author: Justice White Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell,

text:
    EDWARDS v. ARIZONA
    No. 79-5269.
    Argued November 5, 1980
    Decided May 18, 1981

      White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BrenNAN, Stewart, Marshall, BlackmuN, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 487. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, in which Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 488.

      Michael J. Meehan, by appointment of the Court, 447 U. S. 903, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.

      Crane McClennen, Assistant Attorney General of Arizona, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General, and William J. Schafer III.

   Justice White

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in this case, 446 U. S. 950 (1980), limited to Question 1 presented in the petition, which in relevant part was “whether the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments require suppression of a post-arrest confession, which was obtained after Edwards had invoked his right to consult counsel before further interrogation . . .

I

On January 19, 1976, a sworn complaint was filed against Edwards in Arizona state court charging him with robbery, burglary, and first-degree murder. An arrest warrant was issued pursuant to the complaint, and Edwards was arrested at his home later that same day. At the police station, he was informed of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). Petitioner stated that he understood his rights, and was willing to submit to questioning. After being told that another suspect already in custody had implicated him in the crime, Edwards denied involvement and gave a taped statement presenting an alibi defense. He then sought to “make a deal.” The interrogating officer told him that he wanted a statement, but that he did not have the authority to negotiate a deal. The officer provided Edwards with the telephone number of a county attorney. Petitioner made the call, but hung up after a few moments. Edwards then said: “I want an attorney before making a deal.” At that point, questioning ceased and Edwards was taken to county jail.

At 9:15 the next morning, two detectives, colleagues of the officer who had interrogated Edwards the previous night, came to the jail and asked to see Edwards. When the detention officer informed Edwards that the detectives wished to speak with him, he replied that he did not want to talk to anyone. The guard told him that “he had” to talk and then took him to meet with the detectives. The officers identified themselves, stated they wanted to talk to him, and informed him of his Miranda rights. Edwards was willing to talk, but he first wanted to hear the taped statement of the alleged accomplice who had implicated him. After listening to the tape for several minutes, petitioner said that he would make a statement so long as it was not tape-recorded. The detectives informed him that the recording was irrelevant since they could testify in court concerning whatever he said. Edwards replied: “I’ll tell you anything you want to know, but I don’t want it on tape.” He thereupon implicated himself in the crime.

Prior to trial, Edwards moved to suppress his confession on the ground that his Miranda rights had been violated when the officers returned to question him after he had invoked his right to counsel. The trial court initially granted the motion to suppress, but reversed its ruling when presented with a supposedly controlling decision of a higher Arizona court. The court stated without explanation that it found Edwards’ statement to be voluntary. Edwards was tried twice and convicted. Evidence concerning his confession was admitted at both trials.

On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court held that Edwards had invoked both his right to remain silent and his right to counsel during the interrogation conducted on the night of January 19. 122 Ariz. 206, 594 P. 2d 72. The court then went on to determine, however, that Edwards had waived both rights during the January 20 meeting when he voluntarily gave his statement to the detectives after again being informed that he need not answer questions and that he need not answer without the advice of counsel: “The trial court’s finding that the waiver and confession were voluntarily and knowingly made is upheld.” Id., at 212, 594 P. 2d, at 78.

Because the use of Edward’s confession against him at his trial violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as construed in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, we reverse the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court.

II

In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court determined that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ prohibition against compelled self-incrimination required that custodial interrogation be preceded by advice to the putative defendant that he has the right to remain silent and also the right to the presence of an attorney. 384 U. S., at 479. The Court also indicated the procedures to be followed subsequent to the warnings. If the accused indicates that he wishes to remain silent, “the interrogation must cease.” If he requests counsel, “the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.” Id., at 474.

Miranda thus declared that an accused has a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. Here, the critical facts as found by the Arizona Supreme Court are that Edwards asserted his right to counsel and his right to remain silent on January 19, but that the police, without furnishing him counsel, returned the next morning to confront him and as a result of the meeting secured incriminating oral admissions. Contrary to the holdings of the state courts, Edwards insists that having exercised his right on the 19th to have counsel present during interrogation, he did not validly waive that right on the 20th. For the following reasons, we agree.

First, the Arizona Supreme Court .applied an erroneous standard for determining waiver where the accused has specifically invoked his right to counsel. It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case “upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938). See Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806, 835 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U. S. 369, 374-375 (1979); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 404 (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 724-725 (1979).

Considering the proceedings in the state courts in the light of this standard, we note that in denying petitioner’s motion to suppress, the trial court found the admission to have been “voluntary,” App. 3, 95, without separately focusing on whether Edwards had knowingly and intelligently relinquished his right to counsel. The Arizona Supreme Court, in a section of its opinion entitled “Voluntariness of Waiver,” stated that in Arizona, confessions are prima facie involuntary and that the State had the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was freely and voluntarily made. The court stated that the issue of voluntariness should be determined based on the totality of the circumstances as it related to whether an accused’s action was “knowing and intelligent and whether his will [was] overborne.” 122 Ariz., at 212, 594 P. 2d, at 78. Once the trial court determines that “the confession is voluntary, the finding will not be upset on appeal absent clear and manifest error.” Ibid. The court then upheld the trial court’s finding that the “waiver and confession were voluntarily and knowingly made.” Ibid.

In referring to the necessity to find Edwards’ confession knowing and intelligent, the State Supreme Court cited Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 226 (1973). Yet, it is clear that Schneckloth does not control the issue presented in this case. The issue in Schneckloth was under what conditions an individual could be found to have consented to a search and thereby waived his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court declined to impose the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege” standard and required only that the consent be voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. The Court specifically noted that the right to counsel was a prime example of those rights requiring the special protection of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard, id., at 241, but held that “[t]he considerations that informed the Court’s holding in Miranda are simply inapplicable in the present case.” Id., at 246. Schneck-loth itself thus emphasized that the voluntariness of a consent or an admission on the one hand, and a knowing and intelligent waiver on the other, are discrete inquiries. Here, however sound the conclusion of the state courts as to the voluntariness of Edwards’ admission may be, neither the trial court nor the Arizona Supreme Court undertook to focus on whether Edwards understood his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished it. It is thus apparent that the decision below misunderstood the requirement for finding a valid waiver of the right to counsel, once invoked.

Second, although we have held that after initially being advised of his Miranda rights, the accused may himself validly waive his rights and respond to interrogation, see North Carolina v. Butler, supra, at 372-376, the Court has strongly indicated that additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel; and we now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.

Miranda itself indicate'd that the assertion of the right to counsel was a significant event and that once exercised by the accused, “the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.” 384 U. S., at 474. Our later cases have not abandoned that view. In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U. S. 96 (1975), the Court noted that Miranda had distinguished between the procedural safeguards triggered by a request to remain silent and a request for an attorney and had required that interrogation cease until an attorney was present only if the individual stated that he wanted counsel. 423 U. S., at 104, n. 10; see also id., at 109-111 (White, J., concurring). In Fare v. Michael C., supra, at 719, the Court referred to Miranda’s “rigid rule that an accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, requiring that all interrogation cease.” And just last Term, in a case where a suspect in custody had invoked his Miranda right to counsel, the Court again referred to the “undisputed right” under Miranda to remain silent and to be free of interrogation “until he had consulted with a lawyer.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 298 (1980). We reconfirm these views and, to lend them substance, emphasize that it is inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel.

In concluding that the fruits of the interrogation initiated by the police on January 20 could not be used against Edwards, we do not hold or imply that Edwards was powerless to countermand his election or that the authorities could in no event use any incriminating statements made by Edwards prior to his having access to counsel. Had Edwards initiated the meeting on January 20, nothing in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would prohibit the police from merely listening to his voluntary, volunteered statements and using them against him at the trial. The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation. Absent such interrogation, there would have been no infringement of the right that Edwards invoked and there would be no occasion to determine whether there had been a valid waiver. Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, makes this sufficiently clear. 446 U. S., at 298, n. 2.

But this is not what the facts of this case show. Here, the officers conducting the interrogation on the evening of January 19 ceased interrogation when Edwards requested counsel as he had been advised he had the right to do. The Arizona Supreme Court was of the opinion that this was a sufficient invocation of his Miranda rights, and we are in accord. It is also clear that without making counsel available to Edwards, the police returned to him the next day. This was not at his suggestion or request. Indeed, Edwards informed the detention officer that he did not want to talk to anyone. At the meeting, the detectives told Edwards that they wanted to talk to him and again advised him of his Miranda rights. Edwards stated that he would talk, but what prompted this action does not appear. He listened at his own request to part of the taped statement made by one of his alleged accomplices and then made an incriminating statement, which was used against him at his trial. We think it is clear that Edwards was subjected to custodial interrogation on January 20 within the meaning of Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, and that this occurred at the instance of the authorities. His statement, made without having had access to counsel, did not amount to a valid waiver and hence was inadmissible.

Accordingly, the holding of the Arizona Supreme Court that Edwards had waived his right to counsel was infirm, and the judgment of that court is reversed.

go Qr^ereg

Chief Justice Burger,

concurring in the judgment.

I concur only in the judgment because I do not agree that either any constitutional standard or the holding of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) — as distinguished from its dicta — calls for a special rule as to how an accused in custody may waive the right to be free from interrogation. The extraordinary protections afforded a person in custody suspected of criminal conduct are not without a valid basis, but as with all “good” things they can be carried too far. The notion that any “prompting” of a person in custody is somehow evil per se has been rejected. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291 (1980). For me, the inquiry in this setting is whether resumption of interrogation is a result of a, voluntary waiver, and that inquiry should be resolved under the traditional standards established in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938):

“A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver . . . must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”

Accord, e. g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707 (1979); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U. S. 369 (1979). In this case, the Supreme Court of Arizona described the situation as follows:

“When the detention officer told Edwards that the detectives were there to see him, he told the officer that he did not wish to speak to anyone. The officer told him that he had to.” 122 Ariz. 206, 209, 594 P. 2d 72, 75 (1979) (emphasis added).

This is enough for me, and on this record the Supreme Court of Arizona erred in holding that the resumption of interrogation was the product of a voluntary waiver, such as I found to be the situation in both Innis, supra, at 304 (concurring opinion), and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 417-418 (1977) (dissenting opinion).

Justice Powell,

with whom Justice Rehnquist joins, concurring in the result.

Although I agree that the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court must be reversed, I do not join the Court’s opinion because I am not sure what it means.

I can agree with much of the opinion. It states the settled rule:

“It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case 'upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938). See Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806, 835 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U. S. 369, 374-375 (1979); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 404 (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 724-725 (1979).” Ante, at 482-483.

I have thought it settled law, as these cases tell us, that one accused of crime may waive any of the constitutional safeguards — including the right to remain silent, to jury trial, to call witnesses, to cross-examine one’s accusers, to testify in one’s own behalf, and — of course — to have counsel. Whatever the right, the standard for waiver is whether the actor fully understands the right in question and voluntarily intends to relinquish it.

In its opinion today, however, the Court — after reiterating the familiar principles of waiver — goes on to say:

“We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused [has] himself initiate[d] further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Ante, at 484-485 (emphasis added).

In view of the emphasis placed on “initiation,” see also ante, at 485-486, and n. 9, I find the Court’s opinion unclear. If read to create a new per se rule, requiring a threshold inquiry as to precisely who opened any conversation between an accused and state officials, I cannot agree. I would not superimpose a new element of proof on the established doctrine of waiver of counsel.

Perhaps the Court’s opinion can be read as not departing from established doctrine. Accepting the formulation quoted above, two questions are identifiable: (i) was there in fact “interrogation,” see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291 (1980), and (ii) did the police “initiate” it? Each of these questions is, of course, relevant to the admissibility of a confession. In this case, for example, it is clear that Edwards was taken from his cell against his will and subjected to renewed interrogation. Whether this is described as police-“initiated” interrogation or in some other way, it clearly was questioning under circumstances incompatible with a voluntary waiver of the fundamental right to counsel.

But few cases will be as clear as this one. Communications between police and a suspect in custody are commonplace. It is useful to contrast the circumstances of this case with typical, and permissible, custodial communications between police and a suspect who has asked for counsel. For example, police do not impermissibly “initiate” renewed interrogation by engaging in routine conversations with suspects about unrelated matters. And police legitimately may inquire whether a suspect has changed his mind about speaking to them without an attorney. E. g., State v. Turner, 32 Ore. App. 61, 65, 573 P. 2d 326, 327 (1978); see State v. Crisler, 285 N. W. 2d 679, 682 (Minn. 1979); State v. Marcum, 24 Wash. App. 441, 445-446, 601 P. 2d 975, 978 (1979). It is not unusual for a person in custody who previously has expressed an unwillingness to talk or a desire to have a lawyer, to change his mind and even welcome an opportunity to talk. Nothing in the Constitution erects obstacles that preclude police from ascertaining whether a suspect has reconsidered his original decision. As Justice White has observed, this Court consistently has “rejected any paternalistic rule protecting a defendant from his intelligent and voluntary decisions about his own criminal case.” Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U. S. 96, 109 (1975) (White, J., concurring in result).

In sum, once warnings have been given and the right to counsel has been invoked, the relevant inquiry — whether the suspect now desires to talk to police without counsel — is a question of fact to be determined in light of all of the circumstances. Who “initiated” a conversation may be relevant to the question of waiver, but it is not the sine qua non to the inquiry. The ultimate question is whether there was a free and knowing waiver of counsel before interrogation commenced.

If the Court’s opinion does nothing more than restate these principles, I am in agreement with it. I hesitate to join the opinion only because of what appears to be an undue, and undefined, emphasis on a single element: “initiation.” As Justice White has noted, the Court in Miranda v. Ari zona, 384 U. S. 436 (1965), imposed a general prophylactic rule that is not manifestly required by anything in the text of the Constitution. Id., at 526 (White, J., dissenting); see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 443-444 (1974). Miranda itself recognized, moreover, that counsel’s assistance can be waived. 384 U. S., at 475 (opinion of Warren, C. J:). Waiver always has been evaluated under the general formulation of the Zerbst standard quoted above. My concern is that the Court’s opinion today may be read as “constitution-alizing” not the generalized Zerbst standard but a single element of fact among the various facts that may be relevant to determining whether there has been a valid waiver.

       The facts stated in text are for the most part taken from the opinion of the Supreme Court of Arizona.

       It appears from the record that the detectives had brought the tape-recording with them.

       The trial judge emphasized that the detectives had met with Edwards on January 20, without being requested by Edwards to do so, and concluded that they had ignored his request for counsel made the previous evening. App. 91-93.

         The case was State v. Travis, 26 Ariz. App. 24, 545 P. 2d 986 (1976).

       The jury in the first trial was unable to reach a verdict.

       This issue was disputed by the State. The court, while finding that the question was arguable, held that Edwards’ request for an attorney to assist him in negotiating a deal was “sufficiently clear” within the context of the interrogation that it “must be interpreted as a request for counsel and as a request to remain silent until counsel was present.” 122 Ariz., at 211, 594 P. 2d, at 77.

       We thus need not decide Edwards’ claim that the State deprived him of his right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as construed and applied in Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964). In that ease, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel arises whenever an accused has been indicted or adversary criminal proceedings have otherwise begun and that this right is violated when admissions are subsequently elicited from the accused in the absence of counsel. While initially conceding in its opening brief on the merits that Edwards’ right to counsel under Massiah attached immediately after he was formally charged, the State in its supplemental brief and during oral argument took the position that under Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682, 689-690 (1972), and Moore v. Illinois, 434 U. S. 220, 226-227 (1977), the filing of the formal complaint did not constitute the “adversary judicial criminal proceedings” necessary to trigger the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Under the State Constitution, “[n]o person shall be prosecuted criminally in any court of record for felony or misdemeanor, otherwise than by information or indictment; no person shall be prosecuted for felony by information without having had a preliminary examination before a magistrate or having waived such preliminary examination.” Ariz. Const., Art. 2, § 30. The State contends that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until either the constitutionally required indictment or information is filed or at least no earlier than the preliminary hearing to which a defendant is entitled if the matter proceeds by complaint. Under Arizona law, a felony prosecution may be commenced by way of a complaint, Ariz. Rule of Criminal Procedure 22. The complaint is a “written statement of the essential facts constituting a public offense, made upon oath before a magistrate,” Rule 2.3, upon which the magistrate either issues an arrest warrant or dismisses the complaint. Rule 2.4. Once arrested, the accused must be taken before the magistrate for a hearing. Rule 4.1. At that hearing, the magistrate ascertains the accused’s true name and address, and informs him of the charges against him, his right to counsel, his right to remain silent, and his right to a preliminary hearing if charged via complaint. Rule 4.2. Unless waived, the preliminary hearing must take place no later than 10 days after the defendant is placed in custody. Rule 5.1. The purpose of the hearing is to determine whether probable cause exists to hold the defendant for trial. Rule 5.3. Against this background and in support of its position, the State relies on Moore v. Illinois, supra, where after recognizing that under Illinois law “[t]he prosecution in this case was commenced . . . when the victim’s complaint was filed in court,” we noted that “adversary judicial criminal proceedings” were initiated when the ensuing preliminary hearing occurred. Moore, supra, at 228. Cf. United States v. Duvall, 537 F. 2d 15, 20-22 (CA2) (the filing of a complaint and the issuance of an arrest warrant does not trigger the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, that right accruing only upon further proceedings), cert, denied, 426 U. S. 950 (1976). The Arizona Supreme Court did not address the Sixth Amendment question, nor do we.

       In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977), where, as in Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), the Sixth Amendment right to- counsel had accrued, the Court held that a valid waiver of counsel rights should not be inferred from the mere response by the accused to overt or more subtle forms of interrogation' or other efforts to elicit incriminating information. In Massiah and Brewer, counsel had been engaged or appointed and the admissions in question were elicited in his absence. But in McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U. S. 356 (1965), we summarily reversed a decision that the police could elicit information after indictment even though counsel had not yet been appointed.

       If, as frequently would occur in the course of a meeting initiated by the accused, the conversation is not wholly one-sided, it is likely that the officers will say or do something that clearly would be “interrogation.” In that event, the question would be whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel and the right to silence had occurred, that is, whether the purported waiver was knowing and intelligent and found to be so under the totality of the circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities.
      Various decisions of the Courts of Appeals are to the effect that a valid waiver of an accused’s previously invoked Fifth Amendment right to counsel is possible. See, e. g., White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F. 2d 186, 191 (CA7 1979) (“in certain instances, for various reasons, a person in custody who has previously requested counsel may knowingly and voluntarily decide that he no longer wishes to be represented by counsel”), cert, pending, No. 79-6601; Kennedy v. Fairman, 618 F. 2d 1242 (CA7 1980); United States v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F. 2d 482, 486 (CA9) (en banc) (stating that it makes no sense to hold that once an accused has requested counsel, “ [he] may never, until he has actually talked with counsel, change his mind and decide to speak with the police without an attorney being present”), cert, denied, 436 U. S. 919 (1978). See generally Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F. 2d 1331, 1342 (CA2 1975); United States v. Grant, 549 F. 2d 942 (CA4 1977), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Whitehead v. United States, 435 U. S. 912 (1978); United States v. Hart, 619 F. 2d 325 (CA4 1980); United States v. Hauck, 586 F. 2d 1296 (CA8 1978). The rule in the Fifth Circuit is that a knowing and intelligent waiver cannot be found once the Fifth Amendment right to counsel has been clearly invoked unless the accused initiates the renewed contact. See, e. g., United States v. Massey, 550 F. 2d 300 (1977); United States v. Priest, 409 F. 2d 491 (1969). Waiver is possible, however, when the request for counsel is equivocal. Nash v. Estelle, 597 F. 2d 513 (CA5 1979) (en banc). See Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F. 2d 768 (CA5 1979).

       We need not decide whether there would have been a valid waiver of counsel had the events of January 20 been the first and only interrogation to which Edwards had been subjected. Cf. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U. S. 369 (1979).

       Justice White noted in Michigan v. Mosley:

      “Although a recently arrested individual may have indicated an initial desire not to answer questions, he would nonetheless want to know immediately — if it were true — that his ability to explain a particular incriminating fact or to supply an alibi for a particular time period would re-' suit in his immediate release. Similarly, he might wish to know — if it were true — that (1) the case against him was unusually strong and that (2) his immediate cooperation with the authorities in the apprehension and conviction of others or in the recovery of property would redound to his benefit in the form of a reduced charge.” 423 U. S., at 109, n. 1.
      In Michigan v. Mosley, of course, the question was whether a suspect who had invoked his right to remain silent later could change his mind and speak to police. The facts of Mosley differ somewhat from the present case because here petitioner had requested counsel. It is nevertheless true in both cases that “a blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the circumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their interests.” Id., at 102 (opinion of Stewart, J.).

       Such a step should be tahen only if it is demonstrably clear that the traditional waiver standard is ineffective. There is no indication, in the multitude of cases that come to us each Term, that Zerbst and its progeny have failed to protect constitutional rights.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice White Justice Powell, Justice Marshall,

license: Public Domain

text:
    WEBB v. WEBB
    No. 79-6853.
    Argued March 23, 1981
    Decided May 18, 1981
    White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and BreNNAN, Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 502. Marshall, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, post, p. 502.

      Mary R. Carden argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Edward R. Zacker, Roy M. Sobelson, and John L. Cromartie, Jr.

      Manley F. Brown, by appointment of the Court, 449 U. S. 1008, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

      Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Harry M. Fain for the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers; by Phyllis Gelman, Louise Gruner Gans, and Catherine P. Mitchell for the National Center on Women and Family Law, Inc., et al.; and by John C. Deacon for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

   Justice White

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case involves a custody dispute between the mother and father of a minor child. Their dispute has reached this Court because the state courts of Florida and Georgia have reached conflicting results in assigning custody of the child.

On March 8, 1979, petitioner, the mother, filed an action in Florida state court seeking custody of her son. On April 18, 1979, the Florida court entered a judgment granting her custody. On March 23., 1979, respondent, the father, filed an action in Georgia state court also seeking custody. On June 21, 1979, he was awarded custody by the Georgia court. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed that decision. 245 Ga. 650, 266 S. E. 2d 463.

The mother then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court, raising just one question: “Does Article IV, § 1 of the United States Constitution, demand that Georgia . . . give full faith and credit to a Florida decree rendered immediately prior to Georgia’s acceptance of unqualified jurisdiction?” Petitioner alleged that she had properly raised this federal question in the Georgia courts. Respondent filed a brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari in which he argued that the Full Faith and Credit Clause must give way to the “best interests” of the child in a child custody proceeding. At no point in his brief in opposition did respondent dispute petitioner’s contention that the federal issue had been properly raised below, nor did respondent contend that there was some other jurisdictional bar that would prevent this Court from reaching the question raised in the petition.

Under our Rule 19.1, we no longer require, and in fact disfavor, the filing of the lower court record prior to action by this Court on a petition for certiorari. We are, therefore, largely dependent upon the assertions made by the parties as to what that record will demonstrate concerning the manner in which a federal question was raised below. Because petitioner forthrightly asserted that the federal question had been raised and this assertion was not disputed by respondent, we assumed that there would be no jurisdictional problem in reaching the issue raised by the petition, and we granted certiorari. 449 U. S. 819. It has become clear, however, that the federal question was not raised below and that we are without jurisdiction in this case. We must therefore dismiss without reaching the merits.

Because this case comes to this Court from a state court, the relevant jurisdictional statute is 28 U. S. C. § 1257. As applied to the circumstances of this case, that statute requires that in the state courts petitioner have “specially set up or claimed under the Constitution . . . of . . . the United States” that right which she now seeks to have this Court enforce. 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (3). Similarly our Rule 21.1 (h) requires the petitioner to “specify the stage in the proceedings, both in the court of the first instance and in the appellate court, at which the federal questions sought to be reviewed were raised; the method or manner of raising them and the way in which they were passed upon by the court.” Our examination of the record convinces us that petitioner failed properly to raise or preserve a claim under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution in the Georgia courts.

We note first that nowhere in the opinion of the Georgia Supreme Court is any federal question mentioned, let alone expressly passed upon. Nor is any federal issue mentioned by the dissenting opinion in that court. This Court has frequently stated that when “the highest state court has failed to pass upon a federal question, it will be assumed that the omission was due to want of proper presentation in the state courts, unless the aggrieved party in this Court can affirmatively show the contrary.” Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 582 (1969); see also Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U. S. 40, 50, n. 11 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 290, n. 3 (1973); Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U. S. 203, 206-207 (1945). Petitioner argues that the record of this case rebuts this assumption because it demonstrates that she did raise the federal question. Therefore, in her view the State Supreme Court must be understood as having implicitly rejected her federal claim.

Although petitioner did use the phrase “full faith and credit” at several points in the proceedings below, nowhere did she cite to the Federal Constitution or to any cases relying on the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution. In her amended motion to dismiss in the Georgia trial court, petitioner added the following contention: “Plaintiff herein continues to act contrary to the order of the Superior Court of Berrine County, entered September 22, 1977, and also is acting in violation of the April 18, 1979, order of the circuit court of Alachua County, Florida . . . which order should be accorded full faith and credit by this court, as it was.made pursuant to relevant Florida law, as stated above.” Also, in petitioner’s enumeration of errors to the Georgia Supreme Court, she stated that “the [c]ourt erred in failing to find a Florida decree of April 18, 1979, a valid order in a prior pending action, give such full faith and credit, enforce it by ordering Plaintiff to comply with it in all respects, and dismiss this action.”

It is a long-settled rule that the jurisdiction of this Court to re-examine the final judgment of a state court can arise only if the record as a whole shows either expressly or by clear implication that the federal claim was adequately pre-sen ted in the state system. New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 67 (1928); Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler County, 166 U. S. 648, 655 (1897). Petitioner argues that since the Georgia Constitution has no full faith and credit clause, there can be no doubt that the above references in the record were to the Federal Constitution and therefore that her federal claim was properly presented. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. We are unpersuaded. In fact, we find it far more likely that petitioner was referring to state law.

The Georgia Supreme Court understood this case to concern primarily the requirements of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: “This case calls for an interpretation of certain provisions of Georgia’s Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Code Ann. § 74-501, et seq.” That Act has been adopted by both Georgia and Florida. Section 74-514 of that Act, as codified by Georgia, states:

“The courts of this State shall recognize and enforce an initial or modification decree of a court of another state which had assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially in accordance with this Chapter, or which was made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the Chapter, so long as this decree has not been modified in accordance with jurisdictional standards substantially similar to those of this Chapter.” Ga. Code § 74^514 (1979).

Interpreting the meaning of this section is obviously a matter of Georgia state law, but a litigant could plausibly refer to it as a statutory full faith and credit requirement. The record supports the view that it was so understood in this case, by both the courts and the parties.

At the trial court hearing, petitioner discussed the Florida decree but did not invoke the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution. Rather, petitioner argued that in failing to make the Georgia court aware of the previous decree, respondent had violated the terms of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: “[W]hile all this was going on in Florida, [respondent] turned right around and filed an action here, never informed the [c]ourt here that he had done it; never made any of the disclosures that he’s supposed to make under Georgia law [the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act], and never made any response to that whatsoever.” Tr. 8. The appellate briefs of the parties to the Georgia Supreme Court similarly argued the application of the Act to the facts of this case. As noted above, the State Supreme Court apparently did not believe that any federal issue was presented. Finally, petitioner did not claim in her petition for rehearing before the Georgia Supreme Court that the court’s failure to reach the federal claim, which petitioner now contends was raised before that court, was error. She did, however, argue that the failure of the Georgia courts to dismiss the action was error under the Act.

We cannot conclude on this record that petitioner raised the federal claim that she now presents to this Court at any point in the state-court proceedings. Thus, we confront in this case the same problem that arose in Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U. S. 437, 438 (1969): “Although certiorari was granted to consider this question, . . . the sole federal question argued here has never been raised, preserved, or passed upon in the state courts below.” Citing a long history of cases, we stated there that “[t]he Court has consistently refused to decide federal constitutional issues raised here for the first time on review of state court decisions.” Ibid. We have had several occasions to repeat this rule since then, Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U. S. 351, 352 (1973); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U. S. 786, 799 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 658, n. 10 (1972); Hill v. California, 401 U. S. 797 (1971); University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 283 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.), and we see no reason to deviate from it now.

It is appropriate to emphasize again, see Cardinale v. Louisiana, supra, at 439, that there are powerful policy considerations underlying the statutory requirement and our own rule that the federal challenge to a state statute or other official act be presented first to the state courts. These considerations strongly indicate that we should apply this general principle with sufficient rigor to make reasonably certain that we entertain cases from state courts only where the record clearly shows that the federal issue has been properly raised below.

In the first place, although the States are sovereign entities, they are bound along with their officials, including their judges, by the Constitution and the federal statutory law. Principles of comity in our federal system require that the state courts be afforded the opportunity to perform their duty, which includes responding to attacks on state authority based on the federal law, or, if the litigation is wholly private, construing and applying the applicable federal requirements. As the Court has elsewhere observed, this principal of comity requires

“a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 44 (1971).

The principal of comity that stands behind the “properly-raised-federal-question” doctrine is similar to the principle that stands behind the exhaustion-of-state-remedies doctrine applicable to federal habeas corpus review of the constitutional claims of state prisoners. We have described the latter doctrine as one based on “federal-state comity,” Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270, 275 (1971), and have described its function as reflecting

“ “an accommodation of our federal system designed to give the State the initial “opportunity to pass upon and correct” alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.’ We have consistently adhered to this federal policy, for 'it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation.’ ” Ibid, (citations omitted).

There are also very practical reasons for insisting that federal issues be presented first in the state-court system. The requirement affords the parties the opportunity to develop the record necessary for adjudicating the issue. It permits the state courts to exercise their authority, which federal courts, including this one, do not have at least to the same extent, to construe state statutes so as to avoid or obviate federal constitutional challenges such as vagueness and over-breadth. The rule also insures that if there are independent and adequate state grounds that would pretermit the federal issue, they will be identified and acted upon in an authoritative manner. Finally, if the parties to state-court litigation are required to present their federal claims in the state tribunals in the first instance, those issues will be adjudicated in the state courts where necessary to dispose of the case. In most instances, such a judgment will be supported by an opinion that may well obviate any reason for our giving plenary consideration to the case. In terms of our own workload, this is a very substantial matter.

For all of these reasons, we, as well as litigants seeking to bring cases here from the state courts, should take care to comply with the jurisdictional statute and our rules. Although it would avoid uncertainty and the expenditure of much time and effort if litigants identified in the state courts precisely the provisions of the Federal Constitution or the federal statute on which they rely, we have not insisted on such inflexible specificity. The inevitable result is that at times there have been differences of opinion as to whether the state courts have been afforded a fair opportunity to address the federal question that is sought to be presented here. At the minimum, however, there should be no doubt from the record that a claim under a federal statute or the Federal. Constitution was presented in the state courts and that those courts were apprised of the nature or substance of the federal claim at the time and in the manner required by the state law. Otherwise, we cannot be sufficiently sure, when the state court whose judgment is being reviewed has not addressed the federal question that is later presented here, that the issue was actually presented and silently resolved by the state court against the petitioner or the appellant in this Court.

Because petitioner failed to raise her federal claim in the state proceedings and the Georgia Supreme Court failed to rule on a federal issue, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, the writ is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

So ordered.

Justice Powell,

with whom Justice Brennan joins, concurring.

I agree that the writ should be dismissed because petitioner did not raise her federal constitutional challenge in the Georgia courts. I join the Court’s opinion with the understanding, however, that the broad statements in it are not to be taken as departing from the rule, reaffirmed just this Term, that the Court has jurisdiction to review plain error unchallenged in the state court when necessary to prevent fundamental unfairness. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261, 265, n. 5 (1981). See also, Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U. S. 478 (1974) (finding plain error in an appeal from a state court).

Justice Marshall,

dissenting in part.

I share the Court’s concerns for comity and for careful pleadings. Nonetheless, I do not believe that either of these concerns justifies the Court’s apparent conclusion that a petitioner who fails to cite the exact location of a federal constitutional provision has neglected to raise a claim on that ground.

The Court attempts to reason that the petitioner neglected to raise any claim under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution. As the Court acknowledges, however, petitioner “did use the phrase 'full faith and credit’ at several points in the proceedings below.” Ante, at 496. Indeed, she asserted in her amended complaint that the decision of the Florida court “should be accorded full faith and credit” by the Georgia court, and reiterated this claim in her enumeration of errors to the Georgia Supreme Court. The Court tries to translate these words as references not to the identical language in the Federal Constitution, but instead to a provision of Georgia law which fails to mention any of the three words, “full,” “faith,” or “credit.” See Ga. Code § 74-514 (1979), Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. The Georgia provision governs allocation of jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, which both Georgia and Florida have enacted as their own law. I fail to see how the interests of improved pleadings or comity are served by the Court’s strained refusal to ascribe to petitioner’s words their plain meaning.

It remains true that the Georgia Supreme Court neglected to pass on the import of the federal Full Faith and Credit Clause for this case. I would remand for such state review on that issue, rather than dismiss the writ and leave the decision below in place.

       Respondent also argued that the Georgia court properly assumed jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. This is purely a question of state law not properly subject to review in this Court.

       Because — as will be discussed infra — the federal issue was not addressed by the Georgia Supreme Court, it may have been better practice on our part to call for the record before acting on the petition for certiorari.

       In petitioner’s brief to the Georgia Supreme Court she devoted one sentence to this issue: “In such circumstances, Appellant asserts, the decree entered in Florida should have been recognized as a final order subject to full faith and credit.” Brief for Respondent 3. This lower court brief is not a part of the record, but even if it were it would not suffice to establish that petitioner’s claim was based on the Federal Constitution.

         Even if, as a matter of federal law, petitioner had properly raised her federal question, we might still confront here an independent state procedural ground barring our consideration of the federal issue. Rule 45 of the Rules of the Georgia Supreme Court states: “Any enumerated error which is not supported by argument or citation of authority shall be deemed abandoned.” Ga. Code §2A-4545 (Supp. 1980). The Georgia court has held that failure to include citations of authority to support enumerated errors will bar review of those errors in the State Supreme Court. Watts v. Mitchell, 227 Ga. 247, 179 S. E. 2d 774 (1971). The Georgia Supreme Court failed to discuss or even mention petitioner’s full faith and credit claim. Petitioner has not demonstrated that the failure of the Georgia Supreme Court to reach the federal issue was not grounded on an application of this rule. Since we conclude that the federal claim was not properly presented, we need not reach any conclusion about application of this state-court rule.

       See, e. g., Wood v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261 (1981); Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U. S. 478 (1974); Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U. S. 454 (1960); Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63 (1928).


author: Justice Marshall

text:
    ALESSI et al. v. RAYBESTOS-MANHATTAN, INC., et al.
    No 79-1943.
    Argued March 4, 1981
    Decided May 18, 1981

      Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except BreNNan, J., who took no part in the decision of the cases.

      Theodore Sachs argued the cause for appellants in No. 79-1943. With him on the briefs were Michael S. Scarola and I. Mark Steckloff. Marc C. Gettis argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners in No. 80-193.

      Warren John Casey argued the cause for appellees in No. 79-1943. With him on the brief was Sebastian J. Fortunato. Lawrence Reich argued the cause for respondent in No. 80-193. With him on the brief were Otis M. Smith, Eugene L. Hartwig, and David M. Davis. John J. Degan, Attorney-General, Stephen Skillman, Assistant Attorney General, and Michael S. Bokar, Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of New Jersey as appellee in No. 79-1943, under this Court’s Rule 10.4, and as respondent in No. 80-193, under this Court’s Rule 19.6.

      Together with No. 80-193, Buczynski et al. v. General Motors Corp. et al., on certiorari to the same court.

       Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Alfred Miller for the American Association of Retired Persons et ah; by Gill Deford and Neal S. Dudovitz for the Gray Panthers; and by Leonard S. Zubrensky and Theodore Sachs for Merl D. Stong et al.
      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Solicitor General McCree, Acting Assistant Attorney General Murray, Stuart A. Smith, William A. Friedlander, and Michael J. Roach, for the United States; by Richard T. Wentley and Patrick W. Ritchey for Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc.; by Stanley T. Kaleczyc for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; by George J. Pantos for the ERISA Industry Committee; and by Charles R. Volk and William W. Scott, Jr., for the National Steel Corp.

   Justice Marshall

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Some private pension plans reduce a retiree’s pension benefits by the amount of workers’ compensation awards received subsequent to retirement. In these cases we consider whether two such offset provisions are lawful under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), and whether they may be prohibited by state law.

I

Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., and General Motors Corp. maintain employee pension plans that are subject to federal regulation under ERISA. Both plans provide that an employee’s retirement benefits shall be reduced, or offset, by an amount equal to workers’ compensation awards for which the individual is eligible. In 1977, the New Jersey Legislature amended its Workers’ Compensation Act to expressly prohibit such offsets. The amendment states that “[t]he right of compensation granted by this chapter may be set off against disability pension benefits or payments but shall not be set off against employees’ retirement pension benefits or payments.” N. J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-29 (West Supp. 1980-1981) (as amended by 1977 N. J. Laws, ch. 156).

Alleging violations of this provision of state law, two suits were initiated in New Jersey state court. The plaintiffs in both suits were retired employees who had obtained workers’ compensation awards subject to offsets against their retirement benefits under their pension plans. The defendant companies independently removed the suits to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. There, both District Court Judges ruled that the pension offset provisions were invalid under New Jersey law, and concluded that Congress had not intended ERISA to pre-empt state laws of this sort. The District Court Judges also held that the offsets were prohibited by § 203 (a) of ERISA, 29 U. S. C. § 1053 (a). This section prohibits forfeitures of vested pension rights except under four specific conditions inapplicable to these cases. The judges concluded that offsets based on workers’ compensation awards would be forbidden forfeitures, and struck down a contrary federal Treasury Regulation authorizing such offsets.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit consolidated the appeals from these two decisions and reversed. 616 F. 2d 1238 (1980). It rejected the District Court Judges’ view that the offset provisions caused a forfeiture of vested pension rights forbidden by § 1053. Instead, the Court of Appeals reasoned, such offsets merely reduce pension benefits in a fashion expressly approved by ERISA for employees receiving Social Security benefits. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals found no conflict between ERISA and the Treasury Regulation approving reductions based on workers’ compensation awards and ERISA. Finally, the court concluded that the New Jersey statute forbidding offsets of pension benefits by the amount of workers’ compensation awards could not withstand ERISA’s general pre-emption provision, 29 U. S. C. § 1144 (a). We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal taken by the former employees of Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., and granted certiorari on the petition of former employees of General Motors Corp. 449 U. S. 949 and 950 (1980). For convenience, we refer to the former employees in both cases as retirees. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

II

Retirees claim that the workers’ compensation offset provisions of their pension plans contravene ERISA’s nonfor-feiture provisions and that the Treasury Regulation to the contrary is inconsistent with the Act. Both claims require examination of the relevant sections of ERISA.

A

As we recently observed, ERISA is a “comprehensive and reticulated statute,” which Congress adopted after careful study of private retirement pension plans. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U. S. 359, 361 (1980). In Nachman, we observed that Congress through ERISA wanted to ensure that “if a worker has been promised a defined pension benefit upon retirement — and if he has fulfilled whatever conditions are required to obtain a vested benefit— ... he actually receives it.” Id,., at 375. For this reason, the concepts of vested rights and nonforfeitable rights are critical to the ERISA scheme. See id., at 370, 378. ERISA prescribes vesting and accrual schedules, assuring that employees obtain rights to at least portions of their normal pension benefits even if they leave their positions prior to retirement. Most critically, ERISA establishes that “[e]ach pension plan shall provide that an employee's right to his normal retirement benefit is nonforfeitable upon the attainment of normal retirement age.” 29 U. S. C. § 1053 (a).

Retirees rely on this sweeping assurance that pension rights become nonforfeitable in claiming that offsetting those benefits with workers’ compensation awards violates ERISA. Retirees argue first that no vested benefits may be forfeited except as expressly provided in § 1053. Second, retirees assert that offsets based on workers’ compensation fall into none of those express exceptions. Both claims are correct; § 1053 (a) prohibits forfeitures of vested rights except as expressly provided in § 1053 (a)(3), and the challenged workers’ compensation offsets are not among those permitted in that section.

Despite this facial accuracy, retirees’ argument overlooks a threshold issue: what defines the content of the benefit that, once vested, cannot be forfeited? ERISA leaves this question largely to the private parties creating the plan. That the private parties, not the Government, control the level of benefits is clear from the statutory language defining non-forfeitable rights as well as from other portions of ERISA. ERISA defines a “nonforfeitable” pension benefit or right as “a claim obtained by a participant or his beneficiary to that part of an immediate or deferred benefit under a pension plan which arises from the participant’s service, which is unconditional, and which is legally enforceable against the plan.” 29 U. S. C. § 1002 (19). In construing this definition last Term, we observed:

“[T]he term 'forfeiture’ normally connotes a total loss in consequence of some event rather than a limit on the value of a person’s rights. Each of the examples of a plan provision that is expressly described as not causing a forfeiture listed in [§ 1053 (a) (3)] describes an event — such as death or temporary re-employment— that might otherwise be construed as causing a forfeiture of the entire benefit. It is therefore surely consistent with the statutory definition of “nonforfeitable” to view it as describing the quality of the participant’s right to a pension rather than a limit on the amount he may collect.” Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U. S., at 372-373.

Similarly, the statutory definition of “nonforfeitable” assures that an employee’s claim to the protected benefit is legally enforceable, but it does not guarantee a particular amount or a method for calculating the benefit. As we explained last Term, “it is the claim to the benefit, rather than the benefit itself, that must be 'unconditional’ and 'legally enforceable against the plan.’ ” Id., at 371.

Rather than imposing mandatory pension levels or methods for calculating benefits, Congress in ERISA set outer bounds on permissible accrual practices, 29 U. S. C. § 1054 (b)(1), and specified three alternative schedules for the vesting of pension rights, 29 U. S. C. § 1053 (a)(2). In so doing, Congress limited the variation permitted in accrual rates applicable across the entire period of an employee’s participation in the pension plan. And Congress disapproved pension practices unduly delaying an employee’s acquisition of a right to enforce payment of the portion of benefits already accrued, without further employment. These provisions together assure at minimum a legally enforceable claim to 100% of the pension benefits created by a covered plan for those employees who have completed 15 years of service and for those employees aged 45 or older who have completed 10 years of service. Other than these restrictions, ERISA permits the total benefit levels and formulas for determining their accrual before completion of 15 years of service to vary from plan to plan. See 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002 (22), (23) (benefits defined merely as those “under the plan”).

It is particularly pertinent for our purposes that Congress did not prohibit “integration,” a calculation practice under which benefit levels are determined by combining pension funds with other income streams available to the retired employees. Through integration, each income stream contributes for calculation purposes to the total benefit pool to be distributed to all the retired employees, even if the nonpension funds are available only to a subgroup of the employees. The pension funds are thus integrated with the funds from other income maintenance programs, such as Social Security, and the pension benefit level is determined on the basis of the entire pool of funds. Under this practice, an individual employee’s eligibility for Social Security would advantage all participants in his private pension plan, for the addition of his anticipated Social Security payments to the total benefit pool would permit a higher average pension payout for each participant. The employees as a group profit from that higher pension level, although an individual employee may reach that level by a combination of payments from the pension fund and payments from the other income maintenance source. In addition, integration allows the employer to attain the selected pension level by drawing on the other resources, which, like Social Security, also depend on employer contributions.

Following its extensive study of private pension plans before the adoption of ERISA, ■ Congress expressly preserved the option of pension fund integration with benefits available under both the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 401 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), and the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U. S. C. § 231 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill) ; 29 U. S. C. §§ 1054 (b)(1) (B)(iv), 1054 (b)(1)(C), 1054 (b)(1)(G). Congress was well aware that pooling of non-pension retirement benefits and pension funds would limit the total income maintenance payments received by individual employees and reduce the cost of pension plans to employers. Indeed, in considering this integration option, the House Ways and Means Committee expressly acknowledged the tension between the primary goal of benefiting employees and the subsidiary goal of containing pension costs. The Committee Report noted that the proposed bill would

“not affect the ability of plans to use the integration procedures to reduce the benefits that they pay to individuals who are currently covered when social security benefits are liberalized. Your committee, however, believes that such practices raise important issues. On the one hand, the objective of the Congress in increasing social security benefits might be considered to be frustrated to the extent that individuals with low and moderate incomes have their private retirement benefits reduced as a result of the integration procedures. On the other hand, your committee is very much aware that many present plans are fully or partly integrated and that elimination of the integration procedures could substantially increase the cost of financing private plans. Employees, as a whole, might be injured rather than aided if such cost increases resulted in slowing down the growth or perhaps even eliminat[ing] private retirement plans.” H. R. Rep. No. 93-807, p. 69 (1974), reprinted in 2 Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare) 3189 (1976) (Leg. Hist.).

The Committee called for further study of the problem and recommended that Congress impose a restriction on integration of pension benefits with Social Security and Railroad Retirement payments. Congress adopted this recommendation and forbade any reductions in pension payments based on increases in Social Security or Railroad Retirement benefits authorized after ERISA took effect. 29 U. S. C. § 1056 (b). See 29 U. S. C. §§ 1054 (b) (1) (B) (iv), 1054 (b) (1) (C) ; H. R. Rep. No. 93-807, at 69, 2 Leg. Hist. 3189. See also 26 U. S. C. §401 (a) (15).

In setting this limitation on integration with Social Security and Railroad Retirement benefits, Congress acknowledged and accepted the practice, rather than prohibiting it. Moreover, in permitting integration at least with these federal benefits, Congress did not find it necessary to add an exemption for this purpose to its stringent nonforfeiture protections in 29 U. S. C. § 1053 (a). Under these circumstances, we are unpersuaded by retirees’ claim that the non-forfeiture provisions by their own force prohibit any offset of pension benefits by workers’ compensation awards. Such offsets work much like the integration of pension benefits with Social Security or Railroad Retirement payments. The individual employee remains entitled to the established pension level, but the payments received from the pension fund are reduced by the amount received through workers’ compensation. The nonforfeiture provision of § 1053 (a) has no more applicability to this kind of integration than it does to the analogous reduction permitted for Social Security or Railroad Retirement payments. Indeed, the same congressional purpose — promoting a system of private pensions by giving employers avenues for cutting the cost of their pension obligations — underlies all such offset possibilities.

Nonetheless, ERISA does not mention integration with workers’ compensation, and the legislative history is equally silent on this point. An argument could be advanced that Congress approved integration of pension funds only with the federal benefits expressly mentioned in the Act. A current regulation issued by the Internal Revenue Service, however, goes further, and permits integration with other benefits provided by federal or state law. We now must consider whether this regulation is itself consistent with ERISA.

B

Codified at 26 CFR §§ 1.411 (a)-(4)(a) (1980), the Treasury Regulation provides that “nonforfeitable rights are not considered to be forfeitable by reason of the fact that they may be reduced to take into account benefits which are provided under the Social Security Act or under any other Federal or State law and which are taken into account in determining plan benefits.” The Regulation interprets 26 U. S. C. § 411, the section of the Internal Revenue Code which replicates for IRS purposes ERISA’s nonforfeiture provision, 29 U. S. C. § 1053 (a). The Regulation plainly encompasses awards under state workers’ compensation laws. In addition, in Revenue Rulings issued prior to ERISA, the IRS expressly had approved reductions in pension benefits corresponding to workers’ compensation awards. See, e. g., Rev. Rui. 69-421, Part 4 (j), 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 72; Rev. Rui.. 68-243, 1968-1 Cum. Bull. 157.

Retirees contend that the Treasury Regulation and IRS rulings to this effect contravene ERISA. They object first that ERISA’s approval of integration was limited to Social Security and Railroad Retirement payments. This objection is precluded by our conclusion that reduction of pension benefits based on the integration procedure are not per se prohibited by § 1053 (a), for the level of pension benefits is not prescribed by ERISA. Retirees’ only remaining objection is that workers’ compensation awards are so different in kind from Social Security and Railroad Retirement payments that their integration could not be authorized under the same rubric.

Developing this argument, retirees claim that workers’ compensation provides payments for work-related injuries, while Social Security and Railroad Retirement supply payments solely for wages lost due to retirement. Because of this distinction, retirees conclude that integration of pension funds with workers’ compensation awards lacks the rationale behind integration of pension funds with Social Security and Railroad Retirement. Retirees’ claim presumes that ERISA permits integration with Social Security or Railroad Retirement only where there is an identity between the purposes of pension payments and the purposes of the other integrated benefits. But not even the funds that the Congress clearly has approved for integration purposes share the identity of purpose ascribed to them by petitioners. Both the Social Security and Railroad Retirement Acts provide payments for disability as well as for wages lost due to retirement, and ERISA permits pension integration without distinguishing these different kinds of benefits.

Furthermore, when it enacted ERISA, Congress knew of the IRS rulings permitting integration and left them in effect. These rulings do not draw the line between permissible and impermissible integration where retirees would prefer them to, and instead they include workers’ compensation offsets within the ambit of permissible integration. The IRS rulings base their allowance of pension payment integration on three factors: the employer must contribute to the other benefit funds, these other funds must be designed for general public use, and the benefits they supply must correspond to benefits available under the pension plan. The IRS employed these considerations in approving integration with workers’ compensation benefits. E. g., Rev. Rul. 69-421, Part 4 (j), 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 72; Rev. Rul. 68-243, 1968-1 Cum. Bull. 157. In contrast, the IRS has disallowed offsets of pension benefits with damages recovered by an employee through a common-law action against the employer. Rev. Rul. 69-421, Part 4 (j)(4), 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 72; Rev. Rul. 68-243, 1968-1 Cum. Bull. 157-158. The IRS also has not permitted integration with reimbursement for medical expenses or with fixed sums made for bodily impairment because such payments do not match up with any benefits available under a pension plan qualified under the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA. Rev. Rui. 78-178, 1978-1 Cum. Bull. 118. Similarly, the IRS has disapproved integration with unemployment compensation, for, as payment for temporary layoffs, it too is a kind of benefit not comparable to any permitted in a qualified pension plan. Id., at 117-118.

Without speaking directly of its own rationale, Congress embraced such IRS rulings. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 277 (1974), 3 Leg. Hist. 4544 (approving existing antidiscrimination rules). Congress thereby permitted integration along the lines already approved by the IRS, which had specifically allowed pension benefit offsets based on workers’ compensation. Our judicial function is not to second-guess the policy decisions of the legislature, no matter how appealing we may find contrary rationales.

As a final argument, retirees claim that we should defer to the policy decisions of the state legislature. To this claim we now turn.

Ill

The New Jersey Legislature attempted to outlaw the offset clauses by providing that “[t]he right of compensation granted by [the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act] may be set off against disability pension benefits or payments but shall not be set off against employees’ retirement pension benefits or payments.” N. J. Stat. Ann. §34:15-29 (West Supp. 1980) (emphasis added). To resolve retirees’ claim that this state policy should govern, we must determine whether such state laws are pre-empted by ERISA. Our analysis of this problem must be guided by respect for the separate spheres of governmental authority preserved in our federalist system. Although the Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws that “interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress . . . ,” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 211 (1824), the “ 'exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed,’ ” New York Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U. S. 405, 413 (1973), quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U. S. 199, 203 (1952). As we recently reiterated, “[preemption of state law by federal statute or regulation is not favored 'in the absence of persuasive reasons — either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress' has unmistakably so ordained.’ ” Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick ,& Tile Co., 450 U. S. 311, 317 (1981), quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142 (1963). See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525-526 (1977); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 649 (1971); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947); Hines v. Davidowit z, 312 U. S. 52, 61-62 (1941).

In this instance, we are assisted by an explicit congressional statement about the pre-emptive effect of its action. The same chapter of ERISA that defines the scope of federal protection of employee pension benefits provides that

“the provisions of this subchapter . .. shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003 (a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003 (b) of this title.” 29 U. S. C. § 1144 (a).

This provision demonstrates that Congress intended to depart from its previous legislation that “envisioned the exercise of state regulation power over pension funds,” Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 512, 514 (1978) (plurality opinion), and meant to establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern. But for the pre-emption provision to apply here, the New Jersey law must be characterized as a state law “that relate [s] to any employee benefit plan.” 29 U. S. C. § 1144 (a). That phrase gives rise to some confusion where, as here, it is asserted to apply to a state law ostensibly regulating a matter quite’ different from pension plans. The New Jersey law governs the State’s workers’ compensation awards, which obviously are subject to the State’s police power. As a result, one of the District Court Judges below concluded that the New Jersey provision “is in no way concerned with pension plans qua pension plans. On the contrary, the New Jersey statute is solely concerned with protecting the employee’s right to worker’s compensation disability benefits.” Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 456 F. Supp. 867, 873 (NJ 1978). Similarly, the other District Court Judge below reasoned that the New Jersey law “only has a collateral effect on pension plans.” Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., Civ. No. 78-0434 (NJ, Feb. 15, 1979). The Court of Appeals rejected these analyses on two grounds. It read the “relate to pension plans” language in “its normal dictionary sense” as indicating a broad pre-emptive intent, and it also reasoned that the “only purpose and effect of the [New Jersey] statute is to set forth an additional statutory requirement for pension plans,” a purpose not permitted by ERISA. 616 F. 2d, at 1250 (emphasis in original).

We agree with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals but arrive there by a different route. Whatever the purpose or purposes of the New Jersey statute, we conclude that it “relate [s] to pension plans” governed by ERISA because it eliminates one method for calculating pension benefits — integration—that is permitted by federal law. ERISA permits integration of pension funds with other public income maintenance moneys for the purpose of calculating benefits, and the IRS interpretation approves integration with the exact funds addressed by the New Jersey workers’ compensation law. New Jersey’s effort to ban pension benefit offsets based on workers’ compensation applies directly to this cal-eulation technique. We need not determine the outer bounds of ERISA’s pre-emptive language to find this New Jersey provision an impermissible intrusion on the federal regulatory scheme.

It is of no moment that New Jersey intrudes indirectly, through a workers’ compensation law, rather than directly, through a statute called “pension regulation.” ERISA makes clear that even indirect state action bearing on private pensions may encroach upon the area of exclusive federal concern. For the purposes of the pre-emption provision, ERISA defines the term “State” to include: “a State, any political subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this subchapter.” 29 U. S. C. §1144 (c)(2) (emphasis added). ERISA’s authors clearly meant to preclude the States from avoiding through form the substance of the preemption provision.

Another consideration bolsters our conclusion that the New Jersey provision is pre-empted insofar as it bears on pensions regulated by ERISA. ERISA leaves integration, along with other pension calculation techniques, subject to the discretion of pension plan designers. See supra, at 514-516. Where, as here, the pension plans emerge from collective bargaining, the additional federal interest in precluding state interference with labor-management negotiations calls for pre-emption of state efforts to regulate pension terms. See Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U. S. 283, 296 (1959); Railway Employees v. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225, 232 (1956). Cf. Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274 (1971); San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959). As a subject of collective bargaining, pension terms themselves become expressions of federal law, requiring preemption of intrusive state law.

IV

We conclude that N. J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-29 (West Supp. 1980) is pre-empted by federal law insofar as it bears on pension plans governed by ERISA. We find further that Congress contemplated and approved the kind of pension provisions challenged here, which permit offsets of pension benefits based on workers’ compensation awards. The decision of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

Justice BREnnan took no part in the decision of these cases.

       The Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., plan provides:
      “All Retirement Income payments shall be reduced by the entire amount of any and all payments the Member is eligible to receive under any and all statutes pertaining to workmen’s compensation, occupational disease, unemployment compensation, cash sickness benefits, and similar laws, other than primary Social Security benefits, Presently in effect or which may be enacted from time to time, which payments are paid concurrently with the Retirement Income.”
      The offset clause under the General Motors Corp. plan provides:
      “In determining the monthly benefits payable under this Plan, a deduction shall be made unless prohibited by law, equivalent to all or any part of Workmen’s Compensation (including compromise or redemption settlements) payable to such employee by reason of any law of the United States, or any political subdivision thereof, which has been or shall be enacted, provided that such deductions shall be to the extent that such Workmen’s Compensation has been provided by premiums, taxes or other payments paid by or at the expense of the Corporation, except that no deduction shall be made for the following:
      “(a) Workmen’s Compensation payments specifically allocated for hospitalization or medical expense, fixed statutory payments for the loss of any bodily member, or 100% loss of use of any bodily member, or payments for loss of industrial vision.
      “(b) Compromise or redemption settlements payable prior to the date monthly pension benefits first become payable.
      “(c) Workmen's Compensation payments paid under a claim filed not later than two years after the breaking of seniority.”

       In No. 79-1943, former employees of Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., sought permanently to enjoin such offsets and to recover damages for the offsets already made. Similar relief was pursued in No. 80-193, where several former employees of General Motors Corp. brought suit for themselves and on behalf of others similarly situated.

       See n. 8, infra.

       The Regulation provides that “nonforfeitable rights are not considered to be forfeitable by reason of the fact that they may be reduced to take into account benefits which are provided under the Social Security Act or under any other Federal or State law and which are taken into account in determining plan benefits.” 26 CFR § 1.411 (a)-4 (a) (1980).

       In its statement of findings and declaration of policy, Congress noted that “despite the enormous growth in such plans many employees with long years of employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans.” 29 U. S. C. § 1001 (a). ERISA was designed to prescribe minimum vesting and accrual standards in response to such problems. Ibid. To ensure that employee pension expectations are not defeated, the Act establishes minimum rules for employee participation, §§ 1051-1061; funding standards to increase solvency of pension plans, §§ 1081-1085; fiduciary standards for plan managers, §§ 1101-1114; and an insurance program in case of plan termination, §§ 1341-1348 (1976 ed. and Supp. III).

       ERISA establishes three accrual techniques for pension plans covered by the Act. 29 U. S. C. § 1054 (b)(1). See n. 9, infra. Similarly, ERISA establishes several approved vesting schedules. Under any of the approved schedules, at a time prior to normal retirement age but after a given period of service or a combination of age and length of service, the employee is to be guaranteed 100% interest in the pension benefit. 29 U. S. C. § 1053 (a)(2). See n. 10, infra.

       ERISA defines “normal retirement benefit” as “the greater of the early retirement benefit under the plan, or the benefit under the plan commencing at normal retirement áge.” 29 U. S. C. § 1002 (22).

       The statute expressly exempts from its forfeiture ban offsets that: (1) are contingent on the employee’s death, 29 U. S. C. § 1053 (a) (3) (A); (2) occur when the employee takes a job under certain circumstances, § 1053 (a) (3) (B); (3) are due to certain retroactive amendments to a pension plan, § 1053 (a) (3) (C); or (4) result from withdrawals of benefits derived from mandatory contributions, § 1053 (a) (3) (D). Retirees correctly point out that workers’ compensation offsets fall into none of these categories.

       The three different accrual practices approved for defined benefits plans are described in 29 U. S. C. § 1054 (b)(1). One prescribes a minimum percentage of the total retirement benefit that must be accrued in any given year. § 1054 (b) (1) (A). Another permits the use of any accrual formula as long as the accrual rate for a given year of service does not vary beyond a specified percentage from the accrual rate of any other year under the plan. § 1054 (b) (1) (B). The third is essentially a pro rata rule under which in any given year, the employee’s accrued benefit is proportionate to the number of years of service as compared with the number of total’ years of service appropriate to the normal retirement age. § 1054 (b) (1) (C).

       Congress approved some delay in an employee’s acquisition of a vested right to portions of his pension derived from employer contributions. Thus, ERISA specifies that this right could be hinged on a minimum length of service, but an employee reaching the minimum should not lose that right even if he does not continue working for that particular employer until reaching retirement age. That minimum period of service can be calculated under three different formulas, two of which permit gradual vesting of percentages of the accrued benefits over time. Compare 29 U. S. C. § 1053 (a)(2)(A) with §§ 1053 (a) (2) (B), (C). See also Schiller, Proposed ERISA Vesting Regulations: Not What They Seem To Be, 6 J. Corp. L. 263 (1981) (discussing Internal Revenue Service implementation of vesting provisions). In essence, pension plans qualifying for tax treatment advantageous to the employer both must ensure non-forfeiture of all accrued benefits derived from employee contributions and must use vesting and accrual rates assuring portions of the benefits derived from the employer contributions should the employee leave the job before the normal retirement age. 29 U. S. C. §§ 1053 (a) (1), (2).

       This minimum results from the formulas approving gradual vesting over'time of benefits derived from employer contributions. See 29 U. S. C. §§ 1053 (a) (2) (B), (C). Alternatively, a plan may comply with ERISA “if an employee who has at least 10 years of service has a nonforfeitable right to 100 percent of his accrued benefit derived from employer contributions.” 29 U. S. C. §1053 (a)(2)(A).

       The vesting, nonforfeiture, and pension benefits provisions of the bill discussed in H. R. Rep. No. 93-807 were substantially identical to those portions in the bill ultimately enacted as ERISA. The bill reported out of the Conference Committee included an additional provision to restrict temporarily any increases in pension reductions due to increases in Social Security benefits occurring after December 31, 1971. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 131 (1974), 3 Leg. Hist. 4405. Senator Harrison Williams explained that this provision ultimately was deleted because:
      “We have been told that this will greatly increase the costs of private pension plans, something that I am sure none of the Senators would like to see occur. This is particularly true if these increased pension costs result in the termination of private pension plans. Certainly that is not the intent of this legislation which is designed to improve and encourage the expansion of private pension plans.” 120 Cong. Rec. 29928 (1974), 3 Leg. Hist. 4732.

       The Court of Appeals characterized the Treasury Regulation as a “legislative” regulation, entitled to a more restricted scope of review than is applied to “interpretive rules.” 616 F. 2d 1238, 1242. Nonetheless, the Government here represents that the Treasury Regulation is an interpretive rule. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19, n. 12. Because an agency empowered to enact legislative rules may choose to issue nonlegislative statements, we review this Treasury Regulation under the scrutiny applicable to interpretive rules, with due deference to consistent agency practice. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 425, n. 9 (1977); Batterton v. Marshall, 208 U. S. App. D. C. 321, 332-333, 648 F. 2d 694, 705-706 (1980); 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.8 (2d ed. 1979).

       Furthermore, integration with workers’ compensation has been approved by the agency created under ERISA to guarantee payment of all nonforfeitable pension benefits despite termination of the relevant pension plan. That agency, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, has defined the benefits it guarantees to include “a benefit payable as an annuity, or one or more payments related thereto, to a participant who permanently leaves or has permanently left covered employment, or to a surviving beneficiary, which payments by themselves or in combination with Social Security, Railroad Retirement, or workmen’s compensation benefits provide a substantially level income to the recipient.” 29 CFR §2605.2 (1980).

       The House Ways and Means Committee Report proposed codification of the contemporaneous administrative practice developed by the IRS. That practice included IRS approval of integration procedures. See, e. g., 26 CFR § 1.401-3 (e) (1973); Rev. Rul. 69-421, Part 4, 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 70-74; Rev. Rul. 12, 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 290. These IRS rulings implemented a provision of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 401 (a) (4), which forbids favorable tax treatment for pension plans discriminating in favor of company officers, shareholders, or highly compensated employees. The Internal Revenue Code, long before the enactment of ERISA, specified that such forbidden discrimination does not include differences in benefits “because of any retirement benefits created under State or Federal law.” 26 U. S. C. §401 (a) (5) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The IRS has consistently interpreted this discrimination provision to permit pension benefit integration with Social Security and other funds receiving employer contributions and making benefits available to the general public. See, e. g., Rev. Rul. 69-4, 1969-1 Cum. Bull. 118; Rev. Rul. 69-5, 1969-1 Cum. Bull. 125; Rev. Rul. 68-243, 1968-1 Cum. Bull. 157; Rev. Rul. 61-75, 1961-1 Cum. Bull. 140. Congress essentially approved these rulings when its Conference Committee reported: “[T]he conferees intend that the antidiscrimination rules of present law in areas other than the vesting schedule are not to be changed. Thus, the present antidiscrimination rules with respect to coverage, and with respect to contributions and benefits are to remain in effect.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 277 (1974), 3 Leg. Hist, 4544.

       Retirees argue that workers’ compensation should be treated the same as common-law tort damages for the purposes of integration with pension payments. Although workers’ compensation resembles tort judgments against employers for employee injuries, there are differences which could explain their different treatment by the IRS. A tort judgment typically represents a finding of the employer’s fault for the employee’s injury. Workers’ compensation, in contrast, is generally available with no showing of an employer’s fault or an employee’s lack of fault for the work-related injury. 1 A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law §§ 2.10, 6.00 (1979). In treating the two sources of payments differently, the IRS may have concluded that workers’ compensation is as much an income maintenance program, responding to wage loss, as it is remuneration for injury, and therefore it may be integrated with pension benefits to the advantage of the entire employee group. See generally 4 id., §§ 96.10, 97.10, 97.50. Cf. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 83 (1971) (reductions of Social Security based on workers’ compensation comports with due process). In this light, the agency may well have employed the very rationale proffered by retirees — that two benefits systems must have identical purposes before they may be integrated — and departed from retirees’ reasoning only in concluding that these two benefit systems share the same purpose of replacing lost wages, whatever the cause. Regardless of which view of workers’ compensation this Court finds most compelling, we must defer to the consistent agency position that is itself reasonable and consonant with the Act.

       We note that the General Motors offset clause avoids any ambiguity on this point. It disallows deductions for medical expenses or fixed payments for bodily impairment. See n. 1, supra. Although the Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., plan is silent on this point, it is certainly subject to IRS regulation.

       Adopted as an amendment to the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation-.. Act, this provision reversed New Jersey’s prior approval of workers’ compensation offsets in collectively bargained pension agreements. See Brief for Appellee New Jersey in No. 79-1943, pp. 6-7.

       The scope of federal concern is, however, limited by ERISA itself. The statute explicitly preserves state regulation of “insurance, banking, or securities,” 29 U. S. C. § 1144 (b) (2) (A); and “generally applicable criminal law[s] of a State,” § 1144 (b) (2) (B) (4). ERISA also exempts from its coverage several kinds of plans, which may be subject to state regulation. §§ 1144 (a), 1144 (b)(2)(B). See also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 383 (1974), 3 Leg. Hist. 4650.

       ERISA’s pre-emption clause exempts state laws relating to pension plans that do not fall within the Act’s coverage, see n. 19, supra, but no such exemptions are applicable here. The only exemption with any conceivable relevance pertains to state laws governing plans “maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen’s compensation laws.” 29 U. S. C. § 1003 (b) (3). Retirees in No. 80-193 concede that this exception is inapplicable because the General Motors plan is not maintained solely to comply with a workmen’s compensation law. Brief for Petitioners in No. 80-193, p. 44.
      Retirees in No. 79-1943, however, claim that the exception should apply more generally to plans governed by state workers’ compensation laws. They reason that “if a plan which is designed to ‘comply with [an] applicable workmen’s compensation law’ is not preempted by ERISA, then a fortiori the underlying statute with which such plan is permitted to comply equally escapes coverage.” Reply Brief for Appellants in No. 79-1943, p. 18. This reasoning wreaks havoc on ERISA’s plain language, which pre-empts not plans, but “State laws.” 29 U. S. C. §1144 (a). The only relevant state laws, or portions thereof, that survive this preemption provision are those relating to plans that are themselves exempted from ERISA’s scope. And the relevant exemption from ERISA’s coverage — for plans maintained solely for compliance with state workers’ compensation laws — has no bearing on the plans involved here, which more broadly serve employee needs as a result of collective bargaining. As retirees do not, and cannot, claim that the plans involved here are free from ERISA’s coverage, they cannot claim the exception to pre-emption restricted to laws governing such exempted plans.

         Other courts have reached varying conclusions as to the meaning of ERISA’s pre-emptive language in other contexts. See, e. g., American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Merry, 592 F. 2d 118 (CA2 1979) ; Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (ND Cal.1978); Gast v. State, 36 Ore. App. 441, 585 P. 2d 12 (1978). We express no views on the merits of any of those decisions.

       In light of its reading of ERISA, the Court of Appeals declined to reach the issue of pre-emption under the National Labor Relations Act. 616 F. 2d, at 1250, n. 17. The issue was, however, addressed by the District Court below in Alessi v. Raybestos-Mahattan, Inc., Civ. No. 78-0434 (NJ, Feb. 15, 1979). That court reasoned that federal labor law pre-emption does not extend so far as to preclude state regulation of conduct touching deeply rooted local concerns. Ibid, (citing San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S., at 244). Although this reasoning may apply in other contexts, we do not find it compelling in light of the direct clash between the state statute and the federal policy to keep calculation of pension benefits a subject of either labor-management negotiations or federal legislation. In this context, integration of pension benefits with other public income maintenance funds can be forbidden only by the terms of pension plans themselves, or by new federal legislation.

       This conclusion follows naturally from the view of a plurality of this Court in Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497 (1978). There, because Congress preserved a state role in pension regulation before ERISA, the plurality created an exception to the general rule pre-empting state regulation of collective bargaining. Id., at 513-514. This exception no longer applies, however, now that ERISA, with express pre-emptive intent, has eliminated state regulation of most pension plans.