author: Justice Rehnquist

text:
    SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF THE TOWN OF BURLINGTON, MASSACHUSETTS, et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF MASSACHUSETTS et al.
    No. 84-433.
    Argued March 26, 1985
    Decided April 29, 1985

      Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      David Berman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Jane Kenworthy Lewis.

      Ellen L. Janos, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause for respondent Department of Education of Massachusetts. With her on the brief were Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, Judith S. Yogman, Assistant Attorney General, and Kristen Reasoner Apgar. David W. Rosenberg argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Pánico.

        Thomas A. Mela and Stanley J. Eichner filed a brief for Developmental Disabilities Law Center et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

   Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Education of the Handicapped Act (Act), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U. S. C. §1401 et seq., requires participating state and local educational agencies “to assure that handicapped children and their parents or guardians are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of free appropriate public education” to such handicapped children. § 1415(a). These procedures include the right of the parents to participate in the development of an “individualized education program” (IEP) for the child and to challenge in administrative and court proceedings a proposed IEP with which they disagree. §§ 1401(19), 1415(b), (d), (e). Where as in the present case review of a contested IEP takes years to run its course — years critical to the child’s development — important practical questions arise concerning interim placement of the child and financial responsibility for that placement. This case requires us to address some of those questions.

Michael Pánico, the son of respondent Robert Pánico, was a first grader in the public school system of petitioner Town of Burlington, Mass., when he began experiencing serious difficulties in school. It later became evident that he had “specific learning disabilities” and thus was “handicapped” within the meaning of the Act, 20 U. S. C. § 1401(1). This entitled him to receive at public expense specially designed instruction to meet his unique needs, as well as related transportation. §§ 1401(16), 1401(17). The negotiations and other proceedings between the Town and the Pánicos, thus far spanning more than eight years, are too involved to relate in full detail; the following are the parts relevant to the issues on which we granted certiorari.

In the spring of 1979, Michael attended the third grade of the Memorial School, a public school in Burlington, Mass., under an IEP calling for individual tutoring by a reading specialist for one hour a day and individual and group counsel-ling. Michael’s continued poor performance and the fact that Memorial School was not equipped to handle his needs led to much discussion between his parents and Town school officials about his difficulties and his future schooling. Apparently the course of these discussions did not run smoothly; the upshot was that the Pánicos and the Town agreed that Michael was generally of above average to superior intelligence, but had special educational needs calling for a placement in a school other than Memorial. They disagreed over the source and exact nature of Michael’s learning difficulties, the Town believing the source to be emotional and the parents believing it to be neurological.

In late June, the Town presented the Panicos with a proposed IEP for Michael for the 1979-1980 academic year. It called for placing Michael in a highly structured class of six children with special academic and social needs, located at another Town public school, the Pine Glen School. On July 3, Michael’s father rejected the proposed IEP and sought review under § 1415(b)(2) by respondent Massachusetts Department of Education’s Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSE A). A hearing was initially scheduled for August 8, but was apparently postponed in favor of a mediation session on August 17. The mediation efforts proved unsuccessful.

Meanwhile the Panicos received the results of the latest expert evaluation of Michael by specialists at Massachusetts General Hospital, who opined that Michael’s “emotional difficulties are secondary to a rather severe learning disorder characterized by perceptual difficulties” and recommended “a highly specialized setting for children with learning handicaps . . . such as the Carroll School,” a state-approved private school for special education located in Lincoln, Mass. App. 26, 31. Believing that the Town’s proposed placement of Michael at the Pine Glen School was inappropriate in light of Michael’s needs, Mr. Pánico enrolled Michael in the Carroll School in mid-August at his own expense, and Michael started there in September.

The BSEA held several hearings during the fall of 1979, and in January 1980 the hearing officer decided that the Town’s proposed placement at the Pine Glen School was inappropriate and that the Carroll School was “the least restrictive adequate program within the record” for Michael’s educational needs. The hearing officer ordered the Town to pay for Michael’s tuition and transportation to the Carroll School for the 1979-1980 school year, including reimbursing the Pánicos for their expenditures on these items for the school year to date.

The Town sought judicial review of the State’s administrative decision in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts pursuant to 20 U. S. C. § 1415(e)(2) and a parallel state statute, naming Mr. Pánico and the State Department of Education as defendants. In November 1980, the District Court granted summary judgment against the Town on the state-law claim under a “substantial evidence” standard of review, entering a final judgment on this claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The court also set the federal claim for future trial. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment on the state-law claim, holding that review under the state statute was pre-empted by § 1415(e)(2), which establishes a “preponderance of the evidence” standard of review and which permits the reviewing court to hear additional evidence. 655 F. 2d 428, 431-482 (1981).

In the meantime, the Town had refused to comply with the BSEA order, the District Court had denied a stay of that order, and the Pánicos and the State had moved for preliminary injunctive relief. The State also had threatened outside of the judicial proceedings to freeze all of the Town’s special education assistance unless it complied with the BSEA order. Apparently in response to this threat, the Town agreed in February 1981 to pay for Michael’s Carroll School placement and related transportation for the 1980-1981 term, none of which had yet been paid, and to continue paying for these expenses until the case was decided. But the Town persisted in refusing to reimburse Mr. Pánico for the expenses of the 1979-1980 school year. When the Court of Appeals disposed of the state claim, it also held that under this status quo none of the parties could show irreparable injury and thus none was entitled to a preliminary injunction. The court reasoned that the Town had not shown that Mr. Pánico would not be able to repay the tuition and related costs borne by the Town if he ultimately lost on the merits, and Mr. Pánico had not shown that he would be irreparably harmed if not reimbursed immediately for past payments which might ultimately be determined to be the Town’s responsibility.

On remand, the District Court entered an extensive pretrial order on the Town’s federal claim. In denying the Town summary judgment, it ruled that 20 U. S. C. § 1415(e)(3) did not bar reimbursement despite the Town’s insistence that the Pánicos violated that provision by changing Michael’s placement to the Carroll School during the pendency of the administrative proceedings. The court reasoned that § 1415(e)(3) concerned the physical placement of the child and not the right to tuition reimbursement or to procedural review of a contested IEP. The court also dealt with the problem that no IEP had been developed for the 1980-1981 or 1981-1982 school years. It held that its power under § 1415(e)(2) to grant “appropriate” relief upon reviewing the contested IEP for the 1979-1980 school year included the power to grant relief for subsequent school years despite the lack of IEPs for those years. In this connection, however, the court interpreted the statute to place the burden of proof on the Town to upset the BSEA decision that the IEP was inappropriate for 1979-1980 and on the Pánicos and the State to show that the relief for subsequent terms was appropriate.

After a 4-day trial, the District Court in August 1982 overturned the BSEA decision, holding that the appropriate 1979-1980 placement for Michael was the one proposed by the Town in the IEP and that the parents had failed to show that this placement would not also have been appropriate for subsequent years. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Town was “not responsible for the cost of Michael’s education at the Carroll School for the academic years 1979-80 through 1981-82.”

In contesting the Town’s proposed form of judgment embodying the court’s conclusion, Mr. Pánico argued that, despite finally losing on the merits of the IEP in August 1982, he should be reimbursed for his expenditures in 1979-1980, that the Town should finish paying for the recently completed 1981-1982 term, and that he should not be required to reimburse the Town for its payments to date, apparently because the school terms in question fell within the pendency of the administrative and judicial review contemplated by § 1415(e)(2). The case was transferred to another District Judge and consolidated with two other cases to resolve similar issues concerning the reimbursement for expenditures during the pendency of review proceedings.

In a decision on the consolidated cases, the court rejected Mr. Panico’s argument that the Carroll School was the “current educational placement” during the pendency of the review proceedings and thus that under § 1415(e)(3) the Town was obligated to maintain that placement. Doe v. Anrig, 561 F. Supp. 121 (1983). The court reasoned that the Pánicos’ unilateral action in placing Michael at the Carroll School without the Town’s consent could not “confer thereon the imprimatur of continued placement,” id., at 129, n. 5, even though strictly speaking there was no actual placement in effect during the summer of 1979 because all parties agreed Michael was finished with the Memorial School and the Town itself proposed in the IEP to transfer him to a new school in the fall.

The District Court next rejected an argument, apparently grounded at least in part on a state regulation, that the Pánicos were entitled to rely on the BSE A decision upholding their placement contrary to the IEP, regardless of whether that decision were ultimately reversed by a court. With respect to the payments made by the Town after the BSE A decision, under the State’s threat to cut off funding, the court criticized the State for resorting to extrajudicial pressure to enforce a decision subject to further review. Because this “was not a case where the town was legally obliged under section 1415(e)(3) to continue payments preserving the status quo,” the State’s coercion could not be viewed as “the basis for a final decision on liability,” and could only be “regarded as other than wrongful... on the assumption that the payments were to be returned if the order was ultimately reversed.” Id., at 130. The court entered a judgment ordering the Pánicos to reimburse the Town for its payments for Michael’s Carroll placement and related transportation in 1980-1981 and 1981-1982. The Pánicos appealed.

In a broad opinion, most of which we do not review, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit remanded the case a second time. 736 F. 2d 773 (1984). The court ruled, among other things, that the District Court erred in conducting a full trial de novo, that it gave insufficient weight to the BSEA findings, and that in other respects it did not properly evaluate the IEP. The court also considered several questions about the availability of reimbursement for interim placement. The Town argued that § 1415(e)(3) bars the Pánicos from any reimbursement relief, even if on remand they were to prevail on the merits of the IEP, because of their unilateral change of Michael’s placement during the pendency of the § 1415(e)(2) proceedings. The court held that such unilateral parental change of placement would not be “a bar to reimbursement of the parents if their actions are held to be appropriate at final judgment.” Id., at 799. In dictum the court suggested, however, that a lack of parental consultation with the Town or “attempt to achieve a negotiated compromise and agreement on a private placement,” as contemplated by the Act, “may be taken into account in a district court’s computation of an award of equitable reimbursement.” Ibid. To guide the District Court on remand, the court stated that “whether to order reimbursement, and at what amount, is a question determined by balancing the equities.” Id., at 801. The court also held that the Pánicos’ reliance on the BSEA decision would estop the Town from obtaining reimbursement “for the period of reliance and requires that where parents have paid the bill for the period, they must be reimbursed.” Ibid.

The Town filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court challenging the decision of the Court of Appeals on numerous issues, including the scope of judicial review of the administrative decision and the relevance to the merits of an IEP of violations by local school authorities of the Act’s procedural requirements. We granted certiorari, 469 U. S. 1071 (1984), only to consider the following two issues: whether the potential relief available under § 1415(e)(2) includes reimbursement to parents for private school tuition and related expenses, and whether § 1415(e)(3) bars such reimbursement to parents who reject a proposed IEP and place a child in a private school without the consent of local school authorities. We express no opinion on any of the many other views stated by the Court of Appeals.

Congress stated the purpose of the Act in these words:

“to assure that all handicapped children have available to them ... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs [and] to assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents or guardians are protected.” 20 U. S. C. § 1400(c).

The Act defines a “free appropriate public education” to mean

“special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with [an] individualized education program.” 20 U. S. C. § 1401(18).

To accomplish this ambitious objective, the Act provides federal money to state and local educational agencies that undertake to implement the substantive and procedural requirements of the Act. See Hendrick Hudson District Bd. of Education v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 179-184 (1982).

The modus operandi of the Act is the already mentioned “individualized educational program.” The IEP is in brief a comprehensive statement of the educational needs of a handicapped child and the specially designed instruction and related services to be employed to meet those needs. § 1401 (19). The IEP is to be developed jointly by a school official qualified in special education, the child’s teacher, the parents or guardian, and, where appropriate, the child. In several places, the Act emphasizes the participation of the parents in developing the child’s educational program and assessing its effectiveness. See §§ 1400(c), 1401(19), 1412(7), 1415(b)(1)(A), (C), (D), (E), and 1415(b)(2); 34 CFR §300.345 (1984).

Apparently recognizing that this cooperative approach would not always produce a consensus between the school officials and the parents, and that in any disputes the school officials would have a natural advantage, Congress incorporated an elaborate set of what it labeled “procedural safeguards” to insure the full participation of the parents and proper resolution of substantive disagreements. Section 1415(b) entitles the parents “to examine all relevant records with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the child,” to obtain an independent educational evaluation of the child, to notice of any decision to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, and to present complaints with respect to any of the above. The parents are further entitled to “an impartial due process hearing,” which in the instant case was the BSEA hearing, to resolve their complaints.

The Act also provides for judicial review in state or federal court to “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision” made after the due process hearing. The Act confers on the reviewing court the following authority:

“[T]he court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” § 1415(e)(2).

The first question on which we granted certiorari requires us to decide whether this grant of authority includes the power to order school authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on private special education for a child if the court ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act.

We conclude that the Act authorizes such reimbursement. The statute directs the court to “grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate.” The ordinary meaning of these words confers broad discretion on the court. The type of relief is not further specified, except that it must be “appropriate.” Absent other reference, the only possible interpretation is that the relief is to be “appropriate” in light of the purpose of the Act. As already noted, this is principally to provide handicapped children with “a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs.” The Act contemplates that such education will be provided where possible in regular public schools, with the child participating as much as possible in the same activities as nonhandicapped children, but the Act also provides for placement in private schools at public expense where this is not possible. See §1412(5); 34 CFR §§300.132, 300.227, 300.307(b), 300.347 (1984). In a case where a court determines that a private placement desired by the parents was proper under the Act and that an IEP calling for placement in a public school was inappropriate, it seems clear beyond cavil that “appropriate” relief would include a prospective injunction directing the school officials to develop and implement at public expense an IEP placing the child in a private school.

If the administrative and judicial review under the Act could be completed in a matter of weeks, rather than years, it would be difficult to imagine a case in which such prospective injunctive relief would not be sufficient. As this case so vividly demonstrates, however, the review process is ponderous. A final judicial decision on the merits of an IEP will in most instances come a year or more after the school term covered by that IEP has passed. In the meantime, the parents who disagree with the proposed IEP are faced with a choice: go along with the IEP to the detriment of their child if it turns out to be inappropriate or pay for what they consider to be the appropriate placement. If they choose the latter course, which conscientious parents who have adequate means and who are reasonably confident of their assessment normally would, it would be an empty victory to have a court tell them several years later that they were right but that these expenditures could not in a proper case be reimbursed by the school officials. If that were the case, the child’s right to a free appropriate public education, the parents’ right to participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the procedural safeguards would be less than complete. Because Congress undoubtedly did not intend this result, we are confident that by empowering the court to grant “appropriate” relief Congress meant to include retroactive reimbursement to parents as an available remedy in a proper case.

In this Court, the Town repeatedly characterizes reimbursement as “damages,” but that simply is not the case. Reimbursement merely requires the Town to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance had it developed a proper IEP. Such a post hoc determination of financial responsibility was contemplated in the legislative history:

“If a parent contends that he or she has been forced, at that parent’s own expense, to seek private schooling for the child because an appropriate program does not exist within the local educational agency responsible for the child’s education and the local educational agency disagrees, that disagreement and the question of who remains financially responsible is a matter to which the due process procedures established under [the predecessor to § 1415] appl[y].” S. Rep. No. 94-168, p. 32 (1975) (emphasis added).

See 34 CFR § 300.403(b) (1984) (disagreements and question of financial responsibility subject to the due process procedures).

Regardless of the availability of reimbursement as a form of relief in a proper case, the Town maintains that the Pánicos have waived any right they otherwise might have to reimbursement because they violated § 1415(e)(3), which provides:

“During the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to [§ 1415], unless the State or local educational agency and the parents or guardian otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then current educational placement of such child . . . .”

We need not resolve the academic question of what Michael’s “then current educational placement” was in the summer of 1979, when both the Town and the parents had agreed that a new school was in order. For the purposes of our decision, we assume that the Pine Glen School, proposed in the IEP, was Michael’s current placement and, therefore, that the Pánicos did “change” his placement after they had rejected the IEP and had set the administrative review in motion. In so doing, the Pánicos contravened the conditional command of § 1415(e)(3) that “the child shall remain in the then current educational placement.”

As an initial matter, we note that the section calls for agreement by either the State or the local educational agency. The BSEA’s decision in favor of the Pánicos and the Carroll School placement would seem to constitute agreement by the State to the change of placement. The decision was issued in January 1980, so from then on the Pánicos were no longer in violation of § 1415(e)(3). This conclusion, however, does not entirely resolve the instant dispute because the Pánicos are also seeking reimbursement for Michael’s expenses during the fall of 1979, prior to the State’s concurrence in the Carroll School placement.

We do not agree with the Town that a parental violation of § 1415(e)(3) constitutes a waiver of reimbursement. The provision says nothing about financial responsibility, waiver, or parental right to reimbursement at the conclusion of judicial proceedings. Moreover, if the provision is interpreted to cut off parental rights to reimbursement, the principal purpose of the Act will in many cases be defeated in the same way as if reimbursement were never available. As in this case, parents will often notice a child’s learning difficulties while the child is in a regular public school program. If the school officials disagree with the need for special education or the adequacy of the public school’s program to meet the child’s needs, it is unlikely they will agree to an interim private school placement while the review process runs its course. Thus, under the Town’s reading of § 1415(e)(3), the parents are forced to leave the child in what may turn out to be an inappropriate educational placement or to obtain the appropriate placement only by sacrificing any claim for reimbursement. The Act was intended to give handicapped children both an appropriate education and a free one; it should not be interpreted to defeat one or the other of those objectives.

The legislative history supports this interpretation, favoring a proper interim placement pending the resolution of disagreements over the IEP:

“The conferees are cognizant that an impartial due process hearing may be required to assure that the rights of the child have been completely protected. We did feel, however, that the placement, or change of placement should not be unnecessarily delayed while long and tedious administrative appeals were being exhausted. Thus the conference adopted a flexible approach to try to meet the needs of both the child and the State.” 121 Cong. Rec. 37412 (1975) (Sen. Stafford).

We think at least one purpose of § 1415(e)(3) was to prevent school officials from removing a child from the regular public school classroom over the parents’ objection pending completion of the review proceedings. As we observed in Rowley, 458 U. S., at 192, the impetus for the Act came from two federal-court decisions, Pennsylvania Assn. for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (ED Pa. 1971), and 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972), and Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (DC 1972), which arose from the efforts of parents of handicapped children to prevent the exclusion or expulsion of their children from the public schools. Congress was concerned about the apparently widespread practice of relegating handicapped children to private institutions or warehousing them in special classes. See § 1400(b)(4); 34 CFR § 300.347(a) (1984). We also note that § 1415(e)(3) is located in a section detailing procedural safeguards which are largely for the benefit of the parents and the child.

This is not to say that § 1415(e)(3) has no effect on parents. While we doubt that this provision would authorize a court to order parents to leave their child in a particular placement, we think it operates in such a way that parents who unilaterally change their child’s placement during the pendency of review proceedings, without the consent of state or local school officials, do so at their own financial risk. If the courts ultimately determine that the IEP proposed by the school officials was appropriate, the parents would be barred from obtaining reimbursement for any interim period in which their child’s placement violated § 1415(e)(3). This conclusion is supported by the agency’s interpretation of the Act’s application to private placements by the parents:

“(a) If a handicapped child has available a free appropriate public education and the parents choose to place the child in a private school or facility, the public agency is not required by this part to pay for the child’s education at the private school or facility. . . .
“(b) Disagreements between a parent and a public agency regarding the availability of a program appropriate for the child, and the question of financial responsibility, are subject to the due process procedures under [§ 1415].” 34 CFR § 300.403 (1984).

We thus resolve the questions on which we granted certio-rari; because the case is here in an interlocutory posture, we do not consider the estoppel ruling below or the specific equitable factors identified by the Court of Appeals for granting relief. We do think that the court was correct in concluding that “such relief as the court determines is appropriate,” within the meaning of § 1415(e)(2), means that equitable considerations are relevant in fashioning relief.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    UNITED STATES v. MAINE et al. (RHODE ISLAND and NEW YORK BOUNDARY CASE)
    No. 35,
    Orig.
    Decided March 17, 1975 — Decree entered October 6, 1975— Supplemental decree entered June 15, 1981 — Decided February 19, 1985—
    Supplemental decree entered April 29, 1985
   The Court having, by its decision of February 19, 1985, 469 U. S. 504, overruled all exceptions to the Report of its Special Master herein, adopted the Master’s recommendations, and confirmed his Report:

SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE

It Is Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed As Follows:

1. For the purposes of the Court’s Decree herein dated October 6, 1975, 423 U. S. 1 (defining the boundary line between the submerged lands of the United States and the submerged lands of the States bordering the Atlantic Ocean), the coastline of the States of Rhode Island and New York shall be determined on the basis that the whole of Long Island Sound and that portion of Block Island Sound lying west of a straight line between Montauk Point on Long Island (at approximately 41°04'18'' N, 71°51'24" W) and Watch Hill Point on the Rhode Island mainland (at approximately 41°18'12.1'' N, 71°51'33" W) constitute state inland waters;

2. The parties shall bear their own costs of these proceedings and the actual expenses of the Special Master herein shall be borne half by the United States and half by Rhode Island and New York jointly;

3. The Court retains jurisdiction to entertain such further proceedings, enter such orders, and issue such writs as from time to time may be deemed necessary or advisable to effectuate and supplement the decree and the rights of the respective parties.


text:
    ARKANSAS v. MISSISSIPPI
    No. 92,
    Orig.
    Final decree entered April 29, 1985
   FINAL DECREE

The Report of the Special Master is received and ordered filed. The parties have presented a stipulation for entry of the proposed agreed decree. The Report of the Special Master is adopted and a final decree is entered accordingly.

It Is Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed As Follows:

1. The common boundary between the States of Arkansas and Mississippi in the Mississippi River is the thalweg, which is the middle of the main navigable channel followed as the principal course of downstream navigation. This judgment determines the geographical location of this boundary in the reach of the Mississippi River, as more particularly described hereinafter, separating portions of Lee County, Arkansas and Tunica County, Mississippi in the vicinity of Bordeaux Point and Whiskey Island/Bordeaux Island.

2. Establishment of the common Arkansas-Mississippi boundary in “old” Walnut Bend, looping Whiskey Island/ Bordeaux Island, originated with the Bordeaux Chute Cutoff, which occurred in or about 1874 and was complete in or about 1883. The locus of that portion of the state boundary consisting of approximately the eastern one-half of “old” Walnut Bend has been subsequently established by long acquiescence by the States of Arkansas and Mississippi in private boundary lines resulting from prior litigation and agreements among the owners of lands adjacent thereto. The locus of these private boundaries, which the States of Arkansas and Mississippi have adopted by acquiescence as also being the locus of the interstate boundary, is as shown on the map of Mr. W. H. Guyer, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit “A” and described by geodetic coordinates as Segment B, Points PA through PL, in the composite description set forth hereinafter. The remainder of the interstate boundary in approximately the western one-half of “old” Walnut Bend lies along the dead thalweg of the Mississippi River as it existed when the River’s flow ceased in this abandoned bendway subsequent to, and caused by, the Bordeaux Chute Cutoff. The locus of this portion of the interstate boundary in “old” Walnut Bend is as shown in Exhibit “B” and described as Segment B, Points Pm through Pbb in the composite description set forth hereinafter.

3. Establishment of the common Arkansas-Mississippi boundary along the southerly limit of Bordeaux Point originated with the Hardin Point Cutoff, constructed by the United States Army Corps of Engineers in 1942. In 1947, when the Mississippi River ceased to flow in this abandoned bendway (Fox Island Bend), the locus of the state boundary along the dead thalweg was determined by Mr. St. George Richardson, whose plat thereof has been accepted since that time by the States of Arkansas and Mississippi as correctly depicting this portion of the interstate boundary looping Bordeaux Point. A true and correct copy of the St. George Richardson survey is attached hereto as Exhibit “C” and described as Segment D in the composite description set forth hereinafter.

The common Arkansas-Mississippi boundary looping Bordeaux Point between Lee County, Arkansas and Tunica County, Mississippi, from the upper end of Mhoon Bend to the upper end of Fox Island Bend, exclusive of that portion of this boundary in “old” Walnut Bend looping Whiskey Island/Bordeaux Island, is depicted on Exhibit “D” and described as Segment A and Segments C and D in the composite description set forth hereinafter.

4. The common Arkansas-Mississippi state boundary looping Bordeaux Point between Lee County, Arkansas and Tu-nica County, Mississippi, from the upper end of Mhoon Bend to the upper end of Fox Island Bend, as depicted on Exhibits “B” and “D” hereto, is described using geodetic coordinates as follows:

a. Segment A
That portion of the Arkansas-Mississippi state boundary line being the line of the live thalweg of the Mississippi River, points PI through P8 as depicted on the accompanying map titled “Arkansas-Mississippi State Boundary in the Vicinity of Bordeaux Point,” and being more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at point PI on the live thalweg of the Mississippi River at Mhoon Bend, said point being at approximately River Mile 686.3, at longitude 90°28'00'' west and at approximately latitude 34°43'36" north; thence westerly, downriver, coincident with the River’s live thalweg (Arkansas being on the right and Mississippi being on the left) the following approximate courses:
Commencing at point PI,
thence westerly to point P2 at latitude 34°43'26" north, longitude 90°28'30" west,
thence westerly to point P3 at latitude 34°43'20'' north, longitude 90°29'00" west,
thence westerly to point P4 at latitude 34°43'17" north, longitude 90°29'30" west,
thence westerly to point P5 at latitude 34°43'18" north, longitude 90°30'00" west,
thence westerly to point P6 at latitude 34°43'25" north, longitude 90°30'30'' west,
thence westerly to point P7 at latitude 34°43'38" north, longitude 90°31'00" west,
thence westerly to point P8 at latitude 34°43'53" north, longitude 90°31'27" west,
Said point P8 being at the easternmost intersection of the River’s live thalweg with the fixed thalweg of the abandoned Old Walnut Bend Channel which resulted from the 1874 Bordeaux Chute Cutoff.
b. Segment B
That portion of the Arkansas-Mississippi state boundary being the boundary line as surveyed and marked in October, 1974 and November, 1975 by W. H. Guyer, which plat of survey is recorded at Plat Book 1, Page 183, Lee County, Arkansas land records; and at Plat Book 2, Page 25, Tunica County, Mississippi land records; AND said state boundary being the line of the 1883 fixed thalweg line in the sector of the Old Walnut Bend Channel that was abandoned after the avulsive Bordeaux Chute Cutoff; being Points A through L (the W. H. Guyer survey) and Points Pm through Pbb (the fixed thalweg line) as depicted on the accompanying map titled “Arkansas-Mississippi State Boundary in the Vicinity of Whiskey Island and Bordeaux Island” and being more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at said point P8 at the intersection of the River’s live thalweg with a line bearing geodetic South 35°50' West from the southern terminus of the said W. H. Guyer survey line;
thence North 35°50' East to point A at the southern terminus of the said W. H. Guyer survey line at approximately latitude 34°44'20" north, and approximately 90°31'03" west;
thence northerly coincident with the said W. H. Guyer survey line the following courses:
Commencing at point A,
thence northeasterly to point B of the W. H. Guyer survey at latitude 34°44'40" north, longitude 90°30'46" west,
thence northeasterly to point C of the W. H. Guyer survey at latitude 34°44'52" north, longitude 90°30'35" west,
thence northeasterly to point D of the W. H. Guyer survey at latitude 34°45'04" north, longitude 90°30'17" west,
thence northeasterly to point E of the W. H. Guyer survey at latitude 34°45'16" north, longitude 90°29'57'' west,
thence northeasterly to point F of the W. H. Guyer survey at latitude 34°45'27" north, longitude 90°29'39" west,
thence northerly to point G of the W. H. Guyer survey at latitude 34°45'53" north, longitude 90°29'33" west,
thence northerly to point H of the W. H. Guyer survey at latitude 34°46'21" north, longitude 90°29'34" west,
thence northwesterly to point I of the W. H. Guyer survey at latitude 34°47'00" north, longitude 90°30'11" west,
thence northwesterly to point J of the W. H. Guyer survey at latitude 34°47'16" north, longitude 90°30'30'' west,
thence northwesterly to point K of the W. H. Guyer survey at latitude 34°47'24" north, longitude 90°30'41" west,
thence northerly to point L of the W. H. Guyer survey at latitude 34°47'52" north, longitude 90°30'40" west,
thence continuing north to the fixed thalweg line in the sector of the Old Walnut Bend Channel at point Pm at latitude 34°47'54" north, longitude 90°30'40'' west,
thence westerly and southerly along the fixed thalweg line in the sector of the Old Walnut Bend Channel the following courses:
Commencing at point Pm,
thence westerly to point Pn at latitude 34°48'00" north, longitude 90°30'50" west,
thence westerly to point Po at latitude 34°48'03" north, longitude 90°31'00" west,
thence westerly to point Pp at latitude 34°48'07'' north, longitude 90°31'16'' west,
thence westerly to point Pq at latitude 34°48'06" north, longitude 90°31'35'' west,
thence westerly to point Pr at latitude 34°48'00” north, longitude 90°32'00'' west,
thence southwesterly to point Ps at latitude 34°47'45" north, longitude 90°32'27" west,
thence southwesterly to point Pt at latitude 34°47'30" north, longitude 90°32'39" west,
thence southwesterly to point Pu at latitude 34°47'15" north, longitude 90°32'46" west,
thence southwesterly to point Pv at latitude 34°47'00" north, longitude 90°32'52" west,
thence southeasterly to point Pw at latitude 34°46'30" north, longitude 90°32'47" west,
thence southeasterly to point Px at latitude 34°46'15" north, longitude 90°32'43" west,
thence southeasterly to point Py at latitude 34°46'00'' north, longitude 90°32'37" west,
thence southeasterly to point Pz at latitude 34°45'30" north, longitude 90°32'26" west,
thence southeasterly to point Paa at latitude 34°45'19" north, longitude 90°32'22" west,
thence southwesterly to point Pbb at latitude 34°45'02" north, longitude 90°32'28'' west,
thence continuing southwesterly along course Paa to Pbb extended to point P9 at approximately latitude 34°44'20'' north, longitude 90°32'44” west.
Said point P9 being the westernmost intersection of the River’s live thalweg with the fixed thalweg of the abandoned Old Walnut Bend Channel.
. Segment C
That portion of the Arkansas-Mississippi state boundary being the line of the live thalweg of the Mississippi River, points P9 through P18, as depicted on the accompanying map titled “Arkansas-Mississippi State Boundary in the Vicinity of Bordeaux Point,” and being more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at point P9 which is the westernmost intersection of the River’s live thalweg with the dead thalweg of the abandoned, truncated portion of Old Walnut Bend Channel resulting from the 1874 Bordeaux Chute Cutoff, said point being at approximately River Mile 681.5, approximately latitude 34°44'20'' north, and approximately longitude 90°32'44'' west;
thence westerly and southerly downriver, coincident with the River’s live thalweg (Arkansas being on the right and Mississippi on the left) the following approximate courses:
Commencing at point P9,
thence westerly to point P10 at latitude 34°44'23" north, longitude 90°33'00'' west,
thence westerly to point Pll at latitude 34°44'21" north, longitude 90°33'30'' west,
thence westerly to point P12 at latitude 34°44'16" north, longitude 90°33'49'' west,
thence southerly to point P13 at latitude 34°44'06" north, longitude 90°34'00" west,
thence southerly to point P14 at latitude 34°44'00" north, longitude 90°34'04" west,
thence southerly to point P15 at latitude 34°43'30" north, longitude 90°34'07" west,
thence southerly to point P16 at latitude 34°43'17'' north, longitude 90°34'07" west,
thence southerly to point P17 at latitude 34°43'00" north, longitude 90°34'15" west,
thence southerly to point P18 at latitude 34°42'46" north, longitude 90°34'19'' west,
Said point P18 being the intersection of the River’s live thalweg with a line bearing geodetic North 82°41' West from the western terminus of the said St. George Richardson survey line.
d. Segment D
That portion of the Arkansas-Mississippi state boundary principally, being the 1947 survey line of St. George Richardson, points P18 through P32 as depicted on the accompanying map titled “Arkansas-Mississippi State Boundary in the Vicinity of Bordeaux Point,” and being more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at point P18 at the intersection of the River’s live thalweg with a line bearing geodetic North 82°41' West from the western terminus of the said St. George Richardson survey line,
thence geodetic South 82°41' East to point P19, at longitude 90°34'00" west,
thence continuing geodetic South 82°41' East to the said western terminus, being point P20, at latitude 34°42'39" north, longitude 90°33'34" west,
thence easterly coincident with the said St. George Richardson survey line the following courses: Commencing at point P20,
thence easterly to point P21 at latitude 34°42'30" north, longitude 90°33'24" west,
thence easterly to point P22 longitude 90°33'00" west, at latitude 34°42'14" north,
thence easterly to point P23 longitude 90°32'33" west, at latitude 34°42'00" north,
thence easterly to point P24 longitude 90°32'22" west, at latitude 34°41'55" north,
thence easterly to point P25 longitude 90°32'00" west, at latitude 34°41'47" north,
thence easterly to point P26 longitude 90°31'42" west, at latitude 34°41'44" north,
thence easterly to point P27 longitude 90°31'00" west, at latitude 34°41'44" north,
thence easterly to point P28 longitude 90°30'00" west, at latitude 34°42'00" north,
thence easterly to point P29 longitude 90°29'00" west, at latitude 34°42'15" north,
thence easterly to point P30 longitude 90°28'27" west, at latitude 34°42'19" north,
thence easterly to point P31 longitude 90°28'08" west, at latitude 34°42'08" north,
thence easterly to point P32 longitude 90°28'00" west. at latitude 34°42'00" north,

5. All lands now lying on the Arkansas side of the boundary line described hereinabove are wholly within, and a part of, the State of Arkansas. All lands now lying on the Mississippi side of the boundary line described hereinabove are wholly within, and a part of, the State of Mississippi.

6. Certified copies of Exhibits A, B, C, and D in full size are to be filed upon entry of this decree with the Custodian of Official Land Records, in Lee County, Arkansas and Tunica County, Mississippi by representatives of the Attorneys General of the States of Arkansas and Mississippi.


author: Chief Justice Burger Justice Stevens,

text:
    CALIFORNIA v. CARNEY
    No. 83-859.
    Argued October 30, 1984
    Decided May 13, 1985

      BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 395.

      Louis R. Hanoian, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, Steve White, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Michael D. Wellington and John W. Carney, Deputy Attorneys General.

      Thomas F. Homann argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was A. Dale Manicom.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Trott, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, Alan I. Horowitz, and Kathleen A. Felton; and for the State of Minnesota et al. by Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, and Thomas F. Catania, Jr., and PaulR. Kempainen, Special Assistant Attorneys General, Jim Smith, Attorney General of Florida, Tany S. Hong, Attorney General of Hawaii, and Michael A. Lilly, First Deputy Attorney General.

        Frank 0. Bell, Jr., and George L. Schraer filed a brief for the California State Public Defender as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

   Chief Justice Burger

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to decide whether law enforcement agents violated the Fourth Amendment when they conducted a warrantless search, based on probable cause, of a fully mobile “motor home” located in a public place.

H-I

On May 31, 1979, Drug Enforcement Agency Agent Robert Williams watched respondent, Charles Carney, approach a youth in downtown San Diego. The youth accompanied Carney to a Dodge Mini Motor Home parked in a nearby lot. Carney and the youth closed the window shades in the motor home, including one across the front window. Agent Williams had previously received uncorroborated information that the same motor home was used by another person who was exchanging marihuana for sex. Williams, with assistance from other agents, kept the motor home under surveillance for the entire one and one-quarter hours that Carney and the youth remained inside. When the youth left the motor home, the agents followed and stopped him. The youth told the agents that he had received marihuana in return for allowing Carney sexual contacts.

At the agents’ request, the youth returned to the motor home and knocked on its door; Carney stepped out. The agents identified themselves as law enforcement officers. Without a warrant or consent, one agent entered the motor home and observed marihuana, plastic bags, and a scale of the kind used in weighing drugs on a table. Agent Williams took Carney into custody and took possession of the motor home. A subsequent search of the motor home at the police station revealed additional marihuana in the cupboards and refrigerator.

Respondent was charged with possession of marihuana for sale. At a preliminary hearing, he moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the motor home. The Magistrate denied the motion, upholding the initial search as a justifiable search for other persons, and the subsequent search as a routine inventory search.

Respondent renewed his suppression motion in the Superior Court. The Superior Court also rejected the claim, holding that there was probable cause to arrest respondent, that the search of the motor home was authorized under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, and that the motor home itself could be seized without a warrant as an instrumentality of the crime. Respondent then pleaded nolo contendere to the charges against him, and was placed on probation for three years.

Respondent appealed from the order placing him on probation. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that the vehicle exception applied to respondent’s motor home. 117 Cal. App. 3d 36, 172 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1981).

The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction. 34 Cal. 3d 597, 668 P. 2d 807 (1983). The Supreme Court did not disagree with the conclusion of the trial court that the agents had probable cause to arrest respondent and to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of a crime; however, the court held that the search was unreasonable because no warrant was obtained, rejecting the State’s argument that the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement should apply. That court reached its decision by concluding that the mobility of a vehicle “is no longer the prime justification for the automobile exception; rather, ‘the answer lies in the diminished expectation of privacy which surrounds the automobile.’” Id., at 605, 668 P. 2d, at 811. The California Supreme Court held that the expectations of privacy in a motor home are more like those in a dwelling than in an automobile because the primary function of motor homes is not to provide transportation but to “provide the occupant with living quarters.” Id., at 606, 668 P. 2d, at 812.

We granted certiorari, 465 U. S. 1098 (1984). We reverse.

1 — 1 I — I

The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” This fundamental right is preserved by a requirement that searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by an independent judicial officer. There are, of course, exceptions to the general rule that a warrant must be secured before a search is undertaken; one is the so-called “automobile exception” at issue in this case. This exception to the warrant requirement was first set forth by the Court 60 years ago in Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925). There, the Court recognized that the privacy interests in an automobile are constitutionally protected; however, it held that the ready mobility of the automobile justifies a lesser degree of protection of those interests. The Court rested this exception on a long-recognized distinction between stationary structures and vehicles:

“[T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of Government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” Id., at 153 (emphasis added).

The capacity to be “quickly moved” was clearly the basis of the holding in Carroll, and our cases have consistently recognized ready mobility as one of the principal bases of the automobile exception. See, e. g., Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58, 59 (1967); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 52 (1970); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 442 (1973); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 588 (1974); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 367 (1976). In Chambers, for example, commenting on the rationale for the vehicle exception, we noted that “the opportunity to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable.” 399 U. S., at 51. More recently, in United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 806 (1982), we once again emphasized that “an immediate intrusion is necessary” because of “the nature of an automobile in transit. . . .” The mobility of automobiles, we have observed, “creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.” South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, at 367.

However, although ready mobility alone was perhaps the original justification for the vehicle exception, our later cases have made clear that ready mobility is not the only basis for the exception. The reasons for the vehicle exception, we have said, are twofold. 428 U. S., at 367. “Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office.” Ibid.

Even in cases where an automobile was not immediately mobile, the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile vehicle justified application of the vehicular exception. See, e. g., Cady v. Dombrowski, supra. In some cases, the configuration of the vehicle contributed to the lower expectations of privacy; for example, we held in Cardwell v. Lewis, supra, at 590, that, because the passenger compartment of a standard automobile is relatively open to plain view, there are lesser expectations of privacy. But even when enclosed “repository” areas have been involved, we have concluded that the lesser expectations of privacy warrant application of the exception. We have applied the exception in the context of a locked car trunk, Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, a sealed package in a car trunk, Ross, supra, a closed compartment under the dashboard, Cham bers v. Maroney, supra, the interior of a vehicle’s upholstery, Carroll, supra, or sealed packages inside a covered pickup truck, United States v. Johns, 469 U. S. 478 (1985).

These reduced expectations of privacy derive not from the fact that the area to be searched is in plain view, but from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways. Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, at 440-441. As we explained in South Dakota v. Opperman, an inventory search case:

“Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements. As an everyday occurrence, police stop and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers have expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or other safety equipment are not in proper working order.” 428 U. S., at 368.

The public is fully aware that it is accorded less privacy in its automobiles because of this compelling governmental need for regulation. Historically, “individuals always [have] been on notice that movable vessels may be stopped and searched on facts giving rise to probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband, without the protection afforded by a magistrate’s prior evaluation of those facts.” Ross, supra, at 806, n. 8. In short, the pervasive schemes of regulation, which necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met.

When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes — temporary or otherwise — the two justifications for the vehicle exception come into play. First, the vehicle is obviously readily mobile by the turn of an ignition key, if not actually moving. Second, there is a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from its use as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of police regulation inapplicable to a fixed dwelling. At least in these circumstances, the overriding societal interests in effective law enforcement justify an immediate search before the vehicle and its occupants become unavailable.

While it is true that respondent’s vehicle possessed some, if not many of the attributes of a home, it is equally clear that the vehicle falls clearly within the scope of the exception laid down in Carroll and applied in succeeding cases. Like the automobile in Carroll, respondent’s motor home was readily mobile. Absent the prompt search and seizure, it could readily have been moved beyond the reach of the police. Furthermore, the vehicle was licensed to “operate on public streets; [was] serviced in public places;. . . and [was] subject to extensive regulation and inspection.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 154, n. 2 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). And the vehicle was so situated that an objective observer would conclude that it was being used not as a residence, but as a vehicle.

Respondent urges us to distinguish his vehicle from other vehicles within the exception because it was capable of functioning as a home. In our increasingly mobile society, many vehicles used for transportation can be and are being used not only for transportation but for shelter, i. e., as a “home” or “residence.” To distinguish between respondent’s motor home and an ordinary sedan for purposes of the vehicle exception would require that we apply the exception depending upon the size of the vehicle and the quality of its appointments. Moreover, to fail to apply the exception to vehicles such as a motor home ignores the fact that a motor home lends itself easily to use as an instrument of illicit drug traffic and other illegal activity. In United States v. Ross, 456 U. S., at 822, we declined to distinguish between “worthy” and “unworthy” containers, noting that “the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment forecloses such a distinction. ” We decline today to distinguish between “worthy” and “unworthy” vehicles which are either on the public roads and highways, or situated such that it is reasonable to conclude that the vehicle is not being used as a residence.

Our application of the vehicle exception has never turned on the other uses to which a vehicle might be put. The exception has historically turned on the ready mobility of the vehicle, and on the presence of the vehicle in a setting that objectively indicates that the vehicle is being used for transportation. These two requirements for application of the exception ensure that law enforcement officials are not unnecessarily hamstrung in their efforts to detect and prosecute criminal activity, and that the legitimate privacy interests of the public are protected. Applyingthe vehicle exception in these circumstances allows the essential purposes served by the exception to be fulfilled, while assuring that the exception will acknowledge legitimate privacy interests.

III

The question remains whether, apart from the lack of a warrant, this search was unreasonable. Under the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement, “[ojnly the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise [must be such] as the magistrate could authorize.” Ross, supra, at 823.

This search was not unreasonable; it was plainly one that the magistrate could authorize if presented with these facts. The DEA agents had fresh, direct, uncontradicted evidence that the respondent was distributing a controlled substance from the vehicle, apart from evidence of other possible offenses. The agents thus had abundant probable cause to enter and search the vehicle for evidence of a crime notwithstanding its possible use as a dwelling place.

The judgment of the California Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, dissenting.

The character of “the place to be searched” plays an important role in Fourth Amendment analysis. In this case, police officers searched a Dodge/Midas Mini Motor Home. The California Supreme Court correctly characterized this vehicle as a “hybrid” which combines “the mobility attribute of an automobile . . . with most of the privacy characteristics of a house.”

The hybrid character of the motor home places it at the crossroads between the privacy interests that generally forbid warrantless invasions of the home, Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 585-590 (1980), and the law enforcement interests that support the exception for warrantless searches of automobiles based on probable cause, United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 806, 820 (1982). By choosing to follow the latter route, the Court errs in three respects: it has entered new territory prematurely, it has accorded priority to an exception rather than to the general rule, and it has abandoned the limits on the exception imposed by prior cases.

HH

In recent Terms, the Court has displayed little confidence in state and lower federal court decisions that purport to enforce the Fourth Amendment. Unless an order suppressing evidence is clearly correct, a petition for certiorari is likely to garner the four votes required for a grant of plenary review — as the one in this case did. Much of the Court’s “burdensome” workload is a product of its own aggressiveness in this area. By promoting the Supreme Court of the United States as the High Magistrate for every warrantless search and seizure, this practice has burdened the argument docket with cases presenting fact-bound errors of minimal significance. It has also encouraged state legal officers to file petitions for certiorari in even the most frivolous search and seizure cases.

The Court’s lack of trust in lower judicial authority has resulted in another improvident exercise of discretionary jurisdiction. In what is at most only a modest extension of our Fourth Amendment precedents, the California Supreme Court held that police officers may not conduct a nonexigent search of a motor home without a warrant supported by probable cause. The State of California filed a petition for certio-rari contending that the decision below conflicted with the authority of other jurisdictions. Even a cursory examination of the cases alleged to be in conflict revealed that they did not consider the question presented here.

This is not a case “in which an American citizen has been deprived of a right secured by the United States Constitution or a federal statute. Rather, ... a state court has upheld a citizen’s assertion of a right, finding the citizen to be protected under both federal and state law.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1067-1068 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting). As an unusually perceptive study of this Court’s docket stated with reference to California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992 (1983), “this . . . situation . . . rarely presents a compelling reason for Court review in the absence of a fully percolated conflict.” The Court’s decision to forge ahead has established a rule for searching motor homes that is to be followed by the entire Nation. If the' Court had merely allowed the decision below to stand, it would have only governed searches of those vehicles in a single State. The breadth of this Court’s mandate counsels greater patience before we offer our binding judgment on the meaning of the Constitution.

Premature resolution of the novel question presented has stunted the natural growth and refinement of alternative principles. Despite the age of the automobile exception and the countless cases in which it has been applied, we have no prior cases defining the contours of a reasonable search in the context of hybrids such as motor homes, house trailers, houseboats, or yachts. In this case, the Court can barely glimpse the diverse lifestyles associated with recreational vehicles and mobile living quarters. The line or lines separating mobile homes from permanent structures might have been drawn in various ways, with consideration given to whether the home is moving or at rest, whether it rests on land or water, the form of the vehicle’s attachment to its location, its potential speed of departure, its size and capacity to serve as a domicile, and its method of locomotion. Rational decisionmaking strongly counsels against divining the uses and abuses of these vehicles in the vacuum of the first case raising the question before us.

Of course, we may not abdicate our responsibility to clarify the law in this field. Some caution, however, is justified when every decision requires us to resolve a vexing “conflict . . . between the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in privacy and the public interest in effective law enforcement.” United States v. Ross, 456 U. S., at 804. “The certainty that is supposed to come from speedy resolution may prove illusory if a premature decision raises more questions than it answers.” The only true rules governing search and seizure have been formulated and refined in the painstaking scrutiny of case-by-case adjudication. Consideration of this matter by the lower courts in a series of litigated cases would surely have facilitated a reasoned accommodation of the conflicting interests. To identify rules that will endure, we must rely on the state and lower federal courts to debate and evaluate the different approaches to difficult and unresolved questions of constitutional law. Deliberation on the question over time winnows out the unnecessary and discordant elements of doctrine and preserves “whatever is pure and sound and fine.”

HH I — I

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.” We have interpreted this language to provide law enforcement officers with a bright-line standard: “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment— subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 758 (1979).

In United States v. Ross, the Court reaffirmed the primary importance of the general rule condemning warrantless searches, and emphasized that the exception permitting the search of automobiles without a warrant is a narrow one. 456 U. S., at 824-825. We expressly endorsed “the general rule,” stated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 156 (1925), that “ ‘[i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used.’ ” 456 U. S., at 807. Given this warning and the presumption of regularity that attaches to a warrant, it is hardly unrealistic to expect experienced law enforcement officers to obtain a search warrant when one can easily be secured.

The ascendancy of the warrant requirement in our system of justice must not be bullied aside by extravagant claims of necessity:

“ ‘The warrant requirement... is not an inconvenience to be somehow “weighed” against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should be, an important working part of our machinery of government, operating as a matter of course to check the “well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous executive officers” who are a part of any system of law enforcement.’ [Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 481 (1971).]
“. . . By requiring that conclusions concerning probable cause and the scope of a search ‘be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime’ Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948), we minimize the risk of unreasonable assertions of executive authority.” Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S., at 758-759.

If the motor home were parked in the exact middle of the intersection between the general rule and the exception for automobiles, priority should be given to the rule rather than the exception.

Ill

The motor home, however, was not parked in the middle of that intersection. Our prior cases teach us that inherent mobility is not a sufficient justification for the fashioning of an exception to the warrant requirement, especially in the face of heightened expectations of privacy in the location searched. Motor homes, by their common use and construction, afford their owners a substantial and legitimate expectation of privacy when they dwell within. When a motor home is parked in a location that is removed from the public highway, I believe that society is prepared to recognize that the expectations of privacy within it are not unlike the expectations one has in a fixed dwelling. As a general rule, such places may only be searched with a warrant based upon probable cause. Warrantless searches of motor homes are only reasonable when the motor home is traveling on the public streets or highways, or when exigent circumstances otherwise require an immediate search without the expenditure of time necessary to obtain a warrant.

As we explained in Ross, the automobile exception is the product of a long history:

“[SJince its earliest days Congress had recognized the impracticability of securing a warrant in cases involving the transportation of contraband goods. It is this impracticability, viewed in historical perspective, that provided the basis for the Carroll decision. Given the nature of an automobile in transit, the Court recognized that an immediate intrusion is necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit substance. In this class of cases, the Court held that a warrantless search of an automobile is not unreasonable.” 456 U. S., at 806-807 (footnotes omitted).

The automobile exception has been developed to ameliorate the practical problems associated with the search of vehicles that have been stopped on the streets or public highways because there was probable cause to believe they were transporting contraband. Until today, however, the Court has never decided whether the practical justifications that apply . to a vehicle that is stopped in transit on a public way apply with the same force to a vehicle parked in a lot near a courthouse where it could easily be detained while a warrant is issued.

In this case, the motor home was parked in an off-the-street lot only a few blocks from the courthouse in downtown San Diego where dozens of magistrates were available to entertain a warrant application. The officers clearly had the element of surprise with them, and with curtains covering the windshield, the motor home offered no indication of any imminent departure. The officers plainly had probable cause to arrest the respondent and search the motor home, and on this record, it is inexplicable why they eschewed the safe harbor of a warrant.

In the absence of any evidence of exigency in the circumstances of this case, the Court relies on the inherent mobility of the motor home to create a conclusive presumption of exigency. This Court, however, has squarely held that mobility of the place to be searched is not a sufficient justification for abandoning the warrant requirement. In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977), the Court held that a warrantless search of a footlocker violated the Fourth Amendment even though there was ample probable cause to believe it contained contraband. The Government had argued that the rationale of the automobile exception applied to movable containers in general, and that the warrant requirement should be limited to searches of homes and other “core” areas of privacy. See id., at 7. We categorically rejected the Government’s argument, observing that there are greater privacy interests associated with containers than with automobiles, and that there are less practical problems associated with the temporary detention of a container than with the detention of an automobile. See id., at 13, and n. 7.

We again endorsed that analysis in Ross:

“The Court in Chadwick specifically rejected the argument that the warrantless search was ‘reasonable’ because a footlocker has some of the mobile characteristics that support warrantless searches of automobiles. The Court recognized that ‘a person’s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile,’ [433 U. S., at 13], and noted that the practical problems associated with the temporary detention of a piece of luggage during the period of time necessary to obtain a warrant are significantly less than those associated with the detention of an automobile. Id., at 13, n. 7.” 456 U. S., at 811.

It is perfectly obvious that the citizen has a much greater expectation of privacy concerning the interior of a mobile home than of a piece of luggage such as a footlocker. If “inherent mobility” does not justify warrantless searches of containers, it cannot rationally provide a sufficient justification for the search of a person’s dwelling place.

Unlike a brick bungalow or a frame Victorian, a motor home seldom serves as a permanent lifetime abode. The motor home in this case, however, was designed to accommodate a breadth of ordinary everyday living. Photographs in the record indicate that its height, length, and beam provided substantial living space inside: stuffed chairs surround a table; cupboards provide room for storage of personal effects; bunk beds provide sleeping space; and a refrigerator provides ample space for food and beverages. Moreover, curtains and large opaque walls inhibit viewing the activities inside from the exterior of the vehicle. The interior configuration of the motor home establishes that the vehicle’s size, shape, and mode of construction should have indicated to the officers that it was a vehicle containing mobile living quarters.

The State contends that officers in the field will have an impossible task determining whether or not other vehicles contain mobile living quarters. It is not necessary for the Court to resolve every unanswered question in this area in a single case, but common English usage suggests that we already distinguish between a “motor home” which is “equipped as a self-contained traveling home,” a “camper” which is only equipped for “casual travel and camping,” and an automobile which is “designed for passenger transportation.” Surely the exteriors of these vehicles contain clues about their different functions which could alert officers in the field to the necessity of a warrant.

The California Vehicle Code also refutes the State’s argument that the exclusion of “motor homes” from the automobile exception would be impossible to apply in practice. In its definitional section, the Code distinguishes campers and house cars from station wagons, and suggests that they are special categories of the more general terms — motor vehicles and passenger vehicles. A “house car” is “a motor vehicle originally designed, or permanently altered, and equipped for human habitation, or to which a camper has been permanently attached.” Alcoholic beverages may not be opened or consumed in motor vehicles traveling on the highways, except in the “living quarters of a housecar or camper.” The same definitions might not necessarily apply in the context of the Fourth Amendment, but they do indicate that descriptive distinctions are humanly possible. They also reflect the California Legislature’s judgment that “house cars” entertain different kinds of activities than the ordinary passenger vehicle.

In my opinion, searches of places that regularly accommodate a wide range of private human activity are fundamentally different from searches of automobiles which primarily serve a public transportation function. Although it may not be a castle, a motor home is usually the functional equivalent of a hotel room, a vacation and retirement home, or a hunting and fishing cabin. These places may be as spartan as a humble cottage when compared to the most majestic mansion, 456 U. S., at 822; ante, at 398, but the highest and most legitimate expectations of privacy associated with these temporary abodes should command the respect of this Court. Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483, 490 (1964); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 585; United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705, 714-715 (1984). In my opinion, a warrantless search of living quarters in a motor home is “presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances.” Ibid.

I respectfully dissent.

       Respondent contends that the state-court decision rests on an adequate and independent state ground, because the opinion refers to the State as well as the Federal Constitution. Respondent’s argument is clearly foreclosed by our opinion in Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1040-1041 (1983), in which we held, “when... a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.” We read the opinion as resting on federal law.

       With few exceptions, the courts have not hesitated to apply the vehicle exception to vehicles other than automobiles. See, e. g., United States v. Rollins, 699 F. 2d 530 (CA11) (airplane), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 933 (1983).

       We need not pass on the application of the vehicle exception to a motor home that is situated in a way or place that objectively indicates that it is being used as a residence. Among the factors that might be relevant in determining whether a warrant would be required in such a circumstance is its location, whether the vehicle is readily mobile or instead, for instance, elevated on blocks, whether the vehicle is licensed, whether it is connected to utilities, and whether it has convenient access to a public road.

       The Fourth Amendment provides:
      “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

       34 Cal. 3d 597, 606, 668 P. 2d 807, 812 (1983).

         E. g., United States v. Johns, 469 U. S. 478 (1985); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675 (1985); Oklahoma v. Castleberry, ante, p. 146. Cf. Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U. S. 1, 12-13 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.).

       See, e. g., State v. Caponi, 12 Ohio St. 3d 302, 466 N. E. 2d 551 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1209 (1985). The Court’s inventiveness in the search and seizure area has also emboldened state legal officers to file petitions for certiorari from state court suppression orders that are explicitly based on independent state grounds. See, e. g., Jamison v. State, 455 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. App. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1127 (1985); Ex parte Gannaway, 448 So. 2d 413 (Ala. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1207 (1985); State v. Burkholder, 12 Ohio St. 3d 205, 466 N. E. 2d 176, cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1062 (1984); People v. Corr, 682 P. 2d 20 (Colo.), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 855 (1984); State v. Von Bulow, 475 A. 2d 995 (R. I.), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 875 (1984).

         Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1065 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992, 1029 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U. S. 36, 72-73 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259, 273 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 Judicature 177, 182 (1982).

       Pet. for Cert. 15-17, 21, 24-25. The petition acknowledged that the decision below was consistent with dictum in two recent Ninth Circuit decisions. See United States v. Wiga, 662 F. 2d 1325, 1329 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 918 (1982); United States v. Williams, 630 F. 2d 1322, 1326, cert. denied, 449 U. S. 865 (1980).

       Only one case contained any reference to heightened expectations of privacy in mobile living quarters. United States v. Cadena, 588 F. 2d 100, 101-102 (CA5 1979) (per curiam). Analogizing to automobile cases, the court upheld the warrantless search of an oceangoing ship while in transit. The court observed that the mobility “exception” required probable cause and exigency, and that “the increased measure of privacy that may be expected by those aboard a vessel mandates careful scrutiny both of probable cause for the search and the exigency of the circumstances excusing the failure to secure a warrant.” Id., at 102.
      In all of the other cases, defendants challenged warrantless searches for vehicles claiming either no probable cause or the absence of exigency under Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971). United States v. Montgomery, 620 F. 2d 753, 760 (CA10) (“camper”), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 882 (1980); United States v. Clark, 559 F. 2d 420, 423-425 (CA5) (“camper pick-up truck”), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 969 (1977); United States v. Lovenguth, 514 F. 2d 96, 97 (CA9 1975) (“pick up with . . . camper top”); United States v. Cusanelli, 472 F. 2d 1204, 1206 (CA6) (per curiam) (two camper trucks), cert. denied, 412 U. S. 953 (1973); United States v. Miller, 460 F. 2d 582, 585-586 (CA101972) (“motor home”); United States v. Rodgers, 442 F. 2d 902, 904 (CA5 1971) (“camper truck”); State v. Million, 120 Ariz. 10, 15-16, 583 P. 2d 897, 902-903 (1978) (“motor home”); State v. Sardo, 112 Ariz. 509, 513-514, 543 P. 2d 1138, 1142 (1975) (“motor home”). Only Sardo involved a vehicle that was not in transit, but the motor home in that case was about to depart the premises.
      Two State Supreme Courts have upheld the warrantless search of mobile homes in transit, notwithstanding a claim of heightened privacy interests. See State v. Mower, 407 A. 2d 729, 732 (Me. 1979); State v. Lepley, 343 N. W. 2d 41, 42-43 (Minn. 1984). Those cases — which were not cited in the petition for certiorari — are factually distinguishable from the search of the parked motor home here. In any case, some conflict among state courts on novel questions of the kind involved here is desirable as a means of exploring and refining alternative approaches to the problem.

       Estreicher & Sexton, New York University Supreme Court Project, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s Responsibilities (1984) (to be published in 59 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 677, 761 (1984)). The study elaborated: “[T]he Court should not hear cases in which a state court has invalidated state action on a federal ground in the absence of a conflict or a decision to treat the case as a vehicle for a major pronouncement of federal law. Without further percolation, there is ordinarily little reason to believe that the issue is one of recurring national significance. In general, correction of error, even regarding a matter of constitutional law, is not a sufficient basis for Supreme Court intervention. This last category differs from a federal court’s invalidation of state action in that a structural justification for intervention is generally missing, given the absence of vertical federalism difficulties and the built-in assurance that state courts functioning under significant political constraints are not likely to invalidate state action lightly, even on federal grounds. . . . [The Court] should not grant. . . merely to correct perceived error.” Id., at 738-739 (footnote omitted). Chief Justice Samuel Roberts, Retired, of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has expressed similar concerns. Roberts, The Adequate and Independent State Ground: Some Practical Considerations, 17 IJA Rep., No. 2, pp. 1-2 (1985).

       See generally 45 Trailer Life, No. 1 (1985); id., No. 2; 22 Motor Home, No. 1 (1985); id., No. 2; 1 RV Lifestyle Magazine, No. 3 (1985).

       Heilman, The Proposed Intercircuit Tribunal: Do We Need It? Will It Work?, 11 Hastings Const. L. Q. 375, 405 (1984).

       “Although one of the Court’s roles is to ensure the uniformity of federal law, we do not think that the Court must act to eradicate disuniformity as soon as it appears.... Disagreement in the lower courts facilitates percolation — the independent evaluation of a legal issue by different courts. The process of percolation allows a period of exploratory consideration and experimentation by lower courts before the Supreme Court ends the process with a nationally binding rule. The Supreme Court, when it decides a fully percolated issue, has the benefit of the experience of those lower courts. Irrespective of docket capacity, the Court should not be compelled to intervene to eradicate disuniformity when further percolation or experimentation is desirable.
      “Our system is already committed in substantial measure to the principle of percolation. This is one justification for the absence of intercircuit stare decisis. Similarly, state and federal courts daily engage in a process of ‘dialectical federalism’ wherein state courts are not bound by the holdings of lower federal courts in the same geographical area. But more than past practice and the structure of the judicial system supports a policy of awaiting percolation before Supreme Court intervention. A managerial conception of the Court’s role embraces lower court percolation as an affirmative value. The views of the lower courts on a particular legal issue provide the Supreme Court with a means of identifying significant rulings as well as an experimental base and a set of doctrinal materials with which to fashion sound binding law. The occurrence of a conflict acts as a signaling device to help the Court identify important issues. Moreover, the principle of percolation encourages the lower courts to act as responsible agents in the process of development of national law.” Estreicher & Sexton, supra n. 8, at 716, 719 (footnotes omitted).

       B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 179 (1921).

        United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 913-914 (1984); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 236-237 (1983).

       “As we have stated, the decision in Carroll was based on the Court’s appraisal of practical considerations viewed in the perspective of history.” 456 U. S., at 820.

       In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), a plurality refused to apply the automobile exception to an automobile that was seized while parked in the driveway of the suspect’s house, towed to a secure police compound, and later searched:
      “The word ‘automobile’ is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears. And surely there is nothing in this case to invoke the meaning and purpose of the rule of Carroll v. United States — no alerted criminal bent on flight, no fleeting opportunity on an open highway after a hazardous chase, no contraband or stolen goods or weapons, no confederates waiting to move the evidence, not even the inconvenience of a special police detail to guard the immobilized automobile. In short, by no possible stretch of the legal imagination can this be made into a ease where ‘it is not practicable to secure a warrant.’ [267 U. S., at 153,] and the ‘automobile exception’ despite its label, is simply irrelevant.” Id., at 461-462 (opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ.).
      In Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583 (1974), a different plurality approved the seizure of an automobile from a public parking lot, and a later examination of its exterior. Id., at 592-594 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). Here, of course, we are concerned with the reasonableness of the search, not the seizure. Even if the diminished expectations of privacy associated with an automobile justify the warrantless search of a parked automobile notwithstanding the diminished exigency, the heightened expectations of privacy in the interior of a motor home require a different result.

       See Suppression Hearing Tr. 7; Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. In addition, a telephonic warrant was only 20 cents and the nearest phone booth away. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 1526(b), 1528(b) (West 1982); People v. Morrongiello, 145 Cal. App. 3d 1, 9, 193 Cal. Rptr. 105, 109 (1983).

       This willingness to search first and later seek justification has properly been characterized as “a decision roughly comparable in prudence to determining whether an electrical wire is charged by grasping it.” United States v. Mitchell, 538 F. 2d 1230, 1233 (CA5 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 945 (1977).

       “The factors which diminish the privacy aspects of an automobile do not apply to respondent’s footlocker. Luggage contents are not open to public view, except as a condition to a border entry or common carrier travel; nor is luggage subject to regular inspections and official scrutiny on a continuing basis. Unlike an automobile, whose primary function is transportation, luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects. In sum, a person’s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.” 433 U. S., at 13.

       Record, Ex. Nos. 102, 103.

       Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 118, 199, 775 (1983).

       In refusing to extend the California Supreme Court’s decision in Carney beyond its context, the California Courts of Appeal have had no difficulty in distinguishing the motor home involved there from a Ford van, People v. Chestnut, 151 Cal. App. 3d 721, 726-727, 198 Cal. Rptr. 8, 11 (1983), and a cab-high camper shell on the back of a pickup truck, People v. Gordon, 156 Cal. App. 3d 74, 82, 202 Cal. Rptr. 566, 570 (1984). There is no reason to believe that trained officers could not make similar distinctions between different vehicles, especially when state vehicle laws already require them to do so.

       Cal. Veh. Code Ann. §§243, 362, 415, 465, 585 (West 1971 and Supp. 1985).

       §362 (West 1971).

       §§ 23221, 23223, 23225, 23226, 23229 (West Supp. 1985).

       Cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S., at 590 (opinion of Blackmun, J.): “One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation, and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects. A ear has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.”

       “At the risk of belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable. Our cases have not deviated from this basic Fourth Amendment principle. Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances.” United States v. Karo, 468 U. S., at 714-715.