source: Caselaw Access Project

author:
Justice Powell Justice Stevens,
      Justice White,

license: Public Domain

text:
    WIDMAR et al. v. VINCENT et al.
    No. 80-689.
    Argued October 6, 1981
    Decided December 8, 1981

      Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 277. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 282.

      Ted D. Ayres argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Jackson A. Wright.

      James M. Smart, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Michael K. Whitehead

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Jerold Blumoff and Marc D. Stem for the American Jewish Congress; and by Justin J. Finger, Jeffrey P. Sinensky, and Meyer Eisenberg for the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith.
      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Joel H. Paget for the Association for the Coordination of University Religious Affairs; by Wilkes C. Robinson and Jane E. Nelson for Bible Study; by Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., and Kenneth F. Ripple for the Center for Constitutional Studies et al.; by Barry A. Fisher for the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity; by Nathan Lewin, Daniel D. Chazin, and Dennis Rapps for the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs; and by Wilfred R. Caron for the United States Catholic Conference.
      Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Earl W. Trent, Jr., for the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs; by J. Robert Brame, John W. Whitehead, and James J. Knicely for the National Association of Evangelicals; and by Donald L. Reidhaar for the Regents of the University of California.

   Justice Powell

delivered the opinion of the court.

This case presents the question whether a state university, which makes its facilities generally available for the activities of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a registered student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussion.

HH

It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri at Kansas City to encourage the activities of student organizations. The University officially recognizes over 100 student groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to help defray the costs to the University.

From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to conduct its meetings in University facilities. In 1977, however, the University informed the group that it could no longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in 1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or grounds “for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching.”

Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone, brought suit to challenge the regulation in the Federal District Court for the Western District of Missouri. They alleged that the University’s discrimination against religious activity and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907 (1979). It found the regulation not only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the State could not provide facilities for religious use without giving prohibited support to an institution of religion. 480 F. Supp., at 915-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the University could not discriminate against religious speech on the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to less protection than other types of expression. Id., at 918.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (1980). Rejecting the analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regulation as a content-based discrimination against religious speech, for which it could find no compelling justification. Id., at 1315-1320. The court held that the Establishment Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. Id., at 1317. According to the Court of Appeals, the “primary effect” of such a policy would not be to advancé religion, but rather to further the neutral purpose of developing students’ “ ‘social and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curiosity.’” Ibid, (quoting from the University bulletin’s description of the student activities program, reprinted in id., at 1312, n. 1).

We granted certiorari. 450 U. S. 909. We now affirm.

II

Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the University has created a forum generally open for use by student groups. Having done so, the University has assumed an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable constitutional norms. The Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public, even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place. See, e. g., Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 U. S. 167, 175, and n. 8 (1976) (although a State may conduct business in private session, “[w]here the State has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement,” exclusions bear a heavy burden of justification); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 555-559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a public forum, city could not exclude a production without satisfying constitutional safeguards applicable to prior restraints).

The University’s institutional mission, which it describes as providing a “secular education” to its students, Brief for Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitutional scrutiny. With respect to persons entitled to be there, our cases leave no doubt that the First Amendment rights of speech and association extend to the campuses of state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 487 (1960).

Here UMKC has discriminated against student groups and speakers based on their desire to use a generally open forum to engage in religious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment. See, e. g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public forum based on the religious content of a group’s intended speech, the University must therefore satisfy the standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464-465 (1980).

HH HH

In this case the University claims a compelling interest m maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives this interest from the “Establishment Clauses” of both the Federal and Missouri Constitutions.

A

The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of the Constitution of the United States. We agree that the interest of the University in complying with its constitutional obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not follow, however, that an “equal access” policy would be incompatible with this Court’s Establishment Clause cases. Those cases hold that a policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can pass a three-pronged test: “First, the [governmental policy] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. . .; finally, the [policy] must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971). See Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U. S. 736, 748 (1976).

In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech, would have a secular purpose and would avoid entanglement with religion. But the District Court concluded, and the University argues here, that allowing religious groups to share the limited public forum would have the “primary effect” of advancing religion.

The University’s argument misconceives the nature of this case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The University has opened its facilities for use by student groups, and the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of the content of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169 (1972). In this context we are unpersuaded that the primary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of discourse, would be to advance religion.

We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum’s likely effects. It is possible — perhaps even foreseeable — that religious groups will benefit from access to University facilities. But this Court has explained that a religious organization’s enjoyment of merely “incidental” benefits does not violate the prohibition against the “primary advancement” of religion. Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1973); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961).

We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open forum at UMKC would be “incidental” within the meaning of our cases. Two factors are especially relevant.

First, an open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a policy “would no more commit the University ... to religious goals” than it is “now committed to the goals of the Students for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance,” or any other group eligible to use its facilities. 635 F. 2d, at 1317.

Second, the forum is available to a broad class of nonreligious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recognized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 240-241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 781-782, and n. 38. If the Establishment Clause barred the extension of general benefits to religious groups, “a church could not be protected by the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk kept in repair.” Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., supra, at 747 (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S., at 658, n. 6. At least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious groups will dominate UMKC’s open forum, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not be the forum’s “primary effect.”

B

Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect state support for religion, the University claims a compelling interest in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri Constitution.

The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general policy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to those wishing to gather to engage in religious and nonreligious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would decide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide whether, under the Supremacy Clause, a state interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free speech interests protected by the First Amendment. We limit our holding to the case before us.

On one hand, respondents’ First Amendment rights are entitled to special constitutional solicitude. Our cases have required the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which a State undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its content. See, e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). On the other hand, the state interest asserted here — in achieving greater separation of church and State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution — is limited by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case by the Free Speech Clause as well. In this constitutional context, we are unable to recognize the State’s interest as sufficiently “compelling” to justify content-based discrimination against respondents’ religious speech.

IV

Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and manner regulations. Nor do we question the right of the University to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources or “to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.” Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); see University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312-313 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). Finally, we affirm the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S., at 188-189, that recognize a university’s right to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education.

The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and the University is unable to justify this violation under applicable constitutional standards.

For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

Justice Stevens,

concurring in the judgment.

As the Court recognizes, every university must “make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources,” ante, at 276. The Court appears to hold, however, that those judgments must “serve a compelling state interest” whenever they are based, even in part, on the content of speech. Ante, at 269-270. This conclusion apparently flows from the Court’s suggestion that a student activities program — from which the public may be excluded, ante, at 267-268, n. 5 — must be managed as though it were a “public forum.” In my opinion, the use of the terms “compelling state interest” and “public forum” to analyze the question presented in this case may needlessly undermine the academic freedom of public universities.

Today most major colleges and universities are operated by public authority. Nevertheless, their facilities are not open to the public in the same way that streets and parks are. University facilities — private or public — are maintained primarily for the benefit of the student body and the faculty. In performing their learning and teaching missions, the managers of a university routinely make countless decisions based on the content of communicative materials. They select books for inclusion in the library, they hire professors on the basis of their academic philosophies, they select courses for inclusion in the curriculum, and they reward scholars for what they have written. In addition, in encouraging students to participate in extracurricular activities, they necessarily make decisions concerning the content of those activities.

Because every university’s resources are limited, an educational institution must routinely make decisions concerning the use of the time and space that is available for extracurricular activities. In my judgment, it is both necessary and appropriate for those decisions to evaluate the content of a proposed student activity. I should think it obvious, for example, that if two groups of 25 students requested the use of a room at a particular time — one to view Mickey Mouse cartoons and the other to rehearse an amateur performance of Hamlet — the First Amendment would not require that the room be reserved for the group that submitted its application first. Nor do I see why a university should have to establish a “compelling state interest” to defend its decision to permit one group to use the facility and not the other. In my opinion, a university should be allowed to decide for itself whether a program that illuminates the genius of Walt Disney should be given precedence over one that may duplicate material adequately covered in the classroom. Judgments of this kind should be made by academicians, not by federal judges, and their standards for decision should not be encumbered with ambiguous phrases like “compelling state interest.”

Thus, I do not subscribe to the view that a public university has no greater interest in the content of student activities than the police chief has in the content of a soapbox oration on Capitol Hill. A university legitimately may regard some subjects as more relevant to its educational mission than others. But the university, like the police officer, may not allow its agreement or disagreement with the viewpoint of a particular speaker to determine whether access to a forum will be granted. If a state university is to deny recognition to a student organization — or is to give it a lesser right to use school facilities than other student groups — it must have a valid reason for doing so. Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169.

In this case I agree with the Court that the University has not established a sufficient justification for its refusal to allow the Cornerstone group to engage in religious worship on the campus. The primary reason advanced for the discriminatory treatment is the University’s fear of violating the Establishment Clause. But since the record discloses no danger that the University will appear to sponsor any particular religion, and since student participation in the Cornerstone meetings is entirely voluntary, the Court properly concludes that the University’s fear is groundless. With that justification put to one side, the University has not met, the burden that is imposed on it by Healy.

Nor does the University’s reliance on the Establishment Clause of the Missouri State Constitution provide a sufficient justification for the discriminatory treatment in this case. As I have said, I believe that the University may exercise a measure of control over the agenda for student use of school facilities, preferring some subjects over others, without needing to identify so-called “compelling state interests.” Quite obviously, however, the University could not allow a group of Republicans or Presbyterians to meet while denying Democrats or Mormons the same privilege. It seems apparent that the policy under attack would allow groups of young philosophers to meet to discuss their skepticism that a Supreme Being exists, or a group of political scientists to meet to debate the accuracy of the view that religion is the “opium of the people.” If school facilities may be used to discuss anticlerical doctrine, it seems to me that comparable use by a group desiring to express a belief in God must also be permitted. The fact that their expression of faith includes ceremonial conduct is not, in my opinion, a sufficient reason for suppressing their discussion entirely.

Accordingly, although I do not endorse the Court’s reasoning, I concur in its judgment.

Justice White,

dissenting.

In affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, the majority rejects petitioners’ argument that the Establishment Clause of the Constitution prohibits the use of university buildings for religious purposes. A state university may permit its property to be used for purely religious services without violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments. With this I agree. See Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 813 (1973) (WHITE, J., dissenting); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 661 (1971) (opinion of White, J.). The Establishment Clause, however, sets limits only on what the State may do with respect to religious organizations; it does not establish what the State is required to do. I have long argued that Establishment Clause limits on state action which incidentally aids religion are not as strict as the Court has held. The step from the permissible to the necessary, however, is a long one. In my view, just as there is room under the Religion Clauses for state policies that may have some beneficial effect on religion, there is also room for state policies that may incidentally burden religion. In other words, I believe the States to be a good deal freer to formulate policies that affect religion in divergent ways than does the majority. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 422-423 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The majority’s position will inevitably lead to those contradictions and tensions between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses warned against by Justice Stewart in Sherbert v. Verner, supra, at 416.

The University regulation at issue here provides in pertinent part:

“No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching by either student or non-student groups. Student congregations of local churches or of recognized denominations or sects, although not technically recognized campus groups, may use the facilities . . . under the same regulations that apply to recognized campus organizations, provided that no University facilities may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching.”

Although there may be instances in which it would be difficult to determine whether a religious group used university facilities for “worship” or “religious teaching,” rather than for secular ends, this is not such a case. The regulation was applied to respondents’ religious group, Cornerstone, only after the group explicitly informed the University that it sought access to the facilities for the purpose of offering prayer, singing hymns, reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles. Cornerstone described their meetings as follows: “Although these meetings would not appear to a casual observer to correspond precisely to a traditional worship service, there is no doubt that worship is an important part of the general atmosphere.” Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 910 (1979). The issue here is only whether the University regulation as applied and interpreted in this case is impermissible under the Federal Constitution. If it is impermissible, it is because it runs afoul of either the Free Speech or the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

A large part of respondents’ argument, accepted by the court below and accepted by the majority, is founded on the proposition that because religious worship uses speech, it is protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Not only is it protected, they argue, but religious worship qua speech is not different from any other variety of protected speech as a matter of constitutional principle. I believe that this proposition is plainly wrong. Were it right, the Religion Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in which religious practice took the form of speech.

Although the majority describes this argument as “novel,” ante, at 269, n. 6, I believe it to be clearly supported by our previous cases. Just last Term, the Court found it sufficiently obvious that the Establishment Clause prohibited a State from posting a copy of the Ten Commandments on the classroom wall that a statute requiring such a posting was summarily struck down. Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980). That case necessarily presumed that the State could not ignore the religious content of the written message, nor was it permitted to treat that content as it would, or must, treat other — secular—messages under the First Amendment’s protection of speech. Similarly, the Court’s decisions prohibiting prayer in the public schools rest on a content-based distinction between varieties of speech: as a speech act, apart from its content, a prayer is indistinguishable from a biology lesson. See Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962). Operation of the Free Exercise Clause is equally dependent, in certain circumstances, on recognition of a content-based distinction between religious and secular speech. Thus, in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 (1961), the Court struck down, as violative of the Free Exercise Clause, a state requirement that made a declaration of belief in God a condition of state employment. A declaration is again a speech act, but it was the content of the speech that brought the case within the scope of the Free Exercise Clause.

If the majority were right that no distinction may be drawn between verbal acts of worship and other verbal acts, all of these cases would have to be reconsidered. Although I agree that the line may be difficult to draw in many cases, surely the majority cannot seriously suggest that no line may ever be drawn. If that were the case, the majority would have to uphold the University’s right to offer a class entitled “Sunday Mass.” Under the majority’s view, such a class would be — as a matter of constitutional principle — indistinguishable from a class entitled “The History of the Catholic Church.”

There may be instances in which a State’s attempt to disentangle itself from religious worship would intrude upon secular speech about religion. In such a case, the State’s action would be subject to challenge under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. This is not such a case. This case involves religious worship only; the fact that that worship is accomplished through speech does not add anything to respondents’ argument. That argument must rely upon the claim that the State’s action impermissibly interferes with the free exercise of respondents’ religious practices. Although this is a close question, I conclude that it does not.

Plausible analogies on either side suggest themselves. Respondents argue, and the majority agrees, that by permitting any student group to use its facilities for communicative purposes other than religious worship, the University has created a “public forum.” Ante, at 267-268. With ample support, they argue that the State may not make content-based distinctions as to what groups may use, or what messages may be conveyed in, such a forum. See Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965). The right of the religious to nondiscriminatory access to the public forum is well established. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943). Moreover, it is clear that there are bounds beyond which the University could not go in enforcing its regulation: I do not suppose it could prevent students from saying grace before meals in the school cafeteria, or prevent distribution of religious literature on campus.

Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that allowing use of their facilities for religious worship is constitutionally indistinguishable from directly subsidizing such religious services: It would “fun[d] a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting.” Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 743 (1973). They argue that the fact that secular student groups are entitled to the in-kind subsidy at issue here does not establish that a religious group is entitled to the same subsidy. They could convincingly argue, for example, that a state university that pays for basketballs for the basketball team is not thereby required to pay for Bibles for a group like Cornerstone.

A third analogy suggests itself, one that falls between these two extremes. There are a variety of state policies which incidentally benefit religion that this Court has upheld without implying that they were constitutionally required of the State. See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968) (state loan of textbooks to parochial school students); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952) (release of students from public schools, during school hours, to perform religious activities away from the school grounds); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (state provision of transportation to parochial school students). Provision of university facilities on a uniform basis to all student groups is not very different from provision of textbooks or transportation. From this perspective the issue is not whether the State must, or must not, open its facilities to religious worship; rather, it is whether the State may choose not to do so.

Each of these analogies is persuasive. Because they lead to different results, however, they are of limited help in reaching a decision here. They also demonstrate the difficulty in reconciling the various interests expressed in the Religion Clauses. In my view, therefore, resolution of this case is best achieved by returning to first principles. This requires an assessment of the burden on respondents’ ability freely to exercise their religious beliefs and practices and of the State’s interest in enforcing its regulation.

Respondents complain that compliance with the regulation would require them to meet “about a block and a half” from campus under conditions less comfortable than those previously available on campus. I view this burden on free exercise as minimal. Because the burden is minimal, the State need do no more than demonstrate that the regulation furthers some permissible state end. The State’s interest in avoiding claims that it is financing or otherwise supporting religious worship — in maintaining a definitive separation between church and State — is such an end. That the State truly does mean to act toward this end is amply supported by the treatment of religion in the State Constitution. Thus, I believe the interest of the State is sufficiently strong to justify the imposition of the minimal burden on respondents’ ability freely to exercise their religious beliefs.

On these facts, therefore, I cannot find that the application of the regulation to prevent Cornerstone from holding religious worship services in University facilities violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. I would not hold as the majority does that if a university permits students and others to use its property for secular purposes, it must also furnish facilities to religious groups for the purposes of worship and the practice of their religion. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

       The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four campuses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri.

       Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in 1977, “perhaps twenty students . . . participate actively in Cornerstone and form the backbone of the campus organization.” Affidavit of Florian Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911 (WD Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms and in the student center. These meetings were open to the public and attracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and experiences.

       The pertinent regulations provide as follows:
      “4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohibition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offering of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions held in University facilities. . . .
      “4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be used for religious services but not for regular recurring services of any groups. Special rules and procedures shall be established for each such chapel by the Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to any religious group.”
      There is no chapel on the campus of UMKC. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approximately 125 miles east of UMKC.
      Although the University had routinely approved Cornerstone meetings before 1977, the District Court found that University officials had never “authorized a student organization to utilize a University facility for a meeting where they had full knowledge that the purposes of the meeting include[d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 910.

       Respondent Clark Vincent and Florian Chess, a named plaintiff in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University’s Board of Curators.

       This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university, at least for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. See generally Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 636 (1965). “The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly ‘the marketplace of ideas.’” Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, the capacity of a group or individual “to participate in the intellectual give and take of campus debate . . . [would be] limited by denial of access to the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students.” Id., at 181-182. We therefore have held that students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the campus, and that the “denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes” must be subjected to the level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. Id., at 181, 184.
      At the same time, however, our cases have recognized that First Amendment rights must be analyzed “in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). We continue to adhere to that view. A university differs in significant respects from public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university’s mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied a university’s authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and non-students alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its grounds or buildings.

       The dissent argues that “religious worship” is not speech generally protected by the “free speech” guarantee of the First Amendment and the “equal protection” guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. If “religious worship” were protected “speech,” the dissent reasons, “the Religion Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in which religious practice took the form of speech.” Post, at 284. This is a novel argument. The dissent does not deny that speech about religion is speech entitled to the general protections of the First Amendment. See post, at 283-284, and n. 2, 286. It does not argue that descriptions of religious experiences fail to qualify as “speech.” Nor does it repudiate last Term’s decision in Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., which assumed that religious appeals to nonbelievers constituted protected “speech.” Rather, the dissent seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of religious speech explicitly protected by our cases and a new class of religious “speech act[s],” post, at 285, constituting “worship.” There are at least three difficulties with this distinction.
      First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction has intelligible content. There is no indication when “singing hymns, reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles,” post, at 283, cease to be “singing, teaching, and reading” — all apparently forms of “speech,” despite their religious subject matter — and become unprotected “worship.”
      Second, even if the distinction drew an arguably principled line, it is highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial competence to administer. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67, 70 (1953). Merely to draw the distinction would require the university — and ultimately the courts — to inquire into the significance of words and practices to different religious faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner forbidden by our cases. E. g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U. S. 664, 668 (1970).
      Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the distinction on which it seeks to rely, The dissent apparently wishes to preserve the vitality of the Establishment Clause. See post, at 284-286. But it gives no reason why the Establishment Clause, or any other provision of the Constitution, would require different treatment for religious speech designed to win religious converts, see Heffron, supra, than for religious worship by persons already converted. It is far from clear that the State gives greater support in the latter case than in the former.

       See also Healy v. James, supra, at 184:
      “It is to be remembered that the effect of the College’s denial of recognition was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners’ organization the range of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which . . . may justify such restraint, a ‘heavy burden’ rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness of that action.”

       “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .” U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).

       As the dissent emphasizes, the Establishment Clause requires the State to distinguish between “religious” speech — speech, undertaken or approved by the State, the primary effect of which is to support an establishment of religion — and “nonreligious” speech — speech, undertaken or approved by the State, the primary effect of which is not to support an establishment of religion. This distinction is required by the plain text of the Constitution. It is followed in our cases. E.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980). The dissent attempts to equate this distinction with its view of an alleged constitutional difference between religious “speech” and religious “worship.” See post, at 285, and n. 3. We think that the distinction advanced by the dissent lacks a foundation in either the Constitution or in our cases, and that it is judicially unmanageable.

       It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which students can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the forum for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But by creating a forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many views are advocated in the forum with which the University desires no association.
      Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to student groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invalidated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction by religious groups, but not by others. See, e. g., McCollum v. Board of Education, 383 U. S. 203 (1948). In those cases the school may appear to sponsor the views of the speaker.

       We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk greater “entanglement” by attempting to enforce its exclusion of “religious worship” and “religious speech.” See Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310, 1318 (CA8 1980). Initially, the University would need to determine which words and activities fall within “religious worship and religious teaching.” This alone could prove “an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs meet the constitutional definition of religion.” O’Hair v. Andrus, 198 U. S. App. D. C. 198, 203, 613 F. 2d 931, 936 (1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-6 (1978). There would also be a continuing need to monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule.

         In finding that an “equal access” policy would have the primary effect of advancing religion, the District Court in this case relied primarily on Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitutionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years, the Court considered this restriction insufficient: “If, at the end of 20 years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise used to promote religious interests, the original federal grant will in part have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion.” Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposition that state funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used by religious organizations.

        We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the State’s capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other discussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See, e. g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).

       This case is different from cases in which religious groups claim that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. Here, the University’s forum is already available to other groups, and respondents’ claim to use that forum does not rest solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents’ claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association, and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the case. Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to which free exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regulation. Neither do we reach the questions that would arise if state accommodation of free exercise and free speech rights should, in a particular case, conflict with the prohibitions of the Establishment Clause.

       University students are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that the University’s policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v. Richardson, supra, at 685-686. The University argues that the Cornerstone students themselves admitted in affidavits that “[s]tudents know that if something is on campus, then it is a student organization, and they are more likely to feel comfortable attending a meeting.” Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, App. 18, 19. In light of the large number of groups meeting on campus, however, we doubt students could draw any reasonable inference of University support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. The University’s student handbook already notes that the University’s name will not “be identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions of any organization or its members.” 1980-1981 UMKC Student Handbook 25.

       This Court has similarly rejected “the recurrent argument that all aid [to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends.” Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 743 (1973).

       See, e. g., Americans United v. Rogers, 538 S. W. 2d 711, 720 (Mo.) (en banc) (holding Missouri Constitution requires stricter separation of church and State than does Federal Constitution), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976); Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 815-816, 163 S. W. 2d 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1942) (en banc) (same).

       See Mo. Const., Art. 1, §§ 6, 7; Art. 9, § 8. In Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 364 F. Supp. 376 (WD Mo. 1973), aff'd, 419 U. S. 888 (1974), the District Court found Missouri had a compelling interest in compliance with its own Constitution.

       U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.

       See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972) (“The nature of a place, ‘the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable,’” quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027, 1042 (1969)).

       In his opinion concurring in the judgment, post, at 277-287, Justice Stevens expresses concern that use of the terms “compelling state interest” and “public forum” may “undermine the academic freedom of public universities.” As the text above makes clear, this concern is unjustified. See also n. 5, supra. Our holding is limited to the context of a public forum created by the University itself.

       As stated by the Court, “[i]n order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public forum based on the religious content of a group’s intended speech, the University must therefore satisfy the standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions.” Ante, at 269-270. See also ante, this page, n. 20 (“Our holding is limited to the context of a public forum created by the University itself’).

       In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, Justice Frankfurter forcefully spoke of “the grave harm resulting from governmental intrusion into the intellectual life of a university . . . Id,., at 261 (concurring in result). Justice Frankfurter quoted with approval portions of an address by T. H. Huxley:
      “Tt is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail “the four essential freedoms” of a university — to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.’” Id., at 263.
      Although these comments were not directed at a public university’s concern with extracurricular activities, it is clear that the “atmosphere” of a university includes such a critical aspect of campus life. See also University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312 (opinion of Powell, J.) (“Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment”); Note, Academic Freedom and Federal Regulation of University Hiring, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 879 (1979). Cf. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Liberty, reprinted in The Concept of Academic Freedom 59, 77-81 (E. Pincoffs ed. 1972).

       In Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U. S. 173, Justice Blackmun expressed concern with
      “what seems to be a continuing tendency in this Court to use as tests such easy phrases as ‘compelling [state] interest’ and ‘least drastic [or restrictive] means.’ I have never been able fully to appreciate just what a ‘compelling state interest’ is. If it means ‘convincingly controlling,’ or ‘incapable of being overcome’ upon any balancing process, then, of course, the test merely announces an inevitable result, and the test is no test at all. And, for me, ‘least drastic means’ is a slippery slope and also the signal of the result the Court has chosen to reach. A judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little less ‘drastic’ or a little less ‘restrictive’ in almost any situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation down.” Id., at 188-189 (concurring opinion) (citation omitted).

       In Healy, the Court stated:
      “The opinions below also assumed that petitioners had the burden of showing entitlement to recognition by the College. While petitioners have not challenged the procedural requirement that they file an application in conformity with the rules of the College, they do question the view of the courts below that final rejection could rest on their failure to convince the administration that their organization was unaffiliated with the National [Students for a Democratic Society]. For reasons to be stated later in this opinion, we do not consider the issue of affiliation to be a controlling one. But, apart from any particular issue, once petitioners had filed an application in conformity with the requirements, the burden was upon the College administration to justify its decision of rejection. It is to be remembered that the effect of the College’s denial of recognition was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners’ organization the range of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which under circumstances requiring the safeguarding of that interest may justify such restraint, a ‘heavy burden’ rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness of that action.” 408 U. S., at 183-184 (footnotes and citations omitted).

       The University’s asserted determination to keep Church and State completely separate, pursuant to the alleged dictates of the Missouri Constitution, is not without qualification. The very regulations at issue provide that “[n]o regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offering of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions held in University facilities. . . .” See ante, at 266, n. 3.

       See Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 Geo. L. J. 727 (1980).

       Cornerstone was denied access to University facilities because it intended to use those facilities for regular religious services in which “worship is an important part of the general atmosphere.” There is no issue here as to the application of the regulation to “religious teaching.” Reaching this issue is particularly inappropriate in this case because nothing in the record indicates how the University has interpreted the phrase “religious teaching” or even whether it has ever been applied to activity that was not clearly “religious worship.” The District Court noted that plaintiffs did not contend that they were “limited, in any way, from holding on-campus meetings that do not include religious worship services.” 480 F. Supp., at 913. At oral argument, counsel for the University indicated that the regulation would not bar discussion of biblical texts under circumstances that did not constitute “religious worship.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 9. The sole question in this case involves application of the regulation to prohibit regular religious worship services in University buildings.

       Given that the majority’s entire argument turns on this description of religious services as speech, it is surprising that the majority assumes this proposition to require no argument. The majority assumes the conclusion by describing the University’s action as discriminating against “speakers based on their desire to . . . engage in religious worship and discussion.” Ante, at 269. As noted above, it is not at all clear that the University has discriminated or intends to discriminate against “religious discussion” — as a preliminary matter, it is not even clear what the majority means by “religious discussion” or how it entered the case. That religious worship is a form of speech, the majority takes to have been established by three cases. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). None of these cases stand for this proposition. Heffron and Saia involved the communication of religious views to a nonreligious, public audience. Talk about religion and about religious beliefs, however, is not the same as religious services of worship. Niemotko was an equal protection challenge to a discriminatory denial of one religious group’s access to a public park. The Court specifically stated that it was not addressing the question of whether the State could uniformly deny all religious groups access to public parks. 340 U. S., at 272.

       Indeed, while footnote 6 of the majority opinion suggests that no intelligible distinction may be drawn between worship and other forms of speech, footnote 9 recognizes that the Establishment Clause “requires” that such a line be drawn. The majority does not adequately explain why the State is “required” to observe a line in one context, but prohibited from voluntarily recognizing it in another context.

       Counsel for respondents was somewhat more forthright in recognizing the extraordinary breadth of his argument, than is the majority. Counsel explicitly stated that once the distinction between speech and worship is collapsed a university that generally provides student groups access to its facilities would be constitutionally required to allow its facilities to be used as a church for the purpose of holding “regular church services.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. Similarly, although the majority opinion limits its discussion to student groups, counsel for respondents recognized that the First Amendment argument relied upon would apply equally to nonstudent groups. He recognized that respondents’ submission would require the University to make available its buildings to the Catholic Church and other denominations for the purpose of holding religious services, if University facilities were made available to nonstudent groups. Id., at 39. In other words, the University could not avoid the conversion of one of its buildings into a church, as long as the religious group meets the same neutral requirements of entry — e. g., rent — as are imposed on other groups.

       There are obvious limits on the scope of this analogy. I know of no precedent holding that simply because a public forum is open to all kinds of speech — including speech about religion — it must be open to regular religious worship services as well. I doubt that the State need stand by and allow its public forum to become a church for any religious sect that chooses to stand on its right of access to that forum.

       There are, of course, limits to this subsidy argument. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), and Thomas v. Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U. S. 707 (1981), demonstrate that in certain circumstances the State may be required to “subsidize,” at least indirectly, religious practices, under circumstances in which it does not and need not subsidize similar behavior founded on secular motives.

       Respondents also complain that the University action has made their religious message less attractive by suggesting that it is not appropriate fare for the college campus. I give no weight to this because it is indistinguishable from an argument that respondents are entitled to the appearance of an endorsement of their beliefs and practices from the University.

       Since 1820, the Missouri Constitution has contained provisions requiring a separation of church and State. The Missouri Supreme Court has held that the state constitutional provisions are “not only more explicit but more restrictive than the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.” Paster v. Tussey, 512 S. W. 2d 97, 102 (1974).


author:
Chief Justice Burger Justice Rehnquist,
      Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun and Justice O’Connor, Justice White,

text:
    CITIZENS AGAINST RENT CONTROL/COALITION FOR FAIR HOUSING et al. v. CITY OF BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA, et al.
    No. 80-737.
    Argued October 14, 1981
    Decided December 14, 1981

      Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 300. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 301. Blackmun and O’Connor, JJ., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 302. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 303.

      James R. Parrinello argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was John E. Mueller.

      Natalie E. West argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Steven L. Mayer and Charles O. Trie-bel, Jr

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Malcolm H. Furbush, Joseph 1. Kelly, and Robert L. Harris for Pacific Gas and Electric Co.; and by Ronald A. Zumbrun and Raymond M. Momboisse for the Pacific Legal Foundation.

        Robert M. Myers filed a brief for the City of Santa Monica, California, as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
      Briefs of amici curiae were filed by George Agnost and Burk E. Delventhal for the City and County of San Francisco; and by William W. Becker for the New England Legal Foundation.

   Chief Justice Burger

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue on appeal is whether a limitation of $250 on contributions to committees formed to support or oppose ballot measures violates the First Amendment.

I

The voters of Berkeley, Cal., adopted the Election Reform Act of 1974, Ord. No. 4700-N. S., by initiative. The campaign ordinance so enacted placed limits on expenditures and contributions in campaigns involving both candidates and ballot measures. Section 602 of the ordinance provides:

“No person shall make, and no campaign treasurer shall solicit or accept, any contribution which will cause the total amount contributed by such person with respect to a single election in support of or in opposition to a measure to exceed two hundred and fifty dollars ($250).”

Appellant Citizens Against Rent Control is an unincorporated association formed to oppose a ballot measure at issue in the April 19, 1977, election. The ballot measure would have imposed rent control on many of Berkeley’s rental units. To make its views on the ballot measure known, Citizens Against Rent Control raised more than $108,000 from approximately 1,300 contributors. It accepted nine contributions over the $250 limit. Those nine contributions totaled $20,850, or $18,600 more than if none of the contributions exceeded $250. Pursuant to § 604 of the ordinance, appellee Berkeley Fair Campaign Practices Commission, 20 days before the election, ordered appellant Citizens Against Rent Control to pay $18,600 into the city treasury.

Two weeks before the election, Citizens Against Rent Control sought and obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting enforcement of §§ 602 and 604. The ballot measure relating to rent control was defeated. The Superior Court subsequently granted Citizens Against Rent Control’s motion for summary judgment, declaring that §602 was invalid on its face because it violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 2, of the California Constitution. A panel of the California Court of Appeal unanimously affirmed that conclusion.

The California Supreme Court, dividing 4-3, reversed. 27 Cal. 3d 819, 614 P. 2d 742 (1980). Citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), the majority announced that it would strictly scrutinize § 602. It concluded that the section furthered compelling governmental interests because it ensured that special interest groups could not “corrupt” the initiative process by spending large amounts to support or oppose a ballot measure. Such corruption, the court found, could produce apathetic voters; these governmental interests were held to outweigh the First Amendment interests infringed upon. Finally, it concluded that § 602 accomplished its goal by the least restrictive means available. The California Supreme Court did not consider the disclosure requirements of the ordinance a sufficient prophylaxis to dispel perceptions of corruption.

We noted probable jurisdiction, 450 U. S. 908 (1981), and we reverse.

II

The appellees concede that the challenged ordinance has an impact on First Amendment rights; the parties disagree only as to the extent of the impact. Long ago this Court admonished that with respect to the First Amendment:

“[T]he power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 304 (1940).

This was but another way of saying that regulation of First Amendment rights is always subject to exacting judicial review.

We begin by recalling that the practice of persons sharing common views banding together to achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the American political process. The 18th-century Committees of Correspondence and the pamphleteers were early examples of this phenomena and the Federalist Papers were perhaps the most significant and lasting example. The tradition of volunteer committees for collective action has manifested itself in myriad community and public activities; in the political process it can focus on a candidate or on a ballot measure. Its value is that by collective effort individuals can make their views known, when, individually, their voices would be faint or lost.

The Court has long viewed the First Amendment as protecting a marketplace for the clash of different views and conflicting ideas. That concept has been stated and restated almost since the Constitution was drafted. The voters of the city of Berkeley adopted the challenged ordinance which places restrictions on that marketplace. It is irrelevant that the voters rather than a legislative body enacted § 602, because the voters may no more violate the Constitution by enacting a ballot measure than a legislative body may do so by enacting legislation.

Ill

A

The Court has acknowledged the importance of freedom of association in guaranteeing the right of people to make their voices heard on public issues:

“Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.” NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460 (1958).

More recently the Court stated: “The First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression.” Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 15.

Buckley also made clear that contributors cannot be protected from the possibility that others will make larger contributions:

“[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed ‘to secure “the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources,”’ and ‘“to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”’ New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, [376 U. S.], at 266, 269, quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 20 (1945), and Roth v. United States, 354 U. S., at 484. The First Amendment’s protection against governmental abridgment of free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a person’s financial ability to engage in public discussion. Cf. Eastern R. Conf. v. Noerr Motors, 365 U. S. 127, 139 (1961).” 424 U. S., at 48-49.

The Court went on to note that the freedom of association “is diluted if it does not include the right to pool money through contributions, for funds are often essential if ‘advocacy’ is to be truly or optimally ‘effective.’ ” Id., at 65-66. Under the Berkeley ordinance an affluent person can, acting alone, spend without limit to advocate individual views on a ballot measure. It is only when contributions are made in concert with one or more others in the exercise of the right of association that they are restricted by § 602.

There are, of course, some activities, legal if engaged in by one, yet illegal if performed in concert with others, but political expression is not one of them. To place a Spartan limit— or indeed any limit — on individuals wishing to band together to advance their views on a ballot measure, while placing none on individuals acting alone, is clearly a restraint on the right of association. Section 602 does not seek to mute the voice of one individual, and it cannot be allowed to hobble the collective expressions of a group.

Buckley identified a single narrow exception to the rule that limits on political activity were contrary to the First Amendment. The exception relates to the perception of undue influence of large contributors to a candidate:

“To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined. . . .

“. . . Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical... if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disasterous extent.’ [CSC v. Letter Carriers,] 413 U. S., at 565.” 424 U. S., at 26-27.

Buckley thus sustained limits on contributions to candidates and their committees.

Federal Courts of Appeals have recognized that Buckley does not support limitations on contributions to committees formed to favor or oppose ballot measures. In C & C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 583 F. 2d 421 (1978), the Ninth Circuit struck down a Montana statute prohibiting corporate contributions supporting or opposing ballot measures. In so doing the court noted:

“The state interest in preventing corruption of officials, which provided the basis for the Supreme Court’s finding in Buckley that restrictions could permissibly be placed on contributions, is not at issue here.” Id., at 425.

Similarly, the Fifth Circuit interpreted Buckley to hold that

“[t]he sole governmental interest that the Supreme Court recognized as a justification for restricting contributions was the prevention of quid pro quo corruption between a contributor and a candidate.” Let’s Help Florida v. McCrary, 621 F. 2d 195, 199 (1980).

In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978), we held that a state could not prohibit corporations any more than it could preclude individuals from making contributions or expenditures advocating views on ballot measures. The Bellotti Court relied on Buckley to strike down state legislative limits on advocacy relating to ballot measures:

“Referenda are held on issues, not candidates for public office. The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections [citations omitted] simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue. To be sure, corporate advertising may influence the outcome of the vote; this would be its purpose. But the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it: The Constitution ‘protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing.’ Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S., at 689.” 435 U. S., at 790 (footnote omitted).

Notwithstanding Buckley and Bellotti, the city of Berkeley argues that § 602 is necessary as a prophylactic measure to make known the identity of supporters and opponents of ballot measures. It is true that when individuals or corporations speak through committees, they often adopt seductive names that may tend to conceal the true identity of the source. Here, there is no risk that the Berkeley voters will be in doubt as to the identity of those whose money supports or opposes a given ballot measure since contributors must make their identities known under § 112 of the ordinance, which requires publication of lists of contributors in advance of the voting. See n. 4, supra.

Contributions by individuals to support concerted action by a committee advocating a position on a ballot measure is beyond question a very significant form of political expression. As we have noted, regulation of First Amendment rights is always subject to exacting judicial scrutiny. Supra, at 294. The public interest allegedly advanced by § 602 — identifying the sources of support for and opposition to ballot measures — is insubstantial because voters may identify those sources under the provisions of § 112. In addition, the record in this case does not support the California Supreme Court’s conclusion that §602 is needed to preserve voters’ confidence in the ballot measure process. Cf. Bellotti, supra, at 789-790. It is clear, therefore, that § 602 does not advance a legitimate governmental interest significant enough to justify its infringement of First Amendment rights.

B

Apart from the impermissible restraint on freedom of association, but virtually inseparable from it in this context, § 602 imposes a significant restraint on the freedom of expression of groups and those individuals who wish to express their views through committees. As we have noted, an individual may make expenditures without limit under § 602 on a ballot measure but may not contribute beyond the $250 limit when joining with others to advocate common views. The contribution limit thus automatically affects expenditures, and limits on expenditures operate as a direct restraint on freedom of expression of a group or committee desiring to engage in political dialogue concerning a ballot measure.

Whatever may be the state interest or degree of that interest in regulating and limiting contributions to or expenditures of a candidate or a candidate’s committees there is no significant state or public interest in curtailing debate and discussion of a ballot measure. Placing limits on contributions which in turn limit expenditures plainly impairs freedom of expression. The integrity of the political system will be adequately protected if contributors are identified in a public filing revealing the amounts contributed; if it is thought wise, legislation can outlaw anonymous contributions.

IV

A limit on contributions in this setting need not be analyzed exclusively in terms of the right of association or the right of expression. The two rights overlap and blend; to limit the right of association places an impermissible restraint on the right of expression. The restraint imposed by the Berkeley ordinance on rights of association and in turn on individual and collective rights of expression plainly contravenes both the right of association and the speech guarantees of the First Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment of the California Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Justice Rehnquist,

concurring.

I agree that the judgment of the Supreme Court of California must be reversed in this case. Unlike the factual situation in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978), the Berkeley ordinance was not aimed only at corporations, but sought to impose an across-the-board limitation on the size of contributions to committees formed to support or oppose ballot measure referenda. While one of the appellants here, Mason-McDuffie, is a California corporation, there is no indication that the Berkeley ordinance was aimed at corporations as opposed to individuals. Therefore, my dissenting opinion -in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, which relied on the corporate shield which the State had granted to corporations as a form of quid pro quo for the limitation does not come into play. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), holds that in this situation there is no state interest which could justify a limitation on the exercise of rights guaranteed under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Justice Marshall,

concurring in the judgment.

The Court today holds that a local ordinance restricting the amount of money that an individual can contribute to a committee organized to support or oppose a ballot measure violates the right to freedom of speech and association guaranteed by the First Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court fails to indicate whether or not it attaches any constitutional significance to the fact that the Berkeley ordinance seeks to limit contributions as opposed to direct expenditures. As Justice White correctly notes in dissent, beginning with our decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), this Court has always drawn a distinction between restrictions on contributions, and direct limitations on the amount an individual can expend for his own speech. As we noted last term in California Medical Assn. v. FEC, 453 U. S. 182, 196 (1980) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, White, and Stevens, JJ.), the “‘speech by proxy’” that is achieved through contributions to a political campaign committee “is not the sort of political advocacy that this Court in Buckley found entitled to full First Amendment protection.”

Because the Court’s opinion is silent on the standard of review it is applying to this contributions limitation, I must assume that the Court is following our consistent position that this type of governmental action is subjected to less rigorous scrutiny than a direct restriction on expenditures. The city of Berkeley seeks to justify its ordinance on the ground that it is necessary to maintain voter confidence in government. If I found that the record before the California Supreme Court disclosed sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that large contributions to ballot measure committees undermined the “confidence of the citizenry in government,” First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 790 (1978), I would join Justice White in dissent on the ground that the State had demonstrated a sufficient governmental interest to sustain the indirect infringement on First Amendment interests resulting from the operation of the Berkeley ordinance. Like Justices Blackmun and O’Connor, however, I find no such evidentiary support in this record. I therefore concur in the judgment.

Justice Blackmun and Justice O’Connor,

concurring in the judgment.

The contribution limitations at issue here encroach directly on political expression and association. Thus, Berkeley’s ordinance cannot survive constitutional challenge unless it withstands “exacting scrutiny.” First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 786 (1978). To meet this rigorous standard of review, Berkeley must demonstrate that its ordinance advances a sufficiently important governmental interest and employs means “ ‘closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment’” of First Amendment freedoms. Ibid, (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976)).

We would hold that Berkeley has neither demonstrated a genuine threat to its important governmental interests nor employed means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of protected activity. In Buckley, this Court upheld limitations on contributions to candidates as necessary to prevent contributors from corrupting the representatives to whom the people have delegated political decisions. But curtailment of speech and association in a ballot measure campaign, where the people themselves render the ultimate political decision, cannot be justified on this basis.

Nor has Berkeley proved a genuine threat to its interest in maintaining voter confidence in government. We would not deny the legitimacy of that interest. Indeed, in Bellotti, this Court explicitly recognized that “[preserving the integrity of the electoral process, preventing corruption, . . . ‘sustaining] the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of government,’” and “[preservation of the individual citizen’s confidence in government” are “interests of the highest importance” in ballot measure elections. 435 U. S., at 788-789, citing and quoting United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 570, 575 (1957). We did not find those interests threatened in Bellotti, however, in part because the State failed to show “by record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes” or “the confidence of the citizenry in government.” 435 U. S., at 789-790. The city’s evidentiary support in this case is equally sparse.

Finally, Berkeley does not justify its contribution limit as necessary to encourage disclosure. We cannot accept the Court’s conclusion that that interest is “insubstantial,” given the Court’s concession that “when individuals or corporations speak through committees, they often adopt seductive names that may tend to conceal the true identity of the source.” Ante, at 298. Yet Berkeley need not impose a $250 ceiling on contributions to encourage disclosure so long as it vigorously enforces its already stringent disclosure laws. Ante, at 294, n. 4.

We need say no more in order to reverse. Accordingly, we concur in the judgment.

Justice White,

dissenting.

In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), the Court upheld restrictions on contributions but struck down limits on expenditures in campaigns for federal office that Congress, the body most expert in the matter, thought equally essential to protect the integrity of the election process. Two years later, a bare majority of the Court, substituting its judgment for that of the Massachusetts Legislature, invalidated that State’s prohibition on corporate spending in referendum elections. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978). Disagreeing with the Court’s assumption that those regulations inhibited the free interplay of political advocacy, I would have upheld the expenditure limitations at issue in Buckley and the restrictions contested in Bellotti.

This case poses a less encompassing regulation on campaign activity, one tailored to the odd measurements of Buckley and Bellotti. Precisely because it reflects these decisions, the ordinance regulates contributions but not expenditures and does not prohibit corporate spending. It is for that very reason perhaps that the effectiveness of the ordinance in preserving the integrity of the referendum process is debatable. Even so, the result here illustrates that the Buckley framework is most problematical and strengthens my belief that there is a proper role for carefully drafted limitations on expenditures.

Even under Buckley, however, the Berkeley ordinance represents such a negligible intrusion on expression and association that the measure should be upheld. The ordinance certainly does not go beyond what I understand the First Amendment to permit. For both these reasons, I dissent.

I — I

The Berkeley ordinance does not control the quantity or content of speech. Unlike the statute in Bellotti, it does not completely prohibit contributions and expenditures. Any person or company may contribute up to $250. If greater spending is desired, it must be made as an expenditure, and expenditures are not limited or otherwise controlled. Individuals also remain completely unfettered in their ability to join interested groups or otherwise directly participate in the campaign.

The Court reaches the conclusion that the ordinance is unconstitutional only by giving Buckley the most extreme reading and by essentially giving the Berkeley ordinance no reading at all. It holds that the contributions involved here are “beyond question a very significant form of political expression.” Ante, at 298. Yet in Buckley the Court found that contribution limitations “entai[l] only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.” 424 U. S., at 20-21. As with contributions to candidates, ballot measure contributions “involv[e] speech by someone other than the contributor” and a limitation on such donations “does not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.” Id., at 21. Indeed what today has become “a very significant form of political expression” was held just last Term to involve only “some limited element of protected speech.” California Medical Assn. v. FEC, 453 U. S. 182, 196, n. 16 (1981) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, White, and Stevens, JJ.). “‘Speech by proxy,’” we said, “is not the sort of advocacy that this Court in Buckley found entitled to full First Amendment protection.” Id., at 196.

The Court also finds that the freedom of association is im-permissibly compromised by not allowing persons to contribute unlimited funds to committees organized to support or oppose a ballot measure. However, in Buckley, the Court observed that contribution ceilings “leav[e] persons free to engage in independent political expression, to associate actively through volunteering their services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees with financial resources.” 424 U. S., at 28. Associational rights, it was thought, were seriously impinged only by expenditure ceilings — there by virtue of precluding associations from effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents, “the original basis for the recognition of First Amendment protection of the freedom of association.” Id., at 22. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460 (1958). The Court’s concern that this ordinance will “hobble the collective expressions of a group” ante, at 296, is belied by the fact that appellants, having already met their campaign budget, ended all fundraising almost a month before the election.

It is bad enough that the Court overstates the extent to which First Amendment interests are implicated. But the Court goes on to assert that the ordinance furthers no legitimate public interest and cannot survive “any degree of scrutiny.” Apparently the Court assumes this to be so because the ordinance is not directed at quid pro quos between large contributors and candidates for office, “the single narrow exception” for regulation that it viewed Buckley as endorsing. The Buckley Court, however, found it “unnecessary to look beyond the Act’s primary purpose,” the prevention of corruption, to uphold the contribution limits, and thus did not consider other possible interests for upholding the restriction. Indeed, at least since United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 575 (1957), the Court has recognized that “sustaining the active alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of government” is a valid state interest. The Bellotti Court took care to note that this objective, along with “[preserving the integrity of the electoral process [and] the individual citizen’s confidence in government” “are interests of the highest importance.” 435 U. S., at 788-789.

In Bellotti, the Court found inadequate evidence in the record to support these interests, but it suggested that some regulation of corporate spending might be justified if “corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather than serving First Amendment interests.” Id., at 789. The Court suggested that such a situation would arise if it could be shown that “the relative voice of corporations ha[d] been overwhelming [and] . . . significant in influencing referenda.” Id., at 789-790. It is quite possible that such a test is fairly-met in this case. Large contributions, mainly from corporate sources, have skyrocketed as the role of individuals has declined. Staggering disparities have developed between spending for and against various ballot measures. While it is not possible to prove that heavy spending “bought” a victory on any particular ballot proposition, there is increasing evidence that large contributors are at least able to block the adoption of measures through the initiative process. Recognition that enormous contributions from a few institutional sources can overshadow the efforts of individuals may have discouraged participation in ballot measure campaigns and undermined public confidence in the referendum process.

By restricting the size of contributions, the Berkeley ordinance requires major contributors to communicate directly with the voters. If the ordinance has an ultimate impact on speech, it will be to assure that a diversity of views will be presented to the voters. As such, it will “facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 92-93. Of course, entities remain free to make major direct expenditures. But because political communications must state the source of funds, voters will be able to identify the source of such messages and recognize that the communication reflects, for example, the opinion of a single powerful corporate interest rather than the views of a large number of individuals. As the existence of disclosure laws in many States suggests, information concerning who supports or opposes a ballot measure significantly affects voter evaluation of the proposal. The Court asserts, without elaboration, that existing disclosure requirements suffice to inform voters of the identity of contributors. Yet, the inadequacy of disclosure laws was a major reason for the adoption of the Berkeley ordinance. Section 101(d) of the ordinance constitutes a finding by the people of Berkeley that “the influence of large campaign contributors is increased because existing laws for disclosure of campaign receipts and expenditures have proved to be inadequate.”

Admittedly, Berkeley cannot present conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between major undisclosed expenditures and the demise of the referendum as a tool of direct democracy. But the information available suffices to demonstrate that the voters had valid reasons for adopting contribution ceilings. It was on a similar foundation that the Court upheld contribution limits in Buckley and California Medical Assn. v. FEC, 453 U. S. 182 (1981). In my view, the ordinance survives scrutiny under the Buckley and Bellotti cases.

II

There are other grounds for sustaining the ordinance. I continue to believe that because the limitations are content-neutral, and because many regulatory actions will indirectly affect speech in the same manner as regulations in the sphere of campaign finance, “the argument that money is speech and that limiting the flow of money to the speaker violates the First Amendment proves entirely too much.” Buckley, supra, at 262 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Every form of regulation — from taxes to compulsory bargaining — has some effect on the ability of individuals and corporations to engage in expressive activity. We must therefore focus on the extent to which expressive and associational activity is restricted by the Berkeley ordinance. That First Amendment interests are implicated should begin, not end, our inquiry. When the infringement is as slight and ephemeral as it is here, the requisite state interest to justify the regulation need not be so high.

The interests which justify the Berkeley ordinance can properly be understood only in the context of the historic role of the initiative in California. “California’s entire history demonstrates the repeated use of referendums to give citizens a voice on questions of public policy.” James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 141 (1971). From its earliest days, it was designed to circumvent the undue influence of large corporate interests on government decisionmaking. It served, as President Wilson put it, as a “gun behind the door” to keep political bosses and legislators honest. In more recent years, concerned that the heavy financial participation by corporations in referendum contests has undermined this tool of direct democracy, the voters of California enacted by initiative in 1974 the Political Reform Act, which limited expenditures in statewide ballot measure campaigns, and Berkeley voters adopted the ordinance at issue in this case. The role of the initiative in California cannot be separated from its purpose of preventing the dominance of special interests. That is the very history and purpose of the initiative in California, and similarly it is the purpose of ancillary regulations designed to protect it. Both serve to maximize the exchange of political discourse. As in Bellotti, “[t]he Court’s fundamental error is its failure to realize that the state regulatory interests . . . are themselves derived from the First Amendment.” 435 U. S., at 803-804 (White, J., dissenting).

Perhaps, as I have said, neither the city of Berkeley nor the State of California can “prove” that elections have been or can be unfairly won by special interest groups spending large sums of money, but there is a widespread conviction in legislative halls, as well as among citizens, that the danger is real. I regret that the Court continues to disregard that hazard.

       Section 217 of the ordinance defines “measure” as “any City Charter amendment, ordinance or other propositions submitted to a popular vote at an election, whether by initiative, referendum or recall procedure or otherwise, or circulated for the purposes of submission to a popular vote at any election, whether or not the proposition qualifies for the ballot.”

       It was not clear in 1977 whether § 602 would be enforced. The prohibition on contributions to ballot measure campaign committees by corporations and labor unions, § 605, was invalidated in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Berkeley, 60 Cal. App. 3d 123, 131 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1976). Following Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), the city repealed a number of sections of the ordinance, such as § 513, which limited expenditures in support of or in opposition to a ballot measure to the lesser of $7,500 or 10 cents times the number of registered voters. When revising the ordinance to comply with these changes, the city mistakenly labeled § 602, the section challenged in this case, with the notation “do not enforce,” but it corrected this error approximately three months before the election involved in this case.

       Section 604 states: “If any person is found guilty of violating the terms of this chapter, each campaign treasurer who received part or all of the contribution or contributions which constitute the violation shall pay promptly, from available campaign funds, if any, the amount received from such persons in excess of the amount permitted by this chapter to the City Auditor for deposit in the General fund of the City.”

         To assure public awareness of the sources of support for committees, § 112 of the ordinance requires the publication of a list of all contributors of more than $50 in local newspapers twice during the last seven days of a campaign.

       The value of the right to associate is illustrated by the cost of reaching the public. Appellants represent that the cost of a single mailing to each of the 71,088 persons registered to vote in Berkeley in 1977 was $12,800. App. 32. The cost of a full-page advertisement in a Berkeley area newspaper, the Independent Gazette, was $1,620. Note, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1421, 1433, n. 54 (1981).

       The dissent argues a case not before the Court. Its references to Bellotti relate to corporate contributions; § 602 limits contributions by “persons.” The dissent’s references to Buckley relate to contributions to candidates and their committees; the case before us relates to contributions to committees favoring or opposing ballot measures.

       As originally passed by the voters, the Berkeley ordinance restricted expenditures as well as contributions to ballot measure campaigns. Following Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), and the California Supreme Court’s invalidation of statewide expenditure limitations in ballot measure campaigns, Citizens for Jobs & Energy v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 16 Cal. 3d 671, 547 P. 2d 1386 (1976), the city of Berkeley repealed the expenditure limitations. In addition, the measure’s original prohibition on corporate and labor union contributions to ballot measure campaigns was invalidated. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Berkeley, 60 Cal. App. 3d 123, 131 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1976).

       The California Fair Political Practices Commission has reported that campaign contributions from private individuals in the November 1980 general election totaled only one-half of the individual contributions given during the 1978 general election and represented only 5% of all the contributions made. California Fair Political Practices Commission, Campaign Contribution and Spending Report (1981). The chairman of the Commission concluded that the figures demonstrate an ‘“alarming yet steady erosion of the private individual as a force in the political process.’ ” California Fair Political Practices Commission’s Press Release 81-14, May 28, 1981. See also n. 3, infra.

       In a 1978 initiative over the construction of an oil storage terminal in Long Beach, Cal., Standard Oil of Ohio “contributed” all $864,568 spent by the Long Beach Civil Action Committee in support of the measure; opponents spent $17,721. S. Lydenberg, Bankrolling Ballots: The Role of Business in Financing State Ballot Question Campaigns 37 (1979).
      In 1980, three ballot measures were rejected by California voters statewide. One was an initative which sought to circumscribe smoking in public places. The committee supporting the measure collected $676,216; $518,337 in contributions under $1,000. Id., at 33. An opposing group, Californians Against Regulatory Excess, collected over $2,750,987. Of this amount, over $2.5 million was contributed in amounts of over $10,000, and four tobacco companies contributed between $300,000 and $1 million each. S. Lydenberg, Bankrolling Ballots: Update 1980, pp. 44-45 (1981).
      A second example is an initiative which would have taxed large energy companies to provide revenue to finance public transportation and to develop alternative energy sources. Californians for Fair Taxation, an association opposed to the measure, received nearly $6 million in contributions, of which approximately $5 million was given by large corporations. Proponents mustered but $464,000. Id., at 50-51.
      The third measure, like the initiative in this litigation, concerned rent control. Proponents, who sought to repeal existing rent control ordinances, gathered $6,867,108, mostly in contributions over $1,000; opponents collected $195,496, mostly in contributions under $1,000. Id., at 91-101.

       Several studies have shown that large amounts of money skew the outcome of local ballot measure campaigns. Professor Lowenstein’s investigation found that of 15 propositions supported by significant one-sided spending, defined as spending of at least $250,000 and twice as much as the opposite side, 7 were successful and 8 were defeated. On the other hand, of 10 propositions opposed by significant one-sided spending, 9 were defeated and only 1 was successful. D. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions (delivered at annual meeting of American Political Science Association, New York City, Sept. 5, 1981). A study of three Colorado initiatives found that in each of the races the pro-initiative side held a commanding lead which it lost as the campaign progressed. Corporate-backed opposition forces heavily outspent their counterparts. On election day, each initiative was defeated. Mastro, Costlow, & Sanchez, Taking the Initiative: Corporate Control of the Referendum Process Through Media Spending and What to Do About It, 32 Fed. Comm. L. J. 315 (1980). See also J. Shockley, The Initiative Process in Colorado Politics: An Assessment (1980). Nationwide, a study of 19 recent campaigns found that the side with corporate backing outspent opponents by better than 2 to 1 in 15 campaigns and won in 12 of them. S. Lydenberg, Bankrolling Ballots: Update 1980 (1981).

       Voter turnout in Berkeley municipal elections has decreased from 65.9% in April 1973 to 45.6% in April 1981. Brief for Appellees 7.

       See Public Communications Office, Federal Election Commission, Campaign Finance Law 81 (1981). See also Mastro, Costlow, & Sanchez, supra, at 353-354.

       See Brown v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 509, 522, 487 P. 2d 1224, 1232 (1971) (“A ballot measure is devoid of personality and voters who seek to judge the merits of issues by reliance on the personality of those supporting different points of view can do so only if they are made aware, prior to election, of those who are the real advocates for or against the measure”).

       See V. Key & W. Crouch, The Initiative and Referendum in California 425-432 (1939); Lee, California, in Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory 87-88 (D. Butler & A. Ranney eds. 1978); Note, The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform, 48 S. Cal. L. Rev. 922, 923 (1975) (“The primary motivation for the initiative process in California was the public’s desire to counter the lobbyist, the conduit of legislative influence exercised by and for economic and other special interests”).

       Political Reform Act of 1974, Cal. Gov’t Code Ann. § 81000 et seq. (West 1976). See n. 1, swpra.