text:
    No. 95,
    Orig.
    Arkansas v. Oklahoma.
   Motion of Pennsylvania for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae out of time is granted. Motion for leave to file bill of complaint denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 97,
    Orig.
    Louisiana v. Western Reserve Historical Society.
   Motion for leave to file bill of complaint denied.


text:
    No. 82-1295.
    Escambia County, Florida, et al. v. McMillan et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 460 U. S. 1080.] Motion of appellants Kenneth J. Kelson et al. for leave to file response to supplemental brief of appellees denied.


text:
    No. 82-1349.
    No. 82-1350.
    United States v. S. A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines) et al.; and United States v. United Scottish Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 461 U. S. 925.] Motion of respondent S. A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense for leave to file supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 82-1721.
    Seattle Times Co., dba The Seattle Times, et al. v. Rhinehart et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. [Certiorari granted, 464 U. S. 812.] Motion of respondent Keith Milton Rhinehart to present oral argument pro se and for divided argument denied. Motion of Malcolm L. Edwards, Esquire, to permit Haim Habib, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hac vice on behalf of respondents denied.


text:
    No. 82-1795.
    Capital Cities Cable, Inc., et al. v. Crisp, Director, Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 464 U. S. 818.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. Motion of the Solicitor General to permit Michael W. McConnell, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hac vice on behalf of the Federal Communications Commission as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 83-218.
    Reed et al. v. Ross.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certio-rari granted, 464 U. S. 1007.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 83-271.
    National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 464 U. S. 913.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 83-226.
    Arizona v. Rumsey.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. [Certio-rari granted, 464 U. S. 1038.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that James R. Rummage, Esquire, of Phoenix, Ariz., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 83-904.
    Ohio v. Johnson.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1004.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Albert L. Purola, Esquire, of Wil-loughby, Ohio, be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 83-461.
    Club Mediterranee, S. A. v. Dorin et al.
   Appeal from App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 83-558.
    Irving Independent School District v. Tatro et ux., Individually, and as Next Friends of Tatro, a Minor.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 464 U. S. 1007.] Motion of American Association of School Administrators for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae, for divided argument, and for additional time for oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 83-751.
    Securities and Exchange Commission et al. v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 464 U. S. 1038.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 83-498.
    No. 83-573.
    Brown, Director, Department of Law and Public Safety, Division of Gaming Enforcement, State of New Jersey, et al. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International Union Local 54 et al.; and Danziger, Acting Chairman, Casino Control Commission of New Jersey, et al. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International Union Local 54 et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 464 U. S. 990.] Motion of National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 83-838.
    United States v. Lorenzetti.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 464 U. S. 1068.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 83-892. No. 83-1015.
    California State Department of Education et al. v. Los Angeles Branch, NAACP, et al. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People et al. v. Hampton County Election Commission et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir.; and

Appeal from D. C. S. C. The Solicitor General is invited to file briefs in these cases expressing the views of the United States.

Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these orders.


text:
    No. 83-5725.
    Sweetman v. Township of Pennsauken, New Jersey,
   464 U. S. 1036. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed informa pauperis denied.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 83-5913.
    Etlin et al. v. Horan, Commonwealth’s Attorney.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until March 13, 1984, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

For the reasons expressed in Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U. S. 928 (1983), we would deny the petition for certiorari in this case without reaching the merits of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.


text:
    No. 83-5917.
    In re Meeks.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 83-760.
    In re Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., et al.
   Petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 83-469.
    United States v. Young.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-832.
    Paulsen et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-727.
    Alexander, Governor of Tennessee, et al. v. Jennings et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent Rosier Jennings for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certio-rari granted.


text:
    No. 83-478.
    Shaffer v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-552.
    Nabors v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-568.
    Offices Known as 50 State Distributing Co., Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-608.
    Hospital de la Concepcion v. Puerto Rico Labor Relations Board.
   Sup. Ct. P. R. Certiorari denied, Reported below:-P. R. R.-.


text:
    No. 83-631.
    Spacefone Corp. v. Johnston.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-632.
    Mondelli v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-643.
    Adams et al. v. Bell, Secretary of Education, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-673.
    Wisdom v. Pierce, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-679.
    Paul et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-683.
    Bankston v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-696.
    No. 83-713.
    Marino v. United States; and Piccarreto v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717 F. 2d 27.


text:
    No. 83-699.
    American Industries, Ltd., et al. v. Intermodal Cargo Services, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-707.
    Todd et al. v. Benal Concrete Construction Co., Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-714.
    City of Duncanville, Texas v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-740.
    Del-AWARE Unlimited, Inc., et al. v. Baldwin, District Engineer, United States Corps of Engineers, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-763.
    St. Francis Hospital Center et al. v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.
   3. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-766.
    Smith-Corona Group, Consumer Products Division, SCM Corp. v. United States et al.
   C. A. Fed. Dir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-769.
    Belmont et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Dir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-774.
    Sarian v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-;iorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-790.
    Southern States Motor Inns, Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-793.
    Hughes v. Hoffman, Superintendent, Missouri State Highway Patrol.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-796.
    Halloran v. Display Corporation International et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-797.
    Memorial Hospital et al. v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-809.
    Hinkie et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-810.
    Yorke, Trustee in Bankruptcy v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-826.
    Hamed & Salem, Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-831.
    Stuebig, by his Guardian, Heckmann v. Willis et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-841.
    Billingsley v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-844.
    Cherubini v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-849.
    Hyatt Hotels Corp., dba Hyatt Regency New Orleans v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-875.
    Schaab v. Schaab et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-876.
    Freire et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-881.
    Sho-Me Power Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union 53, AFL-CIO.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-889.
    No. 83-955.
    Bunnan Tong & Co., Ltd. v. F. W. Woolworth Co. et al.; and United Garment Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. Nelson, a Minor, by Carson, Guardian ad Litem, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-905.
    Staines v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 14th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-907.
    Rizzuto v. Rizzuto.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-914.
    Merican, Inc., et al. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-919.
    Pitchford v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-921.
    Commonwealth National Bank v. Ashe et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-922.
    Rosenwald v. Barbieri, Court Administrator of Pennsylvania, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-924.
    Galanti v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-926.
    Kleiboemer et al. v. District of Columbia.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-936.
    Hawes et al. v. Abarca et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-938.
    Watson v. M. W. Kellogg Co.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-944.
    Pieri v. South Central Bell Telephone Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-945.
    Union Oil Company of California v. Dillingham Tug & Barge Corp. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-947.
    Vance v. Utah.
   Sup. Ct. Utah. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-950.
    Moss v. Newman.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-951.
    Percy et al. v. Buckhanon et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-952.
    United States v. Wilson et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-953.
    Rock v. Antonio.
   Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-959.
    Hougland et al. v. Gross, as Receiver for Hougland Barge Line, Inc.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-965.
    Cloward v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-968.
    Storniolo v. Gina Karen Fishing, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-969.
    Lubin v. Crittenden Hospital Assn. et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-980.
    Redding et al. v. Fairman et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-983.
    Tako et ux. v. Mayer & Cie et al.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-992.
    Detroit Health Corp. et al. v. Bence et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-993.
    Impro Products, Inc. v. Herrick et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-996.
    Bier v. Fleming et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1002.
    Solem, Warden v. Nerison.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1003.
    Percy, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services v. Daubert et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1004.
    Toshiba America, Inc. v. Copy-Data Systems, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1008.
    Pennsylvania Dental Assn. v. Cutler.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1009.
    North Canton Enterprises of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review of Allegheny County, et al.
   Pa. Commw. Ct. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1016.
    Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Kalman.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1017.
    Bohrer v. Hanes Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1018.
    Esposito et al. v. Mister Softee, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1019.
    Wied v. Valhi, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1025.
    Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. et al. v. Heffelfinger, Administratrix of the Estate of Heffelfinger, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1026.
    Linde, Thomson, Fairchild, Langworthy, Kohn & Van Dyke et al. v. T. J. Raney & Sons, Inc.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1028.
    McNeil v. Rafton et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1033.
    Satellite Television & Associated Resources, Inc. v. Continental Cablevision of Virginia, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1034.
    Brain et al. v. Roadway Express, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1036.
    Weisz v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1042.
    Woo v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1043.
    Burns v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1044.
    Winicki v. Mallard et al.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1048.
    Armando De La Cerra v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1049.
    Harari et al. v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1050.
    Emrich et al. v. Touche Ross & Co. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1051.
    Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church v. Presbytery of Baltimore of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America et al.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1052.
    Phillips v. Smith, Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1058.
    Hall v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1059.
    Langen v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1060.
    Lawther v. Jacobs Manufacturing Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1062.
    Bagley et al. v. Collins et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1063.
    Brumley Estate et al. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1064.
    Blackwell v. Municipal Court of California, Los Angeles County, Malibu Judicial District, et al.
   App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1071.
    McGinty et al. v. Smith, District Attorney of San Francisco, California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1078.
    Jeffboat, Inc. v. Robertson, Administrator of the Estate of Robertson.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1079.
    Travers v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1083.
    Swepeniser v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1088.
    Nichols v. Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1095.
    Taylor v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1099.
    Arrington v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1101.
    Niles v. University Interscholastic League et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1103.
    American Commercial Barge Lines et al. v. Berry.
   App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1108.
    St. Clair v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1110.
    Ruple v. City of Vermillion, South Dakota, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1112.
    Murillo v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1113.
    Wilson v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1114.
    King v. Fidelity National Bank of Baton Rouge.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1120.
    Scarselletti v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1133.
    Behar v. Southeast Bank Trust Co., N. A., Personal Representative of the Estate of Behar.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1137.
    Cordell v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1147.
    Radseck v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1165.
    Capitol City Lumber Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1177.
    Cohen v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5193.
    Foundas v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5293.
    Robinson v. Chapman et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5335.
    Rabb v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5349.
    Miller v. Pierce, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5385.
    Mathis v. United States; and Foster v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 F. 2d 669 (first case); 720 F. 2d 668 (second case).


text:
    No. 83-5483.
    Beale v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5512.
    Wilson v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5560.
    No. 83-5613.
    No. 83-5650.
    Ware v. United States; McGuire v. United States; and Arabia v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 F. 2d 810.


text:
    No. 83-5563.
    Dennis v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5586.
    Holt v. Continental Group, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5606.
    Ford v. Davis, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5609.
    Crowe v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5611.
    Windsor v. The Tennessean et al.
   Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5615.
    McAlpin v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5629.
    No. 83-5657.
    Johnson v. United States; and Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713 F. 2d 654.


text:
    No. 83-5630.
    Bruzzese v. New Jersey.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5655.
    Loftis v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5679.
    Hornick v. Noyes et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5680.
    Granger v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5699.
    Gregorio v. United States Parole Commission.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5706.
    Curra-Barona et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5713.
    Christensen v. Spalding.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5723.
    Garaux v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5728.
    Raheem v. Henderson, Superintendent, Auburn Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5764.
    Fleming v. Staller et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5829.
    Walker v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5837.
    Perez-Robles v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5841.
    Clark v. Coombe, Superintendent, Eastern Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5851.
    Kettler v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5871.
    Dunn v. Maggio, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5872.
    Gates v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5877.
    Weichell v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5879.
    Williams-El v. Young, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5881.
    Baggett v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5883.
    Keenan v. Elo et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5884.
    Hines v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5885.
    Carroll v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5890.
    Wells v. McKaskle, Acting Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5893.
    Rushing v. Stocker et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5895.
    Webb v. Perini, Superintendent, Marion Correctional Institution.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5898.
    Woodruff v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5900.
    Hinton v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5906.
    Hollin v. Sowders, Superintendent, Kentucky State Reformatory.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5910.
    Caylor v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5916.
    Price et al. v. Cohen, Secretary of Public Welfare of Pennsylvania, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5918.
    Poppos v. Young et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5921.
    Downing v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Tuscarawas County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5927.
    Powell v. Mitchell et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5929.
    Reed v. Marshall, Superintendent, Southern Ohio Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5931.
    Jones v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5935.
    Bryant v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5936.
    Doe et al. v. Staples, Director of the Hamilton County Welfare Department, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5944.
    Oliver v. Pennsylvania et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5946.
    Redding v. Fairman et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5947.
    Miller v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5949.
    Sanders v. Israel, Superintendent, Waupun Correctional Institution.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5952.
    Lopez v. Scully, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5959.
    Fahey v. Codo et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5960.
    Foreman v. Ricketts, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5964.
    Schlicher v. Roche et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5968.
    Greene v. Greene.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5969.
    Jackson v. Maggio, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5970.
    Hendrix v. Duckworth, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5975.
    Senti v. Sharma et al.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5976.
    Perkins v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5978.
    Smith v. Cameron.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5979.
    Sims v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5983.
    Rice v. Marshall, Superintendent, Southern Ohio Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5984.
    Wilson v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5986.
    Hornsby et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5988.
    Ciuzio v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5989.
    Kennedy v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5990.
    Bori v. Trustees of Columbia University.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5991.
    Croxton v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5993.
    Williams v. Maggio, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5994.
    Williams v. Williams, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5996.
    Tomay-Ybly v. Zurich-American Insurance Cos.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5997.
    Olsen v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5998.
    Mally v. New York University et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6000.
    Patterson v. McKaskle, Acting Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6002.
    Gibbs v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6003.
    Evans v. Grannis et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6004.
    Davis et al. v. Central Intelligence Agency et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6006.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6007.
    Halpin v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6008.
    Carson v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6012.
    Gonzales v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 2d Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6013.
    Lucero v. Ogden et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6018.
    White v. Toppitzer.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6019.
    Mirrione v. Anderson et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6022.
    Mitchell v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6023.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6025.
    Underwood v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6031.
    Hollis v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6033.
    Tugman et al. v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6038.
    Richardson v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6039.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6046.
    Janoe v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6047.
    Payne et al. v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6052.
    Price et al. v. Washington State Game Department.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6060.
    Cox v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6062.
    Bridges v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6064.
    Jones v. Metz et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6065.
    Killingsworth v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6067.
    Garrett v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6068.
    Everett v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6069.
    Kele v. Carlson, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6071.
    Moya v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6072.
    Manning v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6074.
    Sedlak v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6078.
    Stewart v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6081.
    Baker v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6082.
    Gonzalez v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6088.
    Christensen v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6089.
    Gipson v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6094.
    Matasa v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6095.
    Ely v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6103.
    MacKenzie v. Pennsylvania.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6104.
    Thompson v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6105.
    Carney v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6108.
    Yates v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6110.
    Rogers et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6112.
    Dudley v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6126.
    Samuelson v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6133.
    Bryan v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6146.
    Washington v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6153.
    Forsberg v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2363.
    Pennhurst State School and Hospital et al. v. Halderman et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of respondents Terri L. Halderman et al. for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1876.
    Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Black-mun would grant certiorari on the Robinson-Patman Act issues.


text:
    No. 83-466.
    Russo v. Mitchell et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 83-511.
    Continental Group, Inc. v. Holt.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice White,

text:
    No. 83-723.
    Union Processing Corp. v. Atkin et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Powell join,

dissenting.

Petitioner, Union Processing Corp. (Union), operates a scrap-metal business in Auburn, N. Y. Respondents, Morris, Sol, and Samuel Atkin (Atkins), are in the same business in Rochester. Both Union and Atkins purchase and process scrap metal and then sell the processed metal to steel mills and foundries. In 1974, Union and Atkins independently decided to establish metal-shredding operations in Rochester. Steel mills prefer shredded metal because shredding allows the separation of ferrous and nonferrous scrap, yielding a cleaner grade of scrap. When Union learned that Atkins had entered into a purchase contract for a shredder, it initiated negotiations to ensure that there would be only one shredding operation in Rochester. The parties agreed that there were not enough raw materials in the area to support two shredding operations. Ultimately, they agreed that Atkins would assign the purchase contract to Union in return for 2% of Union’s gross sales for the next seven years. Within two years, Union ceased making payments under the contract.

Atkins brought suit in October 1978 for payments due under the contract. Union argued that the contract was unenforceable because part of the consideration for the contract consisted of an oral promise by Atkins not to operate a shredder in the Rochester area. Such an agreement, Union contended, violates §1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1.

The trial court found that the oral agreement not to compete was indeed a part of the contract. It concluded that since the agreement constituted a horizontal division of territories, it was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.

On appeal, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court rejected Union’s contention that since the contract constituted a horizontal division of markets it was per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act. 90 App. Div. 2d 332, 457 N. Y. S. 2d 152 (1982). The court reasoned that the rule of per se illegality is applicable only if the entire geographic market is divided. It found that the relevant geographic market in this case consisted of the entire area in which steel mills purchase the end product produced by the shredder. Because only the Rochester area was allocated, the court concluded that a rule-of-reason analysis was appropriate. Using that analysis, the court found the impact of the agreement on competition to be minimal because Atkins could operate a shredder anywhere in the relevant geographic market outside of Rochester.

In a one-paragraph memorandum, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. 59 N. Y. 2d 919, 453 N. E. 2d 522 (1983). Apparently it realized that the market that was divided was the market in which raw materials were purchased, rather than the market in which shredded scrap was sold, for it stated: “Additionally we observe that there is no evidentiary support in the record for any finding that the scrap metals/raw materials market (as distinguished from the shredded scrap/products market) was limited to the Rochester area to which the agreement of the parties related.” Id., at 921, 453 N. E. 2d, at 523.

Union then petitioned for a writ of certiorari from this Court, arguing that the state courts misconceived the meaning of our opinions dealing with horizontal division of markets. Such market divisions, Union correctly argues, have consistently been deemed per se illegal.

Our cases make clear the error of the New York courts. As we said in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596, 608 (1972): “One of the classic examples of a per se violation of § 1 is an agreement between competitors at the same level of the market structure to allocate territories in order to minimize competition.” We have time and again “rejected the notion that naked restraints of trade are to be tolerated because they are well intended or because they are allegedly developed to increase competition.” Id., at 610.

Under the view of the courts below, the per se rule is not to be applied to cases involving horizontal division of markets so long as the parties leave some residual zone in which they still compete; that is, the rule does not govern cases in which the entire market is not allocated. Apparently, if two companies in some national market agreed that one would not compete in New York and the other would not compete in California, the per se rule would not apply if they continued to compete in the other 48 States. Not surprisingly, the courts cited no decision of this Court in support of that position.

I assume that the Court has denied this petition because it has “bigger fish to fry,” rather than because it views the decision below as correct. However, because a substantial federal question has been decided in a manner that apparently conflicts with the applicable decisions of this Court, I would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari. Indeed, the decision is a candidate for summary reversal.


text:
    No. 83-767.
    El Paso Times, Inc., et al. v. United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan would grant cer-tiorari.


text:
    No. 83-789.
    Adams et al. v. Proctor & Gamble Manufacturing Co.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


author: Justice Stevens, Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    No. 83-791.
    Texas v. Mead.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens,

respecting the denial of certiorari.

The question that Justice Rehnquist now believes merits review—the proper standard of review concerning a Witherspoon ruling—was extensively analyzed by the Court of Appeals and presented in the petition for certiorari in O’Bryan v. Estelle, 714 F. 2d 365 (CA5 1983), cert. denied sub nom. O’Bryan v. McKaskle, ante, p. 1013. That question is not, however, presented by the State of Texas in its certiorari petition in this case. Since the question Justice Rehnquist has discussed at such length “was neither presented to the [Texas] cour[t] nor presented to this Court in the petition for certiorari,” Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 120 (1982) (Burger, C. J., joined by White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting), and since Justice Rehnquist, by not discussing the question that is presented, apparently agrees that it does not merit review, see, e. g., United States v. Johnston, 268 U. S. 220, 227 (1925) (“We do not grant a certiorari to review evidence and discuss specific facts”); see also Torres-Valencia v. United States, 464 U. S. 44 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), I simply note that the Court’s decision to deny the petition for a writ of certiorari in this case is demonstrably consistent with the principles which inform our exercise of certiorari jurisdiction.

Justice Rehnquist,

with whom The Chief Justice, and Justice O’Connor join,

dissenting.

Respondent Mead was convicted by a jury of the capital offense of murdering a police officer acting in the line of duty. He was sentenced to death. On appeal, Mead argued that some veniremen were improperly excluded from the jury because of their opposition to the death penalty. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (1968). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, with four judges dissenting, conducted a de novo review of the voir dire examination of one of the excluded veniremen and agreed with respondent. 645 S. W. 2d 279 (1983) (en banc). The court gave no deference to the judgment of the trial court that the juror was unalterably opposed to the death penalty and would purposely bias his answers accordingly. Because of the substantial disarray among state and federal appellate courts as to the degree of deference, if any, due to a trial court’s determination that a juror may be excluded for cause under Witherspoon, I would grant certiorari to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and review the case.

In Witherspoon, 391 U. S., at 522, we held that a venireman cannot be excluded for cause in a capital case simply because he voices “general objections” to the death penalty or expresses “conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.” Provided the venireman is willing to fulfill his oath as a juror and consider the full range of penalties provided by state law, he may not be disqualified on account of his beliefs. We stressed, however, that the State is not disabled from challenging jurors for cause when they make it clear that they would “vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings.” Id., at 522, n. 21. In subsequent cases we have reaffirmed that the State has a legitimate interest in obtaining jurors who will consider and decide the facts impartially and faithfully apply the law as charged by the court. Adams v. Texas, 448 U. S. 38, 46 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 596-597 (1978); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U. S. 478, 482 (1969).

As a result of Witherspoon and these later cases, trial courts are faced with the difficult task of distinguishing between a venireman so unalterably opposed to the death penalty as to be unable to apply the law impartially and one who, despite his objections, will conscientiously seek to apply the law in accordance with the facts developed at trial. We have mandated this inquiry; but we have failed to articulate any standard of review for alleged Witherspoon violations. We have failed to explain whether a trial court’s determination that a given venireman may be excluded for cause under Witherspoon should be reversed only if, like other factual determinations, it is clearly erroneous or whether an appellate court must examine the transcript of the voir dire and draw its own conclusions, with no deference accorded the trial court’s judgment. The result, predictably, has been near chaos throughout the state and federal appellate courts.

A review of the decisions of 20 States which have grappled with the application of Witherspoon shows that appellate courts in 7 of those States grant trial courts considerable discretion in excusing jurors based on their opposition to the death penalty and will disturb such rulings only for a clear abuse of discretion. Six States, including Texas, grant no leeway whatsoever to the trial court. The appellate courts conduct their own review of the record and make their own de novo determination of the propriety of any exclusions. The other seven States, without explicitly mentioning any standard, also appear to engage in de novo review, combing the record for errors with no mention of, or deference to, the trial court’s opportunity to observe the demeanor of the veniremen and hear the tenor of their responses.

The degree of confusion and the number of conflicting decisions among the state courts on such an important issue of federal constitutional law are troublesome, to say the least. This same disarray exists in federal courts entertaining petitions for writs of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254. For example, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently split three ways on the question. And the Eleventh Circuit reached opposite results on the proper standard of review in two recent cases and has granted rehearing en banc in one of the cases to consider the issue. I believe this Court has an obligation to clarify its holding in Witherspoon and to resolve these conflicts.

Obviously, there is no simple litmus test for determining when a juror would automatically vote against imposition of the death penalty or be unable to make an impartial decision as to the defendant’s guilt. Of necessity, therefore, the voir dire examination of veniremen in capital cases has become an elaborate and frustrating process. The instant case demonstrates both the difficult position of the trial court and the need for a uniform standard of review of alleged Witherspoon violations.

Venireman Arturo Espindola was excluded from the jury based on the following interchange with the State’s attorney:

“Q. Is this belief—you don’t believe in the death sentence—as your being part of the jury that would have to inflict the death penalty?
“A. Sir, I don’t believe in the death penalty.
“Q. At all?
“A. At all.
“Q. And, you could not vote for the death penalty in a case no matter how horrible the facts were?
“A. No, sir, I could not vote for the death penalty.
“Q. . . . [Y]ou are irrevocably committed before the trial begins to vote against the death penalty regardless of the facts and circumstances because of your belief?
“A. That’s right.” App. to Pet. for Cert. C-3 to C-4.

The State’s attorney then explained to Espindola the Texas procedures for capital cases. The guilt and punishment phases are separated, and in the punishment phase the jury never votes directly to impose the death sentence. The jury is instead asked three questions about the nature of the crime and the probability of future violence by the defendant. If the jury answers “yes” to all three questions, the judge must impose the death penalty. Texas Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071(e) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). After explaining these procedures and reading the questions to the venireman, the questioning continued.

“Q. Because you don’t believe in the death penalty, then would you automatically vote no to these questions no matter what the facts were to keep the man from getting a death sentence?
“A. I imagine I would.
“Q. All right. Because of your beliefs?
“A. Yes, because of my beliefs.
“[Q.] And, your belief would have a—would enter into these deliberations because you just don’t believe in it, and you could not vote yes and you would vote no, is that right?
“A. That’s right.” App. to Pet. for Cert. C-8 to C-9.

Defense counsel then sought to rehabilitate Espindola on cross-examination.

“Q. And, if the State—the next thing I’ll ask you before we get the effect is I will ask you—assume, if you will with me, that the prosecutors prove to you beyond any reasonable doubt that the evidence is there and the questions in your mind, you’re convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that thé questions should be answered yes, okay?
“A. Yes, I understand.
“Q. And, you’re convinced of that in your mind beyond any reasonable doubt that the answers should be yes, okay?
“A. Yes, I understand.
“Q. And, would you be untruthful in your answer intentionally and would you just deliberately answer the question untruthful—untruthfully or would you answer the question according to what the evidence showed, according to your oath as a juror? Would you just intentionally and deliberately answer the question untruthfully?
“A. No, I would not.
“Q. So, you wouldn’t answer it untruthfully?
“A. I would not answer untruthfully, no way.
“Q. So, if you were faced with—the questions that the prosecutor read to you over here, and you either had to answer the questions yes or no, and if you felt in your mind that the answers should be yes, and they have proved that to you beyond any reasonable doubt, and you’re required to give a true answer to the questions asked of you, okay?
“A. Okay
“Q. Would you, simply because you knew what the effect of your answer would be, simply for that reason, would you deliberately answer those questions untruthful just because you knew what the effect of your answers would be?
“A. I said before that I wouldn’t answer untruthfully.” Id., at C-10 to C-12.

Venireman Espindola thus gave directly contradictory answers to the same question posed in different terms by the prosecutor and by defense counsel. This is a classic instance in which the trial judge, based on his own observation of the interchange, is best able to determine whether the venireman could properly discharge his duties as a juror. Yet the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals conducted a de novo review of the record and held that the trial court improperly sustained the State’s challenge for cause.

I find no support in our case law for the utter absence of deference paid to the trial court’s judgment in this case. On the contrary, we have constantly stressed that “actual bias” on the part of a particular juror is a question of “historical fact,” Rushen v. Spain, 464 U. S. 114, 120 (1983), on which the findings of the trial court should not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. See Dennis v. United States, 339 U. S. 162, 168 (1950) (“while empaneling a jury the trial court has a serious duty to determine the question of actual bias, and a broad discretion in its rulings on challenges therefor”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 156 (1879) (“The finding of the trial court upon that issue ought not to be set aside by a reviewing court, unless the error is manifest”). See also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 218 (1982) (findings of trial court on juror bias entitled to presumption of correctness in federal habeas action under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)). I see no reason why different principles should apply when the alleged bias concerns the juror’s feelings about the death penalty.

The question presented in this case is important, and the Court should provide better guidance to other courts faithfully striving to apply Witherspoon. Accordingly, I would grant the petition for certiorari.

       Indeed, Justice Rehnquist discusses O’Bryan, post, at 1046, and n. 8. Justice BRENNAN and Justice MARSHALL dissented from the denial of cer-tiorari in O’Bryan on the basis of their continuing belief that the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. No other Justice recorded a dissent from that denial. Moreover, had The Chief Justice, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O’Connoe, who today find the question warranting an exercise of certiorari jurisdiction, voted to grant in that case, under our Rule of Four the question would now be before us, and hence there would presumably be no need for today’s dissenting opinion.

       Of course, if the petition in this case had been granted, the parties would naturally have briefed the question that is presented and argued in Texas’ petition. Texas presumably would have had to have waited until oral argument to discover that the question Justice Rehnquist finds in this case is the one it presented.
      The only question raised in the certiorari petition reads as follows:
      “WHETHER THE TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS CORRECTLY APPLIED WITHERSPOON V. ILLINOIS, 391 U. S. 510 (1968) AND ADAMS V. TEXAS, 4[4]8 U. S. 38 (1980), WHEN IT REVERSED A TRIAL COURT’S EXCLUSION FOR CAUSE OF ONE VENIREMAN WHO UNAMBIGUOUSLY STATED THAT HE WOULD AUTOMATE CALLY VOTE TO PRECLUDE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY.” Pet. for Cert. i.
      More specifically, Texas contends that the defense failed to rehabilitate the venireman excused for cause after the venireman had initially expressed an unequivocal opposition to the death penalty, arguing that the “voir dire examination, as a whole, demonstrates a juror who would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty . . . .” Id,., at 9. Given the nature of the question presented, the petition primarily consists of a transcript of the voir dire examination of the excused venireman. In other words, Texas asks that this Court conduct a de novo review on the Witherspoon issue.
      The dissent’s reasoning in attempting to suggest that the “deference” question was even decided below, much less presented in the petition, is quite difficult to follow. Justice Rehnquist finds “no support in our case law for the utter absence of deference paid to the trial court’s judgment in this case," post, at 1048, but somehow concludes that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals apparently felt that it was required to disregard totally the trial court’s judgment on the basis of our case law, post, at 1044, n. 2, notwithstanding the fact that in Hughes v. State, 563 S. W. 2d 581, cert. denied, 440 U. S. 950 (1979), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explicitly stated with respect to a Witherspoon issue before it:

      “We must be mindful that where we only have a cold record before us the trial judge in passing on the answers of the ‘equivocating veniremen’ has the opportunity to observe the tone of voice and demeanor of the prospective juror in determining the precise meaning intended.” 563 S. W. 2d, at 585 (dictum).
      The dissent below in this case quoted this language, and argued that the majority had erred in not following Hughes in this case. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-22. In light of the fact that the only statement ever made by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on the “deference” question is favorable to the prosecution, it is no wonder that Texas did not present this question in its petition.

       The dissenting opinion below, it should be noted, was filed regarding the court’s denial without opinion of the State’s second motion for rehearing. One perhaps could speculate on the basis of the papers we have before us that the State attempted to raise the “deference” issue in its second motion for rehearing, since the issue was discussed at the close of the dissenting opinion. Id., at A-21 to A-22. It would appear, however, from the dissenting opinion that the propriety of the arguments presented in the State’s second motion was in some doubt, and the dissent was quite prepared to reconsider the case sua sponte. Id., at A-l to A-2. There was no response to the dissent, the language in Hughes was not disapproved by the majority, and hence there are two reasonable conclusions: (1) the majority below, even after giving deference to the trial court’s ability to observe the demeanor of the venireman, nevertheless concluded that his excusal for cause was erroneous; or (2) the State had waived whatever arguments it raised in its second motion for rehearing as a matter of state practice by failing to raise them earlier. Of course, since Texas is not raising the “deference” question in its petition, it is understandable that it has not attempted to show that the question was properly raised below.

       The court reversed Mead’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. Ordinarily, the appropriate remedy for a Witherspoon violation is to reverse only the death sentence, not the underlying conviction. 391 U. S., at 516-518. See also Adams v. Texas, 448 U. S. 38, 51 (1980). Apparently, however, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has no authority to direct a new trial before a different jury solely on the issue of punishment. See Ellison v. State, 432 S. W. 2d 955, 957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).

       The Texas courts are of course free, as a matter of state law, to decide for themselves what deference shall be given by appellate courts to the findings of trial courts. But since in this case the four dissenting judges stated that under the majority’s result “the discretion of trial judges across this state in excusing potential venirepersons under Witherspoon has been seriously eroded,” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-21, while the majority insisted that “[t]his Court ... is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States,” id., at B-2, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals apparently felt that it was required to conduct de novo review of the trial court’s rulings as a matter of federal constitutional law. The issue also arises in federal courts entertaining petitions for writs of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254, see nn. 7 and 8, infra, where the standard of review is governed by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539 (1981); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422 (1983).

       Generally, in matters of jury selection, we have explicitly required deference to the decisions of trial courts. See, e. g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 723 (1960). But in Witherspoon and the cases following it, the language of deference is conspicuous by its absence. Lower appellate courts are thereby left to guess whether the traditional deference has been set aside in this limited context.

         Thirty-eight States have a death penalty. In many of those States, however, capital cases are few and far between, and it is impossible to determine the standard of review that would be applied to alleged Witherspoon violations. In some other States, although the issue has arisen, it has been dealt with in eonclusory terms which do not reveal whether any deference was paid to the trial court’s judgment.

        Clines v. State, 280 Ark. 77, 87-88, 656 S. W. 2d 684, 689 (1983); Hooks v. State, 416 A. 2d 189, 194-195 (Del. 1980); People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 402-403, 447 N. E. 2d 218, 230 (1983); State v. Treadway, 558 S. W. 2d 646, 649 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 838 (1977); State v. Kirkley, 308 N. C. 196, 206, 302 S. E. 2d 144, 150 (1983); State v. Trujillo, 99 N. M. 251, 252, 657 P. 2d 107, 108 (1982); Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 523, 273 S. E. 2d 36, 43 (1980).

        People v. Lanphear, 26 Cal. 3d 814, 841, 608 P. 2d 689, 703-704 (1980); Blankenship v. State, 247 Ga. 590, 593, 277 S. E. 2d 505, 509 (1981); State v. George, 371 So. 2d 762, 765 (La. 1979); State v. Anderson, 30 Ohio St. 2d 66, 70, 282 N. E. 2d 568, 570 (1972); State v. Harrington, 627 S. W. 2d 345, 349-350 (Tenn. 1981); Rougeau v. State, 651 S. W. 2d 739, 740-745 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (en banc).

        Ex parte Bracewell, 407 So. 2d 845, 846-847 (Ala. 1979); Maggard v. State, 399 So. 2d 973, 976 (Fla. 1981); Frith v. State, 263 Ind. 100, 107-108, 325 N. E. 2d 186, 190 (1975); Peterson v. State, 242 So. 2d 420, 426 (Miss. 1970); Bean v. State, 86 Nev. 80, 87, 465 P. 2d 133, 138 (1970); Jones v. State, 555 P. 2d 1061, 1066 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976); State v. Tyner, 273 S. C. 646, 651, 258 S. E. 2d 559, 562 (1979).

        O’Bryan v. Estelle, 714 F. 2d 365, 371-373 (1983) (assuming, without deciding, that de novo review is proper); id., at 393 (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (“an independent review of the facts may be undertaken against a backdrop of trial court discretion”); id., at 400 (Buchmeyer, J., dissenting) (deference appropriate only if trial judge made “express factual or credibility determinations”).

       Compare McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 705 F. 2d 1553, 1556-1557, n. 9 (1983), with Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F. 2d 1031, 1037, rehearing en banc granted, 699 F. 2d 1043 (1983).

       A transcript of the voir dire examination of venireman Espindola is contained in Appendix C to the petition.

       In Adams v. Texas, 448 U. S., at 46, we had occasion to discuss the circumstances under which a potential juror could be excluded under the very Texas statutory scheme at issue in this case.
      “If the juror is to obey his oath and follow the law of Texas, he must be willing not only to accept that in certain circumstances death is an acceptable penalty but also to answer the statutory questions without conscious distortion or bias. The State does not violate the Witherspoon doctrine when it excludes prospective jurors who are unable or unwilling to address the penalty questions with this degree of impartiality.”
      This enunciation of the standard for exclusion makes clear the factbound nature of the inquiry and, hence, the appropriateness of deferring to the judgment of the trial court.


text:
    No. 83-833.
    No. 83-958.
    Trans-Canada Enterprises, Ltd., et al. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe et al.; and Port of Tacoma v. Puyallup Indian Tribe.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Washington Land Title Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in No. 83-958 granted. Cer-tiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.

Reported below: No. 83-833, 713 F. 2d 455; No. 83-958, 717 F. 2d 1251.


text:
    No. 83-853.
    Jackson, Individually, and as Administrator of the Estate of Jackson, et al. v. City of Joliet et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Rehnquist joins,

dissenting.

Petitioners, representatives of the estates of individuals killed in a one-car accident in Joliet, Ill., filed complaints in Federal District Court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. V), contending that various county and city officials violated decedents’ constitutional rights by failing to save decedents from the burning automobile. In their complaint, petitioners alleged that two minutes after the car swerved off the road and burst into flames, one of the respondents, a police officer, arrived on the scene and began directing traffic around the car. Firemen were summoned, and the fire was extinguished; yet no efforts were made to remove decedents from the car, nor was an ambulance called until some 45 minutes after the accident occurred. The complaint alleged that decedents were still alive when the fire was doused and that had adequate rescue measures been taken at the outset, decedents would have survived.

The District Court denied respondents’ motion to dismiss the complaints for failure to state a cause of action. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, reversed, concluding that an attempt by state officers to assist at an accident does not result in the deprivation of a constitutional right when the attempt fails because of the negligence or gross negligence of the officers. 715 F. 2d 1200 (1983).

In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals noted that “[n]o problem so perplexes the federal courts today as determining the outer bounds of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U. S. C. §1983 . . . .” Id., at 1201. Section 1983 actions have been brought in a variety of contexts by those injured as a result of a state official’s failure to exercise adequate care in carrying out his duties. Clark v. Taylor, 710 F. 2d 4 (CA1 1983); Morrison v. Washington County, 700 F. 2d 678 (CA11), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 864 (1983); Hull v. Duncanville, 678 F. 2d 582 (CA5 1982); Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F. 2d 1252 (CA9 1982); Doe v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 649 F. 2d 134 (CA2 1981), after remand to District Court, 709 F. 2d 782 (CA2 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Catholic Home Bureau v. Doe, 464 U. S. 864 (1983). The results in these cases have not been entirely consistent. While the Court of Appeals in the present case determined that the State’s failure to provide adequate rescue services was not actionable under § 1983, other courts have permitted relief under that section when a foster parent’s abuse of his foster child was permitted by the state agency’s failure adequately to monitor the foster care environment, Doe v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, supra, and when a patient’s death was allegedly caused by the manner in which he was discharged by a state hospital, Morrison, swpra. The inconsistent results below are attributable, at least in part, to the lack of definitive guidelines for determining when tor-tious conduct by state officials rises to the level of a constitutional tort. This Court should attempt to resolve this “perplexing” issue, and this case provides us with an opportunity to do so. Accordingly, I would grant the petition for certiorari and set the case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 83-1039.
    Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of National Independent Dairy-Foods Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5792.
    No. 83-5818.
    No. 83-5836.
    No. 83-5849.
    No. 83-5897.
    No. 83-5905.
    No. 83-5909.
    No. 83-5924.
    No. 83-5939.
    No. 83-5942.
    No. 83-5955.
    No. 83-5973.
    No. 83-5977.
    No. 83-5980.
    No. 83-5999.
    No. 83-6009.
    Griffin v. Texas. Creech v. Idaho. Willie v. Louisiana. Clines et al. v. Arkansas. Shriner v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. Fitzpatrick v. Florida. Harich v. Florida. Johnson v. Florida. Dunkins v. Alabama. Knapp v. Arizona. Knighton v. Louisiana. Lightbourne v. Florida. Mason v. Florida. Sonnier v. Maggio, Warden. Osborn v. Wyoming. Hayes v. Arkansas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;

Sup. Ct. Idaho;

Sup. Ct. La.;

Sup. Ct. Ark.;

C. A. 11th Cir.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. Ala.;

Super. Ct. Ariz., Maricopa County;

Sup. Ct. La.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

C. A. 5th Cir.;

Sup. Ct. Wyo.; and

Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 83-5792, 665 S. W. 2d 762; No. 83-5818, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P. 2d 463; No. 83-5836, 436 So. 2d 553; No. 83-5849, 280 Ark. 77, 656 S. W. 2d 684; No. 83-5897, 715 F. 2d 1452; No. 83-5905, 437 So. 2d 1072; No. 83-5909, 437 So. 2d 1082; No. 83-5924, 438 So. 2d 774; No. 83-5939, 437 So. 2d 1356; No. 83-5955, 436 So. 2d 1141; No. 83-5973, 438 So. 2d 380; No. 83-5977, 438 So. 2d 374; No. 83-5980, 720 F. 2d 401; No. 83-5999, 672 P. 2d 777; No. 83-6009, 280 Ark. 509, 660 S. W. 2d 648.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 83-932.
    Texas International Airlines, Inc. v. National Airlines, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioners in No. 83-1111, Heublein, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., to consolidate with this petition denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-962.
    Meat Price Investigators Assn. et al. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 83-991.
    Aluminum Company of America et al. v. Utilities Commission of North Carolina et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 83-1023.
    Data Probe Acquisition Corp. et al. v. Datatab, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Powell would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 83-5874.
    Withers v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


author: Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 83-5956.
    Justus v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall,

with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

Petitioner Justus was sentenced to death through the retroactive application of a statutory aggravating factor in violation of the Federal Constitution’s prohibition against ex post facto punishments. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 3; Art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The murder for which petitioner was convicted occurred in 1978. In 1979, Florida added a new aggravating factor to the State’s death penalty statute. As a result of the amendment, a judge and jury could for the first time consider during the sentencing stage of trial whether the homicide was “committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification.” 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-353 (codified at Fla. Stat. §921.141(5)(i) (1981)). In 1980, petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. In imposing the death penalty, the Florida Circuit Judge relied on two aggravating factors, one of which was the factor added to the Florida death penalty statute after petitioner committed his crime.

In Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24, 30 (1981), this Court held that a change in sentencing procedures violates the Constitution’s prohibition against ex post facto punishments “if it is both retrospective and more onerous than the law in effect on the date of the offense.” Both the Florida Supreme Court and the State’s Attorney General concede that the constitutionality of applying Florida’s new aggravating factor to petitioner must be measured by the Weaver test. See Combs v. State, 403 So. 2d 418, 421 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 984 (1982), quoted in 438 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1983); Brief in Opposition 4.

The State’s sole argument is that the application of this new aggravating factor had no detrimental effect on petitioner, and therefore was not onerous under Weaver. See 438 So. 2d, at 368. The State’s view is that, since premeditation was already an element of first-degree murder, the retroactive application of Florida’s new aggravating factor placed no additional burden on petitioner. Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court has taken the peculiar position that this new factor “inure[s] to the benefit of a defendant” because the factor adds to premeditation the limitations of “cold, calculated and . . . without . . . moral or legal justification.” Combs v. State, supra, at 421.

The State’s position is simply untenable. A Florida Circuit Judge relied upon Florida’s new aggravating factor to sentence petitioner to death. Before 1979, the Florida death penalty statute contained no aggravating factor analogous to the one added by 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-353. Had the new factor not been applied at petitioner’s sentencing trial, the sentencing judge would have found only one aggravating factor, and it is impossible to know whether he still would have chosen to impose the death penalty. The application of the new aggravating factor made it easier for the Florida judge to sentence petitioner to death, and for that reason alone was more onerous for petitioner than the sentencing procedure in place at the date of his offense. See Weaver v. Graham, supra.

The detrimental effect of 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-353, on petitioner is in no way ameliorated by the fact that premeditation was an element of petitioner's underlying conviction. For one thing, “homicide . . . committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any . . . moral or legal justification” is not synonymous with premeditated murder. If the language of 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-353, is to carry its natural meaning, the new aggravating factor covers crimes that are more ruthless and coldblooded than ordinary first-degree murder.

More importantly, defending an aggravating factor by reference to elements of the underlying offense is inconsistent with this Court’s prior death penalty decisions. The sole purpose of requiring a sentencing authority to balance aggravating factors against mitigating circumstances is to force the sentencer to look beyond the offense to determine whether capital punishment is warranted given the totality of the circumstances surrounding the crime. By amending its death penalty statute, Florida changed the ground rules for judging the totality of the circumstances. This change most definitely prejudiced petitioner.

As the State itself concedes, “[wjhether a retrospective state criminal statute ameliorates or worsens conditions imposed by its predecessor is a federal question.” Brief in Opposition 3. Because I believe that the Florida Supreme Court incorrectly decided this question, I would grant the petition and vacate the sentence. I dissent.

       Adhering to my view that the death penalty is under all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida insofar as it left undisturbed the death sentence imposed in this case. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).


text:
    No. 83-6042.
    Johnson v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-2004.
    No. 83-561.
    No. 83-662.
    No. 83-668.
    Nibungco v. United States, Moretti et al. v. Multi-Pak Corp. et al., Gaines v. Merchants National Bank & Trust Co., Pace v. Southern Railway Co.,
   464 U. S. 823;

464 U. S. 988;

464 U. S. 1013; and

464 U. S. 1018. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 83-709.
    No. 83-5448.
    No. 83-5460.
    No. 83-5536.
    No. 83-5572.
    No. 83-5624.
    No. 83-5633.
    No. 83-5634.
    No. 83-5638.
    No. 83-5793.
    Walton v. Small Business Administration, Williams v. Pierce, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, et al., Betka v. City of West Linn et al., Kajevic v. United States, McMillan v. Hester et al., Morvay v. Maghielse Tool & Die Co., Inc., Brown v. Rice et al., In re Brown, Skaggs et al. v. Crawford County, Ohio, et al., Howell v. Appling,
   464 U. S. 1009;

464 U. S. 1046;

464 U. S. 979;

464 U. S. 1047;

464 U. S. 1010;

464 U. S. 1011;

464 U. S. 1019;

464 U. S. 1006;

464 U. S. 1019; and

464 U. S. 1072. Petitions

for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 82-2083.
    Rushen, Director, California Department of Corrections, et al. v. Spain,
   464 U. S. 114. Motion of American Civil Liberties Foundation et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae in support of petition for rehearing denied. Petition for rehearing denied.

Justice Brennan would grant the motion.


text:
    No. 83-5374.
    Jones et al. v. Superior Court of California, Orange County,
   464 U. S. 998. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    February 27, 1984
    No. 83-770.
    City of New York et al. v. United States Department of Transportation et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 2d Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 83-918.
    Carter v. Illinois.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 83-1081.
    Finvold et al. v. Sambs et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 83-1098.
    Escondido Imports, Inc., et al. v. California Department of Motor Vehicles.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 83-1006.
    Vaughter v. Tennessee.
   Appeal from Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5408.
    Inchausti v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   Appeal from C. A. 5th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


author: Justice Stevens,

text:
    No. 83-706.
    Lehman, Secretary of the Navy, et al. v. Trout et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions to remand the case to the District Court for the District of Columbia for findings of fact, based on new evidence if necessary, on the question what evidentiary value respondents’ and petitioners’ statistical evidence has in light of the Court of Appeals’ conclusions of law concerning employment decisions that are not actionable in this case. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 292 (1982). The overall sufficiency of the evidence should then be considered in light of United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711 (1983).

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

This litigation began in 1973. In four consolidated cases a class of female professional employees employed by the Naval Command Support Activity of the Navy Regional Data Automation Center (NAVCOSSACT/NARDAC) alleged that petitioners discriminated against them on the basis of their sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§2000e to 2000e-17. After a long trial— the record includes the testimony of 42 witnesses and over 7,500 pages of exhibits—the District Court found discrimination in both hiring and promotion. Trout v. Hidalgo, 517 F. Supp. 873 (DC 1981). The findings were supported by statistical evidence, expert testimony, and nonstatistical evidence covering specific instances of discrimination.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s finding of discrimination in promotion, but held that petitioners were not responsible for the hiring discrimination that had been proved—another federal agency had done the discriminatory hiring—and also that petitioners were not liable for discriminatory conduct prior to 1972. 226 U. S. App. D. C. 357, 702 F. 2d 1094 (1983). Thus, the “employment decisions that are not actionable in this case” are (1) hiring decisions, and (2) pre-1972 discrimination. The order the Court enters today requires that this case be remanded to the District Court for additional findings of fact on the evidentiary value of respondents’ statistical evidence in the light of these two conclusions. The Court’s decision overlooks the fact that both the District Court and the Court of Appeals have already done exactly what the Court orders.

The Court of Appeals has already considered the impact of both of the District Court’s errors on its findings concerning discrimination in promotion, and has squarely held that those findings are adequately supported by the remaining evidence. Thus, with respect to the pre-1972 discrimination, the Court of Appeals stated:

“By grouping nonactionable hiring decisions with those for which NAVCOSSACT/NARDAC could properly be held liable, certain of the plaintiffs’ statistical analyses hold the potential for some distortion concerning the adverse impact of the appellants’ post-1972 promotion policies. However, it is clear that the plaintiffs did not rely solely on data regarding nonactionable hiring decisions; indeed, there is no doubt whatsoever .that the plaintiffs’ statistical analyses included a substantial amount of data concerning post-1972 employment decisions affecting class members. For these reasons, we do not believe that ‘failure to factor out time-barred discrimination discredited the analyses. Statistics tuned to the proper time period are more probative than statistics not so tuned, but categorical rejection of the latter is not warranted.’ Valentino v. United States Postal Service, [218 U. S. App. D. C. 213, 228, n. 26, 674 F. 2d 56, 71, n. 26 (1982)]. The approach to statistics adopted by the Supreme Court in Hazelwood [School District v. United States, 433 U. S. 299, 309-310 (1977)], and International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. [324, 360 (1977)], plainly suggests that statistics including time-barred decisions are ‘sufficient to support a prima facie case and shift the burden to the defendant to show that its actions during the relevant period rebut the inference of discrimination raised by the plaintiff’s broad summary.’ Movement for Opportunity & Equality v. General Motors Corp., 622 F. 2d 1235, 1258 (7th Cir. 1980).
“Although the appellants did attempt to make such a showing, the trial court found their statistical evidence defective on other grounds. We can find no basis upon which to overturn Judge Greene’s findings on this point. Therefore, we agree that the appellants’ evidence was incapable of raising a genuine issue concerning the validity of the inference of discrimination raised by the plaintiffs’ statistical presentation. As a result, NAVCOSSACT/NARDAC was left with only an unquantified theoretical objection that could not undermine the prima facie case. See II Jt. App. 743-744.” Id., at 367, 702 F. 2d, at 1104 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).

With respect to the fact that the Civil Service Commission, rather than petitioners, was responsible for the hiring discrimination, the Court of Appeals wrote:

“We conclude, therefore, that the District Court erred in holding that the class was entitled to relief for discriminatory initial placements.
“This does not mean, however, that the plaintiffs’ statistics could not make out a legally sufficient prima facie case of discrimination in promotions. Because NAVCOSSACT/ NARDAC did not quantify the extent to which the disparity between men and women revealed by the plaintiffs’ statistics was attributable to the locked-in effects of nonactionable discrimination, see, e. g., IV Jt. App. 1829, the plaintiffs’ statistical analyses created a justifiable inference that the defendants had ‘failed to promote equitably individuals who were discriminated against at hiring,’ or had slowed the progress of women who had initially been properly placed.” Id., at 368, 702 F. 2d, at 1105 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).

Thus, the Court of Appeals carefully considered the effect of the District Court’s errors, and found that the remaining evidence was nevertheless sufficient to support a finding of discrimination. I take the Court’s citation of Pullman Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 292 (1982), to mean that it believes that the Court of Appeals found the facts on these two points, rather than permitting the District Court to do so in the first instance. If that is the basis for the Court’s disposition, it is mistaken. The District Court clearly found that even when only post-1972 evidence was considered, respondents had demonstrated the existence of unlawful discrimination both through statistical and nonstatistical evidence. Moreover, the District Court found that even if the actions of the Civil Service Commission were nonactionable, the evidence concerning the actions of NARDAC alone still demonstrated the existence of unlawful discrimination. Most important, the District Court explicitly noted that respondents’ statistics demonstrated that during the post-Act period female employees were paid consistently less than male employees even when the factors used by the Civil Service Commission to make placement decisions were considered. This is simply not a case in which a court of appeals has improperly found the facts in the first instance. Thus, we have a finding of fact that has been reviewed and upheld by a Court of Appeals. Our customary practice is to accord such a finding the greatest respect even in cases that have been fully briefed and argued in this Court. See, e. g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 623 (1982); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188, 193, n. 3 (1972); Berenyi v. Immigration Director, 385 U. S. 630, 635 (1967). To set such a finding aside without even looking at the record, or at any of the evidence on which it is based, strikes me as a gross violation of the procedures that should constrain our work.

Two other observations concerning the Court’s action today are appropriate. First, the strong interest in bringing protracted litigation to a conclusion seems to have no impact on this Court. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, ante, p. 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court’s action today encourages the kind of litigating strategy that gives the party with the greater resources a significant advantage unrelated to the merits of the case. The kind of casual command to begin anew that is reflected in today’s order tends to undermine the ability of trial judges to exercise firm control over the progress of litigation. Moreover, this action can only encourage parties to file more and more petitions asking this Court to engage in factual disputes that we are not equipped to resolve effectively.

Second, this case illustrates the dangers inherent in an excessive reliance on summary dispositions. The District Court and the Court of Appeals had the benefit of extensive briefing, a complete record, and several months of consideration of this case. Today, in summary fashion, we second-guess their considered judgment as to the probative value of respondents’ evidence after the most truncated of presentations. It is, of course, entirely possible that the Court has issued the right command as it gallops by this immense record. But if that be true, the Court is just lucky.

I respectfully dissent.

       At least respondents have so represented; I have not examined the record myself because it has not been filed in this Court.

       The Civil Service Commission, which later became the Office of Personnel Management.

       The Court of Appeals also emphasized that nonstatistical evidence supported the District Court’s findings. It stated: “The District Court also found persuasive the testimony of a number of class members. Although we do not specifically discuss this testimony, the District Court properly considered the statistical and nonstatistical evidence on a cumulative basis in assessing the strength of the plaintiffs’ prima facie case. EEOC v. American Nat’l Bank, 652 F. 2d 1176, 1188-89 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, [459 U. S. 923] (1982).” 226 U. S. App. D. C., at 362, n. 7, 702 F. 2d, at 1099, n. 7.

       The District Court found:
      “Plaintiffs’ expert also performed several variant regressions, including running of the 1979 model using a population of employees hired only since 1972, when Title VII became applicable to federal employees; running of the 1979 model using subpopulations categorized by agency origin within NARDAC; and running of data for both 1977 and 1979 using a logarithmic, rather than a linear, equation. Each of these variants produced statistically significant results which were wholly consistent with those of the basic model.” Trout v. Hidalgo, 517 F. Supp. 873, 879, n. 14 (DC 1981) (emphasis supplied).

       “There was testimony from a number of present and former employees of NARDAC concerning various discriminatory practices, long after 1972, including a denial of supervisory opportunities to women, assignment of women to lower level positions, and the preselection of men for supervisory positions. The Court was especially impressed by the testimony of several former employees of the agency who were very credible witnesses and who related both specific instances and general impressions of discrimination against women at NARDAC. Some of these individuals left NARDAC for other federal employment and thereafter advanced to higher grades far more rapidly than had been possible at NARDAC.” Id,., at 887 (footnotes omitted).

       “The government appears to justify . . . ignoring of possible discrimination in initial placement with the argument that NARDAC had no influence on placement decisions, which were allegedly completely controlled by the Civil Service Commission, and that NARDAC therefore would not be legally liable for any bias at the time of hiring. However, whatever may have been the formalistic Civil Service classification system, defendants failed to demonstrate that NARDAC had no influence on initial grade placement decisions. In fact, the interplay among job description, assignment to positions, distribution of duties, and classification standards leaves ample room for flexible treatment and hence for variation and discrimination.
      “Furthermore, even if all authority for improper initial grade placement were assumed to rest with the Civil Service Commission, the resulting disparities in grade level remaining over several years could still be properly attributable to NARDAC. In such a case, either NARDAC failed to promote equitably individuals who were discriminated against at hiring (which would constitute direct discrimination by NARDAC) or operation of the Whitten Amendment regulations locked in the effects of earlier discrimination. In either event, the assumption implicit in defendants’ statistics that discrimination in initial placement is irrelevant to their case is incorrect and undermines their analysis.” Id., at 885 (citations omitted).

       “Plaintiffs’ expert began his analysis with the undisputed fact that the average salary for female employees at NARDAC has thoughout the relevant period been considerably lower than that of males. At the beginning of that period, in 1972, women earned $2,700 less than men, that is, 82 percent of the male salaries; at the end of the period, in 1979, women earned $4,300 less than men, or 84 percent of the male salaries. The salary differentials throughout this period reflect the relative concentration of women in NARDAC in the lower civil service grade levels. . . .
      “With these salary differentials clearly established, plaintiffs’ expert sought to determine next, on a year-by-year basis between 1972 and 1979, whether the disparity could be accounted for by differences between men and women in education and experience, or whether it was more likely to be attributable to sex discrimination. To accomplish this analysis, the expert witness specified for regression a linear model which included dummy variables for level of education, years of NARDAC service, years of other government employment service, years of potential nongovernment experience between date of receipt of last educational degree and date of entry in federal service, and sex. The dependent variable was sex.
      “When prior experience and education were thus taken into account, female employees still received substantially lower salaries than men, the yearly differential attributable to sex ranging from $2,200 to $3,500. Since there was never any suggestion by the government that factors other than education or experience could legitimately account for the differences, the Court would clearly have been justified, absent some explanation, to draw the conclusion that equally qualified female employees of NARDAC consistently received lower salaries on the average than male employees and, accordingly, that they had been the victims of improper discrimination.” Id,., at 878-879 (footnotes omitted).

       Petitioners’ conduct of this litigation has hardly been a model for future cases. The most persuasive evidence on which petitioners relied in their argument before this Court was not adduced until they filed a motion for reconsideration well after the District Court had decided the case. The Court of Appeals agreed with Judge Greene that petitioners should have adduced this evidence during trial. Indeed, it found petitioners’ conduct indefensible: “We would add that we find it extremely troublesome—in light of the long and complex history of this litigation and in light of Judge Greene’s patient and thoughtful treatment of the case—that the appellants would even propose that the trial court reopen and retry the matter. In the context of this case setting, such an adversarial tactic is irresponsible, insensitive to the extraordinary burdens faced by district courts already overloaded with heavy dockets, and wasteful of precious resources of litigants and the judiciary. Viewed in this posture, we consider the appellants’ request for reconsideration an affront to the judicial system.” 226 U. S. App. D. C., at 369, 702 F. 2d, at 1106-1107.


text:
    No.-.
    Groner v. Slezak et al.
   Motion to direct

the Clerk to docket an appeal out of time denied.


text:
    No. A-660.
    Pine Knob Investment Co. et al. v. Collins, Trustee.
   Bkrtcy. Ct. E. D. Mich. Application for stay, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-365.
    In re Disbarment of Rayburn.
    [For earlier order herein, see 464 U. S. 911.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-371.
    In re Disbarment of Jones.
    [For earlier order herein, see 464 U. S. 911.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-376.
    In re Disbarment of Goldstein.
    [For earlier order herein, see 464 U. S. 926.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-378.
    In re Disbarment of Lorenzo.
    [For earlier order herein, see 464 U. S. 926.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-386.
    In re Disbarment of Perlow.
    [For earlier order herein, see 464 U. S. 958.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-388.
    In re Disbarment of Goldburn.
    [For earlier order herein, see 464 U. S. 980.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-402.
    In re Disbarment of Young.
   It is ordered that Nancy J. Young, of Cos Cob, Conn., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring her to show cause why she should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-403.
    In re Disbarment of Cunningham.
   It is ordered that Patrick J. Cunningham, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-404.
    In re Disbarment of Mirrer.
   It is ordered that Raymond Mirrer, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-406.
    In re Disbarment of Goldstein.
   It is ordered that Julian M. Goldstein, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-407.
    In re Disbarment of Cates.
   It is ordered that Edward L. Cates, of Canton, Miss., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 65,
    Orig.
    Texas v. New Mexico.
   Report of the Special Master received and ordered filed. Exceptions to the Report, with supporting briefs, may be filed by the parties within 45 days. Replies thereto, with supporting briefs, may be filed within 30 days. Request of the Special Master to be discharged is granted, and it is ordered that the Honorable Jean Sala Breitenstein is discharged as Special Master in this case.

[For earlier decision herein, see, e. g., 462 U. S. 554.]


text:
    No. 82-2113.
    Richardson v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 464 U. S. 890.] Motion of the Solicitor General to permit Michael W. McConnell, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hac vice granted.


text:
    No. 83-328.
    Mabry, Commissioner, Arkansas Department of Correction v. Johnson.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 464 U. S. 1017.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 83-317.
    Block, Sheriff of the County of Los Angeles, et al. v. Rutherford et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 464 U. S. 959.] Motion of New York City Board of Correction for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 83-850.
    United States v. Karo et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 464 U. S. 1068.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that respondent Gene R. Rhodes is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis and that Roger Barges, Esquire, of Albuquerque, N. M., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent Gene R. Rhodes in this case.

Justice Blackmun dissents.


text:
    No. 83-916.
    United States v. Morton.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1004.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 83-1084.
    Vista Resources, Inc., et al. v. Sea-grave Corp.
   C. A. 2d Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 83-6111.
    In re Bers.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 83-990.
    School District of the City of Grand Rapids et al. v. Ball et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-1097.
    Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Turner et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-997.
    Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of Chamber of Commerce of the United States for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-671.
    Kattan-Kassin v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-722.
    Meyer v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-734.
    Bayou Des Familles Development Corp. v. United States Corps of Engineers et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-772.
    Snowshoe Co. v. Kruse et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-845.
    No. 83-5951.
    Illinois v. Polovchak et ux.; and Polovchak et al. v. Polovchak et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-863.
    Mid-America Television Co. et al. v. State Tax Commission of Missouri et al.; and Wells Aluminum, Inc. v. Administrative Hearing Commission.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-867.
    East Chicago Rehabilitation Center, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-879.
    Grace v. United States Public Health Service et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-900.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-948.
    Connolly v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-982.
    Bridges et al. v. McLennan County, Texas, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-989.
    James et al. v. Tennessee Valley Authority et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1005.
    Spaulding v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1054.
    Grimm v. Leinart et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1087.
    Campbell v. Coal Processing Equipment, Inc.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1092.
    Boffa v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1100.
    Battaglia v. Committee of Bar Examiners of the State Bar of California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1104.
    City of Newark v. Township of West Milford.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1105.
    Lewis v. Pennsylvania.
   Pa. Commw. Ct. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1111.
    Heublein, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1115.
    Krezdorn v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1123.
    Van Wey v. O’Neal et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1125.
    Gortmaker v. Oregon.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1167.
    Mountainside Butter & Egg Co. v. United States Department of Agriculture.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1174.
    Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co. et al. v. Ryan et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.