source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. A-652 (79-6120).
    Brazas et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Mr. Justice Stewart and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 79-6064.
    Tarkowski v. Grady, U. S. District Judge, et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 79-1171.
    Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 78-1347.
    Wall et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-241.
    Missouri v. All Star News Agency, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-357.
    Thornlow v. Thornlow.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 13th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-683.
    Missouri v. All Star News Agency, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-698.
    Bothman v. Warren B. et ux.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-731.
    Porter & Dietsch, Inc., et al. v. Federal Trade Commission; and Pay’n Save Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission.
    No. 79-1090.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-751.
    Sotto et al. v. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offender Rehabilitation of Florida.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-812.
    Osmose Wood Preserving Co. of America, Inc., et al. v. City of Los Angeles.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-902.
    Friedman v. Harbold.
   Ct. App. Ga. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-904.
    Sellinger v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-975.
    Bell v. New York.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1078.
    Pittsburgh Metro Area Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Service.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1094.
    Authorized Air Conditioning Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1097.
    Fowler v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1098.
    DiVivo v. United States et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1103.
    Menominee Tribe of Indians et al. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1124.
    Illinois et al. v. United States et al.; and Illinois et al. v. Interstate Commerce Commission et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1163.
    Johnson v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1170.
    McGraw-Edison Co. et al. v. Fremont et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1177.
    McBride et al. v. Rockefeller Family Fund et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1201.
    Wright v. Wright.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1206.
    Ruffin et al. v. County of Los Angeles et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1207.
    Lyles v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1209.
    Coastal Corp. et al. v. Weisberg.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1215.
    Leifer v. New York.
   • App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1224.
    General Footwear Co., Ltd., et al. v. American Footwear Corp.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1227.
    Peltzman v. American Radio Assn.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1232.
    Jackson et al. v. Hayakawa et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1257.
    Sexton v. Cleveland Athletic Club et al.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1293.
    Plummer v. Klepak, Chairman, Drug Abuse Control Commission of New York, et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5747.
    Edwards v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5778.
    Lykins v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5820.
    Klobuchir v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5821.
    Rogers v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5831.
    Meyer v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5860.
    Goolsby v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5867.
    Jackson v. Kansas.
   Sup. Ct. Kan. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5878.
    Streeter v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5899.
    Brown v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5900.
    Kralik v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5937.
    Jackson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5938.
    Clayton v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6025.
    Magee v. Mitchell, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6038.
    Bowden v. Mitchell, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6051.
    No. 79-6052.
    Ballard v. Smith, Warden; and Campbell v. Sowders, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6054.
    Brewer v. Brewer.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6059.
    Martin v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Lawrence County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6065.
    Grooms v. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offender Rehabilitation of Florida.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6068.
    Carter v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6069.
    Sanders, aka Taylor v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6072.
    Farrell v. Department of Social and Health Services of Washington.
   Ct. App. Wash. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6076.
    Maselli v. Henderson, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6091.
    Perez-Huerta v. St. Francis Community Hospital.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6102.
    Bullock et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6127.
    Blake v. Thompson, Warden.
   C. A. 6th

Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6130.
    McClanahan v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6151.
    Hinson v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6153.
    Merrow v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6154.
    Watson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6169.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6171.
    Attwell et al. v. LaSalle National Bank et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6173.
    Lewis v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6185.
    Alanis v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6195.
    Till v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6197.
    McQuin v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6074.
    Pollard v. United States Tobacco Co.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 79-5754.
    No. 79-5755.
    No. 79-5819.
    No. 79-5928.
    Ginsburg v. Overlook Hospital et al., Solomon v. Frame et al., Reed v. Schwab et al., Gamble v. United States,
   444 U. S.1086;

444 U. S. 1086;

444 U. S. 1088; and

444 U. S. 1092. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    April 14, 1980
    No. 79-1373.
    Republican National Committee et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y.


text:
    No. 79-1375.
    Republican National Committee et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al.
   Affirmed on appeal

from C. A. 2d Cir.


text:
    No. 79-1152.
    Hefner v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 5th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5837.
    Swink v. Texas.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Tex. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certio-rari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6090.
    Wayland v. Tiffany et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 1st Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6084.
    Savarin v. National Bank of Commerce-Master Charge.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Tenn. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 78-1803.
    United States v. Humphries.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and ease remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Crews, ante, p. 463.


text:
    No. 79-1041.
    California v. Austin.
   App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded to consider whether judgment is based on federal or state constitutional grounds, or both.


text:
    No. A-700.
    Schultz v. Florida et al.
   C. A. 5th dr. Application for injunction and other relief, addressed to Mr. Justice Brennan and referred to the Court, denied.

       For the Court’s orders prescribing Rules of Procedure for the Trial of Misdemeanors before United States Magistrates, see post, p. 976, and adopting amendments to the Rules of this Court, see post, p. 984.


text:
    No. A-831.
    Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, Local 1-547 v. Goubeaux, Regional Director, National Labor Relations Board.
   D. C. C. D. Cal. Application for stay pending appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, presented to Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall, and by them referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-849.
    United States Taxpayer’s Union et al. v. United States et al.
   Application for stay of order of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado pending appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, presented to Mr. Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan would grant the application.


text:
    No. A-855.
    Record Data, Inc., et al. v. Nichols et al.
   Application for stay of mandate of the Supreme Court of Alabama, addressed to Mr. Justice White and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-866.
    Green v. United States et al.
   Application for a writ of habeas corpus and/or release on personal recognizance, presented to Mr. Justice Blackmun, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 86,
    Orig.
    Louisiana v. Mississippi et al.
   Motion for leave to file a bill of complaint granted. The defendants are allowed 60 days in which to answer. Application for stay of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied.


text:
    No. 79-343.
    Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania et al.
   Pa. Commw. Ct. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 444 U. S. 1011.] Motion of Local No. 6, Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of America, AFL-CIO, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 79-509.
    Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wisconsin.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 444 U. S. 961.] Motion of appellant for leave to file a brief after argument granted.

Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 79-521.
    Consumer Product Safety Commission et al. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Cer-tiorari granted, 444 U. S. 979.] Motion of the Solicitor General to permit Peter Buscemi, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hoc vice granted.


text:
    No. 79-701.
    Roadway Express, Inc. v. Monk et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 444 U. S. 1012.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted. Motion of NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 79-824.
    No. 79-825.
    No. 79-826.
    No. 79-827.
    Federal Communications Commission et al. v. WNCN Listeners Guild et al.; Insilco Broadcasting Corp. et al. v. WNCN Listeners Guild et al.; American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., et al. v. WNCN Listeners Guild et al; and National Association of Broadcasters et al. v. WNCN Listeners Guild et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 914.] Motion to dispense with printing appendix granted except as to those portions designated by the Solicitor General who will bear the costs.


text:
    No. 79-935.
    Allen et al. v. McCurry.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 444 U. S. 1070.] Motion of petitioners to dispense with printing appendix granted.


text:
    No. 79-938.
    Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. [Certiorari granted, 444 U. S. 1070.] Joint motion to dispense with printing appendix granted.


text:
    No. 79-952.
    Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. [Certiorari granted, 444 U. S. 1070.] Motion of petitioner to dispense with printing appendix granted.


text:
    No. 79-1236.
    Carson et al. v. American Brands, Inc., t/a American Tobacco Co., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. A-723 (79-1323).
    Quinones v. United States.
   Application for stay of mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, presented to Mr. Justice Brennan, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-793 (79-1434).
    Mandel et al. v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Application for stay, addressed to Mr. Justice Brennan and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 79-5903.
    H. L. v. Matheson, Governor of Utah, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Utah. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 903.] Motion to appoint Alan Ernest as counsel for children unborn and born alive denied. Motion of Legal Defense Fund for Unborn Children for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 79-1028.
    No. 79-1246.
    No. 79-6079.
    No. 79-6110.
    Mandel et al. v. En Banc Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit et al; Connolly et al. v. United States District Court for the Central District of California (Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., Real Party in Interest); McClain v. Blumenfeld; and Green v. United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 79-5962.
    Vincent v. Texas.
   Appeal from Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Motion of appellant for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits. Reported below: 586 S. W. 2d 880.


text:
    No. 79-621.
    Arizona v. Manypenny.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 608 F. 2d 1197.


text:
    No. 79-1128.
    Montana et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-1013.
    Rubin v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 79-5688.
    Hudson v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 78-6320.
    Pearson v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6374.
    Fletcher v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-862.
    Foster v. Pearcy.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-885.
    Sherman v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-926.
    Padilla v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-958.
    O’Brien v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1014.
    Buckner v. United States.
   C. A. ’9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1016.
    Giacalone v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1029.
    Mandel et al. v. United States; and Rodgers et al. v. United States
    No. 79-1030.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1040.
    Gilbert v. Cleland et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1042.
    Dolese et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1050.
    Hudler v. United-States.
   C. A.. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1051.
    City of Rohnert Park v. Landrieu, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1060.
    Zalmanowski et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1063.
    Keefe et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1100.
    Rials v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1104.
    E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1108.
    Jones et al. v. Morrison.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1116.
    McInnis v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1121.
    No. 79-1122.
    Scott v. United States; and Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1138.
    Schulz v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1146.
    Petty et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1149.
    Allstate Savings & Loan Assn. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1150.
    California, by and through the Department of Transportation of California, et al. v. Doria Mining & Engineering Corp. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1161.
    St. Joseph’s Hospital Health Center v. Blue Cross of Central New York, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1165.
    Scott v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1166.
    Smith v. Wilson Freight Co. et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1168.
    McDonald v. Gerberding et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1196.
    Timmons v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1198.
    Spannaus, Attorney General of Minnesota v. Goldschmidt, Secretary of Transportation, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1212.
    Weinkle v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1231.
    Ely v. United Parcel Service, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1249.
    Backus v. California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir.' Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1255.
    Earp v. Washington.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1261.
    J. C. Athans Engineering & Construction Co., Inc. v. Powell et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist; Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1264.
    Haas, Executrix v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., Trustee.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1265.
    Caterina v. Pennsylvania.
   Pa. Commw. Ct. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1271.
    Polley v. Kirkland et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1272.
    Perrin, Warden, et al. v. Henry et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1274.
    Desert Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., et al. v. Chrysler Corp.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1278.
    Ellis et ux. v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1283.
    Chicago Title & Trust Co., Trustee, et al. v. Tully, Assessor of Cook County, et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1285.
    Maschhoff v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1286.
    Morigeau v. Larrivee.
   Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1287.
    Stewart v. Superior Court of Pima County, Arizona, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1288.
    Wilt et al. v. Ohio State Board of Education et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1291.
    Tucker v. Neal et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1292.
    Nunnally et al. v. Trust Company Bank, Co-Trustee, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1302.
    Kennedy, Trustee in Bankruptcy v. Hancock Investment Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1307.
    Davis Oil Co. et al. v. Parvin.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1319.
    Pomerantz v. New York.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1322.
    Ison v. First State Bank of Centralia, Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1324.
    Cosden Oil & Chemical Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 826.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 11th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1360.
    Serrano v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1363.
    Ash v. United States et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1364.
    Gode et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1374.
    Republican National Committee et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari before judgment denied.


text:
    No. 79-1379.
    Staten v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1381.
    Esparza-Corral et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1390.
    Wright, Administratrix v. Southern Bell Telephone Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1405.
    Kaufman et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1413.
    Jackstadt v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1419.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1430.
    Straube v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Board, dba Emanuel Hospital.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1431.
    Freeman v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5431.
    Tsinnijinnie v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5805.
    Berryman et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5916.
    Alexander v. Perini, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5930.
    Bray v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5935.
    Herring v. Sanders et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5940.
    Turner v. Mitchell, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5941.
    Meier v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5943.
    Nickerson et al. v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5964.
    Metheny v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5977.
    Coleman v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6012.
    Gelestino v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6040.
    Beede v. New Hampshire.
   Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6053.
    No. 79-6063.
    Walker v. United States; and Mack v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir, Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6070.
    Lynn et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6085.
    Carey v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6087.
    Torres v. Romero, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6092.
    Lillibridge et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6097.
    Duke v. Harris, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 4th dr. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6098.
    McGruder v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6105.
    Canty v. Mahoney et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6113.
    Owens v. Marshall, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6114.
    Prestigiacomo v. Smith, Reformatory Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6115.
    Terrell v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6118.
    Sherrod v. Maryland House of Correction.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6119.
    Hall v. Iowa.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6124.
    LeBrun v. Oregon.
   Ct. App. Ore. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6125.
    Coulston v. Hutto, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6126.
    Hawkins v. Crist, Warden, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6131.
    Jones v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6132.
    Mason v. Harris, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6135.
    Cunningham v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6136.
    Williams v. Arizona.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6140.
    Thicker v. Cupp, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6144.
    Allen v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6162.
    Norment et al. v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
   C, A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6186.
    Noe v. Civiletti, Attorney General, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6215.
    Mears v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6233.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6252.
    Wright v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6256.
    Callahan v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6259.
    Burgess v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-6268.
    Suhail, aka Kier v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


author: Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    No. 79-807.
    Peer, Director, Department of Public Welfare of County of San Diego, et al. v. Griffeth et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

dissenting.

The Court of Appeals has taken a significant step in this case to expand the ruling of this Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970), a step that I believe merits plenary-consideration by the full Court. The question pertains to whether an applicant for state-mandated welfare benefits is entitled to a hearing under the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution before being denied welfare benefits for failure to meet the initial requirements imposed by state law. The California courts themselves, in Zobriscky v. Los Angeles County, 28 Cal. App. 3d 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1972), have concluded that an applicant is not entitled to any hearing because, in the words of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, they “refused to find general relief to be a protected property interest.” Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F. 2d 118, 121 (1979).

There has been much decisional law from this and other courts, and much scholarly commentary, as to what is a protected “property” interest under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and what procedural guarantees are necessary under that Clause before one may be denied such a property interest. See, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979); Van Alstyne, Cracks in “The New Property”: Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 445 (1977). Obviously this Court cannot parse every state-lajjv provision to determine whether it creates a protected “property interest” under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But here I believe the District Court put its finger on the significance of the case when it ruled against respondents, saying:

“Plaintiffs [respondents] argue that the pretermination evidentiary hearing required by the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 . . . (1970) should be applied to protect denied applicants for General Relief in San Diego County. . . . Defendants oppose An extension of Goldberg's protection of terminated, recipients of welfare to denied applicants for General Relief. The Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U. S. 280, 284-285 . . . (1970) (Burger, C. J., dissenting).” (Emphasis supplied in part.) Griffeth v. Detrich, 448 F. Supp. 1137, 1139 (SD Cal. 1978).

Particularly when the only state appellate court to consider the question has concluded that there is no protected property interest under state law, this extension of Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, should receive plenary consideration by this Court.


text:
    No. 79-1074.
    United Parcel Service, Inc., et al. v. United States et al.
   C: A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioner to strike brief of intervening respondents and certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1197.
    National Labor Relations Board v. Mercy Hospital Assn.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice White would grant cer-tiorari.


text:
    No. 79-5707.
    Flanagan v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion for leave to file a supplement to petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5901.
    Wade v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certio-rari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Black-mun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 79-1248.
    Missouri v. Wandix.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1306.
    Castro v. Territory of Guam.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stewart would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 79-6111.
    No. 79-6116.
    No. 79-6168.
    No. 79-6187.
    Ford v. Florida. Thomas v. Florida. Stamper v. Virginia. Tucker v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. Va.; and

Sup. Ct. Ga. Certio-rari denied. Reported below: No. 79-6111, 374 So. 2d 496; No. 79-6116, 374 So. 2d 508; No. 79-6168, 220 Va. 260, 257 S. E. 2d 808; No. 79-6187, 244 Ga. 721, 261 S. E. 2d 635.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 78-1323.
    No. 78-1335.
    No. 78-1871.
    No. 79-265.
    No. 79-579.
    No. 79-830.
    Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt, Administratrix, Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment et al., Snepp v. United States, United States v. Snepp, Erwin et al. v. United States, Vinson v. United States,
   444 U. S. 490;

444 U. S. 620;

444 U. S. 507;

444 U. S. 507;

444 U. S. 1071; and

444 U. S. 1074. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 79-833.
    No. 79-890.
    No. 79-894.
    No. 79-918.
    No. 79-942.
    No. 79-971.
    No. 79-1001.
    No. 79-5360.
    No. 79-5733.
    No. 79-5744.
    No. 79-5777.
    No. 79-5802.
    No. 79-5830.
    No. 79-5872.
    No. 79-5893.
    No. 79-5917.
    No. 79-5929.
    No. 79-5973.
    Kondrat v. City of Willoughby Hills et al., Lamers Dairy, Inc., et al. v. Secretary of Agriculture, Parker v. Texas, Shuffman, Executrix v. Hartford Textile Corp. et al., Shuffman, Executrix v. Hartford Textile Corp. et al., Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., Shuffman, Executrix v. Hartford Textile Corp. et al., Morris v. Cate-McLaurin Co. et al., Jones et ux. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., Alderman v. Balkcom, Warden, Hayes v. Board of Trustees of Clark County School District, Clark v. Payne et al., Bowden v. Zant, Warden, Harrison v. Naifeh, Judge, et al., Young v. Indiana, Hunt v. Greenberg, District Attorney of Albany County, et al., Taylor v. City of Atlanta et al., Sellars v. Community Release Board of California,
   444 U.S. 1075;

444 U. S. 1077;

444 U. S. 1060;

444 U. S. 1078;

444 U. S. 1078;

444 U. S. 1060;

444 U. S. 1080;

ante, p. 917;

444 U. S. 1085;

444 U. S. 1103;

444 U. S. 1061;

444 U. S. 1088;

444 U. S. 1103;

ante, p. 932;

ante, p. 906;

ante, p. 918.

ante, p. 907; and

ante, p. 919. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 78-1548.
    California Brewers Assn. et al. v. Bryant et al.,
   444 U. S. 598. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 79-5986.
    Mahler v. Nelson, Warden,
   444 U. S. 1092. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    April 17, 1980
    No. 79-5974.
    Brockington et al. v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari dismissed as to petitioner Brockington under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    CALIFORNIA v. VELASQUEZ
    No. A-773.
    Decided March 24, 1980
   Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

Circuit Justice.

Applicant seeks a stay of the enforcement of the judgment of the Supreme Court of California in People v. Velasquez, 26 Cal. 3d 425, 606 P. 2d 341 (1980), pending the filing of a petition for certiorari and its disposition by this Court. Applicant contends that the Supreme Court of California has reversed the imposition of a sentence of death, although upholding the conviction, because the trial was conducted in violation of this Court’s decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (1968).

This Court has granted certiorari in Adams v. Texas, No. 79-5175, 444 U. S. 990, and that case is presently set for argument today. The issues presented there are sufficiently related to the issues which the applicant State says it will raise in its petition for certiorari in this case that I have decided to grant the State’s application for stay pending (1) consideration and decision of Adams v. Texas, supra, by this Court, and (2) the filing and disposition of a timely petition for certiorari in this case by the applicant.

I am not persuaded by the response that the decision below rests upon a reading of state law by the Supreme Court of California. Neither In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 447 P. 2d 117 (1968), which was cited by the court below, nor People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748 (1978), which was not, supports respondent’s position. Anderson, as I read it, was based primarily upon this Court’s decision in Wither-spoon. Wheeler, while itself based on state law, seems clearly distinguishable from the present case.

The application for stay is accordingly granted.


author: Mb. Chief Justice BubgeR

text:
    CURTISS-WRIGHT CORP. v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
    No. 79-105.
    Argued January 14, 1980
    Decided April 22, 1980

      Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Ralph N. Del Deo argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Richard S. Zackin, David Lasky, and Alfred J. Kovell.

      Isaac N. Groner argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Walter H. Fleischer, Alfred F. Belcuore, and Albert G. Besser.

   Mb. Chief Justice BubgeR

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 (b) allows a district court dealing with multiple claims or multiple parties to direct the entry of final judgment as to fewer than all of the claims or parties; to do so, the court must make an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. We granted certiorari in order to examine the use of this procedural device. 444 U. S. 823 (1979).

I

From 1968 to 1972, respondent General Electric Co. entered into a series of 21 contracts with petitioner Curtiss-Wright Corp. for the manufacture of components designed for use in nuclear powered naval vessels. These contracts had a total value of $215 million.

In 1976, Curtiss-Wright brought a diversity action in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking damages and reformation with regard to the 21 contracts. The complaint asserted claims based on alleged fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of contract by General Electric. It also sought $19 million from General Electric on the outstanding balance due on the contracts already performed.

General Electric counterclaimed for $1.9 million in costs allegedly incurred as the result of “extraordinary efforts” provided to Curtiss-Wright during performance of the contracts which enabled Curtiss-Wright to avoid a contract default. General Electric also sought, by way of counterclaim, to recover $52 million by which Curtiss-Wright was allegedly unjustly enriched as a result of these “extraordinary efforts.”

The facts underlying most of these claims and counterclaims are in dispute. As to Curtiss-Wright’s claims for the $19 million balance due, however, the sole dispute concerns the application of a release clause contained in each of the 21 agreements, which states that “Seller . . . agree [s] as a condition precedent to final payment, that the Buyer and the Government . . . are released from all liabilities, obligations and claims arising under or by virtue of this order.” App. 103a. When Curtiss-Wright moved for summary judgment on the balance due, General Electric contended that so long as Curtiss-Wright’s other claims remained pending, this provision constituted a bar to recovery of the undisputed balance.

The District Court rejected this contention and granted summary judgment for Curtiss-Wright on this otherwise undisputed claim. Applying New York law by which the parties had agreed to be bound, the District Court held that Curtiss-Wright was entitled to payment of the balance due notwithstanding the release clause. The court also ruled that Curtiss-Wright was entitled to prejudgment interest at the New York statutory rate of 6% per annum.

Curtiss-Wright then moved for a certification of the District Court’s orders as final judgments under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 (b), which provides:.

“When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.”

The court expressly directed entry of final judgment for Curtiss-Wright and made the determination that there was “no just reason for delay” pursuant to Rule 54 (b).

The District Court also provided a written statement of reasons supporting its decision to certify the judgment as final. It acknowledged that Rule 54 (b) certification was not to be granted as a matter of course, and that this remedy should be reserved for the infrequent harsh case because of the overload in appellate courts which would otherwise result from appeals of an interlocutory nature. The essential inquiry was stated to be “whether, after balancing the competing factors, finality of judgment should be ordered to advance the interests of sound judicial administration and justice to the litigants.”

The District Court then went on to identify the relevant factors in the case before it. It found that certification would not result in unnecessary appellate review; that the claims finally adjudicated were separate, distinct, and independent of any of the other claims or counterclaims involved; that review of these adjudicated claims would not be mooted by any future developments in the case; and that the nature of the claims was such that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than once even if there were subsequent appeals.

Turning to considerations of justice to the litigants, the District Court found that Curtiss-Wright would suffer severe daily financial loss from nonpayment of the $19 million judgment because current interest rates were higher than the statutory prejudgment rate, a situation compounded by the large amount of money involved. The court observed that the complex nature of the remaining claims could, without certification, mean a delay that “would span many months, if not years.”

The court found that solvency of the parties was not a significant factor, since each appeared to be financially sound. Although the. presence of General Electric’s counterclaims and the consequent possibility of a setoff recovery were factors which weighed against certification, the court, in balancing these factors, determined that they were outweighed by the other factors in the case. Accordingly, it granted Rule 54 (b) certification. It also granted General Electric’s motion for a stay without bond pending appeal.

A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the case was controlled by its decision in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 521 F. 2d 360 (1975), where the court had stated:

“In the absence of unusual or harsh circumstances, we believe that the presence of a counterclaim, which could result in a set-off against any amounts due and owing to the plaintiff, weighs heavily against the grant of 54 (b) certification.” Id., at 366 (footnote omitted).

In Allis-Chalmers, the court defined unusual or harsh circumstances as those factors “involving considerations of solvency, economic duress, etc.” Id., at 366, n. 14.

In the Third Circuit’s view, the question was which of the parties should have the benefit of the amount of the balance due pending final resolution of the litigation. The court held that AUis-Chalmers dictated “that the matter remain in status quo when non-frivolous counterclaims are pending, and in the absence of unusual or harsh circumstances.” 597 F. 2d 35, 36 (1979) (per curiam). The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Curtiss-Wright’s inability to have use of the money from the judgment might seem harsh, but noted that the same could be said for General Electric if it were forced to pay Curtiss-Wright now but later prevailed on its counterclaims. Ibid.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court had abused its discretion by granting Rule 54 (b) certification in this situation and dismissed the case for want of an appeal-able order; it also directed the District Court to vacate its Rule 54 (b) determination of finality. Curtiss-Wright’s petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc were denied. 599 F. 2d 1259 (1979). Four judges dissented from that denial, observing that the case was in conflict with United Bank of Pueblo v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 529 F. 2d 490 (CA10 1976). We reverse.

II

Nearly a quarter of a century ago, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U. S. 427 (1956), this Court outlined the steps to be followed in making determinations under Rule 54 (b). A district court must first determine that it is dealing with a “final judgment.” It must be a “judgment” in the sense that it is a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be “final” in the sense that it is “an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action.” 351 U. S., at 436.

Once having found finality, the district court must go on to determine whether there is any just reason for delay. Not all final judgments on individual claims should be immediately appealable, even if they are in some sense separable from the remaining unresolved claims. The function of the district •court under the Rule is to act as a “dispatcher.” Id., at 435. It is left to the sound judicial discretion of the district court to determine the “appropriate time” when each final decision in a multiple claims action is ready for appeal. Ibid. This discretion is to be exercised “in the interest of sound judicial administration.” Id., at 437.

Thus, in deciding whether there are no just reasons to delay the appeal of individual final judgments in a setting such as this, a district court must take into account judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved. Consideration of the former is necessary to assure that application of the Rule effectively “preserves the historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals.” Id., at 438. It was therefore proper for the District Judge here to consider such factors as whether the claims under review were separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated and whether the nature of the claims already determined was such that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than once even if there were subsequent appeals.-

Here the District Judge saw no sound reason to delay appellate resolution of the undisputed claims already adjudicated. The contrary conclusion of the Court of Appeals was strongly influenced by the existence of nonfrivolous counterclaims. The mere presence of such claims, however, does not render a Rule 54 (b) certification inappropriate. If it did, Rule 54 (b) would lose much of its utility. In Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry Co., 351 U. S. 445 (1956), this Court explained that counterclaims, whether compulsory or permissive, present no special problems for Rule 54 (b) determinations; counterclaims are not to be evaluated differently from other claims. 351 U. S., at 452. Like other claims, their significance for Rule 54 (b) purposes turns on their interrelationship with the claims on which certification is sought. Here, the District Judge determined that General Electric’s counterclaims were severable from the claims which had been determined in terms of both the factual and the legal issues involved. The Court of Appeals did not conclude otherwise.

What the Court of Appeals found objectionable about the District Judge’s exercise of discretion was the assessment of the equities involved. .The Court of Appeals concluded that the possibility of a setoff required that the status quo be maintained unless petitioner could show harsh or unusual circumstances; it held that such a showing had not been made in the District Court.

This holding reflects a misinterpretation of the standard of review for Rule 54 (b) certifications and a misperception of the appellate function in such cases. The Court of Appeals relied on a statement of the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure, and its error derives from reading a description in the commentary as a standard of construction. When Rule 54 (b) was amended in 1946, the Notes of the Advisory Committee which accompanied the suggested amendment indicated that the entire lawsuit was generally the appropriate unit for appellate review, “and that this rule needed only the exercise of a discretionary power to afford a remedy in the infrequent harsh case to provide a simple, definite, workable rule.” 28 U. S. C. App., p. 484; 5 F. R. D. 433, 473 (1946). However accurate it may be as a description of cases qualifying for Rule 54 (b) treatment, the phrase “infrequent harsh case” in isolation is neither workable nor entirely reliable as a benchmark for appellate review. There is no indication it was ever intended by the drafters to function as such.

In Sears, the Court stated that the decision to certify was with good reason left to the sound judicial discretion of the district court. At the same time, the Court noted that “ [w] ith equally good reason, any abuse of that discretion remains reviewable by the Court of Appeals.” 351 U. S., at 437 (emphasis added). The Court indicated that the standard against which a district court’s exercise of discretion is to be judged is the “interest of sound judicial administration.” Ibid. Admittedly this presents issues not always easily resolved, but the proper role of the court of appeals is not to reweigh the equities or reassess the facts but to make sure that the conclusions derived from those weighings and assessments are juridically sound and supported by the record.

There are thus two aspects to the proper function of a reviewing court in Rule 54 (b) cases. The court of appeals must, of course, scrutinize the district court’s evaluation of such factors as the interrelationship of the claims so as to prevent piecemeal appeals in cases which should be reviewed only as single units. But once such juridical concerns have been met, the discretionary judgment of the district court should be given substantial deference, for that court is “the one most likely to be familiar with the case and with any justifiable reasons for delay.” Sears, supra, at 437. The reviewing court should disturb the trial court’s assessment of the equities only if it can say that the judge’s conclusion was clearly unreasonable.

Plainly, sound judicial administration does not require that Rule 54 (b) requests be granted routinely. That is implicit in commending them to the sound discretion of a district court. Because this discretion “is, with good reason, vested by the rule primarily” in the district courts, Sears, supra, at 437, and because the number of possible situations is large, we are reluctant either to fix or sanction narrow guidelines fof the district courts to follow. We are satisfied, however, that on the record here the District Court’s assessment of the equities was reasonable.

One of the equities which the District Judge considered was the difference between the statutory and market rates of interest. Respondent correctly points out that adjustment of the statutory pre judgment interest rate is a matter within the province of the legislature, but that fact does not make the existing differential irrelevant for Rule 54 (b) purposes. If the judgment is otherwise certifiable, the fact that a litigant who has successfully reduced his claim to judgment stands to lose money because of the difference in interest rates is surely not a “just reason for delay.”

The difference between the pre judgment and market interest rates was not the only factor considered by the District Court. The court also noted that the debts in issue were liquidated and large, and that absent Rule 54 (b) certification they would not be paid for “many months, if not years” because the rest of the litigation could be expected to continue for that period of time. The District Judge had noted earlier in his opinion on the merits of the release clause issue that respondent General Electric contested neither the amount of the debt nor the fact that it must eventually be paid. App. 164a-172a. The only contest was over the effect of the release clause on the timing of the payment, an isolated and strictly legal issue on which summary judgment had been entered against respondent.

The question before the District Court thus came down to which of the parties should get the benefit of the difference between the prejudgment and market rates of interest on debts admittedly owing and adjudged to be due while unrelated claims were litigated. The central factor weighing in favor of General Electric was that its pending counterclaims created the possibility of a setoff against the amount it owed petitioner. This possibility was surely not an insignificant factor, especially since the counterclaims had survived a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Id., at 173a^l74a. But the District Court took this into account when it determined that both litigants appeared to be in financially sound condition, and that Curtiss-Wright would be able to satisfy a judgment on the counterclaims should any be entered.

The Court of Appeals concluded that this was not enough, and suggested that the presence of such factors as economic duress and insolvency would be necessary to qualify the judgment for Rule 54 (b) certification. 597 F. 2d, at 36. But if Curtiss-Wright were under a threat of insolvency, that factor alone would weigh against qualifying; that very threat would cast doubt upon Curtiss-Wright’s capacity to produce all or part,of the $19 million should General Electric prevail on some of its counterclaims. Such a showing would thus in fact be self-defeating.

Nor is General Electric’s solvency a dispositive factor; if its financial position were such that a delay in entry of judgment on Curtiss-Wright’s claims would impair Curtiss-Wright’s ability to collect on the judgment, that would weigh in favor of certification. But the fact that General Electric is capable of paying either now or later is not a “just reason for delay.” At most, as the District Court found, the fact that neither party is or will become insolvent renders that factor neutral in a proper weighing of the equities involved.

The question in cases such as this is likely to be close, but the task of weighing and balancing the contending factors is peculiarly one for the trial judge, who can explore all the facets of a case. As we have noted, that assessment merits substantial deference on review. Here, the District Court’s assessment of the equities between the parties was based on an intimate knowledge of the case and is a reasonable one. The District Court having found no other reason justifying delay, we conclude that it did not abuse its discretion in granting petitioner’s motion for certification under Rule 54 (b).

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

       This was the second motion by Curtiss-Wright for Rule 54 (b) certification. An earlier motion was denied by the District Court because at that time the matter of prejudgment interest had not yet been resolved.

       We do not suggest that the presence of one of these factors would necessarily mean that Rule 54 (b) certification would be improper. It would, however, require the district court to find a sufficiently important reason for nonetheless granting certification. For example, if the district court concluded that there was a possibility that an appellate court would have to face the same issues on a subsequent appeal, this might perhaps be offset by a finding that an appellate resolution of the certified claims would facilitate a settlement of the remainder of the claims. See Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry Co., 351 U. S. 445, 450, n. 5 (1956).

       We note that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62 (h) allows a court certifying a judgment under Rule 54 (b) to stay its enforcement until the entering of a subsequent judgment or judgments. Rule 62 (h) also states that the court “may prescribe such conditions as are necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment is entered.” Under this Rule, we assume it would be within the power of the District Court to protect all parties by having the losing party deposit the amount of the judgment with the court, directing the Clerk to purchase high yield government obligations and to hold them pending the outcome of the case. In this way, valid considerations of economic duress and solvency, which do not affect the juridical considerations involved in a Rule 54 (b) determination, can be provided for without preventing Rule 54 (b) certification.
      In the instant case, after certifying the judgment as final under Rule 54 (b), the District Court granted respondent’s motion for a stay of judgment without bond, but only pending resolution of the appeal.