author: CADY, Justice.

text:
    Charmaine HUNTER, Appellant v. CITY OF DES MOINES MUNICIPAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, Russell Underwood, Theresa Taylor and Tangela Weiss, Appellees.
    No. 05-0375.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Nov. 9, 2007.

      Robert A. Wright, Jr. of Wright & Wright, Des Moines, for appellant.
    Michael F. Kelley, Des Moines, for ap-pellees.
   CADY, Justice.

This appeal is a culmination of a long and complex dispute between a landlord and a tenant. It began as an eviction action and eventually returned to district court as a claim and counterclaim for damages and other relief. The district court granted judgment for the landlord. The tenant appealed, and we transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed the decision of the district court and remanded the case for a determination of damages and entry of judgment for the tenant. On our review, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the decision of the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Charmaine Hunter leased a house in Des Moines from the Des Moines Municipal Housing Agency (DMMHA). The DMMHA is a state agency that works in conjunction with the federal government to provide low-income housing for qualifying tenants. The term of the lease was for thirty days, beginning on November 1, 1988. The lease, however, automatically renewed for successive one-month terms. Among other terms, the lease required Hunter to accurately report her income and family composition each year and did not allow any unauthorized person to live in the dwelling unit. The DMMHA used this information to determine the amount of Hunter’s rent and her continued eligibility for assisted housing, as well as to ensure the size of the dwelling was appropriate for the number of residents. Based on the information Hunter submitted, monthly rent was set at $12.

Hunter was permitted under the rental agreement to terminate the lease with fifteen days’ notice. The DMMHA, however, was only permitted to terminate or refuse to renew the lease if the tenant committed a serious or repeated violation of material terms of the lease. Such a violation specifically included willful misstatement or concealment of information, as well as a failure to furnish accurate income and family composition information. The DMMHA was required to give thirty days’ written notice of termination of the lease when based on grounds other than nonpayment of rent. The lease provided for a grievance procedure to address disputes between the parties, including disputes over termination of the lease.

Hunter resided in the dwelling for the next twelve years. She consistently reported only a modest amount of income to the DMMHA, largely in the form of public assistance and social security. She did not report any unauthorized persons living in the dwelling.

In 2001, DMMHA discovered an individual named Leo Clark had been living in the dwelling occupied by Hunter for numerous years. Clark was not approved to reside in the house. Moreover, Clark and Hunter had received substantial gambling winnings from Prairie Meadows Racetrack and Casino as regular patrons at the casino. None of this information was disclosed to DMMHA.

Armed with this undisclosed information, the DMMHA served Hunter on April 27, 2001, with a “notice of lease termination” pursuant to Iowa Code section 562A.34(3). The notice requested Hunter to vacate the premises on or before May 31, 2001, based on numerous lease violations, including her alleged failure to accurately report income and permitting an unauthorized person to live with her.

Hunter pursued her rights under the lease to contest the termination by requesting a grievance hearing. On May 24, 2001, a hearing officer upheld the decision by the DMMHA to terminate the lease. The hearing officer found Clark was living in the dwelling in violation of the lease, and both Clark and Hunter failed to report income to DMMHA in violation of the lease.

Hunter refused to vacate the premises and sought judicial review of the decision of the hearing officer in federal district court. During this time, the DMMHA served Hunter with a three-day notice to quit and initiated a forcible entry and de-tainer action in state small claims court. This proceeding was stayed pending the judicial review proceeding in federal court.

On July 23, 2001, the federal district court upheld the decision of the hearing officer. Hunter did not appeal this decision. On August 7, 2001, the small claims court granted judgment for the DMMHA in the forcible entry and detainer action. Hunter appealed the small claims decision to district court. On October 2, 2001, the district court reversed the small claims decision and dismissed the forcible entry and detainer petition. It held the action was required to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the DMMHA had failed to follow the procedures in Iowa Code section 562A.27(1), which the district court found required the DMMHA to provide Hunter with a notice to cure the alleged violations.

The DMMHA then served Hunter with a “notice of termination of month-to-month tenancy and nonrenewal of lease term” on January 16, 2002, pursuant to Iowa Code section 562A.34(2). The notice informed Hunter the lease would terminate on February 28, 2002, based on the prior grounds of failing to accurately report her income and permitting Clark to live in the house. It did not include a notice to cure under section 562A.27(1), and Hunter again contested the termination through a grievance hearing. The grievance hearing officer upheld the DMMHA’s decision to terminate the lease and found the DMMHA did not have to provide Hunter with a notice to cure because Hunter’s breaches were not amenable to cure.

Hunter again refused to vacate the house, and the DMMHA served Hunter with a three-day notice to quit and brought another forcible entry and detainer action against her. The district court, however, granted Hunter’s motion to dismiss the action based on the DMMHA’s failure to give Hunter a notice to cure.

Hunter then filed an action against the DMMHA, and others, for breach of contract and abuse of process. Hunter sought damages, injunctive relief, and attorney fees based on the conduct of DMMHA in terminating the lease and bringing the forcible entry and detainer action without first providing a notice to cure. DMMHA filed a counterclaim against Hunter for breach of contract. It sought to recover the amount of rent Hunter would have been required to pay over the years if she had disclosed the information as required under the lease.

Hunter and the DMMHA both moved for summary judgment. The claim for summary judgment by Hunter was largely predicated on her position that the DMMHA was required to provide her with a notice to cure before terminating her lease and utilizing the court system to remove her from the premises. She asserted the district court rulings in the FED actions established her claim that notice to cure was required as a matter of law, and the parties were precluded from relitigating the notice-to-cure issue under the doctrine of res judicata. The DMMHA claimed it was not required to provide the notice, and the two prior administrative grievance proceedings between the parties conclusively established Hunter failed to disclose the required information, resulting in its damages of $20,294. Hunter submitted an affidavit in which she denied any gambling income and indicated that Clark was only in her house as a paid caretaker.

The district court granted summary judgment for the DMMHA and dismissed Hunter’s claims as a matter of law. It determined Hunter could not recover on her claim for breach of contract without first establishing she had performed all the terms under the lease. The district court determined Hunter could not meet this predicate to recovery because the prior grievance proceedings between the parties conclusively established she failed to disclose required information. Accordingly, the district court found the doctrine of issue preclusion prohibited relitigation of the issue. Additionally, the district court found DMMHA was not required to give Hunter a notice to cure under the statute. This conclusion also supported the determination by the district court that Hunter could not establish her abuse-of-process claim as a matter of law. The district court additionally found Hunter failed to produce any evidence of an improper purpose by the DMMHA in pursuing the forcible entry and detainer action.

After the district court ruled on Hunter’s claims, the parties entered into a stipulation regarding the DMMHA’s breach-of-contract claim. Among other things, the stipulation stated the DMMHA had calculated Hunter owed them over $20,000 in past rent. Relying on its previous findings during summary judgment and on the stipulated facts, the district court entered judgment for the DMMHA on its counterclaim, awarding the DMMHA $20,294 in damages.

Hunter appealed the decision of the district court, and we transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed the district court decision and remanded the case for a determination of damages for Hunter. Although it agreed with the district court that there was no evidence of an improper purpose to support the claim for abuse of process, it determined Hunter was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law in the breach-of-contract claim based upon its holding that the findings made in the prior grievance decisions involving the parties could not be used in this action to establish that Hunter failed to perform her obligations under the lease. Consequently, the court of appeals found the evidence set forth in Hunter’s affidavit was sufficient to support her breach-of-contract claim. The court of appeals held the findings from the grievance proceedings that the DMMHA relied upon to support its claim had no preclusive effect because of the absence of a notice to cure. It also found that federal law prohibited any preclusive effect of the grievance hearings, and that the administrative proceedings could not otherwise support a claim of issue preclusion. Additionally, the court of appeals found the doctrine of issue preclusion precluded the district court in this action from deciding that the notice to cure was not required to be given by the DMMHA, after two previous district court decisions determined the notice was required to be given. Both parties sought further review.

II. Issues and Standard of Review.

The questions now on further review were initially brought before the district court on the parties’ motions for summary judgment. We review rulings on motions for summary judgment for the correction of errors at law. See Clinkscales v. Nelson Sec., Inc., 697 N.W.2d 836, 840—41 (Iowa 2005). Summary judgment is not appropriate unless “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). The moving party has the burden to establish it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Clinicscales, 697 N.W.2d at 841.

III. Hunter’s Breach-of-Contract Claim.

The breach-of-contract claim by Hunter is premised on the argument that the DMMHA was required to provide a notice to cure under Iowa Code section 562A.27(1) before terminating the lease. The district court in this proceeding determined the statute did not require a notice to cure, while the district court in the prior FED decisions held a notice to cure was required. The court of appeals determined the prior FED decisions were res judicata, which precluded the DMMHA from asserting in this proceeding that it was not required to provide a notice to cure under section 562A.27(1).

Issue preclusion generally applies when four elements are present:

“(1) the issue concluded must be identical; (2) the issue must have been raised and litigated in the prior action; (3) the issue must have been material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action; and (4) the determination made of the issue in the prior action must have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment.”

Grant v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 722 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1981)). The rule serves two important goals of providing fairness to the successful party in the first case and promoting efficient use of court resources by prohibiting repeated litigation over the same issue. State ex rel. Casas v. Fellmer, 521 N.W.2d 738, 740-41 (Iowa 1994) (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649, 58 L.Ed.2d 552, 559 (1979)). The court of appeals applied this general rule to conclude that the district court in this action was precluded from relitigating the prior rule of law enunciated by the district court in the FED litigation that the DMMHA was required to provide Hunter with a notice to cure.

Even when the requirements of the general issue preclusion rule are present, courts are required to consider if special circumstances exist that make it inequitable or inappropriate to prevent relitigation of the issue previously determined in the prior action. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 288 F.3d 519, 528 (3d Cir.2002); Grant, 722 N.W.2d at 174 (applying third exception to collateral estoppel doctrine). The exceptions share the same goal of fairness as the general rule and have been summarized in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 (1982). The second of five recognized exceptions provides:

Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the following circumstances:
2. The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that are substantially unrelated, or (b) a new determination is warranted in order to take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal context or otherwise avoid inequitable administration of the laws....

We turn to the first alternative of the second exception that permits relitigation when “[t]he issue is one of law” and “the two actions involve claims that are substantially unrelated.” We have not previously considered the application of this exception.

This exception was first discussed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 45 S.Ct. 66, 69 L.Ed. 262 (1924). In that case, the Court observed that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to “unmixed questions of law.” Id. at 242, 45 S.Ct. at 67, 69 L.Ed. at 264. That is, when a court has enunciated a rule of law in deciding a case between two parties, the same parties are not “estopped from insisting that the law is otherwise,” in a subsequent action between them. Id. Yet, “a fact, question or right distinctly adjudged in the original action cannot be disputed in a subsequent action, even though the determination was reached upon an erroneous view or by an erroneous application of the law.” Id. (emphasis added).

The Court has subsequently acknowledged the uncertainty that can be presented in the application of this exception, but has attempted to elucidate the exception through a two-step process. United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 104 5.Ct. 575, 78 L.Ed.2d 388 (1984); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28, reporter’s note to cmt. b. (“The distinction suggested in the Moser case, no matter how formulated, is difficult of application.”). First, a court must determine if an “issue of fact” or an “issue of law” is sought to be relitigated. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. at 171, 104 S.Ct. at 579, 78 L.Ed.2d at 393. Second, a court must decide whether the “issue of law” is presented “in a successive case that is so unrelated to the prior case that relitigation of the issue is warranted.” Id. Yet, even if the issue is one of law, estoppel applies to prevent relitigation “ ‘[w]hen the claims in the two separate actions between the same parties are the same or are closely related.’ ” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 cmt. b).

On one hand, this approach signals a rather straightforward rule that collateral estoppel ordinarily applies when two cases present the same legal issue. See 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4425, at 658 (1981) [hereinafter Charles Alan Wright]. On the other hand, the approach “sounds a note of caution where the issue involved is the choice or formulation of the governing rule of law.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 288 F.3d at 530. Thus, “[w]here the same legal issue is presented in two suits but the second suit calls for application of the previously selected rule of law in a significantly different context, it may be inappropriate to preclude a party from contending that the governing rule of law applied in the first was erroneously chosen or formulated.” Id. The rationale for this rule is explained in comment b to section 28 of Restatement (Second) of Judgments. When claims between the same parties are closely related, preclusion applies to issues that were litigated in the first action because it is unfair to the “winning party and an unnecessary burden on the courts.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 cmt. b. Yet,

if the claims in the two actions are substantially unrelated, the more flexible principle of stare decisis is sufficient to protect the parties and the court from unnecessary burdens. The rule of law declared in an action between two parties should not be binding on them for all time, especially as to claims arising after the first proceeding has been concluded, when other litigants are free to urge that the rule should be rejected. Such preclusion might unduly delay needed changes in the law and might deprive a litigant of a right that the court was prepared to recognize for other litigants in the same position.

Id.

The decision “[w]hether the context in which the legal issue is presented in the second suit is sufficiently unrelated to that in the first to counsel against preclusion ... should be made with reference to the consequences of preclusions for the precluded party and the administration of justice.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 288 F.3d at 530. One reason a different context can preclude relitigation is that it “may make it more likely that the second suit and the stake there at issue were not foreseeable at the time of the first suit.” Id.-, see Charles Alan Wright, at 244.

Applying these principles to the case at hand, it is clear that the question whether a statute requires a landlord to give a notice to cure before terminating a month-to-month tenancy is one of law. The district court previously decided the issue in the context of whether it had jurisdiction or authority to hear an FED action. The district court did not distinctly adjudge a “fact, question or right” between the parties, but instead enunciated a rule of law in the course of deciding its jurisdiction to adjudicate the rights of the parties.

In this case, the same legal issue is presented as in the prior case between the parties, but in an entirely different context. Here, the issue is presented in the course of deciding whether a tenant is entitled to damages from a landlord for failing to provide a notice to cure under claims of abuse of process and breach of contract. These claims are unrelated to a claim to remove a tenant from leased property.

It is unlikely the district court in the first action foresaw that the rule of law would be applied to a damage claim.in a second lawsuit, and it is equally unlikely a second lawsuit was considered when an appellate court denied the DMMHA’s request for discretionary review of the legal ruling. The different contexts of the two cases make it fair to permit the DMMHA to challenge the legal precept previously established by the district court in the first case. Significantly, the DMMHA is not challenging the application of the law to the circumstances of the first case, but the rule of law itself. The reporter’s notes to the Restatement exception provide:

Subsection (2) recognizes ... that a rule of law declared in a proceeding between two litigants is not binding on them for all time with respect to all claims that may arise between them ... where, for example, a court deciding a case has enunciated a rule of law, the parties in a subsequent action upon a different demand are not estopped from insisting that the law is otherwise, merely because the parties are the same in both cases.

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28, reporter’s note to cmt. b.

Under the circumstances of this case, the DMMHA should not be “estopped from insisting that the law is otherwise.” Id. The circumstances fall within the exception and warrant relitigation. The common question is purely one of law, and the two claims, while factually related, are based upon different demands. Clearly, the illustrations and examples provided by the Restatement to support relitigation under the exception are more closely aligned to the facts of this case than the provided examples of situations that fall outside of the exception. See generally id. cmt. b & rptrs. ns.

As a result, the findings by the district court in the prior FED actions are not binding on this proceeding. Moreover, there is nothing else that prohibits us on further review from determining whether a notice to cure was required to be given. The issue has been argued and appealed throughout these proceedings. Therefore, we proceed to analyze whether the DMMHA was required to provide a notice to cure under section 562A.27(1) of the Iowa Code.

We begin by recognizing the termination of the lease in this case was governed by multiple sources — not just the Iowa Code. The rental agreement, federal law, and our state law all address the subject of termination of the lease. Hunter’s claim in this case, of course, is that the DMMHA breached the lease by failing to provide a notice to cure pursuant to section 562A.27(1) of Iowa’s Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (IURLTA). See generally Russell E. Lovell II, The Iowa Uniform Residential Landlord & Tenant Act & the Iowa Mobile Home Parks Residential Landlord & Tenant Act, 31 Drake L.Rev. 253 (1981) [hereinafter Lovell]. While the IURLTA was not specifically enacted to govern federally subsidized low-income housing, it does not exclude such leases from its reach. See Iowa Code § 562A.5 (stating the scope and jurisdiction of chapter 562A). Instead, the IURLTA was made applicable “to rental agreements entered ... after January 1, 1979.” Id. § 562A.37. Consequently, the lease between the DMMHA and Hunter must comply with the IURLTA’s provisions. As a result, the DMMHA would be required to give a notice if required under the IURLTA.

The IURLTA imposes certain requirements for the termination of a residential lease, generally depending on the type of tenancy and the reasons and timing of the termination. See Lovell, 31 Drake L.Rev. at 329-37 (discussing termination under the IURLTA). One set of rules requires written notice of termination for periodic tenancies. For example, if the tenancy is month-to-month, the landlord or tenant is required to give written notice to the other at least thirty days prior to the end of the monthly tenancy. Iowa Code § 562A.34(2).

A separate set of rules govern the termination of a lease by a landlord prior to the termination date in the lease agreement for noncompliance with the lease terms. See id. §§ 562A.27-.27A; see also id. § 562A.21 (stating the general and similar rules tenants must follow when terminating a lease because of landlord noncompliance). Section 562A.27(1) is one of these rules. It allows the landlord to terminate the lease agreement before its stated termination date when there “is a material noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement.” Id. § 562A.27(1). In order to pursue this special remedy, the landlord must follow the statutory procedure. This procedure requires the landlord to “deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying the acts and omission constituting the breach” and additionally provide the tenant with a notice to cure, which must allow the tenant seven days to cure the breach. Id. If the breach is not cured by that date, the lease terminates as stated in the notice. Id. The lease does not terminate if the breach is cured within seven days. Id. However, if a similar breach recurs within six months, then the landlord may terminate the lease with seven days’ notice. Id. Thus, the law creates a special remedy because it permits the landlord to terminate a tenancy before the end of the period of possession agreed under the lease or established by operation of law. At the same time, the law permits the tenant to ameliorate the harshness of the landlord’s remedial action by allowing the tenant to stop the termination by curing the breach that gave rise to the exercise of the remedy by the landlord.

In addition to the statutory rules for terminating a lease, the IURLTA permits the landlord and tenant to impose their own terms if not prohibited by the IURL-TA or any other law. Id. § 562A.9 (1). Thus, the terms of a lease must also be examined to determine if the landlord and tenant have agreed to terms in addition to those provided by law. We begin by first examining whether the IURLTA required the DMMHA to give a notice to cure.

The IURLTA rules governing the termination of a month-to-month tenancy at the end of the tenancy do not include a notice to cure. Unlike the termination of a lease prior to the end of the tenancy, the tenant has nothing to cure when a landlord decides to end a month-to-month tenancy at the conclusion of the tenancy period. A notice to cure is only required to be given by the landlord in order to terminate a tenancy prior to the end of the period of occupancy, when a tenant violates a term of the lease, to give the tenant an opportunity to remain in the dwelling until the end of the tenancy period by remedying the breach. See id. § 562A.27(1) (tenancy does not terminate if tenant adequately remedies breach before time established by landlord). A notice to cure is not required under the IURLTA when a landlord seeks to terminate a tenancy at the end of a tenancy period. In this case, the DMMHA would only need to invoke the special self-help termination remedy and include the notice to cure found in section 562A.27(1) if it sought to terminate Hunter’s lease prior to the termination date without thirty days’ notice, or the notice was otherwise required under the terms of the lease. See Lovell, 31 Drake L.Rev. at 330 (“The basic self-help termination remedy [found in Iowa Code section 562A.21 (for tenants) and section 562A.27 (for landlords)] will seldom be of importance to the tenant who has a month-to-month tenancy, the most common situation for the residential low-income tenant, as he [or the landlord] can always terminate without cause by giving thirty days’ notice.”).

The lease agreement in this case clearly created a month-to-month tenancy. The original term of the lease was thirty days, and the tenancy automatically renewed for successive monthly terms under the lease agreement. Consequently, as a month-to-month tenancy, the IURLTA did not require a notice to cure in the event the landlord desired to terminate the lease at the end of the tenancy. The IURLTA only required thirty days’ written notice of termination. Thus, we turn to consider whether the lease terms imposed a notice-to-cure requirement.

The terms of the lease permitted the DMMHA to terminate the lease at the end of the tenancy only if the tenant engaged in “serious or repeated violations of material terms” of the lease. Of course, under the IURLTA, the parties were permitted to agree to this additional requirement of termination because it was not prohibited by law. See Iowa Code § 562A.9(1).

The notices of termination sent by the DMMHA informed Hunter her lease would terminate thirty days after the current month’s term ended. The DMMHA’s second notice of termination was specifically entitled “Notice of Termination of Month to Month Tenancy and Nonrenewal of Lease Term.” The DMMHA was not attempting to terminate the lease before the end of the lease period. Moreover, these notices complied with the IURLTA, as well as with the terms of the lease. They stated Hunter had violated certain lease terms, which permitted the landlord to terminate the tenancy with thirty days’ notice. Yet, this notice was not required under the IURLTA and did not transform the proceeding into a special remedy under section 562A.27(1). This notice was derived only from the terms of the lease, and those terms did not further require a notice to cure.

Thus, under the lease the DMMHA was required to prove noncomplianee in order to terminate Hunter’s lease, even if the DMMHA simply did not want to renew Hunter’s lease for another month. Yet, the lease imposed no additional notice-to-cure requirement. Moreover, all the IURLTA required was for the DMMHA to provide thirty days’ notice of termination. Id. § 562A.34(2). The notices clearly met these requirements, and there is nothing to indicate the notice of termination otherwise breached the lease or was contrary to any federal or state law. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(i). As a result, Hunter’s claim for breach of contract must fail. The district court properly granted the DMMHA’s motion for summary judgment on Hunter’s breach-of-contract claim.

IV. The DMMHA’s Breach-of-Contract Claim.

We next consider the DMMHA’s motion for summary judgment concerning its breach-of-contract claim. It sought summary judgment based on factual findings made in the grievance proceedings by two administrative hearing officers. In these proceedings, Hunter was found to have violated the terms of the lease agreement. The DMMHA contends these findings are res judicata and affirmatively establish that Hunter violated the lease. Hunter claims the doctrine of issue preclusion does not apply to these findings for several reasons. Chief among her reasons is the DMMHA failed to provide a notice to cure, and its failure to do so divested all adjudicative bodies of subject matter jurisdiction so that their findings are void.

Generally, a defect in the notice requirements under section 562A.27(1) “deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to hear a forcible entry and detainer action to recover possession of the leased property.” Liberty Manor v. Rinnels, 487 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Iowa 1992). Yet, this principle does not impact this case because the DMMHA was not required to provide the notice to cure under section 562A.27(1). Thus, even if we presume this principle applies to the prior administrative and federal proceedings, the adjudicative bodies in these proceedings had jurisdiction to hear the issues presented.

Hunter also argues, as the court of appeals determined, that an exception to the issue-preclusion doctrine applies in this case under our holding in Grant. 722 N.W.2d at 175. In other words, Hunter argues we cannot give res judicata effect to the grievance hearing decisions because the grievance hearing proceedings were not the type of administrative hearings recognized in Iowa to justify res judicata. Such a conclusion, however, misinterprets our holding in Grant.

In Grant we were presented with the issue whether the department of human services could adjudicate a request to correct an assessment of child abuse after a district court had determined in a prior parallel proceeding that the child abuse occurred. We recognized an exception to the application of issue preclusion when “ ‘[a] new determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts or by factors relating to the allocation of jurisdiction between them,’ ” id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(3), at 273), and ultimately held that the department of human services could correct its own assessment. However, the justification for permitting relitigation under the exception was based on the clear legislative scheme allocating jurisdiction of the issue to the department of human services. The ruling was narrow and largely predicated on the special statutory process in place. Importantly, the decision was not based on “differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures.” Thus, because Hunter relies on “the differences in the quality and extensiveness” between the procedures of the prior grievance proceedings and the district court proceeding to support her claim for relitigation, Grant provides little support.

Our review of procedures available to tenants under a grievance process reveals they comport with due process and afford a tenant a full and fair opportunity to litigate the factual issues. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.56. These procedures include the right to be represented by counsel, the right to present evidence and arguments in support of a tenant’s complaint, and the right to examine witnesses. See id. § 966.56(b). The procedures largely resemble those normally provided in a court proceeding. Moreover, the decision of a grievance officer is, and was in this case, subject to review in federal court.

Nevertheless, Hunter points out that the grievance procedure requires a tenant to first make a showing of entitlement to relief before the housing agency has the burden to justify its actions. See id. 966.56(e). The requirement for the tenant to make a preliminary showing does not alter our conviction that any difference in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures in the grievance proceedings and in the underlying district court proceeding are not significant. We have not required identical procedures in determining whether to permit relitigation of issues, but primarily look to those procedural differences “likely to cause a different result” or differences that otherwise deprive a litigant of an opportunity to fully litigate the issues. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. D.J.I., 545 N.W.2d

866, 873 (Iowa 1996); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(4) (relitigation not precluded if party had a “significantly heavier burden”). There is nothing in the record in this case to suggest the applicable procedures would “likely cause a different result” or play any significant role in the outcome. In fact, the hearing officer in the grievance proceedings in this case specifically found by a preponderance of the evidence that the DMMHA established Hunter violated the two provisions in the lease that are the basis for the DMMHA’s breach-of-contract claim. Thus, the burden-shifting procedure used in the grievance process ultimately placed the burden on the DMMHA to establish the violations. As a result, we see no reason why the grievance decisions should not be afforded the effect of res judicata. See Pinkerton v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 588 N.W.2d 679, 680 (Iowa 1998) (“A final adjudicatory decision of an administrative agency is regarded res judicata the same as if it were a judgment of the court.”).

Finally, Hunter claims federal law does not permit grievance decisions to be used to affect other court proceedings, such as her contract action for damages. Federal regulations provide

[a] decision by the hearing officer ... in favor of the [DMMHA] or which denies the relief requested by the complainant in whole or in part shall not constitute a waiver of, nor affect in any manner whatever, any rights the complainant may have to a trial de novo or judicial review in any judicial proceedings, which may thereafter be brought in the matter.

24 C.F.R. § 966.57(c) (emphasis added). While there is very little judicial authority on the application of this regulation, we question whether it prohibits a grievance decision from being used to preclude reliti-gation of the issues decided. A breach-of-contract action for damages by the DMMHA is not a judicial proceeding “thereafter ... brought in the matter.” It is a separate matter.

More importantly, however, even if we assume the federal regulation intended to preclude any res judicata effect of grievance decisions, this state is not obligated to follow the pronouncement. It is our task to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in our courts to administrative decisions or particular types of administrative decisions, and we are satisfied the doctrine is properly applied in this case.

We conclude the DMMHA was entitled to summary judgment on its counterclaim. Hunter violated the lease, and the DMMHA performed the terms and conditions for termination. The parties stipulated to the damages, and Hunter provided no evidence to the contrary. We reject all claims made by Hunter in opposition to summary judgment.

V. Hunter’s Abuse-of-Process Claim.

To prevail on an abuse-of-process claim Hunter must prove, among other things, the DMMHA used the legal process in an improper or unauthorized manner. See Wilson v. Hayes, 464 N.W.2d 250, 266 (Iowa 1990) (noting the plaintiff must prove three elements to recover on an abuse-of-process claim). Hunter attempts to do so by emphasizing the DMMHA’s failure to comply with the holdings of the district court in the FED actions that required the DMMHA to include a notice to cure in its notice of termination. We, however, have already concluded these holdings were not res judicata, and the DMMHA did not have to provide the notice to cure under these circumstances. Therefore, Hunter’s claim does not support this element of abuse of process.

In addition, even if the DMMHA was required to provide the notice to cure, Hunter must “prove that the [DMMHA] used the legal process primarily for an impermissible or illegal motive.” Id. Hunter sought to establish a primary impermissible or illegal motive by evidence that the DMMHA filed the second FED action without providing a notice to cure after the district court ruled a notice to cure was required and by evidence the DMMHA lobbied for legislation during the pendency of the proceedings to eliminate any notice-to-cure requirement.

We conclude this evidence is insufficient to support the legal requirement that the DMMHA use the FED process primarily for an improper or illegal purpose. Without more, a legal dispute over the correct procedure to follow in pursuing an FED action does little to establish an improper motive in using the legal system. Even though the DMMHA was aware of the ruling by the district court that it was required to include the notice to cure when it sent the second notice of termination, the DMMHA relied on a different statutory provision for terminating the lease. Compare Iowa Code § 562A.34(2) (landlord may terminate month-to-month tenancy by giving thirty days’ written notice) with Iowa Code § 562A.34(3) (landlord may bring action for possession if tenant remains in possession after expiration of the lease term). Therefore, the DMMHA did not act with disregard for the district court’s decision by replicating its prior action. Similarly, a desire to lobby for a legislative change or clarification in the legal requirements to use the court system does not establish a primary illegal motive for using the legal system. As a result, we find the district court properly granted the DMMHA’s motion for summary judgment regarding Hunter’s abuse-of-process claim.

VI. Conclusion.

We vacate the decision of the court of appeals, and affirm the judgment of the district court.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

All justices concur except HECHT, J., who takes no part.

      . In 1996, Hunter filed a civil rights action against a Des Moines police officer. A trial was held in 2001. Clark testified in deposition and at trial that he had been living with Hunter since 1996. Hunter also testified at trial that Clark lived at her house. Additionally, significant gambling winnings were disclosed. For example, records at Prairie Meadows Racetrack and Casino for 1999 indicated Clark and Hunter recorded winnings of over $75,000 each. While both individuals had significant losses as well, their winnings apparently exceeded their wagers by several thousands of dollars.

      . Although Hunter originally did not appeal the federal district court decision against her, after the state district court ruled a notice to cure was required, Hunter made several motions in federal court requesting relief from the federal district court’s decision against her. These attempts, and their appeals, ultimately proved unsuccessful. See Hunter v. Underwood, 362 F.3d 468 (8th Cir.2004).

      . The district court rejected Hunter's claim that the prior FED decisions by the district court (holding the law required the DMMHA to give a notice to cure) were binding on the parties in this action under the doctrine of res judicata. The district court held it was free to revisit rulings by another district court judge. However, the district court did apply the doctrine of issue preclusion to preclude relitigation of the factual findings made in the administrative proceedings that Hunter failed to disclose the required information. The DMMHA never argued issue preclusion also applied to preclude relitigation of the decision in the second administrative hearing that notice to cure was not required to be given. Additionally, the DMMHA never raised any such issue on appeal.

      . Based on the arguments of the parties, the relevant prior order under the issue-preclusion analysis is the district court ruling in the FED action. Hunter claimed on appeal that the administrative rulings cannot serve as a basis for issue preclusion, and the only relevant prior actions for the purposes of applying res judicata to the issue of notice are the two prior FED proceedings. The DMMHA made no claim on appeal that the second administrative ruling, holding notice to cure was not required under the landlord-tenant statute, precluded relitigation in this issue on res judicata grounds. However, even if both administrative proceedings are considered in the res judicata analysis (including the second administrative proceeding that decided a notice to cure was not required to be given), the last district court ruling becomes the important prior action in the analysis because it was the last prior action to decide the notice-to-cure issue. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 15. Thus, the fighting issue, regardless of the path followed to reach the question, is whether special circumstances exist that make it inequitable or inappropriate to prohibit relitigation of the notice-to-cure issue.

      . We recognize all five exceptions reflect a policy that the doctrine of “issue preclusion is not so ■ unyielding that it must invariably be applied, even in the face of strong competing considerations.” See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 cmt. g. Moreover, the exceptions share some common considerations, which we have considered in the past. For example, in Gardner v. Hartford Insurance Accident & Indemnity Co., 659 N.W.2d 198, 204 (Iowa 2003), we considered whether the issue presented in the second action was foreseeable at the time of the first action in the context of the fifth exception that permits relitigation when there is a "clear and convincing need for a new determination of the issue.” See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(5). While foreseeability can also be a consideration under the first alternative of the second exception, we nevertheless have never previously considered this particular exception. We have considered and applied, however, the second alternative of the second exception that permits relitigation when "the issue is one of the law” and “a new determination is warranted in order to take account of an intervening change in applicable legal context.” State v. Anderson, 338 N.W.2d 372, 375 (Iowa 1983).

      . We recognize the fifth exception to the general rule of issue preclusion specifically permits relitigation when there is a "clear and convincing need for a new determination ... because it was not sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the initial action that the issue would arise in the context of the subsequent action.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(5)(b); see Gardner, 659 N.W.2d at 204. This stand-alone exception is compatible with the second exception, but the second exception extends beyond the foreseeability that the issue would be presented in the second action and focuses on the fairness of precluding a party from challenging a rule of law. Our failure to apply the fifth exception to permit relitigation in Gardner does not impact our analysis of the application of the second exception to the circumstances of this case.

      . The Iowa legislature recently amended section 562A.27 to permit a municipal housing agency to terminate a lease with thirty days’ notice when the tenant has violated federal law without serving a notice to cure. See Iowa Code § 562A.27(5) (2007).

      . Current federal law states "[t]he lease shall have a twelve month term,” and "the lease term must be automatically renewed for the same period.” 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(a)(2)(f) (2006). Prior to 2000, however, federal law simply required the lease to “set forth ... [t]he term of the lease and provisions for renewal, if any." 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(a)(1) (1999).

      . Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d 440, 446 (Iowa 2002) (“The 'concept of federalism assumes power, and duly, of independence in interpreting our own organic law.’ ” (quoting Pool v. Super. Ct., 139 Ariz. 98, 677 P.2d 261, 271 (1984))).


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Iowa, Appellee v. Darryl Anthony McCOY, Appellant.
    No. 06-0339.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Dec. 21, 2007.

      Rockne 0. Cole, Iowa City, for appellant.

      Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and William A. Hill, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
   CADY, Justice.

In this appeal, we must determine whether the district court erred in determining that an individual was not a “wrongfully imprisoned person” entitled to bring a claim for damages under the Iowa Tort Claims Act. On our review of the district court decision, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Darryl McCoy was charged by a trial information with the first-degree murder and willful injury of Jonathan Johnson. Johnson was found dead in the backseat of his car on January 27, 2002, in Davenport. He was covered with a blanket and had a plastic bag over his head. Johnson had been shot multiple times, stabbed, cut, and struck with blunt force to the head.

On September 13, 2002, McCoy was convicted of the charges following a jury trial. The evidence at trial revealed McCoy was at an apartment in Davenport with his brother and an individual named Chance Barnes. Johnson and an individual named Jerome Wilson came to the apartment and knocked on the door. A dispute quickly erupted between McCoy’s brother and Johnson, and Wilson was instructed to leave the premises. Wilson complied and went outside the apartment building. He then heard loud noises emanating from the apartment. Barnes subsequently exited the apartment, and Wilson asked him about the whereabouts of Johnson. Barnes told Wilson not to worry about Johnson and not to enter the apartment. McCoy made numerous incriminating statements to police following his arrest, and these statements were introduced into evidence at the trial. Essentially, McCoy told police he observed his brother and Barnes engage in a fight with Johnson in the apartment before they shot and stabbed him. McCoy also confessed to helping dispose of the dead body and cleaning the apartment after the murder.

McCoy was sentenced by the district court to a term of life imprisonment on October 10, 2002. He was placed in one of the state correctional institutions to serve his sentence. McCoy appealed the conviction and sentence.

On February 4, 2005, we reversed the judgment of conviction and sentence against McCoy and remanded the case for a new trial. See State v. McCoy, 692 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 2005). We concluded McCoy received ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial because his trial counsel failed to seek suppression of the incriminating statements made to police. We determined the statements were involuntary and the admission of the statements at trial was prejudicial.

Following the remand for a new trial, the county attorney filed a motion to dismiss the charges against McCoy in the interest of justice. The county attorney believed the State could not obtain a conviction on retrial without the incriminating statements found to be inadmissible on appeal. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the charges against McCoy on March 23, 2005. McCoy was released from imprisonment after being confined for over three years.

On October 3, 2005, McCoy filed an application with the district court requesting a determination that he was a “wrongfully imprisoned person” and entitled to seek compensation from the state. The Attorney General of Iowa filed a resistance to the application, and the application was scheduled for a hearing. McCoy submitted the trial transcript of the underlying criminal trial as evidence to support his application, excluding the evidence of his incriminating statements.

The district court agreed with McCoy that the incriminating statements could not be considered as evidence at the hearing in determining McCoy’s right to seek compensation as a wrongfully imprisoned person. Nevertheless, the district court found McCoy failed to establish he was entitled to bring an action as a “wrongfully imprisoned person.” The district court determined McCoy was not a “wrongfully imprisoned person” because it was possible for the State to refile a murder charge against him in the future. The district court also found McCoy failed to establish he did not commit the murder or the willful injury.

McCoy appealed and raises two claims. First, he claims the evidence supported a finding that he was a “wrongfully imprisoned person.” Second, he claims the evidence established he did not commit murder or any lesser included offense.

II. Standard of Review.

Our review from the district court’s ruling on an application to file a claim as a “wrongfully imprisoned person” is for correction of errors at law. State v. Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Iowa 2006). We uphold the findings of the district court if supported by substantial evidence. Id.

III. Wrongful Imprisonment.

The Iowa wrongful imprisonment statute creates a cause of action for wrongful imprisonment that permits a person to commence an action for damages under the State Tort Claims Act. See generally Iowa Code ch. 663A (2005). We have previously considered the framework of our statute and observed that Iowa was one of a growing number of states to enact wrongful imprisonment compensation legislation. Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d at 430-31 (discussing statutory framework); Cox v. State, 686 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa 2004). The statutes are a response to the mounting evidence of innocent persons who have been wrongfully convicted and imprisoned in this country. See generally Adele Bern-hard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to Compensate Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52 Drake L.Rev. 703, 711-13 (2004). Iowa’s statute was enacted in 1997. See 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 196.

Like other persons permitted to bring a tort action against the state, a wrongfully imprisoned person is given the right to sue the state in district court for damages after first presenting the claim to the State Appeals Board. See Iowa Code §§ 669.3 — .5; see also id. § 669.14 (listing claims that are excepted from the State Tort Claims Act). However, a wrongfully imprisoned person must first clear a hurdle not set for other state tort claimants. A wrongfully imprisoned person may not proceed with a lawsuit under the State Tort Claims Act until the district court has conducted a predicate review and assessment of the claim and found the person is entitled to commence a civil action based on two preliminary findings. See Dohl-man, 725 N.W.2d at 430-31. This additional procedure permits the district court to serve as a gatekeeper of such claims to insure only meritorious claims for damages will be filed with the State Appeals Board.

The first essential finding required to be made by the district court in its gatekeep-ing function is the claimant must be a “wrongfully imprisoned person.” Iowa

Code § 663A.1(3). The statute provides five criteria that must be satisfied to be a “wrongfully imprisoned person.” Id. § 663A.1(1). Generally, those criteria consider the seriousness of the charge, form of conviction, term of incarceration, disposition of the conviction, and reason for the imprisonment. Id. The second essential finding is the claimant did not commit the offense or the offense was not committed by any person. Id. § 663A.1(2). Both findings must be made. Id. Otherwise, the person has no right to pursue a claim under the State Tort Claims Act. Id. § 663A.1(3).

The two separate findings reveal that the right to sue the state under the State Tort Claims Act as a “wrongfully imprisoned person” not only requires the person qualify as a “wrongfully imprisoned person,” but also requires the person be a “wrongfully imprisoned person” who did not commit the offense or whose offense of conviction was not committed by any person. Id. This distinction reveals the crux of the right to seek recovery as a wrongfully imprisoned person is the second finding that requires the person to be an “innocent man” or woman. See Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d at 435 (observing the statute normally requires complete exoneration); Cox, 686 N.W.2d at 214 (stating “an action under chapter 663A is based on imprisonment of an innocent person”).

The second finding under the statute must be based on “clear and convincing evidence.” Iowa Code § 663A.1(2). The statute, however, does not provide for any standard of proof to make the first finding of a “wrongfully imprisoned person.” See id. § 663A.1(1). This approach signals the second finding is a product of a fact-intensive process, while the first finding is primarily met through an examination of court records and documents by the district court that confirm each criterion. In fact, the statute does not require the district court to make the second finding until presented with “an order vacating, dismissing, or reversing the conviction and sentence in a case for which no further proceedings can be or will be held against an individual on any facts and circumstances alleged in the proceedings which resulted in the conviction.” Id. § 663A.K2).

In this case, the district court determined McCoy was not a “wrongfully imprisoned person” and then proceeded to also determine that he failed to establish that the offenses of conviction were not committed by him. Accordingly, we can affirm on either ground. In other words, we normally do not decide an issue on appeal when another issue is dispositive. For that reason, we proceed to review the decision by the district court that McCoy failed to establish the offenses of conviction were not committed by him.

The lynchpin of a wrongful imprisonment proceeding before the district court is innocence. See Cox, 686 N.W.2d at 212. Under the statute, innocence may be established in one of two ways. The person seeking authorization to file a tort claim against the state must establish by clear and convincing evidence either the person did not commit the offense (for which the person was convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned), including a lesser offense, or that the offense was not committed by any person. Iowa Code § 663A.1(2); Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d at 435. Generally, this means there must be proof the person did not commit the acts charged or that the acts committed did not constitute a crime. See Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d at 433-35 (finding claimant failed to prove he did not commit the crime).

The burden imposed on a wrongfully imprisoned person is difficult to meet because it requires the person to prove a negative. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1444, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669, 1678 (1960) (noting that “as a practical matter, it is never easy to prove a negative”). Essentially, it means the person must show he or she was actually innocent of the crime, or no crime occurred. Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d at 435 (“In most cases, this status will apply to a person who is completely exonerated of the crime for which he was imprisoned, or if it is determined the victim fabricated that crime.”). Thus, we have said it is not enough for the person seeking the right to sue for compensation as a wrongfully imprisoned person to merely establish that a reviewing court determined the conviction was not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 433. Such a finding only signifies a reasonable fact finder could not be convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. When the crime of conviction was committed by someone, the person seeking the right to sue as a wrongfully imprisoned person must affirmatively establish by clear and convincing evidence that he or she did not commit the crime or any lesser included crime.

McCoy claims the transcript of the evidence at his criminal trial, stripped of the inadmissible evidence of his involuntary statements, establishes he did not commit the murder or willful injury, or any lesser included offense. In other words, McCoy claims the absence of proof of his criminal guilt in the trial transcript constitutes evidence of his innocence.

The State argues that incriminating statements excluded from a criminal prosecution can still be admitted at a hearing under the wrongfully imprisoned person statute because it is a civil proceeding. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 460, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3035, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046, 1064 (1976) (refusing to exclude evidence seized unlawfully by a criminal law enforcement agent of one sovereign in a civil proceeding against another sovereign). The district court, however, refused to consider McCoy’s incriminating statements at the wrongfully imprisoned person hearing. Nevertheless, the district court found the redacted transcript failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that McCoy did not commit the crimes. Accordingly, we need not decide the evidentiary dispute if the redacted record supports the trial court finding.

Normally, a transcript of the evidence at a criminal trial, by itself, will not provide the evidence necessary to establish innocence under section 663A.1(2). As determined in Dohlman, a wrongfully imprisoned person must establish more than the absence of guilt in law to establish innocence under section 668A.1(2). Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d at 433. The person must be factually innocent, not merely procedurally free from reprosecution or not guilty. See Hugo Adam Bedau, Michael A. Radelet & Constance E. Putnam, Convicting the Innocent in Capital Cases: Criteria, Evidence, and Inference, 52 Drake L.Rev. 587, 598 (2004) (recognizing an acquittal or reversal of a conviction may constitute an adjudication of “procedural innocence,” but “[wjhether such a defendant was also factually innocent is a further question never settled just by the fact that some appellate court correctly found procedural or due process objections to the defendant’s conviction or sentence”). Thus, we turn to the record presented at the hearing to determine if it supported the district court finding that McCoy failed to show he did not commit the murder or willful injury.

In this case, the district court found McCoy failed to establish his innocence due to the evidence in the trial transcript that he was present at the scene of the murder at the time it may have taken place. This finding is based on the trial testimony of a witness who accompanied the murder victim to an apartment occupied by McCoy and others. This was the last time the witness saw the victim alive. The evidence suggests a fight involving the victim occurred in the apartment during the time McCoy was present and after the witness was instructed to leave the apartment. The witness was also later instructed not to return to the apartment.

Our review of this evidence supports the conclusion of the district court. This evidence presents too many unanswered questions about McCoy’s role in the murder, which the wrongfully-imprisoned-person hearing failed to answer. To prove a negative by clear and convincing evidence, it is not enough for a wrongfully imprisoned person to merely create questions and doubts about his or her involvement in the crime of conviction. Instead, the person must affirmatively answer those doubts and questions to the point that the district court will be convinced the person did not commit the crime or any lesser included crime. McCoy has failed to do this. There was ample evidence to support the finding of the district court.

IV. Conclusion.

Substantial evidence supports the finding by the district court that McCoy failed to establish his right to sue the State as a wrongfully imprisoned person. We affirm the district court.

AFFIRMED.

      . In Cox v. State, we observed that Iowa was among 16 jurisdictions to enact a wrongful imprisonment statute. 686 N.W.2d at 212. There are now 22 states, as well as the federal government, with some form of a compensation statute. The Innocence Project, State Compensation Laws, http://www.innocence project.org/news/LawViewl .php (last visited Dec. 18, 2007).

      . In Dohlman, we did not specifically distinguish between a “wrongfully imprisoned person” and a "wrongfully imprisoned person” entitled to sue for damages in reviewing the framework of the statute. See 725 N.W.2d at 431. However, we were not required to do so in Dohlman because the parties agreed the defendant met the five criteria of a “wrongfully imprisoned person” under section 663A.1(1). Id. Yet, the holding in Dohlman reinforces this distinction. In Dohlman, the defendant met the five criteria of a "wrongfully imprisoned person,” but had no right to sue for damages because he was unable to establish he did not commit the offense. Id. at 431-35.

      . "The Innocent Man” is the title of a book by John Grisham that chronicles the life of a wrongfully imprisoned person, Ron Williamson, in the State of Oklahoma. Williamson was eventually exonerated by DNA evidence after serving 11 years of incarceration on death row following his conviction for capital murder in 1988. He died in 2004, an innocent man. John Grisham, The Innocent Man (Doubleday 2006). The list of convicted prisoners in the United States, maintained by The Innocence Project, who have been exonerated by DNA evidence since 1989 now numbers 210 and includes at least one woman, Paula Gray. See The Innocence Project, The Innocence Project Profiles, http://www.innocence project.org/know/Browse-Profiles.php (last visited Dec. 18, 2007).

      .This predicate statutory requirement for a hearing to determine innocence is tied to the fourth criterion of a "wrongfully imprisoned person,” that “[t]he individual’s conviction was vacated or dismissed, or was reversed, and no further proceedings can be or will be held against the individual on any facts or circumstances alleged in the proceedings which had resulted in the conviction.” Iowa Code § 663A.l(l)(d). While the fourth criterion can be documented by an order, it may also require the district court to make a legal determination that “no further proceedings can be or will be held against the individual.” Id. (emphasis added).

      . McCoy did not claim that the offenses of murder and willful injury were "not committed by any person.” Iowa Code § 663A.l(2)(fc). McCoy’s brother and Chance Barnes were successfully prosecuted for the murder of Jonathan Johnson. See State v. McCoy, No. 02-1516, 2003 WL 22899507, *3 (Iowa App. Dec. 10, 2003) (affirming first-degree murder conviction of Lawrence McCoy); State v. Barnes, No. 02-1363, 2003 WL 22340208, *3 (Iowa App. Oct. 15, 2003) (affirming first-degree murder conviction of Chance Barnes).

      . Some state compensation statutes have been interpreted to preclude recovery by persons who voluntarily confess to the crime, based on statutory language that disqualifies persons from compensation who have contributed to their own conviction in some way. See Bernhard, Justice Still Fails, at 717-18. The Iowa wrongful imprisonment statute does not contain such language, but does disqualify a person who has pled guilty from being a “wrongfully imprisoned person” under section 663A.l(l)(fc).

      . The district court must have no serious or substantial doubt about the person’s criminal involvement in the crime of conviction to find the person did not commit the crime. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). The 2007 Model State Compensation legislation developed by The Innocence Project requires the claimant to prove "[h]e did not commit any of the acts charged in the accusatory instrument or the acts or omissions charged in the accusatory instrument did not constitute a crime.” The Innocence Project, Model Legislation, 2007 State Legislative Sessions: An Act Concerning Claims for Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment 1, 3, available at http://www.innocenceproiect.org/docs/ Model_Compensation_Statute.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2007).


author: HUITINK, P.J.

text:
    Jacqueline TRIPLETT, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. McCOURT MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee, Fund Ways, Inc., a/k/a Tom’s Rental-Tops Rental, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
    No. 06-1826.
    Court of Appeals of Iowa.
    Sept. 19, 2007.

      Richard D. Crotty, Council Bluffs, for appellant/eross-appellee.
    Brian Nolan, Scott Lautenbaugh, and Melvin C. Hansen of Nolan, Olson, Hansen, Lautenbaugh & Buckley, L.L.P., Omaha, Nebraska, for appellee/cross-ap-pellant Fund Ways, Inc., a/k/a Tom’s Rental-Tops Rental.
    Philip Willson of Willson & Pechacek, P.L.C., Council Bluffs, for appellee/cross-appellee, McCourt Manufacturing Corporation.
    Heard by HUITINK, P.J., and VOGEL and BAKER, JJ.
   HUITINK, P.J.

In this appeal we address plaintiffs contentions that the trial court should not have reduced her jury award.

I.Background Facts and Prior Proceedings

On April 23, 2002, Jacqueline Triplett attended a “rally” at her employer’s place of business. She was injured when her chair suddenly collapsed and she fell to the ground. She was immediately taken to the hospital by ambulance. The fall caused intense pain in both her back and right leg. The pain continued, and six months later she underwent spinal fusion surgery to correct the problem. This surgery did not alleviate her pain. She spent the next two years trying different combinations of pain medications to ease the pain in her back and her leg. In September 2004 she had a second surgery. This surgery was marginally successful, as it alleviated most of the pain in her leg; however, her back pain persisted.

Triplett filed suit against McCourt Manufacturing Corporation, the manufacturer of the chair, and Fund Ways Inc., a/k/a Tom’s Rental-Tops Rental, the company that rented the chair to her employer, for the injuries to her back and leg. In April 2006, after a three day trial, the jury returned the following verdict for Triplett:

1. $180,000 in past medical expenses.
2. $9,000 in future medical expenses.
3. $10,000 for the past loss of her full body.
4. $30,000 for the future loss of her full body.
5. $200,000 for past pain and suffering.
6. $296,000 for future pain and suffering.
Total: $725,000

McCourt filed a motion for a new trial, contending the verdicts for past and future pain and suffering were excessive or the result of passion or prejudice. The district court entered an order finding the award of future pain and suffering was not based on passion or prejudice, but nonetheless excessive. In doing so, the court stated:

From the Court’s consideration of the record made, including Triplett’s history of treatment and the medical expense damages found by the jury in the amount of $180,000, and the jury’s award in the amount of $200,000 for past pain and suffering; the Court cannot conclude such award was based upon passion or prejudice by the jury. The Court also concludes the jury’s award for past pain and suffering has a reasonable basis within the record. In considering the jury’s award for future pain and suffering in the amount of $296,000, the Court does not find that such verdict was reached based upon improper passion or prejudice.
However, based upon the evidence in the record, including the jury’s award of $9,000 for future medical expenses and Triplett’s description of the level of success achieved in the second surgery with the resulting decrease in the sources of and the level of pain; this Court concludes the jury’s award of $296,000 for future pain and suffering was beyond the limits of fair compensation for the injuries shown; that such award is flagrantly excessive; and is not supported by the evidential record. The Court concludes that justice to the parties may be accomplished by a reduction of the award for future pain and suffering to the sum of $100,000, and Triplett’s re-mittitur of the award for future pain and suffering in excess of $100,000 and total damages in excess of $529,000.

Pursuant to this ruling, the court ordered a new trial unless Triplett filed a remitti-tur of damages in excess of $529,000 within thirty days. Triplett refused to file a re-mittitur, and this appeal follows.

II. Standard of Review

We review remittitur rulings for an abuse of discretion. Kuta v. Newberg, 600 N.W.2d 280, 284 (Iowa 1999). An abuse-of-discretion standard is appropriate because the trial court has had the advantage of seeing and hearing the evidence; in applying that standard, other cases are of limited value. See Rees v. O’Malley, 461 N.W.2d 883, 840 (Iowa 1990) (“In determining whether the damage award is excessive, we must abide by the principle that each case depends upon its own facts, and precedents are of little value.”). We will not find an abuse of discretion unless it is shown that the trial court’s discretion was exercised on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. State v. Brumage, 435 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Iowa 1989).

III. Merits

Because fixing the amount of damages is a function for the jury, we are “loath to interfere with a jury verdict.” Sallis v. Lamansky, 420 N.W.2d 795, 799 (Iowa 1988). In considering a contention that the jury verdict is excessive, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. The verdict must not be set aside merely because the reviewing court would have reached a different conclusion. Id. When considering a remittitur, we will reduce or set aside a jury award only if it is: (1) flagrantly excessive or inadequate; (2) so out of reason as to shock the conscience; (3) a result of passion, prejudice, or other ulterior motive; or (4) lacking in evidentiary support. Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 869 (Iowa 1994). If a verdict meets this standard or fails to do substantial justice between the parties, the district court must grant a new trial or enter a remittitur. Id.

The jury awarded damages of $200,000 for Triplett’s pain and suffering during the four-year period between the accident and trial. The district court found this figure, approximately $50,000 per year, had a “reasonable basis within the record.”

The jury was also instructed that, based on standard mortality tables, Triplett was expected to live for 15.1 more years. In light of the medical evidence suggesting her current pain symptoms would likely continue for the rest of her life, the jury awarded Triplett $296,000 for future pain and suffering. As a result, her future pain and suffering award amounts to approximately $19,600 per year for the balance of her expected lifetime. The district court found this figure, although not based on improper passion or prejudice, was flagrantly excessive because it lacked eviden-tiary support. Specifically, the court found this figure was improper based upon the limited award for medical expenses and “the level of success achieved in the second surgery with the resulting decrease in the sources of and the level of pain.”

We disagree. Upon our review of the record, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Sallis, 420 N.W.2d at 799, we find there was substantial evidence in the record to support the jury’s verdict.

The evidentiary support for future pain and suffering was substantial. Triplett testified extensively about her daily battle with back pain. Since the accident, she has sought medical help on more than thirty occasions. While the pain in her leg subsided after her second surgery, the pain in her back has never abated. On a scale of one to ten, her level of back pain varies between a three and a seven, but “never” goes below a three. This pain limits her ability to do many things. Work restrictions issued by her doctor also limit her from lifting more than ten pounds, bending or twisting, sitting or standing for more than thirty minutes, or walking more than four blocks at a time. Her back pain also makes it difficult for her to sleep at night. The strength of her pain medication also means that she is required to meet with her doctor every two months.

Triplett also has a permanent impairment rating of twenty-five percent, and although she performs therapeutic exercises every week, her physician indicates she has achieved her maximum level of improvement and her pain symptoms will likely continue for the rest of her life.

As mentioned above, the jury awarded Triplett approximately $50,000 a year for past pain and suffering. In light of the fact that she no longer experiences significant leg pain and the fact that she has made some progress managing her pain, the jury reduced her award for future pain and suffering by more than sixty percent to approximately $19,600 per year. We find this award falls within the permissible range of the evidence.

We also find the limited award for future medical expenses should not restrict her recovery for future pain and suffering. While the amount of future medical expenses may be a factor when calculating future pain and suffering, we find its importance is limited when the plaintiff will continue to suffer pain despite achieving the maximum level of recovery from the accident. Triplett’s projected medical expenses reflect the fact that she will be required to purchase pain medication and meet with her doctor on a routine basis for the balance of her life. The jury had a reasonable basis from which to conclude that compensation for continuous pain is not discounted solely because extensive surgery or aggressive treatment is no longer medically necessary.

In essence, the district court only disputes the compensable value for her future pain and suffering. In the court’s view, the jury’s decision to reduce her annual award for future pain and suffering to less than forty percent of the annual amount for past pain and suffering was not sufficient. The court decided to reduce the amount to less than fifteen percent of the annual award for past pain and suffering, to approximately only $6650 per year. The only valid reason articulated by the court for this reduction — “the level of success achieved in the second surgery with the resulting decrease in the sources of and the level of pain” — was obviously factored into the jury’s decision to award her sixty percent less annual damages for future pain and suffering. The court articulates no reason why its additional reduction was necessary in light of the facts of this case.

A remittitur of this nature is difficult to uphold in view of the court’s specific finding that the verdict was not the result of passion or prejudice. Furthermore, the court’s conclusion that the jury award was not supported by the evidence is contradicted by the fact that the court merely assigned a different amount of future pain and suffering damages based on the same evidence. As discussed above, there was ample evidentiary support for future pain and suffering based on the current level of pain and permanency of that pain. The fact that the court reduced the judgment, without articulating any basis for its own calculation of future pain and suffering, suggests the court supplanted its damage total for that of the jury. Because we find no reasonable basis for the court’s conclusion that Tripplet’s future pain and suffering was worth less than that awarded by the jury, we find the court’s order for remittitur was untenable and therefore was an abuse of discretion. See Kiner v. Reliance Ins. Co., 463 N.W.2d 9, 15 (Iowa 1990) (reversing district court’s order for remittitur when the only basis for remitti-tur was that the jury verdict was “merely excessive”).

IV. Conclusion

While a trial court is vested with broad discretion in passing upon a motion for a new trial, under the facts of this case, we find the award for future pain and suffering was sufficiently substantiated by the record. Cf. Estate of Pearson ex rel. Latta v. Interstate Power & Light Co., 700 N.W.2d 333, 347 (Iowa 2005) (“Damages for physical and mental pain and suffering cannot be measured by any exact or mathematical standard and must be left to the sound judgment of the jury.”). We will not set aside the verdict merely because we may have reached a different conclusion. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order for a remittitur or a new trial and remand for entry of judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . The jury awarded no damages on her claims for loss of earnings and loss of future earning capacity.

      . Her treating physician did, at one point, discuss a spinal cord stimulator to alleviate some of the pain. However, this procedure was never prescribed. Her physician also testified that if Triplett had this procedure, "She probably has a chance to improve her pain by 30 to 50 percent.” This procedure would cost approximately $50,000.

      . Accordingly, we need not address Fund Ways's cross-appeal arguing that the award of new trial should be based upon damages only, and should not include issues of liability.


author: /s/Helen M. Meyer Associate Justice

text:
    In re PETITION FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST Ronald Lyle KOPESKA, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 5754X.
    No. A07-2152.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   ORDER

The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility has filed a petition for disciplinary action alleging that respondent Ronald Lyle Kopeska committed professional misconduct warranting public discipline, namely, conversion of client funds that were subject to a receivership; failure to inform the receiver of the disbursement; failure to return the client funds; failure to timely satisfy a court-ordered judgment entered in favor of the receiver for the amount respondent converted; entering into an improper business transaction with a client, which created a conflict of interest; and failure to comply with the requirements for entering into a business transaction with a client, namely, providing the client with a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel and failing to obtain the client’s written consent to the conflict, in violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c), 8.4(c) and (d), 1.7(b), and 1.8(a).

Respondent admits his conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, waives his rights under Rule 14, Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR), and has entered into a stipulation with the Director in which they jointly recommend that the appropriate discipline is a 90-day suspension, with reinstatement by affidavit, followed by two years of supervised probation. The parties also jointly recommend that if respondent, while on supervised probation, intends to enter into a business transaction with a client, respondent be required to submit the terms of the transaction to the Director for review in order to ensure respondent’s compliance with Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.8(a).

The court has independently reviewed the file and approves the jointly recommended disposition, except that the Director’s review of proposed transactions between respondent and his clients shall extend to proposed transactions between respondent’s clients and entities in which respondent has a direct or indirect ownership interest or in which respondent serves as an officer or director.

Based upon all the flies, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent Ronald Lyle Kopeska is suspended from the practice of law for 90 days, effective as of the date of filing of this order. The hearing provided for under Rule 18, RLPR, is waived. Respondent shall be conditionally reinstated following the expiration of the suspension provided that at least 15 days before the expiration of the suspension, respondent files an affidavit with the clerk of appellate courts and the Director’s Office establishing that respondent is current with continuing education requirements and has fully complied with Rules 24 and 26, RLPR. Upon reinstatement, respondent shall be subject to supervised probation for a period of two years under the following conditions:

(a) Respondent shall cooperate fully with the Director’s Office in its efforts to monitor compliance with the probation and shall promptly respond to the Director’s correspondence by its due date. Respondent shall provide to the Director a current mailing address and shall immediately notify the Director of any change of address. Respondent shall cooperate with the Director’s investigation of any allegations of unprofessional conduct that may come to the Director’s attention. Upon the Director’s request, respondent shall provide authorization for release of information and documentation to verify compliance with the terms of this probation.
(b) Respondent shall abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(c) Respondent shall be supervised by a licensed Minnesota attorney, appointed by the Director to monitor compliance with the terms of this probation. Respondent shall provide to the Director the names of four attorneys who have agreed to be nominated as respondent’s supervisor within two weeks from the date of filing of this order. If, after diligent effort, respondent is unable to locate a supervisor acceptable to the Director, the Director will seek to appoint a supervisor. Until a supervisor has signed a consent to supervise, the respondent shall on the first day of each month provide the Director with an inventory of active client files described in paragraph (d) below. Respondent shall make active client files available to the Director upon request.
(d) Respondent shall cooperate fully with the supervisor in his or her efforts to monitor compliance with this probation. Respondent shall contact the supervisor and schedule a minimum of one in-person meeting per calendar quarter. Respondent shall submit to the supervisor an inventory of all active client files by the first day of each month during the probation. With respect to each active file, the inventory shall disclose the client name, type of representation, date opened, most recent activity, next anticipated action, and anticipated closing date. Respondent’s supervisor shall file written reports with the Director at least quarterly, or at such more frequent intervals as may reasonably be requested by the Director.
(e) If respondent, or any entity in which respondent has an ownership interest or serves as an officer or director, intends to enter into a business transaction with one of respondent’s clients, respondent shall notify the Director and submit the terms of the transaction to the Director for review in order to ensure respondent’s compliance with Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.8(a).

Respondent shall pay $900 in costs pursuant to Rule 24, RLPR. Respondent shall successfully complete the professional responsibility portion of the state bar examination within one year from the date of filing of this order. Respondent shall comply with Rule 26, RLPR (requiring notice of suspension to clients, opposing counsel, and tribunals).

BY THE COURT:

/s/Helen M. Meyer

Associate Justice


text:
    In re Petition for REINSTATEMENT OF Edward F. ROONEY, a Minnesota attorney, Registration No. 9321X.
    No. A07-832.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Dec. 20, 2007.
   ORDER

On February 16, 2006, we suspended petitioner Edward F. Rooney from the practice of law for a period of 18 months for misappropriation of client funds totaling $27,700. In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn.2006). Petitioner applied for reinstatement in April 2007, and a hearing was held before a panel of the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board. The panel found that petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that he is competent and morally fit to resume the practice of law. See In re Swanson, 343 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn.1984) (providing that the burden is on the attorney to establish by clear and convincing evidence the moral fitness to resume the practice of law). The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility confirms that petitioner has complied with Rule 26, Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR), paid costs under Rule 24, RLPR, successfully completed the professional responsibility portion of the bar examination, and is current with continuing legal education requirements. The panel recommended that petitioner be reinstated to the practice of law and be placed on probation for three years, subject to the following conditions:

(a) Petitioner shall cooperate fully with the Director’s Office in its efforts to monitor compliance with this probation and shall promptly respond to the Director’s correspondence by the due date. Petitioner shall cooperate with the Director’s investigation of any allegations of unprofessional conduct which may come to the Director’s attention. Upon the Director’s request, petitioner shall provide authorization for release of information and documentation to verify compliance with the terms of this probation.
(b) Petitioner shall abide by the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct.
(c) Petitioner shall be supervised by a licensed Minnesota attorney, appointed by the Director to monitor compliance with the terms of his probation. Petitioner shall provide to the Director the names of four attorneys who have agreed to be nominated as his supervisor within two weeks from the date this probation begins. If, after diligent effort, petitioner is unable to locate a supervisor acceptable to the Director, the Director will seek to appoint a supervisor. Petitioner shall not accept any client cases until a supervisor has signed a consent to supervise. Petitioner shall on the first day of each month provide his supervisor with an inventory of active client files described in paragraph
(d) below. Petitioner shall make active client files available to the Director upon request.
(d) Petitioner shall cooperate fully with the supervisor in his efforts to monitor compliance with this probation. Petitioner shall contact the supervisor and schedule a minimum of one in-person meeting per calendar quarter. Petitioner shall submit to the supervisor an inventory of all active client files by the first day of each month during the probation. With respect to each active client file, the inventory shall disclose the client name, type of representation, date opened, most recent activity, date of most recent activity, next anticipated action, and anticipated closing date. Petitioner’s supervisor shall file written reports with the Director at least quarterly, or at such more frequent intervals as may reasonably be requested by the Director. Petitioner’s supervisor shall review with petitioner the economic viability of matters undertaken by petitioner to ensure that the representation undertaken will not, together with other matters already undertaken, result in undue financial stress on petitioner’s practice.
(e) Petitioner shall initiate and maintain office procedures that ensure that there are prompt responses to correspondence, telephone calls, and other important communications from clients, courts, and other persons interested in matters that petitioner is handling, and that will ensure that petitioner regularly reviews each and every file and completes legal matters on a timely basis.
(f) Within 30 days from the commencement of probation, petitioner shall provide to the Director and to the probation supervisor a written plan outlining office procedures designed to ensure that petitioner is in compliance with probation requirements. Petitioner shall provide progress reports to the supervisor and/or the Director as requested.
(g) Petitioner is permanently prohibited from maintaining a law office trust account solely in his name. Before accepting any cases requiring client or third party funds to be deposited into a trust account, petitioner shall submit to the Director the names of three alternate signatories, to be approved by the Director, together with the name of an attorney who shall serve as petitioner’s trust account supervisor.
(h) Petitioner may have up to three additional attorney signatories on any client trust account he maintains in connection with his law practice.
(i) Each disbursement from a client trust account must be signed and/or authorized by petitioner and one other alternate signatory.
(j) At least one of the signatories, upon approval by the Director, must accept responsibility for supervision of petitioner’s trust account. That is, one signatory will be designated to perform at least quarterly reviews of petitioner’s trust account books and records, including petitioner’s deposits, disbursements, checkbook register, client subsidiary ledgers, and reconciliations. This person will have full access to all retainer agreements and underlying client files and will be charged with ensuring that all funds received by petitioner on behalf of clients or third parties are properly deposited in a trust account and that disbursements from the trust account(s) are appropriately made.
(k) The person responsible for supervising the maintenance of petitioner’s trust account books and records may charge a fee for services rendered.
(l) Petitioner’s wife shall not serve as a trust account supervisor or alternate signatory.
(m) The requirements of paragraphs (g) through (l) shall survive the term of petitioner’s probation.

The court has independently reviewed the file and approves the panel’s recommendation.

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, effective immediately, petitioner Edward F. Rooney is reinstated to the practice of law and is placed on probation for a period of three years subject to the terms and conditions set forth above.

BY THE COURT:

/s/Helen M. Meyer

Associate Justice