author: JENSEN, Circuit Judge.

text:
    2007 SD 93
    NORTHSTREAM INVESTMENTS, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. 1804 COUNTRY STORE CO., Defendant and Appellee.
    Nos. 24232, 24257.
    Supreme Court of South Dakota.
    Considered on Briefs March 21, 2007.
    Decided Aug. 29, 2007.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 9, 2007.

      Timothy M. Engel and Brittany L. No-votny of May, Adam, Gerdes & Thompson, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellant.
    James E. Carlon of Carlon Law Office Attorney, Pierre, South Dakota, for defendant and appellee.
   JENSEN, Circuit Judge.

[¶ 1.] This is the second appeal by Northstream Investments Inc. (North-stream) in its action to enforce a secured loan made by Security Bank N.A. (Security) to the 1804 Country Store Co. (1804 Store). The continuing question is the validity of a purported assignment of the 1804 Store loan from Security to North-stream. In Northstream Inv., Inc. v. 1804 Country Store Co., 2005 SD 61, ¶23, 697 N.W.2d 762, 768 (Northstream I), the Court remanded the case for trial after reversing the trial court’s summary judgment decision determining the assignment was invalid. This appeal is from the trial court’s decision on remand invalidating the assignment following trial. We reverse and remand to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of North-stream.

FACTS

[¶ 2.] In September 1991 the 1804 Store executed two promissory notes evidencing a loan obligation to Security. The notes were secured by a real estate mortgage, security agreement and stock pledge agreement. On June 10, 1992, Security’s shareholders voted to voluntarily liquidate the bank’s assets. The shareholders appointed Paul Nordstrom (Nordstrom) as liquidating agent for the bank and authorized Security’s board of directors to continue their duties until the bank’s assets were liquidated. Nordstrom controlled the majority interest in Security as the majority shareholder of Northstream, the bank’s holding company. The shareholders also approved the sale of substantially all of Security’s assets to First National Bank of Pierre (First National) as a part of the liquidation. First National chose not to purchase the 1804 Store loan and a number of other loans from Security.

[¶ 3.] After the sale to First National was completed, Security held its final directors meeting on December 22, 1992. Security continued to hold the loans rejected by First National, including the 1804 Store loan, at the time of the meeting. The directors unanimously approved the following resolution at the meeting:

A motion was made by Gaylord Norman to appoint Paul Nordstrom to serve as liquidating agent to transfer the remaining assets of [Security] to the bank’s holding company, Northstream Investments, the sole remaining shareholder, for exchange of stock.

[¶ 4.] The December 22, 1992 Minutes (Minutes) were typewritten and contain the typewritten words “Secretary” and “Marcie Nordstrom” at the bottom of the Minutes. No handwritten signature appears on the Minutes. Marcie Nordstrom was the corporate secretary for Security at this time. She testified that she did not sign the Minutes, but intended the typewritten name to be her signature on the document.

[¶ 5.] Trial testimony was undisputed that Security’s directors intended and believed that they assigned the remaining assets, including the 1804 Store loan, to Northstream at the December 22, 1992 meeting. Nordstrom testified that North-stream gave written notice to each borrower, including the 1804 Store, of the loans transferred from Security to Northstream. A written notice purportedly sent to all such borrowers was introduced into evidence, but no documentation was introduced to show that the notice was actually sent to the 1804 Store.

[¶ 6.] Harvey Wald (Wald), the sole shareholder of the 1804 Store, testified that the 1804 Store did not receive written notice of the assignment. Wald testified that the 1804 Store was aware of Security’s liquidation and began making payments to First National in January 1993 believing the loan was included in the First National sale. The 1804 Store was subsequently notified by phone that its loan had been transferred to Northstream and that loan payments should be made to North-stream. The 1804 Store then began making monthly payments to Northstream and continued to do so for more than six years.

[¶ 7.] The 1804 Store defaulted on its monthly payments in October 1999 and Northstream commenced this action for foreclosure of the mortgage; replevin of the personal property; and a judgment on the notes. Following a trial on remand from the first appeal, the trial court determined that the 1804 Store loan was a valid loan, but Northstream had no right to enforce the loan obligation because it was not properly assigned to Northstream. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusion of law and dismissed the action. Northstream appeals the trial court’s decision arguing that Security’s directors assigned the 1804 Store loan to Northstream at the December 22, 1992 director’s meeting and that the Minutes reflect that transfer.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

[¶ 8.] On appeal the trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review. Myers v. Eich, 2006 SD 69, ¶ 18, 720 N.W.2d 76,- 82 (additional citations omitted). Conclusions of law are reviewed under the de novo standard of review. Credit Collection Services, Inc. v. Pesicka, 2006 SD 81, ¶ 5, 721 N.W.2d 474, 476. Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo. Johnson v. Light, 2006 SD 88, ¶ 10, 723 N.W.2d 125, 127.

DECISION

[¶ 9.] The trial court invalidated the purported assignment between Security and Northstream for three reasons, all of which related' to the statute of frauds defense raised by the 1804 Store. First, the trial court concluded the Minutes did not satisfy the signature requirement of the statute of frauds because they were not hand signed by Security’s corporate secretary. Second, the trial court reasoned that the Minutes did not clearly show a present intent by Security to assign the 1804 Store loan to Northstream. Finally, the trial court determined that the subject matter of the assignment was not sufficiently described in the Minutes. Northstream claims that the trial court erred as to all of these determinations.

[¶ 10.] The 1804 Store does not contest the validity of its loan obligation in this litigation. It only disputes the validity of the purported assignment between Security and Northstream. Neither party has addressed the question of whether the 1804 Store has standing to assert the statute of frauds defense as it relates to the purported assignment between Security and Northstream.

[¶ 11.] We do not decide this appeal on the standing issue because it has not been properly raised. Nor do we adopt the authorities discussed in the footnote below. Nonetheless, the standing issue bears mentioning because it highlights the difficulty of the 1804 Store as a stranger to the purported assignment relying upon the statute of frauds defense. “The primary purpose of the statute of frauds is evidentiary in nature.” Northstream I, 2005 SD 61, ¶ 17, 697 N.W.2d at 766. The writing requirement of the statute of frauds ensures, reliable evidence is presented before a contract obligation is enforced against one of the parties to the contract. See SDCL 53-8-2. In this instance, the two parties to the purported assignment, Security and Northstream, both agree that the 1804 Store loan was assigned to Northstream on December 22, 1992. This undisputed fact, along with the writing relied upon by Northstream, is ultimately dispositive of this appeal.

Signature Requirement

[¶ 12.] The Court concluded in Northstream I that the mortgage assignment must be in writing because it involves an interest in real estate. 2005 SD 61, ¶¶ 12-15, 697 N.W.2d at 765-66. The statute of frauds contained in SDCL 53-8-2 provides that those contracts required to be in writing are not enforceable “unless the contract or some memorandum thereof is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged.... ” (emphasis added). The trial court’s decision seems to interpret the statute of frauds as requiring a handwritten signature on the document. While the Court has not previously addressed the meaning of the term “subscribed” under SDCL 53-8-2, the term is inclusive of more than a handwritten signature.

[¶ 13.] Courts from other jurisdictions have consistently approved of a typewritten signature to authenticate a memorandum or contract if the party intended the typewritten name or symbol to be his or her act authenticating the document. Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 188 F.2d 569 (9th Cir.1951), cert denied 342 U.S. 820, 72 S.Ct. 37, 96 L.Ed. 620 (1951); Rader Co. v. Stone, 178 Cal.App.3d 10, 223 Cal.Rptr. 806, 812 (1986); Irving v. Goodimate Co., 320 Mass. 454, 458, 70 N.E.2d 414, 416 (1946); Hansen v. Hill, 215 Neb. 573, 579, 340 N.W.2d 8, 12 (1983); Radke v. Brenon, 271 Minn. 35, 40, 134 N.W.2d 887, 891 (1965); Hillstrom v. Gosnay, 188 Mont. 388, 394, 614 P.2d 466, 469 (1980); Weber v. DeCecco, 1 N.J.Super. 353, 356, 61 A.2d 651, 653 (1948); Frohn v. Central Trust Co., 72 N.E.2d 303, 304 (Ohio Ct.App.1946); see also Restatement Contracts (Second) § 210 (1932); Restatement (Second) Contracts § 134 (1981). “The traditional form of signature is, of course, the handwritten name of the signer. But initials or any symbol may also be used; and the signature may be written in pencil, typed, printed, made with a rubber stamp or impressed into the paper.” George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 115 Idaho 386, 766 P.2d 1267, 1270 (1988). “It is generally held that a typewritten ‘signature’ may be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, but only if the party intends to authenticate the instrument by that act.” Jerry Harmon Motors, Inc. v, First National Bank and Trust Co., 472 N.W.2d 748, 753 (N.D.1991) (citations omitted).

[¶ 14.] We hold that the term “subscribed” contained in SDCL 53-8-2 may include a typewritten name or other symbol of authentication where the party intends such act to be his or her signature on the document. The trial court concluded that the corporate secretary’s typewritten name “did not satisfy the signature requirement,” but made no finding whether the corporate secretary intended the typewritten name to be her signature on the Minutes.

[¶ 15.] Marcie Nordstrom testified that she intended the typewritten name to be her signature on the Minutes. The testimony of the other former officers and directors of Security involved in the meeting supported her testimony. Security was the party to be charged with the obligation to assign the 1804 Store loan to Northstream for the purpose of the statute of frauds. Where the corporate secretary, authorized to act on behalf of the party to be charged with the obligation, testifies that she intended the typewritten name to be her signature and authentication of the document, this satisfies the evidentiary purpose of the statute of frauds as a matter of law. There is no factual issue on intent in this record and the Minutes were subscribed by the party to be charged under SDCL 53-8-2. But see Jerry Harmon Motors, 472 N.W.2d at 753, (holding by the North Dakota Supreme Court that a factual issue on intent existed for the jury where the party to be charged disputed that a corporate officer’s typewritten name below a signature line was intended to be his signature).

Present Intent to Assign the Loan

[¶ 16.] The trial court found that the “Minutes do not demonstrate clear evidence of a present intent to assign the 1804 Store loan.” The Court stated in Northstream I that “it must be clear that the party intended a present transfer of rights and did not merely bind himself to make a.future transfer.” 2005 SD 61, ¶ 15, 697 N.W.2d at 766. “Typically, any language, however informal, will be sufficient to show the intent of the assignor.” Id. The Court in Northstream I determined from the Minutes that an ambiguity or fact question existed concerning “whether Security Bank’s Board of Directors intended their action to be a present assignment of their interest, or a statement merely authorizing the assignment to be carried out at a later date.” Id. ¶ 20, 697 N.W.2d 762. Because there was absence from the record of “any testimony as to the intent of the [directors]” the Court remanded the case for such evidence to be received and considered. Id.

[¶ 17.] We have held that where a contract is uncertain or ambiguous, parol or extrinsic evidence may be used to determine the parties’ intent. Kling v. Stern, 2007 SD 51, ¶ 8, 733 N.W.2d 615, 618; Hanks v. Corson County Board of County Commissioners, 2007 SD 10, 10, 727 N.W.2d 296, 301 (quoting Pauley v. Simonson, 2006 SD 73, 8, 720 N.W.2d 665, 668 (citing Jensen v. Pure Plant Food Intern., Ltd., 274 N.W.2d 261, 263-264 (S.D.1979))). The trial court received par-ol evidence consistent with the directive in Northstream I, but did not consider this uncontroverted testimony on the issue of the intent to assign.

[¶ 18.] This evidence shows that December 22 was the final meeting of Security’s directors. Security’s directors intended and believed the remaining assets, including the 1804 Store loan, were assigned from Security to Northstream at the meeting. Following this meeting, the attorney handling Security’s liquidation sent Nordstrom a letter on January 15, 1993, stating, “I understand you have completed the transfer of all of the assets of the Bank to the Bank’s shareholders....” This letter directs Nordstrom to send the final report of Security’s liquidation to the Comptroller of the Currency. Nordstrom sent the final report of liquidation to the Comptroller of the Currency, along with the Bank’s original charter, on January 21, 1993. The final report of liquidation, signed by Nordstrom as being true and correct, represented that Security had no remaining assets.

[1Í 19.] The 1804 Store presented no evidence to dispute this testimony. Wald testified that he questioned whether an assignment was made to Northstream. However, the 1804 Store began making monthly payments to Northstream after being advised that the loan was transferred to Northstream. The 1804 Store continued to do so for more than six years until the default occurred.

[¶ 20.] The trial court’s findings of fact on the issue of intent are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. Under clearly erroneous review, “[w]e will overturn the trial court’s findings of fact on appeal only when a complete review of the evidence leaves the Court with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Hanks, 2007 SD 10, 9, 727 N.W.2d at 301. In Hanks, we upheld the trial court’s interpretation of an ambiguous contract where the trial court “properly considered the contract language together with extrinsic evidence to determine the intended scope of the agreement.” Id. 10, 727 N.W.2d 296.

[¶ 21.] In its memorandum opinion incorporated into the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court stated that it believed testimony that Security’s directors intended to transfer the remaining assets from Security to Northstream at the December 22, 1992 meeting. However, the trial court rejected this extrinsic evidence stating that this “intent must be expressed in writing, which it is not.” The trial court’s failure to consider the extrinsic evidence was contrary to the Court’s direction in Northstream I to consider testimony as to the intent of the directors of Security at the December 22, 1992 meeting.

[¶ 22.] The Minutes provide satisfactory written evidence under the statute of frauds to show that Security intended to assign its remaining assets to North-stream. The undisputed testimony, which the trial court believed, clearly shows that Security had a present intent at the December 22, 1992 meeting to make an assignment to Northstream. We are convinced on this record that the trial court was clearly erroneous in determining otherwise.

Sufficiency of the description of the subject matter

[IT 23.] The language of an assignment must “describe the subject matter of the assignment.” Northstream I, 2005 SD 61, ¶ 15, 697 N.W.2d at 766. The Minutes provide only a general description of the subject matter of the assignment. The description consists of the “remaining assets of Security.” The trial court found that the Minutes did not “describe any asset to be assigned or the subject matter of the assignment” and concluded that “the remaining assets” language did not satisfy the statute of frauds.

[¶ 24.] The weight of authorities suggest that the statute of frauds does not render a general written description of the subject matter of an assignment unenforceable where the more specific description is proved through extrinsic evidence. The description of the subject matter of an assignment “need not be done with any greater particularity than is actually necessary, with the aid of surrounding circumstances.” 6 Am.Jur.2d Assignments 117. The sufficiency of the description of the subject matter of the assignment “var[ies] to some extent with the facts of an individual case[,]” if the description is sufficiently definite that, “armed with it and aided by competent extraneous evidence, parol or otherwise, the property covered may with certainty be identified, the description is sufficient.” Northwestern Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. A.M. Cameron Co., 212 F.2d 484, 485 (1954). However, if the description is “so inherently vague and indefinite” that this may not be done then extraneous evidence will not “supply the deficiency.” Id.

[¶ 25.] This is consistent with our case law allowing parol evidence to provide the specific description of the subject matter of a contract required to be in writing. “A general description of the land which is the subject matter of the contract is sufficient, and parol evidence may be admitted to provide the more particular description.” Jacobson v. Gulbransen, 2001 SD 33, ¶ 15, 623 N.W.2d 84, 89 (citing Amdahl v. Lowe, 471 N.W.2d 770, 775 (SD 1991)). The Jacobson court further stated:

The agreement itself need not be the writing relied upon, a memorandum evidencing the obligation is sufficient. SDCL 53-8-2. “The memorandum serves to furnish written evidence of the obligation to be enforced against the party who subscribes his name to the memorandum; that is, a memorandum is not required to make a contract but merely to evidence in writing that a contract has been entered into.” The memorandum need not embody the exact terms of the contract; “it is sufficient that the substance of a contract for the purchase of real property is inferred from the writing[.]”

Id. (citing Wiggins v. Shewmake, 374 N.W.2d 111, 114 (S.D.1985)).

[¶ 26.] The Minutes evidence that Security was assigning all its assets to Northstream. The testimony at trial was undisputed that Security and Northstream both understood that these assets included the loans which were not sold to First National, including the 1804 Store loan. This evidence satisfies both the statute of frauds and the requirement for a valid assignment to adequately describe the subject matter of the assignment. “There is no fatal ambiguity if the contract terms are sufficiently certain to make the acts required of each party clearly ascertainable.” Amdahl, 471 N.W.2d at 775.

[¶ 27.] The trial court erred in its legal conclusion that the Minutes failed to “adequately describe the subject matter” of the assignment. Further, there are no disputed facts as to the specific assets assigned to Northstream to create any issue of fact, and Northstream is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this issue.

CONCLUSION

[¶ 28.] Northstream I stated that on remand the record should be developed on the issue of the notice of assignment to the 1804 Store. The issue of the notice of assignment to the 1804 Store is not directly raised by either party on this appeal, but the trial court’s findings and the record show that notice was provided to the 1804 Store, albeit both belated and informal. In Northstream I, the Court stated that “no special form of notice is required; any notice is adequate, even if not formally given.” 2005 SD 61, ¶ 18, 697 N.W.2d at 767. The record establishes the requisite notice for an assignment and that the 1804 Store loan was assigned to Northstream. Accordingly, Northstream has a right to enforce the loan against the 1804 Store.

[¶ 29.] We reverse the dismissal of this action by the trial court and remand for entry of a judgment in favor of North-stream consistent with its claim for relief and the evidence presented at trial.

[1130.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SABERS, KONENKAMP and MEIERHENRY, Justices, concur.

[¶ 31.] JENSEN, Circuit Judge, for ZINTER, Justice, disqualified.

      . Restatement Contracts (Second) § 144 (1981) provides that "[o]nly parties to a contract and their transferees and successors can take advantage of the Statute of Frauds.” Comment b to Restatement (Second) Contracts § 324 (1981) addressing the "Mode of Assignment in General,” states that assignments required to be in writing by the Statute of Frauds generally may not be enforced:
      against an assignor unless there is a memorandum in writing or some substitute formality, but under the rule stated in § 144 of this Restatement they cannot ordinarily be asserted by third persons, including the ob-ligor of an assigned right. Notwithstanding non-compliance with the Statute, therefore, the assignment is effective against the obli-gor. Moreover, the obligor discharges his duty by performing in accordance with the assignment, and the assignee can keep the benefit of the performance.

        See also Fjelland v. Wemhoff, 249 N.W.2d 634, 638 (Iowa 1977) (stating that if both parties admit the existence of an oral contract, it is irrelevant that a stranger objects)(overruled on other grounds).

      . The trial court placed reliance upon the corporate secretary’s testimony that she customarily hand signed the Minutes of the prior directors meeting after their approval at the next meeting. She testified that she did not hand sign the Minutes here because there were no further meetings after the Minutes. It is noteworthy that the corporate Minutes introduced into evidence that were hand signed in the past all had a line for the signature above the typewritten name. The Minutes do not have such a line above the typewritten name.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: STREIT, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD, Appellee, v. Michael D. BLAZEK, Appellant.
    No. 07-0507.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Sept. 21, 2007.

      Michael J. Carroll of Babich, Goldman, Cashatt & Renzo, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
    Charles L. Harrington and Teresa A. Vens, Des Moines, for appellee.
   STREIT, Justice.

An Iowa attorney was convicted in federal court of four felonies involving sexual misconduct and children. Because he is unfit to practice law, we revoke his license.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

Michael Blazek was admitted to the Iowa bar in 1987. He is currently serving a 235-month sentence in a federal prison in Marion, Illinois. He was convicted on February 20, 2004 of the following felonies: (1) attempted enticement of a minor for sex, (2) traveling in interstate commerce to engage in sex with a minor, (3) receipt of visual depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, and (4) possession of visual depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. United States v. Blazek, 431 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1082, 126 S.Ct. 1800, 164 L.Ed.2d 538 (2006). The eighth circuit court of appeals summarized the underlying facts:

In July 2001, Blazek entered an internet “male for male” chat room from his computer in Des Moines and then sent an instant message asking “Brian” for his age and location. Brian responded that he was a 15 year old male in Chicago. Brian was in fact Inspector Dan Everett of the Chicago Police Department posing as a teenage boy to investigate internet crimes against children. Blazek and Brian discussed their respective sexual experiences. Blazek stated that he preferred “[yjounger smooth guys” and described his sexual preferences. Blazek and Brian continued their instant message and e-mail conversations for fifteen months. At the end of May 2002, Bla-zek became more explicitly sexual, inviting Brian to give him a massage and suggesting it could lead to sex. In July, Blazek gave a detailed description of how he would massage Brian and said, “[sjometimes when guys get playful they lose their clothes.” In September, Bla-zek engaged in graphic sexual conversations, discussing oral sex and suggesting a three-way sexual encounter with one of Brian’s friends.
Blazek arranged to meet Brian on October 26 at a restaurant in Chicago. Bla-zek was arrested when he arrived at the restaurant from Iowa.... After Blazek traveled to Chicago, postal inspectors obtained a warrant, searched his apartment, and seized his computer. They found hundreds of images and movies of child pornography.

Id. at 1106-07.

In June 2006, the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board (Board) filed a complaint against Blazek based on these criminal convictions. The Board alleged Blazek violated Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers DR 1-102(A)(1) (attorney shall not violate a disciplinary rule), DR 1-102(A)(3) (attorney shall not engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude), and DR 1-102(A)(6) (attorney shall not engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the practice of law). The Commission found Blazek violated these rules and recommended revocation of his law license.

This conviction was not Blazek’s first. In December 1997, he pled guilty in federal court to a felony charge of knowingly engaging in sexual contact with a child under twelve. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Blazek, 590 N.W.2d 501, 502 (1999). That incident stemmed from a family reunion on a cruise ship where Blazek sexually assaulted his eleven-year-old nephew by fondling the boy’s bare buttocks and genitals. Id. Bla-zek was sentenced to twelve months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. Id. Based on this incident, we suspended Blazek’s law license indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for two years. Id. at 504.

II. Scope of Review.

We review the findings of the Grievance Commission de novo. Iowa Ct. R. 35.10(1). We give weight to the Commission’s findings but we are not bound by those findings. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGrath, 713 N.W.2d 682, 695 (Iowa 2006). The Board has the burden to prove disciplinary violations by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. D’Angelo, 710 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Iowa 2006). This burden is “ ‘less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but more than the preponderance standard required in the usual civil case.’ ” Id. (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Lett, 674 N.W.2d 139, 142 (Iowa 2004)).

III. Ethical Violations.

Blazek is precluded from relitigat-ing the findings made in the underlying criminal action which is the basis of the Board’s present claim. See Iowa Code § 602.10122(1) (2005) (stating “[t]he record of conviction is conclusive evidence” in an attorney disciplinary action); Iowa Ct. R. 35.7(3) (allowing issue preclusion to be used by either party in a lawyer disciplinary case if certain conditions are met); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Iversen, 723 N.W.2d 806, 809 (Iowa 2006) (holding attorney was “barred from relitigating the issue of his criminal conduct in this disciplinary action”).

We agree with the Commission Blazek’s criminal misconduct violated DR 1-102(A)(1), DR 1-102(A)(3), and DR 1-102(A)(6). We have previously defined “moral turpitude” as “an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the duties which one person owes to another or to society in general....” Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Tompkins, 415 N.W.2d 620, 623 (Iowa 1987) (citing Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Patterson, 369 N.W.2d 798, 801 (Iowa 1985)). Certainly attempted enticement of a minor for sex and possession of child pornography fit this definition. See Blazek, 590 N.W.2d at 503; Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Lindaman, 449 N.W.2d 341, 342 (Iowa 1989). Moreover, such conduct adversely reflects on the practice of law. As the Commission stated, “[Blazekfs conduct is an embarrassment to the bar and to our system of justice.” See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Thompson, 595 N.W.2d 132, 134 (Iowa 1999) (stating the public’s confidence in our profession is lessened when a lawyer violates the law).

IV.Sanction.

We now turn to the appropriate sanction to address Blazek’s unethical and criminal conduct. “We consider ‘the nature of the violations, protection of the public, deterrence of similar misconduct by others, the lawyer’s fitness to practice, and our duty to uphold the integrity of the profession in the eyes of the public.’ ” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Rickabaugh, 728 N.W.2d 375, 381 (Iowa 2007) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Fleming, 602 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 1999)). We also consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id. “Ultimately, the form and extent of a disciplinary sanction ‘must be tailored to the specific facts and circumstances of each individual case.’ ” Id. at 381-82 (quoting Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Rogers, 313 N.W.2d 535, 537 (Iowa 1981)).

We agree with the Commission revocation is the appropriate sanction. See Iowa Code § 602.10122(1) (stating a felony conviction is sufficient cause for revocation or suspension). In Lindaman, we revoked an attorney’s license after he pleaded guilty to two counts of lascivious acts with a child. Lindaman, 449 N.W.2d at 343. There, we found the attorney’s “ethical violations so serious and dangerous to the public, we [thought] any sanction less than revocation would do violence to our professional code of responsibility.” Id. In Blazek’s first disciplinary action, he successfully distinguished his situation from Lindaman. We said “Blazek has not tried to defend his improper actions and admits to the ethical violations. Further, he has taken significant steps toward rehabilitation and shows minimal risk of reoffense, unlike Lindaman.” Blazek, 590 N.W.2d at 504.

Blazek cannot distinguish this case from Lindaman. He continued to prey on minor children and indulge his pedophilia after his first conviction. His behavior is reprehensible. We gave him the opportunity to redeem himself and he squandered it. He is unfit to practice law.

Blazek urges us to delay our decision regarding revocation while his post-conviction claims are pending. He claims to have a “good faith basis to request that the underlying judgment be set aside.” It appears Blazek intends to argue in his request for post-conviction relief that he could not have committed the crimes of attempted enticement of a minor for sex and traveling in interstate commerce to engage in sex with a minor because the person with whom he was “chatting” online was an adult posing as a minor. But see United States v. Helder, 452 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir.2006) (holding the crime of attempting to entice a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity does not require the intended victim to be an actual minor); United States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945, 959-60 (10th Cir.2005) (same); United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 717-20 (9th Cir.2004) (same); United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1227-28 (11th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1176, 123 S.Ct. 1006, 154 L.Ed.2d 921 (2003) (same); United States v. Farner, 251 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir.2001) (same). However, even if he were successful, it still does not change the fact Blazek intended to entice a minor and took steps to act on that intent. Nor does it change the fact Blazek possessed hundreds of images of child pornography. We therefore find it unnecessary to delay our decision pending the outcome of Blazek’s post-conviction claims.

V. Conclusion.

We revoke Blazek’s license to practice law in the State of Iowa. Costs are taxed to Blazek pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.25(1).

LICENSE REVOKED.

      . Blazek’s suspension ran from March 7, 1997, the date of his temporary suspension. His license was reinstated on September 2, 1999.


author: HECHT, Justice. WIGGINS, Justice

text:
    In the Matter of Michael Patrick NASH, Applicant for the Iowa Bar Examination.
    No. 07-0286.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Sept. 21, 2007.
    Mark McCormick of Belin Lamson McCormick Zumbach Flynn, P.C., Des Moines, for applicant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Jeanie Kunkle Vaudt, Assistant Attorney General, for Iowa Board of Law Examiners.
   HECHT, Justice.

Michael Nash seeks review of the Iowa board of law examiners’ denial of his application to take the Iowa bar examination. After holding an evidentiary hearing on the question whether Nash possesses the requisite character and fitness to practice law, the board denied Nash’s application. We conclude Nash has satisfied his burden to demonstrate his good moral character and fitness to practice law. We therefore reverse the board’s denial of his application and grant his petition for permission to take the bar examination.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On February 24, 2006, Michael Nash, a third-year law student at Creighton University School of Law, submitted an application to take the July 2006 Iowa bar exam. Question 32(h) of the application inquired whether Nash had ever been “formally or informally investigated, reprimanded, disciplined, discharged or asked to resign by an employer or educational institution for misconduct, including ... actions in disregard for health, safety and welfare of others.” Nash responded in the affirmative, disclosing in 2002 he was accused of sexually abusing a minor approximately twenty years earlier while he was employed as a Roman Catholic priest in Juneau, Alaska.

Upon receipt of Nash’s application, the board initiated an investigation of his moral character and fitness to practice law. See Iowa Ct. R. 31.9(1) (2006) (“The Iowa board of law examiners shall make an investigation of the moral character and fitness of any applicant and may procure the services of any bar association, agency, organization, or individual qualified to make a moral character or fitness report.”). After completing its initial investigation into the sexual abuse allegations, the board notified Nash that his application to take the bar examination had been denied. See Iowa Ct. R. 31.11(3).

Nash filed a timely written request for a hearing before the board. He also requested, and the board granted, leave to take the bar examination pending the hearing. The board set a hearing date and appointed one of its attorney-members as the hearing officer. See Iowa Ct. R. 31.11(3) (d). Following the hearing, the hearing officer prepared a summary of the testimony and exhibits which he provided for consideration by the other members of the board. See Iowa Ct. R. 31.11(3)(⅞). The following is a brief summary of the relevant hearing evidence.

Nash was ordained a Roman Catholic priest in May 1980 and assigned to a church in Juneau, Alaska. During his early years as a priest, Nash was primarily involved in youth ministry in the Juneau diocese. In that capacity, Nash organized and led trips outside of Alaska for children in the diocese during the 1980s. Nash arranged the trips to occur during his personal summer vacation time, when he would be traveling to visit friends in the lower forty-eight states. While on the trips, the groups visited tourist sites, cathedrals, amusement parks, and an occasional play or show. Nash used the trips to give the children, many of whom hailed from logging camps, a “crash course” in basic manners, a broader world view, and a larger sense of the church. Nash invited only teenagers on these trips because they were able to take care of their own basic needs. On occasion, Nash piloted an airplane owned by the diocese to facilitate the trips.

Nash admitted he used spanking, tickling, push-ups, and sit-ups as disciplinary techniques during the trips. Nash further conceded he sometimes required the boys to remove their trousers prior to the spanking, tickling, or calisthenics. Nash denied he was sexually motivated in his choices of these disciplinary techniques, but stated he intended the experience to humiliate the children and encourage them to modify the behaviors for which they were disciplined. Nash employed the spankings and calisthenics as disciplinary techniques because as an adolescent he had experienced similar forms of punishment at a Catholic summer camp.

Nash also admitted that from 1981 to 2002 he often requested or “cajoled” boys under his watch to massage his feet and' neck. He typically requested the massages when he was tired from flying, driving, or walking for a long period of time. Nash admitted the massages occasionally may have occurred behind closed doors with only one boy present, but denied any sexual motivation for such conduct. Nash remained clothed at all times during the massages.

The board presented other evidence of alleged improprieties that were denied by Nash. One witness, Tracy Mettler, alleged Nash disciplined him on at least three occasions by spanking his bare buttocks. Mettler claimed his genitals were touched by Nash during these spankings which allegedly occurred in the late 1970s or early 1980s. Nash denies recollection of any contact with Mettler, but admits he occasionally issued bare-bottom spankings to children during that time period. Nash denies ever touching a boy’s genitals while administering a spanking.

In 1989, after receiving a complaint by a parent upset about the disciplinary techniques used on her child during a summer trip, the bishop of the Juneau Diocese met with Nash. Nash told the bishop he was experiencing “burn-out” and was considering leaving the priesthood. In lieu of resignation, the bishop and Nash agreed that Nash would undergo an evaluation at a voluntary, long-term, custodial care residential center for Roman Catholic priests. Nash entered, and completed in 1990, a five-month residential holistic health program recommended in the evaluation report. The later stages of Nash’s therapy sessions focused on the appropriateness of his disciplinary techniques and the parameters of appropriate pastoral boundaries. The therapist recommended Nash redirect the focus of his ministry in order to become less closely involved with children. The record evidences that Nash complied with this recommendation when he resumed his parish responsibilities.

There are no allegations of improper conduct by Nash after the summer of 1989. In 1995, he was named diocese administrator by his fellow priests. Nash served in this capacity managing the day-to-day activities of the diocese until a permanent bishop was selected and installed in 1996. In July 1999, after taking a two-year sabbatical to earn a Master’s degree in theology with an emphasis in Christian ethics from the University of Louvain in Belgium, Nash returned to pastor a parish in Juneau. In 2001, he was appointed vicar general of the diocese and was authorized to take certain administrative actions in the Bishop’s absence.

In 2002, the Juneau Diocese investigated allegations that Nash engaged in inappropriate conduct with parish youths in the 1980s. The bishop appointed a review board consisting of parishioners to investigate the allegations. Before the review board, as he later did before the Iowa board of law examiners, Nash admitted using the disciplinary techniques described above. Although Nash steadfastly denied his conduct was sexually motivated, the information developed during the investigation was forwarded to the Vatican. On November 18, 2005, Nash was dismissed from the clerical state ex officio et pro bono Ecclesiae (for the good of the church).

At the hearing before the board of law examiners, Nash offered testimony of twelve individuals who attested to his good moral character. These witnesses included adults from the Juneau diocese, individuals who went on trips with Nash as youths during the 1980s, the dean and another faculty member from the Creighton University School of Law, and a law school classmate. In addition to the live testimony at the hearing, the board received nearly eighty letters of support for Nash’s application.

At the conclusion of the board hearing, counsel for the board of law examiners requested Nash be required to undergo a full sexual abuse evaluation. The hearing officer declined that request, but allowed Nash to supplement the hearing record with an evaluation from a Des Moines psychiatrist, Dr. Michael Taylor. The evaluation was performed and Dr. Taylor opined:

I find no evidence that Mr. Nash suffers from any diagnosable psychiatric disorder of any sort. Further, I find no evidence that Mr. Nash presents a risk of perpetrating abuse of any type upon any individual, minor or adult. Finally, I find no evidence that Mr. Nash possesses any mental disorder or personality traits which would, in any way, impair his ability to maintain the moral character and honesty expected of an Iowa lawyer.

After considering the hearing evidence, three members of the board voted in favor of Nash’s admission, and three members voted against it. Because the vote was evenly divided, the board declared its earlier decision affirmed by operation of law. Nash has requested our review of the board’s determination.

II. Scope of Review.

This court has exclusive authority to admit persons to the practice of law. Iowa Ct. R. 31.9(1). We therefore review the record de novo. In re Hanus, 627 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 2001).

III. Discussion.

An applicant for admission to the Iowa bar has the burden to demonstrate he or she “is a person of honesty, integrity and trustworthiness, and one who appreciates and will adhere to the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct....” Iowa Ct. R. 31.5. The board of law examiners makes an initial determination of the applicant’s moral character and fitness, but we have the authority to review the board’s decision. Iowa Ct. R. 31.9(1).

We have previously held a bar applicant must demonstrate the requisite moral character and fitness by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. Hanus, 627 N.W.2d at 224 (citing In re Peterson, 439 N.W.2d 165, 166 (Iowa 1989)). Although we queried in Harms whether it is the applicant’s burden to prove character and fitness by a convincing preponderance standard or by a mere preponderance of the evidence, we concluded the burden of proof did not control the outcome in that case because the applicant failed to establish his good moral character even under a preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. We conclude a more precise enunciation of the burden of proof is also unnecessary in this case because Nash’s proof of his character and fitness satisfies the more exacting convincing preponderance standard.

Those who apply for admission to the bar must demonstrate their honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness. Iowa Ct. R. 31.5(1). We require these character traits of bar applicants because attorneys are put in a position of considerable influence over their clients, whose trust in them must remain inviolate. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Hill, 540 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Iowa 1995) (“A person acting in a professional role can have a disproportionate influence on those they serve. They owe to the public a solemn duty to use their considerable influence with utmost discrimination. The metes and bounds of propriety in any professional relationship must be observed scrupulously because the professional role is held in trust”) (quoting Fisher v. Iowa Bd. of Optometry Exam’rs, 510 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Iowa 1994)); State v. Johnson, 149 Iowa 462, 128 N.W. 837, 839 (Iowa 1910) (“The relation between an attorney and his client must necessarily be one of great confidence, and an attorney who knowingly abuses the trust and confidence placed in him by his client is unfit for the profession and unworthy of a place therein.”). Nash’s admitted use of questionable disciplinary techniques was deemed by clerical authorities an abuse of his parishioners’ trust that led to his removal from the priesthood. The board contends these abuses of trust were so serious that Nash remains unfit to practice law notwithstanding his completion of a treatment program, his many subsequent years of appropriate priest-parishioner trust relationships, and his apology to those harmed by his earlier actions. We disagree.

While we certainly, do not condone Nash’s disciplinary techniques, we do not believe such noncriminal acts from seventeen (or more) years ago reflect poorly on his present moral character and fitness to practice law. Nash utilized the techniques when he was a relatively young and inexperienced priest dealing with misbehaving teenagers in remote logging camps of southeast Alaska in the 1980s. While those methods of discipline would certainly be considered inappropriate by today’s standards, when viewed in the social and historical context in which they were applied, they appear significantly less sinister. Bill Chalmers, a high school teacher in Juneau, testified he used similar techniques during the same era, and did not consider Nash’s behavior extraordinary when placed in historical context.

We believe Nash’s conduct over the past seventeen years is the best indicator of his present moral character and fitness to practice law. While passage of time between an act of misconduct and submission of an application for admission to the bar alone will usually not be sufficient evidence of present good moral character, see In re King, 212 Ariz. 559, 136 P.3d 878, 885 (2006), we are convinced Nash came to understand certain disciplinary techniques crossed appropriate pastoral boundaries. Following his treatment experience, Nash voluntarily avoided one-on-one interactions with parish children to avoid the appearance of impropriety. In 2006, as soon as the Catholic Church allowed him to speak with anyone involved in its investigation, Nash issued a written apology to the children whom he had improperly disciplined. He has earned 'and maintained -the support, admiration, and trust of nearly eighty individuals who testified and wrote letters supporting his admission to the bar. Nash’s testimony at the board hearing reflects sincere contrition for his actions in the 1980s. When compared with the considerable evidence of his good moral character during the past seventeen years, the decades-old inappropriate but noncriminal acts admitted by Nash are insufficient to support the board’s denial of Nash’s application to become a member of the Iowa bar.

IV. Conclusion.

' We have a duty to the citizens of Iowa to ensure the practice of law is reserved for individuals who will respect the trust inherent in the lawyer-client relationship. We conclude Michael Nash has established by a convincing preponderance of the evidence he possesses the requisite moral character and fitness for admission to the Iowa bar. We -therefore grant his application to take the Iowa bar examination.

PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO TAKE BAR EXAMINATION GRANTED.

All justices concur except WIGGINS, J., who dissents.

WIGGINS, Justice

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. As late as October 26, 2006, Nash filed a signed document acknowledging the public could consider his prior actions as sexual abuse. In this document, he stated:

I have come to realize that regardless of my intentions, these forms of discipline were inappropriate; more recently, these forms of discipline have even come to be considered by some to be sexually abusive. Indeed, I have since learned that these and other actions of mine were subjectively experienced as sexually abusive by a few boys with whom I had interacted.

I agree the acts to which Nash admitted to doing can be characterized as sexually abusive.

The majority bases its decision that Nash has the requisite moral character and fitness for admission to the Iowa bar on Nash’s conduct over the last seventeen years of his life. But as the majority notes, the last seventeen years occurred after Nash, entered a comprehensive five-month inpatient treatment program for the complaints Nash acknowledged could be construed as sexually abusive.

In another signed document, dated October 26, 2006, Nash opines the treatment he received allowed him to understand his actions were inappropriate. In discussing his treatment, he states:

You should know that some years ago, I participated in a renewal program where I addressed, among many other topics, my dealings with young people. I came to understand it was inappropriate and wrong of me to treat them as I did. I assure you I have not done such a thing for many, many years, nor will I in the future.

Unfortunately, any records of the treatment, diagnosis, or prognosis from that comprehensive inpatient program were unavailable to the board of law examiners or us for review.

Due to the prior admitted allegations and the unavailability of the prior treatment records, the board asked Nash to submit to a comprehensive evaluation to determine if he presents a risk to perpetrate sexual abuse. Nash refused, but instead saw a local psychiatrist, Dr. Michael Taylor, for an opinion on this subject. Although Dr. Taylor is a board certified psychiatrist, the record does not establish that he has special training or certification in the area of sexual abuse. Additionally, Dr. Taylor reached his conclusions after a brief visit, rather than through a comprehensive inpatient evaluation.

Under these circumstances, I do not feel Nash met his high burden to prove by a convincing preponderance of evidence that he has the requisite moral character and fitness for admission to the Iowa bar. However, I would not reject Nash’s application at this time. Before making a final decision, I would require Nash to complete the comprehensive inpatient treatment as requested by the board. Consequently, without such an evaluation I am unwilling to take the same chance as the majority to admit him as a member of the Iowa bar.

      . All references are to the Iowa Court Rules that were in effect at the time Nash filed his application in 2006.

      . Nash took the Iowa bar examination in July 2006, but the result has not been published pending our determination of his character and fitness to be a member of the Iowa bar.

      . In 2002 a former youth parishioner in Juneau, Joel Post, reported to the Juneau Diocese that Nash sexually abused him repeatedly in the early 1980s. Nash steadfastly denied the accusation. The allegations made by Post were investigated by the Juneau Diocesan Review Board over a period of five months. The review board found Post's allegations were lacking in credibility and did not communicate them to the Vatican as part of the review board’s report that later led to Nash's separation from the priesthood. The board of law examiners does not rely on the Post allegations to support its determination that Nash presently lacks the moral character to practice law in Iowa. Upon our de novo review, we find Post's allegations are not supported in the record, and therefore we assign no weight to them.

      . The hearing officer and two other attorney-members of the board voted for admission; two lay-members and another attorney-member voted against admission. One member abstained.


author: ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice.

text:
    MAVCO, INC. d/b/a Maverick Construction, Appellant v. Rodney EGGINK, et al., Respondents, Vermillion State Bank, et al., Defendants, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Respondent.
    No. A05-2018.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Aug. 23, 2007.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 10, 2007.

      Frank J. Rajkowski, St. Cloud, MN, for AppellanVPetitioner Mavco, Inc., d/b/a Maverick Construction.
    Robert J. Feigh, Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett, P.A., St. Cloud, MN, for Respondents Rodney Eggink and Karla Eggink.
    Thomas H. Boyd, John Charles Holper, Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for Respondent Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
    John M. Koneck, Joseph G. Springer, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for Amicus Curiae.
   OPINION

ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice.

Approximately four months after filing a mechanic’s lien statement against Rodney and Karla Eggink’s real property and serving a copy of the statement on the Egginks, Mavco, Inc. commenced an action in Sherburne County District Court to foreclose its lien. Three days before Mav-co filed its complaint, summons, and notice of lis pendens, the Egginks granted a mortgage on their property to Wells Fargo Bank. More than two months after Mavco commenced its action, Wells Fargo recorded its mortgage. Mavco was unaware of the mortgage when it filed its complaint and summons and did not name Wells Fargo as a defendant in its foreclosure action.

Mavco later learned of Wells Fargo’s mortgage but did not join Wells Fargo in its foreclosure action within the one-year timeframe set forth in Minn.Stat. § 514.12, subd. 3 (2006). In the meantime, Mavco and the Egginks reached a mediated settlement, but the Egginks failed to pay Mavco as agreed. Mavco then moved the district court to, among other things, grant Mavco leave to file a supplemental complaint against Wells Fargo and award Mavco’s lien priority over all other liens on the property. The court denied Mavco’s motion as to the supplemental complaint and awarded Wells Fargo’s mortgage priority over Mavco’s lien. Mavco appealed to the court of appeals, which affirmed. We reverse.

In 2003, respondents Rodney and Karla Eggink retained appellant Mavco, Inc. d/b/a Mavco Construction to provide labor and material to improve their real property in Sherburne County. Mavco worked on the property from May 20 to November 26. When the Egginks failed to pay for part of the work, Mavco filed a mechanic’s lien statement with the Sherburne County Recorder pursuant to MinmStat. § 514.08, subd. 2 (2006), and served a copy of the lien statement on the Egginks by certified mail. County records indicate that the mechanic’s lien statement was recorded on January 23, 2004, within the statutory time period, and the statement indicates that November 26, 2003, was the last day on which Mavco provided labor and materials to improve the Egginks’ property. It is apparently undisputed that the lien statement was properly filed, served, and recorded.

On May 14, 2004, the Egginks refinanced their debt on the property and granted a mortgage to respondent Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., which mortgage replaced two outstanding obligations to mortgagee Vermillion State Bank. Wells Fargo did not immediately record its mortgage. Three days after the Egginks granted the mortgage to Wells Fargo, Mavco commenced a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action by filing a complaint and summons in Sherburne County District Court. Mavco’s complaint named as defendants the Egginks and four other entities whose interests in the property were then of record. One of .these entities was Vermillion State Bank, which still had of record its two mortgages on the Egginks’ property — one dated February 12, 2001, and the other dated August 9, 2002. Wells Fargo was not among the parties named in Mavco’s complaint. Shortly after commencing its foreclosure action, Mavco filed with the Sherburne County Recorder a notice of lis pendens, as required by Minn. Stat. § 514.12, subd. 1 (2006), and the notice was recorded on May 19.

The Egginks were the only defendants who answered Mavco’s complaint. In their answer, dated June 30, the Egginks (1) denied that Vermillion State Bank had any mortgages on the property as alleged in Mavco’s complaint; and (2) alleged that Wells Fargo had a mortgage on the property. On July 28, Wells Fargo recorded its mortgage with the Sherburne County Recorder.

On August 5, Mavco served interrogatories on the Egginks, asking them to disclose the names of “all mortgag[ee]s who have had a lien on the property” since the Egginks acquired it. On November 3— approximately three weeks before the one-year anniversary of Mavco’s last day of work on the property — the Egginks responded, stating that the two mortgages previously held by Vermillion State Bank “were replaced in full by the May 14, 2004 mortgage to Wells Fargo.” Mavco did not join Wells Fargo as a party to its action after receiving the Egginks’ responses to its interrogatories.

In January 2005, Mavco and the Eg-ginks reached a mediated settlement under which the Egginks agreed to satisfy Mavco’s lien claim by paying Mavco $100,000 on or before March 5, 2005. The settlement agreement provided that if the Egginks failed to pay, judgment would be entered granting a hen on the property in the amount of $100,000 plus attorney’s fees and costs. The Egginks failed to make the agreed-upon payment, and Mavco moved the district court for an order that would (1) allow Mavco to file a supplemental complaint joining Wells Fargo as a party; (2) grant Mavco a lien in the amount of $100,000 plus attorney’s fees and costs; (3) award Mavco’s lien priority over all other liens on the property; and (4) order the Egginks’ property sold.

Following a hearing, the district court granted Mavco’s motion with respect to the $100,000 hen and ordered that the parties abide by the settlement agreement. But the court reserved judgment on Mav-co’s motion for a forced sale of the property and ordered that Wells Fargo’s mortgage take priority over Mavco’s hen. In support of its order, the court cited Morrison County Lumber Co. v. Duclos, 138 Minn. 20, 24, 163 N.W. 734, 736 (1917) for the proposition that a mechanic’s hen is inferior to the interest of any party whom a lienholder did not join in its foreclosure action within one year after the lienholder’s last day of work. The court also denied Mavco’s request for leave to file a supplemental complaint, concluding that Mavco could not use Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 to “circumvent” the one-year time limit set forth in section 514.12.

Mavco appealed the district court’s rulings on the lien priority and supplemental complaint issues, and a divided Minnesota Court of Appeals panel affirmed as to both issues. Mavco, Inc. v. Eggink, 720 N.W.2d 841, 844 (Minn.App.2006). We granted Mavco’s petition for further review in order to address the following questions: (1) whether Minn.Stat. § 514.12, subd. 3, operates to subordinate Mavco’s lien to Wells Fargo’s mortgage; and (2) whether Mavco can file a supplemental complaint against Wells Fargo that “relates back” under Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 to Mavco’s original complaint.

I.

Whether the district court properly subordinated Mavco’s mechanic’s lien to Wells Fargo’s mortgage under Minn.Stat. § 514.12, subd. 3, and certain related statutes is a question of law we review de novo. See Ryan Contracting, Inc. v. JAG Investments, Inc., 634 N.W.2d 176, 181 (Minn.2001). We have stated that the one-year time limit under section 514.12, subd. 3, “is a requirement for the creation of a lien action” and as such, must be strictly construed. Ryan Contracting, 634 N.W.2d at 183-84.

Minnesota Statutes § 514.12

As previously stated, the parties apparently agree that Mavco properly filed for record and served a copy of its mechanic’s lien statement on the Egginks before the Egginks granted a mortgage to Wells Fargo. Accordingly, the question before us is not whether Mavco preserved and perfected its mechanic’s lien, but rather, whether Mavco took all steps necessary to ensure that it could enforce its lien against Wells Fargo. A mechanic’s lien foreclosure action “may be commenced by any lienholder who has filed a lien statement for record and served a copy thereof on the owner,” Minn.Stat. § 514.11 (2006), but the lien-holder must meet certain statutory requirements that govern such actions. The requirements at the center of this dispute are set forth in Minn.Stat. § 514.12 (2006), which provides:

Subdivision 1. Recording. At the beginning of the action the plaintiff shall file for record with the county recorder * * * a notice of the pendency thereof* * *.
Subd. 2. One action for all. After such filing, no other action shall be commenced for the enforcement of any lien arising from the improvement described, but all such lienholders shall intervene in the original action by answer, as provided in section 514.11. Any such lien-holder not named as a defendant may answer the complaint and be admitted as a party. If more than one action shall be commenced in good faith, all shall be consolidated and tried as one, under such order of the court as may best protect the rights of all parties concerned.
Subd. 3. One-year limitation. No lien shall be enforced in any case unless the holder thereof shall assert the same, either by filing a complaint or answer with the court administrator, within one year after the date of the last item of the claim as set forth in the recorded lien statement; and, no person shall be bound by any judgment in such action unless made a party thereto within the year; and, as to a bona fide purchaser, mortgagee, or encumbrancer without notice, the absence from the record of a notice of lis pendens of an action after the expiration of the year in which the lien could be so asserted shall be conclusive evidence that the lien may no longer be enforced and, in the case of registered land, the registrar of titles shall refrain from carrying forward to new certificates of title the memorials of lien statements when no such notice of lis pendens has been registered within the period.

Mavco argues that when section 514.12 is read as a whole and in the broader context of MinmStat ch. 514, it is apparent that the only persons who must be joined in a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action within one year, in order for the lien to be enforceable against them, are persons who have an interest of record at the time the action is commenced. More specifically, Mavco asserts that a mechanic’s lien claimant is not precluded from enforcing its lien against another party more than one year after the completion of work if the other party did not record its interest in the subject property before the commencement of the action. Wells Fargo argues that section 514.12, subd. 3, must be strictly construed and that under the statute’s plain language as historically applied by Minnesota courts, a lien claimant’s failure to join any person with an interest in the subject property within one year results in the lien being unenforceable against that person. Amici Curiae Minnesota State Bar Association Construction Law and Real Property Law Sections (MSBA) assert that mechanic’s lienholders are the only persons against whom a mechanic’s lien may not be enforced after the one-year period for commencing a mechanic’s hen foreclosure action has expired.

Our analysis of the foregoing arguments draws on several key principles of statutory construction. First, “[t]he object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” MinmStat. § 645.16 (2006). Second, “ ‘[w]hen the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, that plain language must be followed.’ ” Am. Family Ins. Group v. Kiess, 697 N.W.2d 617, 620 (Minn.2005) (quoting Vlahos v. R & I Constr. of Bloomington, Inc., 676 N.W.2d 672, 679 (Minn. 2004)). Finally, we are required “to read a particular [clause] in context with other [clauses] of the same statute in order to determine the meaning of the particular [clause].” ILHC of Eagan, LLC v. County of Dakota, 693 N.W.2d 412, 419 (Minn.2005); see also Van Asperen v. Darling Olds, Inc., 254 Minn. 62, 74, 93 N.W.2d 690, 698 (1958) (“[T]he legislature must be presumed to have understood the effect of its words and intended the entire statute to be effective and certain.”).

Minnesota Statutes § 514.12 consists of three subdivisions, the third of which has three clauses. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with much of MSBA’s reasoning regarding the way in which these subdivisions and clauses interrelate to support a conclusion that mortgagees are not in the class of interest holders who must be joined in a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action within one year in order for the lien to be enforceable against them.

Subdivision 1 of section 514.12 is directed to mechanic’s lien claimants and requires claimants to record a notice of lis pendens “[a]t the beginning of’ a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action. Subdivision 2 is likewise directed to mechanic’s lien claimants in that it refers to “all such lienholders” after stating that only one action “shall be commenced for the enforcement of any lien arising from the improvement described” (Emphasis added.)

As noted above, subdivision 3 of section 514.12, contains three distinct clauses. The first of these clauses follows logically from subdivision 2 by telling mechanic’s lienholders that “[n]o hen shall be enforced in any case unless the holder thereof shall assert the same, either by filing a complaint or answer with the court administrator, within one year after the date of the last item of the claim as set forth in the recorded lien statement.” (Emphasis added.) This clause sets a time limit of one year from the last date of work performed by the lienholder for the lienholder to commence a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action and indicates the procedure for so doing-that is, filing a complaint or answer. But importantly, the clause does not specify which parties must be named as defendants in the action. The legislature addressed that question explicitly in Minn. Stat. § 514.11, which provides: “The action may be commenced by any lienholder who has filed a lien statement for record and served a copy thereof on the owner pursuant to section 514.08, and all other such lienholders shall be made defendants therein.” (Emphasis added.)

We now turn to the second clause of section 514.12, subd. 3, which provides, “no person shall be bound by any judgment in such action unless made a party thereto within the year.” The antecedent to “the year” in this second clause is plainly the year within which a mechanic’s lien-holder must commence its lien foreclosure action under the first clause of subdivision 3. Based partly on this reference to the first clause, we conclude that the word “person” in the second clause denotes only a mechanic’s lienholder and not a mortgagee or other encumbrancer, given that mechanic’s lienholders are the only persons who must enforce their interests in the subject property within the specified one-year period by filing either a complaint or an answer in a lien foreclosure action. Our conclusion finds further support in section 514.11, which plainly states that other mechanic’s lienholders are the only persons whom a mechanic’s lien claimant must name as defendants at the commencement of a lien foreclosure action.

We agree with MSBA that when viewed in the context of section 514.12 as a whole and in the broader context of MinmStat. ch. 514, the underlying purpose of the second clause of section 514.12, subd. 3, is to ensure that all mechanic’s lien claims arising from an improvement to real property are joined in one action within one year of each lienholder’s last day of work. As MSBA notes, despite the requirement in section 514.11 that a mechanic’s lien claimant name all other mechanic’s lien-holders as defendants at the commencement of a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action, another mechanic’s lienholder could be omitted from the complaint because of inadvertence on the claimant’s part or because the omitted lienholder recorded its lien statement after the claimant filed its complaint and summons. Interpreting “no person” in the second clause of section 514.12, subd. 3, to mean “no other mechanic’s lienholder” is consistent -with the requirement set forth in section 514.12, subd. 2, that courts adjudicate only one foreclosure action for all liens arising from the improvement of the subject property. Given that the district court must determine the relative priority of all mechanic’s lien claims in one action and ensure that the various lien claimants share accordingly in the proceeds from an eventual foreclosure and sale of the subject property, it is logical that the second clause of section 514.12, subd. 3, would provide that any mechanic’s lienholder not joined in a lien foreclosure action within one year of its last date of work will not receive the benefit of the mechanic’s lien foreclosure action.

We now turn to the third clause of section 514.12, subd. 3, which provides:

and, as to a bona fide purchaser, mortgagee, or encumbrancer without notice, the absence from the record of a notice of lis pendens of an action after the expiration of the year in which the lien could be so asserted shall be conclusive evidence that the lien may no longer be enforced and, in the case of registered land, the registrar of titles shall refrain from carrying forward to new certificates of title the memorials of lien statements when no such notice of lis pendens has been registered within the period.

Unlike the first and second clauses, which appear to be directed to mechanic’s lien-holders for the reasons we identified above, this third clause is directed by its first three words — “and, as to” — to a different class of persons: bona fide purchasers, mortgagees, and encumbrancers without notice. As an initial matter, we note that this clause would be purposeless if we were to interpret the word “person” in the second clause to mean all persons who have an interest in the subject property because under such an interpretation, every purchaser, mortgagee, and encum-brancer would have to be joined in a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action within one year or the mechanic’s lien would be unenforceable against them. We generally reject interpretations that render statutory language purposeless. See, e.g., Am. Family Ins. Group v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn.2000) (noting that in statutory construction, “no word, phrase, or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or insignificant.” (quotation marks omitted)).

Further, we note that this third clause expressly applies only when the record contains no notice of lis pendens within the year during which a mechanic’s lien of record could be enforced under the first clause of section 514.12, subd. 3. In essence, the third clause of section 514.12, subd. 3, creates a statutory safe harbor for bona fide purchasers, mortgagees, and en-cumbrancers without notice by assuring them that if a notice of lis pendens of an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien is not of record within one year of the lienholder’s last day of work on the property, that lien may no longer be enforced.

Prior Case Law

We recognize that the interpretation of section 514.12, subd. 3, that we articulate today can be construed as a departure from past cases in which we have held that a mechanic’s lien ceases to exist against mortgagees and the holders of other non-mechanic’s lien interests who are not joined in a lien foreclosure action within the one-year period set forth in the current statute or its predecessor. See, e.g., Falconer v. Cochran, 68 Minn. 405, 407, 71 N.W. 386, 386-87 (1897) (holding that a mechanic’s lien not asserted against a mortgagee within one year is unenforceable against the mortgagee); see also Thompson Plumbing Co. v. J.E.C., Inc., 422 N.W.2d 26 (Minn.App.1988); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Dior Development, Inc., 409 N.W.2d 30 (Minn.App.1987), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 30, 1987). In particular, two such cases, Morrison County Lumber Co. v. Duclos, 138 Minn. 20, 163 N.W. 734 (1917), and Ryan Contracting, Inc. v. JAG Investments, Inc., 634 N.W.2d 176 (Minn.2001), are discussed at some length by the parties to the present dispute.

In Morrison County Lumber, a mechanic’s lienholder began work on a parcel of real property and filed his mechanic’s lien statement after a bank executed and recorded its first mortgage on the property. 138 Minn. at 21, 163 N.W. at 735. After the lien statement was filed, the bank executed and recorded a second mortgage on the property, and, “in ignorance of the lien claims, satisfied the [first] mortgage.” Id. at 22, 163 N.W. at 735. Sometime thereafter, the lien claimant commenced a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action but did not timely join the bank. Id., 163 N.W. at 735. We held in Morrison County Lumber that the claimant’s mechanic’s lien ceased to exist as against the bank on the expiration of the one-year anniversary of the last date of work on the property. Id. at 24, 163 N.W. at 736.

In Ryan Contracting, a mechanic’s lien claimant filed a complaint and summons initiating a foreclosure action, and served the summons and complaint on the general contractor of the subject property within one year after the claimant’s final date of work. 634 N.W.2d at 179. But the claimant did not serve a copy of the summons on the property owner within one year. Id. at 179-80. We held in Ryan Contracting that under section 514.12, subd. 3, the claimant’s mechanic’s lien could not be enforced against the owner. 634 N.W.2d at 180, 182-83. After noting that the owner was “an essential defendant to [the] lien action because mechanics’ liens attach to property interests,” id. at 180, we went on to describe the one-year limitation of section 514.12, subd. 3, as a matter of personal jurisdiction:

[Although [the lienholder] filed' its complaint within one year from its last day of work, it did not serve [the owner] within that one year. Therefore, [the lienholder’s] lien action against [the owner] ceased to exist one year from [the lienholder’s] last day of work. See, e.g., Thompson Yards, Inc. v. Standard Home Bldg. Co., 161 Minn. 143, 146-47, 201 N.W. 300, 302 (1924) (“[0]ne is not a party to an action until he is in a position to be bound by the judgment therein. That does not come about until the court acquires jurisdiction of his person by the service on him of the summons or by his voluntary appearance.”); Smith [v. Hurd], 50 Minn. [503,] 507, 52 N.W. [922,] 922 [(1892)] (“[W]hen [a lien] action is commenced as to any defendant there must be an existing cause of action against him, and the right to a remedy upon it.”); Steinmetz v. St. Paul Trust Co., 50 Minn. 445, 447, 52 N.W. 915, 915 (1892) (“Of course, no judgment to enforce a lien against the land could be rendered unless the owner is made a party by being brought into the action.”); see also Guillaume & Assocs., Inc. v. Don-John Co., 336 N.W.2d 262, 264 (Minn.1983) (“We have strictly interpreted the time limitations [of the lien statutes] insofar as they determine when a lien is established and when it terminates.”).

Id. at 184. We further concluded that the owner’s actual knowledge of the foreclosure action was not a sufficient basis on which to subject the owner to personal jurisdiction under the mechanic’s hen statutes. Id. at 183.

While the facts in the aforementioned cases may differ from those we confront here, we acknowledge that Morrison County Lumber, Ryan Contracting, and other cases contain language to the effect that a mechanic’s lien cannot be enforced against any person with an interest in the subject property that is not made a party to the foreclosure within the one-year time period. To the extent that these cases rely on section 514.12’s one-year time limit as a basis for precluding a mechanic’s lien claimant from enforcing its lien against any person other than another mechanic’s lienholder — when the mechanic’s lien claimant has otherwise met the statutory requirements for commencing a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action — these cases are overruled. Importantly, we will continue to strictly enforce the one-year time limit with respect to joining those persons deemed necessary parties to a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action under section 514.12-namely, other mechanic’s lienhold-ers.

Mavco’s Mechanic’s Lien Foreclosure Action

With the foregoing analysis in mind, we must now apply section 514.12, subd. 3, to the facts of this case. It is apparently undisputed that Mavco properly commenced its mechanic’s lien foreclosure action by filing a complaint, summons, and notice of lis pendens within one year after its last date of work on the Egginks’ property. Consequently, the first clause of subdivision 3 provides no basis for a conclusion that Mavco’s lien is unenforceable against Wells Fargo. Further, because Wells Fargo is a mortgagee and not a mechanic’s lienholder, Wells Fargo is not a person who, under the second clause, “shall not be bound by any judgment in [the mechanic’s lien foreclosure] action unless made a party thereto within the year.” Finally, Mavco’s mechanic’s lien is not rendered unenforceable against Wells Fargo by the third clause of subdivision three, because Mavco filed a notice of lis pendens before “the expiration of the year in which the lien could be so asserted.” For all of these reasons, we conclude that Minn.Stat. § 514.12, subd. 3, does not bar Mavco from seeking to enforce its lien against Wells Fargo despite the fact that Mavco did not join Wells Fargo in its lien foreclosure action within one year after Mavco’s last day of work.

Minnesota Recording Act and Lis Pen-dens Statute

While we need look no further than the language of section 514.12 to support our conclusion to reverse the district court, we also note that to do otherwise on the facts of this case would require us to contravene the Minnesota Recording Act, Minn.Stat. § 507.34 (2006), and the lis pen-dens statute, Minn.Stat. § 557.02 (2006). The Recording Act states that “[e]very conveyance of real estate ⅜ * * [that is not] recorded shall be void * * * as against any attachment levied thereon * * * of record prior to the recording of such conveyance.” Minn.Stat. § 507.34. “Under the Minnesota Recording Act, a bona fide purchaser who records first obtains rights to the property which are superior to a prior purchaser who failed to record.” Chergosky v. Crosstown Bell, Inc., 463 N.W.2d 522, 524 (Minn.1990). Here, Mavco’s notice of lis pendens was recorded more than two months before Wells Fargo recorded its mortgage. The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is to provide “notice of the pendency of the action * * * to purchasers and encum-brancers of the rights and equities of the [filing] party.” Minn.Stat. § 557.02. Accordingly, Wells Fargo is not a bona fide purchaser under the “race-notice” approach codified by the Minnesota Recording Act and therefore, Mavco’s lien must take priority over Wells Fargo’s mortgage absent other procedural or substantive barriers to enforceability. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1286 (8th ed. 2004) (“A [race-notice statute] provid[es] that the person who records first, without notice of prior unrecorded claims, has priority.”).

Further, our analysis of the implications of the Recording Act for this case is consistent with cases outside the mechanic’s lien context in which courts have subordinated a mortgage that was executed before — but recorded after — another claimant filed a notice of lis pendens. For example, in United States v. Premises Known as 7725 Unity Ave. N., Brooklyn Park, Minn., the Eighth Circuit held that under Minnesota law, a mortgagee’s interest is junior to the government’s civil forfeiture claim if the government files a notice of lis pendens after the mortgage is executed but before the mortgage is recorded. 294 F.3d 954, 956-57 (8th Cir. 2002). Similarly, in Fingerhut Corp. v. Suburban Nat’l Bank, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a mortgagee is a subsequent encumbrancer to a corporation suing a former employee for a constructive trust in the subject property when the corporation files a notice of lis pendens after a mortgage is executed but before the mortgage is recorded. 460 N.W.2d 63, 65-66 (Minn.App.1990).

For all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court improperly subordinated Mavco’s lien to Wells Fargo’s mortgage after erroneously concluding that Minn.Stat. § 514.12, subd. 3, barred Mav-co’s enforcement of its lien against Wells Fargo.

II.

We next address Mavco’s claim that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mavco’s request to file a supplemental complaint under Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 in order to join Wells Fargo in Mavco’s mechanic’s lien foreclosure action. The court concluded that Rule 15.03 was inapplicable on the grounds that Mav-co’s failure “to join Wells Fargo as a defendant or to assert a mechanic’s lien against Wells Fargo in a timely manner [under Minn.Stat. § 514.12, subd. 3] pre-eludes Mavco from joining Wells Fargo to the current legal action.” As the court correctly noted,

Minn. R. Civ. P[ ]. 81.01, and Appendix A thereto, provide that the rules of civil procedure do not govern practice and procedure in mechanic lien actions insofar as the rules are inconsistent with the statutes. See [ ] Ryan Contracting, Inc., 634 N.W.2d at 181. Further, the rules of civil procedure cannot be used to circumvent the provisions of the mechanic’s lien statutes. Lyman Lumber Co. v. Dior Development, Inc., 409 N.W.2d 30 (Minn.App.1987).

Because the court concluded that Minn. R. Civ. P. 16.03 was in conflict with the one-year time limit for enforcing a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action under section 514.12, subd. 3, the court never determined whether Mavco would otherwise meet the requirements for filing a supplemental complaint against Wells Fargo. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 (setting forth criteria for when an amendment relates back to the original pleading).

In light of our opinion today, the one-year time limit set forth in section 514.12, subd. 3, is not a barrier to Mavco’s efforts to enforce its mechanic’s lien against Wells Fargo. Accordingly, section 514.12, subd. 3, does not conflict with Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 as a matter of law. Without deciding whether Mavco meets the criteria required to file a supplemental complaint under Rule 15.03, we remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

MEYER, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

      . Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 15.03 allows a party to amend its pleading to change the party against whom a claim is asserted, and for that amendment to "relate! 1 back to the date of the original pleading," if certain conditions are met.

      . We also granted the motion of the Minnesota State Bar Association Construction Law and Real Property Law Sections to file an amicus curiae brief.

        .See Minn.Stat. § 514.08, subd. 1 (2006) (providing that a mechanic’s lien ceases 120 days after the lienholder completes the last of the work on the subject property unless, within that 120 days, "(1) a statement of the claim is filed for record with the county recorder * * *; and (2) a copy of the statement is served * * *on the owner”).

      . We note that it may be a matter of good practice for a mechanic's lien claimant to name as defendants in a mechanic's lien foreclosure action all interest holders of record as of the filing of the complaint and summons. Such a practice helps to ensure that the priority of all interests can be determined in the action. But our task here is not to decide which persons should be named as a matter of good practice; rather, we must determine only which persons are necessary parties to a mechanic's lien foreclosure action under Minn.Stat. ch. 514, to the extent this determination affects the enforceability of Mavco's lien against Wells Fargo.

      . We note that the mechanic’s lien law in effect at the time Falconer was decided apparently did not contain language substantially similar to the statement in section 514.12, subd. 3 that "no person shall be bound by any judgment in such action unless made a party thereto within the year." See Minn. Gen.Stat. § 6238 (1894). The first substantially similar language in the statutes appears in Minn. Rev. Laws § 3515 (1905) ("[N]o lien shall be enforced in any case unless the holder thereof shall assert the same, either by complaint or answer, .within one year after the date of the last item of his claim * ⅜ *; nor shall any person be bound by the judgment in such action. unless he is made a party thereto within said year.” (emphasis added)).

      . Minnesota Statutes § 507.01 (2006) defines a purchaser broadly to denote “[any] person to whom any estate or interest in real estate is conveyed * * ⅝.”

      . The mortgaged property in both 7725 Unity Ave. and Fingerhut was Torrens property, whereas the property in this case is abstract property. But like a mortgage on Torrens property, a mortgage on abstract property is not enforceable against third parties until the mortgage is recorded. See Minn.Stat. § 507.34. Accordingly, we find the reasoning of these cases instructive. But see also Chaney v. Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency, 641 N.W.2d 328, 333-35 (Minn.App.2002) (distinguishing between Torrens and abstract property as to the effect of a lis pendens on a prior unrecorded mortgage).


author: /s/Helen M. Meyer Associate Justice

text:
    Mark D. SCHMITT, Respondent, v. INNOVATIVE LAWN SYSTEMS, INC., Respondent, and American Interstate Insurance Co., Respondent, and West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., Relator, and MN Dept. of Labor & Industry, Voc. Rehab. Unit, MN Dept. of Human Services, St. Paul Radiology, Regions Hospital, Intervenors, and Special Compensation Fund.
    No. A07-1212.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Sept. 26, 2007.
    Matthew P. Bandt, Jardine, Logan & O’Brien, PLLP, Lake Elmo, MN, for relator West Bend Mutual Insurance Co.
    John H. Guthmann, Trisha A. Vicario, Hansen, Dordell, Bradt, Odlaug & Bradt, PLLP, St. Paul, MN, for respondent Innovative Lawn Systems.
    Jay T. Hartman, Tracy M. Borash, Hea-cox, Hartman, Koshmrl, Cosgriff & Johnson, PA, St. Paul, MN, for respondent American Interstate Ins. Co.
    Thaddeus V. Jude, St. Paul, MN, Rory H. Foley, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for Special Compensation Fund.
   ORDER

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals filed May 24, 2007, be, and the same is, affirmed without opinion. See Hoff v. Kempton, 317 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Minn.1982) (explaining that “[sjummary affirmances have no precedential value because they do not commit the court to any particular point of view,” doing no more than establishing the law of the case).

BY THE COURT:

/s/Helen M. Meyer Associate Justice


author: /s/Sam Hanson Associate Justice

text:
    Kathy L. MARICLE, Relator, v. FARMSTEAD FOODS/SELF-INSURED, and Special Compensation Fund, Respondent, and EMPI, Inc., Minnesota Department of Human Services, Mayo Foundation, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of GA/Healthcare Recoveries, Inc., Ucare Minnesota, Intervenors.
    No. A07-1267.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Sept. 26, 2007.
    Robert M. Maus, Baulder, Baulder, Maus & Blahnik, PLLP, Austin, MN, for Employee Relator.
    Rory H. Foley, Office of the Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN, for Respondents.
   ORDER

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals filed June 14, 2007, be, and the same is, affirmed without opinion. See Hoff v. Kempton, 317 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Minn.1982) (explaining that “[s]ummary affirmances have no precedential value because they do not commit the court to any particular point of view,” doing no more than establishing the law of the case).

BY THE COURT:

/s/Sam Hanson Associate Justice