author: Per Curiam. Justice Stevens,

text:
    CENTRAL TRUST CO., ROCHESTER, N. Y. v. OFFICIAL CREDITORS’ COMMITTEE OF GEIGER ENTERPRISES, INC., et al.
    No. 80-1565.
    Decided January 11, 1982
   Per Curiam.

On August 15, 1979, Geiger Enterprises, Inc. (Geiger), filed a petition in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York seeking relief under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (formerly 11 U. S. C. § 701 et seq.) (Bankruptcy Act). Geiger continued operating its business as a debtor-in-possession, and numerous creditors filed claims, including a claim by the United States for $2,075,674.64 in unpaid taxes. Respondent Official Creditors’ Committee was established by the Bankruptcy Court to represent the interests of creditors with relatively small claims.

On October 1, 1979, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 11 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (New Code), became effective. Thereafter, several of Geiger’s wholly owned subsidiaries and affiliate corporations filed petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the New Code. On January 9, 1980, Geiger moved to dismiss its Chapter XI petition on the representation that if dismissal were granted it too would immediately file a petition under Chapter 11 of the New Code and would seek substantive consolidation of its proceedings with the proceedings of its subsidiary and affiliate corporations.

This motion was opposed by petitioner, a secured creditor, and by the United States. Both opponents argued that such dismissal was prohibited by § 403(a) of the New Code, a transitional rule enacted by Congress to govern cases pending under the Bankruptcy Act on the effective day of the New Code. Section 403(a) provides:

“A case commenced under the Bankruptcy Act, and all matters and proceedings in or relating to any such case, shall be conducted and determined under such Act as if [the New Code] had not been enacted, and the substantive rights of parties in connection with any such bankruptcy case, matter, or proceeding shall continue to be governed by the law applicable to such case, matter, or proceeding as if the [New Code] had not been enacted.” 92 Stat. 2683, note preceding 11 U. S. C. § 101 (1976 ed., Supp. IV).

The Bankruptcy Court rejected this argument and granted the motion to dismiss Geiger’s Chapter XI petition, relying primarily upon Rule ll-42(a) of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which provides:

“Voluntary Dismissal or Conversion to Bankruptcy.
“The debtor may file an application or motion to dismiss the case or to convert it to bankruptcy at any time prior to confirmation or, where the court has retained jurisdiction, after confirmation. On filing of such application or motion, the court shall. . . enter an order after hearing on notice dismissing the case or adjudicating him a bankrupt whichever may be in the best interest of the estate.”

The Bankruptcy Court characterized this Rule as “unique in that the purpose of dismissal is to permit refiling under compatible substantive law provisions and [to] permit substantive consolidation,” and found that consolidation of Geiger’s proceedings with the proceedings of its subsidiaries and affiliates would “be in the best interest of this estate.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-ll. Thus, on February 8, 1980, Geiger’s original petition was dismissed and Geiger immediately filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the New Code.

The United States District Court for the Western District of New York reversed. It held “the plain meaning of section 403(a)” to be “that the bankruptcy court must apply the [Bankruptcy] Act to cases filed prior to October 1, 1979 and that such cases shall proceed as if the New [Code] had never been enacted.” Id., at A-19.

On appeal, the District Court’s decision was in turn reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In re Geiger Enterprises, Inc., 635 F. 2d 106 (1980). The Court of Appeals held “that Rule ll-42(a) must be read in conjunction with section 403(a)” to permit dismissal and refiling in certain cases, and that “[t]he operative test is whether the estate’s best interest will be served by” such procedure. Id., at 109. The Court of Appeals qualified this test by holding that dismissal and refiling would be improper if they prejudiced the claims of the creditors, and remanded the case so that the Bankruptcy Court and District Court could consider the existence of actual prejudice.

Petitioner has sought review in this Court, arguing that the decision of the Court of Appeals “conflicts with the plain meaning of § 403(a) as well as its legislative history,” and “provides a procedural device by which the clear Congressional intent is easily negated.” Pet. for Cert. 9. We agree.

The language of § 403(a) is unequivocal. It provides that cases filed under the Bankruptcy Act “shall be conducted and determined under such Act as if [the New Code] had not been enacted.” It makes no exception for petitions to be refiled under the New Code; indeed, it expressly provides that petitions such as Geiger’s “shall continue to be governed” by the Bankruptcy Act. Any exception to this mandate recognized by the Court of Appeals is of wholly judicial creation, supported by neither the language of the New Code nor its legislative history.

Nor does Rule ll-42(a) provide authority for the procedure. The language of the Rule clearly contemplates a voluntary dismissal which results in an adjudication of the debt- or’s bankruptcy or one which revests title of all property in the debtor and removes from it the protection of the bankruptcy laws. It does not contemplate a dismissal, such as the one in this case, which neither declares the debtor bankrupt nor restores the creditors’ rights against the debtor’s property, but simply holds matters in abeyance while the debtor files its petition under a new law. Even if it were possible to so interpret Rule ll-42(a), the Rule would not modify the clear command of § 403(a). The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure are applicable under the New Code only “to the extent not inconsistent with the amendments made by [the New Code].” Transitional Rules §405(d), 92 Stat. 2685. As interpreted by the Court of Appeals, Rule ll-42(a) clearly conflicts with § 403(a).

Thus, the Court of Appeals erred when it “amended” § 403(a) to permit refiling under the New Code if such refiling would not actually prejudice the creditors. That the Court of Appeals thought consolidation of Geiger’s petition with those of its subsidiaries and affiliates would serve the best interests of the estate, or would conserve judicial resources, does not justify its disregard of a clear congressional directive. “It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the law-making body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.” Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 485 (1917). While the Court of Appeals may have reached a practical result, it was a result inconsistent with the unambiguous language used by Congress. Accordingly, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, and the judgment is reversed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Marshall joins,

dissenting.

If a bankruptcy judge, with the consent of all parties to a proceeding commenced prior to October 1, 1979, correctly concluded that the best interest of the estate and all its creditors and the judiciary would be served by permitting the voluntary dismissal of that proceeding and the immediate commencement of a new proceeding under the New Code, would that action be prohibited by § 403(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2683, note preceding 11 U. S. C. § 101 (1976 ed., Supp. IV)? I think not. Although two creditors objected to the dismissal in this case, the Court today leaves no doubt about its answer to this question. Despite its recognition that “the Court of Appeals may have reached a practical result,” ante, this page, and that “consolidation of Geiger’s petition with those of its subsidiaries and affiliates would serve the best interests of the estate [and] would conserve judicial resources,” ante, at 359, the Court holds that Congress expressly forbade such a result when it enacted § 403(a).

It seems most unlikely that Congress would have commanded the result the Court reaches today if it had contemplated the set of facts confronting the Bankruptcy Court in this case. The purpose of the New Code was to modernize the bankruptcy laws and to make the system more workable and efficient. H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, pp. 3, 52 (1977). Permitting Geiger to dismiss its petition under the Bankruptcy Act and to file a petition under the New Code, thereby facilitating consolidation of its petition with the petitions of its numerous affiliates and subsidiaries, is perfectly consistent with the spirit of both bankruptcy statutes.

Moreover, I believe that the Court of Appeals’ holding is faithful to the language of § 403(a). That provision contains two commands relating to proceedings commenced prior to the effective date of the New Code; one command is procedural and the other is substantive. The procedural command requires that proceedings commenced prior to October 1, 1979, be conducted under the Bankruptcy Act. The substantive command requires that the rights of the parties in such proceedings continue to be governed by that statute.

The procedural command was followed in this ease. The original petition was filed on August 15, 1979, and was dismissed pursuant to Rule ll-42(a) of the Rules applicable to cases commenced under the Bankruptcy Act. That Rule expressly authorizes a voluntary dismissal based upon a finding that such action is “in the best interest of the estate.” As the Court of Appeals noted, “the best interests of the estate must be interpreted to mean those of the creditors as well as the debtor,” and whether dismissal of the original petition and refiling under the New Code is in the best interest of the creditors in this case is not clear from the record. The Court of Appeals instructed the Bankruptcy Court to consider on remand whether a refiling under the New Code and consolidation of the bankruptcy petitions of Geiger and its affiliates and subsidiaries would affect the creditors’ substantive rights. If substantive rights of the creditors “are in fact materially prejudiced,” In re Geiger Enterprises, Inc., 635 F. 2d 106, 109 (CA2 1980), then dismissal of the originial petition will not be permitted. If dismissal is determined to be in the best interest of all parties, then such action is permitted by Rule 11 — 42(a); the procedural command of § 403(a), therefore, will have been satisfied.

Likewise, the Court of Appeals’ disposition assures that the substantive command of § 403(a) will be followed. If dismissal is in the best interest of the estate, meaning in this case that the creditors’ substantive rights are not materially prejudiced, then dismissal of the original petition is authorized by the Bankruptcy Act. In such a case, the creditors’ substantive rights would have been governed by the Bankruptcy Act, not by the New Code. This satisfies the substantive command of § 403(a).

Even if I were persuaded that Congress intended to enact the inflexible rule the Court enforces today, I still would not decide that issue in this case. It is probable that the question raised by the certiorari petition would become moot if the Court were to follow its normal practice of declining to review interlocutory orders. The United States, which has a $2,075,674.64 tax claim at stake, while agreeing with this Court’s reading of § 403(a), recognizes that the question is of “limited administrative importance” and does not merit review by this Court. The only practical consequence of the Court’s holding is to impose unnecessary work on busy federal judges. The Bankruptcy Court and three Circuit Judges recognized that it would be more efficient to conduct a single consolidated proceeding rather than separate proceedings for a group of affiliated bankruptcy petitioners. Meanwhile, this Court expends its scarce time and energy in a case that at best involves an error that is harmless to the parties and the law.

I respectfully dissent.

       The legislative history of the New Code supports the unequivocal language of § 403(a). The House Report on the New Code explained:
      “The first phase of transition begins on October 1, [1979], the primary effective date of the bill. On that date, the new substantive law of bankruptcy as proposed by the bill will be put into effect. It will apply to all cases commenced on or after October 1, [1979]. The application of the new law will only be to new cases, however. Cases commenced before October 1, [1979], will continue to be governed by the Bankruptcy Act, as in effect September 30, [1979], and by all other applicable laws in effect on that date. Those cases will proceed as though this bill had not been enacted.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, pp. 287-288 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
      The same Report also states:
      “[Section 403(a)] continues cases pending as of the effective date of the bill without change. The new law will not affect cases commenced under the old law. Those cases will proceed as though this Act did not take effect. The section applies to substantive as well as procedural matters.” Id., at 459.

       Rule lH2(a) provides that upon voluntary dismissal, the Bankruptcy Court will either “enter an order adjudicating the debtor a bankrupt,” or will “enter an order . . . dismissing the case.” If the latter order is entered, subdivision (d) of the Rule provides that “[a] certified copy of the order of dismissal under this rule shall constitute conclusive evidence of the revesting of the debtor’s title to his property.” Thus, if voluntary dismissal does not result in an adjudication of bankruptcy, it revests title to all property in the debtor and removes from it the protection of the bankruptcy petition. As one commentator has stated:
      “It should be apparent that, upon dismissal, the debtor is placed exactly where he was before the Chapter XI case was filed and it is therefore unnecessary in the statute to provide for something so plain. When an order of confirmation in a Chapter XI [proceeding] is entered it has legal consequence and among the legal consequences is the revestment of title to property in the debtor, and of the divestment by the court of its jurisdiction over the debtor and its property wherever located. . . . Rule ll-42(d) merely makes plain not only that the debtor is revested with title to its property but, also, that a certified copy of the order of dismissal shall constitute conclusive evidence of that revestment. This, in effect, preserves to the creditors who have been informed of the dismissal under Rule ll-42(c), their remedies against the debtor’s property.” 14 W. Collier, Bankruptcy ¶ 11-42.07 (14th ed. 1976).
      As is evident from this discussion, the dissent misperceives the purpose of Rule 11-42 when it argues that the Rule provides the mechanism by which the procedural and substantive commands of § 403(a) were satisfied in this case. The Rule authorizes only one kind of dismissal, one that results in a full discharge from bankruptcy. Geiger was not discharged from bankruptcy by the dismissal below. Rather, the dismissal was entered solely to permit Geiger to file under the New Code, that is, to permit it to avoid the prohibition of § 403(a).

       Section 405(d) of the Transitional Rules of the New Code provides:
      “The [R]ules [of Bankruptcy Procedure] prescribed under section 2075 of title 28 of the United States Code and in effect on September 30,1979, shall apply to cases under title 11, to the extent not inconsistent with the amendments made by this Act, or with this Act, until such rules are repealed or superseded by rules prescribed and effective under such section, as amended by section 248 of this Act.” 92 Stat. 2685, note preceding 28 U. S. C. § 1471 (1976 ed., Supp. III).
      Although this provision describes the Rules’ effect on cases filed under the New Code, and thus does not directly apply to Geiger’s first petition which was filed under the Bankruptcy Act, it clearly demonstrates Congress’ intent that the old Bankruptcy Rules not override provisions of the New Code. Section 403(a) does apply to Geiger’s original petition, and the Court of Appeals erroneously relied upon Rule ll-42(a) to override its clear command.

       “A ease commenced under the Bankruptcy Act, and all matters and proceedings in or relating to any such case, shall be conducted and determined under such Act as if [the New Code] had not been enacted . . ..” 92 Stat. 2683, note preceding 11 U. S. C. § 101 (1976 ed., Supp. IV).

       Section 403(a) continues: “[A]nd the substantive rights of parties in connection with any such bankruptcy case, matter, or proceeding shall continue to be governed by the law applicable to such case, matter, or proceeding as if the [New Code] had not been enacted.”

       Rule ll-42(a) relating to voluntary dismissals provides in pertinent part:
      “On the filing of such application or motion, the court shall . . . enter an order, after hearing on notice dismissing the case or adjudicating him a bankrupt whichever may be in the best interest of the estate.”
      In this case the Bankruptcy Judge, after a full hearing, made these findings:
      “The motion is governed by the provisions of 11-42 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. It is unique in that the purpose of dismissal is to permit refiling under compatible substantive law provisions and distribution rules and, thus, permit substantive consolidation. In opposing the motion, the parties have argued that Congress did not intend to permit this result. To the contrary, there is no reason to believe that the Congress even envisioned a problem such as that at hand.
      “Practical, economical and expeditious administration and the avoidance of unnecessary and costly litigation by the alternative approach suggested by the Government [piercing the corporate veil of the affiliate and subsidiary corporations and bringing them under the Bankruptcy Act] render dismissal to permit refiling to be in the best interest of this estate.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-ll.

         In re Geiger Enterprises, Inc., 635 F. 2d 106, 109 (CA2 1980) (citing Banque de Financement v. First National Bank of Boston, 568 F. 2d 911, 921-922 (CA2 1977)).

       Considering only one creditor, the United States, given the differences in treatment accorded tax claims under the two statutes, see 635 F. 2d, at 109, it is unlikely that the Bankruptcy Court would find that it is in the best interest of the Government to proceed under the New Code.

       In explaining why there is no need for this Court to grant certiorari, the Solicitor General stated:
      “Despite the error of the decision below, we did not seek certiorari because of the absence of a conflict among the courts of appeals, the possibility that the government may prevail in the proceedings on remand, and the limited administrative importance of the question presented dealing with the transitional rules governing the enactment of the new Bankruptcy Code.” Memorandum for United States 5.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author:
Per Curiam.
      Justice O’Connor, Justice Rehnquist,

license: Public Domain

text:
    BOAG v. MacDOUGALL, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
    No. 80-6845.
    Decided January 11, 1982
   Per Curiam.

Petitioner, who was then an inmate of the Arizona Department of Corrections Reception and Treatment Center, filed a crudely written complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, in which he alleged, inter alia, that he had been placed in solitary confinement on March 3, 1980, without any notice of charges or any hearing, that he was threatened with violence when he asked what the charges were, and that he was still in “the hole” a week later. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the case was moot because petitioner had been transferred to another facility.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals did not endorse the District Court’s mootness rationale, and rightfully so, since the transfer did not moot the damages claim. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals affirmed, 642 F. 2d 455 (1981), concluding that first, district courts have “especially broad” discretion to dismiss frivolous actions against prison officials under 28 U. S. C. § 1915(d), and second, petitioner’s action is frivolous because it does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We need not address the permissible contours of the Court of Appeals’ first conclusion, for its second conclusion is erroneous as a matter of law. Construing petitioner’s inartful pleading liberally, as Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972), instructs the federal courts to do in pro se actions, it states a cause of action. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 555-572 (1974). On the basis of the record before us, we cannot find a sufficient ground for affirming the dismissal of the complaint.

The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pau-peris and the petition for certiorari are granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice O’Connor,

concurring.

I join in the per curiam, but write separately to emphasize two points. First, nothing in the Court’s opinion prevents the District Court on remand from dismissing this suit under 28 U. S. C. § 1915(d) if it finds grounds to believe that the complaint is “malicious or frivolous.” This Court only requires the District Court to articulate briefly its reasons for dismissal in order to facilitate appellate review. Second, I find merit in Justice Rehnquist’s comments that this Court is not equipped to correct every perceived error coming from the lower federal courts. The effectiveness of this Court rests in part on its practice of deciding cases of broad significance and of declining to expend limited judicial resources on cases, such as the present one, whose significance is limited to the parties. In exercising our discretionary certiorari jurisdiction, we should not be influenced solely by the merits of the petitioner’s case.

Justice Rehnquist,

with whom The Chief Justice and Justice White join,

dissenting.

The per curiam reverses the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case because neither it nor the District Court articulated a proper basis for dismissing the petitioner’s complaint. While I agree with the per curiam’s conclusion that the case is not moot and that the complaint, construed liberally, alleges a cause of action, I find a sufficient basis to support the decision below. More importantly, I find this to be a good example of the kind of cases the Court should not decide.

The record shows that petitioner failed to comply with the local rules of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Phoenix Division, in which his complaint was filed. As part of his claim, petitioner filed a typewritten document entitled “Form To Be Used By Prisoner In Filing a Complaint Under The Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1983.”

Section I of the document was headed “Previous Lawsuits,” and subsection A required the plaintiff to answer:

“Have you begun other lawsuits in state or federal court dealing with the same facts in this action or otherwise relating to your imprisonment? Yes (-) No (-)•”

Petitioner failed to check either the “Yes” or the “No” space and did not answer the next seven questions about previous filings, thereby violating the local rules of the District Court. Rule 53(a), Local Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. There appears to have been good reason for this omission. Records of the District Court, of which we may take judicial notice, Wells v. United States, 318 U. S. 257, 260 (1943), indicate that petitioner had in the past filed at least 10 prisoner civil rights suits and had been denied leave to proceed informa pauperis in at least 2 others.

In my view, the District Court was justified in dismissing the complaint, if for no other reason, on the ground that petitioner had simply refused to comply with local rules regarding the disclosure of previous lawsuits. The fact that neither lower court relied upon this ground for dismissal does not remove it from our consideration. A respondent may seek af-firmance in this Court on any ground disclosed by the record which would not expand the relief granted. United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U. S. 159, 166, n. 8 (1977); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 475, n. 6 (1970); Ryerson v. United States, 312 U. S. 405, 408 (1941). By reversing the decision below without first permitting the parties to brief the merits of this case, the per curiam precludes respondent from seeking affirmance on this or any other basis.

Even if there were no grounds for affirmance, I would find this case unworthy of the Court’s attention. In our zeal to provide “equal justice under law,” we must never forget that this Court is not a forum for the correction of errors. As was said by Chief Justice Vinson:

“The Supreme Court is not, and never has been, primarily concerned with the correction of errors in lower court decisions. In almost all cases within the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, the petitioner has already received one appellate review of his case. The debates in the Constitutional Convention make clear that the purpose of the establishment of one supreme national tribunal was, in the words of John Rutledge of South Carolina, ‘to secure the national rights & uniformity of Judgmts.’ The function of the Supreme Court is, therefore, to resolve conflicts of opinion on federal questions that have arisen among lower courts, to pass upon questions of wide import under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, and to exercise supervisory power over the lower federal courts. If we took every case in which an interesting legal question is raised, or our prima facie impression is that the decision below is erroneous, we could not fulfill the Constitutional and statutory responsibilities placed upon the Court. To remain effective, the Supreme Court must continue to decide only those cases which present questions whose resolution will have immediate importance far beyond the particular facts and parties involved. ”

It cannot be doubted that this case will have no importance beyond the facts and parties involved.

Finally, it is worth emphasizing what the Court is not saying in this case. The statutory provision under which petitioner was permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, 28 U. S. C. § 1915(d), expressly authorizes courts to dismiss such suits “if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.” This especially broad dismissal power, recognized in the footnote to the per curiam, safeguards the public and the courts from abuses of the in forma pauperis privilege by those who are not restrained by the costs of litigation. I do not read the per curiam as narrowing that power. Nor does the per curiam equate the dismissal power of § 1915(d) with that of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather, the per curiam simply holds that the legal conclusions of the lower courts were erroneous. From reversal on that basis, in this case, I respectfully dissent.

      Neither the Court of Appeals nor the District Court relied upon the argument advanced in the dissenting opinion. Indeed, the dissent’s information that petitioner had attempted to file a dozen previous civil rights actions is not disclosed in the record, the opinions below, or the briefs filed with this Court. We recognize that 28 U. S. C. § 1915(d) vests the federal courts with broad discretion to take judicial notice of such information and to identify and dismiss frivolous complaints, but it does not appear from the papers before us that any such discretion was exercised by either the Court of Appeals or the District Court; both courts relied solely upon erroneous legal grounds for dismissing the complaint. We are in no position to decide, on the basis of these legal errors and this record, whether the argument advanced in the dissenting opinion would have “satisfied [the District Court] that the action is frivolous or malicious.” 28 U. S. C. § 1915(d). A question of that character must be addressed in the first instance by the District Court. If a dismissal is to be based on the ground that petitioner failed to comply with the local rule, or that his prior filings justify the conclusion that his action is frivolous or malicious, a brief statement explaining that ground should be made by the District Court to facilitate intelligent appellate review.

      Address of Chief Justice Vinson before the American Bar Association, Sept. 7, 1949 (quoted in R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 258-259 (5th ed. 1978)).


author: Per Curiam. Justice Powell, Justice Brennan,

text:
    HUTTO, DIRECTOR, VIRGINIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al. v. DAVIS
    No. 81-23.
    Decided January 11, 1982
   Per Curiam.

On October 26, 1973, law enforcement officers raided respondent’s home and seized approximately nine ounces of marihuana and assorted drug paraphernalia. Several days before the raid, officers had tape-recorded a transaction in which respondent had sold marihuana and other controlled substances to a police informant. With the aid of the seized evidence and the tape recording, respondent was convicted in Virginia state court of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of marihuana. The jury imposed a fine of $10,000 and a prison term of 20 years on each of the two counts, the prison terms to run consecutively. At the time of respondent’s conviction, Virginia law authorized fines of up to $25,000 and prison terms of not less than 5 nor more than 40 years for each of respondent’s offenses. Davis v. Davis, 585 F. 2d 1226, 1229 (CA4 1978).

After exhausting direct appeal, respondent brought a ha-beas action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, asserting that a 40-year sentence was so grossly disproportionate to the crime of possessing less than nine ounces of marihuana that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment as proscribed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court, relying primarily upon the four factors set forth in Hart v. Coiner, 483 F. 2d 136 (CA4 1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 938 (1974), agreed:

“After examining the nature of the offense, the legislative purpose behind the punishment, the punishment in the Commonwealth of Virginia for other offenses, and the punishment actually imposed for the same or similar offenses in Virginia, this court must necessarily conclude that a sentence of forty years and twenty thousand dollars in fines is so grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crimes as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444, 453 (1977).

Accordingly, the District Court issued a writ of habeas corpus.

A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. Davis v. Davis, supra. The panel correctly noted that this Court “has never found a sentence for a term of years within the limits authorized by statute to be, by itself, a cruel and unusual punishment,” 585 F. 2d, at 1229, and held that respondent had failed to show that his sentence, in light of the factors known to the jury and the punishment authorized by Virginia, was sufficiently extraordinary to violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id., at 1233. The decision was short-lived. Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals reheard the case and, “for reasons sufficiently stated by the district judge in his opinion,” affirmed the award of habeas relief. Davis v. Davis, 601 F. 2d 153, 154 (1979). We granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of our decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980). Sub nom. Hutto v. Davis, 445 U. S. 947 (1980). The Court of Appeals again affirmed the District Court, this time by an equally divided vote. Davis v. Davis, 646 F. 2d 123 (1981). Because the Court of Appeals failed to heed our decision in Rummel, we now reverse.

The petitioner in Rummel was sentenced to life imprisonment under the Texas recidivist statute upon being convicted of his third felony: obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. He had previously been convicted of passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36, and of fraudulently using a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods or services. 445 U. S., at 265-266. Like the respondent in this case, Rummel argued that the length of his imprisonment was so “grossly disproportionate” to the crime for which he was sentenced that it violated the ban on cruel and unusual punishment of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In rejecting that argument, we distinguished between punishments — such as the death penalty — which by their very nature differ from all other forms of conventionally accepted punishment, and punishments which differ from others only in duration. This distinction was based upon two factors. First, this “Court’s Eighth Amendment judgments should neither be nor appear to be merely the subjective views of individual Justices.” Id., at 275. And second, the excessiveness of one prison term as compared to another is invariably a subjective determination, there being no clear way to make “any constitutional distinction between one term of years and a shorter or longer term of years.” Ibid. Thus, we concluded that “one could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies, . . . the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative.” Id., at 274. Accordingly, we held that Rummel’s life sentence did not violate the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment.

As mentioned above, the District Court found respondent’s sentence to be unconstitutional by applying the four-part test of Hart v. Coiner, supra. Hart also was relied upon by the lower-court dissenters in Rummel, and was implicitly disapproved by our rejection of the dissenters’ view. Not only did we expressly recognize Hart as the primary opposing authority, 445 U. S., at 267, 269, but our opinion also disapproved each of its four “objective” factors. Because the District Court’s grant of habeas relief was clearly guided by these factors, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming.

In short, Rummel stands for the proposition that federal courts should be “reluctan[t] to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment,” id. at 274, and that “successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences” should be “exceedingly rare,” id. at 272. By affirming the District Court decision after our decision in Rummel, the Court of Appeals sanctioned an intrusion into the basic line-drawing process that is “properly within the province of legislatures, not courts.” Id., at 275-276. More importantly, however, the Court of Appeals could be viewed as having ignored, consciously or unconsciously, the hierarchy of the federal court system created by the Constitution and Congress. Admittedly, the Members of this Court decide cases “by virtue of their commissions, not their competence.” And arguments may be made one way or the other whether the present case is distinguishable, except as to its facts, from Rummel. But unless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.

Accordingly, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss respondent’s habeas petition.

It is so ordered.

Justice Powell,

concurring in the judgment.

The Court holds that the Eighth Amendment countenances a prison term of 40 years and a fine of $20,000 for respondent’s possession and distribution of approximately nine ounces of marihuana said to have a street value of about $200. I view the sentence as unjust and disproportionate to the offense. Nevertheless, for the reasons stated below I reluctantly conclude that the Court’s decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980), is controlling on the facts before us. Accordingly, I join the judgment only.

I

The respondent Davis met Eads in prison. During Eads confinement, his wife had become a drug user. Concerned about this development and its effect on their 2-year-old child, Eads offered to cooperate with the police “to assist in the exposure and arrest of those supplying drugs to his wife and any illicit drug distributor in the area, including Davis who Eads identified as an active drug dealer in Wythe County.” Davis v. Davis, 585 F. 2d 1226, 1228 (CA4 1978).

On furlough from prison, Eads told Davis he wished to buy-drugs for himself and some mutual friends currently in prison. Shortly thereafter, the two went to Davis’ home where Davis sold Eads three ounces of marihuana for $74. Davis also gave Eads “drug pills which included L. S. D and another illicit controlled drug.” Ibid. A police raid on Davis’ home later uncovered about six ounces of marihuana, two scales, and other drug paraphernalia.

Davis was found guilty of both distributing marihuana and of possessing marihuana with intent to distribute. On each count, he received a sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. These sentences were imposed on a consecutive basis. The District Court granted his petition for a writ of habeas corpus because the sentences were “so grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crimes as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment . . . ,” This judgment was reversed on appeal, Davis v. Davis, supra, but reinstated by the Court of Appeals on rehearing en banc. We remanded for reconsideration in light of our decision in Rummel v. Estelle, supra. By an equally divided vote en banc, the Court of Appeals again affirmed.

II

The sole authority upon which the Court today relies is its decision in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel decided that the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual punishments was not transgressed by the imposition of life imprisonment for a recidivist’s third felony, each a nonviolent fraud involving less than $125. The Court also observed, however:

“This is not to say that a proportionality principle [viz., that grossly disproportionate punishments are unconstitutional] would not come into play in the extreme example mentioned by the dissent, post, at 288, if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment.” 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11.

The Rummel Court therefore did not reject the proportionality principle long settled by our cases. It did take such a restricted view of the principle that — in the future — appellate courts, duty bound to follow the decision of this Court, often will be compelled to accept sentences that arguably are cruel and unusual.

I recognize, of course, that under our system the limits of a prison sentence normally are a matter of legislative prerogative, and trial courts have the primary responsibility to determine an appropriate sentence — within these limits — in light of the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Review of sentencing is not generally a function of appellate review. Yet, our system of justice always has recognized that appellate courts do have a responsibility — expressed in the proportionality principle — not to shut their eyes to grossly disproportionate sentences that are manifestly unjust. I therefore have no criticism of the District Court or the Court of Appeals for exercising this responsibility and reaching the judgments that are reversed here today.

There are features of this case that arguably distinguish it from Rummel. I identify these briefly. The first is a letter from the Commonwealth Attorney who successfully prosecuted Davis. The letter is set forth in full below. It was solicited by Davis’ lawyer, some three years after Davis had commenced to serve his 40-year term. One can say, of course, that such a letter often can be obtained from a prosecutor who may have second thoughts as to the justness of a sentence he had sought at trial. I normally would give little weight to such a letter. But the prosecutor here, in a thoughtful letter, did advance a nonfrivolous reason for his conclusion that Davis’ sentence was a “gross injustice.” He referred to the “grave disparity in sentencing” in comparable drug offenses in the “Commonwealth [of Virginia] and the nation.”

The second and more important factor that arguably distinguishes Rummel is the action of the Virginia State Legislature in 1979. It then reduced the maximum penalty for offenses of which Davis was convicted to 10 years on each count — regardless of aggravating circumstances. See Va. Code §18.2-248.1(a)(2) (Supp. 1981) and §18.2-10(e) (1975). This maximum is less than half the sentence Davis received. Because it sets a maximum, the legislative action takes all relevant aggravating circumstances into account. This reduction — five years after Davis’ conviction and two years after his prosecutor’s letter — evidences Virginia’s present sentencing judgment that marihuana possession and distribution in small amounts no longer would justify Davis’ sentence. Although this change in law was not made retroactive, it is evidence from the most authoritative state source that Davis’ sentence was unjust and no longer would be valid.

f — I > — I I — I

Based on this evidence of comparative sentencing and the relatively minor degree of Davis’ criminality, affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Appeals arguably could be justified. I conclude, however, that Rummel requires reversal. Davis was convicted of distributing marihuana, and had dealt in other drugs as well. He was willing to sell marihuana for use by prison inmates and “probably as well to the wife of an inmate left alone with an infant child.” 585 F. 2d, at 1233. He previously had been sentenced on a drug-related offense. By comparison, Rummel’s offenses — three minor frauds involving almost trifling sums of money — were far less serious. Rummers sentence, moreover, was more severe than Davis’. And Davis has been unable to show — by means of statutory comparisons — that his sentences suffer from a greater degree of disproportionality than Rummel’s did. Compare Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444, 452-453 (WD Va. 1977), with 445 U. S., at 296-302.

These cases illustrate the seriousness of the disparity in sentencing that may distinguish our system of justice from other mature systems. Sentencing disparity in our country primarily results not from varying statutory limits among the States. Rather, in a nation of our size and with the sentencing decision in particular cases vested — as it should be — in trial courts, a good deal of disparity is inevitable. Effort to minimize this, at least on a state-by-state basis, certainly should be continued. Nor should reform in this respect be addressed only to prevent excessive penalties. The criticism of courts occurs more frequently, often fully justified, when persons guilty of crimes of violence, or serious drug distribution offenses, are given sentences that are disproportionately light in view of their offenses, as well as disparate in comparison with other sentences. Sentencing that is just should take into account the paramount interest of society in being protected from criminal conduct as well as the right of convicted persons to be dealt with fairly according to law.

I join the judgment of the Court.

Justice Brennan,

with whom Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens join,

dissenting.

The increasingly alarming penchant of the Court inappropriately to invoke its power of summary disposition could not be more evident than in this case. With the benefit of neither full briefing nor oral argument, the Court holds that Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980), precluded the courts below from holding that respondent has been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Rummel considered whether the application of the Texas habitual offender statute to petitioner William Rummel constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Texas statute prescribed a mandatory life sentence following a third conviction on a felony charge. Rummel became subject to this provision in 1973, when he was convicted of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses, then a felony under Texas law. On two earlier occasions, Rummel had been convicted of felonies under Texas law: in 1964 for fraudulently using a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods or services, and in 1969 for passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36. Rummel argued that the imposition of a mandatory life sentence in his case amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660, 667 (1962). The Court rejected Rummel’s constitutional attack. While noting that “one could argue . . . that for crimes con-cededly classified and classifiable as felonies, . . . the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative,” 445 U. S., at 274, the Court adopted a much narrower basis for decision, holding that, in the context of Texas’ habitual offender statute, the imposition of a life sentence on Rummel served the legitimate state interests of deterring recidivism and of segregating habitual offenders “from the rest of society for an extended period of time.” Id., at 284. Because this narrower ground was chosen, the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the Eighth Amendment would have been violated if, in the absence of the habitual offender statute, a life sentence had been imposed on Rummel “merely for obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses.” Id., at 276. The Court stated in this respect:

“[T]he interest of the State of Texas here is not simply that of making criminal the unlawful acquisition of another person’s property; it is in addition the interest, expressed in all recidivist statutes, in dealing in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminal law. By conceding the validity of recidivist statutes generally, Rummel himself concedes that the State of Texas, or any other State, has a valid interest in so dealing with that class of persons.” Ibid.

Relying on Rummel, the per curiam suggests that because the punishment imposed on respondent was within the maximum prescribed by the state legislature, the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the District Court’s grant of habeas relief on Eighth Amendment grounds, “sanctioned an intrusion into the basic line-drawing process that is ‘properly within the province of legislatures, not courts.’” Ante, at 374, quoting Rummel, supra, at 275-276. Even if I viewed Rummel as properly decided, and I do not, the per curiam, by suggesting that it was improper for the courts below to engage in a disproportionality analysis, represents a serious and improper expansion of Rummel. Rummel acknowledged that prior decisions of this Court, see, e. g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667 (1977); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910), recognized that the Eighth Amendment includes a principle of proportionality that requires the invalidation of a sentence that is “grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime,” Rummel, supra, at 271-272. Rummel did not overrule those cases but cited them approvingly. Rummel rests on the understanding that, as a consequence of the overwhelming state interests in deterring habitual offenders, the Eighth Amendment does not preclude a State from imposing what might otherwise constitute a disproportionate prison sentence on an individual determined under state law to be a habitual offender. Of course, in the instant case, the Commonwealth of Virginia has expressed no will to punish Davis as a habitual offender, and there has been no determination that he is one.

The per curiam nevertheless reverses the judgment below on the basis that “Rummel stands for the proposition that federal courts should be ‘reluctan[t] to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment’ . . . and that ‘successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences’ should be ‘exceedingly rare.’” Ante, at 374, quoting Rummel, supra, at 274, 272. But this general principle of deference surely cannot justify the complete abdication of our responsibility to enforce the Eighth Amendment. The question presented here is whether the sentence imposed on respondent in this case comports with the limitation contained in the Eighth Amendment. To reverse on the basis of Rummel, the Court must at least demonstrate why this is not one of those “exceedingly rare” cases in which the Eighth Amendment invalidates a sentence as disproportionate. But the per curiam engages in no such analysis. We may be sure, however, that the Court of Appeals, directed to reconsider this case in light of Rummel, did undertake that analysis — upon full review and with the benefit of a substantial record, oral argument, and briefs.

It is obvious to me, as it apparently was to at least five judges of the Court of Appeals, that this case is one of those “exceedingly rare” cases in which a sentence should be invalidated on Eighth Amendment grounds. First, the indications are that the punishment imposed on respondent for the possession and distribution of less than nine ounces of marihuana — 40 years’ imprisonment and fines of $20,000 — is not simply harsh, but is in cruel and painful excess of the punishments imposed by the Virginia courts on other defendants convicted of similar offenses. As the District Court noted:

“From October 31, 1975 to August, 1976 one hundred and seventeen (117) inmates were committed to the State Department of Corrections for possessing, selling, or manufacturing marijuana. The average sentence for these offenses was three years and two months, the minimum was sixty days, and the maximum was fifteen years.” Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444, 453 (WD Va. 1977).

Second, this case is unique in that the very prosecutor who brought the charges against the respondent was forced to concede in light of his experience that the case represents a “grave disparity in sentencing,” and that the continued incarceration of Davis “is grossly unjust.” Finally, by its subsequent action, the Virginia Legislature has implicitly indicated that it views the punishment imposed on the respondent as too severe: in 1979 it reduced from 40 years to 10 years the maximum sentence that can be imposed with respect to each of the two offenses for which the respondent was convicted. See Va. Code § 18.2-248.1(a)(2) (Supp. 1981); §18.2-10(e) (1975). Under the current statute, respondent could, at maximum, be sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment — two consecutive 10-year terms. This legislative reappraisal of criminal punishment for marihuana offenses does not necessarily render unconstitutional respondent’s substantially longer term. But it plainly confirms the views of the courts below, which I share, that the punishment inflicted on Davis is unconstitutionally disproportionate and unsupported by any considered legislative judgment that the punishment inflicted is appropriate for the offenses committed. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he legislative rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly confirms our own judgment, which is that death is indeed a disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman”). See also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S., at 101 (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”). For these three reasons, and in the absence of full briefing or oral argument, I think that the judgment below — that Davis has indeed been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment — is not an unreasonable one.

Today’s decision is profoundly disturbing not only because the Court has misused precedent in order to place its imprimatur on a punishment that the courts below have determined, with ample justification, to be cruel and unusual, but also because it represents yet another instance of this Court’s “growing and inexplicable readiness ... to ‘dispose of’ cases summarily.” Harris v. Rivera, ante, at 349 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). I am, of course, cognizant that, because of an ever-increasing docket, the Court has come under extraordinary pressure to accelerate its disposition process. But I do not believe that summary disposition on the basis of the certiorari papers is a proper response to such pressure where, as here, it is employed to change or extend the law in significant respects. Here, the Court reverses the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which had the benefit of our decisions, a concrete record, and a thoughtful District Court opinion. And the Court does so in a context in which the Court of Appeals affirmed by an equally divided court, without opinion; there is accordingly no statement of law below that requires correcting. I can only believe that the Court perceives this case as one in which the narrow Rummel ruling concerning recidivist statutes can be extended to new terrain without the necessary exertion of argument and briefing. Unfortunately, it is Roger Trenton Davis who must now suffer the pains of the Court’s insensitivity, and serve out the balance of a 40-year sentence viewed as cruel and unusual by at least six judges below. I dissent from this patent abuse of our judicial power.

       In addition to the evidence seized during the raid and the tape recording of the drug transaction, all of which demonstrated that respondent was an active drug dealer, the jury knew from evidence presented at trial that respondent had knowingly sold drugs to be smuggled into prison, had sold drugs to an inmate’s wife who was alone with an infant child, and had himself been imprisoned in the past. Davis v. Davis, 585 F. 2d, at 1227-1228.

       Applying the first Hart factor to this case, the District Court found “no element of violence and minimal, debatable danger to the person.” Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444, 452 (WD Va. 1977). In Rummel, however, we noted that “the presence or absence of violence does not always affeet the strength of society’s interest in deterring a particular crime or in punishing a particular criminal.” 445 U. S., at 275. Hart’s second factor calls for an examination of the purposes behind the criminal statute and the existence of less restrictive means of effectuating those purposes. On this factor the District Court was inconclusive, but noted that the amount of marihuana involved was less than nine ounces, implying that such minimal possession could adequately be deterred with shorter prison sentences. 432 F. Supp., at 452. Such analysis was implicitly rejected by our conclusion in Rummel that the “ ‘small’ amount of money taken” was inapposite, because to acknowledge that the State could have given Rummel a life sentence for stealing some amount of money “is virtually to concede that the lines to be drawn are indeed ‘subjective,’ and therefore properly within the province of legislatures, not courts.” 445 U. S., at 275-276. Applying the third Hart factor, the District Court found that respondent’s sentence for possession with intent to distribute exceeded the maximum penalty available for that offense in all but four States, and that his sentence for distribution exceeded the maximum penalty available for that offense in all but eight States. 432 F. Supp., at 452-453. We rejected such comparison in Rummel, stating that “[ajbsent a constitutionally imposed uniformity inimical to traditional notions of federalism, some State will always bear the distinction of treating particular offenders more severely than any other State.” 445 U. S., at 282. Finally, the fourth Hart factor led the District Court to conclude that respondent’s sentence was disproportionate when compared to punishments applicable to other offenses under Virginia law. 432 F. Supp., at 453. This comparison was rejected in Rummel because “[ojther crimes . . . implicate other societal interests, making any such comparison inherently speculative.” 445 U. S., at 282, n. 27.

       We noted in Rummel that there could be situations in which the proportionality principle would come into play, such as “if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment.” Id., at 274, n. 11.

         Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444, 453 (WD Va. 1977).

        Davis v. Davis, 601 F. 2d 153 (CA4 1979).

         Hutto v. Davis, 445 U. S. 947 (1980).

        Davis v. Davis, 646 F. 2d 123 (CA4 1981).

       “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”

         E. g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584 (1977); Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910).

       The letter from the Commonwealth Attorney to Davis’ attorney reads as follows:
      “This will confirm our recent telephone conversation wherein I advised I would pose no objection to the release of Mr. Davis from the Virginia penal system on a suspended term basis.

        “Heretofore, I have steadfastly opposed his release. However, the sentences now being imposed throughout the majority of the Commonwealth and the nation for comparable acts of drug distribution are extremely light and in most cases insignificant. In view of such, I think a gross injustice would be done should I not recommend his immediate release with the remainder of his term suspended.
      “I do wish to make it expressly clear that my recommendation should not be construed as being critical of the jury that convicted Mr. Davis. I actually asked for a heavier sentence than was imposed. The citizens of this county have not softened their views toward drug offenders, and neither have I, but by the same token I cannot condone such grave disparity in sentencing.

      “I think our community, our jury, and our Court were correct in their approach to the drug problem. However, that we may be correct and others wrong in their assessment, does not enable me to continue to ignore the wrong that would be perpetuated upon Mr. Davis by his continued confinement. My [conscience] dictates that in view of the lack of any semblance of uniformity of sentencing throughout the nation in dealing with the drug problem, that Mr. Davis’s continued incarceration is grossly unjust.

      “I trust that this is a fair summary of the content of our conversation, and if it is not, I hope you will please advise me.” Letter of Feb. 28, 1977 (emphasis added).
      In the District Court, the parties stipulated that, had this prosecutor testified “with respect to the severity of the sentences imposed upon Petitioner for marijuana-related offenses, his testimony would comport with the contents of the attached letter . . . .” Supplemental Stipulation of Fact, Mar. 18, 1977.

       Davis also prepared a study of drug-related sentencing in Virginia over a 9!4-month period in 1975-1976. This study summarized sentencing of 117 inmates convicted of possessing, selling, or manufacturing marihuana. The average of these sentences was three years, two months. The maximum — for any quantity — was 15 years. I give this study only slight weight because of its short time period and its failure to give information about relevant aggravating circumstances.

        Rummel also involved a legislative revision of the relevant crimes. The basis for Rummel’s life sentence was his conviction as a habitual offender. After conviction for two prior felonies, this habitual offender law provided for automatic imposition of a life sentence upon a third felony conviction. 445 U. S., at 278. Rummel’s third felony was theft by false pretext. After his conviction on that count and as a habitual offender, Texas reclassified his third offense as a misdemeanor. Id., at 295. Unlike Virginia’s 1979 amendment with respect to Davis, however, Texas’ statutory reduction did not convey any basic change in its attitude toward the statutory basis for Rummel’s lengthy sentence: recidivism.

       “While not given all the details, the jury knew from Eads’ testimony that this was not Davis’ first trouble with the law in a drug related offense.” Davis v. Davis, 585 F. 2d 1226, 1228 (CA4 1978). “[T]he trial judge, who could have sentenced concurrently, sentenced consecutively. Not only had he heard the witnesses testify, which we have not; he knew, for example, which the jury did not, that Davis previously had been convicted of selling LSD, and that the two offenses for which Davis had just been found guilty were committed while on bail pending appeal from the previous conviction for selling LSD.” Id,., at 1233. Cf. Vines v. Muncy, 553 F. 2d 342, 349 (CA4 1977) (jury sentence not final under Virginia practice, since its findings are subject to suspension by the trial judge).

       That there should be any doubt as to the continued validity of the proportionality principle is particularly incomprehensible in view of the Rummel Court’s reliance on the proportionality principle in a footnote, where the Court, responding to the fanciful hypothetical of the dissent, stated that this principle would bar a legislature from making “overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment.” 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11.

       The per curiam notes that the District Court applied the four-factor proportionality test of Hart v. Coiner, 483 F. 2d 136 (CA4 1973). Ante, at 371, 373, and n. 2. It then suggests that the test is inconsistent with the decision in Rummel and that reversal is therefore appropriate here. Even if the Court were correct in its suggestion that the Hart test is inconsistent with Rummel, reversal would not be appropriate, because there is simply no basis for saying that the judgment of the Court of Appeals rests on the Hart test. The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed the judgment of the District Court by an equally divided court, and therefore did not issue an opinion. Accordingly, the five judges of the Court of Appeals that voted to affirm the judgment of the District Court may have based their view of the unconstitutionality of Davis’ punishment on reasoning entirely unrelated to that offered by the District Court — particularly since the District Court’s opinion had been issued prior to Rummel. In any event, this Court reviews judgments, not opinions, and therefore the Court can reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals only if it is not sustainable on any basis.

       The prosecutor’s comments were contained in the following letter that he sent to Davis’ attorney:
      “This will confirm our recent telephone conversation wherein I advised I would pose no objection to the release of Mr. Davis from the Virginia penal system on a suspended term basis.
      “Heretofore, I have steadfastly opposed his release. However, the sentences now being imposed throughout the majority of the Commonwealth and the nation for comparable acts of drug distribution are extremely light and in most cases insignificant. In view of such, I think a gross injustice would be done should I not recommend his immediate release with the remainder of his term suspended.
      “I do wish to make it expressly clear that my recommendation should not be construed as being critical of the jury that convicted Mr. Davis. I actually asked for a heavier sentence than was imposed. The citizens of this county have not softened their views toward drug offenders, and neither have I, but by the same token I cannot condone such grave disparity in sentencing.
      “I think our community, our jury, and our Court were correct in their approach to the drug problem. However, that we may be correct and others wrong in their assessment, does not enable me to continue to ignore the wrong that would be perpetrated upon Mr. Davis by his continued confinement. My conscious [sic] dictates that in view of the lack of any semblance of uniformity of sentencing throughout the nation in dealing with the drug problem, that Mr. Davis’s continued incarceration is grossly unjust.
      “I trust that this is a fair summary of the content of our conversation, and if it is not, I hope you will please advise me.” Letter from Thomas B. Baird, Jr., to Edward L. Hogshire (Feb. 28, 1977).

       This legislative action also undermines any claim that the state interest in having Davis serve a 40-year prison sentence is sufficiently strong to preclude invalidation of the sentence as disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment. See supra, at 381-383.

       Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment, nevertheless concludes that the punishment imposed on Davis is not as disproportionate as that imposed on Rummel and that therefore the instant case is controlled by the facts of Rummel. Ante, at 379-380. But even if the punishment in the instant case could be determined, in the abstract, to be less severe than that imposed on Rummel, the fact remains that Rummel was sentenced as a habitual offender and this Court determined the State’s interest in imposing unusually harsh sentences on habitual offenders to be a substantial one. No comparable state interest has been offered to support the punishment inflicted here. Although it may be true that the respondent in the instant case has previously been convicted of a drug offense, he was not sentenced as a habitual offender, but for possession and distribution of less than nine ounces of marihuana. Indeed, while the trial judge, who made consecutive the jury’s recommended sentences of 20 years on each count, was aware of the respondent’s prior conviction, the jury, which awarded the sentences, was unaware that the respondent had previously been convicted. See Davis v. Davis, 585 F. 2d 1226, 1233 (CA4 1978).

       Indeed, an increased rate of summary dispositions may prove to be counterproductive. As the bar becomes alert to the increased probability of summary disposition, lawyers responding to a petition for certiorari will likely choose to minimize the risk of summary disposition by taking the additional step of providing a full statement of their argument on the merits. As others have noted, this will only “mean additional and unnecessary work for the lawyer, expense to the client, and unessential reading matter for the already overburdened Court.” R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 365 (5th ed. 1978). Accord, Brown, Foreword: Process of Law, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 77, 81-82 (1958).

       In view of this abuse, it is certainly startling that the Court should suggest that the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the District Court in this case was tantamount to “anarchy.” Ante, at 375. Quite to the contrary, the Court of Appeals has only fiilfilled its constitutional responsibility to apply the Court’s precedents in light of reason and experience — something that this Court today has plainly failed to do.


author: Per Curiam. Justice Powell,

text:
    DONOVAN, SECRETARY OF LABOR, et al. v. RICHLAND COUNTY ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CITIZENS
    No. 81-255.
    Decided January 11, 1982
   Per Curiam.

Appellee brought this action against officials of the United States Department of Labor seeking a declaratory judgment that the Fair Labor Standards Act does not apply to employees of the Sidney Group Home, a mental health facility operated by appellee. In the alternative, appellee sought a declaration that an application of the Act to the Home would be unconstitutional. The United States District Court for the District of Montana held that “[t]he Fair Labor Standards Act is unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff Association in its operation of the Sidney Group Home.” App. to Juris. Statement 26a. The federal officials appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed. Id., at la. The Government has now filed an appeal from that decision of the Court of Appeals.

Pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252, appellants could have filed a direct appeal to this Court from the decision of the District Court. This right to pursue a direct appeal to this Court also served to deprive the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction, however, for 28 U. S. C. § 1291 provides that “[t]he courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.” Since the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction in this case, its judgment and opinion must be vacated.

In addition, the appeal filed from the decision of the Court of Appeals must be dismissed. Appellants’ proper course of conduct was to file a direct appeal from the decision of the District Court. At this time, however, such relief is foreclosed by 28 U. S. C. § 2101(a).

We decline appellants’ request that we remand this matter to the District Court for entry of a fresh decree from which a timely appeal might be taken. Although the complexities of litigation involving three-judge district courts made it appropriate to relieve certain appellants from the consequences of a misapplication of that somewhat arcane jurisprudence, as the cases cited in Justice Powell’s separate opinion demonstrate, that rationale has no application to appellants’ simple failure in this case to follow the clear commands of 28 U. S. C. §1252 and 28 U. S. C. §1291.

Judgment vacated and appeal dismissed.

Justice Powell,

with whom Justice Blackmun joins,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in the Court’s decision to vacate the judgment and opinion of the Court of Appeals. But I would not simply dismiss the Government’s appeal. Rather I would remand the matter to the District Court for entry of a fresh decree from which a timely appeal might be taken. This is the course customarily followed by the Court in cases such as this. See Query v. United States, 316 U. S. 486 (1942); see also Gonzalez v. Employees Credit Union, 419 U. S. 90 (1974); United States v. Christian Echoes Ministry, 404 U. S. 561 (1972); Board of Regents of University of Texas System v. New Left Education Project, 404 U. S. 541 (1972); Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U. S. 427 (1970); Moody v. Flowers, 387 U. S. 97 (1967). Title 28 U. S. C. § 1252 is designed to expedite review by this Court, not defeat it. Because review in this case has been unnecessarily delayed, the Court reasons that “a recognition of jurisdiction would permit needless delay in securing Supreme Court review of a decision holding a federal statute unconstitutional.” Ante, at 391, n. 3. But just because this case already has been delayed too long does not require that we should compound the error by leaving the case in a posture defeating all review.

An Act of Congress has been held unconstitutional. I cannot believe that Congress intended § 1252 to serve the function of blocking review in this Court in these circumstances. Because the Court’s disposition defeats the fundamental purpose of § 1252, I dissent.

       “Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory or final judgment, decree or order of any court of the United States . . . holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the United States or any of its agencies, or any officer or employee thereof, as such officer or employee, is a party.” 28 U. S. C. § 1252.

       The Court of Appeals actually entered two separate decisions in this case. In the judgment sought to be reviewed, the court affirmed the decision of the District Court holding the Fair Labor Standards Act unconstitutional as applied to the Sidney Group Home. After appellants had filed their notice of appeal in this case — and indeed after appellants had filed their jurisdictional statement in this Court — the Court of Appeals sua sponte recalled its earlier opinion and entered a new judgment reversing the District Court. Richland County Assn. v. Marshall, 660 F. 2d 388 (1981). The filing of the notice of appeal clearly divested the Court of Appeals of any jurisdiction that it otherwise had to decide the merits of this case.

       On the basis of the decision in McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U. S. 21 (1975), appellants contend that any defect in the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1252. Appellants’ reliance on McLucas, however, is misplaced. In that case, the Court held that it had jurisdiction under § 1252 to consider a direct appeal taken from a decision of a district court, even though the district court lacked jurisdiction because a three-judge district court should have been convened. The Court noted that the purpose of § 1252 was “to afford immediate review in this Court in civil actions to which the United States or its officers are parties and thus will be bound by a holding of unconstitutionality.” 421 U. S., at 31. To effectuate this statutory purpose, the Court held that immediate review was available; it was not necessary to vacate the decision of the district court and remand the case for further proceedings by a three-judge court.
      In contrast, appellants do not contend that the District Court in the instant case lacked jurisdiction over this controversy. Rather than pursue their right to immediate review in this Court, however, appellants obtained an intermediate decision from a Court of Appeals that had no power to consider this case. In so doing, they failed to pursue timely the right to immediate review conferred by § 1252. The fact that the Court of Appeals also held that the Act was unconstitutional does not resurrect the right created by § 1252 that had lapsed by appellants’ action. This case is the antithesis of McLucas; a recognition of jurisdiction would permit needless delay in securing Supreme Court review of a decision holding a federal statute unconstitutional. We cannot believe that Congress intended § 1252 to serve such a function.


author: Per Curiam. Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    BLANDING et al. v. DuBOSE et al.
    No. 81-325.
    Decided January 11, 1982
   Per Curiam.

Appellants, citizens of Sumter County, S. C., have taken an appeal from a summary judgment entered against them on February 17, 1981, by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The three-judge District Court concluded that Sumter County in June 1979 had made a preclearance submission under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, when it wrote the United States Attorney General informing him that a referendum had approved at-large County Council elections. Because the Attorney General failed to object within 60 days to the claimed preclearance submission, the District Court permitted Sumter County to proceed with at-large elections for its County Council. We hold that the county’s June 1979 letter was a reconsideration request, not a preclearance submission, and reverse.

I

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act provides that when a covered political subdivision enacts a voting procedure different from that in effect on November 1, 1964, the political subdivision must either seek a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia approving the procedure or submit it to the United States Attorney General for preclearance. If the procedure is submitted to the Attorney General and he does not interpose an objection to the preclearance submission within 60 days, the procedure may be enforced.

On November 1,1964, Sumter County was governed by its South Carolina General Assembly delegation acting through a County Board of Supervisors. In 1967, the General Assembly enacted a local bill that established a new form of government for Sumter County, namely, a seven-member County Commission elected at-large. See 1967 S. C. Acts, No. 371. Although this change required preclearance under §5 of the Voting Rights Act, no steps were taken to obtain preclearance and at-large elections were held in 1968, 1970, 1972, and 1974.

In 1975, the General Assembly passed, and the Governor approved, the State’s Home Rule Act, 1975 S. C. Acts, No. 283, codified as S. C. Code § 4-9-10 et seq. (1976 and Supp. 1980). The Act permitted a South Carolina county to hold a referendum to select a form of local government and to choose between at-large and single-member district elections. § 4-9-10. The Act specifically provided that if Sumter County did not hold a referendum, it would be assigned, effective July 1, 1976, the council-administrator form of government with council members elected at-large. § 4-9-10(b).

The Home Rule Act was submitted to the Attorney General of the United States for preclearance. The Attorney General did not interpose an objection to the Act, as such, but he indicated that the outcomes of Home Rule Act refer-enda or assignments of forms of government under the Act would be subject to preclearance.

Sumter County chose not to hold a referendum. Accordingly, it was assigned the council-administrator form of government with at-large elections. The County Council passed a resolution and ordinance adopting that form of government and method of election.

On August 13, 1976, the County Administrator submitted the Sumter County Home Rule Ordinance and the 1967 Act to the Attorney General for preclearance. On December 3, after having obtained necessary additional information, see 28 CFR §51.18 (1980), the Attorney General made a timely objection to the at-large method of election of the Council. He interposed no objection to the council-administrator form of government.

The county requested the Attorney General to reconsider his objection to at-large elections, see § 51.21(b), and the county and the Attorney General continued to correspond during 1977 and 1978. In early 1978, the county asked whether the Attorney General would withdraw his objection if a county referendum endorsed the at-large method of election. On April 28 of that year, the Attorney General declined to withdraw the objection and advised the county that a favorable referendum result, by itself, would not cause him to change his mind.

A Council election was scheduled for June 13, 1978. After the Attorney General refused to withdraw his objection, private parties and the United States brought separate federal suits to prevent elections under the at-large system. The two suits were consolidated. A single judge issued a temporary restraining order, and on June 21, 1978, a three-judge District Court permanently enjoined County Council elections until the requirements of the Voting Rights Act were fulfilled.

In November 1978, Sumter County went ahead with its referendum in which voters were asked whether they preferred that Council members be elected at-large or from single-member districts. The majority endorsed the at-large method. Because Council members already were being elected under the at-large system, the county did not enact any resolution or ordinance to adopt the results of the referendum.

Then came the critical exchange of correspondence. On June 4, 1979, the Attorney General received a letter, dated June 1, from the county advising him of the referendum results. The letter expressed doubt as to whether it was a new preclearance submission of the at-large method, see 28 CFR § 51.2(c) (1980), or a request that the Attorney General reconsider his earlier objection to at-large elections, see § 51.21. Subsequently, on July 23, a conference was held in Washington, D. C., between county officials and representatives of the Department of Justice. See § 51.23. Fifteen days later, see § 51.24, on August 7, the Attorney General, referring to the county’s letter as a “request for reconsideration,” refused to withdraw the objection to at-large elections, but advised the county that the Department of Justice had not yet completed its review. On September 27, the Attorney General for a second time refused to withdraw his objection. See §51.25.

Thereafter, the defendant-appellees moved the District Court for summary judgment. They contended that the June letter was a preclearance submission, not a request for reconsideration. Section 5, the appellees noted, requires the Attorney General to object within 60 days of a preclearance submission. They asserted that, since the Attorney General did not interpose an objection by August 3, the county was free under § 5 to proceed with at-large elections.

A three-judge District Court was again convened. It agreed with appellees. 509 P. Supp. 1334 (1981). Referring to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the court observed that the 1978 referendum approved a method of electing county officials different from that in effect on November 1, 1964. The letter received June 4, 1979, according to the District Court, was the required preclearance submission. Rejecting the Attorney General’s argument that the letter was a request for reconsideration of his timely 1976 objection to at-large elections, the District Court declared: “This Court will not be a party to the [Attorney General’s] effort to excuse his failure to act by mislabeling a submission for preclearance as a ‘request for reconsideration.’” 509 F. Supp., at 1336.

hH I — I

We conclude that the District Court, not the Attorney General, mislabeled the June 1979 letter. The court ruled that that letter was a preclearance submission because the referendum approved a method of selecting officials different from that in effect on November 1, 1964. But the change to at-large County Council elections already had been submitted to the Attorney General for preclearance. The 1978 referendum merely approved the pre-existing at-large method — the very method to which the Attorney General earlier had made a timely objection. Because the referendum did no more than endorse a method of election that previously had been submitted to the Attorney General and that was the subject of an outstanding objection, the June letter did not amount to a new preclearance submission.

Indeed, the June letter fell squarely within the definition of a reconsideration request. The applicable regulation provides that the Attorney General will reconsider his objection upon a request by a submitting authority “to present further substantiating or explanatory information which was not previously available to the submitting authority.” 28 CFR § 51.21(b) (1980). The results of the referendum constituted further explanatory information concerning at-large elections which the county asked the Attorney General to consider. The June letter thus was nothing more than a request that the Attorney General reconsider his earlier objection to at-large County Council elections in light of the referendum results.

The District Court put forward several reasons why, in its view, the June letter was not a reconsideration request. None of them persuades us. First, the District Court pointed out that the county already had made one reconsideration request. But the regulations do not limit a political subdivision to a single request for reconsideration.. Second, the court relied upon 28 CFR § 51.21(b) (1980), which requires that a reconsideration request be made within 10 days of the Attorney General’s objection. The Attorney General, however, follows the laudable practice of accepting reconsideration requests even though they are untimely, thus considering possibly important information that was not available within 10 days of the original objection. See also §51.25 (permitting the Attorney General to reconsider his objection on his own motion). In any event, the mere fact that a reconsideration request is untimely does not convert it into a preclearance submission. Third, the court also cited § 51.21(b) for the proposition that a reconsideration request must be based on information not previously available. That requirement poses no obstacle to considering the June letter a reconsideration request, because the outcome of the referendum constituted information not previously available to Sumter County authorities. And, just as a reconsideration request does not become a preclearance submission merely by being untimely, so a reconsideration request does not become a preclearance submission simply by being repetitive.

Not only does the District Court decision mischaracterize the June letter, but its decision also has undesirable results. Under that court’s ruling, a political subdivision could recommence the 60-day period at will by readopting the contested voting procedure. In addition, the Attorney General would be forced to interpose redundant objections to the same change in voting laws. For these reasons also, we refuse to accept the District Court’s interpretation of § 5.

Finally, we have frequently stated that courts should grant deference to the interpretation given statutes and regulations by the officials charged with their administration. See, e. g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U. S. 555 (1980); United States v. Sheffield Board of Comm’rs, 435 U. S. 110, 131 (1978); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965). In this case, the Attorney General employed reasonable definitions of a preclearance submission and of a reconsideration request when he treated the June letter as in the latter category. Indeed, the Attorney General followed the more sensible course.

The judgment of the District Court is

Reversed.

The Chief Justice concurs in the judgment.

Justice Rehnquist,

with whom Justice Powell joins,

concurring.

The per curiam correctly concludes that the June 1, 1979, letter from Sumter County was a request for reconsideration, not a preclearance submission. Therefore, I concur in the per curiam’s reasoning and conclusion. I concur reluctantly, however, for the record in this case illustrates what I view as the unreasonably burdensome and unrealistic control which the Federal Government routinely exercises over state and local governments under the Voting Rights Act.

The record recounts a 5-year effort by Sumter County to obtain the approval of several United States Assistant Attorneys General for an election method adopted by the South Carolina General Assembly. This effort included occasional correspondence with high-level attorneys in the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, and, apparently, more frequent contact with low-level attorneys who requested information about plans, statistics, histories, names, places, and related facts. Although such communications are not unusual in dealings with today’s federal bureaucracy, the record portrays a particularly frustrating effort to please a distant authority with veto power over the decisions of local officials. For example, an October 31, 1977, letter from appellees to an Assistant Attorney General explains the county’s legal inability under state law to comply with various “suggestions” from the Department of Justice. The letter concludes:

“This leaves us in a dilemma. The [County] Council doesn’t wish to be in the position of seeming to pay no attention to your suggestion that the form of election should properly be changed; or to seem to be disregarding your suggestions. On the other hand, the County’s Council is advised that it has inadequate legal power to act under South Carolina law in the manner you seem to be suggesting. . . . Perhaps you can suggest something to us which would help us to resolve our difficulties which have us disturbed, perplexed, and confounded.” 1 Record, Defendants’ Exhibit 20, pp. 2-3, attached to County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, filed Jan. 25, 1980.

Today’s decision, of course, will only reopen the dispute and again place the county at the mercy of attorneys in the Justice Department. There seems to be something inherently unsatisfactory about a system which places such discretionary authority in the hands of a few unelected federal officials who are wholly detached from the realities of the locality and the preferences of the local electorate. Nonetheless, it is the system which Congress has established, and I therefore concur in the judgment.

       Section 5, as amended, reads in pertinent part as follows:
      “Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the first sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, . . . such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, . . . and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission. . . . Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.”

       The Attorney General acted through the Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division.

       The letter states: “We are uncertain as to whether this submission should be termed a ‘new submission,’ or a ‘request’ for reconsideration of the Attorney General’s objection to the County’s original submission.” 1 Record, Defendants’ Exhibit 7, p. 3, attached to County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment filed with the District Court on Jan. 25, 1980.

       Section 51.24 reads:
      “An objection shall be withdrawn if the submitting authority can produce information not previously available to it which satisfies the Attorney General that the change does not have a racially discriminatory purpose or effect. The Attorney General shall notify the submitting authority within 60 days of the request for reconsideration (provided that the Attorney General shall have at least 15 days following any conference that is held in which to decide) of his decision to continue or withdraw an objection, giving the reasons for his decision. A copy of the notification shall be sent to any party that has commented on the submission or has requested notice of the Attorney General’s action thereon.”

       The District Court in its opinion, 509 F. Supp. 1334 (1981), omitted mention of the August 7 letter, which is Defendants’ Exhibit 8 attached to the motion for summary judgment. The court stated that the Attorney General did not take action following the July 23 conference until he refused to withdraw his objection on September 27. 509 F. Supp., at 1336. In this respect, the decision of the District Court was clearly erroneous.

       Once it concluded that the June letter was a preclearance submission, the District Court found that the Attorney General’s actions were untimely. But it can hardly be said that the Attorney General failed to act in response to the June letter. We note again that Department of Justice officials held a conference with Sumter County officials on July 23, that the Attorney General refused to withdraw his objection on August 7, within 15 days of that conference, and that the Attorney General once more, on September 27, refused to withdraw his objection.

       Before the District Court, there was a dispute whether the June letter was accompanied by a multipage document supplying, inter alia, the information required by 28 CFR §51.10 (1980), or whether that document was first presented to the Department of Justice at the July 23 conference. If the document was not presented until July 23, the Attorney General’s August 7 letter might not have been untimely even if the June letter were a preclearance submission. See §§ 51.3(b) and 51.18(a). See also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 171 (1980). Because we hold that the June letter was not a preclearance submission, we need not address this issue.