author: Per Curiam. Justice Stevens,

text:
    ILLINOIS v. BATCHELDER
    No. 82-947.
    Decided July 6, 1983
   Per Curiam.

An Illinois statute, Ill. Rev. Stat, ch. 9554, ¶ 11-501.1 (1981), provides that any person who drives an automobile in that State consents to take ’ a breath-analysis test when requested to do so by an officer as incident to an arrest for driving while intoxicated. The statute also prescribes the manner in which the test is to be administered and provides a nine-point list of matters of which the arresting officer is to inform the arrestee, including the right to refuse to submit to a breath analysis and the fact that such a refusal may be admitted in evidence against him “in any hearing concerning the suspension, revocation or denial of his license or permit.” ¶ 11-501.1(a)(4). Finally relevant for our purposes is subsection (d) of ¶ 11-501.1, which provides in pertinent part:

“The arresting officer shall file with the Clerk of the Circuit Court for the county in which the arrest was made, a sworn statement naming the person refusing to take and complete the test requested under the provisions of this Section. . . . Such sworn statement shall include a statement that the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe the person was driving the motor vehicle within this State while under the influence of intoxicating liquor ....
“The Clerk shall thereupon notify such person in writing that his privilege to operate a motor vehicle will be suspended unless, within 28 days from the date of mailing of the notice, he shall request in writing a hearing thereon. . . .
. . Such hearing shall proceed in the Court in the same manner as other civil proceedings, except that the scope of such proceedings shall cover only the issues of whether the person was placed under arrest for [driving while intoxicated], whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that such person was driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, whether the person was informed orally and in writing as provided in paragraph (a) that his privilege to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended if he refused to submit to and complete the test and whether, after being so advised, he refused to submit to and complete the test upon request of the officer.”

Respondent Milton D. Batchelder was stopped while driving his automobile by an officer of the Peoria, Illinois, Police Department after the officer observed respondent driving in a reckless and erratic manner. After completing the stop, the officer approached respondent, determined that he was intoxicated, and arrested him on the charge of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The officer thereafter requested that respondent take a breath-analysis test. Respondent refused. The officer then executed and filed a sworn statement that read in pertinent part:

“I hereby certify that I have placed the above-named person under arrest, and that I had at the time of arrest reasonable grounds to believe that said person was driving a motor vehicle in this State while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in that: Traveling Too Fast In Alley With Pedestrians Around, Crossed Walnut W/O Slowing, Maintained Speed Behind Slipper Club Then Parked Abruptly Behind 519 S. W. Adams. I further certify that said person did willfully refuse to submit to the breath analyses when requested to do so in accordance with Section 11-501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, after being informed of the possible consequences of his or her refusal.” Pet. for Cert. 5-6.

To avoid having his license automatically suspended, respondent exercised his statutory right to request a hearing pursuant to ¶ 11-501.1(d).

Prior to taking evidence, the judge presiding at the hearing asked if there were any motions. Respondent’s counsel moved to dismiss the officer’s affidavit, quoted above, on the ground that it did not state any facts showing that respondent was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of his arrest. The judge found that the affidavit did not comply with ¶ 11-501.1(d) because it failed to state facts showing that respondent was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of his arrest. An order was entered denying the State’s request for suspension of respondent’s license.

The State appealed and the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third Judicial District, agreed with the trial court that the facts stated in the affidavit were insufficient to support the conclusion that respondent was intoxicated at the time he was arrested. 107 Ill. App. 3d 81, 437 N. E. 2d 364 (1982). The Appellate Court, however, held that the affidavit literally complied with the requirements of ¶ 11-501.1(d); that subsection requires only that the officer’s affidavit state that he “had reasonable cause to believe the person was driving . . . while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” The affidavit nonetheless was deemed “insufficient. . . due to its failure to comport with the United States Constitution, specifically, the fourth and fourteenth amendments thereof.” Id., at 83, 437 N. E. 2d, at 366.

Relying on our decision in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 (1979), the Appellate Court opined that “[t]he fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution pertain to this situation because stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of those amendments . . . .” 107 Ill. App. 3d, at 84, 437 N. E. 2d, at 367. The court also relied on Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), for the proposition that “[t]he permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s fourth amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” 107 Ill. App. 3d, at 84, 437 N. E. 2d, at 367. Applying this standard here, the Appellate Court held that ¶ 11-501.1(d) is constitutional only if it requires an arresting officer to set out, in his affidavit prepared pursuant to ¶ 11-501.1(d), “the underlying circumstances which provided him with a reasonable belief that the arrested person was driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” Ibid.

In its application of the Federal Constitution to the Illinois implied-consent statute, the Appellate Court inexplicably failed to look to how this Court undertook a similar task in Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U. S. 1 (1979). In Mackey, we held that the Massachusetts statute mandating suspension of a driver’s license because of his refusal to take a breath-analysis test upon arrest for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The procedures provided for in the Illinois implied-consent statute are, if anything, even more solicitous of due process values than those we upheld in Mackey.

We noted in Mackey that “suspension of a driver’s license for statutorily defined cause implicates a protectible property interest.” Id., at 10. There, as here, the only question presented was “what process is due to protect against an erroneous deprivation of that interest.” Ibid. We held that this question should be resolved by considering the following three factors:

“ ‘First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.’” Ibid., quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976).

The analysis utilized in Mackey is equally applicable to and dispositive of this case.

First, the driver’s interest in the continued possession and use of his license was recognized in Mackey. However, in undertaking the first step of the Eldridge balancing process in Mackey, our concern centered on “[t]he duration of any potentially wrongful deprivation of a property interest,” 443 U. S., at 12. Under the Massachusetts statute, the license of a driver who refused to submit to a breath-analysis test was suspended pending the outcome of a hearing that he was entitled to demand. There is no concern or risk under the Illinois statute that a driver will be deprived of his license prior to a hearing. Paragraph 11-501.1(d) clearly grants a driver the right to have a hearing before his license is suspended. Thus, respondent can seek no solace in the first step of the Eldridge analysis.

“[T]he second stage of the Eldridge inquiry requires consideration of the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest involved as a consequence of the procedures used.” Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U. S., at 13. In Mackey, we noted that “‘something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.’” Ibid., quoting Dixon v. Love, 431 U. S. 105, 113 (1977). Clearly, then, the fact that ¶ 11-501.1(d) provides for a predepri-vation hearing abundantly weights this second part of the Eldridge analysis in favor of the constitutionality of the Illinois implied-consent scheme.

“The third leg of the Eldridge balancing test requires us to identify the governmental function involved; also, to weigh in the balance the state interests served by the summary procedures used, as well as the administrative and fiscal burdens, if any, that would result from the substitute procedures sought.” Mackey v. Montrym, supra, at 17. The interest of the States in depriving the drunk driver of permission to continue operating an automobile is particularly strong. We recently commented on “[t]he carnage caused by drunk drivers” in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 558 (1983). See also Mackey v. Montrym, supra, at 17-18; Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 657 and 672 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395, 401 (1971) (Black-mun, J., concurring); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U. S. 432, 439 (1957). Indeed, it is the effect of the Appellate Court’s opinion on the Illinois effort to halt this “carnage” that has prompted our summary action in this case. That interest is substantially served by the procedures outlined in ¶ 11-501.1(d). Again, the fact that we upheld a more summary procedure in Mackey refutes the suggestion that the Illinois scheme runs afoul of the Eldridge test.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Constitution does not require arresting officers in Illinois, in enforcing that State’s implied-consent statute, to recite in an affidavit the specific and concrete evidentiary matters constituting “the underlying circumstances which provided him with a reasonable belief that the arrested person was driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” 107 Ill. App., at 84,437 N. E. 2d, at 367. The driver’s right to a hearing before he may be deprived of his license for failing to submit to a breath-analysis test accords him all of, and probably more than, the process that the Federal Constitution assures. The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third Judicial District, is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, dissenting.

This case comes to us from an intermediate Illinois appellate court. It is a case that the Illinois Supreme Court declined to review. Its practical consequences concern the amount of detail that Illinois police officers in the Third Appellate District must include in an affidavit supporting a petition to suspend a driver’s license. In final analysis the only question presented relates to how an Illinois statute is to be implemented in one part of the State. I suspect that the Illinois Supreme Court may have decided not to take this case because it preferred to address the question presented in a case in which both parties would be adequately represented.

The only paper filed in behalf of the losing party in this Court reads, in full, as follows:

Court Clerk;
Re: Illinois vs: Milton D. Batchelder
No: 82-947
In regard to your letter of 3-31-83 pertaining to the above captioned matter.
I have a heart problem and am unemployed.
I do not have the funds to hire an attorney.
Is it possible for the court to appoint me counsel or for the court to rule on the record that is on appeal?
I am unlearned at law and have had little formal education.
Unless the court can give me some help I will not be able to pursue this matter.
This letter written by;
Donald E. Worlow 302 Pontiac Rd.
Marquette Hgts., Ill. 61554
For Milton D. Batchelder
/s/ Milton Batchelder

If a case is important enough to merit a decision on the merits by this Court, I believe it also should be important enough to justify the appointment of counsel to represent the party defending the judgment of the court below. I respectfully dissent from the Court’s summary disposition.

       Illinois Rev. Stat., eh. 9514, ¶ 11-501.1 (1981), provides in pertinent part:
      “Suspension of license — Implied consent, (a) Any person who ... drives a motor vehicle anywhere within this State thereby consents, under the terms of this Section, to take and complete a test or chemical analysis of his breath to determine the alcoholic content of his blood when made as an incident to and following his lawful arrest, evidenced by the issuance of a Uniform Traffic Ticket, for an offense defined in Section 11-501 of this Act [proscribing driving while intoxicated] or a similar provision of a municipal ordinance.”

       Two implied-consent statutes labeled ch. 9554, ¶ 11-501.1, were passed by the Illinois General Assembly on the same day. The Appellate Court of Illinois in this case relied on the version we have quoted in text and in n. 1, supra. In any event, the differences in language between the two statutes do not affect our analysis in this case. See Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 1, ¶ 1105 (1981).

       The Appellate Court purported to rely on the Fourth, as well as the Fourteenth, Amendment. To the extent that there are Fourth Amendment interests at stake here, see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 662-663 (1979), they are amply protected so long as the officer who arrested respondent had “at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that . . . [respondent was] subject to seizure for violation of law . . . .” Id., at 663. That fact would be determined at the hearing provided for under ¶ 11-501.1(d). The logical thrust of the Appellate Court’s opinion is that respondent was somehow denied due process because the arresting officer’s affidavit did not specify the grounds which led him to believe that respondent was driving under the influence of alcohol. We thus treat the Appellate Court’s opinion as resting exclusively on due process grounds.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    CALIFORNIA v. BEHELER
    No. 82-1666.
    Decided July 6, 1983
   Per Curiam.

The question presented in this petition for certiorari is whether Miranda warnings are required if the suspect is not placed under arrest, voluntarily comes to the police station, and is allowed to leave unhindered by police after a brief interview. Because this question has already been settled clearly by past decisions of this Court, we reverse a decision of the California Court of Appeal holding that Miranda warnings are required in these circumstances.

H

The respondent, Jerry Beheler, and several acquaintances, attempted to steal a quantity of hashish from Peggy Dean, who was selling the drug in the parking lot of a liquor store. Dean was killed by Beheler’s companion and stepbrother, Danny Wilbanks, when she refused to relinquish her hashish. Shortly thereafter, Beheler called the police, who arrived almost immediately. See Brief in Opposition 3. He told the police that Wilbanks had killed the victim, and that other companions had hidden the gun in the Behelers’ backyard. Beheler gave consent to search the yard and the gun was found. Later that evening, Beheler voluntarily agreed to accompany police to the station house, although the police specifically told Beheler that he was not under arrest.

At the station house, Beheler agreed to talk to police about the murder, although the police did not advise Beheler of the rights provided him under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). The interview lasted less than 30 minutes. After being told that his statement would be evaluated by the District Attorney, Beheler was permitted to return to his home. Five days later, Beheler was arrested in connection with the Dean murder. After he was fully advised of his Miranda rights, he waived those rights and gave a second, taped confession during which he admitted that his earlier interview with the police had been given voluntarily. The trial court found that it was not necessary for police to advise Beheler of his Miranda rights prior to the first interview, and Beheler’s statements at both interviews were admitted into evidence.

The California Court of Appeal reversed Beheler’s conviction for aiding and abetting first-degree murder, holding that the first interview with police constituted custodial interrogation, which activated the need for Miranda warnings. The court focused on the fact that the interview took place in the station house, that before the station house interview the police had already identified Beheler as a suspect in the case because Beheler had discussed the murder with police earlier, and that the interview was designed to produce incriminating responses. Although the indicia of arrest were not present, the balancing of the other factors led the court to conclude that the State “has not met its burden of establishing that [Beheler] was not in custody” during the first interview. App. to Pet. for Cert. 36.

We held in Miranda that “[b]y custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 384 U. S., at 444 (footnote omitted). It is beyond doubt that Beheler was neither taken into custody nor significantly deprived of his freedom of action. Indeed, Beheler’s freedom was not restricted in any way whatsoever.

In Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492 (1977), which involved a factual context remarkably similar to the present case, we held that the suspect was not “in custody” within the meaning of Miranda. The police initiated contact with Mathiason, who agreed to come to the patrol office. There, the police conducted an interview after informing Mathiason that they suspected him of committing a burglary, and that the truthfulness of any statement that he made would be evaluated by the District Attorney or a judge. The officer also falsely informed Mathiason that his fingerprints were found at the scene of the crime. Mathiason then admitted to his participation in the burglary. The officer advised Mathiason of his Miranda rights, and took a taped confession, but released him pending the District Attorney’s decision to bring formal charges. The interview lasted for 30 minutes.

In summarily reversing the Oregon Supreme Court decision that Mathiason was in custody for purposes of receiving Miranda protection, we stated: “Such a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a ‘coercive environment.’” 429 U. S., at 495. The police are required to give Miranda warnings only “where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’” 429 U. S., at 495. Our holding relied on the very practical recognition that “[a]ny interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime.” Ibid.

The court below believed incorrectly that Mathiason could be distinguished from the present case because Mathiason was not questioned by police until some 25 days after the burglary. In the present case, Beheler was interviewed shortly after the crime was committed, had been drinking earlier in the day, and was emotionally distraught. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 24-25. In addition, the court observed that the police had a great deal more information about Beheler before their interview than did the police in Mathiason, and that Mathiason was a parolee who knew that “it was incumbent upon him to cooperate with police.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 25. Finally, the court noted that our decision in Mathiason did not preclude a consideration of the “totality of circumstances” in determining whether a suspect is “in custody.”

Although the circumstances of each case must certainly influence a determination of whether a suspect is “in custody” for purposes of receiving Miranda protection, the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement” of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Mathiason, supra, at 495. In the present case, the “totality of circumstances” on which the court focused primarily were that the interview took place in a station house, and that Beheler was a suspect because he had spoken to police earlier. But we have explicitly recognized that Miranda warnings are not required “simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. ” 429 U. S., at 495. That the police knew more about Beheler before his interview than they did about Mathiason before his is irrelevant, see n. 2, supra, especially because it was Beheler himself who had initiated the earlier communication with police. Moreover, the length of time that elapsed between the commission of the crime and the police interview has no relevance to the inquiry.

I — I I — i HH

Accordingly, the motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pawperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted, the judgment of the California Court of Appeal is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, dissenting.

This case comes to us from an intermediate appellate court in California. It is a case that the Supreme Court of California deemed unworthy of review. It is a case in which the California Court of Appeal wrote a 38-page opinion, most of which was devoted to an analysis of the question whether, under all of the relevant facts, the respondent was “in custody” under the test set forth in People v. Blouin, 80 Cal. App. 3d 269, 283, 145 Cal. Rptr. 701, 707-708 (1978).

In reviewing that question, the California court analyzed the facts of the case in light of the decisions in People v. Herdan, 42 Cal. App. 3d 300, 116 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1974); People v. Hill, 70 Cal. 2d 678, 452 P. 2d 329 (1969); People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P. 2d 515 (1967); People v. White, 69 Cal. 2d 751, 446 P. 2d 993 (1968); People v. Sam, 71 Cal. 2d 194, 454 P. 2d 700 (1969); In re James M., 72 Cal. App. 3d 133, 139 Cal Rptr. 902 (1977); People v. McClary, 20 Cal. 3d 218, 571 P. 2d 620 (1977); People v. Randall, 1 Cal. 3d 948, 464 P. 2d 114 (1970); and People v. Howard, 5 Crim. No. 5181 (Cal. App., July 16, 1982). The court also considered and distinguished our opinions in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291 (1980), and Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492 (1977). The court summarized its analysis in the following manner:

“As we have previously stated, the prosecution has the burden of establishing a [sic] voluntariness of the defendant’s statement beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Jimenez, [21 Cal. 3d 595, 580 P. 2d 672 (1978)].) In the instant case, there appears to be no conflicting testimony on the Miranda issue. Where the facts are uncontradicted, the appellate court must independently determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the incriminating statement was properly admitted. (People v. Murtishaw, [29 Cal. 3d 733, 753, 631 P. 2d 446, 457 (1981)].)
“We conclude that respondent has not met its burden of establishing that appellant was not in custody during the February 21 interview. Furthermore, the incriminating statements from the February 21 interview should have been suppressed by the trial court. On the record before us, appellant essentially confessed to felony murder during the February 21 interrogation. A confession has been defined as ‘amounting to a declaration of defendant’s intentional participation in a criminal act.’ (People v. McClary, [20 Cal. 3d 218, 230, 571 P. 2d 620, 627 (1977)].) The improper introduction of a confession is reversible error per se. (People v. Randall, [1 Cal. 3d 948, 958, 464 P. 2d 114, 120-121 (1970)].)” App. to Pet. for Cert. 36-37.

Today, without receiving briefs or arguments on the merits, this Court summarily reverses the decision of the intermediate appellate court of California. In doing so the Court notes that “the circumstances of each case must certainly influence a determination of whether a suspect is ‘in custody’ ” and that the ultimate inquiry is whether the restraint on freedom of movement is “of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Ante, at 1125. I believe that other courts are far better equipped than this Court to make the kind of factual study that must precede such a determination. We are far too busy to review every claim of error by a prosecutor who has been unsuccessful in presenting his case to a state appellate court. Moreover, those courts are far better equipped than we are to assess the police practices that are highly relevant to the determination whether particular circumstances amount to custodial interrogation. I therefore respectfully dissent from the Court’s summary decision of the merits of this case.

       Beheler suggests that the decision below rested upon adequate and independent state grounds in that the court applied state “in custody” standards. See Brief in Opposition 9, n. 5. It is clear from the face of the opinion, however, that the opinion below rested exclusively on the court’s “decision on the Miranda issue.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 37. Although the court relied in part on People v. Herdan, 42 Cal. App. 3d 300, 116 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1974), that decision applies Miranda.

       Our holding in Mathiason reflected our earlier decision in Beckwith v. United States, 425 U. S. 341 (1976), in which we rejected the notion that the “in custody” requirement was satisfied merely because the police interviewed a person who was the “focus” of a criminal investigation. We made clear that “Miranda implicitly defined ‘focus’... as ‘questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’ ” Id., at 347 (quoting Miranda, 384 U. S., at 444).

       Beheler offers a number of arguments in opposition to the State’s petition for certiorari. The thrust of these arguments is that even though he voluntarily engaged in the interview with police, his participation was “coerced” because he was unaware of the consequences of his participation. Beheler cites no authority to support his contention that his lack of awareness transformed the situation into a custodial one. In addition, Beheler argues that it would be unjust to uphold his conviction because the trigger-man was convicted only of voluntary manslaughter. We do not find Beheler’s argument to be persuasive. See Standefer v. United States, 447 U. S. 10 (1980).


text:
    June 27, 1983
    No. 82-1745.
    Pascoe v. Kuehnast.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Tex., 10th Sup. Jud. Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 82-6726.
    Neal v. Alabama.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ala. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 82-268.
    First Pennsylvania Bank, N. A. v. Lancaster County Tax Claim Bureau et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Pa. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U. S. 791 (1983).


text:
    No. 81-307.
    West v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983).


text:
    No. 81-935.
    Jeffboat, Inc. v. Robertson, Administrator.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U. S. 523 (1983).


text:
    No. 82-650.
    Pavlak v. Church, Chief of Police for the City of Boise, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U. S. 345 (1983); and Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U. S. 650 (1983).


text:
    No. 82-667.
    Florida v. Zafra.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U. S. 579 (1983).


text:
    No. 82-674.
    United States v. Beale.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983).


text:
    No. 82-853.
    Russell Creek Land Co. et al. v. Charjuan, Inc.
   Cir. Ct. W. Va., Cabell County. Certio-rari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U. S. 791 (1983).


text:
    No. 82-948.
    Illinois v. Bean.
   App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U. S. 640 (1983).


text:
    No. 82-1006.
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. S. 669 (1983).


text:
    No. 82-1365.
    Continental Insurance Co. v. Moseley, Executrix of the Estate of Oliver, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U. S. 791 (1983).


text:
    No. 82-1857.
    Washington v. Bartholomew.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862 (1983). Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would deny certiorari.


text:
    No.-.
    Detenber et al. v. Turnage, Director, Selective Service System, et al.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file the petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied.


text:
    No. A-1000.
    Abravaya v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Application for stay, presented to Justice Stevens, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-1002 (82-2045).
    Committee to Preserve American Color Television, aka COMPACT, et al. v. United States.
   Application to continue the injunction entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, presented to Justice Brennan, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-334.
    In re Disbarment of Aglow.
    [For earlier order herein, see 461 U. S. 902.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-353.
    In re Disbarment of Greene.
   It having been reported to the Court that Raymond T. Greene died November 5, 1982, the rule to show cause, heretofore issued on June 6, 1983 [462 U. S. 1103], is hereby discharged.


text:
    No. D-354.
    In re Disbarment of Connolly.
   Robert John Connolly, of Tacoma, Wash., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on June 6, 1983 [462 U. S. 1103], is hereby discharged.


text:
    No. D-364.
    In re Disbarment of Downes.
   It is ordered that John P. Downes, of Oxon Hill, Md., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 80,
    Orig.
    Colorado v. New Mexico et al.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 459 U. S. 1229.]
   Report of the Special Master containing additional factual findings requested by order of Court is received and ordered filed. Exceptions to the Report, with supporting briefs, may be filed by the parties within 45 days. Replies to the Exceptions, -with supporting briefs, may be filed within 30 days.


text:
    No. 86,
    Orig.
    Louisiana v. Mississippi et al.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 454 U. S. 937.]
   Report of the Special Master is received and ordered filed. Exceptions to the Report, with supporting briefs, may be filed by the parties within 45 days. Replies to the Exceptions, with supporting briefs, may be filed within 30 days.


text:
    No. 81-1304.
    No. 81-1381.
    National Association of Greeting Card Publishers v. United States Postal Service et al.; and United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. United States Postal Service et al.,
   462 U. S. 810. Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 81-2332.
    Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 1145.] Motion of respondent Brooklyn Union Gas Co. for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.

Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 82-914.
    Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 460 U. S. 1010.] Motion of Associates for Antitrust Analysis for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.

Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 82-1401.
    Calder et al. v. Jones.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 460 U. S. 1080.] Motions of Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. and Association of American Publishers, Inc., for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-6675.
    Gilliam v. 2201 Boardwalk Corp. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma -pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until July 18, 1983, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 82-6702.
    Ganey v. Safron et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until July 18, 1983, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 82-6827.
    Pettee v. Kilpatrick et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until July 18, 1983, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 82-6858.
    In re Wassall.
   Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 82-963.
    Massachusetts v. Sheppard.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-1616.
    United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-1771.
    United States v. Leon et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-1772.
    Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Ringer et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-1479.
    Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-1711.
    Colorado v. Quintero.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-1630.
    No. 82-6695.
    Hudson v. Palmer; and Palmer v. Hudson.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motions of Russell Thomas Palmer for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 697 F. 2d 1220.


text:
    No. 81-2328.
    Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Fanetti.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-643.
    O’Leary v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1229.
    Lovell et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1276.
    Diamond M Drilling Corp. v. Tarlton et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1507.
    Washington State Department of Game v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1510.
    Goose Creek Consolidated Independent School District v. Horton, as Next Friend of Horton et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1584.
    Schell v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1679.
    Alberding v. Donovan, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1690.
    Lee v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1728.
    David Metzger Trust et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1737.
    Ellis Banking Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1756.
    Baker et al. v. Wisconsin.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1779.
    Hoffman v. Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1780.
    Burlington Northern Inc. v. Donovan, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1784.
    Troy State University et al. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1789.
    Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Gibraltar Financial Corporation of California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1794.
    Fritz v. Hagerstown Reproductive Health Services et al.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1797.
    Northern Publishing Co., Inc., dba Anchorage Daily News v. Green.
   Sup. Ct. Alaska. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1798.
    Driggers et al. v. Southern Cooperative Development Fund et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1802.
    First National Bank of Tekamah, Nebraska v. Hansen et ux.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1803.
    Avedisian v. Ramsey et al.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1804.
    Mueller v. Superior Court of California, County of Orange (California, Real Party in Interest).
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1810.
    Dillard et ux. v. Broyles et al.
   Ct. App. Tex., 13th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1830.
    Brown et al. v. Johnston, Polk County Attorney, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1837.
    Burt Realty Co. et al. v. Dougherty County Board of Tax Assessors.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1847.
    Strickland, as Personal Representative of Strickland v. Roosevelt County Rural Electric Cooperative et al.
   Ct. App. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1850.
    Washington Wildlife Preservation, Inc., et al. v. Minnesota Department of Natural Resources et al.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1852.
    Adamsons v. American Airlines.
   Ct.

App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1878.
    David v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1887.
    Shelton v. United States.
   C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1891.
    San Diego County Association for the Retarded v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1912.
    Brown v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1924.
    Sena v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1926.
    Kopituk et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1933.
    Dabeit v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1937.
    Rodriguez-Ramos v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1940.
    I. S. Joseph Co., Inc., et al. v. Partrederiet Lista et al.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1941.
    Greene et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1955.
    Gavin v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1957.
    Finazzo v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1958.
    Philpot v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5491.
    Waltzer v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6256.
    Frankenberry v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6297.
    Bradshaw v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6301.
    Frankenberry v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6332.
    Cathey v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6377.
    Scott v. Maggio, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6426.
    Stahl v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6455.
    Nieb v. Marshall.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6599.
    Hance v. Zant, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6618.
    Bothwell v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6664.
    Shabazz v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6665.
    Carruthers v. Arizona.
   Ct. App. Ariz.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6667.
    Smith v. Pennsylvania.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6670.
    Hines v. Enomoto, Director, California Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6671.
    Gibson v. United States Parole Commission et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6673.
    Watkins v. Laws et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6677.
    Holston v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6680.
    Walters v. Gaul, Treasurer, Cuyahoga County, et al.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6684.
    Bradley v. Davis, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6685.
    Holcomb v. Murphy, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6687.
    Johnson v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6690.
    Stutzman v. Maryland.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6698.
    Batchelor v. Cupp, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6700.
    Langley v. Allsbrook et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6703.
    Holloway v. Lukhard, Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Welfare.
   C. A. 4th

Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6707.
    Sanchez-Sanchez v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6718.
    Player v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6791.
    Bartholomew v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6796.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6799.
    Washington v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6800.
    Ruip v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6802.
    Wescott v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6805.
    Covington v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6806.
    Jones v. Farm Credit Administration.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6812.
    Maghe v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6815.
    Amick v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6818.
    Ross v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6834.
    Gometz v. Miller, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6839.
    Harris v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6847.
    Scott v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6859.
    Bartos v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6861.
    Byrd v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6863.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6875.
    Minicozzi v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1772.
    Martell et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari, vacate the judgment, and remand for further consideration in light of United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983).


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 81-5240.
    No. 81-5312.
    No. 81-5947.
    No. 81-5962.
    No. 81-6827.
    Gates v. Zant, Superintendent, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center. Stephens v. Georgia. Waters v. Georgia. Taylor v. North Carolina. Redd v. Zant, Warden. Mathis v. Georgia. Moore v. Louisiana. Williams v. Maggio, Warden, et al. Roberts v. South Carolina.
   Super. Ct. Ga., Butts County;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. N. C.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

No. 82-5128.

No. 82-5260.

No. 82-5868.

No. 82-6192.

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. La.;

C. A. 5th Cir.; and

Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 81-5812, 247 Ga. 698, 278 S. E. 2d 398; No. 81-5947, 248 Ga. 355, 283 S. E. 2d 238; No. 81-5962, 304 N. C. 249, 283 S. E. 2d 761; No. 81-6827, 249 Ga. 211, 290 S. E. 2d 36; No. 82-5128, 249 Ga. 454, 291 S. E. 2d 489; No. 82-5260, 414 So. 2d 340; No. 82-5868, 679 F. 2d 381; No. 82-6192, 278 S. C. 572, 300 S. E. 2d 63.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting. Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 82-1755.
    Branche et al. v. Freeman.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-1777.
    Harris et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioner John Lester Harris for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1808.
    Nebraska ex rel. Mercurio v. Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska.
   Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 82-1816.
    Ohio v. Liberatore.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor would grant certio-rari and summarily reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio.


text:
    No. 82-2006.
    No. 82-2015.
    Veliotis v. United States; and Davis et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of the Solicitor General to expedite consideration of the petitions for writs of certiorari granted. Certio-rari denied. Reported below: 702 F. 2d 418.


text:
    No. 82-2011.
    Marc Rich & Co. A.G. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of the Solicitor General to expedite consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1536.
    No. 82-6439.
    Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Tufts et al., Reiter v. Huffman, Sheriff,
   461 U. S. 300; and

461 U. S. 934. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 81-2124.
    Boston Association of School Administrators & Supervisors, AFL-CIO v. Morgan et al.,
   459 U. S. 827. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 81-2306.
    Local 66, Boston Teachers Union, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Boston School Committee et al.,
   459 U. S. 881 and 1059. Motion for leave to file second petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    June 29, 1983
    No. A-1033.
    Selective Service System et al. v. Doe et al.
   Application for stay of the order of the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota entered on June 16, 1983, case Nos. 3-82 Civ. 1670 and 3-83 Civ. 100, presented to Justice Blackmun, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending the timely docketing and final disposition of the appeal in this Court.


author: Justice White,

text:
    July 6, 1983
    No. 81-2008.
    No. 81-2020.
    No. 81-2151.
    No. 81-2171.
    No. 82-177.
    No. 82-209.
    No. 82-935.
    No. 82-1044.
    Process Gas Consumers Group et al. v. Consumer Energy Council of America et al.; Interstate Natural Gas Association of America et al. v. Consumer Energy Council of America et al.; Petrochemical Energy Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America et al.; American Gas Assn. v. Consumer Energy Council of America et al.; United States Senate v. Consumer Energy Council of America et al.; United States House of Representatives v. Consumer Energy Council of America et al.; United States Senate v. Federal Trade Commission et al.; and United States House of Representatives v. Federal Trade Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Judgment in Nos. 81-2008, 81-2020, 81-2151, and 81-2171 affirmed.

Justice Rehnquist would note probable jurisdiction and set cases for oral argument. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these appeals.

Certiorari in Nos. 82-177 and 82-209 denied. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions. Judgment in Nos. 82-935 and 82-1044 affirmed. JUSTICE REHNQUIST would note probable jurisdiction and set cases for oral argument. Motion of Charles Pashayan, Jr., et al. for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in No. 82-1044 granted. Reported below: Nos. 81-2008, 81-2020, 81-2151, 81-2171, 82-177, and 82-209, 218 U. S. App. D. C. 34, 673 F. 2d 425; Nos. 82-935 and 82-1044, 223 U. S. App. D. C. 386, 691 F. 2d 575.

Justice White,

dissenting.

The principal issue in these cases is the constitutionality of the legislative veto as applied to agency rulemaking. Given the Court’s recent decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983), the summary affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ decisions striking the veto as unconstitutional is hardly surprising. These cases illustrate the constitutional myopia of the Chadha reasoning as applied to independent regulatory agencies and cast further light on the destructiveness of the Chadha holding.

In Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 218 U. S. App. D. C. 34, 673 F. 2d 425 (1982), the Court of Appeals invalidated the one-House legislative veto provision of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA), contained in § 202(c) of the Act, 92 Stat. 3372, 15 U. S. C. § 3342(c) (1982 ed.). The NGPA was a response to the need for financial incentives to encourage the production of natural gas for the interstate market. The Act was a compromise, reached only after months of impasse between the two Houses over the optimal means of deregulating natural gas prices while preventing excessive fuel bills for consumers and industry. Congress finally settled on a phased deregulation of natural gas prices, with a system of incremental pricing to ease the transition. Specifically, the compromise agreed to by the Conference Committee provided for an initial experiment with incremental pricing for a small class of industrial users, while authorizing the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to propose expansion of incremental pricing to other industrial users at a later time. This proposal would be submitted to Congress and would become effective unless disapproved by either House. The veto provision was central to this accommodation, because it allowed the Congress to observe the effects of the initial phase of incremental pricing without committing the Nation to a broader program which, it was feared, would drive industrial gas users to oil, increasing the demand for imported oil, and raising the cost of gas for residential consumers. The Conference solution allowed the House and Senate to reach agreement and the NGPA was enacted.

In United States Senate v. FTC, 223 U. S. App. D. C. 386, 691 F. 2d 575 (1982), the Court of Appeals struck down § 21(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 393, 15 U. S. C. §57a-l (1982 ed.), which provides that an FTC trade regulation rule shall become effective unless both Houses of Congress disapprove it. The Act authorizes the Commission to issue trade regulation rules which define unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce. 15 U. S. C. §57a(a)(l)(B) (1982 ed.). For three years, Congress debated the breadth of the Commission’s rulemaking authority, noting that the FTC could, pursuant to the Act, “regulate virtually every aspect of America’s commercial life.” 124 Cong. Rec. 5012 (1978) (Rep. Broyhill). The two-House veto provision was settled upon as a means of allowing Congress to study and review the broad and important policy pronouncements of the Commission.

I cannot agree that the legislative vetoes in these cases violate the requirements of Art. I of the Constitution. Where the veto is placed as a check upon the actions of the independent regulatory agencies, the Art. I analysis relied upon in Chadha has a particularly hollow ring. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), I set forth my belief that the legislative veto as applied to rules promulgated by an independent regulatory agency fully comports with the Constitution.

“[F]or a regulation to become effective, neither House need approve it, pass it, or take any action at all with respect to it. The regulation becomes effective by non-action. This no more invades the President’s powers than does a regulation not required to be laid before Congress. Congressional influence over the substantive content of agency regulation may be enhanced, but I would not view the power of either House to disapprove as equivalent to legislation or to an order, resolution, or vote requiring the concurrence of both Houses.” Id., at 284-285.
“Disapproval nullifies the suggested regulation and prevents the occurrence of any change in the law. The regulation is void. Nothing remains on which the veto power could operate. It is as though a bill passed in one House and failed in another.” Id., at 285, n. 30.

The Court’s opinion in Chadha has not convinced me otherwise. Congress, with the President’s consent, characteristically empowers the agencies to issue regulations. These regulations have the force of law without the President’s concurrence; nor can he veto them if he disagrees with the law that they make. The President’s authority to control independent agency lawmaking, which on a day-to-day basis is nonexistent, could not be affected by the existence or exercise of the legislative veto. To invalidate the device, which allows Congress to maintain some control over the lawmaking process, merely guarantees that the independent agencies, once created, for all practical purposes are a fourth branch of the Government not subject to the direct control of either Congress or the Executive Branch. I cannot believe that the Constitution commands such a result. For these reasons and for those expressed in my dissenting opinion in INS v. Chadha, I respectfully dissent.

      These cases also present the important question of whether the legislative veto is severable from the authorization for FERC to issue an expanded interim pricing rule. There is no severability clause in the NGPA, an omission which itself suggests the inseverability of the provision, see Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 313 (1936), and much of the legislative history suggests that Congress would not have granted the Commission unfettered rulemaking authority. See, e. g., 124 Cong. Rec. 29662-29663 (1978) (comments of Sen. Percy).


text:
    No. 82-1080.
    Simon et al. v. Davis, Secretary of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. M. D. Pa.

Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 82-1085.
    Arcudi, Chairman, Board of Compensation Commissioners of Connecticut, et al. v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from C. A. 2d Cir.


text:
    No. 81-349.
    Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 454 U. S. 1029. ] Appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 82-298.
    Anaconda Co. v. Franchise Tax Board of California.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 81-1834.
    Bartow County Bank et al. v. Bartow County Board of Tax Assessors et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ga. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, ante, p. 855.


text:
    No. 82-299.
    No. 82-300.
    Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts; and Travelers Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts.
   Appeals from Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Judgment vacated and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., ante, p. 85. Reported below: 385 Mass. 598, 433 N. E. 2d 1223.


text:
    No. 81-1672.
    Pennzoil Co. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Public Service Comm’n of New York v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co., ante, p. 319.


text:
    No. 81-1916.
    California v. Riegler.
   Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Illinois v. Andreas, ante, p. 765.


text:
    No. 82-151.
    International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local No. 710 Pension Fund, et al. v. Janowski et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 (1983).


text:
    No. 82-262.
    California et al. v. Retired Public Employees’ Association of California, Chapter 22, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, ante, p. 1073.


text:
    No. 82-722.
    Ledbetter et al. v. Benham et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Jones v. United States, ante, p. 354.


text:
    No. 82-791.
    No. 82-913.
    Teachers Insurance & Annuity Assn. et al. v. Spirt et al.; and Long Island University v. Spirt et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, ante, p. 1073. Reported below: 691 F. 2d 1054.


text:
    No. 82-794.
    Peters et al. v. Wayne State University et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment

vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, ante, p. 1073.


text:
    No. 82-840.
    Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Corrections v. Henry.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Barclay v. Florida, ante, p. 939.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would deny cer-tiorari.


text:
    No. 82-6263.
    Sawyer v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862 (1983).


text:
    No. 82-6370.
    Marrero v. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offender Rehabilitation of Florida.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Solem v. Helm, ante, p. 277.


text:
    No. A-1035.
    Regan, Secretary of the Treasury, et al. v. Wald et al.
   Application to stay the mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, presented to Justice Brennan, and by him referred to the Court, is granted pending the timely filing and disposition of a petition for writ of certiorari.

Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens would deny the application.


text:
    No. D-317.
    In re Disbarment of Mack.
    [For earlier order herein, see 460 U. S. 1008.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-324.
    In re Disbarment of Javitz.
    [For earlier order herein, see 460 U. S. 1019.]
   Disbarment entered.


author: Justice Blackmun,

text:
    No. 80-1640.
    No. 80-1656.
    United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission et al. v. Sholly et al.; and Metropolitan Edison Co. et al. v. People Against Nuclear Energy et al.,
   461 U. S. 912. Motion of respondents for reconsideration of the Court’s order denying their motion to retax costs denied.

Justice Blackmun,

dissenting.

In order to facilitate maintenance and cleaning following the 1979 accident at a nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island, petitioner Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved an amendment to the reactor’s operating license authorizing the venting of accumulated radioactive gas. Respondents, several individuals who reside near Three Mile Island and an organization opposed to nuclear power, filed an action in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit challenging the Commission’s determination that it could approve the amendment without a hearing.

Before the Court of Appeals acted on the case, the venting process was completed. The court eventually held that the case was not moot because the situation was capable of repetition yet evading review. On the merits, the court agreed with respondents that the Commission lacked authority under § 189 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U. S. C. § 2239, to dispense with a hearing before amending a license. 209 U. S. App. D. C. 59, 651 F. 2d 780 (1980) (per curiam). The Commission then proposed to Congress legislation that would authorize similar license amendments without a hearing. We granted certiorari, 451 U. S. 1016 (1981), and twice postponed oral argument while Congress considered the proposed legislation. 454 U. S. 1050 (1981); 458 U. S. 1128 (1982).

In January of this year, Congress enacted legislation amending the relevant portion of § 189. Act of Jan. 4, 1983, § 12(a), 96 Stat. 2073. Petitioners then suggested that this Court vacate and remand the case to the Court of Appeals with directions to dismiss it as moot. On February 22, we adopted an alternative disposition proposed by respondents, vacating the judgment and remanding for consideration of the issue of mootness and for farther consideration in light of the new law. 459 U. S. 1194.

Costs were assessed against respondents in the amount of $2,226 pursuant to this Court’s Rule 50.2, which provides: “In a case of reversal or vacating of any judgment or decree by this Court, costs shall be allowed to appellant or petitioner, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.” Respondents moved to retax costs, asserting that under the circumstances it would be unfair to burden them with petitioners’ costs as well as their own. The Court, over the dissent of two Justices, denied the motion on May 2, 1983, 461 U. S. 912, and respondents now seek reconsideration of that decision.

In again denying respondents’ motion to retax costs, the Court fails to exercise the sound discretion contemplated by Rule 50.2. The rationale of Rule 50.2 is that a petitioner who prevails in this Court should be reimbursed for his costs. In essence, the Rule presumes that the petitioner prevails when the lower court’s judgment is vacated or reversed, but enables the Court to alter the operation of that presumption when fairness so dictates. The Court has exercised this authority in prior cases, e. g., Commissioner v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 434 U. S. 900 (1977); Wood v. Strickland, 421 U. S. 997 (1975). In my view, it is even more appropriate in this case to depart from the usual operation of the Rule and to order that each party bear its own costs.

In vacating the Court of Appeals’ judgment, this Court expressed no view of the merits. The only judicial decision addressing the propriety of the Commission’s actions under the preamendment version of § 189 is that of the Court of Appeals, which resolved the issue in respondents’ favor. This Court’s judgment in no way suggests that petitioners would have triumphed under the prior statutory scheme; it simply reflects petitioners’ success in shifting their energies from the judicial to the legislative arena. Petitioners, in short, lost in the Court of Appeals, persuaded this Court to review that court’s decision at substantial cost to all the parties, and, after obtaining an amendment of the relevant statutory provision, sought unsuccessfully to have this Court order the Court of Appeals to vacate its judgment as moot. Yet respondents, who were victorious in the Court of Appeals, and suggested the disposition adopted by the Court in this case following the enactment of the new legislation, now must pay petitioners’ costs.

Because this result is unnecessary under the Court’s Rules and patently unfair under the circumstances of this case, I dissent. I would grant respondents’ motion, and allow no costs to either party.


text:
    No. 81-1687.
    No. 81-2101.
    Sony Corporation of America et al. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., et al. Pennhurst State School and Hospital et al. v. Halderman et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 457 U. S. 1116]; and

C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 457 U. S. 1131.] Cases restored to calendar for reargument.


text:
    No. 82-185.
    No. 82-246.
    No. 82-259.
    Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, et al.; Boston Police Patrolmen’s Assn., Inc. v. Castro et al.; and Beecher et al. v. Boston Chapter,
   NAACP, et al., 461 U. S. 477. Motion of respondents to retax costs denied.

Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.

Justice Blackmun,

dissenting.

In 1981, the city of Boston decided to lay off hundreds of firefighters and police officers. By statute, Massachusetts requires that civil service layoffs occur in the order of reverse seniority. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 31, §39 (West 1979). Many minority members of Boston’s Police and Fire Departments had been hired only recently pursuant to consent decrees by which Boston agreed to increase the proportion of minorities in the Departments in order to remedy its past discriminatory hiring practices. As a result, layoffs under the statutory last-hired, first-fired policy would have reduced significantly the minority representation in the two Departments.

Respondents obtained an order from the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts enjoining Boston from laying off personnel pursuant to the statutory policy to the extent that such layoffs would reduce the percentage of minority police officers and firefighters below the level obtained before the layoffs began. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. 679 F. 2d 965 (1982). After the Court of Appeals’ decision, Massachusetts enacted legislation providing Boston with new revenues, requiring it to reinstate all police officers and firefighters laid off during the city’s fiscal crisis, and securing those persons against future layoffs for fiscal reasons. 1982 Mass. Acts, ch. 190, §25.

This Court granted certiorari to consider this important affirmative-action issue. 459 U. S. 967 (1982). After hearing oral argument, however, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded for consideration of mootness in light of the new Massachusetts legislation. 461 U. S. 477 (1983). Costs were assessed against respondents under this Court’s Rule 50.2, which provides: “In a case of reversal or vacating of any judgment or decree by this Court, costs shall be allowed to appellant or petitioner, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.” Respondents have moved to retax costs.

Here, as in United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n v. Sholly, ante, p. 1224 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of motion), I believe the Court errs in denying respondents’ motion. The Court’s disposition of this case, which petitioners actively opposed, accorded petitioners none of the relief they sought, and in no way questioned the propriety, at the time it was rendered, of the Court of Appeals’ judgment. Under these circumstances, I simply do not understand why respondents must pay petitioners’ costs. As in Sholly, I would grant respondents’ motion, and allow no costs to either party.


text:
    No. 81-2149.
    Solem, Warden, South Dakota State Penitentiary v. Stumes.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted limited to Question 3 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 81-432.
    Civil Service Commission of the City of New York et al. v. Guardians Assn. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1332.
    Roberts v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1747.
    United States v. Duncan et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2334.
    White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Smith, Attorney General, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6021.
    Walls v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6787.
    Blakney v. Montana.
   Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6807.
    Skinner v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-201.
    Reading Hospital & Medical Center v. Chowdhury.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-698.
    Howard et al. v. Taylor et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-896.
    Acquin v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5916.
    Harden v. Missouri.
   Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2240.
    Alabama et al. v. Mylar, aka Miles.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5044.
    No. 81-5698.
    No. 81-5971.
    No. 81-6454.
    No. 82-5935.
    No. 82-6110.
    No. 82-6425.
    Monroe v. Louisiana. Sonnier v. Louisiana. White v. Florida. Mattheson v. Louisiana. Jackson v. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Corrections of Florida. Raulerson v. Florida. Woomer v. South Carolina. Middleton v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. La.;

Sup. Ct. La.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. La.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. S. C.; and Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 81-5044, 397 So. 2d 1258; No. 81-5698, 402 So. 2d 650; No. 81-5971, 403 So. 2d 331; No. 81-6454, 407 So. 2d 1150; No. 82-5935, 421 So. 2d 1385; No. 82-6110, 420 So. 2d 567; No. 82-6425, 278 S. C. 468, 299 S. E. 2d 317; No. 82-6663, 426 So. 2d 548.

No. 82-6663.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 82-1.
    Minnesota v. Brown.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1312.
    No. 82-1345.
    No. 82-1346.
    Utah Power & Light Co. et al. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission et al.; Alabama Power Co. et al. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission et al.; and Pacific Gas & Electric Co. et al. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of Sacramento Municipal Utility District et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Motion of Utah Public Service Commission in No. 82-1312 for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motions of American Farm Bureau Federation et al. and Public Utilities Commission of California in No. 82-1346 for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Justice White and Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions and these petitions. Reported below: 685 F. 2d 1311.


text:
    No. 82-6645.
    Merrell v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, dissenting.

Between May 11, 1979, and April 19, 1980, the Federal Bureau of Investigation maintained surveillance of certain premises in Detroit that were suspected of being the site of an illegal gambling operation. The surveillance, which entailed videotaping and recording activities and conversations, revealed an illegal dice game. As a result, 13 people were charged with violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1955 and conspiracy under 18 U. S. C. §371. Eight codefendants, the lessor of the premises, the game operator, three dealers, and three watchmen, pleaded guilty after three days of trial. The remaining five codefendants waived a jury for the rest of the trial. Four of them were acquitted of all charges because they were “mere bettors.” The evidence presented by the Government concerning petitioner established that he regularly served coffee to bettors during the gambling sessions; after the sessions he stacked tables and chairs, swept the floor, cleaned ashtrays, and repositioned the tables and chairs. Petitioner was convicted of the substantive offense of conducting an illegal gambling business, but acquitted of conspiracy.

On appeal, petitioner claimed that his activities did not justify his conviction. The Court of Appeals held that the proper standard to employ in resolving petitioner’s claim is whether he performed “any act, duty or function which is necessary or helpful in operating the enterprise.” 701 F. 2d 53, 55 (1983). That holding conflicts with the decision in United States v. Boss, 671 F. 2d 396, 400 (CA10 1982), where it was held that the proper standard is whether the person performs “a function . . . necessary to the illegal gambling business.” That court interpreted the term “conduct” to require “some actual involvement in the gambling operation,” ibid., and found that neither a waitress, a bartender, nor a band member could be considered “conductors” under § 1955, id., at 402.

There is a significant difference between activities that are “necessary” to the operation of an illegal gambling establishment and those that are only “helpful.” The Boss case involved the question whether waitresses who served drinks to the bettors in the illegal gambling establishment as well as to customers in the adjacent dance hall were “conductors” within the meaning of § 1955. The Tenth Circuit found they were not because their functions were not necessary, but merely helpful. I do not find that case distinguishable from the present one. The difference between conviction and acquittal should not rest on whether an illegal gambling establishment existed in isolation or was concealed within another, legal, establishment. If a waitress who functions solely as a waitress in an illegal gambling establishment could not be convicted under § 1955, as the Tenth Circuit has held, then a waiter/janitor who functions solely as a waiter/janitor should not be convicted either.

Because a case involving a conflict among the courts of appeals concerning the standard to be applied in determining criminal liability involves either the unjust conviction of an innocent person or the frustration of congressional intent to criminalize specific conduct, it necessarily presents an important question. Certiorari should be granted, and the case should be set for argument. I dissent.

      Title 18 U. S. C. § 1955 provides, in pertinent part:
      “Prohibition of illegal gambling businesses
      “(a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
      “(b) As used in this section—
      “(1) ‘illegal gambling business’ means a gambling business which—
      “(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted;
      “(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business; and
      “(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day.”


text:
    July 8, 1983
    No. 82-1859.
    Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co. et al. v. Ogilvie, as Trustee of the Property of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    August 3, 1983
    No. 82-1147.
    International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (AFL-CIO) et al. v. National Constructors Assn, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    No. 82-5934.
    Garcia v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    August 5, 1983
    No. A-66 (81-5698).
    Sonnier v. Louisiana,
   ante, p. 1229. Application for suspension of the order of the Court denying the petition for writ of certiorari pending the disposition of the petition for rehearing, presented to Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant the application. The Chief Justice and Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.


text:
    August 8, 1983
    No. 83-10.
    Pressroom Unions-Printers League Income Security Fund v. Continental Assurance Co. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari dismissed as to respondents Reserve Life Insurance Co. and American Progressive Life & Health Insurance Company of New York under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    August 16, 1983
    No. 82-1146.
    National Electrical Contractors Assn., Inc., et al. v. National Constructors Assn. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    August 17, 1983
    No. 82-1143.
    Miller Electric Co. et al. v. National Constructors Assn. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    August 23, 1983
    No. A-16.
    Hanlon v. United States.
   Application for stay, addressed to Justice Rehnquist and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 82-485.
    Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 1169.] Motions of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of America, Inc., CBS Inc. et al., and Association of American Publishers, Inc., for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-500.
    Southland Corp. et al. v. Keating et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 459 U. S. 1101.] Motion of Securities Division of the State of Washington et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-792.
    Grove City College et al. v. Bell, Secretary of Education, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 1199.] Motion of American Association of University Women et al. for leave to file out-of-time motion for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae denied.


text:
    No. 82-898.
    No. 82-977.
    Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight et al.; and Minnesota Community College Faculty Assn. et al. v. Knight et al.
   D. C. Minn. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 460 U. S. 1050.] Motion of American Association of University Professors for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-1246.
    Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.
   C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, 461 U. S. 904.] Motions of American Civil Liberties Union et al. and The New York Times Co. et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-1256.
    Lynch, Mayor of Pawtucket, et al. v. Donnelly et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, 460 U. S. 1080.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 82-1401.
    Calder et al. v. Jones et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 460 U. S. 1080.] Motion of Authors League of America, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-1432.
    Pulliam, Magistrate for the County of Culpeper, Virginia v. Allen et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 461 U. S. 904.] Motion of Judge Abraham J. Gafni for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 81-2162.
    No. 82-834.
    No. 82-1395.
    No. 82-1408.
    No. 82-1496.
    No. 82-1562.
    No. 82-1612.
    No. 82-1686.
    No. 82-1834.
    No. 82-5527.
    No. 82-5840.
    No. 82-6281.
    No. 82-6466.
    No. 82-6514.
    No. 82-6521.
    No. 82-6534.
    No. 82-6556.
    No. 82-6565.
    No. 82-6567.
    No. 82-6590.
    No. 82-6689.
    Pioneer Finishing Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board et al., Walck v. American Stock Exchange, Inc., et al., Drury v. United States, Maggio, Warden v. Fulford, Cardwell et al. v. Taylor, Timmons v. Zoning Board of Adjustment et al., Ahmed v. Environmental Protection Agency, Kalaris, Administrative Appeals Judge, et al. v. Donovan, Secretary of Labor, et al., Scalise et al. v. Attorney General of the United States et al., Rios v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Miller v. Illinois, Zarrilli v. Randall et al., Ruiz v. Illinois, Zettlemoyer v. Pennsylvania, Rothwell v. Bailey et al., Duvallon v. Florida, Gretzler v. Arizona, Masters v. Ohio, Johnson v. United States, Ritter v. Ritter, Spellman v. Ridley, Administrator, Lorton Youth Center,
   460 U. S. 1080;

461 U. S. 942;

461 U. S. 943;

462 U. S. Ill;

461 U. S.

571;

461 U. S. 929;

461 U. S. 930;

462 U. S. 1119;

462 U. S. 1121;

461 U. S. 958;

461 U. S. 961;

460 U. S. 1090;

462 U. S. 1112;

461 U. S. 970;

461 U. S. 946;

462 U. S. 1109;

461 U. S. 971;

461 U. S. 960;

462 U. S. 1121;

462 U. S. 1121; and

462 U. S. 1110. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 81-430.
    Illinois v. Gates et ux.,
   462 U. S. 213. Petition for rehearing and correction of judgment denied.


text:
    No. 81-2095.
    No. 82-345.
    Clancy et al. v. Jartech, Inc., et al., Cooper, City Attorney of Santa Ana, California v. Mitchell Brothers’ Santa Ana Theater et al.,
   459 U. S. 879 and 1059; and

459 U. S. 944 and 1093. Motions for leave to file second petitions for rehearing and all other relief denied.


text:
    No. 82-714.
    Seath v. Regulations and Permits Administration et al.,
   459 U. S. 1146. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 82-6662.
    In re Kageler et al.,
   462 U. S. 1117. Petition for rehearing and all other relief denied.