author: Justice White Justice Marshall,

text:
    LYNG, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE v. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE, & AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW, et al.
    No. 86-1471.
    Argued December 7, 1987
    Decided March 23, 1988

      White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 374. Kennedy, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

      Lawrence S. Robbins argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Lauber, William Kanter, John S. Koppel, and Mark L. Gross.

      Richard W. McHugh argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Jordan Rossen, Michael Holland, Judith A. Scott, and Wendy L. Kahn.

        John A. Powell, Helen Hershkojf, Steven R. Shapiro, and C. Edwin Baker filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

   Justice White

delivered the opinion of the Court.

A 1981 amendment to the Food Stamp Act states that no household shall become eligible to participate in the food stamp program during the time that any member of the household is on strike or shall increase the allotment of food stamps that it was receiving already because the income of the striking member has decreased. We must decide whether this provision is valid under the First and the Fifth Amendments.

I

In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357, Congress enacted a package of budget cuts throughout the Federal Government. Among the measures contained in OBRA were more than a dozen specific changes in the food stamp program, id., §§ 101-117. One of them was the amendment at issue in this case, § 109 of OBRA, which is set out in the margin. The Committee Reports estimated that this measure alone would save a total of about $165 million in fiscal years 1982, 1983, and 1984. H. R. Rep., at 12; S. Rep., at 63.

In 1984, two labor unions and several individual union members brought suit against the Secretary of Agriculture in District Court, contending that §109 is unconstitutional and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, and the Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that Congress’ action was well within its constitutional prerogatives. After a hearing, the District Court denied both motions. 648 F. Supp. 1234, 1241 (DC 1986) (Appendix).

Both sides conducted discovery and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On November 14, 1986, the District Court granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and issued a declaratory judgment, holding the statute unconstitutional. 648 F. Supp. 1234. Specifically, the District Court found that the amendment to the Food Stamp Act was unconstitutional on three different grounds. First, it interferes or threatens to interfere with the First Amendment rights of the individual plaintiffs to associate with their families, with their unions, and with fellow union members, as well as the reciprocal rights under the First Amendment of the union plaintiffs to their members’ association with them. Second, it interferes with strikers’ First Amendment right to express themselves about union matters free of coercion by the Government. Third, it violates the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As the basis for its conclusion on the equal protection claim, the District Court mentioned several somewhat related deficiencies in the amendment: it betrays an animus against an unpopular political minority, it irrationally treats strikers worse than individuals who quit a job, and it impermissibly directs the onus of the striker’s actions against the rest of his family. Id., at 1239-1241. The Secretary appealed the decision directly to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1252, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 481 U. S. 1036 (1987). We now reverse.

II

We deal first with the District Court’s holding that § 109 violates the associational and expressive rights of appellees under the First Amendment. These claimed constitutional infringements are also pressed as a basis for finding that appellees’ rights of “fundamental importance” have been burdened, thus requiring this Court to examine appellees’ equal protection claims under a heightened standard of review. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 383 (1978). Since we conclude that the statute does not infringe either the associational or expressive rights of appellees, we must reject both parts of this analysis.

A

The challenge to the statute based on the associational rights asserted by appellees is foreclosed by the reasoning this Court adopted in Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U. S. 635 (1986). There we considered a constitutional challenge to the definition of “household” in the Food Stamp Act, 7 U. S. C. § 2012(i), which treats parents, siblings, and children who live together, but not more distant relatives or unrelated persons who do so, as a single household for purposes of defining eligibility for food stamps. Although the challenge in that case was brought solely on equal protection grounds, and not under the First Amendment, the Court was obliged to decide whether the statutory classification should be reviewed under a stricter standard than mere rational-basis review because it “ ‘directly and substantially’ interfere^] with family living arrangements and thereby burden[s] a fundamental right.” 477 U. S., at 638. The Court held that it did not, explaining that the definition of “household” does not “order or prevent any group of persons from dining together. Indeed, in the overwhelming majority of cases it probably has no effect at all. It is exceedingly unlikely that close relatives would choose to live apart simply to increase their allotment of food stamps, for the costs of separate housing would almost certainly exceed the incremental value of the additional stamps.” Ibid.; see also id., at 643 (Brennan, J-., dissenting) (stating that rational-basis review is applicable); ibid. (White, J., dissenting) (same).

The same rationale applies in this case. As was true of the provision at issue in Castillo, it is “exceedingly unlikely” that § 109 will “prevent any group of persons from dining together.” Id., at 638. Even if isolated instances can be found in which a striking individual may have left the other members of the household in order to increase their allotment of food stamps, “in the overwhelming majority of cases [the statute] probably has no effect at all.” Ibid. The statute certainly does not “order” any individuals not to dine together; nor does it in any other way “ ‘directly and substantially’ interfere with family living arrangements.” Ibid.

The statute also does not infringe the associational rights of appellee individuals and their unions. We have recognized that “one of the foundations of our society is the right of individuals to combine with other persons in pursuit of a common goal by lawful means,” NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 933 (1982), and our recognition of this right encompasses the combination of individual workers together in order better to assert their lawful rights. See, e. g., Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U. S. 1, 5-6 (1964). But in this case, the statute at issue does not “‘directly and substantially’ interfere” with appellees’ ability to associate for this purpose. Lyng, supra, at 638. It does not “order” appellees not to associate together for the purpose of conducting a strike, or for any other purpose, and it does not “prevent” them from associating together or burden their ability to do so in any significant manner. As we have just stated with respect to the effect of this statute on an individual’s decision to remain in or to leave his or her household, it seems “exceedingly unlikely” that this statute will prevent individuals from continuing to associate together in unions to promote their lawful objectives. 477 U. S., at 638.

Prior cases indicate that § 109 has no unconstitutional impact on the right of individuals to associate for various purposes. Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U. S. 525, 530-531 (1949), for example, held that where a State forbids employers to restrict employment to members of a union, enforcement of that state policy does not abridge the associational rights of unions or their members, despite their claim that a closed shop “is ‘indispensable to the right of self-organization and the association of workers into unions.’ ” Similarly, in Board of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U. S. 537, 548 (1987), we held that requiring Rotary Clubs to admit women “does not require the clubs to abandon or alter” any of their activities or their basic goals and therefore did not abridge the members’ associational rights. Both of those cases upheld state laws that exerted a much more direct and substantial threat to associational freedoms than the statute at issue here.

Any impact on associational rights in this case results from the Government’s refusal to extend food stamp benefits to those on strike, who are now without their wage income. Denying such benefits makes it harder for strikers to maintain themselves and their families during the strike and exerts pressure on them to abandon their union. Strikers and their union would be much better off if food stamps were available, but the strikers’ right of association does not require the Government to furnish funds to maximize the exercise „of that right. “We have held in several contexts [including the First Amendment] that a legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right.” Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U. S. 540, 549 (1983). Exercising the right to strike inevitably risks economic hardship, but we are not inclined to hold that the right of association requires the Government to minimize that result by qualifying the striker for food stamps.

In Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U. S. 471 (1977), we upheld a statute that denied unemployment compensation benefits to workers who are thrown out of work as a result of a labor dispute other than a lockout, saying that the case “does not involve any discernible fundamental interest.” Id., at 489. Although the complaining worker there was a nonstriking employee of a parent company that found it necessary to close because its subsidiary was on strike, it is clear enough that the same result would have obtained had the striking employees themselves applied for compensation.

B

For the same reasons, we cannot agree that § 109 abridges appellees’ right to express themselves about union matters free of coercion by the Government. Appellees rely on Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U. S. 209 (1977). But we do not read either Abood or the First Amendment as providing support for this claim. In Abood, the challenged state law required certain employees to pay a fee to their representative union. We ruled that this law violated the First Amendment insofar as it allowed those funds to be used to promote political and ideological purposes with which the employees disagreed and to which they objected, because by its terms the employees were “compelled to make . . . contributions for political purposes.” Id., at 234. We based this conclusion on our observation that “at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one’s beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.” Id., at 234-235. By contrast, the statute challenged in this case requires no exaction from any individual; it does not “coerce” belief; and it does not require appellees to participate in political activities or support political views with which they disagree. It merely declines to extend additional food stamp assistance to striking individuals simply because the decision to strike inevitably leads to a decline in their income. And this Court has explicitly stated that even where the Constitution prohibits coercive governmental interference with specific individual rights, it “‘does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom.’” Regan, supra, at 550, quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 318 (1980).

Ill

Because the statute challenged here has no substantial impact on any fundamental interest and does not “affect with particularity any protected class,” Hodory, supra, at 489, we confine our consideration to whether the statutory classification “is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.” Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 533 (1973). We have stressed that this standard of review is typically quite deferential; legislative classifications are “presumed to be valid,” Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 314 (1976), largely for the reason that “the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one.” Ibid.; see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485 (1970).

Appellant submits that this statute serves three objectives. Most obvious, given its source in OBRA, is to cut federal expenditures. Second, the limited funds available were to be used when the need was likely to be greatest, an approach which Congress thought did not justify food stamps for strikers. Third was the concern that the food stamp program was being used to provide one-sided support for labor strikes; the Senate Report indicated that the amendment was intended to remove the basis for that perception and criticism. S. Rep., at 62.

We have little trouble in concluding that § 109 is rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of avoiding undue favoritism to one side or the other in private labor disputes. The Senate Report declared: “Public policy demands an end to the food stamp subsidization of all strikers who become eligible for the program solely through the temporary loss of income during a strike. Union strike funds should be responsible for providing support and benefits to strikers during labor-management disputes.” Ibid. It was no part of the purposes of the Food Stamp Act to establish a program that would serve as a weapon in labor disputes; the Act was passed to alleviate hunger and malnutrition and to strengthen the agricultural economy. 7 U. S. C. § 2011. The Senate Report stated that “allowing strikers to be eligible for food stamps has damaged the program’s public integrity” and thus endangers these other goals served by the program. S. Rep., at 62. Congress acted in response to these problems.

It would be difficult to deny that this statute works at least some discrimination against strikers and their households. For the duration of the strike, those households cannot increase their allotment of food stamps even though the loss of income occasioned by the strike may well be enough to qualify them for food stamps or to increase their allotment if the fact of the strike itself were ignored. Yet Congress was in a difficult position when it sought to address the problems it had identified. Because a striking individual faces an immediate and often total drop in income during a strike, a single controversy pitting an employer against its employees can lead to a large number of claims for food stamps for as long as the controversy endures. It is the disbursement of food stamps in response to such a controversy that constitutes the source of the concern, and of the dangers to the program, that Congress believed it was important to remedy. We are not free in this instance to reject Congress’ views about “what constitutes wise economic or social policy.” Dandridge, supra, at 486.

It is true that in terms of the scope and extent of their ineligibility for food stamps, § 109 is harder on strikers than on “voluntary quitters.” See 648 F. Supp., at 1253-1254 (Appendix A); compare 7 CFR § 273.1(g) (1987) with id., § 273.7(n). But the concern about neutrality in labor disputes does not arise with respect to those who, for one reason or another, simply quit their jobs. As we have stated in a related context, even if the statute “provides only ‘rough justice,’ its treatment... is far from irrational.” Hodory, 431 U. S., at 491. Congress need not draw a statutory classification to the satisfaction of the most sharp-eyed observers in order to meet the limitations that the Constitution imposes in this setting. And we are not authorized to ignore Congress’ considered efforts to avoid favoritism in labor disputes, which are evidenced also by the two significant provisos contained in the statute. The first proviso preserves eligibility for the program of any household that was eligible to receive stamps “immediately prior to such strike.” 7 U. S. C. § 2015(d)(3). The second proviso makes clear that the statutory ineligibility for food stamps does not apply “to any household that does not contain a member on strike, if any of its members refuses to accept employment at a plant or site because of a strike or lockout.” Ibid. In light of all this, the statute is rationally related to the stated objective of maintaining neutrality in private labor disputes.

In view of the foregoing, we need not determine whether either of the other two proffered justifications for § 109 would alone suffice. But it is relevant to note that protecting the fiscal integrity of Government programs, and of the Government as a whole, “is a legitimate concern of the State.” Hodory, supra, at 493. This does not mean that Congress can pursue the objective of saving money by discriminating against individuals or groups. But our review of distinctions that Congress draws in order to make allocations from a finite pool of resources must be deferential, for the discretion about how best to spend money to improve the general welfare is lodged in Congress rather than the courts. Bowen v. Owens, 476 U. S. 340, 345 (1986). “Fiscal considerations may compel certain difficult choices in order to improve the protection afforded to the entire benefited class.” Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S., at 355 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In OBRA Congress had already found it necessary to restrict eligibility in the food stamp program and to reduce the amount of deductions that were allowed to recipients. Rather than undertaking further budget cuts in these or other areas, and in order to avoid favoritism in labor disputes, Congress judged that it would do better to pass this statute along with its provisos. The Constitution does not permit us to disturb that judgment in this case.

Appellees contend and the District Court held that the legislative classification is irrational because of the “critical” fact that it “impermissibly strikes at the striker through his family.” 648 F. Supp., at 1240. This, however, is nothing more than a description of how the food stamp program operates as a general matter, a fact that was acknowledged by the District Court. Ibid. Whenever an individual takes any action that hampers his or her ability to meet the program’s eligibility requirements, such as quitting a job or failing to comply with the work-registration requirements, the entire household suffers accordingly. We have never questioned the constitutionality of the entire Act on this basis, and we just recently upheld the validity of the Act’s definition of “household” even though that definition embodies the basic fact that the Act determines benefits “on a ‘household’ rather than an individual basis.” Lyng, 477 U. S., at 636. That aspect of the program does not violate the Constitution any more so today.

The decision of the District Court is therefore

Reversed.

Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Justice Marshall,

with whom

Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun join, dissenting.

The Court today declares that it has “little trouble” in concluding that Congress’ denial of food stamps to the households of striking workers is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. Ante, at 371. The ease with which the Court reaches this conclusion is reflected in the brevity of its Fifth Amendment analysis: the Court gives short shrift to appellees’ equal protection challenge to the striker amendment even though this argument was the centerpiece of appellees’ case in their briefs and at oral argument. I believe that the Court’s dismissive approach has caused it to fail to register the full force of appellees’ claim. After canvassing the many absurdities that afflict the striker amendment, I conclude that it fails to pass constitutional muster under even the most deferential scrutiny. I therefore would affirm the judgment below.

I

The thrust of appellees’ equal protection challenge is that the striker amendment to the Food Stamp Act — § 109 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, codified at 7 U. S. C. § 2015(d)(3) — singles them out for special punitive treatment without reasonable justification. As the Court observes, this Fifth Amendment challenge to an allegedly arbitrary legislative classification implicates our least intrusive standard of review — the so-called “rational basis” test, which requires that legislative classifications be “ ‘rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.’ ” Ante, at 370, quoting Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 533 (1973). The Court fails to note, however, that this standard of, review, although deferential, “‘is not a toothless one.’” Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181, 185 (1976), quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 510 (1976). The rational-basis test contains two substantive limitations on legislative choice: legislative enactments must implicate legitimate goals, and the means chosen by the legislature must bear a rational relationship to those goals. In an alternative formulation, the Court has explained that these limitations amount to a prescription that “all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432, 439 (1985); see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 216 (1982); Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 76 (1971).

In recent years, the Court has struck down a variety of legislative enactments using the rational-basis test. In some cases, the Court found that the legislature’s goal was not legitimate. See, e. g., Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U. S. 612 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55 (1982). In other cases, the Court found that the classification employed by the legislature did not rationally further the legislature’s goal. See, e. g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972); Reed v. Reed, supra, at 76-77. In addition, the Court on occasion has combined these two approaches, in essence concluding that the lack of a rational relationship between the legislative classification and the purported legislative goal suggests that the true goal is illegitimate. See, e. g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., supra, at 450; Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, supra, at 534. The Court’s failure today to take seriously appellees’ challenge or to address systematically the irrationalities they identify in the striker amendment is difficult to reconcile with these precedents.

The Secretary asserts that the striker amendment is rationally related to three legitimate governmental goals. First, the Secretary points out that denying food stamps to households containing a striker will reduce federal expenditures. Second, the Secretary contends that the striker amendment channels limited public funds to the most needy. Finally, the Secretary maintains that the striker amendment fosters governmental neutrality in private labor disputes. Although the asserted goals are legitimate, it is difficult to discern a rational relationship between them and the striker amendment. The arguments of the Secretary and the Court seeking to establish such a relationship are fraught with pervasive inconsistencies.

A

The Secretary’s argument that the striker amendment will save money proves far too much. According to the Secretary’s reasoning, the exclusion of any unpopular group from a public benefit program would survive rational-basis scrutiny, because exclusion always would result in a decrease in governmental expenditures. Although it is true, as the Court observes, that preserving the fiscal integrity of the Government “‘is a legitimate concern of the State,’” ante, at 373, quoting Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U. S. 471, 493 (1977), this Court expressly has noted that “a concern for the preservation of resources standing alone can hardly.justify the classification used in allocating those resources.” Plyler v. Doe, supra, at 227. We have insisted that such classifications themselves be rational rather than arbitrary. See Reed v. Reed, supra, at 76; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 633 (1968). Our cases thus make clear that something more than an invocation of the public fisc is necessary to demonstrate the rationality of selecting strikers, rather than some other group, to suffer the burden of cost-cutting legislation.

B

Perhaps recognizing this necessity, the Secretary defends the singling out of strikers and their households as rationally related to the goal of channeling resources to those persons most “‘genuinely in need.’” Brief for Appellant 17, quoting 119 Cong. Rec. 24929 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Young). As a threshold matter, however, households denied food stamps because of the presence of a striker are as “needy” in terms of financial resources as households that qualify for food stamps: the former are denied food stamps despite the fact that they meet the financial eligibility requirements of 7 U. S. C. § 2014 (1982 ed. and Supp. IV), even after strike-fund payments are counted as household income. This point has particular poignancy for the infants and children of a striking worker. Their need for nourishment is in no logical way diminished by the striker’s action. The denial to these children of what is often the only buffer between them and malnourishment and disease cannot be justified as a targeting of the most needy: they are the most needy. The record below bears witness to this point in a heartbreaking fashion.

The Secretary argues, however, that the striker amendment is related to need at least in the sense of willingness to work, if not in the strict sense of financial eligibility. Because the Food Stamp Act generally excludes persons unwilling to work — and their households — the Secretary argues that it is consistent to exclude strikers and their households as well, on the ground that strikers remain “unwilling to work,” at least at the struck business, for the duration of the strike. In the Secretary’s eyes, a striker is akin to an unemployed worker who day after day refuses to accept available work. One flaw in this argument is its false factual premise. It is simply not true, as the Secretary argues, that a striker always has a job that “remains available to him.” Reply Memorandum for Appellant 4. Many strikes result in the complete cessation of a business’ operations, so that the decision of an individual striker to return to work would be unavailing. Moreover, many of the businesses that continue to operate during a strike hire permanent replacements for the striking workers. In this situation as well, a striker no longer has the option of returning to work. In fact, the record in this case reveals that a number of appellees were denied food stamps even though they had been permanently replaced by their employers.

But even if it were true that strikers always can return to their jobs, the Secretary’s “willingness to work” rationale falls apart in light of the glaring disparity between the treatment of strikers and the treatment of those who are unwilling to work for other reasons. People who voluntarily quit their jobs are not disqualified from receiving food stamps if, after notice and a hearing, they can demonstrate that they quit with “good cause.” 7 CFR §§273.7(n)(1)(i), (vi) (1987). Moreover, even if the state agency determines that the quit was without good cause, the voluntary quitter is disqualified only for a period of 90 days, and the quitter’s household is disqualified only if the quitter was the “head of household.” §273.7(n)(1)(v). In contrast, a striker is given no opportunity to demonstrate that the strike was for “good cause,” even though strikers frequently allege that unfair labor practices by their employer precipitated the strike. In addition, strikers and their entire households, no matter how minimal the striker’s contribution to the household’s income may have been, are disqualified for the duration of the strike, even if the striker is permanently replaced or business operations temporarily cease.

In a similar vein, the striker amendment expressly distinguishes between strikers and nonstrikers in conditioning eligibility for food stamps on willingness to accept struck work. Unemployed workers may refuse to accept otherwise appropriate employment at a business involved in a strike or a lockout and still remain eligible to receive food stamps — as long as they are not themselves on strike. Only strikers, though they may be as “willing to work” in every salient respect, must give up their eligibility for food stamps if they refuse to cross a picket line. The Secretary’s “willingness to work” argument provides no justification for this especially harsh treatment of strikers and their households.

C

Unable to explain completely the striker amendment by the “willingness to work” rationale, the Secretary relies most heavily on yet a third rationale: the promotion of governmental neutrality in labor disputes. Indeed, the Court relies solely on this explanation in rejecting appellees’ equal protection challenge to the amendment. According to the Secretary and the Court, this last goal rationalizes the discrepancies in the treatment of strikers and voluntary quitters, and of strikers and nonstrikers unwilling to cross a picket line. As the Court explains it, excluding strikers from participation in the food stamp program avoids “undue favoritism to one side or the other in private labor disputes” by preventing governmental “‘subsidization’” of strikes. Ante, at 371, quoting S. Rep. No. 97-139, p. 62 (1981). The Court notes that we accepted a version of this governmental neutrality argument “in a related context” in Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U. S. 471 (1977). See ante, at 372.

As a threshold matter, the Court’s reliance on Hodory to support the Secretary’s argument is misplaced. In Hodory, we upheld a statute that denied unemployment compensation benefits to workers who became unemployed as a result of a labor dispute other than a lockout. The Court reasoned that the denial was rationally related to the goal of maintaining governmental neutrality in labor disputes because the unemployment compensation at issue was partially funded by employer contributions. We recognized that “[t]he employer’s costs go up with every laid-off worker who is qualified to collect unemployment. The only way for the employer to stop these rising costs is to settle the strike so as to return the employees to work. Qualification for unemployment compensation thus acts as a lever increasing the pressures on an employer to settle a strike.” 431 U. S., at 492. The reasoning of Hodory is completely inapplicable to the food stamp context. Employer contributions form no part of food stamp benefits, which are funded instead by general public revenues; receipt of food stamps by strikers therefore places no special or coercive burden on the strikers’ employer.

More important, the “neutrality” argument on its merits is both deceptive and deeply flawed. Even on the most superficial level, the striker amendment does not treat the parties to a labor dispute evenhandedly: forepersons and other management employees who may become temporarily unemployed when a business ceases to operate during a strike remain eligible for food stamps. Management’s burden during the course of the dispute is thus lessened by the receipt of public funds, whereas labor must struggle unaided. This disparity cannot be justified by the argument that the strike is labor’s “fault,” because strikes are often a direct response to illegal practices by management, such as failure to abide by the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement or refusal to bargain in good faith.

On a deeper level, the “neutrality” argument reflects a profoundly inaccurate view of the relationship of the modern Federal Government to the various parties to a labor dispute. Both individuals and businesses are connected to the Government by a complex web of supports and incentives. On the one hand, individuals may be eligible to receive a wide variety of health, education, and welfare-related benefits. On the other hand, businesses may be eligible to receive a myriad of tax subsidies through deductions, depreciation, and credits, or direct subsidies in the form of Government loans through the Small Business Administration (SBA). Businesses also may receive lucrative Government contracts and invoke the protections of the Bankruptcy Act against their creditors. None of these governmental subsidies to businesses is made contingent on the businesses’ abstention from labor disputes, even if a labor dispute is the direct cause of the claim to a subsidy. For example, a small business in need of financial support because of labor troubles may seek a loan from the SBA. See 15 U. S. C. § 661 et seq. And a business that claims a net operating loss as a result of a strike or a lockout presumably may carry the loss back three years and forward five years in order to maximize its tax advantage. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 172, 381, 382. In addition, it appears that businesses may be eligible for special tax credits for hiring replacement workers during a strike under the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit program. See BNA Daily Labor Report No. 68, p. A-6 (April 10, 1987). When viewed against the network of governmental support of both labor and management, the withdrawal of the single support of food stamps — a support critical to the continued life and health of an individual worker and his or her family — cannot be seen as a “neutral” act. Altering the backdrop of governmental support in this one-sided and devastating way-amounts to a penalty on strikers, riot neutrality.

D

In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432 (1985), we concluded that the insubstantiality of each of the city’s asserted justifications for the ordinance at issue suggested that the ordinance in fact rested “on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.” Id., at 450. The successive failure of each of the Secretary’s purported rationales for the striker amendment likewise suggests that the enactment at issue here rests on public animus toward strikers. This conclusion draws substantial support from the legislative history of the precursors of the 1981 amendment. Beginning in 1968, four years after the enactment of the Food Stamp Act, Congress considered at regular intervals proposals similar or identical to the striker amendment eventually passed in 198.1. Such proposals were considered and rejected in 1968, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, and 1977. Each time a proposal was discussed on the floor of the House, Representatives decried the “antiunion” and “antistrike” animus that motivated it. In 1977, the House Committee on Agriculture reviewed the history of such proposals and rejected the most recent one, explaining its decision as follows:

“The real purpose of the amendment . . . was not to restore some government neutrality allegedly lost because strikers are eligible for food stamps but, on the contrary, to use a denial of food stamps as a pressure on the worker — or more accurately on his family — to help break a strike.....
“The amendment was an effort to increase the power of management over workers, using food as a weapon in collective bargaining.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-464, p. 129 (1977).

I am mindful that the views expressed on the floor of the House and in the 1977 Committee Report were from those opposed to the striker amendment. But the evidence of animus is not limited to statements by the amendment’s opponents. Rather, supporters of the striker amendment likened strikers to “hippies” and “commune residents” — groups whose exclusion from the food stamp program this Court struck down 15 years ago in Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528 (1973). The exhortation by the sponsor of the 1971 version of the striker amendment to his colleagues to “say to strikers what we have said ... to hippies,” 117 Cong. Rec. 21673 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Michel), strongly suggests that the same sort of hostility informed the two amendments, although the striker amendment was not enácted into law until 1981. Our warning in Moreno that “a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest'’ 413 U. S., at 534, would seem directly applicable to the instant case. I find the Court’s refusal to heed that warning both inexplicable and ill considered.

II

I agree with the Court that “[i]t was no part of the purposes of the Food Stamp Act to establish a program that would serve as a weapon in labor disputes.” Ante, at 371. The striker amendment under consideration today, however, seems to have precisely that pur posé — one admittedly irreconcilable with the legitimate goals of the food stamp program. No other purpose can adequately explain the especially harsh treatment reserved for strikers and their families by the 1981 enactment. Because I conclude that the striker amendment cannot survive even rational-basis scrutiny, I would affirm the District Court’s invalidation of the amendment. I dissent.

       Included were such fundamental changes as redefining the requirements to constitute a family unit, reducing the gross income eligibility standard (except for the elderly and the disabled), and adjusting the levels of deductions that are allowed to recipients. §§ 101, 104(a), 105, 106, 115. The Committee Reports estimated that these changes in the food stamp program would save several billion dollars in fiscal years 1982, 1983, and 1984. H. R. Rep. No. 97-158, pp. 11-13 (1981) (hereafter H. R. Rep.); S. Rep. No. 97-139, pp. 52-70 (1981) (hereafter S. Rep.).

       “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a household shall not participate in the food stamp program at any time that any member of the household, not exempt from the work registration requirements ... is on strike as defined in section 142(2) of title 29, because of a labor dispute (other than a lockout) as defined in section 152(9) of title 29: Provided, That a household shall not lose its eligibility to participate in the food stamp program as a result of one of its members going on strike if the household was eligible for food stamps immediately prior to such strike, however, such household shall not receive an increased allotment as the result of a decrease in the income of the striking member or members of the household: Provided further, That such ineligibility shall not apply to any household that does not contain a member on strike, if any of its members refuses to accept employment at a plant or site because of a strike or lockout.” OBRA, § 109, 95 Stat. 361, 7 U. S. C. § 2015(d)(3).

       The District Court did not find that any individuals had left their households in order to increase their allotment of food stamps. It found instead only that some individuals “have been told by state agencies or have learned that they can avoid household disqualification by having the striker leave the household.” 648 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (DC 1986). Appellees note that one striker’s spouse and children left the household after he was denied food stamps, and that the couple was subsequently divorced. Affidavit of Mark Dyer, ¶¶ 4-8, App. 25-26; Deposition of Mark Dyer,.id, at 82-83.

       The District Court found that one individual quit his job and abandoned his union membership in order to receive food stamps, and another individual left a picket line to seek other work and lost his union membership. 648 F. Supp., at 1237. Some other strikers have voted to ratify or accept collective-bargaining agreements that were less favorable than they wished, motivated by lack of wages as a result of being out of work and, to a lesser degree, lack of food stamps. Ibid.

       It is clear from previous decisions that associational rights “are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference,” Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 523 (1960), and that these rights can be abridged even by government actions that do not directly restrict individuals’ ability to associate freely. See, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 183 (1972). But none of these cases indicates that the statute challenged here “will affect in any significant way the existing members’ ability to carry out their various purposes.” Board of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U. S., at 548. The Court has found, for example, that compulsory disclosure of the membership lists of an organization, which led to harassment, physical threats, and economic reprisals against those individuals, worked “a substantial restraint upon the exercise by petitioner’s members of their right to freedom of association.” NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 462 (1958). We also have held that the First Amendment “restricts the ability of the State to impose liability on an individual solely because of his association with another” when the individual lacks the specific intent to further any illegal aims that may be promoted by other members of a group. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 919-920 (1982). The facts of this case, however, do not demonstrate any “significant” interference with appellees’ associational rights of the magnitude found in decisions like Patterson and Claiborne Hardware. Exposing the members of an association to physical and economic reprisals or to civil liability merely because of their membership in that group poses a much greater danger to the exercise of associational freedoms than does the withdrawal of a government benefit based not on membership in an organization but merely for the duration of one activity that may be undertaken by that organization.

       The decision in Hodory was based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and not on the First Amendment, but our application of rational-basis review to the constitutional claim raised in that case indicated that fundamental rights guaranteed by the First Amendment were not implicated there.

       Appellees rely heavily on Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), in which we held that a State violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment when it denied unemployment benefits to a woman whose religious beliefs did not allow her to work on Saturday. That decision, however, “was decided in the significantly different context of a constitutionally imposed ‘governmental obligation of neutrality’ originating in the Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.” Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 475, n. 8 (1977). The reasoning of Sherbert has not been applied in other contexts, and is inapposite here as shown by our decision in Hodory, which found no fundamental rights to be infringed by a State’s denial of unemployment benefits to a man who was unable to work as a result of a labor dispute.

       We reject the proposition that strikers as a class are entitled to special treatment under the Equal Protection Clause. City of Charlotte v. Firefighters, 426 U. S. 283, 286 (1976); Hodory, 431 U. S., at 489. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528 (1973), does not counsel otherwise. There we upheld an equal protection, challenge to a provision of the Food Stamp Act and concluded that “a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” Id., at 534 (emphasis in original). This statement is merely an application of the usual rational-basis test: if a statute is not rationally related to any legitimate governmental objective, it cannot be saved from constitutional challenge by a defense that relates it to an illegitimate governmental interest. Accordingly, in Moreno itself we examined the challenged provision under the rational-basis standard of review. Id., at 533.

       For example, one who voluntarily quits a job is disqualified for food stamps for 90 days. Thereafter, he is eligible as long as he registers for work and cannot find a job. 7 CFR § 273.7(n)(1)(v) (1987). The striker, unless he quits his job, is disqualified for as long as he is on strike. § 273.1(g).

       Because I conclude that the striker amendment fails the deferential rational-basis test, I see no need to address whether stricter scrutiny should apply to protect the First Amendment interests asserted by appellees, although I am unconvinced by the Court’s treatment of that issue as well.

       In addition, there is substantial reason to question the invocation of the public fisc in this case. Statistics available to Congress at the time of the enactment of the striker amendment indicated that strikers rarely met the financial eligibility requirements of the food stamp program and thus rarely participated in the program. A Government Accounting Office study found that in four out of five periods studied, 89 to 96 percent of strikers did not participate in the food stamp program. In the fifth period, which included the 1978 coal strike, 64 percent of strikers did not participate. 127 Cong. Rec. 12157 (1981) (remarks of Sen. Levin). The strikers who do participate in the food stamp program apparently account for only a very small percentage of total program outlays. Statistical information collected by the House Committee on Agriculture in 1975 indicated that households containing strikers accounted for only 0.2 to 0.3 percent of non-public-assistance households participating in the food stamp program. H. R. Rep. No. 95-464, p. 128 (1977).

       See Declaration of Donald A. Bivens, App. 8 (“My two younger children were sick a great deal during the period of the strike and I believe it was, in part, due to a lack of nourishment”); Declaration of Johnie B. Blake, id., at 11 (finding it “nearly impossible to get adequate food for [household of] seven people” during strike); Affidavit of Barm Combs, id., at 20 (“My daughter Jennifer Ann, who has serious kidney problems, was missing needed medical treatment and medication”); Declaration of Robert J. Shorb, Jr., id., at 47 (“[0]ur children were in danger of not having enough to eat. Therefore, we had to send them to live with their grandparents in New York State so that they would get enough nourishment”).

       See Declaration of Ray Westfall, id., at 51; Supplemental Declaration of Johnie B. Blake, id., at 14-15; Affidavit of Donald Gibson, id., at 34; Affidavit of Zola Higgins, id., at 37.

       “Good cause” as defined in the applicable regulations includes, inter alia, “[discrimination by an employer based on age, race, sex, color, handicap, religious beliefs, national origin or political beliefs,” 7 CFR § 273.7(n)(3)(i) (1987), “[w]ork demands or conditions that render continued employment unreasonable, such as working without being paid on schedule,” §273.7(n)(3)(ii), or work conditions under which “[t]he degree of risk to health and safety is unreasonable,” § 273.7(i)(2)(i), incorporated by reference in §273.7(n)(3)(vi).

       See, e. g., Affidavit of Zola Higgins, App. 36-37; Affidavit of Paul David Michel, id., at 39-40; Declaration of Ray Westfall, id., at 51-52.

       In addition, strikers may not become eligible for food stamps even if they demonstrate their “willingness to work” by registering for and accepting alternative interim employment. Indeed, the fact that strikers had been subject to the same work registration and acceptance requirements as all other food stamp applicants prior to the enactment of the striker amendment easts considerable doubt on the Secretary’s argument that the amendment’s purpose was to ensure that food stamp recipients are “willing to work.” Cf. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 537 (1973) (existence of fraud provisions prior to the amendment denying food stamps to households containing unrelated persons “necessarily casts considerable doubt upon the proposition that the 1971 amendment could rationally have been intended to prevent those very same abuses”).

       See, e. g., 116 Cong. Rec. 42019 (1970) (decrying “the apparent anti-strike aspect” of the proposed amendment) (remarks of Rep. Conyers); 117 Cong. Rec. 21675 (1971) (“This amendment cannot be justified by any public good that could come of it; none can. It is at its base mean-spirited, vindictive and vengeful”) (remarks of Rep. Foley); 118 Cong. Rec. 23376 (1972) (“Those seeking to pass this amendment are simply opposed to strikes . . . and hope to assist the employer in breaking a strike with this cruel amendment”) (remarks of Rep. Koch); 119 Cong. Rec. 24931 (1973) (“This amendment is punitive, antilabor, antiunion, unfair, and discriminatory”) (remarks of Rep. Foley); id., at 24934 (“I think it would be unconstitutional ... for us to say that we can cut out a segment of our society just because they are doing something that some other segment of our society does not like”) (remarks of Rep. Casey); 120 Cong. Rec. 20614 (1974) (noting that voluntary quitters, convicted felons, and alcoholics may receive food stamps and that the striker amendment “only draws the line against one small group of people”) (remarks of Rep. O’Hara).

       See 117 Cong. Rec. 21673 (1971) (We should “say to strikers what we have said to students, to hippies, and others— ‘. . . if you are one of the voluntarily poor, you must look to your own resources for help’ ”) (remarks of Rep. Michel); 119 Cong. Rec. 24931 (1973) (“[I]n the early history of the program, food stamps for strikers, college students, hippies, and commune residents never entered into the minds of food stamp proponents”) (remarks of Rep. Goodling).

       The remarks of Representatives over the years admittedly express the views of different Congresses from the one that eventually passed the 1981 striker amendment. Nonetheless, the length of time over which the same proposal was considered and the frequent references over the years by Representatives to former colloquies on the matter, see, e. g., 117 Cong. Rec. 21672 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Michel) (referring to 1970 debate); 119 Cong. Rec. 24933 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Casey) (referring to 1971 debate); H. R. Rep. No. 95-464, pp. 122-127 (1977) (canvassing the amendment’s legislative history from 1968 to 1977), strongly suggest that these earlier discussions informed the 1981 decision.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    BOWEN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. KIZER, DIRECTOR OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES, et al.
    No. 86-863.
    Argued November 10, 1987
    Decided March 23, 1988

      Deputy Solicitor General Merrill argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Lauber, Jerrold J. Ganzfried, and Richard Olderman.

      Ralph Johnson, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, and Evelyn R. Frank.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Maryland et al. by Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina, and Henry T. Rosser, Assistant Attorney General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: W. J. Michael Cody of Tennessee, Nicholas J. Spaeth of North Dakota, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Robert M. Spire of Nebraska, and Ken Eikenberry of Washington; and for the California Association of Public Hospitals et al. by Mark S. Windisch.

   Per Curiam.

We granted the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ petition for certiorari, 479 U. S. 1083 (1987), in order to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that the Secretary unlawfully rejected a California Medicaid plan amendment because an internal agency manual stating approval of the type of provision in question was a binding regulation, and because acceptance of the amendment was required by § 2373(c) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1112, note following 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (1982 ed., Supp. III). Cubanski v. Heckler, 781 F. 2d 1421 (1986). After the case had been briefed and argued, Congress enacted § 4106 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330, which required the Secretary to approve the proposed California amendment, retroactively to the date of its proposal. The Secretary has complied with that requirement.

The parties agree that these developments have rendered the controversy moot. In accordance with our established practice, we vacate the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remand with instructions to dismiss the suit. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U. S. 193, 200, 204 (1988); United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39-40 (1950).

It is so ordered.

Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    TEXAS v. NEW MEXICO
    No. 65, Orig.
    Decided May 19, 1980 and June 17, 1983
    Order entered June 11, 1984
    Decided and decree entered June 8, 1987
    Decided and amended decree and order entered March 28, 1988
   Per Curiam.

Last Term we issued a decree in this case which enjoined the State of New Mexico “to comply with its Article 111(a) obligation under the Pecos River Compact and to determine the extent of its obligation in accordance with the formula approved by the decisions of this Court.” Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U. S. 124, 133 (1987). We retained jurisdiction for the purpose of any order, direction, or modification of the decree as might be deemed proper. In particular, we approved the Special Master’s recommendation that a River Master be appointed in this case, and requested that on remand the Special Master “recommend an amendment to the decree, specifying as he deems necessary the duties of the River Master and the consequences of his determinations. Any other suggestions for amendments should also be called to our attention.” Id., at 135.

The Special Master has now submitted a report, which includes a proposed amended decree. New Mexico’s.motion for leave to file a reply brief is granted. New Mexico’s exceptions to the report are overruled. The report is approved and an amended decree will issue forthwith. The- Special Master has also recommended a person to serve as River Master. We accept that recommendation.

AMENDED DECREE

It Is Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed That:

I

DEFINITIONS

A. For purposes of this Decree:

1. “Accounting year” is the calendar year during which the River Master makes the calculations required by Article III.B.l. below; “water year” is the calendar year immediately preceding the accounting year.
2. “Manual” is the Pecos River Master’s Manual admitted into evidence as Texas Exhibit 108, which is an integral part of this Decree. The Manual may be modified from time to time in accordance with the terms of this Decree.
3. “Overage” is the amount of water delivered by New Mexico in any water year which exceeded the Article 111(a) obligation for that year.
4. “Shortfall” is the amount by which the water delivered by New Mexico in any water year fell short of the Article 111(a) obligation for that year.

II

INJUNCTION

A. The State of New Mexico, its officers, attorneys, agents, and employees are hereby enjoined:

1. To comply with Article 111(a) of the Pecos River Compact and to meet the obligation thereof by delivering water to Texas at state line as prescribed in this Decree.
2. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of a final Report of the River Master identifying a shortfall, to submit to the River Master a proposed plan providing for verifiable action by New Mexico that will increase the amount of water at state line prior to March 31 of the year following the accounting year by the amount of the shortfall. In order to identify the incremental amount of water being delivered to Texas to satisfy a prior shortfall, the plan shall:
(a) Identify the specific actions to be taken by New Mexico to increase the amount of water flowing to Texas, including, if applicable, the points at which water will enter the river or diversions will be curtailed;
(b) Specify the dates and times the actions will be taken;
(c) Provide a calculation under the procedures and equations set forth in the Manual of the amount of water that can be presumed to arrive at state line as a result of the actions;
(d) Identify the means by which the actions can be verified and provide assurances that documents and data necessary for verification will be submitted to the River Master within thirty (30) days from the date the actions are taken;
(e) Provide guarantees that the water to be delivered pursuant to the plan will not be diverted within New Mexico.
3. To comply prior to March 31 of the year following the accounting year with the terms of an Approved Plan to remedy any shortfall. Compliance with an Approved Plan will be deemed to satisfy the shortfall. Subject to the review provided in Article III.D. of this Decree, the calculations made pursuant to Article II.A.2(c), as approved by the River Master, shall be determinative of the amount of water delivered at state line.

III

RIVER MASTER

A. Appointment. The appointment of a River Master is made by the attached Order of Appointment.

B. Duties. The River Master shall perform the following duties:

1. Calculate in accounting year 1988, beginning with water year 1987, and continuing every year thereafter, pursuant to the methodology set forth in the Manual:
(a) The Article 111(a) obligation;
(b) Any shortfall or overage, which calculation shall disregard deliveries of water pursuant to an Approved Plan;
(c) The net shortfall, if any, after subtracting any overages accumulated in previous years, beginning with water year 1987.
2. Deliver to the parties a Preliminary Report setting forth the tentative results of the calculations required by Section III.B.l. of this Decree by May 15 of the accounting year;
3. Consider any written objections to the Preliminary Report submitted by the parties prior to June 15 of the accounting year;
4. Deliver to the parties a Pinal Report setting forth the final results of the calculations required by Section III.B.l. of this Decree by July 1 of the accounting year;
5. Review any plan proposed by New Mexico pursuant to Article II. A.2. of this Decree for its efficacy in satisfying any shortfall and consider any written objections to the plan which are submitted by Texas by September 1 of the accounting year.
6. Modify the proposed plan as is deemed necessary to ensure satisfaction of the shortfall and deliver to the parties such Approved Plan by October 1 of the accounting year;
7. Deliver to the parties and file with this Court a Compliance Report by June 1 of the year following any accounting year in which there is an Approved Plan, which report shall include a finding of New Mexico’s compliance or noncompliance with the terms of the Approved Plan and the reasons for such finding.

C. 'Modification of Manual.

1. The River Master shall modify the Manual in accordance with any written agreement of the parties. Such written agreement shall state the effective date of the modification and whether it is to be retroactive. If retroactive, the agreement shall specify the procedures for making the retroactive adjustments.
2. Absent written agreement of the parties, upon motion by either party and for good, cause shown, the River Master may modify the Manual. Opposition to any such motion shall be submitted to the River Master in writing within thirty (30) days after service of the motion or within such extended time as may be allowed by the River Master. Additional written submissions and any oral presentation will be at the River Master’s discretion. The River Master may adopt, reject, or amend the proposed modification and shall serve upon the parties his or her written Modification Determination and the grounds therefor. The River Master may also defer decision on a proposed modification, but if no action is taken within one (1) year of its submission, the motion shall be deemed denied.
3. A modification of the Manual by motion shall be first applicable to the water year in which the modification becomes effective.
4. All modifications of the Manual shall be transmitted immediately to the Clerk of this Court and shall be retained in the files for this case.

D. Effect ofRiver Master’s Determination. Unless stayed by this Court, any Final Report, Approved Plan, Compliance Report, or Modification Determination (hereinafter, collectively, “Final Determination”) shall be effective upon its adoption, and shall be subject to review by this Court only on a showing that the Final Determination is clearly erroneous. A party seeking review of a Final Determination must file a motion with the Clerk of this Court within thirty (30) days of its adoption, which motion shall set forth the Final Determination on which review is sought and a concise statement of the basis of the claim that the Final Determination is clearly erroneous.

E. Authority of Pecos River Commission. Nothing in this Decree is intended to displace the authority of the Pecos River Commission to administer the Pecos River Compact, and if the Commissioners reach agreement on any matter, the parties shall advise the Court and seek an appropriate amendment to this Decree.

F. Communication with River Master. Ex parte communications with the River Master are forbidden. Any written communication with the River Master by motion or otherwise shall be simultaneously served by mail on the opposing party. Any oral communication with the River Master shall be made in the presence of the opposing party, whether by telephone conference call or in person.

G. Distribution of Costs. The compensation of, and the costs and expenses incurred by, the River Master shall be approved by the Court and borne equally by the State of Texas and the State of New Mexico.

IV

DISMISSAL OF UNITED STATES

A. The United States is dismissed from this proceeding without prejudice.

V

RETENTION OF JURISDICTION

The Court retains jurisdiction of this suit for the purpose of any order, direction, or modification of the Decree, or any supplementary decree, that may at any time be deemed proper in relation to the subject matter in controversy.

ORDER APPOINTING RIVER MASTER

It Is Ordered that Neil S. Grigg be and he hereby is appointed River Master of the Pecos River for the purpose of performing the duties set forth in the Amended Decree of March 28, 1988.

It Is Further Ordered that the River Master shall have the power and authority to subpoena information or data, compiled in reasonable usable form, which he deems necessary or desirable for the proper and efficient performance of his duties.

It Is Further Ordered that the River Master is allowed his necessary expenses and reasonable fees for his services, statements for which shall be submitted quarterly to the Court for its approval. Upon Court approval, such statements will be paid by the State of New Mexico and the State of Texas.

It Is Further Ordered that if the position of River Master becomes vacant during a recess of the Court, The Chief Justice shall have authority to make a new designation which shall have the same effect as if originally made by the Court.

Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    BENNETT v. ARKANSAS
    No. 86-6124.
    Argued March 2, 1988
    Decided March 29, 1988

      Thomas M. Carpenter, by appointment of the Court, 484 U. S. 921, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Charles L. Carpenter and Charles L. Carpenter, Jr.

      Richard J. Lazarus argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Merrill, Charles A. Rothfeld, John F. Cordes, and John P. Schnitker.

      J. Steven Clark, Attorney General of Arkansas, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Clint Miller, Assistant Attorney General.

        Michael John Mirra and Robert A. Stalker filed a brief for Lawrence McDowell as amicus curiae urging reversal.

   Per Curiam.

This case involves an attempt by the State of Arkansas to attach certain federal benefits paid to individuals who are incarcerated in Arkansas prisons. In 1981, Arkansas adopted the State Prison Inmate Care and Custody Reimbursement Act, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 46-1701 et seq. (Supp. 1985), a statute that authorizes the State to seize a prisoner’s property or “estate” in order to help defray the cost of maintaining its prison system. The Act specifically defines “estate” to include a prisoner’s federal Social Security benefits, as well as other types of pension or retirement benefits. §46-1702(d). The State filed separate actions in state court seeking to attach Social Security benefits that had been paid to petitioner Bennett and Veterans’ Administration (VA) disability pension benefits that were paid to another inmate, Shelton. In relevant part, the inmates responded by arguing that the Arkansas statute violates the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution because it permits the State to attach funds that federal law exempts from legal process. In particular, petitioner pointed to 42 U. S. C. § 407(a) (1982 ed., Supp. III), which provides that “none of the moneys paid or payable . . . under [the Social Security Act] shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process. ” Similarly, Shelton- contended that attachment of his VA benefits is inconsistent with 38 U. S. C. § 3101(a), which provides that such benefits “shall be exempt from the claim of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary.”

The state trial court rejected the inmates’ arguments and directed that a portion of each of their benefits be seized. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed, with one justice dissenting. 290 Ark. 47, 716 S. W. 2d 755 (1986). Briefly stated, the court found that there is no conflict between the federal and state statutes because “the federal statutes contain an implied exception to the exemption from legal process when the State provides for the care and maintenance of a beneficiary of social security or veterans’ funds.” Id., at 49, 716 S. W. 2d, at 756. We granted Bennett’s petition for certiorari. 484 U. S. 895 (1987).

We think — contrary to the conclusion of the Supreme Court of Arkansas — that there is a clear inconsistency between the Arkansas statute and 42 U. S. C. § 407(a) (1982 ed., Supp. III). Section 407(a) unambiguously rules out any attempt to attach Social Security benefits. The Arkansas statute just as unambiguously allows the State to attach those benefits. As we see it, this amounts to a “conflict” under the Supremacy Clause — a conflict that the State cannot win. See Rose v. Arkansas State Police, 479 U. S. 1 (1986). We reject the State’s attempt to avoid this conclusion by arguing that the federal statute contains an “implied exception” that would allow attachment of otherwise exempted federal payments simply because the State has provided the recipient with “care and maintenance.” We declined to find such an exception in Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, 409 U. S. 413 (1973), where we held that § 407 bars a State from attempting to attach Social Security benefits as reimbursement for state welfare assistance payments. Philpott may be factually distinguishable on the ground that there the State provided for only part of the needs of the Social Security recipient while here the State provides for all of the prisoners’ needs, see Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, State of Fla. v. Davis, 616 F. 2d 828, 830 (CA5 1980) (relying on such a distinction). But we do not think that such a distinction carries the day given the express language of § 407(a) and the clear intent of Congress that Social Security benefits not be attachable.

Nor do we think that the State’s “implied exception” argument is supported by our decision last Term in Rose v. Rose, 481 U. S. 619 (1987). There we held that 38 U. S.C. § 3101 did not bar a state court from holding a disabled veteran in contempt for failing to pay child support, even though the veteran’s only means of paying his obligation was to use his VA disability benefits. But in that case we held that the benefits in question were designed by Congress to support not only the recipient of the benefits, but also his dependents. Accordingly, allowing the state court in that case to enforce a valid child support order was fully consistent with the underlying intent of § 3101, which was in part to “'prevent the deprivation and depletion of the means of subsistence’ ” of the beneficiaries of the federal payments. Id., at 630 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1243, pp. 147-148 (1976)). Here, in contrast, the State cannot be said to be a “beneficiary” of petitioner’s Social Security benefits.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas is

Reversed.

       Arkansas Stat. Ann. § 46-1704(a) (Supp. 1985) provides that the estate of a person incarcerated in a penal facility of the Arkansas Department of Correction “may be subjected to the payment to the State of the expenses paid and to be paid by it on behalf of said person as a prisoner.” Arkansas Stat. Ann. § 46-1702(b) (Supp. 1985) defines “estate” as “any properties, tangible or intangible, real or personal, belonging to or due an inmate confined to an institution of the Department of Correction, including income or payments to such inmate from Social Security, previously earned salary or wages, bonuses, annuities, pensions or retirement benefits, or from any source whatsoever.”

       Shelton’s separate petition for certiorari was not docketed by the Court due to his failure to file an affidavit to accompany his motion to proceed informa pauperis. See this Court’s Rule 46.1. Accordingly the only issue directly before us is the propriety of the State’s attempt to attach Bennett’s Social Security benefits.


author: Justice Kennedy

text:
    BETHESDA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION et al. v. BOWEN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
    No. 86-1764.
    Argued February 29, 1988
    Decided April 4, 1988

      Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Leonard C. Homer argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Carel T. Hedlund.

      Andrew J. Pincus argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Wallace, Assistant Attorney General Willard, and Deputy Solicitor General Merrill.

        Linda A. Tomaselli and Stuart M. Gerson filed a brief for the American Hospital Association as amicus curiae urging reversal.

   Justice Kennedy

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the Medicare program, Title XVÍII of the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 291, 42 U. S. C. § 1395 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III), certain qualified providers of health care services are reimbursed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services for the reasonable cost of providing covered services to Medicare beneficiaries. Each such provider submits a cost report at the end of the year to a fiscal intermediary, usually a private insurance company acting as an agent for the Secretary. The fiscal intermediary audits the cost report and issues a Notice of Program Reimbursement specifying the amount of reimbursement due to the provider and explaining any adjustments.

A provider may appeal the intermediary’s final determination to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board and, under certain circumstances, may obtain a hearing from the Board. The Board is authorized to affirm, modify, or reverse intermediary decisions. The Secretary, either on his own motion or on request of the provider, may review the matter further, and any provider that remains dissatisfied with a final decision of the Board or Secretary may seek review in a United States district court. §§ 1395oo(a), (d), (f).

This case requires us to decide whether the Board may decline to consider a provider’s challenge to one of the Secretary’s regulations on the ground that the provider failed to contest the regulation’s validity in the cost report submitted to its fiscal intermediary.

I

Petitioners Bethesda Hospital Association and Deaconess Hospital of Cincinnati are Ohio entities that operate hospitals in that State. Bethesda and Deaconess joined with some 27 other hospitals to challenge a 1979 regulation promulgated by the Secretary, which disallowed certain claims for malpractice insurance premium costs. We are not concerned here with the merits of the challenge to the 1979 regulation; rather, we must decide whether the Board had jurisdiction to consider the issue.

In their cost reports for 1980, petitioners followed the 1979 regulation in their apportionment of malpractice insurance costs and thereby effected, in the lexicon of the Medicare program, a “self-disallowance” of malpractice insurance costs in excess of those allowed by the 1979 regulation. Petitioners later filed a timely request for a hearing before the Board, challenging the validity of the malpractice regulation and seeking reimbursement for malpractice costs in accordance with the pre-1979 methodology. Because the amounts had been self-disallowed in the reports filed with the fiscal intermediary, however, the Board determined that it was without jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ claims. The Board held, in essence, that a statutory condition to its jurisdiction had not been met, stating that its authority to grant hearings is limited to cases in which the provider is “dissatisfied with a final determination of the . . . fiscal intermediary,” and reasoning that petitioners could not be dissatisfied when they had effected a self-disallowance of the claims. The District Court, in disagreement with the Board’s reasoning, held that the Board should have exercised jurisdiction over the matter. Bethesda Hospital v. Heckler, 609 F. Supp. 1360, 1368 (SD Ohio 1985).

The Secretary appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the District Court. The Court of Appeals stated that “[w]ere we considering this issue as a matter of first impression, we may well haye reached a different conclusion as to the advisability of requiring submission of statutory and/or constitutional challenges to a private insurance company as a condition precedent to further administrative as well as judicial review of the Secretary’s regulations.” Bethesda Hospital v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 810 F. 2d 558, 562 (1987). The court found itself bound, however, by the decision of a prior panel in Baptist Hospital East v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 802 F. 2d 860 (1986), where it was held that the Board had properly “refused to exercise jurisdiction over those claims by providers who had self-disallowed reimbursement and had failed to challenge the Secretary’s regulations before the fiscal intermediary.” Bethesda Hospital v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, supra, at 561. We granted certiorari, 484 U. S. 813 (1987), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals. We now reverse.

II

The plain meaning of the statute decides the issue presented. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 432, and n. 12 (1987); Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984). The parties agree that §1395oo(a) addresses the circumstances in which a provider may invoke the Board’s jurisdiction. To the extent pertinent here, § 1395oo(a) states that a provider may obtain a hearing before the Board with respect to its cost report if

“(1) such provider—
“(A)(i) is dissatisfied with a final determination of . . . its fiscal intermediary ... as to the amount of total program reimbursement due the provider... for the period covered by such report. . .
“(2) the amount in controversy is $10,000 or more, and
“(3) such provider files a request for a hearing within 180 days . . . 42 U. S. C. §1395oo(a) (1982 ed. and Supp. III).

The Secretary contends that the requirement that a provider be “dissatisfied with a final determination of. . . its fiscal intermediary” necessarily incorporates an exhaustion requirement. In the Secretary’s view, a provider’s right to a hearing before the Board extends only to claims presented to a fiscal intermediary because the provider cannot be “dissatisfied” with the intermediary’s decision to award the amounts requested in the provider’s cost report. Petitioners counter that it would have been improper, or at least irregular, to submit a claim for cost reimbursement in a manner prohibited by the regulations, and that it was correct to raise their challenge in the first instance by presenting the matter to the Board.

The strained interpretation offered by the Secretary is inconsistent with the express language of the statute. We agree that, under subsection (a)(1)(A)(i), a provider’s dissatisfaction with the amount of its total reimbursement is a condition to the Board’s jurisdiction. It is clear, however, that the submission of a cost report in full compliance with the unambiguous dictates of the Secretary’s rules and regulations does not, by itself, bar the provider from claiming dissatisfaction with the amount of reimbursement allowed by those regulations. No statute or regulation expressly mandates that a challenge to the validity of a regulation be submitted first to the fiscal intermediary. Providers know that, under the statutory scheme, the fiscal intermediary is confined to the mere application of the Secretary’s regulations, that the intermediary is without power to award reimbursement except as the regulations provide, and that any attempt to persuade the intermediary to do otherwise would be futile. Thus, petitioners stand on different ground than do providers who bypass a clearly prescribed exhaustion requirement or who fail to request from the intermediary reimbursement for all costs to which they are entitled under applicable rules. While such defaults might well establish that a provider was satisfied with the amounts requested in its cost report and awarded by the fiscal intermediary, those circumstances are not presented here. We conclude that petitioners could claim dissatisfaction, within the meaning of the statute, without incorporating their challenge in the cost reports filed with their fiscal intermediaries.

While the express language of subsection (a) requires the result we reach in the present case, our conclusion is also supported by the language and design of the statute as a whole. Cf. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U. S. 207, 220-221 (1986). Section 1395oo(d), which sets forth the powers and duties of the Board once its jurisdiction has been invoked, explicitly provides that in making its decision whether to affirm, modify, or reverse the intermediary’s decision, the Board can “make any other revisions on matters covered by such cost report . . . even though such matters were not considered by the intermediary in making such final determination.” This language allows the Board, once it obtains jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (a), to review and revise a cost report with respect to matters not contested before the fiscal intermediary. The only limitation prescribed by Congress is that the matter must have been “covered by such cost report,” that is, a cost or expense that was incurred within the period for which the cost report was filed, even if such cost or expense was not expressly claimed.

Neither the fiscal intermediary nor the Board has the authority to declare regulations invalid. It does not follow, however, that the statute treats the two entities alike or that it requires the provider to announce its regulatory challenge at each level; for the Board has a statutory function that the fiscal intermediary does not have. Subsection (f)(1) grants providers the right to obtain judicial review of an action of the fiscal intermediary, but the predicate is that the Board must first make a determination that it is without authority to decide the matter because the provider’s claim involves a question of law or regulations. It is this determination of the Board, or alternatively the Board’s failure to act, that triggers the right of judicial review.

The Secretary notes that subsection (f)(1) posits review of an “action of the fiscal intermediary,” and argues that without presenting the intermediary with the challenge to the regulation there can be no action to review. The statute provides, however, that the intermediary has no authority to deviate from the rules and regulations and that the Board, not the fiscal intermediary, is to make the determination that it lacks the requisite authority to consider the validity of the regulation. Under this statutory scheme, requiring submission of the regulatory challenge to the fiscal intermediary is quite unnecessary. The Board has a role in shaping the controversy that is subject to judicial review; the fiscal intermediary does not.

Finally, the Secretary’s proffered requirement of notice to the fiscal intermediary is internally inconsistent. The Secretary cannot maintain, on the one hand, that it is of vital importance to present challenges to the Secretary’s regulations in the first instance to the fiscal intermediary and, on the other, acknowledge that a mere cover letter would suffice because the fiscal intermediary lacks authority to rule on the challenge. By objecting to the regulation in the first instance in proceedings before the Board, the petitioners protected their right to judicial review.

We hold that the plain language of the statute demonstrates that the Provider Reimbursement Review Board had jurisdiction to entertain this action. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

       Compare Bethesda Hospital v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 810 F. 2d 558 (CA6 1987) (case below) (finding there is no Board jurisdiction); North Broward Hospital Dist. v. Bowen, 808 F. 2d 1405 (CA11 1987) (same), cert. pending, No. 86-1986; Community Hospital of Roanoke Valley v. Health and Human Services, 770 F. 2d 1257 (CA4 1985) (same); Athens Community Hospital, Inc. v. Schweiker, 222 U. S. App. D. C. 363, 686 F. 2d 989 (1982), modified, 240 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 743 F. 2d 1 (1984) (same), with Adams House Health Care v. Heckler, 817 F. 2d 587 (CA9 1987) (finding there is mandatory Board jurisdiction), cert. pending, No. 87-443; St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center v. Department of Health and Human Services, 698 F. 2d 1337 (CA7 1983) (same), cert. denied sub nom. St. James Hospital v. Heckler, 464 U. S. 830 (1983), with St. Luke’s Hospital v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 810 F. 2d 325 (CA1 1987) (finding there is Board jurisdiction, but that it is discretionary), and with Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center v. Bowen, 815 F. 2d 1435 (CA11 1987) (finding there is jurisdiction in the situation at issue here, but not for appeals that do not involve a challenge to a regulation), cert. pending, No. 87-380.

       See 42 CFR § 421.100 (1987) (stating that the intermediary can only pay claims that are “covered under Medicare Part A or Part B.”); § 421.120 (directing that the Secretary shall periodically review an intermediary’s audit procedures to ensure it is making “[e]orrect coverage and payment determinations” and is guarding the “proper management of administrative funds”); 42 CFR § 405.460(a)(2) (1985) (“Reimbursable provider costs may not exceed the costs estimated by HCFA [Health Care Financing Administration] to be necessary for the efficient delivery of needed health services. HCFA may establish estimated cost limits for direct or indirect overall costs or for costs of specific items or services or groups of items or services”).

       Subsection (d) provides:
      “A decision by the Board shall be based upon the record made at such hearing, which shall include the evidence considered by the intermediary and such other evidence as may be obtained or received by the Board, and shall be supported by substantial evidence when the record is viewed as a whole. The Board shall have the power to affirm, modify, or reverse a final determination of the fiscal intermediary with respect to a cost report and to make any other revisions on matters covered by such cost report (including revisions adverse to the provider of services) even though such matters were not considered by the intermediary in making such final determination.”

       Section 1395oo(d) only allows the Board to “affirm, modify, or reverse a final determination of the fiscal intermediary . . . Subsection (f)(1) recognizes that this limitation does not allow Board decisions with regard to the validity of rules or regulations. The subsection provides for judicial review of a challenged regulation when the Board determines it is “without authority to decide the question.” See also n. 3, supra.

       Subsection (f)(1) provides:
      “A decision of the Board shall be final unless the Secretary, on his own motion, and within 60 days after the provider of services is notified of the Board’s decision, reverses, affirms, or modifies the Board’s decision. Providers shall have the right to obtain judicial review of any final decision of the Board, or of any reversal, affirmance, or modification by the Secretary, by a civil action commenced within 60 days of the date on which notice of any final decision by the Board or of any reversal, affirmance, or modification by the Secretary is received. Providers shall also have the right to obtain judicial review of any action of the fiscal intermediary which involves a question of law or regulations relevant to the matters in controversy whenever the Board determines (on its own motion or at the request of a provider of services as described in the following sentence) that it is without authority to decide the question, by a civil action commenced within sixty days of the date on which notification of such determination is received. If a provider of services may obtain a hearing under subsection (a) of this section and has filed a request for such a hearing, such provider may file a request for a determination by the Board of its authority to decide the question of law or regulations relevant to the matters in controversy (accompanied by such documents and materials as the Board shall require for purposes of rendering such determination). The Board shall render such determination in writing within thirty days after the Board receives the request and such accompanying documents and materials, and the determination shall be considered a final decision and not subject to review by the Secretary. If the Board fails to render such determination within such period, the provider may bring a civil action (within sixty days of the end of such period) with respect to the matter in controversy contained in such request for a hearing. Such action shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in which the provider is located (or, in an action brought jointly by several providers, the judicial district in which the greatest number of such providers are located) or in the District Court for the District of Columbia and shall be tried pursuant to the applicable provisions under chapter 7 of title 5 notwithstanding any other provisions in section 405 of this title. Any appeal to the Board or action for judicial review by providers which are under common ownership or control or which have obtained a hearing under subsection (b) of this section must be brought by such providers as a group with respect to any matter involving an issue common to such providers.”


text:
    FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY v. ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
    No. 86-1715.
    Argued February 23, 1988
    Decided April 4, 1988

      Ruth E. Peters argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were William E. Persina and Arthur A. Horowitz.

      Lawrence S. Robbins argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Cohen, and William Ranter.

   Per Curiam.

The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U. S. C. § 7101 et seq., protects the right of federal employees “to form, join, or assist any labor organization, or to refrain from any such activity,” § 7102, and requires that federal agencies and labor organizations bargain in good faith concerning the terms and conditions of employment, §§ 7102, 7114, 7116(a)(5), and (b)(5). Recognizing “the special requirements and needs of the Government,” § 7101(b), Title VII exempts certain matters from the duty to negotiate. One such exemption provides that an agency’s duty to bargain extends “to matters which are the subject of any agency rule or regulation . . . only if the [Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority)] has determined under subsection (b) of this section that no compelling need . . . exists for the rule or regulation.” § 7117(a)(2). Subsection (b) specifies detailed procedures for determining whether there is a “compelling need” for the agency regulation. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between Circuits as to whether § 7117(b) provides the exclusive procedure for determining whether there is a compelling need for an agency regulation or whether the Authority alternatively may make a compelling need determination in connection with an unfair labor practice (ULP) proceeding. 484 U. S. 813 (1987).

In September 1981, the respondent, Aberdeen Proving Ground, notified its employees’ union representatives that Aberdeen intended to curtail operations for the three days after Thanksgiving, November 27-29, 1981, and that, as a result, Aberdeen employees would be placed on forced annual leave for Friday, November 27. Thereafter, Aberdeen met with union representatives to discuss leave procedures. Union representatives requested that the employees instead be granted administrative leave; management replied that administrative leave was not permitted by the relevant rules and regulations and that the issue “verges on nonnegotiability.” 21 F. L. R. A. 826, 829 (1982).

The union then filed an ULP charge with the Authority, and the Authority’s General Counsel issued a complaint alleging that Aberdeen’s refusal to negotiate concerning the union’s administrative leave proposal was a failure to negotiate in good faith. The Administrative Law Judge held in Aberdeen’s favor, concluding that the union’s proposal was inconsistent with agency regulations and thus not subject to negotiations because the Authority had not previously determined under § 7117(b) that there was no compelling need for the regulations. Id., at 834. The Authority reversed, holding that an ULP charge is properly filed where the Government employer undertakes a unilateral change in conditions of employment, even though the union’s proposal may conflict with an agency regulation and there has been no compelling need determination. In the Authority’s view, in such cases the compelling need determination may be properly unified with the ULP proceeding. 21 F. L. R. A. 814, 816-820 (1986). Finding that the regulation was not justified by a compelling need, the Authority held that Aberdeen had violated its duty to negotiate in good faith. See §§ 7116(a)(1) and (a)(5).

The Court of Appeals summarily reversed on the authority of its prior decision in U. S. Army Engineer Center v. FLRA, 762 F. 2d 409 (CA4 1985). In U. S. Army Engineer Center the Court of Appeals wrote that “an examination of the history, policies, and, above all, the language of the Federal Labor-Management Relations Act persuades us that Congress meant the § 7117(b) negotiability appeal to be the sole means of determining a compelling need question under the statute.” 762 F. 2d, at 417. We agree with both the analysis and conclusion of the Court of Appeals.

The plain language of Title VII unambiguously provides that where a matter is covered by regulation, no duty to bargain arises until the Authority has first determined that no compelling need justifies adherence to the regulation. Section 7117(a)(2) states unequivocally that “[t]he duty to bargain in good faith shall . . . extend to matters which are the subject of any agency rule or regulation . . . only if the Authority has determined under subsection (b) of this section that no compelling need . . . exists for the rule or regulation.” (Emphasis supplied.) As the Court of Appeals noted, the language of the statute is that of a condition precedent. 762 F. 2d, at 413. The phrase “only if” denotes exclusivity; it does not suggest one of multiple options. Moreover, the words “has determined under subsection (b) of this section” .clearly refer to an event that has come to pass. Thus, the duty to bargain does not arise until the § 7117(b) determination has occurred. Section 7117(b) further confirms this reading of the statute. Here, the statute again speaks in exclusive and mandatory terms: “In any case of collective bargaining in which an exclusive representative alleges that no compelling need exists for any rule or regulation . . . which is then in effect and which governs any matter at issue in such collective bargaining, the Authority shall determine under paragraph (2) of this subsection . . . whether such a compelling need exists.” (Emphasis supplied.)

This plain reading of Title VII is fully consistent with — if not compelled by — the legislative history and asserted purpose of the statute. Title VII strives to achieve a balance between the rights of federal employees to bargain collectively and “the paramount public interest in the effective conduct of the public’s business.” Message from the President Transmitting A Draft of Proposed Legislation to Reform the Civil Service Laws 4 (1978), Legislative History of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Committee Print compiled for the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service) Print No. 96-7, p. 626 (1979) (Leg. Hist.); see also 124 Cong. Rec. 25600-25601, 25613-25614 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Clay), Leg. Hist. 842-845.

Section 7117(b) is carefully constructed to strike such a balance. Under § 7117(b) employees are provided with a means to clarify the scope of the agency’s duty to bargain; if the agency then refuses to bargain, the union may seek relief through an ULP proceeding. At the same time, § 7117(b) provides special procedures designed to promote effective government. For instance, under a § 7117(b) negotiability appeal, but not in the ULP forum, the agency that issued the relevant regulation is a necessary party, § 7117(b)(4); the Authority’s General Counsel is not a party, § 7117(b)(3); and the negotiability appeal is presented directly to the Authority, rather than first to an administrative law judge, 5 CFR pt. 2424 (1987). Moreover, a § 7117(b) hearing is an expedited proceeding, § 7117(b)(3), thus resolving doubt as to whether a regulation is controlling as promptly as practicable. Most importantly, requiring that compelling need be resolved exclusively through a § 7117(b) appeal allows agencies to act in accordance with their regulations without an overriding apprehension that their adherence to the regulations might result in sanctions under an ULP proceeding. See § 7118(a)(7). To allow compelling need to be adjudicated in the context of an ULP proceeding, without any prior § 7117(b) negotiability appeal, would frustrate this careful balance and would disregard Congress’ direction that Title VII “be interpreted in a manner consistent with the requirement of an effective and efficient Government.” § 7101(b).

Although “reviewing courts should uphold reasonable and defensible constructions of an agency’s enabling Act,... they must not ‘rubber-stamp . . . administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute.’” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U. S. 89, 97 (1983), quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U. S. 278, 291-292 (1965). The Court of Appeals properly concluded that the Authority acted inconsistently with the language and purpose of Title VII in permitting resolution of the compelling need issue in the ULP forum.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly

Affirmed.

       Compare Defense Logistics Agency v. FLRA, 244 U. S. App. D. C. 22, 754 F. 2d 1003 (1985) (permissible for Authority to resolve compelling need in either § 7117(b) negotiability appeal or ULP forum in unilateral change eases), with U. S. Army Engineer Center v. FLRA, 762 F. 2d 409 (CA4 1985) (§ 7117(b) negotiability appeal exclusive procedure to resolve compelling need).