text:
    No. 80-847.
    No. 80-1067.
    Common Cause et al. v. Schmitt et al.; and Federal Election Commission v. Americans for Change et al.
   Appeals from D. C. D. C. Prob-

able jurisdiction noted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 512 F. Supp. 489.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 80-5950.
    Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. Motion of appellant for leave to proceed in jorma pauperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 80-327.
    Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 80-986.
    North Haven Board of Education et al. v. Bell, Secretary of Education, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari granted.


text:
    No. 80-1082.
    Smith, Correctional Superintendent v. Phillips.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 80-689.
    WIDMAR et al. v. VINCENT et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motions of Bible Study et al. and Center for Law and Religious Freedom of the Christian Legal Society for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 80-702.
    United States v. New Mexico et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 80-848.
    No. 80-883.
    Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, Personal Representative of the Estates of Fehilly et al.; and Hartzell Propeller, Inc. v. Reyno, Personal Representative of the Estates of Fehilly et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari in No. 80-848 granted. Certiorari in No. 80-883 granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition. Cases consolidated and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 630 F. 2d 149.


text:
    No. 80-757.
    No. 80-895.
    No. 80-936.
    New York Mercantile Exchange et al. v. Leist et al.; Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Inc. v. Leist et al.; and Heinold Commodities, Inc., et al. v. Leist et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of Board of Trade of the City of Chicago et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae in No. 80-757 granted. Motion of Futures Industry Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in No. 80-936 granted. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 638 F. 2d 283.


text:
    No. 80-846.
    Rose, Warden v. Lundy.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-1881.
    Agrella v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-442.
    Garman v. Northern Trust Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-553.
    Demanett et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-585.
    Mayne v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-601.
    Cassady v. Green.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 80-607.
    Sager v. Missouri.
   Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-610.
    Freeman et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-616.
    McGovern et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-617.
    Stemple v. Board of Education of Prince George’s County et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-631.
    Hospital Central Services Assn. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-673.
    Taylor v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-693.
    Siffrin Residential Association for the Developmentally Disabled of Stark County, Inc., et al. v. Garcia et ux.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-698.
    Newspaper Printing Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-715.
    United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-716.
    No. 80-940.
    Lone Star Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.; and National Labor Relations Board v. Lone Star Steel Co. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 639 F. 2d 545.


text:
    No. 80-722.
    Canadian Mountain Holidays, Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, County of Alameda (Buist, Real Party in Interest).
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-728.
    Coletti v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-734.
    Pena et al. v. O’Connell, Receiver.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-742.
    National Pork Producers Council et al. v. Block, Secretary of Agriculture, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-758.
    No. 80-979.
    S.S. Zoe Colocotroni et al. v. Puerto Rico et al.; and Puerto Rico et al. v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 628 F. 2d 652.


text:
    No. 80-759.
    Sanchez et al. v. Tucson Unified School District No. 1 et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-760.
    Turner v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-764.
    Enstam v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-765.
    Brown Insulating Systems, Inc. v. Donovan, Secretary of Labor, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-766.
    Anderson et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-768.
    Amusement & Music Operators Assn. et al. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-771.
    Burnham Van Service, Inc., et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-773.
    Penello v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-776.
    Short v. Kittrell.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 80-779.
    Concerned Jewish Youth v. McGuire, Police Commissioner of New York City, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-785.
    Certain Unindicted Individuals and Corporations v. United States et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari

denied.


text:
    No. 80-786.
    Rashkind, Assistant State Prosecuting Attorney, 11th Judicial Circuit of Florida v. Marrero et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-804.
    Silverman, Administratrix v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-809.
    Litton Systems, Inc. v. Lundy.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-814.
    Safeway Stores, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-818.
    Redding et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-819.
    Bristol Spring Manufacturing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-820.
    Manka et al. v. Martin et al.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-822.
    Livingston, Administratrix v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-828.
    Pacific Legal Foundation et al. v. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-832.
    Miller et al. v. Calhoun et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-835.
    DASCO, Inc., et al. v. American City Bank & Trust Co., N. A., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-839.
    No. 80-1019.
    Martier v. United States; and Jastrzebski v. United States.
   C. A. 3d

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 633 F. 2d 210.


text:
    No. 80-843.
    Caribe Trailer Systems, Inc., et al. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-844.
    Safir v. Chudnoff, Trustee in Bankruptcy.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-845.
    Kaufman Investment Corp. v. Johnson et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-858.
    No. 80-859.
    International Printing & Graphic Communications Union et al. v. Collier; and International Printing & Graphic Communications Union, Local No. 6, et al. v. Collier.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 80-858, 220 Va. ciii; No. 80-859, 220 Va. civ.


text:
    No. 80-860.
    Ouimet Corp. et al. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-862.
    McNeil v. North Carolina.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-863.
    Wolski v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-864.
    Pathway Bellows, Inc. v. Blanchette et al., Trustees.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-865.
    No. 80-884.
    Harris et al. v. Virginia; and Syski v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 80-865, 221 Va. xcviii; No. 80-884, 221 Va. cxlviii.


text:
    No. 80-873.
    W. W. Leasing Unlimited v. County of Monterey.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-876.
    Scarpelli v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-877.
    Hopkins et al. v. Rector, Churchwardens, and Vestrymen of the Parish of Calvary, Holy Communion and St. George’s in the City of New York, et al.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-879.
    Sax et al. v. Oliff et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-881.
    Tema Oil Co. et al. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-891.
    AuBuchon v. Missouri.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-894.
    Becker’s Motor Transportation, Inc., et al. v. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-898.
    Toner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-900.
    Carbone et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-903.
    Fowler v. Idaho.
   Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 80-907.
    Jensen et al. v. Farrell Lines, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-911.
    Jones et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-913.
    Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co. v. Ingle.
   Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-914.
    Cohen, Attorney General of Maine v. Equifax Services, Inc., et al.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 80-918.
    True et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-919.
    Moore v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-930.
    Blue Shield of Virginia et al. v. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-933.
    Physicians National House Staff Assn. et al. v. Murphy, Chairman, National Labor Relations Board, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-934.
    Anthony J. Bertucci Construction Co., Inc., et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-935.
    First National Bank of Jackson v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-942.
    Shaheen v. United States District Court for the Southern District of New York et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-943.
    Curtin v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-946.
    Louisiana Aircraft, Inc. v. Aycock, Administrator, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-952.
    Emory v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-954.
    Arboleda v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-959.
    Ohio v. Thompson et al.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Stark County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-960.
    Matschke v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-961.
    Federal Trade Commission v. Official Airline Guides, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-962.
    Board of Supervisors of San Diego County v. Lonergan, Auditor and Controller of San Diego County et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-967.
    Hospital & Institutional Workers Union, Local 250 v. Pasatiempo Development Corp.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-971.
    Landis v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-973.
    Smith v. Ford Motor Co.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-976.
    Sircy v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-982.
    Karn v. Magnavox Co. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-984.
    Garrett v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-996.
    McGinley v. Hynes, Deputy Attorney General of New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-998.
    Wolfson v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1001.
    Jackson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1003.
    Daniel Construction Co., a division of Daniel International Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1005.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1006.
    Craig et al. v. County of Los Angeles et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1011.
    Wyche v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1015.
    Ascher v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1020.
    Adams et al. v. D’Andrea.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1028.
    Toner et al. v. Hanna et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1029.
    London et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1033.
    Jamil v. Southridge Cooperative Section 4, Inc.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1039.
    Maciejewski et al. v. Entertainment Concepts, Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1041.
    Rizzo v. Davis, District Director of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1042.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1046.
    Reichstein v. Briggs.
   Super. Ct. Ariz., County of Maricopa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1050.
    Barker v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1051.
    Anderson v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1053.
    Quick v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1054.
    Oltersdorf v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad Co.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1056.
    Tourville v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1059.
    Allott v. Sicinski et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1063.
    Montgomery v. American Airlines, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1064.
    Singleton v. City of New York et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1065.
    Two Rivers Co. v. Curtiss Breeding Service, A Division of Searle Agriculture, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1066.
    Baskes v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1071.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1072.
    Gerald v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1078.
    Rollins International, Inc. v. Staub et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1079.
    Ragu Foods, Inc., et al. v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1081.
    Holmes v. District of Columbia Board of Appeals and Review.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1088.
    Blodgett et ux. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1089.
    Shakespeare Co. v. Fury Imports, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1090.
    Hatcher et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1091.
    Riggs et ux. v. Terrazas.
   Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1094.
    Burlington Northern Inc. v. Flanigan.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1097.
    Stalder et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1100.
    Marriott Corp. et al. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1108.
    Shartel et al. v. Blasingham et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1111.
    Wing Ding Chan v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1113.
    Athanasiou et al. v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1117.
    Castillo v. Forsht, United States Marshal.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1131.
    Viars v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1133.
    Finger v. Joint Bar Association Grievance Committee for the Second and Eleventh Judicial Districts.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1141.
    Estate of Cady v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1143.
    Matsis v. Matsis.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1144.
    Gutierrez v. Boston Old Colony Insurance Co.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1150.
    Smith v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1157.
    Sandate et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1174.
    Soo Line Railroad Co. v. Town of East Troy.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1175.
    Martinez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1186.
    No. 80-5936.
    Murzyn v. United States; and Hall v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 631 F. 2d 525.


text:
    No. 80-1197.
    Garner v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1218.
    Bowler v. Reagan, President of the United States, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1280.
    Chacon et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5382.
    Ford et al. v. Griffin, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5454.
    Alfaro et al. v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5485.
    Sullivan et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5503.
    Justice v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5522.
    Gooch v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5563.
    Wright v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5582.
    Clenny v. Harrison, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5595.
    Gurmankin v. Costanzo et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5596.
    Chin et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d

Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5599.
    Alestra v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5603.
    Lewis v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5604.
    Chavez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5631.
    Sasser v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5633.
    Bland v. Texas.
   Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5635.
    Anderson v. Oregon.
   Ct. App. Ore. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5653.
    Calhoun v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5662.
    Watters et al. v. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5663.
    Stricklin v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5664.
    Barber v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5675.
    Cramer v. Wisconsin.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5688.
    Martinez et al. v. Blum, Commissioner, New York State Department of Social Services, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5689.
    Corey v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5694.
    Kenney v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5697.
    Patterson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5699.
    Deems v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5719.
    Dufur, aka Baker v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5723.
    Boni v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5726.
    Light v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certi-

orari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5742.
    Turner v. Muncy, Correctional Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5743.
    Pry v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5755.
    Harding v. Bordenkircher, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Ya. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5791.
    Yaretsky et al. v. Blum, Commissioner, New York State Department of Social Services, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5800.
    Larose v. Worcester Housing Authority et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5801.
    Solomon, dba Vic’s Garage v. Fusco et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5802.
    Brooks v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5803.
    Anaya v. Romero, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5807.
    Cooper v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5810.
    Bradenburg v. Maschner, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5811.
    Rogers v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5814.
    Phillips v. Benton, Corrections Director, et al.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. 'Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5817.
    Fallin v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5821.
    Clumm v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Athens County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5822.
    Cariglio v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5825.
    Robinson v. Stephenson et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5826.
    Robinson v. Sanders et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5827.
    Williams et al. v. North Carolina State Bar et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5828.
    Hanei v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5829.
    Haid v. Walker et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5831.
    Housley v. Mattox et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5833.
    Brooks v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5834.
    Donohue v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5835.
    Grochulski v. Henderson, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5842.
    Edwards v. Jago.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5845.
    Knight v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5846.
    Robinson v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5848.
    Barksdale v. Brewer, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5849.
    Gray v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5852.
    Magill v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5855.
    Hall v. Iowa.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5857.
    Henderson v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5858.
    Lane v. Jones, Sheriff.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5860.
    Arceneaux et al. v. Texaco, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5863.
    Packard v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5865.
    Wofford v. Harris, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5868.
    Lewandowski v. Egeler, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5869.
    Vasser v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5871.
    Valentino v. Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa (California, Real Party in Interest).
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5873.
    Oliver v. Cuyler, Correctional Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5874.
    Pruitt v. Leeke, Corrections Commissioner, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5875.
    Shuler v. Garrison, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5878.
    Phillips v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5879.
    In re C. S.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5880.
    Erickson et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5881.
    Lawson v. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5883.
    Cleveland v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5886.
    Brooks v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5890.
    Orpiano v. Johnson et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5891.
    Theriault et al. v. Establishment of Religion on Taxpayers’ Money in the Federal Bureau of Prisons et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5892.
    Watkins v. Martin, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5898.
    Passaro v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5903.
    Countryman v. Zipp, Regional Director, National Labor Relations Board, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5905.
    Johnson v. Texas.
   Ct. Crina. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5911.
    Hill v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5912.
    Aviles v. Superior Court of California, County of Monterey, et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5915.
    Preacher v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5917.
    Flenner v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5922.
    Graves v. Williams, Sheriff.
   Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5923.
    Pusch et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5924.
    Teng et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5930.
    Keezer et al. v. Minnesota.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5934.
    Sullivan v. Sowders, Penitentiary Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5935.
    Kanasola v. Smith, Attorney General, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5941.
    Broughton v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5944.
    Kohls v. United Parcel Service, Inc., et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5948.
    Lockett v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5949.
    Burkhalter v. Chrysler Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5952.
    Steele v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5955.
    Finlayson et al. v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5956.
    Skinner v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5957.
    Johnson v. Blackburn, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5958.
    Kadet v. Smith, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5959.
    Antonelli v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5960.
    Mazzella v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5961.
    No. 80-5965.
    Thomas v. United States; and Maddox v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 676 F. 2d 239.


text:
    No. 80-5962.
    Rheuark et al. v. Dallas County, Texas, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5963.
    Holmes v. Orr, Secretary of the Air Force, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5964.
    Phipps v. Brown et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5967.
    Moore, aka Ward v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5968.
    Rohl v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5970.
    Hale v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5973.
    Faison et ux. v. United States District Court for the Western District of Washington et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5974.
    Eliason v. Christley et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5975.
    Smith v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5976.
    Ivory v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5978.
    Brown v. Loggins, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5979.
    Harris v. Peterson.
   Ct. App. Ore. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5983.
    Osborne v. United States
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5984.
    Muccie v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5985.
    DeLoach, aka Zockman v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5987.
    Timmons v. Franzen et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5988.
    Boag v. Arizona.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5989.
    Coney v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5990.
    Hockenbury v. Sowders, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5991.
    McDonald v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5992.
    Hughes v. Hopper et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5993.
    Avery v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5995.
    Young, aka Cloudy v. Rustamier.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5997.
    Witherspoon v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6001.
    Yin-Ho Wong v. Carlson et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6004.
    Regan v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6010.
    George v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6011.
    Zuckerman v. United States Consumer Product Safety Commission et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6014.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6015.
    Dunaway v. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6016.
    Ferreboeuf v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6018.
    Claybrooks v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6019.
    Jacks v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6020.
    Guerra v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6022.
    Tucker v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6043.
    Osborne v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6048.
    Woods v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6054.
    Aebischer v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6057.
    Spikes v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6062.
    Armstrong v. United States.
   C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6063.
    Tolliver v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6065.
    Wright v. Bombard, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6070.
    Lee v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6072.
    Lewis v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6078.
    Gregg v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6079.
    Mowat v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6081.
    Luttrell v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6083.
    Wickizer v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6086.
    McCoy v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6099.
    Fontanez v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6105.
    Molina v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1856.
    Eaton Corp. v. Fox.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.

Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 79-1953.
    Freeman, Director, Missouri Department of Social Services, et al. v. Chambly et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Powell would grant certiorari.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 79-6309.
    No. 80-5856.
    No. 80-5986.
    Clark v. Florida. Baker v. Georgia. Green v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Fla.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.; and

Sup. Ct. Ga. Certio-rari denied. Reported below: No. 79-6309, 379 So. 2d 97; No. 80-5856, 246 Ga. 259, 272 S. E. 2d 61; No. 80-5986, 246 Ga. 598, 272 S. E. 2d 475.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 80-255.
    Georgia Power Co. v. 138.30 Acres of Land et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun would grant cer-tiorari.


text:
    No. 80-381.
    DiGilio v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


author: Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    No. 80-472.
    Engle, Correctional Superintendent v. Sims.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

Justice Rehnquist,

with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun join,

dissenting.

This Court has been asked to review a determination by a Federal Court of Appeals that a state-court murder conviction was obtained in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Because I think the conclusion of the Court of Appeals is wrong and has erroneously expanded the role that court was to play in providing habeas corpus review of state-court criminal convictions, I dissent from denial of the petition for certiorari.

On February 27, 1962, the Juvenile Division of the Cuya-hoga County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas issued a citation and warrant against the respondent alleging that he had participated in several armed robberies, one of which resulted in a death. Respondent was taken into custody and brought before the Juvenile Court on March 27, 1962, for a hearing; no transcript or record of that hearing was made. In accordance with then Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2151.26 (1954), the Juvenile Court decided to bind respondent over to the Criminal Division of the Court of Common Pleas for trial as an adult. This determination was entered on the court’s docket as a journal entry which is the only record of what transpired at that hearing. The journal entry reads:

“TO COURT: This twenty-seventh day of March, 1962, James Samuel Sims, a minor of about the age of seventeen years, came before the Honorable Albert A. Wold-man upon the petition of Charles R. Reynolds alleging that James Samuel Sims is a delinquent child in this: that on or about February 16, 1962, at 4502 St. Clair Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio, he did unlawfully, and by putting in fear while armed with a dangerous weapon, to wit, a pistol, rob from the person of one, Dorothy Kulas, cash in the approximate amount of $1069.00, contrary to the statute in such case made and provided for and against the peace and dignity of the State of Ohio. That on or about February 18, 1962, at 3005 Woodhill Road, Cleveland, Ohio, he did unlawfully, purposely and while in the perpetration of a robbery, kill one, William C. Beasley, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided for and against the peace and dignity of the State of Ohio. That on or about February 23, 1962, at 6938 Kinsman Road, Cleveland, Ohio, he did unlawfully, and by putting in fear while armed with a dangerous weapon, to wit, a pistol, rob from the person of one, David Warren, cash in the approximate amount of $104.50, contrary to the form of the statute in such ease made and provided for and against the peace and dignity of the State of Ohio. It appearing to the Court that said child has committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would be felonies, a mental and physical examination having been made by duly qualified persons as provided by statute, it is hereby ordered that pursuant to Section 2151.26 Ohio Revised Code the said James Samuel Sims be bound over to the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County for further proceedings according to law. It is ordered that said James Samuel Sims be, and he hereby is, committed to the jail of Cuya-hoga County.” 619 F. 2d 598, 599 (1980). (Emphasis added.)

Following this journal entry, respondent was indicted on two counts of first-degree murder. Respondent pleaded not guilty, but later withdrew his plea and entered a plea of guilty to homicide generally and waived trial by jury. Pursuant to then-current Ohio law, respondent was tried before a three-judge court solely on the issue of the degree of culpability. He was found guilty of first-degree murder on both counts of the indictment and sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment.

On May 17, 1976, respondent filed a pro se motion for leave to appeal with the Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals seeking to challenge his conviction on the ground that he had been placed twice in jeopardy by being tried and convicted as an adult in criminal court. The Court of Appeals granted his motion, appointed counsel, but later found no error and affirmed the convictions and sentences. With regard to the double jeopardy claim, the court acknowledged that this Court held in Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975), that a juvenile who has been subject to a “jurisdictional or adjudicatory hearing” in a juvenile court before being bound over to be tried as an adult is placed twice in jeopardy by the later criminal trial. However, this Court also stated that it was not foreclosing States from requiring a finding of probable cause as a prerequisite for transfer. Id., at 538, n. 18. Applying the principles set forth in Breed, the Ohio Court of Appeals found that there was no indication that an adjudicatory hearing or a jurisdictional hearing was conducted in this case. The court explained:

“There is no finding of delinquency, and there is no recitation of any evidence upon which such an adjudication could be premised. All that appears to have occurred is that the Juvenile Court arrived at a determination that there was an appearance of possible criminal action which properly and appropriately should be considered by the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County.” State v. Sims, 55 Ohio App. 2d 285, 290, 380 N. E. 2d 1350, 1353 (1977).

After the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed respondent’s appeal for failure to state a substantial constitutional question, respondent petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio again alleging a double jeopardy claim. The District Court denied the petition. The court held that the journal entry lent little support to respondent’s position because it contained neither a specific finding that respondent committed any of the criminal acts alleged nor a recitation of evidence. The court also rejected the respondent’s contention that because the journal entry purported to be issued pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2151.26 (1954), compliance with that statute required that a juvenile be formally adjudged delinquent before being bound over to be tried as an adult. In rejecting this contention, the District Court explained that the proper operation and construction of § 2151.26 was largely unsettled prior to the clarification provided by the Ohio Supreme Court in In re Jackson, 21 Ohio St. 2d 215, 257 N. E. 2d 74 (1970). Prior to that 1970 decision, many Juvenile Courts bound over only on a determination of probable cause. Given the uncertainty of the law surrounding § 2151.26 prior to the Jackson decision, the District Court was unwilling to assume that an adjudication of delinquency was made at respondent’s 1962 hearing. The pre-Jackson practice of binding over on a probable-cause determination, coupled with the absence of any specific factual findings indicative of adjudication, strongly suggests that respondent’s juvenile hearing was of a nonadjudicatory nature.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. 619 F. 2d 598 (1980). According to the Court of Appeals, the District Court’s reasoning overlooks the essential fact that the Juvenile Judge was empowered to impose sanctions at the 1962 hearing, that evidence was taken, and that the liberty and reputation of the respondent were put in risk at that time. The rendering of a final judgment is immaterial to the applicability of the Double Jeopardy Clause and therefore the much disputed meaning of the Juvenile Court’s journal entry is irrelevant and unnecessary to the disposition of the case. The court stated:

“What actually occurred at the March 27, 1962 hearing is also insignificant. Once the Juvenile Court, possessing the jurisdiction and power to enter final orders levying a wide range of possible sanctions, began a hearing, not limited in scope by statute to a preliminary or probable cause hearing, jeopardy attached and appellant possessed the constitutional right to have the Juvenile Court, as the original trier of fact, determine his fate.” Id., at 605.

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals denied a petition for rehearing, stating that petitioner was in error in his contention that the court’s opinion would require the release of every juvenile who was bound over according to the procedures of former Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2151.26 (1954). The court explained that it was not deciding that there would be a double jeopardy violation where the record of the Juvenile Court hearing plainly established that the hearing was limited to a determination of probable cause.

The decision of the Court of Appeals, in my view, merits review if not outright summary reversal for several reasons. In the first place, any petition for habeas corpus which seeks to attack a juvenile journal entry, or to construe it, by means of a federal habeas petition filed 16 years later should receive the strictest scrutiny from the federal courts who are asked to intervene and set aside a state-court conviction presumptively valid on its face. This was commendably recognized by the District Court when it said:

“Inquiry concerning the nature of the March 27, 1962 hearing by the Juvenile Court is hindered by the absence of any transcript of the proceeding.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-20.

A federal court in this situation should also not lose sight of the fact that it is the habeas applicant who has the burden of proving a constitutional violation, see Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539 (1981), and that no system of justice which gives both society and a defendant their due is aided by attempting to reconstruct or re-evaluate events that took place decades ago, as if it were an archaeological expedition, rather than an exercise in the administration of justice.

Public confidence that justice is administered fairly between the defendant and the State is not bolstered by the fact that the opinion of the Court of Appeals can quite reasonably be read as inconsistent on its face with its later order denying the petition for rehearing. In that order, the court stated that a double jeopardy violation would not arise if it were clear that a probable-cause determination, as opposed to a delinquency determination, was made at the bindover hearing. This is in direct contradiction to the analysis the court employed in its original opinion where it stated that it need not inquire into what occurred at the 1962 hearing because once the Juvenile Court began a hearing which was not limited by statute to a probable-cause determination, jeopardy attached.

To the extent the court meant what it said in its original opinion, the decision is of significant importance. First, to reach its conclusion the court had to make an assessment as to the type of determination a juvenile court was required to make in 1962 prior to binding over a juvenile for trial as an adult. The court held that an Ohio juvenile court was required to make a “delinquency” determination at such a hearing and it reached this result even though the other courts which addressed the issue, including the Ohio state courts, all concluded to the contrary, explaining that the law on this point was not settled until the 1970 decision in Jackson. The prior uncertainty of the law on this point (and consequently the Court of Appeals’ error) is most clearly illustrated by the fact that Jackson itself affirmed a lower court opinion reversing a juvenile’s bindover on a finding of probable cause. It is patently obvious to me that the Ohio state courts are much more competent than a federal habeas court to determine what Ohio law required of juvenile courts in 1962.

The assumption, made cavalierly in my opinion by the Court of Appeals, that a double jeopardy violation arose because the Ohio Juvenile Court was required to make a delinquency determination prior to binding the juvenile over for trial as an adult, goes far beyond what we held in Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975). If the decision remains the law of the Sixth Circuit, and if we deny certiorari there is no reason to believe that other Circuits will not follow it, and it may well require the release of every juvenile bound over under the same statute and then subsequently convicted as an adult. If we dealt here with the fate of only one criminal defendant, it would not be worth the time of this Court to inquire into the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeals. But a decision that appears to require what may be the massive release of large numbers of similarly situated convicted criminals should not occur without this Court’s first reviewing the constitutional underpinnings of such decision.

The District Court, sitting as it did with a District Judge far more familiar with Ohio practice than the three judges of the Court of Appeals only one of whom is an Ohioan, was surely correct in its unwillingness to assume that an adjudication of delinquency was made at respondent’s 1962 hearing. Indeed, as the District Court stated:

“The pre-7n re Jackson practice of binding over on a probable cause determination, coupled with the absence of any specific factual findings indicative of an adjudication, discussed infra, strongly suggest that petitioner’s juvenile hearing was of a non-adjudicatory nature.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-23.

For the reasons previously stated, I would grant certiorari to review what seems to me an abuse of the “Great Writ” by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Respondent was indicted by the Cuyahoga County grand jury on two counts of first-degree murder 19 years ago, and although first pleading not guilty to these charges, later withdrew this plea and entered a plea of guilty to homicide generally and waived a trial by jury. He was then tried before a three-judge court solely on the degree of culpability according to then-current Ohio law, and was found guilty and sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment on the basis of his plea. It was not until 14 years later that it occurred to him that these Ohio proceedings violated the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and then he unsuccessfully sought relief in the Ohio Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court of Ohio, and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. It cannot be fairly said that the opinion of the Court of Appeals will affect only respondent, but it can be fairly said that respondent has set in motion legal machinery, both state and federal, far exceeding either the merits of his claim or the proper allocation of judicial resources in a system of justice which recognizes both the interests of society and that of the defendant.

       At the time of the juvenile proceedings afforded respondent in this case, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2151.26 (1954) provided:
      “In any case involving a delinquent child under sections 2151.01 to 2151.54, inclusive, of the Revised Code, who has committed an act which could be a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile judge, after full investigation and after a mental and physical examination of such child has been made by the bureau of juvenile research, or by some other public or private agency, or by a person qualified to make such examination, may order that such child enter into a recognizance with good and sufficient surety, subject to the approval of the judge, for his appearance before the court of common pleas at the next term thereof, for such disposition as the court of common pleas is authorized to make for a like act committed by an adult; or the judge may exercise the other powers conferred in such sections in disposing of such case.”


text:
    No. 80-484.
    Prince Edward School Foundation v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Rehnquist,

with whom Justice Stewart and Justice Powell join,

dissenting.

The initial question presented by this petition is whether the Internal Revenue Service is entitled to deny tax-exempt status to a private school which discriminates in its admissions policy. If so, the additional question posed is what steps a private school must take in order to establish that its admissions policy is in fact nondiscriminatory.

Petitioner, Prince Edward School Foundation, was formed as a nonprofit private school foundation to operate elementary and secondary schools in Prince Edward County, Ya. The principal purpose for petitioner’s establishment was to ensure a segregated education for the white children who attended petitioner’s schools. Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218, 223, 231 (1964). Presently, petitioner’s sole activity is the operation of one private school, Prince Edward Academy.

From 1959 until 1970, petitioner was considered by the Service as a tax-exempt organization within the terms of § 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 IT. S. C. § 501 (c)(3). Section 501 (a) of the Code exempts from the federal income taxes organizations described in §501 (c)(3), and this latter provision includes corporations or foundations “organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, . . . literary, or educational purposes . . . .”

In 1970, the Service announced that it would no longer recognize the tax-exempt status of any private school unless the school adopted and administered a nondiscriminatory admissions policy. This new position was announced during the course of litigation in Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (DC 1971), in which the Service’s prior policy was being challenged. A three-judge panel in Green thereafter ruled that a private school is not entitled to acquire or retain exempt status under § 501 (c) (3) unless it has a racially nondiscriminatory admissions policy. Although § 501 (c) (3) does not, by its express terms, impose such a limitation on the right to tax-exempt status, the Green court reasoned that such a limitation was mandated by both public policy and the common-law definition of “charitable.”

To effectuate its new policy regarding tax exemptions for private schools, the Service issued Revenue Procedure 72-54 (currently Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 Cum. Bull. 587), which requires a private school seeking tax-exempt status to publicize its nondiscriminatory admissions policy to all segments of the community either through a newspaper of general circulation or over the broadcast media.

Petitioner has continuously refused to publicize that its school has a racially nondiscriminatory admissions policy, although it has steadfastly contended that in fact this is the case. (App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a.) In 1978, the Service revoked petitioner’s exempt status because it “[had] not complied with the requirements of Revenue Procedure 75-50 nor any of its guidelines that preceded it and [has] not demonstrated that [it has] adopted a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students . . . .” {Id., at 18a.)

Thereafter, petitioner brought this action under 26 U. S. C. § 7428 to review the Service’s determination regarding its tax-exempt status, attacking both the statutory and constitutional validity of Rev. Proc. 75-50. Petitioner filed affidavits in the District Court asserting that it has an open admissions policy and, although no black student has ever attended its school, no black student has ever applied for admission and no official of or personnel related to the petitioner has ever done or said anything to discourage such application. (App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a.) Petitioner also argued to the District Court that since 1973 it has been subject to an injunction entered by another District Court requiring it to admit any qualified black applicants. McCrary v. Runyon, 363 F. Supp. 1200 (ED Va. 1973), aff’d, 427 U. S. 160 (1976). No contention has been made that petitioner is in violation of that injunction order.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court upheld the Service’s determination. The District Court concluded:

“It is accordingly undisputed that the plaintiff has never admitted, never received an application from, and thus has never denied admission to a black person. Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence in either party’s favor, it remains the plaintiff’s burden to establish that its policy is to admit black students on the same basis as those of other races. The plaintiff has failed to present any evidence to that effect. On the other hand, the inference that plaintiff in fact administers a racially discriminatory policy may be drawn from the circumstances surrounding the school’s establishment. ... A further inference that plaintiff administers a racially discriminatory admissions policy can be drawn from the fact that plaintiff has previously conceded that it practiced a racially discriminatory policy of exclusiveness, was subsequently enjoined from such practices by court order, but has failed to present any evidence that it has since modified that policy.”

The questions presented by this petition are of widespread importance. The validity of the Service’s policy of denying tax-exempt status to private schools which have a racially discriminatory admissions policy is not apparent from a reading of the relevant provisions of the 1954 Code. Section 501 (c) (3) speaks to a number of different types of organizations which are entitled to tax-exempt treatment. Separate references are made to “educational” and “charitable” organizations. Arguably, these separate references reflect Congress’ intent that not all educational institutions must also be charitable institutions (as that term was used in the common law) in order to receive tax-exempt status. Moreover, for statutory interpretation purposes, it is difficult to distinguish between private schools which discriminate on the basis of race, private “religious” schools which discriminate on the basis of religion, and private “religious” schools which discriminate on the basis of race but claim that separation of the races is one of the tenets of their religion. Certainly, the Service has never proffered any persuasive reason why these situations should be treated dissimilarly.

Given the general rule that words of a statute, including the Revenue Acts, should be interpreted where possible in their ordinary, everyday sense, Malat v. Riddell, 383 U. S. 569, 571 (1966); Hanover Bank v. Commissioner, 369 U. S. 672, 687 (1962), the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate this policy regarding the tax status of private schools is sufficiently questionable to merit review by this Court. Perhaps, implementation by the Service of the express language of the statute will, as suggested by the District Court in Green v. Connolly, supra, create problems of a constitutional nature. That, however, is a question that this Court, as opposed to the Service, is better equipped to address.

Assuming, arguendo, the validity of the Service’s policy pertaining to private schools, the determination made by the District Court that petitioner does not qualify for tax-exempt treatment is questionable on the record before us. Petitioner was, and still is, under a court order not to discriminate in its admissions. No contempt proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner for violation of that order. Moreover, the District Court had before it sworn affidavits that petitioner has an open admissions policy. Admittedly, petitioner refused to advertise this open admissions policy, but the Service’s requirement of such is one step further removed from the express language of the statute and therefore of even more questionable statutory and constitutional validity.

Not surprisingly, petitioner has not had the opportunity to demonstrate the sincerity of its open admissions practice. Petitioner has retained, and in fact teaches, its belief that racial segregation is desirable. The Court, however, has upheld the First Amendment right of parents to send their children to educational institutions such as petitioner’s, although we have condemned as unlawful the practice of denying admission to such institutions on account of race. McCrary v. Runyon, 427 U. S. 160, 176 (1976). It is easy to understand why any black parents would not seek their child’s admission to an “educational” institution which seeks to inculcate the merits of segregation in the value system of its students. It is not at all unlikely that petitioner will never receive an application for the admission of a black child. This, however, is of no relevance to the narrow question of whether a black child, if he desired to attend petitioner’s institution, would in fact be granted admission on the same basis as a white child. The Service presented no evidence to rebut the evidence brought forth by the petitioner that this would be the case.

Because I believe the time has come for this Court to deal with the difficult statutory and constitutional questions raised in this petition, I dissent from the denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari.

       This Court summarily affirmed the District Court’s decision, sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U. S. 997 (1971), but we later explained in Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U. S. 725, 740, n. 11 (1974), that this affirmance lacks precedential weight because no controversy remained in Green by the time the ease reached this Court.

       The District Court did not address petitioner’s statutory and constitutional challenges to Rev. Proc. 75-50. The court reasoned that a ruling on the validity of this Revenue Procedure would not affect the ultimate question of whether petitioner was in fact administering a nondiscriminatory admissions policy. The opinion of the District Court was affirmed in a per curiam, order by the Court of Appeals.


text:
    No. 80-733.
    Sheet Metal Workers’ International Assn., AFL-CIO v. Carter.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Rehnquist,

dissenting.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in this case that an order of the District Court for the Southern District of Georgia remanding a case to the state court from which it was removed was reviewable through a petition for a writ of mandamus. This conclusion is directly contrary to the plain language of 28 U. S. C. § 1447 (d), which provides that “[a]n order remanding a case to the state court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” Such manifest disregard of the language of Congress should in my opinion warrant at least review by this Court, if not summary reversal.

The complicated course of this litigation began in 1972, when respondent filed an action against petitioner International Union in state court. Petitioner did not answer the complaint but instead moved to dismiss it for improper service. This motion was denied and a default judgment eventually entered against petitioner. A state trial was held for the sole purpose of calculating damages. The judgment entered for respondent, however, was ultimately reversed by the Georgia Supreme Court on the ground that the International had not been properly served. Sheet Metal Workers’ International Assn. v. Carter, 241 Ga. 220, 244 S. E. 2d 860 (1978). When the action was reinstituted and petitioner was properly served, it removed the action to federal court. As early as pretrial conference it clearly developed that respondent’s only claim was a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, App. to Pet. for Cert, la, but respondent never moved to remand the case and the court did not do so sua sponte. The case proceeded to trial and the jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages in favor of respondent. Petitioner then moved to have the judgment vacated and the case remanded for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The District Court concluded that jurisdiction was lacking, set aside the verdict and judgment, and remanded the action to state court. The court then stated: “Notwithstanding 28 U. S. C. § 1447 (d), this Court hopes this Order is appealable. Perhaps another exception may be carved out of the statute.” Id., at 3a.

The Court of Appeals acceded to the wishes of the District Court. It granted respondent’s petition for a writ of mandamus, vacated the remand order, and directed the District Court to consider if it had pendent jurisdiction of the state-law claim. It overcame to its satisfaction the seemingly clear prohibition of § 1447 (d) on the ground that § 1447 (c) required remand “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction,” while the District Court ordered remand after final judgment. Relying on our decision in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336 (1976), the court reasoned that the remand order was not within § 1447 (c) and thus review was not prohibited by § 1447 (d).

In Thermtron, however, the Court stated that “[i]f a trial judge purports to remand a case on the ground that it was removed ‘improvidently and without jurisdiction,’ his order is not subject to challenge in the court of appeals by appeal, by mandamus, or otherwise.” 423 U. S., at 343. The District Court remanded this case precisely for the quoted reason. While Thermtron also stated that “[t]here is no indication whatsoever that Congress intended to extend the prohibition against review to reach remand orders entered on grounds not provided by the statute,” id., at 350, this remand order was entered on grounds permitted by the statute and therefore comes under that portion of the Thermtron opinion stating that “we neither disturb nor take issue with the well-established general rule that § 1447 (d) and its predecessors were intended to forbid review by appeal or extraordinary writ of any order remanding a case on the grounds permitted by the statute.” Id., at 351-352. See Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U. S. 404, 414, n. 13 (1977) (“Where the order is based on one of the enumerated grounds, review is unavailable no matter how plain the legal error in ordering the remand”); Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 430 U. S. 723 (1977) (“Title 28 U. S. C. § 1447 (c) provides for remanding a removed action when the district court determines that ‘the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction’; and when a remand has been ordered on these grounds, 28 U. S. C. § 1447 (d) unmistakably commands that the order ‘remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise’ ”). Nothing in Thermtron suggests a further exception to the clear prohibition of § 1447 (d) based merely on the timing of the district judge’s remand order.

The Court of Appeals stated that appellate review of remand orders entered after final judgment served the policy concerns underlying § 1447 (d). Not only is such policy analysis inappropriate in light of the plain language of the statute, it is unsound also. Congress’ purpose in enacting § 1447 (d) was to “prevent delay in the trial of remanded cases by protracted litigation of jurisdictional issues.” Thermtron, supra, at 351. When the appellate court undertakes review of a remand order entered after final judgment and concludes that remand was appropriate, the wasteful delay is clear. Although a retrial in state court may be avoided if a reviewing federal court determines remand was inappropriate, such a benefit can only be had by subjecting all remand orders after final judgment to review. The present case is actually a paradigmatic example of the delay Congress intended to prevent, since the Court of Appeals did not even resolve the jurisdictional issue, but remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. A clearer instance of the evil Congress intended to avoid — “delay in the trial of remanded cases by protracted litigation of jurisdictional issues” — would be difficult to imagine.

This Court obviously cannot grant certiorari to review every case in which four of its Members believe an important issue is presented and wrongly decided. But where, as here, we deal not with shades of gray clustering on both sides of a wavering legal line, but instead with a jurisdictional statute in which Congress has stated in bright-line terms that “[a]n order remanding a case to the state court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise,” the case for plenary consideration is considerably stronger.

In these days of proliferating litigation, there is a tendency to lose sight of the very sensible observation of Justice Brandéis, dissenting in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932), that “in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.” This is particularly true of jurisdictional statutes and statutes and rules regulating trial procedures and appellate review. Here the Court of Appeals, contrary to the opinion in Thermtron, supra, reviewed by extraordinary writ (mandamus) an order remanding a ease on grounds permitted by the applicable statute. If it may without further review here breathe life into the District Court’s hope that “another exception may be carved out of the statute,” the congressional policy underlying the statute will soon be at the mercy of any court of appeals which wishes to disobey it.

Since the litigation in question has been protracted, and because petitioner may be suspected of having engaged in tactical maneuvering in order to bring itself within the ambit of the congressional prohibition against such review, there is natural sympathy for respondent. But sympathy so generated is not a sound basis for administering a system of justice involving sensitive federal-state questions such as this. Since the action of the Court of Appeals was squarely contrary to the express congressional language referred to above, I would grant the petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment.


author: Justice Powell,

text:
    No. 80-777.
    Blackburn, Warden v. Thomas.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

Justice Powell,

with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist join,

dissenting.

In 1972, respondent was tried in a Louisiana state court for possessing and distributing cocaine and heroin. Pursuant to the state law applicable at that time, the jury consisted of five members. La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 782 (West 1967) (amended 1975). Respondent raised no objection to its size. The jury unanimously voted to convict respondent, and he was sentenced to a prison term.

More than six years later, after exhausting state remedies, respondent sought habeas corpus in Federal District Court. Relying on this Court’s decision in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U. S. 223 (1978), respondent argued that his trial violated the Sixth Amendment (applicable to the States through the Fourteenth), because a jury of five persons was constitutionally inadequate. The District Court granted the writ in reliance on Ballew, App. to Pet. for Cert. 11a, 22a-31a, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 623 F. 2d 383 (1980). The Court of Appeals recognized that respondent’s conviction had become final long before Ballew held that five-member juries are unconstitutional. It nevertheless held that Ballew should be applied retroactively to invalidate all convictions rendered by juries of that size.

1 believe that the Court of Appeals improperly applied Ballew to reverse respondent’s conviction. I therefore would grant the petition for certiorari and reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Three recent cases govern respondent’s claim. In Ballew, supra, we held that juries in criminal cases must have at least six members to meet constitutional requirements. A smaller jury may be insufficient to “foster effective group deliberation,” 435 U. S., at 232, 234 (opinion of Blackmun, J.), and to provide a “fair cross-section” of the community, id., at 245 (White, J., concurring in judgment). Our decision in Ballew was reaffirmed one year later in Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U. S. 130, 137 (1979), when we identified similar constitutional flaws in a conviction reached by a nonunanimous six-member jury. Cf. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U. S. 356 (1972).

Soon thereafter, in Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U. S. 323 (1980), the Court applied Burch retroactively to reverse a conviction reached by a nonunanimous six-member jury. The Court divided three ways in Broum, and it is essential for our present purposes to identify the divergent views. Justice Brennan wrote for a plurality of four Justices and concluded that any conviction reached by a nonunanimous six-member jury should be reversed. Two other Justices concurred in the result, stating that Burch should be applied retroactively only to cases pending on direct review at the time Burch was decided. 447 U. S., at 337 (Powell, J., with whom Stevens, J., joined), quoting Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U. S. 233, 248 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). Three Justices dissented, arguing against any retroactive application of the new rule, because there was no “ 'substantial likelihood’ ” that a 5-to-l jury reached a result that was “ Tactually incorrect.’ ” 447 U. S., at 338 (Rehnquist, J., with whom Burger, C. J., and White, J., joined), quoting Williams v. United States, 401 U. S. 646, 656, n. 7 (1971).

In sum, in Burch, as in Ballew, we identified constitutional defects in jury composition. Though the system challenged in each case differed somewhat, we invalidated each one for essentially the same reason: the Constitution requires that criminal juries be structured in a manner conducive to highly reliable adjudication. Ballew, supra, at 232, 234 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); Burch, supra, at 137. It does not follow from either case, however, that unanimous five-member juries and nonunanimous six-member juries frequently — or even occasionally — render incorrect decisions. A criminal defendant’s interest in a new trial, based on post hoc “speculation about what would have happened” with a jury of different size or structure, Brown v. Louisiana, supra, at 340 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), need not always prevail over the public interest in assuring the finality of convictions. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539, 550-551, n. 3 (1981) (“both society and the individual criminal defendant have [an interest] ‘in insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an end to litigation’ ”), quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 24-25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 675-702 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Hankerson v. North Carolina, supra, at 247-248 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). At some point, the costs of retroactive application of new constitutional principles of jury size or structure exceed the possibility of enhanced reliability that may be obtained upon retrial.

The present case involves a conviction rendered by a unanimous five-member jury. If the case now were to be tried, it is plain in light of Ballew that such a jury is not of constitutionally adequate size. But this case was tried in 1972 — more than six years before Ballew — and it is now before us on collateral review. The retroactivity analysis of the plurality in Brown v. Louisiana thus is not controlling. Instead, the governing position is that represented by the combined views of the other five Justices in Broion. Because the Court of Appeals in this case improperly relied on the reasoning of the Brown plurality to apply Ballew retroactively, I would grant certiorari and reverse its judgment.

       Respondent did not take a direct appeal from his conviction. He exhausted his state remedies by seeking state collateral relief, relying for the first time on his jury-composition claim. The state trial court did not address respondent’s failure to enter a contemporaneous objection to the five-member jury. Its denial of relief thus was on the merits. App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied review. State ex rel. Thomas v. Blackburn, 361 So. 2d 1218 (1978).

       Respondent failed to object at trial to the size of his jury. N. 1, supra. The Court of Appeals correctly disregarded this procedural default and reached the merits of respondent’s petition because the state trial court on collateral review had ruled upon the merits, see ibid. County Court of Ulster v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140, 152-153, 154 (1979); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 161-162 (1978).

       The State is greatly disadvantaged when a conviction, long thought to be final, is reversed on collateral review. The State’s opportunity to hold a retrial under these circumstances may be only theoretical. Witnesses disappear and memories fade with the passage of time. See Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U. S. 233, 247 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).


text:
    No. 80-837.
    Grassi v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari and reverse the conviction.


text:
    No. 80-963.
    Michigan v. Olah.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment. Justice Black-mun would grant certiorari and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 80-5432.
    Watkins v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment.

Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U. S. 343 (1980).


author: Justice Brennan,

text:
    No. 80-5643.
    Snell v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan,

with whom Justice Marshall joins,

dissenting.

Petitioner seeks review on double jeopardy grounds of his conviction of attempted bank robbery. 18 U. S. C. § 2113 (a). I would grant the petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Petitioner was originally charged in an indictment with attempted extortion, 18 U. S. C. § 1951, and conspiracy to commit bank robbery, 18 U. S. C. §§ 371, 2113 (a), and was convicted on both counts. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conspiracy conviction, but reversed the attempted extortion conviction on the ground that the conduct charged was within the exclusive coverage of 18 U. S. C. § 2113 (a). 550 F. 2d 515 (1977). Petitioner was then charged in a second indictment with attempted bank robbery in violation of §2113 (a), arising out of the same transaction which had given rise to the conspiracy conviction and the reversed conviction of attempted extortion. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed this second indictment on double jeopardy and due process grounds. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the District Court for trial. 592 F. 2d 1083 (1979). A petition for certiorari was denied. 442 U. S. 944 (1979). Petitioner was then convicted of attempted bank robbery. His request to set aside his conviction on double jeopardy grounds was rejected by the Court of Appeals, 627 F. 2d 186 (1980), and this petition followed.

I adhere to the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the prosecution in one proceeding, except in extremely limited circumstances not present here, of “all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 453-454 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). See Clift v. Alabama, 435 U. S. 909 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 429 U. S. 1053 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting), and cases collected therein. Since the charge under the second indictment arose out of the same criminal transaction that led to the conspiracy conviction and the reversed conviction of attempted extortion, the Double Jeopardy Clause barred its prosecution. I would, therefore, grant the petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.


text:
    No. 80-784.
    Washington v. Daugherty.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-964.
    Kentucky v. Newsome et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1086.
    Wyrick, Warden v. Henson.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-812.
    Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O’Cheskey, Commissioner of Revenue of New Mexico, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of Navajo Forest Products Industries for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-978.
    Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of Legal Services for the Elderly for leave to file an untimely brief as amicus curiae denied. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1007.
    Marschak, aka Ashley, Trustee v. Kirkland & Ellis et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 80-1025.
    LeClair et al. v. Saunders.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 80-1026.
    Chrysler Corp. v. Dawson et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion of petitioner to strike portions of respondents’ brief in opposition denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1038.
    Public Service Commission of Tennessee et al. v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 80-5824.
    Lum et al. v. Campbell, Director, Office of Personnel Management, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certi-orari denied.

Justice Brennan, Justice White, and Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 80-5840.
    Langworthy v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Motion of Citizens’ Commission on Human Rights for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-395.
    No. 79-870.
    No. 79-1679.
    No. 79-2040.
    No. 79-2059.
    No. 80-613.
    No. 80-707.
    No. 80-5315.
    No. 80-5580.
    No. 80-5585.
    No. 80-5612.
    No. 80-5716.
    No. 80-5725.
    No. 80-5770.
    No. 80-5780.
    No. 80-5782.
    No. 80-5866.
    United States v. Morrison, United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Fokakis, Pacileo, Sheriff v. Walker, American Electric Power Co., Inc., et al. v. City of Mishawaka, Indiana, et al., Shoshone Tribe et al. v. Dry Creek Lodge, Inc., et al., Brady v. Doe, Maggard v. Florida Parole Commission, Euge v. United States et al., Papp v. Ohio, In re Gambara, Baloun et al. v. General Motors Corp., Gooden v. Texas, In re Jackson, In re Beach, In re Lohmann, Proca v. United States,
   449 U. S. 361;

449 U. S. 166;

449 U. S. 1060;

449 U. S. 86;

449 U. S. 1096;

449 U. S. 1118;

449 U. S. 1081;

449 U. S. 960;

449 U. S. 1065;

449 U. S. 1065;

449 U. S. 1087;

449 U. S. 1090;

449 U. S. 1072;

449 U. S. 1075;

449 U. S. 1076;

449 U. S. 1109; and

449 U. S. 1093. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 80-163.
    In re Chestnutt Management Corp.,
   449 U. S. 816 and 1027. Motion for leave to file a second petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 80-5476.
    No. 80-5540.
    Gornick v. Illinois et al., Grinan v. Trespalacios,
   449 U. S. 1018; and 449 U. S. 1036. Motion for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    February 27, 1981
    No. 87,
    Orig.
    California v. Texas.
   In this case the Solicitor General is invited to file a brief expressing the views of the United States by noon Wednesday, March 4, 1981.


text:
    March 2, 1981
    No. 80-1040.
    Pincus v. Estate of Greenberg et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Fla. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Justice Stewart would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 80-1102.
    Lung et al. v. O’Cheskey et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. M. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 80-1152.
    Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 80-1192.
    Syska, Guardian v. Montgomery County Board of Education et al.
   Appeal from Ct. Sp. App. Md. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 80-1231.
    Garrison v. Illinois.
   Appeal from Sup.

Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 80-5658.
    Ruiz v. Texas.
   Appeal from Common Ct. at Law No. 1, Hidalgo County, Tex., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 79-5710.
    Besser v. Graham, Governor of Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Weaver v. Graham, ante, p. 24.


text:
    No. 79-5885.
    Portley v. Grossman et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Weaver v. Graham, ante, p. 24.


text:
    No. 79-6574.
    Matthews v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Weaver v. Graham, ante, p. 24.


text:
    No. A-714.
    Schiff v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Application for recall and stay of mandate, addressed to Justice Brennan and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 80-396.
    City of Newport et al. v. Fact Concerts, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, 449 U. S. 1060.] Motion of James Clancy for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 80-11. No. 80-15.
    Merrion et al., dba Merrion & Bayless, et al. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe et al.; and Amoco Production Co. et al. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 449 U. S. 820.] Motion of Westmoreland Resources, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.

Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 80-251.
    Rostker, Director of Selective Service v. Goldberg et al.
   D. C. E. D. Pa. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 449 U. S. 1009.] Motion of National Organization for Women for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 80-348.
    H. A. Artists & Associates, Inc., et al. v. Actors’ Equity Assn. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 449 U. S. 991.] Motion of respondents for leave to divide oral argument with American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 80-420.
    Flynt et al. v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. [Certiorari granted, 449 U. S. 1033.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. Motion of the Solicitor General to permit Andrew J. Levander, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hac vice as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 80-429.
    County of Washington, Oregon, et al. v. Gunther et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 449 U. S. 950.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 80-824.
    Polk County et al. v. Dodson.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 80-885.
    No. 80-1103.
    National Labor Relations Board v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp.; National Labor Relations Board v. Malleable Iron Range Co.; and Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of Office & Professional Employees, AFL-CIO, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in No. 80-885 granted. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: No. 80-885 (first case) and No. 80-1103, 627 F. 2d 766; No. 80-885 (second case), 631 F. 2d 734.


text:
    No. 80-939.
    No. 80-1129.
    Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee et al.; and National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 212 U. S. App. D. C. 374, 660 F. 2d 773.


text:
    No. 80-569.
    Locals 1830 and 1833, General Longshore Workers, International Longshoremen's Assn., AFL-CIO v. Bailey et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-657.
    McCown et al. v. Cravens, Receiver, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-741.
    Hidalgo County Grand Jury Commissioners et al. v. Ciudadanos Unidos De San Juan et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-746.
    Bradshaw, Secretary, North Carolina Department of Transportation v. Hall et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-823.
    Basso v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-866.
    Hays v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-868.
    No. 80-1076.
    Burwell et al. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.; and Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Burwell et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 633 P. 2d 361.


text:
    No. 80-880.
    Continental Oil Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-920.
    South Shore Hospital v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-926.
    Hedman et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-938.
    Burbank Anti-Noise Group et al. v. Lewis, Secretary of Transportation, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-948.
    Armored Transport, Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-953.
    City of Chicago v. National Organization for Women et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-956.
    Emch et al., Co-Personal Representatives of Emch’s Estate v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-957.
    Odom Construction Co., Inc., et al. v. United States Department of Labor et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-981.
    Hammond v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-989.
    Brown v. Brown.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-999.
    Green v. Ackerman, Director of Health of Ohio, et al.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1062.
    Shields v. United States National Bank of Oregon.
   Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1068.
    Jewish Hospital Association of Louisville, Kentucky, Inc. v. Stewart Mechanical Enterprises, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1092.
    Eaton et al. v. Supreme Court of Arkansas Committee on Professional Conduct.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1098.
    Orange County, New York v. Donovan, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1105.
    Wolfson v. Baker et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1106.
    Castelli v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1116.
    Standard Register Co. v. Graphic Arts International Union, Local 508, O-K-I.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1120.
    No. 80-1271.
    Palmeri et al. v. United States; and Campisano v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 630 F. 2d 192.


text:
    No. 80-1125.
    Bartz et al. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1136.
    Drummond v. Stahl et al.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1138.
    Mayor of Baltimore et al. v. Crockett
   et ux. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1179.
    Mathews v. Hannah, Judge, et al.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1184.
    McGee v. Alaska.
   Sup. Ct. Alaska. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1223.
    Jones v. United States
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1265. No. 80-1266.
    D’Antignac v. United States; and Welch v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 628 F. 2d 428.


text:
    No. 80-1299.
    Mazza v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-1309.
    Lee v. Law Offices of Alioto et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5637.
    Carter v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5647.
    Frame v. Oregon.
   Ct. App. Ore. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5665.
    Culbreth v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5711.
    Landry v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5718.
    Burton v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5740.
    Byers v. Henderson, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5758.
    Guice v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5851.
    Turner v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5872.
    Occhino v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5913.
    Goldstein v. Board of Review, Department of Labor and Industry of New Jersey, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5937.
    Petrofsky, dba Petrop Trading Co. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-5999.
    Hargrove v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6000.
    Davis v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6002.
    Haynes v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6003.
    McKeldin v. Rose, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6006.
    Potts v. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6013.
    Gallion v. Massey Ferguson Co. et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6024.
    Statum v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6089.
    Butz v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6095.
    Hopkinson v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6103.
    Washington v. Marks et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6104.
    Whitney v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6120.
    Welch v. Hickey, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6122.
    Edmon v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6126.
    Littles, aka D’Angelo v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6129.
    Massey v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6138.
    Mesa v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6142.
    Jenkins v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-6159.
    Weight v. United States.
   C.A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-323.
    Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motions of National Broadcasting Co., Inc.; American Broadcasting Cos., Inc.; and All-Industry Television Station Music License Committee for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions or this petition.


text:
    No. 80-340.
    Washington v. Dyer.
   Ct. App. Wash. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-548.
    Michigan v. Randle.
   Ct. App. Mich. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice and Justice Powell would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 80-854.
    Kerpelman v. Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Motion to recuse The Chief Justice denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 80-929.
    Corbin, Trustee in Bankruptcy v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certi-orari denied.

Justice Stewart and Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 80-1104.
    Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Western Electric Co., Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 80-650.
    No. 80-723.
    No. 80-775.
    No. 80-5429.
    No. 80-5565.
    No. 80-5641.
    No. 80-5751.
    No. 80-5778.
    No. 80-5792.
    No. 80-5830.
    Connor v. Flynn, Patricelli v. Mecca Ltd. et al., Ciaffoni et al. v. Cowden et al., DeGideo v. Altemose Construction Co., Williams v. Louisiana, Doe v. West et al., Baldwin v. Louisiana, Wilson v. Georgia, Johl v. Town of Groton et al., Dunk et ux. v. Manufacturers Light & Heat Co.,
   449 U. S. 1079;

449 U. S. 1082;

449 U. S. 1083;

449 U. S. 1086;

449 U. S. 1103;

449 U. S. 1088;

449 U. S. 1103;

449 U. S. 1103;

449 U. S. 1092; and

449 U. S. 1128. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 79-938.
    No. 80-529.
    Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, Personal Representative of Hague’s Estate, Calgon Corp. v. Davis,
   449 U. S. 302; and

449 U. S. 1101. Petitions for rehearing denied.

Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.


text:
    March 6, 1981
    No. A-754.
    Williams v. Indiana.
   Application for stay of execution of Steven T. Judy, presented to Justice Stevens, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant the stay.


text:
    March 9, 1981
    No. 80-276.
    Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Vaughn et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, ante, p. 248.

Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.