeded to apply the Rule of Reason. There is no dispute as to the proper statement of the Rule. “The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.” Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238 (1918).

On the basis of the facts as described by the Court of Appeals I seriously doubt whether the Rule of Reason was violated. The Court of Appeals held the cross-ownership rule is anticompetitive because it restricts the access of NASL teams to sports capital, and that this anticompetitive effect outweighs any procompetitive effects of the rule. It rejected the argument that the rule enables NFL owners to compete effectively in the entertainment market by assuring them of the undivided loyalty of fellow owners.

I believe the Court of Appeals gave too little weight to the procompetitive features of the cross-ownership rule and engaged in excessive speculation as to its anticompetitive effect.

The NFL owners are joint venturers who produce a product, professional football, which competes with other sports and other forms of entertainment in the entertainment market. Although individual NFL teams compete with one another on the playing field, they rarely compete in the marketplace. The NFL negotiates its television contracts, for example, in a single block. The revenues from broadcast rights are pooled. Indeed, the only interteam competition occurs when two teams are located in one major city, such as New York or Los Angeles. These teams compete with one another for home game attendance and local broadcast revenues. In all other respects, the league competes as a unit against other forms of entertainment.

This arrangement, like the arrangement in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U. S. 1 (1979), is largely a matter of necessity. If the teams were entirely independent, there could be no consistency of staffing, rules, equipment, or training. All of these are at least arguably necessary to permit the league to create an appealing product in the entertainment market. Thus, NFL football is a different product from what the NFL teams could offer independently, and the NFL, like ASCAP, is “not really a joint sales agency offering the individual goods of many sellers, but is a separate seller offering its [product], of which the individual [teams] are raw material. [The NFL], in short, made a market in which individual [teams] are inherently unable to compete fully effectively.” Id., at 22-23.

The cross-ownership rule, then, is a covenant by joint ven-turers who produce a single product not to compete with one another. The rule governing such agreements was set out over 80 years ago by Judge (later Chief Justice) Taft: A covenant not to compete is valid if “it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary to protect the covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by the other party.” United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (CA6 1898), aff’d as modified, 175 U. S. 211 (1899).

The cross-ownership rule seems to me to meet this test. Its purposes are to minimize disputes among the owners and ■to prevent some owners from using the benefits of their association with the joint venture to compete against it. Participation in the league gives the owner the benefit of detailed knowledge about market conditions for professional sports, the strength and weaknesses of the other teams in the league, and the methods his co-venturers use to compete in the marketplace. It is only reasonable that the owners would seek to prevent their fellows from giving these significant assets, which are in some respects analogous to trade secrets, to their competitors.

The courts have not, to my knowledge, prohibited businesses from requiring employees to agree not to compete with their employer while they remain employed. See, e. g., Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F. 2d 255 (CA7 1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 921 (1982). I cannot believe the Court of Appeals would expect a law firm to countenance its partners working part time at a competing firm while remaining partners. Indeed, this Court has noted that the Rule of Reason does not prohibit a seller of a business from contracting not to compete with the buyer in a reasonable geographic area for a reasonable time after he has terminated his relationship with the business. National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679, 688-689 (1978) (citing Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711)). It is difficult for me to understand why the cross-ownership rule is not valid under this standard.

The anticompetitive element of the restraint, as found by the Court of Appeals, is that competitors are denied access to “sports capital and skill.” In defining this market, the Court of Appeals noted that although capital is fungible, the skills of successful sports entrepreneurs are not. This entre-. preneural skill, however, is precisely what each NFL owner, as co-venturer, contributes to every other owner. ;

The validity of covenants not to compete does not depend upon the availability to competing firms of similarly qualified individuals, but rests on the principle that competitors may seek to maintain their ability to compete effectively without running afoul of the antitrust laws. The Court of Appeals seems to me to have implicitly adopted the view that businesses must arrange their affairs so as to make it possible for would-be competitors to compete successfully. This Court has explicitly stated the contrary: The inquiry under the Rule of Reason is concerned only with “impact on competitive conditions.” Professional Engineers, supra, at 688, 690. “The antitrust laws . . . were enacted for ‘the protection of competition, not competitors.’ ” Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 477, 488 (1977) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 320 (1962)) (emphasis in original). Indeed, the Second Circuit has applied this principle in the past: “We should always be mindful lest the Sherman Act be invoked perversely in favor of those who seek protection against the rigors of competition. ” Berkey Photo, 603 F. 2d, at 273. The Court of Appeals should have been more mindful of its own admonition.

The Court of Appeals also faulted the NFL for failing to show that its restriction was as narrow as possible. Although the Court of Appeals did not cite any authority for this objection, it seems to be relying on the requirement of Addyston, supra, that the restraint be “necessary to protect. the covenantee.” 85 F., at 282. The Court of Appeals has taken this statement too far by adopting the least restrictive alternative analysis that is sometimes used in constitutional law. The antitrust laws impose a standard of reasonableness, not a standard of absolute necessity. The Court of Appeals ignored its own holding that the proper standard is that the constraint be “‘reasonably necessary.’” Berkey Photo, supra, at 303 (quoting American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F. 2d 1230, 1249 (CA3 1975)). Accord, Lektro-Vend, supra, at 265. The Court of Appeals also ignored its own holding that the possibility of less restrictive alternatives is only one among many proper considerations for the factfinder. Berkey Photo, supra, at 303.

In any event, it seems to me that the cross-ownership rule is narrowly drawn to vindicate the legitimate interests described above. The owners are limited only in areas where the special knowledge and skills provided by their co-owners can be expected to be of significant value. They are not prohibited from competing with the NFL in areas of the entertainment market other than professional sports. An owner may invest in television movies, rock concerts, plays, or anything else that suits his fancy.

It simply does not appear that the positive effects of the challenged restraint in helping the NFL to compete in the economic marketplace are outweighed by their negative effects on competition. The antitrust laws do not require the NFL to operate so as to make it easier for another league to compete against it. I fear that, under the decision below, the maxim that the antitrust laws exist to protect competition, not competitors, may be reduced to a dead letter.

I would grant certiorari.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 82-5308.
    No. 82-5542.
    Otey v. Nebraska. Brown v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. Neb.; and

Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 82-5308, 212 Neb. 103, 321 N. W. 2d 453; No. 82-5542, 306 N. C. 151, 293 S. E. 2d 569.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 81-2261.
    No. 82-84.
    No. 82-487.
    No. 82-514.
    No. 82-5372.
    No. 82-5386.
    No. 82-5488.
    Kim et al. v. Taylor et al., Gens et al. v. United States, Stulbach v. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Morton v. Providence Hospital, Ma v. Community Bank, Respres v. Georgia, Wayland v. Internal Revenue Service et al.,
   ante, p. 833;

ante, p. 906;

ante, p. 972;

ante, p. 945;

ante, p. 962;

ante, p. 975; and

ante, p. 984. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    December 13, 1982
    No. 81-583.
    Beneficial Finance of Kansas, Inc. v. United States et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 10th Cir. dismissed as moot.


text:
    No. 82-640.
    Palmgren et al. v. Kansas ex rel. Murray, County Attorney of Thomas County, Kansas, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Kan. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-691.
    Perlman et al. v. Attorney General of New Jersey et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. J. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-5074.
    Bove v. New Jersey.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. J. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-5630.
    Taylor v. Texas.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Tex., 2d Sup. Jud. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 81-1866.
    Commonwealth National Bank v. Ashe et al., t/a C&S Fuel Service, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Security Industrial Bank, ante, p. 70.


text:
    No.-.
    Federal Grand Jury et al. v. United States Attorney et al.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file the petition for writ of certiorari that does not comply with the Rules of this Court and to waive payment of docket fee denied.


text:
    No. A-469 (82-5772).
    Shaffer et al. v. Board of School Directors of the Albert Gallatin Area School District et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Marshall and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-268.
    In re Disbarment of Cyphers.
    [For earlier order herein, see 456 U. S. 957.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-275.
    In re Disbarment of Bobbitt.
    [For earlier order herein, see 457 U. S. 1103.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-283.
    In re Disbarment of Nadel.
    [For earlier order herein, see 458 U. S. 1126.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-287.
    In re Disbarment of Bonds.
    [For earlier order herein, see 458 U. S. 1127.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-289.
    In re Disbarment of Brisbois.
    [For earlier order herein, see 458 U. S. 1127.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-303.
    In re Disbarment of Otis.
   It is ordered that Shéldon P. Otis, of Detroit, Mich., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-304.
    In re Disbarment of McConnell.
   It is ordered that W. Stephen McConnell, of Annandale, Va., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-305.
    In re Disbarment of Wood.
   It is ordered that Gary M. Wood, of Surfside Beach, S. C., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-306.
    In re Disbarment of Phillips.
   It is ordered that Duncan B. Phillips, of Washington, D. C., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 88,
    Orig.
    California v. Texas et al.
   It is hereby ordered that all parties to this action, and their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all people in active concert with them, be and hereby are restrained from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any state or United States court, other than this Court, which will or would lead to a determination of the domicile of Howard Robard Hughes, Jr., for death tax purposes pending further order of this Court. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 1067.]


text:
    No. 81-523.
    Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 456 U. S. 960.] Motion of ap-pellee for divided argument to permit Multistate Tax Commission to present oral argument as amicus curiae denied.

Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 81-1251.
    Connick, District Attorney in and for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana v. Myers.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 455 U. S. 999.] Motion of petitioner for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 81-1271.
    Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 455 U. S. 988.] Motion of respondent for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 81-1891.
    Morrison-Knudsen Construction Co. et al. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 820.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 81-2147.
    No. 81-2188.
    Arizona et al. v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona et al.; Arizona et al. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians et al.; and Montana et al. v. Northern Cheyenne Tribe of the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 821.] Motion of petitioners in No. 81-2147 for review of Clerk’s action granting respondents’ request for an extension of time for filing briefs on the merits denied. Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted. Motion of petitioners in No. 81-2188 for divided argument granted. Motion of petitioners in No. 81-2188 for additional time for oral argument denied. Motion of petitioners in No. 81-2147 for divided argument granted, and request for additional time for oral argument denied. Motion of Wyoming for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for additional time for argument denied.


text:
    No. 81-2408.
    United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, et al. v. Flowers et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1034.] Motion of respondents for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted.


text:
    No. 82-131.
    Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 821.] Motion of petitioner and amici curiae Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc., et al. for additional time for oral argument denied. Motion of amici curiae Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc., et al. for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 82-195.
    Mueller et al. v. Allen et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 820.] Motion of United Americans for Public Schools for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-5738.
    In re Kahey et al.
   Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 82-5606.
    In re MaGee.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 82-695.
    Franchise Tax Board of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits.


text:
    No. 82-5279.
    No. 82-5331.
    Dixson v. United States; and Hinton v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 683 F. 2d 195.


text:
    No. 82-155.
    Credithrift of America, Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-409.
    Hecht et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-435.
    Commonwealth Edison Co. et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-445.
    Mizrahi v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-479.
    Orr, Governor of Indiana, et al. v. Board of School Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-549.
    Victory Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio et al.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Lorain County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-552.
    United States v. 156.81 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in County of Marin, California, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-631.
    Timms, dba Petrol Express, et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-651.
    Santa Fe Engineers, Inc. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-672.
    Barnes v. Sanzo et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-676.
    Ferren v. Henrichsen.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-678.
    ITEL Corp. v. District of Columbia.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-686.
    Costantini, dba United Travel Service et al. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-688.
    Capitol Industries-EMI, Inc. v. Bennett et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-689.
    Comeau et ux. v. City of Brookside Village et al.
   Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-692.
    Shell Oil Co. et al. v. Williams.
   C, A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-693.
    Illinois v. Struebin, Ancillary Administrator of the Estate of Struebin, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-694.
    Coffran et vir v. Hitchcock Clinic, Inc.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-699.
    Champion Products Inc. v. University of Pittsburgh.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-710.
    Kaplan v. Black.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-711.
    Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority.
   Sp. Ct. R. R. R. A. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-712.
    Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers, Local No. 222, AFL-CIO.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-717.
    Terrace West, Inc. v. City of Plattsburgh, New York, et al.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-718.
    State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, aka State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bell.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-721.
    Gabriel v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company of Missouri et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-724.
    Children of the Chippewa, Ottawa, and Potawatomy Tribes, et al. v. Regents of the University of Michigan.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-760.
    Balejko et al. v. Milton Hospital, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-764.
    White et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-789.
    Wilkett v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-802.
    Martin v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-806.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-807.
    Fields v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-824.
    Stansbury, Personal Representative of the Estate of Stansbury v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5131.
    Consagra v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5271.
    Armstrong v. Washington.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5283.
    Goldberg v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5290.
    Watts v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5375.
    Goodwin v. Davis et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5423.
    Levesque et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5427.
    Pride v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5513.
    Bacheler v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5562.
    Patrick v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5577.
    Tubwell v. Hargett et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5578.
    Thomas v. Manson.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5581.
    Sellner v. Prince George’s County, Maryland, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5582.
    Candelaria v. Quinlan, Correctional Officer, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5584.
    Curtis v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5586.
    Bradley v. City of Berkeley et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5594.
    Singer v. Tele-Features, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5596.
    Soto v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5599.
    Clark et al. v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y,, 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5602.
    Jenkins v. Oregon Department of Adult and Family Services et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5603.
    Holsey v. Keller et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir, Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5604.
    Wilson v. White.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5605.
    McRorie v. Oshiro et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5607.
    Waters v. Duckworth, Warden, Indiana State Prison.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5622.
    Lipscomb v. Stewart et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5640.
    Ray v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5655.
    Stebbing v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5657.
    Morrow v. Raines, Superintendent, Arizona State Prison, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5664.
    Legato v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5686.
    Rush v. United States Department of Justice et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5702.
    Puckett v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5710.
    Kirsch v. Internal Revenue Service et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5715.
    May v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5728.
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-982.
    First National Bank of Boston (International) v. Banco Nacional de Cuba.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White and Justice Powell would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-335.
    People for Free Speech at SAC et al. v. United States Air Force et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-497.
    Alberta Gas Chemicals, Ltd. v. Celanese Corp. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-659.
    Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Gardner et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of respondent Donald Eugene Gardner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5567.
    Wilson v. Zant.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.


text:
    No. 82-5589.
    Flores v. IBM Corp.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 81-6610.
    No. 81-6866.
    No. 81-6876.
    Scott v. United States, Settle et al. v. Espiefs, Trustee, Blue Thunder v. United States,
   456 U. S. 994;

ante, p. 849; and

ante, p. 850. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 81-6904.
    No. 82-88.
    No. 82-123.
    No. 82-345.
    No. 82-5344.
    No. 82-5425.
    No. 82-5545.
    Anonymous v. O’Brien et al., In re Rice, Timmons v. Andrews et al., Cooper, City Attorney of Santa Ana, California v. Mitchell Brothers’ Santa Ana Theater et al., Malloy v. Sullivan, Komorowski v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., Long v. United States,
   ante, p. 968;

ante, p. 903;

ante, p. 862;

ante, p. 944;

ante, p. 974;

ante, p. 993; and

ante, p. 994. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 82-431.
    LaBar et al. v. United States,
   ante, p. 945. Petition of LaBar for rehearing denied. Petition of Romanowski for rehearing denied.


text:
    December 17, 1982
    No. 82-776.
    Pennsylvania State University et al. v. American Future Systems, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    December 20, 1982
    No. 82-836.
    Hoff v. Washington.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    December 23, 1982
    No. 82-1022.
    Alabama Furniture Co. v. Still, Trustee, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner to expedite consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-150.
    No. 81-546.
    Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. et. al.; and United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. et al.,
   458 U. S. 50, and ante, p. 813. Application of the Solicitor General to further extend the stay of judgment denied.


text:
    January 7, 1983
    No. A-556 (82-863).
    Hastings, United States District Judge v. United States et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Brennan and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    January 10, 1983
    No. 82-563.
    Grant-Oliver Corp. et al. v. Moon Area School District.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Pa. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-743.
    Lincoln Credit Co. et al. v. Peach, Circuit Attorney of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Mo. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-926.
    St. Marie v. Iowa.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Iowa dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-5688.
    Scott et al. v. Kimerling.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ala. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-704.
    Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ohio dismissed for want of properly presented federal question.


text:
    No. 82-744.
    Cowger v. Mongin et al.
   Appeal from App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5764.
    Medlin v. City and Borough of Sitka.
   Appeal from Super. Ct. Alaska, 1st Jud. Dept., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-611.
    Donovan, Secretary of Labor v. Blitz.
   Appeal from D. C. D. C. Judgment vacated and case remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint as moot.


text:
    No. 82-353.
    City of Long Beach v. Bozek.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded to the Supreme Court of California to consider whether its judgment is based upon federal or state constitutional grounds, or both. California v. Krivda, 409 U. S. 33 (1972).


text:
    No. 82-458.
    Tulare Lake Canal Co. et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and case is remanded to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California with directions to dismiss the action as moot. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950).


text:
    No. 82-820.
    Brigham Young University v. United States et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded to consider the question of mootness presented by the memorandum for respondents filed December 8, 1982.


text:
    No. A-474.
    Hanlon v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Rehnquist and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-485 (82-1070).
    Benedetto v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Powell and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-500.
    James v. United States.
   Application for bond, presented to Justice Marshall, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-523 (82-891).
    Phoenix Union High School District et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Application for stay, presented to Justice O’Connor, and by her referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-536.
    Severo v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Marshall and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-544.
    No. A-545.
    No. A-546.
    Southern Pacific Transportation Co. et al. v. Interstate Commerce Commission et al.; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission; and Kansas City Southern Railway Co. et al. v. Interstate Commerce Commission et al.
   Applications for stay of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, presented to Justice Stevens, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 88,
    Orig.
    California v. Texas et al.
   Plaintiff having submitted a Notice of Dismissal of Certain Defendants, dated August 12, 1982, and a Notice of Dismissal of an Additional Defendant, dated December 9, 1982, and all parties having informed the Special Master that they do not oppose the dismissal of the defendants named in the Notices of Dismissal referred to, and the Special Master having recommended said dismissal by letter dated January 3, 1983, it is ordered that defendants William Rice Lummis, individually; Howard Hughes Gano; Doris Gano Wallace; Annette Gano Gragg; Janet Houstoun Davis; Aileen Lummis Russell; Annette Gano Lummis Neff; Frederick Rice Lummis; Sarah Houstoun Lindsey; Mrs. William Kent Gano, Executrix of the Estate of William Kent Gano; John McIntosh Houstoun; Margot Houstoun (Ritchie); James Wilkin Houstoun; Richard Alexander Houstoun; Southern National Bank of Houston, Independent Executor of the Estate of James Patrick Houstoun, Jr.; George Neff, Executor of the Estate of Annette Gano Lummis; Summa Corp.; Barbara Cameron; Elspeth Depould; Agnes Roberts; and Richard C. Gano, individually and as California General Administrator of the Estate of Howard R. Hughes, Jr., are dismissed from this action on the terms and conditions set forth in the Stipulation attached as Exhibit “A” to the Notice of Dismissal of Certain Defendants dated August 12, 1982, said Stipulation providing, inter alia, that each of said defendants (other than Summa Corp.) will be bound by a final judgment of this Court on the issue of domicile at death of Howard R. Hughes, Jr., for state death taxation purposes. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 1083.]


text:
    No. 80-1832.
    No. 80-2170.
    No. 80-2171.
    Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha et al. United States House of Representatives v. Immigration and Naturalization Service et al. United States Senate v. Immigration and Naturalization Service et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 454 U. S. 812];

C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 454 U. S. 812]; and

C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 454 U. S. 812.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to file a third supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 81-984.
    First National City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certio-rari granted, ante, p. 942.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 82-256.
    Michigan v. Long.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. [Cer-tiorari granted, ante, p. 904.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 81-1180.
    Dickerson, Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. New Banner Institute, Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 455 U. S. 1015.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 81-1251.
    Connick, District Attorney in and for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana v. Myers.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 455 U. S. 999.] Motion of respondent for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 81-1717.
    American Bank & Trust Co. et al. v. Dallas County et al.; Bank of Texas et al. v. Childs et al.; and Wynnewood Bank & Trust et al. v. Childs et al.
   Ct. App. Tex., 5th Sup. Jud. Dist. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 966.] Motions of Dale National Bank and American Bankers Association for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.

Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions.


text:
    No. 81-1985.
    Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 904.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 81-1889.
    No. 81-1958.
    No. 81-2042.
    No. 82-19.
    Public Service Commission of the State of New York v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. et al.; Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. et al.; Michigan v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. et al.; and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 820.] Motion of Public Service Commission of New York for divided argument denied. Motion of Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 82-34.
    No. 82-226.
    American Paper Institute, Inc. v. American Electric Power Service Corp. et al.; and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. American Electric Power Service Corp. et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 904.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 82-118.
    Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 986.] Motion of Equal Employment Advisory Council for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-131.
    Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 821.] Motion of International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-185.
    No. 82-246.
    No. 82-259.
    Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, et al.; Boston Police Patrolmen’s Assn., Inc. v. Castro et al.; and Beecher et al. v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 967.] Motions of Washington Legal Foundation, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al., and Pacific Legal Foundation for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.

Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions.


text:
    No. 82-195.
    Mueller et al. v. Allen et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 820.] Motions of Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, National School Boards Association, and National Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-215.
    United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1033.] Motion of the parties to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 82-492.
    Solem, Warden, South Dakota State Penitentiary v. Helm.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 986.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that John Joseph Burnett, Esquire, of Rapid City, S. D., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 82-834.
    Walck v. American Stock Exchange, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 82-5119.
    Bell v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1034.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Roy W. Allman, Esquire, of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case.


text:
    No. 82-5576.
    Pickett et al. v. Brown et al.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 1068.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Harold W. Horne, Esquire, of Memphis, Tenn., be appointed to serve as counsel for appellants in this case.


text:
    No. 82-5818.
    In re Green.
   Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 82-5706.
    In re Pitts.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 82-585.
    No. 82-586.
    Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation of Hawaii; and Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation of Hawaii.
   Appeals from Sup. Ct. Haw. Probable jurisdiction noted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 65 Haw. 1, 647 P. 2d 263.


text:
    No. 82-500.
    Southland Corp. et al. v. Keating et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Cal. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits.


text:
    No. 81-2159.
    Silkwood, Administrator of the Estate of Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of Wisconsin et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits.


text:
    No. 82-374.
    Flanagan et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-472.
    Russello v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-618.
    Kosak v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-738.
    Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-766.
    Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-599.
    No. 82-774.
    Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Engle et ux. Farmar et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir.; and

C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: No. 82-599, 677 F. 2d 594; No. 82-774, 231 Ct. Cl. 642, 689 F. 2d 1017.


text:
    No. 81-839.
    Sklar et al. v. Shores, Executor.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-175.
    Swarek v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-220.
    Armstrong v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-252.
    DeBenedictis v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-261.
    Friel v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-317.
    Knight v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-332.
    Fujimoto et al. v. City of Happy Valley et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-337.
    Ferretti v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-356.
    Stigler v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-376.
    Waite v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-427.
    Gumbhir v. Kansas State Board of Pharmacy.
   Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-451.
    Costello et al. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-459.
    Parcinski v. Outlet Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-461.
    Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Duckworth, District Judge, 26th Judicial District of Kansas, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-462.
    Insurance & Prepaid Benefits Trust et al. v. Donovan, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-532.
    Weiss v. Lehman.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-543.
    North Carolina et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-546.
    Birch v. Lehman, Secretary of the Navy.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-565.
    MacDonald v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-577.
    Campbell Industries, Inc., et al. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-579.
    Florida v. County of Monroe, New York.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-581.
    Mila et al. v. District Director of the Denver, Colorado, Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-588.
    First National Bank of Omaha, Executor of the Estate of McIninch v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-593.
    No. 82-762.
    City of Burbank v. United States et al.; and United States et al. v. City of Burbank.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 685 F. 2d 441.


text:
    No. 82-596.
    Bufalino v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-614.
    Rebhan et al. v. Fiat Motors of North America, Inc.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-619.
    Exxon Corp. et al. v. Hunt, Administrator of New Jersey Spill Compensation Fund, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-632.
    American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2017, et al. v. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-637.
    Save The Valley, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-658.
    Consolidated Service Corp. et al. v. Robinson, Trustee in Bankruptcy of D. C. Sullivan & Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-680.
    Fire Equipment Manufacturers’ Assn., Inc., et al. v. Donovan, Secretary of Labor, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-682.
    Richardson v. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-685.
    Conley v. City of Montgomery, Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-690.
    General Motors Corp. v. International Trade Commission et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-719.
    Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-728.
    Computer Sciences Corp. et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-733.
    Pullman Standard, Inc. v. Pinkard.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-735.
    Golden State Transit Corp., dba Yellow Cab of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-737.
    Ice Cream Industry Drivers & Ice Cream Employees Unions Pension Fund v. Novembre et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-748.
    Wein v. Committee of Bar Examiners of the State Bar of California et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-750.
    McCloud v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. (AMTRAK).
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-752.
    Fergus et al. v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-753.
    Franklin County Sheriff’s Office v. Sellers et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-755.
    Toomey v. Toomey.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-758.
    Campbell v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-761.
    Kuchta et al. v. Allstate Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-767.
    Williams v. Vision Care Service, Inc.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-768.
    PVM Redwood Co., Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-770.
    Benda v. Medtronic, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-775.
    Green Bay Packaging Inc. et al. v. Technicon Medical Information Systems Corp.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-778.
    Johnson v. Central Valley School District No. 356.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-779.
    Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-781.
    White v. Board of Trustees of Western Wyoming Community College District et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-782.
    Olsen, an Incompetent by Olsen, his Guardian, et al. v. Ford Motor Co. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-783.
    Diefenthal et al. v. Civil Aeronautics Board et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-790.
    Bartel v. Johnson County et al.
   Ct. App. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-795.
    Watts v. Joseph Horne Co., Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-801.
    Harkins & Co. et al. v. Elliott et al.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-808.
    Shay v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 5th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-810.
    Lang et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-823.
    Pielet et al. v. Pielet et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-838.
    Gottheiner v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-845.
    Giella v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-846.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-847.
    Torres-Torres v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-860.
    Madonna v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-861.
    Carpentier v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-865.
    Kalish v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-870.
    Snowden et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-879.
    Butera v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-880.
    Thompson et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-881.
    Fortner v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-884.
    A & D Davenport Transportation, Inc., et al. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-894.
    Mastro et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-899.
    Pinto v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-902.
    Miranne et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-921.
    Ewing et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-923.
    Northwest Excavating, Inc. v. Waggoner et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-941.
    Parsons & Whittemore Alabama Machinery & Service Corp. et al. v. Yeargin Construction Co.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-956.
    Hayes v. Valley Bank of Nevada et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5014.
    Santucci et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5191.
    Herrera v. Iowa et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5242.
    Weser v. Atkins, Director, Kansas State Penitentiary, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5266.
    Cannon v. Cannon.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5277.
    Spencer v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5281.
    Hall v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5341.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5350.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5356.
    United States ex rel. Bassett v. Lane, Director, Illinois Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5371.
    Lemm et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5374.
    Owens v. Marks.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5395.
    Langone v. Smith, Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5408.
    Gantt v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5411.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5418.
    Macias v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5426.
    Payne v. Coughlin et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5428.
    Rogers v. McMullen, Superintendent, DeSoto Correctional Institution.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5434.
    Reggie v. Zimmerman.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5442.
    Jordan v. Hammock, Chairman, New York State Board of Parole.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5456.
    Smith et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5468.
    Craig v. Duckworth, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5473.
    Lynch v. Wilson et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5479.
    Sacco v. Keohane, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5497.
    Chodos v. United States et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5526.
    Shigemura v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5541.
    Riley v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5573.
    Allard v. Benner et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5593.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5595.
    Kele v. Hanberry, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5598.
    Prince v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5610.
    Manning v. Iowa.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5613.
    Coleman, Personal Representative of the Estate of Coleman v. City of Winston-Salem et al.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5617.
    Bennett v. White et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5618.
    Kennedy v. Marshall, Superintendent, Southern Ohio Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5626.
    Stevens v. Hunt, Governor of North Carolina, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5628.
    Smith v. Goodlander et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5635.
    Bolder v. Wyrick, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5638.
    McDonald v. Draper et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5644.
    Huntley v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5647.
    Carter v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5651.
    Williams v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5652.
    Howell v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5654.
    Tijerina v. Overberg, Superintendent, London Correctional Institute.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5660.
    Jones v. Kemp, Warden, Chatham County Correctional Institution.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5663.
    Lake v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5670.
    Townes v. Wake County ex rel. Carrington.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5672.
    Holt v. Wyrick, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5673.
    Cooper v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5675.
    Ross v. Henderson, Superintendent, Auburn Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5676.
    Miller v. Miller.
   Ct. App. Ohio, San-dusky County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5679.
    Smith v. Linahan et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5680.
    Williams v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5682.
    Roughton v. Court of Common Pleas, Lucas County, Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5685.
    McQueen v. Staten.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5689.
    Worthon v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5690.
    Tyler v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5692.
    Jones v. Chrysler Credit Corp.
   Ct. App. La., 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5693.
    Garrett v. Maggio, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5694.
    Thomas v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5695.
    Manis v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5696.
    Pool v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5697.
    Smith v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5699.
    Olguin v. Griffin, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5701.
    Jacobs v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5703.
    Pauth-Arzuza et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5704.
    Gadson v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5705.
    Evans v. Zimmerman, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5707.
    Lofton et al. v. Schabarum et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5711.
    Flynn v. Maine Employment Security Commission et al.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5712.
    Smith v. Smith.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5718.
    Lonzo v. Franzen.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5720.
    Kent v. Missouri.
   Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5722.
    Richardson v. Ray et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5724.
    Santana v. Fenton, Superintendent, Rahway State Prison, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5725.
    Jones v. Marks et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5726.
    Moore et al. v. Ross, Industrial Commissioner of New York, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5727.
    Edwards v. Jernigan, Warden, Macon Correctional Center.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5729.
    Wolfel v. Sanborn et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5730.
    Hartman, Administratrix of the Estate of Hartman v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5731.
    Curtis v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5732.
    Quinones-Navarette v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5733.
    Sims v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5736.
    Leuschner v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5741.
    Doherty v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5742.
    Caldwell v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5746.
    Gabriel v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5749.
    Paradiso v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5751.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5752.
    Sherman v. Marsh, Secretary of the Army, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5755.
    Webster v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 2d Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5765.
    Holt v. Merit Systems Protection Board.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5766.
    Laney v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5767.
    Bailey v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5783.
    Petrie v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5782.
    No. 82-5788.
    Wright v. United States; and Salisbury v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 689 F. 2d 1262.


text:
    No. 82-5784.
    McGough v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5792.
    Wright v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5796.
    Madison v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5797.
    Zinerco v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5798.
    Griffin v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5808.
    Bols v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5810.
    Zani v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5815.
    Goldberg v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5827.
    No. 82-5828.
    Banks v. United States; and Banks et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 682 F. 2d 841.


text:
    No. 82-5831.
    Bliss v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5843.
    Sims v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5850.
    Patton v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5860.
    Slotcavage v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5862.
    Boggs v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 81-6937.
    White v. Estelle.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

The Court of Appeals held that the appropriate standard to be applied to petitioner’s due process claim was whether, “[vjiewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the [finding of competence], . . . any rational trier of fact could conclude that the evidence does not predominate in favor of the appellant’s claim of incompetence.” 669 F. 2d 973, 977 (1982). While noting that “[t]his is, admittedly, a close case,” ibid., the appellate court concluded that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find White competent to stand trial. For the reasons set forth below, I would grant the petition for certiorari in order to determine whether petitioner’s constitutional claim should be reconsidered under a less deferential standard that until now has been applicable to such claims on federal habeas review.

I

On February 11, 1975, petitioner Robert Lee White was indicted in Lubbock County, Tex., on the charge of capital murder. Shortly thereafter, petitioner’s competency to stand trial was called into question by his attorneys. On June 28, 1975, the trial court granted defense counsel’s motion for a private psychiatric examination and evaluation of the defendant, directing that White be released from jail for testing at the Southwest Center for Psychological and Vocational Testing. On three occasions, the court granted defense counsel’s motions for further neurological and psychiatric examinations. On September 3, 1976, the court ordered an examination by a disinterested, qualified expert to determine White’s competence to stand trial. The appointed psychiatrist reported that White had been psychotic “for at least seven to eight years.”

In January 1977, the court, finding that there was some evidence that White was not competent, empaneled a jury to determine White’s competency to stand trial. At the competency hearing, defense counsel called the court-appointed psychiatrist and two psychologists who had also previously examined White. Based upon their diagnostic tests and observations, the experts testified that White was “chronically psychotic,” that is, he suffered from schizophrenia of long standing, characterized by hallucinations and an inability to distinguish between reality and fantasy. They also testified that petitioner’s IQ of 69-75 indicated “borderline mental retardation.” The defendant’s experts concluded that while he understood the charges against him, White’s mental disorders rendered him incompetent to consult with his attorneys. One of the defendant’s attorneys gave testimony confirming that White was not able to assist in his defense.

The prosecution called two experts, a neurologist and a radiologist, who testified that they found no evidence of organic brain damage, but expressed no view as to White’s competence. The prosecution’s remaining witnesses, White’s jailer and a Deputy Sheriff, stated that White behaved like other prisoners and appeared to communicate normally with his attorneys. Based primarily upon the testimony of these lay witnesses and his cross-examination of the defense witnesses, the prosecutor urged that the defendant had misled his examiners into believing that he was mentally disturbed.

The judge instructed the jury that “a person is incompetent to stand trial if he does not have sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or, a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. ” The jury returned a verdict that stated simply: “We, the jury, find the defendant, ROBERT LEE WHITE, competent to stand trial at the time of this trial, to-wit: January 5, 1977.” White was then tried and convicted of capital murder. On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider whether White had properly been found competent to stand trial. White v. State, 591 S. W. 2d 851, 854-856 (1979).

White then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Relying on the opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the District Court denied the petition on the ground that “[t]he evidence adduced was legally sufficient to enable a rational trier of facts to make the same findings which the jury made.”

The Court of Appeals affirmed. In searching for the proper standard of review to be applied to the jury verdict of competency to stand trial, the Court of Appeals noted that in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S 162 (1975), this Court found it necessary to undertake its own analysis of the facts concerning the defendant’s competency so that “ ‘the appropriate enforcement of the federal right may be assured.’” Id., at 174-175, and n. 10. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals rejected the “hard look” given the trial court’s conclusion in Drope. 669 F. 2d, at 976. In its place, the Court of Appeals adopted the more deferential review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), which governs claims that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Under Jackson a court must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., at 319 (emphasis in original). Applying this standard to the issue of competency, the court below determined that there had been sufficient evidence for a rational trier to find White competent to stand trial.

II

Whether a defendant is competent to stand trial is a question of federal constitutional law. Due process forbids a State to try or convict a defendant who is incompetent to stand trial. Drope v. Missouri, supra; Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375 (1966). To be competent to stand trial for the purposes of the Due Process Clause, the defendant must have the “capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense.” Drope v. Missouri, supra, at 171.

A federal court acting on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus must make an independent decision on the question of competence, see Drope v. Missouri, supra, at 175, and n. 10, just as it must decide any other federal constitutional question independently of a state-court determination. In each case, “the federal habeas petitioner who claims he is detained pursuant to a final judgment of a state court in violation of the United States Constitution is entitled to have the federal habeas court make its own independent determination ... on the merits of that claim.” Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 87 (1977).

In making an independent appraisal of the habeas petitioner’s constitutional claim, a federal district judge must sometimes defer to a state court’s resolution of “issues of fact” underlying its determination. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). Those antecedent findings which a habeas court may be required to accept are limited “to what are termed basic, primary, or historical facts: facts ‘in the sense of a recital of external events and the credibility of their narrators. . . .’” Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 309, n. 6 (1963), quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 506 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). Express factual determinations by a state court after a full and fair evidentiary hearing generally must be accepted unless they are not fairly supported by the record. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539 (1981); Townsend v. Sain, supra, at 312-313, 316; 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(8). Even where the state trier has made no express findings, this presumption of correctness must also be afforded to findings of fact which “the District Court [can] reconstruct” either because the trier’s “view of the facts is plain from his opinion or because of other indicia.” 372 U. S., at 314-315.

In this case, the jury was not asked to make and did not make any express findings to support its legal conclusion. Nor can such findings be fairly reconstructed. Therefore, the District Court was obligated to make its own factual determinations on the basis of the record of the state proceeding and, if necessary to resolve disputed issues of fact, on an evidentiary hearing. Townsend v. Sain, supra, at 313-316, 318-319.

This Court’s opinion in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U. S. 162 (1975), indicates that when a state-court determination of competency is unaccompanied by findings of fact, a federal court must undertake independent factfinding, as it would in comparable “situation[s] in which the ‘so-called facts and their constitutional significance [are] ... so blended that they cannot be severed in consideration.’” Townsend v. Sain, supra, at 315, quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534, 546 (1961). The question in Drope was whether the defendant “was deprived of due process of law by the failure of the trial court to order a psychiatric examination with respect to his competence to stand trial.” 420 U. S., at 163-164. The state courts had “viewed the evidence as failing to show that during trial petitioner had acted in a manner that would cause the trial court to doubt his competence.” Id., at 178. This Court did not consider itself bound by the state courts’ view of the evidence, for “in such circumstances we believe it is ‘incumbent upon us to analyze the facts in order that the appropriate enforcement of the federal right may be assured.’” Id., at 176. See also id., at 175, n. 10. The Court concluded, based upon its independent examination of the record, that “[notwithstanding the difficulty of making evaluations of the kind required in these circumstances, . . . the record reveals a failure to give proper weight to the information suggesting incompetence.” Id., at 179.

In the instant case, the constitutional question is somewhat different from the question in Drope. The due process question is not whether the evidence of incompetency was such as to require a hearing, but whether the evidence adduced at a hearing indicated that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial. But this difference does not warrant any greater deference to the state conclusion with regard to competency than was accorded by this Court in Drope.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), does not call for a more deferential attitude toward state-court conclusions of law than has been required by Townsend v. Sain and succeeding cases. Jackson involved federal review of a claim that the defendant was convicted in the absence of proof sufficient to convince the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See 443 U. S., at 309; id., at 326 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); cf. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 361 (1970). The Court concluded that the proper standard of review “is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U. S., at 319. When a federal ha-beas court makes this legal determination as to the sufficiency of the evidence, it does so independently of the state court’s determination of the same legal question. Both the state courts and the federal courts must conduct the same inquiry as to sufficiency. The Jackson standard is thus completely consistent with the traditional scope of habeas review. See id., at 318 (citing Drope v. Missouri and Townsend v. Sain).

Ill

The courts below faced the difficult question whether petitioner’s mental disorders made him unable to consult with his attorney and prepare his defense to the extent required by due process. Unfortunately, such a determination can never be made with certainty or precision. Courts must consider many factors. The testimony of expert witnesses recounting their observations of the defendant’s behavior and mental processes, along with their professional diagnoses, is, of course, highly relevant. The court also must take into account the observations of lay witnesses, and particularly the observations of the defendant’s counsel, with respect to the defendant’s ability to reason, to remember, to cooperate, and to communicate. The court’s own observations of the defendant may also be relevant, though even the most irrational individual may appear normal to an untrained observer. The defendant’s mental condition must be considered in the context of the totality of the circumstances of the case, including the complexity of the charges and of the defense, and the likely length of the trial.

In this case, the jury initially made the difficult due process determination after a legally correct, though undetailed, instruction on the applicable standard of competency to stand trial. While the jury may be equally qualified to make the findings of fact upon which the determination must be based, I have little doubt that a judge ordinarily is better qualified to resolve the constitutional question on the basis of whatever facts are found. See Lyles v. United States, 103 U. S. App. D. C. 22, 27, 254 F. 2d 725, 730 (1958) (opinion of Prettyman and Burger, JJ.) (“the competency of the accused at the time of trial to understand the charges against him and to assist in his defense is a legal question for the judge, not for the jury”), cert, denied, 356 U. S. 961 (1958). A judge is generally aware of what a defendant must do to participate in his defense. A judge may be guided by his reading of previous cases resolving questions of competency to stand trial and may develop useful experience in making the competency determination. Yet in this case, every state and federal court that faced the question simply deferred to the jury's application of constitutional law once it was found that there was “sufficient” evidence upon which to conclude that White was competent to stand trial.

The deferential review undertaken by the federal courts below denied petitioner his right to an independent determination of his constitutional claim. It was improper to assume, in the absence of any express findings of fact, that the jury resolved all disputed issues of fact in the manner most favorable to a determination that the defendant was competent to stand trial. Instead, the District Court was required to make an independent resolution of disputed factual issues and then to apply the constitutional standard to the facts that it found. I would grant certiorari to address the lower courts’ departure from these accepted principles for collateral review of a state-court conviction. I dissent from the Court’s refusal to do so.

       Texas Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 46.02, §3(a) (Vernon 1979), permits a court to “appoint disinterested experts experienced and qualified in mental health or mental retardation to examine the defendant with regard to his competency to stand trial and to testify at any trial or hearing on this issue.”

       This Court has approved a test of incompetence which seeks to determine whether the defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding&emdash;and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U. S. 402, 402 (1960). The State of Texas has adopted essentially the same standard. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 46.02, § 1(a) (Vernon 1979).

       Thus, on collateral review of a state conviction, a federal court must independently determine that a defendant’s confession was voluntary under the Fifth Amendment, that postindictment delay did not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, that the defendant was provided effective assistance of counsel, or that the right to an impartial jury was not impaired by extraneous influences. See, e. g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335, 341-342 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 401-403 (1977); Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 (1953); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 51-52 (1949) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).

       A federal district court may “reconstruct the findings of the state trier of fact” when the state court’s “view of the facts is plain from [its] opinion.” Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 314 (1963). In addition, when a determination in favor of the constitutional claim follows inexorably from particular findings of fact, a federal district court “may assume that the state trier found the facts against the petitioner” in rejecting the constitutional claim. Id., at 315. In this case, no particular view of the facts can be inferred from the conclusory language of the jury’s one-sentence verdict, and there are no findings of fact upon which the competency determination necessarily turned. Therefore, “[t]he federal court cannot exclude the possibility that the [trier] believed facts which showed a deprivation of constitutional rights and yet (erroneously) concluded that relief should be denied.” id., at 315-316.

       “In any event, even if it is clear that the state trier of fact utilized the proper standard, a hearing is sometimes required if his decision presents a situation in which the ‘so-called facts and their constitutional significance [are] ... so blended that they cannot be severed in consideration. . . .’ Unless the district judge can be reasonably certain that the state trier would have granted relief if he had believed petitioner’s allegations, he cannot be sure that the state trier in denying relief disbelieved these allegations. If any combination of the facts alleged would prove a violation of constitutional rights and the issue of law on those facts presents a difficult or novel problem for decision, any hypothesis as to the relevant factual determinations of the state trier involves the purest speculation. The federal court cannot exclude the possibility that the trial judge believed facts which showed a deprivation of constitutional rights and yet (erroneously) concluded that relief should be denied. Under these circumstances it is impossible for the federal- court to reconstruct the facts, and a hearing must be held.” Townsend v. Sain, supra, at 315-316. See also Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75 Yale L. J. 895, 935-946 (1966); Note, Developments in the Law — Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1038, 1135-1137 (1970).


text:
    No. 82-281.
    Treen, Governor of Louisiana, et al. v. Williams et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-352.
    Pueblo Aircraft Service, Inc. v. City of Pueblo, Colorado, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White and Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-494.
    Bath Iron Works Corp. et al. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of respondent Donald J. Simpson for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-512.
    Public Service Company of Indiana, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of Indiana Air Pollution Control Board for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-628.
    Energy Reserves Group, Inc., et al. v. Hodel, Secretary of Energy, et al.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari denied.

Justice White, Justice Powell, and Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 82-649.
    Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise et al. v. City of Homestead, Florida.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 82-727.
    Mustang Transportation Co. et al. v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-rari denied.

Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 82-754.
    Florida v. Coler.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-965.
    Linahan, Warden v. Machetti, aka Smith.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-787.
    International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America v. Great Coastal Express, Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Black-MUN would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-796.
    Stoner v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 82-1022.
    Alabama Furniture Co. v. Still, Trustee, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari before judgment denied.