text:
    No. 81-679.
    International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, Silvergate District Lodge 50 v. Anderson et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 81-683.
    Mayfair Supermarkets, Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-688.
    Talbert v. City of Richmond et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-692.
    Stonecipher v. Bray et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-703.
    Gaines v. Haughton et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-717.
    Cordova v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-736.
    Burlington Northern Railroad Co., Successor In Interest to St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v. Dunn.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-760.
    Bill Hames Shows, Inc. v. J. J. Taylor Syndicate #173 et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-764.
    East-West Towing Co., Inc., et al. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-786.
    Brams et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-792.
    Hinds et al. v. Consolidated Rail Corp. et al.
   Sp. Ct. R. R. R. A. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-803.
    Paverite, Inc. v. ITT Industrial Credit Co.
   Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-807.
    Pavilonis v. Morgan et al.; Pavilonis v. O’Bryant et al.; and Pavilonis v. King et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 657 F. 2d 260 (first and second cases); 663 F. 2d 1066 (third case).


text:
    No. 81-808.
    Kester et al. v. Devine, Director, Office of Personnel Management.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-809.
    Boyd v. Madison County Mutual Insurance Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-810.
    Nunn et al. v. Black et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-813.
    Shimokawa v. Liberty Bank.
   Int. Ct. App. Haw. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-817.
    Northern Engineering & Plastics Corp. v. Eddy, dba Marshall Manufacturing Co.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-818.
    Boynton et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-819.
    Stainbrook v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation.
   Pa. Commw. Ct. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-821.
    Danning, Trustee in Bankruptcy v. World Airways, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-822.
    Levison v. Levison.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-823.
    Thornburgh, Governor of Pennsylvania, et al. v. McMullan et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-824.
    Jacks v. Duckworth, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-829.
    BMW of North America, Inc., et al. v. Grove, Executor, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-831.
    Dacus v. Southern College of Optometry.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-832.
    Faith Baptist Church of Boca Raton, Inc., now known as Woodlands Park Baptist Church, et al. v. City of Boca Raton, Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-833.
    Ross v. Bird, Chief Justice, California Supreme Court, et al.; and Ross v. San Diego County Superior Court et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 652 F. 2d 65.


text:
    No. 81-838.
    Thorpe v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-845.
    Investors Tax Sheltered Real Estate, Ltd. v. Hallmark Group Cos., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-847.
    Mori et al. v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers, Local Lodge No. 6, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-852.
    Willy’s Grocery v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-853.
    Lincoln Bank v. Goggin, Trustee in Bankruptcy.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-858.
    Watson v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-885.
    Federal Republic of Nigeria et al. v. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-888.
    McCoy Restaurants, Inc. v. Greater Orlando Aviation Authority et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-891.
    Industrial Personnel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-893.
    Brent et al. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-894.
    County of LaSalle ex rel. Peterlin, State’s Attorney of LaSalle County, et al. v. Mauzy, Director, Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-898.
    Thevis v. Urban Industries, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-906.
    Shunnarah v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-909.
    Steubner et al. v. Martin.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-914.
    Stephens v. United States et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-916.
    Johnson v. Wyrick, Warden, Missouri State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-918.
    Cut Rate Plastic Hangers, Inc. v. Warbern Packaging Industries, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-931.
    Alexander v. Kessler, Judge, Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-947.
    Trebbe et al. v. Colorado.
   Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-951.
    Goldstein et al. v. Garrity, Trustee of Debtor.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-957.
    Ruggirello v. Mintzes.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-958.
    Guzman et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-966.
    Percy v. Daubert et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-972.
    Winfield v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-980.
    Hatch v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-983.
    Conlon v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-991.
    Engelstad et al. v. Swenson et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-994.
    Siemens America, Inc., et al. v. United States.
   C. C. P. A. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-995.
    Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1015.
    Blecker v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1027.
    Litman et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1030.
    Leck v. Pugh et al.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 10th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5284.
    Sangemino v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5303.
    Lawson v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5358.
    Black v. Robbins et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5359.
    Guiden v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5361.
    Morris v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5376.
    Dickinson v. Pensacola Aeromotive Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5388.
    Breeding et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5394.
    Bassler v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5414.
    Martin et al. v. Delaware.
   Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5420.
    Brown v. Delaware.
   Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5426.
    Mendoza v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5429.
    Flint et al. v. Haynes et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5446.
    Jones et al. v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5485.
    Flood v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5488.
    Martin v. Warden, Huntingdon State Correctional Institution, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5489.
    Mullins v. Davis et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5528.
    Brunson v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5531.
    Hill v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5551.
    Taylor v. Taylor.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5616.
    Graham v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5625.
    Cochran v. Birkel.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5626.
    United States ex rel. Baker v. Franzen et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5636.
    Gray v. Sines et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5642.
    Crosley v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5645.
    Caudle v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5646.
    Opfermann v. Barg et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5647.
    Prince v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5651.
    United States ex rel. Slaughter v. Brewer, Warden, Stateville Penitentiary.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5652.
    Mendibles et al. v. Superior Court of Pinal County et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5656.
    Kelley v. Lane.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5658.
    Darby v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5659.
    Kilgore v. Duckworth, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5661.
    Stone v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5663.
    Padilla v. MacDougall et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5664.
    McAfee v. Ford Motor Co. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5665.
    Shaw v. Dail et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5666.
    Hegwood v. Blackburn, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5667.
    Evans et al. v. Croom et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5669.
    Johnson et al. v. United Parcel Service et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5671.
    Garcia v. Neagle, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5674.
    Lindhorst v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5675.
    Caraballo v. Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5676.
    Bailey v. Redman, Warden, Delaware Correctional Center, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5678.
    Harris v. Baker.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5680.
    Patrick v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5683.
    Salman v. Frisch.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5684.
    Myron v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5685.
    El-Ameen v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5688.
    Partee v. Johnson et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5690.
    Bradley v. Dermitt, Warden, Idaho State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5691.
    Handy v. Weslaco Independent School District et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5696.
    Satchell v. Raines, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5702.
    Bankston v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5706.
    Gratton v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5707.
    King v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5711.
    Herrington v. Deukmejian, Attorney General of California, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5712.
    Holloway v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5714.
    Senatore v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5715.
    Mintz v. Superior Court of California, County of Stanislaus (California, Real Party in Interest).
   Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5719.
    Shaw v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5723.
    Stokes v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5724.
    Sandutch v. Bednarz, District Magistrate.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5726.
    Rasberry v. Estelle.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5732.
    Williams v. Circuit Court, City of St. Louis, Division 1.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5735.
    S. L. W. v. New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5737.
    Lewis et al. v. Exxon Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5739.
    Gallo v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5742.
    Ellis v. Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5745.
    Shumake v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5766.
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5773.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5779.
    Bernal v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5780.
    Garonzik v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5787.
    Taylor v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5788.
    Womack v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5789.
    Singer v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5792.
    Di Silvestro v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5793.
    Johnson v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5794.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5799.
    Leyva v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5807.
    White v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5813.
    Hines v. Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5815.
    Owens v. Wharton, U. S. Department of State, Office of Citizenship Appeals and Legal Assistance.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5817.
    Phillips v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5832.
    McGovern v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5833.
    Ravasani-Asl v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5837.
    Darland v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5841.
    Sabir v. Rainier National Bank.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5846.
    Armstrong v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-5853.
    Walker v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    No. 80-1975.
    Yazoo County Industrial Development Corp. et al. v. Suthoff et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Rehnquist,

dissenting.

Respondents in this case sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi under the provisions of 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3). They sought compensatory and punitive damages and attorney’s fees or, in the alternative, the rescission of instruments by which they conveyed certain real property to petitioners. App. to Pet. for Cert. A2. Petitioners filed the customary Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 motions requesting dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The District Judge, a practicing Mississippi lawyer for many years before he took the bench, granted the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction:

“The complaint contains conclusory allegations, but when reduced to the essentials, plaintiffs allege that while they received $100,830.00 this was not enough; that the land was in fact worth several times this amount; that they were induced to sell by the fraud and deceit of their own attorneys and appraiser; and that the remaining defendants were in a conspiracy to acquire the land for a fraction of its true worth.
“The plaintiffs thus are asserting a classic common law action for the common law tort of fraud and deceit. If the plaintiffs indeed have such a claim it is properly re-dressable only in the state court. The allegations do not reach Federal Constitutional proportions.” Id., at A3.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of dismissal:

“The issue before us is narrow: Was the federal court without jurisdiction conferred by Congress to decide the case, on the face of the complaint, under the stringent test enunciated by Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 681-682 . . . (1946); ‘[W]here the complaint... is so drawn as to seek recovery directly under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the federal court, but for two possible exceptions, . . . must entertain the suit.’ (Italics ours.) (The two exceptions are where the federal question ‘clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’ Id.) ... .
“So tested, the complaint sufficiently states federal claims, and (without intimating as to the merits of the claims) we reverse the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.” 637 F. 2d 337, 339 (1981).

Had the Court of Appeals been content to end its opinion at that point, this case would be one among hundreds where busy federal appellate courts decide whether “conclusory allegations” made under the “notice pleading” premise of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do or do not properly invoke federal jurisdiction. This Court in turn would be entirely correct in concluding that the petition for certiorari does not warrant plenary consideration. But, for better or for worse, the Court of Appeals did not stop there. Instead, it proceeded to step on what is, in my opinion, a legal landmine when it elaborated on the meaning of Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1946). The Court of Appeals obviously recognized its obligation to follow the dictates of that case as best it could, and because to me the decision in Bell is one of the most cryptic in the recent history of this Court’s jurisprudence, I have nothing but sympathy for those who seek to divine its meaning.

It is apparent from the above-quoted language of the Court of Appeals that, on remand, the District Court would be perfectly free to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This conclusion was made crystal clear by the concluding language of the Court of Appeals:

“We do not necessarily hold that the plaintiffs will prevail if they establish the facts alleged in the petition; we hold only that, taking the facts alleged in the complaint as true, the plaintiffs have established their right to a day in federal court. The dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with law.” 637 F. 2d, at 340.

Whether or not the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction for consideration of the complaint under 42 U. S. C. §1983 is an issue which the Court of Appeals in this case approached somewhat differently than did the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Beistline v. City of San Diego, 256 F. 2d 421 (1958), and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Warrington Sewer Co. v. Tracy, 463 F. 2d 771 (1972). But whether these cases are properly distinguishable, as the Court of Appeals in this case thought, see 637 F. 2d, at 340, or whether they are not, is an issue on which I would not vote to grant certiorari if it stood by itself.

The far more fundamental issue, I think, is that the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case reveals enough differences of approach among the Federal Courts of Appeals in deciding whether the federal question alleged in a complaint is “wholly insubstantial and frivolous” within the meaning of Bell, to suggest a need for clarification of Bell itself. The Court of Appeals quite accurately recognized that Bell created, in cases seeking recovery directly under the Constitution or laws of the United States, three tiers of review. The first tier was where the complaint stated a claim found to be wholly insubstantial and frivolous, in which case it could be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The second tier was where the complaint stated a claim not wholly insubstantial and frivolous, in which case the federal court could not dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, but could dismiss it for failure to state a-claim upon which relief may be granted. In other words, at the second-tier level, the federal court might find simply on the basis of the allegations of the complaint that no triable constitutional issue was raised, and accordingly dismiss it on that ground. The third tier of review would be where the federal court finds the allegations of the complaint sufficient to state a constitutional claim, and accordingly requires further pleadings, discovery, and perhaps eventually a trial on the merits to determine whether the plaintiff can prove the allegations of his complaint.

But this three-tiered analysis required by Bell seems to me wholly at odds with Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which quite clearly contemplates only a two-tiered standard of review of a complaint on a motion to dismiss. As I understand Rule 12, it requires the federal court to make a legal determination of whether or not the allegations of the complaint state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6). This is a question of law, and if the court concludes that they do not state such a claim, an order of dismissal will be entered. But if the court concludes that the allegations do state a claim, the defendant will be required to answer and the case go to trial unless settled. The trial and, at earlier stages of the case, summary judgment proceedings, are for the purpose of deciding disputed issues of material fact.

With the vast expansion in the case dockets of all federal courts in recent years, the more settled the procedural system by which these cases are to run the judicial gauntlet, the better off will be litigants, lawyers, and judges. The Court of Appeals here, by its careful adherence to the dictates of Bell, has brought out the sharp contrast between those dictates and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While the merits of the Court of Appeals’ treatment of the constitutional question in this case may not justify a grant of certiorari, the question of how Bell can be reconciled with Rule 12, a question I believe to be fairly subsumed under questions 2 and 3 of the petition, does justify such action. “To conceal [the] appropriate inquiry invites mechanical or thoughtless application of misfocused doctrine.” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 396 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).

I would grant the petition for certiorari in this case, limited to questions 2 and 3 of the petition.

      It might be argued that Rule 12(b)(1), which authorizes a court to dismiss a claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, is the equivalent of the first tier of Bell. Such an interpretation of Rule 12(b)(1) is possible, however, only because of the existence of the three-tier analysis of Bell and its cryptic statement that frivolous complaints invoke no federal-court jurisdiction. In the absence of Bell, Rule 12(b)(1) could be properly understood as referring to dismissals for lack of diversity or amount in controversy, or other more traditional jurisdictional defects. Thus, the existence of Rule 12(b)(1) does not obviate the need to clarify Bell.

      As 28 U. S. C. § 1915(d) demonstrates, dismissals for frivolousness can be authorized without ambiguity. This Court has not done so in Rule 12(b)(1), and Congress has implicitly expressed satisfaction with the current formulation of Rule 12(b)(1) by not seeking to add a dismissal-for-frivolousness standard — like that found in § 1915(d) — in a manner similar to its revision of the Federal Rules of Evidence.


text:
    No. 81-79.
    Missouri et al. v. United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of Philip Goldstein et al. to defer consideration of the petition denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-273.
    Homette Corp. v. Harvey, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent Laura Marie Briggs for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-442.
    New York v. Utter.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-484.
    Colorado v. Lee.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-794.
    Perini, Superintendent, Marion Correctional Institution v. Linton.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-797.
    Turman et al. v. Morales et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-590.
    Bagstad v. Orange County Transit District et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Paralyzed Veterans of America for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-645.
    International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers (IAM) v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Indonesia-U. S. Business Committee of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-693.
    Hullinghorst Industries, Inc. v. Carroll et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondent David E. Carroll for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-798.
    Murray Investment Co. et al. v. Life Insurance Company of Virginia.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.

Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 81-848.
    Ponchartrain State Bank v. Marsh Investment Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 81-861.
    Florida v. Buford.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

granted. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 81-882.
    Johns-Manville Corp. et al. v. White et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 81-903.
    Lakewood Bank & Trust Co. v. Abramson, Trustee.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motions of American Land Title Association, Federal National Mortgage Association, and Federal Land Bank of Texas et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-904.
    Rockwell International Corp. et al. v. City of New York et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of Chamber .of Commerce of the United States for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice White,

text:
    No. 81-929.
    Champlin Petroleum Co. v. King & King Enterprises, dba King Gas & Oil, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Justice White,

dissenting.

Because the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in this case conflicts with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 567 F. 2d 1316 (1978), I would grant the petition for certiorari.


text:
    No. 81-5454.
    Anthon v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 81-5496.
    Witherspoon v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 81-5855.
    Buford v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer-tiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.


text:
    No. 81-5462.
    Martin v. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certio-rari denied.

Justice White,

dissenting.

Because the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in this case conflicts with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Rosenberg v. Richardson, 538 F. 2d 487 (1976), I would grant the petition for certiorari.

Rehearing Denied


text:
    No. 80-1604.
    No. 80-2077.
    No. 80-6785.
    No. 80-6933.
    No. 81-43.
    No. 81-53.
    No. 81-236.
    No. 81-317.
    No. 81-383.
    No. 81-387.
    No. 81-464.
    No. 81-477.
    No. 81-695.
    No. 81-5174.
    No. 81-5338.
    Brockett, Spokane County Prosecuting Attorney, et al. v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., et al., Leeke, Director of South Carolina Department of Corrections, et al. v. Timmerman et al., Spaziano v. Florida, Evans v. Arizona, Odom v. North Carolina, Florida v. Garrett, Grindstone Butte Project et al. v. Watt, Secretary of the Interior, et al., Weinberger v. Florida Bar, McCormick v. Edwards, Governor of Louisiana, et al., Morris v. City of Midland, Texas, et al., Von Minden v. NUWES, Department of the Navy, Witte v. Bar Committee of the Twenty-first Judicial Circuit, Bland v. United States, Rooks v. United States, Straight v. Florida,
   ante, p. 1022;

ante, p. 83;

ante, p. 1037;

ante, p. 964;

ante, p. 1052;

ante, p. 1004;

ante, p. 965;

ante, p. 934;

ante, p. 1017;

ante, p. 941;

ante, p. 1032;

ante, p. 1025;

ante, p. 1055;

ante, p. 1057; and

ante, p. 1022. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 81-249.
    No 81-553.
    No. 81-5410.
    No. 81-5456.
    No. 81-5463.
    No. 81-5498.
    No. 81-5613.
    Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Fernandez et al.; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Rodriguez; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Santiago de Orta; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Angiuta de Rios; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Sanchez; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Santana; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Perez-Ramirez; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Roman de Molina; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Collazo; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Garcia; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Lopez de Ferra; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Beltran; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Cacho de Freytes; and Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Navarro, Gordon v. Heimann, United States Comptroller of the Currency, et al.; Gordon v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System et al.; and Gordon v. Securities and Exchange Commission et al., Behar v. Southeast Bank Trust Co., N. A., Personal Representative of the Estate of Behar, Herron v. Pendleton, Sabian & Craft et al., Perea v. United States, Johnson v. U. S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan et al., In re Boyden,
   ante, p. 6;

ante, p. 1033;

ante, p. 1035;

ante, p. 1036;

ante, p. 1057;

ante, p. 1088; and

ante, p. 1051. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 80-6643.
    Davis v. United States,
   ante, p. 842. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 81-12.
    Fischer v. Dakopolos,
   ante, p. 858. Petition for rehearing denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    January 12, 1982
    No. 81-884.
    No. 81-1099.
    Inryco, Inc. v. United States; and United States v. Inryco, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53. Reported below: 642 F. 2d 290.


text:
    MORI et al. v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF BOILERMAKERS, IRON SHIP BUILDERS, BLACKSMITHS, FORGERS & HELPERS, LOCAL LODGE NO. 6, et al.
    No. A-417 (81-847).
    Decided November 23, 1981
   Justice Rehnquist,

Circuit Justice.

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case, the mandate of which I have been asked to stay, turns upon the construction of § 101(a)(3)(A) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 522, 29 U. S. C. § 411(a)(3)(A);

“Except in the case of a federation of national or international labor organizations, the rates of dues and initiation fees payable by members of any labor organization in effect on September 14, 1959, shall not be increased, and no general or special assessment shall be levied upon such members, except—
“(A) in the case of a local labor organization, (i) by majority vote by secret ballot of the members in good standing voting at a general or special membership meeting, after reasonable notice of the intention to vote upon such question, or (ii) by majority vote of the members in good standing voting in a membership referendum conducted by secret ballot.” (Emphasis supplied.)

A convention of the International Union was held in August 1977 at which a majority of the delegates adopted a new dues structure applicable only to field construction members. The balloting was not secret. The new dues structure required payment of not less than two percent of gross income to the local as a “field dues supplement” to regular local dues, unless the International president approved payment of a lesser amount. These amendments, which were incorporated into Art. XX of the International’s Constitution, also established an additional dues requirement of one-half of one percent of gross wages, to be collected by the local and forwarded to the International.

At the beginning of the following year, respondent Local 6 collected from the plaintiffs field dues of two percent of gross earnings plus regular dues of $13 per month. The membership of Local 6 has never approved the increase of field dues, and has attempted to adopt bylaws excluding the new field dues requirement. The membership also unsuccessfully sought permission from the president of the International to halt the collection of the supplemental dues. 653 F. 2d 1279, 1281 (CA9 1981).

Applicants contend that this action on the part of the International violated the above-quoted provisions of Title 29, and have lodged with this Court a petition for certiorari setting out the reasons why the writ should be granted. The Court of Appeals decision in this case, which upheld the validity of the dues increase, is supported by Ranes v. Office Employees Union, Local No. 28, 317 F. 2d 915 (CA7 1963), and by dicta in Local No. 2, International Brotherhood of Telephone Workers v. International Brotherhood of Telephone Workers, 362 F. 2d 891 (CA1), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 947 (1966). It seems to me to be contrary to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Steib v. New Orleans Clerks and Checkers, Local No. 1497, 436 F. 2d 1101 (1971).

In my opinion, there is a strong probability that four Justices of this Court would vote to grant applicants’ presently pending petition. The funds held in escrow, now totalling somewhere in the neighborhood of $150,000, would be very difficult to recover should applicants’ stay not be granted. Since I believe that applicants have a reasonable probability of success on the merits, and the balance of equities weighs heavily in their favor, it is ordered that the applicants’ application for stay of mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit be, and hereby is, granted until consideration and disposition of their petition for certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case.


text:
    CLEMENTS et al. v. LOGAN
    No. A-480.
    Decided December 9, 1981
   Justice Rehnquist,

Circuit Justice.

Applicants, a former Sheriff of Arlington County, Va., and a Deputy Sheriff, ask that I stay the mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remanding this case to the District Court following the Court of Appeals’ holding that a policy of strip-searches implemented at the Arlington County Detention Center is unconstitutional. This request was denied by The Chief Justice, and a reapplication has been addressed to me. For the reasons that follow, I have referred the reapplication to the full Court at its next regularly scheduled Conference and I have temporarily stayed the mandate of the Court of Appeals pending the Court’s disposition of the stay request.

The events that prompted this suit began with respondent’s arrest on suspicion of driving while intoxicated following a two-car collision. Respondent failed several field tests for intoxication, and she was taken by police cruiser to the Arlington County Detention Center for administration of a breath-analysis examination. Respondent, an attorney, refused to take the test until allowed to telephone a friend who was also an attorney. She persisted in this demand despite being informed by the investigating officer and a Magistrate before whom she appeared that she had no right to contact an attorney under Virginia’s implied-consent statute, Va. Code §18.2-268 (1975 and Supp. 1981). The Magistrate issued two warrants against respondent, one for driving while intoxicated and the other for refusing to submit to a breath-analysis test. The Magistrate authorized respondent’s release on her own recognizance on the condition that a responsible person come to the Detention Center to assume custody. The Magistrate’s office did not have a phone available for respondent’s use, but she was informed that she could make a call upon commitment to jail. The arresting officer then transferred custody of respondent to applicant Carol Sachtleben, a Deputy Sheriff.

Prior to respondent’s arrest, applicant Clements, at that time the Sheriff, had instituted a policy requiring deputies to conduct visual strip-searches of all persons held at the Center in order to discover whether weapons or contraband were being concealed. This policy was adopted after the shooting of a deputy by a misdemeanant who had not been strip-searched. Pursuant to this policy, applicant Sachtleben first inventoried respondent’s personal property and then took her to a holding cell where she conducted a visual strip-search. Respondent was then allowed to call her friend, and eventually was released into her friend’s custody.

Respondent subsequently brought suit for damages and in-junctive relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging an assortment of constitutional violations. She complained of (1) denial of the assistance of counsel; (2) unjustified detention following establishment of the conditions of release; and (3) the Sheriff’s policy of administering strip-searches of all persons held at the Detention Center without reasonable cause to suspect concealment of weapons or contraband. The complaint named as defendants the arresting officer, a correctional officer at the Detention Center, several Deputy Sheriffs (including applicant Sachtleben), three Magistrates, the Commonwealth Attorney for Arlington County, applicant Clements, the current Sheriff Gondles, and Arlington County. Several claims were dismissed prior to trial, directed verdicts were entered as to others in favor of the defendants, and after post-trial briefing, the District Court entered judgment for defendants on those claims that remained. Logan v. Shealy, 500 F. Supp. 502 (ED Va. 1980). In particular, the court held that the policy of conducting strip-searches did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 506.

The Court of Appeals for the most part affirmed, but it reversed on the issue of strip-searches. Logan v. Shealy, 660 F. 2d 1007 (CA4 1981). The court purported to rely on the standard for judging the reasonableness of searches expressed in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 559 (1979), which requires consideration of “the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” The court concluded:

“On the undisputed and stipulated evidence, Logan’s strip search bore no such discernible relationship to security needs at the Detention Center that, when balanced against the ultimate invasion of personal rights involved, it could reasonably be thought justified. At no time would Logan or similar detainees be intermingled with the general jail population; her offense, though not a minor traffic offense, was nevertheless one not commonly associated by its very nature with the possession of weapons or contraband; there was no cause in her specific case to believe that she might possess either; and when strip-searched, she had been at the Detention Center for one and one-half hours without even a pat-down search. An indiscriminate strip search policy routinely applied to detainees such as Logan along with all other detainees cannot be constitutionally justified simply on the basis of administrative ease in attending to security considerations.” 660 F. 2d, at 1013.

The court remanded with directions to enter a permanent injunction against enforcement of the policy. The court also reversed directed verdicts in favor of applicants and remanded with instructions that judgment be entered against them “for all damages determined by a jury to have been proximately caused by the strip search, unless those defendants can establish before a jury their respective defenses of good faith immunity (or any others available to them) in accordance with [the court’s] opinion.” Id., at 1014. Applicants unsuccessfully sought a stay from the Court of Appeals. A similar request was denied by the The Chief Justice, and the present reapplication was delivered to me on December 8, 1981. Without a stay, trial of the damages claims against applicants will commence on December 9.

Applicants for a stay bear a heavy burden of demonstrating the need for exercise of the equitable power conferred on a Circuit Justice by 28 U. S. C. § 2101(f). That burden is heavier still if the request for a stay has previously been denied by a Member of this Court. See, e. g., New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 439 U. S. 1331, 1337 (1978) (Marshall, J., in chambers); Republican State Central Committee v. The Ripon Society, 409 U. S. 1222, 1227 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers). While The Chief Justice is not entitled to a presumption that by virtue of his office he knows more law than the other Members of the Court, it is presumed that he knows at least as much, and his denial of relief “counsels circumspection.” Republican State Central Committee, supra, at-1227.

After consideration of the reapplication and the response, I have concluded that the issues involved warrant consideration by the full Court. This opportunity will arise at the next regularly scheduled Conference on Friday, December 11. Nevertheless, that date is several days in the distance and, more importantly, the proceedings that applicants seek to stay will commence in the interim in the absence of a stay. As a result, I think it is incumbent on me to exercise my authority as Circuit Justice to determine how the matter shall remain until it can be considered by the full Court. See Evans v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 429 U. S. 1334, 1335 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers).

In my view, the decision of the Court of Appeals is so at odds with this Court’s resolution of a similar issue in Bell v. Wolfish, supra, that its mandate ought to be stayed temporarily pending consideration by the full Court. Bell v. Wolfish was a class action initiated by inmates of a federally operated short-term detention facility challenging the constitutionality of numerous conditions of confinement and related administrative practices. The facility was primarily used to house persons charged with a crime but not yet brought to trial. One of the challenged practices was the requirement that inmates submit to a strip-search and visual inspection of their body cavities after every contact visit with someone from outside the institution. This Court ultimately held that under the circumstances, such searches were not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 441 U. S., at 558-560. Rather, they were “reasonable responses ... to legitimate security concerns,” id., at 561, and could be conducted in the absence of probable cause, id., at 560.

The Court of Appeals recited from Bell v. Wolfish the general standard by which searches are judged under the Fourth Amendment, but it chose to ignore the Court’s application of that standard to the practice of conducting strip-searches of persons detained after being charged with a crime. Respondent in this case was arrested and charged by a Magistrate with driving while intoxicated and unlawful refusal to submit to a breath-analysis examination. The Magistrate authorized her release from the Detention Center only when a responsible individual arrived to take custody. Until that time, respondent remained officially under arrest and subject to those measures adopted for the maintenance of internal security at the jail. Her position was no different, for constitutional purposes, from the pretrial detainees in Bell v. Wolfish. If anything, the detainees in that case were subject to more onerous conditions, given the greater intrusiveness of a body-cavity search. The Court nevertheless upheld such searches “in the light of the central objective of prison administration, safeguarding institutional security.” Id., at 547.

The Court of Appeals gave little or no weight to that objective. The clear import of its decision is that strip-searches may not be conducted without probable cause to believe that the subject of the search possesses weapons or contraband. No such requirement attended the search policy upheld in Bell v. Wolfish, and indeed the Court expressly held that strip-searches need not be conditioned on probable cause. Id., at 560. Nor was the result in Bell v. Wolfish predicated on a showing that searches were limited to those persons whose alleged offenses were “commonly associated by [their] very nature with the possession of weapons or contraband.” 660 F. 2d, at 1013. In short, the Court of Appeals decision reads as if Bell v. Wolfish had never been decided. Much as that may have been the desire of the lower court, the decision is authoritative precedent and I believe it clearly dictates a contrary result in this case.

In view of the Court of Appeals’ attempt to distinguish a decision of this Court which to me seems clearly applicable to the case before it, I believe there is substantial likelihood that the full Court will grant a stay pending disposition of the petition for certiorari. A delay in the proceedings until the Court has an opportunity to consider the application will not prejudice respondent, and it will forestall the expense and effort of a trial until the legal basis for further proceedings is clarified. Accordingly, the mandate of the Court of Appeals is hereby stayed temporarily, pending consideration of the application for a stay by the full Court at the next regularly scheduled Conference.

       Under Virginia law, driving while intoxicated is a Class 2 misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment for up to six months and a fine of $500. Va. Code §§ 18.2-270, 18.25 — 11 (1975). Unreasonable refusal to submit to a breath-analysis test is punishable as a first offense by mandatory suspension of the driver’s license for 90 days. Repeat offenses are punishable by imprisonment for six months. § 18.2-268(n).

       Respondent was asked to remove her clothing, one garment at a time, to hand them to the deputy, and to turn around for visual inspection. Respondent complied and her clothes were immediately returned to her.

       The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to order the issuance of a permanent injunction is, I think, open to serious question. Although respondent has suffered an injury sufficient to establish her standing to seek damages, “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 495-496 (1974). As O’Shea makes clear, standing to seek in-junctive relief depends on a showing of “a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.” Id., at 496. Respondent has not alleged that she anticipates being arrested again and again subjected to a strip-search at the Arlington County Detention Center. Even if she had made such an allegation, it would “tak[e] us into the area of speculation and conjecture.” Id., at 497. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 371-373 (1976).

       See n. 1, supra. •


author: Chief Justice Burger

text:
    WASHINGTON v. CHRISMAN
    No. 80-1349.
    Argued November 3, 1981
    Decided January 13, 1982

      Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined., post, p. 10.

      Ronald R. Cai'penter argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.

      Robeii F. Patrick argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

       Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W. Schmidt, and James P. Manak for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc.; and by David Crump and Michael C. Kuhn for the Legal Foundation of America et al.

        Timothy K. Ford filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

   Chief Justice Burger

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to consider whether a police officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, accompany an arrested person into his residence and seize contraband discovered there in plain view.

I

On the evening of January 21, 1978, Officer Daugherty of the Washington State University police department observed Carl Overdahl, a student at the University, leave a student dormitory carrying a half-gallon bottle of gin. Because Washington law forbids possession of alcoholic beverages by persons under 21, Wash. Rev. Code §66.44.270 (1981), and Overdahl appeared to be under age, the officer stopped him and asked for identification. Overdahl said that his identification was in his dormitory room and asked if the officer would wait while he went to retrieve it. The officer answered that under the circumstances he would have to accompany Overdahl, to which Overdahl replied “OK.”

Overdahl’s room was approximately 11 by 17 feet and located on the 11th floor of the dormitory. Respondent Chris-man, Overdahl’s roommate, was in the room when the officer and Overdahl entered. The officer remained in the open doorway, leaning against the doorjamb while watching Chris-man and Overdahl. He observed that Chrisman, who was in the process of placing a small box in the room’s medicine cabinet, became nervous at the sight of an officer.

Within 30 to 45 seconds after Overdahl entered the room, the officer noticed seeds and a small pipe lying on a desk 8 to 10 feet from where he was standing. From his training and experience, the officer believed the seeds were marihuana and the pipe was of a type used to smoke marihuana. He entered the room and examined the pipe and seeds, confirming that the seeds were marihuana and observing that the pipe smelled of marihuana.

The officer informed Overdahl and Chrisman of their rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966); each acknowledged that he understood his rights and indicated that he was willing to waive them. Officer Daugherty then asked whether the students had any other drugs in the room. The respondent handed Daugherty the box he had been carrying earlier, which contained three small plastic bags filled with marihuana and $112 in cash. At that point, Officer Daugherty called by radio for a second officer; on his arrival, the two students were told that a search of the room would be necessary. The officers explained to Overdahl and Chris-man that they had an absolute right to insist that the officers first obtain a search warrant, but that they could voluntarily consent to the search. Following this explanation, which was given in considerable detail, the two students conferred in whispers for several minutes before announcing their consent; they also signed written forms consenting to the search of the room. The search yielded more marihuana and a quantity of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), both controlled substances.

Respondent was charged with one count of possessing more than 40 grams of marihuana and one count of possessing LSD, both felonies under Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401(c) (1976) (current version at Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401(d) (1981)). A pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized in the room was denied; respondent was convicted of both counts. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, upholding the validity of the search. 24 Wash. App. 385, 600 P. 2d 1316 (1979).

The Supreme Court of Washington reversed. 94 Wash. 2d 711, 619 P. 2d 971 (1980). It held that, although Overdahl had been placed under lawful arrest and “there was nothing to prevent Officer Daugherty from accompanying Overdahl to his room,” the officer had no right to enter the room and either examine or seize contraband without a warrant. The court reasoned there was no indication that Overdahl might obtain a weapon or destroy evidence, and, with the officer blocking the only exit from the room, his presence inside the room was not necessary to prevent escape. Because the officer’s entry into the room and his observations of its interior were not justified by “exigent circumstances,” the seizure of the seeds and pipe were held not to fall within the plain-view exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The court went on to hold that because the students’ consent to the subsequent search of the room was the fruit of the officer’s initial entry, the contraband found during that search should also have been suppressed.

Three justices dissented. They concluded it was reasonable for a police officer to keep an arrested person in sight at all times; accordingly, the officer had a legitimate reason for being in the place where he discovered the contraband, and was entitled, under the plain-view doctrine, to seize it.

We granted certiorari, 452 U. S. 959 (1981), and reverse.

l — i HH

A

The “plain view” exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971); Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234 (1968). Here, the officer had placed Overdahl under lawful arrest, and therefore was authorized to accompany him to his room for the purpose of obtaining identification. The officer had a right to remain literally at Overdahl’s elbow at all times; nothing in the Fourth Amendment is to the contrary.

The central premise of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Washington is that Officer Daugherty was not entitled to accompany Overdahl from the public corridor of the dormitory into his room, absent a showing that such “intervention” was required by “exigent circumstances.” We disagree with this novel reading of the Fourth Amendment. The absence of an affirmative indication that an arrested person might have a weapon available or might attempt to escape does not diminish the arresting officer’s authority to maintain custody over the arrested person. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 109-110 (1977); United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 234-236 (1973). Nor is that authority altered by the nature of the offense for which the arrest was made.

Every arrest must be presumed to present a risk of danger to the arresting officer. Cf. United States v. Robinson, supra, at 234, n. 5. There is no way for an officer to predict reliably how a particular subject will react to arrest or the degree of the potential danger. Moreover, the possibility that an arrested person will attempt to escape if not properly supervised is obvious. Although the Supreme Court of Washington found little likelihood that Overdahl could escape from his dormitory room, an arresting officer’s custodial authority over an arrested person does not depend upon a reviewing court’s after-the-fact assessment of the particular arrest situation. Cf. New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 458-460 (1981); United States v. Robinson, supra, at 235.

We hold, therefore, that it is not “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer, as a matter of routine, to monitor the movements of an arrested person, as his judgment dictates, following the arrest. The officer’s need to ensure his own safety — as well as the integrity of the arrest — is compelling. Such surveillance is not an impermissible invasion of the privacy or personal liberty of an individual who has been arrested.

It follows that Officer Daugherty properly accompanied Overdahl into his room, and that his presence in the room was lawful. With restraint, the officer remained in the doorway momentarily, entering no farther than was necessary to keep the arrested person in his view. It was only by chance that, while in the doorway, the officer observed in plain view what he recognized to be contraband. Had he exercised his undoubted right to remain at Overdahl’s side, he might well have observed the contraband sooner.

B

Respondent nevertheless contends that the officer lacked authority to seize the contraband, even though in plain view, because he was “outside” the room at the time he made his observations. The Supreme Court of Washington noted that “[t]he record is in conflict as to whether Officer Daugherty stood in the doorway and then entered the room or whether, while in the doorway, he was in fact in the room.” 94 Wash. 2d, at 716, 619 P. 2d, at 974. It concluded, however, that it “need not... let the result be determined by such niceties,” and assumed for purposes of its decision that the officer “was in the room at the time he observed the seeds and pipe.” Ibid. We agree that on this record “such niceties” are not relevant. It is of no legal significance whether the officer was in the room, on the threshold, or in the hallway, since he had a right to be in any of these places as an incident of a valid arrest.

Respondent’s argument appears to be that, even if the officer could have stationed himself “inside” the room had he done so immediately upon Overdahl’s entry, his 30- to 45-sec-ond hesitation was fatal; and that having chosen to remain in the doorway, the officer was precluded from proceeding further to seize the contraband. We reject this contention. Respondent’s argument,, if accepted, would have the perverse effect of penalizing the officer for exercising more restraint than was required under the circumstances. Moreover, it ignores the fundamental premise that the Fourth Amendment protects only against unreasonable intrusions into an individual’s privacy. See Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967).

The “intrusion” in this case occurred when the officer, quite properly, followed Overdahl into a private area to a point from which he had unimpeded view of and access to the area’s contents and its occupants. His right to custodial control did not evaporate with his choice to hesitate briefly in the doorway rather than at some other vantage point inside the room. It cannot be gainsaid that the officer would have had unrestricted access to the room at the first indication that he was in danger, or that evidence might be destroyed — or even upon reassessment of the wisdom of permitting a distance between himself and Overdahl.

We therefore conclude that, regardless of where the officer was positioned with respect to the threshold, he did not abandon his right to be in the room whenever he considered it essential. Accordingly, he had the right to act as soon as he observed the seeds and pipe. This is a classic instance of incriminating evidence found in plain view when a police officer, for unrelated but entirely legitimate reasons, obtains lawful access to an individual’s area of privacy. The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit seizure of evidence of criminal conduct found in these circumstances.

f — I

Since the seizure of the marihuana and pipe was lawful, we have no difficulty concluding that this evidence and the contraband subsequently taken from respondent’s room were properly admitted at his trial. Respondent voluntarily produced three bags of marihuana after being informed of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). He then consented, in writing, to a search of the room, after being advised that his consent must be voluntary and that he had an absolute right to refuse consent and demand procurement of a search warrant. The seizure of the drugs pursuant to respondent’s valid consent did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

The arrest in this case was made on the street. It gave Officer Daugherty no authority to enter Overdahl’s quarters without his consent. But Overdahl wanted to retrieve his identification from his room; if Daugherty was willing for Overdahl to do so, he could properly condition his consent on accompanying Overdahl and keeping him under close surveillance. Accordingly, when Overdahl entered his room, Daugherty could stay as close to Overdahl as he deemed necessary to protect himself and maintain control over his arrestee. If it had been reasonably necessary for Daugherty to enter the room in pursuit of these purposes, he would not have violated any of Overdahl’s Fourth Amendment rights. It is also plain enough that he was entitled to stand in the doorway and keep Overdahl in sight.

The record in this case is clear, however, that Daugherty did not leave the doorway and enter the room in order to protect himself or maintain control over Overdahl. Daugherty’s uncontradicted testimony was that he entered the room solely to confirm his suspicion that the seeds and the seashell he had observed from the doorway were marihuana seeds and a seashell pipe that had been used to smoke marihuana. Daugherty made no claim that he entered the room as a necessary incident to the permission given Overdahl to secure his identification. Rather, he claimed that the entry was justified because of what was in plain view on the desk inside the room.

The plain-view doctrine, however, does not authorize an officer to enter a dwelling without a warrant to seize contraband merely because the contraband is visible from outside the dwelling. This is settled law. As the Court said in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 468 (1971):

“[P]lain view alone is never enough to justify the war-rantless seizure of evidence. This is simply a corollary of the familiar principle discussed above, that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent ‘exigent circumstances.’ Incontrovertible testimony of the senses that an incriminating object is on premises belonging to a criminal suspect may establish the fullest possible measure of probable cause. But even where the object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may not enter and make a warrantless seizure. Taylor v. United States, 286 U. S. 1; Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10; McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451; Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 497-498; Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610; Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699.”

Coolidge emphasized that the plain-view doctrine applies only after a lawful search is in progress or the officer was otherwise legally present at the place of the seizure. The initial intrusion must be justified by a warrant, by an exception to the warrant requirement, or by other circumstances authorizing his presence.

If a police officer passing by an open door of a home sees incriminating evidence within the house, his observation may provide probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. Yet the officer may not enter the home without a warrant urn less an exception to the warrant requirement applies. This rule is fully supported by Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, and the cases cited in the Court's opinion in that case.' Any contrary rule would severely undercut the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment, for it is the physical entry of the home that is the chief evil against which the Amendment is directed. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 585-586 (1980); United States v. United States Distinct Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972).

The Court does not purport to hold otherwise. There is apparent agreement that the seizure in this case is consistent with the Fourth Amendment only if the officer was legally where he was when he made the seizure. Neither does the Court purport to find that Daugherty’s presence in the room was in fact necessary to effectuate the arrest or to protect the officer. To do so would require contradicting Daugherty’s own testimony. Rather, the Court asserts that Daugherty could have remained at Overdahl’s elbow, that he could have entered the room wholly apart from his observation of the seeds, and that the case should be judged as though Daugherty had found it necessary to enter the room for the purpose of guarding Overdahl. Under this approach, the officer’s presence at the desk where he made the seizure should be deemed lawful.

The difficulty with this is not merely that the officer himself did not suggest that he entered the room to maintain control over Overdahl or to protect himself. The more basic issue is whether the Court is justified in concluding as a matter of law that the circumstances would have warranted an entry for those reasons. The trial court did not sustain the entry on this basis, and the Washington Supreme Court expressly held that there were no exigent circumstances connected with Overdahl’s arrest and custody that gave Daugherty sufficient reason to enter the room. I am unwilling on this record to decide as a matter of law what is more properly to be resolved as a matter of fact; and I would not differ with the state court on the record we now have before us.

I perceive no justification for what is in effect a per se rule that an officer in Daugherty’s circumstances could always enter the room and stay at the arrestee’s elbow. This would be true only if there were no limits to the conditions which the officer could attach when he permits his charge to return to his room. I doubt, for example, that he could insist that he be permitted to search desks, closets, drawers, or cabinets. Likewise, he should not be permitted to invade living quarters any more than is necessary to maintain control and protect himself. Bright-line rules are indeed useful and sometimes necessary, cf. Pennsylvania v. Minims, 434 U. S. 106, 109-110 (1977); United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 234-236 (1973), but the Court should move with some care where the home or living quarters are involved.

This is not a case, therefore, involving punishing an officer for entering a room for the wrong reason when there was a perfectly legal basis for his doing so. See Scott v. United States, 436 U. S. 128, 138 (1978); Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U. S. 560, 564-565 (1968) (White, J., dissenting). This is a case where the record before us does not demonstrate that it was necessary for the officer to enter the room as an incident to his custodial arrest. He thus had no legal basis for being in the room unless his sighting of the seeds permitted him to be there. The Court agrees that the plain-view doctrine does not provide that justification.

For me, the case comes down to whether the trial court properly found that the officer’s observation from the doorway furnished exigent circumstances for the entry and seizure. The Washington Supreme Court did not review this finding of the trial court, but it should have before setting the conviction aside. I would therefore vacate and remand for this purpose.

       In addition, University regulations prohibit possession of alcoholic beverages on University property. Tr. 4, 34. At the suppression hearing, Officer Daugherty testified that, because of these regulations, he would have stopped Overdahl without regard to his age. Id., at 6-7.

       The opinion of the Supreme Court of Washington repeatedly refers to the Fourth Amendment and our cases construing it. The court did not, however, cite Art. I, § 7, of the Washington Constitution, which provides that “[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law. ” While respondent, relying on this latter provision, urges that we “treat the case as having been decided under the Washington State Constitution,” it is clear that the court did not rest its decision on an independent state ground.

       The trial court found that it was Overdahl who proposed to retrieve the identification, and, after being informed that Officer Daugherty would have to accompany him, agreed to the officer’s presence. Respondent nevertheless claims that Overdahl was “coerced” to return to the room in violation of the Fifth Amendment, because he was in custody and had not yet been advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). He argues that since identification would serve as proof of Over-dahl’s age — an element of the offense for which he had been arrested — the officer could not ask him for this “incriminating” evidence without first advising him of his rights to counsel and to remain silent.
      Assuming, arguendo, that Overdahl’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated in some fashion, this does not vitiate the legality of his arrest, nor does it undercut the officer’s right to maintain custody over an arrested person. The failure to give “Miranda warnings” might preclude introduction of incriminating statements made by Overdahl while in custody; but no such statements are even peripherally involved in this case. The act of going to the room was neither “incriminating” nor a “testimonial communication.” Cf. Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391, 408-414 (1976).

       Indeed, were the rule otherwise, it is doubtful that an arrested person would ever be permitted to return to his residence, no matter how legitimate the reason for doing so. Such a rule would impose far greater restrictions on the personal liberty of arrested individuals than those occasioned here.

       The circumstances of this case distinguish it significantly from one in which an officer, who happens to pass by chance an open doorway to a residence, observes what he believes to be contraband inside. See, e. g., Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 585-589 (1980); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14-15 (1948).

       In light of our disposition, we need not decide whether, as the Washington Court of Appeals held, the likelihood that the contraband would be destroyed constituted an “exigent circumstance” independently justifying the officer’s entry into the room.

       We reject as frivolous the respondent’s contention that, on the facts presented here, Officer Daugherty was required to knock and announce his presence at the doorway prior to entering the room.

       The officer testified at the suppression hearing that he had entered the room for just one purpose — “to affirm my beliefs and to seize the articles, if they were [contraband].” Tr. 44.

        The officer also testified:
      “I stood in the doorway without entering, actually physically entering the room. ... I was standing against the doorjamb. ... I was not in the room. I was in the doorway.” Id., at 7, 9, 21.
      .The trial court stated in its memorandum opinion that “[tjhe officer stood in the doorway, and watched [Overdahl],” observed the seashell pipe and the seeds from the doorway, and "then entered the room and examined the pipe and seeds closely.” App. 47 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court of Appeals stated: “Prior to entering the room, the officer saw from his vantage point in the doorway what he believed to be contraband. Only at that time, did he cross the threshold and seize the pipe and marijuana seeds.” 24 Wash. App. 385, 389, 600 P. 2d 1316, 1318 (1979) (emphasis added).
      As I read the Supreme Court of Washington’s opinion, the court held that whether or not the officer had physically entered the room by standing in the doorway, his presence in the doorway was sufficiently intrusive that his observations were unlawful unless he could justify his presence. The court concluded that the officer should have remained outside the room, since there was no indication that Overdahl was likely to escape, destroy evidence, or seize a weapon.

       One of the many cases cited in Coolidge to illustrate this point was Taylor v. United States, 286 U. S. 1 (1932). The police officers in Taylor had looked through a small opening in a garage and had seen cardboard cases inside the garage that they believed contained contraband liquor. The officers could smell the odor of whiskey coming from the garage. Yet this Court held that they had violated the Fourth Amendment by entering the garage and seizing the whiskey without obtaining a warrant.

       There is no contention in this case that by entering the dormitory building the officer had already entered respondent’s dwelling. The officer himself testified at trial that a dormitory room is considered a “private area” but that the public has access to the hallway. Tr. 37.

         Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234 (1968), is not to the contrary. There, an automobile had been impounded and towed to a police station. The windows of the car were open, the doors were unlocked, and it had begun to rain. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not require the police officer to obtain a warrant before opening the door of the car to roll up the car window, for this was simply “a measure taken to protect the car while it was in police custody.” Id., at 236. Harris did not rely on the plain-view doctrine to justify the warrantless intrusion into the automobile. The Court emphasized that the police officer had already lawfully entered the car when he saw incriminating evidence in plain view inside the car and seized it:

        “Once the door had lawfully been opened, the registration card, with the name of the robbery victim on it, was plainly visible. It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.” Ibid, (emphasis added).
      The broad wording of the second sentence quoted above has apparently created some confusion regarding the plain-view doctrine. One commentator remarked:
      “The hardest conceptual problem attending the plain view doctrine is to grasp that it is not a universal statement of the right of a policeman to seize after seeing something in open view; it is rather a limited statement of that right in one of its several instances — following a valid intrusion. . . . The source of difficulty is that the harbinger case, Harris v. United States, spoke carelessly in universal terms: ‘It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure. . . .’
      “Seeing something in open view does not, of course, dispose ... of the problem of crossing constitutionally protected thresholds.” Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great “Search Incident” Geography Battle, 26 Mercer L. Rev. 1047, 1096 (1975).
      See also 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.2(a) (1978).
      This problem of “crossing constitutionally protected thresholds” without a warrant is easily resolved if the so-called “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement applies, for that exception justifies a warrantless entry into the automobile to seize contraband in plain view inside the car. In Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U. S. 1 (1980), for example, we held that an officer’s observation of items in plain view inside a car did not violate the occupant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id., at 4, n. 4. The officer’s observations could therefore be used to establish probable cause to search the car. Yet it was also necessary to justify the warrantless intrusion into the car. We did not seek to justify that intrusion by relying on the plain-view doctrine. Rather, we held that the warrantless entry was justified under the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925).