text:
    Richard R. SNYDER, Respondent, v. YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, Self-Insured, Relators.
    No. A04-536.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    July 22, 2004.

      Michael J. Patera, Buffalo MN, for Relator, Snyder, Richard D.
    Raymond R. Peterson, McCoy, Peterson & Jorstad, Minneapolis MN, for Respondent, Yellow Freight Systems, Inc.
   OPINION

ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Justice.

This workers’ compensation matter comes before us by certiorari upon the relation of Yellow Freight System, self-insured employer, to review a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversing the compensation judge’s calculation of the self-insured employer’s future credit in the distribution of the proceeds from the employee’s third-party action. We affirm.

Richard R. Snyder, the employee, sustained a compensable cervical spine injury on August 3, 1998 while working for Yellow Freight System. The injury resulted in permanent total disability; the employee at some point started receiving Social Security disability benefits; and the $25,000 threshold in weekly permanent total benefits, for purposes of taking the government benefits offset, has been paid.

The employee also brought a third-party action, in the nature of a medical malpractice claim, that resulted in a settlement in the amount of $900,000. The settlement agreement contemplated that the proceeds of the tort recovery would be run through the statutory formula, reducing the damages by the costs of collection, giving the employee $199,528.48, reimbursing the employer $60,000 for past benefits paid, and giving the employer a credit of $399,056.97 against future benefits. A dispute arose over the method or rate by which the employer could take its credit. The employer took the position that it should have the benefit of the full credit before paying future benefits, and the employee took the position that the employer should be obligated to pay 33.5 percent of the benefits otherwise due until the entire credit remaining was exhausted. The compensation judge concluded that after reducing the credit by the percentage for the costs of collection, the employer was entitled to its full credit from the third-party action on a dollar-for-dollar basis and that the employee was not entitled to any compensation until the credit was exhausted. On appeal, the WCCA reversed, concluding that under Kealy v. St. Paul Housing & Redev. Auth, 303 N.W.2d 468, 475 (Minn.1981), the credit should be reduced by the percentage for the costs of collection as the benefits are paid and not on the amount available for reimbursement. Snyder v. Yellow Freight System, 2004 WL 692079, at ⅜5 (Minn. WCCA Mar. 1, 2004).

While this court does not disturb a WCCA “decision unless it is manifestly contrary to the evidence, a decision which rests upon the application of a statute to basically undisputed facts involves a conclusion of law which is not binding on this court.” Bradley v. Vic’s Welding, 405 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Minn.1987) (citation omitted).

Damages recovered in third-party actions are distributed according to a statutory formula that allocates roughly one-third of a plaintiff-employee’s tort recovery to the employee after deduction of the expenses of collection, the remainder to reimburse the employer for compensation paid, and any balance remaining thereafter to the employee with a credit to the employer against future compensation payable. Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 837 (Minn.1988) (citing Minn.Stat. § 176.061, subd. 6 (1981)). The employer’s credit is also reduced by the costs of collection. Kealy, 303 N.W.2d at 475 (citing Cronen v. Wegdahl Coop. Elevator Ass’n, 278 N.W.2d 102, 105 (Minn.1979)).

Under Kealy/Cronen, “for every dollar of benefits paid in the future, the subdivision 6(d) credit should be reduced by * * * the percentage derived in the subdivision 6(c) computation [percentage for the costs of collection].” Kealy, 303 N.W.2d at 475. The employer is “liable for 100 [percent] of all workers’ compensation benefits payable thereafter.” Id. This is done so that the employer does “not avoid its obligation to share the costs of litigation while benefiting from that litigation.” Id. Accordingly, pursuant to Kealy/Cronen, “for every dollar of future compensation liability incurred, the employer would actually pay the employee approximately 33 cents, and reduce its credit by one dollar.” Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Desk-book § 16.14, at 16-22 (Jay T. Hartman & Thomas D. Mottaz eds., 2d. ed.1997); Wil-ber W. Fluegel, et al., The Fundamentals of Third-Party Practice at 29 (Minn. CLE Sept. 1995) (same). In calculating the sub-rogation reimbursement, the balance remaining under subdivision 6(c) “is not to be reduced by the factor of the costs incurred in making the recovery. The amount of the subrogation reimbursement under the formula turns on the amount of workers compensation benefits paid and not on the amount available of reimbursement.” Fluegel, supra at 30.

Here, the parties initially agreed that the employer was entitled to a future credit of $339,056.97 by application of the statutory distribution formula:

$900,000.00 Third party settlement
— $300,000.00 Attorney fees
- $ 1,414.55 Costs
$598,585.45 Proceeds
- $199,528.48 Employee’s statutory one-third portion
$399,056.97 Remainder available
$ 60,000.00 To be paid to the employer for partial reimbursement of benefits paid to date
$339,056.97 Stipulated future credit

The parties also had no dispute that for the $85,007.77 in past benefits paid, and which the employer chose to recover from future benefits, the employer could have a dollar-for-dollar offset for those benefits. Snyder, 2004 WL 692079, at *3. As to the remaining credit due, $254,049.20, the compensation judge determined that the employer was to reduce that amount by the percentage of the costs of collection (33.5 percent), resulting in a future credit of $168,942.72; that this future credit could be taken on a dollar-for-dollar basis until the credit was exhausted; and that the employee was not entitled to any compensation until exhaustion of the credit.

The WCCA disagreed, concluding that the compensation judge’s calculation of the credit was inconsistent with the Kealy/Cronen rationale. Snyder, 2004 WL 692079, at ⅜6 (slip op. at 9). The WCCA said:

The [compensation] judge’s focus in this case somehow suggests that the employer has an interest in the balance remaining under Minn.Stat. § 176.061, subd. 6(d), before its obligation to pay benefits in the future is realized. To the contrary, we believe the employer’s right to a credit arises when it is required to pay a benefit to the employee. At that time, the employer also incurs a corresponding obligation to share in the costs of collection, already fronted by the employee. To allow the employer a dollar-for-dollar offset is to require the employee to front the entire cost of collection, with the possibility that the employer will never be required to pay its proportionate share. Such a result would contravene the supreme court’s directive in Cronen and Kealy. In addition, the total future credit allowed the employer, and consequently, its share of the costs of collection, cannot be determined except on an ongoing basis. To calculate the costs of collection before the employer’s future liability can be determined is premature.

Id. (emphasis added). We agree with the WCCA. In calculating the amount of an employer’s subrogation reimbursement from the proceeds of a third-party action, the employer’s credit against future workers’ compensation benefits is reduced by the costs of collection on the amount of workers’ compensation benefits actually paid.

Affirmed.

Employee is awarded $1,200 in attorney fees.

      . When permanent total disability compensation is payable, the employer/insurer pay full weekly benefits until a total of $25,000 in weekly wage loss benefits have been paid. After the $25,000 in benefits have been paid, the benefits are reduced by the amount of disability benefits paid by the government {e.g., social security and PERA disability benefits). Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4 (2002). Only permanent total disability compensation may be credited toward the $25,000 threshold. McClish v. Pan-O-Gold Baking Co., 336 N.W.2d 538, 544 (Minn.1983). Consequently, if an initial finding of temporary total disability is superseded by a finding of permanent total disability, temporary total disability benefits count toward the $25,000 threshold. Id. at 542 n. 4 (citing Souden v. Hopkins Motor Sales, Inc., 289 Minn. 138, 182 N.W.2d 668 (1971)). But if the initial finding of temporary total disability is not replaced by a finding of permanent total disability, the temporary total disability payments do not count toward the $25,000 threshold. See Id.

      In the matter currently before the court, the employer paid the employee temporary total disability benefits for 104 weeks, the outside limit per Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 1(f) (2002). The parties subsequently agreed that the employee had been permanently totally disabled as of the date of injury so that the 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits did count toward the $25,000 threshold for the government-benefits offset. Recalculation of the employee's benefits by application of the government-benefits offsets resulted in an overpayment that the employer may recover as a credit against ongoing benefits. Minn.Stat. § 176.179 (2002) (When compensation payments have been made under mistake of fact or law to a person who is entitled to receive further payments of compensation for the same injury, the mistaken compensation may be taken as a credit against future benefit entitlement; however, the credit applied against further payments of compensation cannot exceed 20 percent of the amount that would otherwise be payable).

      . Although the employer was entitled to outright reimbursement of $145,007.77, the employer chose outright reimbursement of $60,000 and recovery of the remaining $85,007.77 from future benefits.

      . The statutory formula in Minn.Stat. § 176.061, subd. 6 (2002) provides as follows:
      The proceeds of all actions for damages or of a settlement of an action under this section, except for damages received under subdivision 5, clause (b) received by the injured employee or the employee’s dependents or by the employer or the special compensation fund, as provided by subdivision 5, shall be divided as follows:
      (a)After deducting the reasonable cost of collection, including but not limited to attorneys fees and burial expense in excess of the statutory liability, then
      (b) One-third of the remainder shall in any event be paid to the injured employee or the employee's dependents, without being subject to any right of subrogation.
      (c) Out of the balance remaining, the employer or the special compensation fund shall be reimbursed in an amount equal to all benefits paid under this chapter to or on behalf of the employee or the employee’s dependents by the employer or special compensation fund, less the product of the costs deducted under clause (a) divided by the total proceeds received by the employee or dependents from the other party multiplied by all benefits paid by the employer or the special compensation fund to the employee or the employee's dependents.
      (d) Any balance remaining shall be paid to the employee or the employee's dependents, and shall be a credit to the employer or the special compensation fund for any

        benefits which the employer or the special compensation fund is obligated to pay, but has not paid, and for any benefits that the employer or the special compensation fund is obligated to make in the future.
      There shall be no reimbursement or credit to the employer or to the special compensation fund for interest or penalties.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    ILLINOIS FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Respondents, v. GLASS SERVICE COMPANY, Inc., et al., Appellants.
    No. A03-109.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    July 22, 2004.

      Charles J. Lloyd, Matthew P. Lewis, Livgard & Rabuse, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN, for Appellants.
    Eric J. Magnuson, John M. Bjorkman, Paula Duggan Vraa, Rider Bennett, LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents.

      William M. Hart, Thomas H. Propson, Livia E. Babcock, Meagher & Geer, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN, for Amicus Curiae Ins. Federation of MN.
    Thomas H. Goodman, Mark Thieroff, Siegel, Brill, Greupner, Duffy & Foster, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for Amicus Curiae MN Ind. Auto Glass Ass’n.
   OPINION

ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice.

Glass Service Company and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Auto Glass Service Center (collectively Glass Service), appeal from a Minnesota Court of Appeals decision requiring them to separately arbitrate over 5,700 individual claims of alleged underpayment by Illinois Farmers Insurance Company and Mid-Century Insurance Company (collectively Farmers). Glass Service asserts that Farmers underpaid it for glass work that it performed for Farmers’ insureds. The alleged underpayments collectively total more than $1,000,000. The district court concluded that a mandatory arbitration clause in Farmers’ insurance policy and Minnesota’s No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act (No-Fault Act), Minn.Stat. §§ 65B.41-65B.71 (2002), require Glass Service to separately arbitrate each claim of alleged underpayment. The court also ordered the parties to arbitrate each underpayment claim before the same arbitration panel. The court of appeals agreed in part, but held that the parties were required to arbitrate each of the more than 5,700 alleged underpayments before separate arbitration panels. III. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Glass Service Co., Inc., 669 N.W.2d 420, 428 (Minn.App.2003). We affirm in part, holding that arbitration is required, but we remand to the district court to determine whether some or all of these claims may be consolidated.

Minnesota’s auto glass industry is highly regulated and the case before us appears to be another chapter in the evolving relationship between independent auto glass companies and automobile insurers. For example, legislation now bars insurers from requiring customers to use particular insurer-favored auto glass companies. Minn.Stat. § 72A.201, subd. 6(14)-(16) (2002). Likewise, the glass companies are prohibited from soliciting insureds as customers by offering gifts to those customers who choose to use their services. Minn. Stat. § 325F.783 (2002). Once a customer selects an auto glass company, the insurers are required to pay “a competitive price that is fair and reasonable within the local industry at large.” MinmStat. § 72A.201, subd. 6(14) (2002). The Commissioner of Commerce is empowered to promulgate rules to enforce this legislation. Minn. Stat. § 72A.201, subd. 1 (2002).

Minnesota Statutes § 65B.134 (2002) requires that “[a]ny policy of automobile insurance * * * providing comprehensive coverage * * * must provide at the option of the insured complete coverage for repair or replacement of all damaged safety glass without regard to any deductible or minimum amount.” By forbidding deductibles, Minnesota’s statutory scheme for automobile insurance essentially removes the auto glass customer from the payment process. As a result, auto glass companies routinely bill their customers’ insurance companies directly. Glass Service follows this practice and includes on its invoices language that its customer “assignfe] any and all claims in connection with this installation against my insurance company to Glass Service Company, Inc.”

Glass Service asserts that Farmers underpaid it for glass work by systematically paying Glass Service less than the amounts stated on its invoices. According to Glass Service, this practice is contrary to the requirements of Farmers’ insurance policy, which requires payment in the “amount which it would cost to repair or replace damaged * * * property with other of like kind and quality.” Glass Service alleges over 5,700 instances of underpayment, for which it demands compensation in the amount of $1,138,229.52, plus interest.

The amount of the alleged underpayments varies among the several claims. Some include discrepancies as large as 72.5 percent between the amount billed and the amount paid, while other discrepancies are as small as 5.5 percent. The underpayments result from work Glass Service performed across the state and span a five-year time period from August 1997 to April 2002.

During this time period, the regulatory structure of the auto glass industry changed significantly. An earlier statute regulating claims practices required insurers to “assume all reasonable costs sufficient to pay the insured’s chosen [glass] vendor.” Minn.Stat. § 72A.201, subd. 6(14) (1996). In 2000, the legislature amended this statute to require payment “based on a competitive price,” and direct- ’ ed the Commissioner of Commerce to conduct a market survey to determine “a fair and reasonable market price for similar services.” Minn.Stat. § 72A.201, subd. 6(14) (2000). Under this legislation, the market survey was to be used to establish prices for glass work when an insurer disputed an amount charged by a glass company. Id. The legislature again amended the statute in 2002 to require payment “based on a competitive price that is fair and reasonable within the local industry at large.” Minn.Stat. § 72A.201, subd. 6(14) (2002).

The parties agree that pricing in the auto glass industry is based primarily on three components: glass, adhesives, and labor. Both Glass Service and Farmers base their prices upon the National Auto Glass Specifications (NAGS), a national price-list publication. Glass Service charges prices for glass, adhesive, and labor that are percentages of the list prices. While Farmers pays Glass Service based upon identical NAGS figures, it employs different percentages of the NAGS list prices to calculate the amount it pays Glass Service. The NAGS list prices change quarterly and the parties adjust their prices accordingly. Therefore, the component prices that Glass Service charges and the amount that Farmers pays change on a regular basis.

Using its percentage of the NAGS list prices, Farmers regularly paid Glass Service less than the amount billed. Glass Service characterizes the pricing and payment method in the auto glass industry as “formulaic.” It contends that the issues in its dispute with Farmers do not vary among the 5,700 claims. Rather, it contends that these claims against Farmers amount to one dispute over the percentage of the NAGS list prices to be used in calculating payments for auto glass work. While Farmers admits that its payments are based on formulas, Farmers contends that Glass Service oversimplifies the uniformity of the individual disputed claims. The record demonstrates that Glass Service utilized different percentages of the NAGS list prices throughout the five-year time period at issue. . During this time period, Glass Service also adjusted the prices it charged for labor and adhesive.

Because the discrepancies between the amounts billed and the amounts reimbursed were relatively small, usually under $500, Glass Service rarely disputed individual claims. If Glass Service had disputed any of those claims individually, it would have been bound by a mandatory arbitration clause in Farmers’ policy. The clause requires arbitration of “all cases where a claim made by an insured person is $5000 or less.” The No-Fault Act also provides for the “mandatory submission to binding arbitration of all cases at issue where the claim at the commencement of arbitration is in an amount of $10,000 or less ⅜ * * for no-fault benefits or comprehensive or collision damage coverage.” Minn.Stat. § 65B.525, subd. 1. The Act includes auto glass coverage under the umbrella of “comprehensive coverage.” Minn.Stat. § 65B.134. None of the alleged underpayments in this case exceeds $5,000, so the parties agree that each customer’s claim, standing alone, is subject to arbitration. But they disagree whether those claims must be arbitrated separately and, most critically, whether the 5,700 plus claims can be combined so that Glass Service’s “claim” exceeds the jurisdictional amount for mandatory arbitration.

In 2002, Glass Service served a demand for arbitration of its claims against Farmers. Farmers in turn brought a declaratory judgment action in Ramsey County District Court, arguing that any assignment of claims from its policyholders to Glass Service did not include the right to arbitrate. Alternatively, Farmers sought a declaration that any right to arbitration did not include the right to arbitrate claims collectively. But then the parties’ positions on arbitration changed. In its answer, Glass Service brought a counterclaim for breach of contract resulting from the alleged underpayments. In response, Farmers moved for summary judgment on the breach of contract counterclaim and sought a declaration that Glass Service was required to arbitrate each claim individually. The court ordered the parties to arbitrate the claims separately, but required that each of the claims be arbitrated before the same arbitration panel. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s summary judgment ruling, but held that the district court erred when it required that all the claims be arbitrated before the same panel. III. Farmers, 669 N.W.2d at 428. Rather, the court of appeals held that the claims could not be consolidated to be heard by the same arbitration panel. Id. Glass Service petitioned for further review, which we granted.

I.

Before addressing whether any or all of the disputed claims must be arbitrated, we first address Glass Service’s argument that Farmers waived its contractual right to mandatory arbitration under its insurance policy. Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right. Har-Mar, Inc. v. Thorsen & Thorshov, Inc., 300 Minn. 149, 156-57, 218 N.W.2d 751, 756 (1974). One way a party may waive a contractual right to arbitration is if “judicial proceedings based on that contract have been initiated and have not been expeditiously challenged on the grounds that disputes under the contract are to be arbitrated.” Bros. Jurewicz, Inc. v. Atari, Inc., 296 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Minn. 1980). The party alleging waiver must provide evidence that the party that is alleged to have waived the right possessed both knowledge of the right in question and the intent to waive that right. Stephenson v. Martin, 259 N.W.2d 467, 470 (Minn.1977).

Glass Service makes a two-pronged argument for waiver. Its first argument is based on the language in the arbitration clause of Farmers’ policy, which provides that if Farmers denies a claim, it is to advise the claimant of the claimant’s right to demand arbitration. Glass Service argues that the policy creates a condition precedent. Glass Service claims that, in order for Farmers to preserve its contractual right to mandatory arbitration, Farmers, after denying Glass Service’s claim, was required to advise Glass Service of its “right to demand arbitration.”

This argument requires us to determine whether the language of the arbitration clause in Farmers’ insurance policy creates a condition precedent to demanding arbitration. The interpretation of insurance contracts is governed by general principles of contract law. Thommes v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 641 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn.2002). The interpretation of contractual language is an issue of law for the court to decide. Denelsbeck v. Wells Fargo & Co., 666 N.W.2d 339, 346 (Minn.2003). Contract language is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. Id. When the language of an insurance contract is unambiguous, we interpret that language in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 880.

The arbitration clause of Farmers’ policy provides that “[s]ubmission to binding arbitration is mandatory in all cases where a claim made by an insured person is $5,000 or less.” (Emphasis added.) We conclude that the language in the arbitration clause is unambiguous and that its plain and ordinary meaning establishes that any claim under $5,000 automatically becomes arbitrable. Further, the policy does not make Farmers’ ability to seek arbitration contingent upon the happening of any event. Absent a contractual condition precedent to Farmers demanding arbitration, Farmers cannot be said to waive any right set forth in the policy. Because arbitration under Farmers’ policy is automatic and not contingent on any event, we conclude that Farmers did not waive its right to demand arbitration when, after denying the claims, it failed to notify Glass Service of the right to arbitrate.

We next turn to Glass Service’s second argument that Farmers waived its right to demand arbitration when it pursued litigation in district court. We have held that, in' certain instances, a party may waive its right to arbitrate a dispute by litigating that dispute in the courts. For example, in Anderson v. Twin City Rapid Transit Co., a contract between a local public transit authority and its union provided for arbitration of employment disputes arising from the transit authority’s conversion from streetcars to buses. 250 Minn. 167, 170, 84 N.W.2d 593, 596 (1957). After a group of employees brought a wrongful discharge action in district court, the transit authority answered, conducted discovery, and defended the suit on the merits. Id. at 171-72, 84 N.W.2d at 597. When, 16 months after litigation commenced, the transit authority demanded arbitration, we held that the transit authority waived its right to arbitrate by allowing litigation to progress to such an advanced stage before demanding arbitration. Id. at 181, 84 N.W.2d at 602. We affirmed the principles of Anderson in Brothers Jurewicz, in which we held that a party waived its right to arbitration by answering a claim on the merits and allowing the district court litigation over the contract to proceed for over one year without moving the court to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration. 296 N.W.2d at 428.

Glass Service notes that, similar to the behavior of the parties in Anderson and Brothers Jureivicz, Farmers filed a declaratory judgment action in district court opposing arbitration. Glass Service argues that Farmers waived its right to arbitrate by bypassing the arbitration procedures in its insurance policy and the No-Fault Act. Farmers responds by distinguishing Anderson and Brothers Jurewiez as eases in which the parties defended claims on the merits and allowed district court litigation to progress for a significant time before seeking arbitration. In contrast, Farmers notes that its declaratory judgment action was commenced not to resolve the merits, but rather to address the jurisdictional question of whether arbitration was required.

We are not persuaded by Glass Service’s argument that, by pursuing litigation in district court, Farmers waived its right to demand arbitration. Anderson and Brothers Jurewiez are distinguishable in that each of those cases involved actions that were litigated in court on their merits for over a year before a party demanded arbitration. Bros. Jurewicz, 296 N.W.2d at 428; Anderson, 250 Minn, at 182, 84 N.W.2d at 603. Glass Service is correct that, in this case, Farmers initially contested Glass Service’s right to arbitrate and opposed Glass Service’s demand for consolidated arbitration. However, this opposition was jurisdictional and did not involve a challenge to the merits of Glass Service’s claim. See Patterson v. Wu Family Corp., 608 N.W.2d 863, 869 (Minn.2000) (holding that participation in discovery does not waive jurisdictional defenses). Farmers’ current declaratory judgment action seeks only to determine where and how this dispute shall be resolved; it does not call upon the courts of this state to resolve the merits of the dispute. Because Farmers only asked the court to determine this preliminary question, we conclude that its actions do not demonstrate an intent to waive its right to arbitration.

In addition, to the extent that this dispute is governed by the mandatory arbitration provision of the No-Fault Act, the doctrine of waiver does not apply. Minnesota Statutes § 65B.525, subdivision 1, mandates that all disputes over comprehensive coverage “in an amount of $10,000 or less” must be submitted to mandatory binding arbitration. See also Minn. No-Fault Arb. R. 6 (referring to “jurisdiction in mandatory cases”). The statute thereby deprives district courts of subject matter jurisdiction over a certain type of dispute — claims for comprehensive benefits of $10,000 or less. Id.; see Olson v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 636 N.W.2d 598, 604 (Minn.App.2001) (noting that district court does not have jurisdiction over claims of “no-fault benefits”). Because the mandatory arbitration provision of the No-Fault Act limits the district courts’ subject matter jurisdiction, the right to demand arbitration under the Act may not be waived. See Marzitelli v. City of Little Canada, 582 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Minn.1998) (“[I]t is blackletter law that subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived.”); Duininck Bros. & Gilchrist v. Brandondale Chaska Corp., 311 Minn. 291, 293, 248 N.W.2d 743, 744 (1976). We conclude that Farmers did not waive its right to demand arbitration under the No-Fault Act when it pursued a declaratory judgment action in district court in order to address whether arbitration was required.

II.

Glass Service also argues that we should adopt the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel and use this doctrine to deny Farmers’ demand for arbitration because Farmers has taken inconsistent positions in this litigation. Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that prevents a party from assuming inconsistent positions in the course of litigation. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748-49, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001); Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir.1996). Although we have never expressly adopted the doctrine of judicial estoppel, State v. Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451, 462 (Minn.1999), Glass Service urges us to do so in order “to protect the integrity of the judicial process” from parties who play “ ‘fast and loose with the courts.’ ” Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 937 (D.C.Cir.1980) (citation omitted). Glass Service argues that Farmers abused the judicial process by demanding arbitration after first opposing Glass Service’s initial demands for arbitration. The court of appeals noted that we have declined to recognize the doctrine of judicial estoppel and therefore rejected Glass Service’s argument. Ill. Farmers, 669 N.W.2d at 426.

We conclude that Glass Service does not present a compelling case to apply judicial estoppel. At different points in this litigation, both Glass Service and Farmers have demanded and opposed arbitration, presumably preferring the forum that they perceived as most beneficial at the time. See Home Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. of Pittsburgh, 658 N.W.2d 522, 535 (Minn.2003) (“It is a well-established principle that one who comes into equity must come with clean hands.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). While we neither adopt nor reject the doctrine of judicial estoppel, we conclude that neither party to this litigation would be entitled to the benefit of our equitable powers.

III.

Next, we address Glass Service’s argument that the district court and the court of appeals erred by concluding that arbitration is required. Here, we must first reconcile the mandatory arbitration terms of Farmers’ insurance policy with the arbitration provisions of the No-Fault Act.

Farmers’ policies provide:

If an insured person and we [Farmers] do not agree (1) that the insured person is legally entitled to recover damages, or (2) on the amount of payment under this Part, the following applies:
Mandatory Arbitration
Submission to binding arbitration is mandatory in all cases where a claim made by an insured person is $5000 or less. If we deny the claim we will advise you of your right to demand arbitration.
In that event, the insured person will select an arbitrator and we will select another. The two arbitrators will select a third.
If they cannot agree on the third arbitrator within 30 days, the judge of a court having jurisdiction will appoint the third arbitrator. The insured person will pay the arbitrator selected by that person.
We will pay the arbitrator we select. The expense of the third arbitrator and all other expenses of arbitration will be shared equally.
Arbitration will take place in the county where the insured person lives. Local court rules governing procedures and evidence will apply. The decision in writing of two arbitrators will be binding subject to the terms of this insurance.

The No-Fault Act states that this court and the “several courts of general trial jurisdiction of this state shall by rules of court or other constitutionally allowable device, provide for the mandatory submission to binding arbitration of all cases at issue where the claim * * * is in an amount of $10,000 or less * * Minn. Stat. § 65B.525, subd. 1. Pursuant to the No-Fault Act, we adopted rules for the administration of no-fault arbitration — the Minnesota No-Fault Arbitration Rules. The parties do not claim that the Rules create any inconsistencies with the Act and we find no inconsistencies ourselves. Furthermore, none of the amendments to the Act after our adoption of the Rules create any conflict with the Rules at issue here. Accordingly, for purposes of the case before us, we treat the Rules as having the force and effect of statute. Cf. U.S. West Material Resources, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 511 N.W.2d 17, 20 n. 2 (Minn.1994) (noting that administrative rules have the force and effect of law). Thus, in examining the potential conflicts between Farmers’ policy and the No-Fault Act, we look to the No-Fault Rules in addition to the Act itself.

The Minnesota No-Fault Arbitration Rules require an arbitration organization to administer the selection of arbitrators in the following manner:

The arbitration organization shall send simultaneously to each party to the dispute an identical list of four names of persons chosen from the panel. Each party to the dispute * * ⅜ [may] cross out a maximum of one name objected to, [and] number the remaining names in order of preference. * * ⅜ One of the persons who has been approved on both lists shall be invited by the arbitration organization to serve in accordance with the designated order of the mutual preference.

Minn. No-Fault Arb. R. 8.

The procedure for arbitrator selection as established under the No-Fault Rules conflicts with Farmers’ policy, which requires panel arbitration. Farmers’ policy and the procedure under the No-Fault Act also have another crucial difference. Unlike Farmers’ policy, which requires that most expenses be shared equally, arbitration under the Rules provides the single arbitrator with the discretion to assess arbitration expenses as part of an award. Minn. No-Fault Arb. R. 42.

In the absence of a legal restriction to the contrary, parties to an insurance contract, just as parties to other agreements, are free to bargain for the coverage they wish. Bobich v. Oja, 258 Minn. 287, 294, 104 N.W.2d 19, 24 (1960). But it has long been our policy that insurance policies “do[ ] not stand on the same footing as ordinary contracts. The business of insurance is quasi public in character; hence, it is competent for the state, in the exercise of the police power, to regulate it for the protection of the public.” Clark v. Rochester Farmers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 161 Minn. 476, 479, 201 N.W. 930, 931-32 (1925). If a term in an insurance contract conflicts with Minnesota statutes, the contract term becomes unenforceable. Streich v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 358 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Minn.1984). An insurer may, however, provide an insured with broader coverage than the No-Fault Act or Rules mandate. Gaalswyck v. General Cas. Co. of Wisconsin, 372 N.W.2d 435, 437 (Minn.App.1985) (citing 8D Appleman Insurance Law and Practice § 5163 (1981)); see also Watson v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 566 N.W.2d 683, 690 (Minn.1997) (holding that Minnesota standard fire insurance policy provides statutory minimum coverage). When an insurance policy contains a conformity clause, as Farmers’ policies do, that clause amends all policy terms in conflict with Minnesota law to conform to those laws. Lessard v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Minn.1994).

As noted earlier, the use of panel arbitration in Farmers’ insurance policy without the discretion to award costs conflicts with the single arbitrator method established under the No-Fault Rule. Compared with this procedure, Farmers’ policy creates a system of dispute resolution that is decidedly disadvantageous to insured persons with small claims. Therefore, unless the policy provides greater protection for the insured than the No-Fault Act, the terms of the policy must be conformed to the provisions of the Act.

At oral argument, Farmers conceded that arbitration under its policy is costly and designed primarily for large claims. Arbitration under the No-Fault Rules, in contrast, requires the claimant to pay only a $60 filing fee and split the arbitrator’s $300 fee. Minn. No-Fault Arb. R. 39 & 40. These lower fees, combined with the possibility that the claimant may be awarded arbitration costs from the insurer if he or she prevails, bestows a benefit on the insured by facilitating a low-cost method of dispute resolution. The efficiency of this model provides the insured with an incentive to arbitrate his or her dispute with the insurer. Farmers’ policy deprives the insured of this benefit by forcing the insured to bear an equal share of the cost of panel arbitration, irrespective of the merit of his or her claim. Because Farmers’ policy fails to provide its insureds with protections that are equal to or greater than the protections provided by the No-Fault Act and the Rules, we hold that the Act governs the issue of arbitrability in this case.

IV.

Having decided that the No-Fault Act determines the arbitrability of the dispute between Farmers and Glass Service, we turn to the question of whether the No-Fault Act requires Glass Service to arbitrate its claims against Farmers. Questions of statutory interpretation are issues of law that we review de novo. Mutual Service Cas. Ins. Co. v. League of Minnesota Cities Ins. Trust, 659 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn.2003). We construe statutes in order to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2002). In doing so, we give effect to the plain meaning of statutory terms. Minn.Stat. § 645.08 (2002); Miller-Largo v. N. States Power Co., 582 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Minn.1998).

Because Glass Service accepted payment from its customers in the form of assignments of their insurance claims against Farmers, we first must determine the rights and obligations that the No-Fault Act imposes on Glass Service as an assign-ee of Farmers’ insurance policies. The district court concluded that, as an assign-ee of the policyholders’ claims against Farmers, Glass Service stands in the shoes of the individual policyholders and therefore must arbitrate each claim as each claim was subject to arbitration before it was assigned to Glass Service. The court of appeals agreed that “ultimately, these are disputes between individual policyholders and their respective insurance companies.” Ill. Farmers, 669 N.W.2d at 426. The court of appeals therefore held that the assignment of individual claims to Glass Service could not defeat the jurisdictional limit for no-fault arbitration. Id.

An assignment operates to place the assignee in the shoes of the assignor, and provides the assignee with the same legal rights as the assignor had before assignment. Martin ex rel. Hoff v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 13 (Minn.2002). Similarly, a debtor may assert all equities and defenses against the assignee that were available against the assignor. Dennis v. Swanson, 176 Minn. 267, 272, 223 N.W. 288, 290 (1929). Thus, if Farmers had the right to demand no-fault arbitration against individual policyholders, it will also have that right against Glass Service as assignee of the policyholders’ claims against Farmers.

The No-Fault Act provides that arbitration is mandatory to resolve “all claims * * * in an amount of $10,000 or less.” Minn.Stat. § 65B.525. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “claim” as “[t]he aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court.” Black’s Law Dictionary 240 (7th ed.1999). We have defined “claim” in the context of the arbitration provisions of the No-Fault Act as “the amount the claimant is asking for.” Brown v. Allstate Ins. Co., 481 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Minn.1992). Accordingly, we have held that a claimant could not split a no-fault claim between wage losses and medical expenses in order to bring her case under the jurisdictional limit for mandatory arbitration. Charboneau v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 481 N.W.2d 19, 21-22 (Minn.1992).

Glass Service disagrees with how the district court and the court of appeals characterized its dispute with Farmers and argues that it is a single claimant with a single claim against Farmers. Citing the fact that its dispute with Farmers totals over $1 million, Glass Service relies on Brown for the proposition that, because it is asking for such a large sum from Farmers, its “claim” exceeds the jurisdictional amount for mandatory no-fault arbitration. Central to Glass Service’s argument is its assertion that this case involves a single dispute between it and Farmers with a single issue, which issue is the systematic policy of short paying Glass Service invoices.

Farmers, on the other hand, argues that the “claimants” in this case are the individual policyholders. Because the amount of underpayment for each individual policyholder is under $10,000, Farmers argues that each policyholder has a “claim” of under $10,000, which is subject to mandatory arbitration. Farmers asserts that Glass Service, as an assignee, takes no greater or lesser rights than these individual policyholders. It then asserts that, because the individual policyholders could not avoid arbitration by consolidating their claims with those of other policyholders, Glass Service also lacks this ability. Thus, Farmers maintains that Glass Service is likewise required to arbitrate each of its claims under the No-Fault Act.

We agree with Farmers that Glass Service may not defeat the No-Fault Act’s jurisdictional mandate for arbitration by consolidating the claims of Farmers’ individual policyholders. The aggregate of operative facts that gave rise to the claims against Farmers at issue in this case were the individual auto glass jobs that Glass Service performed for Farmers’ policyholders. Thus, after receiving glass work from Glass Service, the individual policyholders became claimants, each with a claim of less than $10,000 against Farmers. Glass Service chose to accept payment for glass work in the form of an assignment of the proceeds from Farmers’ insurance policies. The form, volume, and amount of the assignments does not, however, transform Glass Service’s status as an assignee of 5,700 plus individual claims into a claimant with a single claim of over $1 million. We therefore conclude that Glass Service is an assignee of 5,700 plus individual claims, each of which is subject to mandatory arbitration under the No-Fault Act.

Glass Service correctly points out that our holding in Charboneau prevents the splitting of individuals’ no-fault claims against insurers. See Charboneau, 481 N.W.2d at 21-22. However, Charboneau is distinguishable, as it involved one individual claimant whose sole claim against her insurer arose from a single automobile accident and exceeded the jurisdictional amount for arbitration. Id. at 20. In Charboneau, we prevented an individual from forum shopping by splitting her claim into two separate components. Id. at 21. We are not willing to read Charboneau to sanction an equally undesirable form of forum shopping by allowing parties to avoid mandatory arbitration for individual claims by treating those individual claims as one single claim.

In summary, the claimants in this case are the individual policyholders, each of whom possesses a claim against Farmers of under $10,000. Because the assignment of claims from the policyholders to Glass Service does not transform Glass Service’s status from an assignee to an individual claimant, those claims are subject to no-fault arbitration after assignment. Therefore, we hold that the No-Fault Act requires that each of these claims be arbitrated.

Like the court of appeals, we recognize that the result we reach today may not be the most efficient method of resolving the underlying dispute between Glass Service and Farmers. See Ill. Farmers, 669 N.W.2d at 426. We are mindful of Glass Service’s concern that the cost of more than 5,700 arbitrations could easily exceed the amount at stake in this matter. However, we must follow the mandate of the No-Fault Act, which unequivocally demands that “all claims in an amount of $10,000 or less be arbitrated.” Minn.Stat. § 65B.525 (emphasis added). We note, however, that no-fault arbitration under the Rules, which utilizes a single arbitrator with the discretion to assess costs to a party, might allay some of Glass Service’s concerns. See Minn. No-Fault Arb. R. 42. In addition to being more cost-effective than panel arbitration, this system may remove some of the disincentive for parties to arbitrate small claims.

V.

Having decided that Glass Service is required to arbitrate its claims under the No-Fault Act, we next address Glass Service’s alternative demand that its claims be consolidated into one arbitration proceeding. The No-Fault Act and our Rules of No-Fault Arbitration are silent on the ability of courts to consolidate arbitration proceedings. We do, however, have a leading case on the issue — Grover-Dimond Assocs. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n., 297 Minn. 324, 211 N.W.2d 787 (1973).

In Grover-Dimond, a building owner sought a consolidated arbitration proceeding to recover unauthorized expenses from two parties, an architect and a contractor. Id. at 325, 211 N.W.2d at 787-88. The building owner’s contracts with the architect and the contractor each contained arbitration clauses. Id. at 325, 211 N.W.2d at 788. After acknowledging the lack of binding authority on the issue, we adopted the New York rule that the power of courts to order arbitration and enforce arbitration awards “imports power to regulate the method of enforcement,” and then ordered consolidation. Id. at 328-29, 211 N.W.2d at 789 (citing Matter of Chariot Textiles Corp., 21 App. Div.2d 762, 764, 250 N.Y.S.2d 493, 495 (1964)). We noted that, where consolidation is not prohibited by statute or by the agreement to arbitrate, consolidation of similar disputes prevents both redundancy and conflicting awards. Grover-Dimond, 297 Minn, at 329, 211 N.W.2d at 790. We stated that consolidation was particularly appropriate because the owner’s disputes with the contractor and the architect involved common evidence and would likely result in the contractor and the architect blaming each other for the overcharges. Id. at 330, 211 N.W.2d at 790. We concluded that consolidation was proper in such a case, as it furthered the purpose of the Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 572.08-572.30 (2002), to “encourage arbitration as a ‘speedy, informal, and relatively inexpensive procedure for resolving controversies arising out of commercial transactions.’ ” Grover-Dimond, 297 Minn, at 327, 211 N.W.2d at 788 (quoting Layne-Minnesota Co. v. Regents of the Univ., 266 Minn. 284, 287, 123 N.W.2d 371, 374 (1963)).

Since Grover-Dimond, two competing views on consolidation have emerged in other jurisdictions. Some courts follow the rationale we adopted in Grover-Dimond and have allowed consolidation when it will increase the efficiency of the arbitration. See Exber, Inc. v. Sletten Constr. Co., 92 Nev. 721, 558 P.2d 517, 524 (1976); Litton Bionetics, Inc. v. Glen Constr. Co. Inc., 292 Md. 34, 437 A.2d 208, 217-18 (1981). Like Grover-Dimond, many of these cases involve “vertical consolidation,” in which A has an arbitration agreement with B; B has an arbitration agreement with C; and a party seeks to consolidate the A v. B and B v. C arbitrations. See Baesler v. Continental Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193, 1196 (Brown, J., dissenting) (defining “vertical consolidation”). In authorizing consolidation, these courts have recognized the efficiency gains of consolidating proceedings that involve common parties, common evidence, and common witnesses. See Exber, 558 P.2d at 524. In addition, because in many of these cases there is a dispute over which one of several parties is responsible for damages, courts often cite the danger of inconsistent judgments as a justification for consolidation. See Grover-Dimond, 297 Minn, at 329, 211 N.W.2d at 789-90.

In contrast, several federal circuit courts have considered the issue of consolidation under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The majority of these courts have refused to allow consolidation absent an explicit contractual or statutory mandate. See Baesler, 900 F.2d at 1195; Weyerhaeuser Co. v. W. Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir.1984). These courts have taken the view that their sole duty under arbitration agreements is to ensure that agreements are enforced in accordance with their terms. Accordingly, the courts taking this view seek to protect the right of parties to receive their bargained-for dispute settlement mechanism, regardless of any inefficiencies that may result. See Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d at 637.

Our survey of the law as it has developed leads us to the conclusion that Grover-Dimond remains good law in Minnesota and that it should guide our decision in this matter. In Grover-Dimond, we based our holding in part on our state’s policy under the Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act of promoting arbitration as a cost-effective, simplified, and informal alternative to litigation. Grover-Dimond, 297 Minn, at 327, 211 N.W.2d at 788. Although this case arises under the No-Fault Act, the legislature’s stated purpose behind the Act demonstrates that similar policy considerations are at work here. The No-Fault Act provides that one of its purposes is “[t]o speed the administration of justice, to ease the burden of litigation on the courts of this state, and to create a system of small claims arbitration to decrease the expense of and to simplify litigation.” Minn.Stat. § 65B.42 (2002); see also Charboneau, 481 N.W.2d at 21 (quoting Minn.Stat. § 65B.42). If Glass Service is correct in its characterization of this controversy as a dispute over the “formulaic” method of reimbursement for glass work, the policy considerations that guided us in Grover-Dimond may well justify consolidation of the claims in this case.

When deciding whether to order consolidation, courts should consider the efficiencies of consolidation, the danger of inconsistent judgments if disputes are arbitrated separately, and the prejudice that parties may suffer as a result of consolidation. Gñ'over-Dimmd, 297 Minn, at 329, 211 N.W.2d at 789-90. Efficiencies may result from a commonality of witnesses or evidence in multiple proceedings, similarity of claims between the parties, or the dependence of multiple claims on a common set of facts. Exber, 558 P.2d at 524. The desirability of consolidation to avoid inconsistent judgments is greatest in “vertical” cases such as Grover-Dimond. On the other hand, a court may find that the differences between claims, such as differences in governing law or factual differences between individual claims, make consolidation undesirable. A court also may determine that consolidation is inappropriate if it would prejudice the rights of one of the parties to the dispute. See Seguro de Servicio de Salud de Puerto Rico v. McAuto Systems Group, Inc., 878 F.2d 5, 9 (1st Cir.1989).

Whether consolidation is proper is a fact-sensitive question that is best decided by the district court exercising its sound discretion. We therefore reverse the court of appeals on the consolidation issue and remand this case to the district court for a determination of whether some or all of Glass Service’s claims against Farmers may be consolidated into one or more proceedings. The court shall order the parties to arbitrate their disputes in accordance with our Rules of No-Fault Arbitration. If the court finds that some or all of the claims may be joined into one proceeding, it may, in its discretion, order consolidation of those claims.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

GILBERT, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

      . The amended version of the No-Fault Act did not become effective until March 28, 2002. Act of March 27, 2002, ch. 283 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 72A.201, subd. 6(14) (2002)). Therefore, few, if any, disputed claims would be decided under this version of the Act.

      . The previous version of Rule 8, which was in effect when this litigation began, was identical to the current rule, except that the previous version specifically placed the administration of the no-fault arbitration system in the hands of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) rather than an "arbitration organization.”

      . The Eighth Circuit in particular has noted that the United States Supreme Court “explicitly rejected the assertion that the overriding goal of the [FAA] is to promote the expeditious resolution of claims.” Baesler, 900 F.2d at 1195 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985)).


text:
    Jeff WIEGAND, on behalf of himself and all persons similarly situated, Appellant, v. WALSER AUTOMOTIVE GROUPS, INC., and all related dealerships including but not limited to: Walser Plymouth C., L.L.C., d/b/a Walser Chevrolet, et al., Respondents.
    No. A03-250.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    July 29, 2004.

      William H. Crowder, Crowder, Bedor & Paulson, L.L.P., St. Paul, Richard Fuller, Mansfield, Tanick & Cohen, P.A., Minneapolis, Consumer Justice Center, P.A., Thomas J. Lyons, Jr., John H. Goolsby, Little Canada, for appellants.
    William M. Hart, Melissa Dosick Rieth-of, Meagher & Geer, Minneapolis, for respondents.
    Hart L. Robinovitch, David M. Cial-kowski, Zimmerman Reed, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, Stacy J. Canan, Deborah M. Zuckerman, AARP Foundation, Michael Schuster, Washington, DC, Ira Rheingold, Gen. Counsel, Nat. Ass’n of Consumer Advocates, Washington, DC, for amici curiae AARP and Nat. Ass’n of Consumer Advocates.
    Glen Robinsin, Mid-Minnesota Legal Assistance, Minneapolis, Timothy Thompson, Minneapolis, for amicus curiae Mid-MN Legal Assistance.
    Mike Hatch, Minnesota Atty. Gen., Prentiss Cox, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for amicus curiae State of MN.
    Edward T. Wahl, Aaron D. Van Oort, Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., Minneapolis, for amici curiae Chamber of Commerce, et al.
   OPINION

ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice.

Appellant Jeff Wiegand brought this private consumer fraud class action against respondent Walser Automotive Group, Inc. under Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a (2002), and Minn.Stat. § 325F.69, subd. 1 (2002). Wiegand seeks damages on behalf of a class of consumers who purchased service contracts and/or credit insurance from Walser. The issue before us is whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief. The district court dismissed the suit on a Rule 12 motion. The court concluded, as a matter of law, that causation could not be proven on the facts alleged. More particularly, the court concluded that a causal nexus for consumer fraud violations could never be proven between oral representations and consumer injuries when a contract, signed by the consumer, contradicts the content of the oral representations. The court of appeals affirmed. We reverse.

On or about September 26, 1998, appellant Jeff Wiegand visited an automobile dealership owned and operated by respondent Walser Automotive Group, Inc. in order to purchase a motor vehicle — a 1995 Isuzu Trooper. Wiegand alleges that when he purchased the Isuzu Trooper, a Walser representative misrepresented to him the need to purchase a service contract and credit insurance. More specifically, Wiegand alleges that the representative told him he was required to purchase a $1,500 service contract and a $340.37 credit insurance policy in order to obtain financing. Wiegand also alleges that the representative told him that after he made 12 monthly payments, he could refinance at an annual percentage rate (APR) lower than the 19.75% provided for in the contract. According to Wiegand, after he made the 12 monthly payments, he contacted an employee at the bank where he obtained financing and was told that the bank would not refinance.

Wiegand alleges that he agreed to purchase the $1,500 service contract and the $340.37 credit insurance based on the misrepresentations of Walser’s representative. Wiegand asserts that these misrepresentations were made to induce him to purchase the service contract and the credit insurance, which resulted in substantial profits for Walser.

Wiegand brought this class action against Walser under Minn.Stat. § 325F.69, subd. 1 — a provision of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act. Wiegand seeks damages under the private attorney general statute — Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a. Minnesota Statutes § 325F.69, subdivision 1, prohibits fraud and misrepresentation related to the sale of merchandise. Specifically, section 325F.69, subdivision 1, provides:

The act, use, or employment by any person of any fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, misleading statement or deceptive practice, with the intent that others rely thereon in connection with the sale of any merchandise, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived, or damaged thereby, is enjoinable as provided herein.

Minnesota Statutes § 8.31, subdivision 3a, allows private plaintiffs to seek damages if they are “injured” by violations of the Consumer Fraud Act. Specifically, Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a, provides:

In addition to the remedies otherwise provided by law, any person injured by a violation of any of the laws referred to in subdivision 1 may bring a civil action and recover damages, together with costs and disbursements, including costs of investigation and reasonable attorney’s fees, and receive other equitable relief as determined by the court.

Wiegand seeks damages on behalf of a class of consumers who purchased service contracts and/or credit insurance from Walser, which Wiegand alleges includes at least 100 other consumers. Wiegand bases these class action allegations on his own alleged experience with Walser, as well as a settlement agreement reached between Walser and the Minnesota Attorney General. This settlement resolved the Attorney General’s investigation of Walser dealerships over their sales and business practices in connection with motor vehicle service contracts. In the settlement, Walser agreed that in the future it would tape record its sales process for service contracts and other products, agreed not to suggest that a service contract is a required purchase, not to misrepresent the scope or extent of coverage under any service contract, and to make a good faith attempt to satisfactorily resolve all future consumer complaints brought to its attention.

Walser points out, and Wiegand acknowledges, that the language of the service contract Wiegand signed directly contradicts the alleged oral misrepresentations about the service contract and credit insurance that he asserts were made by Walser’s representative. Specifically, the contract states that credit insurance is not required and, above the signature line, the contract states: “I understand that the purchase of this service contract is not required in order to obtain financing or to purchase this vehicle.”

Regarding refinancing, the sales contract between Wiegand and Walser states that Wiegand must make 52 payments at a 19.75% APR, resulting in a $457.50 monthly payment for the full term of the loan. The sales contract does not provide for refinancing at a lower APR after 12 monthly payments, though there is no provision that directly contradicts the alleged statement that Wiegand could refinance after making 12 monthly payments.

Walser brought a Rule 12 motion to dismiss Wiegand’s action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). The district court granted Walser’s motion. The court concluded that Wie-gand’s allegations that a Walser representative misrepresented to him the need to purchase a service contract and credit insurance could not be proven because any reliance on oral representations is unjustifiable as a matter of law when a written contract, signed by the consumer, contradicts the content of oral representations. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed. Wiegand v. Walser Automotive Groups, Inc., 670 N.W.2d 449, 455 (Minn.App.2003). The court of appeals concluded that causation could not be proven as a matter of law because “[e]ach of the oral misrepresentations alleged by Wiegand is contradicted by direct, clear, and unambiguous contractual language included as part of his pleadings.” Wiegand, 670 N.W.2d at 454.

The district court and court of appeals both based their conclusions on a court of appeals case — Scott v. Forest Lake Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, 598 N.W.2d 713 (Minn.App.1999), rev. granted in part, denied in part (Minn. Nov. 17, 1999) (denying review on consumer fraud issue), rev’d on other grounds, 611 N.W.2d 346 (Minn.2000). In Scott, the court of appeals relied on its earlier case, St. Croix Printing Equip., Inc. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 428 N.W.2d 877 (Minn.App.), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 1988), to hold that reliance on oral representations is unjustifiable as a matter of law in a statutory consumer fraud action when the oral representations are contradicted by clear and unambiguous contract language. Scott, 598 N.W.2d at 720. In St. Croix Printing Equipment, however, the court of appeals held that reliance on an oral representation that is directly contradicted by a written contract is unjustifiable as a matter of law in an action based on common law fraud rather than statutory consumer fraud. 428 N.W.2d at 882. Furthermore, the court of appeals in St. Croix Printing Equipment specifically discussed the importance to its decision that the contract was between “merchants” as defined by the Uniform Commercial Code and that unequal bargaining power was not present between the parties to the contract in that case. 428 N.W.2d at 880.

The court of appeals in Wiegand recognized the limitations of Scott and St. Croix Printing Equipment as precedent. Wiegand, 670 N.W.2d at 453-54. The court nevertheless held that it was unwilling “to adopt a position directly contrary to Scott, in the absence of clear direction from the supreme court that, for rule 12 purposes, the CFA permits a cause of action where alleged oral misrepresentations directly contradict otherwise unobjectionable contractual language.” Id. at 455. The dissent, on the other hand, concluded that our decision in Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 621 N.W.2d 2 (Minn.2001), changed the analysis for private consumer fraud actions that the court of appeals utilized in Scott. The dissent stated that the majority’s decision in Wiegand “eviscerates the legislature’s intent to provide broader consumer protection than that found in common law fraud cases.” Wiegand, 670 N.W.2d at 455 (Wright, J., dissenting). We granted Wiegand’s petition for review of the issues presented to the court of appeals.

When a defendant brings a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, we must treat the allegations in the complaint as true. Northern States Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 395, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (1963). The general standard is that to survive a Rule 12 motion, a plaintiff need only set forth in the complaint “a legally sufficient claim for relief.” Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn.2003). On review of a Rule 12 dismissal, we will not uphold the dismissal “if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.” Martens v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 616 N.W.2d 732, 739-40 (Minn.2000) (quoting Northern States Power Co., 265 Minn, at 395, 122 N.W.2d at 29).

As mentioned above, we recently examined the requirements for a private consumer fraud class action in Group Health. There, in the context of a federal Rule 12 motion to dismiss, we were asked to answer the following certified question: must private plaintiffs “plead and prove reliance on the defendant’s statements or conduct in order to be eligible for relief in the form of damages under the [Consumer Fraud Act]?” Id. We held that a plaintiff “need only plead that the defendant engaged in conduct prohibited by the statutes and that the plaintiff was damaged thereby.” Id. at 12 (emphasis added). In other words, “[a]llegations of reliance are * * * not necessary to state a claim under section 8.31, subdivision 3a, for damages resulting from a violation.” Id. We based this conclusion on the fact that the legislature had eliminated the requirement of pleading and proving “traditional common law reliance” as an element of a cause of action based on misrepresentations regarding the sale of merchandise. Id. at 13. As a result, we held that “it is not necessary to plead individual consumer reliance on the defendant’s wrongful conduct to state a claim for damages under [Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a] and the substantive misrepresentation in sales statutes.” Id.

We recognized in Group Health, however, that in order to ultimately prove allegations of consumer fraud, the “injured” element of Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a, requires that a private plaintiff prove a “causal nexus” between the plaintiffs injuries and the defendant’s wrongful conduct. Id. at 14. We explained that in a case such as Group Health, in which the plaintiffs’ damages were “alleged to be caused by a lengthy course of prohibited conduct that affected a large number of consumers,” direct evidence of reliance by individual consumers was not required. Id. Rather, in a case such as Group Health, “the causal nexus and its reliance component may be established by other direct or circumstantial evidence that the district court determines is relevant and probative as to the relationship between the claimed damages and the alleged prohibited conduct.” Id.

In the ease before us, Wiegand alleges in his complaint that a Walser representative falsely told him and potentially at least 100 other consumers that he was required to purchase a $1,500 service contract in order to obtain financing, and that he did so. Wiegand also alleges that a Walser representative falsely told him and potentially others that they had to purchase a credit insurance policy in order to obtain financing, and that he did so. Wie-gand alleges that he agreed to purchase the service contract and credit insurance based on the misrepresentations of Wal-ser’s representative. In sum, the complaint alleges that misrepresentations were made and consumers were damaged thereby. Wiegand’s complaint, therefore, meets the requirements we set forth in Group Health to establish a legally sufficient claim for relief.

This conclusion, however, does not end our analysis. Dismissal on a Rule 12 motion is still appropriate if the moving party can demonstrate that it is not possible to grant relief on any evidence that might be produced consistent with the complaint. Walser asserts, as the court of appeals held in Scott, that the existence of a written contract that contradicts the alleged oral misrepresentations of Walser’s representative means that Wiegand cannot prove a causal nexus between the alleged misrepresentations and his injuries as a matter of law. Scott, 598 N.W.2d at 720. Walser also attempts to distinguish this case from Group Health. According to Walser, because the alleged violations took place through one-on-one transactions, Minnesota law requires proof of individual reliance as a causal link to damages, rather than the causal nexus requirement that we adopted in Group Health.

The policy and purpose underlying the Consumer Fraud Act, however, suggest that Walser’s assertion that Wiegand and potentially others cannot prove a causal nexus as a matter of law is wrong. We have recognized that the Consumer Fraud Act’s substantive misrepresentation in sales section — Minn. Stat. § 325F.69, subd. 1 — eliminates elements of common law fraud, such as reliance on misrepresentations. State by Humphrey v. Alpine Air Prods., Inc., 500 N.W.2d 788, 790 (Minn.1993). More specifically, in Group Health, we stated that the Consumer Fraud Act’s substantive misrepresentation in sales section eliminates the requirement of proving “traditional common law reliance.” 621 N.W.2d at 13. This is so because the Consumer Fraud Act reflects the legislature’s intent “to make it easier to sue for consumer fraud than it had been to sue for fraud at common law.” Alpine Air Prods., 500 N.W.2d at 790. Furthermore, one of the central purposes of the Consumer Fraud Act is to address the unequal bargaining power that is often found in consumer transactions. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 308 (Minn.2000).

We held in Group Health that reliance is a component of the causal nexus requirement for a private consumer fraud class action under MinmStat. § 8.31, subd. 3a. Group Health, 621 N.W.2d at 14. But a private consumer fraud class action does not necessarily require the justifiable reli-anee standard of common law fraud. We conclude that the existence of a written contract that contradicts Walser’s alleged oral misrepresentations does not, as a matter of law, negate any possibility of Wie-gand and potentially others proving a causal nexus between oral representations and consumer injuries.

At this point in the proceedings, it is unclear what evidence might be produced consistent with the complaint. Accordingly, for purposes of Walser’s Rule 12 motion to dismiss, it is not necessary for us to determine precisely what might be required for Wiegand to prove a causal nexus and its reliance component in this private consumer fraud action. Nor is it necessary for us to resolve Walser’s assertion that proof of individual reliance is required because the alleged violations took place through one-on-one transactions. Thus, we hold that Wiegand’s complaint sets forth a claim for relief that is legally sufficient to survive Walser’s Rule 12 motion to dismiss. The district court erred when it dismissed Wiegand’s complaint.

Reversed.

PAGE and GILBERT, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

      . Neither party has argued that the issues before us implicate the parol evidence rule. The touchstone of the parol evidence rule is that evidence that contradicts the terms of a written contract may not be admitted to alter the terms of a contract. Ridgway v. County of Hennepin, 289 Minn. 128, 137-38, 182 N.W.2d 674, 679 (1971). We do not address the applicability of the parol evidence rule to the issues before us.


author: ANDERSON, RUSSELL A, Justice.

text:
    EISCHEN CABINET COMPANY, Appellant, v. John O. HILDEBRANDT, et al., Respondents, Hampton Bank, n/k/a Merchants Bank, N.A., Defendant, Ameriquest Mortgage Company, Respondent.
    No. A03-358.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    July 29, 2004.

      George L. May, Terence Garner O’Brien, May & O’Brien Law Offices, Hastings, for Appellant.
    Michael J. O’Loughlin, Michael J. O’Loughlin & Associates, Minneapolis, for Respondent, John O. Hildebrandt.
    Scott Evan Stevens, Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, Minneapolis, for Respondent, Ameri-quest Mortgage Co.
   OPINION

ANDERSON, RUSSELL A, Justice.

A mechanics’ lien ceases 120 days after the last work is completed unless the mechanic files a claim statement with the county recorder’s office and serves upon the property owner, either personally or by certified mail, a copy of the claim statement. Minn.Stat. § 514.08, subd. 1 (2002). In this ease, we are asked whether service by certified mail of a copy of a mechanics’ lien claim statement upon the property owner, as permitted by Minn.Stat. § 514.08, subd. 1(2) (2002), is effective upon mailing or upon receipt and we hold that service is effective upon mailing.

On May 4, 2000, John and Marlene Hil-debrandt (“Hildebrandts”) contracted with Eischen Cabinet Company (“Eischen”) to provide custom-made cabinets for their home in Hastings, Minnesota. Eischen completed the work on January 25, 2002. The sum of $30,631.72 was due Eischen under the contract and Hildebrandts paid all but $3,131.72. On Friday, May 24, 2002, Eischen mailed a mechanics’ lien claim statement to the Dakota County Recorder for filing and also sent a copy of the claim statement by certified mail to Hilde-brandts’ home address, where the work was done. Eischen did not know that Hildebrandts received their mail at a Hastings post office box, and not at their home. The county recorder’s office, and also the Hastings post office where Hilde-brandts received their mail, were closed on Monday, May 27, for Memorial Day. The lien statement was filed and recorded by the county recorder on May 28. The certified letter with Eischen’s claim statement was received by the Hastings post office on May 28 and Hildebrandts picked up the letter at their Hasting post office box on May 30, 2002.

Eischen commenced an action to enforce its mechanics’ lien and Hildebrandts filed a counterclaim alleging that it would cost $3,000 to complete and correct the cabinet installation. Hildebrandts brought a motion for partial summary judgment which the district court granted, dismissing that portion of Eischen’s complaint seeking to enforce its mechanics’ lien and also discharging the claim statement — the notice of lis pendens — filed with the county recorder. The court concluded that service did not occur until Hildebrandts received the copy of the claim statement on May 30, 2002, and since May 30 was beyond the 120-day statutory time limit for service, Eisehen’s mechanics’ lien was untimely.

The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that timeliness of service is an essential requirement of the mechanics’ lien statute, and that service by certified mail is effective upon receipt of certified mail, not upon its mailing. Eischen Cabinet Co. v. Hildebrandt, 671 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn.App.2003). We granted review and now reverse.

We review summary judgment to determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jorgensen v. Knutson, 662 N.W.2d 893, 897 (Minn.2003). Our review of the law, which includes the construction of statutes, is de novo. Ryan Contracting, Inc. v. JAG Investments, Inc., 634 N.W.2d 176,181 (Minn.2001).

We construe a statute to effect its essential purpose but we do not disregard the clear language of a statute — the letter of the law — to pursue the spirit of the law. Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn.1999). Our objective in all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 558 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn.1997). See also MinmStat. § 645.16 (2002).

In this case, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the legal issue is when service by certified mail is effective under section 514.08. The statute provides, in relevant part, that a mechanics’ lien

ceases at the end of 120 days after doing the last of the work, or furnishing the last item of skill, material, or machinery, unless within this period:
(1) a statement of the claim is filed for record with the county recorder or * * * the registrar of titles * * *; and
(2) a copy of the statement is served personally or by certified mail on the owner or the owner’s authorized agent or the person who entered into the contract with the contractor.

Minn.Stat. § 514.08, subd. 1. (emphasis added).

The language of the statute is silent as to whether service by certified mail is effective upon mailing or upon receipt. It is clear, however, that the mechanics’ lien statute is remedial in nature and its essential purpose is to reimburse laborers and material provider's who improve real estate and are not paid for their services. Guillaume & Assocs. v. Don-John Co., 336 N.W.2d 262, 263 (Minn.1983). Yet, the purpose of the mechanics’ lien statute does not answer precisely the question of whether service of a liens claim statement by certified mail is effective upon mailing or upon receipt.

The term “certified mail” is trademarked by the United States Postal Service and is a method of sending mail in which the sender receives “a receipt stamped with the date of mailing.” http:// www.usps. com/send/w ay stosendmail/'ex-traservices/'ceriifiedmailservice. htm (last visited July 13, 2004). For an additional fee, a sender can request delivery verification, through the use of a “return receipt.” Id. Within Minnesota statutes, however, when “service by certified mail” is effective differs with each statutory provision. Some statutory provisions declare that service is effective upon mailing. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. § 281.23, subd. 5 (2002) (relating to real estate tax sales and requiring service of notice of the expiration of redemption rights to be provided to all property tax payers and fee owners by “certified mail, return receipt requested,” acknowledging that “[p]roof of such mailing shall be made” but that “[fjailure to receive the notice shall not operate to postpone or excuse any default”). Other statutory provisions expressly state that service by certified mail is effective upon receipt or refusal to accept receipt. See Minn.Stat. § 144E.19, subd. 3(c) (2002) (providing that service of notice of temporary license suspension for emergency medical personnel “is effective when the order is served on the licensee personally or by certified mail, which is complete upon receipt, refusal, or return for nondelivery to the most recent address provided to the board”). Still other statutes expressly provide a specific timeframe for the effective date of service. See Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)(b) (2002) (providing that parental notification is effective at 12 noon on the day following the day that notice was sent via certified mail). Some statutes, like the mechanics’ lien statute at issue here, allow for service by certified mail but do not specify when service is effective. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. § 481.13, subd. 2(a) (2002) (providing for attorneys’ liens); Minn.Stat. § 67A.18, subd. 2 (2002) (allowing an insurance company to annul and cancel a township insurance policy by providing a 10-day notice via certified mail).

We have not addressed before the specific question of whether service by certified mail of a copy of a mechanics’ lien claim statement upon the property owner, as permitted by Minn.Stat. § 514.08, subd. 1(2), is effective upon mailing or upon receipt. The court of appeals previously addressed the specific question but its decisions are in conflict as to whether .service is effective upon mailing or upon receipt. We are not able to reconcile the conflicting decisions of the court of appeals, but we find our decision in Schneider v. Plainview Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 407 N.W.2d 673 (Minn.1987), to be instructive. In Schneider, we interpreted a statutory notice provision for annulment and cancellation of township insurance. The statute, Minn.Stat. § 67A.18, subd. (2) (2002) provides that “[t]he company may annul and cancel any policy after giving not less than ten days’ written notice to the insured by registered or certified mail to the last known address of the insured and to any mortgagee to whom the policy is made payable.” While the statute permits service of notice by certified mail, it is silent as to whether such service is effective upon mailing or upon receipt of the notice. We concluded that service occurred upon mailing, explaining that “[w]e can perceive of no reason for requiring small, rural township mutual companies to use a costly form of cancellation notice, neither required of nor commonly used by commercial insurance companies, unless the legislature intended that the mailing itself constitutes the requisite notice.” Schneider, 407 N.W.2d at 675.

Our ruling in Schneider that service by certified mail is effective upon mailing is consistent with general legal authorities. See 66 C.J.S. Notice § 30(a) (1998) (providing that in the absence of custom, statute or estoppel, when notice is allowed to be served by mail, service is not effective until the notice comes into the hands of the one to be served but “[w]here a statute specifies that a person shall be notified by particular means, such as certified or registered mail, notice is effective when deposited in the mails.”) Id. at n. 88 (emphasis added). Our interpretation in Schneider is also consistent with the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure which provide that service of notice generally is effective upon mailing, not delivery. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.02 (“[s]ervice by mail is complete upon mailing”).

When we consider (1) the remedial purpose of the mechanics’ lien statute; (2) the definition of certified mail provided by the U.S. Postal Service; (3) general legal authorities; (4) our own rules of civil procedure that provide that service by certified mail is effective upon mailing; and (5) our previous interpretation in Schneider, where the statutory notice provision was silent, that service by certified mail is effective upon mailing, we conclude that service by certified mail of a mechanics’ lien claim statement, as permitted by Minn. Stat. § 514.08, subd. 1(2) (2002), is effective upon mailing.

Reversed.

      . The claim statement that Eischen filed and served stated that the last day of work was January 25, 2002. Eischen's complaint alleged that the last day of work was January 29, 2002. The district court found that for purposes of determining Hildebrandts’ partial summary judgment motion, Eischen “agrees that the last date it provided labor or material was Januaiy 25, 2002, the date alleged in the mechanic’s lien statement.” In light of Eis-chen’s agreement and the district court’s findings, the court of appeals concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the last day that Eischen provided work or materials was January 25, 2002. Eischen did not appeal that determination.

      . The timeliness of the filing the lien claim statement with the county recorder is not at issue. The district court found that from January 25, 2002, the last day of work, the 120-day period for filing expired May 25, 2002, but since May 25 was a Saturday and Monday, May 27, was Memorial Day, the district court extended the filing deadline to Tuesday, May 28. Hildebrandts did not appeal the district court’s conclusion that the lien claim statement was timely filed with' the county recorder.

      . Eischen urges this court to construe Minn. Stat. § 514.08 in pari materia with Minn.Stat. § 514.06 (2002), which under circumstances not applicable here, permits a person's interest in land to be protected from lien upon proper notice by certified mail. Section 514.06 provides that, "service may be made by personal service or by certified mail” and also that "[mjailed service is effective when mailed.” Minn.Stat. § 514.08.

        In pari materia is a canon of statutory construction which provides that statutes relating to the same person or thing or having a common purpose should be construed together. Apple Valley Red-E-Mix, Inc. v. State by Dept. of Public Safety, 352 N.W.2d 402, 404 (Minn.1984). The court of appeals declined to read the two statutes in pari materia, concluding that their time and purpose are dissimilar. We decline to decide the issue before us by construing the two statutes in pari mate-ria, but we acknowledge that it would be potentially troublesome to practitioners if one admittedly distinct section of the mechanics' lien statute provided that notice by certified mail is effective upon mailing, while another admittedly distinct section of the mechanic lien statute were construed to require that service by certified mail is effective upon receipt.

      . In Har-Ned Lumber Co. v. Amagineers, Inc., the court of appeals held that service occurred when the lien statement was mailed to the homeowner within the statutory time even though the homeowner never actually received the notice. 436 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. App.1989). The court reasoned,
      Generally, service is complete when the paper is properly mailed. The risk of failure of the mail is on the person to whom it is addressed. Certified mail is a service that provides a mailing receipt to the sender and a record of delivery at the office of address. The use of certified mail fills the function of insuring receipt by a person of suitable age or discretion at the person's last known address and is thus reasonably calculated to provide notice to the affected person. While service by certified mail raises a presumption of actual notice, such notice may be found where the certified mailing is properly directed to the intended recipient, even though not actually received by them. Due process requires only that notice be reasonably calculated to reach interested parties.

        Id. at 815 (citations omitted).
      Recently, in Carolina Holdings Midwest LLC v. Copouls, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's determination that service by certified mail of a copy of a lien statement occurred even though a copy was returned to the sender undelivered. 658 N.W.2d 236, 238 (Minn.App.2003). Citing Har-Ned Lumber, the court of appeals rejected the argument that service by certified mail is only complete upon receipt by the addressee. Carolina Holdings, 658 N.W.2d at 240.
      Notice has been found when certified mail is properly directed to an intended recipient, even though not actually received. Here, the lien statements were properly directed to appellants. Moreover, the lien statements were sent several months after the completion date to the work site address that appellants themselves had given as their address when they obtained a mortgage; it was not unreasonable for respondents to assume that mail sent to this address would reach appellants. The district court's conclusion that the liens were not void because of inadequate service was not an error of law.

        Id.

      . The court of appeals concluded that service occurred upon receipt when it examined the question, indirectly, in an attorney malpractice case. Rouse Mechanical, Inc. v. Dahl 489 N.W.2d 272 (Minn.App.1992). In Rouse, an attorney apparently failed to timely serve a mechanics' lien claim statement upon the property owner. In the malpractice suit against him, the attorney requested that venue be changed to the county from where he mailed the claim statement. The district court denied the attorney’s motion for a change of venue and the attorney petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. Id. at 273. The court of appeals denied the petition and in doing so, stated that "certified mail service of a lien statement occurs upon delivery or willful refusal to accept delivery.” Id. In the present case, the court of appeals relied upon its statement in Rouse to affirm the district court's determination that notice to Hildebrandts was untimely. Eischen Cabinet, 671 N.W.2d at 611.

      . We note that the mechanics’ lien statutes, Minn.Stat §§ 514.01 to 514.17, are specifically excepted from the Rules of Civil Procedure governing the procedure in the district courts in all suits of a civil nature. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 81.01 and appendix A. The civil rules are not binding in this case, but we note that our decision is consistent with the procedure followed under the civil rules.