author: Justice Stevens

text:
    BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM v. MCORP FINANCIAL, INC., et al.
    No. 90-913.
    Argued October 7, 1991
    Decided December 3, 1991

      Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Thomas, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.

      Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for petitioner in No. 90-913 and respondent in No. 90-914. On the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Ger-son, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, Michael R. Lazerwitz, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, and James V. Mattingly, Jr.

      Alan B. Miller argued the cause for respondents in No. 90-913 and petitioners in No. 90-914. With him on the briefs were Harvey R. Miller, Steven Alan Reiss, John D.

      Hawke, Jr., Jerome I. Chapman, Howard N. Cayne, and David F. Freeman, Jr.

       Together with No. 90-914, MCorp et al. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, also on certiorari to the same court.

   Justice Stevens

delivered the opinion of the Court.

MCorp, a bank holding company, filed voluntary bankruptcy petitions in March 1989. It then initiated an adversary proceeding against the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) seeking to enjoin the prosecution of two administrative proceedings, one charging MCorp with a violation of the Board’s “source of strength” regulation and the other alleging a violation of § 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, as added, 48 Stat. 183, and amended. The District Court enjoined both proceedings, and the Board appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had no jurisdiction to enjoin the §23A proceeding, but that, under the doctrine set forth in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184 (1958), the District Court had jurisdiction to review the validity of the “source of strength” regulation. The Court of Appeals then ruled that the Board had exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating that regulation. 900 F. 2d 852 (CA5 1990). We granted certiorari, 499 U. S. 904 (1991), to review the entire action but, because we conclude that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin either regulatory proceeding, we do not reach the merits of MCorp’s challenge to the regulation.

H-t

In 1984, the Board promulgated a regulation requiring every bank holding company to “serve as a source of financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary banks.” In October 1988, the Board commenced an administrative proceeding against MCorp, alleging that MCorp violated the source of strength regulation and engaged in unsafe and unsound banking practices that jeopardized the financial condition of its subsidiary banks. The Board also issued three temporary cease-and-desist orders. The first forbids MCorp to declare or pay any dividends without the prior approval of the Board. ' App. 65-67. The second forbids MCorp to dissipate any of its nonbank assets without the prior approval of the Board. Id., at 68-70. The third directs MCorp to use “all of its assets to provide capital support to its Subsidiary Banks in need of additional capital.” Id., at 85. By agreement, enforcement of the third order was suspended while MCorp sought financial assistance from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).

In March 1989, the FDIC denied MCorp’s request for assistance. Thereafter, creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against MCorp in the Southern District of New York, and the Comptroller of the Currency determined that 20 of MCorp’s subsidiary banks were insolvent and, accordingly, appointed the FDIC as receiver of those banks. MCorp then filed voluntary bankruptcy petitions in the Southern District of Texas and all bankruptcy proceedings were later consolidated in that forum.

At the end of March, the Board commenced a second administrative proceeding against MCorp alleging that it had violated §23A of the Federal Reserve Act by causing two of its subsidiary banks to extend unsecured credit of approximately $63.7 million to an affiliate. For convenience, we shall refer to that proceeding as the “§ 23A proceeding” and to the earlier proceeding as the “source of strength proceeding.”

In May 1989, MCorp initiated this litigation by filing a complaint in the Bankruptcy Court against the Board seeking a declaration that both administrative proceedings had been automatically stayed pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code; in the alternative, MCorp prayed for an injunction against the further prosecution of those proceedings without the prior approval of the Bankruptcy Court. On the Board’s motion, the District Court transferred that adversary proceeding to its own docket.

In June 1989, the District Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to enjoin the Board from prosecuting both administrative proceedings against MCorp and entered a preliminary injunction halting those proceedings. The injunction restrained the Board from exercising “its authority over bank holding companies ... to attempt to effect, directly or indirectly, a reorganization of the MCorp group [of companies] except through participation in the bankruptcy proceedings.” In re MCorp, 101 B. R. 483, 491. The Board appealed.

Although the District Court did not differentiate between the two Board proceedings, the Court of Appeals held that the § 23A proceeding could go forward but that the source of strength proceeding should be enjoined. The court reasoned that the plain language of the judicial review provisions of the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 (FISA), 80 Stat. 1046, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1818 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. II), particularly § 1818(i)(1), deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to enjoin either proceeding, but that our decision in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184 (1958), nevertheless authorized an injunction against an administrative proceeding conducted without statutory authorization. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Board's promulgation and enforcement of its source of strength regulation exceeded its statutory authority. Accordingly, the court vacated the District Court injunction barring the § 23A proceeding, but remanded the case with instructions to enjoin the Board from enforcing its source of strength regulation. Both parties petitioned for certiorari.

The Board's petition challenges the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Leedom v. Kyne, as well as its invalidation of the source of strength regulation. MCorp's petition challenges the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the relationship between the provisions governing judicial review of Board proceedings and those governing bankruptcy proceedings. We first address the latter challenge.

II

A series of federal statutes gives the Board substantial regulatory power over bank holding companies and establishes a comprehensive scheme of judicial review of Board actions. See FISA; the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA), 12 U. S. C. § 1841 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. II); and the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, 12 U. S. C. § 3901 et seq. In this litigation, the most relevant of these is FISA.

FISA authorizes the Board to institute administrative proceedings culminating in cease-and-desist orders, 12 U. S. C. §§ 1818(a) — (b) (1988 ed., Supp. II), and to issue temporary-cease-and-desist orders that are effective upon service on a bank holding company. § 1818(c). In addition, FISA establishes a tripartite regime of judicial review. First, § 1818(c)(2) provides that, within 10 days after service of a temporary order, a bank holding company may seek an injunction in district court restraining enforcement of the order pending completion of the related administrative proceeding. Second, § 1818(h) authorizes court of appeals review of final Board orders on the application of an aggrieved party. Finally, §1818(i)(l) provides that the Board may apply to district court for enforcement of any effective and outstanding notice or order.

None of these provisions controls this litigation: The action before us is not a challenge to a temporary Board order, nor a petition for review of a final Board order, nor an enforcement action initiated by the Board. Instead, FISA’s preclusion provision appears to speak directly to the jurisdictional question at issue in this litigation:

“[E]xcept as otherwise provided in this section no court shall have jurisdiction to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement of any notice or order under this section, or to review, modify, suspend, terminate, or set aside any such notice or order.” Ibid.

Notwithstanding this plain, preclusive language, MCorp argues that the District Court’s injunction against the prosecution of the Board proceedings was authorized either by the automatic stay provision in the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. §362, or by the provision of the Judicial Code authorizing district courts in bankruptcy proceedings to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over certain civil proceedings, 28 U. S. C. § 1334(b). We find no merit in either argument.

The filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as an automatic stay of several categories of judicial and administrative proceedings. The Board’s planned actions against MCorp constitute the “continuation . . . [of] administrative . . . proceeding^]” and would appear to be stayed by 11 U. S. C. § 362(a)(1). However, the Board’s actions also fall squarely within § 362(b)(4), which expressly provides that the automatic stay will not reach proceedings to enforce a “governmental unit’s police or regulatory power.”

MCorp contends that in order for § 362(b)(4) to obtain, a court must first determine whether the proposed exercise of police or regulatory power is legitimate and that, therefore, in this litigation the lower courts did have the authority to examine the legitimacy of the Board’s actions and to enjoin those actions. We disagree. MCorp’s broad reading of the stay provisions would require bankruptcy courts to scrutinize the validity of every administrative or enforcement action brought against a bankrupt entity. Such a reading is problematic, both because it conflicts with the broad discretion Congress has expressly granted many administrative entities and because it is inconsistent with the limited authority Congress has vested in bankruptcy courts. We therefore reject MCorp’s reading of § 362(b)(4).

MCorp also argues that it is protected by §§ 362(a)(3) and 362(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Those provisions stay “any act” to obtain possession of, or to exercise control over, property of the estate, or to recover claims against the debtor that arose prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. MCorp contends that the ultimate objective of the source of strength proceeding is to exercise control of corporate assets and that the § 23A proceeding seeks enforcement of a prepetition claim.

We reject these characterizations of the ongoing administrative proceedings. At this point, the Board has only issued “Notices of Charges and of Hearing” and has expressed its intent to determine whether MCorp has violated specified statutory and regulatory provisions. It is possible, of course, that the Board proceedings, like many other enforcement actions, may conclude with the entry of an order that will affect the Bankruptcy Court’s control over the property of the estate, but that possibility cannot be sufficient to justify the operation of the stay against an enforcement proceeding that is expressly exempted by § 362(b)(4). To adopt such a characterization of enforcement proceedings would be to render subsection (b)(4)’s exception almost meaningless. If and when the Board’s proceedings culminate in a final order, and if and when judicial proceedings are commenced to enforce such an order, then it may well be proper for the Bankruptcy Court to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1334(b). We are not persuaded, however, that the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code have any application to ongoing, nonfinal administrative proceedings.

MCorp’s final argument rests on 28 U. S. C. § 1334(b). That section authorizes a district court to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over certain bankruptcy-related civil proceedings that would otherwise be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of another court. MCorp’s reliance is misplaced. Section 1334(b) concerns the allocation of jurisdiction between bankruptcy courts and other “courts,” and, of course, an administrative agency such as the Board is not a "court." Moreover, contrary to MCorp's contention, the prosecution of the Board proceedings, prior to the entry of a final order and prior to the commencement of any enforcement action, seems unlikely to impair the Bankruptcy Court's exclusive jurisdiction over the property of the estate protected by 28 U. S. C. § 1334(d). In sum, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the specific preclusive language in 12 U. S. C. § 1818(i)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. II) is not qualified or superseded by the general provisions governing bankruptcy proceedings on which MCorp relies.

III

Although the Court of Appeals found that § 1818(i)(1) precluded judicial review of many Board actions, it exercised jurisdiction in this litigation based on its reading of Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184 (1958). Kyne involved an action in District Court challenging a determination by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) that a unit including both professional and nonprofessional employees was appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes-a determination in direct conflict with a provision of the National Labor Relations Act. The Act, however, did not expressly authorize any judicial review of such a determination. Relying on Switchmen v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U. S. 297 (1943), the NLRB argued that the statutory provisions establishing review of final Board orders in the courts of appeals indicated a congressional intent to bar review of any NLRB action

in the District Court. The Court rejected that argument, emphasizing the presumption that Congress normally intends the federal courts to enforce and protect the rights that Congress has created. Concluding that the Act did not bar the District Court’s jurisdiction, we stated: “This Court cannot lightly infer that Congress does not intend judicial protection of rights it confers against agency action taken in excess of delegated powers.” 358 U. S., at 190.

In this litigation, the Court of Appeals interpreted our opinion in Kyne as authorizing judicial review of any agency action that is alleged to have exceeded the agency’s statutory authority. Kyne, however, differs from this litigation in two critical ways. First, central to our decision in Kyne was the fact that the Board’s interpretation of the Act would wholly deprive the union of a meaningful and adequate means of vindicating its statutory rights.

“Here, differently from the Switchmen’s case, ‘absence of jurisdiction of the federal courts’ would mean ‘a sacrifice or obliteration of a right which Congress’ has given professional employees, for there is no other means, within their control ... to protect and enforce that right.” Ibid.

The cases before us today are entirely different from Kyne because FISA expressly provides MCorp with a meaningful and adequate opportunity for judicial review of the validity of the source of strength regulation. If and when the Board finds that MCorp has violated that regulation, MCorp will have, in the Court of Appeals, an unquestioned right to review of both the regulation and its application.

The second, and related, factor distinguishing this litigation from Kyne is the clarity of the congressional preclusion of review in FISA. In Kyne, the NLRB contended that a statutory provision that provided for judicial review implied, by its silence, a preclusion of review of the contested determination. By contrast, in FISA Congress has spoken clearly and directly: “[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement of any [Board] notice or order under this section.” 12 U. S. C. § 1818(i)(l) (1988 ed., Supp. II) (emphasis added). In this way as well, this litigation differs from Kyne.

Viewed in this way, Kyne stands for the familiar proposition that “only upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 141 (1967). As we have explained, however, in this case the statute provides us with clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended to deny the District Court jurisdiction to review and enjoin the Board’s ongoing administrative proceedings.

IV

The Court- of Appeals therefore erred when it held that it had jurisdiction to consider the merits of MCorp’s challenge to the source of strength regulation. In No. 90-913, the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding the case with instructions to enjoin the source of strength proceedings is therefore reversed. In No. 90-914, the judgment of the Court of Appeals vacating the District Court’s injunction against prosecution of the § 23A proceeding is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.

       The “source of strength” regulation provides in relevant part:
      “A bank holding company shall serve as a source of financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary banks and shall not eon[d]uct its operations in an unsafe or unsound maimer.” 12 CFR § 225.4(a)(1) (1991).

       Section 23A sets forth restrictions on bank holding companies’ corporate practices, including restrictions on transactions between subsidiary banks and nonbank affiliates. See 12 U. S. C. § 371c.

       See n. 1, supra. In 1987, the Board clarified its policy and stated that a “bank holding company’s failure to assist a troubled or failing subsidiary bank . . . would generally be viewed as an unsafe and unsound banking practice or a violation of [12 CFR § 225.4(a)(1)] or both.” 52 Fed. Reg. 15707-15708.

         The term “MCorp” refers to the corporation and to two of its wholly owned subsidiaries, MCorp Financial, Inc., and MCorp Management.

       MCorp timely challenged these orders in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas, pursuant to 12 U. S. C. § 1818(c)(2). The District Court stayed MCorp’s challenge pending resolution of this proceeding. Brief for MCorp et al. 3.

       The current status of this order is unclear. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 22-25, 41-42. We address only MCorp’s effort to enjoin the Board’s administrative proceedings and express no opinion on the continuing vitality or validity of any of the temporary cease-and-desist orders.

       Although the several "Notices of Charges and of Hearing" issued by the Board against MCorp relied on FISA and the BHCA, e. g., App. 57, 72, the parties have focused only on the former. We note, however, that the BHCA includes a preclusion provision that is similar to § 1818(i)(1) in F ISA. See 12 U. S. C. § 1844(e)(2).

       The statute characterizes such review of final Board orders as “exclusive” and provides:
      “(2) Any party to any proceeding under paragraph (1) may obtain a review ... by the filing in the court of appeals of the United States for the circuit in which the home office of the depository institution is located, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, within thirty days after the date of service of such order, a written petition praying that the order of the agency be modified, terminated, or set aside. . . . Upon the filing of such petition, such court shall have jurisdiction, which upon the filing of the record shall except as provided in the last sentence of said paragraph (1) be exclusive, to affirm, modify, terminate, or set aside, in whole or in part, the order of the agency.” 12 U. S. C. § 1818(h)(2) (1988 ed., Supp. II).
      The referenced exception concerns actions taken by the agency with permission of the court.

       The automatic stay provision provides in relevant part:
      “(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C. 78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of—
      “(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;

      “(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;

      “(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title . . . 11 U. S. C. § 362(a).

       Title 11 U. S. C. § 362(b)(4) provides:
      “(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or of an application under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C. 78eee(a)(3)), does not operate as a stay—

      “(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power .. . .”

       The Board suggests that the automatic stay provisions of § 362 do not themselves confer jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court, and thus that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as an automatic stay only where the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction has not already been precluded by a statute like § 1818(i)(l). We need not address this question in light of our determination that the automatic stay does not apply to the Board’s ongoing administrative proceedings.

       Title 28 U. S. C. § 1334(b) provides:
      “(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.”

       That subsection provides:
      "(d) The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of the estate."

       See 29 U. S. C. § 159(b)(l).

       In Switchmen v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U. S., at 306, the Court had reasoned:
      “When Congress in § 3 and in § 9 provided for judicial review of two types of orders or awards and in § 2 of the same Act omitted any such provision as respects a third type, it drew a plain line of distinction. And the inference is strong from the history of the Act that that distinction was not inadvertent. The language of the Act read in light of that history supports the view that Congress gave administrative action under § 2, Ninth a finality which it denied administrative action under the other sections of the Act.”

       The other cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals — Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667 (1986); Breen v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16, 396 U. S. 460 (1970); and Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U. S. 233 (1968) — are distinguishable from this litigation for the same reasons. In each of those cases, the Court recognized that an unduly narrow construction of the governing statute would severely prejudice the party seeking review, and construed the statute to allow judicial review not expressly provided.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: JUSTICE SCALIA Justice Blackmun,

license: Public Domain

text:
    GRIFFIN v. UNITED STATES
    No. 90-6352.
    Argued October 7, 1991
    Decided December 3, 1991
    Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post,
      p. 60. THOMAS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
    Michael G. Logan argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
    Deputy Solicitor General Bryson argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Mueller, and Jeffrey P. Minear.
   JUSTICE SCALIA

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether, in a federal prosecution, a general guilty verdict on a multiple-object conspiracy charge must be set aside if the evidence is inadequate to support conviction as to one of the objects.

I

A federal grand jury returned a 23-count indictment against petitioner Diane Griffin and others. Count 20, the only count in which Griffin was named, charged her, Alex Beverly, and Betty McNulty with conspiring to defraud an agency of the Federal Government in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 371, which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

"If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be [guilty of a crime]."

The unlawful conspiracy was alleged to have had two objects: (1) impairing the efforts of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to ascertain income taxes; and (2) impairing the efforts of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to ascertain forfeitable assets.

The evidence introduced at trial implicated Beverly and McNulty in both conspiratorial objects, and petitioner in the IRS object. However, because testimony anticipated by the Government from one of its witnesses did not materialize, the evidence did not connect petitioner to the DEA object. On that basis, petitioner moved for a severance, but her motion was denied. At the close of trial, she proposed instructions to the effect that she could be convicted only if the jury found she was aware of the IRS object of the conspiracy. She also proposed special interrogatories asking the jury to identify the object or objects of the conspiracy of which she had knowledge. Both requests were denied. The court instructed the jury in a manner that would permit it to return a guilty verdict against petitioner on Count 20 if it found her to have participated in either one of the two objects of the conspiracy. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty on Count 20 against Beverly, McNulty, and petitioner.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld petitioner’s conviction, rejecting the argument that the general verdict could not stand because it left in doubt whether the jury had convicted her of conspiring to defraud the IRS, for which there was sufficient proof, or of conspiring to defraud the DEA, for which (as the Government concedes) there was not. United States v. Beverly, 913 F. 2d 337 (1990). We granted certiorari, 498 U. S. 1082 (1991).

The question presented for review, as set forth in the petition, is simply whether a general verdict of guilty under circumstances such as existed here “is reversible.” The body of the petition, however, sets forth the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the jury trial provision of the Sixth Amendment as bases for the relief requested. Only the former has been discussed (and that briefly) in the written and oral argument before us. For that reason, and also because the alleged defect here is not that a jury determination was denied but rather that a jury determination was permitted, we find it unnecessary to say anything more about the Sixth Amendment. We address below the Due Process Clause and also the various case precedents relied upon by petitioner.

II

The rule of criminal procedure applied by the Seventh Circuit here is not an innovation. It was settled law in England before the Declaration of Independence, and in this country long afterwards, that a general jury verdict was valid so long as it was legally supportable on one of the submitted grounds — even though that gave no assurance that a valid ground, rather than an invalid one, was actually the basis for the jury’s action. As Wharton wrote in 1889:

“For years it was the prevailing practice in England and this country, where there was a general verdict of guilty on an indictment containing several counts, some bad and some good, to pass judgment on the counts that were good, on the presumption that it was to them that the verdict of the jury attached, and upon the withdrawal by the prosecution of the bad counts.... [I]n the United States, with but few exceptions, the courts have united in sustaining general judgments on an indictment in which there are several counts stating cognate of-fences, irrespective of the question whether one of these counts is bad.” F. Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Practice § 771, pp. 533-536 (9th ed. 1889) (footnotes omitted).

And as this Court has observed:

“In criminal cases, the general rule, as stated by Lord Mansfield before the Declaration of Independence, is ‘that if there is any one count to support the verdict, it shall stand good, notwithstanding all the rest are bad.’ And it is settled law in this court, and in this country generally, that in any criminal case a general verdict and judgment on an indictment or information containing several counts cannot be reversed on error, if any one of the counts is good and warrants the judgment, because, in the absence of anything in the record to show the contrary, the presumption of law is that the court awarded sentence on the good count only.” Claassen v. United States, 142 U. S. 140, 146 (1891) (quoting Peake v. Oldham, 1 Cowper 275, 276, 98 Eng. Rep. 1083 (K. B. 1775)) (other citations omitted).

See also Snyder v. United States, 112 U. S. 216, 217 (1884); Clifton v. United States, 4 How. 242, 250 (1846); 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Procedure § 1015, p. 631 (2d ed. 1872).

This common-law rule applied in a variety of contexts. It validated general verdicts returned on multicount indictments where some of the counts were legally defective (“bad”), see, e. g., Clifton, supra, at 250; State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa 477, 511 (1859); State v. Burke, 38 Me. 574, 575-576 (1854); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336, 337 (1821), and general verdicts returned on multicount indictments where some of the counts were unsupported by the evidence, see, e. g., State v. Long, 52 N. C. 24, 26 (1859); State v. Bugbee, 22 Vt. 32, 35 (1849); 1 Bishop, supra, § 1014, p. 630. It also applied to the analogous situation at issue here: a general jury verdict under a single count charging the commission of an offense by two or more means. For example, in reviewing a count charging defendants with composing, printing, and publishing a libel, Lord Ellenborough stated:

“It is enough to prove publication. If an indictment charges that the defendant did and caused to be done a particular act, it is enough to prove either. The distinction runs through the whole criminal law, and it is invariably enough to prove so much of the indictment as shows that the defendant has committed a substantive crime therein specified.” King v. Hunt, 2 Camp. 583, 584-585, 170 Eng. Rep. 1260 (N. P. 1811).

The latter application of the rule made it a regular practice for prosecutors to charge conjunctively, in one count, the various means of committing a statutory offense, in order to avoid the pitfalls of duplicitous pleading.

“A statute often makes punishable the doing of one thing or another,... sometimes thus specifying a considerable number of things. Then, by proper and ordinary construction, a person who in one transaction does all, violates the statute but once, and incurs only one penalty. Yet he violates it equally by doing one of the things. Therefore the indictment on such a statute may allege, in a single count, that the defendant did as many of the forbidden things as the pleader chooses, employing the conjunction and where the statute has ‘or,’ and it will not be double, and it will be established at the trial by proof of any one of them.” 1 J. Bishop, New Criminal Procedure §436, pp. 355-356 (2d ed. 1913) (footnotes omitted).

See, e. g., Crain v. United States, 162 U. S. 625, 636 (1896); Sanford v. State, 8 Ala. App. 245, 247, 62 So. 317, 318 (1913); State v. Bresee, 137 Iowa 673, 681, 114 N. W. 45, 48 (1907); Morganstern v. Commonwealth, 94 Va. 787, 790,26 S. E. 402, 403 (1896). See also Schad v. Arizona, 501 U. S. 624, 630-631 (1991); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 7(c)(1) (authorizing a single count to allege that an offense was committed “by one or more specified means”).

The historical practice, therefore, fails to support petitioner’s claim under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 276-277 (1856). Petitioner argues, however, that — whether as a matter of due process or by virtue of our supervisory power over federal courts — a result contrary to the earlier practice has been prescribed by our decision in Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957). Yates involved a single-count federal indictment charging a conspiracy “(1) to advocate and teach the duty and necessity of overthrowing the Government of the United States by force and violence, and (2) to organize, as the Communist Party of the United States, a society of persons who so advocate and teach.” Id., at 300. The first of these objects (the “advocacy” charge) violated § 2(a)(1) of the Smith Act of 1940 (subsequently repealed and substantially reenacted as 18 U. S. C. § 2385), and the second of them (the “organizing” charge) violated § 2(a)(3). We found that the “organizing” object was insufficient in law, since the statutory term referred to initial formation, and the Communist Party had been “organized” in that sense at a time beyond the period of the applicable statute of limitations. 354 U. S., at 304-311. We then rejected the Government’s argument that the convictions could nonetheless stand on the basis of the “advocacy” object. Our analysis made no mention of the Due Process Clause but consisted in its entirety of the following:

“In these circumstances we think the proper rule to be applied is that which requires a verdict to be set aside in cases where the verdict is supportable on one ground, but not on another, and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected. Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 367-368; Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 291-292; Cramer v. United States, 325 U. S. 1, 36, n. 45.” id, at 312.

None of the three authorities cited for that expansive proposition in fact establishes it. The first of them, Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), is the fountainhead of decisions departing from the common law with respect to the point at issue here. That case, however — which does not explicitly invoke the Due Process Clause — does not sanction as broad a departure as the dictum in Yates expresses, or indeed even the somewhat narrower departure that the holding in Yates adopts. The defendant in Stromberg was charged in one count of violating a California statute prohibiting the display of a red flag in a public place for any one of three purposes: (a) as a symbol of opposition to organized government; (b) as an invitation to anarchistic action; or (c) as an aid to seditious propaganda. Id., at 361. The jury was instructed that it could convict if it found the defendant guilty of violating any one purpose of the statute. Id., at 363-364. A conviction in the form of a general verdict followed. The California appellate court upheld the conviction on the ground that, even though it doubted the constitutionality of criminalizing the first of the three purposes, the statute (and conviction) could be saved if that provision was severed from the statute. We rejected that:

“As there were three purposes set forth in the statute, and the jury were instructed that their verdict might be given with respect to any one of them, independently considered, it is impossible to say under which clause of the statute the conviction was obtained. If any one of these clauses, which the state court has held to be separable, was invalid, it cannot be determined upon this record that the appellant was not convicted under that clause.... It follows that instead of its being permissible to hold, with the state court, that the verdict could be sustained if any one of the clauses of the statute were found to be valid, the necessary conclusion from the manner in which the case was sent to the jury is that, if any of the clauses in question is invalid under the Federal Constitution, the conviction cannot be upheld.” Id., at 368.

This language, and the holding of Stromberg, do not necessarily stand for anything more than the principle that, where a provision of the Constitution forbids conviction on a particular ground, the constitutional guarantee is violated by a general verdict that may have rested on that ground.

The same principle explains the other two cases relied on by Yates. In Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942), the defendant was convicted of bigamous cohabitation after the jury had been instructed that it could disregard the defendants’ Nevada divorce decrees on the ground either that North Carolina did not recognize decrees based on substituted service or that the decrees were procured by fraud. Id., at 290-291. The former of these grounds, we found, violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause. We continued:

“[T]he verdict of the jury for all we know may have been rendered on that [unconstitutional] ground alone, since it did not specify the basis on which it rested. ... No reason has been suggested why the rule of the Strom-berg case is inapplicable here. Nor has any reason been advanced why the rule of the Stromberg case is not both appropriate and necessary for the protection of rights of the accused. To say that a general verdict of guilty should be upheld though we cannot know that it did not rest on the invalid constitutional ground on which the case was submitted to the jury, would be to countenance a procedure which would cause a serious impairment of constitutional rights.” Id., at 292.

The third case cited by Yates, Cramer v. United States, 325 U. S. 1 (1945), was our first opportunity to interpret the provision of Article III, §3, which requires, for conviction of treason against the United States, that there be “two Witnesses to the same overt Act.” The prosecution had submitted proof of three overt acts to the jury, which had returned a general verdict of guilty. After a comprehensive analysis of the overt-act requirement, id., at 8-35, we found that two of the acts proffered by the prosecution did not satisfy it, id., at 36-44, and accordingly reversed the conviction. “Since it is not possible,” we said, “to identify the grounds on which Cramer was convicted, the verdict must be set aside if any of the separable acts submitted was insufficient.” Id., at 36, n. 45.

A host of our decisions, both before and after Yates, has applied what Williams called “the rule of the Stromberg case” to general-verdict convictions that may have rested on an unconstitutional ground. See, e. g., Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U. S. 564, 570-571 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 31-32 (1969); Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 585-588 (1969); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 5 (1949); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 529 (1945). Cf. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 880-884 (1983) (rejecting contention that Stromberg required a death sentence to be set aside if one of several statutory aggravating circumstances underlying the jury verdict was unconstitutionally vague). Yates, however, was the first and only case of ours to apply Strom-berg to a general verdict in which one of the possible bases of conviction did not violate any provision of the Constitution but was simply legally inadequate (because of a statutory time bar). As we have described, that was an unexplained extension, explicitly invoking neither the Due Process Clause (which is an unlikely basis) nor our supervisory powers over the procedures employed in a federal prosecution.

Our continued adherence to the holding of Yates is not at issue in this case. What petitioner seeks is an extension of its holding — an expansion of its expansion of Stromberg — to a context in which we have never applied it before. Petitioner cites no case, and we are aware of none, in which we have set aside a general verdict because one of the possible bases of conviction was neither unconstitutional as in Strom-berg, nor even illegal as in Yates, but merely unsupported by sufficient evidence. If such invalidation on evidentiary grounds were appropriate, it is hard to see how it could be limited to those alternative bases of conviction that constitute separate legal grounds; surely the underlying principle would apply equally, for example, to an indictment charging murder by shooting or drowning, where the evidence of drowning proves inadequate. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U. S., at 630-631. But petitioner’s requested extension is not merely unprecedented and extreme; it also contradicts another case, postdating Yates, that in our view must govern here.

Turner v. United States, 396 U. S. 398 (1970), involved a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support a general guilty verdict under a one-count indictment charging the defendant with knowingly purchasing, possessing, dispensing, and distributing heroin not in or from the original stamped package, in violation of 26 U. S. C. § 4704(a) (1964 ed.). We held that the conviction would have to be sustained if there was sufficient evidence of distribution alone. We set forth as the prevailing rule: “[W]hen a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive, as Turner’s indictment did, the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged.” Id., at 420. Cf. United States v. Miller, 471 U. S. 130, 136 (1985).

Although petitioner does not ask us to overrule Turner, neither does she give us any adequate basis for distinguishing it. She claims that we have not yet applied the rule of that case to multiple-act conspiracies. That is questionable. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 250 (1940). But whether we have yet done so or not, the controlling point is that a logical and consistent application of Turner demands that proof of alternative facts in conspiracy cases be treated the same as proof of alternative facts in other contexts. Imagine the not unlikely case of a prosecution for defrauding an insurer through two means and for conspiring to defraud the insurer through the same two means; and imagine a failure of proof with respect to one of the means. Petitioner’s proposal would produce the strange result of voiding a conviction on the conspiracy while sustaining a conviction on the substantive offense. We agree with the vast majority of Federal Courts of Appeals, which have made no exception to the Turner rule for multiple-object and multiple-overt-act conspiracies. See, e. g., United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F. 2d 1285, 1302 (CA2 1991), cert. denied, post, p. 813; United States v. Beverly, 913 F. 2d 337, 362-365 (CA7 1990) (case below); United States v. Johnson, 713 F. 2d 633, 645-646, and n. 15 (CA11 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Wilkins v. United States, 465 U. S. 1081 (1984); United States v. Wedelstedt, 589 F. 2d 339, 341-342 (CA8 1978), cert. denied, 442 U. S. 916 (1979); United States v. James, 528 F. 2d 999, 1014 (CA5), cert. denied sub nom. Austin v. United States, 429 U. S. 959 (1976); Moss v. United States, 132 F. 2d 875, 877-878 (CA6 1943).

Petitioner also seeks to distinguish Turner on the basis that it applies only where one can be sure that the jury did not use the inadequately supported ground as the basis of conviction. That assurance exists, petitioner claims, when the prosecution presents no evidence whatever to support the insufficient theory; if the prosecution offers some, but insufficient, evidence on the point, as it did in this case, then the Yates “impossible to tell” rationale controls. This novel theory posits two different degrees of failure of proof — a failure that is sufficiently insufficient, to which Turner would apply, and one that is insufficiently insufficient, to which Yates would apply. Besides producing an odd system in which the greater failure of proof is rewarded, the rule seems to us full of practical difficulty, bereft of support in Turner, and without foundation in the common-law presumption upon which Turner is based.

Finally, petitioner asserts that the distinction between legal error (Yates) and insufficiency of proof (Turner) is illusory, since judgments that are not supported by the requisite minimum of proof are invalid as a matter of law — and indeed, in the criminal law field at least, are constitutionally required to be set aside. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (1979). Insufficiency of proof, in other words, is legal error. This represents a purely semantical dispute. In one sense “legal error” includes inadequacy of evidence— namely, when the phrase is used as a term of art to designate those mistakes that it is the business of judges (in jury cases) and of appellate courts to identify and correct. In this sense “legal error” occurs when a jury, properly instructed as to the law, convicts on the basis of evidence that no reasonable person could regard as sufficient. But in another sense — a more natural and less artful sense — the term “legal error” means a mistake about the law, as opposed to a mistake concerning the weight or the factual import of the evidence. The answer to petitioner’s objection is simply that we are using “legal error” in the latter sense.

That surely establishes a clear line that will separate Turner from Yates, and it happens to be a line that makes good sense. Jurors are not generally equipped to determine whether a particular theory of conviction submitted to them is contrary to law — whether, for example, the action in question is protected by the Constitution, is time barred, or fails to come within the statutory definition of the crime. When, therefore, jurors have been left the option of relying upon a legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that their own intelligence and expertise will save them from that error. Quite the opposite is true, however, when they have been left the option of relying upon a factually inadequate theory, since jurors are well equipped to analyze the evidence, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 157 (1968). As the Seventh Circuit has put it:

“It is one thing to negate a verdict that, while supported by evidence, may have been based on an erroneous view of the law; it is another to do so merely on the chance— remote, it seems to us — that the jury convicted on a ground that was not supported by adequate evidence when there existed alternative grounds for which the evidence was sufficient.” United States v. Townsend, 924 F. 2d 1385, 1414 (1991).

* * *

What we have said today does not mean that a district court cannot, in its discretion, give an instruction of the sort petitioner requested here, eliminating from the jury’s consideration an alternative basis of liability that does not have adequate evidentiary support. Indeed, if the evidence is insufficient to support an alternative legal theory of liability, it would generally be preferable for the court to give an instruction removing that theory from the jury’s consideration. The refusal to do so, however, does not provide an independent basis for reversing an otherwise valid conviction. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Justice Blackmun,

concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the Court that petitioner has not made out a violation of the Due Process Clause, although I do not follow the Court on its self-guided tour of the common law. See ante, at 49-52. It is enough, I think, to observe that petitioner has not presented any sustained constitutional argument whatsoever.

I agree further with the Court’s conclusion that Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957), does not require reversal in this case, and that petitioner has not sufficiently distinguished Turner v. United States, 396 U. S. 398 (1970). See ante, at 56-59. I would emphasize more strongly than does the Court, however, the danger of jury confusion that was inherent in this multiple-defendant, 23-count indictment and the resulting 5- to 6-week trial.

The Court rightly observes that “it would generally be preferable” for the trial court to remove unsupported theories from the jury’s consideration. See ante, at 60. I would also note that the Government had two other means of avoiding the possibility, however remote, that petitioner was convicted on a theory for which there was insufficient evidence: The Government either could have charged the two objectives in separate counts, or agreed to petitioner’s request for special interrogatories. The Court wisely rejects, albeit silently, the Government’s argument that these practices, but not the complex and voluminous proof, would likely have confused the jury. I would go further than the Court and commend these techniques to the Government for use in complex conspiracy prosecutions.

       At the outset of its discussion of the two overt acts, the Cramer Court said: “At the present stage of the case we need not weigh their sufficiency as a matter of pleading. Whatever the averments might have permitted the Government to prove, we now consider their adequacy on the proof as made.” 325 U. S., at 37. Petitioner suggests this means that Cramer was a sufficiency-of-the-evidence case — a point relevant to our later analysis, see infra, at 58-59. That suggestion is mistaken. As is apparent from the Court’s full discussion, “adequacy on the proof as made” meant not whether the evidence sufficed to enable an alleged fact to be found, but rather whether the facts adduced at trial sufficed in law to constitute overt acts of treason. Thus the Court could say: “It is not relevant to our issue to appraise weight or credibility of the evidence apart from determining its constitutional sufficiency.” 325 U. S., at 43. The Court of Appeals’ opinion in Cramer makes even clearer that legal as opposed to evi-dentiary sufficiency was at issue; it specifically distinguishes the case from those in which multiple overt acts sufficient in law are submitted to the jury and the conviction is upheld as long as the evidence suffices to show one of them. See United States v. Cramer, 137 F. 2d 888, 893-894 (CA2 1943).

       The only Court of Appeals we are aware of that adheres to the contrary rule is the Third Circuit, albeit without distinguishing, or even acknowledging the existence of, Turner. See United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F. 2d 466, 474-475 (1977). Many eases can be found, some of which are cited by petitioner, that invalidate general conspiracy verdicts on the basis of legal deficiency of some of the objects rather than inadequacy of proof; these are of course irrelevant. See, e. g., United States v. Irwin, 654 F. 2d 671, 680 (CA10 1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 1016 (1982); United States v. Head, 641 F. 2d 174, 178-179 (CA4 1981), cert. denied, 462 U. S. 1132 (1983); United States v. Kavazanjian, 623 F. 2d 730, 739-740 (CA1 1980); United States v. Carman, 577 F. 2d 556, 567-568 (CA9 1978); United States v. Baranski, 484 F. 2d 556, 560-561 (CA7 1973); Van Liew v. United States, 321 F. 2d 664, 672 (CA5 1963). Some other cases cited by petitioner do not involve a conspiracy charge at all, e. g., United States v. Natelli, 527 F. 2d 311, 324-325 (CA2 1975), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 934 (1976), or apply their ruling to both substantive and conspiracy charges, e. g., United States v. Garcia, 907 F. 2d 380, 381 (CA2 1990) — which means that they flatly contradict Turner and offer no support for the distinction that petitioner suggests. Still others have been distinguished (or effectively overruled) by later cases within the Circuit, see, e. g., United States v. Berardi, 675 F. 2d 894, 902 (CA7 1982).


author: Chief Justice Rehnquist Justice O’Connor,

text:
    ESTELLE, WARDEN v. McGUIRE
    No. 90-1074.
    Argued October 9, 1991
    Decided December 4, 1991

      Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Blackmun, Scalia, Kennedy, and SouteR, JJ., joined, and in Part I of which Stevens and 0’Connoe, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 75. Thomas, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

      Dane R. Gillette, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, John H. Sugiyama, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Morris Beatus, Supervising Deputy Attorney General.

      Ann Hardgrove Voris, by appointment of the Court, 499 U. S. 917, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

       Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Mueller, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, and Clifford M. Sloan; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger.

        Charles D. Weisselberg and Dennis E. Curtis filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

   Chief Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent Mark Owen McGuire was found guilty in a California state court of second-degree murder for the killing of his infant daughter. After unsuccessfully challenging his conviction on appeal in the state courts, McGuire sought federal habeas relief, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit set aside his conviction. 902 F. 2d 749 (1990). We hold that in so doing the Court of Appeals exceeded the limited scope of federal habeas review of state convictions.

McGuire and his wife brought their 6-month-old daughter, Tori, to a hospital in Hayward, California. The baby was bluish in color and was not breathing. The attending physician noticed a large and relatively recent bruise on Tori’s chest with multiple bruises around it, as well as black and blue marks around her ears. Efforts to revive the child were unsuccessful; Tori died 45 minutes after being brought to the hospital. An autopsy revealed 17 contusions on the baby’s chest, 29 contusions in her abdominal area, a split liver, a split pancreas, a lacerated large intestine, and damage to her heart and one of her lungs. The autopsy also uncovered evidence of rectal tearing, which was at least six weeks old, and evidence of partially healed rib fractures, which were approximately seven weeks old.

The police questioned McGuire and his wife. McGuire stated his belief that Tori’s injuries must have resulted from a fall off the family couch. He told the police that when his wife went out to make a telephone call, he went upstairs, leaving Tori lying on the couch; when he heard the baby cry, he came back downstairs to find her lying on the floor. After a police officer expressed skepticism at this explanation, McGuire replied that “[m]aybe some Mexicans came in” while he was upstairs. Id., at 751. During separate questioning, McGuire’s wife stated'that she had not hit Tori, and that she was unsure whether her husband had done so.

McGuire was charged with second-degree murder. At trial, the prosecution introduced both the statements made by McGuire to police and the medical evidence, including the evidence of prior rectal tearing and fractured ribs. Two physicians testified that Tori was a battered child, relying in part on the prior rib and rectal injuries, as well as on the more recent injuries. McGuire’s neighbor testified that she had seen McGuire carry Tori by one of her arms to the car and roughly pinch her cheeks together when she cried. The neighbor added that McGuire’s wife had expressed fear in leaving Tori alone with McGuire, because he had been rough with the baby and “did bad things” to her.

In addition, the prosecution called a witness who had overheard a conversation between McGuire and his wife in the hospital emergency room the night of Tori’s death. According to the witness, McGuire’s wife several times insistently asked, “What really happened?” McGuire replied that he “didn’t know,” and that he “guessed” the baby fell off the couch. His wife continued to press for an answer, stating, “I am very patient. I can wait a long time. I want to know what really happened.” Finally, she told McGuire that “the baby was alright when I left. You are responsible.” App. 44; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 3-4. McGuire’s wife was called by the prosecution to testify at trial, after having been granted transactional immunity from future prosecution. In contrast to her prior statement to the police and her declarations at the hospital, she stated that she had beaten Tori on the day of her death before her husband arrived home. The jury convicted McGuire of second-degree murder.

The California Court of Appeal affirmed McGuire’s conviction. The court observed that the evidence of prior rib and rectal injuries was introduced to prove “battered child syndrome.” That syndrome exists when a child has sustained repeated and/or serious injuries by nonaccidental means. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 249, 681 P. 2d 291, 299 (1984). After reviewing California authority on the subject, the court concluded that “proof of Tori’s ‘prior injuries’ tending to establish the ‘battered child syndrome’ was patently proper.” App. 47. The California Supreme Court denied review.

McGuire then filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. That court denied relief. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and granted McGuire’s habeas petition. The court ruled that the prior injury evidence was erroneously admitted to establish battered child syndrome, because no evidence linked McGuire to the prior injuries and no claim had been made at trial that the baby died accidentally. In addition, the court believed that the trial court’s instruction on the use of prior act evidence allowed a finding of guilt based simply on a judgment that McGuire committed the prior bad acts. The court concluded that the admission of the evidence, in conjunction with the prejudicial instruction, “rendered [McGuire’s] trial arbitrary and fundamentally unfair” in violation of due process. 902 F. 2d, at 753. We hold that none of the alleged errors rise to the level of a due process violation, and so reverse.

I

We first consider whether the admission of the prior injury evidence justified habeas relief. In ruling that McGuire’s due process rights were violated by the admission of the evidence, the Court of Appeals relied in part on its conclusion that the evidence was “incorrectly admitted . . . pursuant to California law.” Id,., at 754. Such an inquiry, however, is no part of a federal court’s habeas review of a state conviction. We have stated many times that “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U. S. 764, 780 (1990); see also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U. S. 37, 41 (1984). Today, we reemphasize that it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions. In conducting ha-beas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U. S. C. § 2241; Rose v. Hodges, 423 U. S. 19, 21 (1975) (per curiam).

We thus turn to the question whether the admission of the evidence violated McGuire’s federal constitutional rights. California law allows the prosecution to introduce expert testimony and evidence related to prior injuries in order to prove “battered child syndrome.” People v. Bledsoe, supra, at 249, 681 P. 2d, at 299; Panderos v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 409, 551 P. 2d 389, 393 (1976); People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504,506-508,95 Cal. Rptr. 919, 921-922 (1971). The demonstration of battered child syndrome “simply indicates that a child found with [serious, repeated injuries] has not suffered those injuries by accidental means.” Id., at 507, 95 Cal. Rptr., at 921. Thus, evidence demonstrating battered child syndrome helps to prove that the child died at the hands of another and not by falling off a couch, for example; it also tends to establish that the “other,” whoever it may be, inflicted the injuries intentionally. When offered to show that certain injuries are a product of child abuse, rather than accident, evidence of prior injuries is relevant even though it does not purport to prove the identity of the person who might have inflicted those injuries. See id., at 506-508, 95 Cal. Rptr., at 921-922; People v. Bledsoe, supra, at 249, 681 P. 2d, at 299. Because the prosecution had charged McGuire with second-degree murder, it was required to prove that Tori’s death was caused by the defendant’s intentional act. Proof of Tori’s battered child status helped to do just that; although not linked by any direct evidence to McGuire, the evidence demonstrated that Tori’s death was the result of an intentional act by someone, and not an accident. The Court of Appeals, however, ignored the principle of battered child syndrome evidence in holding that this evidence was incorrectly admitted. For example, the court stated that “[ejvidence cannot have probative value unless a party connects it to the defendant in some meaningful way.” 902 F. 2d, at 753. We conclude that the evidence of prior injuries presented at McGuire’s trial, whether it was directly linked to McGuire or not, was probative on the question of the intent with which the person who caused the injuries acted.

In holding the prior injury evidence inadmissible, the Court of Appeals also relied on the theory that, because no claim was made at trial that Tori died accidentally, the battered child syndrome evidence was irrelevant and violative of due process. Id., at 754. This ruling ignores the fact that the prosecution must prove all the elements of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In this second-degree murder case, for example, the prosecution was required to demonstrate that the killing was intentional. Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§187, 189 (West 1988). By eliminating the possibility of accident, the evidence regarding battered child syndrome was clearly probative of that essential element, especially in light of the fact that McGuire had claimed prior to trial that Tori had injured herself by falling from the couch. The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the evidence should have been excluded because McGuire did not raise the defense of accidental death at trial. But the prosecution’s burden to prove every element of the crime is not relieved by a defendant’s tactical decision not to contest an essential element of the offense. In the federal courts, “[a] simple plea of not guilty .. . puts the prosecution to its proof as to all elements of the crime charged.” Mathews v. United States, 485 U. S. 58, 64-65 (1988). Neither the Court of Appeals nor the parties have given us any reason to think that the rule is different in California. The evidence of battered child syndrome was relevant to show intent, and nothing in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the State to refrain from introducing relevant evidence simply because the defense chooses not to contest the point.

Concluding, as we do, that the prior injury evidence was relevant to an issue in the case, we need not explore further the apparent assumption of the Court of Appeals that it is a violation of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment for evidence that is not relevant to be received in a criminal trial. We hold that McGuire’s due process rights were not violated by the admission of the evidence. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 563-564 (1967) (“Cases in this Court have long proceeded on the premise that the Due Process Clause guarantees the fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial.... But it has never been thought that such cases establish this Court as a rule-making organ for the promulgation of state rules of criminal procedure”) (citations omitted).

II

The Court of Appeals, however, did not rely solely on a finding that the admission of the evidence was unconstitutional. It based its decision in part on a belief that the instruction given by the trial court, set forth in n. 1, supra, allowed the jury to consider the prior injury evidence for more than simply proof of the battered child syndrome, and thereby violated McGuire’s due process rights. McGuire focuses on the portion of the instruction explaining to the jury that the prior injury evidence

“was received and may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show ... a clear connection between the other two offense[s] and the one of which the Defendant is accused, so that it may be logically concluded that if the Defendant committed other offenses, he also committed the crime charged in this case.” App. 41.

McGuire argues that, despite the absence of any direct evidence showing that he caused the rib and rectal injuries, the instruction told the jury to find that he had committed those prior offenses. Furthermore, he argues, the instruction left the jury with the mistaken impression that it could base its finding of guilt on the simple fact that he had previously harmed Tori. Under McGuire’s reading, the instruction is transformed into a propensity instruction, allowing the jury to consider as evidence of his guilt the fact that his prior acts show a disposition to commit this type of crime. This, he contends, violates the Due Process Clause.

In arguing his point, McGuire makes much of the fact that, in giving its instruction, the trial court deviated in part from standard jury instruction 2.50, 1 California Jury Instructions, Criminal (4th ed. 1979) (CALJIC). As we have stated above, however, the fact that the instruction was allegedly incorrect under state law is not a basis for habeas relief. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 438, n. 6 (1988) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules”). Federal habeas courts therefore do not grant relief, as might a state appellate court, simply because the instruction may have been deficient in comparison to the CALJIC model. Nor do our habeas powers allow us to reverse McGuire’s conviction based on a belief that the trial judge incorrectly interpreted the California Evidence Code in ruling that the prior injury evidence was admissible as bad acts evidence in this case. See Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 1101(b) (West 1988). The only question for us is “whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U. S. 141, 147 (1973); see also Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U. S. 145, 154 (1977); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U. S. 637, 643 (1974) (“ ‘[I]t must be established not merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even “universally condemned,” but that it violated some [constitutional] right’ ”). It is well established that the instruction “may not be judged in artificial isolation,” but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. Cupp v. Naughten, supra, at 147. In addition, in reviewing an ambiguous instruction such as the one at issue here, we inquire “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way” that violates the Constitution. Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370, 380 (1990). And we also bear in mind our previous admonition that we “have defined the category of infractions that violate ‘fundamental fairness’ very narrowly.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U. S. 342, 352 (1990). “Beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation.” Ibid.

McGuire first claims that the instruction directed the jury to find that he had caused the prior injuries, thereby effectively taking that question from the jury. One might argue that the “two offense[s]” referred to in the instruction were McGuire’s pinching of the child’s cheeks and the lifting of the child by her arm. When read in context, however, we conclude that the most likely interpretation is that the reference was to the rectal tearing and fractured ribs. McGuire argues that, despite the lack of any direct evidence linking him to those injuries, the instruction directed the jury to find that he had committed them. This claim is clearly foreclosed, however, by the language of the instruction. The challenged portion of the instruction included the words “if the Defendant committed other offenses.” App. 41. By including this phrase, the trial court unquestionably left it to the jury to determine whether McGuire committed the prior acts; only if the jury believed he was the perpetrator could it use the evidence in deciding whether McGuire was guilty of the crime charged. Therefore, if the jury did not believe McGuire caused the prior injuries, he was not harmed by the challenged portion of the instruction. To the extent that the jury may have believed McGuire committed the prior acts and used that as a factor in its deliberation, we observe that there was sufficient evidence to sustain such a jury finding by a preponderance of the evidence. Cf. People v. Simon, 184 Cal. App. 3d 125, 134, 228 Cal. Rptr. 855, 858 (1986); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U. S. 681,690 (1988). The proof of battered child syndrome itself narrowed the group of possible perpetrators to McGuire and his wife, because they were the only two people regularly caring for Tori during her short life. See People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d, at 507, 95 Cal. Rptr., at 921 (“Only someone regularly ‘caring’ for the child has the continuing opportunity to inflict these types of injuries; an isolated contact with a vicious stranger would not result in this pattern of successive injuries stretching through several months”). A neighbor testified that she had seen McGuire treat Tori roughly on two occasions, and that McGuire’s wife was scared to leave Tori alone with McGuire because he “did bad things” to her; the neighbor further testified that she had never seen McGuire’s wife abuse the child in any way. Futhermore, when being questioned by the police after Tori died, McGuire’s wife stated that she observed bruises on the baby’s body when bathing her. When asked by the police for an explanation, she replied, “I don’t really know, you know, I am not the only one who is taking care of her.” App. 131. The evidence described, along with other evidence in the record, convinces us that there was sufficient proof for the jury to conclude, if it so desired, that McGuire caused the prior rib and rectal injuries.

McGuire also contends that, even if the determination of the perpetrator was left to the jury, the instruction constituted a “propensity” instruction, allowing the jury to base its determination of guilt in part upon the conclusion that McGuire had committed the prior acts and therefore had a propensity to commit this type of crime. While the instruction was not as clear as it might have been, we find that there is not a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury would have concluded that this instruction, read in the context of other instructions, authorized the use of propensity evidence pure and simple. Boyde v. California, supra, at 380. It seems far more likely that the jury understood the instruction, supra, at 71, to mean that if it found a “clear connection” between the prior injuries and the. instant injuries, and if it found that McGuire had committed the prior injuries, then it could use that fact in determining that McGuire committed the crime charged. The use of the evidence of prior offenses permitted by this instruction was therefore parallel to the familiar use of evidence of prior acts for the purpose of showing intent, identity, motive, or plan. See, e. g., Fed. Rule Evid. 404(b). Furthermore, the trial court guarded against possible misuse of the instruction by specifically advising the jury that the “[prior injury] evidence, if believed, was not received, and may not be considered by you[,] to prove that [McGuire] is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit crimes.” See n. 1, supra. Especially in light of this limiting provision, we reject McGuire’s claim that the instruction should be viewed as a propensity instruction.

We therefore hold that neither the introduction of the challenged evidence, nor the jury instruction as to its use, “so infused the trial with unfairness as to deny due process of law.” Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 228 (1941); see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U. S., at 643. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore

Reversed.

Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Justice O’Connor,

with whom Justice Stevens joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree with the Court that the evidence of battered child syndrome was relevant. The State had to prove that Mark McGuire intended to kill his daughter, and the evidence that Tori was a battered child was probative of causation and intent. I therefore join Part I of the Court's opinion.

I do not join Part II of the opinion because I think there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misapplied the prior acts instruction. The trial court instructed the jury that evidence of Tori’s prior injuries had been admitted to show that McGuire had committed offenses similar to that for which he was on trial, and that, if the jury found a “clear connection” between the prior offenses and the charged offense, “it may be logically concluded that if the Defendant committed other offenses, he also committed the crime charged in this case.” App. 41. In my view, the instruction encouraged the jury to assume that McGuire had inflicted the prior injuries and then directed the jury to conclude that the prior abuser was the murderer. Because the instruction may have relieved the State of its burden of proving the identity of Tori’s murderer beyond a reasonable doubt, I would hold that the instruction was error and remand to the Court of Appeals for a determination of whether that error was harmless.

The fact that a 6-month-old child was repeatedly beaten in the course of her short life is so horrifying that a trial court should take special care to inform the jury as to the significance of that evidence. As the Court notes, the demonstration of battered child syndrome is relevant because it “ ‘indicates that a child found with [serious, repeated injuries] has not suffered those injuries by accidental means,’ ” ante, at 68 (quoting People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 507; 95 Cal. Rptr. 919, 921 (1971)). L therefore agree that proof of Tori’s battered child status, although “not linked by any direct evidence to McGuire,” was properly admitted because “the evidence demonstrated that Tori’s death was the result of an intentional act by someone, and not an accident.” Ante, at 69. Precisely because the relevance of battered child syndrome is not tied to the identity of the abuser, however, I believe that a jury instruction clarifying the limited probative value of that evidence was required.

Instead of an instruction limiting the use of evidence of Tori’s prior injuries, the trial judge gave an instruction limiting the use of evidence of McGuire’s prior bad acts. In so doing, the trial judge himself appears to have assumed that the prior injuries could be attributed to McGuire. The judge told the jury that “[ejvidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the Defendant committed acts similar to those constituting a crime other than that for which he is on trial.” App. 40. The State concedes that this category of evidence encompasses both the acts for which McGuire was positively identified as the actor (carrying the child by one arm and roughly pinching her cheeks) and the far more brutal acts for which no actor was identified (the fractured ribs and the rectal tearing). The grouping of these two distinct classes of evidence created a reasonable likelihood that the jury would believe that McGuire had been identified — at least in the eyes of the trial judge — as the prior abuser.

The trial court’s error in implying that McGuire had been identified as the prior abuser was compounded by its further instruction that, if the jury found a “clear connection” between the prior offénses and the charged offense, “it may be logically concluded that if the Defendant committed other offenses, he also committed the crime charged in this case.” The Court finds it “likely” that the jury understood the instruction to mean that “if it found a ‘clear connection’ between the prior injuries and the instant injuries, and if it found that McGuire had committed the prior injuries, then it could use that fact in determining that McGuire committed the crime charged.” Ante, at 75. In my view, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury did not understand this single sentence to establish a two-step process.

The jury was instructed to “consider” the evidence that McGuire had “committed acts similar” to the crime charged and to “determin[e]” whether there was a “clear connection” between these prior acts and the ones that resulted in Tori’s death. App. 40, 41. The trial court did not instruct the jury that it must first “determine” whether McGuire had in fact inflicted the prior injuries. The part of the instruction relied upon by the Court — “it may be logically concluded that if the defendant committed other offenses, he also committed the crime charged in this case” — does not make clear that it is the jury’s role to ascertain whether McGuire was the perpetrator of the prior abuse. Rather, coming as it does in the middle of what appears to be a conclusion of law, it is reasonably likely that the jury understood that such a determination had already been made and that its role was merely to determine if there was a “clear connection” between Tori’s prior injuries and the injuries that killed her.

Although we “have defined the category of infractions that violate ‘fundamental fairness’ very narrowly,” Dowling v. United States, 493 U. S. 342, 352 (1990), it is well established that the fundamental fairness guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79, 85 (1986). This constitutional principle “prohibits the State from using evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge that have the effect of relieving the State of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of a crime.” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307, 313 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510 (1979). Thus, we have held that mandatory presumptions violate the Due Process Clause if they relieve the State of the burden of persuasion on an element of the offense. Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197, 215 (1977); Sandstrom, supra, at 520-524. By contrast, a permissive inference is not a violation of due process because the State still has the burden of persuading the jury that the suggested conclusion should be inferred based on the predicate facts proved. Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140, 157-163 (1979).

In this case, the instruction perhaps was intended to posit a permissive inference that whoever had inflicted Tori’s prior injuries was likely to have inflicted the injuries that caused her death. But the trial court did not make clear that the State first had to prove the predicate facts from which the inference was to be drawn. Furthermore, the wording of the instruction is such that the jury may well have assumed that it had no choice but to “logically conclud[e]” that McGuire was the murderer once it found a “clear connection” between the prior injuries and the fatal ones. Because I cannot say with any confidence that the instruction allowed a mere permissive inference drawing from proven facts, I think the instruction should be treated as a mandatory presumption that may have relieved the State of its burden of proving the identity of Tori’s killer beyond a reasonable doubt.

Had the instruction been clearly worded, I would agree with the Court that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence in the record to support a finding that McGuire was the perpetrator of the prior injuries. After all, as the Court points out, “[t]he proof of battered child syndrome itself narrowed the group of possible perpetrators to McGuire and his wife, because they were the only two people regularly caring for Tori.” Ante, at 74. In this case, however, it is important to remember that the other person regularly caring for Tori — Daisy McGuire — took the stand and testified, under a grant of immunity, that she was the one who inflicted the fatal injuries on the night of July 7, 1981.

McGuire’s jury deliberated for three days before returning a verdict of guilty. Any evaluation of the jury instruction must be conducted against the background of Daisy McGuire’s surprise testimony and the dilemma it so clearly posed for the jury. In my view, the jury instruction on similar acts was so “ambiguous,” ante, at 72, that there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury was encouraged to make assumptions and conclusions about the identity of Tori’s murderer that relieved the State of having to prove that element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In cases where the Court has found that jury instructions included mandatory presumptions inconsistent with the guarantees of the Due Process Clause, the Court has remanded to determine whether the erroneous instruction was harmless, which is the course that should be followed here. See, e. g., Sandstrom, supra, at 526-527; Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S. 570, 584 (1986); Carella v. California, 491 U. S. 263, 266-267 (1989) (per curiam).

       The court instructed the jury:
      “Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the Defendant committed acts similar to those constituting a crime other than that for which he is on trial. Such evidence, if believed, was not received, and may not be considered by you[,] to prove that he is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit crimes. Such evidence was received and may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show three things:
      “1. The impeachment of Daisy McGuire’s testimony that she had no cause to be afraid of the Defendant,
      “2. To establish the battered child syndrome, and
      “3. Also a clear connection between the other two offense[s] and the one of which the Defendant is accused, so that it may be logically concluded that if the Defendant committed other offenses, he also committed the crime charged in this case.
      “For the limited purpose for which you may consider such evidence, you must weigh it in the same manner as you do all other evidence in the case. You are not permitted to consider evidence for any other purpose.” App. 40-41.

       In this regard, we observe that the Ninth Circuit reached a similar result in Blair v. McCarthy, 881 F. 2d 602 (1989), cert. granted, 498 U. S. 807, vacated as moot and remanded, 498 U. S. 954 (1990). In that case, the Court of Appeals based its grant of habeas relief solely on a violation of state law that prejudiced the defendant. Blair v. McCarthy, supra, at 603-604. As our discussion above makes clear, such state-law violations provide no basis for federal habeas relief.

       Meticulous compliance with CAUIC 2.50, as in effect at McGuire’s trial, would have led the trial court to instruct the jury that the prior injury evidence
      “was received and may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show:

        “A characteristic method, plan or scheme in the commission of criminal acts similar to the method, plan or scheme used in the commission of the offense in this case which would further tend to show a clear connection between the other offense[s] and the one of which defendant is accused so that it may be logically concluded that if defendant committed the other offense[s] he also committed the crime charged in this case” (portion in italics was omitted from the actual jury instruction given at McGuire’s trial).

       We acknowledge that language in the later cases of Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U. S. 39 (1990), and Yates v. Evatt, 500 U. S. 391 (1991), might be read as endorsing a different standard of review for jury instructions. See Cage, supra, at 41 (“In construing the instruction, we consider how reasonable jurors could have understood the charge as a whole”); Yates, supra, at 401 (“We think a reasonable juror would have understood the [instruction] to mean . . In Boyde, however, we made it a point to settle on a single standard of review for jury instructions — the “reasonable likelihood” standard — after considering the many different phrasings that had previously been used by this Court. 494 U. S., at 379-380 (considering and rejecting standards that required examination of either what a reasonable juror “could” have done or “would” have done). So that we may once again speak with one voice on this issue, we now disapprove the standard of review language in Cage and Yates, and reaffirm the standard set out in Boyde.

       Because we need not reach the issue, we express no opinion on whether a state law would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of “prior crimes” evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime.

       Although not dispositive, it is worth noting that California’s model jury instructions on “evidence of other crimes” has since been revised to eliminate the phrase “so that it may be logically concluded.” See 1 California Jury Instructions, Criminal 2.50 (5th ed. 1987).