author: TERNUS, Chief Justice.

text:
    Scott E. THOMAS and Rhonda R. Thomas, Appellees, v. PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.
    No. 06-1094.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    May 16, 2008.

      Steven T. Durick and Joseph M. Barron of Peddicord, Wharton, Spencer, Hook, • Barron & Wegman, LLP, Des Moines, for appellant.
    Anthony W. Tauke of Porter, Tauke & Ebke, Council Bluffs, for appellees.
   TERNUS, Chief Justice.

The appellant, Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, claims it provides no coverage under an insurance policy issued to appellee Rhonda R. Thomas for damages sustained by her husband, appellee Scott E. Thomas, in an accident with an underinsured motorist. Progressive relies on a named driver exclusion that listed Scott as an excluded driver. The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the coverage issue, concluding the exclusion did not apply to the underinsured motorist coverage of the policy. We disagree and therefore reverse the district court’s ruling and remand for entry of judgment in favor of the defendant on Scott’s claim.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In 2004 Rhonda Thomas purchased an automobile liability insurance policy from Progressive. While this policy was in effect, her husband, Scott, was driving the insured vehicle when he was involved in an accident. Scott was injured, and the insurer of the other driver paid its policy limits to Scott. The Thomases, believing their damages exceeded their recovery from the other driver, sought payment from Progressive under the underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage of Rhonda’s policy. Progressive denied coverage for Scott’s claim because Scott was listed on a named driver exclusion that excluded coverage for any claim arising from Scott’s operation of a motor vehicle.

The Thomases then filed this suit, seeking UIM benefits under the Progressive policy. In its answer, Progressive asserted it had no coverage for Scott’s damages due to the named driver exclusion. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment on the coverage issue. The district court determined the named driver exclusion did not apply to the underinsured motorist coverage of the policy, but refused to rule the plaintiffs were entitled to recover under the policy as a matter of law because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the degree of Scott’s comparative fault and his damages. Progressive filed an application for interlocutory appeal, which this court granted.

II. Scope of Review.

Summary judgment rulings are reviewed for correction of errors of law. Lee v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 646 N.W.2d 403, 406 (Iowa 2002). “To obtain a grant of summary judgment on some issue in an action, the moving party must affirmatively establish the existence of undisputed facts entitling that party to a particular result under controlling law.” Interstate Power Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 603 N.W.2d 751, 756 (Iowa 1999).

III. Governing Legal Principles.

In the present case, the pertinent facts are undisputed. The disagreement centers on the proper construction and interpretation of the insurance policy. The construction of an insurance policy is the process of determining the policy’s legal effect; interpretation is the process of determining the meaning of the words used in the policy. See Hornick v. Owners Ins. Co., 511 N.W.2d 370, 371 (Iowa 1993). “When the parties offer no extrinsic evidence on the meaning of policy language, the interpretation and construction of an insurance policy are questions of law for the court.” Lee, 646 N.W.2d at 406.

“In the construction of insurance policies, the cardinal principle is that the intent of the parties must control; and except in cases of ambiguity this is determined by what the policy itself says.” A.Y. McDonald Indus., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 607, 618 (Iowa 1991). “The test for ambiguity is an objective one: Is the language fairly susceptible to two interpretations?” Iowa Fuel & Minerals, Inc. v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 471 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Iowa 1991). “Only when the policy language is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations do we find an ambiguity.” Kibbee v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 525 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1994). In determining whether a policy provision is subject to two equally proper interpretations, we read the insurance contract “ ‘as an entirety rather than seriatim by clauses.’ ” Cairns v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 398 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Iowa 1987) (quoting Archibald v. Midwest Paper Stock Co., 176 N.W.2d 761, 763 (Iowa 1970)). Moreover, the court “avoids straining the words or phrases of the policy ‘to impose liability that was not intended and was not purchased.’” Id. at 824 (quoting Gateway State Bank v. N. River Ins. Co., 387 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Iowa 1986)).

“An insurer assumes a duty to define any limitations or exclusionary clauses in clear and explicit terms.” Hornick, 511 N.W.2d at 374. Thus, when an exclusionary provision is fairly susceptible to two reasonable constructions, the construction most favorable to the insured will be adopted. Cairns, 398 N.W.2d at 824. Nonetheless, if there is no ambiguity, the court “will not ‘write a new contract of insurance’ ” for the parties. Id. (quoting Stover v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 189 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Iowa 1971)).

Notwithstanding the principle that the plain meaning of an insurance contract generally prevails, this court has recognized that statutory law may also affect the interpretation and validity of policy provisions. Lee, 646 N.W.2d at 406. When a statute authorizes a contract of insurance, “ ‘[t]he statute itself forms a basic part of the policy and is treated as if it had actually been written into the policy.’ ” Id. (quoting Tri-State Ins. Co. v. De Gooyer, 379 N.W.2d 16, 17 (Iowa 1985)). Consequently, when construing a contract provision that affects underinsured motorist coverage, we must review not only the language of the policy but the terms of the UIM statute, Iowa Code chapter 516A, as well. Homick, 511 N.W.2d at 372.

IV. Interpretation of Policy.

A. Policy Provisions. Because exclusions must be interpreted in the context of the entire contract, we commence our analysis with a brief overview of the policy. The policy begins with a section entitled “general definitions.” The contract then has five parts, with each part dedicated to a particular type of coverage. These coverages include “liability to others,” “medical payments,” “uninsured/un-derinsured motorist,” “damage to a vehicle,” and “roadside assistance.” Each part contains an insuring agreement, additional definitions, exclusions, and other matters specific to that particular coverage. After the parts relating to these five coverages, the contract contains sections entitled “general provisions” and “named driver exclusion.” The named driver exclusion provides:

If you have asked us to exclude any person from coverage under this policy, then we will not provide coverage for any claim arising from an accident or loss involving a motorized vehicle being operated by that excluded person. THIS INCLUDES ANY CLAIM FOR DAMAGES MADE AGAINST YOU, A RELATIVE, OR ANY OTHER PERSON OR ORGANIZATION THAT IS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR AN ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF THE OPERATION OF A MOTORIZED VEHICLE BY THE EXCLUDED DRIVER.

The policy also contains a declarations page that shows Rhonda as a “Named insured” and Scott as an “excluded driver.” In addition to the contract itself, a separate document entitled “Named Driver Exclusion Election” similarly states: “No coverage is provided for any claim arising from an accident or loss involving a motorized vehicle operated by an excluded person.” Scott was identified as an excluded driver in this document, and the document was signed by Rhonda.

B. Parties’ Arguments. Progressive argues the exclusion is unambiguous and by its clear terms applies to “any claim arising from an accident or loss involving a motorized vehicle being operated by [the] excluded person.” (Emphasis added.) The insurer points out it is undisputed Scott was an excluded person, he was operating a motorized vehicle at the time of the accident, and his claim arises from that accident.

The plaintiffs contend an ambiguity is created when one views in context the language upon which Progressive relies. They note the named driver exclusion is included in the general provisions section of the policy, not in the specific exclusions listed in- the uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage part. They also rely on the second sentence of the exclusion, which specifically refers to coverage for vicarious liability, a claim falling within the liability coverage, but does not expressly mention the UM/UIM coverage. These circumstances, the plaintiffs argue, might lead an ordinary person to conclude the named driver exclusion affected liability coverage only, thus creating an ambiguity that should be resolved in favor of the insured.

C. Discussion. To address these arguments, we consider “what the policy itself says.” A.Y. McDonald Indus., Inc., 475 N.W.2d at 618. The first sentence of the exclusion states: “If you have asked us to exclude any person from coverage under this policy, then we will not provide coverage for any claim arising from an accident or loss involving a motorized vehicle being operated by that excluded person.” We agree with the insurer that this sentence, at least when considered in isolation, clearly and unambiguously excludes coverage for Scott’s UIM claim. The word “you” is defined in the policy as the person shown as the named insured on the declarations page. For this policy, that person is Rhonda. There is no dispute that Rhonda asked the insurer “to exclude [a] person from coverage under this policy” and that person was Scott. It is also undisputed that the UIM claim asserted by Scott arose from an accident involving a motorized vehicle being operated by Scott, the excluded person.

It is significant there is no limiting language in the first sentence of the exclusion that would indicate an intent that the exclusion does not apply to claims brought under the UM/UIM coverage. To the contrary, the exclusion encompasses “any claim.” We have previously held that the use of the word “any” in a statute “means all or every.” State v. Bishop, 257 Iowa 336, 341, 132 N.W.2d 455, 458 (1965); accord Lopez v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 192, 195 (Colo.Ct.App.1994) (interpreting word “any” in named driver exclusion to “mean[ ] ‘every,’ ‘all,’ ‘the whole of,’ and ‘without limit’ ” (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 97 (1986)); State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kiehne, 97 N.M. 470, 641 P.2d 501, 502 (1982) (interpreting word “any” in named driver exclusion to mean “without limit”). The word “claim” means “a demand for compensation, benefits or payment.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 414 (unabr. ed.2002). See generally Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co., 568 N.W.2d 815, 818 (Iowa 1997) (stating that in searching for the ordinary meaning of a policy term, “we often look to dictionaries”). Giving the words in the contract their ordinary meaning, we think the first sentence of the named driver exclusion clearly encompasses the UIM claim asserted by Scott, unless other provisions in the policy give rise to an ambiguity. See Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Schneck, 572 Pa. 216, 813 A.2d 828, 831 (2002) (holding nearly identical exclusion of “ ‘any claim’ ... unambiguously operates to bar recovery of UIM benefits under policy when driver is excluded”); cf. Nelson v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 162 P.3d 1228, 1234 (Alaska 2007) (holding nearly identical policy language “plainly indicates that any claim arising from [the excluded driver’s] operation of the automobile is not covered,” including negligent entrustment claim against the named insured); O’Brien v. Dorrough, 928 P.2d 322, 325-26 & n. 10 (Okla.Civ.App.1996) (holding similar exclusion excluding coverage for “any loss” was “clear and unambiguous” and excluded coverage for UM claims even though such claims were not expressly mentioned in the exclusion).

We turn now to the plaintiffs’ contention that the exclusion is ambiguous when considered in context. The plaintiffs assert the second sentence of the exclusion clouds the meaning of the first sentence. They argue that, when the two sentences are read together, the “clear meaning” of the exclusion is that it “applies only when the excluded person is liable for an accident.” Based on the ordinary meaning of the words used in the named driver exclusion, we do not think this provision is subject to the interpretation suggested by the plaintiffs.

The second sentence of the exclusion states: “This includes any claim for damages made against you, a relative, or any other person or organization that is vicariously liable for an accident arising out of the operation of a motorized vehicle by the excluded driver.” As the plaintiffs acknowledge, this sentence addresses vicarious liability claims arising out of the excluded driver’s operation of a motorized vehicle. The sentence begins with the words “this includes.” The word “this,” which immediately follows the first sentence of the exclusion, obviously refers to the exclusion set forth in the preceding sentence. Thus, the exclusion described in the first sentence “includes” vicarious liability claims arising out of the excluded driver’s operation of a motor vehicle. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1143 (defining “include” as “to take in, enfold, or comprise as a discrete or subordinate part or item of a larger aggregate, group, or principle”). We agree with the insurer that the second sentence of the exclusion clarifies that, when Scott Thomas is the driver, coverage of “any claim” is excluded, not only for Scott, but for others who are alleged to be vicariously liable.

The plaintiffs point out, if the first sentence of the exclusion is interpreted to be all-inclusive, the second sentence is superfluous. In light of the insurer’s duty to define “exclusionary clauses in clear and explicit terms,” Homick, 511 N.W.2d at 374, we doubt that the clarifying language of the second sentence could properly be considered superfluous. In any event, notwithstanding our desire to interpret a policy so as not to render any part superfluous, “we will not do so when that [interpretation] is inconsistent with the structure and format of the [provision] and' when that [interpretation] is otherwise unreasonable.” Kibbee, 525 N.W.2d at 869. In the named driver exclusion, the first sentence unambiguously excludes “any claim” arising out of the excluded driver’s operation of a motor vehicle. The second sentence clearly states that this exclusion “includes” claims of vicarious liability. To interpret the second sentence as limiting the scope of the first sentence to only instances when the excluded driver is liable would result in a strained and unnatural interpretation of the contractual language. See id. at 868-69 (‘We do not indulge in a strained or unnatural interpretation of policy language merely to find ambiguity.”).

For these reasons, we conclude the second sentence of the named driver exclusion cannot reasonably be interpreted as a limitation on the exclusion of “any claim” as stated in the first sentence of the provision. See Nelson, 162 P.3d at 1234-35 (holding second sentence of a nearly identical exclusion did not limit the scope of the exclusion). Consequently, the second sentence of the exclusion does not create an ambiguity. See id. at 1234 (holding exclusion was not ambiguous). To the contrary, the second sentence confirms the broad scope of the exclusion stated in the first sentence by expressly stating that the exclusion “includes” claims of vicarious liability asserted against persons other than the excluded driver.

The plaintiffs claim an ambiguity also arises from the fact that the named driver exclusion is placed at the end of the policy rather than in the UM/UIM coverage part. But the placement of the exclusion after the “general provisions” of the policy is entirely consistent with an interpretation of the exclusion as applying to “any claim,” regardless of the specific coverage under which the claimant seeks to recover. If, in fact, the exclusion applies only to the liability coverage, as plaintiffs contend, it is more logical that the exclusion would have been placed in the policy part for “liability to others.” We do not think the location of the exclusion supports an interpretation limiting the exclusion to the liability coverage. See Rockford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 217 Ill.App.3d 181, 160 Ill.Dec. 187, 576 N.E.2d 1141, 1144-45 (1991) (holding location of named driver exclusion in endorsement did not make it ambiguous; exclusion applied to “all coverage afforded by [the] policy,” including the UM coverage).

In summary, we hold the named driver exclusion is unambiguous. By the plain meaning of its terms, this provision excludes coverage for any claim that arises from the excluded driver’s operation of a motor vehicle, including underinsured motorist claims. Cf. Castaneda v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 357 Ark. 345, 166 S.W.3d 556, 561 (2004) (holding nearly identical named driver exclusion “was plain and unambiguous” and excluded claim brought under UM coverage); Kiehne, 641 P.2d at 502 (holding named driver exclusion excluding “any kind” of liability was “clear and unambiguous” and excluded coverage for UM claim even though UM coverage was not specifically mentioned in the exclusion).

V. Effect of Underinsured Motorist Statute.

Having determined the policy unambiguously excludes coverage for UIM claims arising from Scott’s operation of a motor vehicle, we must now consider whether that interpretation is inconsistent with Iowa’s underinsured motorist statute. The plaintiffs claim the “Named Driver Exclusion Election” signed by Rhonda does not satisfy the statutory requirement that UIM coverage be rejected in writing. In addition, they contend the public policy evidenced by the UIM statute is violated by the named driver exclusion.

A. Compliance with Chapter 516A. Iowa Code section 516A.1 requires that automobile liability policies issued in this state include uninsured and underin-sured motorist coverage “for the protection of persons insured under such policy.” Iowa Code § 516A.1 (2001). “However, the named insured may reject [some or all of such coverages], by written rejections signed by the named insured.” Id. “If rejection is made on a form or document furnished by an insurance company, ... it shall be on a separate sheet of paper which contains only the rejection and information directly related to it.” Id. The plaintiffs argue the statutory rejection requirement was not satisfied because the separate writing signed by Rhonda Thomas did not clearly state which coverages were excluded.

Before we address this issue, however, we must determine whether Progressive was obligated to provide UIM coverage to Scott so as to trigger the written-rejection requirement. As this court observed in Homick, we have adopted the “prevailing view” that “persons who must be insured by the underinsured motorist insurance are those who are protected by the liability coverage.” 511 N.W.2d at 373 (citing Kats v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 490 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa 1992)); accord Iowa Code § 516A.1 (providing underinsured motorist coverage is only required “for the protection of persons insured under such policy”). In Kats, the named insured signed an amendment to his automobile liability policy that added a named driver exclusion listing his stepson. 490 N.W.2d at 62. We concluded the stepson was not otherwise insured under the policy “because of the specific exclusion for the [stepson].” Id. Therefore, we held the insurer was not required to provide UIM coverage for the stepson. Id.

The same result is required here. Like the stepson in Kats, Scott was specifically excluded from coverage by the named driver exclusion. Because Scott had no liability coverage under the policy, Progressive was not required to offer UIM coverage to him. See id. Therefore, section 516A.1 does not require a written rejection of UIM coverage as a condition of Progressive’s exclusion of Scott from UIM coverage. See Castaneda, 166 S.W.3d at 563 (Imber, J., concurring) (stating because statute required UM coverage “only when there is liability coverage” and since named insured’s son, who was driving vehicle at time of accident, was subject of named driver exclusion, insurer was not required to obtain a rejection of coverage).

B. Public Policy. The plaintiffs argue that, even if the insurance policy excludes UIM coverage for Scott when he is operating a motorized vehicle, the contract should not be enforced because to do so would violate the public policy underlying section 516A.1. “We have stated that the term ‘public policy’ is not susceptible of an exact definition, but ‘a court ought not enforce a contract which tends to be injurious to the public or contrary to the public good.’ ” Principal Cas. Ins. Co. v. Blair, 500 N.W.2d 67, 69 (Iowa 1993) (quoting Walker v. Am. Family Mut Ins. Co., 340 N.W.2d 599, 601 (Iowa 1983)).

“[P]ublic policy” is not determined by this court’s “generalized concepts of fairness and justice” or our determination of what might be most just in a particular case. “ ‘We must look to the Constitution, statutes, and judicial decisions of [this] state, to determine [our] public policy and that which is not prohibited by statute, condemned by judicial decision, nor contrary to the public morals contravenes no principle of public policy.’ ”

Claude v. Guaranty Nat’l Ins. Co., 679 N.W.2d 659, 663 (Iowa 2004) (quoting Harvey v. Care Initiatives, Inc., 634 N.W.2d 681, 686 (Iowa 2001) and In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 780 (Iowa 2003)). “ ‘The power to invalidate a contract on public policy grounds must be used cautiously and exercised only in cases free from doubt.’ ” Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Jungling, 654 N.W.2d 530, 540 (Iowa 2002) (quoting DeVetter v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 516 N.W.2d 792, 794 (Iowa 1994)).

The plaintiffs assert section 516A.1 evidences a public policy that all automobile insurance policies include UIM coverage unless rejected by the named insured. The public policy underlying the UIM statute is not so broad, however. As we have discussed, this court has consistently recognized that section 516A.1 requires UIM coverage only for persons “who are protected by the liability coverage.” Hornick, 511 N.W.2d at 373. Here, Scott is not protected by the liability coverage, and therefore, chapter 516A does not require that he be protected by the UIM coverage. Consequently, the public policy of chapter 516A is not thwarted by enforcement of the named driver exclusion. Cf. Lopez, 890 P.2d at 196 (holding public policy of UM statute not violated by exclusion of UM coverage for passenger of vehicle driven by excluded driver); Gheae v. Founders Ins. Co., 854 N.E.2d 419, 422-23 (Ind.Ct. App.2006) (holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as UM coverage did not contravene UM statute because statute required UM coverage “only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy”).

The plaintiffs also contend that, because Scott would arguably have been covered under the UIM provision had he been a pedestrian, it does not further the purpose of UIM protection to deny coverage when he is the victim of an underinsured motorist. They claim it should not matter whether he was a pedestrian or a driver. But that distinction is at the core of the public interest underlying named driver exclusions. States that have upheld the validity of named driver exclusions note such exclusions further

[the] public policy of protecting all potential claimants from damages resulting from automobile accidents by enabling drivers with family members having poor driving records to procure affordable insurance, rather than obtaining coverage from an assigned risk pool at a greater cost or not securing insurance at all.

St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 337 Ill.App.3d 1054, 272 Ill.Dec. 666, 787 N.E.2d 852, 858 (2003) (citing cases from Delaware, Oklahoma, Texas and Utah). Importantly, these exclusions also deter “insured drivers from entrusting their vehicles to unsafe excluded drivers which [keeps] those unfit drivers off the road.” Id.

Requiring coverage of an excluded driver whenever the excluded driver is not at fault (an after-the-fact determination) would encourage such unfit drivers to take a chance driving, hoping they would not drive negligently, rather than deterring them from driving. Not only would the deterrent effect of the exclusion be' undermined, the general public would be put at greater risk. Under the plaintiffs’ argument, if an excluded driver is in an accident while operating a motor vehicle and is not at fault, the excluded driver will have uninsured or underinsured coverage for his damages. Unfortunately, if the excluded driver is at fault, victims of his fault will not be so fortunate. In that instance, the exclusion would apply, so there would be no liability coverage for damages sustained by the unfit driver’s victims and the public policy of protecting potential claimants from such drivers would be undermined. We question whether it is in the public interest to “rewrite” the named driver exclusion in such a way that more protection is provided to the excluded driver than to the general public. Because the exclusion as written promotes the public policy underlying named driver exclusions, we will not invalidate it or restrict its application as urged by the plaintiffs. See O’Brien, 928 P.2d at 324, 326 (refusing to limit named driver exclusion to instances when named driver was negligent, rejecting argument that applying exclusion to UM coverage violated public policy); Schneck, 813 A.2d at 832 (holding identical exclusion was consistent with “public policy of cost containment and consumer choice” evidenced by statutory scheme that tied UIM coverage to liability coverage and authorized named driver exclusions).

Finally, we note that our legislature has implicitly authorized named driver exclusions in automobile insurance policies issued in Iowa, apparently in recognition of the public value of such exclusions. Section 515D.4 provides:

A person shall not be excluded from the [automobile insurance] policy unless the exclusion is based on one or more of the following reasons, or is agreed upon by both the named insured and the insurer ....

Iowa Code § 515D.4(2) (emphasis added). Significantly, section 515D.4(2) allows the parties to an insurance contract to exclude a person “from the policy.” (Emphasis added.) The statutory authorization is not limited to the liability coverage of the insurance policy. Thus, our legislature has made a policy decision that exclusions such as the one at issue here are not contrary to the public good.

In view of the legislature’s authorization of named driver exclusions and its decision to require UIM coverage only for drivers protected by the liability coverage of the policy, we conclude the named driver exclusion in Progressive’s policy does not violate the public policy of this state. See Schneck, 813 A.2d at 834 (holding nearly identical exclusion “did not violate public policy,” noting “there is no clear legislative pronouncement of public policy requiring UM/UIM coverage for a named driver exclusion”). Therefore, we reject the plaintiffs’ argument that the exclusion is unenforceable.

VI. Summary and Disposition.

The named driver exclusion is unambiguous and excludes coverage for Scott’s un-derinsured motorist claim arising out of his operation of a motorized vehicle. Enforcement of the exclusion under the circumstances before us does not violate Iowa’s underinsured motorist statute and is not contrary to public policy.

The district court erred in granting summary judgment to Scott Thomas and in denying summary judgment to Progressive on Scott’s claim. We reverse the district court’s summary judgment ruling and remand this case to the district court for entry of summary judgment in favor of Progressive on Scott Thomas’s claim.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . The precise basis of the district court’s coverage decision is not clear. The court noted that Scott claimed the exclusion was "ambiguous” and alternatively that "public policy demands coverage for him under the underin-sured motorist provisions of the policy.” The court discussed both theories together, concluding they were "inextricably intertwined.” After a short discussion of Iowa's UIM statute, the court ruled:
      In order to comply with the dictates of Chapter 516A of the Iowa Code and at the same time be clear and unambiguous, ex-elusions should very clearly state which coverages within the policy it intends to exclude certain persons from. Progressive has not done that in this case and this Court concludes that coverage under the underinsured motorist provisions of the policy must apply to Scott under the undisputed facts of this case.

      . We do not address the insurer's liability under the UIM coverage for Rhonda’s loss-of-consortium claim, as that issue is not raised on appeal.

      . Terms defined in the policy appear in boldface. The all-capital-letters emphasis is also found in the policy. In subsequent quotations of the exclusion in this opinion, we have eliminated the boldface as well as the emphasis supplied by using all capital letters.

      . The complete contents of this document follows:
      You have named the following persons as excluded drivers under this policy:
      SCOTT THOMAS Date of Birth: 9/17/74 No coverage is provided for any claim arising from an accident or loss involving a motorized vehicle operated by an excluded person. This includes any claim for damages made against you, a relative, or any other person or organization that is vicariously liable for an accident arising out of the operation of a motorized vehicle by the excluded driver.
      I understand and agree that this Named Driver Exclusion election shall apply to this policy and any renewal, reinstatement, substitute, amended, altered, modified, or replacement policy with this company or any affiliated company, unless a named insured revokes this election.
      Signature of Named Insured Date [signed by Rhonda Thomas]_8-3-04

      . Cases interpreting language in statutes are persuasive authority in interpreting contractual language. In both situations, the court strives to determine intent, the legislature’s intent in the case of a statute and the parties' intent in the case of a contract. See A.Y. McDonald Indus., Inc., 475 N.W.2d at 619 (stating with respect to contracts of insurance that “the cardinal principle is that the intent of the parties must control”); State v. Bishop, 257 Iowa 336, 339, 132 N.W.2d 455, 457 (1965) (stating "[t]he first principle in construing a statute” is that “the courts search for legislative intent as shown by what the legislature said”). Additionally, in both contexts the words of the statute or contract are given their ordinary meaning in the absence of a definition in the statute or contract. See State v. Muhlenbruch, 728 N.W.2d 212, 214 (Iowa 2007) ("In the absence of a legislative definition, words in a statute are given their ordinary meaning.”); Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co., 568 N.W.2d 815, 818 (Iowa 1997) ("When a policy term is not defined in the policy, ... we give the term its ordinary meaning.”).

      . The exclusion in Kats provided:
      This policy does not apply under any of the coverages to any vehicle in the care, custody, or control of, or while operated by
      Mulder, Keith A. or any other person with his or her permission or at his or her direction.

        Kats, 490 N.W.2d at 62.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: APPEL, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Nicholas Anthony TONELLI, Jody George, and Stephen Nolte, Appellees.
    No. 07-0776.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    May 23, 2008.
    Rehearing Denied June 10, 2008.

      Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen Holmes, County Attorney, and Timothy Meals and Mary Howell Sirna, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellant.
    Christine R. Keenan of Feilmeyer, Feil-meyer, Keenan, Forbes & Fultz, P.L.C., Ames, for appellee Tonelli.
    Joseph R. Cahill of Cahill Law Offices, Nevada, for appellee George.
    Daniel J. Gonnerman, Ames, for appel-lee Nolte.
   APPEL, Justice.

In this case, we must decide whether the term “conspiracy,” as used in the Iowa Rules of Evidence to allow for the admission of statements by coconspirators, is limited by the definition of criminal “conspiracy” found in the Iowa criminal code. We hold that while the crime of “conspiracy” arises under Iowa law only with respect to agreements to perform acts amounting to aggravated misdemeanors or felonies, the evidentiary rule may be applied more broadly to combinations or agreements to accomplish a criminal or unlawful act, or to do a lawful act in an unlawful manner.

I. Factual and Procedural Background.

The State asserts that in late 2005, defendants Nicholas Anthony Tonelli, Jody George, and Stephen Nolte lived together in an apartment in Ames, Iowa, near Iowa State University. According to the minutes of testimony, the three men and two of their friends, Anthony Galante and Kelly Campbell, planned a December 2 house party. The State maintains that Tonelli, George, and Nolte participated in the planning of the party by putting an invitation on an internet site, Facebook, by purchasing two kegs of beer and other alcohol, by making “Jell-O” shots, and by making arrangements to collect money at the door and split the proceeds.

The State plans to show that the men knew there were numerous people at the party who were under the legal age to drink alcohol and that they had reasonable cause to believe they were serving alcohol to minors. One of the underaged guests was twenty-year-old Shanda Munn. After leaving the defendants’ party, Munn drove home and killed Kelly Laughery by striking Laughery with her vehicle.

Based on these asserted facts, the State charged Tonelli, George, and Nolte with providing alcohol to a person under the legal age in violation of Iowa Code sections 123.47(1) and 123.47(6) (2005). Iowa Code section 123.47(1) prohibits the serving of alcoholic beverages to minors and is a serious misdemeanor. Iowa Code § 123.47(4). Iowa Code section 123.47(6) provides that any person of legal age who supplies alcoholic beverages to a minor which results in the death of any person is guilty of a class “D” felony. Id. § 123.47(6).

During a pretrial hearing on a motion to sever the trials, the State indicated that it intended to offer the testimony of cocon-spirators Galante and Campbell into evidence pursuant to Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.801(d )(2)(E). This rule of evidence provides, in relevant part: “The following statements are not hearsay: ... a statement by a conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(d)(2)(E).

In response, counsel for Tonelli asserted that the term “conspiracy” in Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.801 (d )(2)(E) was limited by the definition of criminal “conspiracy” contained in Iowa Code section 706.1. Iowa Code section 706.1 provides, in relevant part:

A person commits conspiracy with another if, with intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a crime which is an aggravated misdemeanor or felony, the person does either of the following. ...

Iowa Code § 706.1. Tonelli’s counsel claimed the rule applied only where there was a conspiracy to commit an aggravated misdemeanor or felony and that her client conspired only to do something entirely legal, namely plan a party. When the court asked whether it was possible to have a conspiracy in Iowa without establishing “the elements set out in the code,” Nolte’s trial counsel responded “I do not believe so.... ” The court did not enter a ruling on the issue at the hearing on the motion to sever.

In light of the colloquy at the hearing, the State filed a motion for adjudication of a law point. The State’s application asserted for purposes of Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.801(d )(2)(E), conspiracy should be broadly defined to include “a combination or agreement between two or more persons to accomplish a criminal or unlawful act, or to do a lawful act in an unlawful manner.” State v. Ross, 573 N.W.2d 906, 914 (Iowa 1998). In the alternative, even if “conspiracy” under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.801(d)(2)(E) required an aggravated misdemeanor or felony, the State asserted that because the charge of providing alcohol resulting in death is a felony, the statements of coconspirators would be fully admissible. The defendants, conversely, argued that at most they conspired to supply alcohol to underaged persons, a serious misdemeanor, making the evidentiary rule inapplicable.

At the hearing, no party offered evidence; the hearing proceeded solely with legal argument. The district court ruled that “conspiracy” for purposes of the admission of evidence pursuant to Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.801(d )(2)(E) may be established only with evidence that the declar-ant was involved in a conspiracy to commit a crime which was an aggravated misdemeanor or felony as required by Iowa Code section 706.1.

In light of the adverse ruling of the district court, the State filed an application for discretionary review, which we granted.

II. Standard of Review.

This court reviews a district court ruling on a motion for adjudication of a law point for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 4; State v. Olsen, 482 N.W.2d 452, 455 (Iowa Ct.App.1992).

III. Discussion.

This court is confronted solely with legal questions surrounding the proper interpretation of Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.801(d) (2)(E), which were presented in the motion to adjudicate a law point.

We note at the outset that a party does not need to be charged with the crime of conspiracy for Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.801(d) (2)(E) to apply. More than thirty years ago in State v. Lain, 246 N.W.2d 238 (Iowa 1976), this court noted that the mere fact that a conspiracy charge was not present “was immaterial to the admissibility of [a coconspirator’s] statements.” Lain, 246 N.W.2d at 240. This approach is consistent with the majority of jurisdictions. See generally Instruction or Evidence as to Conspiracy Where There is No Charge of Conspiracy in Indictment or Information, 66 A.L.R. 1311 (Supp.2008).

On the question of what constitutes a “conspiracy” sufficient to trigger Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.801(d) (2)(E) or its predecessors, this court has articulated varying formulations without a clear definition. In 1976, this court noted in Lain that “[w]e are dealing at this point, of course, with proof of a conspiracy to establish admissibility of declarations, not with proof of a conspiracy....” Lain, 246 N.W.2d at 240. While in In re Matter of Scott, 508 N.W.2d 653, 655 (Iowa 1993), the court indicated that the evidentiary definition of conspiracy was “guided” by the criminal definition. The issue in that case, however, related to the existence of a plan or agreement, not whether the underlying goal of the conspiracy was sufficiently unlawful to trigger the hearsay exception. Scott, 508 N.W.2d at 655. In the more recent case of Ross, this court adopted a broad definition of conspiracy in the evi-dentiary context — “a combination or agreement between two or more persons to do or accomplish a criminal or unlawful act, or to do a lawful act in an unlawful manner.” Ross, 573 N.W.2d at 914. No Iowa case has specifically addressed the question of whether the evidentiary rule applies only where the conspiracy upon which the admission of the statements is based is to accomplish an aggravated misdemeanor or felony.

Iowa, however, has recognized a cause of action for civil conspiracy. Basic Chems., Inc. v. Benson, 251 N.W.2d 220, 233 (Iowa 1977). In order to state a claim for civil conspiracy, it is not necessary that the underlying conduct amount to an aggravated misdemeanor or felony, or even be criminal at all, but only that it be for an unlawful purpose or use unlawful means. Id. The teaching of eases from other jurisdictions and legal commentators is that the rule of evidence regarding statements of coconspirators applies in civil as well as criminal settings. See, e.g., Earle v. Benoit, 850 F.2d 836, 841 n. 6 (1st Cir.1988); James R. Snyder Co., Inc. v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Detroit Chapter, Inc., 677 F.2d 1111, 1117 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1015, 103 S.Ct. 374, 74 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982); State v. Cornell, 314 Or. 673, 842 P.2d 394, 397 n. 9 (1992); Danny L. Davis Contractors, Inc. v. Hobbs, 157 S.W.3d 414, 419 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004); 2 McCormick on Evidence § 259, at 160 (5th ed. 1999) (“The evidence is similarly admissible in civil cases, where the conspiracy rule applies to tortfeasors acting in concert.”); Thomas J. Leach, Civil Conspiracy: What’s the Use? 54 U. Miami L.Rev. 1, 12-13 (1999) (noting that the hearsay rule in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) (2)(E) applies equally to civil and criminal conspiracies). If the rule applies in civil cases where there is no underlying criminal misconduct at all, it logically follows that the rule applies in criminal cases where the unlawful conduct falls short of an aggravated misdemeanor or felony.

Furthermore, in construing the admissibility of coconspirator statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) (2)(E), the federal courts have distinguished between the concept of conspiracy for purposes of the rule of evidence and the substantive elements of conspiracy under criminal law. For example, in United States v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546, 549 (7th Cir. 1979), the court emphasized the distinction between criminal conspiracy and the co-conspirator exclusion to the hearsay rule. Gil noted that while criminal conspiracy involves elements more than a mere joint enterprise, the coconspirator exclusion to the hearsay rule is based upon concepts of agency law, may be applied in both criminal and civil cases, and is based on:

“the common sense appreciation that a person who has authorized another to speak or to act to some joint end will be held responsible for what is later said or done by his agent, whether in his presence or not.”

Gil, 604 F.2d at 549 (quoting United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d 623, 626 (3d Cir. 1976)).

The court further noted:

The substantive criminal law of conspiracy, though it obviously overlaps in many areas, simply has no application to this evidentiary principle. Thus, once the existence of a joint venture for an illegal purpose, or for a legal purpose using illegal means, and a statement made in the course of and in furtherance of that venture have been demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence, it makes no difference whether the declar-ant or any other “partner in crime” could actually be tried, convicted and punished for the crime of conspiracy.

Id. at 549-50; see also Government of Virgin Islands v. Brathwaite, 782 F.2d 399, 403 (3d Cir.1986) (“The independent evidence must demonstrate only that a conspiracy or joint undertaking existed; it need not show that the combination of individuals including the defendant or defendants was ‘criminal or otherwise unlawful.’ ” (Citations omitted.)); United States v. Saimiento-Rozo, 676 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir.1982) (“Nor need the conspiracy or agreement be criminal in nature; it may be in the form of a joint venture.”).

The language in Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.801(d) (2)(E) is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) (2)(E). While the federal cases are not determinative on questions of state law, we often cite them as persuasive authority regarding the interpretation of an identical Iowa Rule of Evidence. Matter of Property Seized from DeCamp, 511 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Iowa 1994); State v. Florie, 411 N.W.2d 689, 695 (Iowa 1987).

After review of the above authorities, we are convinced that the definition of “conspiracy” for purposes of Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.801(d) (2)(E) is distinguishable from the definition of criminal conspiracy under Iowa Code section 706.1. There is no requirement that the underlying conduct amount to an aggravated misdemean- or or felony for the evidentiary rule to apply.

There is a remaining question, however, regarding whether Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.801(d) (2)(E) may be applied to an agreement or joint enterprise where the underlying goal and means used to accomplish the goal are not illegal. The defendants claim there can be no conspiracy to plan a party because the mere planning of a party and sending of invitations are lawful acts and means.

The point is subject to dispute. According to at least one commentator, the term conspiracy as used in the rule of evidence does not depend upon a goal to promote a crime or civil wrong. Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 8:59, at 478 n. 4 (3d ed.2007) (citing United States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d 197, 201 (D.C.Cir.2006)) (stating exception applies even if venture is lawful). Other authorities suggest that the common understanding of the term “conspiracy” necessarily involves unlawful conduct. See Clifford S. Fishman, Jones on Evidence § 27:48, at 566 (7th ed. 1992) (“The essence of a conspiracy is an actual agreement to engage in unlawful conduct.”).

A review of Iowa case law reveals that the term “conspiracy” has generally been used in the context of unlawful conduct, whether civil or criminal. More than fifty years ago, this court in State v. Schenk, 236 Iowa 178, 18 N.W.2d 169 (1945), quoted with approval a Kentucky case which stated that “ ‘the broad definition or description everywhere accepted is that conspiracy is a combination between two or more persons to do or accomplish a criminal or unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by criminal or unlawful means.’ ” Schenk, 236 Iowa at 183, 18 N.W.2d at 172 (quoting Commonwealth v. Donoghue, 250 Ky. 343, 63 S.W.2d 3, 5 (1933)); accord Ross, 573 N.W.2d at 914; State v. Blyth, 226 N.W.2d 250, 263 (Iowa 1975). Furthermore, in common usage, the term conspiracy implies unlawful conduct of some kind and not innocent undertakings. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 485 (unabr. ed.2002) (defining “conspiracy” as “an agreement ... to do an unlawful act or use unlawful means to do an act which is lawful”); Black’s Law Dictionary 329 (8th ed.2004) (defining “conspiracy” as “[a]n agreement by two or more persons to commit an unlawful act ... ”). As a result, we conclude that Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.801(d) (2)(E) may be applied where there is evidence of a conspiracy to accomplish a criminal or unlawful act, or to do a lawful act in an unlawful manner, but not to combinations or agreements in furtherance of entirely lawful goals advanced by lawful means.

Today we decide only the legal question raised by the motion to adjudicate a law point. We do not decide the application of the law, as explained in this opinion, to the facts of this case. Prior to the admission of hearsay evidence under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.801(d) (2)(E) in this or any other case, the trial court must make a preliminary finding, by a preponderance of evidence, that there was a conspiracy, that both the declarant and the party against whom the statement is offered were members of the conspiracy, and that the statements were made in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. State v. Tangie, 616 N.W.2d 564, 569 (Iowa 2000).

IV. Conclusion.

The trial court holding that the State must show a conspiracy to commit an aggravated misdemeanor or felony in order to invoke Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.801(d)(2)(E) is reversed. The case is remanded to the district court.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

All justices concur except BAKER, J., who takes no part.


author: WIGGINS, Justice.

text:
    IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD, Complainant, v. Jean M. CURTIS, Respondent.
    No. 07-2059.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    May 23, 2008.
    Rehearing Denied June 10, 2008.

      Charles L. Harrington and David J. Grace, Des Moines, for complainant.
    Jean M. Curtis, Guttenberg, respondent, pro se.
   WIGGINS, Justice.

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board filed a complaint against Jean Curtis with the Grievance Commission of the Iowa Supreme Court alleging Curtis committed various violations of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers and the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. The Commission found Curtis’s conduct violated numerous provisions of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers and the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. The Commission recommended we suspend Curtis’s license to practice law indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for a period of one year.

Because we find Curtis’s conduct violated numerous provisions of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers and the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, we suspend Curtis’s license to practice law indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for a period of one year.

I. Prior Proceedings.

In February 2000 we admitted Curtis to practice law in Iowa by motion. She practices law in Guttenberg. She has one pri- or disciplinary action. In February 2004 we publicly reprimanded Curtis for her failure to recognize the inherent conflict in attempting to represent both parties in matters relating to a marriage dissolution and for communicating with a party who was represented by counsel when she did not have permission to speak directly to the represented party.

On June 26, 2007, the Board filed a five-count complaint with the Commission alleging numerous violations of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers and the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. Count I alleged Curtis misapplied a client’s fee. Count II alleged Curtis disclosed confidential information about a client. Count III alleged Curtis did not act with reasonable diligence and promptness when representing a client. Count IV alleged Curtis did not provide competent representation in an estate matter and failed to deposit an unearned fee into her trust account. Count V alleged Curtis failed to file a proper objection in a bankruptcy proceeding and then misrepresented the status of the matter to a client.

The Commission found the Board failed to prove the allegations contained in counts I, II, and III, but that the Board proved the violations alleged in counts IV and V. The Commission also found Curtis suffers from depression and attention deficit disorder. Both conditions are being treated with medication.

Based on her prior disciplinary action and her medical condition the Commission recommended: (1) Curtis’s license to practice law in the state of Iowa be suspended indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for one year; (2) as a condition of reinstatement, Curtis present evidence from her treating healthcare provider that she is not suffering from any illness that would interfere with her ability to be attentive to her clients’ legal needs and to competently handle the matters entrusted to her; (3) as a condition of reinstatement, Curtis be required to pass the Iowa Bar Exam; and (4) as a condition of reinstatement, Curtis be barred from practicing in probate or bankruptcy matters unless and until she associates with a practitioner having experience in those areas.

II. Scope of Review.

Our review of a report filed by the Commission is de novo. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.10(1). “Under this standard of review, we give weight to the factual findings of the Commission, especially with respect to witness credibility, but we find the facts anew.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Beckman, 674 N.W.2d 129, 131 (Iowa 2004). Although we consider the discipline recommended by the Commission, we have the final decision regarding the appropriate sanction. Id, Therefore, the court can impose a greater or lesser sanction than what the Commission recommends.

The Board bears the burden of proving misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. Id.‘This burden of proof is greater than that in a civil case but less than that in a criminal case.’” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Zenor, 707 N.W.2d 176, 178 (Iowa 2005) (citation omitted).

III. Analysis.

On our de novo review of the record, we find the following as to each count.

A. Count I. Curtis represented Jeffrey Reinhardt in domestic relations matters. At some point during the representation, Reinhardt asked Curtis whether she could represent him in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. Then, in April 2004 Reinhardt issued Curtis a check for $209. The Board claimed this money was earmarked for filing Reinhardt’s bankruptcy petition. Curtis produced a letter she wrote to Reinhardt in which she stated she could not represent him in his bankruptcy proceeding and that she was going to apply the $209 check to his outstanding bill on the domestic relations matters. Reinhardt did not testify. The Board claimed Curtis committed numerous ethical violations by not earmarking these funds for a bankruptcy proceeding.

The Commission determined the evidence presented by the Board did not meet its burden to prove by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that the check was earmarked for a bankruptcy proceeding. Factually, Curtis’s letter refutes this allegation. Accordingly we agree with the Commission’s findings on count I and find the Board has failed to prove its allegations of misconduct.

B. Count II. Curtis represented the father of children who had been removed from the father’s home by the state. The Board alleged Curtis told a department of human services (DHS) representative that the next time they went to court Curtis was going to put witnesses on the stand to testify negatively about her client. The Board also alleged Curtis told a DHS representative that her client was drunk many times when Curtis called, and she felt DHS should have her client submit to urine tests. If the Board’s allegations are true, Curtis may have violated the confidences of her client. Curtis not only denied these allegations, but presented evidence showing personal animus between herself and DHS representatives.

The Commission determined the evidence presented by the Board did not meet its burden to prove by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that the conversations as alleged took place. We agree. Accordingly, we find the Board has failed to prove its allegations of misconduct as alleged in count II.

C. Count III. Curtis was appointed to represent a client on an appeal in a postconviction relief action on July 20, 2005. On August 19 she received a delinquency notice from the clerk of the supreme court for failing to file and serve a combined certificate. On November 21 she received another delinquency notice from the clerk for failing to pay or request a waiver of the docketing fee. On December 20 she received a notice from the court that unless a docket fee was paid or waived within eighteen days after service of the notice, the appeal would be dismissed. The clerk eventually dismissed the appeal.

On January 9, 2006, Curtis filed an application to reinstate the appeal. On February 2 we reinstated the appeal. On May 15 the clerk issued another notice of default for failure to file and serve the appellant’s proof brief. Curtis requested additional time to file the brief, which we granted.

On September 8 the clerk issued another default notice for Curtis’s failure to file and serve the appellant’s proof brief. On October 6 the clerk dismissed the appeal due to Curtis’s failure to file the proof brief. Curtis filed a motion to enlarge time for filing the proof brief. On December 11 we treated her motion as a motion to reinstate the appeal and reinstated the appeal.

On March 16, 2007, the clerk issued another notice of default for Curtis’s failure to file and serve the deferred appendix. Curtis eventually filed the appendix. The State moved to strike the appendix. On June 12 we entered an order striking the appendix and requiring Curtis to file an amended appendix along with eighteen copies of an amended brief.

The Board alleged Curtis’s conduct in handling the appeal violated various rules of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. The Commission found the evidence presented by the Board was insufficient to carry the Board’s complaint because all the required filings are current and the matter is yet pending. We disagree.

The result obtained by an attorney for a client is not a defense to a violation of an ethical rule. An attorney’s failure to meet appellate deadlines constitutes a violation of rules 32:1.1 (failing to provide competent legal representation to a client), 32:1.3 (failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), and 32:8.4(d) (engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Tompkins, 733 N.W.2d 661, 668-69 (Iowa 2007). Additionally, rule 32:3.2 requires a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.

Curtis’s conduct in this appeal was deplorable. Instead of meeting the deadlines required by our court rules, she used the clerk’s office as her private tickler system. We have previously stated, using the clerk’s office as a private tickler system violates rules DR 6-101(A)(3) (a lawyer shall not neglect a client’s legal matter), DR 1-102(A)(5) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), and DR 1-102(A)(6) (a lawyer shall not engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the fitness to practice law) of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Moonen, 706 N.W.2d 391, 399 (Iowa 2005). Under the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, this very same conduct violates rules 32:1.1 (failing to provide competent representation), 32:1.3 (failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness), 32:3.2 (failing to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of her client), and 32:8.4(d) (engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).

D. Count IV. Curtis acted as the attorney for the Estate of David J. Wilson. She opened the estate on October 8, 2003. On June 2, 2005, Curtis filed an unsigned inventory. On July 26 she filed an inventory signed only by her. Based on the later inventory, Curtis filed an application for her fees and for those of the executor. The executor was the sole beneficiary of the estate and questioned Curtis as to why she needed to take a fee. Curtis did not give a reason. Curtis told the executor she would only take half the attorney fee and deposit the rest in her trust account. The court approved a fee of $11,841.51 for Curtis and a fee of $11,841.51 for the executor. Curtis did not deposit the fee in her trust account and took the entire fee.

In spring 2006 Curtis was not returning the executor’s phone calls. The executor became concerned that Curtis was not handling the estate properly. The executor contacted another attorney to take over the legal matters of the estate. The executor sent a letter to Curtis that terminated her employment as the estate’s attorney and informed Curtis another attorney would handle the estate from that point forward. The executor instructed Curtis to forward the estate file and all fees to the new attorney.

The attorney who took over the estate reviewed the file and discovered the estate was relatively simple to probate. Curtis did not send the fees with the file. The new attorney sent Curtis several letters trying to ascertain where the funds were located. After several unanswered letters, Curtis met with the new attorney and offered the explanation that her office secretary had embezzled money from her trust account so Curtis did not put the fees in that account because the secretary had access to that account. Instead, Curtis explained, she put the fees in a savings account. After more requests by the new attorney for the money, Curtis responded by letter stating:

The money is no longer in the account. I’m in the process of tracking the money. From the time I became aware of the totality of the money taken from the business, the Firm’s accounts were transferred to John McGrand and then back to my office. We are still in the process of investigating this matter. I do not have $11,841.51 and I am seeking a loan to repay the estate.

Curtis eventually refunded the fees; however, the checks she issued to the new attorney were not drawn from a trust account. Curtis admitted she did not promptly refund the fees as ordered by the court. An audit of her trust account by a client security auditor for this court did not produce any evidence that money had been taken from Curtis’s trust account through embezzlement.

Further problems with Curtis’s handling of the estate were revealed when the new attorney began to work on the estate file. The inventory filed by Curtis had improper valuations of the assets, causing the court to award excessive fees. Additionally, the inheritance tax return was not filed as of spring 2006, when it should have been filed in July 2004. Curtis never filed tax returns for the estate.

To remedy the problems created by Curtis, the new attorney obtained an order from the court rescinding the prior court order allowing attorney and executor fees. This action was important because if the executor waived her fee and took as a beneficiary, the amount she would receive would not be subject to personal income tax. After obtaining the order rescinding the prior court order allowing fees, the new attorney had to probate the estate as if nothing was done on the estate.

The Board confronted Curtis with these deficiencies in probating the estate at the hearing. Curtis acknowledged she knew little about probating an estate and even less about taxes.

The manner in which Curtis probated the estate prior to July 1, 2005, violated the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, specifically, DR 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), DR 6-101(A)(l) (handling a legal matter which the lawyer knows or should know that the lawyer is not competent to handle without associating with a lawyer who is competent to handle it), DR 6-101(A)(2) (handling a legal matter without adequate preparation under the circumstances), and DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting a client’s matter). Additionally, her conduct after July 1, 2005, violated the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically, rules 32:1.1 (failing to provide competent legal representation to a client), 32:1.3 (failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 32:1.4(a)(3) (failing to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a legal matter), 32:1.4(a)(4) (failing to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information), and 32:8.4(d) (engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).

Under the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers a lawyer should not represent a client when the lawyer knows that she is not competent to handle the matter. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ireland, 723 N.W.2d 439, 441 (Iowa 2006). Under the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers and the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, when an attorney agrees to represent a client, the attorney is required to act competently with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing her client. Curtis’s conduct in probating the estate was more than mere negligence. It appears that her incompetence, procrastination, and failure to communicate with her client in every aspect of the representation stemmed from her indifference to advance the interests of her client when action was required. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Moorman, 683 N.W.2d 549, 552 (Iowa 2004).

Curtis’s conduct regarding the taking of her fee occurred after July 1, 2005, and is governed by the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. Curtis’s misrepresentation to her client that she would only take one-half of the fee, when she in fact took the entire fee, violated rule 32:8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). Moreover, Curtis’s failure to deposit the fee award in the trust account violated rule 32:1.15(c) (requiring an attorney to deposit unearned fees into the trust account). Under the probate rules in effect at the time the court awarded her fees, Curtis could only take one-half of the fees when the estate filed the inheritance tax return and the other half at the time of closing the estate. While she represented the estate, the estate never filed the return; therefore, she was not entitled to any fee.

Additionally, Curtis inflated the value of the estate’s assets on the inventory. We do not believe she purposefully inflated the value, but did so due to her lack of knowledge regarding the probating of estates. Because Curtis inflated the values, the court ordered fees in excess of those allowed by law. See Iowa Code § 633.197 (limiting fees for all sums in an estate over five thousand dollars to two percent of the gross assets). Accordingly, she violated rule 32:1.5(a) by taking an excessive fee.

Finally, we believe Curtis’s handling of the estate by leaving it open for a protracted period of time, together with the numerous violations in doing so, constituted conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and violated rule 32:8.4(d).

E. Count V. Curtis represented Shelley LeGrand with respect to her and her daughter’s claim against Kevin Harbaugh. On December 19, 2002, Harbaugh filed for bankruptcy. On December 20 LeGrand and her daughter obtained a $25,000 judgment against Harbaugh for an intentional tort. The bankruptcy attorney for Har-baugh listed LeGrand, in care of Curtis, as a creditor and the court sent Curtis notice of the bankruptcy. Curtis denied she received this notice when it was filed, but obtained it sometime after she contacted the bankruptcy attorney’s office on April 1, 2003. Curtis offered the problems with the mail delivery in her small town as an explanation for why she did not receive the notice earlier.

Objections to the discharge of debt in bankruptcy were due on April 11. Curtis prepared an objection on the grounds the debt was not dischargeable because it arose from an intentional tort. Instead of filing an original with the clerk, Curtis faxed the objection to the clerk’s office. That same day, the clerk notified Curtis that the rules did not allow her to fax a pleading. The clerk told Curtis she could either get court permission to file via fax or arrange to have a hard copy delivered that day. Curtis did neither. Curtis claimed she did not get the clerk’s message until after the bankruptcy office closed because she was either in mediation or in court all day.

On April 16, after the time had expired to file an objection, Curtis filed a request for an extension of time to file an objection. The bankruptcy court denied the request. Curtis appealed the court’s decision to the Bankruptcy Panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The appeals court held the clerk properly declined to accept the faxed pleading, and the bankruptcy court properly denied the extension. The appeals court left open the option for Curtis to file a complaint objecting to the discharge based on her claim she did not receive proper notice of the bankruptcy proceedings. Curtis told Le-Grand she filed such a complaint when in fact she had not. Curtis admits she made a mistake by not properly filing the original objection to the discharge of the Le-Grand judgment, and that mistake is what led to all of the problems with the representation.

At some point during the representation, LeGrand sent a letter to Curtis requesting she refund LeGrand’s money and return her entire file. LeGrand testified Curtis failed to return the file despite Curtis’s statements to LeGrand that the entire file had been returned to her. LeGrand allowed Curtis to continue representing her after Curtis told her the complaint to the bankruptcy court had been filed and everything was under control. Curtis sent LeGrand documents purporting to be a complaint objecting to the discharge of the proceedings due to a lack of proper notice.

Due to her own dissolution, LeGrand filed for bankruptcy. While working with her bankruptcy attorney, they discussed the judgment against Harbaugh. There was a concern as to whether the judgment would have to be listed as an asset in LeGrand’s bankruptcy proceeding. The bankruptcy attorney checked the docket of Harbaugh’s bankruptcy proceeding and informed LeGrand that Curtis did not file the complaint based on her improper notice claim. The docket also indicated Le-Grand’s judgment against Harbaugh had been discharged in bankruptcy, and the proceeding was closed. The bankruptcy attorney notified Curtis of these facts on June 16, 2005.

Curtis’s failure to file the objections and pursue the improper notice complaint violates DR 6-101(A)(2) (handling a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances), DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting a client’s matter), DR 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), and DR 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in other conduct that adversely reflects on the fitness to practice law).

We also find Curtis intentionally misrepresented to LeGrand that she filed the improper notice complaint. This conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), DR 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), DR 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in other conduct that adversely reflects on the fitness to practice law), DR 7-101(A)(2) (intentionally failing to carry out a contract of employment), DR 7-101(A)(3) (intentionally prejudicing or damaging a client during the course of the professional relationship).

The Board also alleged, and the Commission found, Curtis violated DR 6-101(A)(1) (handling a legal matter which the lawyer knows or should know the lawyer is not competent to handle, without associating with a lawyer who is competent to handle it), and rules 32:8.1 (dishonesty in regard to application to the bar), 32:8.4(a) (violating an ethical rule), 32:8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 32:8.4(d) (engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).

Although Curtis failed to properly file the objection to discharge a debt and failed to file the complaint based on improper notice, the Board failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain a violation of DR 6-101(A)(l). Curtis understood what needed to be done under the bankruptcy laws to protect her client’s interest. Her failure to properly file the required documents may constitute neglect, but does not prove she handled a legal matter which she knew or should have known she was not competent to handle without associating with a lawyer who was.

We also find the Board failed to prove Curtis violated rules 32:8.1, 32:8.4(a), (c), and (d). All of Curtis’s conduct took place prior to July 1, 2005. In order to violate these rules the Board must prove Curtis’s conduct took place after July 1, 2005.

IV. Sanction.

In determining the appropriate sanction a lawyer must face as a result of his or her misconduct, we have stated:

The goal of the Code of Professional Responsibility is “to maintain public confidence in the legal profession as well as to provide a policing mechanism for poor lawyering.” When deciding on an appropriate sanction for an attorney’s misconduct, we consider “the nature of the violations, protection of the public, deterrence of similar misconduct by others, the lawyer’s fitness to practice, and [the court’s] duty to uphold the integrity of the profession in the eyes of the public.” We also consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances present in the disciplinary action.

Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Honken, 688 N.W.2d 812, 820 (Iowa 2004) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).

Mitigating factors include Curtis’s personal illnesses. Curtis has been treated for depression. She blames some of her misconduct on her depression. She feels that she can control her depression with medication. Curtis has attention deficit disorder, which she also treats with medication. Personal illnesses, such as depression or attention deficit disorder, do not excuse a lawyer’s misconduct but can be mitigating factors and influence our approach to discipline. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Frerichs, 718 N.W.2d 763, 768 (Iowa 2006).

The aggravating factors we must consider include multiple incidents of neglect. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Walker, 712 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Iowa 2006). Curtis’s various actions throughout her handling of the three separate legal matters demonstrate that her neglect was not isolated in nature. Moreover, it is significant. that Curtis’s actions caused harm to others in terms of cost and delay to her clients. Id. Another aggravating factor is Curtis’s prior disciplinary sanction. Frerichs, 718 N.W.2d at 768. The final aggravating factor is her misrepresentation of the status of the bankruptcy proceeding to her client. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McCann, 712 N.W.2d 89, 97 (Iowa 2006).

While neglect alone ordinarily deserves a sanction ranging from a public reprimand to a six-month suspension, neglect compounded by other misconduct requires a more' severe sanction. Walker, 712 N.W.2d at 686. Curtis’s conduct is more than mere neglect. Her neglect not only caused a significant delay in processing her clients’ matters, but also caused actual harm to her clients’ interests. These factors and her misrepresentations to her clients make Curtis’s violations serious.

A major concern we have with Curtis’s conduct is her premature taking of a probate fee and her failure to deposit the fee into a trust account. Because the funds were not available when Curtis was asked to produce them, it is evident she converted the unearned fees for her personal use. Usually we revoke an attorney’s license to practice law when that attorney deliberately converts a client’s funds. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Williams, 676 N.W.2d 530, 533 (Iowa 2004); Committee on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Ottesen, 525 N.W.2d 865, 866 (Iowa 1994). However, we have stated when an attorney has “ ‘a colorable future claim to the funds, we will impose a lesser penalty.’ ” McCann, 712 N.W.2d at 97. The facts indicate Curtis had a colorable future claim to the funds she converted because they were to compensate her for services she was to perform for the estate. Therefore, we will not revoke Curtis’s license to practice law.

In light of the multiple violations, the protection of the public, deterrence of similar misconduct by others, our duty to uphold the integrity of the profession in the eyes of the public, the mitigating factors, and the aggravating factors, we conclude an indefinite suspension with no possibility of reinstatement for one year, as recommended by the Commission, is warranted in this case.

As an additional sanction, we require Curtis to pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination as a condition of reinstatement. Iowa Ct. R. 35.12(1). The panoply of violations committed in this case and her prior disciplinary proceeding causes us to impose this additional' sanction. Curtis’s violations include taking on matters she is not competent to handle, neglecting client matters, lacking diligence in handling client matters, taking excessive fees, making misrepresentations to clients, committing trust account violations, accepting employment that constitutes a conflict of interest, and communicating with a represented party. We believe this array of conduct shows Curtis has a basic lack of understanding of our ethical rules.

Finally, as a further condition of reinstatement Curtis is required to undergo a comprehensive mental examination, which evaluates her fitness to practice law.

Y. Disposition.

We suspend Curtis’s license to practice law in this state indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for one year. The suspension applies to all facets of the practice of law. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.12. Upon any application for reinstatement, Curtis must establish that she has not practiced law during the suspension period, she has in all ways complied with the requirements of Iowa Court Rule 35.13, and she has passed the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination. In her application for reinstatement, Curtis must provide this court with an evaluation by a licensed health care professional verifying her fitness to practice law. Before obtaining this evaluation, Curtis shall submit the name of the proposed evaluator and the nature of the evaluation to the Board for its approval. Curtis shall also comply with the notification requirements of Iowa Court Rule 35.21. We tax the costs of this action to Curtis pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.25.

LICENSE SUSPENDED.

All justices concur except BAKER, J., who takes no part.

      . The Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct became effective July 1, 2005, replacing the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. The Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct govern all conduct occurring after its effective date.


author: MEYER, Justice.

text:
    In re CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY and Continental Insurance Company, Petitioners. Continental Casualty Company, et al., Appellants, v. 3M Company, Respondent, ACE Bermuda Insurance, Ltd., et al., Defendants, Transamerica Premier Insurance Company, n/k/a Fairmont Premier Insurance, Respondent.
    No. A07-784.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    May 29, 2008.
    Patrick J. Sauter, Jeanne H. Unger, Brian H. Sande, Bassford Remele, PA, Minneapolis, MN, for appellants Continental Casualty Company and Continental Insurance Company.
    Douglas L. Skor, Louise Dovre Bjork-man, Larson King, LLP, St. Paul, MN, for respondent 3M Company.
   OPINION

MEYER, Justice.

This case arises from a declaratory judgment action commenced in Hennepin County by petitioners Continental Casualty Company and Continental Insurance Company (Continental), insurers of respondent 3M Company. The action seeks a declaratory judgment denying 3M coverage under Continental’s policies based on a variety of breach-of-contract claims. In addition, in the event that coverage is not denied, Continental seeks resolution of trigger and allocation issues to apportion coverage among insurers and 3M. The claims against 3M underlying the coverage dispute involve allegations that defective protective masks manufactured by 3M resulted in injury to users who were exposed to various harmful agents, including asbestos. Additional underlying claims allege injury resulting from exposure to products produced by 3M that themselves contained harmful agents, including asbestos.

Continental venued its declaratory judgment action in Hennepin County District Court on the basis that both the plaintiffs and 3M reside in Hennepin County. Respondent moved for a change of venue to Ramsey County, contending that no defendant resided in Hennepin County and further, that the ends of justice would be promoted by a change of venue to Ramsey County based on certain asbestos orders. Hennepin County District Court transferred venue to the asbestos judges in Ramsey County. The court of appeals affirmed. We also affirm.

According to the complaint, 3M has been the target of a large number of toxic-exposure claims, many of which allege injury resulting from exposure to asbestos-containing products. Continental and many other insurers named in this action issued excess liability insurance policies to 3M at various times after approximately 1960. Continental alleges that 3M has defended, settled, and paid toxic-exposure claims without giving its insurers notice, an opportunity to participate in the defense, or an opportunity to evaluate the settlements.

On January 5, 2007, Continental commenced a declaratory judgment action in Hennepin County District Court, naming 3M and its other insurers as defendants, and seeking to determine the extent of its insurance coverage obligations for a variety of toxic-exposure claims, including many asbestos-exposure claims.

3M demanded a change of venue. 3M argued that there is no defendant residing in Hennepin County and because 3M has its principal place of business in Ramsey County, a change of venue is mandated by MinmStat. § 542.09. 3M also argued that the ends of justice would be promoted by a change of venue to Ramsey County based on a series of orders of chief justices in In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation, No. C4-87-2406, assigning asbestos litigation to specific judges, the most recent assignment being made to two Ramsey County judges. 3M alleges that 90 percent of the protective mask claims involve asbestos exposure.

The Hennepin County court found that the coverage dispute in this case involves coverage for “claims against 3M alleging bodily injury from exposure to * * * asbestos, silica, coal dust, perfluoronated chemicals, and benzene, allegedly caused by 3M products.” The court found that the majority of the claims for which coverage is at issue, and the majority of the costs incurred by 3M for those claims, involve personal injury allegedly caused by asbestos or asbestos-containing products. The court concluded as a matter of law that the asbestos “assignment order is not limited to cases that relate exclusively to asbestos” and can include insurance coverage actions. The court concluded that a transfer of venue to the asbestos judges in Ramsey County would promote the ends of justice. The court further concluded that for the purpose of the convenience of witnesses, Ramsey County is more convenient, or at least as convenient as Henne-pin County. Accordingly, the court transferred the case to Ramsey County under Minn.Stat. § 542.11(4) (2006).

Continental sought appellate review of the transfer of venue by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus in the court of appeals. The court of appeals noted that a decision to change venue under section 542.11(4) “ ‘rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its action will not be disturbed except for a clear abuse of discretion.’ ” Cont’l Cas. Co. v. 3M Co., No. A07-784 at 2 (Minn.App. May 16, 2007) (order denying petition for mandamus) (quoting Thon v. Erickson, 232 Minn. 323, 325, 45 N.W.2d 560, 561 (1950)). After reviewing the reasons summarized above for the district court’s decision to change venue, the court of appeals concluded that the decision was well within the district court’s discretion and Continental had not shown any abuse of discretion. Id. at 4. This appeal followed.

I.

The first issue is whether the court of appeals used the correct standard of review in evaluating the transfer of venue by reviewing for an abuse of discretion. Continental argues that the district court’s decision to transfer venue was based on its interpretation of this court’s asbestos order, and that such interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. 3M argues that the district court did not decide an issue of law, but merely applied the criteria for discretionary transfer of venue under Minn.Stat. § 542.11(4) (2006). As a result, 3M argues, the court of appeals appropriately reviewed only for abuse of discretion.

The district court concluded that venue should be transferred to the asbestos judges in Ramsey County because the asbestos orders “can include insurance coverage lawsuits,” and that transfer of this case “will promote the ends of justice.” The district court thus based its decision to transfer venue on both this court’s asbestos order and the criteria of Minn. Stat. § 542.11(4). The court of appeals reviewed the venue ruling for abuse of discretion, analyzing the district court order under the criteria of Minn.Stat. § 542.11(4). Cont’l Cas. Co. v. 3M Co., No. A07-784 (Minn.App. May 16, 2007).

It is well settled that a district court’s grant of a change of venue in the interests of justice and for the convenience of witnesses will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Thies v. Midland Co-Operative Wholesale, Inc., 254 Minn. 369, 370, 95 N.W.2d 307, 309 (1959); Thon v. Erickson, 232 Minn. 323, 325, 45 N.W.2d 560, 561 (1950). When venue has been transferred under Minn. Stat. § 542.11(4), appellate courts should not review the district court’s decision de novo. The question is whether the standard of review is different when the venue ruling is made pursuant to an assignment order by the chief justice. We consider the history and purpose of the asbestos assignment orders to answer this question.

In December 1987, recognizing significant litigation management challenges that would be presented to the judicial system by the large number of asbestos-related claims that were pending and anticipated, Chief Justice Amdahl issued an order pursuant to Minn.Stat. §§ 480.16 (2006) and 2.724 (1986) assigning all asbestos-related litigation to a single judge for case management purposes. Order, In re Minn. Asbestos Litig., No. C4-87-2406 (Minn. Dec. 14, 1987). The order appointed Judge Jack Mitchell

to hear and decide all matters, including all pretrial and trial proceedings, in all presently pending and future actions before Minnesota state trial courts, whether relating to personal injury, death or property damage, that arise from or seek recovery for the manufacture, distribution, use or exposure to asbestos and asbestos-containing products.

Id., ¶ 1. Through the years, additional orders have been issued appointing subsequent judges to hear asbestos litigation. Since 1994, the asbestos litigation has been assigned to judges in Ramsey County District Court. At the request of the chief judge of the district, the most recent order assigned the litigation to two judges, Judges John T. Finley and Dale B. Lind-man. Order, Minn. Asbestos Litig., No. C4-87-2406 (Minn. Oct. 5, 2006). Each of the orders has contained similar language defining the scope of matters assigned to the “asbestos judge”:

all presently pending and future actions before Minnesota state district courts, whether relating to personal injury, death or property damage, that arise from or seek recovery for the manufacture, distribution, use or exposure to asbestos and asbestos-containing products.

In 1992, this court reviewed the application of this court’s asbestos order. Minn. Pers. Injury Asbestos Cases v. Keene Corp., 481 N.W.2d 24 (Minn.1992). At issue was the consolidation of 11 asbestos actions and the resulting transfer of venue for 9 of the actions. Id. at 26-27. This court reviewed for abuse of discretion and concluded that the transfer of venue was authorized by Minn.Stat. § 542.11(4) and consistent with this court’s 1987 asbestos order, even though the order generally contemplated trial in the county of original venue. Id. (citing Order, Minn. Asbestos Litig., No. C4-87-2406 (Minn. Dec. 14, 1987)). In denying a writ of prohibition, this court explicitly clarified “the broad managerial and substantive authority of the trial court,” indicating that “[t]he discretionary authority of the trial court to consider and decide all motions affecting the proceedings is implicit and wholly compatible with [this court’s asbestos order].” Id. at 27.

In 2004, Judge Michael T. DeCourcy, then serving as the asbestos judge, relied on his broad authority under this court’s asbestos order, and directed that asbestos cases be venued in Ramsey County. Order, In re Minn. Asbestos Litig., No. C8-94-2875 (Ramsey County Dist. Ct. Nov. 24, 2004). Because filing asbestos cases in separate counties throughout the state resulted in inefficient case management, the asbestos judge ordered that all pending cases not filed elsewhere be filed in Ramsey County, and that venue of all cases filed elsewhere be transferred to Ramsey County. Id. ¶¶ 1-2.

The district court in this case relied in part on Judge DeCourey’s 2004 venue order in transferring venue. One of the goals of this court’s asbestos order was to establish “a consistent, efficient and economical system” to manage asbestos litigation. Order, Minn. Asbestos Litig., No. C4-87-2406 (Minn. Dec. 14, 1987). Later, this court emphasized the “broad managerial and substantive authority of the trial court,” referring to the judge assigned to hear asbestos litigation. Minn. Pers. Injury Asbestos Cases, 481 N.W.2d at 27. This court stated that “[t]he discretionary authority of the trial court to consider and decide all motions affecting the proceedings is implicit and wholly compatible with [this court’s asbestos order].” Id. Judge DeCourcy found that “filing each asbestos case in separate counties throughout the State of Minnesota results in inefficient case management and scheduling,” and ordered that all asbestos cases be filed in or transferred to Ramsey County. Order, Minn. Asbestos Litig., No. C8-94-2875 (Ramsey County Dist. Ct. Nov. 24, 2004). We conclude that Judge DeCourey’s order serves the purpose of this court’s asbestos order, which was to fashion “a consistent, efficient and economical system * * * to manage all phases of this litigation and properly allocate limited court facilities and judicial personnel.” Order, Minn. Asbestos Litig., No. C4-87-2406 (Minn. Dec. 14, 1987). Ensuring that interpretation of this court’s asbestos order (and by extension Judge DeCourey’s venue order) is consistently applied promotes a consistent and efficient system for handling asbestos litigation. Therefore, we conclude that a de novo review standard is appropriate.

n.

We turn to the question of whether this court’s asbestos order in In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation is broad enough to include insurance coverage disputes or is limited to personal injury and property damage claims. Continental argues that the assignment order, by its language, limits itself to injury and property damage actions. Continental further argues that even if the asbestos assignment order is broad enough to encompass insurance coverage disputes, this case does not fall within the asbestos order because it is not exclusively about asbestos injury claims. 3M counters that this court’s asbestos order uses language broad enough to encompass an action seeking trigger and allocation determinations for asbestos personal injury claims, notes that the asbestos judge has handled asbestos-related insurance coverage claims before, and indicates that liability insurance has long been part of asbestos litigation nationwide.

This court’s first asbestos order issued on December 14, 1987, with the following language:

The Honorable Jack A. Mitchell of the First Judicial District, having consented pursuant to statute, is hereby appointed to hear and decide all matters, including all pretrial and trial proceedings, in all presently pending and future actions before Minnesota state trial courts, whether relating to personal injury, death or property damage, that arise from or seek recovery for the manufacture, distribution, use or exposure to asbestos and asbestos-containing products.

Order, Minn. Asbestos Litig., No. C4-87-2406 (Minn. Dec. 14, 1987) (emphasis added). The most recent order in this case uses almost identical language to appoint Judges John T. Finley and Dale B. Lind-man. Order, In re Minn. Asbestos Litig., No. C4-87-2406 (Minn. Oct. 5, 2006).

The language of the order is quite broad, extending to all matters that either arise from or seek recovery for the manufacture, distribution, use, or exposure to asbestos. The inclusion of “arise from” as an alternative to “seek recovery for” indicates that this court contemplated appointment of the asbestos judge to hear those claims that do not directly seek recovery for asbestos-related injuries, as long as the claims arise from asbestos production, distribution, use, or exposure. The original 1987 order recites several reasons for this appointment: the expectation that many asbestos-related personal injury, death, or property damage claims will be brought in Minnesota, the expectation that these claims will involve similar issues, the fact that a limited number of defendants are involved in multiple claims, and the need for “a consistent, efficient and economical system” so as to properly allocate limited judicial resources. Order, Minn. Asbestos Litig., No. C4-87-2406 (Minn. Dec. 14, 1987).

In insurance coverage litigation, the dispute is not directly about whether asbestos caused injuries, but about whether the insurer is obliged under the policy to indemnify the insured, here 3M, for judgments on asbestos-related claims or for funds disbursed to settle such claims. Underlying this coverage litigation, there are claims in which the question necessarily at issue is whether and when the asbestos caused the injury. Continental describes the insurance policies in play as “occurrence” policies, under which coverage is triggered when the injury occurs during the policy period. The factual issue of when the underlying injuries occurred is critical to whether 3M was covered, and how to allocate any covered claims among the policies issued by many different insurers over a long period of time.

This court has identified issues that are appropriately heard by the asbestos judge: “the connection between exposure to asbestos and disease; the varieties of diseases that occur subsequent to asbestos exposure; the amount of asbestos exposure that provokes disease; [and] the manufacturer’s knowledge regarding the dangers of asbestos exposure.” Minn. Pers. Injury Asbestos Cases v. Keene Corp., 481 N.W.2d 24, 26 (Minn.1992). Some of these issues are likely to be litigated in this insurance coverage case, and, therefore, we conclude that the insurance coverage claims in this action arise from the manufacture, use, or exposure to asbestos and asbestos-containing products. The district court correctly transferred venue of this case to Ramsey County pursuant to the venue order of Judge DeCourcy. It is not necessary to reach the alternative grounds for transferring venue under Minn.Stat. § 542.11(4) (2006).

Affirmed.

PAGE, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

GILDEA, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

      . This legal and factual dispute is not before the court in this appeal.

      . The district court noted in its conclusions of law that “the asbestos judge directed in 2004 that venue of asbestos cases be transferred to Ramsey County.”