author: PAUL H. ANDERSON, Justice.

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Michael Patrick ASFELD, Appellant.
    No. C3-02-633.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    June 12, 2003.

      Joseph S. Friedberg, Lisa Lodin Peral-ta, Uptown Business Center, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.
    Mike Hatch, Attorney General, State of Minnesota, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, Roger S. Van Heel, Stearns County Attorney, St. Cloud, MN, for Respondent.
   OPINION

PAUL H. ANDERSON, Justice.

Appellant Michael Patrick Asfeld was indicted for four counts of murder in connection with the death of his infant son Dominick. The four murder counts were murder in the first degree (premeditation), murder in the first degree (child abuse), murder in the first degree (domestic abuse), and murder in the second degree. Asfeld was also indicted for violating the terms of an order for protection that had been issued after he admitted shaking Dominick. A jury found Asfeld guilty of all four murder counts, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment for first-degree child abuse murder. Asfeld appeals the conviction on the following grounds: the district court improperly applied the domestic abuse murder statute; the court erred in admitting Spreigl evidence of his prior incidents of violence; there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the conviction.

Michael Patrick Asfeld began dating Wendy Ruprecht in 1995, when he was nineteen and she was sixteen. A year later, they moved into Ruprecht’s parents’ home, and then into a home of their own. After a tumultuous period during which the couple broke up and reunited, Ru-precht became pregnant, and on August 9, 1999, they had a son, Dominick. At this time, they were living together in Cold Spring, Minnesota.

On December 15, 1999, Ruprecht went to work leaving Asfeld at home with Dominick who had been kept out of daycare because he had a cold. Ruprecht called home at noon to say she was sick and coming home. At that time, Asfeld told her that Dominick seemed sick, had eaten very little, and had thrown up. When Ruprecht got home, she called Dominick’s doctor, Dr. Timothy Ebel, and then she and Asfeld took Dominick to see Ebel. Ebel testified that he saw Dominick at around 5:00 p.m. that same day and did a physical exam, which included drawing blood and taking a chest x-ray. Ebel’s notes from that exam described Dominick as “alert,” “nontoxic,” and “in no acute distress.” Ebel diagnosed Dominick with fever, cough, and probable pneumonia and prescribed antibiotics and Tylenol. Ebel later testified that during the exam, Dominick seemed “a little off,” his eyes did not appear to be tracking right, and he did not show any signs of discomfort or flinching when the shots were given.

Ruprecht testified that when they returned home, Dominick’s behavior did not improve significantly. Between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m., Asfeld left the house and when he returned, Dominick continued to be in distress: he was whimpering and had little reaction to his bath. Around 10:00 p.m., Dominick started seizing. Asfeld and Ru-precht then took Dominick to the hospital emergency room. The emergency room doctors testified that Dominick exhibited classic signs of shaken baby syndrome, and a child abuse expert described these signs as seizures, a low sodium level, a subdural hematoma, retinal hemorrhage, and fractures. Dominick was admitted to the hospital and treated for his injuries until he was released into foster care on December 30, 1999. Dominick’s case was reported to the Stearns County authorities.

After Dominick was released into foster care, investigators and social workers told Asfeld and Ruprecht that Dominick would not be released from foster care and their parental rights could be terminated if no one admitted to the alleged abuse. Asfeld and Ruprecht agreed that Asfeld would say that he had shaken Dominick so that Ruprecht would be able to regain custody. Ruprecht and Asfeld both told their families that his admission to the shaking was part of a plan to regain custody and on January 25, 2000, Asfeld told investigators that he had shaken Dominick. Asfeld was subsequently charged with first-degree assault and malicious punishment of a child and a Children In Need of Protective Services (CHIPS) case was filed. At the May CHIPS hearing, Asfeld recanted his confession. An Order For Protection (OFP) was issued nonetheless to keep Asfeld from having unsupervised contact with Dominick and Asfeld reluctantly moved into his parents’ home.

Dominick was still severely injured when he was released from the hospital into foster care: he had a shunt in his head, blurred vision, need for therapy, and was required to attend almost daily medical appointments. Ruprecht attended nearly all of Dominick’s appointments, and Asfeld participated in a few as well. While in foster care, Dominick received both physical and occupational therapy and his condition improved significantly. Asfeld had contact with Dominick during this healing period, and witnesses later described the interaction as being positive. In March 2000, Dominick returned to live with Ruprecht.

About six months later, on October 10, 2000, Asfeld spent the day combining. He finished working around 10:00 p.m. and drove to Ruprecht’s house. He arrived at about 10:30, entered without knocking, read through his mail, and went to the living room. Ruprecht was asleep on the couch and when she woke up they spoke briefly. She then went to the bedroom where she went back to sleep. Asfeld testified that he watched television for a while and then left, without saying goodbye to Ruprecht or checking on Dominick, who was asleep in his crib in another room. Asfeld arrived at his parents’ home between 11:00 and 11:30 p.m., and family members testified that Asfeld appeared normal and calm when he arrived home.

On the morning of October 11, Ruprecht woke with her alarm and went to check on Dominick. He was not breathing and was cold to the touch. She called 911 and the Stearns County Sheriff sergeant who responded to the call found Dominick lying on his back in his crib, clearly dead. There was a pattern of abrasion on Dominick’s cheeks that the pathologist who performed the autopsy later declared were consistent with someone placing a hand or a blanket over the child’s nose and mouth. Witnesses who had seen Dominick on October 10 testified that those abrasions had not been present when they had seen him. A Stearns County detective spoke with Ruprecht that morning and was told that Asfeld had come over the previous night at around 10:00 to pick up his mail, that he had not seen Dominick, who was asleep, and that Ruprecht had checked on Dominick at 11:00 and he was asleep on his stomach. The detective took the mattress, sheets, bumper pad, and blanket from Dominick’s crib and she observed no traces of dirt or foreign objects.

Asfeld moved back in with Ruprecht shortly after Dominick’s death. Their relationship soon deteriorated and Ruprecht eventually moved out of the house about two months after Dominick’s death.

Nearly five months after Dominick’s death, on March 5, 2001, the Stearns County Sheriffs Department received the final autopsy report from the medical examiner’s office. The examiner classified Dominick’s death as a homicide. When Ruprecht learned that Dominick’s death was being classified as a homicide, she told investigators that the night Dominick died Asfeld had woken her up when he arrived, she had spoken with him briefly, gone back to bed, fallen asleep, and then awoke again when she heard his car leave some time later. She explained her earlier contrary statements by stating that Asfeld had asked her to lie. She also told investigators that Asfeld had physically abused her during their relationship. In cooperation with the investigators, Ruprecht called Asfeld and allowed the conversation to be taped. She told Asfeld that Dominick’s death had been ruled a homicide and said “it’s your fault and you know it is,” to which he responded, “[y]ou knew it was from the start.” Later in the conversation, Asfeld laughed and said, “you’re going to prison, too?” Ruprecht asked, “For what? For letting you into the house?” and Asfeld stated, “It’s your word against mine now.”

Asfeld was arrested shortly thereafter and on April 12, 2001, an indictment was filed charging him with five counts: premeditated murder in the first degree, Minn.Stat. § 609.185(1) (2002); child abuse murder in the first degree, Minn.Stat. § 609.185(5) (2002); domestic abuse murder in the first degree, Minn.Stat. § 609.185(6) (2002); second degree intentional murder, Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2002); and violation of an order for protection, Minn.Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(a), (b) (2002). Asfeld’s jury trial began on December 5, 2001.

At Asfeld’s trial, a forensic pathologist from the Ramsey County Medical Examiner’s Office testified that Dominick had died between 11:00 p.m. on October 10 and 3:00 a.m. on October 11. She further testified that the death was a homicide and that Dominick had died from a lack of oxygen due to suffocation. The state submitted testimony about the prior shaking incident, Asfeld’s confession to that shaking, As-feld’s presence in the house the night Dominick died, Asfeld’s asking Ruprecht to lie about having been asleep while As-feld was in the house, and Asfeld’s taped phone conversation with Ruprecht. The state also submitted evidence of Asfeld’s prior assaults against his immediate family. Witnesses testified that Asfeld had repeatedly assaulted his mother, father, brother, and sister. The district court admitted this evidence as going to prove the pattern of prior abuse of the victim or “another family or household member” within the meaning of Minn.Stat. § 609.185(6).

The state also gave notice of its intent to offer Spreigl evidence of Asfeld’s prior assaults against nonfamily members. It argued that the incidents would be used to prove identity, intent, and absence of mistake. The prior assaults by Asfeld were (1) an assault of a 13-year-old boy with a beer bottle, and (2) an assault of a woman in her mid-forties. On April 14, 1996, Asfeld hit the boy on the head with a beer bottle because the boy and his friends were allegedly inappropriately staring at Asfeld. On September 6, 1998, Asfeld arrived drunk and uninvited at a Labor Day party thrown by the woman, and when the woman asked him to leave the party, he punched her in the face. Asfeld argued that the evidence was irrelevant and overly prejudicial, but the court determined that the prior assaults were admissible to prove identity.

In his defense, Asfeld presented his theory that it had been Ruprecht who had shaken and later murdered Dominick. He testified that his confession to shaking Dominick had been a lie, and that he only agreed to the lie so that Ruprecht could regain custody instead of having Dominick in foster care. Asfeld asserted that he did not shake Dominick and implied that Ru-precht must have done so between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. while he was out of the house. In support of this theory, Asfeld presented his own medical expert, Dr. Allan Ingénito, a pediatric neurologist, who testified that Dominick’s injuries from the initial shaking could have been inflicted during the evening when Ruprecht was home alone with Dominick.

The state’s medical expert testified that Dominick had been shaken diming the morning of December 15, 1999, when As-feld was home alone with him. The state’s expert testified that the shaking could not have occurred between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. because Dominick’s sodium level at the time he was admitted to the emergency room was not consistent with that timing. The expert also testified that, based on the age of bone fractures and the presence of an older subdural hematoma, Dominick had been abused prior to the shaking incident. However, Asfeld’s medical expert testified that there was no reliable evidence of prior shaking incidents.

On December 20, 2001, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all four murder counts. On January 17, 2002, the district court entered judgment of conviction against Asfeld for first-degree child abuse murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Asfeld appealed his conviction, challenging the district court’s interpretation of the domestic abuse murder statute, the admission of the Spreigl evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial to support his conviction, and the effectiveness of his trial counsel. We affirm the conviction.

I.

The first issue we must decide is whether the district court properly applied the domestic abuse statute when it allowed the admission of evidence of Asfeld’s prior abuse of his parents and siblings. Asfeld argues that this evidence was improperly admitted. However, he raises this issue for the first time on appeal. We review an objection to the admission of evidence that is raised for the first time on appeal only if the admission was plain error. State v. Patterson, 587 N.W.2d 45, 52 (Minn.1998). Because Asfeld failed to preserve this issue for appeal by objecting below, we review his objection under the following plain error standard: (1) was there an error; (2) was the error plain; and (3) did the error affect substantial rights? State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740-41 (Minn.1998).

Asfeld claims that the district court committed plain error in admitting evidence of his prior abuse against his parents and siblings as going to prove an element of the domestic abuse statute, Minn.Stat. § 609.185(6). The statute provides that a person is guilty of murder in the first degree if he

causes the death of a human being while committing domestic abuse, when the perpetrator -has engaged in a past pattern of domestic abuse upon the victim or upon another family or household member and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life;
⅜ ⅜: ⅜ ⅜ ⅜{ ⅜
For purposes of paragraph (a), clause (6), “domestic abuse” means an act that * * * is committed against the victim who is a family or household member as defined in section 518B.01, subdivision 2, paragraph (b).

MinmStat. § 609.185(6). Section 518B.01, subdivision 2, paragraph (b) defines “family or household members” to include “(1) spouses and former spouses; (2) parents and children; (3) persons related by blood; [and] (4) persons who are presently residing together or who have resided together in the past.” Minn.Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(b) (2002).

Asfeld argues that the statute requires a past pattern of domestic abuse upon the victim or upon another family or household member [of the victim and the perpetrator]. The state argues that the statute requires a past pattern of domestic abuse upon the victim or upon another family or household member [of the perpetrator]. This issue requires that we interpret Minn.Stat. § 609.185. In statutory interpretation, “where the language of the statute is clear, the court is bound to give effect thereto.” State v. Loge, 608 N.W.2d 152, 156-57 (Minn.2000). We will not engage in an analysis of legislative history if the language of the statute is clear. See, e.g., Gomon v. Northland Family Physicians, Ltd., 645 N.W.2d 413, 416 (Minn.2002); Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2002).

The contested language in the statute is the clause “past pattern of domestic abuse upon the victim or upon another family or household member.” Minn.Stat. § 609.185(6) (emphasis added). The question presented is of which “family or household” the prior subject of abuse must be a member-the victim’s, the perpetrator’s, or a “family or household” shared by the victim and the perpetrator? In answering this question, we first look to the definition of domestic abuse in the statute: “ ‘domestic abuse’ means an act that * * * is committed against the victim who is a family or household member.” Minn.Stat. § 609.185. In this clause, the statute establishes that the victim of domestic abuse must be a member of the perpetrator’s “family or household.” Therefore, in stating that the past pattern of abuse must have been committed “upon the victim or upon another family or household member,” the legislature creates a parallel between the victim as one “family or household member” and the prior subject of abuse as another “family or household member.” Id. (emphasis added). Because of this parallel construction, we look to the definition of “family or household” as it applies to the victim to determine how it applies to the other “family or household member.” When we do this, it becomes clear that the statute defines “family or household” as it relates to this other member to be the perpetrator’s “family or household.”

We recognize that when statutory language is “clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2002). Because we conclude that the statutory language here is unambiguous, we decline to examine the statute’s legislative history as As-feld urges us to do. We decline to read into the statute a requirement that the murder victim and the prior victims of abuse be members of the same “family or household,” as long as each was a member of the perpetrator’s “family or household.”

We conclude that such a focus on the perpetrator’s “family or household” is proper in the context of the domestic abuse statute, which addresses the behavior of the perpetrator-the abuse the perpetrator inflicts on members of his family or household. How the victims of that abuse are related is not controlling. With the domestic abuse murder statute, the legislature sought to penalize the repeat abuser who engages in a history of serial acts of violence against those with whom he lives, whether they be persons to whom he is related or merely persons with whom he currently resides or with whom he has resided in the past.

The admissibility of the past acts of abuse is especially clear in this case where the defendant, the murder victim, and the victims of the past abuse were all members of the same “family or household.” Dominick was Asfeld’s son and Dominick was, therefore, “related by blood” to Asfeld’s parents and siblings. Minn.Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(b). Asfeld, his parents, siblings, and his son are all members of one “family or household” under the definition provided by Minn.Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(b)(3). Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of Asfeld’s prior acts of abuse against his parents and siblings as direct evidence going to prove the element of a “past pattern of domestic abuse upon the victim or upon another family or household member.” Minn.Stat. § 609.185(6).

II.

The next issue before us is whether the district court erred in admitting Spreigl evidence of Asfeld’s prior assaults against nonfamily members. In reviewing the admission of Spreigl evidence, we have stated that the discretion exercised by the court will be affirmed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 601 (Minn.1993). As the appellant, Asfeld has the burden of showing that the court erred in admitting this evidence. Id.

Spreigl evidence is evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes, wrongs, or acts, which would otherwise be inadmissible, but which the state can seek to have admitted for the limited purpose of showing motive, intent, absence of mistake, identity, or a common scheme or plan. State v. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d 281, 296 (Minn.2002). In State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965), we provided a five-prong test for evaluating when to admit such evidence: (1) the state must give notice of its intent to admit the evidence; (2) the state must clearly indicate what the evidence will be offered to prove; (3) there must be clear and convincing evidence that the defendant participated in the prior act; (4) the evidence must be relevant and material to the state’s case; and (5) the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its potential prejudice to the defendant. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d at 296.

Here, the state offered testimony about two Spreigl incidents: Asfeld’s assault of a 13-year-old boy because Asfeld felt the boy was staring at him, and Asfeld’s assault of a woman in her mid-forties when she asked him to leave her house during a party. The district court determined that the incidents were relevant to the issue of “identity” and admitted the incidents as demonstrating Asfeld’s “callous attitude towards vulnerable people.” Asfeld concedes that the first three prongs of the Spreigl test were met, but he asserts that the admission of this evidence failed to meet the fourth and fifth prongs: relevancy and lack of undue prejudice.

In evaluating the relevancy factor of the Spreigl test, “the trial court should consider the issues in the case, the reasons and need for the evidence, and whether there is a sufficiently close relationship between the charged offense and the Spreigl offense in time, place or modus operand!” State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 390 (Minn.1998). It is not necessary, however, that the Spreigl evidence be identical to the charged offense. State v. Nelson, 632 N.W.2d 193, 204 (Minn.2001). “[T]his court will uphold admissibility notwithstanding a lack of proximity in time or place if the relevance of the evidence is otherwise clear.” State v. Drieman, 457 N.W.2d 703, 710 (Minn.1990).

Asfeld argues that when Spreigl evidence is offered to prove identity, the relevancy standard is heightened and the court should look for resemblances between the methodologies of the crimes, and not merely at whether they are “the same generic type” of crimes. State v. Shannon, 583 N.W.2d 579, 581, 585-86 (Minn.1998). Asfeld relies largely on Shannon, in which we concluded that the district court improperly admitted Spreigl evidence of a drug-related robbery and shooting that had no clear gang connection to the charged offense of a gang-related killing. Id.

The state responds that we have previously affirmed the admission of Spreigl evidence by relying on relevancy connections similar to the one the district court used here-that all the acts are instances of taking advantage of vulnerable people. In State v. Drieman, we affirmed the admission of evidence that the defendant assaulted a disabled fellow prison inmate 9½ years before his trial for the murder of his girlfriend’s 3-year-old son. 457 N.W.2d at 709-11. We allowed the evidence on the ground that both incidents involved taking advantage of vulnerable people. Id. In State v. Berry, we stated that three prior incidents of the defendant’s violence, which bore little resemblance to each other or to the charged offense of first-degree premeditated murder, were “relevant because of the similarity of the way appellant behaved when trying to maintain control of the people with whom he worked.” 484 N.W.2d 14, 17 (Minn.1992).

We note that while we have affirmed a district court’s determination that prior bad act evidence is relevant to identity simply because it indicates a pattern of taking advantage of vulnerable people, we have never defined “vulnerable” so broadly as to encompass the evidence admitted in this case. The three individuals at issue here are an infant asleep in his crib, a 13-year-old boy hanging out with friends in a parking lot, and a healthy middle-aged woman hosting a party in her home. Undoubtedly, Dominick was a vulnerable person. However, if we were to allow evidence of the assaults of the last two individuals as helping to establish a pattern of aggression toward “vulnerable” individuals, it is difficult to imagine any prior act of assault that would not be admissible under that standard.

Certainly there are circumstances in which a 13-year-old boy or a middle-aged woman could be classified as “vulnerable,” just as there were circumstances in State v. Drieman that led the district court to label the prison inmate as “vulnerable,” when the defendant was one of a group of attackers and the victim-inmate “suffered] from muscular dystrophy and blindness in his right eye * * * [and] was 6 feet tall and weighed 110 pounds.” Drieman, 457 N.W.2d at 710. Such circumstances are not present here. In the absence of similarly compelling circumstances, we hold that the district court erred in admitting evidence of the assaults of the 13-year-old boy and the middle-aged woman as evidence of a pattern of aggression toward vulnerable individuals.

Having determined that the district court improperly admitted evidence of these two prior assaults, we must now determine whether that error requires that Asfeld be granted a new trial: “a new trial is not required unless there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” Stewart, 643 N.W.2d at 298. See also State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d 191, 198, 198 n. 6 (Minn.1995) (distinguishing between harmless error standards for evi-dentiary rulings of a constitutional magnitude and erroneously admitted state’s evidence which does not affect constitutional rights). Here, the jury heard evidence of Asfeld’s abuse of his parents and siblings; it heard, and apparently believed, evidence indicating that Asfeld had previously shaken Dominick resulting in severe injuries; and it heard, and apparently did not believe, Asfeld’s testimony that he did not abuse or murder his son. We hold that there is no reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence of the two prior assaults of two nonfamily or household members affected the guilty verdicts in this case and therefore the error was harmless.

III.

The next issue we address is Asfeld’s assertion that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. When reviewing a claim for sufficiency of the evidence, we are “limited to ascertaining whether, given the facts in the record and any legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a jury could reasonably find that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” State v. Pierson, 530 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Minn.1995). In reviewing a jury verdict, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence. State v. Brocks, 587 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Minn.1998).

Asfeld argues that his conviction was based purely on circumstantial evidence and that “[a] conviction based on circumstantial evidence merits stricter scrutiny.” State v. Bias, 419 N.W.2d 480, 484 (Minn.1988). A defendant challenging a conviction based on circumstantial evidence need show that the evidence in the record and reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are consistent with a rational hypothesis other than his guilt. State v. Hatfield, 639 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Minn.2002) (citing State v. Steinbuch, 514 N.W.2d 793, 798-99 (Minn.1994)). “Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn.2002).

Even in cases based on circumstantial evidence, however, we have consistently recognized that the jury is in the best position to evaluate the evidence, and we “will not overturn a conviction based on circumstantial evidence on the basis of mere conjecture.” State v. Lahue, 585 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Minn.1998). We have defined the defendant’s burden:

[In order to] successfully challenge a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence, a defendant must point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt. However, ‘possibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.’

Taylor, 650 N.W.2d at 206 (citations omitted).

The state presented a ease against As-feld that included the following evidentiary “links”: Asfeld (1) had previously shaken Dominick, which he had admitted; (2) had exhibited little interest in Dominick after he was discharged from the hospital, as evidenced by testimony that Asfeld had missed most of the doctor visits and most of the opportunities to visit Dominick in foster care; (3) had difficulty controlling his aggression when he felt a loss of control, supported by evidence of unprovoked prior assaults against a 13-year-old boy and a middle-aged woman; (4) had engaged in a long history of domestic abuse, supported by testimony about his abuse of Ruprecht, his parents, and his siblings; (5) wanted to move back into the house he shared with Ruprecht and was prevented from doing so because he was not permitted to live with Dominick; (6) was not interested in paying child support, as evidenced by his failure to pay support and the OFP ordering that he do so; (7) was in the house the night that Dominick died; (8) encouraged Ruprecht to lie and not admit to having fallen asleep while he was visiting so it would seem that he had not had an opportunity to be alone with Dominick; and (9) made statements about Dominick’s murder investigation during a taped phone call with Ruprecht that could be viewed as incriminating.

Asfeld’s first insufficiency argument is that once it is established that several of the evidentiary “links” listed above were improperly admitted, his conviction cannot stand because each link in the circumstantial evidence chain must be proven: “the loss of one link may prevent the state from meeting its evidentiary burden.” State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 631 (Minn.1995). Asfeld contends that the weak evidentiary links include the improperly admitted evidence of his prior assaults of his family and of two strangers, and his recanted confession to having shaken Dominick. We have determined that the evidence of Asfeld’s prior abuse of his parents and siblings was properly admitted. Asfeld recanted his confession to shaking Dominick and testified at trial that he only confessed because he wanted Ru-precht to get custody; but he cannot now claim that the state failed to meet its burden simply because the jury did not believe him. While we agree with Asfeld that the Spreigl evidence relating to the assaults on the 13-year-old boy and the middle-aged woman was improperly admitted, we have also determined that the admission was harmless error and do not conclude that the chain of circumstantial evidence would have been significantly weakened by the removal of that “link.”

Next, Asfeld asserts that the evidence was insufficient because the circumstantial evidence points to Ruprecht as strongly as it does to him and, therefore, the inferences that can be drawn from the evidence “are consistent with a rational hypothesis other than * * * [his] guilt.” Hatfield, 639 N.W.2d at 376. In support of this argument, Asfeld cites to his trial testimony, in which he described Ruprecht as someone who never wanted a baby and who did not enjoy her life with Asfeld and Dominick. He also cites the testimony of one of his expert witnesses, Dr. Ingénito, who testified that Dominick’s injuries from the initial shaking could have been inflicted in the evening when Ruprecht was home alone with Dominick. Asfeld submits that given that he and Ruprecht are the only two persons who could arguably be viewed as having been present at both the shaking and then the murder of Dominick, and given that both deny responsibility for the two incidents, the case is properly characterized as her word against his.

Asfeld’s characterization, however, is precisely the kind of situation in which we apply the presumption that the jury, in its role as evaluator of witness credibility, believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses. Brocks, 587 N.W.2d at 42. Previously, when presented with a defendant who made a claim similar to Asfeld’s and stated that the circumstantial evidence at his trial also supported his “unknown killer” theory, we stated that we “assume that the jury disbelieved any testimony in conflict with the result it reached.” State v. Morris, 606 N.W.2d 430 (Minn.2000) (emphasis added). In this case, that requires assuming that the jury disbelieved Asfeld’s claim that he did not murder Dominick. Accordingly, for all the reasons noted above, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict that Asfeld was guilty of murdering Dominick.

IV.

Finally, Asfeld asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object to the presentation of evidence of the prior domestic abuse against his parents and siblings under Minn.Stat. § 609.185(6). When determining that this prior domestic abuse evidence was not admitted in error, we have also addressed this claim; therefore, As-feld’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.

Affirmed.

      . Asfeld also asserted that the evidentiary chain is insufficient to support his conviction because the state failed to explain how he, after a full day of combining, could have smothered his son without leaving any evidence of dust or debris on the baby blanket. As we have previously held, however, in the absence of evidence "in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt," a lack of incriminating physical evidence does not necessarily undermine a guilty verdict. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d at 206; see State v. Landin, 472 N.W.2d 854, 858 (Minn.1991).

      . This testimony was offered to contradict the state's expert witness testimony that Dominick’s injuries could only have been sustained if he had been shaken in the morning when Asfeld was the only person home with Dominick.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LANSING, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Gerald WENDINGER, et al., Appellants, v. FORST FARMS, INC., et al., Respondents, WAKEFIELD PORK, INC., Respondent.
    No. CX-02-1603.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    June 10, 2003.

      Thomas G. Dunnwald, Dunnwald & Peterson, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for appellants.
    Clark A. Tuttle III, Berens, Rodenberg & O’Connor, Chtd., New Ulm, MN, for respondents Forst Farms, Inc., et al.

      Gary W. Koch, Dustan J. Cross, Sara N. Wilson, Gislason & Hunter LLP, New Ulm, MN, for respondent Wakefield Pork, Inc.
    Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Craig L. Engwall, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for amicus curiae State of Minnesota.
    Susan E. Stokes, David R. Moeller, Carl L. Flink, Farmers’ Legal Action Group, Inc., St. Paul, MN, for amicus curiae Land Stewardship Project.
    James P. Peters, Karna M. Peters, Peters & Peters, PLC, Alexandria, MN, for amicus curiae MN COACT.
    Considered and decided by LANSING, Presiding Judge, KLAPHAKE, Judge, and HUDSON, Judge.
   OPINION

LANSING, Judge.

On cross-motions for summary judgment in a dispute involving allegations of nuisance, negligence, and trespass against a confined-animal feeding operation, the district court granted summary judgment for Jerome, Alma, and James Forst, Forst Farms, Inc., and Wakefield Pork, Inc. The district court did not decide the summary judgment motion of Gerald and Julie Wen-dinger on the issue of agency. The Wen-dingers appeal, and we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

FACTS

Julie and Gerald Wendinger own land in rural Nicollet County near a confined-animal feeding operation run by the Forst family (the Forsts), as Forst Farms, Inc. (Forst Farms). The Wendingers and Forsts are long-time residents of the area. The Forsts have farmed their land since the 1960s, and Gerald Wendinger was born on and farmed the Wendinger land until the 1970s. The Wendingers built a new home on that land in 1984.

In 1994, the Forsts entered into an agreement with Wakefield Pork, Inc., (Wakefield) under which the Forsts agreed to construct and operate a confined-animal feeding operation for housing and feeding pigs owned by Wakefield. The operation stores the liquid animal waste in a two-stage outdoor concrete manure lagoon from which it is pumped and spread on area fields each autumn. The Forsts had previously used a “scrape and haul” system with their livestock in which the waste and straw used in the stalls is hauled away in solid form. The new feeding facility was put into operation in 1994.

The manure lagoon was pumped out for the first time in the fall of 1995 and around that time the Wendingers complained about odors they believed to be emanating from the Forst operation. Between late 1995 and 2000, the Wendingers filed scores of further odor complaints with various state and local authorities. State and local environmental officials conducted a series of investigations in response to the complaints.

In the summer of 2001, the Wendingers sued the Forsts, Forst Farms, and Wake-field, stating claims in negligence, nuisance, and trespass and seeking injunctive and compensatory relief. The district court dismissed the trespass claim for failure to state a legally sufficient claim and dismissed the negligence and nuisance claims after granting summary judgment for the defendants. The court did not rule on the Wendingers’ motion for summary judgment recognizing Wakefield’s agency over the Forst Farms confined-feeding operation. The Wendingers now appeal.

ISSUES

I. Do invasive odors give rise to an action in trespass?
II. Must a plaintiff alleging nuisance prove that the nuisance harm is the result of a wrongful act?
III. Does Minn.Stat. § 561.19, subd. 2(a) (2002), impose an absolute two-year limitation on nuisance claims against agricultural operations or provide an affirmative defense against such claims for an agricultural operation in compliance with “generally accepted agricultural practices”?
IV. Does Minn.Stat. § 561.19, subd. 2(b) (2002), provide the standard of care governing negligence claims against agricultural operations?
V. Is Forst Farms, Inc., an agent of Wakefield Pork, Inc., as a matter of law?

ANALYSIS

I

The district court dismissed the Wendingers’ trespass claim on grounds that invasive odors can give rise only to an action for nuisance, not trespass. When reviewing a district court’s dismissal of an action for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, we determine only whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief. Barton v. Moore, 558 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn.1997).

“Trespass encompasses any unlawful interference with one’s person, property, or rights, and requires only two essential elements: a rightful possession in the plaintiff and unlawful entry upon such possession by the defendant.” Special Force Ministries v. WCCO Television, 584 N.W.2d 789, 792-93 (Minn.App.1998) (citations omitted), review denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 1998). The Wendingers argue that the odors from the feeding operation physically invaded their land because the odors migrated onto the property in the form of airborne particulate matter. A claim of trespass by airborne particles, they contend, should be treated the same as claims of trespass by errant bullets, which have been upheld by Minnesota appellate courts. See Whittaker v. Stangvick, 100 Minn. 386, 111 N.W. 295 (1907); Citizens for a Safe Grant v. Lone Oak Sportsmen’s Club, Inc., 624 N.W.2d 796, (Minn.App.2001).

A number of jurisdictions have abandoned the historical distinction between direct and indirect invasions separating nuisance and trespass claims and have applied principles of trespass to cases in which a plaintiff claims invasion by particulate matter. See, e.g., Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So.2d 523 (Ala.1979); Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959); Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Refining Co., 104 Wash.2d 677, 709 P.2d 782 (1985). Minnesota, however, has not recognized trespass by particulate matter. Current Minnesota law was summarized in a 1989 case involving allegations of nuisance and trespass caused by noxious fumes from a waste-water treatment plant: “[a]lthough some of the traditional distinctions between nuisance and trespass have become blurred and uncertain, the distinction now accepted is that trespass is an invasion of the plaintiffs right to exercise exclusive possession of the land and nuisance is an interference with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of the land.” Fagerlie v. City of Willmar, 435 N.W.2d 641, 644 n. 2 (Minn.App.1989) (citing D. Dobbs, Prosser and Keeton on Torts at 622 (5th ed.1984)).

Like the fumes in Fagerlie, the odors of which the Wendingers complain interfere with the use and enjoyment of their land, not with their exclusive possession of it. We accordingly conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing the Wen-dingers’ trespass claim for failure to state a legally sufficient claim.

II

The Wendingers also challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment on their nuisance claim. Specifically, they contend that the district court erred as a matter of law in holding that a claim of private nuisance requires proof of “wrongful conduct” by the defendant. As a legal question, we review de novo the district court’s determination of the necessary elements of a cause of action. See Frost-Benco Elec. Ass’n v. Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn.1984) (explaining that a reviewing court exercises independent review on a purely legal issue).

Nuisance is defined by statute as “[a]nything which is injurious to health, or indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property.” Minn.Stat. § 561.01 (2002). An action in nuisance “may be brought by any person whose property is injuriously affected or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by the nuisance.” Id. In applying the statute in this case, the district court read into it an additional requirement of “wrongful conduct,” drawn from language in Highview N. Apartments v. County of Ramsey, 323 N.W.2d 65, 70-71 (Minn.1982).

Highview involved a municipal drainage system that diverted a watershed into a storm sewer system and caused the flooding of the plaintiffs’ basements. The municipalities, held liable for damages under a nuisance theory, argued on appeal that the district court erred in assigning liability on the basis they had “maintained something which is clearly an unreasonable thing in view of the surroundings.” Id. at 73. The municipalities contended that without proof of negligence, unlawful conduct, or the creation of a dangerous situation, there could be no nuisance. Id. at 70.

The supreme court rejected the municipalities’ argument and held that the nuisance statute “defines a nuisance in terms of the resultant harm rather than in terms of the kind of conduct by a defendant which causes the harm.” Id. The court went on to explain that “there must be some kind of conduct causing the nuisance harm which is ‘wrongful’.” Id. at 70-71 (citing Randall v. Vill. of Excelsior, 103 N.W.2d 131, 134, 258 Minn. 81, 85 (1960)). By enclosing the word “wrongful” in quotation marks preceding the Randall citation, the court signaled that the word was to have the same meaning it had in Randall. In Randall the supreme court used the word “wrongful” to describe the type of injury involved in a nuisance claim: “It is elementary that ‘nuisance’ denotes the wrongful invasion or infringement of a legal right or interest * * * and includes intentional harms and harms caused by negligence, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct.” Randall, 103 N.W.2d at 134, 258 Minn. at 85 (citation omitted). Used in this way, the word “wrongful” is meant simply to limit the scope of nuisance liability to situations in which the defendant can be said to be at fault. See Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modem Legal Usage 72 (1987) (defining “at fault” to include “responsible for a wrong committed”). The holding in Highview confirms this use of wrongful because the defendants were held liable for nuisance harm without proof that the harm resulted from unlawful conduct by them. Rather, nuisance liability was premised solely on the municipalities’ fault under the reasonable-use doctrine governing the drainage of surface waters.

Applying the principles of Randall and Highview to this case, we believe that a plaintiff who presents evidence that the defendant intentionally maintains a condition that is injurious to health, or indecent or offensive to the senses, or which obstructs free use of property, states an actionable claim in nuisance. The Wendingers supported their nuisance claim with evidence that the Forsts were aware of their operation’s alleged impact on the Wendingers’ use and enjoyment of their land as early as 1996. The Forsts do not contest this point. That evidence is sufficient to demonstrate intentional conduct. See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 464 at 1325 (2000) (explaining that a defendant intentionally causes nuisance harm when he maintains the condition causing the harm after having been apprised of its effect upon the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his land). We therefore conclude that the district court erred as a matter of law in holding that an allegation of nuisance must be supported by evidence that the defendant caused the nuisance harm by an independent wrongful act.

Ill

The legislature has shielded agricultural operations from nuisance liability in certain circumstances. This protection is set forth in Minn.Stat. § 561.19, subd. 2, which reads:

Subd. 2. Agricultural operation not a nuisance.
(a) An agricultural operation is not and shall not become a private or public nuisance after two years from its established date of operation if the operation was not a nuisance at its established date of operation.
(b) An agricultural operation is operating according to generally accepted agricultural practices if it is located in an agriculturally zoned area and complies with the provisions of all applicable federal and state statutes and rules or any issued permits for the operation.
(c)The provisions of this subdivision do not apply:
(1) to a condition or injury which results from the negligent or improper operation of an agricultural operation or from operations contrary to commonly accepted agricultural practices or to applicable state or local laws, ordinances, rules, or permits;
(2) when an agricultural operation causes injury or direct threat of injury to the health or safety of any person;
* * *

Minn.Stat. § 561.19, subd. 2 (2002). The district court interpreted these provisions to impose a two-year limitation on nuisance suits against agricultural operations and to bar nuisance claims against operations that are conducted according to “generally accepted agricultural practices.”

Because it presents a question of law, we review the district court’s construction of Minn.Stat. § 561.19 de novo. Brookfield Trade Ctr., Inc. v. County of Ramsey, 584 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn.1998). To determine whether a statute has been correctly applied, we focus on the words of the statute to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2002). If the meaning is plain and unambiguous we apply that meaning as a manifestation of legislative intent. Kersten v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 608 N.W.2d 869, 874-75 (Minn.2000). Plain meaning embodies ordinary use of the language in the context of the whole-act structure, applying the usual conventions of grammar and syntax. Occhino v. Grover, 640 N.W.2d 357, 359-60 (Minn.App. 2002), review denied (Minn. May 28, 2002). If the meaning of statutory language is not plain, we resolve ambiguity by looking to other factors that evince legislative intent and, when applicable, agency interpretation and extrinsic-source canons. Id. at 360; Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (listing factors for ascertaining legislative intent).

Timeliness of nuisance claim

Minn.Stat. § 561.19, subd. 2(a), states that an agricultural operation shall not become a nuisance once it has been established for two years “if the operation was not a nuisance at its established date of operation.” Minn.Stat. § 561.19, subd. 2(a) (emphasis added). Thus, under the plain meaning of the act, a court considering the timeliness of a nuisance claim against a facility that has been in operation for more than two years must determine whether the complaint alleges the operation was a nuisance when established. The Wendingers alleged in their complaint that the Forst operation produced extremely noxious odors and gases “from the beginning.” The district court made no finding on this allegation. Without a determination that the allegation is unsupported by evidence, the district court did not have a basis to conclude that the Wen-dingers’ nuisance claim was barred under subdivision 2(a).

“Generally accepted agricultural practices”

The district court explained in its summary judgment memorandum that when applying Minn.Stat. § 561.19, subd. 2, the “focus is to be upon whether the operation is operating according to generally accepted agricultural practices, defined to be an operation located in an agriculturally zoned area which complies with the provisions of all applicable federal and state statutes and rules or any issued permits for the operation.” The court then went on to suggest that compliance with generally accepted agricultural practices provides an agricultural operation with an affirmative defense to a nuisance claim. Based on the language in its memorandum, the court apparently read subdivision 2(b) as the source of this affirmative defense.

Subdivision 2(b), however, only provides a definition of the phrase “operating according to generally accepted agricultural principles;” it does not connect that definition to any operative section. Neither subdivision 2(b) nor any other part of the statute explains the purpose of the definition, and, indeed, the phrase “generally accepted agricultural practices” appears in no other Minnesota law or regulation. A possible explanation is that subdivision 2(b) was intended to provide a definition for “commonly accepted agricultural practices” in subdivision 2(c). (Emphasis added.) Even if that were the case, however, subdivision 2(c) states exceptions to the limitations on nuisance action and therefore would provide no support for construing the definition to give rise to an affirmative defense.

Although we are unable to discern the legal significance of subdivision 2(b), the plain language of the provision creates no affirmative defense for operations in compliance with generally accepted agriculture practices. We therefore reject the district court’s conclusion that the Wen-dingers’ nuisance claim may be considered only to the extent that it alleges nuisance harm caused by negligence.

IV

The district court held that Minn. Stat. § 561.19, subd. 2(b), states a duty of care applicable to a hog-confinement operator and concluded that the Wendingers’ claim in negligence failed as a matter of law because the Wendingers offered no evidence that the Forst facility deviated from generally accepted agricultural practices. The determination of the proper standard of care presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Bondy v. Allen, 635 N.W.2d 244, 250 (Minn.App. 2001).

A legal duty of care is imposed either by the common law rule requiring exercise of ordinary care not to injure another, or by a statute designed for the protection of others. Lynghaug v. Payte, 247 Minn. 186, 194, 76 N.W.2d 660, 665-66 (1956). While violation of a statutory duty may in certain circumstances constitute negligence per se, see, e.g., Scott v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 709, Duluth, 256 N.W.2d 485, 488-89 (Minn.1977), the inverse proposition — that compliance with a statute precludes a finding of negligence — is not the law. A statutory standard “is no more than a minimum, and it does not necessarily preclude a finding that the actor was negligent in failing to take additional precautions.” Biasing v. P.R.L. Hardenbergh Co., 303 Minn. 41, 49, 226 N.W.2d 110, 115 (1975) (quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed.1971) § 36 at 203); see also Blatz v. Allina Health Sys., 622 N.W.2d 376, 386 (Minn.App.2001) (noting that compliance with statute regulating conduct does not provide conclusive proof that person exercised due care). We therefore conclude that the district court erred as a matter of law in dismissing the Wendingers’ claim without determining whether it alleged a legally sufficient cause of action in negligence.

V

The Wendingers sought summary judgment on the question of whether the Forsts and Forst Farms are agents of Wakefield Pork, so that Wakefield would be hable for any negligence in the operation of the Forst facility or resulting nuisance harm under a theory of respondeat superior. The district court did not rule on the Wendingers’ motion, apparently because of its determination that the Wen-dingers’ substantive claims were insufficient as a matter of law.

Wakefield contends that the lack of a district court ruling on the agency question places that issue beyond the scope of this appeal. But the scope of appehate review is not strictly limited to the judgment or order appealed from; it also includes “any other matter as the interest of justice may require.” Minn. R.App. P. 103.04. Determining the agency question in this appeal would serve the interests of justice by resolving an important question of liability, thereby possibly saving one of the defendants the time and cost of defending this action, at least with respect to certain claims. Nevertheless, we are prevented from considering the question by the lack of factual findings on the relationship between Forst Farms and Wakefield. See Vacura v. Haar’s Equip., Inc., 364 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn.1985) (stating that existence of agency relationship is question of fact). The parties’ appellate briefs make clear that the factual basis of the Forst Farms-Wakefield relationship is contested and must therefore be subject to further fact-finding.

DECISION

Because odors do not interfere with the exclusive possession of land,.an allegation that a confined-animal feeding operation emits invasive odors does not state a claim for trespass. Invasive odors may support a claim in nuisance, however, if they rise to the level of nuisance harm and are caused by a condition intentionally maintained by the defendant. The plain meaning of Minn.Stat. § 561.19, subd. 2, supports neither the imposition of an absolute two-year limitation on nuisance claims against agricultural operations nor the creation of an affirmative defense against such claims for operations that comply with “generally accepted agricultural practices.” Finally, an agricultural operation’s compliance with generally accepted agricultural practices does not preclude a finding of negligence.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.


author: ZINTER, Justice. SABERS, Justice,

text:
    2003 SD 55
    STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Gerald JENSEN, Defendant and Appellee.
    No. 22536.
    Supreme Court of South Dakota.
    Considered on Briefs March 24, 2003.
    Decided May 14, 2003.

      Lawrence E. Long, Attorney General, Paul Cremer, Harold H. Deering, Assistant Attorney Generals, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellant.

      Thomas E. Brady, Spearfish, South Dakota, Attorney for defendant and appellee.
   ZINTER, Justice.

[¶ 1.] The clerk of the Deadbroke Heights Road District published a notice of vacancy for the office of district trustee. The notice indicated that an election would be held on March 7, 2002. Two nominating petitions were filed, but both were allegedly defective. Gerald Jensen, the incumbent, circulated his petition prior to January 1, 2002, in violation of SDCL 12-6-4.1. Marie Slovek, the challenger, filed her petition with the district secretary, instead of the district clerk. By the time the clerk received the petition, the deadline for filing had expired. The clerk ultimately concluded that Jensen’s petition was timely, that Slovek’s petition was late, and therefore, Jensen was the only legal candidate. Consequently, no election was held. The Lawrence County State’s Attorney subsequently initiated this quo war-ranto proceeding to determine who was legally entitled to the office. The circuit court ruled that Jensen legally held the office. The court concluded that Jensen’s petition was valid because SDCL 12-6-4.1 did not apply to road district elections, and Slovek’s petition was invalid because she did not file her petition on time. The State appeals. We reverse the ruling on Jensen’s petition, affirm the ruling on Slo-vek’s petition, and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[¶ 2.] This road district was organized in 2000 pursuant to SDCL ch 31-12A. Lynn Stich, Les Schuchardt and Jensen were initially elected as the trustees. Each trustee served a three-year term. The elections were staggered so that one trustee was subject to election each year.

[¶ 3.] Jensen’s position was open for election in 2002. SDCL 31-12A-15 provided that elections for the district trustees were to be held “on the first Tuesday after the anniversary date of the first election.” The first election for the district was held on March 7, 2000. Therefore, in accordance with the relevant version of SDCL 31-12A-15, the 2002 election should have been scheduled for March 12, 2002, and the deadline for filing nominating petitions was February 25, 2002.

[¶ 4.] Jensen and Slovek each circulated petitions for the election. Jensen circulated his petition on November 15, 2001, a month and one-half before the first day of the year in which the 2002 election was to be held. It was filed with the district clerk on December 10, 2001. Marie Slovek circulated her petition after the first of the year. She filed it on February 22, 2002. However, she filed her petition with the district secretary instead of the district clerk. Slovek’s petition was forwarded to the district clerk who received it on February 27, 2002, two days after the filing deadline.

[¶ 5.] The clerk rejected Slovek’s petition as untimely and accepted Jensen’s petition. Because the clerk believed there was only one valid petition, no election was held. The clerk subsequently notified the Lawrence County Auditor that Jensen would serve a new three-year term as trustee.

[¶ 6.] The Lawrence County State’s Attorney subsequently initiated this quo war-ranto proceeding against Jensen challenging his right to hold the office. The State’s Attorney argued that Jensen’s nominating petition was invalid because the petition was circulated too early, in violation of SDCL 12-6-4.1. The State’s Attorney also argued that Slovek was entitled to the office because she had “substantially complied” with the filing statutes by filing her nominating petition with the district secretary before the deadline. Both the State and Jensen moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the circuit court denied the State’s motion and granted summary judgment to Jensen.

[¶ 7.] The State appeals raising two issues:

1. Whether the early circulation prohibition in SDCL 12-6-4.1 was applicable to road district elections.

2. Whether Slovek was entitled to the office of district trustee.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 8.] Our standard of review for the grant or denial of a summary judgment is well settled.

In reviewing a grant or a denial of summary judgment under SDCL 15-6-56(e), we must determine whether the moving party demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and [established] entitlement to judgment on the merits as a matter of law. The evidence must be viewed most favorably to the nonmoving party[,] and reasonable doubts should be resolved against the moving party.... Our task on appeal is to determine only whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the law was correctly applied.

Braun v. New Hope Township, 2002 SD 67, ¶ 8, 646 N.W.2d 737, 739 (quoting South Dakota State Cement Plant Commission v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 2000 SD 116, ¶ 9, 616 N.W.2d 397, 400-01). “The correctness of [a] claim for a writ of quo warranto is clearly a question of law. We review questions of law de novo, without deference to the decision of the trial court.” McElhaney v. Anderson, 1999 SD 78, ¶ 6, 598 N.W.2d 203, 205.

DECISION

[¶ 9.] 1. The early circulation prohibition in SDCL 12-6-4.1 was applicable to road district elections.

[¶ 10.] Quo warranto proceedings may be used to determine whether a person who holds a public office, is in legal possession of that office.

The writ of quo warranto is derived from the old English practice of inquiring by what authority the king supported his claim. Black’s Law Dictionary 1417 (4th ed.1957). In more recent times, it has also been used to command a public officer to show “by what warrant he exercises such a franchise, having never had any grant of it, or having forfeited it by neglect or abuse.” Id. “[W]e have held that quo warranto is the proper proceeding to determine title to and possession of a public office.” “A judgment in quo warranto shall be rendered upon the right of the defendant, or both upon the right of the defendant and upon the right of the party alleged to be entitled to office, as justice shall require.”
In South Dakota the common-law writ of quo warranto has been statutorily recognized. SDCL ch 21-28 provides for the remedy of writ of quo warranto.
Any person may bring a writ of quo warranto:
(1) When any person shall usurp, intrude into, or unlawfully hold or exercise any public office ...;

McElhaney, 1999 SD 78, ¶¶ 8-9, 598 N.W.2d at 205-206 (internal citations omitted). There is no dispute that the office of district trustee is a public office, and that quo warranto is an appropriate remedy to determine the right to that office. The first question is whether Jensen’s nominating petition was invalid because it was filed prior to the first day of the calendar year of the election, in violation of SDCL 12-6-4.1.

[¶ 11.] A number of statutes govern the times for circulating and filing petitions for road district elections. Initially, SDCL 31-12A-17 requires the filing of the nominating petition with the district clerk no less than fifteen days before the election.

The trustees to be elected at the initial election, shall be nominated by the voters in attendance at the meeting in which the organizational election is held. Any trustee to be elected at subsequent elections, shall be nominated by filing with the district clerk not less than fifteen days before any subsequent election, certificates of nomination for the offices of trustee. The certificates shall be in writing and shall contain the name of the candidate, residence, business address, and the office for which the candidate is named, and shall be signed by at least five percent of the qualified voters.

Id. (emphasis added). In addition, the pre-July 1, 2002 version of SDCL 31-12A-15 provided that the “election shall be conducted according to chapter 9-13.” SDCL 9-13-7 required that nominating petitions be submitted pursuant to the procedures in SDCL ch 9-13 and ch 12-6. One of those procedures is found in SDCL 12-6-4.1, and that statute expressly prohibits a candidate from circulating a petition “prior to the first day of January of the year in which the election will be held.”

[¶ 12.] Although Jensen circulated and filed his petition before the first day of January in the year of the election, the trial court held that SDCL 12-64L1 was not applicable. The court reasoned that because the date of a road district election was related to the anniversary date of the first district election, there could be an occasion where a petition could not be circulated after the first day of January as required by SDCL 12-6-4.1 and still filed at least fifteen days prior to the election as required by SDCL 31-12A-17; (ie., an election occurring during the first fifteen days of the calendar year). While this problem is theoretically possible, we disagree with the rejection of a statutory election requirement simply because there is a hypothetical election scenario in which the statutes may conflict.

[¶ 13.] We have rejected claims of statutory invalidity based on hypothetical factual scenarios. “Judicial machinery should be conserved for problems which are real and present or imminent, not squandered on problems which are abstract or hypothetical or remote.” Gottschalk v. Hegg, 89 S.D. 89, 95, 228 N.W.2d 640, 643-644 (1975) (further citations omitted). Therefore, in the related area of determining the constitutionality of statutes, “ ‘the mere fact that there might be a case[,] where to apply the provisions of [the statute] would result in [a constitutional violation,] does not render the [statute] unconstitutional, but merely prevents its application in such a case.’... [So also, we have recognized that] ‘[t]he potential vagueness of a statute, as applied in hypothetical cases, is no ground for holding the statute unconstitutional. A defendant cannot claim that a statute is unconstitutional in some of its reaches if it is constitutional as applied to him.’ ” City of Pierre v. Russell, 89 S.D. 70, 78-74, 228 N.W.2d 388, 341 (1975) (internal citations omitted). The same rule should apply here.

[¶ 14.] We also observe that the plain language of SDCL 31-12A-15 required that road district elections be conducted under the municipal election procedures in SDCL ch 9-13. Those statutes unambiguously directed application of SDCL ch 12-6, which included SDCL 12-6-4.1.

[¶ 15.] In light of these unambiguous statutes, rules of statutory construction require application of the early circulation prohibition.

The purpose of statutory construction is to discover the true intention of the law which is to be ascertained primarily from the language expressed in the statute. The intent of a statute is determined from what the legislature said, rather than what the courts think it should have said, and the court must confine itself to the language used.
Words and phrases in a statute must be given their plain meaning and effect. When the language in a statute is clear, certain and unambiguous, there is no reason for construction, and the Court’s only function is to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed.

Martinmaas v. Engelmann, 2000 SD 85, ¶ 49, 612 N.W.2d 600, 611 (quoting Moss v. Guttormson, 1996 SD 76, ¶ 10, 551 N.W.2d 14, 17). Furthermore, “[t]here is a presumption against a construction which would render a statute ineffective or meaningless.” Yankton Ethanol, Inc. v. Vironment, Inc., 1999 SD 42, ¶ 15, 592 N.W.2d 596, 599 (quoting In re Real Estate Tax Exemption for Black Hills Legal Services, Inc., 1997 SD 64, ¶ 12, 563 N.W.2d 429, 432). Jensen’s construction, rendering SDCL 12-6-4.1 inapplicable to road district elections, ignores the statutes plain prohibition and incorrectly renders SDCL 31-12A-15, a specific road district election statute, meaningless.

[¶ 16.] We do acknowledge that there could be a short period of time when the early circulation prohibition (as required by SDCL 12-6^11) could conflict with the fifteen-day advance filing requirement (in SDCL 31-12A-17). However, the facts in this case did not present such a conflict. Because this District’s election was held in March, nominating petitions could have easily been circulated after January 1 and at least fifteen days before the election. Under these facts, both statutes could be applied and given effect. We therefore decline to invalidate a statute based on a hypothetical scenario. That conclusion is especially appropriate where- the plain language of both SDCL 31-12A-15 and 12-6-4.1 can be given effect.

[¶ 17.] 2. Slovek was not entitled to the office of district trustee.

[¶ 18.] SDCL 31-12A-17 requires that candidates for district trustee shall file their nominating petitions with the district clerk no less than fifteen days prior to the election. SDCL 2-14-2.1 provides that when a statute uses the term “shall,” it “manifests a mandatory directive and does not confer any discretion in carrying out the action so directed.”

[¶ 19.] It is undisputed that Slo-vek did not file her petition with the clerk before the deadline. On the contrary, she filed it with the secretary, and the secretary forwarded the petition to the clerk, who received it two days after the deadline. Therefore, Slovek’s petition was not filed in compliance with the requirements of SDCL 31-12A-17.

[¶ 20.] The State, however, argues that because Slovek filed her petition with the secretary before the deadline, she substantially complied with SDCL 81-12A-17. Substantial compliance with a statute requires actual compliance with every reasonable objective of the statute.

Substantial compliance with a statute means actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute. It means that a court should determine whether the statute had been followed sufficiently so as to carry out the intent for which it was adopted. Substantial compliance with a statute is not shown unless it is made to appear that the purpose of the statute is shown to have been served. What constitutes substantial compliance with a statute is a matter depending on the facts of each particular case.

In the Matter of License of Cork ‘n Bottle, Inc., 2002 SD 139, ¶ 12, 654 N.W.2d 432, 435 (quoting Wagner v. Truesdell, 1998 SD 9, ¶ 7, 574 N.W.2d 627, 629) (further citations omitted). See also Larson v. Hazeltine, 1996 SD 100, ¶ 19, 552 N.W.2d 830, 835.

[¶21.] Here, the State’s substantial compliance argument is very similar to the one rejected by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State ex rel. Ahlgrimm v. State Elections Board, 82 Wis.2d 585, 263 N.W.2d 152, 157 (1978). In Ahlgrimm, a candidate for a judicial election filed his petition on time, but not in the proper place. The Wisconsin State Elections Board refused to certify Ahlgrimm as a candidate. The Wisconsin Court held that filing a nomination petition in the wrong location was not substantial compliance with a filing statute.

The time and place of filing nomination papers cannot be separated. In order to he timely, the papers must be filed in the proper place. If the papers are initially filed in the wrong place, the error must be corrected and the papers filed in the right place within the filing deadline. Consistent with our earlier opinions ... we view [the statute] governing the time of filing and [the statute] governing the place of filing nomination papers ... to be mandatory. Failure to timely file the papers in the proper place prevents the candidate’s name from being placed on the ballot.

Id. at 157 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).

[¶ 22.] In the present case, Slovek did not substantially comply with the time or place requirements. Slovek filed her nomination petition with the secretary, and the clerk did not receive the petition from the secretary until two days after the filing deadline. In light of the mandatory language of SDCL 31-12A-17, the clerk correctly determined that Slovek’s petition was not timely, and it did not entitle her to be placed on the ballot. Actual compliance with statutory time and place of filing requirements was essential to the reasonable objectives of SDCL 31-12A-17.

[¶ 23.] The State’s reliance on two of our prior opinions involving substantial compliance in elections is misplaced. In Burns v. Kurtenbach, 327 N.W.2d 636 (S.D.1982), two school board candidates failed to sign the circulator’s verification on or before the filing deadline for petitions. The petitions were timely filed, and there does not appear to have been a claim that any of the voters’ signatures on the petitions were improper or invalid. The problem was that the candidates signed the circulator’s verification three days after the filing deadline. In rejecting the argument that the doctrine of substantial compliance could excuse the untimely verifications, we stated “[w]e conclude that the statute clearly and unambiguously requires that the circulator’s verification be executed prior to the filing deadline.” Id. at 638. Thus, Bums requires compliance with explicit statutory requirements.

[¶ 24.] Larson, 1996 SD 100, 552 N.W.2d 830, is also inapposite. Larson involved a requirement that petition circu-lators place their “complete address” on their verification forms. Two circulators put their names, street addresses and county on their verification forms, but did not include their city of residence. The petitions were otherwise in proper form and timely filed with the proper officer. Noting that the applicable statutes and rules did not expressly require the circula-tors’ city of residence, we concluded that there had been substantial compliance with the requirement of a “complete address.” However, we also ruled that the result would have been different if an express statutory requirement had been omitted.

In past cases involving the validity of ... petitions, we have begun our substantial compliance analysis by examining the items expressly enumerated in the statute. Thus, where the statute required both the residence address and post office address, both are considered essential elements and the omission of one or both is not a technicality to be disregarded.... Here, we are not presented with omission of an item expressly required by statute or rule; the circulator’s city is not specifically required as part of the oath by the terms of the rule. Thus, it cannot be said that the circulator’s city is an essential element of the circulator’s verification based on the language of the rule itself.

Larson, 1996 SD 100, ¶ 22, 552 N.W.2d at 836 (emphasis added).

[¶ 25.] In this case, SDCL 31-12A-17 expressly required the filing of petitions with the district clerk. Slovek did not do so. By the time her petition reached the clerk, it was not timely. On these facts, the State has not shown that Slovek substantially complied with the essential requirements of the statute.

[¶ 26.] The State finally argues that if neither Jensen nor Slovek were legally on the ballot, then Jensen should hold over until the next election. However, the trial court did not rule on this issue because it concluded that Jensen was the rightful office holder. We therefore decline to address the issue. We reverse on Issue 1, affirm on Issue 2, and remand for any remaining issues.

[¶ 27.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP and MEIERHENRY, Justices, concur.

[¶ 28.] SABERS, Justice, concurs in result.

SABERS, Justice,

concurring in result.

[¶ 29.] I concur in result but would affirm the trial court’s holding “that Jensen legally held the office” for a different reason. Jensen was the incumbent and having been duly qualified for the office, he holds that position until his successor is qualified and sworn. See SDCL 3-14-1 (providing in part, “[e]xcept when otherwise expressly provided, every lawful incumbent of any public office, with a, definite term, upon the expiration of such term shall continue to discharge its duties until his successor shall have been elected or appointed and has qualified[.]”) Since that has not happened, Jensen holds the office.

[¶ 30.] There is no evidence in this quo warranto proceeding to determine otherwise.

      . SDCL 31-12A-15 was amended by the 2003 Legislature so that future road district elections will be held the second Tuesday in May. SL 2003, ch 158, § 1.

      . The election was incorrectly scheduled for March 7, and the deadline for filing a nomination petition was incorrectly set as February 18. However, Slovek's nomination petition was not timely using the clerk’s February 18 date, or the correct date of February 25. Therefore, the scheduling mistake is not a material issue in this appeal.

      . This version of SDCL 31-12A-15 governed the election for road district trustee because the election would have been held prior to the effective date (July 1, 2002) of a new version of the statute. The new version now requires adherence to township election law (SDCL ch 8-3), rather than municipal election law (SDCL ch 9-13).

      . Although Jensen has not claimed the relevant statutes are unconstitutional, he does argue the applicability of SDCL 12-6-4.1, and we find these rules of construction persuasive in this case.

      . We note that Jensen's hypothetical issue is also moot because the Legislature has changed the statutes. The version of SDCL 31-12A-15 that became effective July 1, 2002, provides that ''[t]he election shall be conducted according to chapter 8-3 ...” (emphasis added). SDCL ch 8-3 governs township elections. Therefore, the municipal election statutes no longer govern road district elections.