author: Justice O’Connor Justice Brennan, Justice White, Justice Marshall, Justice Stevens,

text:
    IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v. LOPEZ-MENDOZA et al.
    No. 83-491.
    Argued April 18, 1984
    Decided July 5, 1984

      O’Connor, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, and IV, in which Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part V, in which Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., post,, p. 1051, White, J., post, p. 1052, Marshall, J., post, p. 1Ó60, and Stevens, J., post, p. 1061, filed dissenting opinions.

      Deputy Solicitor General Frey argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, Kathryn A. Oberly, Barbara L. Herwig, Marshall Tamor Golding, and Howard S. Scher.

      Mary L. Heen argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Burt Neuborne, Charles S. Sims, John E. Huerta, Joaquin G. Avila, Morris J. Bailer, and Charles H. Barr.

   Justice O’Connor

announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, and IV, and an opinion with respect to Part V, in which Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist joined.

This litigation requires us to decide whether an admission of unlawful presence in this country made subsequently to an allegedly unlawful arrest must be excluded as evidence in a civil deportation hearing. We hold that the exclusionary rule need not be applied in such a proceeding.

I

Respondents Adan Lopez-Mendoza and Elias Sandoval-Sanchez, both citizens of Mexico, were summoned to separate deportation proceedings in California and Washington, and both were ordered deported. They challenged the regularity of those proceedings on grounds related to the lawfulness of their respective arrests by officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). On administrative appeal the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), an agency of the Department of Justice, affirmed the deportation orders.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed Sandoval-Sanchez’ deportation order and vacated and remanded Lopez-Mendoza’s deportation order. 705 F. 2d 1059 (1983). It ruled that Sandoval-Sanchez’ admission of his illegal presence in this country was the fruit of an unlawful arrest, and that the exclusionary rule applied in a deportation proceeding. Lopez-Mendoza’s deportation order was vacated and his case remanded to the BIA to determine whether the Fourth Amendment had been violated in the course of his arrest. We granted certiorari, 464 U. S. 1037 (1984).

A

Respondent Lopez-Mendoza was arrested in 1976 by INS agents at his place of employment, a transmission repair shop in San Mateo, Cal. Responding to a tip, INS investigators arrived at the shop shortly before 8 a. m. The agents had not sought a warrant to search the premises or to arrest any of its occupants. The proprietor of the shop firmly refused to allow the agents to interview his employees during working hours. Nevertheless, while one agent engaged the proprietor in conversation another entered the shop and approached Lopez-Mendoza. In response to the agent’s questioning, Lopez-Mendoza gave his name and indicated that he was from Mexico with no close family ties in the United States. The agent then placed him under arrest. Lopez-Mendoza underwent further questioning at INS offices, where he admitted he was born in Mexico, was still a citizen of Mexico, and had entered this country without inspection by immigration authorities. Based on his answers, the agents prepared a “Record of Deportable Alien” (Form 1-213), and an affidavit which Lopez-Mendoza executed, admitting his Mexican nationality and his illegal entry into this country.

A hearing was held before an Immigration Judge. Lopez-Mendoza’s counsel moved to terminate the proceeding on the ground that Lopez-Mendoza had been arrested illegally. The judge ruled that the legality of the arrest was not relevant to the deportation proceeding and therefore declined to rule on the legality of Lopez-Mendoza’s arrest. Matter of Lopez-Mendoza, No. [ AXX XXX XXX ] (INS, Dec. 21, 1977), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 97a. The Form 1-213 and the affidavit executed by Lopez-Mendoza were received into evidence without objection from Lopez-Mendoza. On the basis of this evidence the Immigration Judge found Lopez-Mendoza deportable. Lopez-Mendoza was granted the option of voluntary departure.

The BIA dismissed Lopez-Mendoza’s appeal. It noted that “[t]he mere fact of an illegal arrest has no bearing on a subsequent deportation proceeding,” In re Lopez-Mendoza, No. [ AXX XXX XXX ] (BIA, Sept. 19, 1979), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 100a, 102a, and observed that Lopez-Mendoza had not objected to the admission into evidence of Form 1-213 and the affidavit he had executed. Id., at 103a. The BIA also noted that the exclusionary rule is not applied to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim, and that the BIA had previously concluded that application of the rule in deportation proceedings to deter unlawful INS conduct was inappropriate. Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70 (BIA 1979).

The Court of Appeals vacated the order of deportation and remanded for a determination whether Lopez-Mendoza’s Fourth Amendment rights had been violated when he was arrested.

B

Respondent Sandoval-Sanchez (who is not the same individual who was involved in Matter of Sandoval, supra) was arrested in 1977 at his place of employment, a potato processing plant in Pasco, Wash. INS Agent Bower and other officers went to the plant, with the permission of its personnel manager, to check for illegal aliens. During a change in shift, officers stationed themselves at the exits while Bower and a uniformed Border Patrol agent entered the plant. They went to the lunchroom and identified themselves as immigration officers. Many people in the room rose and headed for the exits or milled around; others in the plant left their equipment and started running; still others who were entering the plant turned around and started walking back out. The two officers eventually stationed themselves at the main entrance to the plant and looked for passing employees who averted their heads, avoided eye contact, or tried to hide themselves in a group. Those individuals were addressed with innocuous questions in English. Any who could not respond in English and who otherwise aroused Agent Bower’s suspicions were questioned in Spanish as to their right to be in the United States.

Respondent Sandoval-Sanchez was in a line of workers entering the plant. Sandoval-Sanchez testified that he did not realize that immigration officers were checking people entering the plant, but that he did see standing at the plant entrance a man in uniform who appeared to be a police officer. Agent Bower testified that it was probable that he, not his partner, had questioned Sandoval-Sanchez at the plant, but that he could not be absolutely positive. The employee he thought he remembered as Sandoval-Sanchez had been “very evasive,” had averted his head, turned around, and walked away when he saw Agent Bower. App. 137, 138. Bower was certain that no one was questioned about his status unless his actions had given the agents reason to believe that he was an undocumented alien.

Thirty-seven employees, including Sandoval-Sanchez, were briefly detained at the plant and then taken to the county jail. About one-third immediately availed themselves of the option of voluntary departure and were put on a bus to Mexico. Sandoval-Sanchez exercised his right to a deportation hearing. Sandoval-Sanchez was then questioned further, and Agent Bower recorded Sandoval-Sanchez’ admission of unlawful entry. Sandoval-Sanchez contends he was not aware that he had a right to remain silent.

At his deportation hearing Sandoval-Sanchez contended that the evidence offered by the INS should be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful arrest. The Immigration Judge considered and rejected Sandoval-Sanchez’ claim that he had been illegally arrested, but ruled in the alternative that the legality of the arrest was not relevant to the deportation hearing. Matter of Sandoval-Sanchez, No. [ AXX XXX XXX ] (INS, Oct. 7, 1977), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 104a. Based on the written record of Sandoval-Sanchez’ admissions the Immigration Judge found him deportable and granted him voluntary departure. The BIA dismissed Sandoval-Sanchez’ appeal. In re Sandoval-Sanchez, No. [ AXX XXX XXX ] (BIA, Feb. 21, 1980). It concluded that the circumstances of the arrest had not affected the voluntariness of his recorded admission, and again declined to invoke the exclusionary rule, relying on its earlier decision in Matter of Sandoval, supra.

On appeal the Court of Appeals concluded that Sandoval-Sanchez’ detention by the immigration officers violated the Fourth Amendment, that the statements he made were a product of that detention, and that the exclusionary rule barred their use in a deportation hearing. The deportation order against Sandoval-Sanchez was accordingly reversed.

f — n J — 4

A deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful entry, though entering or remaining unlawfully in this country is itself a crime. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1302,1306, 1325. The deportation hearing looks prospectively to the respondent’s right to remain in this country in the future. Past conduct is relevant only insofar as it may shed light on the respondent’s right to remain. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1251, 1252(b); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585, 591 (1913); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 730 (1893).

A deportation hearing is held before an immigration judge. The judge’s sole power is to order deportation; the judge cannot adjudicate guilt or punish the respondent for any crime related to unlawful entry into or presence in this country. Consistent with the civil nature of the proceeding, various protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial do not apply in a deportation hearing. The respondent must be given “a reasonable opportunity to be present at [the] proceeding,” but if the respondent fails to avail himself of that opportunity the hearing may proceed in his absence. 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b). In many deportation cases the INS must show only identity and alienage; the burden then shifts to the respondent to prove the time, place, and manner of his entry. See 8 U. S. C. § 1361; Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70 (BIA 1979). A decision of deportability need be based only on “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence,” 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(4). The BIA for its part has required only “clear, unequivocal and convincing” evidence of the respondent’s deportability, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 8 CFR §242.14(a) (1984). The Courts of Appeals have held, for example that the absence of Miranda warnings does not render an otherwise voluntary statement by the respondent inadmissible in a deportation case. Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F. 2d 803, 808 (CA1 1977); Avila-Gallegos v. INS, 525 F. 2d 666, 667 (CA2 1975); Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519 F. 2d 397, 399-401 (CA7 1975). See also Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217, 236-237 (1960) (search permitted incidental to an arrest pursuant to an administrative warrant issued by the INS); Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, 531 (1954) (Ex Post Facto Clause has no application to deportation); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524, 544-546 (1952) (Eighth Amendment does not require bail to be granted in certain deportation cases); United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149, 157 (1923) (involuntary confessions admissible at deportation hearing). In short, a deportation hearing is intended to provide a streamlined determination of eligibility to remain in this country, nothing more. The purpose of deportation is not to punish past transgressions but rather to put an end to a continuing violation of the immigration laws.

III

The “body” or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation occurred. See Ger- stein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119 (1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519, 522 (1952); United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, supra, at 158. A similar rule applies in forfeiture proceedings directed against contraband or forfeitable property. See, e. g., United States v. Eighty-Eight Thousand, Five Hundred Dollars, 671 F. 2d 293 (CA8 1982); United States v. One (1) 1971 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, 508 F. 2d 351 (CA9 1974); United States v. One 1965 Buick, 397 F. 2d 782 (CA6 1968).

On this basis alone the Court of Appeals’ decision as to respondent Lopez-Mendoza must be reversed. At his deportation hearing Lopez-Mendoza objected only to the fact that he had been summoned to a deportation hearing following an unlawful arrest; he entered no objection to the evidence offered against him. The BIA correctly ruled that “[t]he mere fact of an illegal arrest has no bearing on a subsequent deportation proceeding.” In re Lopez-Mendoza, No. [ AXX XXX XXX ] (BIA, Sept. 19, 1979), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 102a.

> HH

Respondent Sandoval-Sanchez has a more substantial claim. He objected not to his compelled presence at a deportation proceeding, but to evidence offered at that proceeding. The general rule in a criminal proceeding is that statements and other evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful, warrantless arrest are suppressible if the link between the evidence and the unlawful conduct is not too attenuated. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963). The reach of the exclusionary rule beyond the context of a criminal prosecution, however, is less clear. Although this Court has once stated in dictum that “[i]t may be assumed that evidence obtained by the [Labor] Department through an illegal search and seizure cannot be made the basis of a finding in deportation proceedings,” United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, supra, at 155, the Court has never squarely addressed the question before. Lower court decisions dealing with this question are sparse.

In United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976), this Court set forth a framework for deciding in what types of proceeding application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate. Imprecise as the exercise may be, the Court recognized in Janis that there is no choice but to weigh the likely social benefits of excluding unlawfully seized evidence against the likely costs. On the benefit side of the balance “the ‘prime purpose’ of the [exclusionary] rule, if not the sole one, ‘is to deter future unlawful police conduct.’ ” Id., at 446, quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 347 (1974). On the cost side there is the loss of often probative evidence and all of the secondary costs that flow from the less accurate or more cumbersome adjudication that therefore occurs.

At stake in Janis was application of the exclusionary rule in a federal civil tax assessment proceeding following, the unlawful seizure of evidence by state, not federal, officials. The Court noted at the outset that “[i]n the complex and turbulent history of the rule, the Court never has applied it to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state.” 428 U. S., at 447 (footnote omitted). Two factors in Janis suggested that the deterrence value of the exclusionary rule in the context of that case was slight. First, the state law enforcement officials were already “punished” by the exclusion of the evidence in the state criminal trial as a result of the same conduct. Id,., at 448. Second, the evidence was also excludable in any federal criminal trial that might be held. Both factors suggested that further application of the exclusionary rule in the federal civil proceeding would contribute little more to the deterrence of unlawful conduct by state officials. On the cost side of the balance, Janis focused simply on the loss of “concededly relevant and reliable evidence.” Id., at 447. The Court concluded that, on balance, this cost outweighed the likely social benefits achievable through application of the exclusionary rule in the federal civil proceeding.

While it seems likely that the deterrence value of applying the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings would be higher than it was in Janis, it is also quite clear that the social costs would be very much greater as well. Applying the Janis balancing test to the benefits and costs of excluding concededly reliable evidence from a deportation proceeding, we therefore reach the same conclusion as in Janis.

The likely deterrence value of the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings is difficult to assess. On the one hand, a civil deportation proceeding is a civil complement to a possible criminal prosecution, and to this extent it resembles the civil proceeding under review in Janis. The INS does not suggest that the exclusionary rule should not continue to apply in criminal proceedings against an alien who unlawfully enters or remains in this country, and the prospect of losing evidence that might otherwise be used in a criminal prosecution undoubtedly supplies some residual deterrent to unlawful conduct by INS officials. But it must be acknowledged that only a very small percentage of arrests of aliens are intended or expected to lead to criminal prosecutions. Thus the arresting officer’s primary objective, in practice, will be to use evidence in the civil deportation proceeding. Moreover, here, in contrast to Janis, the agency officials who effect the unlawful arrest are the same officials who subsequently bring the deportation action. As recognized in Janis, the exclusionary rule is likely to be most effective when applied to such “intrasovereign” violations.

Nonetheless, several other factors significantly reduce the likely deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in a civil deportation proceeding. First, regardless of how the arrest is effected, deportation will still be possible when evidence not derived directly from the arrest is sufficient to support deportation. As the BIA has recognized, in many deportation proceedings “the sole matters necessary for the Government to establish are the respondent’s identity and alienage — at which point the burden shifts to the respondent to prove the time, place and manner of entry.” Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec., at 79. Since the person and identity of the respondent are not themselves suppressible, see supra, at 1039-1040, the INS must prove only alienage, and that will sometimes be possible using evidence gathered independently of, or sufficiently attenuated from, the original arrest. See Matter of Sandoval, supra, at 79; see, e. g., Avila-Gallegos v. INS, 525 F. 2d 666 (CA2 1975). The INS’s task is simplified in this regard by the civil nature of the proceeding. As Justice Brandéis stated: “Silence is often evidence of the most persuasive character. . . . [T]here is no rule of law which prohibits officers charged with the administration of the immigration law from drawing an inference from the silence of one who is called upon to speak. ... A person arrested on the preliminary warrant is not protected by a presumption of citizenship comparable to the presumption of innocence in a criminal case. There is no provision which forbids drawing an adverse inference from the fact of standing mute.” United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S., at 163-154.

The second factor is a practical one. In the course of a year the average INS agent arrests almost 500 illegal aliens. Brief for Petitioner 38. Over 97.5% apparently agree to voluntary deportation without a formal hearing. 705 F. 2d, at 1071, n. 17. Among the remainder who do request a formal hearing (apparently a dozen or so in all, per officer, per year) very few challenge the circumstances of their arrests. As noted by the Court of Appeals, “the BIA was able to find only two reported immigration cases since 1899 in which the [exclusionary] rule was applied to bar unlawfully seized evidence, only one other case in which the rule’s application was specifically addressed, and fewer than fifty BIA proceedings since 1952 in which a Fourth Amendment challenge to the introduction of evidence was even raised.” Id., at 1071. Every INS agent knows, therefore, that it is highly unlikely that any particular arrestee will end up challenging the lawfulness of his arrest in a formal deportation proceeding. When an occasional challenge is brought, the consequences from the point of view of the officer’s overall arrest and deportation record will be trivial. In these circumstances, the arresting officer is most unlikely to shape his conduct in anticipation of the exclusion of evidence at a formal deportation hearing.

Third, and perhaps most important, the INS has its own comprehensive scheme for deterring Fourth Amendment violations by its officers. Most arrests of illegal aliens away from the border occur during farm, factory, or other workplace surveys. Large numbers of illegal aliens are often arrested at one time, and conditions are understandably chaotic. See Brief for Petitioner in INS v. Delgado, O. T. 1983, No. 82-1271, pp. 3-5. To safeguard the rights of those who are lawfully present at inspected workplaces the INS has developed rules restricting stop, interrogation, and arrest practices. Id., at 7, n. 7, 32-40, and n. 25. These regulations require that no one be detained without reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage, and that no one be arrested unless there is an admission of illegal alienage or other strong evidence thereof. New immigration officers receive instruction and examination in Fourth Amendment law, and others receive periodic refresher courses in law. Brief for Petitioner 39-40. Evidence seized through intentionally unlawful conduct is excluded by Department of Justice policy from the proceeding for which it was obtained. See Memorandum from Benjamin R. Civiletti to Heads of Offices, Boards, Bureaus and Divisions, Violations of Search and Seizure Law (Jan. 16, 1981). The INS also has in place a procedure for investigating and punishing immigration officers who commit Fourth Amendment violations. See Office of General Counsel, INS, U. S. Dept, of Justice, The Law of Arrest, Search, and Seizure for Immigration Officers 35 (Jan. 1983). The INS’s attention to Fourth Amendment interests cannot guarantee that constitutional violations will not occur, but it does reduce the likely deterrent value of the exclusionary rule. Deterrence must be measured at the margin.

Finally, the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings is undermined by the availability of alternative remedies for institutional practices by the INS that might violate Fourth Amendment rights. The INS is a single agency, under central federal control, and engaged in operations of broad scope but highly repetitive character. The possibility of declaratory relief against the agency thus offers a means for challenging the validity of INS practices, when standing requirements for bringing such an action can be met. Cf. INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210 (1984).

Respondents contend that retention of the exclusionary rule is necessary to safeguard the Fourth Amendment rights of ethnic Americans, particularly the Hispanic-Americans lawfully in this country. We recognize that respondents raise here legitimate and important concerns. But application of the exclusionary rule to civil deportation proceedings can be justified only if the rule is likely to add significant protection to these Fourth Amendment rights. The exclusionary rule provides no remedy for completed wrongs; those lawfully in this country can be interested in its application only insofar as it may serve as an effective deterrent to future INS misconduct. For the reasons we have discussed we conclude that application of the rule in INS civil deportation proceedings, as in the circumstances discussed in Janis, “is unlikely to provide significant, much less substantial, additional deterrence.” 428 U. S., at 458. Important as it is to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of all persons, there is no convincing indication that application of the exclusionary rule in civil deportation proceedings will contribute materially to that end.

On the other side of the scale, the social costs of applying the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings are both unusual and significant. The first cost is one that is unique to continuing violations of the law. Applying the exclusionary rule in proceedings that are intended not to punish past transgressions but to prevent their continuance or renewal would require the courts to close their eyes to ongoing violations of the law. This Court has never before accepted costs of this character in applying the exclusionary rule.

Presumably no one would argue that the exclusionary rule should be invoked to prevent an agency from ordering corrective action at a leaking hazardous waste dump if the evidence underlying the order had been improperly obtained, or to compel police to return contraband explosives or drugs to their owner if the contraband had been unlawfully seized. On the rare occasions that it has considered costs of this type the Court has firmly indicated that the exclusionary rule does not extend this far. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 54 (1951); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 710 (1948). The rationale for these holdings is not difficult to find. “Both Trupiano and Jeffers concerned objects the possession of which, without more, constitutes a crime. The repossession of such per se contraband by Jeffers and Trupiano would have subjected them to criminal penalties. The return of the contraband would clearly have frustrated the express public policy against the possession of such objects.” One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U. S. 693, 699 (1965) (footnote omitted). Precisely the same can be said here. Sandoval-Sanchez is a person whose unregistered presence in this country, without more, constitutes a crime. His release within our borders would immediately subject him to criminal penalties. His release would clearly frustrate the express public policy against an alien’s unregistered presence in this country. Even the objective of deterring Fourth Amendment violations should not require such a result. The constable’s blunder may allow the criminal to go free, but we have never suggested that it allows the criminal to continue in the commission of an ongoing crime. When the crime in question involves unlawful presence in this country, the criminal may go free, but he should not go free within our borders.

Other factors also weigh against applying the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings. The INS currently operates a deliberately simple deportation hearing system, streamlined to permit the quick resolution of very large numbers of deportation actions, and it is against this backdrop that the costs of the exclusionary rule must be assessed. The costs of applying the exclusionary rule, like the benefits, must be measured at the margin.

The average immigration judge handles about six deportation hearings per day. Brief for Petitioner 27, n. 16. Neither the hearing officers nor the attorneys participating in those hearings are likely to be well versed in the intricacies of Fourth Amendment law. The prospect of even occasional invocation of the exclusionary rule might significantly change and complicate the character of these proceedings. The BIA has described the practical problems as follows:

“Absent the applicability of the exclusionary rule, questions relating to deportability routinely involve simple factual allegations and matters of proof. When Fourth Amendment issues are raised at deportation hearings, the result is a diversion of attention from the main issues which those proceedings were created to resolve, both in terms of the expertise of the administrative decision makers and of the structure of the forum to accommodate inquiries into search and seizure questions. The result frequently seems to be a long, confused record in which the issues are not clearly defined and in which there is voluminous testimony .... The ensuing delays and inordinate amount of time spent on such cases at all levels has an adverse impact on the effective administration of the immigration laws .... This is particularly true in a proceeding where delay may be the only ‘defense’ available and where problems already exist with the use of dilatory tactics.” Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & N., at 80 (footnote omitted).

This sober assessment of the exclusionary rule’s likely costs, by the agency that would have to administer the rule in at least the administrative tiers of its application, cannot be brushed off lightly.

The BIA’s concerns are reinforced by the staggering dimension of the problem that the INS confronts. Immigration officers apprehend over one million deportable aliens in this country every year. Id., at 85. A single agent may arrest many illegal aliens every day. Although the investigatory burden does not justify the commission of constitutional violations, the officers cannot be expected to compile elaborate, contemporaneous, written reports detailing the circumstances of every arrest. At present an officer simply completes a “Record of Deportable Alien” that is introduced to prove the INS’s case at the deportation hearing; the officer rarely must attend the hearing. Fourth Amendment suppression hearings would undoubtedly require considerably more, and the likely burden on the administration of the immigration laws would be correspondingly severe.

Finally, the INS advances the credible argument that applying the exclusionary rule to deportation proceedings might well result in the suppression of large amounts of information that had been obtained entirely lawfully. INS arrests occur in crowded and confused circumstances. Though the INS agents are instructed to follow procedures that adequately protect Fourth Amendment interests, agents will usually be able to testify only to the fact that they followed INS rules. The demand for a precise account of exactly what happened in each particular arrest would plainly preclude mass arrests, even when the INS is confronted, as it often is, with massed numbers of ascertainably illegal aliens, and even when the arrests can be and are conducted in full compliance with all Fourth Amendment requirements.

In these circumstances we are persuaded that the Jams balance between costs and benefits comes out against applying the exclusionary rule in civil deportation hearings held by the INS. By all appearances the INS has already taken sensible and reasonable steps to deter Fourth Amendment violations by its officers, and this makes the likely additional deterrent value of the exclusionary rule small. The costs of applying the exclusionary rule in the context of civil deportation hearings are high. In particular, application of the exclusionary rule in cases such as Sandoval-Sanchez’, would compel the courts to release from custody persons who would then immediately resume their commission of a crime through their continuing, unlawful presence in this country. “There comes a point at which courts, consistent with their duty to administer the law, cannot continue to create barriers to law enforcement in the pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly the duty of the Executive and Legislative Branches.” United States v. Janis, 428 U. S., at 459. That point has been reached here.

y

We do not condone any violations of the Fourth Amendment that may have occurred in the arrests of respondents Lopez-Mendoza or Sandoval-Sanchez. Moreover, no challenge is raised here to the INS’s own internal regulations. Cf. INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210 (1984). Our conclusions concerning the exclusionary rule’s value might change, if there developed good reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers were widespread. Cf. United States v. Leon, ante, at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Finally, we do not deal here with egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained. Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952). At issue here is the exclusion of credible evidence gathered in connection -with peaceful arrests by INS officers. We hold that evidence derived from such arrests need not be suppressed in an INS civil deportation hearing.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore

Reversed.

Justice Brennan,

dissenting.

I fully agree with Justice White that under the analysis developed by the Court in such cases as United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976), and United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974), the exclusionary rule must apply in civil deportation proceedings. However, for the reasons set forth today in my dissenting opinion in United States v. Leon, ante, p. 897, I believe the basis for the exclúsionary rule does not derive from its effectiveness as a deterrent, but is instead found in the requirements of the Fourth Amendment itself. My view of the exclusionary rule would, of course, require affirmance of the Court of Appeals. In this case, federal law enforcement officers arrested respondents Sandoval-Sanchez and Lopez-Mendoza in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. The subsequent admission of any evidence secured pursuant to these unlawful arrests in civil deportation proceedings would, in my view, also infringe those rights. The Government of the United States bears an obligation to obey the Fourth Amendment; that obligation is not lifted simply because the law enforcement officers were agents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, nor because the evidence obtained by those officers was to be used in civil deportation proceedings.

Justice White,

dissenting.

The Court today holds that the exclusionary rule does not apply in civil deportation proceedings. Because I believe that the conclusion of the majority is based upon an incorrect assessment of the costs and benefits of applying the rule in such proceedings, I respectfully dissent.

The paradigmatic case in which the exclusionary rule is applied is when the prosecutor seeks to use evidence illegally obtained by law enforcement officials in his case in chief in a criminal trial. In other classes of cases, the rule is applicable only when the likelihood of deterring the unwanted conduct outweighs the societal costs imposed by exclusion of relevant evidence. United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 454 (1976). Thus, the Court has, in a number of situations, refused to extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than the criminal trial itself. For example, in Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), the Court held that the deterrent effect of the rule would not be reduced by refusing to allow a state prisoner to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim in federal habeas corpus proceedings if he was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate it in state court. Similarly, in United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 351 (1974), we concluded that “[a]ny incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best.” And in United States v. Janis, supra, we declined to extend the exclusionary rule to bar the introduction in a federal civil proceeding of evidence unconstitutionally seized by a state law enforcement officer. In all of these cases it was unquestioned that the illegally seized evidence would not be admissible in the case in chief of the proceeding for which the evidence was gathered; only its collateral use was permitted.

Civil deportation proceedings are in no sense “collateral.” The majority correctly acknowledges that the “primary objective” of the INS agent is “to use evidence in the civil deportation proceeding” and that “the agency officials who effect the unlawful arrest are the same officials who subsequently bring the deportation action.” Ante, at 1043. The Immigration and Naturalization Service likewise concedes that INS agents are “in the business of conducting searches for and seizures of illegal aliens for the purpose of bringing about their deportation.” Brief for Petitioner 37. Thus, unlike the situation in Janis, the conduct challenged here falls within “the offending officer’s zone of primary interest.” 428 U. S., at 458. The majority nonetheless concludes that application of the rule in such proceedings is unlikely to provide significant deterrence. Because INS agents are law enforcement officials whose mission is closely analogous to that of police officers and because civil deportation proceedings are to INS agents what criminal trials are to police officers, I cannot agree with that assessment.

The exclusionary rule rests on the Court’s belief that exclusion has a sufficient deterrent effect to justify its imposition, and the Court has not abandoned the rule. As long as that is the case, there is no principled basis for distinguishing between the deterrent effect of the rule in criminal cases and in civil deportation proceedings. The majority attempts to justify the distinction by asserting that deportation will still be possible when evidence not derived from the illegal search or seizure is independently sufficient. Ante, at 1043-1044. However, that is no less true in criminal cases. The suppression of some evidence does not bar prosecution for the crime, and in many cases even though some evidence is suppressed a conviction will nonetheless be obtained.

The majority also suggests that the fact that most aliens elect voluntary departure dilutes the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule, because the infrequency of challenges to admission of evidence will mean that “the consequences from the point of view of the officer’s overall arrest and deportation record will be trivial.” Ante, at 1044. It is true that a majority of apprehended aliens elect voluntary departure, while a lesser number go through civil deportation proceedings and a still smaller number are criminally prosecuted. However, that fact no more diminishes the importance of the exclusionary sanction than the fact that many criminal defendants plead guilty dilutes the rule’s deterrent effect in criminal cases. The possibility of exclusion of evidence quite obviously plays a part in the decision whether to contest either civil deportation or criminal prosecution. Moreover, in concentrating on the incentives under which the individual agent operates to the exclusion of the incentives under which the agency as a whole operates neglects the “systemic” deterrent effect that may lead the agency to adopt policies and procedures that conform to Fourth Amendment standards. See, e. g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 221 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring).

The majority believes “perhaps most important” the fact that the INS has a “comprehensive scheme” in place for deterring Fourth Amendment violations by punishing agents who commit such violations, but it points to not a single instance in which that scheme has been invoked. Ante, at 1044-1045. Also, immigration officers are instructed and examined in Fourth Amendment law, and it is suggested that this education is another reason why the exclusionary rule is unnecessary. Ibid. A contrary lesson could be discerned from the existence of these programs, however, when it is recalled that they were instituted during “a legal regime in which the cases and commentators uniformly sanctioned the invocation of the rule in deportation proceedings.” 705 F. 2d 1059, 1071 (CA9 1983). Thus, rather than supporting a conclusion that the exclusionary rule is unnecessary, the existence of these programs instead suggests that the exclusionary rule has created incentives for the agency to ensure that its officers follow the dictates of the Constitution. Since the deterrent function of the rule is furthered if it alters either “the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies of their departments,” United States v. Leon, ante, at 918, it seems likely that it was the rule’s deterrent effect that led to the programs to which the Court now points for its assertion that the rule would have no deterrent effect.

The suggestion that alternative remedies, such as civil suits, provide adequate protection is unrealistic. Contrary to the situation in criminal cases, once the Government has improperly obtained evidence against an illegal alien, he is removed from the country and is therefore in no position to file civil actions in federal courts. Moreover, those who are legally in the country but are nonetheless subjected to illegal searches and seizures are likely to be poor and uneducated, and many will not speak English. It is doubtful that the threat of civil suits by these persons will strike fear into the hearts of those who enforce the Nation’s immigration laws.

It is also my belief that the majority exaggerates the costs associated with applying the exclusionary rule in this context. Evidence obtained through violation of the Fourth Amendment is not automatically suppressed, and any inquiry into the burdens associated with application of the exclusionary rule must take that fact into account. In United States v. Leon, ante, p. 897, we have held that the exclusionary rule is not applicable when officers are acting in objective good faith. Thus, if the agents neither knew nor should have known that they were acting contrary to the dictates of the Fourth Amendment, evidence will not be suppressed even if it is held that their conduct was illegal.

As is noted ante, at 1051, n. 5, the BIA has already held that evidence will be suppressed if it results from egregious violations of constitutional standards. Thus, the mechanism for dealing with suppression motions exists and is utilized, significantly decreasing the force of the majority’s predictions of dire consequences flowing from “even occasional invocation of the exclusionary rule.” Ante, at 1048. Although the standard currently utilized by the BIA may not be precisely coextensive with the good-faith exception, any incremental increase in the amount of evidence that is suppressed through application of Leon is unlikely to be significant. Likewise, any difference that may exist between the two standards is unlikely to increase significantly the number of suppression motions filed.

Contrary to the view of the majority, it is not the case that Sandoval-Sanchez’ “unregistered presence in this country, without more, constitutes a crime.” Ante, at 1047. Section 275 of the Immigration and Nationality Act makes it a crime to enter the United States illegally. 8 U. S. C. § 1325. The first offense constitutes a misdemeanor, and subsequent offenses constitute felonies. Ibid. Those few cases that have construed this statute have held that a violation takes place at the time of entry and that the statute does not describe a continuing offense. Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F. 2d 468, 473-474 (CA9 1983); United States v. Rincon-Jimenez, 595 F. 2d 1192, 1194 (CA9 1979). Although this Court has not construed the statute, it has suggested in dictum that this interpretation is correct, United States v. Cores, 356 U. S. 405, 408, n. 6 (1958), and it is relatively clear that such an interpretation is most consistent with the statutory language. Therefore, it is simply not the case that suppressing evidence in deportation proceedings will “allo[w] the criminal to continue in the commission of an ongoing crime.” Ante, at 1047. It is true that some courts have construed § 276 of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1326, which applies to aliens previously deported who enter or are found in the United States, to describe a continuing offense. United States v. Bruno, 328 F. Supp. 815 (WD Mo. 1971); United States v. Alvarado-Soto, 120 F. Supp. 848 (SD Cal. 1954); United States v. Rincon-Jimenez, supra (dictum). But see United States v. DiSantillo, 615 F. 2d 128 (CA3 1980). In such cases, however, the Government will have a record of the prior deportation and will have little need for any evidence that might be suppressed through application of the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Pineda-Chinchilla, 712 F. 2d 942 (CA5 1983) (illegality of arrest does not bar introduction of INS records to demonstrate prior deportation), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 964 (1983).

Although the majority relies on the registration provisions of 8 U. S. C. §§ 1302 and 1306 for its “continuing crime” argument, those provisions provide little support for the general rule laid down that the exclusionary rule does not apply in civil deportation proceedings. First, §1302 requires that aliens register within 30 days of entry into the country. Thus, for the first 30 days failure to register is not a crime. Second, § 1306 provides that only willful failure to register is a misdemeanor. Therefore, “unregistered presence in this country, without more,” ante, at 1047, does not constitute a crime; rather, unregistered presence plus willfulness must be shown. There is no finding that Sandoval-Sanchez willfully failed to register, which is a necessary predicate to the conclusion that he is engaged in a continuing crime. Third, only aliens 14 years of age or older are required to register; those under 14 years of age are to be registered by their parents or guardian. By the majority’s reasoning, therefore, perhaps the exclusionary rule should apply in proceedings to deport children under 14, since their failure to register does not constitute a crime.

Application of the rule, we are told, will also seriously interfere with the “streamlined” nature of deportation hearings because “[n] either the hearing officers nor the attorneys participating in those hearings are likely to be well versed in the intricacies of Fourth Amendment law.” Ante, at 1048. Yet the majority deprecates the deterrent benefit of the exclusionary rule in part on the ground that immigration officers receive a thorough education in Fourth Amendment law. Ante, at 1044-1045. The implication that hearing officers should defer to law enforcement officers’ superior understanding of constitutional principles is startling indeed.

Prior to the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70 (1979), neither the Board nor any court had held that the exclusionary rule did not apply in civil deportation proceedings. 705 F. 2d, at 1071. The Board in Sandoval noted that there were “fewer than fifty” BIA proceedings since 1952 in which motions had been made to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. This is so despite the fact that “immigration law practitioners have been informed by the major treatise in their field that the exclusionary rule was available to clients facing deportation. See 1A C. Gordon and H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure §5.2c at 5-31 (rev. ed. 1980).” 705 F. 2d, at 1071. The suggestion that “[t]he prospect of even occasional invocation of the exclusionary rule might significantly change and complicate the character of these proceedings,” ante, at 1048, is thus difficult to credit. The simple fact is that prior to 1979 the exclusionary rule was available in civil deportation proceedings, and there is no indication that it significantly interfered with the ability of the INS to function.

Finally, the majority suggests that application of the exclusionary rule might well result in the suppression of large amounts of information legally obtained because of the “crowded and confused circumstances” surrounding mass arrests. Ante, at 1049. The result would be that INS agents would have to keep a “precise account of exactly what happened in each particular arrest,” which would be impractical considering the “massed numbers of ascertainably illegal aliens.” Ante, at 1049-1050. Rather than constituting a rejection of the application of the exclusionary rule in civil deportation proceedings, however, this argument amounts to a rejection of the application of the Fourth Amendment to the activities of INS agents. If the pandemonium attending immigration arrests is so great that violations of the Fourth Amendment cannot be ascertained for the purpose of applying the exclusionary rule, there is no reason to think that such violations can be ascertained for purposes of civil suits or internal disciplinary proceedings, both of which are proceedings that the majority suggests provide adequate deterrence against Fourth Amendment violations. The Court may be willing to throw up its hands in dismay because it is administratively inconvenient to determine whether constitutional rights have been violated, but we neglect our duty when we subordinate constitutional rights to expediency in such a manner. Particularly is this so when, as here, there is but a weak showing that administrative efficiency will be seriously compromised.

In sum, I believe that the costs and benefits of applying the exclusionary rule in civil deportation proceedings do not differ in any significant way from the costs and benefits of applying the rule in ordinary criminal proceedings. Unless the exclusionary rule is to be wholly done away with and the Court's belief that it has deterrent effects abandoned, it should be applied in deportation proceedings when evidence has been obtained by deliberate violations of the Fourth Amendment or by conduct a reasonably competent officer would know is contrary to the Constitution. Accordingly, I dissent.

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

I agree with Justice White that application to this case of the mode of analysis embodied in the decisions of the Court in United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976), and United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974), compels the conclusion that the exclusionary rule should apply in civil deportation proceedings. Ante, at 1052-1054. However, I continue to believe that that mode of analysis fails to reflect the constitutionally mandated character of the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Leon, ante, at 931-938 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Janis, supra, at 460 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting). In my view, a sufficient reason for excluding from civil deportation proceedings evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is that there is no other way to achieve “the twin goals of enabling the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring the people — all potential victims of unlawful government conduct — that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in government.” United States v. Calandra, supra, at 357 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

Because the Court has not yet held that the rule of United States v. Leon, ante, p. 897, has any application to warrant-less searches, I do not join the portion of Justice White’s opinion that relies on that case. I do, however, agree with the remainder of his dissenting opinion.

      The Chief Justice joins all but Part V of this opinion.

       The Court of Appeals brushed over Lopez-Mendoza’s failure to object to the evidence in an apparently unsettled footnote of its decision. The Court of Appeals was initially of the view that a motion to terminate a proceeding on the ground that the arrest of the respondent was unlawful is, “for all practical purposes,” the same as a motion to suppress evidence as the fruit of an unlawful arrest. Slip opinion, at 1765, n. 1 (Apr. 25, 1983). In the bound report of its opinion, however, the Court of Appeals takes a somewhat different view, stating in a revised version of the same footnote that “the only reasonable way to interpret the motion to terminate is as one that includes both a motion to suppress and a motion to dismiss.” 705 F. 2d 1059, 1060, n. 1 (1983).

       In United States v. Wong Quong Wong, 94 F. 832 (Vt. 1899), a District Judge excluded letters seized from the appellant in a civil deportation proceeding. In Ex parte Jackson, 263 F. 110 (Mont.), appeal dism’d sub nom. Andrews v. Jackson, 267 F. 1022 (CA9 1920), another District Judge granted habeas corpus relief on the ground that papers and pamphlets used against the habeas petitioner in a deportation proceeding had been unlawfully seized. Wong Chung Che v. INS, 565 F. 2d 166 (CA11977), held that papers obtained by INS agents in an unlawful search are inadmissible in deportation proceedings.

       Sandoval-Sanchez was arrested on June 23, 1977. His deportation hearing was held on October 7, 1977. By that time he was under a duty to apply for registration as an alien. A failure to do so plainly constituted a continuing crime. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1302, 1306. Sandoval-Sanchez was not, of course, prosecuted for this crime, and we do not know whether or not he did make the required application. But it is safe to assume that the exclusionary rule would never be at issue in a deportation proceeding brought against an alien who entered the country unlawfully and then voluntarily admitted to his unlawful presence in an application for registration.
      Sandoval-Sanchez was also not prosecuted for his initial illegal entry into this country, an independent crime under 8 U. S. C. § 1326. We need not decide whether or not remaining in this country following an illegal entry is a continuing or a completed crime under § 1325. The question is academic, of course, since in either event the unlawful entry remains both punishable and continuing grounds for deportation. See 8 U. S. C. § 1251(a)(2).

       Similarly, in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U. S. 883 (1984), the Court concluded that an employer can be guilty of an unfair labor practice in his dealings with an alien notwithstanding the alien’s illegal presence in this country. Retrospective sanctions against the employer may accordingly be imposed by the National Labor Relations Board to further the public policy against unfair labor practices. But while he maintains the status of an illegal alien, the employee is plainly not entitled to the prospective relief — reinstatement and continued employment — that probably would be granted to other victims of similar unfair labor practices.

       We note that subsequent to its decision in Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70 (1979), the BIA held that evidence will be excluded if the circumstances surrounding a particular arrest and interrogation would render use of the evidence obtained thereby “fundamentally unfair” and in violation of due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment. Matter of Toro, 17 I. &. N. Dec. 340, 343 (1980). See also Matter of Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. 319, 321 (1980) (suppression of admission of alienage obtained after request for counsel had been repeatedly refused); Matter of Ramira-Cordova, No. [ AXX XXX XXX ] (Feb. 21, 1980) (suppression of evidence obtained as a result of a nighttime warrantless entry into the aliens’ residence).

       I also question the Court’s finding that Lopez-Mendoza failed to object to admission of the evidence. Ante, at 1040, and n. 1. The Court of Appeals held that he had made a proper objection, 705 F. 2d 1059, 1060, n. 1 (CA9 1983), and the INS did not seek review of that conclusion, Brief for Petitioner 8, n. 8. Moreover, the fact that changes in an opinion are made between the time of the slip opinion and the bound volume has never before been considered evidence that the holding of a case is “unsettled.” See ante, at 1040, n. 1.

       The INS suggests that its disciplinary rules are “not mere paper procedures” and that over a period of four years 20 officers were suspended or terminated for misconduct toward aliens. Brief for Petitioner 45, n. 28. The INS does not assert, however, that any of these officers were disciplined for Fourth Amendment violations, and it appears that the 11 officers who were terminated were terminated for rape or assault. See Brief for Respondents 60, n. 42.

       Section 275 provides in part:
      “Any alien who (1) enters the United States at any time or place other than as designated by immigration officers, or (2) eludes examination or inspection by immigration officers, or (3) obtains entry to the United States by a willfully false or misleading representation . . . shall be guilty of a [crime]. . . .” 8 U. S. C. § 1325.

       Section 276 provides in part:
      “Any alien who—
      “(1) has been arrested and deported or excluded and deported, and thereafter
      “(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States . . .
      shall be guilty of a felony.” 8 U. S. C. § 1826.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    PAYNE v. VIRGINIA
    No. 82-6935.
    Decided July 5, 1984
   Per Curiam.

This petition for certiorari seeks review of a judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia rejecting petitioner’s double jeopardy challenge to a conviction for robbery which followed a prior conviction for capital murder committed during the perpetration of the robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. In this case, as in Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U. S. 682 (1977) (per curiam), where “conviction of a greater crime, murder, cannot be had without conviction of the lesser crime, robbery . . . , the Double Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution for the lesser crime after conviction of the greater one.” Ibid. See also In re Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176, 188 (1889).

Accordingly, the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is reversed. Harris v. Oklahoma, supra.

It is so ordered.


text:
    July 2, 1984
    No. 88-1843.
    Mitchell et al. v. Superior Court of California, Marin County (Mountanos, Real Party in Interest).
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist., dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    No. 83-1564.
    Ruckelshaus, Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986 (1984).

Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 83-902.
    Boeing Vertol Co. et al. v. Edwards.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U. S. 867 (1984).


text:
    No. 83-1506.
    Terry v. Bothke.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for damages denied. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Davis v. Scherer, ante, p. 183.


text:
    No. A-888.
    Pearce v. United States.
   Application for bail, addressed to Justice Brennan and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-974.
    Wisconsin Elections Board et al. v. Republican Party of Wisconsin et al.
   Motion to vacate the stay, heretofore entered by the Court on June 7, 1984 [467 U. S. 1232], denied.


text:
    No. A-1027.
    Hargraves v. Scrivner, Judge of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois, et al.
   Cir. Ct., St. Clair County, Ill. Application for stay, presented to Justice Stevens, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-419.
    In re Disbarment of Stevens.
    [For earlier order herein, see 466 U. S. 948.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-435.
    In re Disbarment of Mann.
   William Davis Mann, of Akron, Ohio, having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on June 11, 1984 [467 U. S. 1237], is hereby discharged.


text:
    No. 65,
    Orig.
    Texas v. New Mexico.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 467 U. S. 1238.]
   The Honorable Jean Sala Breitenstein, whose long and invaluable service to the Court in this case is deeply appreciated, has requested that he be relieved of his duties as Special Master, and the Court having granted that request, it is necessary that a Special Master be appointed to conclude this case. It is therefore ordered that Charles J. Meyers of Denver, Colo., be appointed Special Master in this case with authority to fix the time and conditions for the filing of additional pleadings and to direct subsequent proceedings, and with authority to summon witnesses, issue subpoenas, and take such evidence as may be introduced and such as he may deem it necessary to call for. The Master is directed to submit such reports as he may deem appropriate.

The compensation of the Special Master, the allowances to him, the compensation paid to his legal, technical, stenographic, and clerical assistants, the cost of printing his report, and all other proper expenses shall be charged against and be borne by the parties in such proportion as the Court may hereafter direct.


text:
    No. 82-1295.
    Escambia County, Florida, et al. v. McMillan et al.,
   466 U. S. 48. Motion of appellees to retax costs denied.


text:
    No. 83-599.
    Capital Cities Media, Inc., tdba The Wilkes-Barre Times Leader, et al. v. Toole, Judge, Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County,
   466 U. S. 378. Motion of respondent to retax costs denied.


text:
    No. 83-703.
    No. 83-1031.
    Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, dba Center for Nuclear Responsibility, et al.; and United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission et al. v. Lorion et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 466 U. S. 903..] Motion of petitioner in No. 83-703 for divided argument granted, and a total of 15 minutes allotted for that purpose. Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted, and a total of 15 minutes allotted for that purpose.


text:
    No. 83-727.
    Alexander, Governor of Tennessee, et al. v. Choate et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted sub nom. Alexander v. Jennings, 465 U. S. 1021.] Motion of respondent Hershel Choate for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted.


text:
    No. 83-1170.
    United States v. 50 Acres of Land et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 465 U. S. 1098.] Motion of respondents and National Governors’ Association et al. for divided argument to permit National Governors’ Association et al. to present oral argument as amici curiae denied.


text:
    No. 83-1362.
    No. 83-1363.
    No. 83-6392.
    Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill et al.; Parma Board of Education v. Donnelly et al.; and Loudermill v. Cleveland Board of Education et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 467 U. S. 1204.] Motion of James Loudermill for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Robert M. Fertel, Esquire, of Cleveland, Ohio, be appointed pursuant to Rule 46.6 to serve as counsel for James Loudermill in these cases.


text:
    No. 83-1897.
    In re Fernandez-Toledo et al.
   Motion of petitioners to expedite consideration of the petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 83-6610 (A-1024).
    Barfield v. Harris, Superintendent, North Carolina Correctional Center for Women, et al.,
   467 U. S. 1210. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, is granted pending further order of the Court. Respondent is requested to file a response to the petition for rehearing within 30 days.


text:
    No. 82-1889.
    Springfield Township School District et al. v. Knoll.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-1778.
    Sellfors v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-861.
    City of Columbus et al. v. Leonard et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 82-2079.
    Alabama v. Prince.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1429.
    Alabama Power Co. et al. v. Sierra Club et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Con-nor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 83-1457.
    No. 83-1617.
    No. 83-6514.
    No. 83-6629.
    Rivera-Ramirez v. United States, Coleman v. American Cyanamid Co. et al., Tilli v. Capobianco et al., Kavanaugh v. Sperry Univac,
   467 U. S. 1215;

467 U. S. 1215;

467 U. S. 1217; and

467 U. S. 1218. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 83-382.
    Rush v. United States Agency for International Development et al.,
   464 U. S. 1052 and 465 U. S. 1074. Motion of petitioner for leave to file second petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 83-592.
    Ostrosky et al. v. Alaska,
   467 U. S. 1201. Motion of appellants for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 83-1345.
    Union Carbide Corp. et al. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al.,
   467 U. S. 1219. Petition for rehearing denied.

Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 82-1587.
    No. 83-1674.
    No. 83-6374.
    Christian v. Massachusetts et al., Young v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Attwell et ux. v. Heritage Bank of Mount Pleasant et al.,
   461 U. S. 907;

467 U. S. 1206; and

466 U. S. 953. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    July 5, 1984
    No. 83-1941.
    Trosclair v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Cer-tiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    No. 83-1757.
    Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. McFather et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ga. dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    No. 83-651.
    Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters of California et al.
   Appeal from D. C. C. D. Cal. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 83-1513.
    Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America v. Curran.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., dismissed for want of a final judgment.


text:
    No. 83-637.
    Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Selective Service System et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Minn. The order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit filed August 17, 1983, transferring this case to the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1252 is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider whether appellant has standing.

Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 82-315.
    Oregon v. Roberti.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Berkemer v. McCarty, ante, p. 420.


text:
    No. 82-819.
    United States v. Crozier et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent Florence Margaret Wolke for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Segura v. United States, ante, p. 796; United States v. Leon, ante, p. 897; and United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555 (1983).


text:
    No. 83-24.
    United States v. Tate et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Leon, ante, p. 897.


text:
    No. 83-817.
    Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al. v. Douglas.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984).


author: Justice Blackmun,

text:
    No. 83-866.
    No. 83-885.
    Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc., et al.; and Boston Police Patrolmen’s Assn., Inc. v. Castro et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561 (1984).

Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.

Reported below: 716 F. 2d 931.

Justice Blackmun,

with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens join,

dissenting.

The Court today logically applies yesterday’s illogic. I cannot disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the mootness issue in these cases is similar to some portions of the mootness issue in Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561 (1984). I therefore do not dispute that there is reason to think that the decision in Stotts bears on the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that these cases are moot. In my view, however, the portions of Stotts relevant to the mootness issue in this case are demonstrably wrong; they depart sharply from our precedents and ignore the jurisdictional limits imposed by the “case or controversy” requirements of Article III of the Constitution. The sooner they are forgotten, the earlier that the longstanding principles governing mootness doctrine can be resurrected. The Court of Appeals disposed of these cases in accordance with those principles, and I would let its ruling stand.

I

The controversy in these cases has remarkable similarity to the controversy in Stotts. It began when the city of Boston announced a plan to conduct a reduction in force as a response to its fiscal difficulties. The proposed reductions included layoffs in the Police and Fire Departments, both of which were operating under consent decrees to remedy past discrimination. Those decrees required the Departments to engage in preferential hiring of members of minority groups in order to raise the representation of minorities in the Departments to the level in the surrounding work force. The proposed layoffs were to be conducted on a “last-hired, first-fired” basis, and would have affected many minority persons hired under the consent decree.

Minority officers brought suit in federal court to enjoin the layoffs, and the court concluded that seniority-based layoffs would impede its efforts to remedy the past discrimination. Accordingly, the District Court enjoined the Police and Fire Departments from conducting layoffs in a manner that would reduce the percentage of minorities employed in those Departments. Castro v. Beecher, 522 F. Supp. 873 (Mass. 1981). As a consequence, some nonminority employees were laid off ahead of minorities with less seniority. The State Civil Service Commission and the unions representing affected nonminority persons challenged the orders of the District Court. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed. Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F. 2d 965 (CA1 1982).

Following the Court of Appeals’ decision and this Court’s grant of certiorari to review it, 459 U. S. 967 (1982), the Massachusetts Legislature enacted the Tregor Act to address the situation. 1982 Mass. Acts, ch. 190. That legislation provided the city of Boston with new revenues, required reinstatement of all police and firefighters laid off during the reductions in force, secured those personnel against future layoffs for fiscal reasons, and required the maintenance of minimum-staffing levels in the Police and Fire Departments through June 30, 1983. This legislative action terminated all layoffs, and greatly diminished the risk that future layoffs might take place. Respondents argued before this Court that the legislation rendered the controversy in these cases moot, and deprived the Court of jurisdiction to decide them. Because the legislation’s effects raised serious questions concerning this Court’s jurisdiction, we vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for consideration of mootness in light of the Tregor Act. Firefighters v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, 461 U. S. 477 (1983).

On remand, the Court of Appeals held that the Tregor Act’s mandatory reinstatement of all laid-off police and firefighters, and its requirement of minimum-staffing levels, removed the legally cognizable stake that the litigants had in the suits before the layoffs ended. Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 716 F. 2d 931 (CA1 1983). The court also rejected the claim that the controversy presented by the case was “capable of repetition yet evading review.” If future layoffs occurred despite the Tregor Act, the court explained, there was no reason to assume that the state legislature would once again intervene before resolution by this Court. Finally, the court rejected the claim that these cases remain five because the District Court order interferes with back-pay claims filed with the State Civil Service Commission by the affected nonminority workers. The Court of Appeals explained that those issues properly were to be resolved in the administrative proceedings before the Commission.

II

Because the Tregor Act is a Massachusetts statute, and Stotts involved layoffs in Tennessee, this Court’s decision in Stotts obviously sheds no light on whether the Court of Appeals properly assessed the Tregor Act’s effect on the likelihood that future layoffs will occur in the Boston Police and Fire Departments. This Court’s decision in Stotts bears only on the question whether the backpay claims of individuals affected by the Boston layoffs create a controversy sufficient to provide a federal court with jurisdiction over these cases. The nature of those claims and the most basic principles of Article III make clear that they do not.

The elements of Article Ill’s “case or controversy” requirement are well established. Among them is the requirement that parties before the Court have legally cognizable interests that are adverse to each other. Such adversity of interests must exist “at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125 (1973). In addition, a complaining party must show “an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 38 (1976). A ruling that does not provide any relief to the prevailing party ignores the duty of federal courts “ ‘to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.’” Oil Workers v. Missouri, 361 U. S. 363, 367 (1960), quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, 653 (1895).

When a case becomes moot while pending review, it is the “duty of the appellate court” to vacate the judgment below and remand with directions to dismiss. Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 299 U. S. 259, 267 (1936). “That procedure clears the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and eliminates a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance.” United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 40 (1950). This disposition serves the purpose of preserving the rights of all parties to the controversy in any future litigation that might arise presenting similar issues.

Application of these principles makes it readily apparent that backpay claims filed against the city do not keep these cases alive and that the Court of Appeals correctly found them to be moot. First, claims for backpay simply are not a part of these cases. Petitioners do not seek backpay in them, and a decision of these cases will not provide backpay to anyone. It may be true, as the parties concede, that backpay claims are being litigated, or already have been decided, in administrative proceedings before the State Civil Service Commission. But the status of any such litigation is irrelevant here, for it has always been the rule that a case is not kept alive because of issues that might arise in other proceedings in another forum. A federal court’s jurisdiction is determined by the conditions of the case before it. Oil Workers v. Missouri, 361 U. S., at 370 (“ ‘Our power only extends over and is limited by the conditions of the cáse now before us,’” quoting American Book Co. v. Kansas, 193 U. S. 49, 52 (1904)). Because backpay is not an issue in these cases, it cannot provide a jurisdictional basis for these suits.

Second, it is apparent that the minority officers have no stake in the resolution of backpay claims of others filed with the State Civil Service Commission. If backpay is awarded, it will come from the city, not from the minority officers, who are not parties to those proceedings, and who have no interest in whether such backpay is awarded. The possible dispute over backpay therefore does not create a controversy with respect to the minority officers who are respondents in these cases.

The Court of Appeals based its conclusion that these cases are moot on precisely these considerations. In rejecting the claim that backpay issues keep these cases live, the court explained:

“According to the established practice of the federal courts, when a case is found moot, the district court’s judgment will be vacated. Thus even assuming . . . that the district court’s order directly inhibits the state Civil Service Commission respecting the backpay claims, it will no longer do so. To be sure, a definitive ruling on the constitutionality of the district court’s past order might facilitate the Civil Service Commission’s resolution of the back pay claims. But such a ruling now — rendered in the absence of a present case or controversy in this proceeding — would amount to no more than an advisory opinion. The federal courts are forbidden by Article III of the Constitution from giving advisory opinions. [Petitioners’] interest in the resolution of this case shows that the issue here may retain some collateral vitality, but to avoid mootness a case must present both live issues and parties with legally cognizable interests. Plaintiffs now lack the ‘personal stake’ necessary to keep alive the controversy which engendered this proceeding. The Civil Service Commission must therefore be left to decide the back pay claims under the governing state law without an advisory resolution of the constitutional issue by the federal courts.” 716 F. 2d, at 933 (citations omitted).

Nothing in this Court’s opinion in Stotts explains why these principles are not fully applicable here. It is true that Stotts involved ancillary backpay issues somewhat similar to those in these cases, but the Court’s opinion never explained why vacating the District Court’s orders would not have cleared the path for full litigation of the backpay issues in an appropriate proceeding involving adverse parties. Instead, this Court’s opinion in Stotts proceeded from the misconception that even if the District Court’s orders in those cases were vacated, they still might control backpay claims. 467 U. S., at 571. Because a vacated judgment, by definition, cannot have any preclusive effect in subsequent litigation, the portion of the Court’s decision in Stotts that assumes the contrary is tautologically incorrect.

In addition to being controlled by longstanding principles of Article III, these cases attest to the underlying wisdom of those tenets. Petitioners do not suggest that they are entitled to backpay under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Any backpay claims that may have arisen as a result of the Boston layoffs presumably are controlled by state rather than federal law. We cannot claim familiarity with the standards governing such claims, and hence we are in no position to determine how the federal questions formerly presented by these cases are relevant to the claims for backpay under state law. It seems likely, however, that the issue raised in the civil service proceedings is whether the layoffs of the nonminority persons were “justified” under state law. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 31, §43 (West Supp. 1984-1985). To the extent that application of this standard might involve consideration of whether the layoffs were pursuant to a federal-court order, further review of these cases would shed no new light on that question. There is no dispute over whether the layoffs were conducted pursuant to outstanding federal-court orders that were validly entered and that the city had a legal duty to obey. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U. S. 307, 314 (1967) (court order entered by court with subject-matter and personal jurisdiction over case gives rise to a plain duty to obey until order is stayed, vacated, or reversed). If the Fire and Police Departments can defend backpay claims on the ground that the layoff of nonminority persons was justified because of the city’s duty to obey a federal-court injunction, that defense presumably would exist regardless of whether the injunction is overturned on appeal. In any event, it is precisely because the issue of backpay is not being litigated in these cases, and hence the relevance of the District Court’s injunction is unclear, that it is improper for a federal court to use those claims as a basis for its jurisdiction over these cases. If resolution of backpay claims under state law ultimately does involve a federal question, that question would be reviewable when presented as part of a decision resolving the backpay claims.

The Court’s treatment of these cases is especially incongruous given that just last Term the Court implicitly rejected the view that backpay claims kept these cases live. When this Court vacated the judgment in these cases and remanded them to the Court of Appeals, the Court expressly based its decision on the possibility that the Tregor Act rendered the cases moot. 461 U. S., at 479. That Act affected only the prospective aspects of the layoffs; it ordered reinstatement of laid-off employees and protected them from similar layoffs in the future. There was no suggestion, either then or now, that the Tregor Act had any effect whatsoever on backpay claims stemming from layoffs in the past. Thus, the backpay claims that petitioners now assert as keeping these cases alive were in the same posture last Term. Had this Court then believed that backpay issues created a controversy in these cases, there would have been no reason to remand them to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the Tregor Act. By remanding the cases, this Court implicitly expressed its view that the backpay claims did not save the cases from being moot. The Court offers no explanation for taking a contrary position now.

Ill

Because the Court of Appeals properly stayed within the scope of its Article III powers, I would simply deny the petitions for certiorari in these cases. If the Court believes that the Court of Appeals improperly applied the principles of Article III, the Court has a duty to explain why. It is incongruous for the Court simply to remand for further consideration of the mootness issue “in light of” Stotts, because the Court’s opinion in Stotts ignored the principles that the Court of Appeals relied upon here. Rather than shedding any light on the mootness issue in these cases, Stotts casts a murky shadow over well-established Article III principles.


text:
    No. 83-995.
    Douglas v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-rari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Waller v. Georgia, 467 U. S. 39 (1984).


text:
    No. 83-1037.
    United States v. Cross.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Hobby v. United States, ante, p. 339.


text:
    No. 83-1393.
    United States v. Cassity et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Leon, ante, p. 897.


text:
    No. 83-1431.
    No. 83-1451.
    McDaniel et al. v. Georgia Association of Retarded Citizens et al.; and Board of Public Education for the City of Savannah and the County of Chatham et al. v. Georgia Association of Retarded Citizens et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of National School Boards Association et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae in No. 83-1431 granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Smith v. Robinson, ante, p. 992. Reported below: 716 F. 2d 1565.


text:
    No. 83-1535.
    Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Olivas-Monorrez.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, ante, p. 1032.


text:
    No. 35,
    Orig.
    United States v. Maine et al.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 465 U. S. 1018.]
   Exceptions to the Report of the Special Master are set for oral argument in due course.


text:
    No. 81-1859.
    Illinois v. Lafayette,
   462 U. S. 640. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Respondent’s petition for writ of error coram nobis to vacate the judgment in this case denied.

Justice Marshall, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 82-1913.
    No. 82-1951.
    Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority et al.; and Donovan, Secretary of Labor v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority et al.
   D. C. W. D. Tex. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 464 U. S. 812.] Cases restored to calendar for reargument. In addition to the questions presented in the jurisdictional statements and previously briefed and argued, the parties are requested to brief and argue the following question: “Whether or not the principles of the Tenth Amendment as set forth in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), should be reconsidered?”


text:
    No. 83-18.
    Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Vt. [Certiorari granted, 464 U. S. 959.] Case restored to calendar for reargument. In addition to the questions presented by the petition for writ of certiorari and previously briefed and argued, the parties are requested to brief and argue the following questions:

“1. Whether, in a defamation action, the constitutional rule of New York Times and Gertz with respect to presumed and punitive damages should apply where the suit is against a nonmedia defendant?
“2. Whether, in a defamation action, the constitutional rule of New York Times and Gertz with respect to presumed and punitive damages should apply where the speech is of a commercial or economic nature?”


author: Justice Stevens,

text:
    No. 83-712.
    New Jersey v. T. L. O.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. [Cer-tiorari granted, 464 U. S. 991.] Case restored to calendar for reargument. In addition to the question presented by the petition for writ of certiorari and previously briefed and argued, the parties are requested to brief and argue the following question: “Did the assistant principal violate the Fourth Amendment in opening respondent’s purse in the facts and circumstances of this case?”

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

In its decision in this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed three distinct questions: (1) what is the proper standard for judging the reasonableness of a school official’s search of a student’s purse; (2) on the facts of this case, did the school official violate that standard; and (3) whether the exclusionary rule bars the use in a criminal proceeding of evidence that a school official obtained in violation of that standard. The Supreme Court held (1) that the correct standard is one of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause; (2) that the standard was violated in this case; and (3) that the evidence obtained as the result of a violation may not be introduced in evidence against T. L. 0. in any criminal proceeding, including this delinquency proceeding.

New Jersey’s petition for certiorari sought review of only the third question. The reasons why it did not seek review of either of the other two questions are tolerably clear. There is substantial agreement among appellate courts that the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the correct standard, and it is apparently one that the New Jersey law enforcement authorities favor. As far as the specific facts of the case are concerned, presumably New Jersey believed that this Court is too busy to take a case just for the purpose of reviewing the State Supreme Court’s application of this standard to the specific facts of this case.

The single question presented to the Court has now been briefed and argued. Evidently unable or unwilling to decide the question presented by the parties, the Court, instead of dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, orders reargument directed to the questions that New Jersey decided not to bring here. This is done even though New Jersey agrees with its Supreme Court’s resolution of these questions, and has no desire to seek reversal on those grounds. Thus, in this nonadversarial context, the Court has decided to plunge into the merits of the Fourth Amendment issues despite the fact that no litigant before it wants the Court’s guidance on these questions. Volunteering unwanted advice is rarely a wise course of action.

Of late, the Court has acquired a voracious appetite for judicial activism in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, at least when it comes to restricting the constitutional rights of the citizen. In United States v. Leon, ante, at 905, and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, ante, at 988, n. 5, the Court fashioned a new exception to the exclusionary rule despite its acknowledgment that narrower grounds for decision were available in both cases. In United States v. Karo, ante, p. 705, in order to reverse a decision requiring the suppression of evidence, the Court on its own initiative made an analysis of a factual question that had not been presented or argued by either of the parties and managed to find a basis for ruling in favor of the Government. In Segura v. United States, ante, p. 796, two creative Justices reached the surprising conclusion that an 18-20-hour warrantless occupation of a citizen’s home was “reasonable,” despite the fact that the issue had not been argued and the Government had expressly conceded the unreasonableness of the occupation. And, as I have previously observed, in recent Terms the Court has elected to use its power of summary disposition exclusively for the benefit of prosecutors. In this case, the special judicial action is to order the parties to argue a constitutional question that they have no desire to raise, in a context in which a ground for decision that the Court currently views as nonconstitutional is available, and on which the State’s chief prosecutor believes no guidance from this Court is necessary.

I believe that the adversary process functions most effectively when we rely on the initiative of lawyers, rather than the activism of judges, to fashion the questions for review. I respectfully dissent.

       The petition presented a single question for review: “Whether the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule applies to searches made by public school officials and teachers in school.”

       At oral argument, the following colloquy took place between counsel for New Jersey and the bench:
      “QUESTION: Well, do you think it is open to us to deal with the reasonableness of the search?
      “MR. NODES: I believe that could be considered a question subsumed within the—
      “QUESTION: But it wasn’t your intention to raise it?
      “MR. NODES: It wasn’t our intention to raise it because we agree with the standard that was set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court. We feel that that is a workable standard.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 7.

       See ante, at 962-963 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in Sheppard and dissenting in Leon).

       See Florida v. Meyers, 466 U. S. 380, 385-386, and n. 3 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

       We are told that questions concerning the remedies for a Fourth Amendment violation are not constitutional in dimension. United States v. Leon, ante, at 905-906. Apparently, this Court has imposed the exclusionary rule on the States as a result of the Fourth Amendment’s “invisible radiations,” Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. 770, 780, n. 12 (1984), which act to somehow give the Court nonconstitutional supervisory powers over the state courts. My own view is different. See ante, at 978, and n. 37 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in Sheppard and dissenting in Leon).


text:
    No. 83-963.
    Board of License Commissioners of the Town of Tiverton v. Pastore, Liquor Control Administrator of Rhode Island, et al.
   Sup. Ct. R. I. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82-6230.
    Arnau v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 83-70.
    Pennsylvania v. Santner.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-681.
    No. 83-690.
    No. 83-806.
    Dentico et al. v. United States; Musto et al. v. United States; and D’Agostino v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: Nos. 83-681 and 83-690, 715 F. 2d 822; No. 83-806, 722 F. 2d 735.


text:
    No. 83-979.
    Cronn v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5063.
    Tranowski v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5504.
    Wilkins v. Whitaker et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5689.
    Tydings v. Department of Corrections et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5861.
    Perez et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-5911.
    Gooday v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-768.
    Faulkner et al. v. Wellman et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondents Dwight Walker and Billie R. Adams for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certio-rari denied.


author: Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    No. 83-1212.
    Kentucky v. Hamilton.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Cer-tiorari denied.

Justice Rehnquist,

with whom Justice O’Connor joins,

dissenting.

Respondent Hamilton was tried for the crimes of rape and incest, in which he was charged with having had sexual intercourse with his 10-year-old daughter. He was found guilty on both counts and was sentenced to life imprisonment on the rape charge and 10 years on the incest charge, the sentences to be served concurrently. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed his conviction for rape and his sentence of life imprisonment, but reversed his conviction for incest. 659 S. W. 2d 201 (1983). That court was of the view that sentencing respondent for two different crimes based on the single act of intercourse with his daughter violated the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky believed that the closest analogy to the present case was our decision in Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U. S. 682 (1977), in which we held that petitioner Harris, who had earlier been tried and convicted of the felony murder of a grocery clerk, could not be later tried for the armed robbery of the store which was the predicate offense for the felony-murder prosecution. In the present case, however, it is undisputed that the State defines rape as sexual intercourse with one who is less than 12 years old, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 510.040(l)(b)(2) (1975), and defines incest as sexual intercourse with a member of one’s family, Ky. Rev. Stat. §530.020 (1975). Thus while both offenses require the element of sexual intercourse, each requires an additional element which the other does not. Although the Kentucky Supreme Court purported to rely on our decision in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299 (1932), its ruling is directly contrary to this language from Blockburger:

“The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. . . .” Id., at 304.

Earlier this Term, we reiterated the traditional definition of the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment:

““Tt protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.’” Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161, 165 (1977), quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 717 (1969).” Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U. S. 493, 498 (1984).

In the present case, respondent Hamilton has neither been acquitted and subjected to a second prosecution, nor convicted and subjected to a second prosecution. The only conceivable double jeopardy protection which he can invoke is that against multiple punishments for the same offense. But we held in Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U. S. 359, 368 (1983), that the question whether punishments are “multiple” under the Double Jeopardy Clause is essentially one of legislative intent, a principle we reaffirmed in Ohio v. Johnson, supra, at 499, and n. 8. • Here the Kentucky Legislature has given no indication that it wishes something less than the statutorily provided penalty imposed for each offense when a defendant is convicted of both rape and incest. There was, therefore, no violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, entailed in the sentences imposed by the Kentucky trial court.

I believe that the decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky is so obviously mistaken that it should be summarily reversed on the authority of Ohio v. Johnson, supra, and Missouri v. Hunter, supra, but at the very least I would grant the State’s petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand this case to the Supreme Court of Kentucky for reconsideration in the light of those cases.


text:
    No. 83-1318.
    Garrison, Warden, et al. v. Alston.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 83-1321.
    No. 83-1432.
    No. 83-1433.
    No. 83-1442.
    No. 83-1443.
    No. 83-1618.
    California et al. v. Tenneco Oil Co. et al.; Public Utility Commissioner of Oregon et al. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. et al.; Northwest Pipeline Corp. et al. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. et al.; El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co. et al.; Pacific Gas & Electric Co. et al. v. Tenneco Oil Co. et al.; and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Tenneco Oil Co. et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White and Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari. Justice Powell and Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.

Reported below: 708 F. 2d 1011.


text:
    No. 83-5614.
    Mahoney v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.