author: ANDERSON, G. BARRY, Justice. ANDERSON, PAUL H., J. PAGE, Justice MEYER, Justice

text:
    Aaron R. CARLSON, et al., Appellants, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent, Midwest Family Mutual Insurance Company, Respondent, and Allstate Insurance Company, defendant and third-party plaintiff, Respondent v. Michael J. Fay, et al., third-party defendants, Respondents.
    No. A06-1664.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    May 22, 2008.

      David A. Arndt, Hibbing, MN, for Appellant.
    Karen Kathleen Hatfield, Hansen Dor-dell Bradt et al., St. Paul, MN, Rolf E. Sonnesyn, Tomsche, Sonnesyn & Tomsche, P.A., Louise Annette Behrendt, Stich An-gelí Kreidler & Dodge P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for Respondent.
   OPINION

ANDERSON, G. BARRY, Justice.

Appellant Aaron Carlson was struck and injured by an uninsured motorist while crossing Lyndale Avenue on foot. Aaron secured a default judgment against the uninsured driver and then sought uninsured motorist coverage under a policy purchased by his father, appellant Robert Carlson, and issued by respondent Allstate Insurance Company. Allstate denied coverage, and the Carlsons brought an action seeking no-fault and uninsured motorist benefits. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate. On appeal, the Carlsons argued (1) that the policy on its face provides coverage for the accident; (2) that Minn.Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5) (2006), precludes the policy definition of “insured” and therefore entitles the Carlsons to coverage; and (3) that regardless of the policy’s technical terms the Carlsons are entitled to coverage under the doctrine of reasonable expectations. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Allstate, and we granted review. We affirm.

The facts in this case are largely undisputed. Aaron was the primary driver of a 2002 Ford Focus leased in Robert’s name. Robert made all the lease payments on the vehicle and obtained and paid for the insurance. Aaron paid for some of the oil change, gas, and maintenance expenses on the vehicle.

On January 1, 2003, Aaron, then 27 years old, parked the Focus on Lyndale Avenue, left the vehicle, and began to cross the street. Around the center line, he was struck by a vehicle driven by an uninsured motorist making a U-turn. Aaron sustained several injuries, the most serious of which was to his right knee and required surgery. Aaron’s injuries forced him to miss work over the ensuing months, resulting in a claimed $10,640 in lost wages. Aaron eventually obtained a default judgment against the uninsured driver in the amount of $170,000.

Robert’s insurance policy with Allstate listed Robert and his wife Gail Carlson as named insureds. The policy listed Robert, Gail, Aaron, and Aaron’s brother Christopher as drivers. The policy insured several vehicles but listed Aaron as the driver of the Focus 100% of the time.

The policy provided uninsured motorist insurance as follows: “[Allstate] will pay damages for bodily injury * * * which an insured person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured auto.” (Emphasis added.) The policy defined “insured persons” to include in relevant part “[y]ou and any resident” and “[a]ny person while in, on, getting into or out of an insured auto with your permission.” (Emphasis omitted.) “You” was defined in turn as “the policyholder named on the Policy Declarations and that policyholder’s spouse who resides in the same household.” The term “policyholder” appeared nowhere on the declarations page, which instead identified “named insureds” and “drivers.”

Robert acquired the policy through his long-time insurance agent of many years Michael Fay. Robert fully disclosed to Fay that Aaron would be the primary driver of the Focus, that Aaron lived in Minneapolis while his parents lived in Hibbing, and that Robert would be making lease and premium payments. Robert and Fay never discussed, before the accident, the possibility that Aaron could be injured as a pedestrian by an uninsured motorist. Fay acknowledged that he was unaware before the accident that, under these facts, Aaron would not be covered, because Fay had never previously encountered these circumstances. Fay did caution Robert about the potential liability issues that could arise from having his sons on his policy, but Allstate’s underwriting policies prohibited listing Aaron as a named insured unless he had an ownership interest in the vehicle. Robert received a multi-car discount as a result of insuring multiple vehicles under the same policy. Although Robert and Fay discussed the differing implications of issuing Aaron his own policy rather than listing Aaron as a driver under Robert’s policy, those discussions centered around Robert’s potential liability to an injured third party rather than the circumstances under which Aaron would be covered.

Allstate maintains that the facts are undisputed. The Carlsons, however, identify one area of factual dispute. In his deposition, Robert testified that before the accident, he asked Fay if they were insured “the same as I and my wife” and that Fay responded in the affirmative. Fay disputes that Robert asked that precise question, explaining as follows: “Was the question ever asked, are we covered, are the cars covered? Of course, and we say yes, but not to that detail.” Because we are reviewing the grant of summary judgment in favor of Allstate, we credit the Carlsons’ account for purposes of this appeal. See, e.g., Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc., 701 N.W.2d 783, 788 (Minn.2005) (on review of grant of summary judgment, viewing facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted).

After the accident, Robert called Fay, who submitted the claim to Allstate, but Allstate declined to provide uninsured motorist coverage. In response, the Carlsons brought an action against Allstate seeking no-fault and uninsured motorist benefits in excess of $50,000. In early 2006, Allstate and later the Carlsons filed motions for summary judgment. The district court granted Allstate’s motion and denied the Carlsons’ motion as to Allstate, finding that neither the policy language, nor the doctrine of reasonable expectations, nor Minn.Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5) (2006), provided coverage for Aaron’s injuries. The court of appeals affirmed. Carlson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 734 N.W.2d 695, 703 (Minn.App.2007). We granted review.

I.

“On review of a grant of summary judgment, we inquire (1) whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact; and (2) whether the district court erred in its application of the law.” Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 664 (Minn.2007). “In reviewing the record for the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, we view the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted.’” Id. (quoting O’Malley v. Ulland Bros., 549 N.W.2d 889, 892 (Minn.1996)). We review the district court’s conclusions of law de novo. Id.

We turn first to the question of what coverage the policy by its terms affords the Carlsons. The policy provides uninsured motorist coverage to “an insured person” for damages that such person is legally entitled to recover from an uninsured motorist. “Insured person” is defined to include “You,” and “You” in turn is defined as “the policyholder named on the Policy Declarations.” The Carlsons rely on the fact that the declarations page nowhere uses the term “policyholder” but rather identifies “named insureds” and “drivers.” The Carlsons argue that a reasonable person in the Carlsons’ position would conclude that “policyholder” included the drivers listed on the declarations page. Allstate responds that a reasonable person in the Carlsons’ position would understand that “policyholder” referred to the “named insureds” rather than to the “drivers.”

“General principles of contract interpretation apply to insurance policies.” Lobeck v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 582 N.W.2d 246, 249 (Minn.1998). When a policy’s language is clear and unambiguous, we interpret the policy “according to plain, ordinary sense so as to effectuate the intention of the parties.” Canadian Universal Ins. Co. v. Fire Watch, Inc., 258 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Minn.1977). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law that we review de novo. Bank Midwest, Minn., Iowa, N.A. v. Lipetzky, 674 N.W.2d 176, 179 (Minn.2004). Language in a policy is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations. Medica, Inc. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 566 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Minn.1997).

The parties advance two different interpretations of the phrase “policyholder named on the Policy Declarations”: Allstate argues that the phrase refers only to the named insureds, whereas the Carlsons argue that the phrase encompasses both the named insureds and the drivers. We must decide whether both of these interpretations are reasonable.

The Allstate interpretation comports with standard definitions of the term “policyholder.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “policyholder” as “[o]ne who owns an insurance policy.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1196 (8th ed.2004). A reasonable person would know who owned the policy, especially where, as here, the policy owner actually secured the policy and paid the premiums. Similarly, The Random House Dictionary of the English Language defines “policyholder” as “the individual * * * in whose name an insurance policy is written; an insured.” The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1497 (2d ed.1987). The use in this definition of both the word “name” and the word “insured” suggests a connection in the mind of a reasonable person between the terms “policyholder” and “named insured.” We thus conclude that a reasonable interpretation of the policy is that the term “policyholder” refers to the named insureds and not the drivers listed on the declarations page.

The Carlsons’ interpretation, on the other hand, does not appear reasonable. Other than the fact that the drivers as well as the named insureds appear on the declarations page, the Carlsons offer no basis for the conclusion that a reasonable person would read “policyholders” to include “drivers.” We conclude that a reasonable person, even one unversed in the law or insurance, would understand that “policyholder” referred to the policy’s owner.

Because the Carlsons’ reading is not reasonable, we hold that the policy is unambiguous and that the term “policyholder” refers to the named insureds on the declarations page. Therefore, Aaron is not a policyholder, not “You,” not “an insured,” and in turn not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits under the plain language of the insurance policy.

II.

The Carlsons also argue that Minn.Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5) (2006), precludes the Allstate policy’s narrow definition of “insured.” The statute provides in relevant part, “If at the time of the accident the injured person is not occupying a motor vehicle or motorcycle, the injured person is entitled to select any one limit of liability for any one vehicle afforded by a policy under which the injured person is insured.” Id. (emphasis added). The Carlsons argue that Aaron “is insured” under the Allstate policy and that therefore the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 65B.41-.71 (2006), compels coverage in this situation.

In deciding whether a No-Fault Act provision supersedes a contrary policy provision, we attempt to determine what the legislature intended by the relevant statute. See Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2006) (“The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”); see also Kwong v. Depositors Ins. Co., 627 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Minn.2001) (“[P]olicy terms that conflict with the No-Fault Act will be held invalid.”). Here, the question is whether the legislature intended Minn.Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5), to impose a definition of “insured” that determines who is covered by uninsured or underin-sured motorist coverage mandated by the No-Fault Act, or whether, alternatively, the legislature intended only to set priorities among multiple possible sources for recovery of uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits. We conclude based on the overall structure and language of subdivision 3a(5) that the statute is intended as a list of priorities, rather than as a basic definition of the scope of mandated coverage. That is, the subdivision describes, for each of several categories of circumstances, which policy an injured person may look to for coverage, rather than describing what coverage each of those policies must provide. Under this reading, the meaning of “insured” for purposes of an injured pedestrian depends upon the policy rather than the statute.

Our reading of subdivision 3a(5) is consistent with our description of the purpose of this provision in Becker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 611 N.W.2d 7 (Minn.2000). In Becker, we explained that Minn.Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(1)-(2), allows individuals to protect themselves and family members by paying for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage to which they can turn if injured while riding in a car with lower coverage limits. Becker, 611 N.W.2d at 10. Our interpretation comports with the goal of the 1985 amendments to subdivision 3a as expressed in Becker: to give owners the ability to select and purchase the amount of coverage they desire in excess of the mandatory minimum and then to access that coverage if they are injured in a vehicle owned by someone with minimum coverage. Id. at 13. The concept that subdivision 3a(5) addresses situations where a vehicle owner chooses to purchase more than minimum protection suggests that subdivision 3a(5) is not intended to define mandatory minimum coverage.

Applying this reading of subdivision 3a to the facts before us, the question becomes whether Robert chose to pay for uninsured motorist coverage for someone not a named insured or resident in the event of injury incurred while not occupying a vehicle. To answer that question— that is, to determine the scope of uninsured motorist coverage Robert chose— we look to the policy rather than to the statute. We conclude that because, as discussed above, the policy by its terms affords Aaron no coverage in these circumstances, neither does Minn.Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5).

III.

Finally, the Carlsons argue that even if the insurance policy by its unambiguous terms does not afford uninsured motorist coverage to Aaron, Aaron should receive coverage under the doctrine of reasonable expectations. We discussed the doctrine of reasonable expectations in Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western National Mutual Insurance Co., in which we construed a policy insuring against burglary. 366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn.1985). The policy at issue defined burglary so as to require “evidence of forcible entry.” Id. at 274. While concluding that this definition was not ambiguous, we nevertheless did not permit the insurer to enforce a definition that excluded coverage. Id. at 276, 278-79. We based this decision on our conclusion that “no one purchasing something called burglary insurance would expect coverage to exclude skilled burglaries that leave no visible marks of forcible entry or exit.” Id. at 276. We went on to state:

The doctrine of protecting the reasonable expectations of the insured is closely related to the doctrine of contracts of adhesion. Where there is unequal bargaining power between the parties * * *, the contract will be strictly construed against the party who drafted it. * * * resuft 0f ⅛⅛ 0f insurance expertise on the part of insureds and the recognized marketing techniques of insurance companies is that “[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations.”

Id. at 277 (quoting Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 Harv. L.Rev. 961, 967 (1970)). Although we noted that courts traditionally required ambiguity in a policy before they would apply the doctrine of reasonable expectations, we rejected ambiguity as a rigid requirement:

[Ajmbiguity in the language of the contract is not irrelevant under this standard but becomes a factor in determining the reasonable expectations of the insured, along with such factors as whether the insured was told of important, but obscure, conditions or exclusions and whether the particular provision in the contract at issue is an item known by the public generally.

Id. at 277-78. We cautioned that the doctrine of reasonable expectations does not excuse an insured from reading the policy. Id. at 278. We summarized the doctrine as imposing burdens on both insurer and insured: the insurer must communicate coverage and exclusions accurately and clearly, and the insured’s expectations must be reasonable under the circumstances. Id.

More recent cases have refined the scope of the doctrine of reasonable expectations. In Hubred v. Control Data Corp., we construed a provision in an insurance policy excluding medical expenses due to injury “incurred during employment for wages or profit.” 442 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn.1989). An insured, who was president and majority owner of a business, was injured at his place of business. Id. at 309-10. We rejected the insured’s argument that the doctrine of reasonable expectations should apply, reasoning that he had not shown any facts or circumstances justifying a reasonable expectation of coverage. Id. at 311-12. We were unpersuaded by the fact that the insurer had not orally informed the insured about the exclusion. Id. Although acknowledging that ambiguity is not a prerequisite for applying the doctrine, we emphasized the fact that the exclusion at issue was unambiguous. Id.

Later, in assessing whether a “pollution exclusion” in an insurance policy excluded coverage for asbestos claims, we further limited Atwater. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 517 N.W.2d 888, 889 (Minn.1994). In declining to apply the doctrine of reasonable expectations, we noted that Atwater “presented a unique situation,” suggesting that the doctrine was not broadly applicable, and also noted that the Iowa Supreme Court had limited its application of the doctrine to “egregious situations similar to that in Atwater.” Bd. of Regents, 517 N.W.2d at 891 & n. 4. We reasoned:

The reasonable expectations test of Atwater * * * has no place here * * *. In Atwater, we held that “where major exclusions are hidden in the definitions section, the insured should be held only to reasonable knowledge of the literal terms and conditions.” 366 N.W.2d at 278. In the comprehensive general liability policy involved in this case, the pollution exclusion is plainly designated as such; consequently, the wording of the exclusion should be construed, if a claim of ambiguity is raised, in accordance with the usual rules of interpretation governing insurance contracts. The reasonable expectation test is not a license to ignore the pollution exclusion in this case nor to rewrite the exclusion solely to conform to a result that the insured might prefer.

Id. at 891 (footnote omitted). Board of Regents limits Atwater, if not to its specific facts, at least to circumstances where the exclusion from coverage was unreasonably hidden. See Kabanuk Diversified Invs., Inc. v. Credit Gen. Ins. Co., 553 N.W.2d 65, 72 (Minn.App.1996) (“[SJince the Supreme Court’s decision in Atwater, the doctrine of reasonable expectations has been limited to cases involving contracts with hidden exclusions.”), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 1996); see also Bob Useldinger & Sons, Inc. v. Hangsleben, 505 N.W.2d 323, 327 (Minn.1993) (declining to apply the doctrine despite claims that a party had asked for and been assured coverage, because “the purchasers of the insurance were experienced business people, and there is nothing in the language of the policies that would raise a reasonable expectation of coverage”); Austin P. Keller Constr. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 379 N.W.2d 533, 536 n. 3 (Minn.1986) (finding that the doctrine of reasonable expectations did not apply because the fact that the insured had purchased joint venture liability insurance showed that it “was aware of the difference in the scope of coverages afforded to it as an individual contractor as distinguished from a member of a joint venture”).

Although ambiguity is a factor under Atwater, not a prerequisite, in the application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations, in no case since Atwater have we used the doctrine to provide coverage in contravention of unambiguous policy terms. Moreover, the doctrine has generated criticism and confusion that give us pause. One commentator has observed that “three decades of case law have failed to provide any rules or guidelines for applying the doctrine.” John M. Bjorkman, The Reasonable Expectations Doctrine: An Overview, 29 A.B.A. The Brief 38, 39 (Summer 2000). Commentators also have expressed concern that the doctrine enables courts to vitiate the unambiguous terms of a policy simply to achieve desirable outcomes. See id.; James M. Fischer, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations Is Indispensable, If We Only Knew What For?, 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 151, 165 (1998) (“A public policy base for altering and modifying contract obligations is simply a more honest and accurate statement of what [the doctrine] does. Public policy creates coverage when a court believes it is fair, just, and reasonable to do so, notwithstanding the contrary position of the contract terms. A policyholder’s expectations have nothing to do with the result, unless they happen to coincide with those of the court.”). Against this backdrop, we are unwilling to expand the doctrine of reasonable expectations beyond its current use as a tool for resolving ambiguity and for correcting extreme situations like that in Atwater; where a party’s coverage is significantly different from what the party reasonably believes it has paid for and where the only notice the party has of that difference is in an obscure and unexpected provision.

In this case, the policy definition of “You” directed the reader to the declarations page. Although the precise term “policyholder” does not appear on that page, the policy did distinguish there between “named insureds” and “drivers,” indicating a difference for policy purposes between the two. Although it appears from the record that neither Fay nor the Carlsons ever contemplated the type of accident, and resulting claim, that occurred here, Fay testified that he was generally aware and informed the Carlsons that there were differences in the treatment of named insureds and drivers. Interpreting the doctrine of reasonable expectations to cover such a situation would expand Atwa-ter considerably. We therefore hold that the doctrine of reasonable expectations does not apply to provide the Carlsons with uninsured motorist coverage for Aaron’s injuries.

Affirmed.

DISSENT

ANDERSON, PAUL H., J.

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. I conclude that the Allstate policy is ambiguous as to whether the term “insured” refers to listed drivers as well as named insureds. I also conclude that the Carlsons reasonably expected that their son Aaron would receive the same coverage as his parents in the event of an accident. Because our precedent requires that we construe ambiguous insurance policy language in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured, I would conclude that Aaron is entitled to uninsured motorist coverage for his injuries. Therefore, I would reverse both the court of appeals and district court.

As the majority indicates, the crux of the interpretive question before us rests on who is “the policyholder named on the Policy Declarations.” Despite the fact that the word “policyholder” appears nowhere on the declarations page, the majority concludes that this language unambiguously refers to the “named insureds” on the declarations page. I do not agree with this conclusion. On the contrary, I am persuaded that reasonable persons seeking the “policyholder named on the Policy Declarations” would naturally refer to the declarations page, whereupon they would find two different terms, “named insureds” and “drivers,” and no mention whatsoever of any “policyholder.” Understandably confounded as to who the “policyholder” is, the reasonable reader would be left considering the terms “named insured” and “driver.” Both terms are terms of art in an insurance contract, and neither bears any obvious relationship to the term “policyholder.” Therefore, in the mind of an ordinary person with no expertise in the law and insurance, the “policyholder” could plausibly include the “named insureds,” the “drivers,” or both. This scenario is the very definition of ambiguity — that is, susceptibility to two or more reasonable interpretations. See Medica, Inc. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 566 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Minn.1997).

Having parted ways with the majority on the question of the insurance policy’s ambiguity, a divergent analysis necessarily follows. “Ambiguous terms in an insurance policy are to be resolved against the insurer and in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured.” Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v. Widness ex rel. Widness, 635 N.W.2d 516, 524 (Minn.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the policy is ambiguous, the Carl-sons are entitled to whatever coverage they reasonably expected.

I conclude that Robert Carlson’s expectation that his son Aaron would receive uninsured motorist coverage under these circumstances was reasonable. According to Robert’s deposition testimony, which we must credit for purposes of summary judgment, Robert bargained with independent insurance agent Michael Fay for coverage for Aaron and his brother Christopher that was the same as the coverage for Robert and his wife Gail. It appears that any difference in coverage between the named insureds and the drivers was neither explained to Robert nor reflected in a corresponding difference in premiums. There is no evidence that the Carlsons and Allstate bargained for the “gap” in coverage into which Allstate claims Aaron’s injuries have fallen. On the contrary, Fay, the insurance agent through whom Robert purchased the policy, testified that he did not even know such a gap existed. Allstate, a sophisticated insurance company, and not the Carlsons, who tried in good faith to secure comprehensive insurance coverage for Aaron and Christopher, should bear the burden of that oversight in light of the policy’s ambiguity. Because I conclude that the policy was ambiguous and that the Carlsons reasonably expected, in light of their reading of the policy and Robert’s conversations with Fay, that Aaron would be covered, I would reverse the court of appeals and district court and order that judgment be entered in favor of the Carlsons against Allstate.

PAGE, Justice

(dissenting).

I join in the dissent of Justice Paul H. Anderson.

MEYER, Justice

(dissenting).

I join in the dissent of Justice Paul H. Anderson.

      . The Carlsons do not contend that Aaron was a resident. They also do not contend that Aaron was in, on, or getting into or out of the Focus at the time of the injury. Thus, their argument that the policy by its terms covers Aaron turns solely on the contention that Aaron fell within the definition of "You.”

      . The complaint listed Midwest Family Mutual Insurance Company as a codefendant, pleading that in the event Allstate was found not to provide coverage, Midwest would owe the Carlsons no-fault benefits pursuant to the Minnesota Automobile Assigned Claims Plan. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Carlsons as to Midwest, and that issue is not before us. In addition, Allstate filed a third-party complaint against Fay individually and Mike Fay Insurance Agency; those claims were dismissed when Allstate obtained summary judgment against the Carl-sons.

      . The part of subdivision 3a(5) at issue in Becker is as follows:
      If at the time of the accident the injured person is occupying a motor vehicle, the limit of liability for uninsured and underin-sured motorist coverages available to the injured person is the limit specified for that motor vehicle. However, if the injured person is occupying a motor vehicle of which the injured person is not an insured, the injured person may be entitled to excess insurance protection afforded by a policy in which the injured party is otherwise insured. The excess insurance protection is limited to the extent of covered damages sustained, and further is available only to the extent by which the limit of liability for like coverage applicable to any one motor vehicle listed on the automobile insurance policy of which the injured person is an insured exceeds the limit of liability of the coverage available to the injured person from the occupied motor vehicle.
      Minn.Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5) (emphasis added).

      . Our conclusion that subdivision 3a(5) constitutes a system of priorities and as such governs the source, not the scope, of coverage, finds support from commentators. See Theodore J. Smetak, Underinsured Motorist Coverage in Minnesota: Old Precedents in a New Era, 24 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 857, 933 (1998) (observing that subdivision 3a(5) “established a two-tier priority system that governs access to, and order of payment for, UM and UIM coverages” and "provided a formula-like approach to determining the source of UM/TJIM coverage”) (emphasis added); see also Michael Fargione et al., "Closeness to the Risk" in Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverages in Minnesota, 24 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 945, 948 (1998) ("[Subdivision 3a(5)] created a new system of priorities to determine which underinsured (or uninsured) motorist policies would apply to an individual’s underinsured and uninsured motorist claims.”).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: KLAPHAKE, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re the Matter of Elaine Irene LEE, petitioner, Respondent v. Raymond Michael LEE, Appellant.
    No. A07-0110.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    March 25, 2008.
    As Amended April 7, 2008.
    Review Granted June 25, 2008.

      Robert L. Weiner, Robert L. Weiner & Associates, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.
    Timothy W.J. Dunn, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.
    Considered and decided by KLAPHAKE, Presiding Judge; MINGE, Judge; and SCHELLHAS, Judge.
   OPINION

KLAPHAKE, Judge.

Appellant Raymond Michael Lee challenges the district court’s order modifying a spousal maintenance award, establishing the current needs of the parties, requiring him to obtain life insurance to secure maintenance payments, and awarding respondent Elaine Irene Lee conduct-based attorney fees for her collection of maintenance arrears judgments. Appellant also asserts that the district court abused its discretion by considering respondent’s motions on various maintenance issues and attorney fees when her supporting documents were not timely filed. Appellant further claims that the district court erred by treating his pension benefits as income available to satisfy his maintenance obligation and by failing to terminate his maintenance obligation after his retirement caused a decrease in his income that left his expenses in excess of his income.

We reverse the district court’s order modifying the amount of the maintenance award and requiring appellant to obtain life insurance to secure maintenance payments, reduce respondent’s maintenance award to zero, and modify the district court’s order so that it retains jurisdiction over the issue of future maintenance, consistent with this opinion. Finally, we affirm the district court’s finding of current needs, its award of conduct-based attorney fees, and its application of procedural rules regarding late filings.

FACTS

The parties’ 25-year marriage was dissolved on June 7, 1993, and the original decree awarded respondent permanent spousal maintenance of $650 per month and allocated equally between the parties appellant’s pension benefits derived from three separate plans that had accumulated during the marriage. Subsequently, the court similarly divided the interest in two defined benefit pension plans that were omitted from the 1993 decree.

In June 1994, appellant was laid off from his job as a journeyman electrician and moved to reduce his spousal maintenance obligation. On August 17, 1994, the district court reduced spousal maintenance to $341.08 per month because appellant’s sole income was his unemployment compensation. Nearly ten years later, on February 27, 2004, the district court reinstated the original $650 per month maintenance obligation retroactive to the date of its previous order and increased the obligation to $825 per month retroactive to November 1, 2003. At that time, respondent had retired from employment due to medical disability. The court also entered judgment against appellant for maintenance arrears and awarded respondent attorney fees. This court affirmed the February 27, 2004 order. Lee v. Lee, No. A04-1070, 2005 WL 949038 (Minn.App. Apr. 26, 2005). Respondent then initiated garnishment proceedings against appellant, incurring further attorney fees.

On July 13, 2005, appellant, now retired, moved to terminate spousal maintenance, based on a decrease in his income and an increase in respondent’s income. On August 8, 2005, respondent served and filed a responsive motion, without supporting affidavits, seeking maintenance for the duration of her life, security for spousal maintenance, and attorney fees. Both parties later filed affidavits and objections, and the court heard the matter on August 18, 2005.

In considering the maintenance issue, the district court included in its calculation of appellant’s monthly income available for maintenance all payments that he receives from his pension benefit plans, except $795.64, representing the amount respondent receives from her award of pension benefits, for a net income of $3,227.14. Appellant’s income, excluding all pension benefits, was $1,555. The court found respondent’s net monthly income, excluding spousal maintenance, was $1,674,14. The court also found that neither party submitted reliable evidence of changes in his or her respective expenses after the February 27, 2004 order and therefore used as current expenses that order’s findings of $1,950 for respondent and $2,100 for appellant. The court determined that appellant had suffered a substantial diminution in income, making the original maintenance award unreasonable and unfair. The court found that respondent had a monthly shortfall of $275.14, based on deducting her $1,950 in monthly expenses from her $1,674.14 in net monthly income, while appellant had a monthly surplus of $1,127.14, based on deducting his $2,100 in monthly expenses from his $3,227.14 in net monthly income. The court then “balane[ed] ... the parties’ surpluses and shortages” to reduce spousal maintenance to $700 per month, making the award retroactive to May 1, 2006. The court also ordered appellant to secure payment of spousal maintenance by obtaining a life insurance policy naming respondent as the beneficiary and ordered him to pay attorney fees for the collection of previous maintenance arrears judgments, but the court denied both parties’ motions for attorney fees for the present proceedings.

ISSUES

1. Did the district court err in modifying appellant’s spousal maintenance obligation based on a calculation that included appellant’s pension benefits as income available to satisfy his maintenance obligation?

2. Did the district court err by using the parties’ past expenses to establish their current needs in determining whether to modify spousal maintenance?

3. Did the district court abuse its discretion by modifying spousal maintenance retroactive to a date with no factual basis in the record?

4. Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering appellant to obtain life insurance to secure the payment of spousal maintenance?

5. Did the district court abuse its discretion in its award of attorney fees?

6. Did the district court abuse its discretion by considering respondent’s motion for lifetime spousal maintenance, security for spousal maintenance, and attorney fees, when supporting documents were untimely filed?

ANALYSIS

I. Spousal Maintenance

A district court may modify an order for spousal maintenance upon a showing of a substantial increase or decrease in the gross income or need of either party that makes the terms of the original order “unreasonable and unfair.” Minn.Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2 (2006). “Findings of fact concerning spousal maintenance must be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.” Gessner v. Gessner, 487 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn.App.1992). A finding of fact “induced by an erroneous view of the law” is clearly erroneous. Reserve Mining. Co. v. State, 310 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Minn.1981).

Appellant challenges the district court’s inclusion of his pension plan benefits as income for purposes of determining the amount of modified maintenance. In arriving at the amount of pension benefits available for maintenance, the district court made a simple calculation that subtracted from appellant’s total monthly pension receipts the amount that respondent received as a property award and determined that the difference was income to appellant that is available to pay maintenance. Because appellant had accrued pension benefits for nine years before the marriage, for 25 years during the marriage, and for an indeterminate amount of time after the marriage, we analyze each accrual period of pension benefits separately.

A. Marital Pension Benefits

In the original dissolution decree, the district court awarded respondent one-half of the pension appellant had “accumulated during the marriage.” As such, that award was a division of marital property under Minn.Stat. § 518.58, subd. 3(a) (2006). Alternatively, the district court could have ordered payments from the pension funds as maintenance, in either periodic payments or a fixed dollar amount. Minn.Stat. § 518.581, subd. 1 (2006).

On the modification motion, the district court correctly recognized that pension benefits awarded as marital property are not also available for payment of maintenance. But the district court also found that the benefits appellant received in excess of the benefits received by respondent were available for maintenance. Appellant argues that this finding is clearly erroneous. We agree, concluding that the district court failed to apply the principles set forth in Kruschel v. Kruschel, 419 N.W.2d 119 (Minn.App.1988), and In re Marriage of Richards and Richards, 472 N.W.2d 162 (Minn.App.1991), and instead relied on Walker v. Walker, 553 N.W.2d 90 (Minn.App.1996).

In Kruschel, this court addressed whether pension benefits awarded as property may also be used as income for maintenance purposes, holding that all pension benefits received by a maintenance obligor, who is awarded the benefits as property, are to remain a property award until the obligor receives “an amount equivalent [to the value of the pension benefits] as determined in the original property distribution.” Kruschel, 419 N.W.2d at 123. In Richards, this court, noting that the purpose of Kruschel was to “avoid” a post-decree redistribution of property, applied Kruschel to conclude that “income representing the appreciation of the pension after the divorce [is not] immediately available for maintenance” until benefits equal to the value of the original property award are fully received by the party to whom they were awarded. Richards, 472 N.W.2d at 166.

Applying Kruschel and Richards here, we conclude that until appellant receives the full value of the portion of his pension benefits awarded to him by the original decree, any benefits he receives constitute marital property previously awarded to him. While neither party provided any evidence to establish the value of the pension benefits awarded at the time of the original decree, it is clear that for the foreseeable future, appellant’s monthly benefits payments will not equal that full value.

Respondent claims that the district court’s findings relied on Walker and therefore are not clearly erroneous. Any such reliance was misplaced, because Walker acknowledges Kruschel’s handling of pension benefits as the rule of law but applies the parties’ stipulation to uphold a different valuation of pension benefits. Walker, 553 N.W.2d at 94. In Walker, the parties had stipulated to a specific value of the marital portion of a pension based on anticipated annual benefits payments, and this court affirmed the district court’s decision that applied the parties’ stipulation to conclude that any receipts in excess of the stipulated amount could be considered income for determining maintenance. Id. Walker was thus premised on the existence of the stipulation and is not authoritative here. See, e.g., LaBelle v. LaBelle, 302 Minn. 98, 115-16, 223 N.W.2d 400, 410 (1974) (allowing parties to stipulate to dissolution provision not required by law); Gatfield v. Gatfield, 682 N.W.2d 632, 637 (Minn.App.2004) (same), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). Accordingly, we conclude that Kruschel and Richards continue to state the correct legal principles applicable to this case, and we therefore reverse the district court’s finding on appellant’s income available for maintenance purposes.

B. Nonmarital Pension Benefits

1. Premarital. Appellant acquired more than nine years of pension benefits before marrying respondent. Appellant argues that the district court’s simple subtraction of the amount of benefits respondent was awarded from pension payments appellant received, and its characterization of the difference as income, erroneously converted his premarital, nonmarital pension rights to income available for distribution as maintenance. We agree.

“Maintenance” is defined by statute as an award of payments from future income or earnings. Minn.Stat. § 518.003; subd. 3a (2006). To include pension benefits accrued before marriage, the receipt of which is delayed until a later date, as “future income,” is to ignore the fact that payment of pension benefits is really a distribution of an investment comprising employer contributions for work performed during a certain period, employee contributions for that same period, and appreciation on that investment. If the word “future” in the definition of “future income and earnings” is to have any meaning, it refers to a time frame. See Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2006) (requiring a statute to be construed to “give effect to all its provisions”). Because appellant’s receipt of accrued premarital pension benefits is not a receipt of “future income,” but rather a receipt of property, it is not available for maintenance purposes.

Other references to pension benefits found in the marital dissolution statutes are also instructive on this question. Minnesota law provides that “vested public or private pension rights acquired by the parties ... during the existence of the marriage” are items of marital property subject to division. MinmStat. § 518.003, subd. 3b (2006). Conversely, “nonmarital property” is acquired before and after the marriage relationship. Id. Minnesota law provides for the award of one party’s non-marital property to the other only after a finding of “unfair hardship,” and when such hardship is found, a district court may award only up to one-half of the non-marital property to the other party. Minn.Stat. § 518.58, subd. 2 (2006). By construing accrued premarital pension benefits as “future income” instead of non-marital property, the full amount of the premarital pension benefits may be awarded as “future income” for maintenance purposes in the absence of hardship, while upon the occurrence of a hardship, only one-half of the premarital pension benefits may be invaded. Such a construction lacks logic and common sense.

Further, we observe that statutory changes in the definition of “income,” as it applies to child support and maintenance, suggest that the legislature intended to include premarital pension benefits as income for purposes of calculating child support, but not for awarding maintenance. Historically, the statute, entitled “Maintenance, Support, Property,” included in its preliminary “definitions” section a definition of “income” that included “pension ... payments.” Minn.Stat. § 518.54, subd. 6 (2004). This definition of income was repealed in 2006, however. 2006 Laws eh. 280, § 47. The current statute does not define “income” for purposes of maintenance and generally bases a maintenance award on one party’s need for it and the other party’s ability to pay it while satisfying his or her own needs. Minn.Stat. § 518.552 (2006). By contrast, the current child support statute is more detailed and elaborate and provides a definition of “gross income” that includes “pension ... benefits,” Minn.Stat. § 518A.29 (a) (2006), but refers to this definition only for setting a child support obligation. Minn.Stat. § 518A.35 (2006). To the extent that the earlier statute was rather imprecise in its treatment of income for purposes of awarding maintenance or child support, and to the extent that the current statute separately refers to the general provisions on maintenance and the detailed provisions on child support, we conclude that the legislature intends the definition of income to apply to child support and not to maintenance.

For all of these reasons, we conclude that receipt of premarital accrued pension benefits is a receipt of property, not “future income” available for maintenance. Because the district court’s finding of income included all accrued pension benefits, we reverse the district court’s finding that all of appellant’s pension benefits, less only the portion equal to that received by respondent, are available for maintenance purposes.

2. Postmarital Pension Benefits. Appellant continued to work and accrue pension benefits following the dissolution decree. He argues that his post-marital pension benefits are also nonmar-ital property rights and should not be deemed “future income,” asserting that postmarital pension benefits are no different from premarital pension benefits. Were this a case of first impression, we might be inclined to agree with appellant. But Kruschel and its progeny recognize that after pension payments equal to the value of the original property award are fully received, further payments may be treated as income for maintenance purposes. Kruschel, 419 N.W.2d at 123; see, e.g., Richards, 472 N.W.2d at 166. While these cases do not analyze the difference between “income” and “future income,” we decline to interfere with this longstanding precedent and characterization of post-dissolution acquired pension benefits. See St. Aubin v. Burke, 434 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn.App.1989) (noting that this court is required to follow established judicial precedent), review denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 1989). We conclude that Kruschel and its progeny are settled law in this area, and therefore affirm the rule that after the receipt of pension payments equal to the value of a marital property award, postmarital pension benefits may constitute items of “future income” available to support maintenance.

C. Needs

Once a maintenance obligor establishes entitlement to modification of a maintenance order, the court must balance the needs of the obligee against the obli-gor’s financial condition or ability to pay to determine the amount of maintenance award. Kemp v. Kemp, 608 N.W.2d 916, 921 (Minn.App.2000). The court must determine the parties’ expenses, as well as income, to determine the need for maintenance and the obligor’s ability to pay. Bliss v. Bliss, 493 N.W.2d 583, 587 (Minn.App.1992), review denied (Minn. Feb. 12, 1993). Appellant asserts that the district court erred by using its 2004 findings on the parties’ expenses, rather than making current findings based on the evidence presented at the August 18, 2005 hearing. But the district court reviewed the evidence presented by both sides and determined it to be unreliable, and because the district court’s decision to use the 2004 findings of expenses is neither against logic nor the facts in the record, we affirm the district court’s findings on the parties’ needs. See Gessner, 487 N.W.2d at 923.

Appellant also objects to the district court’s failure to find persuasive evidence suggesting that respondent’s bank statements do not substantiate her claimed expenses. However, a determination of a party’s monthly expenses for maintenance purposes is not measured by actual expenditures in a limited period, but by the marital standard of living. Minn.Stat. § 518.552, subds. 1, 2(c) (2006); see Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 615 N.W.2d 405, 409-12 (Minn.App.2000) (discussing importance of the marital standard of living in determining maintenance recipient’s reasonable monthly expenses), review denied (Minn. Oct. 25, 2000). Appellant’s proffer of evidence that included only two months of respondent’s expenses was insufficient to establish her expenses in relation to the marital standard of living, and the district court did not err in declining to base its needs findings on this evidence.

D.Award

We have determined that the district court erred by attributing to appellant as “future income” premarital pension benefits and pension benefits awarded to appellant as marital property, and using those benefits to calculate a modified maintenance obligation. Excluding all pension benefits, appellant’s monthly income is $1,555, and his monthly expenses are $2,100. Consequently, appellant does not have the current ability to pay maintenance. See Minn.Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2 (2006). That condition would normally terminate such a maintenance obligation, but we instead modify the dissolution decree to allow the district court to retain jurisdiction over the issue of maintenance, because at some future date appellant’s “future income” may again exceed his expenses and merit an award. But because the district court erred in modifying respondent’s maintenance award to $700 per month, we order it reduced to zero.

E. Retroactivity

Modification of a maintenance obligation “may be made retroactive” to any date during which a modification motion is pending, but not before the date of service of the motion. Minn.Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(e). “Because the word “may” is defined as “permissive,” a district court has discretion to set the effective date of a maintenance modification.” Kemp, 608 N.W.2d at 920; see Minn.Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15 (2006) (defining “may” as “permissive” in Minnesota statutes). But here the district court gave no rationale for its choice of May 1, 2006, a date without any significance in the record. We therefore order that appellant’s maintenance obligation should be reduced to zero retroactive to July 13, 2005, the date of his modification motion.

F. Insurance

Appellant argues that the district court erred by ordering him to procure insurance for respondent’s benefit as security for payment of spousal maintenance in the event of his death. Because we have determined that appellant’s current spousal maintenance obligation should be zero, there is nothing to secure. We also note that the district court could order life insurance only after ascertaining appellant’s insurability and the cost of such insurance. See Frederiksen v. Frederiksen, 368 N.W.2d 769, 777 (Minn.App.1985) (remanding to determine ability of maintenance obligor to provide insurance to secure maintenance payments without imposing an unfair burden on obligor when the record contained no information on obligor’s insurability or cost of insurance).

II. Attorney Fees and Late Filings

“An award of attorney fees rests almost entirely within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Crosby v. Crosby, 587 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Minn.App.1998) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 1999). A district court shall award need-based attorney fees if it finds that the fees are necessary for the good-faith assertion of a party’s rights, the party from whom fees are sought has the means to pay them, and the party to whom fees are awarded does not have the means to pay them. Minn.Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2006). The district court may also award conduct-based fees, regardless of need, “against a party who unreasonably contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding.” Id. The district court found that each party could afford to pay his or her own attorney fees for the current proceedings, and therefore denied need-based fees to respondent. But the court also found that respondent incurred $1,699 in attorney fees and costs in attempting to collect on previous judgments for maintenance arrears and that these fees and costs were reasonable. Respondent argues that the court abused its discretion in failing to award attorney fees relating to the present motions; appellant argues that the court abused its discretion in awarding conduct-based fees and that respondent is not entitled to these fees because she failed to file an attorney affidavit contemporaneously with her fees motion.

Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 119.02 provides that an attorney affidavit must accompany motions for attorney fees of $1,000 or more. When a district court “is familiar with the history of the case and has access to the parties’ financial information,” it may waive submission of an attorney affidavit. Gully v. Gully, 599 N.W.2d 814, 826 (Minn.1999). In Gully, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed a district court’s grant of need-based attorney fees despite a party’s failure to file an attorney affidavit. Id. The court based its holding on the advisory committee’s comments to rule 119, stating that the rule “is not intended to limit the court’s discretion, but is intended to encourage streamlined handling of fee applications.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Here, the district court had extensive knowledge of the history of the case because the same judge presided over several years of post-dissolution maintenance proceedings. The court also had access to the parties’ financial information, as it was included in the record in support of their respective motions. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding conduct-based attorney fees, despite the delinquent filing of the attorney affidavit, and observe no error in the amount of fees awarded. The district court’s findings also support its denial of need-based fees to respondent, and its decision is not an abuse of discretion.

Appellant also argues that the district court abused its discretion by considering respondent’s motion raising new issues because she did not file supporting documents in accordance with the requirements of Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 303.03(a)(2). This rule requires a party raising new issues other than those raised in the initial motion to serve opposing counsel and file with the court a notice of motion and motion along with any relevant affidavits, exhibits, and memorandum of law at least ten days before the hearing on such motion. It is within the district court’s discretion to rule on a motion despite respondent’s late filings. See Benassi v. Back & Neck Pain Clinic, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 475 (Minn.App.2001) (affirming as an exercise of court discretion a decision to allow a late filing despite noncompliance with Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 115.03 requiring supporting documents for responsive motions to be filed and served at least three days prior to the hearing), review denied (Minn. Sept. 11, 2001). Further, “[i]t is well settled in this state that where, in a particular case, the interests of justice would be best served by relieving a party from formal compliance with a rule, the trial court, in its discretion, may suspend or relax its operation.” Swenson v. Swenson, 257 Minn. 431, 434, 101 N.W.2d 914, 917 (1960). While the district court should have allowed appellant time to address respondent’s motion, including addressing the cost of insurance to secure maintenance and whether he could afford such insurance, given this court’s decision to reduce maintenance to zero, we decline to further address this issue.

DECISION

The district court erred in considering as “future income” appellant’s pension benefits accumulated before the marriage and during the marriage, before appellant has received pension payments equal to the value of the original property award and payments representing the value of the premarital portion. The district court did not err in its findings regarding the parties’ expenses, but erred in modifying the maintenance award to $700 per month and making it retroactive to a date that bears no relation to any event in the record. Because appellant does not have the current ability to pay maintenance, we order respondent’s maintenance award reduced to zero retroactive to July 13, 20Ó5, but modify the dissolution decree to permit the district court to retain jurisdiction over the issue of maintenance.

The district court also abused its discretion in ordering appellant to obtain life insurance to secure the maintenance payments without first ascertaining appellant’s insurability or the cost of such insurance. The district court acted within its discretion by awarding attorney fees for the collection of previous judgments and by considering respondent’s responsive motion even though she failed to timely file supporting documents.

Affirmed in part as modified and reversed in part.

ORDER

BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:

1. We filed our published opinion in this matter on March 25, 2008.

2. The panel has determined that it is appropriate to make several non-substantive corrections to the opinion. Accordingly, changes have been made on pages 4, 5, 16, and 17.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the opinion filed on March 25, 2008 is withdrawn and the attached opinion is substituted.

BY THE COURT

/a/ Roger M. Klaphake Opinion Judge

      . We emphasize that in addition to the obli-gor’s receipt of pension payments representing the value of the original marital award, the obligor also must have received pension payments representing the value of the premarital portion of his or her pension before further payments may be treated as income.

      . In arriving at a modified maintenance award of $700 per month, the district court "balanc[ed] ... the parties’ surpluses and shortages[.]” We comment on the district court's action only to note that equalization of the parties’ incomes by an adjustment of maintenance is without authority or precedent. Once an obligor establishes that he is entitled to modification, the court must then balance the needs of the spouse receiving maintenance against the obligor’s ability to pay. Kemp v. Kemp, 608 N.W.2d 916, 921 (Minn.App.2000). Given that appellant’s monthly income, excluding all pension benefits, is $1,555 and his monthly expenses are $2,100, appellant does not have the ability to pay maintenance.


author: MINGE, Judge. SCHELLHAS, Judge

text:
    The WORK CONNECTION, INC., Relator, v. Son Q. BUI, Respondent, Department of Employment and Economic Development, Respondent.
    No. A07-0348.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    April 8, 2008.
    Review Granted June 18, 2008.

      M. Gregory Simpson, Siegel, Brill, Gre-upner, Duffy & Foster, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for relator.
    Son Q. Bui, Brooklyn Park, MN, pro se respondent.
    Lee B. Nelson, Katrina Gulstad, Department of Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul, MN, for respondent department.
    Considered and decided by KLAPHAKE, Presiding Judge; MINGE, Judge; and SCHELLHAS, Judge.
   OPINION

MINGE, Judge.

Relator employer appeals from the award of unemployment-insurance benefits to respondent employee, arguing that the employee who relies on public transportation is not available for employment throughout the labor market area as required by Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e) (2006). We affirm.

FACTS

Relator The Work Connection, Inc., is a temporary-staffing service that employed Son Bui from February 2, 2004, to August 29, 2006. Bui worked at Work Connection’s client, Technical Resin and Packaging, until he called in sick on August 29, 2006, and his employment was terminated. Two days later, Bui called Work Connection and requested to be placed in a new job.

Bui lives in Brooklyn Park; he does not own a car. He either rode a bicycle or, in inclement weather, used public bus transportation to commute to his job at Technical Resin. That work site was located about four miles from his residence. Both his home and the job were within walking distance of a bus route. The record does not indicate that he had any difficulty getting to work using these methods of transportation for the two years he was employed by Work Connection.

On September 18, Work Connection offered to place Bui in a position at a warehouse in Coon Rapids. The warehouse was six miles from where he lived. Bui asked whether it was accessible from a bus line. He was told that it was not. He asked relatives whether they could give him a ride and was told they could not guarantee him a ride to work every day. Bui declined the job offer because the work was not accessible to a bus line and eventually applied for unemployment benefits.

DEED initially determined that Bui was qualified for benefits. Work Connection contested the award of benefits, arguing that Bui had rejected its offer of suitable employment without “good cause.” An unemployment law judge (ULJ) found that because Bui relies on public transportation and the job offered was not on a bus line, Bui had rejected the offer for good cause. Work Connection moved for reconsideration, arguing instead that because Bui relied on public transportation, he was not “available for suitable employment” as required by Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e) (2006), and was therefore ineligible for benefits. The ULJ rejected that argument, noting that

Bui would have public transportation to a reasonable number of locations in the labor market area. He would be available for employment at any location which is on a bus line. Therefore, it cannot be said that Bui is not available for employment in the labor market area.

This certiorari appeal follows.

ISSUES

I. Can the court of appeals consider issues that are not addressed by the ULJ in the initial decision but are raised and addressed for the first time on a motion for reconsideration?

II. Did respondent’s reliance on public transportation make him ineligible for unemployment benefits because he failed to meet the statutory requirement that he have transportation throughout the labor market area to be considered “available for suitable employment” under Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e) (2006)?

ANALYSIS

I.

The first issue is whether the argument that Bui is ineligible for benefits because he is not available for work throughout the labor market area as required by Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e) (2006), can be properly considered on appeal. This is a legal question, which we review de novo. See Jenkins v. Am. Express Fin. Corp., 721 N.W.2d 286, 289 (Minn.2006) (allowing appellate courts to exercise independent judgment when reviewing questions of law).

Respondent Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) argues that in the initial proceeding before the ULJ, Work Connection claimed that Bui did not have “good cause” to refuse its offer of employment. DEED asserts that Work Connection did not claim, and the ULJ did not consider, whether Bui was ineligible for benefits because of the different requirement of “availability” under Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e), until Work Connection moved for reconsideration. Accordingly, DEED argues that the “availability” argument is not properly before us on appeal.

Minn.Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7 (2006), does not specifically indicate how arguments brought before the ULJ on reconsideration, rather than at the initial hearing, should be treated on appeal to this court. On a request for reconsideration, the employer or the employee may comment on perceived factual or legal error in a decision, and the ULJ may modify or affirm the decision. Id., subd. 2(a), (b) (2006). The decision on reconsideration is DEED’S final action. Id., subd. 2(f) (2006). It is this final action that is subject to the review of this court. Id.

Moreover, when reviewing a ULJ’s final decision, this court may

affirm the decision of the unemployment law judge or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusion, or decision are:
(1) in violation of constitutional provisions;
(2) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the department;
(3) made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) affected by other error of law;
(5) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or
(6) arbitrary or capricious.

Id., subd. 7(d). We note that the introductory language provides for reversal or remand “if the substantial rights of the [relator] may have been prejudiced” based on “error of law,” without regard to whether any such error was considered by the ULJ before or after the initial evidentiary hearing. Id. This indicates that we may take up issues even if they were first considered by the ULJ after a reconsideration motion. A contrary decision would leave the final decision of the ULJ unreviewable.

In its motion for reconsideration, Work Connection argued that Bui was ineligible for benefits not because he had declined a job offer and did not comply with Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 13c, but because he did not have “transportation throughout the labor market area” as required under the availability requirement of Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e). This argument was not raised at the original hearing. However, in the final reconsideration order, the ULJ ruled that, although he had not considered the availability argument in the initial hearing, Bui was “available for employment” because he had reliable transportation to a reasonable number of locations within the labor market area. It appears that the record was sufficiently developed; there was no request on reconsideration to introduce additional evidence.

Because the ULJ addressed this issue in the final ruling under review on appeal, and because it appears that the record was sufficiently developed for the ULJ to render a decision, we conclude that Work Connection’s argument that Bui was ineligible for benefits because of his unavailability for suitable employment under Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e), is properly before this court.

II.

The second issue is whether Bui was available for employment and thus eligible for unemployment benefits despite his reliance on public transportation. This court reviews a final ULJ decision to determine whether it is affected by an error of law, not supported by substantial evidence, or arbitrary or capricious. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(4)-(6). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., 644 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn.2002). We view the ULJ’s findings of fact in the light most favorable to the decision and will not disturb them as long as there is evidence that reasonably tends to sustain those findings. Id.

An applicant must be “available for suitable employment” in order to be eligible for unemployment benefits. MinmStat. § 268.085, subd. 1(4) (2006). That phrase is defined by law:

(a) “Available for suitable employment” means an applicant is ready and willing to accept suitable employment in the labor market area. The attachment to the work force must be genuine. An applicant may restrict availability to suitable employment, but there must be no other restrictions, either self-imposed or created by circumstances, temporary or permanent, that prevent accepting suitable employment.
(e) An applicant must have transportation throughout the labor market area to be considered “available for suitable employment.”

Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15.

A. Availability, Good Reason, Good Cause

As a preliminary matter, Work Connection urges that we treat the transportation question in determining availability for work the same as in determining eligibility after rejecting a job offer or quitting a job. However, those are there distinctly different bases for determining eligibility for benefits, and each has its own statutory standard. Whether or not an applicant has “good cause” for rejecting employment requires a finding that the applicant rejected work for a reason that would cause a reasonable individual who wants suitable employment to decline the offer. Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 13c(b) (2006). This finding involves a different standard of inquiry from the one at hand. See Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e) (requiring that the applicant be “available for suitable employment”). Likewise, whether an applicant had “good reason” to quit employment requires a finding that the applicant terminated his or her employment because of “good reason caused by the employer.” Minn.Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1(1) (2006) (emphasis added). Again, there is a different standard.

In support of its argument, Work Connection cites Hill v. Contract Beverages, Inc., 307 Minn. 356, 240 N.W.2d 314 (1976), a supreme court case, and several unpublished decisions of this court that deal with quit and job rejection situations. Hill determined that an applicant did not quit for good reason caused by the employer when he could no longer arrange transportation to an existing job. Hill, 307 Minn. at 358, 240 N.W.2d at 316. Because Hill analyzes a different issue and does not address the availability question, the standard it uses should be limited to eases involving a quit. See Cherry v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 426 N.W.2d 475, 477 (Minn.App.1988) (limiting Hill’s identification of transportation as the responsibility of the employee to cases concerning whether an employee had “good cause” in quitting employment rather than a consideration of whether an employee’s failure to provide transportation constituted “misconduct” under the unemployment-insurance statutes). There are no published cases considering the transportation dimension of the requirement that an applicant be “available for suitable employment.” We therefore turn to the statutory language in section 268.085, subdivision 15(e).

B. Ambiguity

When the words of a law are clear and free from all ambiguity, we apply the law according to the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2006). Language is ambiguous only if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn.1999); see also Abrahamson v. Abrahamson, 613 N.W.2d 418, 421-22 (Minn.App.2000) (“When ... the words of a statute are not explicit and more than one reasonable interpretation is possible, the statute must be construed.”).

The statute states that to be “available” for work, “an applicant must have transportation throughout the labor market area.” Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e) (emphasis added). The word “throughout” may be used as an adverb or a preposition. The American Heritage College Dictionary 1436 (4th ed.2002). As “throughout” is used in Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e), it is a preposition. The dictionary definition of “throughout,” used as a preposition, is: “[i]n, to, through, or during every part of; all through.” Id. ' In turn, “through” is defined in relevant part as: “Here and there in; around; a tour through France.” Id. Using these definitions of “throughout” and “through,” there are two relevant meanings: (1) all “here and there in” or all “around,” or, paraphrased more generally, to various locales representative of the whole; or (2) “in ... every part of,” “to ... every part of,” and “through ... every part of.” Thus, in the first meaning, if someone states that she has traveled “throughout” Wisconsin, it does not indicate that she has visited every place within the state, but that she has been “all around” the state or, restated, to locations that are representative of its various parts. By contrast, “in,” “to,” or “through” every part of a particular area would preclude the omission of any “part.” The adverb definition appears to emphasize this narrower, more demanding meaning.

Furthermore, we observe that the context in which the word “throughout” appears is important to its meaning. “Throughout” does not appear in splendid isolation. A key phrase in the same sentence is “labor market area,” and all of these words are part of the legislative effort to define the phrase “available for suitable employment.” Thus, when applying this phrase of the statute to a person claiming benefits, DEED must consider the relevant “labor market area” based on surrounding circumstances. If it is a metropolitan area, there are thousands of places of employment in hundreds of neighborhoods, industrial parks, and other identifiable hubs of activity. There are also discrete, individual locations that are more isolated. The statute does not necessarily require that, to be “available,” one must have transportation to every single employment site in an entire metropolitan area. It requires that the applicant for benefits have transportation “throughout” the relevant labor market area. The labor market area may differ depending on the work experience and location of each applicant for benefits. Thus, the relevant labor market is different for a brain surgeon and a common laborer; it is different for an urban and a rural Minnesotan; and it may be different for ex-urban and inner-city parts of a metropolitan area. As a result, the transportation required to be available throughout the labor market has an inherent ambiguity.

Because the statutory language is subject to more than one interpretation, there is ambiguity, and we look to the purpose of the statute and legislative history to further elucidate the nature of the transportation requirement under Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e).

C. Statutory Construction
When the language is ambiguous, the intention of the legislature may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) the occasion and necessity for the law;
(2) the circumstances under which it was enacted;
(8) the mischief to be remedied;
(4) the object to be attained;
(5) the former law, if any, including other laws upon the same or similar subjects;
(6) the consequences of a particular interpretation;
(7) the contemporaneous legislative history; and
(8) legislative and administrative interpretations of the statute.

Minn.Stat. § 645.16. This court is “to read and construe a statute as a whole and must interpret each section in light of the surrounding sections to avoid conflicting interpretations.” Am. Family Ins. Group v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 278, 277 (Minn.2000). “Although this court retains the authority to review de novo administrative interpretations of statutes, an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it administers is entitled to deference.” In re Eleven, 736 N.W.2d 707, 709 (Minn.App.2007).

1. Purpose

Here, relator challenges DEED’S interpretation of a provision of the Minnesota Unemployment Insurance Law, Minn. Stat. §§ 268.001-.23 (2006). The primary purpose of the program is to “provid[e] workers who are unemployed through no fault of their own a temporary partial wage replacement” to assist them in finding new employment. Minn.Stat. § 268.03, subd. 1 (2006). This statement of public policy is not to be ignored in determining whether benefits are available under the statute. Jenkins, 721 N.W.2d at 293 (Gildea, J., dissenting) (citing Grushus v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 257 Minn. 171, 175, 100 N.W.2d 516, 519 (I960)). In order to effectuate this purpose, provisions that disqualify a person for benefits are narrowly construed. Garcia v. Alstom Signaling, Inc., 729 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Minn.App.2007).

2. Legislative History

Legislative history is relevant to interpretation of a statute. Minn.Stat. § 645.16(7). The meaning of the transportation requirement was raised during the legislative hearings in the following exchange:

Sen. Anderson: [Does section 268.085] repeat what’s already in the rules? I wasn’t aware of this before, for example, you have to have transportation throughout the labor market area to be considered available, is that, that’s been what the rule has been? I’m just curious how that gets interpreted.
Mr. Nelson: [Subdivision 15(e) ] is almost exactly word for word from [the Minnesota Rules] § 3305.0500. There is nothing new here. Yes, you do have to have transportation throughout your labor market area. That usually comes up ... in a situation which someone lives in rural Minnesota, then all of a sudden, doesn’t have a car anymore. And they may be out on a farm and say I can’t get anywhere to work.
Sen. Anderson: That means they get no benefits?
Mr. Nelson: The law would provide that you’re not available for work because you don’t have transportation. The law does require that you be available for work. Transportation being among the most fundamental requirements. In the metropolitan area, of course, there is the mass transit available. The metro area is not generally a problem. But in out-state, it can be, if you live in a very rural area and you lose your transportation. But this is the present law.
Sen. Anderson: This is the present law. Thank you.

Hearing on S.F. No. 1218 Before the Senate Comm, on Jobs, Energy, and Community Development (Mar. 19,1999).

As indicated by this exchange, the legislature was advised that an applicant’s access to transportation under subdivision 15(e) is determined by the surrounding circumstances. Mr. Nelson, as an agency witness, acknowledged that access to the metropolitan mass-transit system, and willingness to use it, is generally, adequate to meet the demands of the “availability” requirement of subdivision 15(e). The rule that Nelson referred to as being codified by subdivision 15(e) read “[a] claimant ... must have transportation from residence to labor market area.” Minn. R. 3305.0500, subp. 13 (1997) (emphasis added), repealed by 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 107, § 67, at 456.

3. Administrative History

The precursor rule, as explained by Nelson at the legislative hearing, apparently represents the position of DEED in this appeal that Bui should not be considered unavailable to work because he does not own a vehicle. Rather, access and willingness to use public transportation is generally sufficient to satisfy the availability requirement in the metro area. This court considers the agency position in interpreting the statute. Kleven, 736 N.W.2d at 709. The Minnesota unemployment insurance program does not expressly limit benefits to people who have ears, or to people who can travel to every worksite within a labor market. The legislature was capable of imposing such a requirement had it so desired. In enacting the statute, the legislature demanded that the applicant’s “attachment to the work force” be genuine. Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(a). A determination of an applicant’s access to transportation should be considered in those terms.

⅛. Absurd Result

We also consider whether Work Connection’s interpretation would lead to an absurd result if accepted. “In seeking for the meaning of a statute, it is proper to consider the result which would follow a particular construction. The legislature cannot be presumed to intend to bring about an absurd or unjust condition.” Johnson Motor Co., Inc. v. Cue, 352 N.W.2d 114, 116-17 (Minn.App.1984) (quoting Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. v. Pierce, 103 Minn. 504, 508, 115 N.W. 649, 651 (1908)), review denied (Minn. Oct. 11, 1984); see also Minn.Stat. §§ 645.16(6) (allowing a consideration of the consequences of a particular interpretation of a law as a method of construction), .17(1) (2006) (instructing courts to presume that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result).

The effect of Work Connection’s argument would be to exclude from unemployment benefits those who rely on mass transit to get to work. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 2008, the Minnesota State Legislature appropriated $93,453,000 to the Metropolitan Council for bus system operations. 2007 Minn. Laws ch. 143, art. 1, § 4, subd. 2, at 1592. Commuter transit is a recognized purpose of our public transportation system. Further, public transportation is heavily used by many low-income workers to commute, and their eligibility for benefits would be compromised if we found this form of transportation to be inadequate. Having invested significant effort and resources to provide an extensive transportation system that employees in the metro area can use to get to work, it would be absurd to conclude that the legislature intends that unemployed workers who rely on that system be considered unavailable for work in the labor market and disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.

We conclude that the term “throughout the labor market area” does not require every applicant for unemployment benefits to have personal automobile transportation. Rather, an applicant’s eligibility under the transportation requirement of Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e), is determined by examining an applicant’s particular circumstances, and whether the applicant has access to transportation such that they are available for work.

D. Application

Bui’s reliance on public transportation must be evaluated in terms of his situation. Bui worked as a line assembly packager for $8.25 per hour. He was subsequently offered a job in warehouse shipping and receiving at $10 per hour. From the record, it appears that he is an unskilled, trainable laborer who lives in Brooklyn Park close to a bus line. He is not a highly paid or specialized worker with a limited number of potential employers. There are many labor positions in various locations throughout the Twin Cities metropolitan area for unskilled, trainable laborers. The routes of the public transportation system in this metropolitan area reach a vast number of these employers. The ULJ found that

[t]he evidence shows that Bui worked for the employer for approximately two years and took a bus to work. The unrefuted facts are that Bui did not have a car and he lives in Brooklyn Park. The offer of September 18, 2006 was in Coon Rapids, and admittedly not on a bus line. The employer does not dispute this. Bui would have public transportation to a reasonable number of locations in the labor market area. He would be available for employment at any location which is on a bus line. Therefore, it cannot be said that Bui is not available for employment in the labor market area.

These findings are complemented by those in the ULJ’s initial order, which stated that Bui credibly testified that he had employed good-faith efforts in attempting to obtain transportation through his relatives.

We conclude that the ULJ’s finding that Bui, as an unskilled, trainable worker, was available for employment throughout the labor market area is supported by substantial evidence. Bui’s access to and willingness to use public transportation is not disputed. The ULJ concluded that Bui met the requirement of having “transportation throughout the labor market area” as required by Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e). Based on this record and our limited standard of review of factual findings, we affirm that determination.

DECISION

This court may review questions first raised and considered by the ULJ on a request for reconsideration. Accordingly, we review the question of whether respondent has adequate transportation to be available for employment under Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e). We conclude that respondent’s reliance on public transit is adequate to satisfy the requirement of transportation throughout the labor market area, id., and that respondent is therefore eligible for unemployment compensation.

Affirmed.

SCHELLHAS, Judge

(concurring in part and dissenting).

I concur with the majority that this court may properly consider arguments raised in Work Connection’s motion for reconsideration before the ULJ, but I respectfully dissent with the majority’s affir-mance of the ULJ’s eligibility decision.

The majority begins by stating that “[rjelator employer appeals from the award of unemployment-insurance benefits to respondent employee, arguing that the employee who relies on public transportation is not available for employment throughout the labor market area as required by Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e) (2006).” But Work Connection does not make this argument. Work Connection argues that Bui is not eligible for unemployment-insurance benefits because he lacks transportation throughout his labor market area. Citing Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(a), (e), Work Connection argues that whatever Bui’s mode of transportation, public or otherwise, he “must have transportation throughout the labor market area to be considered ‘available for suitable employment,’ ” i.e., “ready and willing to accept suitable employment in the labor market area.” Work Connection argues that Bui’s lack of transportation, whatever modes are lacking, is a restriction that is self-imposed or imposed by circumstances and, as such, a restriction that renders Bui unavailable for suitable employment. Id. In short, Work Connection argues that because Bui lacks “transportation throughout the labor market area,” he cannot be considered to be “available for suitable employment,” and therefore cannot be eligible for unemployment benefits under the plain meaning of the statute. Id.

The ULJ, in his Order of Affirmation, noted that “Bui would have public transportation to a reasonable number of locations in the labor market area” and that he “would be available for employment at any location which is on a bus line” and that “[tjherefore, it cannot be said that Bui is not available for employment in the labor market area.” This conclusion conspicuously omits the word, “throughout,” ignoring the plain language of Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e), which provides that “[a]n applicant must have transportation throughout the labor market area to be considered ‘available for suitable employment.’ ” (Emphasis added.)

The majority frames the eligibility issue as “whether Bui was available for employment and thus eligible for unemployment benefits despite his reliance on public transportation.” But “available for employment” is not a phrase found in the applicable statutes. The issue is whether Bui was available for suitable employment under Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(a), (e). “Available for suitable employment” is defined by the legislature in Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(a):

“Available for suitable employment” means an applicant is ready and willing to accept suitable employment in the labor market area. The attachment to the work force must be genuine. An applicant may restrict availability to suitable employment, but there must be no other restrictions, either self-imposed or created by circumstances, temporary or permanent, that prevent accepting suitable employment.

(Emphasis added.) In addition, “[a]n applicant must have transportation throughout the labor market area to be considered ‘available for suitable employment.’ ” Id., subd. 15(e) (emphasis added).

The majority decides that the meaning of the term “throughout” is ambiguous and that whether an applicant has transportation throughout a labor market area depends on an applicant’s specific circumstances. Relying on this construction of “throughout,” the majority determines that because of “Bui’s access to and willingness to use public transportation,” “this meets the requirement of having ‘transportation throughout the labor market area’ as required by MimuStat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e).” I disagree.

The unemployment-benefits statutes are unambiguous. First, they contain no allowable restrictions for availability to suitable employment on the basis of reliance on public transportation or reliance on any specific mode of transportation. Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(a). Second, the use of the term “throughout” in MinmStat. § 268.085, subd. 15(a), (e), is unambiguous. As noted by the majority, the plain meaning of “throughout,” as it appears as a preposition in section 15(e), is the dictionary definition, “[i]n, to, through, or during every part of; all through.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1436 (4th ed.2000). “Throughout” is not reasonably subject to more than one interpretation; therefore, it is not ambiguous. The majority concludes that the definition of “throughout” urged by Work Connection is not appropriate because Work Connection relies on a dictionary definition of “throughout” in its adverb form: “[i]n or through all parts; everywhere.” The distinction between the definitions of “throughout” as an adverb and a preposition is insignificant and, in this case, whichever definition is used, the ULJ reached his decision completely ignoring the presence of the word “throughout” in Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e), when he concluded that:

Bui would have public transportation to a reasonable number of locations in the labor market area. He would be available for employment at any location which is on a bus line. Therefore, it cannot be said that Bui is not available for employment in the labor market area.

(Emphasis added.)

Using the definition of “throughout,” as a preposition, and applying that definition in this case, the issue is whether Bui had transportation “in, to, through, or during every part of’ or “all through” his labor market area. If reliance on public transportation does not provide access to “every part of’ Bui’s labor market area, or “all through” his labor market area, Bui does not have “transportation throughout the labor market area” and therefore is not “available for suitable employment” under Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(a).

While I am mindful that the public policy in chapter 268 urges us to narrowly construe disqualification provisions, I see no reason to apply a different standard to an employee declining the offer of new employment because of lack of transportation than the standard applied by the Minnesota Supreme Court to an employee leaving a job he already has because of a lack of transportation. In Hill v. Contract Beverages, Inc., 307 Minn. 356, 240 N.W.2d 314 (1976), the supreme court denied unemployment benefits to an employee who could no longer get to his employment because of a shift change unilaterally imposed by his employer. In support of its conclusion, the supreme court said:

When relator originally accepted the employment on the third shift, he had no knowledge that he would be able to obtain transportation from some person on that shift or any other shift. Relator accepted the employment before he obtained the transportation upon the expectation that he could find a fellow employee who would provide his transportation. Fortunately, he found transportation on his assigned shift, but the fact that such transportation was not available on another shift cannot be attributed as a fault of the employer. In the absence of contract or custom imposing an obligation of transportation upon the employer, transportation is usually considered the problem of the employee.

Id. at 358, 240 N.W.2d at 316 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Here, like Hill, when first hired, Bui did not tell Work Connection about his lack of transportation or dependence on public transportation. In fact, he both rode the bus and biked to the employment from which he was terminated. That employment was approximately four miles from Bui’s home. He then declined Work Connection’s offer of full-time employment that was approximately six miles from his home because the employment was beyond the bus line. The employment Bui declined was well within Bui’s labor market area. See Preiss v. Comm’r of Economic Security, 347 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Minn.App.1984) (concluding that a drive of 22 miles does not render an available position unsuitable).

The majority states that “[t]he effect of Work Connection’s argument would be to exclude from unemployment benefits those who rely on mass transit to get to work.” I disagree; this purported effect is exaggerated. The effect of not applying the plain meaning of MinmStat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e), as written, is to shift the burden of transportation from employees to employers in violation of clear statutory language and judicial precedent.

The legislature could have provided that applicants who are dependent on public transportation are deemed to have transportation throughout the labor market, see MinmStat. § 268.085, subd. 15(e), or that applicants may restrict their availability to only that employment accessible by public transportation, see id., subd. 15(a), but it has not done so. For this court to construe subdivision 15(a) and (e) to include that language is, in effect, to modify the statute, and that is unauthorized. See State v. Fleck, 281 Minn. 247, 252, 161 N.W.2d 309, 312 (1968) (It must be assumed that, had the legislature desired to expand upon 627.01, it would have effectuated this desire by amending that section.). We must presume that when the legislature enacted section § 268.085, subdivision 15, it acted with full knowledge of previous statutes, agency rules, and existing case law. See Minneapolis E. Ry. Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 247 Minn. 413, 418, 77 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1956) (quoting rule that when legislature enacted statutes it was presumed to have in mind all existing laws relating to the subject matter). Under MinmStat. 268.085, subd. 15(e), Bui was required to have transportation throughout the labor market area, and Bui failed to satisfy that requirement. Therefore, he was not available for suitable employment and is not eligible for unemployment benefits.

I would reverse the ULJs decision finding Bui eligible for unemployment-insurance benefits when he declined the full-time employment offered to him by Work Connection.

      . Suitable employment is further defined in Minn.Stat. § 268.035, subd. 23a. Although not raised by the parties, that definition states that “the distance of the employment from the applicant’s residence shall be considered.’’ Id. subd. 23a(a). We note that other portions of the statute at issue, such as the suitability requirement, do not demand absolutely that an applicant accept any proffered job in order to be eligible benefits. Rather, it is an inquiry into the broader factual circumstances of each case.

      . We also note the distinct purposes and operation of the three different statutory standards. The "availability” requirement merely demands that applicants who have lost their employment remain genuine in their willingness to accept new and suitable employment. It provides the lowest statutory bar. The provision requiring that a potential employee have “good cause” to decline employment provides a higher bar: an applicant must show that he or she had good reason to reject the offered job. When an employee quits a position that he already holds, the bar is still higher: applicants must now show that the quit is caused by the employer.

      . See The Chicago Manual of Style § 5.172 at 187 (15th ed.2003) (stating that when a term is used as a preposition, it takes on an object, as in "Let's slide down the hill;" when used as an adverb, it does not, as in “we sat down.”).

      Work Connection argues that, in this context, "throughout” must mean that an applicant is capable of getting "everywhere” within the labor market area, citing Webster’s New World Dictionary 1483 (2d Coll, ed.1974) and an online version of The American Heritage College Dictionary 1436 (4th ed.2002). In making this argument, Work Connection relies on the dictionary definition of "throughout” in its adverb form, which is "[i]n or through all parts; everywhere.” The American Heritage College Dictionary 1436 (4th ed.2002). The adverb definition is not appropriate.

      . We note that Nelson, who testified at the legislative hearing, was then an attorney on the staff of DEED and is one of the attorneys representing DEED as respondent in this proceeding. Because Nelson was not aware in 1999, when he testified, that he would be acting in an advocacy role in 2008, the legislative testimony may be considered in this proceeding.

      . We acknowledge that, as recognized in the legislative hearing reproduced above, a car may be required in some cases in order for an applicants' attachment to the labor market to be genuine, as when they reside at a location without alternative access to the labor market. In some places, it is common for people to walk or bike to work, such as around small towns or in urban areas. In others, such as the suburbs, this method of transportation may not be adequate to show a genuine attachment to the work force.

      . Again, we do not use the term "throughout'' to mean that labor jobs are available at every place within the metro area, but rather that there are many such jobs dispersed within the specified geographical range.

      . Work Connection points out that the proffered warehouse job was located only about 6 miles from Bui’s home. We note that Bui was not informed of the location of the warehouse until the initial evidentiary hearing with the ULJ. Regardless, this factual information was part of relator’s argument that Bui did not decline the position for "good cause” under Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 13c(b), not its claim on appeal that Bui was unavailable for suitable employment. Work Connection has not appealed the ULJ’s determination that Bui declined the job offer for good cause, and we do not consider that question.