text:
    No. 82-5632.
    Baker v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Cer-tiorari denied.

Justice Brennan,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

I continue to adhere to my view that the death penalty is unconstitutional in all circumstances, and would grant certio-rari and vacate petitioner’s death sentence on this basis alone. However, even if I accepted the prevailing view that the death penalty can constitutionally be imposed under certain circumstances, I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence because the Missouri Supreme Court improperly upheld the sentence on the basis of an aggravating circumstance that had never been considered by the sentencer.

I

Petitioner Robert Baker was convicted of capital murder m the Circuit Court of the city of St. Louis. The victim, a police officer assigned as an undercover agent, was dressed in street clothes at the time of the shooting. When his body was discovered in the front seat of his unmarked police car, his police badge was in his wallet.

At the sentencing stage, the jury was instructed that it may impose the death penalty if it found that the murder “was committed against a peace officer while engaged in the performance of his official duty.” The jury was not instructed that it also had to find that petitioner knew or should have known that the victim was a police officer. The jury imposed the sentence of death solely on the basis of this aggravating circumstance.

The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the death sentence, with two judges dissenting. 636 S. W. 2d 902 (1982). The majority held that based on its review of the record “[t]he evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knew [the victim] was a police officer. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 [(1979)].” Id., at 907. It therefore “decline[d] to address the inscrutable question of mens rea.” Ibid., citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246 (1952); Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514 (1968).

II

The Missouri Supreme Court improperly affirmed the death sentence on a ground neither presented to nor found by the sentencing jury. The jury instruction authorized the imposition of the death sentence on the basis of a bare finding that the victim was a police officer on duty. The jury clearly did not base its imposition of the death sentence on a finding that petitioner knew or should have known the identity of his victim. In affirming the death sentence on the ground that there was sufficient evidence for a rational finder to find that petitioner had the requisite knowledge, the Missouri Supreme Court improperly relied on Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), which established a test for reviewing findings actually made, to “affirm” a finding that was not made.

“[F]undamental principles of procedural fairness” prohibit a reviewing court from affirming a death sentence on the basis of an aggravating circumstance not properly found by the sentencing jury. Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U. S. 14, 16 (1978). As Justice Black stated for a unanimous Court in Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U. S. 196, 202 (1948), “[t]o conform to due process of law, petitioners were entitled to have the validity of their convictions appraised on consideration of the case as it was tried and as the issues were determined in the trial court.” We have stated that this principle applies “with no less force at the penalty phase of a trial in a capital case than [it does] in the guilt-determining phase of any criminal trial.” Presnell v. Georgia, supra, at 16.

Moreover, the death sentence in this case may not be upheld on the ground that it was properly imposed in the absence of a finding that petitioner knew or should have known the identity of his victim. If the Missouri statute does not require knowledge as an element of the aggravating circumstance charged in this case, its application in this case would violate the Constitution.

Petitioner received the death sentence solely because the victim of his crime was by chance an undercover police officer on duty. If his victim had been a private citizen as his appearance indicated, the death sentence could not have been imposed under Missouri law. Nor can the death sentence be imposed on other persons who have committed or may commit similar acts, and whose conduct, and mens rea are in all respects identical, but whose victims are private citizens. Petitioner has been singled out to receive the death sentence because of the “entirely fortuitous circumstance that the victim, who was dressed in civilian clothes and who to all appearances was a private citizen, turned out to be, unknown to [him], a police officer.” 636 S. W. 2d, at 913 (Seiler, J., dissenting).

We have made clear that a State may not authorize the imposition of a death sentence on the basis of an arbitrary factor. While there is undoubtedly a difference between petitioner’s case and cases in which the victims are private citizens, not every difference can justify a State’s decision to execute a defendant. Instead, a constitutionally acceptable death penalty scheme must provide a “principled way to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not.” Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420, 433 (1980) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). See also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242, 258 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (“similar results ... in similar cases”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (“meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not”) (emphasis added).

In my view the imposition of the death sentence based solely on the identity of the victim, unknown to the accused, would result in the ultimate punishment of death being meted out in an unprincipled fashion. The identity of the victim, standing alone, has nothing to do with an accused’s blameworthiness. In this case the State was not required to prove a single fact about petitioner indicating that he was any more deserving of a death sentence than any defendant convicted of murder. Nor is the goal of deterrence rationally furthered, since the enhanced penalty for the killing of a police officer could not deter an individual who is ignorant of the identity of his victim.

For the foregoing reasons, I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

       The statutory aggravating circumstance at issue in this case was as follows: “The capital murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections employee, or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duty.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.012.2(8) (Supp. 1982).

       The existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance is necessary to authorize the imposition of the death sentence. §565.012.5.

       In so doing, the Missouri Supreme Court completely usurped the sentencing jury’s function. Moreover, the reviewing court did not itself find that petitioner had the requisite knowledge, but simply held that if a jury had found that petitioner knew or should have known the identity of the victim, that hypothetical finding would be supported by sufficient evidence. As a result, petitioner’s death sentence was imposed without an actual finding by any tribunal, least of all the jury that sentenced him, that petitioner knew or should have known that the victim was a police officer.

       Missouri law equally forbids the imposition of a death sentence based on aggravating circumstances that were not found by the jury. The Missouri Supreme Court is authorized to review “[wjhether the evidence supports the jury’s or judge’s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in section 565.012.” §565.014.3(2) (1978) (emphasis added). Where the jury has not properly found the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance, nothing in § 565.014 authorizes the Supreme Court to determine de novo whether such a finding should be or could have been made.

       It was “a disputed issue of fact” whether petitioner knew the identity of his victim. 636 S. W. 2d 902, 911 (1982) (Seiler, J., dissenting). Petitioner testified at the guilt stage of the trial that he did not know that the victim was a police officer, and “[ejven in his first taped confession (the second was suppressed because of the beatings), there is nothing to indicate that defendant knew that the victim was a police officer on duty.” Ibid. (emphasis added).

       Cf. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782, 801 (1982) (death penalty must be imposed on the basis of “personal responsibility and moral guilt”).

       This view is fully consistent with our decision in Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U. S. 633 (1977) (per curiam). In striking down a statute which imposed a mandatory death sentence for the killing of a police officer, we acknowledged in Roberts that society has a “special interest in affording protection to these public servants who regularly must risk their lives in order to guard the safety of other persons and property.” Id., at 636 (footnote omitted). Given the assumption, which I do not share, that the death penalty is constitutional under certain conditions, this interest may justify the State in treating the fact that the defendent knew his victim was a police officer as an aggravating circumstance in order to deter such killings, and to give effect to a State’s judgment that the intentional killing of police officers is especially heinous. Yet where the accused had no knowledge that his victim was a police officer, he was not “forewarned,” id., at 647 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and therefore could not have been deterred by the possibility of an enhanced penalty for the killing of a police officer. Moreover, it is irrational to treat as equally reprehensible the premeditated murder of a police officer, and the murder of someone who, unbeknownst to the accused, turns out to have been a police officer. It is similarly irrational to treat differently two murderers simply because in one case the- victim, unknown to the perpetrator, was a police officer. Although several Members of the Court dissented in Roberts v. Louisiana and would have upheld Louisiana’s mandatory death penalty statute, the Louisiana statute required that the accused have the “specific intent” to kill or seriously injure a police officer. It was in this context that the dissenting opinions expressed support for a mandatory death penalty when the killing of a peace officer was “intentional,” id., at 642 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id., at 644, 648 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), or “ deliberate],” id., at 646, 647, 650; or “premeditated,” id., at 644, 649.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 82-5793.
    No. 82-5834.
    No. 82-5861.
    Horton v. Georgia. Blair v. Missouri. Trimble v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. Mo.; and

Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 82-5793, 249 Ga. 871, 295 S. E. 2d 281; No. 82-5834, 638 S. W. 2d 739; No. 82-5861, 638 S. W. 2d 726.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 82-43.
    No. 82-193.
    No. 82-445.
    No. 82-5271.
    No. 82-5352.
    No. 82-5353.
    No. 82-5476.
    No. 82-5534.
    No. 82-5581.
    Asam v. Stanley, dba Poodle Palace, et al., Lampkin-Asam v. Miami Daily News, Inc., dba The Miami News, et al., Mizrahi v. United States, Armstrong v. Washington, Williams v. North Carolina, Pinch v. North Carolina, Cotton v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia et al., White v. Florida, Sellner v. Prince George’s County, Maryland, et al.,
   ante, p. 859;

ante, p. 806;

ante, p. 1086;

ante, p. 1089;

ante, p. 1056;

ante, p. 1056;

ante, p. 1041;

ante, p. 1055; and

ante, p. 1090. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 79-1853.
    No. 82-5051.
    Durham Distributors, Inc., et al. v. Bombardier Ltd. et al., Judd v. United States,
   449 U. S. 890; and

ante, p. 869. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 82-277.
    Schwimmer, dba Supersonic Electronics Co. v. Sony Corporation of America,
   ante, p. 1007. Motion of petitioner for joint consideration with other cases denied. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 82-5589.
    Flores v. IBM Corp.,
   ante, p. 1092. Petition for rehearing denied.

Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    January 31, 1983
    No. 82-968.
    Rebstock v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    February 9, 1983
    No. 81-2305.
    Pennzoil Co. v. United States Department of Energy et al.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certio-rari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    February 17, 1983
    No. 82-1139.
    Ford Motor Co. v. Hasson, a Minor, by and through his Guardian ad Litem, Hasson, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    February 22, 1983
    No. 82-287.
    Arizona et al. v. Ash Grove Cement Co. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Four Members of the Court have disqualified themselves in this case. Because of this absence of a quorum, 28 U. S. C. § 1, and since a majority of the qualified Justices are of the opinion that the case cannot be heard and determined at the next Term of Court, the judgment and order are affirmed under 28 U. S. C. § 2109, which provides that under these circumstances “the court shall enter its order.affirming the judgment of the court from which the case was brought for review with the same effect as upon af-firmance by an equally divided court.”


text:
    No. 82-675.
    Arizona et al. v. United States District Court for the District of Arizona (Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp. et al. , Real Parties in Interest).
   C. A. 9th Cir. Four Members of the Court have disqualified themselves in this case. Because of this absence of a quorum, 28 U. S. C. § 1, and since a majority of the qualified Justices are of the opinion that the case cannot be heard and determined at the next Term of Court, the judgment and order are affirmed under 28 U. S. C. §2109, which provides that under these circumstances “the court shall enter its order affirming the judgment of the court from which the case was brought for review with the same effect as upon affirmance by an equally divided court.”


text:
    No. 82-677.
    Phillips Crane & Rigging of San Antonio, Inc., et al. v. Shaw et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Tex. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 82-835.
    Thompson et al. v. Peoples Liberty Bank.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ky. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-891.
    Phoenix Union High School District et al. v. United States.
   Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certio-rari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1037.
    Trost v. Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County (Rothberg, Real Party in Interest).
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1019.
    Quality Health Service, Inc., et al. v. Johnston, Chairman, Industrial Commission of Ohio, et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-1027.
    Golden Rain Foundation of Laguna Hills v. Laguna Publishing Co.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-1053.
    Haas, Personal Representative of the Estate of Cataldi, et al. v. United Technologies Corp.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Del. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-1100.
    Glusman et al. v. Nevada et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Nev. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 80-2200.
    Wyrick, Warden v. Williams.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Missouri v. Hunter, ante, p. 359.


text:
    No. 81-625.
    Missouri v. Haggard; Missouri v. Collins; Missouri v. Helton; Missouri v. Sinclair; Missouri v. Crews; Missouri v. Tunstall; Missouri v. Crews; Missouri v. Lowery; Missouri v. Williams; Missouri v. Kendrick; Missouri v. Williams; Missouri v. Counselman; Missouri v. White; Missouri v. Payne; Missouri v. Greer; Missouri v. Brown; Missouri v. Martin; Missouri v. Greer; Missouri v. Hawkins; Missouri v. Fletcher; Missouri v. Gaskin; and Missouri v. Pennington.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Motions of respondents Donnie L. Collins, Eddie Greer, Harold Hawkins, Jackie Martin, Terry Gene Crews, Hanford Gaskin, Marlon Payne, Willie Tunstall, Michael White, Robert Lee Haggard, Timothy Crews, Tommy Bryant Kendrick, William Brown, Johnny Williams, Rollan Anthony Williams, Randy Sinclair, Donald Greer, Robert Lowery, Carl Fletcher, Edward H. Pennington, Jr., and Wallace D. Counselman, Jr., for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgments vacated, and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Missouri v. Hunter, ante, p. 359. Reported below: 619 S. W. 2d 44 (1st case); 619 S. W. 2d 66 (2d case); 619 S. W. 2d 69 (3d case); 619 S. W. 2d 73 (4th case); 619 S. W. 2d 78 (5th case); 619 S. W. 2d 71 (6th case); 619 S. W. 2d 76 (7th case); 619 S. W. 2d 77 (8th case); 619 S. W. 2d 63 (9th case); 619 S. W. 2d 61 (10th case); 619 S. W. 2d 82 (11th case); 619 S. W. 2d 72 (12th case); 619 S. W. 2d 79 (13th case); 619 S. W. 2d 75 (14th case); 619 S. W. 2d 65 (15th case); 619 S. W. 2d 68 (16th case); 619 S. W. 2d 80 (17th case); 619 S. W. 2d 62 (18th case); 619 S. W. 2d 64 (19th case); 619 S. W. 2d 57 (20th case); 618 S. W. 2d 620 (21st case); 618 S. W. 2d 614 (22d case).


text:
    No. 81-2117.
    Missouri v. Kane; Missouri v. Thompson; and Missouri v. Arnold.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed informa pauperis and certio-rari granted. Judgments vacated and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Missouri v. Hunter, ante, p. 359. Reported below: 629 S. W. 2d 372 (first case); 629 S. W. 2d 369 (second case); 628 S. W. 2d 665 (third case).


text:
    No. 82-3.
    Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42 et al. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Shepard v. NLRB, ante, p. 344.


text:
    No. 82-272.
    Missouri v. McKinney.
   Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Missouri v. Hunter, ante, p. 359.


text:
    No. 80-1640.
    No. 80-1656.
    United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission et al. v. Sholly et al.; and Metropolitan Edison Co. et al. v. People Against Nuclear Energy et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 451 U. S. 1016.] Judgment vacated and cases remanded to consider the question of mootness and, should the cases not be moot, for further consideration in light of Pub. L. 97-415.


text:
    No. A-654.
    Kavanagh v. Coven.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Rehnquist and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-660.
    Cintolo v. United States et al.
   D. C. Mass. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Stevens and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-299.
    In re Disbarment of Olkon.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 985.]


text:
    No. D-305.
    In re Disbarment of Wood.
   Gary M. Wood, of Surfside Beach, S. C., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on December 13, 1982 [ante, p. 1083], is hereby discharged.


text:
    No. D-307.
    In re Disbarment of Gary.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1140.]


text:
    No. 81-430.
    Illinois v. Gates et ux.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. [Certiorari granted, 454 U. S. 1140.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae, for divided argument, and for additional time for oral argument granted, and 15 additional minutes allotted for that purpose. Respondents also allotted an additional 15 minutes for oral argument. Motion of Florida for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for additional time for argument denied. Motion of respondents for divided argument to permit American Bar Association to present oral argument as amicus curiae denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens would grant this motion.


text:
    No. 81-1180.
    Dickerson, Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. New Banner Institute, Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 455 U. S. 1015.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to file a second supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 81-1717.
    American Bank & Trust Co. et al. v. Dallas County et al.; Bank of Texas et al. v. Childs et al.; and Wynnewood Bank & Trust et al. v. Childs et al.
   Ct. App. Tex., 5th Sup. Jud. Dist. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 966.] Motion of Texas Association of Appraisal Districts et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 81-1985.
    Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 904.] Motion of respondent Florida Gulf Coast Building Trades Council, AFL-CIO, for leave to file motion for divided argument out of time denied.


text:
    No. 81-2257.
    Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 942.] Motion of American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 81-2386.
    No. 81-2408.
    DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters et al. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, et al. v. Flowers et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1034]; and

C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1034.] Motion of Teamsters for a Democratic Union for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in No. 81-2386 granted. Motion of petitioners for divided argument granted, and divided argument on behalf of respondents granted. Motion of respondents in No. 81-2408 for divided argument and for additional time for oral argument denied. Motion of respondents in No. 81-2386 for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 82-34.
    No. 82-226.
    American Paper Institute, Inc. v. American Electric Power Service Corp. et al.; and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. American Electric Power Service Corp. et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 904.] Motion of Edison Electric Institute for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-168.
    National Labor Relations Board v. Transportation Management Corp.
   C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1014.] Motion of New England Legal Foundation et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-185.
    No. 82-246.
    No. 82-259.
    Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, et al.; Boston Police Patrolmen’s Assn., Inc. v. Castro et al.; and Beecher et al. v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 967.] Motion of National Education Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.

Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 82-195.
    Mueller et al. v. Allen et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 820.] Motions for leave to file briefs as amici curiae by the following were granted: Citizens for Educational Freedom, Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, United States Catholic Conference, Parents Rights, Inc., Council for American Private Education et al., and National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs.


text:
    No. 82-242.
    Gorsuch, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency v. Sierra Club et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 942.] Motion of respondents for leave to file motion for divided argument out of time denied.


text:
    No. 82-331.
    New Mexico et al. v. Mescalero Apache Tribe.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1014.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 82-354.
    No. 82-355.
    No. 82-398.
    Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., et al. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. et al.; Consumer Alert et al. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. et al.; and United States Department of Transportation et al. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 987.] Motion of respondents for divided argument denied. Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted. Motion of petitioners in No. 82-355 for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 82-438.
    National Labor Relations Board v. Behring International, Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of respondent to expedite consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 82-799.
    Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Authority et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1145.] Motion of the parties to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 82-401.
    Rice, Director, Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control of California v. Rehner.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 966.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 82-599.
    Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Engle et ux.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1102.] Motion of the parties to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 82-1166.
    Zurn Industries, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner to expedite briefing denied.


text:
    No. 82-5576.
    Pickett et al. v. Brown et al.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 1068.] Motion of Children’s Defense Fund et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-6057.
    No. 82-6079.
    In re West; and In re Tanner.
   Petitions for writs of ha-beas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 82-5806.
    No. 82-5919.
    In re DeJarnette; and In re Faraci.
   Petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 82-1242.
    In re Keene Corp. et al.
   Motion of petitioners to expedite consideration of the petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus denied. Petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 82-5880.
    In re Hanson.
   Petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 82-729.
    Regan, Secretary of the Treasury, et al. v. Time, Inc.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 82-975.
    Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles et al. v. Taxpayers for Vincent et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 82-1066.
    United States v. Ptasynski et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Wyo. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 82-687.
    United States v. Arthur Young & Co. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-792.
    Grove City College et al. v. Bell, Secretary of Education, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-825.
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Shell Oil Co.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-862.
    Consolidated Rail Corporation v. LeStrange.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-1041.
    Dickman et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-1047.
    United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-660.
    United States v. Cronic.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-1135.
    Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections v. Wiggins.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certio-rari granted.


text:
    No. 82-874.
    Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Edwards.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and cer-tiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-5298.
    Segura et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 82-5466.
    Welsh v. Wisconsin.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 81-6661.
    Moss v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-418.
    GAIU Local 13-B, Graphic Arts International Union v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-495.
    Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Aronsen.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-575.
    American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Service et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-598.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-612.
    Wracsaricht et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-633.
    Leichtling v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-662.
    No. 82-703.
    Middlesex County Utilities Authority v. City of New Brunswick et al.; and Borough of Milltown v. City of New Brunswick et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 686 F. 2d 120.


text:
    No. 82-681.
    Horton v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-696.
    A. S. Horner, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-706.
    Tillman v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-720.
    Ashcroft et al. v. United States Department of the Interior et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-725.
    Gilboe v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-741.
    International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Lubbers, General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-749.
    Baraban v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-756.
    Estate of Frock et al. v. United States Railroad Retirement Board.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-759.
    Kawasaki Motors Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-771.
    Union Oil Company of California et al. v. United States Department of Energy et al.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-772.
    Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-784.
    Jones v. Birdsong et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-785.
    Fort Belknap Indian Community et al. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-793.
    Hudson v. Hudson.
   Ct. App. Ind. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-798.
    Coletta et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-800.
    Wooten, as Father and Next Friend of Wooten v. American Motorists Insurance Co.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-817.
    Carmichael et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-821.
    Stroh v. Washington State Bar Assn.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-839.
    Americana Healthcare Corp. et al. v. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-843.
    Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Donovan, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-850.
    Gordon v. Terry et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-863.
    Hastings, United States District Judge v. United States et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-864.
    Imhoff et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-867.
    Faith Center, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-872.
    Legner v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-883.
    Michigan v. Gallagher.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-888.
    Hart v. University of Texas at Houston et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-890.
    City of New Orleans et al. v. Martin.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-892.
    Hanigan v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-903.
    EMI Ltd. v. Bennett et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari before judgment denied.


text:
    No. 82-908.
    Redhead, Co-Executrix of the Estate of Redhead, et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-915.
    Donnell et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-916.
    Herbert v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-920.
    Cain v. Medtronic, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-933.
    Brookside Limited Partnership v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-934.
    Basic/Four Corp. v. Central Microfilm Service Corp.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-937.
    No. 82-1004.
    Robinson, Trustee in Bankruptcy of D. C. Sullivan & Co., Inc. v. Consolidated Service Corp. et al.; and Sullivan v. Robinson, Trustee in Bankruptcy of D. C. Sullivan & Co., Inc.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 685 F. 2d 729.


text:
    No. 82-939.
    Requena v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-951.
    Keith v. Smith, Attorney General of the United States, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-955.
    Wood et al. v. Leist et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-961.
    South Dakota ex rel. Aurora County et al. v. Olgilvie, Trustee of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-966.
    West v. Roadway Express, Inc.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Summit County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-969.
    Aeronautical Machinists Lodge 709, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Lockheed Georgia Co., Division of Lockheed Corp.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-970.
    LaGuardia v. Pennsylvania.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-971.
    Holway v. Smith.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-980.
    Sadlak v. Celeste, Governor of Ohio, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-981.
    Clark Oil & Refining Corp. v. Alderson.
   Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-985.
    Vierthaler et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-987.
    McDonald et al. v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 2d Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-991.
    National Association of Home Health Agencies et al. v. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-993.
    Patrick v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Summit County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1000.
    Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1002.
    Carnation Co. v. New York State Division of Human Rights.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1003.
    Swanger, Executrix of the Estate of Swanger v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1011.
    Fleming v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va.. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1012.
    Gulden et al. v. McCorkle et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1013.
    No. 82-1014.
    No. 82-5824.
    No. 82-5988.
    Brooklier et al. v. United States; Dragna v. United States; Locicero v. United States; and Rizzitello v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 685 F. 2d 1208.


text:
    No. 82-1018.
    Shuffman, Executrix of the Estate of Shuffman v. Hartford Textile Corp. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1030.
    Campbell v. Washington State Bar Assn.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1034.
    Cirillo et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1036.
    Christofferson v. Church of Scientology Mission of Davis et al.
   Ct. App. Ore. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1038.
    Michaels, Trustee of Marin Motor Oil, Inc. v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Committee; and Marin Motor Oil, Inc., et al. v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Committee.
    No. 82-1094.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 689 F. 2d 445.


text:
    No. 82-1040.
    North River Insurance Co. v. Whitman, Sheriff, Bienville Parish, Louisiana.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1043.
    Kelsaw v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1045.
    Newton et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1048.
    Morial v. Council of the City of New Orleans et al.
   Ct. App. La., 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1049.
    Erwin v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 10th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1056.
    Marshall Field & Co. v. Allen et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1058.
    Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. v. Connecticut et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1061.
    Begassat v. Cosmopolitan National Bank of Chicago, as Trustee under Trust No. 13199, et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1062.
    Armstrong v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1063.
    Cook v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1064.
    Meeker v. Attorney General of the United States et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1067.
    Gambrel et al. v. Kentucky Board of Dentistry et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1068.
    Alvarez v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1072.
    Kovic v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1073.
    Young v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1077.
    Keystone Cable-Vision Corp. et al. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1082.
    Rupe v. Blake et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1087.
    International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers, Local 1509 v. Wattleton et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1091.
    Thian v. Ray et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1096.
    Zinger Construction Co., Inc. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1099.
    Fulton County Jail (Staff), Atlanta, Georgia v. Fryer.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1101.
    Sentinel Financial Instruments et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1102.
    Grey v. City of Philadelphia et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1108.
    Siegel v. New York et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1115.
    Kondrat v. City of Willoughby Hills.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Lake County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1116.
    Altman v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1120.
    Toraason v. Burkart.
   App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1122.
    Johmann v. Johmann.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1123.
    Laboke et al. v. Lowdermilk et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1136.
    Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. v. Government Employees Credit Union et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1140.
    McLean v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1145.
    Rothballer et al. v. Wanless.
   App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1151.
    Leathersmith of London, Ltd. v. Alleyn.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1170.
    Stuart-Caballero v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1176.
    Bennett, Administratrix of the Estate of Bennett v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1197.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1210.
    Giacomino v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1232.
    Bulgatz et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1239.
    Deneen v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5417.
    Angle, aka McClure v. Bowen et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5467.
    Costanzo v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5500.
    No. 82-5708.
    Long v. United States; and Crowell v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 688 F. 2d 848.


text:
    No. 82-5516.
    Bowman v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5552.
    Green v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5570.
    Bell v. Iowa.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5574.
    Laswell et al. v. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5575.
    Kell v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5579.
    Matthews v. United States et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5583.
    Cunningham v. Novak.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5608.
    Frazier v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5619.
    Bancroft v. Pennsylvania.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5623.
    Bonuchi v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5624.
    No. 82-5747.
    Cabrera-Martinez v. United States; and Bautista v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 684 F. 2d 1286.


text:
    No. 82-5633.
    Kunitake v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5668.
    Slotnick v. O’Lone, Superintendent, New Jersey State Prison, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5681.
    Minshew v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5684.
    Martin v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5687.
    Linam v. Griffin, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5700.
    Rutherford v. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5709.
    Jessen v. City of Spokane.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5713.
    Brown v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5721.
    Sharrieff v. Hilton, Superintendent, New Jersey State Prison, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5723.
    Anderson v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5734.
    Stone v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5739.
    Day v. Franzen et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5743.
    Moreno v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5753.
    McCruiston v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5772.
    Shaffer et al. v. Board of School Directors of the Albert Gallatin Area School District et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5809.
    Cunningham v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5816.
    Harris v. United States Department of Justice et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5823.
    Lee v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5826.
    Foster v. Wainwright.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5833.
    Bell v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5835.
    Wiener v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5836.
    Ballentine v. Harris, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5837.
    Adams v. Ballentine.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5842.
    Walker v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5846.
    Cardwell v. Maggio, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5854.
    Morgan v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5855.
    Walker v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5858.
    Tarr v. Maggio, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5863.
    Gadson v. Rizzo, Philadelphia Fire Commissioner, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5867.
    Piatkowska v. Employers Insurance of Wausau.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5869.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5872.
    Caruth v. Pinkney, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5874.
    Garrett v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5875.
    Felton v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5883.
    Feng-ming Tung v. Brewster.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5884.
    Smith v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5885.
    Washington v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5886.
    Moody v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5888.
    Phillips v. Washington.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5889.
    Presley v. Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5892.
    Kraus v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5894.
    Muntner v. Control Data Corp. et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5896.
    Schreiber v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5897.
    Reese v. Sister Suzanne Marie et al.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5898.
    Thompson v. Resten.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5899.
    Nassar v. Reagan, President of the United States, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5900.
    Smith v. Lane, Director, Illinois Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5903.
    Broadway v. Stafford, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5904.
    McFadden v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Warren County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5905.
    McClain v. Oklahoma.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5906.
    Shaw v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5912.
    Henson v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5913.
    Dillard v. Wayne County Prosecutor.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5914.
    Combs v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5918.
    Atherton v. Falcone, Gary & Rosenfeld, Ltd., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5923.
    Wise v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5924.
    Scott v. Maggio, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5925.
    McColpin v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5928.
    Elenes-Cazares v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5930.
    Shaumyan et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5931.
    Webster v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5932.
    Watnick v. Elgin State Hospital.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5933.
    Bright v. Garrison et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5937.
    Ford v. Superintendent, Kentucky State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5938.
    Higgins v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5940.
    Bailey et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5941.
    Gipson v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5942.
    Ballance v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5943.
    Keene v. Kansas.
   Sup. Ct. Kan. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5945.
    Sullivan et al. v. Rees, Superintendent, Kentucky State Reformatory, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5946.
    Rene v. Federal Bureau of Prisons.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5947.
    Pelaez-Navarro v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5949.
    Sims v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5951.
    Doroshow v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5952.
    Hall v. Kilanik et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5953.
    Cockrell v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5954.
    Byrd v. Civil Service Commission of the City and County of San Francisco et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5955.
    Barker v. Marine Transportation Lines, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5956.
    Gallagher v. Washington.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5957.
    Easterwood v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5958.
    Gray v. Bordenkircher, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5959.
    Bertie v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5960.
    Smart v. Allsbrook, Superintendent, Odom Complex, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5962.
    Gambill v. Marshall.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5964.
    Elenes-Cardenas v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5966.
    Wilson v. Colorado.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5967.
    Whidden v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5969.
    Mumin et al. v. Maggio, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5970.
    Macon v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5972.
    Cote v. Eagle Stores, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5973.
    Cook v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5975.
    Karkenny v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5976.
    Jenkins v. Jago et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5978.
    Cummings v. Indiana et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5979.
    Crabtree v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5980.
    Losinno et al. v. Bay State National Bank.
   Ct. App. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5981.
    Hilson v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, et al.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5982.
    Lucien v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5983.
    Gadson v. Melleby et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5984.
    Pappageorge v. Sumner, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5985.
    Wojcik v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5986.
    Pendarvis v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5990.
    Johl v. Johl et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5991.
    Klayer v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5993.
    Manko v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5994.
    Morris v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5996.
    Young v. Mirock, Special Agent, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, et al.; and Young v. Reed, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5997.
    McMillion v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5998.
    Paul v. Maggio, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5999.
    Scarborough v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6002.
    Colvin v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6010.
    Lott v. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6012.
    Fiorini v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6013.
    Emanuel v. Michigan.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6014.
    Hicks v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6015.
    Nurse v. Department of the Air Force.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6016.
    Heaton v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6018.
    Bursey v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6022.
    Harp v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6024.
    Collins, aka Cross v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6028.
    Greisinger v. Davis, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6029.
    Scharstein v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6037.
    Hayward v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6038.
    Molovinsky v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6042.
    Wade v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6048.
    Dover v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6053.
    Hollis v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6058.
    Mathis v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6061.
    No. 82-6072.
    No. 82-6073.
    Barros v. United States; Perez-Munoz v. United States; and Rivas-Iglesias v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 681 F. 2d 1372 and 692 F. 2d 116.


text:
    No. 82-6063.
    Schlomann v. Ralston, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6065.
    Spellman v. United States et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6070.
    Pyles v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6083.
    Humphrey v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6087.
    Guerro v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6088.
    Lynn v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6093.
    Beltran-Payan v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6094.
    Cauley v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6096.
    Hernandez v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6099.
    Hanson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6100.
    Yazzie v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


author: The Chief Justice, Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    No. 82-319.
    Massachusetts v. Podgurski et al.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice,

dissenting.

In my view, only the limitations of the Court’s time preclude our granting review of this case. I would grant certio-rari and summarily reverse the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Justice Rehnquist,

dissenting.

This case began when the manager of a clothing store in Canton Center, Mass., observed an unfamiliar blue van in the rear parking lot, which the store owned. From his vantage point about 15 feet away, the manager saw two men in the van cutting up a suspicious looking substance. He reported his observation to the police. The Canton Police Department dispatched Officer Brown to “check ‘[t]wo men inside a van acting suspicious.’” 386 Mass. 385, 386, 436 N. E. 2d 150, 151 (1982). When the officer approached within about 10 feet of the van, he noticed two people in the rear of the van and that the sliding door on the passenger side stood approximately 18 inches ajar. Officer Brown then stuck his head through the door. He observed respondents Podgurski and Collins cutting hashish. Respondents were arrested and the hashish was seized.

Respondents were charged with possession of hashish. The trial court granted their motion to suppress the evidence of the hashish and the Commonwealth appealed. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. It held that Officer Brown had searched the van before viewing the hashish, and that respondents had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the van, even though the door was open. The court apparently thought that Officer Brown should have tried “to question or communicate with” respondents before putting his head inside the door. Id., at 390, 436 N. E. 2d, at 153. It held that Officer Brown had not conducted a “‘lawful threshold inquiry’” under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), because he was conducting a “search.” 386 Mass., at 390, 436 N. E. 2d, at 153. It also thought that there would be no constitutional problem if Officer Brown had looked through the windshield or one of the windows, or had kept his head outside the open door. Id., at 388, 436 N. E. 2d, at 152.

I am not persuaded that the Supreme Judicial Court misconstrued this Court’s decisions in finding that respondents had a legitimate expectation of privacy. However, I am concerned that it took too narrow a view of our cases permitting police officers to make brief investigative stops and searches.

In Terry, supra, we held that “a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” 392 U. S., at 22. Terry approved a search for weapons. In this case, Officer Brown merely sought to initiate a routine investigation by looking in an open door to a van. It is true that the only information available to Officer Brown was the store manager’s report of suspicious activity in a van parked on store property, relayed to him by his dispatcher. However, “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 145 (1972).

Of course, absent probable cause, Officer Brown may not have been permitted to search the glove compartment, or under the seat, or a partitioned section of the interior, but that is not this case. By putting his head inside the door, he intruded only slightly into respondents’ “personal security.” Terry, supra, at 19. The intrusion would not have been materially different if he had kept his head outside the door, as the Supreme Judicial Court indicated would have been permissible.

The police officer in this case had less specific information than did the officers in Terry and Adams, but he did have a citizen’s report of “suspicious activity.” This seems to me to be an articulable suspicion that was sufficiently concrete to justify the minimal intrusion at issue here. Officer Brown seems to have engaged in ordinary, everyday police work. Our decisions in Terry and Adams are by no means limited to “stops”; they embrace searches as well as seizures. In Terry, the officer conducted a patdown search. In Adams, the officer both searched for and seized the pistol.

We have also held that neither probable cause nor an artic-ulable suspicion is necessary to justify a minimal intrusion into individual privacy. In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 (1976), we held that a regular checkpoint stop near the border might be made without any articulated individual suspicion. The Court referred to the visual inspection that accompanied the stop as part of the “objective intrusion,” and therefore may have felt it was dealing with a search as well as a seizure.

I think that the facts available to Officer Brown would “ ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” Terry, supra, at 22, quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96 (1964). Terry and Adams permit searches on articulable suspicion in appropriate circumstances. Martinez-Fuerte permits minimal intrusions even without an articulable suspicion. I believe that the Court should grant certiorari to further consider the extent to which the Terry line of cases applies to minimal intrusions such as this search when they occur in the initial stages of police investigations.


text:
    No. 82-601.
    Parratt, Warden of the Nebraska State Penitentiary v. Holtan.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-928.
    Baskerville v. Stamper.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-996.
    Rent-It Corp. v. Clark.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1009.
    Colorado v. Hendershott.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1083.
    South Dakota v. Lohnes.
   Sup. Ct. S. D. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-715.
    Brainerd v. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-740.
    Moody v. Alabama ex rel. Forresster, Commissioner of Insurance of Alabama, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Motions of Conservative Caucus, Inc., Washington Legal Foundation, Texas Institute of Government, and American Civil Liberties Union et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-957.
    Doubleday Sports, Inc. v. Eastern Microwave, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motions of CBS, Inc., and Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-982.
    Tribune Publishing Co., dba Columbia Daily Tribune, et al. v. Hyde et al.
   Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Motion of respondent Sandra K. Hyde for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-994.
    Robert Welch, Inc. v. Gertz.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 82-1010.
    Neubauer, Personal Representative of the Estate of Neubauer, et al. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 82-1020.
    Smith v. Southern Railway Co.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 82-1059.
    Ehmann v. Webster, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 82-1025.
    Church of Scientology Mission of Davis et al. v. Christofferson.
   Ct. App. Ore. Motion of Churches for Fairness for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1032.
    Doucet v. Diamond M Drilling Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of Mississippi Trial Lawyers Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1075.
    CPG Products Corp. et al. v. Antimonopoly, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motions for leave to file briefs as amici curiae by the following were granted: United States Trademark Association, Committee on Trademarks and Unfair Competition of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc., Bar Association of the District of Columbia et al., Chamber of Commerce of the United States, National Association of Manufacturers, Toy Manufacturers of America, Inc., and Procter & Gamble Co. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1110.
    Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., et al. v. Clipper Exxpress.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of American Trucking Associations, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1125.
    Haas v. Hash et ux.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied.

Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 82-5585.
    Bruscino v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioner to strike the brief of the United States denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5666.
    Riding v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for damages denied. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5839.
    Robinson v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-5853.
    No. 82-5877.
    No. 82-5879.
    No. 82-5902.
    No. 82-5909.
    Fitzgerald v. Virginia. Johnson v. Zant, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center. Daugherty v. Florida. Stevens v. Florida. Peek v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Va.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.; and

Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio-rari denied. Reported below: No. 82-5853, 223 Va. 615, 292 S. E. 2d 798; No. 82-5877, 249 Ga. 812, 295 S. E. 2d 63; No. 82-5879, 419 So. 2d 1067; No. 82-5902, 419 So. 2d 1058; No. 82-5909, 422 So. 2d 843.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 80,
    No. 81-1008.
    No. 82-187.
    No. 82-497.
    No. 82-615.
    No. 82-640.
    No. 82-669.
    No. 82-721.
    No. 82-761.
    No. 82-5266.
    No. 82-5426.
    No. 82-5584.
    No. 82-5638.
    No. 82-5712.
    No. 82-5779.
    No. 82-5834.
    Orig.
    Colorado v. New Mexico et al., Burlington Northern Inc. et al. v. United States et al., Lujan v. United States Department of the Interior et al., Alberta Gas Chemicals, Ltd. v. Celanese Corp. et al., Jersey Sanitation Co., Inc., et al. v. United States, Palmgren et al. v. Kansas ex rel. Murray, County Attorney of Thomas County, Kansas, et al., Soffer v. City of Costa Mesa et al., Gabriel v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company of Missouri et al., Kuchta et al. v. Allstate Insurance Co. et al., Cannon v. Cannon, Payne v. Coughlin et al., Curtis v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., et al., McDonald v. Draper et al., Smith v. Smith, Hoover v. Mississippi, Blair v. Missouri,
   ante, p. 176;

ante, p. 131;

ante, p. 969;

ante, p. 1092;

ante, p. 991;

ante, p. 1081;

ante, p. 1070;

ante, p. 1088;

ante, p. 1106;

ante, p. 1109;

ante, p. 1110;

ante, p. 1090;

ante, p. 1112;

ante, p. 1115;

ante, p. 1149; and

ante, p. 1188. Petitions for rehearing denied.


author: Justice Rehnquist, Circuit Justice.

text:
    CALIFORNIA v. RAMOS
    No. A-349 (81-1893).
    Decided October 26, 1982
   Justice Rehnquist, Circuit Justice.

Respondent Marcelino Ramos was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in the California courts. The trial judge had, pursuant to state statute, informed the sentencing jury that a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole may be commuted by the Governor to a sentence that permits parole. The California Supreme Court vacated the death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding on the ground that respondent was denied due process in violation of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 30 Cal. 3d 553, 639 P. 2d 908.

In March 1982, the State of California applied for a stay of the California Supreme Court’s judgment. I referred the application to the full Court, which denied the stay. 455 U. S. 1011. In April, the State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. On October 4, 1982, the Court granted the petition for certiorari, ante, p. 821, and California now has reapplied for a stay. It states that the new penalty proceeding is scheduled to begin on November 8, 1982. Respondent has. stated that he does not object to issuance of a stay.

I have therefore decided that petitioner’s reapplication for a stay pending disposition of the case by this Court should be granted.

It is so ordered.


text:
    KPNX BROADCASTING CO. et al. v. ARIZONA SUPERIOR COURT et al.
    No. A-543.
    Decided December 23, 1982
   Justice Rehnquist, Circuit Justice.

Applicants, KPNX Broadcasting Co. and several reporters and courtroom sketch artists, ask that I stay two orders issued by the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Ariz. Applicants are reporting on a murder case presently being tried before one of the judges of that court in Phoenix. This is the third trial to arise out of the same murder; three accomplices have been convicted in two previous jury trials. The crime allegedly involves several conspiracies and other connections with organized crime, and has generated extensive publicity. Some members of the jury venire expressed a fear for personal and family safety if they were selected as jurors. The trial court responded that it would do whatever was possible to prevent their pictures from being displayed. Early in the course of this trial, a magazine in Phoenix published an article about one of the prosecuting attorneys.

The trial has been open to the public and press at all times. There has not been any restriction on the reporting of the proceedings in open court. The trial court has, however, entered two orders that “restrict” the press from covering the trial as it would like to do.

First, the trial court ordered court personnel, counsel, witnesses, and jurors not to speak directly with the press. The court appointed a court employee as “Liaison with the media” to provide a “unified and singular source for the media concerning these proceedings.”

Second, on November 30 the trial judge observed two of the applicants, who are television sketch artists, drawing the jurors. The court ordered that all drawings of jurors that are to be broadcast on television be reviewed by the court before being broadcast.

After the second order was issued, an organization calling itself the First Amendment Coalition sought a conference with the trial judge to object to these orders. Nothing was resolved at this conference, and the trial was then recessed until December 6. On that day, the First Amendment Coalition filed a petition for special action with the Supreme Court of Arizona, asking that court to vacate the two orders and enjoin the trial judge from issuing any similar orders. The Arizona Supreme Court dismissed this petition on December 8 on the ground that the First Amendment Coalition lacked standing and the petitioners had failed to join as parties the defendants in the murder trial.

On December 12, the present applicants filed a similar petition for special action and an application for a stay of the two orders. The following day, the Arizona Supreme Court denied the application for a stay and set the petition for oral argument for hearing on January 18. On December 14, the trial court held a hearing on applicants’ standing to challenge the orders in that court. The trial court decided that applicants have standing, and set a hearing on their application to vacate the orders on December 17. Applicants also filed this application on December 17.

On December 20, the trial court entered an order explaining its earlier orders and declining to vacate them. With respect to the order that participants in the case not communicate with the press, the trial court stated that it had evaluated the press’ First Amendment rights against the defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial. It found that the least restrictive course of conduct that would protect the defendants’ rights was to restrict the participants’ outside contact with the press and appoint a court official to answer questions about the proceedings. As to the sketch order, the court held that the sketches of jurors by television artists were used in lieu of actual video recording of the jurors during the proceedings. It held that there is no constitutional right to broadcast pictures of the jurors, relying on Chandler v. Florida, 449 U. S. 560 (1981), and Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U. S. 589 (1978).

Applicants contend that the order that trial participants not communicate with the press conflicts with Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539 (1976), and with several decisions from the Federal Courts of Appeals. Applicants contend there was no showing that the order was necessary to protect the defendants’ right to a fair trial. Respondents contend that this order is supportable on the merits because the trial court has struck a proper balance between the defendants’ right to a fair trial and the press’ First Amendment rights. They point out that nothing in the order limits the press’ right to attend the trial and report anything it observes.

Applicants also contend that the order prohibiting broadcast of sketches of the jurors is an unconstitutional prior restraint. They contend the decision conflicts with Stuart, supra, and with the decisions of several State Supreme Courts. Respondents contend that this order is based on an interpretation of the Arizona Supreme Court’s guideline concerning television coverage of trials. Since the order applies only to television, respondents contend that it is correct under Chandler v. Florida, supra.

These facts seem to place the issues in the general area of constitutional law that is covered by our decisions in cases such as Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for County of Norfolk, 457 U. S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S. 555 (1980); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368 (1979); and Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra. It does not appear that stays were sought from this Court in any but the last of these four cases; and the present case is in a posture very similar to that of Stuart, supra, when that case was before Justice Blackmun on an application for stay. 423 U. S. 1319 (1975); 423 U. S. 1327 (1975). The applicants there, like the applicants in this case, were seeking a stay of a state trial court order pending review of that order in the State Supreme Court. As Justice Blackmun pointed out, “[i]t is highly desirable, of course, that the issue, concerning, as it does, an order by a . . . state court, should be decided in the first instance by the Supreme Court” of the State. 423 U. S., at 1325; 423 U. S., at 1328. There, as here, the State Supreme Court had given some indication that it would not rule on the case for several weeks.

In these circumstances, Justice Blackmun noted that where “a direct prior restraint is imposed upon the reporting of news by the media, each passing day may constitute a separate and cognizable infringement of the First Amendment.” Id., at 1329. Justice Blackmun thought that parts of the order at issue in Stuart created irreparable injuries that required him to act before the State Supreme Court. The applicants in that case were prohibited from “reporting of the details of the crimes, of the identities of the victims, [and] of the testimony of the pathologist at the preliminary hearing.” Id., at 1331. At the same time, Justice Blackmun declined to stay other parts of the order, including a complete prohibition on reporting that the accused had confessed, id., at 1332-1333, a ban on photography in the courthouse, and restrictions on trial participants’ contacts with the media, id., at 1334. Justice Blackmun thought it proper to stay only “the most obvious features that require resolution immediately and without one moment’s further delay.” Ibid.

Given the procedural posture of this case, it would seem that in order for a stay to be granted before the case is heard by the highest court of the State, there should be a risk of irreparable injury together with a demonstrable departure on the part of the trial court from the law laid down in our cases. I simply do not find those elements to be present here. The orders at issue in this case do not prohibit the reporting of any facts on the public record. The trial has never been closed, and all the proceedings may be reported and commented upon. With respect to the court’s order barring communication between trial participants and the press, it seems to me that the following language from Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333 (1966), quoted with approval in Stuart, supra, at 553-554, goes far towards sustaining the action of the trial court:

“Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences. . . . The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor the enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.” 384 U. S., at 362-363.

So far as communication between the trial participants and the press during actual sessions of the court in the courtroom and its immediate environs, I do not have the slightest doubt that a trial judge may insist that the only performance which goes on in the courtroom is the trial of the case at hand. The fact that media coverage has transformed events such as professional sports contests into a framework designed to accommodate that coverage does not mean that the First Amendment requires criminal trials to undergo the same transformation. The mere potential for confusion if unregulated communication between trial participants and the press at a heavily covered trial were permitted is enough to warrant a measure such as the trial judge took in this case. Continuation of the proscription against communication to hours and places where the court is not in session appears to me to be warranted under the above-quoted language from Sheppard, supra.

I find the requirement of clearance with the trial judge before sketches of the jurors may be shown on television the more troubling of the two orders issued by the trial judge. The judge limited the order to sketches drawn for television showing, and did not include within it sketches to be reproduced in newspapers. He apparently made this distinction because Chandler v. Florida, 449 U. S. 560 (1981), suggests a greater latitude in trial courts for regulating television coverage of a trial than for regulation of coverage by the press. For this purpose I am somewhat at a loss to know why the print media and the electronic media should be treated differently, since whatever potential for disruption or distortion may exist would appear to be the same whether the sketches are ultimately reprinted in newspapers or shown on television.

But I cannot accept applicants’ conclusion, drawn from this distinction, that the limitation of the regulation of sketches indicates that the trial judge did not regard it as essential; I think he regarded it as essential, and probably would have extended it to all sketches if he thought that the First Amendment permitted him to do it. Likewise, the requirement of previous clearance of the sketches smacks, at least in the abstract, of the notion of “prior restraint,” which has been roundly condemned in a long line of our cases beginning with Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). I think that in all probability the trial judge’s order would be more defensible on federal constitutional grounds if he had flatly banned courtroom sketching of the jurors, and if he had extended the ban to those who sketch for the print media as well as to those who sketch for television.

But balancing the doubts that this portion of the judge’s second order generates against the procedural posture of the case, I conclude that the application for a stay should be denied. Surely all of the lofty historical reasons which have been advanced in our opinions to support the right of public and press access to criminal trials contemplate the traditional criminal trial as a public governmental procedure of some importance to every citizen. I would think that of all conceivable reportorial messages that could be conveyed by reporters or artists watching such trials, one of the least necessary to appreciate the significance of the trial would be individual juror sketches.

Stuart is a prototypical example of a recent case in this area which has admonished trial courts to employ their usually considerable discretion to search for other alternatives than prior restraints in order to protect the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial and the State’s interest in a verdict which may be upheld on appeal. I am satisfied that the trial judge has indeed sought for these alternatives here, and I do not find them so demonstrably impermissible as to warrant a stay at this stage of the proceedings. The application is therefore

Denied.


text:
    CONFORTE v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
    No. A-584.
    Decided January 12, 1983
   Justice Rehnquist, Circuit Justice.

This controversy began when the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued tax deficiencies and penalties against applicant and his wife for the years 1973 through 1976. The Confortes filed tax returns for the years in question stating a “net income,” but without disclosing their gross income and deductions; they claimed these details would be incriminating. Based on projections of income and expenses, the IRS determined that the Confortes had a greater tax liability than their “net income” revealed.

The Confortes petitioned to the Tax Court for a redetermi-nation. That court sustained the calculations made by the IRS. 74 T. C. 1160 (1980). Pursuant to 26 U. S. C. §7482 (1976 ed. and Supp. V), the Confortes appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On November 5, 1982, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part as to Mrs. Conforte. 692 F. 2d 587. Applicant’s appeal, however, was dismissed. Applicant seeks a stay of that dismissal.

The Court of Appeals found that applicant is a fugitive from justice for convictions on four counts of willfully attempting to evade federal employment taxes. See United States v. Conforte, 624 F. 2d 869 (CA9 1980). Relying on this Court’s decision in Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U. S. 365 (1970) (per curiam), the court held that as a fugitive from justice applicant should not be allowed to prosecute an appeal in the federal courts.

The court rejected applicant’s argument that Molinaro only applies to appeals from criminal convictions. The court noted that “the rule should apply with greater force in civil cases where an individual’s liberty is not at stake,” 692 F. 2d, at 589, and cited a series of cases from the Courts of Appeals so holding. See Doyle v. Department of Justice, 215 U. S. App. D. C. 338, 668 F. 2d 1365 (1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 1002 (1982); Broadway v. City of Montgomery, 530 F. 2d 657 (CA5 1976); United States ex rel. Bailey v. Commanding Officer, 496 F. 2d 324 (CA1 1974). The court also said it need not determine whether Molinaro would apply where the criminal conviction and the civil appeal are unrelated because here the issues of the two cases “are each related components of a general tax evasion scheme.” 692 F. 2d, at 590. Finally, relying on its own decisions in United States v. Wood, 550 F. 2d 435 (1976), and Johnson v. Laird, 432 F. 2d 77 (1970), the court held that Molinaro is not limited to discretionary appeals.

The Court of Appeals did not leave applicant without recourse. The court ruled that “[i]f within 56 days he submits himself to the jurisdiction of the District Court of Nevada [the court from which he is a fugitive], he may move to reinstate his appeal.” 692 F. 2d, at 590. With a three-day extension because of the New Year’s Eve holiday, the 56 days expired on January 3, 1983. On the same day applicant filed in this Court for a stay of the Court of Appeals’ decision pending his filing of a petition for certiorari and our disposition of that petition.

Applicant argues that a stay should be granted because “the 56 day limitation will expire before the application for a writ of certiorari can be completed and filed.” He maintains that should this Court deny his yet-to-be filed petition for certiorari he desires to have time remaining to comply with the Court of Appeals’ directive. The 56 days expired on the day applicant filed for this stay. Except in extreme circumstances the Court generally is unable to provide same-day service. While it might be within our jurisdiction to grant a stay retroactively, an applicant detracts from the urgency of his situation where he makes a last-minute claim and offers no explanation for his procrastination.

Applicant may be injured if a stay does not issue. Assuming he files a petition for certiorari, unless we grant that petition and reverse the lower court the running of the 56 days will bar applicant from reinstating his appeal by surrendering to the authorities. A stay is appropriate, however, only where there is a reasonable possibility that four Justices of this Court will vote to grant certiorari. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 429 U. S. 1341, 1344 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers); Graves v. Barnes, 405 U. S. 1201, 1203 (1972) (Powell, J., in chambers). I do not believe that a reasonable possibility exists here.

In Molinaro v. New Jersey, supra, the Court said that while a litigant’s status as a fugitive from justice “does not strip the case of its character as an adjudicable case or controversy, we believe it disentitles the [litigant] to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims.” Id., at 366. See also Smith v. United States, 94 U. S. 97 (1876). While this Court has never extended the “fugitive from justice” rule beyond the facts of Molinaro and Smith (i. e., where the criminal conviction from which the litigant is a fugitive is the judgment being challenged on appeal), the court below correctly points out that the Courts of Appeals have done so on a number of occasions. Since we have denied certiorari in this type case in the past, I do not believe it likely that applicant’s petition will be granted. See, e. g., Doyle v. Department of Justice, supra.

For these reasons the application is denied.

       While applicant alleges injury in his request for a stay, he does not set forth a legal argument on the merits. Thus, the application could be denied for applicant’s failure to carry his burden of overcoming the presumptive correctness of the Court of Appeals’ decision. Whalen v. Roe, 423 U. S. 1313, 1316 (1975) (Marshall, J., in chambers).

       Applicant’s failure to seek a stay in the Court of Appeals provides an alternative ground for denial of the stay. “An application for a stay or injunction to a Justice of this Court shall not be entertained, except in the most extraordinary circumstances, unless application for the relief sought first has been made to the appropriate court or courts below, or to a judge or judges thereof.” This Court’s Rule 44.4. Applicant seeks to be excused from his failure to comply with this Rule, not because of any “extraordinary circumstances,” but because, according to applicant, the Court of Appeals “has ruled that [he] has forfeited any right to seek relief from the judicial processes of” that court. To the contrary, the court found only that applicant could not pursue his civil appeal unless he turned himself in within 56 days.


author: Justice White, Circuit Justice.

text:
    BONURA et al. v. CBS, INC., et al.
    No. A-622.
    Decided January 16, 1983
   Justice White, Circuit Justice.

There is no doubt that as Circuit Justice I have the power to set aside the stay issued by the Court of Appeals in this case. Only the weightiest considerations, however, would warrant such action by a Circuit Justice. New York v. Kleppe, 429 U. S. 1307, 1310 (1976) (Marshall, J., in chambers); O’Rourke v. Levine, 80 S. Ct. 623, 624, 4 L. Ed. 2d 615, 616 (1960) (Harlan, J., in chambers).

I have examined the transcript of the hearing held by the District Judge at 8:30 p. m. on January 15, 1983, in New Orleans, the order issued after the hearing forbidding the broadcast by CBS in the Dallas area of a particular segment of a designated program, the order issued by a divided panel of the Court of Appeals staying the District Court’s order, and the application to me to vacate the stay of the Court of Appeals. I am not myself convinced that the Court of Appeals was in error in issuing the stay; and I do not think that if the application were before the full Court, five Justices would vote to vacate the stay. Accordingly, I deny the application to vacate the stay.


author: Justice Powell, Circuit Justice.

text:
    JAFFREE et al. v. BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS OF MOBILE COUNTY et al.
    No. A-663.
    Decided February 11, 1983
   Justice Powell, Circuit Justice.

This is an application for a stay of the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama pending an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Applicant Ishmael Jaffree is the father of minor applicants Jamael Aakki Jaffree, Makeba Green, and Chioke Saleem Jaffree, three students in the Mobile County, Alabama, public schools. Respondents are various school and state officials. The application was filed here on Feburary 2. In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I entered an order staying the judgment of the District Court until respondents were afforded an opportunity to respond. Their responses are now in hand, and I have considered the merits of the application for a stay.

The situation, quite briefly, is as follows: Beginning in the fall of 1981, teachers in the minor applicants’ schools conducted prayers in their regular classes, including group recitations of the Lord’s Prayer. At the time, an Alabama statute provided for a one-minute period of silence “for meditation or voluntary prayer” at the commencement of each day’s classes in the public elementary schools. Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1982). In 1982, Alabama enacted a statute permitting public school teachers to lead their classes in prayer. 1982 Ala. Acts 735.

Applicants, objecting to prayer in the public schools, filed suit to enjoin the activities. They later amended their complaint to challenge the applicable state statutes. After a hearing, the District Court granted a preliminary injunction. Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727 (1982). It recognized that it was bound by the decisions of this Court, id., at 731, and that under those decisions it was “obligated to enjoin the enforcement” of the statutes, id., at 733.

In its subsequent decision on the merits, however, the District Court reached a different conclusion. Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (1983). It again recognized that the prayers at issue, given in public school classes and led by teachers, were vio-lative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as that Clause has been construed by this Court. The District Court nevertheless ruled “that the United States Supreme Court has erred.” Id., at 1128. It therefore dismissed the complaint and dissolved the injunction.

There can be little doubt that the District Court was correct in finding that conducting prayers as part of a school program is unconstitutional under this Court’s decisions. In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962), the Court held that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits a State from authorizing prayer in the public schools. The following Term, in Murray v. Curlett, decided with Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963), the Court explicitly invalidated a school district’s rule providing for the reading of the Lord’s Prayer as part of a school’s opening exercises, despite the fact that participation in those exercises was voluntary.

Unless and until this Court reconsiders the foregoing decisions, they appear to control this case. In my view, the District Court was obligated to follow them. Similarly, my own authority as Circuit Justice is limited by controlling decisions of the full Court. Accordingly, I am compelled to grant the requested stay.

It is so ordered.