text:
    No. 80-415.
    No. 80-1239.
    Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. v. Gibbons, Trustee, et al. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. v. Gibbons, Trustee, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ill.; and

Appeal from C. A. 7th Cir. In No. 80-415, further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits. In No. 80-1239, probable jurisdiction noted. Cases consolidated and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. In the course of briefing the questions presented in these cases, the parties are requested to address whether the issue of the constitutionality of sections 106 and 110 of the Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act, as modified by section 701 of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1959, 45 U. S. C. §§ 1005 and 1008 (1976 ed., Supp. IV), is properly before us. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 65(a)(2). Reported below: No. 80-1239, 645 F. 2d 74.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 80-6298.
    Mills v. Habluetzel.
   Appeal from Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 13th Sup. Jud. Dist. Motion of appellant for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 80-1436.
    Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce, et al. v. Shapiro, Essex County Executive.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 80-980.
    Michienzi et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-966.
    Smith v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Receiver.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1154.
    Hayward et al. v. Procunier et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1176.
    Block v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1244.
    Alessi v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1248.
    Briguglio v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1262.
    Supreme Optical Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1286.
    F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Fell et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1295.
    Cornet Stores et al. v. Buchanan et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1296.
    Southern California Financial Corp. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1310.
    Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1326.
    Sanders v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1342.
    Bassett et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1375.
    Alvarez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1423.
    Assarsson v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1445.
    Hearst v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1446.
    Lavin v. Committee of Bar Examiners of the State Bar of California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1451.
    Robbins & Myers, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1468.
    Battelstein et al. v. Internal Revenue Service.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1470.
    Pennington et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1472.
    Houston v. Benttree, Ltd.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1485.
    Lohman v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1487.
    Harvey v. Connor.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1488.
    Parks et al. v. Alexander, Governor of Tennessee, et al.
   Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1489.
    Coyne et al. v. City of Cincinnati.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1490.
    Workman v. Oregon.
   Ct. App. Ore. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1495.
    California v. Austin.
   App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1505.
    Rancho La Costa v. County of San Diego.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1524.
    Tiffany, dba Patricia Ann’s Country Store v. County of Albemarle, Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1559.
    Zeller v. Rankin.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1636.
    Maio v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5660.
    Miller v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6009.
    Rogers v. Britton et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6025.
    Soap v. Carter et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6031.
    Abell v. Missouri.
   Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6059.
    Mitchell et al. v. Superior Court for the County of Santa Clara, California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6107.
    Nelson v. McCarthy, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6135.
    Isble v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6146.
    Tsosie v. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6258.
    Drucker v. Securities and Exchange Commission et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6265.
    Christie v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6282.
    Harrington v. Jago, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6284.
    Heirens v. Mizell, Warden, et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6288.
    Portela v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6289.
    Wexler v. Lower Moreland Township Police Department et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6295.
    Lightcsy v. Sumner, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6296.
    Kickasola, Administratrix v. Jim Wallace Oil Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6297.
    Coda v. Pennsylvania.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6300.
    John v. Joseph.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6305.
    Truppi v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6308.
    Weddell v. Meierhenry, Attorney General of South Dakota.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6310.
    Gamble v. Jones, Sheriff, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6312.
    Holland v. Richtmyer.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6370.
    No. 80-6420.
    Garcia-Yepes v. United States; and Delos-Rios v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 642 F. 2d 42.


text:
    No. 80-6376.
    Scanlon v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6391.
    Mar v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6396.
    Blair v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6402.
    Robles-Sandoval v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6404.
    Fox v. Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6407.
    Gaffney v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6413.
    Miller v. United States.
   C. A. Sth Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6424.
    Hubbard v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6428.
    Heimerle v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice White,

text:
    No. 80-500.
    Newell Bridge & Railway Co. v. Dailey, State Tax Commissioner of West Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Blackmun joins,

dissenting.

Petitioner is a West Virginia corporation. Its pays West Virginia property, capital stock, and income taxes. Petitioner’s sole business is the operation and maintenance of a toll bridge across the Ohio River. The bridge spans the river between Newell, W. Va., and East Liverpool, Ohio. Two-thirds of the bridge is within West Virginia and one-third is within Ohio. The bridge has only one entrance and exit in each State and carries an equal volume of traffic in both directions. There is a single tollbooth, located on the Ohio side.

The West Virginia Business and Occupation Tax, W. Va. Code § 11-13-2 (1974), imposes an annual privilege tax on persons, including corporations, measured by gross receipts. The statute, however, specifically exempts “gross income de-drived from commerce between this State and other states of the United States . . . .” § ll-13-2d. Since 1933, petitioner has regularly reported all tolls collected in its operation of the bridge, but has claimed that this income falls within the exemption for income received from interstate commerce.

In January 1974, respondent assessed the corporation $83,000 in unpaid taxes, representing the tax due on the tolls received between 1968 and 1972. Petitioner appealed this assessment and Avon a reversal. That decision, however, was subsequently reversed, and the tax reinstated, by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

That court held that the exemption for gross income derived from commerce between West Virginia and other States is identical in scope to the federal Interstate Commerce Clause: “If revenues from bridges are not covered by the federal constitution’s commerce clause, they are not excepted from the statute.” — W. Va. -, -, 266 S. E. 2d 463, 454 (1980). To determine the scope of the federal Commerce Clause, the court relied on two prior decisions of this Court: Henderson Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 150 (1897), and Detroit International Bridge Co. v. Corporation Tax Appeal Board, 294 U. S. 83 (1935). In Henderson Bridge, the Court upheld a Kentucky tax on the intangible property of a Kentucky corporation, the business of which was the operation of a railroad bridge over the Ohio River between the Kentucky and Indiana shores. The West Virginia court relied on the following language from that opinion:

“Clearly the tax was not a tax on the interstate business carried on over or by means of the bridge, because the bridge company did not transact such business. That business was carried on by the persons and corporations which paid the bridge company tolls for the privilege of using the bridge.” 166 U. S., at 153-154.

In Detroit International Bridge Co., the Court specifically relied on the above language to reach a similar conclusion. 294 U. S., at 86. It upheld a state tax on a state corporation, the sole business of which was to operate and maintain a toll bridge across the Detroit River, from Detroit, Mich., to Ontario, Canada. In both cases, the Court held that the bridge itself was an “instrumentality which others may use in conducting foreign commerce,” id., at 85, but that operation of the bridge was not itself interstate commerce.

The West Virginia court correctly noted that “Hender son ... is still good law having never been overruled.” - W. Va., at -, 266 S. E. 2d, at 456. In my view, however, it is time that this Court took a new look at Henderson and Detroit International Bridge Co. to consider whether they are consistent with this Court's more recent treatment of the effect of the Interstate Commerce Clause on the power of the States to impose taxes.

The Court has dealt with other fixed facilities as "instru-mentalities” of interstate commerce and treated their operation as interstate commerce. In Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U. S. 100 (1975), the Court assumed that a corporation that owned and operated an interstate pipeline linking the oil refining complexes of Texas and Louisiana with the population centers of the Northeast and Southeast was engaged in interstate commerce. See also Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U. S. 157 (1954). It is not at all clear that a pipeline is distinguishable from a bridge as an instrumentality of interstate commerce.

Furthermore it is arguable that the Court's conclusion in Henderson, subsequently followed in Detroit International Bridge Co., that operation of an interstate bridge is not interstate commerce was not necessary to support the result reached there. Kentucky had excluded tangible and intangible property located in Indiana from its tax: “The tax in controversy was nothing more than a tax on the intangible property of the company in Kentucky.” 166 U. S., at 154. Petitioner argues that the case “involved in reality a de facto apportionment to property within the state.” Pet. for Cert. 16. More importantly, under today's standards it would be unnecessary to exclude an interstate bridge from the interstate commerce field to sustain the Kentucky tax involved in the Henderson case. Under Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977), a state tax on a corporation will be sustained if there is a substantial nexus between its operations and the taxing State, and if the tax is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State. Under this test, it makes no difference whether operation of an interstate bridge is considered “interstate commerce.” Although the Kentucky tax probably would have been upheld under this test, the West Virginia tax involved in the case before us now is an unapportioned tax and would probably not satisfy the test. This creates an incongruous situation: The West Virginia court relied on Henderson’s reasoning, which may never have been, and in any case is not now, necessary to support the conclusion it was designed to reach, to support another conclusion that might not otherwise survive under contemporary standards.

Accordingly, I think this case should be given plenary consideration, and therefore I dissent from denial of certiorari.


text:
    No. 80-1032.
    Gartner v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Stewart would grant certiorari.


author: Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    No. 80-1258.
    Markham et al. v. Geller.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Rehnquist,

dissenting.

This case presents the question whether a school board may enact a policy which, for budgetary reasons, favors the hiring of less experienced teachers. Because I think the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit erred in holding that such a policy violates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq., I dissent from the denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari.

The respondent in this action was 55 years old when she applied for a position as an art teacher in the West Hartford, Conn., school system. Respondent had 13 years of prior experience as a teacher in New Jersey. When the job opening for which respondent applied was filled by a 26-year-old teacher with three years’ experience, respondent initiated this lawsuit alleging violations of the ADEA and pointing in particular to the “sixth step” policy adopted by the West Hartford Board of Education (Board). This cost-cutting policy read:

“Except in special situations and to the extent possible, teachers needed in West Hartford next year will be recruited at levels below the sixth step of the salary schedule.”

The “sixth step” is the salary grade reached by teachers with more than five years’ experience. This policy would be applicable to the respondent because the Board, like most school districts, gives credit for experience received in other schools.

At trial, the respondent introduced statistical evidence establishing that 92.6% of Connecticut teachers between 40 and 65 years of age (the protected age group under ADEA) have more than five years’ experience and thus are discriminated against by the sixth-step policy. The significance of this evidence, however, was minimized by the additional evidence that over 60% of teachers under age 40 also have more than five years’ experience. The District Court instructed the jury that petitioners’ sixth-step policy was discriminatory as a matter of law and that respondent was entitled to recover if petitioners’ employment “decision about [respondent] was made in whole or in part because she was above the fifth step on the salary scale . ” The jury returned a verdict for the respondent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in pertinent part. The Court of Appeals likened this case to a Title VII discriminatory impact case and held that respondent’s statistics had established a prima facie case of discriminatory impact and that petitioners had not justified their employment practice by a showing of business necessity or need. The Court of Appeals specifically rejected petitioners’ contention that the sixth-step policy was supportable as a necessary cost-cutting gesture in the face of tight budgetary constraint. The Court of Appeals reasoned that this cost-cutting justification must fail because of 29 CFE § 860.103 (h) (1979), which provides in part:

“[A] general assertion that the average cost of employing older workers as a group is higher than the average cost of employing. younger workers as a group will not be recognized as a differentiation under the terms and provisions of the Act, unless one of the other statutory exceptions applies. To classify or group employees solely on the basis of age for the purpose of comparing costs, or for any other purpose, necessarily rests on the assumption that the age factor alone may be used to justify a differentiation — an assumption plainly contrary to the terms of the.Act and the purpose of Congress in enacting it. Differentials so based would ■ serve only to perpetuate and promote the very discrimination at which the Act is directed.”

The Court of Appeals held that this regulation similarly defeated petitioners’ defense to respondent’s disparate-treatment case.

In my opinion, the decision of the Court of Appeals is inconsistent with the express provisions of the ADEA and is not supported by any prior decision of this Court. The ADEA makes it unlawful for any employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U. S. C. § 623 (a)(1). The policy under attack in this case, however, makes no reference to age. For budgetary reasons, a school board simply adopted a policy to hire teachers with fewer years of experience. No one contends that the Board discriminated against teachers over the age of 40 who had fewer than five years of prior teaching experience and who sought employment. In spite of this, the courts below found the Board’s policy unlawful because it has a greater “impact” on teachers between the ages of 40 and 65 than it has on teachers under the age of 40. They reached this conclusion even though over 60% of all teachers under the age of 40 also have more than five years of experience and are detrimentally affected by the Board’s policy. This Court has never held that proof of discriminatory impact can establish a violation of the ADEA, and it certainly has never sanctioned a finding of a violation where the statistical evidence revealed that a policy, neutral on its face, has such a significant impact on all candidates concerned, not simply the protected age group.

Of greater importance, however, is the rationale employed by the Court of Appeals in rejecting the Board’s “cost” justification for its policy. The court held that such justification conflicted with 29 CFR § 860.103 (h) (1979), which is one of the many guidelines that has been issued by the Secretary of Labor in this area. By its express terms, however, this regulation is inapplicable to the present situation. The Board has not made a general assertion that “the average cost of employing older workers as a group is higher than the average cost of employing younger workers,” nor does this involve an attempt “[t]o classify or group employees solely on the basis of age for the purpose of comparing costs . . . .” Rather, this is a policy which by its express terms makes no reference to age and which in practice has had a significant impact on teachers under the age of 40 as well as those over that age. The Court of Appeals’ opinion manages to tie the hands of local school boards in dealing with ever-increasing costs without the sanction of the Act which Congress passed to protect older workers. Presumably, the Court of Appeals’ rationale would similarly prohibit the Board from deciding no longer to give full credit for teaching experience received at other school districts. Such a policy, although neutral on its face with regard to age and affecting all teachers, would no doubt have a statistically different impact on teachers over the age of 40 than on those under that age.

In my view, Congress did not intend the ADEA to have the restraining influence on local governments which will result from the decision below. Congress revealed this intention in 29 U. S. C. § 623 (f)(1), which provides that it shall not be unlawful for an employer to take any action otherwise prohibited “where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age.” ' Because the differential based on experience in petitioners’ sixth-step policy has nothing to do with age, I would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and give plenary consideration to the decision of the Court of Appeals.


text:
    No. 80-1289.
    Ohio Department of Highway Safety et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Powell would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 80-1389.
    Alessandrello et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


author: Justice Stevens, Justice Marshall, Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    No. 80-5980.
    Coleman v. Balkcom, Warden.
   Super. Ct. Ga., Tattnall County. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens,

concurring.

The Court’s management of its discretionary docket is a subject that merits re-examination from time to time in the light of changes that affect the business of the federal judiciary. See, e. g., Watt v. Alaska, ante, p. 273 (Stevens, J., concurring), and Singleton v. Commissioner, 439 U. S. 940, 942-946 (opinion of Stevens, J.). Opinions dissenting from the denial of certiorari sometimes create the impression that we review fewer cases than we should; I hold the opposite view. Today Justice Rehnquist advances the proposition, as I understand his dissenting opinion, that we should promptly grant certiorari and decide the merits of every capital case coming from the state courts in order to expedite the administration of the death penalty.

In my judgment, the Court wisely rejects this proposal. In the last 10 months, over 90 certiorari petitions have been filed in capital cases. If we were to hear even a substantial percentage of these cases on the merits, they would consume over half of this Court’s argument calendar. Although the interest in protecting the constitutional rights of persons sentenced to death is properly characterized as a federal interest, the interest in imposing the death sentence is essentially a state interest. Because the persons on death row are concentrated in only a few States, because some States have no capital punishment at all, and because the range of capital offenses differs in different States, it is quite clear that all States do not share the same interest in accelerating the execution rate. This Court’s primary function is to adjudicate federal questions. ' To make the primary mission of this Court the vindication of certain States’ interests in carrying out the death penalty would be an improper allocation of the Court’s limited resources.

Moreover, one may also question whether Justice Rehnquist’s proposal would accomplish its intended purpose. As I understand his proposal, it would preclude the federal district courts from granting writs of habeas corpus in any capital cases on any ground that had been presented to and rejected by this Court. Because this Court is not equipped to process all of these cases as expeditiously as the several district courts, it is most unlikely that this innovative proposal would dramatically accelerate the execution of the persons on death row.

One of the causes of delay in the conclusion of litigation in capital cases has been the fact that the enactment of new state legislation after this Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, generated a number of novel constitutional questions. Although those questions have not been difficult for three Members of the Court, other Justices have found a number of these questions sufficiently important and difficult to justify the delays associated with review in this Court. The principal delay — a matter of four years — was the period between the entry of the stays in the Furman litigation in 1972, and the decisions in July 1976 in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242, and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, in which the constitutionality of the death penalty was ultimately sustained. Following that basic holding, the Court has also decided several other cases presenting substantial constitutional issues relating to capital punishment statutes; presumably those issues will no longer detain the state or federal courts in their consideration of cases in which the death penalty has been imposed. One therefore should not assume that the delays of the past few years will necessarily be reflected in the future if the various state authorities act with all possible diligence.

The deterrent value of any punishment is, of course, related to the promptness with which it is inflicted. In capital cases, however, the punishment is inflicted in two stages. Imprisonment follows immediately after conviction; but the execution normally does not take place until after the conclusion of post-trial proceedings in the trial court, direct and collateral review in the state judicial system, collateral review in the federal judicial system, and clemency review by the executive department of the State. However critical one may be of these protracted post-trial procedures, it seems inevitable that there must be a significant period of incarceration on death row during the interval between sentencing and execution. If the death sentence is ultimately set aside, or its execution delayed for a prolonged period, the imprisonment during that period is nevertheless a significant form of punishment. Indeed, the deterrent value of incarceration during that period of uncertainty may well be comparable to the consequences of the ultimate step itself. In all events, what is at stake in this procedural debate is the length of that period of incarceration rather than the question whether the offender shall be severely punished.

How promptly a diligent prosecutor can complete all of the proceedings necessary to carry out a death sentence is still uncertain. Much of the delay associated with past litigation should not reoccur in eases that merely raise issues that have now been resolved. As is true of all other types of litigation as well, however, inevitably new issues arise that will be sufficiently important and difficult to require deliberation before they are fully resolved. This Court should endeavor to conclude capital cases — like all other litigation — as promptly as possible. We must, however, also be as sure as possible that novel procedural shortcuts have not permitted error of a constitutional magnitude to occur. For after all, death cases are indeed different in kind from all other litigation. The penalty, once imposed, is irrevocable. In balance, therefore, I think the Court wisely declines to select this group of cases in which to experiment with accelerated procedures. Accordingly, I concur in the order denying certiorari.

Justice Marshall,

with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. After exhausting his direct appeals, petitioner filed this action in the Superior Court of Tattnall County, Ga., seeking a writ of habeas corpus. One of petitioner’s claims was that prejudicial publicity had created an atmosphere in which a fair trial was impossible. Petitioner’s counsel asserted in an affidavit that the jurors in his original trial, if called as witnesses, would “testify as to the widespread discussion of the [offense] in Seminole County . . . and to the fact that they, as jurors, were affected in their statutory decision-making process by the adverse pre-trial publicity.” The affidavit further alleged that the county jury commissioners, members of the jury panels, and numerous reporters and expert witnesses would offer testimony to similar effect. In order to prove these allegations, petitioner sought compulsory process to require the witnesses to testify.

At that point, petitioner’s efforts were thwarted by Ga. Code § 38-801 (e) (1978). Although that statute has since been amended, at the time of petitioner’s habeas hearing, it provided that subpoenas in habeas cases could be served only in the county in which the hearing was held or within 150 miles-of that county. None of the witnesses petitioner wished to summon lived so close. As one would expect, most of them lived in or near Seminole County, where the offense was committed. Petitioner was further constrained by the provisions of Ga. Code § 50-127 (1978) to file his habeas petition in the county where he was incarcerated. In sum, only the State’s procedural requirement threatened to prevent petitioner from calling the witnesses who he alleged would testify in support of his claim. Consequently, petitioner asked the trial court to declare § 38-801 (e) unconstitutional and to permit him to perfect service anywhere in the State. The trial court sustained the statute and denied the petition for habeas corpus on the merits. The Georgia Supreme Court declined to grant leave to appeal. Because the availability of compulsory process to an individual challenging his death penalty raises important questions under the Due Process Clause, I would grant the petition for certiorari.

A habeas corpus proceeding is, of course, civil rather than criminal in nature, and consequently the ordinary Sixth Amendment guarantee of compulsory process, which is made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, does not apply. Nevertheless, when the death penalty is in issue, the Constitution may impose unusual limitations on the States. As we emphasized just last Term in Beck v. Ala bama, 447 U. S. 625, 637 (1980), “there is a significant constitutional difference between the death penalty and lesser punishments.” If an individual is imprisoned for an offense he did not commit, the error can to some extent be rectified. But if he is executed, the wrong that has been done can never be corrected. That is just one reason that I, of course, adhere to my view that the State may never put an individual to death without imposing a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Yet surely those among my Brethren who believe that there are circumstances in which the State may legitimately impose this ultimate sanction would not want to see an innocent individual put to death. Certainly no Member of this Court would countenance a conviction obtained in violation of the Constitution. Because of the unique finality of the death penalty, its imposition must be the result of careful procedures and must survive close scrutiny on post-trial review. I do not believe that this rigorous scrutiny is possible when, as here, procedural rules ultimately abandoned by the State are all that stand between the convicted individual and the chance to prove his claims.

Petitioner offered to call as witnesses the jurors, who, he alleged, would testify not merely to the atmosphere surrounding the trial, but to the actual effect of that atmosphere on their deliberations. The only obstacle to calling those witnesses was the State’s failure to provide him with a means of serving compulsory process. In order to agree with petitioner that this failure amounts to a violation of the Due Process Clause, it would not be necessary to hold that compulsory process is constitutionally required in any other civil, or indeed, in any other habeas proceeding. It would instead be sufficient, as it was last Term in Beck, to recognize the unique character of the death penalty and of the restraints required by the Constitution before the State may impose it. Granting the assistance of compulsory process to an individual under sentence of death but ready and willing to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the manner of his conviction might well be among those restraints. Accordingly, I would grant the petition for certiorari to consider that question.

Justice Rehnquist,

dissenting.

Ordinarily I would have no hestitation joining the majority of my colleagues in denying the petition for certiorari in this case. The questions presented in the petition are of importance only to petitioner himself and therefore are not suitable candidates for the exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction. But in a larger sense, the case raises significant issues about the administration of capital punishment statutes in this country, and reflects the increasing tendency to postpone or delay the enforcement of those constitutionally valid statutes. Because I think stronger measures are called for than the mere denial of certiorari in a case such as this, I would grant the petition for certiorari so that the case can be fully briefed and argued.

A mere recital of the facts of this case illustrates the delay to which I have referred. Petitioner was convicted by a jury in 1973 of murdering six members of a family, after raping and torturing some members of that family. He was sentenced to death under Georgia’s capital punishment statute, a statute expressly held constitutional in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976). The sentence was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia, Coleman v. State, 237 Ga. 84, 226 S. E. 2d 911 (1976), and this Court denied the first petition for certiorari. Coleman v. Georgia, 431 U. S. 909, rehearing denied, 431 U. S. 961 (1977). Petitioner subsequently sought state collateral relief, which was denied by the state habeas court. The Georgia Supreme Court then denied his application for a writ of probable cause to appeal. Petitioner has now filed his second petition for certiorari in this Court. Because petitioner has had a full opportunity to have his claims considered on direct review by both the Supreme Court of Georgia and this Court and on collateral review by the state courts of Georgia, and because the issues presented are not substantial, it is not surprising that the majority of the Court votes to deny the petition for certiorari.

I dissent not because I believe that petitioner has made any showing in the Georgia courts that he was deprived of any rights secured to him by the United States Constitution, but rather because our mere denial of certiorari will not in all likelihood end the already protracted litigation in this case. If petitioner follows the path of many of his predecessors, he will now turn to a single-judge federal habeas court, alleging anew some or all of the reasons which he urges here for granting the petition for certiorari. If he fails to impress the particular United States District Court in which his habeas petition is filed, he may upon the issuance of a certificate of probable cause appeal to a United States Court of Appeals. And throughout this exhaustive appeal process, any single judge having jurisdiction over the case may of course stay the execution of the penalty pending further review. 28 U. S. C. § 1651. Given so many bites at the apple, the odds favor petitioner finding some court willing to vacate his death sentence because in its view his trial or sentence was not free from constitutional error. See Estelle v. Jurek, 450 U. S. 1014 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

It seems to me that we have thus reached a stalemate in the administration of federal constitutional law. Although this Court has determined that capital punishment statutes do not violate the Constitution, Gregg v. Georgia, supra, and although 30-odd States have enacted such statutes, apparently in the belief that they constitute sound social policy, the existence of the death penalty in this country is virtually an illusion. Since 1976, hundreds of juries have sentenced hundreds of persons to death, presumably in the belief that the death penalty in those circumstances is warranted, yet virtually nothing happens except endlessly drawn out legal proceedings such as those adverted to above. Of the hundreds of prisoners condemned to die who languish on the various “death rows,” few of them appear to face any imminent prospect of their sentence being executed. Indeed, in the five years since Gregg v. Georgia, there has been only one execution of a defendant who has persisted in his attack upon his sentence. See Spenkelink v. Wainwright, 442 U. S. 1301 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers). My in-chambers opinion in that case describes some of the many avenues of relief which can be pursued by one sentenced to death.

I do not think that this Court can continue to evade some responsibility for this mockery of our criminal justice system. Perhaps out of a desire to avoid even the possibility of a “Bloody Assizes,” this Court and the lower federal courts have converted the constitutional limits upon imposition of the death penalty by the States and the Federal Government into arcane niceties which parallel the equity court practices described in Charles Dickens’ “Bleak House.” Even though we have upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment statutes, I fear that by our recent actions we have mistakenly sent a signal to the lower state and federal courts that the actual imposition of the death sentence is to be avoided at all costs.

That surely was not the intent of the opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens in Gregg v. Georgia. That opinion recognized that capital punishment is said to serve two principal social purposes — retribution and the deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders. It went on to explain:

“The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex factual issue the resolution of which properly rests with the legislatures, which can evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the courts. . . .
“In sum, we cannot say that the judgment of the Georgia Legislature that capital punishment may be necessary in some cases is clearly wrong. Considerations of federalism, as well as respect for the ability of a legislature to evaluate, in terms of its particular State, the moral consensus concerning the death penalty and its social utility as a sanction, require us to conclude, in the absence of more convincing evidence, that the infliction of death as a punishment for murder is not without justification and thus is not unconstitutionally severe.” 428 U. S., at 186-187.

What troubles me is that this Court, by constantly tinkering with the principles laid down in the five death penalty cases decided in 1976, together with the natural reluctance of state and federal habeas judges to rule against an inmate on death row, has made it virtually impossible for States to enforce with reasonable promptness their constitutionally valid capital punishment statutes. When society promises to punish by death certain criminal conduct, and then the courts fail to do so, the courts not only lessen the deterrent effect of the threat of capital punishment, they undermine the integrity of the entire criminal justice system. To be sure, the importance of procedural protections to an accused should not be minimized, particularly in light of the irreversibility of the death sentence. But it seems to me that when this Court surrounds capital defendants with numerous procedural protections unheard of for other crimes and then pristinely denies a petition for certiorari in a case such as this, it in effect all but prevents the States from imposing a death sentence on a defendant who has been fairly tried by a jury of peers. As Justice Jackson stated in Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156, 197 (1953): “The petitioners have had fair trial and fair review. The people of the State are also entitled to due process of law.”

The other principal purpose of capital punishment is retribution. The testimony of Lord Justice Denning, then Master of the Rolls of the Court of Appeal in England, before the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment answers those who insist that respect for the “sanctity of life” compels the end of the death sentence for any crime, no matter how heinous. He explained:

“Punishment is the way in which society expresses its denunciation of wrong doing: and, in order to maintain respect for law, it is essential that the punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great majority of citizens for them. It is a mistake to consider the objects of punishment as being deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else. . . . The truth is that some crimes are so outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment, because the wrong-doer deserves it, irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not.” Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Minutes of Evidence, Dec. 1, 1949, p. 207 (1950), quoted in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 184, n. 30.

There can be little doubt that delay in the enforcement of capital punishment frustrates the purpose of retribution. As the opinion in Gregg stated, “ ‘[w]hen people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they “deserve” then there are sown the seeds of anarchy — of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.’ ” Id., at 183, quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). San Francisco experienced vigilante justice during the Gold Rush in the middle part of the last century; the mining towns of Montana experienced it a short time later; and it is still with us as a result of the series of unsolved slayings of Negro children in Atlanta.

In thinking about capital punishment, it is important to remember that the preservation of some degree of liberty for all demands that government restrain the few who kill law-abiding members of the community. As Judge Learned Hand long ago recognized:

“And what is this liberty which must lie in the hearts of men and women? It is not the ruthless, the unbridled will; it is not freedom to do as one likes. That is the denial of liberty, and leads straight to its overthrow. A society in which men recognize no check upon their freedom soon becomes a society where freedom is the possession of only a savage few; as we have learned to our sorrow.” The Spirit of Liberty 190 (3d ed. 1960).

James Madison made the same point in this now famous passage from Federalist Paper No. 51:

“But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.” The Federalist Papers 322 (1961). (Emphasis supplied.)

I believe we have in our judicial decisions focused so much on controlling the government that we have lost sight of the equally important objective of enabling the government to control the governed. When our systems of administering criminal justice cannot provide security to our people in the streets or in their homes, we are rapidly approaching the state of savagery which Learned Hand describes. In Atlanta, we cannot protect our small children at play. In the Nation’s Capital, law enforcement authorities cannot protect the lives of employees of this very Court who live four blocks from the building in which we sit and deliberate the constitutionality of capital punishment.

In light of the foregoing, I do not believe it is a responsible exercise of our certiorari jurisdiction to blithely deny petitions for certiorari in cases where petitioners have been sentenced to death and present for review claims which seem on their face to have little merit, and which have been extensively considered by state and federal courts on both direct and collateral review. The 5-year history of death sentences, as opposed to execution of those sentences, is a matter with respect to which no Member of this Court can be unaware. If capital punishment is indeed constitutional when imposed for the taking of the life of another human being, we cannot responsibly discharge our duty by pris-tinely denying a petition such as this, realizing full well that our action will simply further protract the litigation.

Accordingly, I believe that the petition should be granted in order that this Court may deal with all of petitioner’s claims on their merits. If after full briefing and argument the Court decides to affirm, the provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 2244 (e) would come into operation. That section provides in pertinent part:

“In a habeas corpus proceeding brought in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a prior judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States on an appeal or review by a writ of certio-rari at the instance of the prisoner of the decision of such State court, shall be conclusive as to all issues of fact or law with respect to an asserted denial of a Federal right which constitutes ground for discharge in a habeas corpus proceeding, actually adjudicated by the Supreme Court therein . . . .”

See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188 (1972).

Thus the jurisdiction of the federal courts over petitioner’s sentence of death would be at an end, and unless the appropriate state officials commuted petitioner’s sentence, it would presumably be carried out. In any event, the decision would then be in the hands of the State which had initially imposed the death penalty, not in the hands of the federal courts.

       This proposed procedure in some cases would require the Court to grant certiorari and review the merits twice, once on direct appeal and once to review state collateral proceedings. Review of the merits would certainly involve more delay than would a denial of certiorari. Moreover, Justice RehNQUIst’s proposal would not have any effect on the delay in those cases in which a state court’s resolution of collateral proceedings on procedural grounds would bar this Court’s consideration of the merits of the claims raised in those proceedings.

       Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall have invariably voted to set aside the death penalty and, if nay memory serves me correctly, Justice Rehnquist has invariably voted to uphold the death penalty.

       See Adams v. Texas, 448 U. S. 38; Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625; Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420; Green v. Georgia, 442 U. S. 95; Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U. S. 14; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586; Bell v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 637; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584; Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282; Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U. S. 633; Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349; Davis v. Georgia, 429 U. S. 122.

       It must be emphasized that some of the delay in these cases is attributable to a congressional determination that state prisoners must exhaust state remedies prior to seeking review in federal court. See 28 U. S. C. §2254 (b).

       In the case of John Spenkelink, the only person who continued to attack his sentence and who has been executed since 1976, the date of'his crime was February 3, 1973, and the date of his execution was May 25, 1979. Of the more than six years between his crime and his execution, approximately 38 months was spent in the federal courts. During 17 of those months Spenkelink’s certiorari petition was awaiting this Court’s determination of the constitutionality of the Florida death penalty statute in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242. Thus over three of the six-plus years were spent at trial, on appeal in the Florida state courts, before the Governor of Florida on a petition for executive clemency, and before the trial court on a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence. See Spinkellink v. State, 313 So. 2d 666 (1975); Spenkelink v. Wainwright, 442 U. S. 1301 (Rehnquist, J., in chambers). These delays would be unaffected by Justice Rehnquist’s proposal.

       The statute as amended, effective February 15, 1980, permits service of process “at any place within the state.” 1980 Ga. Laws 71-72. Petitioner’s hearing was held prior to that date.

       It is true that Rule 45 (e) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limits service of district court subpoenas to 100 miles of the hearing site. But under 28 U. S. C. § 2241 (d) an individual has the option of filing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district where the conviction occurred rather than the one where he is incarcerated. The Georgia statutory scheme challenged in this case does not include that option.

       Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment, I would in any event grant the petition for certiorari and vacate the judgment below insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death sentence.

        Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 17-19 (1967).

       Because Georgia law now permits service anywhere in the State, it cannot fairly be argued that requiring compulsory process to force witnesses to appear would be contrary to any state policy. It is no longer true, as the State asserts in its brief in opposition, that the 150-mile limit reflects a legislative determination concerning “the interests of sparing undue burdens to witnesses and of establishing realistic boundaries to the jurisdictional reach of the trial courts.”

       That same opinion once again rejected the argument that evolving “standards of decency” demand the end of the death penalty, as if the role of judges, as opposed to democratically elected legislatures, is to “divine” what are “decent” societal values. The opinion made clear that recent developments — such as the enactment of capital punishment statutes by 35 States — had undercut that argument. “Despite the continuing debate, dating back to the 19th century, over the morality and utility of capital punishment, it is now evident that a large proportion of American society continues to regard it as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction.” 428 U. S., at 179-180.

       A recent article in the Washington Star, Mar. 21, 1981, p. 1, cols. 3-4, illustrates this growing problem. It reads:
      “ATLANTA (AP) — Two gun-wielding men were arrested yesterday at the start of a housing project’s self-defense patrol to protect youngsters against Atlanta’s child killers.
      “Younger members of the patrol, who carried baseball bats, were not stopped but those carrying weapons were questioned by police. The two arrested were charged with possession of deadly weapons at a public gathering. . . .
      “Israel Green, who heads the project’s tenants’ association, called for national support of the patrol’s right to carry arms.
      “ ‘We cannot stop them (killers) by consulting psychics, by having seances, by prayer vigils or by lighting little candles or forms of distracting activity that is not directly connected to the problems we face,’ Green saici in a statement. ‘We have to face these killers in the real world.’ ”

       When the issue of capital punishment arises, one is reminded of Judge Parker, a well-known judge who sat in the Western District of Arkansas for more than 20 years, and had to deal with the outlaws of his time and place. He had earned the reputation of a “hanging judge.” Of the several biographies written of him, J. Gregory & R. Strictland, Hell on the Border 28 (1971) makes the following statement:
      “It did not seem to Judge Parker to be an act of cruelty to sentence such blood-thirsty men to die. ‘I never hanged a man/ he said when lying on his death bed, ‘I never hanged a man. It is the law. The good ladies who carry flowers and jellies to criminals mean well. There is no doubt of that, but what mistaken, goodness! Back of the sentimentality are the motives of sincere pity and charity, sadly misdirected. They see the convict alone, perhaps chained in his cell; they forget the crime he perpetrated and the family he made husbandless and fatherless by his assassin work.’ ”


text:
    No. 80-6281.
    Schiller et al. v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Motion of James R. Walker et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 80-6299.
    No. 80-6369.
    Pickens v. Arkansas. Peek v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Ark.; and

Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 80-6369, 395 So. 2d 492.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 79-5932.
    No. 80-485.
    No. 80-6061.
    Doe et al. v. Delaware, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Jong Ha Wang et ux., MacArthur v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., et al.,
   450 U. S. 382;

450 U. S. 139; and

450 U. S. 985. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    May 4, 1981
    No. 80-1407.
    Winters et al. v. City of Klamath Falls.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ore. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice Brennan, Justice Stewart, and Justice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 80-6243.
    Heller et al. v. Hancock County Children Services Board et al.
   Appeal from Sup Ct. Ohio dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 80-6277.
    Harris v. Fuerst.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ohio dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 80-6341.
    Thompson v. Kentucky.
   Appeal from Cir. Ct. Ky., Kenton County, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1851.
    Harris v. H. Schuldt Reederei,
   444 U. S. 839. Petition for rehearing granted and order of October 1, 1979, denying petition for writ of certiorari is vacated. Cer-tiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, ante, p. 156.


text:
    No. 79-813.
    American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Griffith et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, ante, p. 156.


text:
    No. 79-1625.
    Sierra Club et al. v. Watt, Secretary of the Interior, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of California v. Sierra Club, ante, p. 287.


text:
    No. 80-26.
    United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, et al. v. Flowers et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-rari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, ante, p. 56.


text:
    No. 80-245.
    Oceanic Navigation Corp. et al. v. Sarauw.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, ante, p. 156.


text:
    No. 80-455.
    Futo, Administratrix v. Lykes Brothers Steamship Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, ante, p. 156.


text:
    No. 80-1643.
    Silver Bulk Shipping, Ltd. v. McCarthy.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, ante, p. 156.


text:
    No. 80-6017.
    Payton v. Harris.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in -forma pauperis and cer-tiorari granted. Judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433 (1981).


text:
    No. A-856 (80-1728).
    Yeoham et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Rehnquist and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-870.
    Premachandra v. Mitts, Acting Associate Deputy Chief Medical Director, Veterans Administration, Department of Medicine and Surgery, et al.
   Application for injunction, addressed to Justice Brennan and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-198.
    In re Disbarment of Fogel.
    [For earlier order herein, see 449 U. S. 979.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-200.
    In re Disbarment of McMahon.
    [For earlier order herein, see 449 U. S. 1006.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-203.
    In re Disbarment of Henderson.
    [For earlier order herein, see 449 U. S. 978.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-205.
    In re Disbarment of Silaski.
    [For earlier order herein, see 449 U. S. 979.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-208.
    In re Disbarment of Noren.
    [For earlier order herein, see 449 U. S. 990.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-213.
    In re Disbarment of Halverson.
    [For earlier order herein, see 449 U. S. 1007.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-234.
    In re Disbarment of Fontaine.
   It is ordered that Ernest H. Fontaine III of Houston, Tex., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-235.
    In re Disbarment of Williams.
   It is ordered that Michael W. Williams, of Corpus Christi, Tex., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-236.
    In re Disbarment of Rosenblum.
   It is ordered that Henry Rosenblum, of Houston, Tex., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 79-404.
    United States v. Cortez et al.,
   449 U. S. 411. Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that S. Jeffrey Minker, Esquire, of Tucson, Ariz., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent, Jesus Cortez, nunc pro tunc.


text:
    No. 77,
    Orig.
    Tennessee v. Arkansas.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 439 U. S. 1061.]
   Report of the Special Master received and ordered filed. Exceptions, if any, with supporting briefs to the Report may be filed by the parties within 45 days. Reply briefs, if any, to such Exceptions may be filed within 30 days.


text:
    No. 80-757.
    No. 80-895.
    No. 80-936.
    New York Mercantile Exchange et al. v. Leist et al.; Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Inc. v. Leist et al.; and Heinold Commodities, Inc., et al. v. Leist et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 450 U. S. 910.] Motion of petitioners in No. 80-757 to divide oral argument with petitioners in Nos. 80-895 and 80-936, and motion of petitioners in Nos. 80-895 and 80-936 to divide oral argument with petitioners in No. 80-757, granted. Motions of petitioners in Nos. 80-895 and 80-936 for designation of counsel to present oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 80-1499.
    Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Delta Metalforming Co., Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondent to consolidate this case with No. 80-1251, United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co. [certiorari granted, 450 U. S. 994], denied.


text:
    No. 80-1188.
    Edgar v. MITE Corp. et al.
   Appeal from

C. A. 7th Cir. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 80-1538.
    Plyler, Superintendent, Tyler Independent School District, et al. v. Doe, Guardian, et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 5th Cir. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 80-1074.
    Velde, Administrator, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, et al. v. National Black Police Assn., Inc., et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.

Justice Powell and Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 80-1345.
    Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 79-706.
    McCulley, Administrator v. Mitsui O. S. K. Lines, Ltd., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1240.
    Stockstill et al. v. Gypsum Transportation et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-94.
    Compania Maritime Navegacion Netumar, S. A. v. Irizarry.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-503.
    King, Chief, Fairfax County Police Department, et al. v. Wallace et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 80-642.
    Raymond, Administratrix v. I/S Caribia.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-745.
    Oriental Steamship Corp. v. McMichael.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-890.
    No. 80-1115.
    Liotta v. National Forge Co.; and National Forge Co. v. Liotta.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 629 F. 2d 903.


text:
    No. 80-1101.
    Kelce v. U. S. Financial Inc. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1261.
    Grubb v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1332.
    No. 80-1335.
    Berkowitz et al. v. Selzer; and Selzer v. Berkowitz et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 629 F. 2d 809.


text:
    No. 80-1344.
    Viegas v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1376.
    Corros, Administratrix v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1385.
    Industrial Contractors, Inc., et al. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local Union No. 215.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1402.
    Principe et al. v. McDonald’s Corp. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1416.
    Rogers et al. v. Gordon, U. S. District Judge, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1480.
    Rowe et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1504.
    Summitt v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1516.
    LoBue v. Nevada ex rel. Department of Highways.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1519.
    Barber, Commissioner, Department of Agriculture and Markets of New York, et al. v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1520.
    Sangster v. United Air Lines, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1522.
    Duemig v. Colorado.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1526.
    D’Arc v. D’Arc.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1530.
    Boise Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1532.
    Entrekin v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1533.
    Barham v. Welch et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1535.
    Morgan et al. v. Global Communications, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1537.
    Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Doca et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1546.
    Acquisto v. Lee County Board of Public Instruction et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1548.
    Esty et al. v. O’Neal, Administratrix.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1605.
    DeLello v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist.. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1645.
    DePalma v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1649.
    Payne v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1657.
    Fletcher v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1660.
    Coronado v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1671.
    Hazelip v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5918.
    Leach v. Greco, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6093.
    Tourtillott v. Oregon.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6102.
    Barrera v. Wisconsin.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6112.
    Williams v. Engle, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6145.
    Bowden v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6240.
    Cobb v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6301.
    John v. Attorney General of the Virgin Islands.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6314.
    Wright, aka Thompson v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Montgomery County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6319.
    Kraimer v. Wisconsin.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6320.
    Jackson v. Howard, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6325.
    Chavez v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6326.
    Smith v. Fairman, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6327.
    Pierce et al. v. Yochum et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6330.
    Segarra v. Sea-Land Service of Puerto Rico, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6331.
    Cundriff v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6333.
    Kolinsky v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6335.
    Turner v. Moore, Sheriff, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6337.

      Huffman v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6338.
    Ryan v. Mitchell, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6339.
    Porter v. Miller, Detention Center Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6340.
    Baker et al. v. Metcalfe, Judge.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6343.
    Ward v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6344.
    Payne v. ET & WNC Transportation Co. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6347.
    Miller v. TRW, Inc., Credit Data Division.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6349.
    Anderson v. Morrow et al.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6350.
    John v. Fenton, Warden.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6351.
    Littlefield v. Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6353.
    Ashlock v. Shields.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6357.
    Hughes v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6360.
    Mount v. Chase Bank et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6361.
    Baker v. Mitchell, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6371.
    Mathews v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6427.
    Owens v. McCall, Chairman, U. S. Parole Commission, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6443.
    Vallier v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6444.
    Cribbs v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6452.
    Garcia v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6453.
    Hilgert v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6455.
    Huberts v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-624.
    Ernst Russ Steamship Co. v. Matthews.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 80-1118.
    Stancil et al. v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan, Justice Stewart, and Justice Marshall would grant the petition and reverse the convictions.


text:
    No. 80-1257.
    Donald Schriver, Inc., et al. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of Center on National Labor Policy for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1267.
    Graves Truck Line, Inc. v. Appleton Electric Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 80-1683.
    General Electric Co. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 80-1449.
    Florida v. Harrison.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 80-6231.
    Dick v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.


text:
    No. 80-1085.
    Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., Inc., et al. v. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, et al.,
   450 U. S. 996. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 80-6090.
    No. 80-6101.
    No. 80-6179.
    Stein v. Frank et ux., Mabry v. Cenla Finance, Inc., Dorty v. Hayes et al.,
   450 U. S. 990;

450 U. S. 1002; and

450 U. S. 1034. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 80-5577.
    Wiley v. Kansas,
   449 U. S. 1087. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    May 11, 1981
    No. 80-6429.
    Daniels et al. v. Boone et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    May 18, 1981
    No. 80-1034.
    Warmuth v. Jones.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. dismissed, it appearing that the judgment below rests upon independent and adequate state grounds.


text:
    No. 80-1073.
    Marcal v. Louisiana.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. La. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6232.
    Beachboard v. Columbia University.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1291.
    Hadwen, Inc. v. Vermont Department of Taxes.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Vt. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 80-1313.
    Lampkin-Asam v. Florida Teaching Profession-National Education Assn.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Fla. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 80-1611.
    Shilling v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 80-1628.
    Wall v. Donovan.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 79-538.
    Mammoth Bulk Carriers, Ltd. v. Bachtel et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, ante, p. 156.


text:
    No. 79-850.
    Twin Harbors Stevedoring Co. v. Bachtel et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, ante, p. 156, and Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 445 U. S. 74 (1980).


text:
    No. A-887 (80-6581).
    McDonald v. Draper, Judge.
   Ct. App. Tenn. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Marshall and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-202.
    In re Disbarment of Easler.
    [For earlier order herein, see 449 U. S. 989.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-214.
    In re Disbarment of Toomey.
    [For earlier order herein, see 449 U. S. 1106.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-217.
    In re Disbarment of Douglas.
    [For earlier order herein, see 449 U. S. 1107.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-218.
    In re Disbarment of Kaufman.
    [For earlier order herein, see 449 U. S. 1120.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-220.
    In re Disbarment of Ostroff.
    [For earlier order herein, see 450 U. S. 976.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-237.
    In re Disbarment of Connaghan.
   It is ordered that John D. Connaghan, of St. Louis, Mo., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-238.
    In re Disbarment of Natale.
   It is ordered that David J. Natale, of Media, Pa., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 80-608.
    United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns. et al.
   D. C. S. D. N. Y. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 449 U. S. 1076.] Motion of appellees for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 80-689.
    Widmar et al. v. Vincent et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 450 U. S. 909.] Motion of Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs for leave tO' file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 80-848.
    No. 80-883.
    Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, Personal Representative of the Estates of Fehilly et al.; and Hartzell Propeller, Inc. v. Reyno, Personal Representative of the Estates of Fehilly et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 450 U. S. 909.] Motion of Boeing Co. et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 78-1545.
    No. 78-1549.
    No. 80-951.
    Zipes et al. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.; Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Zipes et al.; and Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 450 U. S. 979.] TWA’s motion to limit review in No. 80-951 to the order of the District Court entitled “Order Awarding Seniority,” and thereafter to dismiss Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549 as moot, is denied. Motion filed by petitioners in No. 78-1545 (the “plaintiff class”), requesting that the Court (1) grant TWA’s motion; or (2) order TWA and the plaintiff class to stipulate to dismissal of the writs in Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549; or (3) dismiss Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549 as moot, is denied. No. 78-1549 is removed from the argument calendar, and further consideration of the case is deferred. The writ of certiorari in No. 80-951 is limited to Questions 1 and 2 presented by the petition and is otherwise dismissed as improvidently granted.

Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions.


text:
    No. 80-939.
    No. 80-1129.
    Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee; and National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 450 U. S. 964.] Motion of National Republican Senatorial Committee to be designated to argue on behalf of all petitioners denied. Alternative request for divided argument and motion of Federal Election Commission for divided argument granted. Federal Election Commission allotted 20 minutes for oral argument, and National Republican Senatorial Committee allotted 10 minutes for oral argument.


text:
    No. 80-1556.
    Cory, Controller of California, et al. v. White, Attorney General of Texas, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioners to defer consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 80-5727.
    Eddings v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crina. App. Okla. [Certiorari granted, 450 U. S. 1040.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Jay C. Baker, Esquire, of Tulsa, Okla., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case.


text:
    No. 80-6527.
    In re Williams.
   Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 80-6385.
    In re Jones.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 80-6386.
    In re Jones.
   Petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 80-1208.
    No. 80-1471.
    No. 80-1610.
    New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission et al.; Massachusetts et al. v. New Hampshire Legislative Utility Consumers’ Council et al.; and Roberts, Attorney General of Rhode Island, et al. v. New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission et al.
   Appeals from Sup. Ct. N. H. Motions of Edison Electric Institute and New England Power Tool Executive Committee for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Probable jurisdiction noted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 120 N. H. 866, 424 A. 2d 807.


text:
    No. 80-1577.
    City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc.
   Appeal from C. A. 5th Cir. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 80-1576.
    Princeton University et al. v. Schmid.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. J. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 80-1348.
    Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 80-1496.
    Underwriters National Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Insurance Guaranty Assn. et al.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 80-1594.
    United States v. Erika, Inc.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 80-1429.
    Youngberg, Superintendent, Pennhurst State School and Hospital, et al. v. Romeo, an incompetent, by his mother and next friend, Romeo.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Motion of American Psychiatric Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 80-5887.
    White v. New Hampshire Department of Employment Security et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-571.
    Illinois v. City of Milwaukee et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-56.
    Lorain, a division of Koehring Co. v. United Steelworkers of America et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-870.
    Perry v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-985.
    Putnam Fabricating Co. v. Null et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1167.
    No. 80-1168.
    McCord v. Bailey et al.; and Bailey et al. v. McCord.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 U. S. App. D. C. 334, 636 F. 2d 606.


text:
    No. 80-1233.
    Syufy Enterprises v. Northern California State Association of I. A. T. S. E. Locals, Local Union No. 241.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1246.
    Max Factor & Co. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1252.
    No. 80-1253.
    No. 80-1647.
    Puerto Rico v. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury; Virgin Islands v. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury (two cases); and Regan, Secretary of the Treasury v. Puerto Rico; and Regan, Secretary of the Treasury v. Virgin Islands.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: Nos. 80-1252, 80-1253 (first case), and 80-1647 (first case), 206 U. S. App. D. C. 217, 642 F. 2d 622; Nos. 80-1253 (second case) and 80-1647 (second case), 206 U. S. App. D. C. 236, 642 F. 2d 641.


text:
    No. 80-1256.
    Nesbitt v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1274.
    Connor v. United States et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1281.
    No. 80-1346.
    Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Commission et al.; and Trans-Pacific Freight Conference of Japan/Korea et al. v. Federal Maritime Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 209 U. S. App. D. C. 27, 650 F. 2d 1235.


text:
    No. 80-1302.
    Shaffer v. Cook, Judge, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1308.
    Ocanas et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1333.
    Prochaska v. Marcoux.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1341.
    In re Sutton.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1369.
    South Dakota v. Lewis, Secretary of Transportation, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1384.
    Shindelar v. Holdeman et al.
   C. C. P. A. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1432.
    Kenney v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1452.
    Sahara-Tahoe Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1461.
    Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1477.
    Cruz v. Knight, Director, United States Secret Service.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1500.
    Clipper v. Starkey et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1503.
    Dickey Farms, Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1506.
    Arizona Fuels Corp. et al. v. United States.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1515.
    Cuaron v. Estrada; Dawson et al. v. Holguin et al.; and Cuaron v. Mechem, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1540.
    Partido Nuevo Progresista v. Perez, Administrator, Puerto Rico Elections Commission, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1551.
    Goderre v. City of Peekskill et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1552.
    Williams v. Boorstin, Librarian of Congress.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1564.
    Fort Pitt Steel Casting Division, Conval-Penn, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1566.
    Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc. v. Ewald.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1567.
    Madhani v. Mt. Vernon Aviation.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1568.
    Paducah Associates, Ltd. v. Indiana Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1570.
    Smith v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1571.
    Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1572.
    Jackson v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1574.
    Rogers et ux. v. Sarrett Builders & Realty, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1578.
    Carpenter v. Continental Trailways.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1580.
    Lincoln University et al. v. Trotman et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1581.
    Mattis et al. v. Watt, Secretary of the Interior, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1584.
    Crist v. Crist.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1587.
    Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Crespin.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1590.
    Lurie et al. v. California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1593.
    Kurland v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1596.
    Morehouse Parish School et al. v. Pegues.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1603.
    Berard v. General Motors Corp. et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1612.
    Hawkins v. Holiday Inns, Inc.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1618.
    Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., dba Fibercast Co., et al. v. Pierce Associates, Inc.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1620.
    City of Philadelphia v. Gilfillan et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1623.
    Brager & Co., Inc. v. Leumi Securities Corp. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1630.
    Celotex v. United States Gypsum Co.
   C. A. 7th dr. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1634.
    No. 80-1710.
    New York v. Onofre; and New York v. Peoples et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 N. Y. 2d 476, 415 N. E. 2d 936.


text:
    No. 80-1639.
    Miller, Guardian v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1651.
    Leonard et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1654.
    Humphries v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1682.
    Browning v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1718.
    Sarmiento et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1732.
    Gust v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1756.
    Vlcek v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5795.
    Isaacs v. Washington.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5982.
    Coleman v. Superior Court of California, City and County of San Francisco (California, Real Party in Interest).
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6096.
    Wallace v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6109.
    Brown v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6125.
    White v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6136.
    Semenak v. Wisconsin.
   Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6188.
    Fitzharris v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6194.
    Harris v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6202.
    Scott v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6210.
    Blocker v. Herman et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6217.
    Wade v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6358.
    Weber v. Engle, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6359.
    Ciummei v. Amaral, Correctional Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6362.
    Johnson v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6363.
    Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6365.
    Read v. Kubinski et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6373.
    Jackson v. Wyoming.
   Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6381.
    Wilson v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6383.
    Dunham v. Shields, Chairman, Virginia Parole Board.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6388.
    Hammond v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6392.
    McCrary v. Miner et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6393.
    Brisbon v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6394.
    Williams v. Missouri.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6399.
    Lynch v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6400.
    Bonnett v. Solem, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6405.
    De Anda v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6409.
    Robinson v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6410.
    Free v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crina. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6411.
    Friedman v. Fairhill Hospital.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6412.
    Martin v. Fauver, Correction Commissioner, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6414.
    Fields v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6415.
    Spinelli v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6416.
    Osborne v. District of Columbia Parole Board.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6417.
    Hurst v. Harvey, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6421.
    McFarland v. Duckworth, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6422.
    Collins v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6423.
    Glenn v. North Carolina.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6425.
    Phillips v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6426.
    Odes v. Nowland, Acting Director, Department of Registration and Education of Illinois.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6436.
    Howard v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6440.
    Cooper v. Cooper.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6446.
    Bland v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6454.
    Markland v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6465.
    Harrell v. Hopkins, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6467.
    Cheung Hon Law v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6481.
    Hermann v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6484.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6487.
    Bosque v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud, Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6491.
    Thompson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6501.
    Manley v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6503.
    Robinson v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6509.
    Nevitt v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6518.
    Martinez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6522.
    Hart v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6528.
    Winchell v. Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6532.
    Santovenia v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6537.
    McCue v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6543.
    Beachem v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6549.
    Dickinson v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6550.
    Bazan v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6553.
    Hudson v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6555.
    Carcione v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6558.
    Bowers v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6562.
    Dominguez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6563.
    Fountain v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6566.
    Burroughs v. Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-254.
    California v. Smith.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1027.
    Marshall et al. v. Doe.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice, Justice White, and Justice Rehnquist would grant the petition and reverse the judgment for the reasons stated by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Alioto v. Williams, 450 U. S. 1012 (1981).