source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Stevens

license: Public Domain

text:
    MARSH, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, et al. v. OREGON NATURAL RESOURCES COUNCIL et al.
    No. 87-1704.
    Argued January 9, 1989
    Decided May 1, 1989

      Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Solicitor General Fried argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Marzulla, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Jeffrey P. Min-ear, Peter R. Steenland, Jr., and Vicki L. Plant.

      David A. Bricklin argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Neil S. Kagan and Michael D. Axline.

       Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Institute of Law and Public Health Protection by Steven R. Perles and Scott C. Whitney; and for the Northwest Forest Resource Council et al. by Mark C. Rutzick and Douglas C. Blomgren.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California et al. by John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, N. Gregory Taylor and Theodora Berger, Assistant Attorneys General, and Clifford L. Rechtschaffen and Mary Gray Holt, Deputy Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Don Siegelman of Alabama, Grace Berg Schaible of Alaska, Duane Woodard of Colorado, Jim Jones of Idaho, Neil F. Hartigan of Illinois, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, Frederick J. Coioan of Kentucky, James E. Tierney of Maine, James J. Shannon of Massachusetts, Mike Moore of Mississippi, William L. Webster of Missouri, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Greely of Montana, Robert M. Spire of Nebraska, Brian McKay of Nevada, Stephen E. Merrill of New Hampshire, Cary Edwards of New Jersey, Robert Abrams of New York, Lacy H. Thornburg of North Carolina, Robert H. Henry of Oklahoma, LeRoy S. Zimmerman of Pennsylvania, T. Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Charles W. Burson of Tennessee, Jim Mattox of Texas, Jeffrey Amestoy of Vermont, Mary Sue Terry of Virginia, and Charles G. Brown of West Virginia; for the Environmental Defense Fund et al. by Victor M. Sher, Todd D. True, and Tom Lustig; and for the International Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies by Paul A. Lenzini.

      Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Center for Enviromental Education by Nicholas C. Yost and William A. Butler; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A. Zumbrun and Robin L. Rivett.

   Justice Stevens

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case is a companion to Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, ante, p. 332. It arises out of a controversial decision to construct a dam at Elk Creek in the Rogue River Basin in southwest Oregon. In addition to the question whether an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. §4321 et seq., must contain a complete mitigation plan and a “worst case analysis,” which we answered in Robertson, it presents the question whether information developed after the completion of the EIS requires that a supplemental EIS be prepared before construction of the dam may continue.

I

In the 1930’s in response to recurring floods in the Rogue River Basin, federal and state agencies began planning a major project to control the water supply in the Basin. See, e. g., ch. 346, 49 Stat. 439. In 1961 a multiagency study recommended the construction of three large dams: the Lost Creek Dam on the Rogue River, the Applegate Dam on the Applegate River, and the Elk Creek Dam on the Elk Creek near its confluence with the Rogue River. See H. R. Doc. No. 566, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 7-89 (1962). The following year, Congress authorized the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to construct the project in accordance with the recommendations of the 1961 study. See Flood Control Act of 1962, Pub. L. 87-874, §203, 76 Stat. 1192-1193. The Lost Creek Dam was completed in 1977, and the Applegate Dam was completed in 1981.

Plans for the Elk Creek Dam describe a 238-foot-high concrete structure that will control the run-off from 132 square miles of the 135-square-mile Elk Creek watershed. When full, the artificial lake behind the dam will cover 1,290 acres of land, will have an 18-mile shoreline, and will hold 101,000 acre-feet of water. The dam will cost approximately $100 million to construct and will produce annual benefits of almost $5 million. It will be operated in coordination with the nearby Lost Creek Dam, where the control center for both dams will be located. Its “multiport” structure, which will permit discharge of water from any of five levels, makes it possible to regulate, within limits, the temperature, turbidity, and volume of the downstream flow. Although primarily designed to control flooding along the Rogue River, additional project goals include enhanced fishing, irrigation, and recreation.

In 1971, the Corps completed its EIS for the Elk Creek portion of the three-dam project and began development by acquiring 26,000 acres of land and relocating residents, a county road, and utilities. Acknowledging incomplete information, the EIS recommended that further studies concerning the project’s likely effect on turbidity be developed. The results of these studies were discussed in a draft supplemental EIS completed in 1975. However, at the request of the Governor of Oregon, further work on the project was suspended, and the supplemental EIS was not filed to make it possible to analyze the actual consequences of the construction of the Lost Creek Dam, which was nearing completion, before continuing with the Elk Creek project. Following that analysis and the receipt of a statement from the Governor that he was “extremely interested in pursuing construction of the Elk Creek Dam,” the Corps completed and released its final Environmental Impact Statement, Supplement No. 1 (FEISS), in December 1980.

Because the Rogue River is one of the Nation’s premier fishing grounds, the FEISS paid special heed to the effects the dam might have on water quality, fish production, and angling. In its chapter on the environmental effects of the proposed project, the FEISS explained that water quality studies were prepared in 1974 and in 1979 and that “[w]ater temperature and turbidity have received the most attention.” FEISS 33. Using computer simulation models, the 1974 study predicted that the Elk Creek Dam might, at times, increase the temperature of the Rogue River by one to two degrees Fahrenheit and its turbidity by one to three JTU’s. Ibid. The 1979 study took a second look at the potential effect of the Elk Creek Dam on turbidity and, by comparing the 1974 study’s predictions concerning the effects of the Lost Creek Dam with actual measurements taken after that dam became operational, it “increased technical confidence in the mathematical model predictions . . . and reinforced the conclusions of the 1974 [study].” Id., at 33-34. Based on these studies, the FEISS predicted that changes in the “turbidity regime” would not have any major effect on fish production, but that the combined effect of the Lost Creek and Elk Creek Dams on the turbidity of the Rogue River might, on occasion, impair fishing.

Other adverse effects described by the FEISS include the displacement of wildlife population — including 100 black-tailed deer and 17 elk — and the loss of forest land and vegetation resulting from the inundation of 1,290 acres of land with the creation of the artificial lake. Id., at 26, 38, 46. Most significantly, it is perfectly clear that the dam itself would interfere with the migration and spawning of a large number of anadromous fish, but this effect has been mitigated by the construction of a new hatchery. Id., at 35. Finally, the FEISS found that no endangered or threatened species would be affected by the project. Id., at 27.

On February 19, 1982, after reviewing the FEISS, the Corps’ Division Engineer made a formal decision to proceed with construction of the Elk Creek Dam, “subject to the approval of funds by the United States Congress.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a. In his decision, he identified the mitigation measures that had already been taken with respect to the loss of anadromous fish spawning habitat, as well as those that would “most likely” be taken to compensate for the loss of other wildlife habitat. Id., at 56a-57a. He concluded that the benefits that would be realized from the project “outweigh the economic and environmental costs” and that completion would serve “the overall public interest.” Id., at 58a. In August 1985, Congress appropriated the necessary funds. Act of Aug. 15, 1985, Pub. L. 99-88, 99 Stat. 314. The dam is now about one-third completed and the creek has been rechanneled through the dam.

II

In October 1985, four Oregon nonprofit corporations filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon seeking to enjoin construction of the Elk Creek Dam. Their principal claims were that the Corps violated NEPA by failing (1) to consider the cumulative effects of the three dams on the Rogue River Basin in a single EIS; (2) adequately to describe the environmental consequences of the project; (3) to include a “worst case analysis” of uncertain effects; and (4) to prepare a second supplemental EIS to review information developed after 1980.

After conducting a hearing on respondents’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the District Judge denied relief on each of the NEPA claims. 628 F. Supp. 1557 (1986). He first held that courts must employ a standard of “reasonableness” in reviewing an agency’s compliance with NEPA. Under this standard of review, the court must “ ‘make a pragmatic judgment whether the EIS’s form, content and preparation foster both informed decision-making and informed public participation.’” Id., at 1562 (quoting California v. Block, 690 F. 2d 753, 761 (CA9 1982)). Applying this standard, the District Judge concluded that the Corps had, in fact, taken a sufficiently “hard look” at the cumulative effects of the three dams and at the individual effects of the Elk Creek Dam. 628 F. Supp., at 1563-1565. He also con-eluded that a “worst case analysis” was not required because the Corps used state-of-the-art mathematical models, thus avoiding scientific uncertainty and the need to fill gaps in information with a worst case scenario. Id., at 1567. Finally, the District Court held that the Corps’ decision not to prepare a second supplemental EIS to address new information was “reasonable.”

The new information relied upon by respondents is found in two documents. The first, an internal memorandum prepared by two Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife (ODFW) biologists based upon a draft ODFW study, suggested that the dam will adversely affect downstream fishing, and the second, a soil survey prepared by the United States Soil Conservation Service (SCS), contained information that might be taken to indicate greater downstream turbidity than did the FEISS. As to both documents, the District Judge concluded that the Corps acted reasonably in relying on the opinions of independent and Corps experts discounting the significance of the new information. Id., at 1567-1568. At the conclusion of his opinion, the District Judge directed that the motion for preliminary relief be consolidated with trial on the merits pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2), and thus denied respondents’ claim for a permanent injunction as well.

The Court of Appeals reversed. 832 F. 2d 1489 (CA9 1987). Applying the same “reasonableness” standard of review employed by the District Court, the Court of Appeals reached a contrary conclusion, holding that the Corps had not adequately evaluated the cumulative environmental impact of the entire project. Id., at 1497. Since the Corps did not seek review of that holding, we do not discuss it. The court also held that the FEISS was defective because it did not include a complete mitigation plan and because it did not contain a “worst case analysis.” Id., at 1493-1494, 1496-1497. These holdings were erroneous for the reasons stated in our opinion in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, ante, p. 332, and will not be further discussed. With regard to the failure to prepare a second supplemental EIS, the Court of Appeals'concluded that the ODFW and SCS documents brought to light “significant new information” concerning turbidity, water temperature, and epizootic fish disease; that this information, although “not conclusive,” is “probably accurate;” and that the Corps’ experts failed to evaluate the new information with sufficient care. 832 F. 2d, at 1494-1496. The court thus concluded that a second supplemental EIS should have been prepared. Judge Wallace, writing in dissent, took issue with the majority’s analysis of the new information. In his view, it was reasonable for the Corps to have concluded, based on its own expert evaluation, that the information contained in the ODFW document was inaccurate, and that the information contained in the SCS document was insignificant. Id., at 1500 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Ill

The subject of postdecision supplemental environmental impact statements is not expressly addressed in NEPA. Preparation of such statements, however, is at times necessary to satisfy the Act’s “action-forcing” purpose. NEPA does not work by mandating that agencies achieve particular substantive environmental results. Rather, NEPA promotes its sweeping commitment to “prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere” by focusing Government and public attention on the environmental effects of proposed agency action. 42 U. S. C. § 4321. By so focusing agency attention, NEPA ensures that the agency will not act on incomplete information, only to regret its decision after it is too late to correct. See Robertson, ante, at 349. Similarly, the broad dissemination of information mandated by NEPA permits the public and other government agencies to react to the effects of a proposed action at a meaningful time. Ante, at 349-350. It would be incongruous with this approach to environmental protection, and with the Act’s manifest concern with preventing uninformed action, for the blinders to adverse environmental effects, once unequivocally removed, to be restored prior to the completion of agency action simply because the relevant proposal has received initial approval. As we explained in TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 188, n. 34 (1978), although “it would make sense to hold NEPA inapplicable at some point in the life of a project, because the agency would no longer have a meaningful opportunity to weigh the benefits of the project versus the detrimental effects on the environment,” up to that point, “NEPA cases have generally required agencies to file environmental impact statements when the remaining governmental action would be environmentally ‘significant.’”

“(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.” 83 Stat. 853, 42 U. S. C. § 4332.

This reading of the statute is supported by Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and Corps regulations, both of which make plain that at times supplementation is required. The CEQ regulations, which we have held are entitled to substantial deference, see Robertson, ante, at 355-356; Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U. S. 347, 358 (1979), impose a duty on all federal agencies to prepare supplements to either draft or final EIS’s if there “are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.” Similarly, the Corps’ own NEPA implementing regulations require the preparation of a supplemental EIS if “new significant impact information, criteria or circumstances relevant to environmental considerations impact on the recommended plan or proposed action.”

The parties are in essential agreement concerning the standard that governs an agency’s decision whether to prepare a supplemental EIS. They agree that an agency should apply a “rule of reason,” and the cases they cite in support of this standard explicate this rule in the same basic terms. These cases make clear that an agency need not supplement an EIS every time new information comes to light after the EIS is finalized. To require otherwise would render agency decisionmaking intractable, always awaiting updated information only to find the new information outdated by the time a decision is made. On the other hand, and as petitioners concede, NEPA does require that agencies take a “hard look” at the environmental effects of their planned action, even after a proposal has received initial approval. See Brief for Petitioners 36. Application of the “rule of reason” thus turns on the value of the new information to the still pending decisionmaking process. In this respect the decision whether to prepare a supplemental EIS is similar to the decision whether to prepare an EIS in the first instance: If there remains “major Federal actio[n]” to occur, and if the new information is sufficient to show that the remaining action will “affec[t] the quality of the human environment” in a significant manner or to a significant extent not already considered, a supplemental EIS must be prepared. Cf. 42 U. S. C. § 4332(2)(C).

The parties disagree, however, on the standard that should be applied by a court that is asked to review the agency’s decision. Petitioners argue that the reviewing court need only decide whether the agency decision was “arbitrary and capricious,” whereas respondents argue that the reviewing court must make its own determination of reasonableness to ascertain whether the agency action complied with the law. In determining the proper standard of review, we look to § 10e of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 706, which empowers federal courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” if they fail to conform with any of six specified standards. We conclude that review of the narrow question before us whether the Corps’ determination that the FEISS need not be supplemented should be set aside is controlled by the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of § 706(2)(A).

Respondents contend that the determination whether the new information suffices to establish a “significant” effect is either a question of law or, at a minimum, a question of ultimate fact and, as such, “deserves no deference” on review. Brief for Respondents 29. Apparently, respondents maintain that the question for review centers on the legal meaning of the term “significant” or, in the alternative, the predominantly legal question whether established and uncontested historical facts presented by the administrative record satisfy this standard. Characterizing the dispute in this manner, they posit that strict review is appropriate under the “in accordance with law” clause of §706(2)(A) or the “without observance of procedure required by law” provision of § 706 (2)(D). We disagree.

The question presented for review in this case is a classic example of a factual dispute the resolution of which implicates substantial agency expertise. Respondents’ claim that the Corps’ decision not to file a second supplemental EIS should be set aside primarily rests on the contentions that the new information undermines conclusions contained in the FEISS, that the conclusions contained in the ODFW memorandum and the SCS survey are accurate, and that the Corps’ expert review of the new information was incomplete, inconelusive, or inaccurate. The dispute thus does not turn on the meaning of the term “significant” or on an application of this legal standard to settled facts. Rather, resolution of this dispute involves primarily issues of fact. Because analysis of the relevant documents “requires a high level of technical expertise,” we must defer to “the informed discretion of the responsible federal agencies.” Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 412 (1976). See also Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U. S. 87, 103 (1983) (“When examining this kind of scientific determination ... a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential”). Under these circumstances, we cannot accept respondents’ supposition that review is of a legal question and that the Corps’ decision “deserves no deference.” Accordingly, as long as the Corps’ decision not to supplement the FEISS was not “arbitrary or capricious,” it should not be set aside.

As we observed in Citizens to Presene Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 416 (1971), in making the factual inquiry concerning whether an agency decision was “arbitrary or capricious,” the reviewing court “must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.” This inquiry must “be searching and careful,” but “the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.” Ibid. When specialists express conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more persuasive. On the other hand, in the context of reviewing a decision not to supplement an EIS, courts should not automatically defer to the agency’s express reliance on an interest in finality without carefully reviewing the record and satisfying themselves that the agency has made a reasoned decision based on its evaluation of the significance— or lack of significance — of the new information. A contrary approach would not simply render judicial review generally meaningless, but would be contrary to the demand that courts ensure that agency decisions are founded on a reasoned evaluation “of the relevant factors.”

> hH

Respondents’ argument that significant new information required the preparation of a second supplemental EIS rests on two written documents. The first of the documents is the so-called “Cramer Memorandum,” an intraoffice memorandum prepared on February 21, 1985, by two scientists employed by ODFW. See Cramer Memorandum 3a. The Cramer Memorandum, in turn, relied on a draft ODFW study describing the effects of the Lost Creek Dam on fish production. The second document is actually a series of maps prepared in 1982 by SCS to illustrate the composition of soil near the Elk Creek shoreline. The information was provided to the Corps for use in managing the project. Although respondents contend that the maps contained data relevant to a prediction of the dam’s impact on downstream turbidity, the maps do not purport to shed any light on that subject. Nor do they purport to discuss any conditions that had changed since the FEISS was completed in 1980. The Corps responded to the claim that these documents demonstrate the need for supplementation of the FEISS by preparing a formal Supplemental Information Report, dated January 10, 1986. See U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Portland District, Elk Creek Lake Supplemental Information Report No. 2, p. 7a (hereinafter SIR). The SIR explained: “While it is clear based upon our review that this information does not require additional NEPA documentation, Corps regulations provide that a Supplemental Information Report can be used to disseminate information on points of concern regarding environmental impacts set forth in the EIS.”

The significance of the Cramer Memorandum and the SCS survey is subject to some doubt. Before respondents commenced this litigation in October 1985, no one had suggested that either document constituted the kind of new information that made it necessary or appropriate to supplement the FEISS. Indeed, the record indicates that the Corps was not provided with a copy of the Cramer Memorandum until after the lawsuit was filed. Since the probative value of that document depends largely on the expert qualification of its authors, the fact that they did not see fit to promptly apprise the Corps of their concern — or to persuade ODFW to do so— tends to discount the significance of those concerns. Similarly, the absence of any pretrial expression of concern about the soil characteristics described in the 1982 SCS survey is consistent with the view that it shed little, if any, new light on the turbidity potential of the dam. Yet, even if both documents had given rise to prompt expressions of concern, there are good reasons for concluding that they did not convey significant new information requiring supplementation of the FEISS.

The Court of Appeals attached special significance to two concerns discussed in the Cramer Memorandum: the danger that an increase in water temperature downstream during fall and early winter will cause an early emergence and thus reduce survival of spring chinook fry and the danger that the dam will cause high fish mortality from an epizootic disease. Both concerns were based partly on fact and partly on speculation.

With respect to the first, the Cramer Memorandum reported that the authors of the draft ODFW study had found that warming of the Rogue River caused by the Lost Creek Dam had reduced the survival of spring chinook fry; however, the extent of that reduction was not stated, nor did the memorandum estimate the extent of warming to be expected due to closure of the Elk Creek Dam. Instead, the memorandum estimated that an increase of only one degree centigrade in river temperature in January would decrease survival of spring chinook “from by 60-80%.” Cramer Memorandum 3a. The authors of the memorandum concluded that because the Elk Creek Dam is likely to increase the temperature of the Rogue River, further evaluation of this effect should be completed “before ODFW sets its final position on this project.” Ibid.

The Corps’ response to this concern in its SIR acknowledged that the “biological reasoning is sound and has been recognized for some time,” but then explained why the concern was exaggerated. SIR 10a. The SIR stressed that because the model employed by ODFW had not been validated, its predictive capability was uncertain. Indeed, ODFW scientists subsequently recalculated the likely effect of a one-degree-centigrade increase in temperature, adjusting its estimate of a 60-to-80 percent loss downward to between 30 and 40 percent. Id., at 9a. Moreover, the SIR supplied a variable missing in the Cramer Memorandum, suggesting that the Elk Creek Dam would, in most cases, either reduce or leave unchanged the temperature of the Rogue River. Id., at 10a. Discernible increases were only found in July, August, and December of the study year, and even during those months the maximum temperature increase was only 0.6 degrees centigrade. Ibid. Finally, the SIR observed that the Cramer Memorandum failed to take into account the dam’s beneficial effects, including its ability to reduce peak downstream flow during periods of egg incubation and fry rearing and its ability to reduce outflow temperature through use of the multiport structure. Id., at 9a-10a. Given these positive factors, the Corps concluded that any adverse effects of the 0.6-degree temperature increase can be offset. Id., at 10a.

With respect to the second concern emphasized by the Court of Appeals, the Cramer Memorandum reported the fact that “an unprecedented 76% of the fall chinook in 1979 and 32% in 1980 were estimated to have died before spawning” and then speculated that the Lost Creek Dam, which had been completed in 1977, was a contributing cause of this unusual mortality. Cramer Memorandum 4a. The Corps responded to this by pointing out that the absence of similar epizootics after the closure of the Applegate Dam and the evidence of prespawning mortality in the Rogue River prior to the closing of the Lost Creek Dam were inconsistent with the hypothesis suggested in the Cramer Memorandum. See SIR 10a-lla. In addition, the Corps noted that certain diseased organisms thought to have been the cause of the unusually high mortality rates were not found in the outflow from the Lost Creek Dam. Id., at 11a.

In thus concluding that the Cramer Memorandum did not present significant new information requiring supplementation of the FEISS, the Corps carefully scrutinized the proffered information. Moreover, in disputing the accuracy and significance of this information, the Corps did not simply rely on its own experts. Rather, two independent experts hired by the Corps to evaluate the ODFW study on which the Cramer Memorandum was premised found significant fault in the methodology and conclusions of the study. We also think it relevant that the Cramer Memorandum did not express the official position of ODFW. See SIR 9a. In preparing the memorandum, the authors noted that the agency had “adopted a neutral stand on Elk Creek Dam” and argued that new information raised the question whether “our agency should continue to remain neutral. ” Cramer Memorandum 3a. The concerns disclosed in the memorandum apparently were not sufficiently serious to persuade ODFW to abandon its neutral position.

The Court of Appeals also expressed concern that the SCS survey, by demonstrating that the soil content in the Elk Creek watershed is different than assumed in the FEISS, suggested a greater turbidity potential than indicated in the FEISS. 832 F. 2d, at 1495. In addition, the court observed that ODFW scientists believe that logging and road building in the Elk Creek watershed has caused increased soil disturbance resulting in higher turbidity than forecast by the FEISS. Ibid. As to this latter point, the SIR simply concluded that although turbidity may have increased in the early 1980’s due to logging, “watershed recovery appears to have occurred to reduce the turbidity levels back to those of the 1970’s.” SIR 12a. The implications of the SCS soil survey are of even less concern. As discussed in the FEISS, water quality studies were conducted in 1974 and 1979 using computer simulation models. FEISS 33. The 1974 study indicated that turbidity in the Rogue River would increase by no more than one to three JTU’s as a result of the Elk Creek Dam, and the 1979 study verified this result. Ibid. These studies used water samples taken from Elk Creek near the proposed dam site and from near the Lost Creek Dam, and thus did not simply rely on soil composition maps in drawing their conclusions. Id., at 18-19, 21-22, 33-34. Although the SIR did not expressly comment on the SCS survey, in light of the in-depth 1974 and 1979 studies, its conclusion that “the turbidity effects are not expected to differ from those described in the 1980 EISS” surely provided a legitimate reason for not preparing a supplemental FEISS to discuss the subject of turbidity. SIR 12a.

There is little doubt that if all of the information contained in the Cramer Memorandum and SCS survey was both new and accurate, the Corps would have been required to prepare a second supplemental EIS. It is also clear that, regardless of its eventual assessment of the significance of this information, the Corps had a duty to take a hard look at the proffered evidence. However, having done so and having determined based on careful scientific analysis that the new information was of exaggerated importance, the Corps acted within the dictates of NEPA in concluding that supplementation was unnecessary. Even if another decisionmaker might have reached a contrary result, it was surely not “a clear error of judgment” for the Corps to have found that the new and accurate information contained in the documents was not significant and that the significant information was not new and accurate. As the SIR demonstrates, the Corps conducted a reasoned evaluation of the relevant information and reached a decision that, although perhaps disputable, was not “arbitrary or capricious.”

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

       As described by the Army Corps of Engineers:
      “Lying within the southwest corner of Oregon, the Rogue River Basin drains a 5,060 square mile area in Jackson, Josephine, Coos, and Klamath Counties, as well as small portions of Del Norte and Siskiyou Counties in California.... Rogue River passes through vastly different environmental settings in the course of its journey from its upper reaches near Crater Lake to the Pacific Ocean at Gold Beach, Oregon. The climatological factors and other characteristics of the basin are such that floods are frequently experienced.” U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Portland District, Elk Creek Lake Environmental Impact Statement, Supplement No. 1, p. 1 (Dec. 1980) (hereinafter PEISS).

       “Turbidity is an expression of the optical property of water which causes light to be scattered and absorbed rather than transmitted through in straight lines. Turbidity is caused by the presence of suspended matter.” Id., App. E, p. 3. This optical property of water is most commonly measured using the Jackson Turbidity Unit (JTU). “A general rule of thumb guideline is that 5 JTU is the limit for drinking water, 10 JTU impairs flyfishing, 20 JTU impairs other fishing methods, and long-term 50 JTU water alters fish behavior.” Id., at 21.

       See Letter from Governor Atiyeh of August 1, 1979, reprinted in id., App. F.

       See n. 2, supra.

       The FEISS explained that suspended sediments can reduce fish production by clogging or injuring gill structures, by causing abrasions, by reducing food supply, and by making it more difficult for fish to locate what food is available by reducing visibility. FEISS 37. The study nonetheless concluded:

        “Much of the heavy suspended materials will settle out in Elk Creek reservoir so no downstream effect of siltation is expected. Average annual downstream turbidity will be the same with or without the project.
      “No major adverse effect on fish production in the Rogue River is expected as a result of the changes in the turbidity regime as a result of the Elk Creek project. Minor effects on production can be expected in the reach of Elk Creek between the project and its confluence with the Rogue River during normal years when turbidity will be higher than without the project. However, the project will also provide periods when turbidity will be lower than without the project. The multi-level withdrawal capability which will be built into the Elk Creek project will provide the ability to minimize turbidity effects on fish production.” Ibid.

       The impact on fishing is described as follows:
      “Increases in magnitude and extended duration of turbidity in the Rogue River are expected to result from operation of Elk Creek Dam. These increases could affect angling for salmonids in the Rogue because the ability of fish to see lures or flies is impaired by turbidity. Fly-fishing for resident trout and summer steelhead would be the most vulnerable to effects of turbidity. The fly-fishing season runs from late July into October. According to Rogue River guides and [Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife] biologists, fly-fishing success declines at a turbidity level of 10 JTU or greater. Other fishing methods are not productive when turbidity exceeds 20 JTU. It is possible that fisheries at other times, such as in the winter, will be affected for short periods. It is not expected that outflow from Lost Creek and Elk Creek Dams would, under the worst conditions, ever cause turbidity in the Rogue River to exceed 13 JTUs during late summer and early fall.” Id., at 36.
      A “salmonid” is a soft-finned, elongated fish that has an upturned final vertebrae. See Webster’s Third International Dictionary 2004 (1981). Salmon and trout are two common salmonids. Ibid.

       “Anadromous fish are those which spend most of their life in the open sea, but which return as adults to freshwater streams ... to spawn.” Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Game Dept., 433 U. S. 165, 168 (1977).

       As described in the FEISS:
      “Cole M. Rivers Fish Hatchery was constructed to mitigate the loss of anadromous fish-spawning habitat in Elk Creek, Applegate River, and the upper Rogue River, as well as to provide rainbow trout and kokanee for stocking in the reservoirs as mitigation for lost trout production. The hatchery is located about 0.2 miles downstream of Lost Creek Dam. It has a design capacity of 355,000 pounds of salmon and steelhead and 71,000 pounds of trout and kokanee. Production for Elk Creek would utilize approximately 14 percent of the total design capacity . . . .” FEISS 35.

       In the Report accompanying this legislation the Senate Appropriations Committee stressed that it “included specific language in the legislation directing the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers, to award a continuing contract for construction of the main dam for the Elk Creek Lake project.” S. Rep. No. 99-82, p. 97 (1985).

       The four corporations, which are respondents herein, are the Oregon Natural Resources Council, the Oregon Guides and Packers Association, Inc., the Rogue Fly-fishers, Inc., and the Rogue River Guides Association.

       Respondents’ complaint also included claims under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WASRA), 16 U. S. C. § 1278, and the Freedom of Informatio¿i Act (FOIA), 5 U. S. C. § 552. However, prior to the hearing, respondents withdrew their WASRA claim. In order to facilitate prompt consideration of respondents’ motion for a preliminary injunction on the NEPA claims, the District Judge postponed consideration of the FOIA claim for a later date. After considering the NEPA claims, the District Judge directed the entry of final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) to permit prompt appellate review.

       An epizootic disease is one that affects many animals of the same kind at the same time. See 832 F. 2d, at 1496, n. 5.

       NEPA provides in pertinent part:
      “The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible ... (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall—
      “(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on—
      “(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
      “(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
      “(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
      “(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environftient and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and

       Cf. Andreen, In Pursuit of NEPA’s Promise: The Role of Executive Oversight in the Implementation of Environmental Policy, 64 Ind. L. J. 205, 247-248 (1989) (Supplementation is at times necessary because “[t]he entire efficacy of the EIS process is called into question when changes are made to a project after the publication of a final impact statement”).
      The term “action forcing” was introduced during the Senate’s consideration of NEPA, see Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 409, n. 18 (1976), and refers to the notion that preparation of an EIS ensures that the environmental goals set out in NEPA are “infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government,” 115 Cong. Rec. 40416 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Jackson). See also 40 CFR § 1500.1(a) (1987) (“Section 102(2) contains ‘action-forcing’ provisions to make sure that federal agencies act according to the letter and spirit of the Act”).

       In support of this latter proposition, we cited Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F. 2d 1164 (CA6 1972), with approval. In that case the Court of Appeals upheld an injunction barring the continued construction of a dam on the Little Tennessee River pending the filing of an adequate EIS, notwithstanding the fact that the project was initially approved and construction commenced prior to the effective date of NEPA.

       The CEQ regulation provides, in part:
      “Agencies:
      “(1) Shall prepare supplements to either draft or final environmental impact statements if:
      “(i) The agency makes substantial changes in the proposed action that are relevant to environmental concerns; or
      “(ii) There are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.
      “(2) May also prepare supplements when the agency determines that the purposes of the Act will be furthered by doing so.” 40 CFR § 1502.9(c) (1987).

       The Corps regulations provide in relevant part:

        “Supplements. A Supplement to the draft or final EIS on file will be prepared whenever significant impacts resulting from changes in the proposed plan or new significant impact information, criteria or circumstances relevant to environmental considerations impact on the recommended plan or proposed action as discussed in 40 CFR 1502.9(c). A supplement to a draft EIS will be prepared, filed and circulated in the same manner as a draft EIS .... A supplement to a final EIS will be prepared and filed first as a draft supplement and then as a final supplement. ...” 33 CFR §230.11(b) (1987).

       Compare Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F. 2d 1017, 1024 (CA9 1980) (cited in Brief for Respondents 32), and Stop H-3 Assn. v. Dole, 740 F. 2d 1442, 1463-1464 (CA9 1984) (same), cert. denied, 471 U. S. 1108 (1985), with Cuomo v. NRC, 249 U. S. App. D. C. 54, 57, 772 F. 2d 972, 975 (1985) (per curiam) (cited in Reply Brief for Petitioners 14), and Friends of the River v. FERC, 231 U. S. App. D. C. 329, 345, 720 F. 2d 93, 109 (1983) (same).

       In other contexts we have observed:
      ‘“Administrative consideration of evidence . . . always creates a gap between the time the record is closed and the time the administrative decision is promulgated. ... If upon the coming down of the order litigants might demand rehearing as a matter of law because some new circumstance has arisen, some new trend has been observed, or some new fact discovered, there would be little hope that the administrative process could ever be consummated in an order that would not be subject to reopening.’” Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 554-555 (1978) (quoting ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U. S. 503, 514 (1944)). See also Northern Lines Merger Cases, 396 U. S. 491, 521 (1970) (same).

       CEQ regulations define the term “significantly” as follows:
      “ ‘Significantly’ as used in NEPA requires considerations of both context and intensity:
      “(a) Context. This means that the significance of an action must be analyzed in several contexts such as society as a whole (human, national), the affected region, the affected interests, and the locality. Significance varies with the setting of the proposed action. . . .
      “(b) Intensity. This refers to the severity of impact. . . . The following should be considered in evaluation of intensity:
      “(1) Impacts that may be both beneficial and adverse. A significant effect may exist even if the Federal agency believes that on balance the effect will be beneficial.
      “(2) The degree to which the proposed action affects public health or safety.
      “(3) Unique characteristics of the geographic area such as proximity to historic or cultural resources, park lands, prime farmlands, wetlands, wild and scenic rivers, or ecologically critical areas.
      “(4) The degree to which the effects on the quality of the human environment are likely to be highly controversial.

        “(5) The degree to which the possible effects on the human environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks.
      “(6) The degree to which the action may establish a precedent for future actions with significant effects or represents a decision in principle about future consideration.
      “(7) Whether the action is related to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts. . . .
      “(8) The degree to which the action may adversely affect districts, sites, highways, structures, or objects listed in or eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places or may cause loss or destruction of significant scientific, cultural, or historic resources.
      “(9) The degree to which the action may adversely affect an endangered or threatened species or its habitat ....
      “(10) Whether the action threatens a violation of Federal, State, or local law____” 40 CFR § 1508.27 (1987).

       Title 5 U. S. C. § 706(2) provides that a reviewing court shall
      “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be—
      “(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
      “(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
      “(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;
      “(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
      “(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of any agency hearing provided by statute; or

        “(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
      “In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.”
      It is uncontested that the present controversy is not controlled by §§ 706(2)(E) or 706(2)(F), which primarily apply in cases involving either agency rulemaking or adjudication. Nor is there a claim that the Corps exceeded its constitutional authority under § 706(2)(B) or its statutory authority under § 706(2)(C).

       Of course, whenever a court reviews an agency decision or action under the APA, some legal standard is involved. Otherwise, there would be “no law to apply” and thus no basis for APA review. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 410 (1971) (discussing 5 U. S. C. § 701(a)(2)).

       Respondents note that several Courts of Appeals, including the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as articulated in this and other cases, have adopted a “reasonableness” standard of review, see, e. g., Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 816 F. 2d 205, 210 (CA5 1987); Enos v. Marsh, 769 F. 2d 1363, 1373 (CA9 1985); National Wildlife Federation v. Marsh, 721 F. 2d 767, 782 (CA11 1983); Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F. 2d 946, 948 (CA1 1983); Monarch Chemical Works, Inc. v. Thone, 604 F. 2d 1083, 1087-1088 (CA8 1979), and argue that we should not upset this well-settled doctrine. This standard, however, has not been adopted by all of the Circuits. See, e. g., Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F. 2d 412, 417 (CA7 1984) (adopting “arbitrary and capricious” standard). Moreover, as some of these courts have recognized, the difference between the “arbitrary and capricious” and “reasonableness” standards is not of great pragmatic consequence. See Manasota-88, Inc. v. Thomas, 799 F. 2d 687, 692, n. 8 (CA11 1986) (“As a practical matter, . . . the differences between the ‘reasonableness’ and ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standards of review are often difficult to discern”); River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of United States Army,
        764 F. 2d 445, 449 (CA7 1985) (“[W]e are not sure how much if any practical difference there is between ‘abuse of discretion’ and ‘unreasonable’ ”), cert. denied, 475 U. S. 1055 (1986). Accordingly, our decision today will not require a substantial reworking of long-established NEPA law.

       The Cramer Memorandum is reprinted in the brief for petitioners. Page references are to the appendix to that brief.

       The SIR is reprinted in the brief for petitioners. Page references are to the appendix to that brief.

       Corps regulations provide:
      “Whenever it is clearly understood that an EIS supplement is not necessary but where [it] is only necessary to provide supplemental information to a point of concern discussed in the final EIS . . .a supplemental information report will be prepared and filed with EPA.” 33 CFR § 230.11(d) (1987).

       In this respect, the SIR noted that “[t]he reduction in peak floodflows can partially or fully offset the negative effects of temperature increases on fry survival,” and any remaining adverse effects can be “further mitigated by the ability of the intake tower to regulate outflow temperatures.” SIR 9a-10a. A letter sent from ODFW to the Corps in August 1985 supports the conclusion that the multiport system can be used to regulate temperature. The letter, reporting on an attempt to reduce outflow temperature at the Lost Creek Dam, asserts:
      “The experimental reduction in outflow temperatures last October and November, in conjunction with other factors, appears to have improved survival to the fry stage. We had the lowest number on record of wild fish spawning, yet this spring we had the second highest abundance of spring chinook fry on record. The low density of spawners, the absence of floods last winter, and the low incubation temperatures all contributed to the high survival of chinook eggs. We do not know yet what the river temperatures last October-November would have been without the dam, but release temperatures were lower than previous years since dam closure.” Letter from Dr. John R. Donaldson of August 15, 1985, Admin. Record, Doc. No. 109.

       The authors made clear that their concern was not based on any identifiable nexus between the dam closure and the epizootics:
      “We have not determined the actual cause of the epizootics in 1979 and 1980, but we suspect that Lost Creek Dam contributed to them because no such mortality of fall chinook had been documented previously. ” Cramer Memorandum 4a.
      As Judge Wallace noted in his dissenting opinion, the Cramer Memorandum did not address the possibility that diseased hatchery fish, rather than the Lost Creek Dam, caused the 1979 and 1980 epizootics. See 832 F. 2d 1489, 1501 (CA9 1987) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).

       The Cramer Memorandum also raised concerns about the effect of increased downstream flow on fishing and fish production. The memorandum explained that “[ajnglers and guides have complained that high flows have ‘washed out’ many of their favorite fishing riffles and that fly angling is no longer effective in most areas because the water is too deep and swift.” Id., at 4a. In addition, the memorandum observed that “increased flows during September and October cause spring chinook to spawn higher on the gravel bars and this increases the chances that redds will be dewatered when flows are reduced as the dams fill during February-April.” Ibid. However, as the SIR observed, the FEISS did indicate that construction of the dam would cause some unavoidable adverse effects on fishing. See SIR 11a. Moreover, the Cramer Memorandum did not suggest that there has been, or will likely be, any significant increase in mortality due to dewatering or that this effect cannot be minimized through control of the dam’s outflow. Ibid.

       The first of these experts, although agreeing with portions of the ODWF study, indicated that the study “contains considerable statistical inaccuracies, over-extension of statistical methods and undue biological speculation that detracts from an otherwise very laudable professional effort.” S. B. Mathews, Critique of Lost Creek Dam Fisheries Evaluation 1, Admin. Record, Doc. No. 112. The second, although providing a generally more positive assessment of the study, indicated that comparisons between predam and postdam years “is not likely to yield conclusive results.” L. Calvin, Lost Creek Dam Fisheries Evaluation, Phase I Completion Report 2, Admin. Record, Doc. No. 114.

       Their memorandum concluded:
      “Harry, the spring chinook runs on the Rogue are at an all-time low point. Anglers are becoming increasingly frustrated and upset about low runs, shortened seasons and smaller bag limits. They are also becoming more vocal. We feel the agency stands to lose much of its credibility if we continue to support Elk Creek Dam after knowing what has occurred to the adult spring chinook returns following completion of Lost Creek Dam. The Commission should be made aware of this new information and the possible consequences if they continue to hold to the middle of the road.” Cramer Memorandum 5a.


author: Chief Justice Rehnquist Justice Blackmun,

text:
    GRAHAM v. CONNOR et al.
    No. 87-6571.
    Argued February 21, 1989
    Decided May 15, 1989

      Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 399.

      H. Gerald Beaver argued the cause for petitioner. On the briefs was Richard B. Glazier.

      Mark I. Levy argued the cause for respondents. On the brief was Frank B. Ay cock III.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Clegg, David L. Shapiro, Brian J. MaHin, and David K. Flynn; and for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Steven R. Shapiro.

        Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina, Isaac T. Avery III, Special Deputy Attorney General, and Linda Anne Morris, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of North Carolina as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

   Chief Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us to decide what constitutional standard governs a free citizen’s claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other “seizure” of his person. We hold that such claims are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard, rather than under a substantive due process standard.

In this action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, petitioner Dethorne Graham seeks to recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained when law enforcement officers used physical force-against him during the course of an investigatory stop. Because the case comes to us from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the entry of a directed verdict for respondents, we take the evidence hereafter noted in the light most favorable to petitioner. On November 12, 1984, Graham, a diabetic, felt the onset of an insulin reaction. He asked a friend, William Berry, to drive him to a nearby convenience store so he could purchase some orange juice to counteract the reaction. Berry agreed, but when Graham entered the store, he saw a number of people ahead of him in the checkout line. Concerned about the delay, he hurried out of the store and asked Berry to drive him to a friend’s house instead.

Respondent Connor, an officer of the Charlotte, North Carolina, Police Department, saw Graham hastily enter and leave the store. The officer became suspicious that something was amiss and followed Berry’s car. About one-half mile from the store, he made an investigative stop. Although Berry told Connor that Graham was simply suffering from a “sugar reaction,” the officer ordered Berry and Graham to wait while he found out what, if anything, had happened at the convenience store. When Officer Connor returned to his patrol car to call for backup assistance, Graham got out of the car, ran around it twice, and finally sat down on the curb, where he passed out briefly.

In the ensuing confusion, a number of other Charlotte police officers arrived on the scene in response to Officer Con-nor’s request for backup. One of the officers rolled Graham over on the sidewalk and cuffed his hands tightly behind his back, ignoring Berry’s pleas to get him some sugar. Another officer said: “I’ve seen a lot of people with sugar diabetes that never acted like this. Ain’t nothing wrong with the M. F. but drunk. Lock the S. B. up.” App. 42. Several officers then lifted Graham up from behind, carried him over to Berry’s car, and placed him face down on its hood. Regaining consciousness, Graham asked the officers to check in his wallet for a diabetic decal that he carried. In response, one of the officers told him to “shut up” and shoved his face down against the hood of the car. Four officers grabbed Graham and threw him headfirst into the police car. A friend of Graham’s brought some orange juice to the car, but the officers refused to let him have it. Finally, Officer Connor received a report that Graham had done nothing wrong at the convenience store, and the officers drove him home and released him.

At some point during his encounter with the police, Graham sustained a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead, and an injured shoulder; he also claims to have developed a loud ringing in his right ear that continues to this day. He commenced this action under 42 U. S. C. §1983 against the individual officers involved in the incident, all of whom are respondents here, alleging that they had used excessive force in making the investigatory stop, in violation of “rights secured to him under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U. S. C. §1983.” Complaint ¶ 10, App. 5. The case was tried before a jury. At the close of petitioner’s evidence, respondents moved for a directed verdict. In ruling on that motion, the District Court considered the following four factors, which it identified as “[t]he factors to be considered in determining when the excessive use of force gives rise to a cause of action under § 1983”: (1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of the injury inflicted; and (4) “[w]hether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” 644 F. Supp. 246, 248 (WDNC 1986). Finding that the amount of force used by the officers was “appropriate under the circumstances,” that “[t]here was no discernable injury inflicted,” and that the force used “was not applied maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,” but in “a good faith effort to maintain or restore order in the face of a potentially explosive situation,” id., at 248-249, the District Court granted respondents’ motion for a directed verdict.

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 827 F. 2d 945 (1987). The majority ruled first that the District Court had applied the correct legal standard in assessing petitioner’s excessive force claim. Id., at 948-949. Without attempting to identify the specific constitutional provision under which that claim arose, the majority endorsed the four-factor test applied by the District Court as generally applicable to all claims of “constitutionally excessive force” brought against governmental officials. Id., at 948. The majority rejected petitioner’s argument, based on Circuit precedent, that it was error to require him to prove that the allegedly excessive force used against him was applied “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Ibid. Finally, the majority held that a reasonable jury applying the four-part test it had just endorsed to petitioner’s evidence “could not find that the force applied was constitutionally excessive.” Id., at 949-950. The dissenting judge argued that this Court’s decisions in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), and Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1 (1985), required that excessive force claims arising out of investigatory stops be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard. 827 F. 2d, at 950-952. We granted certiorari, 488 U. S. 816 (1988), and now reverse.

Fifteen years ago, in Johnson v. Glick, 481 F. 2d 1028, cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1033 (1973), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed a § 1983 damages claim filed by a pretrial detainee who claimed that a guard had assaulted him without justification. In evaluating the detainee’s claim, Judge Friendly applied neither the Fourth Amendment nor the Eighth, the two most textually obvious sources of constitutional protection against physically abusive governmental conduct. Instead, he looked to “substantive due process,” holding that “quite apart from any ‘specific’ of the Bill of Rights, application of undue force by law enforcement officers deprives a suspect of liberty without due process of law.” 481 F. 2d, at 1032. As support for this proposition, he relied upon our decision in Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952), which used the Due Process Clause to void a state criminal conviction based on evidence obtained by pumping the defendant’s stomach. 481 F. 2d, at 1032-1033. If a police officer’s use of force which “shocks the conscience” could justify setting aside a criminal conviction, Judge Friendly reasoned, a correctional officer’s use of similarly excessive force must give rise to a due process violation actionable under § 1983. Ibid. Judge Friendly went on to set forth four factors to guide courts in determining “whether the constitutional line has been crossed” by a particular use of force — the same four factors relied upon by the courts below in this case. Id., at 1033.

In the years following Johnson v. Glick, the vast majority of lower federal courts have applied its four-part “substantive due process” test indiscriminately to all excessive force claims lodged against law enforcement and prison officials under § 1983, without considering whether the particular application of force might implicate a more specific constitutional right governed by a different standard. Indeed, many courts-have seemed to assume, as did the courts below in this case, that there is a generic “right” to be free from excessive force, grounded not in any particular constitutional provision but rather in “basic principles of § 1983 jurisprudence. ”

We reject this notion that all excessive force claims brought under § 1983 are governed by a single generic standard. As we have said many times, § 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights,” but merely provides “a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979). In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983, analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force. See id., at 140 (“The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit” is “to isolate the precise constitutional violation with which [the defendant] is charged”). In most instances, that will be either the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person, or the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments, which are the two primary sources of constitutional protection against physically abusive governmental conduct. The validity of the claim must then be judged by reference to the specific constitutional standard which governs that right, rather than to some generalized “excessive force” standard. See Tennessee v. Garner, supra, at 7-22 (claim of excessive force to effect arrest analyzed under a Fourth Amendment standard); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U. S. 312, 318-326 (1986) (claim of excessive force to subdue convicted prisoner analyzed under an Eighth Amendment standard).

Where, as here, the excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right “to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures” of the person. This much is clear from our decision in Tennessee v. Garner, supra. In Garner, we addressed a claim that the use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing suspect who did not appear to be armed or otherwise dangerous violated the suspect’s constitutional rights, notwithstanding the existence of probable cause to arrest. Though the complaint alleged violations of both the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause, see 471 U. S., at 5, we analyzed the constitutionality of the challenged application of force solely by reference to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person, holding that the “reasonableness” of a particular seizure depends not only on when it is made, but also on how it is carried out. Id., at 7-8. Today we make explicit what was implicit in Garner’s analysis, and hold that all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force — deádly or not — in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other “seizure” of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its “reasonableness” standard, rather than under a “substantive due process” approach. Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be the guide for analyzing these claims."

Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure-is “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of “ ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ ” against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Id., at 8, quoting United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 703 (1983). Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 22-27. Because “[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 559 (1979), however, its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S., at 8-9 (the question is “whether the totality of the circumstances justified] a particular sort of. . . seizure”).

The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. See Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 20-22. The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause, even though the wrong person is arrested, Hill v. California, 401 U. S. 797 (1971), nor by the mistaken execution of a valid search warrant on the wrong premises, Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U. S. 79 (1987). With respect to a claim of excessive force, the same standard of reasonableness at the moment applies: “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,” Johnson v. Glide, 481 F. 2d, at 1033, violates the Fourth Amendment. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.

As in other Fourth Amendment contexts, however, the “reasonableness” inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. See Scott v. United States, 436 U. S. 128, 137-139 (1978); see also Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 21 (in analyzing the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure, “it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard”). An officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer’s good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional. See Scott v. United States, supra, at 138, citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 (1973).

Because petitioner’s excessive force claim is one arising under the Fourth Amendment, the Court of Appeals erred in analyzing it under the four-part Johnson v. Glick test. That test, which requires consideration of whether the individual officers acted in “good faith” or “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,” is incompatible with a proper Fourth Amendment analysis. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals’ suggestion, see 827 F. 2d, at 948, that the “malicious and sadistic” inquiry is merely another way of describing conduct that is objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. Whatever the empirical correlations between “malicious and sadistic” behavior and objective unreasonableness may be, the fact remains that the “malicious and sadistic” factor puts in issue the subjective motivations of the individual officers, which our prior cases make clear has no bearing on whether a particular seizure is “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. Nor do we agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, see id., at 948, n. 3, that because the subjective motivations of the individual officers are of central importance in deciding whether force used against a convicted prisoner violates the Eighth Amendment, see Whitley v. Albers, 475 U. S., at 320-321, it cannot be reversible error to inquire into them in deciding whether force used against a suspect or arrestee violates the Fourth Amendment. Differing standards under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments are hardly surprising: the terms “cruel” and “punishments” clearly suggest some inquiry into subjective state of mind, whereas the term “unreasonable” does not. Moreover, the less protective Eighth Amendment standard applies “only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 671, n. 40 (1977). The Fourth Amendment inquiry is one of “objective reasonableness” under the circumstances, and subjective concepts like “malice” and “sadism” have no proper place in that inquiry.

Because the Court of Appeals reviewed the District Court’s ruling on the motion for directed verdict under an erroneous view of the governing substantive law, its judgment must be vacated and the case remanded to that court for reconsideration of that issue under the proper Fourth Amendment standard.

It is so ordered.

Justice Blackmun,

with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join the Court’s opinion insofar as it rules that the Fourth Amendment is the primary tool for analyzing claims of excessive force in the prearrest context, and I concur in the judgment remanding the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration of the evidence under a reasonableness standard. In light of respondents’ concession, however, that the pleadings in this case properly may be construed as raising a Fourth Amendment claim, see Brief for Respondents 3,1 see no reason for the Court to find it necessary further to reach out to decide that prearrest excessive force claims are to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than under a substantive due process standard. I also see no basis for the Court’s suggestion, ante, at 395, that our decision in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1 (1985), implicitly so held. Nowhere in Garner is a substantive due process standard for evaluating the use of excessive force in a particular case discussed; there is no suggestion that such a standard was offered as an alternative and rejected.

In this case, petitioner apparently decided that it was in his best interest to disavow the continued applicability of substantive due process analysis as an alternative basis for recovery in prearrest excessive force cases. See Brief for Petitioner 20. His choice was certainly wise as a matter of litigation strategy in his own case, but does not (indeed, cannot be expected to) serve other potential plaintiffs equally well. It is for that reason that the Court would have done better to leave that question for another day. I expect that the use of force that is not demonstrably unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment only rarely will raise substantive due process concerns. But until I am faced with a case in which that question is squarely raised, and its merits are subjected to adversary presentation, I do not join in foreclosing the use of substantive due process analysis in prearrest cases.

       Also named as a defendant was the city of Charlotte, which employed the individual respondents. The District Court granted a directed verdict for the city, and petitioner did not challenge that ruling before the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the city is not a party to the proceedings before this Court.

       Petitioner also asserted pendent state-law claims of assault, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Those claims have been dismissed from the case and are not before this Court.

       The majority did note that because Graham was not an incarcerated prisoner, “his complaint of excessive force did not, therefore, arise under the eighth amendment.” 827 F. 2d, at 948, n. 3. However, it made no further effort to identify the constitutional basis for his claim.

       Petitioner’s argument was based primarily on Kidd v. O’Neil, 774 F. 2d 1252 (CA4 1985), which read this Court’s decision in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1 (1985), as mandating application of a Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness” standard to claims of excessive force during arrest. See 774 F. 2d, at 1254-1257. The reasoning of Kidd was subsequently rejected by the en banc Fourth Circuit in Justice v. Dennis, 834 F. 2d 380, 383 (1987), cert. pending, No. 87-1422.

       The majority noted that in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U. S. 312 (1986), we held that the question whether physical force used against convicted prisoners in the course of quelling a prison riot violates the Eighth Amendment “ultimately turns on ‘whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.’ ” 827 F. 2d, at 948, n. 3, quoting Whitley v. Albers, supra, at 320-321. Though the Court of Appeals acknowledged that petitioner was not a convicted prisoner, it thought it “unreasonable ... to suggest that a conceptual factor could be central to one type of excessive force claim but reversible error when merely considered by the court in another context.” 827 F. 2d, at 948, n. 3.

       Judge Friendly did not apply the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to the detainee’s claim for two reasons. First, he thought that the Eighth Amendment’s protections did not attach until after conviction and sentence. 481 F. 2d, at 1032. This view was confirmed by Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 671, n. 40 (1977) (“Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions”). Second, he expressed doubt whether a “spontaneous attack” by a prison guard, done without the authorization of prison officials, fell within the traditional Eighth Amendment definition of “punishments.” 481 F. 2d, at 1032. Although Judge Friendly gave no reason for not analyzing the detainee’s claim under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against “unreasonable . . . seizures” of the person, his refusal to do so was apparently based on a belief that the protections of the Fourth Amendment did not extend to pretrial detainees. See id., at 1033 (noting that “most of the courts faced with challenges to the conditions of pretrial detention have primarily based their analysis directly on the due process clause”). See n. 10, infra.

       See Freyermuth, Rethinking Excessive Force, 1987 Duke L. J. 692, 694-696, and nn. 16-23 (1987) (collecting cases).

       See Juntice v. Dennis, supra, at 382 (“There are . . . certain basic principles in section 1983 jurisprudence as it relates to claims of excessive force that are beyond question I'd [w]hether the factual circumstances involve an arrestee, a pretrial detainee or a prisoner”).

       The same analysis applies to excessive force claims brought against federal law enforcement and correctional officials under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971).

       A “seizure” triggering the Fourth Amendment’s protections occurs only when government actors have, “by means of physical force or show of authority, ... in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen,” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 19, n. 16 (1968); see Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U. S. 593, 596 (1989).
      Our cases have not resolved the question whether the Fourth Amendment continues to provide individuals with protection against the deliberate use of excessive physical force beyond the point at which arrest ends and pretrial detention begins, and we do not attempt to answer that question today. It is clear, however, that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 535-539 (1979). After conviction, the Eighth Amendment “serves as the primary source of substantive protection ... in cases . . . where the deliberate use of force is challenged as excessive and unjustified.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U. S., at 327. Any protection that “substantive due process” affords convicted prisoners against excessive force is, we have held, at best redundant of that provided by the Eighth Amendment. Ibid.

       In Whitley, we addressed a § 1983 claim brought by a convicted prisoner, who claimed that prison officials had violated his Eighth Amendment rights by shooting him in the knee during a prison riot. We began our Eighth Amendment analysis by reiterating the long-established maxim that an Eighth Amendment violation requires proof of the “ ‘ “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” ’ ” 475 U. S., at 319, quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S., at 670, in turn quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 103 (1976). We went on to say that when prison officials use physical force against an inmate “to restore order in the face of a prison disturbance, . . . the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain . . . ultimately turns on ‘whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.’” 475 U. S., at 320-321 (emphasis added), quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F. 2d, at 1033. We also suggested that the other prongs of the Johnson v. Glick test might be useful in analyzing excessive force claims brought under the Eighth Amendment. 475 U. S., at 321. But we made clear that this was so not because Judge Friendly’s four-part test is some talismanic formula generally applicable to all excessive force claims, but because its four factors help to focus the central inquiry in the Eighth Amendment context, which is whether the particular use of force amounts to the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” See id., at 320-321. Our endorsement of the Johnson v. Glick test in Whitley thus had no implications beyond the Eighth Amendment context.

       Of course, in assessing the credibility of an officer’s account of the circumstances that prompted the use of force, a factfinder may consider, along with other factors, evidence that the officer may have harbored ill-will toward the citizen. See Scott v. United States, 436 U. S. 128, 139, n. 13 (1978). Similarly, the officer’s objective “good faith” — that is, whether he could reasonably have believed that the force used did not violate the Fourth Amendment — may be relevant to the availability of the qualified immunity defense to monetary liability under § 1983.' See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635 (1987). Since no claim of qualified immunity has been raised in this case, however, we express no view on its proper application in excessive force cases that arise under the Fourth Amendment.