author: CADY, Justice. WIGGINS, Justice

text:
    Gertrude K. GODFREY, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
    No. 05-1691.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    June 20, 2008.
    Rehearing Denied July 16, 2008.

      Mark S. Soldat, West Des Moines, and Martin Ozga of Max Schott & Associates, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Julie F. Pottorff, Deputy Attorney General, and -Grant K. Dugdale, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Richard J. Sapp and John T. Clendenin of Nyemaster, Goode, West, Hansell & O’Brien, P.C., Des Moines, for amicus curiae, Christopher J. Rants, as Speaker of the Iowa House of Representatives, Eighty-First General Assembly.
   CADY, Justice.

This appeal involves a claim by a litigant that the Iowa legislature violated the single-subject rule of the Iowa Constitution in enacting a comprehensive statute during a special extraordinary legislative session in 2004. The district court concluded the litigant had no standing to assert the claim and dismissed the action without addressing the merits. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On September 7, 2004, the Iowa General Assembly met at the State Capitol for a special one-day, extraordinary legislative session. See Iowa Const, art. IV, § 11 (“[The governor] may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the general assembly by proclamation, and shall state to both houses, when assembled, the purpose for which they shall have been convened.”). The legislature promptly approved House File 2581, 80th G.A., 1st Extraordinary Sess., § 11, and the measure was signed into law by Governor Thomas J. Vilsack. See 2004 Iowa Acts ch. 1001.

The special session followed our decision in Rants v. Vilsack, 684 N.W.2d 193 (Iowa 2004). In that case, we held the governor had no authority under the constitution to line-item veto portions of a bill passed by the legislature in 2003. Rants, 684 N.W.2d at 207-10. We further held that the exercise of the power by the governor operated, under our constitution, to veto the entirety of the bill. Id. at 210-12. The background of the bill (H.F.692) was chronicled in our decision, and the bill was widely considered to be an important governmental initiative to stimulate and develop the state’s economy. Id. at 197-98. The legislation was complex and lengthy, but generally created and funded an Iowa values fund and included provisions for tax and regulatory reform. Id. The values fund was the focal point of the legislation. The provisions vetoed by the governor mostly dealt with changes in the tax code, products liability legislation, and workers’ compensation, as well as various provisions the governor believed would disrupt the operation of the Department of Economic Development and the governor’s office. Id.

On August 27, 2004, two months after we declared the 2003 bill never passed into law due to the exercise of the line-item veto, Governor Vilsack issued a proclamation for an extraordinary session of the General Assembly to address the Iowa Values Fund and matters relating to the economic security of Iowa. The governor outlined the items — -to be addressed at the special session — that he would sign into law. Ultimately, a single bill was proposed through a compromise and the efforts of the governor and the General Assembly. The bill covered nine points or divisions: (1) The Endow Iowa Grants Program; (2) statutes governing superse-deas bonds; (3) workers’ compensation laws; (4) the Iowa Consumer Credit Code; (5) the Loan and Credit Guarantee Program; (6) interest earned on the Unemployment Compensation Reserve Fund; (7) marketing strategies to expand and stimulate the state economy; (8) accelerated bonus depreciation and expensing allowance for businesses; and (9) re-creation of the Grow Iowa Values Board, the Economic Development Marketing Board, and the Loan and Credit Guarantee Advisory Board. 2004 Iowa Acts ch. 1001.

A separate appropriation bill funded contracts under the special legislation and approved the projects previously approved by the Iowa Values Fund Board prior to the date House File 692 was declared unconstitutional.

The title to the bill read:

AN ACT concerning regulatory, taxation, and statutory requirements affecting individuals and business relating to economic development, workers’ compensation, financial services, unemployment compensation employer surcharges, income taxation bonus depreciation and expensing allowances, and civil action appeal bonds, and including effective date, applicability, and retroactive applicability provisions.

Id. The division of the bill dealing with workers’ compensation included a provision that changed compensation benefits for successive injuries. Id. § 11.

On October 4, 2003, Gertrude K. God-frey filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in district court against the State. Godfrey is a resident of Sioux City and a taxpayer in this state. She also received workers’ compensation benefits in the past based on two prior work-related injuries. She sustained an injury to her knee in 2001 and an injury to her lower back in April 2004. Godfrey claimed House File 2581 violated the single-subject rule of article III, section 29 of our state constitution. She asked the law be declared unenforceable.

The district court denied injunctive relief and ultimately dismissed her petition. It held Godfrey had no standing to bring the claim, and the court refused to rule on the merits of her claim that the bill was unconstitutional in violation of the single-subject rule.

Godfrey filed a notice of appeal. On appeal, she claims she had standing to bring the action based on her status as a citizen, taxpayer, and a potential workers’ compensation claimant. She also asserts she should be exempted from the general requirement of standing based on the important public interest presented by her claim. In addition, Godfrey asks the merits of her claim be addressed on appeal.

II. Standard of Review.

We review claims based on a violation of our state constitution de novo. Kistler v. City of Perry, 719 N.W.2d 804, 805 (Iowa 2006). We review a decision by the district court to dismiss a case based on the lack of standing for errors at law. Birkhofer ex rel. Johannsen v. Birkhofer, 610 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Iowa 2000).

III. Justiciability of a Claim the Legislature Violated the Single-Subject Rule of the Iowa Constitution in Enacting a Statute.

Courts have traditionally been cautious in exercising their authority to decide disputes. As a result, a variety of rules of self-restraint have been developed over the years, one of which has surfaced in this case. Generally, courts refuse to decide disputes presented in a lawsuit when the party asserting an issue is not properly situated to seek an adjudication. See Alons v. Iowa Dist. Ct, 698 N.W.2d 858, 864 (Iowa 2005). This doctrine is now called standing, although it began to develop as a doctrinal rule long before a designation of its title. Today, the doctrine not only serves to limit which persons may bring a lawsuit, but it has developed into a larger cultural doctrine, concerned with the “ ‘role of the courts in a democratic society.’ ” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556, 569 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343, 354 (1975)).

We have frequently described our test for standing by identifying two elements. A plaintiff “ ‘must (1) have a specific personal or legal interest in the litigation and (2) be injuriously affected.’ ” Alons, 698 N.W.2d at 864 (quoting Citizens for Responsible Choices v. City of Shenandoah, 686 N.W.2d 470, 475 (Iowa 2004)). While these two elements frame the essence of our standing doctrine, they were derived from earlier cases involving challenges to administrative agency action and do not fully capture the later development of our doctrine, especially as to actions to enforce public constitutional values by private individuals. See City of Des Moines v. PERB, 275 N.W.2d 753, 759 (Iowa 1979) (adopting the twofold test of standing derived from administrative agency cases involving statutes modeled after the Model State Administrative Procedure Act); John C. Reitz, Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 437, 442-43 (2002). We have frequently supplemented and elaborated on these elements by drawing on the federal law on standing. See Alons, 698 N.W.2d at 869 (recognizing federal authority on standing to be persuasive); Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 821 (Iowa 2005) (citing federal test for standing with approval). In fact, our doctrine on standing parallels the federal doctrine, even though standing under federal law is fundamentally derived from constitutional strictures not directly found in the Iowa Constitution. See Alons, 698 N.W.2d at 867, 869 (recognizing the power of federal courts to decide cases is restricted by the “cases” and “controversies” clause of article III). Most all jurisdictions around the country share prudential restrictions on judicial action based on policy grounds that help explain a general, compatible approach to standing. See Reitz, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. at 459-61 (recognizing “most states” essentially follow the federal-standing doctrine, but also citing differences in state and federal law). Thus, we return to our general two-prong test of standing to consider how it has been more fully augmented by parallel federal law, as well as our own cases, over the years.

We have previously recognized our two elements of standing are separate requirements. Alons, 698 N.W.2d at 864 (“Having a legal interest in the litigation and being injuriously affected are separate requirements.”)- However, we acknowledge these elements have much in common and often are considered together. The first element — the plaintiff has a specific personal or legal interest — is aligned with the general concept of standing that a party who advances a legal claim must have a special interest in the challenged action, “as distinguished from a general interest.” City of Des Moines, 275 N.W.2d at 759. The second requirement — the plaintiff must be injuriously affected — means the plaintiff must be “injured in fact.” United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n. 14, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 2417 n. 14, 37 L.Ed.2d 254, 270 n. 14 (1973) (stating “injury in fact” reflects the requirement under the administrative procedure act that the person be “adversely affected,” and “it serves to distinguish a person with a direct stake in the outcome of a litigation — even though small — from a person with a mere interest in the problem”). This requirement recognizes the need for the litigant to show some “specific and perceptible harm” from the challenged action, distinguished from those citizens who are outside the subject of the action but claim to be affected. Id.

This two-prong Iowa test parallels the landmark test established in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970). In that case, the Court abandoned the traditional “legal interest” test for standing. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153, 90 S.Ct. at 830, 25 L.Ed.2d at 188. This restrictive test essentially required a litigant to satisfy standing by showing some personal interference with a common-law, statutory, or constitutional right. Id. In its place, the Court adopted a more expansive twofold test for the complaining litigant to allege both an “injury in fact” and that “the interest sought to be protected by the complainant to be arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.” Id.

■ Since Data Processing, the Supreme Court has mentioned the “zone of interest” portion of the test infrequently, and has instead developed an expansive body of law of standing under the injury-in-fact component of the test. See Fletcher, 98 Yale L.J. at 257-58. The corpus of law surrounding the injury-in-fact element has essentially identified the various types of injuries that support standing under this criterion. See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 Cornell L.Rev. 275, 276-77, 290-99 (2008). Nevertheless, it is clear the “zone of interest” element is not a continuation of the old “legal interest” test for standing, and this element does not relate to the legal merits of the claim. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153, 90 S.Ct. at 830, 25 L.Ed.2d at 188. If anything; the approach followed by the United States Supreme Court reveals the injury-in-fact requirement is frequently suitable to resolve most constitutional claims, while the zone-of-interest test continues to influence administrative agency claims. See Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 n. 16, 107 S.Ct. 750, 758 n. 16, 93 L.Ed.2d 757, 769 n. 16 (1987) (observing “zone of interest” test is infrequently used outside claims under the administrative procedure act).

Although we continue to spotlight both elements of the test when presented with an issue of standing, we have slightly altered the first requirement of our two-prong test to show a personal or legal interest to better conform to.the federal test. Prior to Citizens for Responsible Choices, the first element required the plaintiff to have a specific, “personal, and legal interest.” Hawkeye Bancorp. v. Iowa Coll. Aid Comm’n, 360 N.W.2d 798, 801 (Iowa 1985) (emphasis added). Consequently, we began to refer to claims by-litigants to enforce public interests as an exception to the “personal and legal interest” requirement. See Alons, 698 N.W.2d at 864-65. However, in Citizens for Responsible Choices, we changed the conjunctive “and” to “or,” which correctly revealed that the interest involved can either be personal or legal. See id. at 863-64. This change aligned our test with the approach taken in Data Processing that standing does not depend on the legal merits of a claim. See Citizens for Responsible Choices, 686 N.W.2d at 475. Instead, the legal-interest component of the test remains a part of our Iowa law on standing, but only as an alternative to the personal-interest component of the test.

A consequence of identifying alternative tests under our first element of standing is that it is unnecessary for us to continue to consider standing involving claims to enforce public rights as a “public interest” exception to our former narrow rule (requiring that a litigant must establish both a personal interest and a legal interest to establish standing). See Alons, 698 N.W.2d at 865-69. Instead, cases involving actions by private persons to enforce public rights may be brought under the personal-interest alternative to the first element. In other words, this approach brings our rule into alignment with the approach taken by federal courts and allows us to focus on the factual-injury element of standing by considering the types of injuries a litigant must show to satisfy the test. This approach has been especially significant in cases involving actions to vindicate the public interest through challenges to governmental action. We no longer require the litigant to allege a violation of a private right and do not require traditional damages to be suffered. Instead, we require the litigant to allege some type of injury different from the population in general. A good example of our approach is found in Hurd v. Odgaard, 297 N.W.2d 355 (Iowa 1980).

In Hurd, two lawyers who were users of the county courthouse brought a mandamus action to compel the county to repair the crumbling, decaying building. 297 N.W.2d at 356. In addressing standing, we flatly rejected the notion that monetary or traditional damages were required to be shown by a private litigant to support standing to enforce the public interest at stake. Id. at 357. Instead, we found that the factual-injury component to support standing could be derived from intangible, noneconomic interests. Id. at 358. While the lawyers were identified as citizens and taxpayers with an interest in the safety and maintenance of the building, their status as users of the building is what actually gave rise to the identifiable injury to support standing. Id. As citizens who use the courthouse “to pay taxes, obtain licenses, record instruments, and attend court,” the lawyers had an individual interest in the safety and conservation of the building that was directly affected by the alleged inaction by the county. Id. Thus, litigants who share intangible interests “in common with all other citizens” must also identify some individual connection with the affected subject matter to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. This injury component, of course, captures more than economic loss and includes con-servational and other intangible interests.

This same broad approach to the injury requirement can be observed in cases involving claims by private litigants of illegal action by government that theoretically results in marginally higher taxes to the litigant or some similar tax burden. In Richards v. Iowa Department of Revenue & Finance, 454 N.W.2d 573 (Iowa 1990), we held a taxpayer had standing to challenge a decision to grant a property tax exemption to a private, nonprofit community living center for the elderly because the decision had the effect of placing a greater tax burden on the litigant. 454 N.W.2d at 576. Similarly, in Elview Construction Co. v. North Scott Community School District, 373 N.W.2d 138 (Iowa 1985), we held an individual taxpayer who lived in the school district had standing to challenge the actions of a school district in awarding construction contracts allegedly in violation of bidding procedures. 373 N.W.2d at 142. Even though the bidding statutes exist to protect the public in general, an individual injury to support standing is recognized to exist for taxpayers who pay for the construction project. Id.

On the other hand, our recent case of Alons illustrates that not all intangible interests satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. In that case, we held that a general, abstract grievance concerning the authority of the district court to terminate a civil union between two women was insufficient to support standing in an action by married citizens, taxpayers, a pastor and church, and state and federal legislators. Alons, 698 N.W.2d at 870. The claimants only identified a general interest in the issue, not an injury in fact.

The United States Supreme Court has also drawn the line at “abstract” claims. In particular, the Court has consistently rejected standing based on the general interest of a litigant in having government act pursuant to the law. Allen, 468 U.S. at 754, 104 S.Ct. at 3326, 82 L.Ed.2d at 571 (denying standing to bring a claim for an “ ‘abstract injury in nonobservance of the Constitution’ ’’(quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S, 208, 223 n. 13, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 2933 n. 13, 41 L.Ed.2d 706, 720 n. 13 (1974))). Such claims present only a generalized grievance because “ ‘all citizens [have an interest] in constitutional governance.’ ” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 160, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 1725, 109 L.Ed.2d 135, 148 (1990) (quoting Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217, 94 S.Ct. at 2930, 41 L.Ed.2d at 716) (holding citizen had no standing to bring an Eighth Amendment challenge to the execution .of another person because the lawsuit only alleged a general interest in government acting in compliance with the Constitution). Likewise, psychological and mental injuries caused by the failure of government to obey the Constitution do not support standing. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485-86, 102 S.Ct. 752, 765-66, 70 L.Ed.2d 700, 718 (1982); see Bermudez v. TRC Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176, 1180 (7th Cir.1998) (“If unease on observing wrongs perpetrated against others were enough to support litigation, all doctrines of standing and justiciability would be out the window.”). A specific invasion of a right “must be suffered” by the litigant. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 224 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. at 2934 n. 14, 41 L.Ed.2d at 721 n. 14.

While both Iowa and federal case law on the application of standing to public-interest litigation has largely focused on the type of factual injury required to support standing, federal law has also developed additional elements that are particularly applicable when the “asserted injury arises from government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else,” as opposed to cases in which the “plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2137, 119 L.Ed.2d 351, 364-65 (1992). Under such a circumstance, the plaintiff must establish “a causal connection between.the injury and the conduct complained of’ and that the injury is “ ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ to be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’ ” Id. at 561-62, 112 S.Ct. at 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d at 364-65 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41-42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1926, 48 L.Ed.2d 450, 460 (1976)). These two additional considerations largely relate to the prudential concerns we have recognized, and we too have relied on them to resolve standing claims in the past. For example, in Citizens for Responsible Choices, we were presented with an action by a group of citizens who sought a declaration that a public-improvement project was illegal because the bonds to finance the project were allegedly issued in violation of the law. 686 N.W.2d at 472. The project included , the construction of a recreational lake and park on land owned or rented by the citizens. Id. We held the citizens group had no standing to challenge the action in the issuance of the revenue bonds because the injury claimed came from the project itself, not the governmental action in the issuance of the bonds. Id. at 475. To borrow from the federal language, the injury was not “fairly traceable” to the challenged action. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. at 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d at 364.

With this legal framework in mind, we turn to the arguments raised by Godfrey to support standing. Godfrey first characterizes her claim as one to seek redress for a personal injury based on the substantive workers’ compensation provisions contained in the legislation claimed to have been enacted by the legislature in violation of our constitution. She claims these provisions will limit any future amount of benefits she would recover in the event she sustains another work-related injury in the future. Thus, she presents herself as the object of the legislative action. She claims this action caused a personal injury and that the injury can be redressed by declaring the statute to be unconstitutional.

Godfrey acknowledges the impact and meaning of the statute at issue is uncertain and that her claim of a future injury is based on her own interpretation of the statute. She admits the courts must ultimately interpret the meaning of the statute, and she makes no claim of injury based on a denial of an opportunity to challenge the interpretation of the statute in the future in the event she actually suffers another work-related injury. This circumstance can impact a variety of factors, including the speculativeness of the injury now alleged.

Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the loss of workers’ compensation benefits by a litigant is the type of injury that would give rise to standing. We also recognize that we have said, “[o]nly a likelihood or possibility of injury need be shown” to support standing. Iowa Bankers Ass’n v. Iowa Credit Union Dep’t, 335 N.W.2d 439, 445 (Iowa 1983). Yet, the injury cannot be “conjectural” or “hypothetical,” but must be “concrete” and “actual or imminent.” Alons, 698 N.W.2d at 867-68. In Iowa Bankers Ass’n, the injury alleged to support standing involved the competitive interests of banks affected by agency rules that were claimed to give a competitive advantage to credit unions. 335 N.W.2d at 444. The likelihood of injury was demonstrated by allegations that some banks had actually lost business in the past as a result of the agency rules. Id. Importantly, the prior loss of business supported the likelihood of an imminent injury to support standing. Id. at 444-45.

In this case, Godfrey claims a future injury based solely on her status as a worker with a prior work-related injury covered by the workers’ compensation statute. Yet, this status does nothing to establish the likelihood of an actual or immediate threat of another covered injury. There is nothing to show that the future injury is not merely theoretical. In fact, the injury asserted by Godfrey is the same type of future injury that fell short of establishing standing in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). There, the Court found a plaintiff who, had been arrested by police and subjected to a life-threatening choke hold that had been approved for use by police under a department policy had no standing to seek an injunction to prohibit the future use of the choke hold by police. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111, 103 S.Ct. at 1670, 75 L.Ed.2d at 690. The Court found the plaintiff failed to demonstrate any immediate or continuing injury based on the prior injury. Id. As in Lyons, Godfrey’s claim of injury lacks any immediacy to support standing to raise a constitutional claim. The important fact is that Godfrey’s prior status as a worker who has suffered a prior work-related injury does not make it any more likely that she will suffer another injury in the future.

Godfrey next asserts standing to challenge the alleged constitutional deficiency in the legislation as a citizen and a taxpayer. Godfrey claims citizens are legally injured when the legislature passes a statute in violation of the constitution. In the same way, she argues her status as a taxpayer allows her to vindicate the public interest in seeing that the laws are properly enacted without demonstrating any pecuniary damage.

While some legal challenges to governmental action can be examined under theories of citizen and taxpayer standing, the litigant must still demonstrate some personal injury connected with the alleged unconstitutional act. A litigant cannot claim standing to challenge the actions of government based only on his status as a citizen. Alons, 698 N.W.2d at 865. In Hurd, the citizen-taxpayer litigants at least established they were users of the government resource allegedly subject to damage by inaction of the county. 297 N.W.2d at 358. The user status of the litigants is what linked them to the affected building so as to establish the necessary individual injury to support standing. A general interest shared by all citizens in making sure government acts legally is normally insufficient to support standing without such a link. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179-80, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 2948, 41 L.Ed.2d 678, 689-90 (1974) (holding citizens lacked standing to challenge statute when all citizens affected in the same way). Similarly, a taxpayer acquires standing by showing some link between higher taxes and the government action being challenged. See, e.g., Elview Constr. Co., 373 N.W.2d at 142.

While a citizen or taxpayer does not need to show pecuniary damage, or some other traditional damage, some personal injury must be demonstrated. In this case, Godfrey claims nothing more than the general vindication of the public interest in seeing that the legislature acts in conformity with the constitution. This is an admirable interest, but not one that is alone sufficient to establish the personal injury required for standing.

Godfrey next argues she has standing as a private litigant to assert the rights of nonparty workers’ compensation claimants who are, in fact, injured under the statute. She argues she is the only litigant in Iowa who is able to assert a constitutional challenge to the statute because the window of opportunity for other litigants to file a single-subject challenge has passed. See State v. Mabry, 460 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Iowa 1990) (holding no single-subject challenge to a statute may be brought after the act is codified).

Third-party standing normally requires a litigant to establish the parties not before the court, who have a direct stake in the litigation, are either unlikely or unable to assert their rights. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 1370, 113 L.Ed.2d 411, 425 (1991). Even if we assume the expiration of the narrow window of time to assert a single-subject challenge meets this test, standing to bring actions on behalf of third parties still requires the litigant to establish a personal injury or stake in the application of the challenged statute. Id. at 410-11, 111 S.Ct. at 1370-71, 113 L.Ed.2d at 425 (providing that to establish third-party standing, litigant must have suffered an “injury in fact” so as to give the litigant a sufficient concrete interest in the outcome of the dispute); ICLU v. Critelli, 244 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 1976) (holding Iowa Civil Liberties Union and lawyers lacked standing to maintain action to challenge a supervisory order of the court pertaining to the trial of criminal cases — only defendants in the criminal cases had standing). This critical element is not eliminated in third-party standing cases and has not been demonstrated in this case.

Finally, Godfrey asks that we create an exception to our standing doctrine that waives the requirement of standing in exceptional circumstances involving issues of great public importance. Godfrey claims her case presents such an exceptional circumstance and that we should decide the constitutional question presented based on the fundamental necessity of ensuring that the executive and legislative branches of government do not overstep their constitutional limitations and suppress the liberties of the people.

While Iowa, like many states, essentially follows the federal doctrine on standing, states generally have greater freedom to develop exceptions or to otherwise modify the doctrine, on public-policy grounds. As a self-imposed rule of restraint we, like other states, are free to shape the doctrine into a form that best meets the concerns and ideals of our role in the overall operation of government. See Hawkeye Bancorp., 360 N.W.2d at 802.

A number of states do permit litigants to raise issues of great importance and interest to the public as a narrow exception to the standing requirement. See Sears v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65, 961 P.2d 1013, 1020 n. 11 (1998) (citing additional jurisdictions); State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheivard, 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999); Sloan v. Wilkins, 362 S.C. 430, 608 S.E.2d 579 (2005). At least one state has even applied the exception to a challenge to a broad economic development statute claimed to be enacted in violation of the single-subject requirement of the state constitution. Sloan, 608 S.E.2d at 583.

We believe our doctrine of standing in Iowa is not so rigid that an exception to the injury requirement could not be recognized for citizens who seek to resolve certain questions of great public importance and interest in our system of government. In fact, we have previously expressed a willingness to recognize a public-policy exception at the time our standing rule was viewed to require a legal injury. Alons, 698 N.W.2d at 864-65; see Exira Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 512 N.W.2d 787, 790 (Iowa 1994) (mentioning an argument based on the great public importance exception to standing, but not considering it). Moreover, our doctrine of self-imposed restraint was not created to keep us from deciding critical public issues of the day, but was built upon a foundation of prudential policies to promote the effective operation of our courts and to define the proper role of the courts within our democratic society. Thus, an exception to standing that conforms to the underlying rationale for the doctrine should be recognized. On the other hand, we cannot allow standing to transform into a loose doctrine. A principled approach is required. Accordingly, the question in this case is whether the circumstances alleged by Godfrey are sufficient to support such an exception.

We begin our consideration of an exception to the standing requirement cognizant of the policies that drive the standing rule. In a broad sense, standing is deeply rooted in the separation-of-powers doctrine and the concept that the branch of government with the ultimate responsibility to decide the constitutionality of the actions of the other two branches of government should only exercise that power sparingly and in a manner that does not unnecessarily interfere with the policy and executory functions of the two other properly elected branches of government. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 750, 104 S.Ct. at 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d at 569. While this policy of standing has no specific constitutional basis in Iowa, as it does in federal law, it is compatible with the overall constitutional framework in this state and properly reflects our role in relationship to the other two coequal branches of government. This ultimate power to decide disputes between the other branches of government and to determine the constitutionality of the acts of the other branches of government does not exist as a form of judicial superiority, but is a delicate and essential judicial responsibility found at the heart of our superior form of government. We have the greatest respect for the other two branches of government and exercise our power with the greatest of caution.

Additionally, standing exists to ensure litigants are true adversaries, which theoretically allows the case to be presented to the court in the most effective manner. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, 678 (1962); Fletcher, 98 Yale L.J. at 222. Similarly, standing helps ensure that the people most concerned with an issue are in fact the litigants of the issue. Fletcher, 98 Yale L.J. at 222. Standing also ensures that a real, concrete case exists to enable the court to feel, sense, and properly weigh the actual consequences of its decision. Id. These policies drive our application of standing and must be kept in the forefront as we consider circumstances to support an exception or waiver of the standing requirement.

We next examine the issue presented. The claim in this case is that the legislature violated the single-subject rule of article III, section 29 in enacting House File 2586. The constitutional provision at issue provides, in part:

Every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith; which shall be expressed in the title.

Iowa Const, art. Ill, § 29. This single sentence contains two separate provisions derived from independent historical bases. Long v. Bd. of Supervisors, 258 Iowa 1278, 1286, 142 N.W.2d 378, 383 (1966); see 1A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 17:1, at 5 (6th ed. 2000) (“The prohibition against the inclusion of more than one subject or object in the same act is invariably joined in the same constitutional passage, often in the same sentence, with a requirement that the subject or object be expressed in the title. They are, however, separate and independent provisions, serving distinct constitutional purposes.”) [hereinafter Singer]. Each provision serves distinct constitutional purposes. Long, 258 Iowa at 1286, 142 N.W.2d at 383.

The first provision is referred to as the single-subject requirement. It exists to “facilitate concentration on the meaning and wisdom of independent legislative proposals or provisions.” Singer, at 5; Giles v. State, 511 N.W.2d 622, 625 (Iowa 1994) (single-subject requirement keeps legislators apprised of pending bills); Long, 258 Iowa at 1286, 142 N.W.2d at 383 (single-subject rule provides for an orderly legislative process and allows the legislature to better grasp and more intelligently discuss legislative proposals). The requirement forces “each legislative proposal to stand on its own merits by preventing the ‘logrolling’ practice of procuring diverse and unrelated matters to be passed as one ‘omnibus’ ” due to “the consolidated votes of the advocates of each separate measure, when no single measure could have been passed on its own merits.” Singer, at 5; see Long, 258 Iowa at 1286, 142 N.W.2d at 383. Likewise, the single-subject rule “prevents the attachment of undesirable ‘riders’ on bills certain to be passed because of their popularity or desirability.” Singer, at 5-6; see Giles, 511 N.W.2d at 625 (explaining the single-subject rule discourages passage of unfair legislation on the coattails of more favorable proposals); Long, 258 Iowa at 1286, 142 N.W.2d at 383.

The second provision requires the .subject of a bill to be expressed in the title. The primary purpose of this provision is to provide reasonable notice of the purview of the act to the legislative members and to the public. Giles, 511 N.W.2d at 625; Singer, at 40-41. The title provides an easy “means for concerned parties to find out what a bill or act is about without reading it in full.” Singer, at 5. The provision ultimately serves to prevent surprise and fraud from being visited on the legislature and the public. Long, 258 Iowa at 1286, 142 N.W.2d at 383. Thus, the title requirement is directed more to the integrity of the legislative process by preventing laws from being surreptitiously passed with “provisions incongruous with the subject proclaimed in the title.” Singer, at 50; see Long, 258 Iowa at 1286, 142 N.W.2d at 383 (title provision primarily directed at legislative process). It surfaced as a constitutional requirement as a result of public demand derived from a prevailing sense that bills giving substantial grants to private parties were often “smuggled through the legislature under an innocent and deceptive title.” Long, 258 Iowa at 1287, 142 N.W.2d at 383.

Importantly, Godfrey does not challenge the title requirement of article III, section 29. In fact, the title of House File 2581 is detailed and comprehensive and identifies each provision of the bill. Instead, Godfrey only challenges the single-subject requirement of article III, section 29 by claiming the individual provisions of House File 2581 do not relate to the same subject. Thus, Godfrey does not seek to vindicate any perpetration of fraud or deceit on the legislature or the public that can occur by infirmities in the title of a bill, but seeks to uphold the internal workings of the legislative process that promotes and encourages legislators to understand and debate the merits of each separate subject. We believe this limited challenge by Godfrey plays a significant role in deciding whether or not to waive standing.

While standing generally limits the exercise of our powers except as to matters that are “strictly judicial in nature,” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 2317, 138 L.Ed.2d 849, 858 (1997), we become especially hesitant to act when asked to resolve disputes that require us to decide whether an act taken by one of the other branches of government was unconstitutional. Id. at 819-20, 117 S.Ct. at 2317-18, 138 L.Ed.2d at 858. Without an individual injury by the complainant under such circumstances, we risk assuming “a position of authority” over the acts of another branch of government. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 574, 112 S.Ct. at 2143, 119 L.Ed.2d at 373. We must avoid such a result. Thus, standing should be waived only when the issue is of utmost importance and the constitutional protections are most needed. We therefore turn to consider if the claim raised by Godfrey is of great public importance.

The absence of an allegation or claim by Godfrey that implicates fraud, surprise, personal and private gain, or other such evils inconsistent with the democratic legislative process diminishes our need to intervene to determine if the legislature has violated a constitutional mandate. The claim by Godfrey only permits her to argue that some of the provisions of House File 2581 may not have been passed as separate bills if the provisions had not been grouped together into one bill. Moreover, there is no allegation that the provisions were purposely placed into one bill to engage in logrolling. In fact, House File 2581 was a joint effort by the executive and legislative branches to reenact legislation determined by the third branch of government to have failed in its prior enactment, and the General Assembly gathered for a special extraordinary session with the understanding of the scope of the session as outlined by the governor. These circumstances minimize our need to interfere with the affairs of another branch of government.

The absence of a claimed violation of the title requirement also diminishes the importance of the constitutional issue presented. While the subject and title requirement rules are separate constitutional principles, they operate together to prevent greater harm than when the single-subject requirement is the only violation claimed. While we strive to protect people from all constitutional violations, we do not respond to all violations the same, or even provide a remedy for every violation. See, e.g., Kain v. State, 378 N.W.2d 900, 902-03 (Iowa 1985) (engaging in a cost-benefit analysis of excluding evidence obtained in violation of state and federal constitutions, and refusing to remedy the violation). In the broad scheme of constitutional violations, the constitutional issue presented in this case is not one of great public importance to support the waiver of our standing rule.

On the whole, we conclude Godfrey failed to present an issue of great public importance that convinces us we should waive the requirement of standing. This conclusion, of course, is not a statement on the merits of the claim, but our determination that the particular claim presented by a litigant without standing is not important enough to require judicial intervention into the internal affairs of the legislative branch of government. While the single-subject claim asserted in this case presents legitimate concerns of public importance, these concerns on balance do not trump the greater interest sought to be protected by our doctrine of standing.

IY. Conclusion.

We affirm the decision of the district court. Godfrey failed to establish standing to assert her claim, and we decline to waive the standing requirement under the claim presented.

AFFIRMED.

All justices concur except WIGGINS and HECHT, JJ., who dissent, and APPEL and BAKER, JJ., who take no part.

WIGGINS, Justice

(dissenting).

I dissent. Specifically, I believe we should waive our judicially created standing doctrine in this case and allow Godfrey to challenge House File 2581, 80th General Assembly, First Extraordinary Session, section 11, as violative of the single-subject clause of article III, section 29 of the Iowa Constitution.

Article III of the United States Constitution limits the judicial power of the federal courts to the resolution of cases and controversies. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. -, -, 127 S.Ct. 2553, 2562, 168 L.Ed.2d 424, 437 (2007). The federal standing doctrine enforces article Ill’s case-or-controversy requirement. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 1861, 164 L.Ed.2d 589, 602 (2006). The Iowa Constitution does not contain a case- or-controversy requirement. Hawkeye Bancorp. v. Iowa Coll. Aid Comm’n, 360 N.W.2d 798, 801-02 (Iowa 1985). Nevertheless, this court has adopted a standing requirement that is similar to the federal requirement. Alons v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 698 N.W.2d 858, 869 (Iowa 2005).

The majority was correct when it found Godfrey does not have standing, under our judicially created standing requirement, to bring this action. The majority was also correct when it held we are free to waive the judicially created standing requirement if we determine the circumstances require us to do so. See Hawkeye Bancorp., 360 N.W.2d at 802. I disagree, however, with the majority’s analysis regarding whether the great-public-importance doctrine requires us to waive the standing requirement and allow Godfrey to maintain this action. I find the majority’s analysis, holding that the title clause of article III, section 29 of the Iowa Constitution trumps the single-subject clause, to be neither principled nor workable.

The majority’s analysis is unprincipled and unworkable because the application of the great-public-importance doctrine by the majority is dependent on whether one clause of article III, section 29 has more importance than another clause. The reason our court requires a party to have standing is to avoid issuing advisory opinions. Alons, 698 N.W.2d at 864. The analysis of whether a person has standing to bring a lawsuit must be made independent from the merits of the claim. Otherwise, a court will issue an advisory opinion on the merits of a claim in deciding the standing issue. This is exactly what the majority did in this case. The analysis employed by the majority allowed it to decide a violation of the single-subject clause of article III, section 29 is akin to harmless error if there was not a violation of the article’s title clause, and there was no fraud or deception in the enactment of the legislation. Had the majority found standing, I assume it would use the same analysis to defeat standing as it would use to defeat the claim on its merits. Thus, the majority effectively issued an advisory opinion on the merits of the claim.

A principled and workable analysis to determine whether to apply the doctrine of great public importance to waive standing first requires us to establish under what circumstances the doctrine should apply. The application of the doctrine should not be dependent on the merits of a claim.

This case appears to be the first opportunity for our court to grant a waiver of standing based upon the doctrine of great public importance. See Exira Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 512 N.W.2d 787, 790 (Iowa 1994) (stating it is unnecessary for the court to consider the great-public-importance doctrine because the general rules of standing apply). In an earlier case involving an item veto, we came close to adopting the great-public-importance doctrine. State ex rel. Turner v. Iowa State Highway Comm’n, 186 N.W.2d 141, 148 (Iowa 1971). There we stated, “The issue of interpretation of the item veto is an important matter and to dismiss this action would not serve the interests of either intervenors or defendants.” Id. However, in that case we appeared to say the inter-venors had standing because they were taxpayers. Id.

Finally, in a recent item-veto case brought by state legislators individually and in their capacity as state legislators, we found the legislators had standing to maintain the action. Rants v. Vilsack, 684 N.W.2d 198, 198 (Iowa 2004). In Rants, we did not distinguish between the legislators’ status as state officials or taxpayers when we decided the standing issue. Id. In doing so, we cited the Turner decision. One could argue by citing the Turner decision, we implicitly recognized the doctrine of great public importance and waived the standing requirement for state legislators to file an action contesting an item veto.

Regardless of whether we previously recognized the doctrine of great public importance, I agree with the majority that we can and should be able to waive the standing requirement under the doctrine. I contend the proper circumstances to apply the doctrine occur in the exceptional case where a citizen claims a branch of government violated a provision of the Iowa Constitution that presents a clear threat to the essential nature of state government as guaranteed by the constitution. See Sears v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65, 961 P.2d 1013, 1019 (1998) (holding the court should only apply the doctrine narrowly and only under exceptional circumstances); see also State ex rel. Coll v. Johnson, 128 N.M. 154, 990 P.2d 1277, 1284 (1999) (stating the doctrine has been applied in cases that “generally involved clear threats to the essential nature of state government guaranteed to New Mexico citizens under their [constitution — a government in which the ‘three distinct departments, ... legislative, executive, and judicial,’ remain within the bounds of their constitutional powers” (citation omitted)).

The single-subject clause prevents logrolling, the practice whereby the legislature joins two or more unconnected matters in one bill to coerce legislators who support one of the matters into voting for the entire bill so they can secure passage of the individual matter they favor. Logrolling is not only inducive of fraud, it also makes it difficult to ascertain whether the legislature would have passed either of the matters had they been voted on separately. State ex rel. Clark v. State Canvassing BcL, 119 N.M. 12, 888 P.2d 458, 461 (1995).

The federal Constitution does not contain a single-subject clause. However, the framers of the Iowa Constitution thought a single-subject clause was important enough to include in both the 1846 constitution and our present-day constitution. See Iowa Const, art. Ill, § 26 (repealed 1857); Iowa Const, art. Ill, § 29. The single-subject clause is an essential constitutional restriction on the power of the legislature to enact laws. To disallow a citizen legal redress to contest a law on the grounds that it violates the single-subject clause is a clear threat to the essential nature of the operation of the legislative branch of state government as guaranteed by the constitution. The joinder of two or more unconnected matters in a bill is no mere irregularity. The single-subject clause goes to the heart of the legislative process mandated by the people of the State of Iowa when they adopted our constitution. Therefore, I would apply the doctrine of great public importance, waive the requirement of standing, and allow Godfrey’s challenge to proceed. See Sloan v. Wilkins, 362 S.C. 430, 608 S.E.2d 579, 583 (2005) (holding the doctrine of great public importance allows a citizen to challenge a bill under the single-subject clause of the South Carolina Constitution).

Consequently, I would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case for a trial on the merits.

HECHT, J., joins this dissent.

      . Our first case to use the word "standing” in the context of a challenge to the right to sue was Iowa Life Insurance Co. v. Black Hawk County, 190 Iowa 777, 180 N.W. 721 (1921). In that case, we applied the rule that a party who seeks to challenge a statute must show the statute infringed upon a personal right.
        Iowa Life Ins. Co., 190 Iowa at 782, 180 N.W. at 722-23. However, the word “standing” was actually used only as a synonym for the "right” to sue, not as a doctrinal heading. Id. The substantive rule was developed in earlier cases without using the word “standing.” See State v. Nebraska Tel. Co., 127 Iowa 194, 197, 103 N.W. 120, 121 (1905) (expressing rule that a party cannot challenge the constitutionality of a statute unless personal rights were affected). Similarly, the doctrine of standing developed in federal courts prior to the time it developed its doctrinal label. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 221, 225-26 (1988). One of the first cases to use the word "stand” in a context of the right to sue was Mississippi & Missouri R.R. v. Ward, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 485, 491 (1862). In that case, the defendant argued the plaintiff did not "stand” in a position to bring the lawsuit. As with federal law, the origins of our modern doctrine of standing can be traced to the administrative law movement that surfaced in the last half of the twentieth century, as well as the accompanying growth of public-interest litigation — • primarily geared at the enforcement of constitutional values — that began to sweep the country. Fletcher, 98 Yale L.J. at 225-28 (1988).

      . The statute, Iowa Code section 85.34, provides:
      7. Successive disabilities.

        a. An employer is fully liable for compensating all of an employee's disability that arises out of and in the course of the employee’s employment with the employer. An employer is not liable for compensating an employee’s preexisting disability that arose out of and in the course of employment with a different employer or from causes unrelated to employment.

        b. If an injured employee has a preexisting disability that was caused by a prior injury arising out of and in the course of employment with the same employer, and the preexisting disability was compensable under the same paragraph of section 85.34, subsection 2, as the employee’s present injury, the employer is liable for the combined disability that is caused by the injuries, measured in relation to the employee’s condition immediately prior to the first injury. In this instance, the employer's liability for the combined disability shall be considered to be already partially satisfied to ihe extent of the percentage of disability for which the employee was previously compensated by the employer.
      If, however, an employer is liable to an employee for a combined disability that is payable under section 85.34, subsection 2, paragraph "u”, and the employee has a preexisting disability that causes the employee's earnings to be less at the time of the present injury than if the prior injury had not occurred, the employer’s liability for the combined disability shall be considered to be already partially satisfied to the extent of the percentage of disability for which the employee was previously compensated by the employer minus the percentage that the employee's earnings are less at the time of the present injury than if the prior injury had not occurred.
      c.A successor employer shall be considered to be the same employer if the employee became part of the successor employer’s workforce through a merger, purchase, or other transaction that assumes the employee into the successor employer’s workforce without substantially changing the nature of the employee’s employment.

      . Unlike most state constitutions, the United States Constitution does not contain a single-subject rule. See Brent R. Appel, Item Veto Litigation in Iowa: Marking the Boundaries Between Legislative and Executive Power, 41 Drake L.Rev. 1, 5 (1992). Consequently, "logrolling” is most commonly associated with federal legislation, under additional labels of “earmarks” and "pork barreling.” Evidence of this practice is frequently exposed by public interest groups. See Stephanie Hauffer & Travis McDade, Of Disunity and Logrolling: Ohio's One-Subject Rule and the Very Evils it Was Designed to Prevent, 51 Clev. St. L.Rev. 557, 558 n. 11 (2004).

      . In Giles, we indicated that another purpose of the single-subject rule was to "alert[ ] citizens to matters under legislative consideration.” 511 N.W.2d at 625. This reason, however, is more closely aligned with the rationale for the companion rule that the subject of a bill must be expressed in its title and is not identified as a primary reason for the single-subject rule in our earlier cases. See Long, 258 Iowa at 1286, 142 N.W.2d at 383. Instead, the single-subject rule is viewed to complement and assist the title-requirement purpose of eradicating stealth legislation. Id.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WIGGINS, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    The PILLSBURY COMPANY, INC., Appellant, v. WELLS DAIRY, INC., Appellee. Wells Dairy, Inc., Third-Party Plaintiff, v. American Industrial Refrigeration, Inc. and Refrigeration Valves and Systems Corporation, Third-Party Defendants.
    No. 06-1002.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    July 11, 2008.
    Rehearing Denied and Opinion Amended Aug. 28, 2008.

      Mark McCormick and Margaret C. Callahan of Belin Lamson McCormick Zum-bada Flynn, P.C., Des Moines, William J. Cremer, Edmund J. Siegert, and Bradley M. Burd of Cremer, Kopon, Shaughnessy & Spina, L.L.C., Chicago, IL, and Daniel L. Hartnett and Marci L. Iseminger of Crary, Huff, Inkster, Sheehan, Ringgen-berg,- Hartnett & Storm, P.C., Sioux City, for appellant.
    Juli Wilson Marshall, Mary Rose Alexander, Thomas J. Heiden, André M. Geve-rola, and Matthew J. Johnson of Latham & Watkins, L.L.P., Chicago, IL, Richard H. Moeller of Berenstein, Moore, Berenstein, Heffernan & Moeller, L.L.P., Sioux City, and Bruce Johnson of Cutler Law Firm, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellee.
   WIGGINS, Justice.

The Pillsbury Company, Inc. appeals a district court ruling granting Wells Dairy Inc.’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Pillsbury’s action on the grounds that Pillsbury was not the real party in interest and the force-majeure clause in the parties’ production contract relieved Wells of performance. On our review of the record, we find that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Pillsbury is the real party in interest and that as a matter of law, under the production contract a force-majeure event must be beyond the reasonable control of Wells. Therefore, we reverse the district court judgment in favor of Wells and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On or about January 28, 1999, Pillsbury entered into a production contract with Wells for the production of Háagen-Dazs ice cream. On March 27 there was an explosion at Wells’ south ice cream manufacturing facility in Le Mars. On August 18 Pillsbury entered into a Contribution and Assumption Agreement with Nestlé-USA Food Group, Inc. to form a joint venture called Ice Cream Partners USA, LLC (ICP). This agreement reflected the parties’ intention to combine Nestlé’s ice cream division assets and Pillsbury’s Háagen-Dazs division assets. Pillsbury sent Wells a notice of assignment on October 20. In the notice, Pillsbury informed Wells that

the assignment is not, nor shall it be deemed to be, a waiver, release, or renunciation by Pillsbury, or by any of its agents or assignees, of any claims, rights or remedies of Pillsbury relating in any way to the explosion that occurred at the Wells facility in Le Mars, Iowa in March 1999 and all subsequent events....

On July 17, 2000, Pillsbury filed a two-count petition against Wells in federal court under the name of its parent company, Diageo, PLC, requesting damages resulting from the explosion on theories of breach of contract and negligence. On August 30 Pillsbury filed an amended petition substituting itself as the plaintiff.

Wells filed an action in state court against various entities involved in the design and installation of its refrigeration system implicated in the explosion. Pillsbury agreed to voluntarily dismiss its federal suit so it could consolidate its action with Wells’ pending state court action against the manufacturers of Wells’ refrigeration system. On August 8, 2002, Pillsbury filed its two-count petition against Wells in state court alleging its breach of contract and negligence claims. On October 14 Wells answered Pillsbury’s state court petition and raised the “force-maj-eure” clause of the production contract as an affirmative defense.

In December 2001 Nestlé acquired the fifty percent interest in ICP originally owned by Pillsbury and renamed the former joint venture NICC. In an agreement between Nestlé and Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Dreyer’s acquired the assets relinquished by Pillsbury under the 1999 contribution agreement that formed ICP with Nestlé.

Over the course of the proceedings, the district court ruled on three motions for summary judgment. On May 29, 2003, Wells filed its first motion for summary judgment arguing the force-majeure clause contained in the 1999 production contract between Wells and Pillsbury excused Wells’ inability to perform. In ruling on this motion the court held the force-maj-eure clause was susceptible to more than one interpretation and ordered the discovery of extrinsic evidence on the issue.

After the parties completed their discovery on the issue, Wells filed a second motion for summary judgment. Again, Wells argued the force-majeure clause excused Wells’ inability to perform. Finally, Wells filed a third motion for summary judgment arguing Pillsbury had no standing to assert its claims against Wells because it had assigned its interest in the cause of action to ICP.

The court found the force-majeure clause relieved Wells from performing under the production contract and sustained Wells’ second motion for summary judgment on this ground. The district court dropped Wells’ standing argument and treated it as an argument that Pillsbury was not the real party in interest to pursue the action against Wells. The district court sustained Wells’ motion by holding Pillsbury was not the real party in interest because it had assigned its interest in the cause of action against Wells to ICP. Accordingly, the district court gave Pillsbury two weeks to join or substitute the real party in interest or the court would dismiss the lawsuit.

Pillsbury attempted to comply with the court’s order by substituting Zurich, its insurer, as the plaintiff. Wells resisted the attempt to allow Zurich to proceed with the action. The court sustained Wells’ resistance, dismissed the action, and entered judgment in favor of Wells.

Pillsbury appeals. We will set out additional facts as they relate to the issues.

II. Issues.

In this appeal, we must decide if the district court correctly determined Pillsbury is not a proper party to the action and if the force-majeure clause of the Wells/Pillsbury production contract relieved Wells from performing under the contract.

III. Scope of Review.

We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment for correction of errors at law. Kragnes v. City of Des Moines, 714 N.W.2d 632, 637 (Iowa 2006). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the record shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981. The appellate court’s review is therefore limited to whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the district court correctly applied the law. City of Cedar Rapids v. James Props., Inc., 701 N.W.2d 673, 675 (Iowa 2005).

The burden of showing the nonexistence of a material fact is upon the moving party. Clinkscales v. Nelson Sec. Inc., 697 N.W.2d 836, 841 (Iowa 2005). Every legitimate inference that can be reasonably deduced from the evidence should be afforded to the nonmoving party, and a fact question is generated if reasonable minds can differ on how the issue should be resolved. Kragnes, 714 N.W.2d at 637.

IV. Proper Party.

A. Real Party in Interest Versus Standing. Wells’ motion for summary judgment claimed Pillsbury had no standing to assert its claims against Wells because it had assigned its interest in the cause of action to ICP. The district court analyzed the issue as one of real party in interest. A party who has standing and the real party in interest are not one in the same.

Our court has not commented on the difference between standing and real party in interest, but several other courts have. For instance, the Supreme Court of Alabama explained the difference as follows:

We use the term “real party in interest,” rather than “standing,” for a reason. Although both parties and the trial court have blurred the issue by referring to [the plaintiffs] “standing,” the question whether a party has standing to sue is distinct from whether he or she is the real party in interest. While the real-party-in-interest principle directs attention to whether the plaintiff has a significant interest in the particular action he or she has instituted, standing requires that the person demonstrate an injury to a legally protected right. Here, [the plaintiff] has standing to sue because [the defendant’s] alleged breach of contract injured her, not the bankruptcy trustee.

Ex Parte Sterilite Corp. of Alabama, 837 So.2d 815, 818-19 (Ala.2002) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). In Sterilite, the court never reached the issue of whether the plaintiff was the real party in interest because the defendant failed to object on those grounds. Id. at 819. However, in other cases, courts have held that simply because a party has standing, does not mean he or she is the real party in interest and vice versa. See, e.g., Hammes v. Brumley, 659 N.E.2d 1021, 1029-30 (Ind.1995).

In Hammes, the Indiana Supreme Court explained the difference between standing and real party in interest as follows:

Standing refers to the question of whether a party has an actual demonstrable injury for purposes of a lawsuit. ...
“In order to invoke a court’s jurisdiction, a plaintiff must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit and must show that he or she has sustained or was in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a result of the conduct at issue.”
A real party in interest, on the other hand, is the person who is the true owner of the right sought to be enforced.

Id. (quoting Higgins v. Hale, 476 N.E.2d 95, 101 (Ind.1985)). The court went on to hold that the bankrupt parties were not the real parties in interest, rather the trustees of their respective bankruptcy estates were. Id. at 1080. However, even though the parties were not the real parties in interest, they still had standing to sue because they suffered a demonstrable injury allegedly caused by the parties they were suing. Id. Because the parties had standing to sue, but were not the real parties in interest, the court found the bankrupt parties should be allowed to amend their petition to include the bankruptcy trustees, who were the real parties in interest, and the amended petition should relate back to the original filing date. Id.

When there is an effective assignment, “the assignee assumes the rights, remedies, and benefits of the assignor,” Red Giant Oil Co. v. Lawlor, 528 N.W.2d 524, 533 (Iowa 1995), and the assignment transfers the “entire rights under a contract from the assignor to the assignee so that the assignee assumes not only the benefits of the contract, but also the rights and remedies,” Ross v. First Savings Bank of Arlington, 675 N.W.2d 812, 817 (Iowa 2004) (emphasis added). Our rules require “[ejvery action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.201. Therefore, the district court was correct to analyze the motion as a real party in interest question rather than a standing question because Wells claims Pillsbury assigned this cause of action to ICP and no longer owned it.

B. Choice of Law. The parties cite only Iowa law on the issue of whether Pillsbury was the proper party to maintain this action. We will not disagree with the parties that Iowa law applies in this case to determine who may and must be the proper party to bring the claim. See Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 125 (1971) (stating “[t]he local law of the forum determines who may and who must be parties to a proceeding unless the substantial rights and duties of the parties would be affected by the determination of this issue”).

Wells argues Pillsbury is not a proper party because it assigned its rights to this cause of action to ICP in the Contribution and Assumption Agreement. Thus, the determination as to whether Pillsbury was a proper party requires us to interpret the Contribution and Assumption Agreement. The choice of law provision in the Contribution and Assumption Agreement provides the laws of the state of New York shall govern the interpretation of the agreement. However, neither party has pled or proved New York law on this issue. Accordingly, we will assume New York law is the same as Iowa law, and we will apply Iowa law to the interpretation of the Contribution and Assumption Agreement. EFCO Corp. v. Norman Highway Constructors, Inc., 606 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa 2000).

C. Contract Interpretation— Iowa Law. In deciding the issues before us, we are required to apply the principles of contract interpretation, rather than contract construction. Interpretation is the process for determining the meaning of the words used by the parties in a contract. Fashion Fabrics of Iowa, Inc. v. Retail Investors Corp., 266 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 1978). Interpretation of a contract is a legal issue unless the interpretation of the contract depends on extrinsic evidence. Id. On the other hand, construction of a contract is the process a court uses to determine the legal effect of the words used. Id. We always review the construction of a contract as a legal issue. Id.

The cardinal rule of contract interpretation is to determine what the intent of the parties was at the time they entered into the contract. Walsh v. Nelson, 622 N.W.2d 499, 503 (Iowa 2001). “Words and other conduct are interpreted in the light of all the circumstances, and if the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great weight.” Fausel v. JRJ Enters., Inc., 603 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Iowa 1999) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(1) (1979)). Another relevant rule of contract interpretation requires that “[w]herever reasonable, the manifestations of intention of the parties to a promise or agreement are interpreted as consistent with each other and with any relevant course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(5) (1979).

These rules of interpretation are general in character and only serve as guides in the process of interpretation. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202 cmt. a (1979). The rules do not depend on a determination that there is an ambiguity, but we use them to determine “what meanings are reasonably possible as well as in choosing among possible meanings.” Fausel, 603 N.W.2d at 618 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202 cmt. a (1979)).

Long ago we abandoned the rule that extrinsic evidence cannot change the plain meaning of a contract. Hamilton v. Wosepka, 261 Iowa 299, 313, 154 N.W.2d 164, 171-72 (1967). We now recognize the rule in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts that states the meaning of a contract “can almost never be plain except in a context.” Id.; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212 cmt. b (1979). Accordingly.

“[a]ny determination of meaning or ambiguity should only be made in the light of relevant evidence of the situation and relations of the parties, the subject matter of the transaction, preliminary negotiations and statements made therein, usages of trade, and the course of dealing between the parties. But after the transaction has been shown in all its length and breadth, the words of an integrated agreement remain the most important evidence of intention.”

Fausel, 603 N.W.2d at 618 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212 cmt. b (1979)) (emphasis in original).

In other words, although we allow extrinsic evidence to aid in the process of interpretation, the words of the agreement are still the most important evidence of the party’s intentions at the time they entered into the contract. When the interpretation of a contract depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the extrinsic evidence, the question of interpretation is determined by the finder of fact.

D. Analysis. We must analyze the relevant portions of the Contribution and Assumption Agreement that formed ICP to determine whether Wells properly asserts Pillsbury is not a proper party because Pillsbury assigned its interest in this action to ICP. Applying the principles of interpretation to the relevant provisions of the contract, we are convinced a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Pillsbury assigned its interest in this action and therefore, whether it is the real party in interest. The language used by the parties to the Contribution and Assumption Agreement is unclear as to whether the cause of action relating to the explosion at Wells was assigned; thus, a reasonable juror could find the intent of the agreement was not to assign the present cause of action to ICP.

Paragraph 2.01(b) of the agreement purports to transfer the assets of Pillsbury’s Haagen-Dazs business to ICP by providing:

(b) Pillsbury shall convey, transfer, assign and deliver to the Joint Venture on the Closing Date, and the Joint Venture shall accept from Pillsbury, free and clear of all Liens, other than Permitted Liens, all of Pillsbury’s (or, if applicable, its Affiliates’) right, title and interest in the assets used or reserved for use in the operation of the Haagen-Dazs Business, except to the extent included in the Excluded Pillsbury Assets (collectively, the “Háagen-Dazs Assets” and, together with the Nestlé Ice Cream Division Assets, the “Contributed Assets”), including, without limitation, all of Pillsbury’s (or, if applicable, its Affiliates’) right, title and interest in the following assets that are used or reserved for use in the Haagen-Dazs Business.

Three separate paragraphs purport to assign the Háagen-Dazs contracts, the causes of action relating to insurance coverage, and the causes of action relating to the Háagen-Dazs business. Paragraph 2.01(b)(2) purports to assign the Háagen-Dazs contracts to ICP.

Paragraph 2.01(b)(8) purports to assign the causes of action against third parties relating to insurance coverage involving the Háagen-Dazs business by providing:

(8) All of Pillsbury’s rights, claims, credits, causes of action or rights of setoff against third parties relating to insurance coverage covering the Háagen-Dazs Business with respect to events occurring or claims arising prior to the Closing Date, but only to the extent such coverage and any proceeds therefrom covers (i) any of the Assumed Liabilities, (ii) any pre-Closing liabilities or obligations of the Háagen-Dazs Business to which the Joint Venture becomes subject notwithstanding the provisions of this Agreement, and (iii) subject to Section 9.07, lost profits claimed (which claim shall not duplicate or be inconsistent with the insurance claim made by Pillsbury prior to the date hereof relating to the Wells Facility Disruption (which, as of the date hereof, seeks recovery for increased costs and lost profits for pre-Closing periods and future marketing and promotional expenses in lieu of amounts that could be available as recovery for lost profits with respect to post-Closing periods)) after the Closing Date relating to any period beginning after the Closing in connection with the Wells’ Facility Disruption.

Paragraph 2.01(b)(9) of the agreement purports to assign all causes of action relating to the Háagen-Dazs business except those that related to the excluded Pillsbury assets or the excluded Pillsbury liabilities by providing:

(9) All of Pillsbury’s rights, claims, credits, causes of action or rights of setoff against third parties relating to the Háagen-Dazs Business, whether liquidated or unliquidated, fixed or contingent, including claims pursuant to all warranties, representations and guaranties made by suppliers, manufacturers, contractors and other third parties in connection with products or services purchased by or furnished to Pillsbury in connection with the Háagen-Dazs Business and affecting any of the Háagen-Dazs Assets, but excluding any such rights, claims, credits, causes of action or rights of setoff to the extent they relate to the Excluded Pillsbury Assets or the Pillsbury Excluded Liabilities.

The excluded assets mentioned in paragraph 2.01(b)(9) that are relevant to this appeal are found in paragraph 2.02(b) of the agreement. That paragraph provides:

Pillsbury and its Affiliates shall not contribute any of its right, title or interest in ... (xiv) all of Pillsbury’s rights, claims, credits, causes of action or rights of setoff against third parties relating to insurance coverage covering the Haagen-Dazs Business with respect to events occurring or claims arising prior to the Closing Date (including, without limitation, the Wells Facility Disruption and the insurance receivables relating thereto), except to the extent included in the Haagen-Dazs Assets pursuant to Section 2.01(b)(8)....

Paragraph 2.02(b)(xiv) excluded all of Pillsbury’s causes of action against third parties relating to insurance coverage of the Haagen-Dazs business with respect to the events occurring or claims arising pri- or to the closing date. This paragraph explicitly states: “including, without limitation, the Wells Facility Disruption and the insurance receivables relating thereto.” A reasonable jury could find this limitation was intended to exclude two separate items — the claim against Wells for the facility disruption and the insurance receivables related to the facility disruptions.

Further evidence contained in the Contribution and Assumption Agreement that would allow a jury to find the agreement treated the cause of action relating to the Wells facility disruption separately from the Haagen-Dazs contracts assigned in paragraph 2.01(b)(2) can be found in the notes to the financial statement attached to the agreement. The financial statement purports to list the value of the assets and liabilities contributed by Pillsbury to ICP. Note seven of the statement provides:

(7) Miscellaneous Income
Miscellaneous income includes ... accrued insurance refund for lost sales through June 30, 1999, resulting from the Wells Facility Disruption as described in the Agreements. In accordance with the Agreements, the Statement of Current Assets and Current Liabilities excludes all current assets and current liabilities related to the Wells’ Facility Disruption.

A jury could interpret note seven to mean the Wells facility disruption claim is to be treated differently than any other asset being assigned to ICP. Thus, the language contained in the Contribution and Assumption Agreement is not clear as to whether Pillsbury intended to assign its cause of action against Wells to ICP.

Finally, the course of dealings of the parties to the Contribution and Assumption Agreement could also allow a reasonable jury to find Pillsbury did not intend to assign the present cause of action to ICP. Shortly after Pillsbury entered into the Contribution and Assumption Agreement it gave notice to Wells that it assigned all its interest in the production contract between them to ICP. Pillsbury also gave this notice to Nestlé, the other party to the agreement, and to ICP, the entity created by the agreement. In that notice Pillsbury stated it was not assigning “any claims, rights or remedies of Pillsbury relating in any way to the explosion that occurred at the Wells facility in Le Mars, Iowa in March 1999.” See Miller v. Geerlings, 256 Iowa 569, 579, 128 N.W.2d 207, 213 (1964) (holding the court will adopt the practical construction placed upon a contract by the parties); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212 cmt. b. (1979) (stating relevant evidence includes the course of dealings between the parties).

Therefore, when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we find a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Pillsbury assigned its interest in the present action to ICP.

V. Force Majeure.

A. Choice of Law. The production contract between Wells and Pillsbury states, “[t]his Agreement and all actions relating hereto will be governed by the laws of the State of Minnesota.” The parties agree that Minnesota law applies to the interpretation of the force-majeure clause in the production contract. They argued this issue as though they pled and proved Minnesota law. The district court in its ruling cited Minnesota law to decide this issue. On appeal, the parties argue this issue by relying on Minnesota law. Therefore, we will apply Minnesota law to the interpretation of the force-majeure clause contained in the production contract.

B. Contract Interpretation — Minnesota Law. Interpreting a contract under Minnesota law requires the court to determine and enforce the intent of the parties. Motorsports Racing Plus, Inc., v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc., 666 N.W.2d 320, 323 (Minn.2003). When interpreting a written contract, the court determines the intent of the parties from the plain language of the instrument itself. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n v. General Mills Inc., 470 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Minn.1991). When a contractual provision is clear and unambiguous, courts should not rewrite, modify, or limit its effect by a strained construction. Telex Corp. v. Data Prods. Corp., 271 Minn. 288, 135 N.W.2d 681, 686-87 (1965); Anderson v. Twin City Rapid Transit Co., 250 Minn. 167, 84 N.W.2d 593, 601 (1957); Grimes v. Toensing, 201 Minn. 541, 277 N.W. 236, 238 (1938).

Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law to be determined by the court. Noreen v. Park Constr. Co., 255 Minn. 187, 96 N.W.2d 33, 36 (1959). A contract that is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation is ambiguous. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Morse, 261 Minn. 259, 111 N.W.2d 620, 624 (1961). If the court finds that no ambiguity exists, contract interpretation and its legal effect are questions of law for the court. Bell Lumber Co. v. Seaman, 136 Minn. 106, 161 N.W. 383, 384-85 (1917). However, where the language is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be used to aid in the interpretation of the contract. Blattner v. Forster, 322 N.W.2d 319, 321 (Minn.1982). In doing so, the court looks to the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract and to the parties’ own subsequent interpretation of the agreement. Fredrick v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 720, 465 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn.Ct.App.1991). This extrinsic evidence can be gleaned from the parties’ course of dealings to aid in the interpretation of the contract. Anoka-Hennepin Educ. Ass’n v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 305 N.W.2d 326, 330 (Minn.1981). If extrinsic evidence is used, the interpretation of the contract is a question of fact for the jury unless such evidence is conclusive. Donnay v. Boulware, 275 Minn. 37, 144 N.W.2d 711, 716 (1966).

C. The Force-Majeure Clause. The production contract between Wells and Pillsbury contained a force-majeure clause. The language of the clause relevant to this appeal states:

FORCE MAJEURE: Neither party will be liable for delays or suspension of performance (other than the obligation to pay for services and goods sold and delivered) caused by acts of God or governmental authority, strikes, accidents, explosions, floods, fires or the total loss of manufacturing facilities or any other cause that is beyond the reasonable control of that party (“Force Majeure”) so long as that party has used its best efforts to perform despite such Force Majeure.

D. Analysis. The district court found that the force-majeure clause is ambiguous because it is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. It concluded the placement of the phrase “that is beyond the reasonable control of that party” creates the ambiguity. The district court held one reasonable interpretation of the force-majeure clause is that this phrase modifies “acts of God or governmental authority, strikes, accidents, explosions, floods, fires or the total loss of manufacturing facilities or any other cause.” Under this interpretation, the explosion and fire at the south ice cream manufacturing facility would not excuse Wells’ nonperformance under the contract if the explosion and fire were not beyond the reasonable control of Wells.

The district court found another reasonable interpretation of the force-majeure clause is that this phrase only applies to “any other cause.” Under this interpretation, the explosion and fire at the south ice cream manufacturing facility excuse Wells’ performance under the contract even if the explosion and fire were within the reasonable control of Wells.

The determination of whether the language of a contract is ambiguous is ordinarily one of law for the court. Noreen, 96 N.W.2d at 36. We understand how the district court came to the conclusion that the placement of the phrase “that is beyond the reasonable control of that party,” can make the force-majeure clause reasonably susceptible to two meanings, if the district court examined the force-majeure clause out of context with the entire agreement. However, when a court is required to make a determination of whether a clause is ambiguous, the words and phrases of sentences cannot be read in isolation. Metro Office Parks Co. v. Control Data Corp., 295 Minn. 348, 205 N.W.2d 121, 124 (1973). The determination of whether “an agreement is ambiguous must be reached through a process of synthesis in which words, phrases, and sentences are assigned a meaning in accordance with the apparent purpose of the agreement as a whole.” Id.

Applying these principals to the force-majeure clause, we disagree with the district court and find the force-majeure clause is not ambiguous. “Force majeure” is “an event that can be neither anticipated nor controlled.” Black’s Law Dictionary 657 (7th ed. 1999). A “force-majeure clause” is a clause “allocating the risk if performance becomes impossible or impracticable as a result of an event or effect that the parties could not have anticipated or controlled.” Id. A force-majeure clause is not intended to shield a party from the normal risks associated with an agreement. 30 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 77:6, at 299 (4th ed. 2004).

Wells claims the parties to the contract did not intend the force-majeure clause to have its common meaning: thus, Wells is relieved from performing even if a strike, accident, explosion, flood, fire or the total loss of the manufacturing facilities was caused by an event within its control. Had the parties meant to change the common meaning of the force-majeure clause, the parties should have had a discussion or negotiations regarding the definition of a force-majeure event. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allied-Gen. Nuclear Servs., 731 F.Supp. 850, 855-56 (N.D.Ill.1990) (finding that because the parties “deal[t] with the question of regulatory force majeure with considerable specificity ... it is the contract, rather than a body of judicial doctrine, [the court] must interpret”). The record is clear that when the parties entered into the 1999 production contract they did not negotiate what would constitute a force-majeure event. The only discussion between the parties involved what would be the obligations of the parties if a force-majeure event occurred. Therefore, in light of the lack of discussion between the parties concerning the meaning of the force majeure clause, Wells’ claim that the common-law meaning of the force majeure clause does not apply is an unreasonable interpretation of the contract. See, e.g., Watson Labs., Inc. v. Rhône-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 178 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1110 (C.D.Cal. 2001) (stating if there is no evidence that the force majeure events were specifically negotiated by the parties, the common law meaning of force majeure is read into the contract).

In addition, Wells’ interpretation of the force-majeure clause is not reasonable in light of the purpose of the contract. The purpose of the contract was for Wells to provide Pillsbury with a specific amount of product in a defined period of time. When the contract is read in its entirety, the obligations of each party are described in detail. There is nothing in the language used by the parties, which describes each party’s various obligations, that indicates a party’s negligence would excuse nonperformance of a specific obligation. Moreover, an agreement excusing a party’s performance due to that party’s negligence defeats the purpose of having an agreement requiring specific performance within a specified period of time.

Wells’ interpretation of the force maj-eure clause is inconsistent with the absence of any discussions between the parties indicating the common understanding of a force-majeure clause was not intended by the parties and with the purpose of a production contract that requires specific performance to be completed in a specified period. Therefore, the contract is not reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation.

Accordingly, as a matter of law we find the phrase “that is beyond the reasonable control of that party” modifies all the events enumerated by the parties in the force-majeure clause. Consequently, we find that Wells is not entitled to summary judgment based on the force-majeure clause, and we reverse the district court’s ruling on this issue.

Although our ruling on the force-maj-eure clause is the law of the case, we will not consider whether Pillsbury is entitled to judgment on this issue because it did not move for summary judgment. See United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 612 N.W.2d 101, 103 (Iowa 2000) (holding “an appellate decision becomes the law of the case and is controlling on both the trial court and on any further appeals in the same case”); see also In re Estate of Campbell, 253 N.W.2d 906, 908 (Iowa 1977) (holding summary judgment may only be entered “for one who has filed a motion asking that relief and only after notice and hearing on that motion”).

VI. Disposition.

We remand the case to the district court for further proceedings because we find the district court improperly granted Wells’ motions for summary judgment.

REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.

All justices concur except HECHT and BAKER, JJ., who take no part.