text:
    No. 83-1175.
    Gorst v. Block, Secretary of Agriculture.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 83-1199.
    Homsapaya v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1206.
    Mekic v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1208.
    Lee v. Burger, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1233.
    Bowden v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1239.
    Kasick et al. v. Block, Secretary of Agriculture, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1253.
    Morris v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1256.
    King v. Malone, Trustee.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5703.
    Gonzalez v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5717.
    Guyon v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5729.
    Santana v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5744.
    Shaw v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5772.
    McQueen v. Ramsey, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5790.
    Hobbs v. Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5795.
    Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, Chippewa County, Wisconsin, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5820.
    Flomenhoft v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5844.
    Albright v. Bordenkircher, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5848.
    Doll v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5889.
    McGill v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5919.
    Meyer v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5958.
    Keefe, as Guardian ad Litem and Next Friend of Three Juveniles v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5963.
    Kane v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5992.
    Israel et ux. v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6011.
    Wright et al. v. London Grove Township.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6014.
    Lucien v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6015.
    Franklin v. McKaskle, Acting Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6027.
    Eubanks v. McKaskle, Acting Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6028.
    Blankner v. City of Chicago et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6029.
    Brown v. Wallace et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6030.
    Archibald v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 14th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6040.
    Weiker v. South Dakota.
   Sup. Ct. S. D. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6049.
    Platel v. Maguire, Voorhis & Wells et al.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6055.
    Van Sant v. Arlington County, Virginia, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6073.
    Squires v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6077.
    Peedin v. Department of the Navy.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6096.
    Layton v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6099.
    Gates v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6113.
    Campbell v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6124.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6132.
    Edrington v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6137.
    Lavoie v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6145.
    Palazzo v. Gulf Oil Corp.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6158.
    Catanzaro v. Hart Electronics Corp.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6163.
    Sprague v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6171.
    Kelly v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6175.
    Gasdiel v. Lane, Director, Illinois Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    No. 83-634.
    California Department of Corrections v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Rehnquist,

dissenting.

Weldon Wiggins, an inmate in the California prison system, was also plaintiff in a civil action pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. At his behest, a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum was issued requiring the State to produce him so that he might attend the trial of his civil action. The State was ordered to bear all the expenses associated with transporting and securing the presence of Wiggins at the trial. The State appealed, claiming that it should be reimbursed by the United States Marshal in light of this Court’s decision in United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U. S. 159 (1977). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order. Wiggins v. County of Alameda, 717 F. 2d 466 (1983).

In so holding, the Court of Appeals relied on Story v. Robinson, 689 F. 2d 1176 (CA3 1982), and sought to distinguish Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F. 2d 476 (CA5 1977), and Ford v. Carballo, 577 F. 2d 404 (CA7 1978). In Story, supra, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a District Court order requiring the State to produce, at its own expense, a state prisoner called as a witness in a federal civil suit. In Ford, supra, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that requiring the State to bear the entire financial burden of producing an incarcerated civil plaintiff at his federal-court trial would be an “unreasonable burden” under the language of United States v. New York Telephone Co., supra. In Ballard, supra, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument of the United States that the State of Florida should bear the entire financial burden of securing the attendance of an incarcerated civil plaintiff at his trial in federal court.

No one doubts the availability of writs of habeas corpus ad tes-tificandum in appropriate circumstances; as the Court of Appeals pointed out in its opinion in this case, authority to issue such a writ is expressly conferred by 28 U. S. C. § 2241(c)(5). But the question of who shall bear the financial burden of securing a prisoner’s attendance—an increasingly important question in view of the mounting number of prisoners’ petitions for writs of habeas corpus and civil rights complaints—is entirely separate from the question of whether federal courts may issue such writs. Because the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits apparently take a narrower view of their authority to impose costs on the State than do the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Ninth Circuit, I would grant certiorari in this case and resolve the conflict.


text:
    No. 83-835.
    Johnson City Central School District et al. v. Quackenbush et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of Western New York Disability Law Coalition for leave to file a brief as ami-cus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1057.
    DiGilio v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 83-1102.
    Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections v. Hutchins.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1130.
    Bair, Director, Iowa Department of Revenue, et al. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Motion of Iowa Farm Bureau Federation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice White,

text:
    No. 83-5352.
    No. 83-5662.
    Murphy v. Kentucky; and Phillips v. Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 83-5352, 652 S. W. 2d 69; No. 83-5662, 655 S. W. 2d 6.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Powell join,

dissenting.

Petitioners challenge their convictions on the ground that they were obtained in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, § 10.

Prior to September 1, 1980, Kentucky law provided that a “conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.” Ky. Rule Crim. Proc. 9.62. Effective that date, the rule was repealed, and thereafter convictions in Kentucky could legally be based upon the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices.

After repeal of the rule, petitioners in these two unrelated cases were tried for crimes that had been committed prior to the repeal. In each case, the trial court rejected the defendant’s request for an instruction to the effect that the jury could not convict on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed both convictions over the claim that application of the new rule violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Murphy v. Commonwealth, 652 S. W. 2d 69 (1983); Phillips v. Commonwealth, 655 S. W. 2d 6 (1983).

The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the change was not ex post facto, because it was merely a change in procedure. The change did not decrease the amount of evidence necessary to convict, but merely removed an impediment to the credibility of certain witnesses. Murphy v. Commonwealth, supra, at 72. In reaching its conclusion, the Kentucky court relied upon this Court’s decision in Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574 (1884), which upheld retroactive application of a statute eliminating the ineligibility of convicted felons as witnesses. The Court in Hopt stated:

“Any statutory alteration of the legal rules of evidence which would authorize conviction upon less proof, in amount or degree, than was required when the offence was committed, might, in respect of that offence, be obnoxious to the constitutional inhibition upon ex post facto laws. But alterations which do not increase the punishment, nor change the ingredients of the offence or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt, but—leaving untouched the nature of the crime and the amount or degree of proof essential to conviction—only remove existing restrictions upon the competency of certain classes of persons as witnesses, relate to modes of procedure only, in which no one can be said to have a vested right, and which the State, upon grounds of public policy, may regulate at pleasure.” Id., at 590.

See also Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167 (1925); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380 (1898).

The Kentucky court found Hopt to be dispositive, stating that “[t]he rule change was simply a procedure change which made a certain class of witnesses competent without corroboration.” 652 S. W. 2d, at 73.

Other courts, however, have come to precisely the opposite conclusion. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, distinguishing Hopt, has held that repeal of a statute requiring corroboration of accomplice testimony “reduces the amount of proof necessary for conviction” and therefore cannot constitutionally be applied retroactively. Government of Virgin Islands v. Civil, 591 F. 2d 255, 259 (1979). See also Bowyer v. United States, 422 A. 2d 973 (D. C. 1980) (abolition of requirement of corroboration of testimony of sex-crime victims); State v. Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 627 P. 2d 788 (1981) (same). Indeed, in Commonwealth v. Brown, 619 S. W. 2d 699 (1981), which was overruled by Murphy v. Commonwealth, supra, the Kentucky Supreme Court itself reached a result contrary to the one it reached in these two cases.

Because of the evident confusion among lower courts concerning the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause to changes in rules of evidence and procedure—and because some 15 other States have accomplice-corroboration requirements that they may choose to abolish, see App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 83-5352, p. 15—we disregard our duty when certiorari is denied. Respectfully, I dissent.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 83-5799.
    No. 83-5943.
    No. 83-6016.
    Russell v. Texas.
    Gilbert v. New Mexico.
    Williams v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;

Sup. Ct. N. M.;

Sup. Ct. Tenn.;

No. 83-6020.

No. 83-6043.

No. 83-6148.

Smith v. Arizona.

Engle v. Florida.

Teffeteller v. Florida.

Sup. Ct. Ariz.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.; and

Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 83-5799, 655 S. W. 2d 711; No. 83-5943, 100 N. M. 392, 671 P. 2d 640; No. 83-6016, 657 S. W. 2d 405; No. 83-6020, 138 Ariz. 79, 673 P. 2d 17; No. 83-6043, 438 So. 2d 803; No. 83-6148, 439 So. 2d 840.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 81-2159.
    No. 83-382.
    No. 83-551.
    No. 83-621.
    No. 83-5341.
    No. 83-5387.
    No. 83-5400.
    No. 83-5664.
    No. 83-5701.
    No. 83-5737.
    No. 83-5771.
    Silkwood, Administrator of the Estate of Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. et al., Rush v. United States Agency for International Development et al., Bratton et al. v. City of Detroit et al., Constant v. United States, Greene v. Massey, Superintendent, Union Correctional Institute, Mitchell v. Texas, Sellner v. Hudnall et al., Sikorski v. Den Norske Amerikalinje et al., Adams v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Cooper v. Florida, Royse v. Corhart Refractories Co.,
   464 U. S. 238;

464 U. S. 1052;

464 U. S. 1040;

464 U. S. 1041;

464 U. S. 1046;

464 U. S. 1073;

464 U. S. 1046;

464 U. S. 1048;

464 U. S. 1063;

464 U. S. 1073; and

464 U. S. 1072. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    February 28, 1984
    No. A-686.
    Taylor v. Maggio, Warden, et al.
   Application for certificate of probable cause and stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens would grant the application. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.


text:
    March 5, 1984

    No. 83-1041.
    Taylor et al. v. North Carolina.

      Justice MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of the orders announced on this date.

   Appeal from Ct. App. N. C. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 83-1055.
    Hahn v. Bryant-Poff, Inc.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ind. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-2340.
    Fairman, Warden v. White.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Solem v. Stumes, ante, p. 638.


text:
    No. 83-5825.
    Daly v. United States.
   C, A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed. Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U. S. 365 (1970).


text:
    No. A-653.
    Edmisten, Attorney General of North Carolina, et al. v. Gingles et al.
   Application to stay the mandate of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina pending appeal, addressed to Justice Powell and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-668 (83-1386).
    Leggett, Collector of Revenue of the City of St. Louis, et al. v. Liddell et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice O’Connor and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-370.
    In re Disbarment of Goldfarb.
    [For earlier order herein, see 464 U. S. 911.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-377.
    In re Disbarment of Mandel.
    [For earlier order herein, see 464 U. S. 926.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-383.
    In re Disbarment of Lowenthal.
    [For earlier order herein, see 464 U. S. 988.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-384.
    In re Disbarment of Bizar.
    [For earlier order herein, see 464 U. S. 958.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-389.
    In re Disbarment of Cohen.
    [For earlier order herein, see 464 U. S. 1014.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-408.
    In re Disbarment of Levenstein.
   It is ordered that Leonard L. Levenstein, of Coral Gables, Fla., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 82-315.
    Oregon v. Roberti.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Motion of petitioner to expedite consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-305.
    California v. Trombetta et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. [Certiorari granted, 464 U. S. 1037.] Motions of National District Attorneys Association, Inc., et al. and Appellate Committee of the California District Attorneys Association for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 83-490.
    Davis et al. v. Scherer.
   C. A. 11th Cir. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 464 U. S. 1017.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 83-498.
    Brown, Director, Department of Law and Public Safety, Division of Gaming Enforcement, State of New Jersey, et al. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International Union Local 54 et al.; and Danziger, Acting Chairman, Casino Control Commission of New Jersey, et al. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International Union Local 54 et al.
    No. 83-573.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 464 U. S. 990.] Motion of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 83-724.
    Roberts, Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Human Rights, et al. v. United States Jaycees.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Probable jurisdiction noted sub nom. Gomez-Bethke v. United States Jaycees, 464 U. S. 1037.] Motion of Community Business Leaders for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 83-1334.
    Winston, Sheriff, et al. v. Lee.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted.


text:
    No. 83-5596.
    Spaziano v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. [Certiorari granted, 464 U. S. 1038.] Motion of Richard W. Ervin et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


author: Justice Brennan,

text:
    No. 83-6032.
    Tedder v. Hanners et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until March 26, 1984, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.

Justice Brennan,

dissenting.

For the reasons expressed in Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U. S. 928 (1983), I would deny the petition for certiorari in this case without reaching the merits of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens,

text:
    No. 83-6138.
    Flasman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until March 26, 1984, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.

Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

For the reasons expressed in Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U. S. 928 (1988), we would deny the petition for certiorari in this case without reaching the merits of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.


text:
    No. 83-1269.
    In re Fernandez et al.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 83-773.
    Oregon v. Elstad.
   Ct. App. Ore. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-1020.
    Ohio v. Kovacs, dba B & W Enterprises et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-1075.
    Central Intelligence Agency et al. v. Sims et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-1132.
    Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-1158.
    Estate of Thornton et al. v. Caldor, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Motion of Council of State Governments et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-373.
    No. 83-570.
    Scott v. Rosenberg et al.; and Scott v. Rosenberg et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 702 F. 2d 1263.


text:
    No. 83-628.
    Mollica v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-851.
    South Street Seaport Museum, as Owner of the Bark Peking v. McCarthy et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-890.
    No. 83-894.
    Spielvogel v. United States; and Levy v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-rari denied. Reported below: 715 F. 2d 843.


text:
    No. 83-897.
    No. 83-908.
    No. 83-909.
    Stonehill et al. v. United States; Stonehill v. United States; and Brooks v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 702 F. 2d 1288.


text:
    No. 83-898.
    Turberville v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-903.
    Briguglio v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1022.
    Earullo et al. v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1073.
    Maidsville Coal Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1127.
    Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1135.
    D’Elia v. California.
   App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Riverside. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1136.
    Robinett v. Schwerman Trucking Co., Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1139.
    Moore v. Buffalo Board of Education.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1142.
    Cosmar Compania Naviera, S. A., et al. v. Symeonides.
   Ct. App. La., 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1150.
    Wehringer v. Gardner.
   Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1152.
    Bell v. City of Louisville.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1154.
    Mount Airy Lodge, Inc. v. Upjohn Co.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1157.
    Bullett, Administrator of the Estate of Bullett, et al. v. United Technologies Corporation Represented Employee Retirement Plan.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1159.
    Kuntz v. Winters National Bank & Trust Co. et al.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Montgomery County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1161.
    Maylie v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, aka AMTRAK.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1163.
    Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1210.
    Pugioti v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1215.
    South Carolina et al. v. Block, Secretary of Agriculture, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1276.
    Webb v. Landon, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1277.
    Stege, Individually, and as Administratrix of the Estate of Stege v. United States et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1288.
    Crim v. Hunter, United States Attorney for the Northern District of California.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1300.
    Nori v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1317.
    Bialy v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5154.
    Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5156.
    Wood v. Xerox Corp.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5310.
    Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5773.
    Lane v. Marshall, Superintendent, Southern Ohio Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5796.
    Crowe v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5824.
    Connelly v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5843.
    Wilkins v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5857.
    Sosa v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5867.
    Carstea et al. v. Poplar Tree Homeowners Assn.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5868.
    Carstea v. Poplar Tree Homeowners Assn.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5880.
    Brown v. Rose, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5882.
    Andree v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5886.
    Goins v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5888.
    Principato v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6036.
    Martin v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6037.
    Webb v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6044.
    Hall v. Ohio.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6045.
    English v. McKaskle, Acting Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6050.
    Morris v. Henderson et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6051.
    Muszynski v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6054.
    Merrill v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6059.
    Fears v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6079.
    Norris v. Redman, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6083.
    Lewis v. Scully, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6085.
    Jones v. Scully, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6091.
    Fox v. Dixon.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6098.
    Leonardi v. Sta-Rite Reinforcing, Inc., et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6100.
    Euge v. Golden et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6114.
    Fisher v. Fauver, Director of the Division of Correction and Parole, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6117.
    Bowring v. Barber, Sheriff, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6122.
    Khabiri v. Wallace et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6123.
    Malik v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6143.
    Davis v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6157.
    Canda v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6170.
    Grimes v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6176.
    Scott v. St. Paul Postal Service.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6192.
    Birch v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6194.
    Kramer v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6198.
    Perez-Paez v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6204.
    Ward v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6205.
    Underwood v. Rees, Superintendent, Kentucky State Reformatory, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6217.
    Bevans v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6220.
    Darnell v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6221.
    DeVincent v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6223.
    Helton v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6225.
    Wood v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-949.
    Stepney v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Motion of respondent for damages denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1140.
    Arizona et al. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. et al.

      See also note, supra, p. 1075.

   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 83-5767.
    No. 83-6084.
    No. 83-6150.
    Leatherwood v. Mississippi. Moore v. Balkcom, Warden, et al. Tafero v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Miss.;

C. A. 11th Cir.; and

Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 83-5767, 435 So. 2d 645; No. 83-6084, 716 F. 2d 1511 and 722 F. 2d 629; No. 83-6150, 440 So. 2d 350.

Justice Brennan,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 82-357.
    No. 83-638.
    No. 83-5581.
    No. 83-5696.
    No. 83-5724.
    No. 83-5734.
    No. 83-5862.
    Michigan v. Clifford et al., Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Board of California et al., Glover et al. v. Alexander, Secretary of the Army, Caulton v. Hospital of the Good Samaritan et al., Baltsavias v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Martel et al. v. New Hampshire et al., Manko v. United States,
   464 U. S. 287;

464 U. S. 1041;

464 U. S. 1071;

ante, p. 1009;

464 U. S. 1050;

464 U. S. 1050; and

ante, p. 1010. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    March 8, 1984
    No. 83-1213.
    Butcher v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    March 12, 1984
    No. 83-305.
    California v. Trombetta et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. [Certiorari granted, 464 U. S. 1037.] Writ of certiorari dismissed as to respondents Thomas Nelson Muldoon and James K. Schneider under this Court’s Rule 53.


author: Justice Marshall,

text:
    March 13, 1984
    No. 83-5720.
    Autry v. McKaskle, Acting Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-rari denied.

Justice Marshall,

with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

It is not unusual for this Court to spend considerable amounts of time deliberating over difficult issues presented in a petition for a writ of certiorari. Yet in this case, where the constitutional validity of a death sentence is challenged on a variety of substantial grounds, the Court is dramatically expediting its normal deliberative processes to clear the way for an impending execution.

Unfortunately, this case is not an aberration but is part of a pattern of recent decisions in each of which the Court has shown an unseemly desire to bring litigation in a capital case to a fast and irrevocable end. See, e. g., Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U. S. 377, 383 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing “rush to judgment” in decision to vacate stay of execution); ibid. (White and Stevens, JJ., dissenting); id., at 383-384 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Autry v. Estelle, 464 U. S. 1, 5-6 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing decision to deny stay of execution pending filing and disposition of petition for certiorari); Barefoot v. Estelle,. 463 U. S. 880, 914-916 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing suggestion that courts of appeals may adopt special, summary procedures for cases in which a stay of a death sentence has been requested).

Among the materials presently before the Court pertaining to petitioner’s conviction and sentence are an application for a certificate of probable cause, two petitions for certiorari, and an application for a stay pending disposition of the latest petition for cer-tiorari. See Autry v. McKaskle, post, p. 1090. Despite the fact that the petition in No. 83-5720 was still pending in this Court, the State set the date for petitioner’s execution during our recess. Aware that the State cannot execute petitioner while his various petitions are pending in this Court, cf. United States v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563 (1906), and yet unwilling to postpone petitioner’s scheduled execution even a day or so, the Court has cut short its consideration of petitioner’s multifarious claims. I, for one, feel unfairly pressed by the Court’s insistence upon expedited procedures in death cases.

As an indication of the serious nature of the questions petitioner poses, I shall briefly discuss two issues raised in one of his petitions for certiorari, No. 83-5720, that clearly merit plenary review. I fear that, in our rush to judgment, we could be overlooking still other important claims.

The first issue posed in No. 83-5720—whether the State wrongfully denied immunity to a witness necessary to petitioner’s defense—implicates a conflict among the Federal Courts of Appeals regarding the proper standards for testing such claims. The second issue involves substantial allegations that petitioner was convicted on the basis, at least in part, of statements made as a result of beatings administered by police—allegations that have never been adequately addressed by the courts below.

Petitioner, James David Autry, was convicted and sentenced to death for murdering a clerk while attempting to rob a convenience store. For the purpose of evaluating his petition for certiorari, two sets of circumstances are significant. First, petitioner unsuccessfully requested the trial court to grant his codefendant, John Alton Sandifer, use immunity for his eyewitness testimony regarding the events that transpired at the scene of the crime. According to petitioner, Sandifer’s testimony would confirm petitioner’s story that neither a robbery nor an attempted robbery occurred at the store. If not committed in the course of a robbery or attempted robbery, the murder would not constitute a capital crime. Although the prosecution granted immunity to three of Sandifer’s relatives, it did not grant immunity to Sandifer himself. As a result, he refused to testify on petitioner’s behalf for fear that the State would subsequently use his testimony against him. Second, Autry alleges that, after he was arrested, he was subjected to physical abuse by police and that, as a result of these beatings, he made a written confession and later repeated certain portions of his confession during a telephone call to his mother that was made within earshot of police officers. The written confession was later suppressed. However, the trial court admitted into evidence the testimony of an officer who overheard petitioner’s conversation with his mother.

I

Petitioner contends that the trial court committed constitutional error when it refused to grant use immunity to Sandifer. In support of this claim, petitioner cites decisions by the Third Circuit recognizing that, under certain conditions, a defendant has a right, under the Due Process Clause, to a judicially administered grant of immunity to a witness whose testimony is essential to an effective defense. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F. 2d 964 (1980); United States v. Herman, 589 F. 2d 1191 (1978); United States v. Morrison, 535 F. 2d 223 (1976). Here, petitioner claims that Sandifer’s testimony was essential to an effective defense because it would show that the elements that elevated his crime to a capital offense — robbery or attempted robbery in the course of an intentional homicide — were simply not present in the conduct for which petitioner has been sentenced to death. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit justified its denial of petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief in part on the basis of its disagreement with the line of cases decided by the Third Circuit. According to the Fifth Circuit, a trial court is not required to grant immunity to a defense witness simply because that witness has essential exculpatory information unavailable from other sources. Autry v. Estelle, 706 F. 2d 1394, 1400-1403 (1983); United States v. Thevis, 665 F. 2d 616, 638-641 (1982). Certiorari should be granted to resolve this conflict, especially inasmuch as it arises in a case in which a death sentence has been imposed.

The Court of Appeals also suggested that, in this case, “differences among the circuits are ... a strawman because Autry fails all their tests.” Autry v. Estelle, supra, at 1401. Its contention that Autry would be ineligible for relief even under the Third Circuit’s less restrictive standard was based upon the Fifth Circuit’s view of the likely nature of Sandifer’s testimony were he to be granted use immunity. The District Court and the Court of Appeals both found that Sandifer’s testimony was unlikely to be exculpatory. Their conclusion stemmed from their evaluation of a confession that Sandifer gave to the police soon after his arrest. Petitioner claimed that Sandifer’s confession tended to exculpate petitioner because it made no mention of a robbery, thus supporting other evidence tending to show that no robbery of the convenience store was either intended or accomplished. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s claim because it found that Sandifer’s confession inculpated petitioner inasmuch as Sandifer named petitioner as the triggerman in the shootings. Indeed, the Court of Appeals concluded that the State’s case would actually have benefited from Sandifer’s testimony. The Court of Appeals’ finding on this issue derives from a misunderstanding of petitioner’s argument. Petitioner does not claim that Sandifer’s testimony would exonerate him of wrongdoing; he claims merely that that testimony would show that no robbery attended the shootings at the convenience store. Sandifer’s testimony might have enhanced the State’s ability to show that petitioner had committed murder, but would have materially weakened the State’s contention that petitioner committed capital murder within the meaning of the pertinent Texas statute.

II

The second issue presented in the petition involves the admissibility of testimony by a police officer regarding statements that the officer heard petitioner make to his mother during a telephone conversation. Prior to the conversation, petitioner had given the police a written confession that was subsequently suppressed by the trial judge. Petitioner claimed that the confession was the result of beatings administered by the police, a claim that was contradicted by the interrogating officers. The trial court did not resolve the issue whether the confession was the product of physical coercion. Rather, it suppressed the confession based upon a finding that the police previously had failed to honor petitioner’s request that the interrogation be terminated. Autry v. Estelle, supra, at 1403. Petitioner claims that the incriminating statements he made during his conversation with his mother stemmed from the tainted written confession because he was afraid that he would again be punished if, during his conversation, he said anything inconsistent with the confession that had just been wrung from him. According to petitioner, one of the officers who was in the room where he made the telphone call to his mother had participated in his beating.

Substantial evidence indicates that petitioner was subjected to physical abuse. Petitioner’s testimony that he was beaten was confirmed by John R. Sandifer, the father of petitioner’s co-defendant and an immunized prosecution witness. John Sandifer stated that when he saw petitioner in jail following petitioner’s arrest and interrogation, he noticed that “[t]he left side of his face was swollen bad.” Pet. for Cert. 11. Sandifer also observed that petitioner “had numerous bruises on his body. Below the belt and above the belt. . . . Looked like his ribs were broke.” Id., at 12. Asked whether petitioner had told him how he received these bruises, Sandifer replied: “He told me they beat him. ... He said they beat him with a Houston telephone book. . . . He told me that they beat on him until he couldn’t take no more. He said he would sign anything if they quit beating him.” Ibid. Also available at the suppression hearing was a videotape of petitioner made by the police soon after he signed his written confessions; that tape subsequently was inexplicably lost. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion to suppress the testimony based on the overheard conversation with his mother. The trial court offered no reasons, however, for its decision and made no findings concerning the alleged beatings.

In habeas corpus proceedings, the Federal District Court handled the trial court’s failure to make factual findings by assuming all of petitioner’s allegations to be true. Assuming that petitioner had been beaten into signing the written confession, the District Court found that his oral declarations were “voluntary and ‘sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint’ of the physically coerced written confessions.” App. B to Pet. for Cert. 11. The Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing the following facts: six hours, during which petitioner was allowed to sleep in his cell, elapsed between the putative beatings and petitioner’s call to his mother; petitioner himself requested to make the call; and the overheard statements were directed not to any agent of the State .but rather to a private party of petitioner’s own choosing. Autry v. Estelle, 706 F. 2d, at 1403.

Assuming, as did the District Court and Court of Appeals, that petitioner’s allegations were true, I cannot accept the lower courts’ conclusion that the overheard statements were voluntary. Petitioner made these statements in a telephone conversation conducted in the booking room of the jail while in close proximity to an officer who had recently participated in beating a confession out of him. To my mind, these circumstances raise sufficient doubt regarding the voluntariness of the statements to require suppression of the policeman’s account of the conversation. I find it implausible that six hours of sleep could erase from petitioner’s consciousness the fear that the earlier beatings must have engendered. Nor does the fact that he initiated the call negate the possibility that he wanted to make contact with a source of outside support and at the same time to avoid a new round of beatings for contradicting his earlier coerced confession. Assuming, as we must, that petitioner was subjected to beatings, the burden was upon the State to show that the telephone conversation was untainted by continued coercion. The State failed to sustain that burden.

For these reasons, I dissent.

       In this case, for example, the Court voted to deny all of petitioner’s requests for relief while this opinion was still being prepared.

       One way to trigger the Texas death penalty statute is intentionally to commit murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(2) (1974).

       As the Fifth Circuit has noted:
      “The Supreme Court has not decided whether courts may grant defense witnesses use immunity, and the circuit courts which have addressed the issue have produced widely divergent opinions. On the question whether judicial use immunity is necessary for essential exculpatory testimony, the courts have split three ways. The Third Circuit. . . held that such immunity is available in certain circumstances. On the other hand, the Seventh, Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits have ruled that such immunity is unavailable. . . . The remaining circuits which have addressed the issue have denied immunity in the specific eases before them, but left open whether immunity would ever be available.” United States v. Thevis, 665 F. 2d, at 639 (footnote omitted). Although the Fifth Circuit has never explicitly determined whether due process may require a trial court to grant a defendant use immunity, its decisions imply that courts lack such power under any circumstances. Id., at 639, n. 25.


text:
    No. 83-6388 (A-718).
    Autry v. McKaskle, Acting Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Application for certificate of probable cause denied. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan,

with whom Justice Marshall joins,

dissenting.

As I have recently explained, see Pulley v. Harris, ante, at 60 (Brennan, J., dissenting), there has been no change over the past 10 years in the manner in which capital punishment is administered in this country that has in any way shaken my conviction that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). I would, therefore, grant the application for a stay of execution, grant certiorari, and vacate the death sentence.

Indeed, the particular circumstances of this case only serve to reinforce my conviction that the imposition of the death penalty in our society inevitably amounts to an inexcusable affront to “the dignity of man.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100 (1958). Mr. Autry has already endured the profound psychological torment of lying strapped to a gurney for over an hour with an intravenous needle in his arm, waiting to be put to death. That wait was brought to an end by the grant of a last-minute stay permitting him time to vindicate his constitutional rights. Following today’s decision, however, he will again have to undergo the same indignity and psychological anguish, knowing that this time will probably be the last. Faced with such circumstances, I for one refuse to accept the notion implicit in today’s decision that we have kept faith with the dual promise of the Eighth Amendment that the State’s power to punish is “exercised within the limits of civilized standards,” and that we keep pace with the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” in carrying out criminal punishments. Id., at 100-101.

I dissent.


text:
    March 14, 1984
    No. 83-1109.
    Riegel Products Corp., Inc., et al. v. Meyer.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    No. A-725.
    Claiborne, United States District Judge v. United States.
   Application to stay proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, presented to Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    March 19, 1984
    No. 83-640.
    Texas v. KVUE-TV, Inc., et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from C. A. 5th Cir.

Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, and Justice O’Connor would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 83-880.
    Johnson v. Schermerhorn et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Minn, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1190.
    Athens Lumber Co., Inc., et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 11th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1265.
    DeNardo v. Johnstone, Judge, Alaska Judicial Council, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Alaska dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6166.
    Pope et al. v. Joliet Federal Savings & Loan Assn.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6202.
    Taylor v. United States.
   Appeal from C. A. 11th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


author: Justice Stevens,

text:
    No. 83-911.
    No. 83-927.
    United States Brewers Assn., Inc., et al. v. Rodriguez, Director of the New Mexico Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control; and Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Rodriguez, Director of the New Mexico Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control.
   Appeals from Sup. Ct. N. M. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. JUSTICE Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these appeals. Reported below: 100 N. M. 216, 668 P. 2d 1093.

Justice Stevens,

concurring.

The New Mexico Discrimination in Selling Act, enacted in 1967, N. M. Stat. Ann. §§60-12-1 through 60-12-10 (1978), limited the price which a producer of “alcoholic liquor” (defined to exclude malt beverages such as beer) could charge New Mexico liquor wholesalers to the lowest price it charged wholesalers in any other State during the preceding month. In 1979, the New Mexico Legislature amended the statute, commonly referred to as a price affirmation law, to extend its coverage to malt beverages. 1979 N. M. Laws, ch. 83.

The appellants, producers of malt beverages, filed this action in the New Mexico District Court of Santa Fe County for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the validity of the 1979 amendment on state and federal constitutional grounds. Specifically, appellants argued that the amended Act constituted a burden on commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause and conflicted -with federal antitrust laws in violation of the Supremacy Clause. In 1980, the District Court entered summary judgment for appellee, upholding the constitutionality of the 1979 amendment. The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court and remanded for further proceedings, rejecting appellants’ federal constitutional claims that the amended statute was invalid on its face. United States Brewers Assn., Inc. v. Director, Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 100 N. M. 216, 668 P. 2d 1093 (1983). The court relied on this Court’s decisions in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35 (1966), and Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U. S. 654 (1982).

In 1981, while the appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court was pending, the New Mexico Legislature repealed the 1967 Act, as amended, and enacted a new price affirmation law. N. M. Stat. Ann. §§60-8A-12 through 60-8A-15 (1981). While in most respects the 1981 Act is a recodification of the previous statute, it differs from the prior law in one respect which appellants in No. 83-911 argue is significant for purposes of constitutional analysis. The 1981 Act does not limit wholesale prices to the lowest price charged in other States in the preceding month, but instead employs a different time period as the reference point.

The New Mexico Supreme Court expressly noted that the 1967 Act had been repealed and replaced by the 1981 Act. 100 N. M., at 217, n. 1, 668 P. 2d, at 1094, n. 1. It did not pass on the validity of the 1981 Act, however, and limited its consideration to the 1967 Act as amended in 1979. Indeed, it does not appear that appellants ever specifically requested the court to construe the 1981 Act or to rule on its validity.

Appellants in No. 83-911 ask us to vacate the judgment below and to remand the case to the New Mexico Supreme Court “for clarification of the implications for this case of the 1981 amendments” and for further consideration in light of this Court’s decision in Healy v. United States Brewers Assn., Inc., 464 U. S. 909 (1983), summarily aff’g 692 F. 2d 275 (CA2 1982). Juris. Statement 11. Appellant in No. 83-927, on the other hand, maintains that since the New Mexico Supreme Court did not rule on the effect or validity of the 1981 statute, no question concerning the 1981 statute is involved in this appeal. Appellant in No. 83-927 also demonstrates that the question of the validity of the 1967 Act as amended in 1979 is not moot.

Our recent decision in Healy, invalidating a Connecticut price affirmation statute, does not undermine the New Mexico Supreme Court’s reliance on Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter and Rice v. Norman Williams Co. in upholding the constitutionality of the 1967 New Mexico Act as amended in 1979. Moreover, it seems quite plain that the New Mexico Supreme Court did not pass on the validity of the 1981 Act. Thus, we have no occasion to consider whatever relevance Healy might have to a constitutional challenge of the 1981 Act in these appeals. Nor do we have any power to order the state court to pass on a question that was apparently not properly presented to it when it entered the judgment we are now being asked to review. I therefore concur in dismissing these appeals from the judgment upholding the 1967 Act as amended in 1979 for want of a substantial federal question without reaching any issue which might exist concerning the 1981 Act.


text:
    No. 83-1086.
    Top Tile Building Supply Corp. et al. v. New York State Tax Commission et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 83-1224.
    Consumer Value Stores v. Board of Pharmacy of New Jersey.
   Appeal from Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 83-6186.
    Rogers v. North Carolina.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. C. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 83-1280.
    Aimone v. Finley, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County.
   Appeal from App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction, it appearing the judgment below rests upon independent and adequate state grounds.


text:
    No. 82-2094.
    Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Webb.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Heckler v. Mathews, ante, p. 728.


text:
    No. 82-5812.
    Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hospital et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Darrone, ante, p. 624.


text:
    No. 83-650.
    Meyerson v. Arizona et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Darrone, ante, p. 624.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No.-.
    Hoopa Valley Tribe of Indians v. Short et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari with an appendix that does not comply with the Rules of this Court granted.


text:
    No. D-368.
    In re Disbarment of Glasschroeder.
    [For earlier order herein, see 464 U. S. 911.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-379.
    In re Disbarment of Grossman.
    [For earlier order herein, see 464 U. S. 926.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-381.
    In re Disbarment of Cairo.
    [For earlier order herein, see 464 U. S. 958.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-394.
    In re Disbarment of Schlesinger.
    [For earlier order herein, see 464 U. S. 1066.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-409.
    In re Disbarment of Maier.
   It is ordered that William C. Maier, of Hobbs, N. M., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-410.
    In re Disbarment of Pacor.
   It is ordered that Victor N. Pacor, of the Bronx, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-411.
    In re Disbarment of Sheehy.
   It is ordered that Donald Joseph Sheehy, of Annapolis, Md., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-412.
    In re Disbarment of Spitznagel.
   It is ordered that Carl S. Spitznagel, Jr., of Tampa, Fla., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-413.
    In re Disbarment of Goldstein.
   It is ordered that Charles H. Goldstein, of West Islip, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-414.
    In re Disbarment of Block.
   It is ordered that Malcolm L. Block, of Cherry Hill, N. J., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 98,
    Orig.
    Pennsylvania v. Oklahoma.
   Motion for leave to file bill of complaint denied.


text:
    No. 83-18.
    Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Vt. [Certiorari granted, 464 U. S. 959.] Motion of respondent for leave to file supplemental brief denied.


text:
    No. 83-141.
    No. 83-236.
    No. 83-283.
    Hawaii Housing Authority et al. v. Midkiff et al.; Portlock Community Assn. (Maunalua Beach) et al. v. Midkiff et al.; and Kahala Community Assn., Inc., et al. v. Midkiff et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 464 U. S. 932.] Motion of appellants in No. 83-236 for divided argument denied.

Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 83-305.
    California v. Trombetta et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. [Certiorari granted, 464 U. S. 1037.] Motion of respondents for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 83-751.
    Securities and Exchange Commission et al. v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 464 U. S. 1038.] Motion of North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc., for leave to file a brief as ami-cus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 83-812.
    Wallace, Governor of Alabama, et al. v. Jaffree et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of American Civil Liberties Union et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 83-916.
    United States v. Morton.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1004.] Motion of the Solicitor General to permit Michael W. McConnell, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hoc vice granted.


text:
    No. 83-967.
    Territory of Guam v. Okada.
   C. A. 9th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 83-997.
    Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1065.] Motion of the parties to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 83-1158.
    Estate of Thornton et al. v. Caldor, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1078.] Motion of Connecticut for leave to intervene as a party petitioner granted. ■


text:
    No. 83-1246.
    Peick et al. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of American Trucking Associations, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 83-1279.
    Florida v. Meyers, aka Weyers.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted.


text:
    No. 83-5778.
    Ordway v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Commission, dba Gulf Coast Mental Health Center, et al.,
   464 U. S. 1067. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.


text:
    No. 83-1035.
    No. 83-1070.
    Tennessee v. Garner et al.; and Memphis Police Department et al. v. Garner et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of Cleamtee Gamer for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted in No. 83-1035. Certiorari granted in No. 83-1070. Cases consolidated and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 710 F. 2d 240.


text:
    No. 83-728.
    Herb’s Welding, Inc., et al. v. Gray et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-859.
    California v. Carney.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-rari granted.


text:
    No. 83-1170.
    United States v. 50 Acres of Land et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-935.
    United States v. Abel.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-1065.
    No. 83-1240.
    County of Oneida, New York, et al. v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State et al.; and New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in these cases expressing the views of the United States. Reported below: 719 F. 2d 525.


text:
    No. 83-5424.
    Ake v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and cer-tiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-1159.
    Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Jones.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-5857.
    Aponte v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-227.
    Schlansky v. United States et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-779.
    Laglia v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-795.
    International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America et al. v. Donovan, Secretary of Labor, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-807.
    Siebert v. Baptist, District Director of Internal Revenue Service, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-848.
    Martinez et al. v. Smith, Attorney General, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-857.
    Town of Orangetown v. Ruckelshaus, Administrator, United States Environmental Agency, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-858.
    No. 83-860.
    Blanton v. United States; and Hood et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 719 F. 2d 815.


text:
    No. 83-864.
    Whitten v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-886.
    State Board of Equalization of Georgia et al. v. Southern Railway Co. et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-933.
    Gray v. Bell et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-937.
    Montemayor de la Paz v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-942.
    Ripley County Area Plan Commission v. Rouse et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-956.
    Berryman v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-972.
    Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. v. Ogilvie, Trustee of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-973.
    American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Service et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-978.
    No. 83-1141.
    Samuel Moore & Co. et al. v. Multiflex, Inc.; and Multiflex, Inc. v. Samuel Moore & Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 709 F. 2d 980.


text:
    No. 83-986.
    Grand Jewels, Inc. v. Montres Rolex, S. A., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-994.
    Mollnow v. Carlton et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1010.
    Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1027.
    Morton v. Hildebrandt et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 88-1046.
    No. 83-6087.
    Gjieli v. United States; and Lulgjuraj et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717 F. 2d 968.


text:
    No. 83-1085.
    American Cyanamid Co. v. Melamine Chemicals, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1107.
    City of Dearborn et al. v. Amen et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1146.
    Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. v. United States et al.
   Sp. Ct. R. R. R. A. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1151.
    Spring v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1156.
    Wilson et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1168.
    Air Line Pilots Assn., International, et al. v. Western Air Lines, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1172.
    Riley v. International Union of Allied Industrial Workers et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1179.
    Stenquist v. Stenquist.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1181.
    Meldish v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1188.
    Smith v. Pennsylvania Board of Law Examiners.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1189.
    Board of Education of the Northport-East Northport Union Free School District et al. v. Ambach, Commissioner of Education of the State of New York, et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1183.
    No. 83-1185.
    No. 83-1195.
    New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Chevrolet Motor Division, General Motors Corp.; Northern California Motor Car Dealers Assn., Inc., et al. v. Chevrolet Motor Division, General Motors Corp.; and 49er Chevrolet et al. v. Chevrolet Motor Division, General Motors Corp.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 146 Cal. App. 3d 533, 194 Cal. Rptr. 270.


text:
    No. 83-1192.
    Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1194.
    Cullen v. Cullen.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1197.
    Mason et al. v. Burger King Corp.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1207.
    Riffe, Administratrix of the Estate of Riffe v. International Harvester Co.
   Ct. App. Ky. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1211.
    Teamsters Local Union No. 36, Building Material & Dump Truck Drivers v. Edwards.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1214.
    Alessi et al. v. Committee on Professional Standards, Third Judicial Department.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1217.
    No. 83-1218.
    Di Buono, Assignment Judge, et al. v. Fauver, Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Corrections; and Union County Jail Inmates et al. v. Fauver, Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713 F. 2d 984 and 718 F. 2d 1247.


text:
    No. 83-1223.
    Whirlpool Corp. v. Vance.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1225.
    Wymbs et al. v. Republican State Executive Committee of Florida.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1238.
    May v. American Southwest Waterbed Distributors, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1243.
    Franklin v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1245.
    Wilhelm v. Continental Title Co. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1247.
    Powell Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Harrington Manufacturing Co., Inc.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1270.
    Dailey et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1271.
    McDonagh v. Massachusetts.
   Ct. App. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1295.
    Caron v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1313.
    Twin Parks Limited Partnership v. N. S. C. Contractors, Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1324.
    Martin v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1343.
    Lopez-Llerena et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1366.
    Foster v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1382.
    Geraghty v. United States Parole Commission et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5102.
    Maurer v. Kartozian et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5214.
    Vogel v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5714.
    Bruton v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5780.
    Vardas v. McKaskle, Acting Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5809.
    Beckett v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5811.
    Shane v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5814.
    Hughes v. Rowe et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5819.
    Ledger v. Jago, Superintendent, London Correctional Institute.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5914.
    Frank v. United States Office of Personnel Management.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5915.
    Brooks v. Cunningham, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5923.
    Lansdown v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5930.
    Villegas-Rojas v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5962.
    Anderson v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5981.
    Michelena-Orovio v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6056.
    Fonner v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6058.
    Gunter v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6063.
    Bright et al. v. Blackburn, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6076.
    Moss v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6101.
    Kinslow v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6106.
    Lannon v. Hogan, Commissioner of Corrections of Massachusetts, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6107.
    Tyler v. Thompson, Governor of Illinois, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6109.
    Ortiz v. Scully, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6115.
    Griffin v. Little et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6116.
    Darden v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6118.
    Soza et al. v. Town of Yreka City.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6119.
    Williams v. Gupton, Superintendent, Wayne Correctional Center.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6120.
    Mabery v. Presley et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6121.
    Nelson v. Willie, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6127.
    Tyler et al. v. Black et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6128.
    Ali v. Ponte, Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6131.
    Cooper v. Blount et al.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6134.
    Foren v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6135.
    Long v. McKeen, Chief of Institutions, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6140.
    Baker v. McKaskle, Acting Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6144.
    Ward v. Owen et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6149.
    McCorkle v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6151.
    Hill v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6152.
    Carter v. Texas.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6154.
    Davidson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6159.
    Ramirez v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. et al.
   Ct. App. La., 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6160.
    Warnas v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6162.
    Mark v. Sharaga et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6164.
    Montgomery v. American Express Co.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6165.
    Woods v. Sumner, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6167.
    Leahy v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6172.
    Leuschner v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6174.
    Dunlap v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6178.
    Harris v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6179.
    Howell v. Trumpower, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6180.
    Howell v. DeWitt, Sheriff.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6185.
    McMinn v. Whitfield et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6187.
    Platel v. Maguire, Voorhis & Wells et al.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6188.
    Vereen v. Newsome, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6191.
    Harris v. Lezak, U. S. Prosecutor for the District of Oregon.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6207.
    Youngerman v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6209.
    Cohen v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6222.
    Edwards v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6236.
    Snider v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6240.
    Lovelace v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6244.
    Campbell v. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6248.
    Bowring v. Marrs et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6255.
    Moody v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6259.
    Plunkett v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6261.
    Street v. United States Parole Commission.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6271.
    Gustin v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6274.
    Cotton v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-6278.
    Foster v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1749.
    Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Kelly.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1082.
    Elrod, Sheriff of Cook County, et al. v. Duran et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1160.
    McAuliffe et al. v. Penthouse International Ltd.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of Charles H. Keating, Jr., et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1166.
    Silver et al. v. Benson et al.
   Pa. Comraw. Ct. Motions of United States Conference of Mayors et al. and Pennsylvania State Association of Township Supervisors et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1171.
    No. 83-1173..
    Exxon Corp. et al. v. Interstate Natural Gas Association of America et al.; and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Interstate Natural Gas Association of America et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.

Reported below: 230 U. S. App. D. C. 197, 716 F. 2d 1.


text:
    No. 83-1200.
    National Association of Recycling Industries, Inc., et al. v. American Mail Line, Ltd., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 83-1230.
    Capitol Hill Dodge, Inc., et al. v. Chrysler Credit Corp.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of respondent for damages denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5965.
    No. 83-6097.
    No. 83-6136.
    Evans v. Texas. Coleman v. Virginia. Dillon v. Indiana.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;

Sup. Ct. Va.; and

Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 83-5965, 656 S. W. 2d 65; No. 83-6097, 226 Va. 31, 307 S. E. 2d 864; No. 83-6136, 454 N. E. 2d 845.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


author: Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 83-6048.
    Williams v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio-rari denied.

Justice Brennan,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder for the killing of a fellow inmate at the Florida State Prison. After the guilty verdict was rendered by the jury, the trial judge announced that the penalty phase of the trial would begin after a 2-hour lunch break. Petitioner’s counsel moved for a continuance on the ground that he was “unable and unprepared to proceed.” App. to Pet. for Cert. E-4. The trial judge stated that he would take the motion under advisement but that both parties should assume that the penalty phase of the trial would begin after the lunch break.

When the court reconvened, the judge denied petitioner’s motion and immediately proceeded with the penalty hearing. Following the hearing, at which no witnesses were presented on petitioner’s behalf, the jury recommended that the court impose the death penalty. After reading the results of a presentencing investigation, the judge adopted the jury’s recommendation and sentenced petitioner to death.

The Florida Supreme Court, with two justices dissenting, upheld the sentence, rejecting petitioner’s claim that the trial court’s denial of a continuance constituted an abuse of discretion. 438 So. 2d 781, 785-786 (1983). The Florida Supreme Court justified its decision by reference to the wide discretion accorded to trial judges in determining whether to grant continuances, defense counsel’s awareness that this was a case in which the death penalty would be sought, and defense counsel’s failure to offer reasons for his unpreparedness.

The trial court’s refusal to grant petitioner a continuance makes a mockery of federal constitutional standards that have been designed to ensure heightened sensitivity to fairness and accuracy where imposition of the death penalty is at issue. Neither the Florida Supreme Court nor the Florida Attorney General has offered any explanation why, in this capital case, commitment to scheduling was of such pressing concern as to justify the denial of even a brief continuance. This is not to excuse the unpreparedness of a defense counsel. But defense counsel’s dereliction of professional duty could have been met with sanctions that did not deprive petitioner of an opportunity to show the judge and jury that mitigating circumstances rendered the death penalty inappropriate in his case.

The trial court’s denial of a continuance represents an egregious instance of a judge penalizing a defendant in order to chasten his attorney. Because of the trial judge’s order, petitioner was subjected to a capital sentencing hearing for which defense counsel was, by his own admission, wholly unprepared. Petitioner was thus denied his federal constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at the point in the judicial process where he was most in need of it.

The State’s sole response is that this Court is precluded from reviewing petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim because he failed to present it to the Florida Supreme Court. In the state court, petitioner apparently attacked the trial judge’s ruling as an abuse of discretion, not as a deprivation of his constitutional rights. While it is true that, as a general matter, this Court will not review federal constitutional issues that have not been raised in state court, this rule is not absolute. When the record in a case has revealed plain error, this Court has enforced federal constitutional standards despite the petitioner’s failure to raise clearly his federal constitutional claim in the court below. See, e. g., Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U. S. 478 (1974) (reversing a criminal conviction on the basis of a due process claim neither made in constitutional form to the State Supreme Court nor presented by the appellant in his jurisdictional statement to this Court).

My inability to countenance the deprivation of constitutional rights to which the petitioner was clearly subjected requires that I dissent from the Court’s denial of certiorari.

       Defense counsel explained as follows the reasons for his motion:
      “Your Honor, the Defendant moves the Court to continue the penalty phase of the proceedings until a day subsequent to today in order to allow the Defendant an opportunity to prepare whatever mitigating circumstances might be appropriate to submit to the jury.
      “This case has moved rather rapidly and has had some unusual circumstances to arrive and counsel is just unable and unprepared to proceed . . . .” App. to Pet. for Cert. E-4.
      Replying to the prosecutor’s suggestion that the penalty hearing proceed on schedule, petitioner’s counsel repeated that “the Defendant has no witnesses and is not prepared to present any witnesses this afternoon . . . Id., at E-5.

       Justice McDonald, in an opinion joined by Justice Overton, contended that petitioner’s sentence should be vacated and a new sentencing proceeding ordered because “[i]t appears on the face of the record that Williams’ trial counsel was totally unprepared for the sentencing proceedings and thus [that] Williams was not afforded his right of effective assistance of counsel at this critical proceeding.” 438 So. 2d 781, 787 (1983).

       See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 305 (1976) (“Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case”) (plurality opinion); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349, 359 (1977) (plurality opinion); id., at 363-364 (White, J., concurring in judgment).

       Cf. Morris v. Florida, 393 U. S. 850 (1968) (a court should not vicariously punish an attorney’s negligence by foreclosing a defendant’s untimely appeal) (Black, J., dissenting).

       The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-fence.” The Court has long recognized that the right to assistance necessarily includes the right to “effective and substantial aid.” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 53 (1932). Hence, the Court has prohibited government conduct that would render ineffective an attorney’s assistance to his client. See, e. g., Moore v. Illinois, 434 U. S. 220 (1977); Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80 (1976); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967). The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has been made applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
      See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963).


text:
    No. 83-6129 (A-708).
    Bowles et al. v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Application for bail, presented to Justice Brennan, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 81-1687.
    No. 82-1135.
    No. 83-593.
    No. 83-5903.
    Sony Corporation of America et al. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., et al., McKaskle, Acting Director, Texas Department of Corrections v. Wiggins, Ellsworth Freight Lines, Inc., et al. v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, Jones v. United States,
   464 U. S. 417;

ante, p. 168;

ante, p. 1001; and

ante, p. 1011. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    March 23, 1984
    No. 83-1228.
    Scala v. Securities and Exchange Commission.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


author: Justice O’Connor,

text:
    HECKLER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. BLANKENSHIP et al.
    No. A-589.
    Decided January 26, 1984
   Justice O’Connor,

Circuit Justice.

Applicant, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary), requests that I issue a stay pending the filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the per curiam judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in this case. The Court of Appeals’ judgment, affirming an order entered by the District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, requires the Secretary: (1) to promulgate regulations adopting a nationwide 180-day time limit for the rendering of decisions in disability benefit cases under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, and (2) to promulgate regulations imposing a nationwide 90-day time limit for the rendering of decisions in disability termination cases under Title XVI of that Act. Although respondents requested only that the Secretary immediately be required to provide hearings and appeals to Kentucky class members, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s order without limiting it in any way. The Secretary attests that the Solicitor General has determined that a petition for a writ of certiorari will be filed to seek review of this order. She further suggests that, in the meantime, it makes no sense to order her to impose nationwide time limits when this Court is about to address the propriety of a court’s imposing such deadlines in even one State in Heckler v. Day, No. 82-1371 (argued December 5, 1983). Accordingly, she seeks a stay from this Court.

My obligation as a Circuit Justice in considering a stay application is “to determine whether four Justices would vote to grant certiorari, to balance the so-called ‘stay equities,’ and to give some consideration as to predicting the final outcome of the case in this Court.” Gregory-Portland Independent School District v. United States, 448 U. S. 1342 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers). These factors lead me to conclude that the request for a stay should be granted.

By granting the Secretary’s petition for a writ of certiorari in Day, this Court has already determined that the question of judicial imposition of time limits on the disability adjudication and appeal process warrants review by this Court. The instant case presents issues of potentially even greater legal and social significance than does Day, because the court below has imposed on the Secretary the obligation to promulgate nationwide, as opposed to statewide, regulations. I think it is fair to say, therefore, that at least four Justices would vote to grant certiorari.

Furthermore, the balance of equities clearly weighs in favor of a stay. Imposition of nationwide time limits would, in all likelihood, require a substantial restructuring of the existing claims adjudication and appeals process. Respondents consist only of residents of Kentucky, and therefore have no standing to insist upon the imposition of deadlines for decisions on claims filed by residents of other States, as the courts below have ordered. Moreover, since the District Court’s order had been stayed for almost 20 months prior to the Court of Appeals’ decision, the extension of that stay for several more months until this Court decides Day should not cause significant incremental hardship to the interests respondents represent in Kentucky. The Secretary remains under her statutory duty to provide hearings and appeals within a reasonable period of time, and I must assume that she will abide by the statutory requirement and make all reasonable efforts to mitigate the hardships that members of the respondent class undoubtedly suffer pending resolution of their claims. But since imposition of time limits would necessarily require a period of transition, it is unlikely that immediate implementation of the District Court’s order would produce benefits for claimants in Kentucky or elsewhere. The equities therefore counsel that the order be stayed until we render our decision in Day.

Finally, irrespective of the likelihood of success on the merits, it is clear that the Court’s opinion in Day will provide guidance concerning the Secretary’s duties in Kentucky and elsewhere. With the equities as they are, prudence dictates that implementation of the District Court’s order await our decision in that case.

I therefore grant the requested stay of the District Court’s order requiring the Secretary to promulgate regulations imposing time limits on the adjudication and appeal of disability claims pending the timely filing and subsequent disposition of a writ of certiorari in this case.

It is so ordered.


author: Justice Blackmun,

text:
    LILES et al. v. NEBRASKA et al.
    No. A-615.
    Decided February 13, 1984
   Justice Blackmun,

Circuit Justice.

On January 31, 1984, Ralph Liles and others presented to me, as Circuit Justice, an application for a stay, pending review here, of an order of the District Court of Cass County, Nebraska, issued on December 14, 1983. That order committed the applicants to the Cass County jail for their refusal to answer certain questions when ordered to do so by the District Court. The Fifth Amendment claim made by the applicants did not appear to be insubstantial. At the time that the applicants submitted their application for a stay, each had an appeal from the contempt order pending before the Nebraska Supreme Court.

On February 7, respondents filed an opposition to the application for stay. On February 9, the Supreme Court of Nebraska entered an order in each applicant’s case dismissing his appeal to that court “for lack of an appealable order.”

With these cases in that posture, I have no jurisdiction to act pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2101(f). I therefore must deny the relief requested of me by the applicants. This, of course, is without prejudice to any further application, if necessary, if and when the cases return in a more favorable posture.


text:
    CLAIBORNE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE v. UNITED STATES
    No. A-725.
    Decided March 12, 1984
   Justice Rehnquist,

Circuit Justice

Harry Eugene Claiborne, the applicant, is a sitting United States Judge in the District Court for the District of Nevada. In December 1983, he was indicted for violations of 18 U. S. C. § 201(c) and 18 U. S. C. §1343. His contentions that a sitting federal judge may not be criminally prosecuted before being removed from office by impeachment, and that the Government prosecuted him in order to punish him for decisions made as a federal judge, were rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. He requests that I stay the criminal proceedings against him, scheduled to commence today, in order that this Court may review these determinations.

The first contention — that a federal judge may not be indicted and tried for a criminal offense until he is first impeached and convicted by Congress — has been rejected not only by the Court of Appeals in this case but also by the only two other Courts of Appeals to consider the question. United States v. Hastings, 681 F. 2d 706 (CA5 1982); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F. 2d 1124 (CA7 1974). This Court denied certiorari in both Hastings, 459 U. S. 1203 (1983), and Isaacs, 417 U. S. 976 (1974).

Applicant’s second claim appears to be a species of “vindictive” or “selective” prosecution, and the fact that he is a sitting federal judge does not seem to me to remove the claim from the principles most recently discussed in United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U. S. 263 (1982). I think the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that the denial of relief on this claim by the District Court was not immediately appealable under the “collateral order” doctrine.

Applicant finally contends that because the first of his claims was appealable under the collateral-order doctrine, the District Court lost jurisdiction to determine other pretrial matters pending resolution of the appeal by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals applied the dual-jurisdiction approach set forth in United States v. Dunbar, 611 F. 2d 985 (CA5), cert. denied, 447 U. S. 926 (1980), and rejected this claim.

I do not believe that four Justices of this Court would vote to grant certiorari to review any one of these claims at the present stage of this litigation, and I therefore deny the application.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    KOEHLER, WARDEN v. ENGLE
    No. 83-1.
    Argued February 28, 1984
    Decided March 26, 1984

      Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General of Michigan, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, and Thomas C. Nelson, Assistant Attorney General.

      John Nussbaumer argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.

Justice Marshall took no part in the decision of this case.