text:
    No. 83-53.
    Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Schaaf.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 83-57.
    Davis v. Pennsylvania.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-58.
    Philadelphia Lift Truck Corp. v. Taylor Machine Works, Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-60.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-62.
    Jenkins v. Jenkins.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-68.
    White v. White.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-69.
    Upjohn Co. v. Mauldin.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-72.
    Brunty v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-74.
    Tabone v. Posner et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-76.
    Children v. Burton et al.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-77.
    Atlantic Purchasers, Inc., et al. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-80.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-81.
    Maiorano v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-82.
    Goldberg v. Woodcrest Nursing Home et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-83.
    Alvarez v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-85.
    Eastern Foods, Inc. v. R. C. McEntire & Co.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-88.
    McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Northrop Corp.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-92.
    Larsen v. Kirkham et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-93.
    Gee v. Fung et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-94.
    S.S. Nancy Lykes et al. v. General Electric Co., International Sales Division.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-98.
    Humphrey v. City of Shreveport et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-99.
    Varkonyi, Individually, and dba Metal Recycling Co. v. Donovan, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-100.
    Ciancaglini et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-102.
    Grenada Bank, dba Coahoma Bank v. Willey et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-104.
    Tango v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-105.
    Wagman v. Lee.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-110.
    Williams et al. v. Ladner et al.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-111.
    Drouillard v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-112.
    Holway v. Thornton et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-115.
    Briece v. Briece et ux.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-117.
    Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Faulkenberry.
   Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-121.
    Heck v. Heck.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-126.
    Malachowski v. Silverberg, Marvin & Swaim, P.C., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-130.
    Meadows et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-133.
    Woo Chin Tong v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-135.
    Givens v. Castillo et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-142.
    Dixon v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-143.
    Sullivan, dba Columbia Poly Pack Co. v. Town of Vernon, Connecticut.
   Super. Ct. Conn., Tolland Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-145.
    American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Hiam, Commissioner of Insurance.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-146.
    S & S Machinery Co. v. Masinexportimport et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-148.
    Johnson v. District School Board of Hernando County, Florida.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-149.
    Robinson v. New Mexico.
   Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-150.
    O’Connor, Director of Insurance of Illinois v. Organ & Co., Inc.
   Ct. App. La., 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-155.
    Veenkant v. Gurn et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-157.
    Veenkant v. Wesler et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-158.
    Members of the Jamestown School Committee et al. v. Schmidt, Commissioner of Education of Rhode Island, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-160.
    Krall v. Bethel Park School District.
   Pa. Commw. Ct. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-161.
    Johnson v. Arkansas.
   Ct. App. Ark. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-164.
    American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Zaitchick et ux.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-168.
    Construction & General Laborers Union Local 304 et al. v. Paul E. Iacono Structural Engineer, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-170.
    Spaulding v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-182.
    Smitty Baker Coal Co., Inc., et al. v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-183.
    LTV Federal Credit Union v. UMIC Government Securities, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-187.
    Tsanos et al. v. Division of Administration, Florida Department of Transportation.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-191.
    Kubiak v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-192.
    Bouclin v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-194.
    Burton v. Pacific Far East Lines, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-197.
    Kocian v. Getty Refining & Marketing Co.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-199.
    Kappas, Administratrix of the Estate of Kappas v. Chestnut Lodge, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-235.
    DMR Corp. et al. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-238.
    Lopera-Ochoa v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-242.
    Padua v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-266.
    Fitterer v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-275.
    Isaacs v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-287.
    Fernandez v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-298.
    No. 83-5298.
    Figueroa v. United States; and Canel v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied. Reported below: 708 F. 2d 894.


text:
    No. 83-5002.
    Dillon v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5003.
    Thompkins v. Marshall.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5004.
    Newman v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5006.
    Laing v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5007.
    Taylor v. Quick.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5008.
    Roberts v. Moore et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5009.
    Rondon-Limonta v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5010.
    Gelb v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5011.
    Fobes v. Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5012.
    Franey v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5013.
    Childress v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5015.
    Waterhouse v. Oregon.
   Ct. App. Ore. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5018.
    Arambula v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5020.
    Cavanaugh v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5024.
    Trussell v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5031.
    Lipscomb v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5033.
    Hunter v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5034.
    Rankin v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5036.
    Hoover v. Lee, Superintendent, Bronx House of Detention.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5038.
    Bruce v. Upper East Tennessee Human Development Agency, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5041.
    Dock v. Smith et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5042.
    Carlsen v. Morris, Warden, Utah State Prison.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5044.
    Flygare v. Washington.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5045.
    Davenport v. Zimmerman et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5046.
    Gaston v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5047.
    Richardson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5048.
    Pepper v. Kazubowski, County Clerk for the County of Santa Clara.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5050.
    Kinnell v. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5052.
    Coleman v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5055.
    Levy v. Department of Rehabilitative Services of Virginia.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5056.
    Chiago v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5057.
    Alston v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5059.
    Wood v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5065.
    Saintil et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5066.
    Ryan v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5068.
    Coxwell v. Fortner, Superintendent, Avon Park Correctional Institution, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5069.
    Oakie v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5070.
    Levy v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5071.
    Phifer v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5073.
    Gonzales v. New Mexico.
   Ct. App. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5074.
    Bell v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5075.
    Harris v. Laster et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5076.
    Johnson v. Louisiana et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5078.
    Morejon-Ortega v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5081.
    Davis v. McKenzie, Wake County Register of Deeds, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5082.
    Tutt v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5084.
    Marquez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5085.
    Piatkowska v. Vons Foodmarkets.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5086.
    Castaneda-Reyes v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5089.
    Kapper v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5090.
    Cagnina v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5091.
    Jones v. Mississippi River Grain Elevator Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5093.
    Chesson v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5096.
    Bustamante v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5097.
    Nation v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5098.
    Scott v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5099.
    Black v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5101.
    Landes v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5103.
    Valenzuela v. Office of Personnel Management.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5104.
    Torpy v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5107.
    Brown v. Lutheran Hospital Society of Southern California, dba Santa Monica Hospital Medical Center.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5110.
    Lipscomb v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5112.
    Sommer v. Dixon et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5113.
    Watts v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5114.
    Stevenson v. Conrad.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5115.
    Tyler v. Maggio, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5118.
    Dodd v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5119.
    No. 83-5219.
    Rosario v. United States; and Sharpe v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 F. 2d 146.


text:
    No. 83-5120.
    Woodson v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5121.
    Samuel v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5125.
    Helton v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5126.
    Lewis v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5128.
    Leonard v. Zimmerman et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5129.
    Salman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5130.
    Crooker v. Internal Revenue Service.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5131.
    Burton v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5132.
    Lozano v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5133.
    Doyle v. Delaware et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5134.
    Klayer v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5135.
    Menichino v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5136.
    McMurtrey v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5137.
    Smith v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5138.
    Menkes v. City of New York et al.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5139.
    Runte v. Hunter,
   U. S. District Judge. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5142.
    Fisher v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5143.
    Holland v. Guest Quarters.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5144.
    Aaron v. New Mexico.
   Sup. Ct. N. M. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5150.
    Deal v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5152.
    Williams et al. v. Air Transport Union Local No. 504 et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5155.
    Gordon v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5157.
    Edwards v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5158.
    Pierce v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5159.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5161.
    Martin v. Meachum, Director, Oklahoma Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5164.
    Robinson v. Boyd.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5166.
    Moore v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5167.
    Hall v. Alabama.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari

denied.


text:
    No. 83-5172.
    Myers v. Spalding, Superintendent, Washington State Penitentiary, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5174.
    Weddell v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5175.
    Zerman v. Jacobs et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5180.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5182.
    Fleming v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5185.
    Poppos v. McCaffrey.
   Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5186.
    Smith v. Clark, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5187.
    Neil v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5190.
    Estlack v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5191.
    Ingraham v. Maine.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5194.
    Evans v. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offenders Rehabilitative Service, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5196.
    McNair v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5197.
    Seltzer v. Peach et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5200.
    Wham v. United States Postal Service.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5201.
    Geiger v. Lehman, Secretary of the Navy.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5202.
    White v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5203.
    Sammons v. Rotroff.
   Ct. App. Tenn. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5205.
    Bishop v. Gandy, District Manager, Social Security Administration.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5207.
    Mulligan v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5208.
    Cinelli v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5210.
    Edwards v. Davis et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5211.
    Neace v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5217.
    Lopez et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5218.
    Ware v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5220.
    Sivright v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5223.
    Allen v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5225.
    Clark v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5228.
    Alexander v. Zeanah et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5230.
    No. 83-5232.
    Matthews v. United States; and Hoffman v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 711 F. 2d 1066.


text:
    No. 83-5233.
    Jay v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5234.
    Tillman v. Van Ness et al.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5235.
    Yeager v. Wilkinson, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5236.
    Zerilli v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5239.
    Price v. Maggio, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5242.
    McQueen v. Barber et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5246.
    Ward v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5247.
    Farmer v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5248.
    Wheeling v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5250.
    Whiteman v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5254.
    Wright v. New York Life Insurance Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5255.
    Pettee v. Purvis et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5256.
    Lagnas v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5257.
    Warner v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5258.
    McCord v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5261.
    Hobson v. U. S. Parole Commission et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5263.
    Drinkwine v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5264.
    Santiago-Gonzalez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5269.
    Ostrer v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5270.
    Ward v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5272.
    Theriault v. Federal Bureau of Prisons et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5276.
    Moore v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5297.
    Holden v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5305.
    Humpherey v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5307.
    Beemblossom v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1653.
    Newman v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. ■Certiorari denied.

Justice Powell would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-1682.
    Jabara v. Webster, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.

Justice Brennan would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-1723.
    Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation District et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion to intervene in order to file a petition for writ of certiorari granted. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-1793.
    Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board et al. v. Lewis-Westco Co.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Motion of Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of California for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1822.
    No. 82-1930.
    No. 82-1934.
    Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove et al.; Reichert et al. v. Village of Morton Grove et al.; and Stengl et al. v. Village of Morton Grove et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of Handgun Control, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 695 F. 2d 261.


text:
    No. 82-1829.
    Callahan v. Young.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1896.
    Texas v. Garza.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1986.
    Washington County Hospital Assn., Inc. v. Morrison, Administratrix of the Estate of Morrison.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-2156.
    Henderson, Superintendent, Auburn Correctional Facility v. Silverstein.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-175.
    Catholic Home Bureau v. Doe.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1836.
    Keene Corp. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 82-1890.
    Cincinnati City School District Board of Education et al. v. Roncker, on Behalf of Roncker.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of National School Boards Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-2034.
    Astilleros Espanoles, S.A. v. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White and Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 82-2051.
    Giddings & Lewis Machine Tool Co. v. Pollak, Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of respondents John and Patricia Trapanese for damages denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-2053.
    Singleton v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 82-2105.
    No. 82-6697.
    No. 82-6733.
    No. 82-6741.
    No. 82-6771.
    No. 82-6852.
    No. 82-6865.
    No. 82-6870.
    No. 82-6876.
    No. 82-6881,
    No. 82-6915.
    No. 82-6916.
    No. 82-6922.
    No. 82-6923.
    No. 82-6933.
    No. 82-6937.
    No. 82-6982.
    No. 82-6990.
    No. 83-5051.
    No. 83-5095.
    No. 83-5145.
    No. 83-5183.
    No. 83-5227.
    McDougall v. North Carolina. Simmons v. Arkansas. Magill v. Florida. Hayes v. Arkansas. Flamer v. Delaware. Wilson v. Georgia. Muhammad v. Florida. Jeffers v. Arizona. Kubat v. Illinois. Free v. Illinois. Bass v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections. Bush v. Alabama. De La Rosa v. Texas. Ford v. Strickland, Warden, Florida State Prison, et al. Pruett v. Mississippi. Porter v. Florida. Narcisse v. Louisiana. Peterson v. Virginia. Williams v. North Carolina. Conner v. Georgia. Armstrong v. Florida. Davis v. Oklahoma. Adamson v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. N. C.;

Sup. Ct. Ark.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. Ark.;

Sup. Ct. Del.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. Ariz.;

Sup. Ct. Ill.;

Sup. Ct. Ill.;

C. A. 5th Cir.;

Sup. Ct. Ala.;

Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;

C. A. 11th Cir.;

Sup. Ct. Miss.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. La.;

Sup. Ct. Va.;

Sup. Ct. N. C.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Ct. Crim. App. Okla.; and Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 82-2105, 308 N. C. 1, 301 S. E. 2d 308; No. 82-6697, 278 Ark. 305, 645 S. W. 2d 680; No. 82-6733, 428 So. 2d 649; No. 82-6741, 278 Ark. 211, 645 S. W. 2d 662; No. 82-6771, 490 A. 2d 104; No. 82-6852, 250 Ga. 630, 300 S. E. 2d 640; No. 82-6865, 426 So. 2d 533; No. 82-6870, 135 Ariz. 404, 661 P. 2d 1105; No. 82-6876, 94 Ill. 2d 437, 447 N. E. 2d 247; No. 82-6881, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 447 N. E. 2d 218; No. 82-6915, 696 F. 2d 1154 and 705 F. 2d 121; No. 82-6916, 431 So. 2d 563; No. 82-6922, 658 S. W. 2d 162; No. 82-6923, 696 F. 2d 804; No. 82-6933, 431 So. 2d 1101; No. 82-6937, 429 So. 2d 293; No. 82-6982, 426 So. 2d 118; No. 82-6990, 225 Va. 289, 302 S. E. 2d 520; No. 83-5051, 308 N. C. 47, 301 S. E. 2d 335; No. 83-5095, 251 Ga. 113, 303 S. E. 2d 266; No. 83-5145, 429 So. 2d 287; No. 83-5183, 665 P. 2d 1186; No. 83-5227, 136 Ariz. 250, 665 P. 2d 972.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 82-2058.
    Nelson, dba Nelson House v. Tuscarora Intermediate Unit No. 11.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Motion of Pennsylvania for leave to intervene as a party respondent granted. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 82-2075.
    Arizona v. Young.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Cer-tiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and this petition.


text:
    No. 82-2077.
    Olsen et al. v. Progressive Music Supply, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of petitioners to consolidate case with No. 83-188, Olsen v. CBS Musical Instruments, denied. Motion of respondent Peavey Electronics Corp. for damages denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-2129.
    No. 82-2149.
    Haider, as Administrator of the Estate of Haider v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. et al.; and Kahl, Special Administrator of the Estate of Kahl, et al. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.

Reported below: 701 F. 2d 1189.


text:
    No. 82-2134.
    Alside, Inc., et al. v. Weiner, United States District Judge.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 82-2146.
    Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp. et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6558.
    Bailey v. Delaware.
   Sup. Ct. Del. Certio-rari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-6591.
    Wilson v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-6642.
    Novack v. Wisconsin.
   Ct. App. Wis. Certio-rari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-6649.
    Nunley v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-6821.
    McClinnahan v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 82-6981.
    Teague v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


author: Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 82-6775.
    Gilliard v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Cer-tiorari denied.

Justice Marshall,

with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is under all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi insofar as it left undisturbed the death sentence imposed in this case. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). However, even if I believed that the death penalty could constitutionally be imposed under certain circumstances, I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence imposed here.

For the third time this year, this Court has refused to review a case in which an all-white jury has sentenced a Negro defendant to death after the prosecution used peremptory challenges to remove all Negroes from the jury. See Miller v. Illinois and Perry v. Louisiana decided together with McCray v. New York, 461 U. S. 961 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certio-rari). The facts of each case follow a now-familiar pattern: For-cause challenges by both defense counsel and the prosecution leave an integrated jury panel. The prosecution then resorts to peremptory challenges to remove Negro members of the panel. Despite defense counsel efforts to show that the prosecution has excluded jurors on the basis of race, the trial court rules that defendant has failed to establish systematic exclusion in the manner required by this Court in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965). The all-white jury proceeds to hear the case and sentence the Negro defendant to death.

The present case does not deviate from this pattern in any material respect. Petitioner, who is a Negro, pleaded guilty to killing Grady Chance during an armed robbery of Mr. Chance’s store. In accordance with Miss. Code Ann. §99-19-101 (Supp. 1983), a sentencing trial was then held. After for-cause challenges, the prosecution was presented a jury panel including seven Negroes. The prosecution peremptorily challenged the seven Negroes. After defense counsel exercised its peremptory challenges, the panel contained one Negro. The prosecution then used an additional peremptory challenge to remove the Negro. During a hearing held to consider petitioner’s motion to quash the jury, the prosecutor took the stand, and offered reasons for three of his peremptory challenges but could not remember why he exercised the other five. Although the prosecutor had used peremptory challenges to remove all the Negro jurors and only the Negro jurors, the trial court nevertheless denied petitioner’s motion, and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, relying on Swain v. Alabama, supra, and two of its own precedents that, in turn, had relied on Swain: Gaines v. State, 404 So. 2d 557, 560 (1981); Coleman v. State, 378 So. 2d 640, 645 (1979). An all-white jury then heard the evidence and sentenced petitioner to death.

Last Term, when the Court denied petitions for certiorari in the three cases mentioned above, I outlined my objections to the Court’s holding in Swain v. Alabama, and expressed my opinion that, regardless of Swain’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, the use of peremptory challenges to exclude racial minorities violates a criminal defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be tried by a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community. McCray v. New York, supra, at 966-970 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968). I continue to hold these views and need not repeat them here.

I write today to address those of my colleagues who agree with me that the use of peremptory challenges in these cases presents important constitutional questions, but believe that this Court should postpone consideration of the issue until more State Supreme Courts and federal circuits have experimented with substantive and procedural solutions to the problem. Although I appreciate my colleagues’ inclination to delay until a consensus emerges on how best to deal with misuse of peremptory challenges, I believe that for the Court to indulge that inclination on this occasion is inappropriate and ill-advised.

When Justice Brandéis originally analogized the States to laboratories in need of freedom to experiment, he was dissenting from a decision by the Court applying a now-discredited interpretation of the Due Process Clause to strike down an Oklahoma statute regulating the sale and distribution of ice. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 310-311 (1932). As Justice Brandéis recognized, an overly protective view of substantive due process unnecessarily stifles public welfare legislation at the state level. Since then, however, the power of the States-as-laboratories metaphor has propelled Justice Brandéis’ concept far beyond the sphere of social and economic regulation. Now we find the metaphor employed to justify this Court’s abstention from reaching an important issue involving the rights of individual defendants under the Federal Constitution.

When a majority of this Court suspects that such rights are being regularly abridged, the Court shrinks from its constitutional duty by awaiting developments in state or other federal courts. Because abuse of peremptory challenges appears to be most prevalent in capital cases, the need for immediate review in this Court is all the more urgent. If we postpone consideration of the issue much longer, petitioners in this and similar cases will be put to death before their constitutional rights can be vindicated. Under the circumstances, I do not understand how in good conscience we can await further developments, regardless of how helpful those developments might be to our own deliberations.

Moreover, I have serious misgivings about my colleagues’ assumption that many States will, in the foreseeable future, engage in meaningful reconsideration of the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. In the area of individual rights, state courts traditionally have looked to the federal judiciary for leadership. When decisions of this Court have expanded personal liberties in an area, state judiciaries have followed and, upon occasion, interpreted state constitutional liberties to exceed those guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. But, conversely, when this Court has announced a clearly defined, but limited, federal constitutional protection for a particular right, the State Supreme Courts have been less willing to develop more generous doctrines under their own State Constitutions.

Constitutional limitations on prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges are a clear example of how a limiting precedent in this Court inhibits doctrinal development in the States. In 1965 in Swain v. Alabama, a majority of this Court held that the prosecution is free to use peremptory challenges to remove Negroes from the jury in any given case so long as the prosecution does not remove Negroes from juries “in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or victim.” 380 U. S., at 228. Even though Swain v. Alabama has been roundly and regularly criticized by commentators, see sources cited in McCray v. New York, supra, at 964-965, n. 1 (Marshall, J., dissenting), in the 18 years since Swain was decided only two State Supreme Courts have interpreted their State Constitutions to provide criminal defendants greater protection against discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N. E. 2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 881 (1979).

Contrary to my colleagues’ assumptions, these two recent decisions by the California and Massachusetts high courts have not inspired other State Supreme Courts to deviate from the rule of Swain and experiment with new remedies for peremptory challenge misuse. To my knowledge, in the five years since Wheeler and Soares, not a single State Supreme Court has imposed state constitutional limits on peremptory challenges. In fact, over the same period, at least 19 jurisdictions have considered the issue and, following Swain, reaffirmed their view that the exclusion of Negroes by peremptory challenges is constitutional in the absence of evidence of systematic exclusion.

Mississippi is typical. Since 1979, the Mississippi Supreme Court has discussed peremptory challenges in four cases. In all of the cases, the court’s analysis of the issue is so cursory that it is possible to reproduce its discussions unabridged. In Coleman v. State, 378 So. 2d 640 (1979), the court wrote:

“The appellant makes general allegations that the jury, composed of 11 whites and 1 black, was not a jury of his peers. His contention seems to be that the district attorney’s action, in exercising 11 of his peremptory challenges against potential black jurors, was discriminatory.
“The record is devoid of any evidence of any discriminatory pattern in the selection of the special venire, the regular ve-nire, the excusing of jurors by the court, or the peremptory challenges exercised by the district attorney. This Court upheld a murder conviction where the State exercised its peremptory challenges to exclude all Negroes from the jury panel. Irving v. State, 228 So. 2d 266 (Miss. 1969), vacated as to death penalty, 408 U. S. 935 . . . (1972).” Id., at 645.

Next, in Gaines v. State, 404 So. 2d 557 (1981), the court wrote:

“Appellant claims that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges on only the black members of the jury venire. Furthermore, the defendant argues that, in the wake of such action, the trial court erred in not quashing the petit jury.
“The United States Supreme Court dealt with this issue in Swain v. Alabama, [380 U. S. 202 (1965)]. [Quotation omitted.]
“For the reasons stated in Swain, the motion to quash the jury was properly denied.” Id., at 560.

Then in Hughes v. State, 420 So. 2d 1060 (1982), the Mississippi Supreme Court said:

“[The victims] are white. The defendants are all black. They allege that the trial judge erred in permitting the state to exercise peremptory challenges so that no blacks sat on the jury. There is no claimed error as to the selection of the ve-nire, or as to any challenge by the state for cause. There is no merit to this assignment. Gaines v. State, 404 So. 2d 557 (Miss. 1981).” Id., at 1062.

Finally, the Mississippi Supreme Court discussed the problem in disposing of petitioner’s appeal in this case:

“After completion of the panel, the appellant requested that the record reflect all persons peremptorily excused by the State were Negroes. Later, after selection of the alternate juror, and sequestration of the jury for the night, appellant filed a motion to quash the panel on that ground. The lower court overruled the motion and the appellant now asserts it was obvious those persons were excused from the jury solely on the basis of race in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments in allowing systematic exclusion of Negroes from the jury.
“In the capital murder case of Gaines v. State, 404 So. 2d 557 (Miss. 1981), the same question was presented to this Court. Relying upon Swain v. Alabama, [380 U. S. 202 (1965)], the Court held that exercise of such challenges did not constitute error. See also Coleman v. State, 378 So. 2d 640 (Miss. 1979).” 428 So. 2d 576, 579 (1983).

Although the issue has arisen repeatedly over the past four years, the Mississippi Supreme Court has not reexamined its peremptory challenges under the State Constitution. On the contrary, the court has simply looked to the Federal Constitution, determined that Swain v. Alabama is still good law, and rejected all claims that the use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of a particular race from the jury is unconstitutional.

While this Court attends the Brandeisian experiments in a handful of state courts, criminal defendants in Mississippi and numerous other States have no legal remedy for what a majority of this Court agrees may well be a constitutional defect in the jury selection process. Under the circumstances, I cannot abide by further delay. I would grant the petition.

       The State contends that the prosecution did not peremptorily challenge all Negro jurors in the venire. According to the State, one Negro served as an alternate. The State, however, does not suggest that this juror ever actually served on the jury or participated in its decision to sentence petitioner to death.

       The only state court that has even intimated that the issue is up for reconsideration was an appellate court in New Mexico. See State v. Crespin, 94 N. M. 486, 612 P. 2d 716 (App. 1981).

       See Flowers v. State, 402 So. 2d 1088, 1093 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981); Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 530, 609 S. W. 2d 898, 903 (1980); Doepel v. United States, 434 A. 2d 449, 457-459 (D. C.), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 1037 (1981); Neil v. State, 433 So. 2d 51 (Fla. App. 1983) (question certified to Florida Supreme Court); Blackwell v. State, 248 Ga. 138, 281 S. E. 2d 599, 599-600 (1981); People v. Williams, 97 Ill. 2d 252, 454 N. E. 2d 220 (1983); State v. Stewart, 225 Kan. 410, 415-417, 591 P. 2d 166, 170-172 (1979); State v. Jones, 408 So. 2d 1285, 1290 (La. 1982); Lawrence v. State, 51 Md. App. 575, 444 A. 2d 478 (1982); Gaines v. State, 404 So. 2d 557, 560 (Miss. 1981); State v. Johnson, 616 S. W. 2d 846, 849 (Mo. App. 1981); People v. McCray, 57 N. Y. 2d. 542, 549, 443 N. E. 2d 915, 919 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U. S. 961 (1983)) State v. Lynch, 300 N. C. 534, 546-547, 268 S. E. 2d 161, 168 (1980); Lee v. State, 637 P. 2d 879, 881-882 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 497 Pa. 23, 26-34, 438 A. 2d 951, 952-956 (1981); State v. Ucero, 450 A. 2d 809, 812-813 (R. I. 1982) (exclusion based on gender); State v. Thompson, 276 S. C. 616, 624, 281 S. E. 2d 216, 220 (1981); Drew v. State, 588 S. W. 2d 562 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979); State v. Grady, 93 Wis. 2d 1, 10-11, 286 N. W. 2d 607, 611 (App. 1979). (The trend in recent state-court decisions was called to my attention by another recently filed petition. See Pet. for Cert. in Teague v. Illinois, O. T. 1983, No. 82-6981 (filed June 20, 1983), cert. denied, ante, p. 867.)

       In three of these cases, an all-white or predominantly white jury sentenced a Negro defendant to death.

       In Irving, the Mississippi Supreme Court merely paraphrased an earlier opinion and said: “[T]he State is not required to accept jurors simply because they belong to the same ethnic group as the defendant. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 .. . (1965); Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 .. . (1953).” Irving v. State, 228 So. 2d, at 270 (paraphrasing Shinall v. State, 199 So. 2d 251 (Miss.), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 1014 (1967)). In both Irving and Shinall, all-white juries sentenced Negro defendants to death.

       The State argues that we should deny the petition because petitioner claims that the trial court denied him a hearing on the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges, when in fact the trial court held a hearing on precisely this question. While the State is correct that this petition makes ambiguous references to the denial of a hearing, I interpret petitioner’s basic claim to be that the prosecutor’s actions in this case established a prima facie case of selective exclusion of jurors on the basis of race in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner argues, and I agree, that once a defendant has made out such a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the prosecution to show that its peremptory challenges were not impermissibly motivated. This claim was made at trial, and preserved on appeal. See McCray v. New York, 461 U. S. 961, 969 (1983) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).


text:
    No. 82-6960.
    Clark v. Marston et al.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Motion of respondents for damages denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-27.
    Eliasen v. Green Bay & Western Railroad Co. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondents for damages denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-156.
    Veenkant v. Blake et al.; and Veenkant v. Corsiglia et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondents Blake and Farrell for award of costs and damages denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-163.
    Syria, Director, Division of Social Services, North Carolina Department of Human Resources, et al. v. Alexander et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-167.
    Pfister v. American Airlines, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner to strike brief in opposition denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5304.
    Nickol v. Zimmerman et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 81-6908.
    No. 82-401.
    No. 82-1696.
    No. 82-6080.
    Barclay v. Florida, Rice, Director, Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control of California v. Rehner, Rasky v. City of Chicago et al., Barefoot v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections,
   463 U. S. 939;

463 U. S. 713;

462 U. S. 1119; and

463 U. S. 880. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 81-2147.
    No. 81-2188.
    Arizona et al. v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona et al.; Arizona et al. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians et al; and Montana et al. v. Northern Cheyenne Tribe of the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation et al.,
   463 U. S. 545. Petitions of Fort McDowell Mohave-Apache Indian Community et al. and San Carlos Apache Tribe et al. for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 81-2245.
    No. 81-2276.
    No. 82-38.
    Nevada v. United States et al.; Truckee-Carson Irrigation District v. United States et al.; and Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation District et al.,
   463 U. S. 110. Petition of Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 82-486.
    United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 610, AFL-CIO, et al. v. Scott et al.,
   463 U. S. 825. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.

Justice Powell would grant this motion.


text:
    No. 82-6633.
    McClain v. Orr et al.,
   462 U. S. 1136. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


author: Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    October 11, 1983
    No. 82-2151.
    Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc. v. Callahan et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice Rehnquist,

dissenting.

Appellant, Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc., signed a purchase agreement in June 1979 whereby it would acquire a six-unit apartment building located adjacent to some property it already owned. Appellant planned to demolish the building and pave over the lot to provide parking to a commercial tenant of the shopping center. Because the apartment units were rent-controlled rental housing, under the terms of Cambridge City Ordinance 926 (1979) appellant first had to obtain permission from the Cambridge Rent Control Board to remove the property from the rental housing market. Although at the time the removal permit was sought only one of the six units was occupied, the Board denied the permit.

The Superior Court for Middlesex County held that under the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Flynn v. City of Cambridge, 383 Mass. 152, 418 N. E. 2d 335 (1981), the restrictions on removing the apartments from the rental market in Cambridge imposed by Ordinance 926 were constitutional. The decision of the Superior Court was affirmed by an equally divided Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc. v. Rent Control Board of Cambridge, 388 Mass. 1051, 446 N. E. 2d 1060 (1983). I would note probable jurisdiction in this case because I believe the case presents important and difficult questions concerning the application of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, which have not been decided before by this Court. They might be postponed or avoided if the case were here on certiorari, but the case is an appeal; we act on the merits whatever we do.

The primary feature of the Cambridge rent control statute, 1976 Mass. Acts, ch. 36, is to place virtually all residential rental property in Cambridge under control of the Cambridge Rent Control Board, whose members are appellees here. Owners of rent-controlled property are also prohibited from evicting tenants without first obtaining a certificate of eviction from the Rent Control Board. The statute limits issuance of eviction certificates to circumstances where tenants have committed certain improper acts. It preserves the landlord’s right to obtain a certificate of eviction to recover possession of the property only for occupancy by the owner or certain of his family members, or if the property is to be removed from the housing market through demolition or otherwise.

Although the state enabling statute preserves in limited fashion a landlord’s traditional right to evict a tenant in order to occupy a rental unit personally, Cambridge City Ordinance 926 eliminated the landlord’s right to evict a tenant save when the Rent Control Board first issues a “removal” permit. Ordinance 926 delegates virtually unfettered discretion to the Board to determine whether to grant a removal permit. The Board may consider the benefits of denying removal to the tenants protected by rent control, the hardship upon existing tenants of the units sought to be removed, and the effect of removal on the proclaimed housing shortage in Cambridge. Nowhere does the ordinance suggest that these considerations be balanced against the landlord’s right to put his property to other uses. In short, Ordinance 926 permits denying a “removal” permit in any situation.

The combined effect of the limitations imposed by the state enabling statute and Ordinance 926 is to deny appellant use of his property. Appellant, as a corporate entity, simply cannot occupy the remaining apartment for personal use. In effect, then, the Rent Control Board has determined that until the remaining tenant decides to leave, appellant will be unable to vacate and demolish the building. In my view this deprives appellant of the use of its property in a manner closely analogous to a permanent physical invasion, like that involved in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419 (1982). In Teleprompter we were presented with the question whether a New York law that authorized a cable television company to install cable facilities on other persons’ property without permission or effective compensation constituted a taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Though the physical invasion was minor, we “conclude[d] that a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve.” Id., at 426. We called a permanent physical occupation of another’s property “the most serious form of invasion of an owner’s property interest.” Id., at 485.

As the Cambridge ordinance operates in this case, I fail to see how it works anything but a physical occupation of appellant’s property. First, appellant’s right to evict the tenant was limited by state law to two circumstances: occupation of the rental unit by the owner or certain members of his family, or demolition. The first of these rights is not available to appellant. The second, demolition, is controlled by Cambridge Ordinance 926, and under the administration of that ordinance by the Cambridge Rent Control Board, appellant has been denied the right to remove the unit from the housing market by demolition. It is not certain whether the Rent Control Board would, if the tenant decided to leave, determine that a demolition permit should issue, but it is clear that until the tenant decides to leave of his own volition, appellant is unable to possess the property.

There is little to distinguish this case from the situation confronting the Court in Teleprompter. As in Teleprompter, the power to end or terminate the physical invasion is under the control of a private party. As in New York, the Massachusetts Legislature can alter the rent control statute to provide appellant with some other means of restoring control of his property. But neither of these factors moved the Court away from its holding in Teleprompter that the physical invasion amounted to a taking. I must conclude, as the Court did in Teleprompter, that Ordinance 926 has effected a permanent physical invasion of appellant’s property.

It might also be argued that the rent control provisions are justified by the emergency housing shortage in Cambridge, but the very fact that there is no foreseeable end to the emergency takes this case outside the Court’s holding in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921). At issue in Block was the constitutionality of a rent control statute enacted by Congress to regulate rents and rental practices in the District of Columbia. Like the rent control practices employed in Cambridge, the regulations disputed in Block fixed rents and denied the landlord the right to evict a tenant except to allow the owner or a member of his family to occupy the unit. We held the rent control statute constitutional because it was enacted to deal with a wartime emergency housing shortage. We noted that “[a] limit in time, to tide over a passing trouble, may well justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent change.” Id., at 157. Thus, although we upheld a regulatory scheme in Block that is remarkably similar to that presently in force in the city of Cambridge, we reserved judgment as to whether such a regulatory scheme would be constitutional if it were made part of a permanent scheme. The Cambridge rent control ordinance presents the question thus reserved.

The provision in the Massachusetts statute ensuring a fair net operating income to the landlord does not change the result that should attend this case. In previous decisions we have recognized that property ownership carries with it a bundle of rights, including the right “‘to possess, use and dispose of it.’” Teleprompter, supra, at 435 (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 378 (1945)). Though no issue is raised here that the rent paid by the tenant is insufficient, that fact does not end the inquiry. What has taken place is a transfer of control over the reversionary interest retained by appellant. This power to exclude is “one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights [,because] even though the owner may retain the bare legal right to dispose of the occupied space by transfer or sale, the permanent occupation of that space by a stranger would ordinarily empty the right of any value, since the purchaser will also be unable to make any use of the property.” Teleprompter, supra, at 435-436. Cf. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 517 (1944) (constitutional wartime rent control did not require owner to offer accommodations for rent). Nothing in the rent control provisions requires the Board to compensate appellant for the loss of control over the use of its property.


text:
    No. 83-101.
    Iowans for Tax Relief et al. v. Campaign Finance Disclosure Commission et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Iowa dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 83-303.
    Maniates v. City of Lynchburg et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Va. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 83-5253.
    Ostrowski v. City of Joliet, Illinois.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 82-1739.
    Fundacion Educativa Ana G. Mendez et al. v. Suarez et al.
   Sup. Ct. P. R. Motion of respondents Berta Gallego et al. for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Operating Engineers v. Jones, 460 U. S. 669 (1983). Reported below: - P. R. R. -.


text:
    No.-.
    P Stone, Inc. v. Koppers Co., Inc., et al.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file the petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied.


author: Justice Stevens, Justice Brennan,

text:
    No. A-145.
    Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Lopez et al.
   D. C. C. D. Cal. Motion of respondents to vacate the stay entered by Justice Rehnquist on September 9, 1983 [463 U. S. 1328], denied.

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Blackmun joins,

dissenting in part.

The Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) has taken the position that she may, at any time, terminate the payment of disability benefits to persons who have previously been found to be disabled and entitled to benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act notwithstanding the complete absence of evidence that the recipient’s medical condition has improved. In maintaining this position, the Secretary refused to follow the settled law in the Ninth Circuit, which requires her to adduce some evidence of medical improvement before terminating disability benefits. See Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F. 2d 582 (1982); Finnegan v. Matthews, 641 F. 2d 1340 (1981). Nevertheless, for the purposes of the stay application under review, the Secretary assumes that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the law is correct. Her stay application was predicated entirely on procedural grounds. A review of the procedural history of the case is therefore necessary.

Respondents filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California challenging the Secretary’s policy. On June 16, 1983, the District Court entered an injunction requiring the Secretary to comply with the law of the Ninth Circuit with respect to recipients of disability benefits who reside in that Circuit. The only portion of the District Court’s injunction presently at issue in this Court is ¶ 4(c), which applies to all persons whose disability benefits have been terminated since August 30, 1981 (or August 25, 1980, in the case of recipients who were “grandfathered” into the federal program from state disability programs). Paragraph 4(c) enjoins the Secretary to notify all such persons that they may reapply for benefits, and upon reapplication, to reinstate their benefits pending a termination hearing at which the Secretary must produce some evidence of medical improvement. It is this portion of the District Court’s injunction which Justice Rehnquist, acting as Circuit Justice, stayed pending the Secretary’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit. 463 U. S. 1328 (1983).

Today the Court declines to vacate the stay entered by Justice Rehnquist. Of course, in considering a motion of this kind, substantial deference must be paid to the judgment of the Circuit Justice. See Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U. S. 273, 286-287 (1953). The Circuit Justice’s decision should not be disturbed simply because the other Members of the Court would have declined to grant the stay as an original matter. Nonetheless, there are cases in which reexamination is proper, see id., at 287-288; I am persuaded that this is such a case.

In Justice Rehnquist’s view, the District Court’s injunction extended to persons over whom the District Court had no jurisdiction. That conclusion does not, however, justify a stay of the injunction to the extent that it granted relief to persons over whom the District Court does have jurisdiction. Moreover, the extent of the overbreadth is less than Justice Rehnquist assumed when he was persuaded to enter his stay.

The jurisdiction of the District Court over this action was based on 49 Stat. 624, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §405(g) (1976 ed., Supp. V), which provides in pertinent part:

“Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Secretary may allow.”

Under the statute, persons whose benefits have been terminated must seek judicial review of their termination within 60 days of a “final decision” of the Secretary. It is my understanding that this class action was filed on February 4, 1983, and that the class certified by the District Court includes persons who were entitled to seek judicial review of an adverse final decision by the Secretary more than 60 days before February 4, 1983 (December 6, 1982), but who failed to do so. As I understand ¶ 4(c) of the injunction entered by the District Court, it grants relief to class members over whom the District Court had no jurisdiction — specifically, to class members who had received “final decisions” from the Secretary more than 60 days prior to February 4, 1983, and who had not timely sought judicial review. To the extent that the stay entered by Justice Rehnquist applies to such persons, I agree that it was properly entered. These persons’ right to seek administrative or judicial review of their termination decisions had expired, and they could obtain benefits only by requests ing that the Secretary reopen their cases. However, the District Court had no jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s refusal to reopen these cases. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99 (1977). Hence, the District Court had no jurisdiction over these persons and should not have granted them relief, see Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 701, 704 (1979); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 71, n. 3 (1976).

I believe, however, that the motion to vacate the stay should be granted insofar as it applies to persons who sought judicial review of a termination of their benefits ordered by the Secretary on or after December 6, 1982, and persons whose right to administrative review of that termination had not expired before December 6, 1982. As to these persons, I believe both the waivable and nonwaivable elements of 42 U. S. C. §405(g) (1976 ed., Supp. V) were satisfied; hence the District Court had jurisdiction to enter injunctive relief.

The nonwaivable exhaustion requirement is simply the requirement that the Secretary have made some sort of decision on a claim for benefits. “The nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary. Absent such a claim there can be no ‘decision’ of any type. And some decision by the Secretary is clearly required by the statute.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 328 (1976). As I understand the submissions of the parties, every class member had returned a questionnaire distributed by the Secretary and had thereby indicated in writing that he or she was still disabled and desired benefits. Thus, all of them had made adequate claims to continued benefits. Their benefits were terminated on the basis of a regulation that is assumed for the purpose of this proceeding to be invalid. In terminating benefits after receiving these questionnaires, it cannot be doubted that the Secretary knew these individuals claimed an entitlement to continue to receive disability benefits or that she then, by terminating their benefits, made a “decision” on the merits of their claims. That is all the non-waivable element of the statute requires. As the Court expressly held in Eldridge, “§ 405(g) requires only that there be a ‘final decision’ by the Secretary with respect to the claim of entitlement to benefits.” Id., at 329 (emphasis supplied). In fact, the questionnaires returned by these respondents made the same claim and received the same decision that was held sufficient to satisfy the statute in Mathews v. Eldridge.

Mathews v. Eldridge also makes it clear that the waivable element of the statute has been satisfied. As was true in that case, further administrative review might have enabled a claimant to recover retroactive benefits but could not have vindicated the right to have correct procedures followed before the request for continued benefits was denied. As I understand respondents’ position on the merits, they assert that a recipient need not respond at all to a claim that he or she is no longer disabled unless the Secretary first comes forward with some evidence that his or her condition has improved. There is no way that right can be vindicated in the administrative process — the Secretary has already taken a firm position on the issue which the administrative judges are not free to ignore. Even if the recipient is ultimately determined to be eligible for benefits for some other reason, the administrative process cannot vindicate the right asserted in this litigation, and hence further exhaustion of administrative remedies as to the claim made in this case is unnecessary. Eldridge, supra, at 330-332. When exhaustion is futile, this element may be deemed waived even over the Secretary’s objection. Mathews v. Diaz, supra, at 75-77; see also Eldridge, supra, at 328, 330. I agree with Justice Rehnquist that respondents’ contention that their claim is a “constitutional” one should be disregarded, but it should make no difference whether plaintiffs’ claim is based on the statute or the Constitution. Even as to a statutory claim which could not be sustained on administrative review, “further exhaustion would not merely be futile for the applicant, but would also be a commitment of administrative resources unsupported by any administrative or judicial interest.” Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 765-766 (1975). Congress could not have intended such a result.

In reaching this conclusion, I express no opinion on the merits of the underlying controversy because the Secretary has assumed, for the purpose of our consideration of the stay application, that the Ninth Circuit’s requirement that the Secretary produce some evidence of medical improvement is sound.

Of course, in considering the motion to vacate the stay, it is also essential to balance the equities. However, as Justice Rehnquist recognized, the equities in this case strongly favor respondents, who are elderly, sick, or disabled persons to whom disability benefits may be crucial. Moreover, as Justice Rehnquist also recognized, this is a stay pending appeal to the Court of Appeals rather than a stay pending disposition of a petition for certiorari to this Court, and in such a case the granting of a stay by a Circuit Justice should be extremely rare and great deference should be shown to the judgment of the Court of Appeals. When these factors are also considered, I am compelled to conclude that the stay entered, by Justice Rehnquist should be modified.

In summary, I would grant the motion to vacate the stay insofar as it relates to those class members (a) whose benefits were terminated on or after December 6, 1982, as well as (b) those whose right to seek administrative review of the termination of their benefits had not expired as of December 6, 1982. To the extent that the Court declines to modify the stay in this fashion, I respectfully dissent.

Justice Brennan,

with whom Justice Marshall joins,

dissenting.

Before the Court is an emergency motion to vacate a stay granted by Justice Rehnquist pending appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 468 U. S. 1328 (1983). In my view, the merits of the underlying jurisdictional issues are far from certain, while the equities clearly favor the class of recipients whose disability benefits have been terminated. I would therefore vacate the stay.

The stay is specifically directed at ¶4(0 of a preliminary injunction issued by the District Court, which would have required that the Secretary reinstate the disability benefits of any applicant who requests such reinstatement in response to a notice already distributed by the Secretary. The stayed portions of the injunction also would have allowed the Secretary to terminate these benefits, after subsequent hearings, but only if the Secretary properly applied prior decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit when conducting those hearings. See Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F. 2d 582 (1982), and Finnegan v. Matthews, 641 F. 2d 1340 (1981) (in hearings to terminate disability benefits on the ground that the recipient is no longer disabled, the Secretary has burden of producing evidence of an improvement in medical condition). Thus, the question presented by the motion to vacate Justice Rehnquist’s stay is whether the payment of interim benefits to approximately 30,000 disabled individuals whose Social Security benefits have been terminated by the Secretary should be continued pending final decision on the merits by the Court of Appeals.

The standard traditionally applied by a Circuit Justice when considering a stay application is whether there is a reasonable probability that four Justices would vote to grant certiorari, whether there is a fair prospect that a majority of the Court would conclude that the decision below was erroneous, and whether a balancing of the equities suggests that a stay should or should not be granted. See Gregory-Portland Independent School District v. United States, 448 U. S. 1342 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers); Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U. S. 1306, 1308 (1980) (Brennan, J., in chambers). Included within this last criterion, of course, is consideration of whether the applicant has demonstrated that irreparable harm is likely to result from the denial of the stay. Moreover, given the respect that is accorded interlocutory decisions of the lower federal courts, a stay application to a Circuit Justice on a matter still pending before a court of appeals, and on which the lower courts have already denied an interim stay, should be granted only in the most extraordinary cases. See O’Rourke v. Levine, 80 S. Ct. 623, 624, 4 L. Ed. 2d 615, 616 (1960) (Harlan, J., in chambers).

Justice Rehnquist accepted the conclusion of the lower court that the “balance of hardships tips sharply toward the [recipients].” He nonetheless granted the stay because he was of the view that the likelihood that the Secretary would prevail on the various jurisdictional issues raised negates giving controlling consideration to the irreparable harm caused by the stay. I am not as optimistic, however, about the prospects for success on the merits of the Secretary’s claims, and therefore I find the overwhelming hardships imposed on the recipients to be determinative.

For purposes of the present motion, I accept Justice Rehnquist’s conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that issues relating to the proper scope of the injunction issued by the District Court would garner enough votes for plenary consideration by the Court. I do not agree, however, that there is a fair prospect of success on the merits of these claims such that the Court ultimately would vacate or substantially amend the injunction issued by the District Court. When refusing to issue a stay pending appeal, the Court of Appeals filed a lengthy opinion clearly explaining why the beneficiaries in this case satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of 42 U. S. C. §§ 405(g), 405(h) (1976 ed. and Supp. V). 713 F. 2d 1432 (1983). Specifically, the court concluded (1) that termination of benefits by the Secretary satisfies the nonwaivable requirement that recipients first present a claim to the Secretary, see, e. g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 328-330 (1976); Wilson v. Edelman, 542 F. 2d 1260, 1270-1271 (CA7 1976); (2) that the waivable requirement of a final decision by the Secretary has been met because regulations made exhaustion of administrative remedies futile or, alternatively, because exhaustion of the recipients’ constitutional claim is not required, see, e. g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 75-77 (1976); and (3) that the requirement that appeals be filed within 60 days of the Secretary’s decision has been waived by the Secretary due to her failure to raise the issue before the District Court. Although after plenary consideration I might agree with much of Justice Stevens’ analysis, I do not believe it is necessary at this time to provide further support for the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals. Suffice it to say that, largely for the reasons stated by that court’s opinion, and for the reasons specified by the large body of case law to which that opinion referred, I am far from convinced that the injunction issued by the District Court was jurisdictionally barred. See also Kuehner v. Sehweiker, No. 82-1514 (CA3 Sept. 19, 1983). Indeed, even if, as Justice Stevens suggests, one or more of these holdings eventually proves erroneous and thereby eliminates jurisdiction over some members of the class, it is indisputable that many remaining recipients have properly presented their claims to the District Court. Accordingly, the probability of success on the merits is clearly not as certain as Justice Rehnquist has suggested.

Nor does the alleged judicial interference in the administrative process, which Justice Rehnquist’s opinion emphasized, add to the likely success of the Secretary’s appeal. In the situation presented by this motion, it is clear to me that it is the Secretary who has not paid due respect to a coordinate branch of Government by expressly refusing to implement the binding decisions of the Ninth Circuit. This is, indeed, the essence of the recipients’ constitutional allegation of nonacquiescence on the part of the Secretary.

At most, therefore, the likelihood of success on the merits is very much in doubt. Therefore, when considering whether or not to grant a stay pending appeal, this factor cannot by itself dictate the result. Rather, it becomes necessary to balance the equities; and, in my view, the overwhelming evidence of irreparable harm that accompanies any termination of disability benefits should be the determinative factor in this emergency application.

As noted, on this consideration Justice Rehnquist accepted the lower courts’ assessment of the comparative harms. I agree. Indeed, as the courts below correctly concluded, termination of the benefits in this case has caused “deprivation of fife’s necessities, further illness, or even death from the very disabilities that the Secretary deemed [the class members] not to have.” Any financial or administrative inconvenience suffered by the Secretary cannot outweigh, or even approach, the human suffering that has been imposed on those disabled recipients of Social Security benefits who have been wrongfully terminated. And as the courts below noted, the potential payment of retroactive benefits after final decision in this case will do little to compensate the recipients for their current deprivations.

In sum, there is little question in my mind that the extraordinary circumstances necessary to stay the decision of the lower court cannot be found in this case. Accordingly, I would grant the emergency motion to vacate the stay, and allow the ordinary appeals process to proceed.

       Once the Secretary meets her burden of production, the burden of proof is on the recipient to prove he or she remains disabled.

       With respect to the nonwaivable requirement, the Eldridge Court wrote: “Eldridge has fulfilled this crucial prerequisite. Through his answers to the state agency questionnaire, and his letter in response to the tentative determination that his disability had ceased, he specifically presented the claim that his benefits should not be terminated because he was still disabled. This claim was denied by the state agency and its decision was accepted by the [Secretary].” 424 U. S., at 329.
      All the members of the respondent class answered a questionnaire substantially identical to the one Eldridge answered, indicating that they believed they were still disabled and entitled to benefits. Thus, each class member specifically presented a “claim.” The only difference between this case and Eldridge’s is that in response to the letter informing Eldridge that he would be terminated and requesting any additional evidence Eldridge might choose to submit, Eldridge wrote a letter. Some unidentified percentage of the respondent class presumably also wrote letters similar to this one, and in any event the Secretary does not rely on the absence of a letter to distinguish this case from Eldridge. Moreover, Eldridge’s letter hardly added to the “claim” he had already presented. In fact the letter did little more than state that Eldridge believed the Secretary already had enough evidence to decide the case. See id., at 324; App. in Mathews v. Eldridge, O. T. 1974, No. 74-204, pp. 13-14. This letter was hardly a new “claim”; Eldridge’s “claim” which satisfied the nonwaivable element of the statute had already been made.

       “It is unrealistic to expect that the Secretary would consider substantial changes in the current administrative review system at the behest of a single aid recipient... in an adjudicatory context.” 424 U. S., at 330.

       It is not clear that the Secretary disagrees with my view. In her memorandum opposing respondents’ application to vacate the stay, she accepts the propriety of the District Court’s injunction as to persons that have exhausted their administrative remedies within 60 days of the filing of this action, and argues, correctly in my view, that the stay was proper as to persons whose right to review had expired more than 60 days before the filing of the suit. She goes on to argue only that the injunction should not apply to persons who are still pursuing their administrative remedies at this time. She does not explicitly quarrel with my conclusion that the District Court’s injunction was proper as to all other persons whose right to seek administrative review had not expired as of December 6, 1982. Therefore, it appears that my only difference with the Secretary is that I would not require persons currently seeking administrative review to exhaust what is a futile remedy.


text:
    No. A-207.
    Brimm v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice O’Connor and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 8,
    Orig.
    Arizona v. California et al.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 462 U. S. 1146.]
   Motion for comments on the proposed decrees submitted by the State parties and the Solicitor General is granted, and the parties are allowed until November 10, 1983, within which to file comments.

Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this order.


text:
    No. 86,
    Orig.
    Louisiana v. Mississippi et al.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 463 U. S. 1204.]
   Exceptions to the Report of the Special Master are set for oral argument in due course.


text:
    No. 94,
    Orig.
    South Carolina v. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 807.]
   Motion of the City of Baltimore et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 81-757.
    No. 81-970.
    Allen v. Wright et al.; and Regan, Secretary of the Treasury, et al. v. Wright et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 462 U. S. 1130.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 82-687.
    United States v. Arthur Young & Co. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 1199.] Motion of Arthur Andersen & Co. et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae, for divided argument, and for additional time for oral argument denied. Motion of respondents for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 82-708.
    Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Commission et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. [Certiorari granted, 460 U. S. 1036.] Motion of National Audubon Society et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-963.
    Massachusetts v. Sheppard.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. [Certiorari granted, 463 U. S. 1205.] Motion of Florida for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae, for divided argument, and for additional time for oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 82-898.
    No. 82-977.
    Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight et al.; and Minnesota Community College Faculty Assn. et al. v. Knight et al.
   D. C. Minn. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 460 U. S. 1050.] Motion of appellants in No. 82-977 to strike appellees’ brief denied.


text:
    No. 82-945.
    Sure-Tan, Inc., et al. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 460 U. S. 1021.] Motion of United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO, for leave to file a supplemental brief as amicus curiae denied. Motions of American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations and California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 82-1047.
    United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 459 U. S. 1199.] Motion of Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 82-1186.
    No. 82-1465.
    Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp. et al.; and Franklin Mint Corp. et al. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 462 U. S. 1118.] Motion of Mark Hammerschlag and Ellen Van Fleet for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae and for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 82-1771.
    United States v. Leon et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 463 U. S. 1206.] Motion of respondents for divided argument granted. Motion of respondents for additional time for oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 83-380.
    In re Waters.
   Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 83-5251.
    In re Banks et al.
   Petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 83-196.
    Ruckelshaus, Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency v. Monsanto Co.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Mo. Probable jurisdiction noted. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 82-2113.
    Richardson v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-1608.
    South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. LeResche, Commissioner, Department of Natural Resources of Alaska, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Pacific Rim Trade Association et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 83-1.
    Koehler, Warden v. Engle.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-1762.
    Trustees of Rex Hospital et al. v. Hospital Building Co.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1879.
    Rousseau v. Nix.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1895.
    Krebs v. Krebs.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1961.
    Schiavoni, aka Fomage v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-1984.
    Smith v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-2040.
    Thomas v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-2072.
    In re Hiss.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6710.
    Keenan v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6722.
    Draper v. Department of Corrections et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6749.
    Holloway v. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6763.
    Brown v. Republic Steel Corp.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6764.
    Wilford v. Jago.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6823.
    McDaniel v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6832.
    Jones v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6909.
    Bashlor v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-6969.
    Veteto v. Warden, United States Penitentiary.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-21.
    No. 83-32.
    No. 83-217.
    American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. MCI Communications Corp. et al.; MCI Communications Corp. et al. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.; and American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. MCI Communications Corp. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 708 F. 2d 1081.


text:
    No. 83-30.
    Bagby et al. v. Vance et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-50.
    Grolier Inc. et al. v. Federal Trade Commission.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-55.
    Armilio v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-59.
    American International Coal Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-66.
    No. 83-254.
    Coloma Community School District v. Berry et al.; and Fellner et al. v. Berry et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 698 F. 2d 813.


text:
    No. 83-75.
    Saavedra, Individually, and dba Saagan Moving & Storage Co. v. Donovan, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-84.
    Balk v. United States International Communication Agency et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-107.
    Committee for an Independent P-I et al. v. Smith, Attorney General of the United States, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-109.
    First Arabian Corp., S.A. v. Pharaon.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-116.
    Shaheed v. Adam Metal & Supply Co. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-125.
    Penntech Papers, Inc., et al. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-127.
    Hammerhead Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. Brezenoff et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-152.
    Karapinka v. Union Carbide Corp. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-178.
    Western Company of North America v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-188.
    Olsen et al. v. CBS Musical Instruments, a Division of Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-202.
    City of Columbia, Missouri v. Paul N. Howard Co. et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-210.
    Ivey et al. v. Fisher.
   Super. Ct. Ga., Cherokee County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-211.
    Lowry et al. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-212.
    Wynn Oil Co. v. Southern Union Exploration Company of Texas.
   Ct. App. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-214.
    One Parcel of Land in Montgomery County, Maryland, et al. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-215.
    Bridges v. Cape Publications, Inc., et al.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-220.
    Nations et ux. v. Sun Oil Co. (Delaware) et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-221.
    Mestre, Personal Representative of the Estate of Mestre v. Pitney Bowes, Inc.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-223.
    Duggan v. Berdin.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-224.
    Adams Central School District No. 090 et al. v. Deist et al.
   Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-230.
    Guard et al. v. Kilburn.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-231.
    Burrell et al. v. County of Sacramento, California, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-232.
    Georgia State Board of Naturopathic Examiners et al. v. Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-237.
    M. W. Zack Metal Co., Inc. v. London Steamship Mutual Insurance Assn., Ltd., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-239.
    Crawford v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-241.
    Olson Motor Co. et al. v. General Motors Corp. et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-246.
    Mackey v. Graham, State Auditor of Washington, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-248.
    New England Toyota Distributor, Inc. v. Jay Edwards, Inc.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-249.
    Everitt et al. v. City of Marshall, Texas, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-250.
    Gibson v. Utah.
   Sup. Ct. Utah. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-261.
    Gable et al. v. Sames et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-262.
    Cheechako Leasing Co. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-267.
    Brownfield v. City of Laguna Beach et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-268.
    Michelin Tire Corp., Commercial Division v. Bostick Oil Co., Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-269.
    Segrest v. Segrest.
   Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-274.
    Adams v. City of Shepherdsville et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-281.
    Thompson v. Thompson.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-304.
    Landy v. Federal Aviation Administration et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-309.
    Duncan v. Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-312.
    Corricelli v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-313.
    Little v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-316.
    Leone et al. v. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co.,
   S.A. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-318.
    LaMaina et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-326.
    Resnick v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-327.
    Halsell v. Local Union No. 5, Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-335.
    American Jewish Congress v. United States Department of the Treasury.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-350.
    International Studio Apartment Assn., Inc., et al. v. Lockwood, Clerk of the Circuit Court, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, et al.
   Dist. Ct. App. Flá., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-360.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-364.
    Hardin et al. v. Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-369.
    Udofot v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-370.
    Duffell v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-375.
    Zinman v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-393.
    Casoria v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-404.
    Simmerson v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5039.
    Davis v. Weldon et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5147.
    Graham v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5221.
    Plain v. City of Baton Rouge.
   19th Jud. Dist. Ct. La., East Baton Rouge Parish. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5222.
    Laing v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5226.
    Holguin v. Raines, Superintendent, Arizona State Prison.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5229.
    McKinon v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5237.
    Bachner v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5238.
    Harris v. Hayes et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5240.
    Faison v. Thornton et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5241.
    Guyton v. Ricketts, Director, Colorado Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5243.
    Thompson v. Steele et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5244.
    Tucker v. London Gold Exchange.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5245.
    Adams v. Barnes et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5249.
    Floyd v. Allen, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5262.
    Coats v. Allsbrook, Superintendent, Odom Complex, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5265.
    Brady v. Mintzes, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5268.
    Holder v. Stephenson, Superintendent, North Carolina Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5271.
    Parez v. City and County of San Diego et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5275.
    Spriggs v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5277.
    Fears v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5279.
    Attwell et al. v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5281.
    Knighten v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5284.
    Cauley v. Henderson, Superintendent, Auburn Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5285.
    Harris v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5288.
    Billups v. Massachusetts.
   Ct. App. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5292.
    Williams v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5294.
    Fields v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5295.
    Billiot et al. v. Duncan Crew Boat Rentals, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5299.
    Flores et al. v. Aranguren.
   Dist. Ct. Union County, N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5301.
    Dugar v. Abrams et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5315.
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5318.
    Ehnes v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5321.
    Maxcy v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5323.
    Crouch v. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5325.
    Baxter v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5327.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5328.
    Frankel v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5331.
    Cascante-Bernitta v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5333.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5337.
    Muhammad v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5345.
    Shackelford v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5353.
    Patel v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5355.
    Minye v. University of Michigan et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5356.
    Moore v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5359.
    D’Alleman, aka Murcia v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5372.
    Malloy v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5373.
    Martin et al. v. California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5380.
    Smith v. Lucas, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5381.
    Van Almen v. Marshall, Superintendent, Southern Ohio Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5407.
    DeVincent v. Verdeyen, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5412.
    Culver v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.