author: Mr. Chief Justice TANEY Mr. Justice DANIEL

text:
    John A. Rowan and John L. Harris, Copartners in Trade under the Name and Style of Rowan and Harris, Plaintiffs in error, v. Hiram G. Runnels, Defendant in error. Same v. Same.
    In the case of Groves ®. Slaughter (15 Peters, 449) this court decided that the constitution of Mississippi did not, of itself, and without any legislative enactment, . prohibit the introduction of slaves as merchandise and for sale.
    This constitution went into operation on the 1st of May, 1833, and on the 13th,of May, 1837, a law was passed to provide for the case.
    This court adheres to the construction of the constitution which was given in the case of Groves ®. Slaughter, and enforces contracts made between the two days above mentioned, although the courts of. the State of Mississippi have, since the decision in the case of Groves v. Slaughter, declared such contracts to be void.
    These cases were brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi. Rowan and Harris were citizens of Virginia, and Runnels was a citizen of Mississippi.",
    Both cases depended upon the same principle, and differed only in this, that, in one, .Runnels executed to Rowan &. Harris, hife own note, and, in the other, indorsed over to them a promissory note executed by George W. Adams. Both notes were due on the 1st of March, 1840, one being f6r $ 2,950.70, and the other for $8,671.33. At maturity the notes were protestéd for nonpayment, and suits brought upon them.
    At the trial, the defendant offered in evidence a transcript of the record" of a suit pending in the Supreme Court of Chancery Óf the State of Mississippi, wherein Rowan & Harris were complainants, and George W. Adams and others, defendants, one object of which was to show that the consideration for the notes was a sale of slaves by Rowan & Harris to Runnels. Whereupon: the defendant moved the court to instruct the jury, that if they believed, from the evidence, that the, original consideration of the note sued on was the sale by plaintiffs to defendant of slaves- introduced into the State of Mississippi for sale and as- merchandise by plaintiffs, since the 1st day of May, 1833, that then said note was void, and they should find for the defendant. Which instruction the court gave to the jury as moved for by the defendant. . To the giving of which instruction the plaintiffs excepted, and upon this exception the case came up to this court.

      Mr. Nelson^ for the plaintiffs in error,
    contended that the case, was entirely covered by the decision of this court in 15 Peters, 449.

      Mr. Bibb, for appéllees.
    These cases grew out of that provision of the constitution of the State of Mississippi which is- in these words : — “ The introduction of slaves into this State as merchandise, or for sale, shall be prohibited from and after the first day of May, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-three.”
    ■ The decision of this court, at the January term, 1841, upon the construction of that clause of the constitution of the State of Mississippi, in the cage of Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Peters, 449, was, that the constitution of the State of Mississippi referred the subject of the prohibition to the legislature as a duty to be performed by that body,, and that there was no prohibition until, the legislature should act.
    That decision is a precedent, not binding, upon the appellees in these two cases, because they were not-parties to that case, neither are they privies. They have a. right to avail themselves of the ■ benefit of all the additional lights and alter circumstances.
    The principle is well settled and firmly established by the decisions of this court, again and again repeated and exemplified, that the construction which the courts of the several States have given to their own constitutions and statutes, respectively, ought to control the decisions of this court upon questions of right growing out of State constitutions and State .statutes, unless they come in conflict with tbe constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. The decision in the case-of Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Peters, 449, alludes to this principle ; but, in the opinion of the court; it is said : — “ The case chiefly relied upon is that of Glidewell and others v. Hite and Fitzpatrick, a newspaper report of which has been .furnished to the court. It was a bill in equity filed some time in the year 1839, since .the commencement of the suit how before this court, and the decree of the chancellor affirmed in the Court of Appeals by the divided court, since the judgment was obtained in .this cause. But if we look into that case, and the points there discussed, and the diversity of opinion entertained by the judges, we cannot consider it as settling'the construction of the constitution,”
    As the case of Groves n. Slaughter itself was decided by a “ divided court,” as there was a “ diversity of opinion entertained by the judges,” as it was a case of first impression, deciding upon the construction of a clause in the constitution of the State of Mississippi, whieh the decisions of the courts of that State had not then settled, as the court then said ; and as Mr. Justice - Barbour died before.the decision, and Mr. Justice Catron did not sit in the case from indisposition, and as Justices Story and McKinley dissented from the opinion delivered,- it is submitted, with great deference, that the opinión in Groves v. Slaughter is open to argument upon these two points :—
    1st. The imperative obligation upon this court to adopt the construction given by the courts of Mississippi to their constitution, when settled.
    2dly. That decisions of the courts of the State of Mississippi have now settled the construction contrary to the decision'in Groves v. Slaughter.
    1. The imperative obligation upon this court to adopt the con- ’ struction given by the courts of the State of Mississippi to their constitution, when settled by such decisions.
    Out of a very great number of precepts and examples given by this court upon that subject, a single decision will suffice. *
    In the case of Elmendorff v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 159, the opinion of the court, delivered by Chief Justice Marshall, declares : — a This .court has uniformly professed its dispositon, in cases depending on the laws of a particular State, to adopt the construction which the courts of the State have' given to those laws. This course is founded on the principle, supposed to be universally recognized, that the judicial department of every government, where such department exists, is the appropriate organ for construing the legislative acts of that government. Thus, no court in the universe, which professed to be governed by principle, would, we pre'sume, undertake to say, that the courts of Great Britain, or of France, or of any other nation, had misunderstood their own stat-. utes ; and therefore erect itself into a tribunal which should correct such misunderstanding.' We receive the construction given by the courts of the nation as the true sense of the.law, and feel ourselves no more at liberty to depart from that construction, than to depart from the words of the statute. On this principle the construction-given ' by this court to the constitution -and laws of the United States is received by all as the true construction ; and, on the same principle, the construction- given by the courts of the several States to the legislative acis of thbse States is received as true, unless they come in conflict with the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. If, then, this question has been settled in Kentucky, we must suppose it to be rightly settled.”
    This case is the more impressive, because this court adopted-the construction given by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky to a statute enacted by the State of Virginia, and conformed to the three last decisions of that court, which conflicted with nine former decisions of the court by the former judges, which former decisions were in a degree fortified by the opinion of this court in the case of Wilson v. Mason, 1 Cranch, 100 (that the particular descriptions in a certificate of survey, before a copy could be demanded as of right, and when it could only be inspected by the courtesy of the surveyor, could not be used by a locator to help out his entry and communicate the necessary notoriety). This court did, notwithstanding, in the case of Elmendorff v. Taylor, say, — “ We must consider the construction as settled finally by the courts of the State ; and this court ought to adopt the same rule, should we even doubt its correctness.” 10 Wheat. 165.
    The reasoning just quoted is so clearly demonstrative and convincing that the citations of the other decisions of this court would be superfluous.
    2. The decisions of the Supreme Court of the State of Mis-' sissippi have now settled the construction of the constitution of that State relating, to the point involved in these cases.
    The cases decided by the court of Mississippi, as reported in 5 Howard’s Mississippi Rep. 100, 110, 769, and 7 ibid. 15, are referred to as having settled the construction of the clause of their constitution now under consideration.
    The courts of Louisiana have, in questions growing out of the prohibition in the constitution of Mississippi before quoted, conformed to the decisions of the court of Mississippi, of which an example is to be found in -6 Robinson’s La. Rep. 115. And the courts of Tennessee have in like manner conformed ; but as the book of reports, containing the decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, has been taken out of the library of the court, I am not able to cite the particular case, nor do I deenl it material; the decisions of the court of Mississippi being the proper standard to which all other courts should conform upon such a question.
    It would be highly inconvenient that one construction of the organic law of the State of Mississippi should prevail in the courts of that State and of the adjoining States, and that another and different construction .of the same instrument should prevail in the federal courts.
    The decision in Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Peters, 449, was by “ a divided court two justices were absent, in a case of the first impression, and when the, construction fixed by- the judiciary department. of tjie government of Mississippi had not settled the proper construction.
    Now that' it is settled by the courts of that State, this court is bound to adopt it as the proper and true construction.
    According' to the principles decided.by this court between Elmen-dorff v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 165, and various others too tedious to mention, -this court is qo .more at liberty to depart from the construction of the State constitution, so settled by the- judicial department of the State of Mississippi, than the courts of that State would be to depart from the construction of the constitution, statutes, and treaties of the United States, as settled* by this Supreme Court of the United States.
   Mr. Chief Justice TANEY

delivered the opinion of the court.

This action was brought in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, by the plaintiffs, upon a promissory note made to them by die defendant for $2,-950.70, dated March 27th, 1839j and payable on the 1st of-March, 1840.

The defendant offered in evidence that the only consideration of this' note was certain' slaves sold by the plaintiff to him in Mississippi in the year 1836, this note being given to take up former securities which had not been paid ; and that the said slaves.were introduced and-imported into the State-in the. year last above mentioned, by the plaintiffs, as merchandise and for sale.

Upon this evidence, the court instructed the jury that if the slaves were so introduced afieif the 1st of May, 1883, the note was void, and their verdict must be for the defendant. The plaintiffs excepted to this instruction, and the verdict and judginent being against them, they have brought the case here by writ of error.

The Circuit Court held this contract to be illegal and void, under' the following section of the constitution of Mississippi, adopted in 1832>_

“ The introduction of slaves into this State, as merchandise or for sale, shall be prohibited from and after the 1st day of May, 1833; provided the actual settler or settlers shall not be prohibited from purchasing slaves -in any State in this Union, and bringing them into this State for. their own individual use, till the year 1845. ”

The question presented in this c'ase is precisely the same with that decided by this .’court in the case of Groves v. Slaughter, reported in 15 Peters, 449. And the court then held, after hearing a very full and elaborate argument, that the clause in the constitution of Mississippi, relied on by the defendant, which went into operation on the 1st of May, 1833, did not-of itself prohibit the introduction of slaves as merchandise and for sale ; and that contracts fot 'the purchase and sale of slaves so introduced, made before the passage of the. law of that State of May 13th, 1837, were valid and binding upon the parties. The reasoning, upon which that opinion was, founded, is fully set forth in the report of the case, and need not be repeated here.

It now appears, however, that the-question has since been brought before the courts of the State, and it has been there settled by its highest tribunals that the clause in the constitution above referred to did, of itself and without any legislative enactment, prohibit the introduction of slaves as merchandise and for sale : and rendered all contracts for the sale of such, slaves, made after May 1st, 1833, illegal and void. And it is argued that inasmuch as this court adopts the construction given by the State courts to their own constitution and laws, we ought to follow the decisions in Mississippi, and declare the contract before us to he void, notwithstanding the case of Groves v.‘ Slaughter. • ■

But we are not aware of any decision in this court which presses the rule so far, or that would justify this court in declaring contracts to be void upon this ground which upon the fullest consideration it has so recently held to be good.. It will be seen, by a reference to the opinion delivered in the case of Groves v. Slaughter, that the court were satisfied not only that the construction it then placed on the constitution of Mississippi was the true one) but that it conformed to the construction upon which, the legislature of the State had acted, and that the validity of these sales had not been brought into question in any of the tribunals of the State until long after the time when this contract was made ; and that as late as the beginning of the year 1841, when Groves v. Slaughter was decided, it did not appear, from any thing before the court, that the construction of the clause in question had béen settled either way, by judicial decision, in the courts of the State.

Acting under the opinion thus deliberately given by this court, we can hardly be required, by any comity or respect for the State courts, to surrender pur judgment to decisions since made in the State, and declare contracts to be void which upon full consideration we have pronounced to be valid. Undoubtedly this court will always feel itself bound to respect the decisions of the State courts, and from the time they are made will regard them as conclusive in all cases upon the construction of their own constitution and laws.

But we ought not to give to them °a retroactive effect, and allow them to render invalid contracts entered into with citizens of other States, which in the judgment of this court were lawfully made. For, if such a rule were adopted, and the comity due to State decisions pushed to this extent, it is evident that the provision in the constitution of the United States, which secures to the citizens of another. State the fight to sue in the courts of the United States, might become utterly useless and nugatory.

We are- of opinion, therefore, that the decision in the case of Groves v. Slaughter must rule this case, and consequently that the judgment of the'Circuit'Court must be reversed.

The same judgment must also.be given in the.other case before us between the same parties, -as it depends on the same principles.

Mr. Justice DANIEL

dissented

From the decision of the court pronounced in these causes, I feel myself constrained to dissent. The rule heretofore- announced and uniformly'observed by this court, with respect to the construction to be given to the constitutions and. statutes of the several States, has been this : — that the. interpretations put upon those constitutions and statutes by the supreme tribunals of the States respectively, should be received and followed as the true interpretation. This rule, so reasonable in itself, so inseparable from every idea of the competency, or indeed the very being of the systems of winch those constitutions and statutes make an essential part, is not even now denied; but’whilst it is, in general terms, assented to in the decision of these causes, it is in effect, if not in terms, by thq same decision utterly overthrown. In the case of Groves et al. v. Slaughter, 15 Peters, 449, this, court, as.it was constrained to do in the absence of any interpretation by the State courts, gave its. own construction to the constitution of Mississippi. Since the decision in Groves v. Slaughter, decisions of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, giving an interpretation to the constitution of that State, have become gener- . ally known,— they are. familiar, unequivocal, uniform, numerous. That any or all of these expositions may have been made posterior to'the decision of-the cause of Grov.es v. Slaughter, I hold to be perfectly immaterial, so far as this circumstance can affect their force and validity. If these expositions establish the meaning of the constitution, of Mississippi, such meaning, must have relation to the period of the consummation- of that instrument. The constitution has always been the same thing from the time of its- adoption. It could not have been some other thing than the constitution, because it'had-not been interpreted ■ to this court, and subsequently have become the constitution merely because its interpretation was then generally declared, The decision of. the causes now before this court gives'to the constitution of Mississippi different meanings •at different periods of its existence, and deduces those meanings from circumstances wholly unconnected with the intrinsic signification of the terms of the instrument itself. Such a rule of. interpretation involves, in my view, a contradiction which I am wholly ..unwilling to adopt.

Order.

This cause came on to.be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit.Court of the United States.for the Southern District of Mississippi, and- was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is ordered and adjudged' by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause bé and the same is hereby reversed, with costs, and that this cause be and the same is-hereby remanded to the said Circuit Court, with directions to award a venire facias de novo.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr.-Justice GRIER

license: Public Domain

text:
    Bennet R. Truly, Complainant and Appellant, v. Moses Wanzer, Jabez Harrison, and John R. Nicholson.
    The preceding case of Rowan and Harris v. Runnels reviewed and confirmed.
    The' general principle with regard to injunctions after a judgment at law is this, — that any fact which proves it to"be against conscience to execute such judgment, and of wiiiefr the party could not have availed himself in a court of law, or.of • which he might have - availed himself at law, but was prevented by fraud ór accident, unmixed with any faplt or negligence in himself or his agents, will authorize a court of equity to interfere by injunction to restrain the adverse party from availing himself of such judgment.
    Hence, where a party-had remained for ten years in the undisturbed enjoyment of the property which he purchased, it was no ground for an injunction to stay proceedings for the recovery of the purchase mopey, to say that the original purchase was void by the law? of the State, but that he had neglected to urge that-defence at law, or to say that he had heard that some persons unknown might possibly'at some future time assert a title to the property.
    Such an injunction, if granted, must be dissolved.
    This was an appeal from the. Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi.
    The facts in the case are sufficiently set forth in the opinion of the‘court.
    The case was argued by Mr. Crittenden, for the appellant, and Mr. Coxe, for the appellees.
   Mr.-Justice GRIER

delivered the opinion of the court.

It is not easy to apprehend or appreciate the grounds upon which the complainant in- this case has invoked the did of a court of chancery.

He purchased some.negroes from one Herbert, in 1836, to whom he gave two notes in payment. On one of these, suit was brought and a judgment obtained, which has beer paid and Satisfied. The other remains unpaid, but the complains at has been summoned as garnishee of Herbert in a suit by Warner and Harrison, in which a judgment has also been obtained, and an execution issued ; and he now asks the interposition of- a court of equity, not only to protect him from the judgment and execution, but also to restore to him that portion', of the consideration which has been recovered by due course of law.

The reasons alleged for-this request áre, first, because the negroes purchased by him were brought into the State of Mississippi for sale contrary to the provisions of the constitution of the State; and therefore the contract was illegal and void. And, secondly, because he has been informed that the vender had not a good title to the negroes, but held them as guardian for his .infant Brothers and sisters, “ and ran them off to the State of Mississippi.” As the complainant..still retains the undisturbed possession of .the property without even a threat of molestation, this allegation would seem to have been inserted in the bill not as containing in itself different grounds for an injunction,, but rather to give, some plausibility to the charge of fraud and thus veil the naked deformity of his case.

That a note, given for thé purchase of negroes brought into the State of Mississippi after 1833 (when the constitution was adopted), and. before 1837 (when the legislature imposed penalties to enforce the constitutional prohibition), was not void, has been decided .by this court in the case of Groves v- Slaughter;, 15 Peters, 449, and again at the present term in the case:of Rowan & Harris v. Runnels.

• But even if the alleged-illegality of the contract would have constituted an available defence to the payment of note, it would be a strange abuse of the functions of a court of equity to grant an injunction against the recovery of a judgment at law, because a purchaser with a full knowledge of has defence had omitted or was ashamed to urge it.

It may be stated as' a general principle, with regard to injunctions after a judgment at law, that any fact which proves it to be against conscience to execute such judgment, and of which the party could not have availed himself in a court of law, or of which he might have availed himself at .law, but was prevented by fraud or ■accident, unmixed with any fault or .negligence‘in himself or his agents, will authorize a court of equity to interfere by injunction to restrain the adverse party from availing himself of such judgment. See 2 Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, 887.

It is too plain for argument that none of these conditions can be-predicated of the present case.

The complainant has had the undisturbed enjoyment of his purchase, without challenge of its title, for ten years ; and it is with a bad' grace that he now invokes the aid of a court of equity to shield him from the payment of the consideration, on .the allegation that he had neglected to urge an unconscionable defence, or that he had heard that some persons unknown might possibly at some future time assert a claim to the property. It is in vain to- search the annals of equity jurisprudence, for a precedent of an injunction granted on such bald pretences.

There is no power, the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound, discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing an injunction, It is the strong arm of equity, that never ought to be extended, unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate; and commensurate remedy in damages^ The right must be blear, the injury impending, and threatened so .as to be averted only by the protecting preventive process of injunction.” Baldwin’s Rep. 218. It never should be permitted to issue where it is even suspected that it will be prostituted to the unworthy purpose of delaying, vexing, and harassing suitors at law in the prosecution of their just demands. -

Let die judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States'for die Southern jDis4 trict of Mississippi, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, .it is now here ordered and decreed by this court that the decree of the said Circuit Court, in this cause be and the,same.is hereby affirmed, with costs.