author: Justice Rehnquist Justice Blackmun,

text:
    REGAN, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, et al. v. TAXATION WITH REPRESENTATION OF WASHINGTON
    No. 81-2338.
    Argued March 22, 1983
    Decided May 23, 1983

      Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Black-mun, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 551.

      Solicitor General Lee argued the cause for appellants in No. 81-2338. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Archer, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Stuart A. Smith, Richard Farber, and Robert S. Pomerance.

      John Cary Sims argued the cause for appellee in No. 81-2338. With him on the brief were Alan B. Morrison and Thomas F. Field.

       Together with No. 82-134, Taxation With Representation of Washington v. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury, et al., also on appeal from the same court.

       Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Sheldon S. Cohen, Julie Noel Gilbert, Dennis B. Drapkin, George H. Gangwere, and Wilmer S. Schantz, Jr., for the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States; by Joseph C. Zengerle and Zachary R. Karol for the Disabled American Veterans et al.; and by Mitchell Rogovin and George T. Frampton, Jr., for the American Legion.

        Thomas A. Troyer, H. David Rosenbloom, Albert G. Lauber, Jr., and John G. Milliken filed a brief for the American Association of Museums et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

   Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellee Taxation With Representation of Washington (TWR) is a nonprofit corporation organized to promote what it conceives to be the “public interest” in the area of federal taxation. It proposes to advocate its point of view before Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Judiciary. This case began when TWR applied for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 501(c)(3). The Internal Revenue Service denied the application because it appeared that a substantial part of TWR’s activities would consist of attempting to influence legislation, which is not permitted by § 501(c)(3).

TWR then brought this suit in District Court against the appellants, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the United States, seeking a declaratory judgment that it qualifies for the exemption granted by § 501(c)(3). It claimed the prohibition against substantial lobbying is unconstitutional under the First Amendment and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The District Court granted summary judgment for appellants. On appeal, the en banc Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that § 501(c)(3) does not violate the First Amendment but does violate the Fifth Amendment. 219 U. S. App. D. C. 117, 676 F. 2d 715 (1982). Appellants appealed pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1252, and TWR cross-appealed. We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal, 459 U. S. 819 (1982).

TWR was formed to take over the operations of two other nonprofit corporations. One, Taxation With Representation Fund, was organized to promote TWR’s goals by publishing a journal and engaging in litigation; it had tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3). The other, Taxation With Representation, attempted to promote the same goals by influencing legislation; it liad tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(4). Neither predecessor organization was required to pay federal income taxes. For purposes of our analysis, there are two principal differences between § 501(c)(3) organizations and § 501(c)(4) organizations. Taxpayers who contribute to § 501(c)(3) organizations are permitted by § 170(c)(2) to deduct the amount of their contributions on their federal income tax returns, while contributions to § 501(c)(4) organizations are not deductible. Section 501(c)(4) organizations, but not § 501(c)(3) organizations, are permitted to engage in substantial lobbying to advance their exempt purposes.

In these cases, TWR is attacking the prohibition against substantial lobbying in § 501(c)(3) because it wants to use tax-deductible contributions to support substantial lobbying activities. To evaluate TWR’s claims, it is necessary to understand the effect of the tax-exemption system enacted by Congress.

Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system. A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its income. Deductible contributions are similar to cash grants of the amount of a portion of the individual’s contributions. The system Congress has enacted provides this kind of subsidy to nonprofit civic welfare organizations generally, and an additional subsidy to those charitable organizations that do not engage in substantial lobbying. In short, Congress chose not to subsidize lobbying as extensively as it chose to subsidize other activities that nonprofit organizations undertake to promote the public welfare.

It appears that TWR could still qualify for a tax exemption under § 501(c)(4). It also appears that TWR can obtain tax-deductible contributions for its nonlobbying activity by returning to the dual structure it used in the past, with a § 501(c)(3) organization for nonlobbying activities and a § 501(c)(4) organization for lobbying. TWR would, of course, have to ensure that the § 501(c)(3) organization did not subsidize the § 501(c)(4) organization; otherwise, public funds might be spent on an activity Congress chose not to subsidize.

TWR contends that Congress’ decision not to subsidize its lobbying violates the First Amendment. It claims, relying on Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958), that the prohibition against substantial lobbying by § 501(c)(3) organizations imposes an “unconstitutional condition” on the receipt of tax-deductible contributions. In Speiser, California established a rule requiring anyone who sought to take advantage of a property tax exemption to sign a declaration stating that he did not advocate the forcible overthrow of the Government of the United States. This Court stated that “[t]o deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech.” Id., at 518.

TWR is certainly correct when it states that we have held that the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 597 (1972). But TWR is just as certainly incorrect when it claims that this case fits the Speiser-Perry model. The Code does not deny TWR the right to receive deductible contributions to support its non-lobbying activity, nor does it deny TWR any independent benefit on account of its intention to lobby. Congress has merely refused to pay for the lobbying out of public moneys. This Court has never held that Congress must grant a benefit such as TWR claims here to a person who wishes to exercise a constitutional right.

This aspect of these cases is controlled by Cammarano v. United States, 358 U. S. 498 (1959), in which we upheld a Treasury Regulation that denied business expense deductions for lobbying activities. We held that Congress is not required by the First Amendment to subsidize lobbying. Id., at 513. In these cases, as in Cammarano, Congress has not infringed any First Amendment rights or regulated any First Amendment activity. Congress has simply chosen not to pay for TWR’s lobbying. We again reject the “notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State.” Id., at 515 (Douglas, J., concurring).

TWR also contends that the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment renders the prohibition against substantial lobbying invalid. TWR points out that § 170(c)(3) permits taxpayers to deduct contributions to veterans’ organizations that qualify for tax exemption under §501(c)(19). Qualifying veterans’ organizations are permitted to lobby as much as they want in furtherance of their exempt purposes. TWR argues that because Congress has chosen to subsidize the substantial lobbying activities of veterans’ organizations, it must also subsidize the lobbying of § 501(c)(3) organizations.

Generally, statutory classifications are valid if they bear a rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose. Statutes are subjected to a higher level of scrutiny if they interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right, such as freedom of speech, or employ a suspect classification, such as race. E. g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 322 (1980). Legislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes. More than 40 years ago we addressed these comments to an equal protection challenge to tax legislation:

“The broad discretion as to classification possessed by a legislature in the field of taxation has long been recognized .... [T]he passage of time has only served to underscore the wisdom of that recognition of the large area of discretion which is needed by a legislature in formulating sound tax policies. Traditionally classification has been a device for fitting tax programs to local needs and usages in order to achieve an equitable distribution of the tax burden. It has, because of this, been pointed out that in taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom.in classification. Since the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a familiarity with local conditions which this Court cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes. The burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.” Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 87-88 (1940) (footnotes omitted).

See also San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 40-41 (1973); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356, 359-360 (1973).

We have already explained why we conclude that Congress has not violated TWR’s First Amendment rights by declining to subsidize its First Amendment activities. The case would be different if Congress were to discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to “ ‘ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas.’” Cammarano, supra, at 513, quoting Speiser, 357 U. S., at 519. But the veterans’ organizations that qualify under §501(c)(19) are entitled to receive tax-deductible contributions regardless of the content of any speech they may use, including lobbying. We find no indication that the statute was intended to suppress any ideas or any demonstration that it has had that effect. The sections of the Internal Revenue Code here at issue do not employ any suspect classification. The distinction between veterans’ organizations and other charitable organizations is not at all like distinctions based on race or national origin.

The Court of Appeals nonetheless held that “strict scrutiny” is required because the statute “affect[s] First Amendment rights on a discriminatory basis.” 219 U. S. App. D. C., at 130, 676 F. 2d, at 728 (emphasis supplied). Its opinion suggests that strict scrutiny applies whenever Congress subsidizes some speech, but not all speech. This is not the law. Congress could, for example, grant funds to an organization dedicated to combating teenage drug abuse, but condition the grant by providing that none of the money received from Congress should be used to lobby state legislatures. Under Cammarano, such a statute would be valid. Congress might also enact a statute providing public money for an organization dedicated to combating teenage alcohol abuse, and impose no condition against using funds obtained from Congress for lobbying. The existence of the second statute would not make the first statute subject to strict scrutiny.

Congressional selection of particular entities or persons for entitlement to this sort of largesse “is obviously a matter of policy and discretion not open to judicial review unless in circumstances which here we are not able to find. United States v. Realty Co., [163 U. S. 427,] 444 [(1896)].” Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U. S. 308, 317 (1937). See also, id., at 313; Alabama v. Texas, 347 U. S. 272 (1954). For the purposes of these cases appropriations are comparable to tax exemptions and deductions, which are also “a matter of grace [that] Congress can, of course, disallow . . . as it chooses.” Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U. S. 27, 28 (1958).

These are scarcely novel principles. We have held in several contexts that a legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), upheld a statute that provides federal funds for candidates for public office who enter primary campaigns, but does not provide funds for candidates who do not run in party primaries. We rejected First Amendment and equal protection challenges to this provision without applying strict scrutiny. Id., at 93-108. Harris v. McRae, supra, and Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464 (1977), considered legislative decisions not to subsidize abortions, even though other medical procedures were subsidized. We declined to apply strict scrutiny and rejected equal protection challenges to the statutes.

The reasoning of these decisions is simple: “although government may not place obstacles in the path of a [person’s] exercise of. . . freedom of [speech], it need not remove those not of its own creation.” Harris, 448 U. S., at 316. Although TWR does not have as much money as it wants, and thus cannot exercise its freedom of speech as much as it would like, the Constitution “does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom.” Id., at 318. As we said in Maher, “[constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose its will by force of law . . . .” 432 U. S., at 476. Where governmental provision of subsidies is not “ ‘aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas,’ ” Cammarano, 358 U. S., at 513, its “power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.” Maher, supra, at 476.

We have no doubt but that this statute is within Congress’ broad power in this area. TWR contends that § 501(c)(3) organizations could better advance their charitable purposes if they were permitted to engage in substantial lobbying. This may well be true. But Congress — not TWR or this Court — has the authority to determine whether the advantage the public would receive from additional lobbying by charities is worth the money the public would pay to subsidize that lobbying, and other disadvantages that might accompany that lobbying. It appears that Congress was concerned that exempt organizations might use tax-deductible contributions to lobby to promote the private interests of their members. See 78 Cong. Rec. 5861 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Reed); id., at 5959 (remarks of Sen. La Follette). It is not irrational for Congress to decide that tax-exempt charities such as TWR should not further benefit at the expense of taxpayers at large by obtaining a further subsidy for lobbying.

It is also not irrational for Congress to decide that, even though it will not subsidize substantial lobbying by charities generally, it -will subsidize lobbying by veterans’ organizations. Veterans have “been obliged to drop their own affairs to take up the burdens of the nation,” Boone v. Lightner, 319 U. S. 561, 575 (1943), “‘subjecting themselves to the mental and physical hazards as well as the economic and family detriments which are peculiar to military service and which do not exist in normal civil life.’” Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 380 (1974) (emphasis deleted). Our country has a longstanding policy of compensating veterans for their past contributions by providing them with numerous advantages. This policy has “always been deemed to be legitimate.” Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 279, n. 25 (1979).

The issue in these cases is not whether TWR must be permitted to lobby, but whether Congress is required to provide it with public money with which to lobby. For the reasons stated above, we hold that it is not. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

Justice Blackmun,

with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion. Because 26 U. S. C. § 501’s discrimination between veterans’ organizations and charitable organizations is not based on the content of their speech, ante, at 548, I agree with the Court that § 501 does not deny charitable organizations equal protection of the law. The benefit provided to veterans’ organizations is rationally based on the Nation’s time-honored policy of “compensating veterans for their past contributions.” Ante, this page. As the Court says, ante, at 548 and 550, a statute designed to discourage the expression of particular views would present a very different question.

I also agree that the First Amendment does not require the Government to subsidize protected activity, ante, at 546, and that this principle controls disposition of TWR’s First Amendment claim. I write separately to make clear that in my view the result under the First Amendment depends entirely upon the Court’s necessary assumption — which I share — about the manner in which the Internal Revenue Service administers § 501.

If viewed in isolation, the lobbying restriction contained in § 501(c)(3) violates the principle, reaffirmed today, ante, at 545, “that the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right.” Section 501(c)(3) does not merely deny a subsidy for lobbying activities, see Cammarano v. United States, 358 U. S. 498 (1959); it deprives an otherwise eligible organization of its tax-exempt status and its eligibility to receive tax-deductible contributions for all its activities, whenever one of those activities is “substantial lobbying.” Because lobbying is protected by the First Amendment, Eastern Railroad Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U. S. 127, 137-138 (1961), § 501(c)(3) therefore denies a significant benefit to organizations choosing to exercise their constitutional rights.

The constitutional defect that would inhere in § 501(c)(3) alone is avoided by § 501(c)(4). As the Court notes, ante, at 544, TWR may use its present § 501(c)(3) organization for its nonlobbying activities and may create a § 501(c)(4) affiliate to pursue its charitable goals through lobbying. The § 501(c)(4) affiliate would not be eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions.

Given this relationship between § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4), the Court finds that Congress’ purpose in imposing the lobbying restriction was merely to ensure that “no tax-deductible contributions are used to pay for substantial lobbying.” Ante, at 544, n. 6; see ante, at 545. Consistent with that purpose, “[t]he IRS apparently requires only that the two groups be separately incorporated and keep records adequate to show that tax-deductible contributions are not used to pay for lobbying.” Ante, at 545, n. 6. As long as the IRS goes no further than this, we perhaps can safely say that “[t]he Code does not deny TWR the right to receive deductible contributions to support its nonlobbying activity, nor does it deny TWR any independent benefit on account of its intention to lobby.” Ante, at 545. A § 501(c)(3) organization’s right to speak is not infringed, because it is free to make known its views on legislation through its § 501(c)(4) affiliate without losing tax benefits for its nonlobbying activities.

Any significant restriction on this channel of communication, however, would negate the saving effect of § 501(c)(4). It must be remembered that § 501(c)(3) organizations retain their constitutional right to speak and to petition the Government. Should the IRS attempt to limit the control these organizations exercise over the lobbying of their § 501(c)(4) affiliates, the First Amendment problems would be insurmountable. It hardly answers one person’s objection to a restriction on his speech that another person, outside his control, may speak for him. Similarly, an attempt to prevent § 501(c)(4) organizations from lobbying explicitly on behalf of their § 501(c)(3) affiliates would perpetuate § 501(c)(3) organizations’ inability to make known their views on legislation without incurring the unconstitutional penalty. Such restrictions would extend far beyond Congress’ mere refusal to subsidize lobbying. See ante, at 544-545, n. 6. In my view, any such restriction would render the statutory scheme unconstitutional.

I must assume that the IRS will continue to administer §§ 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) in keeping with Congress’ limited purpose and with the IRS’s duty to respect and uphold the Constitution. I therefore agree with the Court that the First Amendment questions in these cases are controlled by Cammarano v. United States, 358 U. S. 498, 513 (1959), rather than by Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 518-519 (1958), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 597 (1972).

       Section § 501(c)(3) grants exemption to:
      “Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition ... , or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office” (emphasis supplied).

       The Due Process Clause imposes on the Federal Government requirements comparable to those that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the States. E. g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 226, n. 6 (1981).

       Appellants contend that we lack jurisdiction of the cross-appeal because 28 U. S. C. § 1252 refers only to appeals, and this Court’s Rule 12.4 only establishes a procedure for taking a cross-appeal. Section 1252 provides:

        “Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory or final judgment, decree or order of any court of the United States . . . holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action ... to which the United States or any of its agencies ... is a party” (emphasis supplied). This language is broad enough to encompass appellee’s cross-appeal. We hold that it does. Therefore, we deny the appellants’ motion to dismiss, and decide the cross-appeal together with the appeal.

       Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to statutes in this opinion refer to the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C.
      Section 501(c)(4) grants exemption to:
      “Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, . . . and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.”

       In stating that exemptions and deductions, on the one hand, are like cash subsidies, on the other, we of course do not mean to assert that they are in all respects identical. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U. S. 664, 674-676 (1970); id., at 690-691 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at 699 (opinion of Harlan, J.).

       TWR and some amici are concerned that the IRS may impose stringent requirements that are unrelated to the congressional purpose of ensuring that no tax-deductible contributions are used to pay for substantial lobbying, and effectively make it impossible for a § 501(c)(3) organization to establish a § 501(e)(4) lobbying affiliate. No such requirement in the Code or regulations has been called to our attention, nor have we been able to discover one. The IRS apparently requires only that the two groups be separately incorporated and keep records adequate to show that tax-deductible contributions are not used to pay for lobbying. This is not unduly burdensome.
      We also note that TWR did not bring this suit because it was unable to operate with the dual structure and seeks a less stringent set of bookkeeping requirements. Rather, TWR seeks to force Congress to subsidize its lobbying activity. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 37-39.

         Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290 (1981), upon which TWR relies, is not to the contrary. In that case the challenged ordinance regulated First Amendment activity by limiting individuals’ expenditures of their own money on political speech.
      TWR contends that Congress has overruled Cammarano by enacting § 162(e), which permits businesses to deduct certain lobbying expenses that are “ordinary and necessary [business] expenses.” See Brief for Ap-pellee 13. It is elementary that Congress’ decision to permit deductions does not affect this Court’s holding that refusing to permit them does not violate the Constitution.

       The rules governing deductibility of contributions to veterans’ organizations are not the same as the analogous rules for § 501(c)(3) organizations. For example, an individual may generally deduct up to 50% of his adjusted gross income in contributions to § 501(c)(3) organizations, but only 20% in contributions to veterans’ organizations. Compare § 170(b)(1)(A) with § 170(b)(1)(B). Taxpayers are permitted to carry over excess contributions to § 501(c)(3) organizations, but not veterans’ organizations, to the next year. § 170(d). There are other differences. If it were entitled to equal treatment with veterans’ organizations, TWR would, of course, be entitled only to the benefits they receive, not to more.

       See, e. g., Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256 (1979) (veterans’ preference in civil service employment); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361 (1974) (educational benefits).

       See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 518-519 (1958); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U. S. 498, 515 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring) (denial of business-expense deduction for lobbying is constitutional, but an attempt to deny all deductions for business expenses to a taxpayer who lobbies would penalize unconstitutionally the exercise of First Amendment rights); cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 317, n. 19 (1980) (denial of welfare benefits for abortion is constitutional, but an attempt to withhold all welfare benefits from one who exercises right to an abortion probably would be impermissible); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 474-475, n. 8 (1977) (same).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice O’Connor Justice Stevens,

license: Public Domain

text:
    UNITED STATES v. EIGHT THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND FIFTY DOLLARS ($8,850) IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY
    No. 81-1062.
    Argued January 18, 1983
    Decided May 23, 1983

      O’CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 570.

      Deputy Solicitor General Frey argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Jensen, Carter G. Phillips, John Fichter De Pue, and David B. Smith.

      Victor Sherman argued the cause for claimant Vasquez. With him on the brief was Paul L. Gabbert.

   Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

United States Customs officials seized $8,850 in currency from the claimant as she passed through customs at Los Angeles International Airport. The question in this case is whether the Government’s 18-month delay in filing a civil proceeding for forfeiture of the currency violates the claimant’s right to due process of law. We conclude that the four-factor balancing test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (1972), provides the relevant framework for determining whether the delay in filing a forfeiture action was reasonable. Applying the Barker test to the circumstances of this case, we find no unreasonable delay.

I

A

Section 231 of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1122, 31 U. S. C. § 1101, requires persons knowingly transporting monetary instruments exceeding $5,000 into the United States to file a report with the Customs Service declaring the amount being transported. Congress has authorized the Government to seize and forfeit any monetary instruments for which a required report was not filed. 31 U. S. C. § 1102(a). Since the Bank Secrecy Act does not specify the procedures to be followed in seizing monetary instruments, the Customs Service generally follows the procedures governing forfeitures for violations of the customs laws, as set forth in 19 U. S. C. § 1602 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), and the implementing regulations. Under these procedures, the Customs Service notifies any person who appears to have an interest in the seized property of the property’s liability to forfeiture and of the claimant’s right to petition the Secretary of the Treasury for remission or mitigation of the forfeiture. See 19 CFR § 162.31(a) (1982). The regulations require a claimant to file the petition within 60 days. 19 CFR § 171.12(b) (1982).

If the claimant does not file a petition, or if the decision on a petition makes legal proceedings appear necessary, the appropriate customs officer must prepare a full report of the seizure for the United States Attorney. 19 U. S. C. § 1603 (1976 ed., Supp. V). Upon receipt of a report, the United States Attorney is required “immediately to inquire into the facts” and, if it appears probable that a forfeiture has been incurred, “forthwith to cause the proper proceedings to be commenced and prosecuted, without delay.” 19 U. S. C. § 1604 (1976 ed., Supp. V). After a case is reported to the United States Attorney for institution of legal proceedings, no administrative action may be taken on any petition for remission or mitigation. 19 CFR § 171.2(a) (1982).

The Customs Service processes over 50,000 noncontra-band forfeitures per year. U. S. Customs Service, Customs U. S. A. 36 (1982). In 90% of all seizures, the claimant files an administrative petition for remission or mitigation. Brief for United States 7. The Secretary in turn grants at least partial relief for an estimated 75% of the petitions. Ibid. Typically, this relief terminates the dispute without the filing of a forfeiture action in district court.

B

On September 10, 1975, claimant Mary Josephine Vasquez and a companion arrived at Los Angeles International Airport after a short visit to Canada. During customs processing, Vasquez declared that she was not carrying more than $5,000 in currency. Nevertheless, a customs inspector discovered and seized $8,850 in United States currency from her. On September 18, 1975, the Customs Service officially informed Vasquez by letter that the seized currency was subject to forfeiture and that she had the right to petition for remission or mitigation. A week later, Vasquez filed a petition for remission or mitigation, asserting that the violation was unintentional because she had mistakenly believed she was required to declare only funds that had been obtained in another country and that she had brought the seized funds with her from the United States.

On October 20, 1975, the Customs Office of Investigation assigned Special Agent Pompeo to investigate the petition. Within a few days, Agent Pompeo had interviewed the customs inspectors at the airport who were involved in the seizure. After several unsuccessful attempts to contact him, in mid-November Agent Pompeo contacted Vasquez’ attorney to arrange an interview with Vasquez. The attorney was unable to meet at that time, and he desired to be present during the interview with his client. Around this time, Agent Pompeo also opened a criminal file because she suspected Vasquez of smuggling drugs. From November 1975 until April 1976, Agent Pompeo contacted various state, federal, and Canadian law enforcement officials to determine whether the seized currency was part of a narcotics transaction.

In January 1976, Vasquez’ attorney inquired about the status of the petition, and was informed it was still under investigation. On March 2, 1976, Agent Pompeo again contacted the attorney regarding an interview with Vasquez, and an interview took place three days later. On April 26, 1976, the attorney again inquired about the status of the petition and requested that it be acted on as soon as possible. Also in April 1976, Agent Pompeo received final reports from the law enforcement agencies. From these reports, Agent Pompeo concluded there was no evidence to support a charge of narcotics violations.

In May 1976, Agent Pompeo submitted a report to the United States Attorney, recommending prosecution of Vasquez for the reporting violation. After Agent Pompeo re-interviewed the customs agents and reported her findings, the United States Attorney submitted the case to the grand jury. On June 15, 1976, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Vasquez with the felony of knowingly and willfully making false statements to a United States Customs officer, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001; and with the misdemeanor of knowingly and willfully transporting $8,850 into the United States without filing a report, in violation of 31 U. S. C. §§ 1058 and 1101. The indictment sought forfeiture of the currency as part of the misdemeanor count.

In August 1976, Agent Pompeo recommended that disposition of the remission petition be withheld until the currency was no longer needed as evidence at the criminal trial. On December 24, 1976, Vasquez was convicted on the felony count but acquitted on the misdemeanor charge of willfully failing to file a currency report. Four days after the criminal trial was completed, Vasquez' attorney again inquired whether there would be any further delay in acting on the petition.

On March 10,1977, the Customs Service informed Vasquez that the claim of forfeiture had been referred to the United States Attorney. Within two weeks, a complaint seeking forfeiture under 31 U. S. C. § 1102 was filed in Federal District Court. In answer to the complaint, Vasquez admitted the factual allegations but asserted as one of several affirmative defenses that the Government’s “dilatory processing” of her petition for remission or mitigation and “dilatory” commencement of the civil forfeiture action violated her right to due process. The District Court, after a 2-day bench trial held in January 1978, determined that the time which had elapsed was reasonable under the circumstances and therefore declared the currency forfeited under 31 U. S. C. § 1102.

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 645 F. 2d 836 (1981). Proceeding from the premise that the Government must bring forfeiture actions promptly because seizures infringe upon property rights, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Government’s 18-month delay in filing its forfeiture action was unjustified. The Court of Appeals specifically held that pending administrative or criminal investigations cannot justify the delay when the necessary elements for a forfeiture were established at the time of the seizure and when the claimant seeks a speedy resolution of the claim. The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the Government’s argument that the claimant should be required to show that the delay prejudiced her ability to present a defense to the forfeiture action. As a remedy for the due process violation, the Court of Appeals ordered dismissal of the Government’s forfeiture action.

Since other Circuits have determined that pending criminal or administrative investigations and prejudice to the claimant are relevant considerations in determining whether a delay in instituting forfeiture proceedings violates due process, we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 455 U. S. 1015 (1982). We reverse.

II

The due process issue presented here is a narrow one. Vasquez concedes that the Government could constitutionally seize her property without a prior hearing. Nor does Vasquez challenge the sufficiency of the judicial hearing that was eventually held. She argues only that the Government’s delay in filing a civil forfeiture proceeding violated her due process right to a hearing “‘at a meaningful time,”’ Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 80 (1972), quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965). Unlike the situation where due process requires a prior hearing, there is no obvious bright line dictating when a postseizure hearing must occur. Because our prior cases in this area have wrestled with whether due process requires a preseizure hearing, we have not previously determined when a postseizure delay may become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner has been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time.

The Government argues that there is no general due process requirement of prompt postseizure filing of a judicial forfeiture action. Rather, the Government urges that the standard for assessing the timeliness of the suit be the same as that employed for due process challenges to delay in instituting criminal prosecutions. As articulated in United States v. Lovasco, 431 U. S. 783 (1977), such claims can prevail only upon a showing that the Government delayed seeking an indictment in a deliberate attempt to gain an unfair tactical advantage over the defendant or in reckless disregard of its probable prejudicial impact upon the defendant’s ability to defend against the charges. The Government argues that in the absence of unfair conduct of this sort, the timeliness of the suit is controlled only by the applicable statute of limitations. Here, Congress has required the Government to institute forfeiture proceedings within five years. 19 U. S. C. §1621 (1976 ed., Supp. V).

We reject the Government’s suggestion that Lovasco provides the appropriate test for determining whether the delay violates the due process command. Lovasco recognized that the interests of the suspect and society are better served if, absent bad faith or extreme prejudice to the defendant, the prosecutor is allowed sufficient time to weigh and sift evidence to ensure that an indictment is well founded. While the value of allowing the Government time to pursue its investigation applies to the civil forfeiture situation as well as the criminal proceeding, a major distinction exists. A suspect who has not been indicted retains his liberty; a claimant whose property has been seized, however, has been entirely deprived of the use of the property.

A more apt analogy is to a defendant’s right to a speedy trial once an indictment or other formal process has issued. In that situation, the defendant no longer retains his complete liberty. Even if he is allowed to post bail, his liberty is subject to the conditions required by his bail agreement. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (1972), we developed a test to determine when Government delay has abridged the right to a speedy trial. The Barker test involves a weighing of four factors: length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Id., at 530.

Of course, Barker dealt with the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial rather than the Fifth Amendment right against deprivation of property without due process of law. Nevertheless, the Fifth Amendment claim here — which challenges only the length of time between the seizure and the initiation of the forfeiture trial — mirrors the concern of undue delay encompassed in the right to a speedy trial. The Barker balancing inquiry provides an appropriate framework for determining whether the delay here violated the due process right to be heard at a meaningful time. We have often repeated the seminal statement from Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972), that “due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” E. g., Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U. S. 188, 200 (1982); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 14-15, n. 15 (1978). The flexible approach of Barker, which “necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis,” 407 U. S., at 530, is thus an appropriate inquiry for determining whether the flexible requirements of due process have been met. As we stressed in Barker, none of these factors is a necessary or sufficient condition for finding unreasonable delay. Rather, these elements are guides in balancing the interests of the claimant and the Government to assess whether the basic due process requirement of fairness has been satisfied in a particular case.

III

In applying the Barker balancing test to this situation, the overarching factor is the length of the delay. As we said in Barker, the length of the delay “is to some extent a triggering mechanism.” Ibid. Little can be said on when a delay becomes presumptively improper, for the determination necessarily depends on the facts of the particular case. Our inquiry is the constitutional one of due process; we are not establishing a statute of limitations. Obviously, short delays — of perhaps a month or so — need less justification than longer delays. We regard the delay here — some 18 months— as quite significant. Being deprived of this substantial sum of money for a year and a half is undoubtedly a significant burden.

Closely related to the length of the delay is the reason the Government assigns to justify the delay. Id., at 531. The Government must be allowed some time to decide whether to institute forfeiture proceedings. The customs official’s decision to seize property is of necessity a hasty one. Both the Government and the claimant have an interest in a rule that allows the Government some time to investigate the situation in order to determine whether the facts entitle the Government to forfeiture so that, if not, the Government may return the money without formal proceedings. Cf. Lovasco, supra, at 791. Normally, investigating officials can make such a determination fairly quickly, so that this reason alone could only rarely justify a lengthy delay.

An important justification for delaying the initiation of forfeiture proceedings is to see whether the Secretary’s decision on the petition for remission will obviate the need for judicial proceedings. This delay can favor both the claimant and the Government. Cf. Barker, supra, at 521; Lovasco, supra, at 794-795. In many cases, the Government’s entitlement to the property is clear, and the claimant’s only prospect for reacquiring the property is that the Secretary will favorably exercise his discretion and allow remission or mitigation. If the Government were forced to initiate judicial proceedings without regard to administrative proceedings, the claimant would lose this benefit. Further, administrative proceedings are less formal and expensive than judicial forfeiture proceedings. Given the great percentage of successful petitions, allowing the Government to wait for action on administrative petitions eliminates unnecessary and burdensome court proceedings. Finally, a system whereby the judicial proceeding occurs after administrative action spares litigants and the Government from the burden of simultaneously participating in two forums.

The Government takes the extreme position, however, that a pending administrative petition should completely toll the requirement of filing a judicial proceeding. Nothing in the statutory scheme or in our cases supports this argument. A claimant need not waive his right to a prompt judicial hearing simply because he seeks the additional remedy of an administrative petition for mitigation. Unreasonable delay in processing the administrative petition cannot justify prolonged seizure of his property without a judicial hearing. Rather, the pendency of an administrative petition is simply a weighty factor in the flexible balancing inquiry.

Pending criminal proceedings present similar justifications for delay in instituting civil forfeiture proceedings. A prior or contemporaneous civil proceeding could substantially hamper the criminal proceeding, which — as here — may often include forfeiture as part of the sentence. A prior civil suit might serve to estop later criminal proceedings and may provide improper opportunities for the claimant to discover the details of a contemplated or pending criminal prosecution. Compare Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. In some circumstances, a civil forfeiture proceeding would prejudice the claimant’s ability to raise an inconsistent defense in a contemporaneous criminal proceeding. See, e. g., United States v. U. S. Currency, 626 F. 2d 11 (CA6 1980). Again, however, the pendency of criminal proceedings is only an element to be considered in determining whether delay is unreasonable. Although federal criminal proceedings are generally fairly rapid since the advent of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. § 3161 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), the pendency of a trial does not automatically toll the time for instituting a forfeiture proceeding.

In this case the Government relies on both a pending petition for mitigation or remission and a pending criminal proceeding to justify the delay in filing civil forfeiture proceedings. During the initial seven months after the seizure the Customs Service was determining whether to grant the petition. This investigation required responses to inquiries to state, federal, and Canadian law enforcement officers. Such an investigation inherently is time consuming, and there is no indication that it was not pursued with diligence. The Customs Service then referred the matter to the United States Attorney, who obtained criminal indictments within two months. Importantly, one count of the indictment sought forfeiture as part of the sentence. If the Government had prevailed, a civil forfeiture would have been rendered unnecessary. There is no evidence in the record that the Government was responsible for the slow pace of the criminal proceedings, which reached a verdict five months later. After the criminal trial ended, the Secretary of the Treasury made a final decision within three months to deny the petition, and the United States Attorney promptly filed a civil forfeiture proceeding.

We are impressed by the assessment made by the District Court that the Goverment had acted with all due speed. Indeed, in an oral colloquy during trial the District Judge commented:

“I have been anxious to see in this case whether there has been a lot of dilitory [sic] conduct that the government has really not done what it should do in order to push this thing with all reasonable speed, and, frankly, I don’t see any point in which the government has been lax.
“If I had found such, and I found it an unreasonable length of time, I would have been happy to so hold ....
“But, in view of the evidence here, I just cannot see any way in which this Court can say that the government has not pursued their claim in all reasonable diligence.” App. 77.

In sum, the Government’s diligent pursuit of pending administrative and criminal proceedings indicates strongly that the reasons for its delay in filing a civil forfeiture proceeding were substantial.

The third element to be considered in the due process balance is the claimant’s assertion of the right to a judicial hearing. A claimant is able to trigger rapid filing of a forfeiture action if he desires it. First, the claimant can file an equitable action seeking an order compelling the filing of the forfeiture action or return of the seized property. See Slocum, v. Mayberry, 2 Wheat. 1, 10 (1817) (Marshall, C. J.). Less formally, the claimant could simply request that the Customs Service refer the matter to the United States Attorney. If the claimant believes the initial seizure was improper, he could file a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) for a return of the seized property. Yasquez did none of these things and only occasionally inquired about the result of the petition for mitigation or remission and asked that the Secretary reach a decision promptly. The failure to use these remedies can be taken as some indication that Yasquez did not desire an early judicial hearing.

The final element is whether the claimant has been prejudiced by the delay. The primary inquiry here is whether the delay has hampered the claimant in presenting a defense on the merits, through, for example, the loss of witnesses or other important evidence. Such prejudice could be a weighty factor indicating that the delay was unreasonable. Here, Vasquez has never alleged or shown that the delay affected her ability to defend against the impropriety of the forfeiture on the merits. On the contrary, Vasquez conceded that the elements necessary for a forfeiture under § 1102(a) were present in her case.

IV

In this case, the balance of factors indicates that the Government’s delay in instituting civil forfeiture proceedings was reasonable. Although the 18-month delay was a substantial period of time, it was justified by the Government’s diligent efforts in processing the petition for mitigation or remission and in pursuing related criminal proceedings. Vasquez never indicated that she desired early commencement of a civil forfeiture proceeding, and she has not asserted or shown that the delay prejudiced her ability to defend against the forfeiture. Therefore, the claimant was not denied due process of law. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. In this case the claimant was deprived of her property on September 10, 1975. No preseizure process of any kind was provided. The postseizure proceeding that, under the Court’s view, satisfies the constitutional requirement was commenced on March 22, 1977, over 18 months later.

None of the various activities that various Government bureaucrats undertook before filing the civil forfeiture proceeding was required by the Constitution or by any statute. None of those activities made it impossible, or even arduous, for the Government to act promptly to establish its right to hold claimant’s currency. In my opinion a rule that allows the Government to dispossess a citizen of her property for more than 18 months without her consent and without a hearing is a flagrant violation of the Fifth Amendment.

I respectfully dissent.

       In addition to the general remission provisions of Title IV, Title II of the Bank Secrecy Act contains its own remission provision, 31 U. S. C. § 1104: “The Secretary may in his discretion remit any forfeiture or penalty under this subchapter in whole or in part upon such terms and conditions as he deems reasonable and just.”

       At the time of the seizure in this case, a customs officer could institute nonjudicial, summary forfeiture proceedings if the value of the seized merchandise was not more than $2,500. See 19 U. S. C. §§ 1607-1609. Congress has since raised this limit to $10,000. 19 U. S. C. § 1607 (1976 ed., Supp. V). Even for a seizure of property appraised at less than $10,000, the claimant has a right to a judicial determination upon posting a $250 bond to cover costs. 19 U. S. C. § 1608.

       At the time of the seizure of the currency from Vasquez, 19 U. S. C. § 1603 contained no requirement of a prompt report of a seizure by the Customs Service to the United States Attorney for purposes of instituting forfeiture proceedings. As amended in 1978, § 1603 now requires the appropriate customs officer “to report promptly” to the United States Attorney whenever legal proceedings “in connection with such seizure or discovery are required.” 19 U. S. C. § 1603 (1976 ed., Supp. V).

       On September 11, 1975, the day after the seizure, Vasquez’ counsel had written an informal letter to the District Director of Customs, explaining why she had not declared the money.

       This inquiry was relevant to the reporting violation. A currency reporting violation is normally a misdemeanor, but a reporting violation committed in furtherance of any other federal offense is a felony. Compare 31 U. S. C. § 1058 with 31 U. S. C. § 1059.

       The conviction on the felony count was subsequently reversed because court files were left in the jury room during deliberations. United States v. Vasquez, 597 F. 2d 192 (CA9 1979).

       On March 28, 1977, the Customs Service officially notified Vasquez that her petition had been denied.

       Because we find no violation of due process, we do not decide whether dismissal of the forfeiture action with prejudice would be an appropriate remedy for undue delay.

         E. g., White v. Acree, 594 F. 2d 1385 (CA10 1979).

        E. g., United States v. Thirty-Six Thousand One Hundred & Twenty-Five Dollars in U. S. Currency, 642 F. 2d 1211 (CA5), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 835 (1981) (aff’g 510 F. Supp. 303 (ED La. 1980)).

         E. g., United States v. Various Pieces of Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment, 649 F. 2d 606 (CA8 1981); United States v. One 1976 Mercedes 450 SLC, 667 F. 2d 1171 (CA5 1982).

       The general rule, of course, is that absent an “extraordinary situation” a party cannot invoke the power of the state to seize a person’s property without a prior judicial determination that the seizure is justified. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 378-379 (1971). See also North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 601 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969); cf. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600 (1974). But we have previously held that such an extraordinary situation exists when the government seizes items subject to forfeiture. In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663 (1974), the Court upheld a Puerto Rico statute modeled after a federal forfeiture statute, 21 U. S. C. § 881(a), which allowed Puerto Rican authorities to seize, without prior notice or hearing, a yacht suspected of importing marihuana. Pearson Yacht clearly indicates that due process does not require federal customs officials to conduct a hearing before seizing items subject to forfeiture. Such a requirement would make customs processing entirely unworkable. The government interests found decisive in Pearson Yacht are equally present in this situation: the seizure serves important governmental purposes; a pre-seizure notice might frustrate the statutory purpose; and the seizure was made by government officials rather than self-motivated private parties.

       In United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363 (1971), we construed a statute allowing customs officials to seize obscene material as requiring a postseizure filing within 14 days and completion of the hearing in an additional 60 days. That case interpreted the statute so as to avoid possible First Amendment problems of prior restraint. The case did not involve, and thus we had no occasion to address, the time restraints imposed by the Due Process Clause. Even if we'were inclined to interpret the statutes here in such a way as to avoid any due process question, it would be impossible to read into the statutory scheme, as we did in Thirty-seven Photographs, a short statute of limitations, since 19 U. S. C. § 1621 (1976 ed., Supp. V) expressly allows the Government to bring a civil forfeiture proceeding within five years.

       The deprivation in Barker — loss of liberty — may well be more grievous than the deprivation of one’s use of property at issue here. Thus, the balance of the interests, which depends so heavily on the context of the particular situation, may differ from a situation involving the right to a speedy trial.

       By regulation, the Secretary is not allowed to process any petition for remission or mitigation while a civil forfeiture proceeding is pending. 19 CFR § 171.2(a) (1982).

       Under the 1978 revisions to 19 CFR § 162.31(a), the Customs Service is now required to warn claimants that unless they agree to defer judicial forfeiture proceedings until completion of the administrative process, the case will be referred promptly to the United States Attorney for institution of judicial proceedings, or summary forfeiture proceedings will be begun.

       The property was not contraband; it was seized simply because claimant made a misstatement to a customs officer.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    CARDWELL et al. v. TAYLOR
    No. 82-1496.
    Decided May 23, 1983
   Per Curiam.

The respondent, Louis Cuen Taylor, was convicted of 28 counts of first-degree murder arising out of a fire set in a hotel in 1970. He received a sentence of life imprisonment on each count. After the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences, State v. Taylor, 112 Ariz. 68, 537 P. 2d 938 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U. S. 921 (1976), he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The District Court denied the writ, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether certain statements made by Taylor and introduced in evidence against him were voluntary. 579 F. 2d 1380 (1978). On remand, the District Court decided that the statements were voluntary and again denied the writ. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed once more. 692 F. 2d 765 (1982). It relied on Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979), decided after the first appeal to the Ninth Circuit but before the hearing on remand. In Dunaway, this Court required the exclusion of custodial statements following an arrest that violated the Fourth Amendment, unless the circumstances showed the attenuation of the taint of the illegal arrest. The Court of Appeals stated that the District Court “should have permitted the petitioner to argue the Fourth Amendment issue.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a. Although the District Court had not considered the issue, the Court of Appeals thought the record sufficient to permit it to resolve the question. It determined that Taylor had been arrested without probable cause and that “[n]o significant event intervened” between the illegal arrest and the statements to attenuate the taint. Id., at 3a. Consequently, it directed the District Court to issue the writ. We now reverse.

In Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), Powell, like the respondent in this case, argued that evidence used in his trial was the product of an illegal arrest. This Court held that federal courts could not, on a state prisoner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, consider a claim that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment should have been excluded at his trial, when the prisoner has had an opportunity for full and fair litigation of that claim in the state courts. The Court of Appeals in this case, however, did just that, holding that the custodial statements made by Taylor were obtained in violation of our decision in Dun-away. Dunaway relied not on the involuntariness of the statements made — a concern under the Fifth Amendment— but on whether there was an unattenuated causal link between the statements and a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, the Court in Dunaway sought to dispel any “lingering confusion between ‘voluntariness’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and the ‘causal connection’ test established” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 442 U. S., at 219. Therefore, under Stone v. Powell, the Court of Appeals should not have considered the petitioner’s argument that Dunaway required the exclusion of his statements. Only if the statements were involuntary, and therefore obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment, could the federal courts grant relief on collateral review. On remand, the Court of Appeals should review the District Court’s decision on voluntariness, giving appropriate deference, of course, to any findings of fact made by the state courts in the long course of these proceedings, Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539 (1981). The motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant the petition and set the case for oral argument.