text:
    No. A-325.
    Gifford v. United States.
   Application for bail, addressed to Justice Stevens and referred to the Court, denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. A-390.
    Cepulonis et al. v. Connolly et al.
   Application for injunction, addressed to Justice Stevens and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-285.
    In re Disbarment of Gloeckner.
    [For earlier order herein, see 458 U. S. 1127.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-297.
    In re Disbarment of Jeffcoat.
   Lynn R. Jeffcoat, of Richardson, Tex., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on October 18, 1982 [ante, p. 939], is hereby discharged.


text:
    No. 9,
    Orig.
    United States v. Louisiana et al.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 457 U. S. 1115.]
   Petition of the Special Master, Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., for allowance of interim compensation and expenses, as set forth in the petition filed October 18, 1982, is granted, and it is ordered that the United States bear one-half the costs and the States of Mississippi and Alabama each bear one-quarter of the costs.

Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 88,
    Orig.
    California v. Texas et al.
   It is ordered that the Honorable Wade H. McCree, Jr., of Ann Arbor, Mich., be appointed Special Master in this case with authority to fix the time and conditions for the filing of additional pleadings and to direct subsequent proceedings, and with authority to summon witnesses, issue subpoenas, and take such evidence as may be introduced and such as he may deem necessary to call for. The Special Master is directed to submit such reports as he may deem appropriate.

The compensation of the Special Master, the allowances to him, the compensation paid to his technical, stenographic, clerical, and legal assistants, the cost of printing his report, and all other proper expenses shall be charged against and be borne by the parties in such proportion as the Court may hereafter direct.

[For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 458 U. S. 1131.]

It is further ordered that if the position of Special Master in this case becomes vacant during a recess of the Court, The Chief Justice shall have authority to make a new designation which shall have the same effect as if originally made by the Court herein.

The notice of dismissal of certain defendants is referred to the Special Master.


text:
    No. 81-3.
    Bob Jones University v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 454 U. S. 892.] Motion of petitioner for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 81-920.
    Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 454 U. S. 1140.] Stephen N. Shulman, Esquire, of Washington, D. C., a member of the Bar of this Court, is invited to argue this case as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below.


text:
    No. 81-1320.
    Kolender, Chief of Police of San Diego, et al. v. Lawson.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 455 U. S. 999.] Treating appellee’s letter of October 19, 1982, as a motion for leave to present oral argument pro se, the motion is denied. Mark D. Rosenbaum, Esquire, of Los Angeles, Cal., a member of the Bar of this Court, is invited to argue this case as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below.


text:
    No. 81-1493.
    Gillette Co. v. Miner.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. [Certiorari granted, 456 U. S. 914.] Motion of Consumer Coalition for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 81-1893.
    California v. Ramos.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 821.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Ezra Hendon, Esquire, of San Francisco, Cal., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 81-1618.
    No. 81-1619.
    Weyerhaeuser Co. et al. v. Lyman Lamb Co. et al.; and Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Lyman Lamb Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 456 U. S. 971.] Motion of Alaska et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae and for additional time for oral argument denied. Motion of National Lumber & Building Material Dealers Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.

Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions.


text:
    No. 82-233.
    No. 82-413.
    Brooks et al. v. Winter, Governor of Mississippi, et al.; and Winter, Governor of Mississippi, et al. v. Brooks et al.
   D. C. N. D. Miss. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in these cases expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 82-610 (A-388).
    In re Hopfmann et al.
   Motion of petitioner to expedite consideration of the petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus and/or injunction denied. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Powell and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 82-5358.
    In re Pena-Perez.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 82-25.
    Jones, a Minor Child, by his Mother and Next Friend, Jones, et al. v. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-rari granted.


text:
    No. 82-91.
    Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Phinpathya.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-401.
    Rice, Director, Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control of California v. Rehner.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 81-1717.
    American Bank & Trust Co. et al. v. Dallas County et al.; Bank of Texas et al. v. Childs et al.; and Wynnewood Bank & Trust et al. v. Childs et al.
   Ct. App. Tex., 5th Sup. Jud. Dist. Motions of American Bankers Association and Dale National Bank for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions and this petition.

Reported below: 615 S. W. 2d 810 (second case).


text:
    No. 81-1857.
    Oregon v. Bradshaw.
   Ct. App. Ore. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 81-2399.
    No. 82-358.
    Metropolitan Edison Co. et al. v. People Against Nuclear Energy et al.; and United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission et al. v. People Against Nuclear Energy et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motions of Atomic Industrial Forum, American Mining Congress, and Chamber of Commerce of the United States for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 219 U. S. App. D. C. 358, 678 F. 2d 222.


text:
    No. 82-23.
    Marsh, Nebraska State Treasurer, et al. v. Chambers.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Question 4 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 82-167.
    Chappell et al. v. Wallace et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondents Vernon Wallace et al. for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-185.
    No. 82-246.
    No. 82-259.
    Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, et al.; Boston Police Patrolmen’s Assn., Inc. v. Castro et al.; and Beecher et al. v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in No. 82-185 granted. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 679 F. 2d 965.


text:
    No. 81-2026.
    Uncle Ben’s, Inc. v. Johnson.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2195.
    Kinsel v. Wolfe.
   Dist. Ct. Hot Springs County, Wyo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2258.
    Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Incorvaia.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2275.
    Cardin v. De La Cruz et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2280.
    Callaway v. Wisconsin.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2303.
    Faberge, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2349.
    No. 82-99.
    Japan Line, Ltd. v. Turner et al.; and Philippine President Lines, Inc., Manila v. Turner et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 651 F. 2d 1300.


text:
    No. 81-2404.
    Gold Bondholders Protective Council, Inc. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6823.
    Minor v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 8th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6838.
    Hicks v. Nix, Warden, Iowa State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6849.
    Alvarez v. Wainwright.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6853.
    Staples v. Israel.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6858.
    Daniels v. Maggio, Warden, Angola State Penitentiary, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6903.
    Harrell v. Jago et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6904.
    Anonymous v. O’Brien et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6948.
    Velasquez v. Cuyler et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6974.
    Weddle v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-62.
    Davis Co. v. United Furniture Workers of America, AFL-CIO, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-80.
    King v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-141.
    Jacobo Marti & Sons, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-152.
    Hall v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-187.
    Lujan v. United States Department of the Interior et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-204.
    Orders et al. v. Stotts et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-222.
    1616 Reminc Limited Partnership v. United States Elevator Corp.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-237.
    Montana ex rel. Intake Water Co. v. Board of Natural Resources and Conservation of Montana et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-254.
    Hospitality Motor Inn, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-274.
    Pennsylvania et al. v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-310.
    Skippy, Inc. v. CPC International, Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-316.
    Costantini, dba United Travel Service et al. v. Civil Aeronautics Board.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-350.
    Darville et al. v. Texaco, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-359.
    Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-363.
    Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, Local 70 v. California Trucking Assn. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-364.
    Neumaier v. Animal Matters Hearing Board.
   Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-366.
    Louisiana v. Walgamotte.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-367.
    Miller, Trustee in Bankruptcy v. Haynes.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-371.
    Behar v. Southeast Bank Trust Co., N.A., Personal Representative of the Estate of Behar.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-373.
    Lazzara v. Plaintiff’s Legal Committee et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-379.
    Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp. et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-382.
    Robinson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-385.
    O’Bannon, Secretary of Public Welfare of Pennsylvania, et al. v. Shadis et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-387.
    Conrod v. Jeep Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-389.
    Leasure v. Connor.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-390.
    Bailey et al. v. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, et al.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-394.
    Bellassai et al. v. McAvoy et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-395.
    Dill et al. v. Davies Nitrate Co. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-400.
    Karapinka v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-403.
    Cougar Business Owners Assn. et al. v. Washington et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-407.
    Katzman v. Pennsylvania.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-408.
    Georgia Residential Finance Authority et al. v. Jeffries et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-415.
    Robinson v. Magovern et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-419.
    Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Williams et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-433.
    Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Robert E. Lipschutz Associates, Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-436.
    Irwin v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-443.
    Johnson & Son Erectors Co. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-457.
    Viestenz v. Fleming Cos., Inc.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-464.
    Coleman v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-484.
    Albaugh v. Wood et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-487.
    Stulbach v. United States Patent and Trademark Office.
   C. C. P. A. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-506.
    Safir v. Lewis, Secretary of Transportation, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-522.
    Kovic v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-535.
    French v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-544.
    Traynor v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-547.
    Jansson v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-553.
    Scott et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-559.
    DeVito v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-560.
    Kanelopoulos v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-562.
    Gibson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-569.
    Pedersen et ux. v. South Williamsport Area School District et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-570.
    Hirsh v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5010.
    Bizzard v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5080.
    Gavin v. Anderson, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5092.
    Haddix v. Ohio Liquor Control Commission.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5129.
    Vann v. Harding.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5133.
    Pilcher v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5139.
    No. 82-5181.
    Mucci v. United States; and Bendis v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 681 F. 2d 561.


text:
    No. 82-5177.
    Celestine v. Crown Center Hotel.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5237.
    Murr v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5284.
    Smokes v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5329.
    Miller v. Miller.
   Ct. App. Ohio, San-dusky County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5333.
    Gumsey v. Crawford.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5334.
    Aiken v. Citizens & Southern Bank of Cobb County.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5336.
    Patrick et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5342.
    Hayes v. Credit Bureau of Georgia, Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5343.
    Graham v. Marshall.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5344.
    Malloy v. Sullivan.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5345.
    Noone v. Pettinato.
   Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5349.
    Craft v. Choate et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5351.
    Benard v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal, 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5357.
    Grant v. Oregon.
   Ct. App. Ore. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5359.
    Russell v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5364.
    Royster v. Federal Bureau of Investigation et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5365.
    Cromartie v. Mack et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5367.
    Maggard v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5370.
    Williams v. Bank of Nova Scotia.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5377.
    Davis v. Greer, Warden, Menard Correctional Center, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5379.
    Lopes v. Howard et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5383.
    Walker v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5384.
    Nowels v. Oregon.
   Ct. App. Ore. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5385.
    Phillips v. Duckworth, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5386.
    Respres v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5387.
    Medlin v. Mann.
   Super. Ct. Alaska, 1st Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5389.
    Watson v. DeFrances.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5391.
    Wasson v. Engle, Superintendent, Chillicothe Correctional Institute.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5397.
    Abbitt v. Jordan; and Abbitt v. Saied.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5400.
    Sanchez et al. v. Egger, Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5424.
    Grooms et al. v. Duckworth, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5439.
    McCarty v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5451.
    Hall v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5455.
    Yates v. Medical College of Pennsylvania et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5477.
    Hamilton v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5481.
    Lewis v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5485.
    Polansky v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1591.
    Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Vishipco Line et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motions of New York Clearing House Association and Federal Reserve Bank of New York for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.

Justice White and Justice Powell would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 81-2249.
    Sumner, Warden, San Quentin Prison v. Maxwell.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 81-2273.
    Caminita v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-181.
    Peltzman v. Federal Maritime Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed as a seaman granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-207.
    Eastside Mental Health Center, Inc. v. Williams.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    No. 81-2406.
    No. 82-22.
    City of Polson, Montana v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, Montana, et al.; and Namen et al. v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, Montana, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 665 F. 2d 951.

Justice Rehnquist,

with whom Justice White joins,

dissenting.

In deciding these cases, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that (1) the historic Flathead Reservation was not terminated by an Act of Congress in 1904; (2) by virtue of the Treaty of Hell Gate the title to the bed and banks of the south half of Flathead Lake, a large inland lake in northwestern Montana, was retained by the United States as trustee for respondent Tribes, rather than passing to the State of Montana at the time the latter was admitted to the Union; and (3) respondent Tribes have the authority to regulate the riparian rights of non-Indian owners of land abutting Flathead Lake. In my opinion, the decision of the Court of Appeals with respect to the “termination” issue was based on principles derived from cases such as Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U. S. 584 (1977), DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U. S. 425 (1975), and Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U. S. 481 (1973), and does not warrant review here. With respect to the “ownership” issue and the “regulatory” issue, as they were described by the Court of Appeals, however, I believe there is reason to think that the Court of Appeals incorrectly applied our decisions in Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544 (1981), Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191 (1978), and United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313 (1978), and I would grant certiorari to review these determinations.

The “ownership” issue. This requires deciding who owns the southern half of the bed and banks of Flathead Lake. The Court of Appeals relied on its own decision 40 years ago in Montana Power Co. v. Rochester, 127 F. 2d 189 (1942). Petitioners contended in the Court of Appeals that Rochester had been significantly undercut by our decision in Montana v. United States, supra, where we held that the treaty establishing the Crow Indian Reservation had not conveyed to the Indians beneficial ownership of the bed of the Big Horn River flowing through the Reservation. The Court of Appeals advanced several factual distinctions between the execution of the treaty in Montana and the execution of the Treaty of Hell Gate involved in these cases. But the Court of Appeals apparently also disagreed with a portion of this Court’s reasoning in Montana. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated:

“The Montana Court emphasized that ‘Congress was, of course, aware of this presumption once it was established by this Court.’ [Citation omitted.] There is no evidence, however, that the presumption against pre-statehood federal grants of land under navigable waters had been established at the time the Hell Gate Treaty was negotiated and ratified. The earliest statement of the presumption appeared seven decades later. . . .” 665 F. 2d 951, 961, n. 27 (1982).

While this may be a proper statement of the chronology, it would surely be as applicable to the Crow Treaty involved in Montana as to the Treaty of Hell Gate involved in this case.

It would appear that the Court of Appeals decision in Rochester, supra, was a dispute between a licensee under the Federal Power Commission which had built a dam at the outlet of Flathead Lake and a non-Indian owner of patented land. But the Rochester court did not even purport to discuss the principle laid down in United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49 (1926), and reaffirmed in Montana, supra, that there is no conveyance of ownership where there is nothing in a treaty “which even approaches a grant of rights in lands underlying navigable waters; nor anything evincing a purpose to depart from the established policy . . . of treating such lands as held for the benefit of the future State.” United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, at 58-59, quoted in Montana v. United States, supra, at 552-553.

While it may be understandable why the Court of Appeals treated its decision in Rochester as stare decisis in these cases, the same is obviously not true so far as this Court is concerned. Because after Montana there is substantial doubt as to whether the Court of Appeals reached the right conclusion on the “ownership” issue, I would grant certiorari to review its judgment on that point.

The “regulatory” issue. The Court of Appeals also decided that a tribal ordinance regulating the riparian rights of owners of fee lands abutting Flathead Lake could be applied to non-Indian owners. The Court of Appeals saw, perhaps quite rightly, conflicting indications from our decisions in Montana v. United States, supra, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, supra, and United States v. Wheeler, supra, on the one hand, and Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U. S. 134 (1980), on the other hand.

In Oliphant, supra, we acknowledged that Indian tribes retain elements of “quasi-sovereign” authority after ceding their lands to the United States, but went on to observe:

“The tribes’ retained powers are not such that they are limited only by specific restrictions in treaties or congressional enactments. As the Court of Appeals recognized, Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising both those powers of autonomous states that are expressly terminated by Congress and those powers ‘inconsistent with their status.’” 435 U. S., at 208.

In Wheeler, supra, we further observed that “[t]he areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have occured are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe.” 435 U. S., at 326.

The Court of Appeals saw an inconsistency between these statements and the statement contained in Washington v. Confederated Tribes, supra, that “[t]ribal powers are not implicitly divested by virtue of the tribe’s dependent status.” 447 U. S., at 153. But the Court of Appeals also recognized that the most recently decided of these cases, Montana v. United States, supra, cited Wheeler with complete approval. In Montana, we went on to say:

“Thus, in addition to the power to punish tribal offenders, the Indian tribes retain their inherent power to determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members. [Citation omitted.] But exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation. [Citations omitted.] Since regulation of hunting and fishing by nonmembers of a tribe on lands no longer owned by the tribe bears no clear relationship to tribal self-government or internal relations, the general principles of retained inherent sovereignty did not authorize the Crow Tribe to adopt Resolution No. 74-05.” 450 U. S., at 564-565 (footnote omitted).

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals felt that even under the more recently expressed doctrines reaffirmed in Montana, the ordinance regulating non-Indian lands abutting Flathead Lake was authorized because the southern half of the lake, in its view, was owned by the United States in trust for the Tribes. The correctness of that conclusion obviously depends upon the Court of Appeals’ resolution of the “ownership” issue; if upon review of this latter determination we were to decide that the southern half of Flathead Lake passed to the State of Montana under our decision in Montana v. United States, the Court of Appeals’ justification for its decision of the “regulatory” issue would likewise fail.

The “ownership” and “regulatory” issues present important questions having ramifications throughout the many Western States within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. I would grant certiorari to review that court’s decision of both issues.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 81-6813.
    No. 82-5317.
    No. 82-5348.
    No. 82-5373.
    Elledge v. Florida. Berryhill v. Georgia. Riley v. Florida. Brown v. Zant, Superintendent, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center.
   Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.; and

Super. Ct. Ga., Butts County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 81-6813, 408 So. 2d 1021; No. 82-5317, 249 Ga. 442, 291 S. E. 2d 685; No. 82-5348, 413 So. 2d 1173.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 82-393.
    Western Electric Co., Inc. v. Hill et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Powell would grant the petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment, and remand the case for further consideration in light of General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U. S. 147 (1982).


text:
    No. 82-399.
    Span-Deck, Inc. v. Fabcon, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 82-5083.
    McDowell v. North Dakota.
   Sup. Ct. N. D. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


author: Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 82-5328.
    Thomas v. Zant, Superintendent, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center.
   Super. Ct. Ga., Butts County. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall,

with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that capital punishment is unconstitutional in all circumstances, I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence on this basis alone. However, even if I believed that the death sentence could constitutionally be imposed under certain circumstances, I would grant cer-tiorari and vacate the death sentence imposed here. The decision below is inconsistent with this Court’s decision in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420 (1980).

At the sentencing proceeding which followed petitioner’s conviction of murder, the trial court instructed the jury, in the terms of the Georgia death penalty statute, that it could impose the death sentence if it found “that the offense of murder for which the accused has been convicted was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman in that it involved torture and depravity of mind.” Ga. Code §27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978). The jury instruction did not in any way clarify or narrow the words of the statute.

The Court recognized in Godfrey that an instruction reciting this statutory language does not provide a constitutionally adequate “restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence,” because it fails to “channel the sentencer’s discretion by ‘clear and objective standards’ that provide ‘specific and detailed guidance,’ and that ‘make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.’” 446 U. S., at 428 (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted). Although the instruction in this case, like the instruction in Godfrey, did no more than restate the broad statutory language, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s death sentence without requiring a new sentencing proceeding. In failing to require resentencing, the Georgia Supreme Court disregarded the clear mandate of Godfrey. Although the state appellate court concluded, upon reviewing the trial record, that petitioner deserved the death sentence, the fact remains that the critical sentencing decision was left to “the uncontrolled discretion of a basically uninstructed jury,” id., at 429 (plurality opinion). See Newlon v. Missouri, ante, at 888-889 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Brooks v. Georgia, 451 U. S. 921 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Godfrey v. Georgia, supra, at 436-437 (Marshall, J., concurring).


text:
    No. 81-6606.
    No. 82-120.
    Francois v. Florida, Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Trailways, Inc., et al.,
   458 U. S. 1122; and

ante, p. 862. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 81-5243.
    Cotner v. Oklahoma,
   454 U. S. 1100. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    November 2, 1982
    No. 82-243.
    Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Perez et ux.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    November 8, 1982
    No. 82-284.
    International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from C. A. D. C. Cir.


text:
    No. 82-290.
    Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Finance Administration of the City of New York et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 82-293.
    North Shore University Hospital et al. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Board et al.
   Appeal from App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept., dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Justice Blackmun would dismiss the appeal for want of substantial federal question. Justice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 82-5488.
    Wayland v. Internal Revenue Service et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 1st Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No.-.
    Ross v. Woodard, Chairman, North Carolina Parole Commission.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file the petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. D-262.
    In re Disbarment of Auwaerter.
    [For earlier order herein, see 456 U. S. 902.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-267.
    In re Disbarment of DeFazio.
    [For earlier order herein, see 456 U. S. 956.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-286.
    In re Disbarment of Nadler.
    [For earlier order herein, see 458 U. S. 1127.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-290.
    In re Disbarment of Spiro.
   Demetri M. Spiro, of Chicago, Ill., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on September 9, 1982 [458 U. S. 1128], is hereby discharged.


text:
    No. D-299.
    In re Disbarment of Olkon.
   It is ordered that Ellis Olkon, of St. Louis Park, Minn., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-300.
    In re Disbarment of Grubor.
   It is ordered that John M. Grubor, of Pittsburgh, Pa., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-301.
    In re Disbarment of Bonnin.
   It is ordered that Robbin James Bonnin, of Amherst, Mich., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-302.
    In re Disbarment of Johnson.
   It is ordered that Richard Vernon Johnson, of Baltimore, Md., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 81-1618.
    No. 81-1619.
    Weyerhaeuser Co. et al. v. Lyman Lamb Co. et al.; and Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Lyman Lamb Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 456 U. S. 971.] Motion of respondents for relief from compliance with Rule 28.1 granted.

Justice White, Justice Powell, and Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 81-1636.
    Florida v. Brady et al.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. [Certiorari granted, 456 U. S. 988.] The parties are directed to file supplemental memoranda addressing the present posture of the cases in the state courts, the status of the charges against each respondent and how any change, if there be any change, affects the case pending in this Court. Oral argument in this case, presently scheduled for December 8, 1982, is postponed and the case of District of Columbia Court of Appeals et al. v. Feldman et al., No. 81-1335 [cer-tiorari granted, 458 U. S. 1105], is set for oral argument in its stead.


text:
    No. 82-171.
    Marine Terminals Corp. et al. v. Kelly,
   ante, p. 863. Motion of respondent for reimbursement of costs denied.


text:
    No. 82-446.
    Dallas County Hospital District v. Dallas Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondent Leon Gowans for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.


text:
    No. 82-667.
    Florida v. Zafra.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Motion of petitioner to expedite consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-118.
    Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-372.
    Federal Trade Commission et al. v. Grolier Inc.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 81-1859.
    Illinois v. Lafayette.
   App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-492.
    Solem, Warden, South Dakota State Penitentiary v. Helm.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certio-rari granted.


text:
    No. 82-271.
    Chardon et al. v. Fumero Soto et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Questions 1 and 2 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 82-354.
    No. 82-355.
    No. 82-398.
    Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., et al. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. et al.; Consumer Alert et al. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. et al.; and United States Department of Transportation et al. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of Automotive Occupant Protective Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 220 U. S. App. D. C. 170, 680 F. 2d 206.


text:
    No. 81-6908.
    Barclay v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 81-2199.
    James v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 5th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2221.
    Rutledge v. Small Business Administration.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2243.
    Fincher v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2254.
    Gelvin v. North Dakota.
   Sup. Ct. N. D. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2373.
    Gaziano v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5912.
    Wood v. Utah.
   Sup. Ct. Utah. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6882.
    Ephraim v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-94.
    No. 82-424.
    Local 282, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America v. National Labor Relations Board et al.; and Frank Mascali Construction G.C.P. Co. et al. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 697 F. 2d 294.


text:
    No. 82-154.
    Brandstetter v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. III., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-217.
    No. 82-608.
    No. 82-616.
    No. 82-626.
    Stover et al. v. Rau et al.; Crown Center Redevelopment Corp. et al. v. Stover et al.; Johnson et al. v. Stover et al.; and Rau v. Stover et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied. Reported below: 680 F. 2d 1175.


text:
    No. 82-224.
    American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3486 v. New Jersey Air National Guard, 177th Fighter Interceptor Group, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-241.
    Mobay Chemical Corp. et al. v. Gorsuch, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-270.
    United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Erkins et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-308.
    Delpro Co. v. Brotherhood Railway Carmen of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-383.
    Fumero Soto et al. v. Chardon et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-384.
    Stack v. Capital-Gazette Newspapers, Inc.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-412.
    Amfac Foods, Inc. v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-426.
    Snell et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-434.
    Northern Utilities, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Corp. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-439.
    Hardy et ux. v. Housing Management Co. et al.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-441.
    Faulkner v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-442.
    Calvo v. Los Angeles Unified School District et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-448.
    Creative Environments, Inc., et al. v. Estabrook et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-456.
    Greenfield v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-460.
    Dunning v. Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa (Dunning, Real Party in Interest).
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-463.
    McNea et al. v. Voinovich et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-466.
    Curry v. State Bar of Wisconsin et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-470.
    City of Los Angeles v. Societa per Azioni de Navigazione Italia.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-471.
    Jordan et al. v. Maneikis.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-474.
    Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Dogherra.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-478.
    Recora Co., Inc. v. Tapeswitch Corporation of America.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-510.
    Finch et al. v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-515.
    Murphy v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-539.
    Fiberglass Specialty Co., Inc. v. Bor-Son Construction, Inc.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-558.
    Lucerne Products, Inc. v. Skil Corp.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-590.
    Kurtz v. United States on Behalf of Small Business Administration.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-591.
    Zero et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-602.
    Lawson v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-606.
    Saad v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-613.
    Perl v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-615.
    Jersey Sanitation Co., Inc., et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-627.
    Thomsen et al. v. Western Electric Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5041.
    Wasilowski v. Dietz, Chairman, New Jersey State Parole Board, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5169.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5216.
    Swain et al. v. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5223.
    Brown v. Warden, Great Meadow Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5224.
    Bush v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5229.
    Sullivan et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5382.
    Hunsberger v. Nebraska.
   Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5388.
    Wireman v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5398.
    Tippett v. Wyrick, Warden, Missouri State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5401.
    Harrell v. Ingram, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5403.
    Simpson v. Wyrick, Warden, Missouri State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5405.
    McPeek et al. v. Young, United States District Judge, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5407.
    Joshua v. Maggio, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5410.
    McClanahan v. Community Action Committee of the Lehigh Valley, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5413.
    Heirens v. Housewright, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5416.
    Smith v. Avance et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5421.
    Douglas v. Smith.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5422.
    Houston v. Housewright, Commissioner, Arkansas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5425.
    Komorowski v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5430.
    Naylor v. Dixon et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5435.
    Montgomery v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5436.
    Vipperman v. Nevada Department of Parole.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5437.
    Pelczarski v. Grant et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5447.
    Stovall v. Patterson et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5449.
    Miller v. Cuyler et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5486.
    Buie v. Marble.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5499.
    Bertman v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5502.
    Matthews v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5508.
    Broadway v. Bogan, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5510.
    Hawkins v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5532.
    McNeil v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5535.
    Viccarone v. United States Board of Parole et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5536.
    Conyers v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5537.
    Austin v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5545.
    Long v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice White,

text:
    No. 81-2103.
    Pennco, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Blackmun and Justice Rehnquist join,

dissenting.

Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(5), makes an employer’s refusal to collectively bargain with the representative of its employees an unfair labor practice. A union certified as the exclusive representative of an employer’s workers enjoys an irrebuttable presumption that it has the loyalty of the majority of an employer’s workers, and is thus the legal representative of the employer’s workers, for one year after certification. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U. S. 96, 98-104 (1954). Upon the expiration of that period, the presumption becomes a re-buttable one, and an employer may then withdraw recognition of the union and refuse to bargain with the union if it has a doubt, “reasonably grounded” and “based on objective considerations,” that the union no longer has the support of a majority of the employer’s workers. See, e. g., Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F. 2d 1055, 1110 (CA1 1981); NLRB v. Windham Community Memorial Hospital, 577 F. 2d 805, 811 (CA2 1978).

In this case, as in several others, the employer attempted to withdraw recognition from a union because the composition of the employer’s work force had significantly changed as a result of the employer’s hiring of permanent replacements for striking workers. In such cases, the National Labor Relations Board has consistently relied on a presumption that striker replacements support the union in the same ratio as those whom they have replaced. E. g., Windham Community Memorial Hospital, 230 N. L. R. B. 1070 (1977).

Several Circuits appear to presume that striker replacements do not support the certified union, and refuse to enforce NLRB decisions grounded on the Board’s contrary presumption. While these Circuits have to some extent pointed to specific facts of the cases before them in relying on a presumption antithetical to that of the Board, all three, the First, Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, supra, at 1110, the Fifth, NLRB v. Randle-Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc., 584 F. 2d 720, 728 (1978), and the Eighth, National Car Rental System, Inc. v. NLRB, 594 F. 2d 1203, 1206 (1979), seem to rely heavily on the statement, made by one commentator, R. Gorman, Labor Law (1976), that “if a new hire agrees to serve as a replacement for a striker ... , it is generally assumed that he does not support the union and that he ought not to be counted toward a union majority.” Id., at 112 (citing only Titan Metal Manufacturing Co., 135 N. L. R. B. 196 (1962), a case that has neither been cited by the NLRB for the proposition Gorman states nor been expressly overruled).

The Second Circuit has also had occasion to review a decision in which the NLRB has relied on its presumption. NLRB v. Windham Community Memorial Hospital, supra (NLRB suit to enforce its order in Windham Community Memorial Hospital, supra). It avoided the question of the validity of the NLRB’s presumption that replacement workers supported the certified union in the same ratio as did the strikers. It did, however, clearly reject the presumption that “no replacement employee supports the Union,” describing it as “equally, if not more, assailable than the NLRB’s [presumption].” 577 F. 2d, at 813. The Second Circuit ultimately decided that the employer’s withdrawal of recognition was unjustified, not because the NLRB’s presumption was valid, but because the employer did not present any evidence supporting a basis for its belief that the certified union no longer enjoyed the support of a majority of its workers.

The Sixth Circuit, in the decision below, rejected both the presumption that striker replacements do not support the union and the presumption that the striker replacements support the union in the same ratio that the strikers support the union. The Sixth Circuit held the employer’s withdrawal of recognition unlawful because the employer simply did not establish any basis, aside from an invalid presumption, for believing that the certified union was not the choice of the majority.

The questions of whether presumptions can properly be used to determine whether a union has the support of striker replacements, and whether replacements should be presumed to oppose the certified union or favor the certified union, have produced conflict among the Courts of Appeals and between the Courts of Appeals and the agency charged with enforcing the National Labor Relations Act. The questions are of obvious significance to national labor policy. The need for a uniform approach to these questions is equally obvious. I would grant certiorari to resolve this controversy.


text:
    No. 81-2313.
    Avenue Book Store v. City of Tallmadge, Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Summit County. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

In a common-law public nuisance action instituted by the city of Tallmadge, Ohio, petitioner Avenue Book Store was found to have been selling obscene material. The trial court concluded that the operation of the bookstore constituted a public nuisance as “a danger to the public morals and to the community welfare.” The rear portion of petitioner’s bookstore, where the obscene material had been displayed and sold, was ordered permanently closed.

On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld the injunction with some modifications. The injunction currently in effect provides:

“In abatement of the nuisance, defendant is enjoined from utilizing the rear section of the store for the exhibition, display or sale of materials which display or depict sexual conduct (activity) that is obscene as defined by R. C. 1907.01 and interpreted by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Burgun (1978), 56 Ohio St. 2d 354.” City of Tallmadge, Ohio v. Avenue Book Store, No. 10038 (Ohio App., Summit County, Oct. 28, 1981) (unreported); App. to Pet. for Cert. 47.

The Court of Appeals held that the injunction, as modified, did not constitute a prior restraint of protected communicative material in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments because “no punishment will be imposed until it is proven that obscene material was indeed involved.” Id., at 48. Assuming the injunction was a prior restraint, the court held it was not an unconstitutional one because it did not “carry with it any of the dangers of a censorship system” against which the First Amendment protects. Id., at 49. Petitioner challenges both aspects of this holding.

In Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U. S. 308 (1980), this Court upheld a finding that a Texas public nuisance statute authorized an unconstitutional “prior restraint of indefinite duration on the exhibition of motion pictures without a final judicial determination of obscenity and without any guarantee of prompt review of a preliminary finding of probable obscenity.” Id., at 309. Fatal to that statute were particular procedural infirmities of the Texas nuisance scheme whereby the subject of an abatement order or injunction “would be subject to contempt proceedings even if the film [was] ultimately found to be nonobscene.” Id., at 316.

The Court has never determined, however, whether abatement orders, such as the one involved in the present case, will pass constitutional muster when they permanently enjoin the use of a business premises for the sale or display of obscene material, but do not subject the owner to contempt sanctions unless there has been a judicial determination of obscenity. Various state courts have held that the exhibition, display, or sale of obscene material may not be enjoined unless there has been a prior judicial determination on the obscenity of the particular materials sought to be enjoined regardless of the procedural safeguards employed. See, e. g., People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 59, 550 P. 2d 600, 610 (exhibition or sale of magazines or films not specifically determined to be obscene may not be enjoined), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 922 (1976); State ex rel. Cahalan v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 59 Mich. App. 223, 242, 229 N. W. 2d 389, 398 (1975) (upholding one-year closure but rejecting permanent injunction on use of building for exhibition of lewd films — only films already adjudged obscene may be enjoined).

Other state courts have upheld such injunctions against a constitutional challenge. The present case is such a decision. See also State ex rel. Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N. C. 251, 250 S. E. 2d 603 (1979), vacated and remanded, 445 U. S. 947 (1980), reaffirmed, 302 N. C. 321, 330, 275 S. E. 2d 443, 449 (1981) (upholding injunction against sale or exhibition of obscene material because there is no possibility of punishment for sale or exhibition of nonobscene material); State ex rel. Kidwell v. U. S. Marketing, Inc., 102 Idaho 451, 458, 631 P. 2d 622, 629 (1981) (one-year closure of business premises is not an unconstitutional prior restraint), appeal dism’d by stipulation of parties, 455 U. S. 1009 (1982).

The extent to which States may use nuisance statutes and common-law nuisance actions to control obscenity and the nature of the procedural safeguards necessary to avoid constitutional problems are important unsettled questions which this Court should address. Accordingly, I dissent from the denial of certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-24.
    Federal Trade Commission v. Francis Ford, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White and Justice O’Connor would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-130.
    Lawrence et al. v. Bauer Publishing & Printing Ltd. et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.

Justice Rehnquist,

dissenting.

Because of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in this case, “[t]wo highly motivated senior citizens are left without redress for libelous publications holding them up to contempt and ridicule in the community in which they have lived for many years. This is the result of their sincere attempt to participate in local government.” 89 N. J. 451, 446 A. 2d 469 (1982) (Schreiber, J., dissenting). Because I think that the decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey was based on an erroneous belief that the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution required it, notwithstanding society’s “pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation,” Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U. S. 75, 86 (1966), I dissent from the denial of certiorari.

Petitioners, Lawrence and Simpson, were officers of a citizens group called Rahway Taxpayers Association. In 1974, the Association began a petition drive seeking a public referendum on plans to construct a new municipal firehouse. In late December 1974, petitions containing over 5,000 signatures were submitted to the Rahway City Clerk. On January 9, 1975, the Rahway News-Record, a newspaper owned and operated by respondents, printed the following headline across the top of its front page: “City Attorney rules association petitions improper; forgery charges may loom for Lawrence, Simpson.” The accompanying article stated in pertinent part:

“In separate actions city attorney Alan Karcher ruled the petitions filed by the officials of the Rahway Taxpayers Association are improper and attorney Theodore J. Romankow was asked to take action by city officials against association leaders because of ‘irregularities’ in the petitions.
“The Rahway News-Record learned Mr. Romankow was empowered to handle a case against Alonzo W. Lawrence, president of the Association, and James Simpson, the group’s secretary-treasurer.
“The case would be based on charges that forgery was involved in the gathering of approximately 5,000 signatures which the two men filed with the city clerk Robert W. Schrof on December 27, the News-Record was told.
“In connection with this the men would also be charged with false swearing of oaths and affidavits, it was asserted.” 89 N. J., at 456, 446 A. 2d, at 471.

In response to petitioners’ request that the News-Record retract these allegations, the newspaper ran a second front-page story on April 17, 1975. The headline read: “News-Record asked to retract article on firehouse battle.” Rather than give a retraction, the newspaper proceeded to reiterate and defend its earlier story claiming that the story was based on information provided by “a source in the [city] administration.” Id., at 456, 446 A. 2d, at 471.

Petitioners brought this libel action, alleging they had been defamed by both of the stories. The trial court ruled that Simpson was not a public figure and allowed his case to go to the jury without instructions on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), “actual malice.” The jury returned a verdict for Simpson in the amount of $22,500. The trial court ruled that Lawrence was a public figure, and in the first instance ruled that there was insufficient evidence for Lawrence to get to the jury on the New York Times “actual malice” issue. Subsequently, the trial court reversed itself on the latter finding and granted Lawrence’s motion for a new trial. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that both Simpson and Lawrence were “public figures” as defined by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974), and its progeny, and that “the evidence in the record is ‘constitutionally insufficient’ to present a jury question of actual malice.” 89 N. J., at 468, 446 A. 2d, at 478.

In reaching its conclusion that no jury question was presented, the New Jersey court set out the “actual malice” standard as defined by this Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, and succeeding cases. The court prefaced its discussion of the facts by saying: “In light of this stringent standard we have carefully examined the record below to determine whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to present a jury question as to actual malice. That examination reveals that there was insufficient evidence of actual malice toward either plaintiff.” 89 N. J., at 467, 469 A. 2d, at 477.

The court then proceeded to review the facts of the case de novo. The testimony indicated that the newspaper’s sole source for the first story was Joseph Hartnett, a recent appointee as City Business Administrator. Hartnett had no official duties in connection with the filing of the petitions. Hartnett testified that he had informed an editor and reporter for the News-Record that there was an investigation concerning some signatures on the petitions, but he maintained repeatedly that he had never linked petitioners with the investigation. Hartnett further stated that the forgery claims concerned such instances as a husband signing a petition for his wife or vice versa and that the false swearing claims concerned the formalities of the affidavits submitted by the persons circulating the petitions. The News-Record editor and reporter testified that the information given by Hartnett was identical to that printed in its news stories, i. e., that petitioners were under investigation for forgery and false swearing.

On the basis of its de novo review of these facts, the New Jersey court said:

“Here, defendants honestly believed that the concededly misleading statements published in the two articles were true. Their misconceptions arose primarily from their conversation with Hartnett in which he told them that the petitions were under investigation for possible evidence of false swearing and forgery. . . . Neither ‘errors of interpretation of judgment’ nor ‘misconceptions’ are sufficient to create a jury issue of actual malice under the New York Times standard. See Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U. S. 279, 290 [1971] .... There is not ‘clear and convincing’ evidence that defendants knew that the defamatory publications were false, or that they actually doubted their accuracy. [Citation omitted.] Rather, . . . defendants published a careless and perhaps irresponsible account of the information received concerning the scope of the City Attorney’s investigation. But the evidence in the record is ‘constitutionally insufficient’ to present a jury question of actual malice. See New York Times [Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S., at 288].” Id., at 467-468, 446 A. 2d, at 477-478.

My cursory examination of New Jersey precedents suggests to me that New Jersey follows the rule adhered to in almost all of the States with respect to the ruling of a trial court on a motion for directed verdict. “[T]he trial court cannot weigh the evidence but must accept as true all evidence which supports the view of the party against whom the motion is made and must give him the benefit of all legitimate inferences which are to be drawn therefrom in his favor.” Wilson v. Savino, 10 N. J. 11, 18, 89 A. 2d 399, 402-403 (1952). In reviewing a jury verdict on appeal, the New Jersey courts have held that “it is equally well settled that the court may not set aside a verdict merely because in its opinion the jury upon the evidence might well have found otherwise. The appellate tribunal cannot invade the constitutional office of the jury; it may not merely weigh the evidence where it is fairly susceptible of divergent inferences and substitute its own judgment for that of the jury.” Brendel v. Public Service Electric and Gas Co., 28 N. J. Super. 500, 511, 101 A. 2d 56, 61-62 (1953). It seems to me inescapable that the New Jersey Supreme Court in this case felt bound by some invisible radiations from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to reweigh for itself the credibility of interested witnesses who might have been wholly disbelieved by a jury. The above quotation from the New Jersey court’s opinion indicates that it felt required to credit the testimony of the defendant’s witnesses, all of whom were interested in the outcome of the lawsuit.

That there are no such “invisible radiations” from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is established by our decision in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111 (1979). There we said that “[t]he proof of ‘actual malice’ calls a defendant’s state of mind into question . . . and does not readily lend itself to summary disposition.” Id., at 120, n. 9. This view was stated another way in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727 (1968):

“The defendant in a defamation action . . . cannot, however, automatically insure a favorable verdict by testifying that he published with a belief that the statements were true. The finder of fact must determine whether the publication was indeed made in good faith.”

Id., at 732.

Although post-New York Times Co. v. Sullivan decisions from this Court therefore confirm the principle that the jury is to be the judge of the credibility of the witnesses in libel cases as in other lawsuits, it seems clear that the Supreme Court of New Jersey did not follow this principle. There were sharp conflicts in the testimony respecting crucial events in the lawsuit. Hartnett, the City Business Administrator, testified he did not tell the News-Record that petitioners were under investigation. If he is to be believed, then the News-Record, which asserted that Hartnett was their only source, had no basis for stating that petitioners were targets of such an investigation and implying that petitioners were guilty of forgery and false swearing. That the newspaper’s editor testified that he “believed” that the stories were true may give the jury additional basis for finding for the defendant, but his testimony does not require any such result as a matter of federal law. The jury as a matter of federal law is at liberty to totally disbelieve him, or to find that his belief was not reasonably justified. St. Amant v. Thompson, supra.

Repeated citations in the opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey to this Court’s decisions following New York Times Co. v. Sullivan satisfy me that the court is under the impression that as a matter of federal constitutional law it is required to reweigh testimony and reassess the credibility of witnesses in a trial for libel or slander. At the very least, we have jurisdiction on the basis set forth in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562, 568 (1977), and I would exercise that jurisdiction by granting the petition for certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-280.
    Sylvain v. Henderson, Executrix.
   Sup. Ct. N. H. Motion of petitioner for leave to add party as respondent denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-145.
    Smith v. Gonzales et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

dissenting.

The respondent police officer Lane went to the local District Attorney’s office with petitioner Smith’s minor daughter, who averred that she had had sexual relations with her father. After hearing her story, an Assistant District Attorney swore out an affidavit and procured an arrest warrant from a judge. Lane, acting pursuant to the warrant, then arrested Smith on incest charges. After being tried and acquitted of these charges, Smith filed a 42 U. S. C. §1983 damages action for deprivation of his constitutional rights, alleging, inter alia, that Lane’s involvement in his arrest was malicious, harassing, and in bad faith. After a trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Lane.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the claim relating to the incest charges never should have gone to trial, but rather should have been dismissed. Assuming, arguendo, that Lane had, as alleged, acted maliciously by withholding evidence of Smith’s innocence from the Assistant District Attorney who obtained the arrest warrant, the court found that the officer was nevertheless insulated from § 1983 liability, because “if the facts supporting an arrest are put before an intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermediary’s decision to issue a warrant or return an indictment breaks the causal chain . . . .” 670 F. 2d 522, 526 (CA5 1982).

The Fifth Circuit thus held that an officer cannot be liable even if, by wrongful means, he taints the independent judgment of the grand jury, magistrate, prosecutor, or other intermediary. This holding appears to conflict with statements of the courts in Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F. 2d 261 (CA9 1981), cert. denied, ante, p. 829; Ames v. United States, 600 F. 2d 183 (CA8 1979); and Dellums v. Powell, 184 U. S. App. D. C. 275, 566 F. 2d 167 (1977), cert. denied, 438 U. S. 916 (1978). The Ninth Circuit determined in Smiddy that an intermediary’s independent decision breaks the causal chain and insulates the arresting officer from future liability if, but only if, the officer does not color the intermediary’s independent judgment by, for example, exerting pressure or presenting false evidence. 665 F. 2d, at 266-267. The District of Columbia Circuit indicated in Dellums that pressure, undue influence, or knowing misstatements by the police could rebut the presumption of independent judgment by United States Attorneys and extend the “chain of causation.” 184 U. S. App. D. C., at 300-301, 566 F. 2d, at 192-193. Likewise, the Eighth Circuit in Ames stated that “the presentation of false evidence or the withholding of evidence” might preclude an immunization of officers from tort liability. 600 F. 2d, at 185. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 653 (1977); W. Prosser, Law of Torts 836-837 (4th ed. 1971).

The differing approaches to the causation problem are typified by three contrasting opinions in Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 556 F. 2d 1185 (CA5 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1047 (1978), which the court below in the present case purported to follow. The six plurality judges in Rodriguez reasoned that the defendant officers could not be liable for a wrongful arrest because an indictment by a properly constituted grand jury “conclusively” determined the existence of probable cause. 556 F. 2d, at 1191 (opinion of Tjoflat, J.). Two specially concurring judges indicated that the plurality’s rule might not be applicable should an officer “maliciously or in bad faith seek to obtain an indictment from a grand jury.” Id., at 1195 (opinion of Hill, J.). Six dissenting judges felt that even an officer acting in subjective good faith in procuring an indictment could still be liable if his conduct was not within the “‘bounds of reason.’” Id., at 1207 (opinion of Goldberg, J.) (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 321 (1975)).

Section 1983 actions for wrongful arrest and prosecution are frequently brought against police officers. The causation issue will be important, if not dispositive, in many of these cases. I would grant certiorari to resolve this significant, recurring question that has divided the lower courts.

       Smith’s complaint also alleged that unconstitutional conduct of Lane caused him to be damaged in a number of other ways that I need not detail here.

       In his brief in opposition to certiorari, Lane argues at length that there was no evidence that he withheld any evidence or acted improperly in any manner. I do not reach this question. Had the Fifth Circuit rested its holding on this basis, this would be a different ease. But the court did not do so; it was willing to at least assume that there was sufficient evidence that Lane’s actions were wrongful.


text:
    No. 82-277.
    No. 82-362.
    Schwimmer, dba Supersonic Electronics Co. v. Sony Corporation of America; and Venture Technology, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied. Reported below: No. 82-277, 677 F. 2d 946; No. 82-362, 685 F. 2d 41.

Justice White,

dissenting.

The Court’s refusal to review these cases is doubly inexplicable: they pose two substantial issues on which the lower courts are divided.

In both cases, juries found that respondents had conspired to impose a restraint of trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1. In Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of America, 677 F. 2d 946 (CA2 1982), it was alleged that Sony, in conspiracy with certain retailers, terminated Schwimmer’s dealership because it had sold Sony products to other dealers at lower than normal prices. In Venture Technology, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 685 F. 2d 41 (CA2 1982), the complaint was that respondent National Fuel Gas had conspired to prevent Venture Technology from entering the western New York gas production business. There was no direct evidence of conspiracy in either case; rather, the petitioners’ cases were based on the respondents refusal to deal with petitioners after receiving complaints from other companies.

On appeal, different panels of the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to permit a jury to find that respondents had conspired. Relying on an earlier Second Circuit decision, H. L. Moore Drug Exchange v. Eli Lilly & Co., 662 F. 2d 935, 941 (1981), cert. denied, ante, p. 880, both panels stated that “[e]ven where a termination follows the receipt of complaints from wholesalers or agents, there is no basis for inferring the existence of concerted action, absent some other evidence of a tacit understanding or agreement with them.” Schwimmer, supra, at 953; Venture Technology, supra, at 45. This view of the evidence necessary to create a jury question under the Sherman Act is shared by the Third Circuit. Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F. 2d 105 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U. S. 911 (1981). The Seventh and the Eight Circuits, however, clearly reject this position. Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F. 2d 1226, 1238-1239 (CA7 1982); Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 673 F. 2d 984 (CA8 1982). Because illegal conspiracies can rarely be proved through evidence of explicit agreement, but must usually be established through inferences from the conduct of the alleged conspirators, this disagreement in the Circuits over the nature of proof required is especially significant.

This first conflict is parlayed by a second concerning the portion of the evidence a court is to consider in ruling upon a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. These cases indicate that it is the Second Circuit’s practice to examine all of the evidence in a manner most favorable to the non-moving party. This is also the position of at least the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F. 2d 365, 374-375 (CA5 1969); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F. 2d 271, 281-282 (CA7 1981). In the Eighth Circuit, however, it appears that only evidence which supports the verdict winner is to be considered. Simpson v. Skelly Oil Co., 371 F. 2d 563 (1967). The First and Third Circuits follow a middle ground: the reviewing court may consider un-contradicted, unimpeached evidence from disinterested witnesses. Layne v. Vinzant, 657 F. 2d 468, 472 (CA1 1981); Inventive Music Ltd. v. Cohen, 617 F. 2d 29, 33 (CA3 1980). Thus, the Federal Courts of Appeals follow three different approaches to determining whether evidence is sufficient to create a jury issue. See 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §2529, p. 572 (1971). Because the scope of review will often be influential, if not dispositive, of a motion for judgment n.o.v., this disagreement among the Federal Courts of Appeals is of far more than academic interest.

For both these reasons, I would grant the petitions for certiorari.

       The opinion for the Seventh Circuit in Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F. 2d, at 1238-1289, makes the conflict unmistakable:
      “We believe . . . that proof of termination following competitor complaints is sufficient to support an inference of concerted action. In Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 673 F. 2d 984 (8th Cir. 1982), the Eighth Circuit declined to follow Sweeney and held that ‘proof of a dealer’s complaints to the manufacturer about a competitor dealer’s price cutting and the manufacturer’s action in response to such complaints would be sufficient to raise an inference of concerted action.’ Id., at 991 (emphasis in original). We agree” (footnote omitted).

       In Schwimmer, the court noted: “ ‘If, however, after viewing all the evidence most favorably to plaintiff, we cannot say that the jury could reasonably have returned the verdict in his favor, our duty is to reverse the judgment below.’” 677 F. 2d, at 952, quoting H. L. Moore Drug Exchange v. Eli Lilly & Co., 662 F. 2d 935, 941 (CA2 1981) (emphasis added), cert. denied, ante, p. 880.


text:
    No. 82-365.
    Love, Warden, et al. v. Stacy.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-396.
    Twin City Sportservice, Inc., et al. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 82-444.
    Greitzer & Locks et al. v. Johns-Manville Corp. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondents to defer consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and this petition.


text:
    No. 82-453.
    Francis Oil & Gas, Inc., et al. v. Exxon Corp. et al.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Motions of Independent Petroleum Association of America et al. and Texas Independent Producers Legal Action Association et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5053.
    McCallum v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 82-5315.
    John BB et al. v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.

Justice White would grant cer-tiorari.


text:
    No. 81-2392.
    No. 81-6766.
    No. 81-6836.
    No. 81-6854.
    No. 81-6931.
    Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Saucedo, Sudranski v. Veterans Administration, Wade v. United States, Davis v. Georgia, Boles v. Guilford Technical Institute,
   ante, p. 839;

ante, p. 845;

ante, p. 848;

ante, p. 891; and

ante, p. 852. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 81-6979.
    No. 82-318.
    No. 82-5006.
    No. 82-5076.
    No. 82-5166.
    No. 82-5326.
    Shapiro v. United States Veterans Administration, Stroom v. Carter, Borrelli v. Cuyler et al., Borrelli v. Ciccitto et al., In re Hoover, In re Barney,
   ante, p. 855;

ante, p. 866;

ante, p. 866;

ante, p. 870;

ante, p. 818; and

ante, p. 818. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    November 15, 1982
    No. 82-149.
    Black Construction Corp. v. Agsalud, Director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations of Hawaii, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Haw. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-482.
    Hamilton et al. v. Virginia.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Va. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-5433.
    Cavanaugh, dba Tot College v. Colorado Department of Social Services.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Colo, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-519.
    Counihan, Temporary Administrator, et al. v. Department of Transportation of Georgia et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ga. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Justice Blackmun and Justice O’Connor would dismiss the appeal for want of a properly presented federal question.


text:
    No. 82-592.
    Foulds v. Pennsylvania.
   Appeal from Super. Ct. Pa. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1055.
    Poythress, Secretary of State of Georgia, et al. v. Duncan et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. [Cer-tiorari granted, 455 U. S. 937.] Writ of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted.


text:
    No. A-392.
    Albano et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Brennan and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-402 (82-711).
    Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority.
   Sp. Ct. R. R. R. A. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Brennan and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 8,
    Orig.
    Arizona v. California et al.
   Motion of Quechan Tribe for modification of the order granting divided argument denied.

Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.

[For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 940.]


text:
    No. 81-89.
    Zant, Warden v. Stephens.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 454 U. S. 814; question certified, 456 U. S. 410.] The parties are invited to file within 30 days supplemental memoranda addressing the opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia, Case No. 38763, decided October 27, 1982 [250 Ga. 97, 297 S. E. 2d 1], and its effect on the case pending before this Court.


text:
    No. 81-1114.
    Illinois v. Abbott & Associates, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 455 U. S. 1015.] Motion of respondents for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 81-1284.
    Eicke v. Eicke.
   Ct. App. La., 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 456 U. S. 970.] Motion of Martin S. Sanders, Jr., Esquire, to permit Martin S. Sanders III, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hac vice on behalf of respondent granted.


text:
    No. 81-1476.
    United States v. Rodgers et al.; and United States v. Ingram et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certio-rari granted, 456 U. S. 904.] Motion of respondents for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 81-1756.
    Lehr v. Robertson et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 456 U. S. 970.] Motion of New York for leave to file an out-of-time motion for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 81-2150.
    Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 458 U. S. 1120.] Motions of American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. and Carpenters Trust Funds of Southern California et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 81-2169.
    Haring, Lieutenant, Arlington County Police Department, et al. v. Prosise.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 904.] Motion of respondent for leave to proceed further herein informa paupe-ris granted.


text:
    No. 81-2245.
    No. 81-2276.
    No. 82-38.
    Nevada v. United States et al.; Truckee-Carson Irrigation District v. United States et al.; and Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation District et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 904.] Motion of petitioners for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 82-791.
    Teachers Insurance & Annuity Assn. et al. v. Spirt et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of petitioners to expedite consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5612.
    No. 82-5616.
    In re Seitu; and In re Johnson.
   Petitions for writs of ha-beas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 82-276.
    Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-331.
    New Mexico et al. v. Mescalero Apache Tribe.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-502.
    Pallas Shipping Agency, Ltd. v. Duris.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-168.
    National Labor Relations Board v. Transportation Management Corp.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of Council on Labor Law Equality for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 81-2152.
    Wasserman et al. v. Wasserman.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2324.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6820.
    Borcherding v. United States et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6844.
    DeSantis v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6870.
    Chaka v. Morris et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6875.
    Fasick v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6883.
    Morales v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6905.
    Robinson v. Shea et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6955.
    MacDonald v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6983.
    Quick v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6994.
    Cotton v. Mabry, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-47.
    Gambrel v. Kentucky Board of Dentistry.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-101.
    Travelers Indemnity Co. et al. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-148.
    James Snyder Co., Inc., et al. v. Associated General Contractors of America et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-157.
    Smith v. Olson, Registrar of Voters, Orange County, California, et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-179.
    Sacchinelli v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-183.
    United States v. Doe.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-186.
    Shahid v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-263.
    Boulahanis et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-289.
    Green v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-322.
    No. 82-329.
    Romano v. United States; and Romano v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 684 F. 2d 1057.


text:
    No. 82-392.
    Monex International, Ltd., et al. v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-450.
    Cramer v. Fahner, Attorney General of Illinois.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-473.
    Symanowicz v. Army and Air Force Exchange Service et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-476.
    Sausalito Pharmacy, Inc. v. Blue Shield of California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-477.
    Herzog v. Dayton Bar Assn. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-491.
    United States. v. RSR Corp.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-496.
    Coffey v. Department of Social and Health Services of Washington.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-503.
    Shaver v. Hunter et al.
   Ct. App. Tex., 7th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-504.
    Armijo, Personal Representative of the Estate of Armijo v. Tandysh.
   Ct. App. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-507.
    Evra Corp., Formerly Hyman-Michaels Co. v. Swiss Bank Corp.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-509.
    Bankston v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 5th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-511.
    Dragan et al. v. Miller et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-513.
    Reichel v. Shasta County, California, Superior Court Judges et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-518.
    Ackerman, Superintendent, Fort Wayne State Hospital and Training Center v. DeLesstine.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-529.
    Murillo v. Bambrick, Clerk of the Superior Court of New Jersey.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-531.
    Morgan Walton Properties, Inc., et al. v. International City Bank & Trust Co. et al.; and Morgan et ux. v. International City Bank & Trust Co. et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 675 F. 2d 666 (first case); 675 F. 2d 669 (second case).


text:
    No. 82-534.
    Morrell v. Duke University, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-548.
    Dusanek v. O’Donnell et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-609.
    Sedco International, S.A., et al. v. Cory et al., Executors of the Estate of Carver.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-625.
    Dean v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-634.
    Curtis v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-644.
    Gray v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-657.
    Franco-Gomez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-671.
    Oggoian v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-679.
    Cavale v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5024.
    Morgan v. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offender Rehabilitation of Florida, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5087.
    Cerkoney v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5094.
    Ricks v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5098.
    Kleinbart v. Superior Court for the District of Columbia et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5116.
    McCaskill v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5136.
    McCoy v. Bordenkircher.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5157.
    Ransom v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5196.
    Rochkind v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5200.
    Harden v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5203.
    Jones v. Bartle et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5236.
    West v. Jones, Superintendent, Great Meadows Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5238.
    Mosley v. Rose, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5239.
    Mancuso v. Harris, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5251.
    Hollenbeck v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5253.
    Eichelberger v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5286.
    Wilson v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5302.
    Picciotti v. Court of Appeals of New York.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5392.
    McCroskey v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5431.
    Davis v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5438.
    Reiter v. Harding et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5441.
    Laracuente-Matos v. Puerto Rico Department of Labor and Human Resources et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5446.
    Hohman v. Prince William County, Virginia, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5450.
    Rose v. Abshire.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5452.
    Emmons v. Wyrick.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5453.
    Prince v. Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5454.
    Moawad v. Tallahatchie County Circuit Court.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5457.
    Kordower v. Borodinsky.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5458.
    Harvey v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5461.
    Barboza v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5462.
    Knee v. Wyrick, Warden, Missouri State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5471.
    Spear v. Roberts.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5480.
    Gruzen v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5487.
    Mills v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5496.
    Alonzo v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5506.
    Cooper v. Rees, Superintendent, Kentucky State Reformatory.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5517.
    Truesdale v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5520.
    Erman v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5533.
    Young v. United States Parole Commission et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5555.
    Nearis v. Massachusetts.
   Ct. App. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5588.
    Black et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5591.
    Singleterry v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5592.
    Poland v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5601.
    Fillipponio v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2344.
    A v. X et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan, Justice White, and Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-184.
    L. B. B. Corp. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 82-228.
    Barrett et al. v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant the petition for writ of certio-rari and reverse the convictions.


text:
    No. 82-501.
    Euster et al. v. Pennsylvania Horse Racing Commission et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of Jockeys’ Guild, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.