text:
    No. 82-1606.
    Blume et al. v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 82-6104.
    Folston v. Allsbrook et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 82-6267.
    No. 82-6423.
    No. 82-6433.
    No. 82-6555.
    Evans v. Mississippi. Bolander v. Florida. Aldridge v. Florida. McCrae v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Miss.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.; and

Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 82-6267, 422 So. 2d 737; No. 82-6423, 422 So. 2d 833; No. 82-6433, 425 So. 2d 1132; No. 82-6555, 422 So. 2d 824.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all cir-cumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. D-309.
    In re Disbarment of McClellan,
   460 U. S. 1049. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 82-5992.
    No. 82-6035.
    No. 82-6062.
    No. 82-6078.
    No. 82-6148.
    No. 82-6200.
    No. 82-6221.
    Kilbane et al. v. Marshall et al., Quintana v. Virginia, Fornash v. Marshall, Ronson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Johl et al. v. Moukawsher et al., Maras v. Ammerman, Evans v. United States,
   460 U. S. 1053;

460 U. S. 1029;

460 U. S. 1042;

460 U. S. 1043;

460 U. S. 1054;

460 U. S. 1071; and

460 U. S. 1055. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 82-6135.
    Stallworth v. Detroit Board of Education et al.,
   460 U. S. 1025. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    May 23, 1983
    No. 80-1158.
    Florida v. Rodriguez.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Petition for rehearing granted. The order entered May 26, 1981 [451 U. S. 1022], denying the petition for writ of certiorari is vacated. Certiorari is granted, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further consideration in light of Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983).

Justice Brennan would deny the petition.


text:
    No. 82-328.
    Borden, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions that it remand the case to the Federal Trade Commission for entry of the cease-and-desist order to which the parties have agreed.


text:
    No. D-341.
    In re Disbarment of Scacchetti.
   It is ordered that Carl R. Scacchetti, Jr., of Rochester, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-342.
    In re Disbarment of Baker.
   It is ordered that John David Baker, of Rochester, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-343.
    In re Disbarment of McGrath.
   It is ordered that Thomas Francis McGrath, Jr., of Seattle, Wash., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-344.
    In re Disbarment of Stroh.
   It is ordered that Hugh William Stroh, of Bellevue, Wash., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-345.
    In re Disbarment of Walgren.
   It is ordered that Gordon Lee Walgren, of Bremerton, Wash., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 81-1044.
    United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,
   460 U. S. 711. Motion of respondent to retax costs denied.

Justice Blackmun would grant this motion.


text:
    No. 81-2147.
    Arizona et al. v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona et al.; Arizona et al. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians et al.; and Montana et al. v. Northern Cheyenne Tribe of the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation et al.
    No. 81-2188.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S.

821.] Motion of respondents San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona et al. for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 82-357.
    Michigan v. Clifford et al.
   Ct. App. Mich. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 1168.] Further consideration of respondents’ motion partially to vacate the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted is deferred to the hearing of the case on the merits.


text:
    No. 82-945.
    Sure-Tan, Inc., et al. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 460 U. S. 1021.] Motion of petitioners to proceed further herein in forma pauperis denied. Motion of petitioners to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 82-1414.
    Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., et al. v. Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 82-1761.
    In re Hanson.
   Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 82-1746.
    In re Karapinka.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 82-1213.
    New York v. Quarles.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-834.
    Walck v. American Stock Exchange, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1023.
    Callahan et al. v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1373.
    Miller v. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1384.
    Alcan Sales, Division of Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1395.
    Drury v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1403.
    International Fashions v. Buchanan et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1437.
    Homewood City Board of Education et al. v. Avery.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1515.
    Bucks County Water and Sewer Authority v. Delaware River Basin Commission et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1532.
    Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. et al. v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1545.
    Kaiser v. Consolidated Rail Corporation et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1590.
    Stith v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1598.
    Vaughan v. North Carolina.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1601.
    Gilmore v. Koehler, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1603.
    Toybox Corp. v. Illfelder Toy Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1604.
    Dewey v. University of New Hampshire et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1605.
    McGinnis v. Langhorne Manor Borough.
   Pa. Commw. Ct. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1613.
    Helmerich & Payne, Inc. v. Rock Island Improvement Co. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1617.
    Nitz v. Iowa.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1618.
    Benson v. Schwartz et al.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1619.
    Illinois v. Tiller.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1622.
    Baruch v. Sheriff of Cook County.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1623.
    American Airlines, Inc. v. Braniff Airways, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1637.
    Stendebach v. CPC International, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1640.
    Williams v. Pasma.
   Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1642.
    Drury et al. v. Westborough Mall, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1659.
    Robinson et al. v. Cumberland Capital Corp. et al.
   Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1707.
    Orloski v. Mellenberg, Judge, Court of Common Pleas.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1741.
    Rojas v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6214.
    Locklear v. Garrison, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6234.
    Parks v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6299.
    No. 82-6300.
    Waddell v. United States; and Murphy v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 696 F. 2d 282.


text:
    No. 82-6327.
    Mumit v. Henderson.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6408.
    Barlow v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6449.
    Mazzei v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6479.
    Navarre v. Louisiana.
   15th Jud. Dist. Ct. La., Vermilion Parish. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6481.
    Smith v. Fairman et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6487.
    Gadomski v. United States Steel Corp.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6490.
    Haddix v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6491.
    Johnson v. Fields et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6492.
    McDonald v. Humphries et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6493.
    Armstrong v. Wisconsin.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6494.
    Cook v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6501.
    Rivera v. Smith, Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6505.
    Kincaid v. Duckworth, Warden, Indiana State Prison.
   A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6506.
    Bridgeforth v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6517.
    Melia v. Fischer & Porter Co., Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6521.
    Rothwell v. Bailey et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6528.
    Laden v. Michigan Department of Corrections et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6529.
    Huff v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6530.
    Lewis v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6574.
    Holloway v. Lynch.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6575.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6585.
    Dreyfus-de Campos v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6593.
    Butts v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6603.
    Bivins v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6608.
    Graham et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6623.
    Welty v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6624.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6630.
    Schlacks v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6639.
    Grainger v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1319.
    Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Corrections v. Grizzell.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1321.
    Higa, Judge of the Second Circuit of Hawaii v. Mayo.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice White,

text:
    No. 82-6483.
    Taliaferro v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun join,

dissenting.

Maryland requires criminal defendants, upon request, to provide the State with the name and address of each alibi witness they wish to call at trial. Md. Rule Proc. 741. As a sanction for failure to abide by this Rule, the trial court has the discretion to prohibit the defendant from introducing the testimony of an undisclosed alibi witness. Ibid. This case presents the question whether the exclusion of a witness merely for failure to abide by a discovery rule such as Rule 741 impermissibly infringes upon a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to offer witnesses on his behalf. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 302 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 19 (1967).

On the second day of trial in the present case, petitioner sought to call Edward Rich as an alibi witness, even though Rich had not been named in response to the State’s Rule 741 request. The State indicated that it would have no objection to Rich’s testifying if the case were continued for a few days, so that an investigation of Rich could be conducted. The trial court declined to order a continuance; instead, it ordered that Rich not be permitted to testify. The court did not find that petitioner’s violation of Rule 741 was deliberate; rather, it found that petitioner had not been “diligent” and “hadn’t made any real effort, except yesterday, to locate this witness.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-90 — A-91. The court’s ruling severely prejudiced petitioner, since alibi was his only defense, and Rich was his only alibi witness. Petitioner was convicted, and the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed by a 4-3 vote. 295 Md. 376, 456 A. 2d 29 (1983). The dissent vigorously protested that where, as here, the sanction of exclusion deprives a defendant of his only alibi witness, the violation of the discovery rule is not deliberate, and any prejudice to the prosecution can be cured by a short continuance, the exclusionary sanction violates the defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id., at 398, 456 A. 2d, at 41 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).

This Court has twice expressly reserved judgment on this Sixth Amendment question. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U. S. 470, 472, n. 4 (1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78, 83, n. 14 (1970). Respondent concedes that the question is significant. Brief in Opposition 1. At least one Federal Court of Appeals has flatly held “that the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment forbids the exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence solely as a sanction to enforce discovery rules or orders against criminal defendants.” United States v. Davis, 639 F. 2d 239, 243 (CA5 1981). Accord, Hackett v. Mulcahy, 493 F. Supp. 1329 (NJ 1980). See also Ronson v. Commissioner of Correction, 604 F. 2d 176 (CA2 1979). The American Bar Association and several scholarly writers have also found arguable constitutional infirmity in the exclusionary sanction. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 11-4.7(a), and accompanying commentary (2d ed. 1980); Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 711, 838-839 (1976); Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 137-139 (1974); Note, 81 Yale L. J. 1342 (1972).

By the count of the Court of Appeals majority, 35 States and the District of Columbia have provisions similar to Rule 741 that allow the exclusion of evidence as a penalty for noncompliance with discovery rules. See 295 Md., at 387, 456 A. 2d, at 35. Rule 12.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also allows such a sanction to be assessed. One State apparently even requires the exclusionary sanction to be applied when a defendant fails to disclose his witness. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 768.20, 768.21 (1982). In light of the sharp disagreement in the legal community as to the constitutionality of this penalty, I would grant certiorari and resolve this recurring issue.


text:
    No. 81-6746.
    No. 82-1328.
    No. 82-1445.
    No. 82-6238.
    No. 82-6239.
    No. 82-6260.
    Medina-Pena v. United States, Pfotzer et al. v. United States, The Don’t Bankrupt Washington Committee v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Company of Chicago et al., Jones et al. v. Mitchell et al., Jones et al. v. Jefferson Parish School Board, Harrison v. Oklahoma,
   460 U. S. 1068;

460 U. S. 1052;

460 U. S. 1077;

460 U. S. 1064;

460 U. S. 1064; and

460 U. S. 1090. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    May 31, 1983
    No. 82-1307.
    Graham v. Louisiana.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. La. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-1663.
    Fleischmann, Trustee v. Wethersfield Planning and Zoning Commission et al.
   Appeal from App. Sess., Super. Ct. Conn., Hartford-New Britain Jud. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-1588.
    No. 82-1628.
    Lee M. Scarborough & Co. v. Fox, Special Deputy Commissioner of Insurance of Wisconsin for the Liquidation of All-Star Insurance Corp., et al.; and APS Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Fox, Special Deputy Commissioner of Insurance of Wisconsin for the Liquidation of All-Star Insurance Corp., et al.
   Appeals from Sup. Ct. Wis. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice White and Justice Powell would note probable jurisdiction and set cases for oral argument.

Reported below: 110 Wis. 2d 72, 327 N. W. 2d 648.


text:
    No. 82-6075.
    Schlang v. Heard, Sheriff.
   Appeal from C. A. 5th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6274.
    Jones v. Orleans Parish School Board.
   Appeal from C. A. 5th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6496.
    Counsell v. Munro-Burns General Contractors.
   Appeal from Int. Ct. App. Haw. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1399.
    City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power, et al. v. Manhart et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Hensley v. Eckerhart, ante, p. 424.


text:
    No. 81-1830.
    Earl B. Miller & Co. v. Hughes.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Hensley v. Eckerhart, ante, p. 424.

Justice Stevens dissents and would deny certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-156.
    City of Riverside et al. v. Rivera et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Hensley v. Eckerhart, ante, p. 424.


text:
    No. 82-192.
    Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Thornberry et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Hensley v. Eckerhart, ante, p. 424.


text:
    No. 82-747.
    Bond et al. v. Burks et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Hensley v. Eckerhart, ante, p. 424.

Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens dissent and would deny certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-816.
    Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Broz et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Heckler v. Campbell, ante, at 464, n. 8.


text:
    No. 82-1335.
    Rhodes et al. v. Stewart.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Hensley v. Eckerhart, ante, p. 424.


text:
    No.-.
    Kopituk et al. v. United States.
   Motion of petitioners for leave to file an appendix to the petition for writ of certiorari that does not comply with the Rules of this Court granted.


text:
    No. A-872.
    Dabeit v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice O’Connor and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-933.
    Weech et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Application to recall and stay the mandate, addressed to Justice Marshall and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-328.
    In re Disbarment of Juncker.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 460 U. S. 1019.]


text:
    No. D-330.
    In re Disbarment of Bluestein.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 460 U. S. 1049.]


text:
    No. D-346.
    In re Disbarment of Hollingsworth.
   It is ordered that Frederick E. Hollingsworth, of Boca Raton, Fla., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-347.
    In re Disbarment of Rocap.
   It is ordered that Read Rocap, Jr., of Media, Pa., be suspended from.the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-348.
    In re Disbarment of Davis.
   It is ordered that Gary A. Davis, of Columbia, S. C., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-349.
    In re Disbarment of Butler.
   It is ordered that Paul A. Butler, of South Natick, Mass., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-350.
    In re Disbarment of Bucci.
   It is ordered that Andrew A. Bucci, of North Providence, R. I., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 81-2159.
    Silkwood, Administrator of the Estate of Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 459 U. S. 1101.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 81-2169.
    Haring, Lieutenant, Arlington County Police Department, et al. v. Prosise.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 904.] Motion of respondent for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 81-2245.
    No. 81-2276.
    No. 82-38.
    Nevada v. United States et al.; Truckee-Carson Irrigation District v. United States et al.; and Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation District et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 904.] Motion of petitioners in Nos. 81-2245 and 81-2276 for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 82-432.
    Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen & Packers, et al. v. Crowley et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 1168.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 82-818.
    No. 82-852.
    National Labor Relations Board v. Bildisco & Bildisco, Debtor-In-Possession, et al.; and Local 408, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 1145.] Motions of United Mine Workers of America, International Union, and International Brotherhood of Teamsters for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-874.
    Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Edwards.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted sub nom. Schweiker v. Edwards, 459 U. S. 1200.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 82-940.
    Hishon v. King & Spalding.
   C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 1169.] Motion of Robert Abrams et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-1041.
    Dickman et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 1199.] Motion of D’Ancona & Pflaum for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 82-1127.
    Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall et al.
   Sup. Ct. Tex. [Certiorari granted, 460 U. S. 1021.] Motion of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-1401.
    Calder et al. v. Jones et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 460 U. S. 1080.] Appeal as to appellee Ingels dismissed. Motion of appellants to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, as to Ingels denied.


text:
    No. 81-1374.
    Blum, Commissioner, New York State Department of Social Services v. Stenson.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-1253.
    Solem, Warden, South Dakota State Penitentiary, et al. v. Bartlett.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-1005.
    No. 82-1247.
    No. 82-1591.
    Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al.; American Iron & Steel Institute et al. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al.; and Ruckelshaus, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of Mid-America Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 222 U. S. App. D. C. 268, 685 F. 2d 718.


text:
    No. 82-1330.
    Thigpen, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections, et al. v. Roberts.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pawperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-1651.
    Nix, Warden of the Iowa State Penitentiary v. Williams.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 81-2135.
    Uniroyal, Inc. v. Chrapliwy et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-6754.
    Kirk v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1383.
    Cintolo v. United States et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1466.
    Patterson v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1504.
    L. G. Everist, Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1539.
    Druker et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1547.
    Dabney v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1581.
    Quenneville, Executrix of the Estate of Quenneville v. Delmark Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1594.
    Milo v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1624.
    R. R. Gable, Inc. v. Burrows et ux.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1627.
    Great Southwest Fire Insurance Co. v. Ison et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1629.
    Brito Enterprises, Inc., t/a Brito’s Boatyard v. Westberry.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1632.
    Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1648.
    Horton v. Martin, Warden, Central Correctional Institute, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1665.
    Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Grip-Pak, Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1717.
    Kroening v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee et al.
   Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1736.
    Sabouni et al. v. Leaver et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1748.
    Carlin v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1774.
    Cuti v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1782.
    Hensel v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1783.
    Hillard v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1786.
    Trainello v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1790.
    Phillips v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5527.
    Rios v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5539.
    Picard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services; and Sherwin v. Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6254.
    Elaire v. Blackburn, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6344.
    Grantt et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6411.
    Bennett v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6495.
    Langford v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6497.
    Akbar v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6509.
    Bressler, dba Marie’s Originals v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6510.
    Shao Fen Chin, Individually, and as Administrator of the Estate of Ke-Sien Chin v. St. Luke’s Hospital Center et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6513.
    Bradford v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6515.
    Peppers v. Tard et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6518.
    Adams v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6520.
    Pearson v. Conklin.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6523.
    Webb v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6527.
    Bigg v. United States Army.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6531.
    Goodrich v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6550.
    Mullen v. Starr et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6565.
    Masters v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Mahoning County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6569.
    Leone v. Doran et al.
   Sup. Jud. Ct.

Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6580.
    Anderson v. Zimmerman et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6596.
    McGavran v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6602.
    Murrell v. Bennett, Commissioner of Alabama Board of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6643.
    Martin v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6651.
    Christopher et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6652.
    Hawkins v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6654.
    Green v. Warden, U. S. Penitentiary.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6660.
    Clemons v. Smith, Attorney General, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6666.
    Trignani v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6668.
    Duncan v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6669.
    Gastelum-Almeida v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1183.
    No. 82-1187.
    No. 82-1199.
    No. 82-1240.
    No. 82-1255.
    Lederer v. United States; Murphy v. United States; Thompson v. United States; Criden v. United States; and Myers et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of American Civil Liberties Union Foundation in No. 82-1199 for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 692 F. 2d 823.


text:
    No. 82-1289.
    Chicago Housing Authority v. Gautreaux et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

JUSTICE Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


author: Justice Stevens, Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 82-1381.
    No. 82-5840.
    No. 82-5910.
    McCray v. New York. Miller v. Illinois. Perry v. Louisiana.
   Ct. App. N. Y.;

App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.; and

Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 82-1381, 57 N. Y. 2d 542, 443 N. E. 2d 915; No. 82-5840,104 Ill. App. 3d 1205, 437 N. E. 2d 945; No. 82-5910, 420 So. 2d 139.

Opinion of

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Black-mun and Justice Powell join, respecting the denial of the petitions for writs of certiorari.

My vote to deny certiorari in these cases does not reflect disagreement with Justice Marshall’s appraisal of the importance of the underlying issue — whether the Constitution prohibits the use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of a particular group from the jury, based on the prosecutor’s assumption that they will be biased in favor of other members of the same group. I believe that further consideration of the substantive and procedural ramifications of the problem by other courts will enable us to deal with the issue more wisely at a later date. There is presently no conflict of decision within the federal system. During the past five years, two State Supreme Courts have held that a criminal defendant’s rights under state constitutional provisions are violated in some circumstances by the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of particular racial, ethnic, religious, or other groups from the jury. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N. E. 2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 881 (1979). That premise, understandably, has given rise to litigation addressing both procedural and substantive problems associated with judicial review of peremptory challenges, which had traditionally been final and unreviewable. See, e. g., People v. Allen, 23 Cal. 3d 286, 292, 590 P. 2d 30, 33 (1979); People v. Fuller, 136 Cal. App. 3d 403, 186 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1982); People v. Rousseau, 129 Cal. App. 3d 526, 536, 179 Cal. Rptr. 892, 897 (1982); Commonwealth v. Walker, 379 Mass. 297, 397 N. E. 2d 1105 (1979); Commonwealth v. Kelly, 10 Mass. App. 847, 406 N. E. 2d 1327 (1980); Commonwealth v. Brown, 11 Mass. App. 283, 416 N. E. 2d 218 (1981). In my judgment it is a sound exercise of discretion for the Court to allow the various States to serve as laboratories in which the issue receives further study before it is addressed by this Court.

Justice Marshall,

with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

These cases present a significant and recurring question of constitutional law: whether the State’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude all potential Negro jurors because of their race violates a criminal defendant’s right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community.

In No. 82-1381, after a first trial had resulted in a hung jury, an all-white jury convicted a Negro of first- and second-degree robbery of a white victim. The prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges to exclude all seven Negroes and one Hispanic who had been drawn as prospective trial jurors.. Asserting that the prosecutor’s actions violated the Constitution, petitioner moved for a mistrial, or alternatively, for a hearing to examine the prosecutor’s motives in exercising the challenges. These motions were denied. The New York Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the conviction by a vote of four to three. 57 N. Y. 2d 542, 443 N. E. 2d 915 (1982). Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals relied heavily on Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), in rejecting petitioner’s constitutional argument.

In No. 82-5840 and in No. 82-5910, all-white juries convicted Negro defendants of murdering white victims. In No. 82-5840, the prosecutor employed his peremptory challenges to exclude all 14 potential Negro jurors. In No. 82-5910, following the removal of three Negroes for cause, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to exclude every remaining Negro venireman. In both cases, counsel for petitioners unsuccessfully objected to the State’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude all Negroes from the jury. The state appellate courts concluded that petitioners had merely shown that Negroes were excluded from the juries in their cases, not that the State had systematically excluded Negroes over a period of time. And in each case, respondents rely heavily upon Swain v. Alabama, supra, to defend the judgments below.

In Swain, a closely divided Court held that the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to strike Negroes from the jury panel in one particular case did not deny the defendant the equal protection of the laws. The majority reasoned: “The presumption in any particular case must .be that the prosecutor is using the State’s challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case before the court. The presumption is not overcome and the prosecutor therefore subjected to examination by allegations that in the case at hand all Negroes were removed from the jury or that they were removed because they were Negroes.” Id., at 222. The majority conceded that circumstances might arise where “the purposes of the peremptory challenge are being perverted.” Id., at 224. But the majority stated that an equal protection claim would assume “added significance” only where “the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes . . . .” Id., at 223.

In the nearly two decades since it was decided, Swain has been the subject of almost universal and often scathing criticism. Since every defendant is entitled to equal protection of the laws and should therefore be free from the invidious discrimination of state officials, it is difficult to understand why several must suffer discrimination because of the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges before any defendant can object. Moreover, Swain is inconsistent with the rule established in other jury selection cases that a prima facie violation is established by showing that an all-white jury was selected and that the selection process incorporated a. mechanism susceptible to discriminatory application, irrespective of when in the selection process that opportunity arose. Finally, the standard of proof for discrimination in Swain imposes a nearly insurmountable burden on defendants. For these reasons, some leading state courts have declined to follow Swain in interpreting state constitutional provisions. See State v. Crespin, 94 N. M. 486, 612 P. 2d 716 (App. 1980); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N. E. 2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 881 (1979); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748 (1978). Cf. People v. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 436 N. E. 2d 1046 (1982).

I would grant certiorari to reexamine the standard set forth in Swain. In contrast to the defendant in Swain, petitioners have not relied upon the Equal Protection Clause in their challenge to the exclusion of potential Negro jurors. They rely instead on their Sixth Amendment right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. Swain was decided before this Court held that the Sixth Amendment applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), and well before this Court identified the contours of that right in Taylor v. Lousiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975). It should be reconsidered in light of Sixth Amendment principles established by our recent cases.

In Taylor v. Louisiana, this Court explained that “[t]he purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power — to make available the commonsense judgment of the community.” Id., at 530. We noted that the effect of excluding “‘any large and identifiable segment of the community ... is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable.’” Id., at 532, n. 12, quoting Peters v. Kiff, 407 U. S. 493, 503 (1972) (opinion of Marshall, J.). Accordingly, we accepted the “fair-cross-section requirement as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment,” 419 U. S., at 530, and we specifically stated that “the exclusion of Negroes from jury service because of their race ‘contravenes the very idea of a jury — “a body truly representative of the community” ....’” Id., at 528 (quoting Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U. S. 320, 330 (1970)).

The right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community is rendered meaningless if the State is permitted to utilize several peremptory challenges to exclude all Negroes from the jury. This Court has consistently struck down methods of jury selection that produce racially biased jury venires. The very purpose of refusing to tolerate racial discrimination in the composition of the venire is to prevent the State’s systematic exclusion of any racial group from juries. The desired interaction of a cross section of the community does not take place within the venire; it is only effectuated by the jury that is selected and sworn to try the issues. The systematic exclusion of prospective jurors because of their race is therefore unconstitutional at any stage of the jury selection process. There is no point in taking elaborate steps to ensure that Negroes are included on venires simply so they can then be struck because of their race by a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges. Yet, given the normal allowance of such challenges, a prosecutor who wishes to exclude all Negroes can normally do so. The effect of excluding minorities goes beyond the individual defendant, for such exclusion produces “injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts.” Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S. 187, 195 (1946).

The right to be tried by a jury representative of a cross section of the community does not mean that each jury must include constituents of every group in the population. The impracticality of such a formulation is obvious. But there is a serious question whether the right to an impartial jury permits the State to exclude members of a racial minority solely because of their race. When a prosecutor uses several peremptory challenges to exclude every potential Negro juror, there is strong circumstantial evidence that the exclusions are racially motivated and therefore in violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right. At the very least, a defendant should be able to state a cognizable claim without proof of absolute exclusion of every Negro in every case'for several years, as required by Swain.

In California, for example, a defendant must make a timely objection and show from all the circumstances a strong likelihood that the prosecution is exercising its peremptory challenges because of race alone. If the trial judge finds a reasonable inference of exclusion based on race, the statutory provision that no reason need be given for a peremptory challenge gives way to the constitutional imperative and the prosecution must show some nonracial basis for the exercise of its challenges. The trial court then makes the ultimate determination as to whether the defendant has successfully demonstrated that the prosecution is using its peremptory challenges in a constitutionally impermissible manner. See People v. Wheeler, supra. Such a procedure is merely illustrative, but it appears to be quite workable. The California courts have indicated no difficulty in applying it. See, e. g., People v. Johnson, 22 Cal. 3d 296, 583 P. 2d 774 (1978); People v. Allen, 23 Cal. 3d 286, 590 P. 2d 30 (1979) (trial court errs in failing to require prosecution to demonstrate nonracial basis for exclusion); People v. Rousseau, 129 Cal. App. 3d 526, 179 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1982) (trial court correctly concluded that defendant failed to establish prima facie case); People v. Fuller, 136 Cal. App. 3d 403, 186 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1982).

Accordingly, I would grant certiorari to consider whether petitioners’ Sixth Amendment rights, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, were violated by the prosecutors’ use of peremptory challenges to exclude all Negroes from the juries in these three cases. Sixth Amendment principles have evolved significantly since Swain was decided, and it is time to reexamine whether the rule announced in Swain under the Equal Protection Clause can be reconciled with the Sixth Amendment right of every defendant.

       Although these eases present only the question of peremptory challenges on racial grounds, the same constitutional claims may also apply to the exclusion of other identifiable groups. The California Supreme Court has held that the State may not use peremptory challenges solely on the basis of religious, ethnic, or similar group affiliations. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d, at 272, 583 P. 2d, at 758 (relying on both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 16, of the California Constitution). Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has condemned peremptory challenges based on “sex, race, color, creed or national origin.” Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass., at 487-489, and nn. 29, 33, 387 N. E. 2d, at 515-516, and nn. 29, 33 (relying on Art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights). Cf. State v. Crespin, 94 N. M. 486, 612 P. 2d 716 (App. 1980) (declaring constitutional right, apparently on state grounds, but not specifying whether groups other than racial groups are protected).
      Furthermore, although these cases involve peremptory challenges by the prosecutor, the Massachusetts court in Soares held that the Commonwealth as well as the defense could challenge the improper exercise of such challenges. 377 Mass., at 489-490, n. 35, 387 N. E. 2d, at 517, n. 35; see Commonwealth v. Reid, 384 Mass. 247, 424 N. E. 2d 495 (1981).

       See, e. g., Martin, The Fifth Circuit and Jury Selection Cases: The Negro Defendant and His Peerless Jury, 4 Hous. L. Rev. 448 (1966); Note, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 135-139 (1965); Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 52 Va. L. Rev. 1157 (1966); Note, Fair Jury Selection Procedures, 75 Yale L. J. 322 (1965); Note, Peremptory Challenge — Systematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss. L. J. 157 (1967); Note, The Jury: A Reflection of the Prejudices of the Community, 20 Hastings L. J. 1417 (1969); Comment, A Case Study of the Peremptory Challenge: A Subtle Strike at Equal Protection and Due Process, 18 St. Louis U. L. J. 662 (1974); Comment, The Prosecutor’s Exercise of the Peremptory Challenge to Exclude Nonwhite Jurors: A Valued Common Law Privilege in Conflict with the Equal Protection Clause, 46 U. Cin. L. Rev. 554 (1977); Recent Development, Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection, 41 Albany L. Rev. 623 (1977); Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 Yale L. J. 1715 (1977).

       As one state court justice has written: “Is justice to sit supinely by and be flaunted in case after case before a remedy is available? Is justice only obtainable after repeated injustices are demonstrated? Is there any justification within the traditions of the Anglo-Saxon legal philosophy that permits the use of a presumption to hide the existence of an obvious fact?” Commonwealth v. Martin, 461 Pa. 289, 299, 336 A. 2d 290, 295 (1975) (Nix, J., dissenting).

       See, e. g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625 (1972) (grand jury); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545 (1967) (petit jury); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559 (1953) (petit jury).

       It is doubtful that many jurisdictions maintain comprehensive records of peremptory challenges, let alone information regarding the race of those individuals challenged. Defendants attempting to demonstrate the kind of systematic exclusion required by Swain have virtually always failed, see J. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain Commitment to Representative Panels 156, and nn. 83-98 (1977) (listing more than 50 cases); Annot., 79 A. L. R. 3d 14, 56-73 (1977) (collecting federal and state cases), despite proof that unmistakeably creates an inference of racial discrimination. See, e. g., United States v. Carter, 528 F. 2d 844, 848, and n. 3 (CA8 1975) (evidence showing that prosecutors used peremptory challenges to exclude 81% of Negroes available to serve on petit jurors in 15 criminal cases tried during 1974, and that in 7 of the trials the prosecutor excluded all available Negroes, held insufficient to establish claim under Swain), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 961 (1976); United States v. Nelson, 529 F. 2d 40, 43 (CA8 1976) (faced once again with prosecutor utilizing peremptory challenges to remove all Negroes in case involving Negro defendant, court expresses “concern” but merely warns that in future district judges will take “appropriate action” in exercise of their supervisory powers); United States v. Pearson, 448 F. 2d 1207, 1213-1218 (CA5 1971) (prosecutor’s notes showing race of defendants, number of Negroes on the jury panel, and number of Negroes challenged during one week of trials supported “reasonable conclusion” that Government challenged as many Negroes as possible when the defendant was a Negro, but did not suffice under Swain); United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467 (Conn. 1976), vacated sub nom. United States v. Newman, 549 F. 2d 240 (CA2 1977); State v. Simpson, 326 So. 2d 54 (Fla. App. 1976) (reversing trial court’s conclusion of systematic exclusion); Ridley v. State, 475 S. W. 2d 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (holding that Swain standard was not satisfied by evidence that prosecutor had used seven peremptory challenges to remove Negroes from the panel, by testimony from local attorneys as to prosecutor’s sytematic use of peremptory challenges in cases involving Negro defendants and white victims, and by an assistant district attorney’s admission that it was his practice to do so).

       See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U. S. 493 (1972); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 404 (1967); Jones v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 24 (1967); Whitus v. Georgia, supra; Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U. S. 129 (1964); Avery v. Georgia, supra; Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463 (1947); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U. S. 613 (1938); Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U. S. 394 (1935); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935); Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316 (1906); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1881); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880).

       For example, in the federal system the prosecutor is entitled to 20 peremptory challenges in capital eases, 6 peremptory challenges if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, and 3 if the offense is punishable by imprisonment of not more than one year or by fine or both. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 24(b).

       Of course, the State has an interest in exercising its peremptory challenges as it wishes. But while the peremptory challenge may be an important right of an accused, Pointer v. United States, 151 U. S. 396, 408 (1894), there is nothing in the Constitution that requires peremptory challenges for either the accused or the State, Stilson v. United States, 250 U. S. 583, 586 (1919). When the representative cross-section requirement — “an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial,” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522, 528 (1975) — conflicts with what is at most a statutory right to exercise peremptory challenges, the latter must give way.

       Because I continue to believe that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would in any event grant certiorari in No. 82-5910. In light of the special emphasis we have placed on providing an impartial jury in capital cases, see Adams v. Texas, 448 U. S. 38 (1980); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (1968), review of the use of peremptory challenges in capital cases is particularly appropriate.

       As respondent in No. 82-1381, the State of New York has also requested that this Court grant the petition for writ of certiorari. The State concedes that the Court of Appeals’ decision raises a significant and recurring question of law concerning race discrimination in the jury selection process. Brief for Respondent in Support of Petition 6-9. The State also notes the conflict among state-court decisions and contends that the conflict is likely to grow as a result of widespread litigation of this issue in numerous state courts. Id., at 9-11.


author: Justice Powell,

text:
    No. 82-1646.
    Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. Nalls, Administrator for the Estate of Abraham, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.

Justice Powell,

dissenting.

I dissent from the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari for reasons similar to those stated by Judge Wilkey in his Statement as to Reasons for Voting for En Banc Consideration in the Court of Appeals. 226 U. S. App. D. C. 276, 702 F. 2d 255 (1983).


text:
    No. 82-6514.
    Zettlemoyer v. Pennsylvania. Gretzler v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Pa.; and

No. 82-6556.

Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 82-6514, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A. 2d 937; No. 82-6556, 135 Ariz. 42, 659 P. 2d 1.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 82-1061.
    No. 82-5950.
    No. 82-6273.
    No. 82-6369.
    Begassat v. Cosmopolitan National Bank of Chicago, as Trustee Under Trust No. 13199, et al., Spencer v. Israel, Warden, Becker v. Arcadian Gardens, Puchala et al. v. Cointelpro et al.,
   459 U. S. 1207;

460 U. S. 1102;

460 U. S. 1090; and

460 U. S. 1092. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 82-701.
    New Castle Area Transit Authority v. Kramer et al.,
   459 U. S. 1146. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing and for other relief denied.


text:
    June 3, 1983
    No. 82-6658.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.

I


author: Justice Brennan

text:
    PICKETT et al. v. BROWN et al.
    No. 82-5576.
    Argued April 27, 1983
    Decided June 6, 1983

      Brennan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Harold, W. Home, by appointment of the Court, 459 U. S. 1100, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants.

      Susan Short Kelly, Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were William M. Leech, Jr., Attorney General, and Robert B. Littleton.

        JamesD. Weill, MarianWrightEdelman, and JudithL.Lichtman filed & brief for the Children’s Defense Fund et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

   Justice Brennan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us to decide the constitutionality of a provision of a Tennessee statute that imposes a 2-year limitations period on paternity and child support actions brought on behalf of certain illegitimate children.

Under Tennessee law both fathers and mothers are responsible for the support of their minor children. See Tenn. Code Ann. §34-101 (1977); Rose Funeral Home, Inc. v. Julian, 176 Tenn. 534, 539, 144 S. W. 2d 755, 757 (1940); Brooks v. Brooks, 166 Tenn. 255, 257, 61 S. W. 2d 654 (1933). This duty of support is enforceable throughout the child’s minority. See Blackburn v. Blackburn, 526 S. W. 2d 463, 466 (Tenn. 1975); Whitt v. Whitt, 490 S. W. 2d 159, 160 (Tenn. 1973). See also Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-820, 36-828 (1977). Tennessee law also makes the father of a child born out of wedlock responsible for “the necessary support and education of the child.” § 36-223. See also Brown v. Thomas, 221 Tenn. 319, 323, 426 S. W. 2d 496, 498 (1968). Enforcement of this obligation depends on the establishment of paternity. Tennessee Code Ann. § 36-224(1) (1977) provides for the filing of a petition which can lead both to the establishment of paternity and to enforcement of the father’s duty of support. With a few exceptions, however, the petition must be filed within two years of the child’s birth. See §36-224(2); n. 1, supra.

In May 1978, Frances Annette Pickett filed an action pursuant to § 36-224(1) seeking to establish that Braxton Brown was the father of her son, Jeffrey Lee Pickett, who was born on November 1, 1968. App. 3. Frances Pickett also sought an order from the court requiring Brown to contribute to the support and maintenance of the child. Ibid. Brown denied that he was the father of the child. Id., at 13. It is uncontested that he had never acknowledged the child as his own or contributed to the child’s support. Id., at 5-6, 13-14; Brief for Appellants 5. Brown moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that it was barred by the 2-year limitations period established by § 36-224(2). Frances Pickett responded with a motion challenging the constitutionality of the limitations period. App. 5-7, 13.

The Juvenile Court held that the 2-year limitations period violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and certain provisions of the Tennessee Constitution. Id., at 14. The court based its conclusion on the fact that the limitations period governing paternity actions imposed a restriction on the support rights of some illegitimate children that was not imposed on the identical rights of legitimate children. Ibid. Without articulating any clear standard of review, the court rejected the State’s argument that the 2-year limitations period was justified by the State’s interest in preventing the litigation of “stale or spurious” claims. Id., at 15. In the court’s view, this argument was undermined by the exception to the limitations period established for illegitimate children who are, or are likely to become, public charges, for “the possibilities of fraud, perjury, or litigation of stale claims [are] no more inherent in a case brought [for] a child who is not receiving public assistance than [in] a case brought for a child who is a public charge.” Ibid.

On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Juvenile Court and upheld the constitutionality of the 2-year limitations period. 638 S. W. 2d 369 (1982). In addressing Frances Pickett’s equal protection and due process challenges to the statute, the court first reviewed our decision in Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U. S. 91 (1982), and several decisions from other state courts. Based on this review, the court stated that the inquiry with respect to both claims was “essentially the same: whether the state’s policy as reflected in the statute affords a fair and reasonable opportunity for the mother to decide in a rational way whether or not the child’s best interest would be served by her bringing a paternity suit.” 638 S. W. 2d, at 376. The court concluded that “[t]he Legislature could rationally determine that two years is long enough for most women to have recovered physically and emotionally, and to be able to assess their and their children’s situations logically and realistically.” Id., at 379.

The court also found that the 2-year statute of limitations was substantially related to the State’s valid interest in preventing the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. Id., at 380. The court justified the longer limitations period for illegitimates who are, or are likely to become, public charges, on the ground that “[t]he state’s countervailing interest in doing justice and reducing the number of people on welfare is served by allowing the state a longer time during which to sue.” Ibid. The court also suggested that “the Tennessee statute is ‘carefully tuned’ to avoid hardship in predictable groups of cases, since it contains an exception for actions against men who have acknowledged their children in writing or by supporting them, and it has been held that. . . regular or substantial payments are not required in order to constitute ‘support.’” Id., sd, 379 (footnote omitted). Finally, the court found that the uniqueness of the limitations period in not being tolled during the plaintiff’s minority did not “alone requir[e] a holding of unconstitutionality of a two-year period, as opposed to any other period which can end during the plaintiff’s minority.” Id., at 380.

We noted probable jurisdiction. We reverse. 459 U. S. 1068 (1982).

II

We have considered on several occasions during the past 15 years the constitutional validity of statutory classifications based on illegitimacy. See, e. g., Mills v. Habluetzel, supra; United States v. Clark, 445 U. S. 23 (1980); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U. S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628 (1974); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U. S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164 (1972); Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 391 U. S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68 (1968). In several of these cases, we have held the classifications invalid. See, e. g., Mills v. Habluetzel, supra; Trimble v. Gordon, supra; Jimenez v. Weinberger, supra; New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, supra; Gomez v. Perez, supra; Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra; Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., supra; Levy v. Louisiana, supra. Our consideration of these cases has been animated by a special concern for discrimination against illegitimate children. As the Court stated in Weber:

“The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual — as well as an unjust — way of deterring the parent. Courts are powerless to prevent the social opprobrium suffered by these hapless children, but the Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of birth where — as in this case — the classification is justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise.” 406 U. S., at 175-176 (footnotes omitted).

In view of the history of treating illegitimate children less favorably than legitimate ones, we have subjected statutory classifications based on illegitimacy to a heightened level of scrutiny. Although we have held that classifications based on illegitimacy are not “suspect,” or subject to “our most exacting scrutiny,” Trimble v. Gordon, supra, at 767; Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S., at 506, the scrutiny applied to them “is not a toothless one . . . .” Id., at 510. In United States v. Clark, supra, we stated that “a classification based on illegitimacy is unconstitutional unless it bears ‘an evident and substantial relation to the particular . . . interests [the] statute is designed to serve.’” 445 U. S., at 27. See also Lalli v. Lalli, supra, at 265 (plurality opinion) (“classifications based on illegitimacy . . . are invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment if they are not substantially related to permissible state interests”). We applied a similar standard of review to a classification based on illegitimacy last Term in Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U. S. 91 (1982). We stated that restrictions on support suits by illegitimate children “will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent they are substantially related to a legitimate state interest.” Id., at 99.

Our decisions in Gomez and Mills are particularly relevant to a determination of the validity of the limitations period at issue in this case. In Gomez we considered “whether the laws of Texas may constitutionally grant legitimate children a judicially enforceable right to support from their natural fathers and at the same time deny that right to illegitimate children.” 409 U. S., at 535. We stated that “a State may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally,” id., at 538, and held that “once a State posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential right to a child simply because its natural father has not married its mother.” Ibid. The Court acknowledged the “lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity,” ibid., and suggested that they could not “be lightly brushed aside.” Ibid. But those problems could not be used to form “an impenetrable barrier that works to shield otherwise invidious discrimination.” Ibid.

In Mills we considered the sufficiency of Texas’ response to our decision in Gomez. In particular, we considered the constitutionality of a 1-year statute of limitations governing suits to identify the natural fathers of illegitimate children. 456 U. S., at 92. The equal protection analysis focused on two related requirements: the period for obtaining paternal support has to be long enough to provide a reasonable opportunity for those with an interest in illegitimate children to bring suit on their behalf; and any time limit on that opportunity has to be substantially related to the State’s interest in preventing the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. Id., at 99-100.

The Texas statute failed to satisfy either requirement. The 1-year period for bringing a paternity suit did not provide illegitimate children with an adequate opportunity to obtain paternal support. Id., at 100. The Court cited a variety of factors that make it unreasonable to require that a paternity suit be brought within, a year of a child’s birth. Ibid. In addition, the Court found that the 1-year limitations period was not “substantially related to the State’s interest in avoiding the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims.” Id., at 101. The problems of proof surrounding paternity suits do not “justify a period of limitation which so restricts [support rights] as effectively to extinguish them.” Ibid. The Court could “conceive of no evidence essential to paternity suits that invariably will be lost in only one year, nor is it evident that the passage of 12 months will appreciably increase the likelihood of fraudulent claims.” Ibid, (footnote omitted).

In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor, joined by four other Members of the Court, suggested that longer limitations periods also might be unconstitutional. Id., at 106. Justice O’Connor pointed out that the strength of the State’s interest in preventing the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims was “undercut by the countervailing state interest in ensuring that genuine claims for child support are satisfied.” Id., at 103. This interest “stems not only from a desire to see that ‘justice is done,’ but also from a desire to reduce the number of individuals forced to enter the welfare rolls.” Ibid, (footnote omitted). Justice O’Connor also suggested that the State’s concern about stale or fraudulent claims “is substantially alleviated by recent scientific developments in blood testing dramatically reducing the possibility that a defendant will be falsely accused of being the illegitimate child’s father.” Id., at 104, n. 2. Moreover, Justice O’Connor found it significant that a paternity suit was “one of the few Texas causes of action not tolled during the minority of the plaintiff.” Id., at 104 (footnote omitted). She stated:

“Of all the difficult proof problems that may arise in civil actions generally, paternity, an issue unique to illegitimate children, is singled out for special treatment. When this observation is coupled with the Texas Legislature’s efforts to deny illegitimate children any significant opportunity to prove paternity and thus obtain child support, it is fair to question whether the burden placed on illegitimates is designed to advance permissible state interests.” Id., at 104-105.

Finally, Justice O’Connor suggested that “practical obstacles to filing suit within one year of birth could as easily exist several years after the birth of the illegitimate child.” Id., at 105. In view of all these factors, Justice O’Connor concluded that there was “nothing special about the first year following birth” that compelled the decision in the case. Id., at 106.

Against this background, we turn to an assessment of the constitutionality of the 2-year statute of limitations at issue here.

Ill

Much of what was said in the opinions in Mills is relevant here, and the principles discussed in Mills require us to invalidate this limitations period on equal protection grounds.

Although Tennessee grants illegitimate children a right to paternal support, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-223 (1977), and provides a mechanism for enforcing that right, § 36-224(1), the imposition of a 2-year period within which a paternity suit must be brought, §36-224(2), restricts the right of certain illegitimate children to paternal support in a way that the identical right of legitimate children is not restricted. In this respect, some illegitimate children in Tennessee are treated differently from, and less favorably than, legitimate children.

Under Mills, the first question is whether the 2-year limitations period is sufficiently long to provide a reasonable opportunity to those with an interest in illegitimate children to bring suit on their behalf. 456 U. S., at 99. In this regard, it is noteworthy that § 36-224(2) addresses some of the practical obstacles to bringing suit within a short time after the child’s birth that were described in the opinions in Mills. See 456 U. S., at 100; id., at 105-106 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The statute creates exceptions to the limitations period if the father has provided support for the child or has acknowledged his paternity in writing. The statute also allows suit to be brought by the State or by any person at any time prior to a child’s 18th birthday if the child is, or is liable to become, a public charge. See n. 1, swpra. This addresses Justice O’Connor’s point in Mills that a State has a strong interest in preventing increases in its welfare rolls. 456 U. S., at 103-104 (concurring opinion). For the illegitimate child whose claim is not covered by one of the exceptions in the statute, however, the 2-year limitations period severely restricts his right to paternal support. The obstacles to filing a paternity and child support suit within a year after the child’s birth, which the Court discussed in Mills, see id., at 100; n. 7, supra, are likely to persist during the child’s second year as well. The mother may experience financial difficulties caused not only by the child’s birth, but also by a loss of income attributable to the need to care for the child. Moreover, “continuing affection for the child’s father, a desire to avoid disapproval of family and community, or the emotional strain and confusion that often attend the birth of an illegitimate child,” 456 U. S., at 100, may inhibit a mother from filing a paternity suit on behalf of the child within two years after the child’s birth. Justice O’Connor suggested in Mills that the emotional strain experienced by a mother and her desire to avoid family or community disapproval “may continue years after the child is born.” Id., at 105, n. 4 (concurring opinion). These considerations compel a conclusion that the 2-year limitations period does not provide illegitimate children with “an adequate opportunity to obtain support.” Id., at 100.

The second inquiry under Mills is whether the time limitation placed on an illegitimate child’s right to obtain support is substantially related to the State’s interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. Id., at 99-100. In this case, it is clear that the 2-year limitations period governing paternity and support suits brought on behalf of certain illegitimate children does not satisfy this test.

First, a 2-year limitations period is only a small improvement in degree over the 1-year period at issue in Mills. It, too, amounts to a restriction effectively extinguishing the support rights of illegitimate children that cannot be justified by the problems of proof surrounding paternity actions. As was the case in Mills, “[w]e can conceive of no evidence essential to paternity suits that invariably will be lost in only [two years], nor is it evident that the passage of [24] months will appreciably increase the likelihood of fraudulent claims.” Id., at 101 (footnote omitted).

Second, the provisions of § 36-224(2) undermine the State’s argument that the limitations period is substantially related to its interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. As noted, see supra, at 6, §36-224(2) establishes an exception to the statute of limitations for illegitimate children who are, or are likely to become, public charges. Paternity and support suits may be brought on behalf of these children by the State or by any person at any time prior to the child’s 18th birthday. The State argues that this distinction between illegitimate children receiving public assistance and those who are not is justified by the State’s interest in protecting public revenue. See Brief for Appellee Leech 26-30. Putting aside the question of whether this interest can justify such radically different treatment of two groups of illegitimate children, the State’s argument does not address the different treatment accorded illegitimate children who are not receiving public assistance and legitimate children. This difference in treatment is allegedly justified by the State’s interest in preventing the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. But as the exception for children receiving public assistance demonstrates, the State perceives no prohibitive problem in litigating paternity claims throughout a child’s minority. There is no apparent reason why claims filed on behalf of illegitimate children who are receiving public assistance when they are more than two years old would not be just as stale, or as vulnerable to fraud, as claims filed on behalf of illegitimate children who are not public charges at the same age. The exception in the statute, therefore, seriously undermines the State’s argument that the different treatment accorded legitimate and illegitimate children is substantially related to the legitimate state interest in preventing the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims and compels a conclusion that the 2-year limitations period is not substantially related to a legitimate state interest.

Third, Tennessee tolls most actions during a child’s minority. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106 (1980). In Parlato v. Howe, 470 F. Supp. 996 (ED Tenn. 1979), the court stated that “[t]he legal disability statute represents a long-standing policy of the State of Tennessee to protect potential causes of actions by minors during the period of their minority.” Id., at 998-999. In view of this policy, the court held that a statute imposing a limitations period on medical malpractice actions “was not intended to interfere with the operation of the legal disability statute.” Id., at 998. Accord, Braden v. Yoder, 592 S. W. 2d 896 (Tenn. App. 1979). But see Jones v. Black, 539 S. W. 2d 123 (Tenn. 1976) (1-year limitations period governing wrongful-death actions applies “regardless of the minority or other disability of any beneficiary of the action”). Many civil actions are fraught with problems of proof, but Tennessee has chosen to overlook these problems in most instances in favor of protecting the interests of minors. In paternity and child support actions brought on behalf of certain illegitimate children, however, the State instead has chosen to focus on the problems of proof and to impose on these suits a short limitations period. Although the Tennessee Supreme Court stated that the inapplicability of the tolling provision to paternity actions did not “alone” require invalidation of the limitations period, 638 S. W. 2d, at 380, it is clear that this factor, when considered in combination with others already discussed, may lead one “to question whether the burden placed on illegitimates is designed to advance permissible state interests.” Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U. S., at 105 (O’Connor, J., concurring). See also id., at 106 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).

Finally, the relationship between a statute of limitations and the State’s interest in preventing the litigation of stale or fraudulent paternity claims has become more attenuated as scientific advances in blood testing have alleviated the problems of proof surrounding paternity actions. As Justice O’Connor pointed out in Mills, these advances have “dramatically reduc[ed] the possibility that a defendant will be falsely accused of being the illegitimate child’s father.” Id., at 104, n. 2 (concurring opinion). See supra, at 10-11. See also Little v. Streater, 452 U. S. 1, 6-8, 12, 14 (1981). Although Tennessee permits the introduction of blood test results only in cases “where definite exclusion [of paternity] is established,” Tenn. Code Ann. §36-228 (1977); see also §24-7-112 (1980), it is noteworthy that blood tests currently can achieve a “mean probability of exclusion [of] at least . . . 90 percent . . . .” Miale, Jennings, Rettberg, Sell, & Krause, Joint AM A-ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Sero-logic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 Family L. Q. 247, 256 (1976). In Mills, the Court rejected the argument that recent advances in blood testing negated the State’s interest in avoiding the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims. 456 U. S., at 98, n. 4. It is not inconsistent with this view, however, to suggest that advances in blood testing render more attenuated the relationship between a statute of limitations and the State’s interest in preventing the prosecution of stale or fraudulent paternity claims. This is an appropriate consideration in determining whether a period of limitations governing paternity actions brought on behalf of illegitimate children is substantially related to a legitimate state interest.

IV

The 2-year limitations period established by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-224(2) (1977) does not provide certain illegitimate children with an adequate opportunity to obtain support and is not substantially related to the legitimate state interest in preventing the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. It therefore denies certain illegitimate children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment of the Tennessee Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

       Tennessee Code Ann. § 36-224(2) (1977) reads as follows:
      “(2) Proceedings to establish the paternity of the child and to compel the father to furnish support and education for the child may be instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or after the birth of the child, but shall not be brought after the lapse of more than two (2) years from the birth of the child, unless paternity has been acknowledged by the father in writing or by the furnishing of support. Provided, however, that the department of human services or any person shall be empowered to bring a suit in behalf of any child under the age of eighteen (18) who is, or is liable to become a public charge.”

       Tennessee Code Ann. §36-224(1) (1977) reads as follows:
      “(1) A petition to establish paternity of a child, to change the name of the child if it is desired, and to compel the father to furnish support and education for the child in accordance with this chapter may be filed by the mother, or her personal representative, or, if the child is likely to become a public charge by the state department of human services or by any person. Said petition may be filed in the county where the mother or child resides or is found or in the county where the putative father resides or is found. The fact that the child was bom outside this state shall not be a bar to filing a petition against the putative father. After the death of the mother or in case of her disability said petition may be filed by the child acting through a guardian or next friend.”

       Frances Pickett challenged the statute on equal protection and due process grounds under both the Federal and State Constitutions. App. 6-7. She also alleged that the statute amounted to cruel and unusual punishment under both the Federal and State Constitutions. Ibid. The Juvenile Court did not address this claim. The Tennessee Supreme Court later noted that she did not seriously press it before that court. 638 S. W. 2d 369, 371 (1982). She also does not advance it before this Court.
      Pickett also sought permission to amend her complaint to bring the paternity suit in the name of her child. App. 6.
      After Pickett filed her motion challenging the constitutionality of the statute the State Attorney General was notified and he intervened to defend the statute. See id., at 13; 638 S. W. 2d, at 371.

       The court also found that the statute discriminated between “children born out of wedlock who are receiving public assistance and such children whose mothers are not receiving public assistance.” App. 15-16. In this regard, the court pointed out that a mother’s fulfillment of her obligation to support her child does not relieve the father of his duty of support. Id., at 16.
      The court granted Pickett permission to amend her complaint to bring the suit in the name of her child. Ibid.

       The Juvenile Court “allowed an interlocutory appeal by certifying that the constitutionality of [Tenn. Code Ann.] § 36-224(2) was the sole determinative question of law in the proceedings.” 638 S. W. 2d, at 371.

       The court also rejected the due process challenge to the statute. Id,., at 376, 380.
      In addition, the court found that the Juvenile Court had committed a harmless error, from which Brown and the State did not appeal, in allowing Pickett “to amend her complaint to add the name of the child, by the mother as next friend, as a plaintiff.” Id., at 380. The court stated that § 36-224(1) “does not permit an action to be brought by the child except in case of death or disability of the mother.” Ibid.

       The Court suggested that “[financial difficulties caused by childbirth expenses or a birth-related loss of income, continuing affection for the child’s father, a desire to avoid disapproval of family and community, or the emotional strain and confusion that often attend the birth of an illegitimate child all encumber a mother’s filing of a paternity suit within 12 months of birth.” 456 U. S., at 100. The Court also pointed out that “[e]ven if the mother seeks public financial assistance and assigns the child’s support claim to the State, it is not improbable that 12 months would elapse without the filing of a claim.” Ibid. In this regard, the Court noted that “[s]everal months could pass before a mother finds the need to seek such assistance, takes steps to obtain it, and is willing to join the State in litigation against the natural father.” Ibid, (footnote omitted).

       The Court found no need to reach a due process challenge to the statute. Id., at 97.

       The Chief Justice, Justice BREnnan, and Justice Blackmun joined Justice O’ConnoR’s concurring opinion. Id., at 102. Justice Powell joined Part I of Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion, but did not join the Court’s opinion. Id., at 106 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).

       Justice O’Connor wrote separately because she feared that the Court’s opinion might “be misinterpreted as approving the 4-year statute of limitation now used in Texas.” Id., at 102.

       In this light, we need not reach Pickett’s due process challenge to the statute.

       Problems stemming from a mother’s emotional well-being are of particular concern in assessing the validity of Tennessee’s limitations period because § 36-224(1), see n. 2, supra, permits suit to be filed only by the mother or by her personal representative if the child is not likely to become a public charge. As the Tennessee Supreme Court stated, §36-224(1) “does not permit an action to be brought by the child except in case of death or disability of the mother.” 638 S. W. 2d, at 380. The Texas statute involved in Mills permitted suit to be brought by “ ‘any person with an interest in the child’. . . .” 456 U. S., at 100. See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 31-33.

       The State unquestionably has a legitimate interest in protecting public revenue. As Justice O’ConnoR pointed out in Mills, however, the State also has an interest in seeing that “ ‘justice is done’ ” by “ensuring that genuine claims for child support are satisfied.” 456 U. S., at 103 (concurring opinion). Moreover, an illegitimate child has an interest not only in obtaining paternal support, but also in establishing a relationship to his father. As the Juvenile Court suggested in this case, these interests are not satisfied merely because the mother is providing the child with sufficient support to keep the child off the welfare rolls. App. 16. See n. 4, supra. The father’s duty of support persists even under these circumstances. App. 16. See also Rose Funeral Home, Inc. v. Julian, 176 Tenn. 534, 539, 144 S. W. 2d 755, 757 (1940); Brooks v. Brooks, 166 Tenn. 255, 257, 61 S. W. 2d 654 (1933). In any event, we need not resolve this tension in this case. As we discuss infra, the State’s interest in protecting the public revenue does not make paternity claims any more or less stale or vulnerable to fraud.

       Tennessee Code Ann. § 28-1-106 (1980) reads as follows:
      “If the person entitled to commence an action is, at the time the cause of action accrued, either within the age of eighteen (18) years, or of unsound mind, such person, or his representatives and privies, as the case may be, may commence the action, after the removal of such disability, within the time of limitation for the particular cause of action, unless it exceed [sic] three (3) years, and in that case within three (3) years from the removal of such disability.”

       There is some confusion about the relationship between § 28-1-106 and § 36-224. Compare Brief for Appellants 18; Tr. of Oral Arg. 10, 13, with Brief for Appellee Leech 13-14, 18; Tr. of Oral Arg. 30-31, 37-38. Even assuming that the limitations period in §36-224(2) is tolled during the mother’s minority, the important point is that it is not tolled during the minority of the child. As noted, see supra, at 15, and n. 14, statutes of limitations generally are tolled during a child’s minority. This certainly undermines the State’s argument that the different treatment accorded legitimate and illegitimate children is justified by its interest in preventing the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims.
      It is not critical to this argument that the right to file a paternity action generally is given to the mother. It is the child’s interests that are at stake. The father’s duty of support is owed to the child, not to the mother. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-223 (1977). Moreover, it is the child who has an interest in establishing a relationship to his father. This reality is reflected in the provision of § 36-224(1) that allows the child to bring suit if the mother is dead or disabled. Cf. S. Rep. No. 93-1356, p. 52 (1974) (“[T]he interest primarily at stake in [a] paternity action [is] that of the child”). Restrictive periods of limitation, therefore, necessarily affect the interests of the child and their validity must be assessed in that light.

       See also Stroud, Bundrant, & Galindo, Paternity Testing: A Current Approach, 16 Trial 46 (Sept. 1980) (“Recent advances in scientific techniques now enable the properly equipped laboratory to routinely provide attorneys and their clients with a 95-98 percent probability of excluding a man falsely accused of paternity”); Terasaki, Resolution By HLA Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases Not Excluded By ABO Testing, 16 J. Family L. 543 (1978). See generally Ellman & Kaye, Probabilities and Proof: Can HLA and Blood Group Testing Prove Paternity?, 54 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1131 (1979).