author: Chief Justice Burger

text:
    CHAPPELL et al. v. WALLACE et al.
    No. 82-167.
    Argued April 26, 1983
    Decided June 13, 1983
    Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Assistant Attorney General McGrath argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, David A. Strauss, Robert E. Kopp, and John F. Cordes.

      John Murcko, by appointment of the Court, 459 U. S. 1068, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Mitchell L. Lathrop and Terrence L. Bingman for the Naval Reserve Association; and by Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar, and Nicholas E. Calió for the Washington Legal Foundation.
      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Nanette Dembitz and Burt Neubome for the American Civil Liberties Union; by Leonard B. Boudin for the Bill of Rights Foundation, Inc.; by Barry Sullivan for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; and by Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabritt III, Steven L. Winter, and Steven J. Phillips for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.

   Chief Justice Burger

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to determine whether enlisted military personnel may maintain suits to recover damages from superior officers for injuries sustained as a result of violations of constitutional rights in the course of military service.

Respondents are five enlisted men who serve m the United States Navy on board a eombat naval vessel. Petitioners are the commanding officer of the vessel, four lieutenants, and three noncommissioned officers.

Respondents brought action against these officers seeking damages, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. Respondents alleged that because of their minority race petitioners failed to assign them desirable duties, threatened them, gave them low performance evaluations, and imposed penalties of unusual severity. App. 5-16. Respondents claimed, inter alia, that the actions complained of “deprived [them] of [their] rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the right not to be discriminated against because of [their] race, color or previous condition of servitude . . . .” Id., at 7, 9, 11, 13, 15. Respondents also alleged a conspiracy among petitioners to deprive them of rights in violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1985.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the actions respondents complained of were nonreviewable military decisions, that petitioners were entitled to immunity, and that respondents had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 661 F. 2d 729 (1981). The Court of Appeals assumed that Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), authorized the award of damages for the constitutional violations alleged in their complaint, unless either the actions complained of were not reviewable or petitioners were immune from suit. The Court of Appeals set out certain tests for determining whether the actions at issue are reviewable by a civilian court and, if so, whether petitioners are nonetheless immune from suit. The case was remanded to the District Court for application of these tests.

We granted certiorari, 459 U. S. 966 (1982), and we reverse.

II

This Court’s holding in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, supra, authorized a suit for damages against federal officials whose actions violated an individual’s constitutional rights, even though Congress had not expressly authorized such suits. The Court, in Bivens and its progeny, has expressly cautioned, however, that such a remedy will not be available when “special factors counselling hesitation” are present. Id., at 396. See also Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 18 (1980). Before a Bivens remedy may be fashioned, therefore, a court must take into account any “special factors counselling hesitation.” See Bush v. Lucas, post, at 378.

The “special factors” that bear on the propriety of respondents’ Bivens action also formed the basis of this Court’s decision in Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950). There the Court addressed the question “whether the [Federal] Tort Claims Act extends its remedy to one sustaining ‘incident to [military] service’ what under other circumstances would be an actionable wrong.” Id., at 138. The Court held that, even assuming the Act might be read literally to allow tort actions against the United States for injuries suffered by a soldier in service, Congress did not intend to subject the Government to such claims by a member of the Armed Forces. The Court acknowledged “that if we consider relevant only a part of the circumstances and ignore the status of both the wronged and the wrongdoer in these cases,” id., at 142, the Government would have waived its sovereign immunity under the Act and would be subject to liability. But the Feres Court was acutely aware that it was resolving the question of whether soldiers could maintain tort suits against the Government for injuries arising out of their military service. The Court focused on the unique relationship between the Government and military personnel — noting that no such liability existed before the Federal Tort Claims Act — and held that Congress did not intend to create such liability. The Court also took note of the various “enactments by Congress which provide systems of simple, certain, and uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in the armed services.” Id., at 144. As the Court has since recognized, “[i]n the last analysis, Feres seems best explained by the ‘peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, [and] the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline ....’” United States v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150, 162 (1963), quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110, 112 (1954). See also Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 743-744 (1974); Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S. 666, 673 (1977). Although this case concerns the limitations on the type of nonstatutory damages remedy recognized in Bivens, rather than Congress’ intent in enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Court’s analysis in Feres guides our analysis in this case.

The need for special regulations in relation to military discipline, and the consequent need and justification for a special and exclusive system of military justice, is too obvious to require extensive discussion; no military organization can function without strict discipline and regulation that would be unacceptable in a civilian setting. See Parker v. Levy, supra, at 743-744; Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 94 (1953). In the civilian life of a democracy many command few; in the military, however, this is reversed, for military necessity makes demands on its personnel “without counterpart in civilian life.” Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738, 757 (1975). The inescapable demands of military discipline and obedience to orders cannot be taught on battlefields; the habit of immediate compliance with military procedures and orders must be virtually reflex with no time for debate or reflection. The Court has often noted “the peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors,” United States v. Brown, supra, at 112; see In re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147, 153 (1890), and has acknowledged that “the rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty . . . .” Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion). This becomes imperative in combat, but conduct in combat inevitably reflects the training that precedes combat; for that reason, centuries of experience have developed a hierarchical structure of discipline and obedience to command, unique in its application to the military establishment and wholly different from civilian patterns. Civilian courts must, at the very least, hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the established relationship between enlisted military personnel and their superior officers; that relationship is at the heart of the necessarily unique structure of the Military Establishment.

Many of the Framers of the Constitution had recently experienced the rigors of military life and were well aware of the differences between it and civilian life. In drafting the Constitution they anticipated the kinds of issues raised in this case. Their response was an explicit grant of plenary authority to Congress “To raise and support Armies”; “To provide and maintain a Navy”; and “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” Art. I, § 8, els. 12-14. It is clear that the Constitution contemplated that the Legislative Branch have plenary control over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military Establishment, including regulations, procedures, and remedies related to military discipline; and Congress and the courts have acted in conformity with that view.

Congress’ authority in this area, and the distance between military and civilian life, was summed up by the Court in Orloff v. Willoughby, supra, at 93-94:

“[J]udges are not given the task of running the Army. The responsibility for setting up channels through which . . . grievances can be considered and fairly settled rests upon the Congress and upon the President of the United States and his subordinates. The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters.”

Only recently we restated this principle in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U. S. 57, 64-65 (1981):

“The case arises in the context of Congress’ authority over national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference.”

In Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 4 (1973), we addressed the question of whether Congress’ analogous power over the militia, granted by Art. I, § 8, cl. 16, would be impermissibly compromised by a suit seeking to have a Federal District Court examine the “pattern of training, weaponry and orders” of a State’s National Guard. In denying relief we stated:

“It would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political branches directly responsible — as the Judicial Branch is not — to the electoral process. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches. The ultimate responsibility for these decisions is appropriately vested in branches of the government which are periodically subject to electoral accountability.” Id., at 10 (emphasis in original).

Congress has exercised its plenary constitutional authority over the military, has enacted statutes regulating military life, and has established a comprehensive internal system of justice to regulate military life, taking into account the special patterns that define the military structure. The resulting system provides for the review and remedy of complaints and grievances such as those presented by respondents. Military personnel, for example, may avail themselves of the procedures and remedies created by Congress in Art. 138 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U. S. C. §938, which provides:

“Any member of the armed forces who believes himself wronged by his commanding officer, and who, upon due application to that commanding officer, is refused redress, may complain to any superior commissioned officer, who shall forward the complaint to the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the officer against whom it is made. The officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction shall examine into the complaint and take proper measures for redressing the wrong complained of; and he shall, as soon as possible, send to the Secretary concerned a true statement of that complaint, with the proceedings had thereon.”

The Board for Correction of Naval Records, composed of civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, provides another means with which an aggrieved member of the military “may correct any military record . . . when [the Secretary of the Navy acting through the Board] considers it necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice.” 10 U. S. C. § 1552(a). Respondents’ allegations concerning performance evaluations and promotions, for example, could readily have been made within the framework of this intra-military administrative procedure. Under the Board’s procedures, one aggrieved as respondents claim may request a hearing; if the claims are denied without a hearing, the Board is required to provide a statement of its reasons. 32 CFR §§ 723.3(e)(2), (4), (5), 723.4, 723.5 (1982). The Board is empowered to order retroactive backpay and retroactive promotion. 10 U. S. C. § 1552(c). Board decisions are subject to judicial review and can be set aside if they are arbitrary, capricious, or not based on substantial evidence. See Grieg v. United States, 226 Ct. Cl. 258, 640 F. 2d 1261 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 907 (1982); Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 285, 594 F. 2d 804 (1979).

The special status of the military has required, the Constitution has contemplated, Congress has created, and this Court has long recognized two systems of justice, to some extent parallel: one for civilians and one for military personnel. Bums v. Wilson, 346 U. S., at 140. The special nature of military life — the need for unhesitating and decisive action by military officers and equally disciplined responses by enlisted personnel — would be undermined by a judicially created remedy exposing officers to personal liability at the hands of those they are charged to command. Here, as in Feres, we must be “concerned] with the disruption of ‘[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors’ that might result if the soldier were allowed to hale his superiors into court,” Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S., at 676 (Marshall, J., dissenting), quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U. S., at 112.

Also, Congress, the constitutionally authorized source of authority over the military system of justice, has not provided a damages remedy for claims by military personnel that constitutional rights have been violated by superior officers. Any action to provide a judicial response by way of such a remedy would be plainly inconsistent with Congress’ authority in this field.

Taken together, the unique disciplinary structure of the Military Establishment and Congress’ activity in the field constitute “special factors” which dictate that it would be inappropriate to provide enlisted military personnel a Bivenstype remedy against their superior officers. See Bush v. Lucas, post, p. 367.

Ill

Chief Justice Warren had occasion to note that “our citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes.” Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 181, 188 (1962). This Court has never held, nor do we now hold, that military personnel are barred from all redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service. See, e. g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348 (1980); Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973). But the special relationships that define military life have “supported the military establishment’s broad power to deal with its own personnel. The most obvious reason is that courts are ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might have.” Warren, supra, at 187.

We hold that enlisted military personnel may not maintain a suit to recover damages from a superior officer for alleged constitutional violations. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

       The record shows that one of the respondents availed himself of his remedy before the Board for Correction of Naval Records by filing an application for correction of naval records. The request for relief was denied by the Board based on a failure to exhaust administrative remedies and to present sufficient relevant evidence. App. 67. The applicant was informed of his right to pursue an appeal from this decision, ibid., and the record does not reflect whether any further action was taken.

       Respondents and the Court of Appeals rely on Wilkes v. Dinsman, 7 How. 89 (1849), after remand, Dinsman v. Wilkes, 12 How. 390 (1852). Wilkes, however, is inapposite because it involved a well-recognized common-law cause of action by a marine against his commanding officer for damages suffered as a result of punishment and did not ask the Court to imply a new kind of cause of action. Also, since the time of Wilkes, significant changes have been made establishing a comprehensive system of military justice.

       We leave it for the Court of Appeals to decide on remand whether the portion of respondents’ suit seeking damages flowing from an alleged conspiracy among petitioners in violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1985(3) can be maintained. This issue was not adequately addressed either by the Court of Appeals or in the briefs and oral argument before this Court.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Marshall

license: Public Domain

text:
    HARING, LIEUTENANT, ARLINGTON COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al. v. PROSISE
    No. 81-2169.
    Argued April 20, 1983
    Decided June 13, 1983

      Marshall, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      David R. Lasso argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Charles G. Flinn.

      Norman A. Townsend argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Sebastian K. D. Graber and Bradley S. Stetler.

        Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W. Schmidt, James P. Manak, Evelle J. Younger, Daniel B. Hales, and David Crump filed a brief for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Charles S. Sims and Burt Neubome for the American Civil Liberties Union; and by Stephen A. Saltzburg for the University of Virginia School of Law Post-Conviction Assistance Project.

   Justice Marshall

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The trial court accepted respondent John Franklin Pro-sise’s plea of guilty to one count of manufacturing a controlled substance — phencyclidine. At the hearing at which respondent pleaded guilty, a police officer gave a brief account of the search of respondent’s apartment that led to the discovery of material typically used in manufacturing this substance. Thereafter, Prosise brought a damages action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in Federal District Court against petitioner Gilbert A. Haring and the other officers who participated in the search of his apartment. The question presented by this case is whether respondent’s § 1983 claim is barred by his prior guilty plea.

Í — f

On April 27, 1978, pursuant to a plea agreement, Prosise pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court for Arlington County, Va., to one count of manufacturing phencyclidine. The Commonwealth then called one witness, Detective Henry Allen of the Arlington County Police Department. Allen testified that on September 7, 1977, he responded to a radio call directing him to an Arlington apartment which turned out to be leased to Prosise. By the time he arrived, two uniformed officers had placed Prosise under arrest for the possession of a controlled substance. After entering the apartment, Allen noticed various chemicals in the apartment as well as a quantity of what he believed to be phencyclidine. A warrant was later obtained for a search of the apartment. Allen and Detective Petti then conducted a search which led to the seizure of devices, and chemicals used to manufacture phencyclidine, receipts for such chemicals, a paper containing a formula for making phencyclidine, and two buckets containing traces of the substance.

At the conclusion of Allen’s testimony, the judge accepted Prosise’s guilty plea, finding that it had been entered voluntarily and intelligently and that it had a sufficient basis in fact. On June 23, 1978, the court denied Prosise’s motion to withdraw his plea and sentenced him to 25 years’ imprisonment.

On January 23, 1979, while under confinement in the Arlington Detention Center, Prosise filed a pro se action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against Lt. Gilbert A. Haring and various other members of the Arlington County Police Department who had participated in the search of his apartment. His complaint alleged that the officers had unlawfully searched his apartment prior to obtaining a search warrant, and that after obtaining the warrant the officers conducted a search that exceeded the scope of the warrant.

The District Court granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground that Prosise’s guilty plea to the charge of manufacturing phencyclidine barred his § 1983 claim. The court reasoned that Prosise’s failure to assert his Fourth Amendment claim in state court constituted a waiver of that right, precluding its assertion in any subsequent proceeding. It relied primarily on this Court’s decision in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S. 258 (1973), which held that when a state criminal defendant has pleaded guilty to the offense for which he was indicted by the grand jury, he cannot in a later federal habeas corpus proceeding raise a claim of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury. The District Court stated that, under the reasoning in Tollett, a guilty plea would similarly foreclose federal habeas inquiry into the constitutionality of a search that turned up evidence of the crime charged. The court concluded:

“If a defendant who pleads guilty is foreclosed from obtaining his freedom because of an illegal search and seizure, he should not be allowed to secure damages in a § 1983 suit and thereby litigate the antecedent constitutional question relating to the search that could not otherwise be heard because of Tollett.”

The District Court also appears to have held that Prosise’s plea of guilty constituted an implied admission that the search of his apartment was legal. The court stated that even though the constitutionality of the police conduct was not litigated in the state criminal proceedings, Prosise’s “plea of guilty estops him from asserting a fourth amendment claim in a § 1983 suit [because his] plea of guilty necessarily implied that the search giving rise to the incriminating evidence was lawful.”

The Court of Appeals reversed in pertinent part and remanded for further proceedings. 667 F. 2d 1133 (CA4 1981). It held that the principles governing guilty pleas announced in Tollett are applicable only to subsequent habeas corpus proceedings and that the preclusive effect, if any, of a guilty plea upon subsequent proceedings under §1983 “is to be determined on the basis of other principles, specifically, of collateral estoppel and the full faith and credit statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1738.” Id., at 1136-1137. The Court of Appeals proceeded to examine the law of Virginia “to determine whether, and to what extent, that state would give preclu-sive effect to the criminal judgment here in issue.” Id., at 1138. The court found that under Virginia law “criminal judgments, whether by guilty plea or adjudicated guilt, have no preclusive effect in subsequent civil litigation.” Id., at 1139. Because the courts of Virginia would not give preclu-sive effect to the criminal judgment, it was not entitled to any greater effect under § 1738.

The Court of Appeals concluded that in any event a guilty plea should not “have preclusive effect as to potential but not actually litigated issues respecting the exclusion of evidence on fourth amendment grounds.” Id., at 1140-1141. The court cited the general view of courts and commentators that “among the most critical guarantees of fairness in applying collateral estoppel is the guarantee that the party sought to be estopped had not only a full and fair opportunity but an adequate incentive to litigate ‘to the hilt’ the issues in question.” Id., at 1141. Unlike a criminal defendant who has been convicted after a full trial on the criminal charges, a defendant who pleads guilty has not necessarily had an adequate incentive to litigate “with respect to potential but unlitigated issues related to the exclusion of evidence on fourth amendment grounds.” Ibid.

After the Court of Appeals denied rehearing, id., at 1143, petitioners’ suggestion for rehearing en banc was denied by an equally divided court. Ibid. We granted certiorari, 459 U. S. 904 (1982), to resolve the uncertainty concerning the impact of a guilty plea upon a later suit under § 1983. We now affirm.

l — l

We must decide whether Prosise s § 1983 action to redress an alleged Fourth Amendment violation is barred by the judgment of conviction entered in state court following his guilty plea. Petitioners’ initial argument is that under principles of collateral estoppel generally applied by the Virginia courts, Prosise’s conviction would bar his subsequent civil challenge to police conduct, and that a federal court must therefore give the state judgment the same effect under 28 U. S. C. § 1738.

In Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90 (1980), the Court considered whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel can be invoked against a § 1983 claimant to bar relitigation of a Fourth Amendment claim decided against him in a state criminal proceeding. The Court rejected the view that, because the § 1983 action provides the only route to federal district court for the plaintiff’s constitutional claim, relitigation of the Fourth Amendment question in federal court must be permitted. No support was found in the Constitution or in § 1983 for the “principle that every person asserting a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered opportunity to litigate that right in a federal district court, regardless of” whether that claim has already been decided against him after a full and fair proceeding in state court. Id., at 103. The Court concluded that the doctrine of collateral estoppel therefore applies to §1983 suits against police officers to recover for Fourth Amendment violations. The Court in Allen v. McCurry did not consider precisely how the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied to a Fourth Amendment question that was litigated and decided during the course of a state criminal trial. Id., at 105, n. 25.

We begin by reviewing the principles governing our determination whether a §1983 claimant will be collaterally es-topped from litigating an issue on the basis of a prior state-court judgment. Title 28 U. S. C. § 1738 generally requires “federal courts to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S., at 96. In federal actions, including § 1983 actions, a state-court judgment will not be given collateral-estoppel effect, however, where “the party against whom an earlier court decision is asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or issue decided by the first court.” Id., at 101. Moreover, additional exceptions to collateral estoppel may be warranted in § 1983 actions in light of the “understanding of § 1983” that “the federal courts could step in where the state courts were unable or unwilling to protect federal rights.” Ibid. Cf. id., at 95, n. 7; Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 478, 485-486 (1980) (42 U. S. C. § 1988 authorizes federal courts, in an action under § 1983, to disregard an otherwise applicable state rule of law if the state law is inconsistent with the federal policy underlying § 1983).

The threshold question is whether, under the rules of collateral estoppel applied by the Virginia courts, the judgment of conviction based upon Prosise’s guilty plea would foreclose him in a later civil action from challenging the legality of a search which had produced inculpatory evidence. Because there is no Virginia decision precisely on point, we must look for guidance to Virginia decisions concerning collateral estop-pel generally. While it is often appropriate to look to the law as it is generally applied in other jurisdictions for additional guidance, we need not do so in this case because the state-law question is not a particularly difficult one.

The courts of Virginia have long recognized that a valid final “ ‘judgment rendered upon one cause of action’ ” may bar a party to that action from later litigating “ ‘matters arising in a suit upon a different cause of action.’” Eason v. Eason, 204 Va. 347, 350, 131 S. E. 2d 280, 282 (1963), quoting Kemp v. Miller, 166 Va. 661, 674-675, 186 S. E. 99, 104 (1936). However, “the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.” Ibid. Unless an issue was actually litigated and determined in the former judicial proceeding, Virginia law will not treat it as final. See, e. g., Luke Construction Co. v. Simpkins, 223 Va. 387, 291 S. E. 2d 204 (1982); Eason v. Eason, supra. Compare Brown v. Felsen, 442 U. S. 127, 139, n. 10 (1979). Furthermore, collateral es-toppel precludes the litigation of only those issues necessary to support the judgment entered in the first action. As the Virginia Supreme Court stated in Petrus v. Robbins, 196 Va. 322, 330, 83 S. E. 2d 408, 412 (1954), “[t]o render the judgment conclusive, it must appear by the record of the prior suit that the particular matter sought to be concluded was necessarily tried or determined, — that is, that the verdict could not have been rendered without deciding that matter.” Cf. Block v. Commissioners, 99 U. S. 686, 693 (1879); Segal v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 606 F. 2d 842, 845, n. 2 (CA9 1979).

It is clear from the foregoing that the doctrine of collateral estoppel would not be invoked in this case by the Virginia courts for at least three reasons. First, the legality of the search of Prosise’s apartment was not actually litigated in the criminal proceedings. Indeed, no issue was “actually litigated” in the state proceeding since Prosise declined to contest his guilt in any way. Second, the criminal proceedings did not actually decide against Prosise any issue on which he must prevail in order to establish his § 1983 claim. The only question raised by the criminal indictment and determined by Prosise's guilty plea in Arlington Circuit Court was whether Prosise unlawfully engaged in the manufacture of a controlled substance. This question is simply irrelevant to the legality of the search under the Fourth Amendment or to Prosise’s right to compensation from state officials under § 1983.

Finally, none of the issues in the § 1983 action could have been “necessarily” determined in the criminal proceeding. Specifically, a determination that the county police officers engaged in no illegal police conduct would not have been essential to the trial court’s acceptance of Prosise’s guilty plea. Indeed, a determination that the search of Prosise’s apartment was illegal would have been entirely irrelevant in the context of the guilty plea proceeding. Neither state nor federal law requires that a guilty plea in state court be supported by legally admissible evidence where the accused’s valid waiver of his right to stand trial is accompanied by a confession of guilt. See Kibert v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 660, 222 S. E. 2d 790 (1976); cf. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25, 37-38, and n. 10 (1970); Willett v. Georgia, 608 F. 2d 538, 540 (CA5 1979).

We therefore conclude that Virginia law would not bar Prosise from litigating the validity of the search conducted by petitioners. Accordingly, the issue is not foreclosed under 28 U. S. C. § 1738.

Ill

We turn next to petitioners’ contention that even if Prosise’s claim is not precluded under §1738, this Court should create a special rule of preclusion which nevertheless would bar litigation of his § 1983 claim. As a general matter, even when issues have been raised, argued, and decided in a prior proceeding, and are therefore preclusive under state law, “[r]edetermination of [the] issues [may nevertheless be] warranted if there is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed in prior litigation.” Montana v. United States, 440 U. S. 147, 164, n. 11 (1979). Yet petitioners maintain that Prosise should be barred from litigating an issue that was never raised, argued, or decided, simply because he had an opportunity to raise the issue in a previous proceeding. Petitioners reason that by pleading guilty Prosise should be deemed to have either admitted the legality of the search or waived any Fourth Amendment claim, thereby precluding him from asserting that claim in any subsequent suit. According to petitioners, such a federal rule of preclusion imposed in addition to the requirements of § 1738 is necessary to further important interests in judicial administration.

There is no justification for creating such an anomalous rule. To begin with, Prosise’s guilty plea in no way constituted an admission that the search of his apartment was proper under the Fourth Amendment. During the course of proceedings in Arlington County Circuit Court, Prosise made no concession with respect to the Fourth Amendment claim.

Petitioners contend that we should infer such an admission because Prosise had a substantial incentive to elect to go to trial if he considered his Fourth Amendment claim meritorious since the State would most likely have been unable to obtain a conviction in the absence of the evidence seized from Prosise’s apartment. In our view, however, it is impermissible for a court to assume that a plea of guilty is based on a defendant’s determination that he would be unable to prevail on a motion to suppress evidence. As we recognized in Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 750 (1970), and reaffirmed in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S., at 263, a defendant’s decision to plead guilty may have any number of other motivations:

“For some people, their breach of a State’s law is alone sufficient reason for surrendering themselves and accepting punishment. For others, apprehension and charge, both threatening acts by the Government, jar them into admitting their guilt. In still other cases, the post-indictment accumulation of evidence may convince the defendant and his counsel that a trial is not worth the agony and expense to the defendant and his family.”

Similarly, a prospect of a favorable plea agreement or “the expectation or hope of a lesser sentence . . . are considerations that might well suggest the advisability of a guilty plea without elaborate consideration of whether [a Fourth Amendment challenge to the introduction of inculpatory evidence] might be factually supported.” Tollett v. Henderson, supra, at 268. Therefore, Prosise’s decision not to exercise his right to stand trial cannot be regarded as a concession of any kind that a Fourth Amendment evidentiary challenge would fail. Cf. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U. S., at 137.

We similarly reject the view, argued by petitioners and accepted by the District Court, that by pleading guilty Prosise “waived” any claim involving an antecedent Fourth Amendment violation. Petitioners rely on our prior decisions concerning the scope of federal habeas review of a criminal conviction based upon a guilty plea. See, e. g., Brady v. United States, supra; Tollett v. Henderson, supra; Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U. S. 21 (1974); Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U. S. 283 (1975); Menna v. New York, 423 U. S. 61 (1975) (per curiam). In Brady, we reaffirmed that a guilty plea is not simply “an admission of past conduct,” but a waiver of constitutional trial rights such as the right to call witnesses, to confront and cross-examine one’s accusers, and to trial by jury. Brady, supra, at 747-748, citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 242 (1969). For this reason, a guilty plea “not only must be voluntary but must be [a] knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady, supra, at 748. In Tollett v. Henderson, we concluded that an intelligent and voluntary plea of guilty generally bars habeas review of claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred before the defendant pleaded guilty. We held that, because “[t]he focus of federal habeas inquiry is the nature of [defense counsel’s] advice and the voluntariness of the plea, not the existence as such of an antecedent constitutional infirmity,” 411U. S., at 266, Henderson was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of infirmities in the selection of the grand jury.

Our decisions subsequent to Tollett make clear that a plea of guilty does not bar the review in habeas corpus proceedings of all claims involving constitutional violations antecedent to a plea of guilty. A defendant who pleads guilty may seek to set aside a conviction based on prior constitutional claims which challenge “the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him.” Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U. S., at 30. Because a challenge to an indictment on grounds of prosecu-torial vindictiveness was such a claim, we concluded that a federal court may grant the writ of habeas corpus if it found merit in that constitutional challenge. Id., at 30-31. We also applied this principle in Menna v. New York, supra, in holding that a double jeopardy claim may be raised in federal habeas proceedings following a state-court conviction based on a plea of guilty. In Lefkowitz v. Newsome, supra, we held that Tollett does not apply to preclude litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim subsequent to a guilty plea when the State itself permits the claim to be raised on appeal.

Under our past decisions, as the District Court correctly recognized, a guilty plea results in the defendant’s loss of any meaningful opportunity he might otherwise have had to challenge the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. It does not follow, however, that a guilty plea is a “waiver” of antecedent Fourth Amendment claims that may be given effect outside the confines of the criminal proceeding. The defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment are not among the trial rights that he necessarily waives when he knowingly and voluntarily pleads guilty. Moreover, our decisions provide no support for petitioners’ waiver theory for the simple reason that these decisions did not rest on any principle of waiver. The cases relied on by petitioners all involved challenges to the validity of a state criminal conviction. Our decisions in Tollett and the cases that followed simply recognized that when a defendant is convicted pursuant to his guilty plea rather than a trial, the validity of that conviction cannot be affected by an alleged Fourth Amendment violation because the conviction does not rest in any way on evidence that may have been improperly seized. State law treats a guilty plea as “a break in the chain of events [that] preceded it in the criminal process,” Tollett v. Henderson, supra, at 267. Therefore, the conclusion that a Fourth Amendment claim ordinarily may not be raised in a habeas proceeding following a plea of guilty does not rest on any notion of waiver, but rests on the simple fact that the claim is irrelevant to the constitutional validity of the conviction. As we explained in Menna v. New York, supra, at 62-63, n. 2:

“[W]aiver was not the basic ingredient of this line of cases. The point of these cases is that a counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case. In most cases, factual guilt is a sufficient basis for the State’s imposition of punishment. A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction, if factual guilt is validly established.” (Emphasis in original; citation omitted.)

It is therefore clear that Prosise did not waive his Fourth Amendment claims by pleading guilty in state court. The cases relied on by petitioners do not establish that a guilty plea is a waiver of Fourth Amendment claims. Moreover, the justifications for denying habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims following a guilty plea are inapplicable to an action under §1988. While Prosise’s Fourth Amendment claim is irrelevant to the constitutionality of his criminal conviction, and for that reason may not be the basis of a writ of habeas corpus, that claim is the crux of his § 1983 action which directly challenges the legality of police conduct.

Adoption of petitioners’ rule of preclusion would threaten important interests in preserving federal courts as an available forum for the vindication of constitutional rights. See England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 416-417 (1964); McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268, 281 (1910); Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 40 (1909); Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821). Under petitioners’ rule, whether or not a state judgment would be accorded preclusive effect by state courts, a federal court would be barred from entertaining a § 1983 claim. The rule would require “an otherwise unwilling party to try [Fourth Amendment] questions to the hilt” and prevail in state court “in order to [preserve] the mere possibility” of later bringing a § 1983 claim in federal court. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U. S., at 135. Defendants who have pleaded guilty and who wish to bring a § 1983 claim would be forced to bring that claim in state court, if at all. Not only have petitioners failed to advance any compelling justification for a rule confining the litigation of constitutional claims to a state forum, but such a rule would be wholly contrary to one of the central concerns which motivated the enactment of § 1983, namely, the “grave congressional concern that the state courts had been deficient in protecting federal rights.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S., at 98-99, citing Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 241-242 (1972), and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 180 (1961). See Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496 (1982).

HH <

We conclude that respondent’s conviction m state court does not preclude him from now seeking to recover damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation that was never considered in the state proceedings. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

       On July 17, 1979, the Supreme Court of Virginia denied respondent’s petition for a writ of error to review the trial court’s decision that his plea was voluntary and its refusal to permit the withdrawal of the plea.

       In Metros v. United States District Court for the District of Colorado, 441 F. 2d 313 (1970), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that a guilty plea to one count of possession of heroin must be given preclusive effect in a subsequent civil rights action against police officers who had searched the premises in which the narcotics were found. Other federal courts have concluded, however, that civil rights plaintiffs are not barred from litigating issues that could have been raised in prior proceedings in state court on a different cause of action. See, e. g., New Jersey Ed. Assn. v. Burke, 579 F. 2d 764, 772-774 (CA3 1978); Lombard v. Board of Ed. of City of New York, 502 F. 2d 631, 635-637 (CA2 1974). Since no motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds was ever raised at the state-court proceedings, this case does not present questions as to the scope of collateral estoppel with respect to particular issues that were litigated and decided at a criminal trial in state court. As we did in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 93, n. 2 (1980), we now leave those questions to another day.

       Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 at the time in question provided:
      “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”

       The Fourth Amendment provides:
      “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

       Title 28 U. S. C. § 1738 provides, in relevant part, that the “Acts, records and judicial proceedings” of any State, Territory, or Possession “shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.”

       If the state courts would not give preclusive effect to the prior judgment, “the courts of the United States can accord it no greater efficacy” under § 1738. Union & Planters’ Bank v. Memphis, 189 U. S. 71, 75 (1903).

       We have recognized various other conditions that must also be satisfied before giving preclusive effect to a state-court judgment. See generally Montana v. United States, 440 U. S. 147 (1979). For example, collateral-estoppel effect is not appropriate when “controlling facts or legal principles have changed significantly since the state-court judgment,” id., at 155, or when “special circumstances warrant an exception to the normal rules of preclusion,” ibid.; see, e. g., Porter & Dietsche, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F. 2d 294, 300 (CA7 1979); cf. Montana v. United States, supra, at 163 (preclusive effect to a state-court judgment may be inappropriate when the § 1983 claimant has not “ 'freely and without reservation submitted] his federal claims for decision by the state courts . . . and ha[d] them decided there . . . (quoting England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 419 (1964)).

       It is our practice to accept a reasonable construction of state law by the court of appeals “even if an examination of the state-law issue without such guidance might have justified a different conclusion.” Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 346 (1976). See id., at 346, n. 10. Because we would be particularly hesitant to consider creating a new federal rule of preclusion, however, where a state rule of preclusion may itself be given effect under 28 U. S. C. § 1738, we consider petitioners’ assertion that the Virginia courts would give collateral-estoppel effect to Prosise’s conviction. We emphasize, however, that, standing alone, a challenge to state-law determinations by the court of appeals will rarely constitute an appropriate subject of this Court’s review. See this Court’s Rule 17.

       Like the federal courts, the courts of Virginia apply different rules of preclusion to matters arising in a suit between the same parties and based upon the same causes of action as those involved in the previous proceeding. Under the doctrine of res judicata, “ ‘the judgment in the former [action] is conclusive of the latter, not only as to every question which was decided, but also as to every other matter which the parties might have litigated and had determined, within the issues as they were made or tendered by the pleadings, or as incident to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation, whether the same, as a matter of fact, were or were not considered.’” Eason v. Eason, 204 Va., at 350, 131 S. E. 2d, at 282, quoting Kemp v. Miller, 166 Va., at 674, 186 S. E., at 103-104. This doctrine does not apply, however, to a later action between different parties or to a later action between the same parties on a different claim or demand. Ibid.

       The court below found that, even if the Fourth Amendment issue had been litigated and necessarily determined by the state court, that determination would not be given preclusive effect for an additional reason: under Virginia law, “‘a judgment rendered in a criminal prosecution, whether of conviction or acquittal, does not establish in a subsequent civil action the truth of the facts on which it is rendered.’ ” 667 F. 2d 1133, 1139 (CA4 1981), quoting Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Anderson, 200 Va. 385, 388, 105 S. E. 2d 869, 872 (1958). This general rule is based largely on the traditional principle that collateral estoppel may only be asserted by persons who were either a party or privy to the prior action. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Anderson, supra, at 389, 105 S. E. 2d, at 872. Although the doctrine of mutuality of parties has been abandoned in recent years by the courts of many jurisdictions, see, e. g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322, 326-333 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S. 313 (1971), it has not been rejected by the courts of Virginia. Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Bailey Lumber Co., 221 Va. 638, 272 S. E. 2d 217 (1980).
      In one reported case, however, the highest court of the State has allowed a stranger to a criminal conviction to invoke the doctrine of collateral estop-pel in an action brought against him by the convicted person. Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S. E. 314 (1927). In Eagle, Star the court held that a convicted arsonist was foreclosed from seeking to recover the proceeds of a fire insurance policy. This exception to the mutuality doctrine was expressly limited to cases in which “the plaintiff who brings [the] action has committed the felony, and seeks to recover the fruit of his own crime.” Id., at 105, 140 S. E., at 321. That Eagle, Star announced only a narrow exception to the rule that a criminal conviction may not be given preclusive effect in a later action was confirmed by the court in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Anderson, supra, at 389, 105 S. E. 2d, at 872. See also Smith v. New Dixie Lines, Inc., 201 Va. 466, 472-473, 111 S. E. 2d 434, 438-439 (1959). Since a § 1983 action is not a suit to “recover the fruit” of the plaintiff’s crime, the court below reasonably concluded that, under Virginia law, a criminal conviction would not be given preclusive effect in a § 1983 action with respect to any issues, including issues that were actually and necessarily decided.

       Although petitioners also contend that a special federal rule of preclusion is necessary to preserve important federal interests in judicial administration, we fail to understand how any such interests justify the adoption of a rule that would bar the assertion of constitutional claims which have never been litigated. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S., at 95, n. 7; cf. Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496, 501-502, 512-513, and n. 13 (1982); Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U. S. 461, 476 (1982). Petitioners allude generally to the interests that underlie the principles of collateral estoppel, such as the elimination of “the expense, vexation, waste, and possible inconsistent results of duplicatory litigation.” Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U. S. 464, 470 (1958). Yet these interests are quite simply inapplicable to this case. When a court accepts a defendant’s guilty plea, there is no adjudication whatsoever of any issues that may subsequently be the basis of a § 1983 claim. There is thus no repetitive use of judicial resources and no possibility of inconsistent decisions that could justify precluding the bringing of such claims. Cf. England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U. S., at 419.


text:
    NEW MEXICO et al. v. MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE
    No. 82-331.
    Argued April 19, 1983
    Decided June 13, 1983
    MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Thomas L. Dunigan, Special Assistant Attorney General of New Mexico, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Paul Bardacke, Attorney General, and Paul A. Lenzini.

      George E. Fettinger argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Kathleen A. Miller and Kim Jerome Gottschalk.

      Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Dinkins, and Jacques B. Gelin.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, Steven J. Silver, Special Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth L. Eikenberry, Attorney General of Washington, and James R. Johnson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Arizona et al.; and by David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General, Richard L. Dewsnup, Solicitor General, and Dallin W. Jensen and Michael M. Quealy, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Utah.
      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Frank E. Maynes for the Southern Ute Indian Tribe; by Martin E. Seneca, Jr., for the Uintah and Ouray Tribe; and by Robert C. Brauchli for the White Mountain Apache Tribe.

   Justice Marshall

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We are called upon to decide in this case whether a State may restrict an Indian Tribe’s regulation of hunting and fishing on its reservation. With extensive federal assistance and supervision, the Mescalero Apache Tribe has established a comprehensive scheme for managing the reservation’s fish and wildlife resources. Federally approved tribal ordinances regulate in detail the conditions under which both members of the Tribe and nonmembers may hunt and fish. New Mexico seeks to apply its own laws to hunting and fishing by nonmembers on the reservation. We hold that this application of New Mexico’s hunting and fishing laws is pre-empted by the operation of federal law.

The Mescalero Apache Tribe (Tribe) resides on a reservation located within Otero County in south central New Mexico. The reservation, which represents only a small portion of the aboriginal Mescalero domain, was created by a succession of Executive Orders promulgated in the 1870’s and 1880’s. The present reservation comprises more than 460,000 acres, of which the Tribe owns all but 193.85 acres. Approximately 2,000 members of the Tribe reside on the reservation, along with 179 non-Indians, including resident federal employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health Service.

The Tribe is organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), which authorizes any tribe residing on a reservation to adopt a constitution and bylaws, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary). The Tribe’s Constitution, which was approved by the Secretary on January 12, 1965, requires the Tribal Council

“[t]o protect and preserve the property, wildlife and natural resources of the tribe, and to regulate the conduct of trade and the use and disposition of tribal property upon the reservation, providing that any ordinance directly affecting non-members of the tribe shall be subject to review by the Secretary of [the] Interior.” App. 53a.

The Constitution further provides that the Council shall

“adopt and approve plans of operation to govern the conduct of any business or industry that will further the economic well-being of the members of the tribe, and to undertake any activity of any nature whatsoever, not inconsistent with Federal law or with this constitution, designed for the social or economic improvement of the Mescalero Apache people, . . . subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior.” Ibid.

Anticipating a decline in the sale of lumber which has been the largest income-producing activity within the reservation, the Tribe has recently committed substantial time and resources to the development of other sources of income. The Tribe has constructed a resort complex financed principally by federal funds, and has undertaken a substantial development of the reservation’s hunting and fishing resources. These efforts provide employment opportunities for members of the Tribe, and the sale of hunting and fishing licenses and related services generates income which is used to maintain the tribal government and provide services to Tribe members.

Development of the reservation’s fish and wildlife resources has involved a sustained, cooperative effort by the Tribe and the Federal Government. Indeed, the reservation’s fishing resources are wholly attributable to these recent efforts. Using federal funds, the Tribe has established eight artificial lakes which, together with the reservation’s streams, are stocked by the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, which operates a federal hatchery located on the reservation. None of the waters are stocked by the State. The United States has also contributed substantially to the creation of the reservation’s game resources. Prior to 1966 there were only 13 elk in the vicinity of the reservation. In 1966 and 1967 the National Park Service donated a herd of 162 elk which was released on the reservation. Through its management and range development the Tribe has dramatically increased the elk population, which by 1977 numbered approximately 1,200. New Mexico has not contributed significantly to the development of the elk herd or the other game on the reservation, which includes antelope, bear, and deer.

The Tribe and the Federal Government jointly conduct a comprehensive fish and game management program. Pursuant to its Constitution and to an agreement with the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, the Tribal Council adopts hunting and fishing ordinances each year. The tribal ordinances, which establish bag limits and seasons and provide for licensing of hunting and fishing, are subject to approval by the Secretary under the Tribal Constitution and have been so approved. The Tribal Council adopts the game ordinances on the basis of recommendations submitted by a Bureau of Indian Affairs’ range conservationist who is assisted by full-time conservation officers employed by the Tribe. The recommendations are made in light of the conservation needs of the reservation, which are determined on the basis of annual game counts and surveys. Through the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, the Secretary also determines the stocking of the reservation’s waters based upon periodic surveys of the reservation.

Numerous conflicts exist between state and tribal hunting regulations. For instance, tribal seasons and bag limits for both hunting and fishing often do not coincide with those imposed by the State. The Tribe permits a hunter to kill both a buck and a doe; the State permits only buck to be killed. Unlike the State, the Tribe permits a person to purchase an elk license in two consecutive years. Moreover, since 1977, the Tribe’s ordinances have specified that state hunting and fishing licenses are not required for Indians or non-Indians who hunt or fish on the reservation. The New Mexico Department of Game and Fish has enforced the State’s regulations by arresting non-Indian hunters for illegal possession of game killed on the reservation in accordance with tribal ordinances but not in accordance with state hunting regulations.

In 1977 the Tribe filed suit against the State and the Director of its Game and Fish Department in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, seeking to prevent the State from regulating on-reservation hunting or fishing by members or nonmembers. On August 2,1978, the District Court ruled in favor of the Tribe and granted declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the State’s hunting and fishing laws against any person for hunting and fishing activities conducted on the reservation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 630 F. 2d 724 (1980). Following New Mexico’s petition for a writ of certiorari, this Court vacated the Tenth Circuit’s judgment, 450 U. S. 1036 (1981), and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544 (1981). On remand, the Court of Appeals adhered to its earlier decision. 677 F. 2d 55 (1982). We granted certiorari, 459 U. S. 1014 (1982), and we now affirm.

HH

New Mexico concedes that on the reservation the Tribe exercises exclusive jurisdiction over hunting and fishing by members of the Tribe and may also regulate the hunting and fishing by nonmembers. New Mexico contends, however, that it may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over nonmembers and that therefore its regulations governing hunting and fishing throughout the State should also apply to hunting and fishing by nonmembers on the reservation. Although New Mexico does not claim that it can require the Tribe to permit nonmembers to hunt and fish on the reservation, it claims that, once the Tribe chooses to permit hunting and fishing by nonmembers, such hunting and fishing is subject to any state-imposed conditions. Under this view the State would be free to impose conditions more restrictive than the Tribe’s own regulations, including an outright prohibition. The question in this case is whether the State may so restrict the Tribe’s exercise of its authority.

Our decision in Montana v. United States, supra, does not resolve this question. Unlike this case, Montana concerned lands located within the reservation but not owned by the Tribe or its members. We held that the Crow Tribe could not as a general matter regulate hunting and fishing on those lands. 450 U. S., at 557-567. But as to “land belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust for the Tribe,” we “readily agree[d]” that a Tribe may “prohibit nonmembers from hunting or fishing . . . [or] condition their entry by charging a fee or establish bag and creel limits.” Id., at 557. We had no occasion to decide whether a Tribe may only exercise this authority in a manner permitted by a State.

On numerous occasions this Court has considered the question whether a State may assert authority over a reservation. The decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 560 (1832), reflected the view that Indian tribes were wholly distinct nations within whose boundaries “the laws of [a State] can have no force.” We long ago departed from the “conceptual clarity of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s view in Worcester,” Mescolero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 148 (1973), and have acknowledged certain limitations on tribal sovereignty. For instance, we have held that Indian tribes have been implicitly divested of their sovereignty in certain respects by virtue of their dependent status, that under certain circumstances a State may validly assert authority over the activities of nonmembers on a reservation, and that in exceptional circumstances a State may assert jurisdiction over the on-reservation activities of tribal members.

Nevertheless, in demarcating the respective spheres of state and tribal authority over Indian reservations, we have continued to stress that Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing “ ‘attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory,’” White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracket, 448 U. S. 136, 142 (1980), quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557 (1975). Because of their sovereign status, tribes and their reservation lands are insulated in some respects by a “historic immunity from state and local control,” Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, at 152, and tribes retain any aspect of their historical sovereignty not “inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National Government.” Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, 153 (1980).

The sovereignty retained by tribes includes “the power of regulating their internal and social relations,” United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 381-382 (1886), cited in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 322 (1978). A tribe’s power to prescribe the conduct of tribal members has never been doubted, and our cases establish that “ ‘absent governing Acts of Congress,’ ” a State may not act in a manner that “ ‘infringe[s] on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.’” McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U. S. 164, 171-172 (1973), quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 219-220 (1959). See also Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382, 388-389 (1976) (per curiam).

A tribe’s power to exclude nonmembers entirely or to condition their presence on the reservation is equally well established. See, e. g., Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544 (1981); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S. 130 (1982). Whether a State may also assert its authority over the on-reservation activities of nonmembers raises “[m]ore difficult questions,” Bracker, supra, at 144. While under some circumstances a State may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over non-Indians acting on tribal reservations, see, e. g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes, supra; Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976), such authority may be asserted only if not pre-empted by the operation of federal law. See, e. g., Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U. S. 832 (1982); Bracker, supra; Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 448 U. S. 160 (1980); Williams v. Lee, supra; Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 380 U. S. 685 (1965); Fisher v. District Court, supra; Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U. S. 423 (1971).

In Bracker we reviewed our prior decisions concerning tribal and state authority over Indian reservations and extracted certain principles governing the determination whether federal law pre-empts the assertion of state authority over nonmembers on a reservation. We stated that that determination does not depend “on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but call[s] for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake.” 448 U. S., at 145.

We also emphasized the special sense in which the doctrine of pre-emption is applied in this context. See id., at 143-144; Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra, at 838. Although a State will certainly be without jurisdiction if its authority is pre-empted under familiar principles of pre-emption, we cautioned that our prior cases did not limit pre-emption of state laws affecting Indian tribes to only those circumstances. “The unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty” and the federal commitment to tribal self-sufficiency and self-determination make it “treacherous to import. . . notions of pre-emption that are properly applied to . . . other [contexts].” Bracker, supra, at 143. See also Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra, at 838. By resting pre-emption analysis principally on a consideration of the nature of the competing interests at stake, our cases have rejected a narrow focus on congressional intent to pre-empt state law as the sole touchstone. They have also rejected the proposition that pre-emption requires “‘an express congressional statement to that effect.’” Bracket, supra, at 144 (footnote omitted). State jurisdiction is pre-empted by the operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority. Bracket, supra, at 145. See also Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra, at 845, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941).

Certain broad considerations guide our assessment of the federal and tribal interests. The traditional notions of Indian sovereignty provide a crucial “backdrop,” Bracket, supra, at 143, citing McClanahan, supra, at 172, against which any assertion of state authority must be assessed. Moreover, both the tribes and the Federal Government are firmly committed to the goal of promoting tribal self-government, a goal embodied in numerous federal statutes. We have stressed that Congress’ objective of furthering tribal self-government encompasses far more than encouraging tribal management of disputes between members, but includes Congress’ overriding goal of encouraging “tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.” Bracket, 448 U. S., at 143 (footnote omitted). In part as a necessary implication of this broad federal commitment, we have held that tribes have the power to manage the use of their territory and resources by both members and nonmembers, Merrion, supra, at 137; Bracket, supra, at 151; Montana v. United States, supra; 18 U. S. C. § 1162(b); 25 U. S. C. §§ 1321(b), 1322(b), to undertake and regulate economic activity within the reservation, Merrion, 455 U. S., at 137, and to defray the cost of governmental services by levying taxes. Ibid. Thus, when a tribe undertakes an enterprise under the authority of federal law, an assertion of state authority must be viewed against any interference with the successful accomplishment of the federal purpose. See generally Bracket, supra, at 143 (footnote omitted); Ramah Navajo School Bd., 458 U. S., at 845, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, supra, at 67 (state authority precluded when it “ 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress’ ”).

Our prior decisions also guide our assessment of the state interest asserted to justify state jurisdiction over a reservation. The exercise of state authority which imposes additional burdens on a tribal enterprise must ordinarily be justified by functions or services performed by the State in connection with the on-reservation activity. Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra, at 843, and n. 7; Bracker, supra, at 148-149; Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 448 U. S., at 174 (Powell, J., dissenting). Thus a State seeking to impose a tax on a transaction between a tribe and nonmembers must point to more than its general interest in raising revenues. See, e. g., Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona, 380 U. S. 685 (1965); Bracket, supra; Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra. See also Confederated Tribes, 447 U. S., at 157 (“governmental interest in raising revenues is . . . strongest when the tax is directed at off-reservation value and when the taxpayer is the recipient of state services”); Moe, 425 U. S., at 481-483 (State may require tribal shops to collect state cigarette tax from nonmember purchasers). A State’s regulatory interest will be particularly substantial if the State can point to off-reservation effects that necessitate state intervention. Cf. Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., 433 U. S. 165 (1977).

HH H-4 » — I

With these principles m mind, we turn to New Mexico’s claim that it may superimpose its own hunting and fishing regulations on the Mescalero Apache Tribe’s regulatory scheme.

A

It is beyond doubt that the Mescalero Apache Tribe lawfully exercises substantial control over the lands and resources of its reservation, including its wildlife. As noted supra, at 330, and as conceded by New Mexico, the sovereignty retained by the Tribe under the Treaty of 1852 includes its right to regulate the use of its resources by members as well as nonmembers. In Montana v. United States, we specifically recognized that tribes in general retain this authority.

Moreover, this aspect of tribal sovereignty has been expressly confirmed by numerous federal statutes. Pub. L. 280 specifically confirms the power of tribes to regulate on-reservation hunting and fishing. 67 Stat. 588, 18 U. S. C. § 1162(b); see also 25 U. S. C. § 1321(b). This authority is afforded the protection of the federal criminal law by 18 U. S. C. § 1165, which makes it a violation of federal law to enter Indian land to hunt, trap, or fish without the consent of the tribe. See Montana v. United States, 450 U. S., at 562, n. 11. The 1981 Amendments to the Lacey Act, 16 U. S. C. § 3371 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. Y), further accord tribal hunting and fishing regulations the force of federal law by making it a federal offense “to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase any fish or wildlife . . . taken or possessed in violation of any . . . Indian tribal law.” § 3372(a)(1).

B

Several considerations strongly support the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the Tribe’s authority to regulate hunting and fishing pre-empts state jurisdiction. It is important to emphasize that concurrent jurisdiction would effectively nullify the Tribe’s authority to control hunting and fishing on the reservation. Concurrent jurisdiction would empower New Mexico wholly to supplant tribal regulations. The State would be able to dictate the terms on which nonmembers are permitted to utilize the reservation’s resources. The Tribe would thus exercise its authority over the reservation only at the sufferance of the State. The tribal authority to regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers, which has been repeatedly confirmed by federal treaties and laws and which we explicitly recognized in Montana v. United States, supra, would have a rather hollow ring if tribal authority amounted to no more than this.

Furthermore, the exercise of concurrent state jurisdiction in this case would completely “disturb and disarrange,” Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, supra, at 691, the comprehensive scheme of federal and tribal management established pursuant to federal law. As described supra, at 326, federal law requires the Secretary to review each of the Tribe’s hunting and fishing ordinances. Those ordinances are based on the recommendations made by a federal range conservationist employed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Moreover, the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife stocks the reservation’s waters based on its own determinations concerning the availability of fish, biological requirements, and the fishing pressure created by on-reservation fishing. App. 71a.

Concurrent state jurisdiction would supplant this regulatory scheme with an inconsistent dual system: members would be governed by tribal ordinances, while nonmembers would be regulated by general state hunting and fishing laws. This could severely hinder the ability of the Tribe to conduct a sound management program. Tribal ordinances reflect the specific needs of the reservation by establishing the optimal level of hunting and fishing that should occur, not simply a maximum level that should not be exceeded. State laws in contrast are based on considerations not necessarily relevant to, and possibly hostile to, the needs of the reservation. For instance, the ordinance permitting a hunter to kill a buck and a doe was designed to curb excessive growth of the deer population on the reservation. Id,., at 153a-154a. Enforcement of the state regulation permitting only buck to be killed would frustrate that objective. Similarly, by determining the tribal hunting seasons, bag limits, and permit availability, the Tribe regulates the duration and intensity of hunting. These determinations take into account numerous factors, including the game capacity of the terrain, the range utilization of the game animals, and the availability of tribal personnel to monitor the hunts. Permitting the State to enforce different restrictions simply because they have been determined to be appropriate for the State as a whole would impose on the Tribe the possibly insurmountable task of ensuring that the patchwork application of state and tribal regulations remains consistent with sound management of the reservation’s resources.

Federal law commits to the Secretary and the Tribal Council the responsibility to manage the reservation’s resources. It is most unlikely that Congress would have authorized, and the Secretary would have established, financed, and participated in, tribal management if it were thought that New Mexico was free to nullify the entire arrangement. Requiring tribal ordinances to yield whenever state law is more restrictive would seriously “undermine the Secretary’s [and the Tribe’s] ability to make the wide range of determinations committed to [their] authority.” Bracker, 448 U. S., at 149. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S., at 390; United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544 (1975).

The assertion of concurrent jurisdiction by New Mexico not only would threaten to disrupt the federal and tribal regulatory scheme, but also would threaten Congress’ overriding objective of encouraging tribal self-government and economic development. The Tribe has engaged in a concerted and sustained undertaking to develop and manage the reservation’s wildlife and land resources specifically for the benefit of its members. The project generates funds for essential tribal services and provides employment for members who reside on the reservation. This case is thus far removed from those situations, such as on-reservation sales outlets which market to nonmembers goods not manufactured by the tribe or its members, in which the tribal contribution to an enterprise is de minimis. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U. S., at 154-159. The tribal enterprise in this case clearly involves “value generated on the reservation by activities involving the Trib[e].” Id., at 156-157. The disruptive effect that would result from the assertion of concurrent jurisdiction by New Mexico would plainly “‘stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress/” Ramah Navajo School Bd., 458 U. S., at 845, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S., at 67.

C

The State has failed to “identify any regulatory function or service . . . that would justify” the assertion of concurrent regulatory authority. Bracker, supra, at 148. The hunting and fishing permitted by the Tribe occur entirely on the reservation. The fish and wildlife resources are either native to the reservation or were created by the joint efforts of the Tribe and the Federal Government. New Mexico does not contribute in any significant respect to the maintenance of these resources, and can point to no other “governmental functions it provides,” Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra, at 843, in connection with hunting and fishing on the reservation by nonmembers that would justify the assertion of its authority.

The State also cannot point to any off-reservation effects that warrant state intervention. Some species of game never leave tribal lands, and the State points to no specific interest concerning those that occasionally do. Unlike Puyallup Tribe w Washington Game Dept., this is not a case in which a treaty expressly subjects a tribe’s hunting and fishing rights to the common rights of nonmembers and in which a State’s interest in conserving a scarce, common supply justifies state intervention. 433 U. S., at 174, 175-177. The State concedes that the Tribe’s management has “not had an adverse impact on fish and wildlife outside the Reservation.” App. to Brief in Opposition 35a.

We recognize that New Mexico may be deprived of the sale of state licenses to nonmembers who hunt and fish on the reservation, as well as some federal matching funds calculated in part on the basis of the number of state licenses sold. However, any financial interest the State might have in this case is simply insufficient to justify the assertion of concurrent jurisdiction. The loss of revenues to the State is likely to be insubstantial given the small numbers of persons who purchase tribal hunting licenses. Moreover, unlike Confederated Tribes, supra, and Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976), the activity involved here concerns value generated on the reservation by the Tribe. Finally, as already noted supra, at 342, the State has pointed to no services it has performed in connection with hunting and fishing by nonmembers which justify imposing a tax in the form of a hunting and fishing license, Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra, at 843; Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 448 U. S., at 174 (Powell, J., dissenting), and its general desire to obtain revenues is simply inadequate to justify the assertion of concurrent jurisdiction in this case. See Bracker, 448 U. S., at 150; Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra, at 845.

IV

In this case the governing body of an Indian Tribe, working closely with the Federal Government and under the authority of federal law, has exercised its lawful authority to develop and manage the reservation’s resources for the benefit of its members. The exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by the State would effectively nullify the Tribe’s unquestioned authority to regulate the use of its resources by members and nonmembers, interfere with the comprehensive tribal regulatory scheme, and threaten Congress’ firm commitment to the encouragement of tribal self-sufficiency and economic development. Given the strong interests favoring exclusive tribal jurisdiction and the absence of state interests which justify the assertion of concurrent authority, we conclude that the application of the State’s hunting and fishing laws to the reservation is pre-empted.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

       See 1 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs Laws and Treaties 870-873 (1904). The final boundaries were fixed by the Executive Order of Mar. 24, 1883 (Order of President Arthur). Portions of the reservation were briefly included in a National Forest, but were restored to the Mescalero Reservation by the Executive Order of Feb. 17, 1912 (Order of President Taft). An intervening Executive Order of Mar. 1, 1910, issued by President Taft exempted from the reservation two “small holdings claims” covering settlements located before the establishment of the reservation. The Tribe has since purchased all but 23.8 acres of the land covered by these claims.

       These lands comprise the 23.8 acres remaining of the “small holdings claims,” see n. 1, supra; 10 acres granted to St. Joseph’s Catholic Church by the Act of Mar. 29,1928, ch. 299, 45 Stat. 1716; and the unimproved and unoccupied 160-acre “Dodson Tract” in the northwest portion of the reservation. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 2, n. 3.

       Financing for the complex, the Inn of the Mountain Gods, came principally from the Economic Development Administration (EDA), an agency of the United States Department of Commerce, and other federal sources. In addition, the Tribe obtained a $6 million loan from the Bank of New Mexico, 90% of which was guaranteed by the Secretary of the Interior under the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), and 10% of which was guaranteed by tribal funds. Certain additional facilities at the Inn were completely funded by the EDA as public works projects, and other facilities received 50% funding from the EDA. App. to Brief in Opposition 7a-8a.

       Income from the sale of hunting and fishing licenses, “package hunts” which combine hunting and fishing with use of the facilities at the Inn, and campground and picnicking permits totaled $269,140 in 1976 and $271,520 in 1977. The vast majority of the nonmember hunters and fishermen on the reservation are not residents of the State of New Mexico.

       The State has not stocked any waters on the reservation since 1976.

       These efforts have included controlling and reducing the population of other animals, such as wild horses and cattle, which compete for the available forage on the reservation.

       The New Mexico Department of Game and Fish issued a permit for the importation of the elk from Wyoming into New Mexico. The Department has provided the Tribe with any management assistance which the Tribe has requested; such requests have been limited. Id., at 16a.

       That agreement, which provides for the stocking of the reservation’s artificial lakes by the Bureau, obligates the Tribe to “designate those waters of the Reservation which shall be open to public fishing” and to “establish regulations for the conservation of the fishery resources.” App. 71a.

       These conflicts have persisted despite the parties’ stipulation that the New Mexico State Game Commission has attempted to “accommodate the preferences of the Mescalero Apache Tribe and other Indian tribes.” App. to Brief in Opposition 25a.

       Prior to 1977 the Tribe consented to the application to the reservation of the State’s hunting and fishing regulations.

       Brief for Petitioners 7, 12, 20; Tr. of Oral Arg. 7.

       Even so, the Court acknowledged that “Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands.” 450 U. S., at 565. The Court stressed that in Montana the pleadings “did not allege that non-Indian hunting and fishing on [non-Indian] reservation lands [had] impaired [the Tribe’s reserved hunting and fishing privileges],” id., at 558, n. 6, or “that non-Indian hunting and fishing on fee lands imperil the subsistence or welfare of the Tribe,” id., at 566, and that the existing record failed to suggested “that such non-Indian hunting and fishing . . . threaten the Tribe’s political or economic security.” Ibid.

       See, e. g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 667-668 (1974); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191 (1978).

       See, e. g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U. S. 134 (1980); Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976).

       See Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., 433 U. S. 165 (1977). Puyallup upheld the State of Washington’s authority to regulate on-reservation fishing by tribal members. Like Montana v. United States, the decision in Puyallup rested in part on the fact that the dispute centered on lands which, although located within the reservation boundaries, no longer belonged to the Tribe; all but 22 of the 18,000 acres had been alienated in fee simple. The Court also relied on a provision of the Indian treaty which qualified the Indians’ fishing rights by requiring that they be exercised “in common with all citizens of the Territory,” 433 U. S., at 175, and on the State’s interest in conserving a scarce, common resource. Id., at 174. 175-177.

       The exercise of state authority may also be barred by an independent barrier — inherent tribal sovereignty — if it “unlawfully infringefs] ‘on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.’ ” White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 142 (1980), quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959). “See also Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 502 (1979); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382 (1976) (per curiam); Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U. S. 423 (1971).” 448 U. S., at 142-143.

       For example, the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), states: “It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress ... to help develop and utilize Indian resources, both physical and human, to a point where the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for the utilization and management of their own resources and where they will enjoy a standard of living from their own productive efforts comparable to that enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring communities.” § 1451. Similar policies underlie the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U. S. C. § 450 et seq., as well as the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), pursuant to which the Mescalero Apache Tribe adopted its Constitution. The “intent and purpose of the Reorganization Act was ‘to rehabilitate the Indian’s economic life and to give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and paternalism.’” Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 152 (1973), quoting H. R. Rep. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934). The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U. S. C. § 1301 et seq., likewise reflects Congress’ intent “to promote the well-established federal ‘policy of furthering Indian self-government.’” Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 62 (1978), quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974).

       Our cases have recognized that tribal sovereignty contains a “significant geographical component.” Bracker, supra, at 151. Thus the off-reservation activities of Indians are generally subject to the prescriptions of a “nondiscriminatory state law” in the absence of “express federal law to the contrary.” Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, at 148-149.

       New Mexico concedes that the Tribe originally relied on wildlife for subsistence, that tribal members freely took fish and game in ancestral territory, and that the Treaty of July 1, 1852, 10 Stat. 979, between the Tribe and the United States confirmed the Tribe’s rights regarding hunting and fishing on the small portion of the aboriginal Mescalero domain that was eventually set apart as the Tribe’s reservation. Brief for Petitioners 12. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U. S. 404 (1968); Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544, 558-559 (1981). See also United States v. Winans, 198 U. S. 371, 381 (1905) (recognizing that hunting and fishing “were not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed”).

       The Tribe’s authority was also confirmed more generally by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U. S. C. § 476, which reaffirms “all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law.”

       The provision of Pub. L. 280 granting States criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations under certain conditions provides that States are not thereby authorized to
      “deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing or regulation thereof.’’ 18 U. S. C. § 1162(b) (emphasis added). The same language is contained in 25 U. S. C. § 1321(b).

       Sections 3376(a) and (b) authorize the Secretary to enter into agreements with Indian tribes to enforce the provisions of the law by, inter alia, making arrests and serving process.

       In addition, as noted earlier, supra, at 327-328, the Federal Government played a substantial role in the development of the Tribe’s resources.

       The Secretary assumed precisely the opposite is true — that state jurisdiction is pre-empted — when he approved a tribal ordinance which provided that nonmembers hunting and fishing on the reservation need not obtain state licenses. That assumption is also embodied in an agreement between the Tribe and the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, see n. 8, supra, which openly acknowledges that tribal regulations need not agree with state laws. The agreement provides that “[ijnsofar as possible said regulations shall be in agreement with State regulations.” App. 71a. (Emphasis added.)

       Congress’ intent to pre-empt state regulation of hunting and fishing on reservations is reinforced by Pub. L. 280. That law, which grants limited criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian reservations to States which meet certain requirements, contains a provision which expressly excludes authority over hunting and fishing. See n. 21, supra. Pub. L. 280 evidences Congress’ understanding that tribal regulation of hunting and fishing should generally be insulated from state interference, since “Congress would not have jealously protected” tribal exemption from conflicting state hunting and fishing laws “had it thought that the States had residual power to impose such [laws] in any event.” McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 411 U. S. 164, 177 (1973). In McClanahan we concluded that the Buck Act, 4 U. S. C. § 105 et seq., which contains a provision exempting Indians from a grant to the States of general authority to tax residents of federal areas, likewise provided evidence of Congress’ intent to exempt Indians from state taxes. Ibid.

       In Washington v. Confederated Tribes the Court held that the sales of tribal smokeshops which sold cigarettes to nonmembers were subject to the state sales and cigarette taxes. 447 U. S., at 154-159. The Court relied on the fact that the tribal smokeshops were not marketing “value generated on the reservation,” id., at 156-157, but instead were seeking merely to market a “tax exemption to nonmembers who do not receive significant tribal services.” Id., at 157.

       We reject the State’s claim that the Tribe’s ability to manage its wildlife resources suffers from a lack of enforcement powers and that therefore concurrent jurisdiction is necessary to fill the void. The Tribe clearly can exclude or expel those who violate tribal ordinances. Trespassers may be referred for prosecution under 18 U. S. C. § 1165. Furthermore, the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981,16 U. S. C. § 3371 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. V), make it a federal offense to violate any tribal law, provide for civil and criminal penalties and authorize forfeiture of fish or wildlife as well as vehicles or equipment used in the violation, §§3373, 3374, and provide that the Secretary can grant authority to tribal personnel to enforce these provisions. §§ 3375(a), (b).

       The State receives federal matching funds through the Pittman-Robertson Act, 16 U. S. C. § 669 (hunting), and the Dingell-Johnson Act, 16 U. S. C. §777 (fishing), which are allocated through a formula which considers the number of licenses sold and the number of acres in the State.

       In recent years the Tribe sold 10 antelope licenses compared to 3,500 for the State, 50 elk licenses compared to 14,000 by the State, and 500 deer licenses compared to 100,000 for the State.

       New Mexico concedes that it has expended no Dingell-Johnson funds for projects within the reservation during the last six to eight years. App. to Brief in Opposition 17a-18a. It presented no evidence as to expenditures of Pittman-Robertson funds within the reservation.