text:
    2005 SD 17
    STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Lance M. SWALVE, Defendant and Appellant.
    No. 23210.
    Supreme Court of South Dakota.
    Argued Jan. 11, 2005.
    Decided Feb. 2, 2005.

      Lawrence E. Long, Attorney General, Grant E. Gormley, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.
    Philip R. Parent of Arneson, Issenhuth & Parent, L.L.P., Madison, South Dakota, Attorney for defendant and appellant.
   SABERS, Justice.

[¶ 1.] Lance Swalve (Swalve) operated two auto dealerships in South Dakota. Swalve was charged and convicted of numerous counts of grand theft and failure to deliver title. Swalve appeals and we affirm.

Facts

[¶ 2.] Swalve operated two auto dealerships in Watertown and Arlington: Kneips of Watertown and Kneips GMC. When purchasing vehicles from these businesses, customers would commonly trade-in vehicles that had outstanding liens on them and would also purchase extended warranties, also referred to as “service contracts,” on the “new” vehicles. It was then the dealerships’ responsibility to pay off the outstanding liens on the trade-in vehicles and forward the extended warranty contracts to the warranty company.

[¶ 3.] In the later part of 2002, local law enforcement and the South Dakota Division of Motor Vehicles received a number of complaints alleging: (1) the auto dealerships failed to pay off the outstanding liens on trade-in vehicles, (2) the dealerships failed to purchase extended warranties on behalf of their customers, and (3) Certificates of Title to the newly purchased vehicles were not provided to the buyers. An investigation ensued and ultimately concluded with Swalve surrendering his dealer license on November 22, 2002.

[¶ 4.] On May 5, 2003, Swalve was charged by Complaint with seventy-seven counts of grand theft and failure to deliver title. Following a jury trial, Swalve was found guilty of twenty-one counts of grand theft and thirty counts of failure to deliver title.

Standard of Review

[¶ 5.] In, determining whether a trial court erred in denying a defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, “[o]ur inquiry is whether the State set forward sufficient evidence from which the finder of fact could reasonably find the defendant guilty.” State v. Boston, 2003 SD 71, ¶ 6, 665 N.W.2d 100, 103 (citing State v. Gonzalez, 2001 SD 47, ¶ 7, 624 N.W.2d 836, 838). “A guilty verdict will not be set aside if the state’s evidence and all favorable inferences that can be, drawn therefrom support a rational theory of guilt.” State v. Phair, 2004 SD 88, ¶ 16, 684 N.W.2d 660, 665 (quoting State v. Downing, 2002 SD 148, ¶ 22, 654 N.W.2d 793, 800).

[¶ 6.] 1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal on charges of grand theft by deception in creating a false impression as to title status and the ability to provide clear title.

[¶ 7.] Swalve was convicted of'the following counts of Grand Theft by Deception: 17, 49, 54 and 60. The jury determined that Swalve deceived his customers by creating a false impression as to the title status and the ability to provide clear title.

[¶ 8.] The record shows that the vehicles in question were taken in by the dealerships as trade-ins.' Each of these vehicles had outstanding liens which were supposed to be paid off by the dealership. But, in each of these instances, the vehicles were re-sold before the prior liens were paid off.

[¶ 9.] Swalve correctly states that in the crime of Theft by Deception, there must exist in the mind of the perpetrator the specific intent to defraud at the time the property was received. He contends that since he was not the primary salesperson in each of these instances the State failed to offer any evidence of the requisite intent to defraud at the time the transaction was conducted. However, both Ryan Easthouse and Laurie Bleeker, two former employees, testified that it was Swalve himself who determined which lien pay offs on trade-in vehicles would be made and when they would be made. Additionally, Easthouse testified that regardless of which salesperson was involved, Swalve was the ultimate authority on any sale. It can be reasonably inferred from this evidence that Swalve knew that he did no't have clear title to these trade-in vehicles when they were re-sold due to the fact that he had not yet paid off the outstanding liens on the vehicles.

[¶ 10.] Based on the above, the record discloses sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Swalve intended to defraud these customers at the time the trade-in vehicles with outstanding liens were resold to them. Therefore, it has not been shown that the trial court erred in denying Swalve’s motion for judgment of acquittal on Counts 17, 49, 54 and 60. We affirm Issue 1.

[¶ 11.] 2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal on charges of grand theft by deception in creating a false impression as to the ability to pay off the outstanding liens on trade-in vehicles.

[¶ 12.] Swalve was convicted of the following counts of Grand Theft by Deception: 32, 55, 55A, 57, 65 and 72. In these instances, the jury concluded that Swalve intended to deceive by creating a false impression as to the ability to pay off the outstanding loans owed on trade-in vehicles.

[¶ 13.] The record shows that the vehicles involved in these counts were taken in by the two dealerships as trade-in vehicles. However, the dealership subsequently failed to pay-off the outstanding liens on the vehicles. As a result, the lien holders sought payment from the prior owners even .though they no longer owned the vehicles.

[¶ 14.] Again, Swalve contends that he was not the salesperson in these particular transactions. Furthermore, Swalve gave money to two of the complaining customers so that payments could be made to the outstanding liens when the liens were not paid off in a timely manner. Swalve argues that this indicates that he did not intend to defraud the customers at the time the trade-ins were made. Therefore, it is his contention that the State’s evidence failed to prove intent to defraud on his part.

[¶ 15.] The testimony provided by the customers who traded-in these vehicles indicates that Swalve himself was involved to some extent in the trade-in deals pertaining to counts 32, 57, 65, and 72. The evidence also shows that Swalve personally signed the loan applications related to the deals involved in counts 55, 55A, and 72. Additionally, Ryan Easthouse and Laurie Bleeker, both testified that it was Swalve who determined which lien pay offs on trade-in vehicles would be made and when they would be made.

[¶ 16.] Concerning Swalve’s contention that his partial payment of two outstanding liens indicates that he did not intend to defraud the customers at the time the trade-ins were made, we look to SDCL 22-30A-10.1 which provides:

If a person, who has been accused of theft, restores or returns the property allegedly appropriated before an indictment or information is laid before a magistrate, such fact may be considered in mitigation of punishment. The restoration or return of the property is not a defense nor may it be considered by the finder of fact.

(emphasis added). This Court has held that “[t]he plain language of this statute clearly excludes evidence of restoration or repayment from being considered by the finder of fact in theft prosecutions. There are no exceptions.” Phair, 2004 SD 88, ¶ 10, 684 N.W.2d at 664. Therefore, any evidence that Swalve may have made partial payments subsequent to his failure to fully pay off the outstanding liens in a timely manner cannot be considered.

[¶ 17.] Based on the above, the record discloses sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Swalve intended to defraud these customers when he failed to pay off the outstanding liens on the trade-in vehicles in a timely manner. Therefore, it has not been shown that the trial court erred in denying Swalve’s motion for judgment of acquittal on Counts 32, 55, 55A, 57, 65 and 72. We affirm Issue 2.

[¶ 18.] 3. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal on charges of grand theft by deception in creating a false impression that a vehicle warranty would be provided.

[¶ 19.] It is common industry practice that when an auto dealer sells a vehicle, an extended warranty or “service contract” is offered to the customer through the dealer. CNA National Warranty Corporation (CNA) had an agreement with Kneips GMC where the dealership would offer CNA’s extended warranties to their customers. CNA would set the wholesale price and Kneips GMC would set the retail price. The customer pays the retail price and the dealer remits the wholesale price to CNA. Pursuant to the agreement, Kneips GMC was to report sales of extended warranties and pay CNA for those contracts within ten days of the end of the month in which they were sold. In the three years that Kneips GMC had this arrangement with CNA over 200 extended warranties were sold. However, for several months in 2002, Swalve remitted no money to CNA for extended warranties that his dealership sold to customers. CNA was unaware that the extended warranties had been sold in its name and had not received any payment on these contracts up to the time of trial.

[¶ 20.] In Counts 36, 41, 44, 45 and 51, Swalve was convicted of Theft by Deception for creating a false impression to the customer that an extended warranty had been purchased on their behalf, when in fact it had not. Swalve now argues that the trial court should have granted his judgment of acquittal on these counts because there was no evidence that Swalve intended to defraud his customers at the time he collected monies fof* the extended warranties. He also points out that all of the individuals in these counts eventually received service contracts effective as of the date of sale.

[¶ 21.] The record shows that when a customer purchased an extended warranty along with a “new” vehicle, the financing for the purchase would include payment for the “new” vehicle, payment for any outstanding liens on the trade-in vehicle (if applicable), and payment for the extended warranty. In other words, payment for the extended warranty was factored into the financing agreement for the newly purchased vehicle. Laurie Bleeker testified that these payments were deposited into the dealership’s account. She would then prepare the checks that were to be remitted to CNA each month for the extended warranties that were sold in the preceding month; however, they would not'be sent until Swalve instructed her to do so. Therefore, even though the dealership had already been paid the full retail price for the extended warranties, Swalve chose not to remit those funds to CNA.

[¶ 22.] It should be noted that regardless of Swalve’s failure to remit the documentation and payment for the extended warranties that were sold to these customers, CNA honored the contracts. Rick Jones, a senior vice-president of CNA, testified that the company chose to honor the extended warranties in the interest of customer relations even though they had not received payment for those contracts.

[¶ 23.] Based on the above, the record discloses sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Swalve intended to defraud his customers when he failed to remit payment to CNA for the extended warranties purchased through the dealership. Therefore, it has not been shown that the trial court erred in denying Swalve’s motion for judgment of acquittal on Counts 36, 41, 44, 45 and 51. We affirm Issue 3.

[¶ 24.] 4. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal on charges of failure to deliver title pursuant to SDCL 32-3-7.

[¶ 25.] Swalve appeals the convictions of twenty-one counts of failure to deliver title. SDCL 32-3-7 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Any person, upon the sale and delivery of any used or secondhand motor vehicle, shall within thirty days thereof deliver to the purchaser a certificate of title, endorsed according to law, and issued for the vehicle by the department. ... A violation of this section is a Class 2 misdemeanor.

[¶ 26.] During 2002, Swalve’s dealerships sold a number of vehicles without providing certificate of title to the purchaser within the statutorily required thirty-day period. In some cases, the receipt of the title was late but in other cases the certificate of title was never delivered to the purchaser.

[¶ 27.] Swalve contends that he had a lawful excuse for failing to deliver title pursuant to SDCL -32-3-7. He claims that Pioneer Garage (Pioneer) of High-more, South Dakota, unlawfully withheld vehicle titles making it impossible for Swalve to deliver the titles to his customers. This stems from an arrangement that Swalve had with Pioneer in which Swalve’s dealerships would sell vehicles owned by Pioneer. This is referred to as a “floor planning” arrangement. Under this arrangement, whenever Swalve -sold one of Pioneer’s vehicles, he would forward payment for the vehicle to Pioneer and in turn Pioneer would provide the title to Swalve so that it could be delivered to the customer. The record indicates that Swalve and Pioneer operated under this arrangement for approximately two years, during which time a number of Pioneer vehicles were sold by Swalve’s dealerships and titles to those vehicles were delivered to the respective customers without incident. However, in the Spring of 2002, the relationship between Swalve and Pioneer began to sour. Jon Briggs, the collection manager for Pioneer, testified that Pioneer began to lose its trust in Swalve when some of the checks that were sent to Pioneer were returned due to insufficient funds. Furthermore, the management at Pioneer began to suspect that Swalve was not informing Pioneer of all the sales involving Pioneer-owned vehicles. Because of this, Pioneer eventually refused to deliver any vehicle titles to Swalve in order to maintain their only security interest in the Pioneer vehicles that Swalve possessed.

[¶ 28.] Both the State and Swalve agree that SDCL 32-3-7 is a general intent crime, as opposed to a specific intent crime. Therefore, the State is only required to prove that Swalve committed the act of failure to deliver title without a lawful excuse and is not required to prove the act of omission plus a specific intent. See State v. Taecker, 2003 SD 43, ¶ 25, 661 N.W.2d 712, 718. In each of these counts, it is uncontested that Swalve failed to deliver the titles to the purchaser within thirty days. Therefore, the pertinent question is whether Swalve had a lawful excuse in failing to deliver the titles within thirty days.

[¶ 29.] The testimony of Jon Briggs, Laurie Bleeker, and Ryan Easthouse establishes that Swalve deliberately attempted to deceive Pioneer through the use of “customer appreciation days.” Therefore, it was Swalve’s own fraudulent activity that led to the situation where Pioneer refused to turn over titles.

[¶ 30.] Based on the above, the record discloses sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Swalve failed to deliver vehicle titles to purchasers within thirty days, without legal excuse. Therefore, it has not been shown that the trial court erred in denying Swalve’s motion for judgment of acquittal on these counts. We affirm Issue 4.

[IT 31.] 5. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.

[¶ 32.] Subsequent to the investigation of Swalve in November and December of 2002, but prior to the filing of this complaint, three separate felony charges were lodged against Swalve in Codington County. On December 9, 2002, investigators obtained a search warrant and subsequently seized Swalve’s business records from a trailer in his possession. As part of his defense to those charges, Swalve filed a motion to suppress the evidence that was obtained from the trailer. The trial court granted Swalve’s motion to suppress holding that the affidavit in support of the search warrant did not establish probable cause and that the warrant was overbroad.

[¶ 33.] In the present case, Swalve filed a motion to suppress evidence pertaining to certain counts of the indictment because those counts were the product of the invalid search. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court suppressed the evidence as to Counts 5, 69 and 70, determining that they “were developed through resort to the seized evidence.” Therefore, by implication, the trial court also held that the evidence pertaining to the balance of the counts was not developed by resort to the seized evidence. Swalve argues that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence as to the balance of the counts.

[¶ 34.] “A motion to suppress based on an alleged violation of a constitutionally protected right is a question of law reviewed de novo.” State v. Hodges, 2001 SD 93, ¶ 8, 631 N.W.2d 206, 209 (citing State v. Stanga, 2000 SD 129, ¶ 8, 617 N.W.2d 486, 488). “The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly eiToneous standard of review, but the application of a legal standard to those facts is a question of law, which we review de novo.” State v. Cummings, 2004 SD 56, ¶ 6, 679 N.W.2d 484, 486.

[¶ 35.] On November 21, 2002 and December 4, 2002, investigators met with Swalve and obtained information from him regarding: vehicle transactions in which title had not yet been transferred, vehicle transactions in which hen pay offs on trade-in vehicles had not been made, vehicles that had been sold without clear title, and vehicles in which extended warranties had been sold but the funds were not forwarded to the warranty company. The information was voluntarily provided through hand-written lists, purchase orders received from the dealerships, vehicle title records and information obtained from the DealerTracker system, and Pioneer Garage of Highmore, South Dakota. Furthermore, on December 6, 2002, investigators made contact with a representative of CNA and requested information regarding CNA warranties sold by Swalve.

[¶ 36.] “The independent source doctrine applies when evidence is legally seized though a source independent of an illegal search.” State v. Boll, 2002 SD 114, ¶ 23, 651 N.W.2d 710, 717 (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920)). The information gathered as a result of the investigators’ meetings with Swalve and through CNA was all obtained prior to the issuance of the search warrant on December 9, 2002, and from sources independent of the illegally seized business records, as described above. Therefore, any of the information garnered from these sources that also happens to be contained in the suppressed business records would fall under the independent source doctrine exception to the exclusionary rule. Id.

[¶ 37.] Based on the above, it has not been shown that the trial court erred in failing to grant Swalve’s motion to suppress evidence. We therefore affirm Issue 5.

[¶ 38.] 6. Whether the trial court erred in allowing an undisclosed witness to testify during the State’s casein-chief.

[¶ 39.] Prior to trial, the trial court granted Swalve’s discovery motion asking for the names and addresses of all witnesses the State intended to call in its case-in-chief and all individuals interviewed by the State in its investigation of the case. Pursuant to this order, the State provided a list of the persons involved in this ease. Included on this list was Mike Schmidt (Schmidt) who worked for CNA. However, during the trial, the State instead called Rick Jones (Jones), a Senior Vice-President of CNA, to testify to the same or similar information. Swalve objected to Jones being called as he had not been disclosed to the defense. The trial court held that Swalve had known “for a considerable period of time” about a potential CNA witness and therefore allowed Jones to testify instead of Schmidt. Swalve argues that this was error.

[¶ 40.] In the case of nondisclosure of discoverable material, the trial court’s choice of remedy or failure to grant a particular remedy is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Sorenson, 2000 SD 127, ¶ 6, 617 N.W.2d 146, 148. “We will not reverse a ruling reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard absent a showing of prejudice.” Id. ¶ 10 (citing State v. Daniel, 2000 SD 18, ¶ 13, 606 N.W.2d 532, 535).

[¶ 41.] Here, Swalve argues that the trial court erred in allowing Jones to testify but makes no showing that he was prejudiced by Jones’s testimony any more than he would have been through Schmidt’s testimony. In fact, at oral argument, counsel conceded his client was not prejudiced on this point. As a result, it has not been shown that the trial court’s ruling warrants reversal. We therefore affirm Issue 6.

[¶ 42.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP, ZINTER and MEIERHENRY, Justices, concur.

      . Ryan Easthouse, one of the salespersons for Kneip's of Watertown, testified that when a customer traded-in a vehicle with an outstanding lien it was the dealerships' responsibility to pay off the lien. Easthouse stated that this was usually done within 7-10 days after the trade-in vehicle was received. However, in each of these instances, more than 30 days passed between the time when the vehicle was traded-in and when it was resold with the outstanding lien still on the vehicle.

        . SDCL 22-30A-3 provides in relevant part:
      Any person who obtains property of another by deception is guilty of theft. A person deceives if with intent to defraud he:
      (1) Creates or reinforces a false impression, including false impressions as to law, value, intention, or other state of mind; but deception as to a person’s intention to perform a promise shall not be inferred from the fact alone that he did not subsequently perform the promise;

      (4) Fails to disclose a known lien, adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of property which he transfers pr encumbers in consideration for property he obtains, whether such impediment is or is not valid, is or is not a matter of official record.
      The term "deceive” does not, however, include falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely to deceive reasonable persons.

      . In regard to Count 32, the evidence shows that the dealership attempted to pay off the outstanding lien on the trade-in vehicle but the dealership's check was returned due to insufficient funds. In response to this, Swalve gave the customer $695 in cash so that she could make two loan payments which would have brought the account current at that time. In regard to Count 72, the evidence shows that Swalve made one monthly payment on the outstanding lien but then failed to pay off the balance.

      . Swalve was also charged with identical counts of Theft by Deception relating to extended warranty contracts in Counts 28, 56 and 61, but the jury acquitted him of those counts.

      . Laurie Bleeker’s testimony regarding the CNA extendecfwarranties was as follows:
      Q: Again, having prepared the check, would you wait for the defendant's instruction to send it?
      A: Yes.
      Q: In September which contract would have been due? Not the specific ones. In September, the contracts from August would be due; correct?
      A: Correct.
      Q: Do you recall whether you prepared a sheet for August?
      A: I probably prepared a sheet but I don't remember sending it off.
      Q: For in October, did you prepare a sheet for September?
      A: Yes.
      Q: Do you remember sending it off?
      A: No.
      Q: In November, was there a sheet prepared for October?
      A: Yes.
      Q: Was it sent off?
      A: No.
      Q: Now was there any attempt or did you receive any instruction to contact CNA, or the customers that there was an issue with the delivery of that documentation to CNA?
      A: No.

      . The State contends that Pioneer learned of the clandestine sales when it discovered that Swalve was obtaining duplicate titles in order to avoid his arrangement with Pioneer. The State further contends that Swalve deliberately attempted to deceive Pioneer's inventory inspectors by establishing “customer appreciation days.” When Swalve would receive notification of an upcoming inventory inspection, the dealerships would contact customers who had purchased Pioneer-owned vehicles and would offer to clean and wash the vehicles if they brought them back to the dealerships on a specified day. The State argues that this was done to deceive the Pioneer inventory inspectors into believing that those vehicles were still part of Swalve’s inventory and had not been sold.

      . Ryan Easthouse's testimony regarding “customer appreciation days” is as follows:
      Q: What is customer appreciation day?
      A: That was — we had a few customers that were friends of the dealership and if we had an inspection, we would have them bring their cars in to be on the lot for the inspection.
      Q: Now those wouldn't be just any cars; would they?
      A: No.
      Q: Why those particular cars?
      A: They were on our floor plan list.
      Q: And so they were on the list that Pioneer was coming to check?
      A: Yes.

        Q: Well, if they are on the list, but they had been sold, why would they have come back in?
      A: They were supposed to be paid off the list.
      Q: What do you mean, they were supposed to be paid off the list?
      A: We have to pay — pay Pioneer that amount of money that was floor planned to us for that vehicle after we sold it.
      Q: So it was an attempt to keep the sale secret from Pioneer?
      A: Yes.
      Q: And did there come a time in late 2002, when [a] Pioneer inspection occurred and there were [a] significant number of vehicles missing?
      A: Yes.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CADY, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Juan and Maria SANCHEZ, for Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, and John and Jane Doe, For Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Appellants, v. STATE of Iowa, Tom Miller, Attorney General, State of Iowa, Kevin W. Techau, Commissioner, Iowa Department of Public Safety and Mark Wandro, Director, Department of Transportation, Appellees.
    No. 04-0176.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Feb. 18, 2005.

      Curt N. Daniels, Chariton, for appellants.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mark Hunacek, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
   CADY, Justice.

Immigrant access to driver’s licenses has surfaced as a controversial issue in Iowa and throughout the United States, and it frames the issue presented in this appeal. Yet, this case does not require us to pass upon the merits of the competing policy arguments surrounding this issue— that is the role of the legislature. Rather, our task is to determine the legality and constitutionality of the practice in Iowa of denying driver’s licenses to illegal aliens residing in this state. For the reasons that follow, we conclude the practice is both legal and constitutional. We affirm the decision of the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

There are thousands of illegal aliens residing in Iowa. Although they have entered the United States without complying with federal law, they live and work in Iowa and have become integrated into many Iowa communities. Like others in Iowa, they engage in myriad family and community activities that give rise to transportation needs. However, they are unable to obtain driver’s licenses from the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) because they do not have social security numbers or other documents required by the state to obtain a driver’s license. Their unauthorized presence in the United States precludes them from qualifying for a social security number or from obtaining proper immigration documents.

Juan and Maria Sanchez represent a class of illegal, undocumented aliens present in the state who want to obtain driver’s licenses. John and Jane Doe represent a class of licensed drivers in the state who want the DOT to license the Sanchez class to make it safer for members of the Doe class to drive on the state’s roads. On November 13, 2003, the Doe and Sanchez classes sued the State and various state officials, claiming that the denial of driver’s licenses to the members of the Sanchez class violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, article I, sections 6 and 22 of the Iowa Constitution, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and 18 U.S.C. § 242. The State moved to dismiss, contending that illegal aliens have no right to receive driver’s licenses in the State of Iowa and that the Doe class lacked standing.

The district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. This appeal followed. We address each claim raised by the classes in the following separate divisions of this opinion.

II. Standards of Review

Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed for correction of errors at law. State v. Stratmeier, 672 N.W.2d 817, 820 (Iowa 2003) (citing State v. Hornik, 672 N.W.2d 836, 838 (Iowa 2003); State v. Stoneking, 379 N.W.2d 352, 353-54 (Iowa 1985)). We review constitutional questions de novo. State v. Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 38, 44 (Iowa 2003) (citing State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 106 (Iowa 2001)). A motion to dismiss should only be granted if the allegations in the petition, taken as true, could not entitle the plaintiff to any relief. Mlynarik v. Bergantzel, 675 N.W.2d 584, 586 (Iowa 2004) (citations omitted).

III. State Statutory Claim

Iowa Code section 321.182(l)(a) allows the DOT to waive the social security number requirement for foreign nationals “[p]ursuant to procedures established by the department.” The two classes claim that the social security requirement should be waived for illegal aliens because section 321.196(1) “command[s] the Department of Transportation to issue drivers licenses to undocumented aliens.” We think the classes take this provision out of context.

Section 321.196 is the provision governing renewal of existing licenses. It presupposes that a licensee seeking renewal of a license previously qualified for and obtained a license. The statute does not allow, let alone “command,” the DOT to issue licenses to anyone who does not meet the requirements of section 321.182.

Moreover, the Sanchez class has not followed the procedures established by the DOT to obtain a waiver of the social security number requirement. The DOT has adopted the following procedure for waiver:

If you are a temporary foreign national who is not authorized for employment, the DOT may waive the Social Security Number requirement for a non-commercial driver’s license or identification card. However, you must present your immigration documents so that the DOT can record the BCIS (INS) number in lieu of the Social Security Number.

Iowa Dep’t of Transp., Verification of Social Security Number for an Iowa Driver’s License or ID Card, at http:// www.iamvd.com/ods/ssn.htm (last updated Feb. 25, 2004) (emphasis added). Under the DOT’s procedure, only foreign nationals who are authorized by the INS (now the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Bureau of the Department of Homeland Security) to be in the country are entitled to have the social security requirement waived. See id.; see also Iowa Dep’t of Transp., Foreign National Iowa Driver’s Licenses & IDs, at http://www.iamvd.com/ods/foreign.htm (last updated Feb. 25, 2004) (“Licenses and Non-Driver Identification Cards issued to temporary foreign nationals will be limited to the period of time the foreign national is authorized to be in the United States, not to exceed two years. The examiner or county treasurer will determine the term by reviewing Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) documents. Temporary Foreign nationals should be prepared to show their INS documentation.”). The district court correctly determined that the Sanchez class did not qualify for licenses under the state statutory scheme. We thus turn to consider whether this statutory scheme is constitutional.

IV. Constitutional Claims

A. Equal Protection

The classes challenge the DOT’s refusal to provide licenses to illegal aliens under the federal and state Equal Protection Clauses. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits states from “denying] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1. Article I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution provides: “All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the general assembly shall not grant to any citizen or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.” Iowa Const, art. I, § 6. Because neither party in this case has argued that our equal protection analysis under the Iowa Constitution should differ in any way from our analysis under the Federal Constitution, we decline to apply divergent analyses in this case. See Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2004) (“[I]t is prudent to delay any consideration of whether a different analysis is appropriate to a case in which this issue was thoroughly briefed and explored.” (citing In re Detention of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275, 280 n. 1 (Iowa 2000))).

State laws are subjected to various levels of scrutiny depending on the classification the laws draw and the kind of right the laws affect. If a statute affects a fundamental right or classifies individuals on the basis of race, alienage, or national origin, it is subjected to strict scrutiny review. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313, 320 (1985) (citations omitted). The State must prove it is narrowly tailored to the achievement of a compelling state interest. Id. (citations omitted). If a statute classifies individuals on the basis of gender or legitimacy, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny and will only be upheld if it is substantially related to an important state interest. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2275, 135 L.Ed.2d 735, 751 (1996); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268, 99 S.Ct. 518, 524, 58 L.Ed.2d 503, 511 (1978). But

[t]he general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. When social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude, and the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.

City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. at 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d at 320 (citations omitted).

The classes argued in their brief that we should apply strict scrutiny in this case. However, at oral arguments, counsel correctly conceded that no suspect class or fundamental right was at issue in this case and that rational basis was the appropriate level of scrutiny. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2398, 72 L.Ed.2d 786, 803 (1982) (“Undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class because their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a ‘constitutional irrelevancy.’ ”); id. at 218 n. 15, 102 S.Ct. at 2395 n. 15, 72 L.Ed.2d at 799 n. 15 (stating that fundamental rights are those explicitly or implicitly contained in the Constitution).

Under rational-basis review, the statute need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. at 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d at 320. As the Supreme Court has explained:

Under rational-basis review, where a group possesses “distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement,” a State’s decision to act on the basis of those differences does not give rise to a constitutional violation. “Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Moreover, the State need not articulate its reasoning at the moment a particular decision is made. Rather, the burden is upon the challenging party to negative “ ‘any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.’ ”

Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366-67, 121 S.Ct. 955, 963-64, 148 L.Ed.2d 866, 879 (2001) (citations omitted); see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84, 120 S.Ct. 631, 646, 145 L.Ed.2d 522, 542 (2000) (“[W]hen conducting rational basis review ‘we will not overturn such [government action] unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the [government’s] actions were irrational.’ ” (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 943, 59 L.Ed.2d 171, 176 (1979))).

The State proffers four state interests served by the challenged statute: (1) “not allowing its governmental machinery to be a facilitator for the concealment of illegal aliens,” Doe v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 147 F.Supp.2d 1369, 1376 (N.D.Ga.2001); (2) “limiting its services to citizens and legal residents,” id.; (3) “restricting [Iowa] driver’s licenses to those who are citizens or legal residents because of the concern that persons subject to immediate deportation will not be financially responsible for property damage or personal injury due to automobile accidents,” id., (4); and discouragement of illegal immigration.

With respect to the first state interest, the classes respond that giving illegal aliens driver’s licenses will not necessarily facilitate their concealment because the DOT could make the licenses identify the holder’s status as an illegal alien. This is not an argument that the proffered state interest is not legitimate. Rather, it is an argument that the statute is not narrowly tailored. Nevertheless, the legislature is not required to employ the “best” means of achieving a legitimate state interest. Equal protection only requires the legislature to have reasonably believed that the means chosen would promote the purpose. W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 668, 101 S.Ct. 2070, 2083, 68 L.Ed.2d 514, 531 (1981). “As long as the classifieatory scheme chosen by [the legislature] rationally advances a reasonable and identifiable governmental objective, we must disregard the existence of other methods of allocation that we, as individuals, perhaps would have preferred.” Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 1083, 67 L.Ed.2d 186, 198 (1981). At least in cases when rational basis scrutiny applies, our system of federalism and separation of powers requires courts to allow state legislatures “ ‘to serve as laboratories for testing solutions to novel légal problems.’ ” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 275-76, 120 S.Ct. 746, 759,145 L.Ed.2d 756, 773-74 (2000) (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 24, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 1198, 131 L.Ed.2d 34, 53 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)); accord United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1641, 131 L.Ed.2d 626, 652 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that when “considerable disagreement exists about how to best accomplish [a] goal, ... the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear” (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1304-05, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, 52-53 (1973); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311, 52 S.Ct. 371, 386-87, 76 L.Ed. 747, 771 (1932) (Brandéis, J., dissenting))).

We conclude the state’s licensing scheme is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of “not allowing its governmental machinery to be a facilitator for the concealment of illegal aliens.” Doe, 147 F.Supp.2d at 1376. Thus, the classes have failed to carry their burden of negating all reasonable bases that could justify the challenged statute. Furthermore, we need not address the legitimacy of the other state interests proffered in this case. Denying driver’s licenses to the class of illegal aliens does not violate the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions.

B. Due Process

The classes also challenge the refusal by the DOT to license illegal immigrants under the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. Article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution provides that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Iowa Const, art. I, § 9. Because the parties have not articulated any basis for distinguishing the state due process analysis from the federal due process analysis, the federal analysis shall apply equally to appellants’ claim under article I, section 9. See Pfister v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Polk County, 688 N.W.2d 790, 795 (Iowa 2004) (“Because the parties have articulated no basis for distinguishing these clauses for purposes of determining a parolee’s right to counsel, our discussion of the federal due process claim applies equally to the claim made under the Iowa Constitution.” (Citations omitted.)); Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 675 N.W.2d at 6 (“Despite this court’s right to fashion its own test for examining claims brought under our state constitution, we do not think this case is the proper forum to consider an analysis that might be more compatible with Iowa’s constitutional language.... [I]t is prudent to delay any consideration of whether a different analysis is appropriate to a case in which this issue was thoroughly briefed and explored.” (Citations omitted.)).

The classes make a substantive due process argument in this appeal. Substantive due process “ ‘provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.’ ” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060, 147 L.Ed.2d 49, 56 (2000) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2267, 138 L.Ed.2d 772, 787 (1997); citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447, 123 L.Ed.2d 1, 16 (1993)). “ ‘Substantive due process’ analysis must begin with a careful description of the asserted right, for ‘[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.’ ” Reno, 507 U.S. at 302, 113 S.Ct. at 1447, 123 L.Ed.2d at 16 (citations omitted). If the liberty interest at issue is fundamental, strict scrutiny applies. Id. (citations omitted). ■ Otherwise, the challenged statute need only satisfy the rational-basis test. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 727, 117 S.Ct. at 2271, 138 L.Ed.2d at 792 (stating that if liberty interest is not fundamental, statute must still “be rationally related to legitimate government interests” (citations omitted)). Fundamental liberty interests are those that “are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’ ” Id. at 720-21, 117 S.Ct. at 2268, 138 L.Ed.2d at 787-88 (citations omitted). They include “the rights to marry, to have children, to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, to marital privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion.” Id. at 720, 117 S.Ct. at 2267, 138 L.Ed.2d at 787 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has “also assumed, and strongly suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.” Id. (citation omitted).

As previously noted, the classes conceded at oral arguments that there is no fundamental right implicated in this case. Thus, under substantive due process analysis, as with equal protection analysis, the statute need only meet the rational-basis test. For the reasons discussed in the equal protection analysis, the statute clearly meets that test.

C. Article I, Section 22 of the Iowa Constitution

As a part of its claim that the denial of driver’s licenses to undocumented aliens violates due-process principles, the classes further argue that it violates article 1, section 22 of the Iowa Constitution. Ar-tide T, section 22 of the Iowa Constitution provides:

Foreigners who are, or may hereafter become residents of this state, shall enjoy the same rights in respect to the possession, enjoyment and descent of property, as native born citizens.

We assume the classes claim that a driver’s license is “property” under article 1, section 22. However, the classes fail to examine this claim in their brief and fail to address any specific application of the language of section 22 to this case. See Iowa R.App. P. 6.14(l)(c). Accordingly, the classes have waived this argument, and we do not address it further. Id.

V. Federal Statutory Claims

The classes do not have a viable claim under § 1983 because their constitutional rights have not been violated. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes tó be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.... ” (Emphasis added.)). In addition, because the equal protection claim raised by the classes is meritless, their § 1981 claim must also fail. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2347, 156 L.Ed.2d 304, 342 (2003) (citing Gen. Building Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389-91, 102 S.Ct. 3141, 3149-50, 73 L.Ed.2d 835, 848-49 (1982) (the prohibition against discrimination in § 1981 is co-extensive with the Equal Protection Clause)). Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 242 is a criminal statute, under which there is no private right of action. Rockefeller v. U.S. Ct. of Appeals Office, for Tenth Circuit Judges, 248 F.Supp.2d 17, 28 (D.D.C.2003) (citing cases).

VI. Standing of the Does

“ ‘Standing to sue’ has been defined to mean that a party must have ‘sufficient stake in an otherwise justicia-ble controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.’ ” Our cases have determined that a complaining party must (1) have a specific personal or legal interest in the litigation and (2) be injuriously affected. In the Hawkeye Bancorporation case, we emphasized that having a legal interest in the litigation and being injuriously affected are separate requirements for standing, both of which must be satisfied.

Citizens for Responsible Choices v. City of Shenandoah, 686 N.W.2d 470, 475 (Iowa 2004) (citations omitted); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351, 364 (1992) (“First, the plaintiff must have suffered ah ‘injury in fact’ — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent’, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ ” Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be ‘fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court.’ Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’ (Citations and alterations omitted.)).

Because it is undisputed that the Sanchez class had standing to bring this suit and because we have already determined that the district court properly dismissed the suit, we need not decide whether the Doe class also had standing. “[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly held that if one party has standing in an action, a court need not reach the issue of the standing of other parties when it makes no difference to the merits of the case.” Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. United States, 987 F.2d 806, 810 (D.C.Cir.1993) (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189, 93 S.Ct. 739, 746, 35 L.Ed.2d 201, 211 (1973); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 n. 16, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2629 n. 16, 57 L.Ed.2d 595, 610 n. 16 (1978)).

VII. Conclusion

We conclude that the practice of denying driver’s licenses to illegal aliens violates none of the statutory and constitutional provisions raised by the classes. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED.

      . See generally Am. Immigration Lawyers’ Ass'n et al., Immigrant Access to State Driver’s Licenses: A Tool Kit for Advocates (Feb.2004), available at http://www.nclr.org/content/publi-cations/download/1073; Alexander L. Mounts, Note, A Safer Nation?: How Driver’s License Restrictions Hurt Immigrants and Noncitizens, Not Terrorists, 37 Ind. L.Rev. 247 (2003); Frank Santiago, Immigrant Court Case Stirs Debate Over Driving, Des Moines Reg., Jan. 9, 2005, at IB; Editorial, Allow Driver’s Licenses for Illegal Immigrants, Des Moines Reg., Jan. 5, 2005, at 8A.

      . See Office of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 2002 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 215 (Oct.2003), available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/abou-tus/statistics/ Yearbook2002.pdf (estimating there were 24,000 unauthorized immigrants in Iowa in 2000).

      . Iowa Code section 32Í.182(l)(a) (2003) requires applicants for licenses to provide a social security number on their applications for licenses. However, it also states: "Pursuant to procedures required by the department and for an applicant who is a foreign national temporarily present in this state, the department may waive the requirement that the application include the applicant's social security number.” Id. Yet,
      [i]f a licensee is a foreign national who is temporarily in this state, the license shall be issued only for the length of time the foreign national is authorized to be present as determined by the department, not to exceed two years.

        Id. § 321.196(1). To determine whether the applicant is “authorized to be present,” DOT regulations require the applicant to submit one of sixteen immigration documents. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 761-601.5(2)(a )(4) (2002).

      .Juan and Maria Sanchez are pseudonyms for the members of the class, as are John and Jane Doe.

      . The district court did not rule on this issue, but it was alleged in the classes' petition.


author: WIGGINS, Justice.

text:
    EMMET COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, Appellant, v. William RIDOUT, Trustee of the Erma Anderson Testamentary Trust for Lawrence Anderson, Deceased, Appellee.
    No. 04-0254.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Feb. 25, 2005.

      Gregory R. Brown, Christine B. Long, and Timothy S. Eckley of Duncan, Green, Brown & Langeness, P.C., Des Moines, and Peter C. Hart, Specially Appointed Emmet County Attorney, Emmetsburg, for appellant.
    James D. Hart, Estherville, for appellee.
   WIGGINS, Justice.

We must decide whether there is statutory or common-law authority supporting a county’s claim for reimbursement for payments made on behalf of one of its residents for community-based mental health services under Iowa Code chapter 225C (2001), and whether the five-year statute of limitations precludes the county from recovering any payments made on behalf of one of its residents for inpatient mental health services at a state hospital under Iowa Code chapter 230. Because we agree with the district court that there is neither statutory nor common-law authority supporting the county’s claim for reimbursement for payments made for community-based mental health services under chapter 225C, and the statute of limitations bars the county from recovering any payments made on this resident’s behalf for inpatient mental health services at a state hospital under chapter 230, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The parties submitted this case to the district court on stipulated facts. Lawrence Anderson, a resident of Emmet County, was born on June 3, 1939. At some point in time, Anderson was diagnosed with incurable schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. In connection with Emmet County’s obligation to provide support for a person committed to a state hospital, it paid $9,412.97 in mental health benefits on Anderson’s behalf for his care at the Cherokee Mental Health Institute from January 1,1968 to May 6,1970 and $6,834.99 on Anderson’s behalf for his care from August 4, 1970 to June 3, 1972. The county maintained an account ledger indicating Anderson or the persons legally liable for Anderson’s support were indebted to the county for the funds it advanced for Anderson’s care at the Cherokee Mental Health Institute. Anderson’s parents paid the county a small amount in a compromise settlement that reduced the account ledger to zero.

From April 5, 1973 through August 8, 1984, the county paid $25,518.68 for mental health benefits on Anderson’s behalf. Of this total, it paid $20,274.07 for inpatient treatment provided to Anderson at the Cherokee Mental Health Institute. Neither Anderson nor his parents entered into a compromise settlement for these payments. Instead, the county chose to maintain an account ledger regarding these benefits.

Anderson’s father died on January 16, 1982. Anderson’s mother died on April 6, 1987. Pursuant to her will, her estate passed equally to her three sons. Specifically, as to Anderson’s share, the will created a trust and provided:

Such of the income and corpus as needed shall be applied or distributed by said trustee, in cash or in kind, for the support, education and general welfare of my son, Lawrence F. Anderson. Said distribution shall be made to those persons and in such manner and amounts as said trustee, in its unrestricted discretion, believes will fulfill the purposes of this trust, regardless of the existence of other funds available for these purposes.

The will also contained a spendthrift clause, which stated the “interest of the beneficiary ... shall not be seized by creditors or said beneficiary or by anyone, by attachment, garnishment, execution or otherwise.”

The county made no payments on Anderson’s behalf from August 8, 1984 through August 5, 1993. On August 5, 1993, the county charged $7,637.22 to Anderson’s account ledger. On March 15, 1994, the county charged an additional $2,527.57 to the account ledger. The record does not establish why the county entered these charges on the ledger. The record does establish the last day Anderson received inpatient services at the Cherokee Mental Health Institute was October 10, 1984. From March 15, 1994 through June of 1996, the county paid an additional $7,814.67 in community-based outpatient mental health benefits for Anderson.

On June 25, 1996, Anderson and his trustee made an application to the county for additional community-based benefits. Included in the application was a disclosure that Anderson had financial resources available to him through the trust totaling $110,942.63. By a notice of decision dated August 1, 1996, the county denied the application because Anderson had resources available to him in excess of $2000 to cover the cost of the benefits requested. Anderson and his trustee responded to the notice of decision by filing a request for a conciliation process regarding the denial of his claim. The trustee and the county reached an agreement whereby the county authorized Anderson to receive partial payments for community-based services. The county memorialized this agreement in a written notice of decision stating the county would pay one-half of the cost of supervised apartment services and community support services with Anderson being responsible for paying $180 per month for his share of the cost of the services. The county later terminated its contribution towards community-based services on the basis Anderson was no longer receiving them.

On July 12, 1997, Anderson reapplied asking the county to continue to fund community-based services. The county approved this request on July 29, 1997. Until his death, Anderson annually reapplied to the county to fund community-based services. From July 1996 through the date of Anderson’s death, the trust created by Anderson’s parents paid $17,020.81 for community-based services. At the time of Anderson’s death, his trust assets had a fair market value of $123,713.57. No estate was opened because there were insufficient assets to require the administration of an estate.

On November 21, 2002, the board of supervisors filed a claim in probate against the Erma Anderson Testamentary Trust for Lawrence F. Anderson, deceased, for $60,687.89. This amount represented $20,274.07 for payments made by the county for inpatient services provided to Anderson from April 5,1973 through October 10, 1984, and $40,413.82 for payments made by the county for community-based services from August 5, 1993 until Anderson’s death on April 13, 2002.

The district court denied the county’s claim in probate. The district court found there was neither statutory nor common-law authority supporting the county’s claim for reimbursement for payments on Anderson’s behalf for community-based mental health services under Iowa Code chapter 225C, and the statute of limitations precluded the county from recovering any of the payments made on Anderson’s behalf for inpatient mental health services at a state hospital under Iowa Code chapter 230.

II. Issues.

In this appeal we must decide (1) whether statutory or common-law authority exists entitling the county to reimbursement from the trust for the sums it paid on Anderson’s behalf for community-based mental health services under Iowa Code chapter 225C; and (2) whether the statute of limitations precludes the county from recovering from the trust any payments it made on Anderson’s behalf for inpatient mental health services at a state hospital under Iowa Code chapter 230.

III. Scope of Review.

Because the district court tried this contested claim at law, our review is for the correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 6.4; In re Dodge’s Estate, 281 N.W.2d 447, 449 (Iowa 1979). Regarding the issue of substantial evidence, we have stated:

When a party challenges a district court’s ruling for lack of substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment. When a reasonable mind would accept the evidence as adequate to reach a conclusion, the evidence is substantial. Evidence is not insubstantial merely because we may draw different conclusions from it; the ultimate question is whether it supports the finding actually made, not whether the evidence would support a different finding. However, neither the district court’s conclusions of law nor its application of its legal conclusions is binding on appeal.

Raper v. State, 688 N.W.2d 29, 36 (Iowa 2004) (citations omitted).

IV. Analysis.

Payments Made Pursuant to Iowa Code Chapter 225C

The services provided to Anderson after October 10, 1984 were community-based mental health services governed by Iowa Code chapter 225C. The county concedes chapter 225C does not contain any provisions authorizing the county to seek reimbursement for the payments it made under chapter 225C. We have long held the common law of this state does not require a recipient of public assistance to reimburse the provider for the assistance received by the recipient. State v. Brooks, 412 N.W.2d 613, 614 (Iowa 1987). Any assistance furnished by the county is considered a charity to which the recipient is entitled and the county is obligated to provide. In re Estate of Frentress, 249 Iowa 783, 786, 89 N.W.2d 367, 368 (1958). Although there is neither statutory nor common-law authority for the county to seek reimbursement for the payments it made for community-based mental health services under chapter 225C, the county argues it is entitled to reimbursement for the payments it made on Anderson’s behalf because (1) the trust created by Anderson’s mother’s will was a discretionary support trust; (2) the trust entered into a contract with the county to reimburse the county; and (3) the home rule act allows the county to seek reimbursement for chapter 225C expenses.

Discretionary Support Trust Claim. The district court found and both parties agree that the trust is a discretionary support trust. A settlor creates a discretionary support trust when the purpose of the trust is to furnish the beneficiary with support, and the trustee has the discretion to pay the income or principal to the beneficiary, as the trustee deems necessary for the support of the beneficiary. In re Barkema Trust, 690 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Iowa 2004). The county argues that because our court of appeals held that a county could consider the assets of a discretionary support trust to • determine a beneficiary’s eligibility for county funding of mental health services, the county should be able to reach those same assets to reimburse it for the funds it expended on Anderson’s behalf for community-based mental health services under chapter 225C. See Strojek v. Hardin County Bd. of Supervisors, 602 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Iowa Ct.App.1999) (holding the assets of a discretionary support trust could be considered when determining a mentally handicapped beneficiary’s eligibility for living expenses).

Generally, in a discretionary support trust,

the beneficiary has a right that the trustee pay him the amount which in the exercise of reasonable discretion is needed for his support ...; and the beneficiary can transfer this interest or his creditors may reach it, unless it is protected by a spendthrift clause.

Barkema, 690 N.W.2d at 54 (citations omitted). Under certain circumstances, even the assets of a trust protected by a spendthrift clause, such as the trust in the present case, may be reached to satisfy and enforce a claim against the beneficiary. Restatement (Second) of Trusts, section 157 states:

Although a trust is a spendthrift trust or a trust for support, the interest of the beneficiary can be reached in satisfaction of an enforceable claim against the beneficiary,
(b) for necessary services rendered to the beneficiary or necessary supplies furnished to him;
(c) for services rendered and materials furnished which preserve or benefit the interest of the beneficiary.

Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 157, at 328 (1959).

We have not had the occasion to adopt Restatement (Second) of Trusts section 157(c)’s standard. We have adopted section 157(b)’s standard with qualifications. Those qualifications are:

(1) [T]he claim is for necessary goods or services, not officiously rendered, which the settlor intended to be provided the beneficiary by trust funds; and (2) the withholding of payment for the goods and services is not properly within the discretion granted the trustee by the instrument, before a creditor’s claim may be enforced against the trustee of a support trust subject to a spendthrift clause.

In re Dodge’s Estate, 281 N.W.2d at 451.

In addressing the county’s argument, we are not required to decide whether to adopt the standard in section 157(c), or if the standard of section 157(b), with the qualifications as adopted by this court, applies to the present case because section 157 is inapplicable to the county’s claim for reimbursement of chapter 225C expenses. Section 157 only allows a creditor to reach the assets of a spendthrift trust “in satisfaction of an enforceable claim against the beneficiary.” Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 157, at 328 (emphasis added). We have determined the county has neither a statutory nor a common-law right to recover chapter 225C expenses against Anderson or any other person who may be legally responsible for Anderson’s expenses. Without the right to recover the payments it made on Anderson’s behalf, the county does not have an enforceable claim against the trust, even though the county may have considered the trust assets to determine Anderson’s eligibility for community-based mental health services under chapter 225C.

Contract Claim. The county also argues the trust agreed to reimburse the county for chapter 225C expenses when the county agreed to pay part of the cost of community-based services. The district court considered this argument and found the parties did not enter into a contract requiring reimbursement by the trust.

Our review of the record reveals that when Anderson made a request for community-based services, he disclosed to the county in his application that the trust had $110,942.63 in assets available for Anderson’s support. -The county denied Anderson any services under chapter 225C because Anderson had resources in excess of $2000 available to him at the time of the application. Anderson appealed the initial non-eligibility finding by filing a request for a conciliation process. After Anderson filed the request for conciliation, the county reversed its original decision and in a written notice of decision agreed to pay part of the costs for -community-based mental health services for Anderson as long as Anderson’s trust was willing to pay for part of the services. This arrangement continued through a series of written notices of decision. Each time the county agreed to pay for services for Anderson, the trust was required to pay for part of the services. Not one of the notices of decision contained any language requiring the trust to reimburse the county for the payments it made.

Substantial evidence exists in the record supporting the findings of the district court. The district court was correct when it determined the parties did not enter into a contract requiring reimbursement by the trust for chapter 225C expenses advanced by the county for community-based mental health services.

Home Rule Claim. The county argues the implementation of home rule in Iowa Code chapter 381 supports its argument that the county is entitled to seek reimbursement for the sums it advanced under Iowa Code chapter 225C. The county contends section 331.756(47), which requires the county attorney to “[c]arry out duties relating to the collection of the costs for the care, treatment, and support of persons with mental illness as provided in sections 230.25 and 230.27,” gives it the authority to seek reimbursement for payments it made under chapter 225C. See Iowa Code § 331.756(47). The county’s reliance on section 331.756(47) is misplaced. By its clear and express terms, section 331.756(47) does not create a right to collect any payments advanced on behalf of a mentally ill person but merely lists the duties of a county attorney under the implementation of home rule. Therefore, Iowa Code chapter 331 does not grant the county any authority to collect payments made on Anderson’s behalf for community-based mental health services under chapter 225C.

For these reasons, we agree with the district court that the county cannot make a claim against the trust for reimbursement of the expenses it paid on behalf of Anderson for mental health community-based services under Iowa Code chapter 225C.

Payments Made Pursuant to Iowa Code Chapter 230

Prior to October 10, 1984, Anderson received inpatient mental health services at the Cherokee Mental Health Institute. When a person is committed to a state mental health institute, the county is responsible to reimburse the State for the necessary and legal costs and expenses of the commitment. Iowa Code § 230.1(l)(a). Although the county is responsible to reimburse the State for the costs and expenses of a patient’s care and treatment at a state mental health institute, the patient or a person legally liable for the patient’s support remains liable for those expenses. Id. § 230.15. Sections 230.25 through 230.27 contain the procedures for the county to obtain reimbursement from the patient or a person legally liable for the patient’s support.

Prior to beginning any collection efforts, the board of supervisors is required to conduct an investigation to determine if the patient or a person legally liable for the patient’s support is presently able to pay the expenses of the patient’s hospitalization. Id. § 230.25(1). If the board finds the patient or a person legally liable for the patient’s support is presently able to pay the expenses of the patient’s hospitalization, the auditor shall keep an index of the names of those persons presently able to pay the expenses, together with an accurate account of the charges. Id. § 230.26. After the board of supervisors makes its determination, and the auditor has indexed the names and charges, the board of supervisors can then turn the matter over to the county attorney for collection. Id. § 230.27. If a patient dies prior to collection, the county can make a claim in the estate against the person who is receiving or has received assistance under chapter 230. Id. § 230.30. Because the legislature included specific collection provisions in chapter 230, we conclude there is statutory authority for the county to recover any payments it made on Anderson’s behalf for inpatient treatment he received at the Cherokee Mental Health Institute. The district court, however, denied the county the right of reimbursement concluding the statute of limitations barred the county from seeking reimbursement, and the county failed to follow the applicable procedures of chapter 230 in seeking reimbursement.

Statute of Limitations. Iowa Code sections 230.15 and 230.25 through 230.27 create an open account for payments made by the county on behalf of a patient under chapter 230 between the patient and a person legally liable for the patient’s support and the county. See Scott County v. Townsley, 174 Iowa 192, 194-95, 156 N.W. 291, 292 (1916). A note or other written agreement between the parties does not evidence the debt created by chapter 230; therefore, the five-year statute of limitations governing unwritten contracts in Iowa Code section 614.1(4) applies to the county’s claim. Swartz v. Bly, 183 N.W.2d 733, 738 (Iowa 1971), A cause of action based on an open account “shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of the last item therein.... ” Iowa Code § 614.5; Townsley, 174 Iowa at 194-95, 156 N.W. at 292.

The last date Anderson received inpatient mental health services under chapter 230 was October 10, 1984. There are, however, entries on the account ledger indicating the county paid for services for Anderson as late as March 15,1994. Even if we assume the March 15,1994 entry was for inpatient mental health services provided by Iowa Code chapter 230, the county filed its claim against the trust more than five years after the date of the last item on the account ledger. The failure of the county to file a timely claim bars the county from proceeding against the trust.

The county argues that the date of the last item on the open account was on April 8, 2002; thus, its cause of action did not accrue until this date. We disagree. The county made the April 8 payment for community-based mental health services provided Anderson under chapter 225C. Although a book record evidences an account in its technical legal meaning, in its broader sense “an account is equivalent to a ‘claim’ or ‘demand’ based upon a transaction creating a debtor-creditor relation.” In re Stratman’s Estate, 231 Iowa 480, 489, 1 N.W.2d 636, 643 (1942). The payments on Anderson’s behalf for community-based mental health services on April 8, 2002 under chapter 225C did not create a debtor-creditor relation between the county and the trust because any payments made by the county pursuant to chapter 225C are not recoverable by the county. Thus, the March 15, 1994 item is the last item arguably creating a debtor-creditor relation that the county could have legitimately entered on the account ledger. More than five years transpired between the March 15, 1994 entry and the filing of the claim

The county also argues the statute of limitations did not begin to run until Anderson’s death. The county relies on In re Sadler’s Estate, 73 S.D. 56, 38 N.W.2d 879 (1949), as authority for its argument. Sadler is distinguishable because the statutory scheme in South Dakota for the recovery of payments made by a county on behalf of a person with mental illness is significantly different from the statutory scheme found in Iowa Code chapter 230. As far back as 1916, this court has held that under Iowa’s statutory scheme a county must commence its cause of action for reimbursement of payments made by it on behalf of one of its residents committed to a state hospital within five years from the last item on the account. Townsley, 174 Iowa at 194-95, 156 N.W. at 292. We see no reason to abandon this authority when the county makes a claim in probate against a third party, rather than against the estate of the person receiving or who has received assistance under chapter 230.

Lastly, the county argues Anderson’s June 25, 1996 application for benefits constituted a novation or revival of the debt for all services provided to the county to Anderson prior to that date. To prove a novation, the county must establish its elements by clear and satisfactory evidence. In re Integrated Res. Life Ins. Co., 562 N.W.2d 179, 182 (Iowa 1997). The elements of a novation are “(1) a previous valid obligation; (2) agreement of all parties to the new contract; (3) extinguishment of the old contract; and (4) validity of the new contract.” Id. (citations omitted).

The district court addressed this issue and concluded:

More specifically, as stated in the findings of fact, there is no evidence in the record to suggest [the parties] discussed any prior agreement between the county and Larry and/or the trust to reimburse it for services previously provided. Moreover, the county has failed to come forward with any proof to establish that the trust and the county agreed to extinguish any old contract and entered into a new contract, beyond the trust paying a portion of Larry’s community-based services. In the absence of such proof, the court concludes that the county has failed to establish the existence of a novation in this case.

On our review of the record, we agree with the district court that the county has failed to establish by clear and satisfactory evidence a novation occurred reviving the debt for payments it made on Anderson’s behalf for inpatient mental health services under chapter 230.

We need not address the issue as to whether the county followed the applicable procedures found in chapter 230 because we agree with the district court that the statute of limitations bars the county’s claim for reimbursement under chapter 230.

V. Disposition.

We affirm the judgment of the district court because we agree with the district court that there is neither statutory nor common-law authority supporting the county’s claim for reimbursement for payments made on Anderson’s behalf for community-based mental health services under Iowa Code chapter 225C, and the statute of limitations bars the county from recovering any payments made on Anderson’s behalf for inpatient mental health services at a state hospital under Iowa Code chapter 230.

AFFIRMED.

      . Iowa Code section 230.30 provides:
      On the death of a person receiving or who has received assistance under the provisions of this chapter, and whom the board has previously found, under section 230.25, is able to pay there shall be allowed against the estate of such decedent a claim of the sixth class for that portion of the total amount paid for that person's care which exceeds the total amount of all claims of the first through the fifth classes, inclusive, as defined in section 633.425, which are allowed against that estate.
      We do not have to decide the effect of this section on the statute of limitations because the county made the claim against the trust, not against the estate of the person receiving or who has received assistance under chapter 230.


author: LARSON, Justice.

text:
    IOWA SUPREME COURT BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT, Appellee, v. Dewey P. SLOAN, Jr., Appellant.
    No. 04-1567.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Feb. 25, 2005.
    Bruce L. Walker of Phelan, Tucker, Mullen, Walker, Tucker & Gelman, L.L.P., Iowa City, for appellant.
    Charles L. Harrington and Teresa A. Vens, Des Moines, for appellee.
   LARSON, Justice.

The grievance commission of this court has found the respondent, Dewey P. Sloan, Jr., has violated our Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers and has recommended suspension of his license for a minimum of ninety days. On our review of the commission’s findings and recommendation, we conclude the violations have been established by the requisite standard of proof, and we order his license suspended for a minimum of three months.

The respondent has practiced law since 1987. He has most recently been practicing in LeMars, Iowa. In 2003 he was charged with three drug offenses: Count I — gathering where drugs are used (Iowa Code section 124.407 (2003), a serious misdemeanor); Count II — possession of drug paraphernalia (Iowa Code section 124.414, a simple misdemeanor); and Count III— possession of crack cocaine (Iowa Code section 124.401(5), a serious misdemeanor). Under a plea agreement, Sloan pled guilty to Counts II and III, and the court dismissed Count I. Sloan was fined $50 on Count II; on Count III, he received a 180-day suspended sentence with one year probation, revocation of his driver’s license for 180 days, and a $250 fine. He was also ordered to complete substance-abuse toeatment, abstain from all mind-altering substances, and provide random drug specimens.

Sloan spent one month at Keystone Treatment Center in South Dakota, where he completed their inpatient treatment program. He also received treatment as an outpatient at the Jackson Recovery Center in LeMars. This center recommended outpatient treatment for five years with random drug testing. The Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct filed a complaint against Sloan in March 2004. In July 2004 the board and Sloan filed a stipulation of facts, basically setting out the facts as outlined above. In addition, Sloan admitted violations of DR 1-102(A)(1) (lawyer shall not violate a disciplinary rule) and DR 1-102(A)(6) (lawyer shall not engage in conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law).

The stipulation noted, as mitigating circumstances, that Sloan had completed inpatient toeatment in South Dakota and outpatient treatment at the LeMars facility. It also noted aggravating circumstances, including Sloan’s representation of drug-case defendants and his resulting familiarity with “the impact of illegal drugs on both individuals and the community.” In addition, Sloan had represented a defendant, Richard Myers, in an unrelated drug case, despite the fact that Sloan had witnessed Myers’ drug-trafficking activities. In fact, reports by investigating officers revealed that it was Sloan’s personal involvement in Myers’ drug activities that led to Sloan’s own problems with the law.

As a part of the stipulation, it was agreed that a sixty-day suspension of Sloan’s license would be appropriate, although the stipulation acknowledged that “[t]he parties understand and agree that neither the Grievance Commission nor the Iowa Supreme Court is bound by its recommendation.”

The grievance commission found the facts as set out above. The commission found that Sloan had illegally used drugs with Myers and that the district court had removed Sloan as Myers’ attorney because of his conflict of interest. Sloan’s tenacity in obtaining drugs, the commission found, caused him to place twenty-six calls to Myers in one day to obtain drugs. The court found that a “convincing preponderance of the evidence,” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Mattson, 558 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Iowa 1997), supported a finding that Sloan had violated DR 1-102(A)(1) and DR 1-102(A)(6).

Despite the parties’ agreement that a sixty-day suspension would be appropriate, the commission recommended a ninety-day suspension. The commission said this was

[b]ased upon Respondent’s harm he has caused his client despite knowing Respondent was a witness to Myers’ drug trafficking activities and with Respondent’s use of illegal drugs with his own client, Myers, who was also Respondent’s supplier of illegal drugs.

The parties correctly observed in their stipulation that the matter of sanction is solely within the authority of this court. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Shuminsky, 359 N.W.2d 442, 444 (Iowa 1984); Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Wollenzien, 342 N.W.2d 490 (Iowa 1984). In resolving the question of sanctions,

we impose an appropriate sanction, considering not only the respondent’s fitness to practice law, but the need to deter others from similar conduct and assure the public that courts will uphold the ethics of the legal profession.

Shuminsky, 359 N.W.2d at 444-45.

Shuminsky was similar to this case in that it involved two misdemeanor convictions of drug possession. In determining the sanction to be applied, we noted the provisions of two ethical considerations. Under EC 1-5,

“[a] lawyer ... should refrain from all illegal and morally reprehensible conduct. Because of his position in society, even minor violations of law by a lawyer may tend to lessen public confidence in the legal profession. Obedience to law exemplifies respect for law. To lawyers especially, respect for the law should be more than a platitude.”

Id. at 445 (quoting EC 1-5). In addition, we noted that EC 9-6 provided: “ ‘Every lawyer owes a solemn duty ... to encourage respect for the law....”’ Id. (quoting EC 9-6). These ethical considerations remain essentially the same today, highlighting the special responsibilities of lawyers to refrain from the type of activity in which Sloan was engaged.

In Shuminsky we suspended the respondent’s license for not less than three months, id. at 446, and we believe that is the appropriate sanction here. Accordingly, we suspend the license of the respondent for a period of not less than three months. This- suspension shall apply to all facets of the practice of law as provided in Iowa Court Rule 35.12(3) and requires notification of clients as outlined in Iowa Court Rule 35.21. Costs are assessed against the respondent, and any reinstatement shall be conditioned on his payment of costs in full.

LICENSE SUSPENDED.


text:
    Kenneth E. STONE, Respondent, v. HAROLD CHEVROLET, and ASU Risk Management Group, Relators.
    No. A04-2311.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Feb. 24, 2005.
   ORDER

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals filed November 3, 2004, be, and the same is, affirmed without opinion. See Hoff v. Kempton, 317 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Minn.1982) (summary dispositions have no precedential value because they do not commit the court to any particular point of view, doing no more than establishing the law of the case).

Employee is awarded $1,200 in attorney fees.

BY THE COURT:

/s/Russell A. Anderson Associate Justice


author: ANDERSON, G. BARRY, Justice.

text:
    Mark CARNEY, petitioner, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.
    No. A04-513.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    March 10, 2005.

      Deborah K. Ellis, St. Paul, MN, for Appellant.
    Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Kimberly Parker, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for Respondent.
   OPINION

ANDERSON, G. BARRY, Justice.

Appellant Mark Carney appeals from a summary denial of his petition for postcon-viction relief alleging, inter alia, that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his lawyer did not adequately investigate his mental health, history and failed to present medical evidence at trial that may have supported Carney’s heat of passion defense and mitigated the element of premeditation. The postconviction court summarily denied Carney’s petition on the ground that his claims were procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 787 (1976). The postconviction court further stated that even if Carney’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not procedurally barred, it failed on the merits. We affirm the postconvietion court’s denial of relief.

The facts of this case are fully detailed in the opinion that we issued in response to Carney’s direct appeal. State v. Carney, 649 N.W.2d 455, 456-60 (Minn.2002). The following summary provides context for the issues Carney raises in this appeal. In August 2000, Mark Carney was indicted for the first-degree premeditated murder of John Voeller. At the time of the murder, Carney believed that Voeller was having an affair with his wife. In February 2001, Carney was tried before a Crow Wing County jury and found guilty of first-degree premeditated murder under Minn.Stat. § 609.185(1) (2004) and sentenced to life in prison.

Before trial, Carney’s counsel consulted with Dr. Todd Johnson, a doctor of pharmacy, who researched the drug Zoloft and reviewed Carney’s medical records. Johnson then submitted a memorandum to Carney’s counsel stating that in his professional opinion “it would be difficult to attribute Mr. Carney’s behavior to an adverse consequence of his Zoloft therapy.” At trial, Carney testified that in the spring of 1999 he experienced a loss of motivation and had trouble concentrating. After talking with his wife, he saw a physician and received a prescription for the anti-depressant Zoloft, which he stopped taking after three days.

Carney testified that in May 2000 his marriage had grown increasingly troubled, and that he again saw his doctor who prescribed the anti-depressant Wellbutrin, which he began to take. One month later, Carney was taken to the hospital by his parents after he threatened to kill himself. He cheeked himself out the next day. Shortly thereafter, Carney returned to his physician and received a second prescription for Zoloft, which he was taking at the time of the shooting. Although Carney testified at trial that he had taken Zoloft for three days the previous year, he did not testify that he was taking Zoloft at the time of the shooting. Rather, he testified only that he had “changed” his medication after he spent the night at the hospital.

During his testimony, Carney admitted that he shot Voeller, but claimed that he acted in the heat of passion and without premeditation, and requested a heat of passion manslaughter instruction. Id. at 459-60. The district court denied this request and Carney was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder. Id. On direct appeal Carney argued that the district court erred in denying his request for a heat of passion manslaughter instruction. Id. at 460. We affirmed his conviction, holding, inter alia, that the district court did not err in refusing to submit a heat of passion manslaughter instruction. Id. at 462-63.

Carney then filed a petition for postcon-viction relief, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer did not adequately investigate his mental health history, and thus failed to present medical evidence that would have negated the element of premeditation and supported Carney’s heat of passion defense. Relying on Knaffla, 309 Minn. at 246, 243 N.W.2d at 737, the postconviction court held that, because Carney knew of the claims at the time of his direct appeal but failed to bring those claims, and because no additional factfinding was required, his claims were procedurally barred. The postconviction court further noted that had Carney’s claims not been barred under Knaffla, they would have nonetheless failed on the merits.

Because claims of ineffective assistance of counsel involve mixed questions of law and fact, we review postconviction court decisions regarding such claims de novo. Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d 414, 420 (Minn.2004). A defendant is permitted to seek postconviction relief “to vacate and set aside the judgment * ⅜ * or grant a new trial ⅜ ⅜ * or make other disposition as may be appropriate.” Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2004). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing the facts alleged in the petition by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Minn.Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3; McKenzie v. State, 687 N.W.2d 902, 905 (Minn.2004). A district court must grant an evidentiary hearing for any postconviction petition filed, unless the issues raised in the petition conclusively show that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. Minn.Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1; Roby v. State, 531 N.W.2d 482, 483 (Minn.1995).

When a direct appeal has been taken and litigated before this court, all matters raised during that appeal and all claims known but not raised by the defendant will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief. Ives v. State, 655 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Minn.2003) (citing Knaffla, 309 Minn. at 252, 243 N.W.2d at 741) (“Knaffla rule”). This court has established two exceptions to the Knaffla rule: 1) where a claim is so novel that the legal basis was not available on direct appeal, or 2) where the petitioner did not “deliberately and inexcusably” fail to raise the claim on direct appeal and fairness requires its consideration. Dukes v. State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 251 (Minn.2001).

In this case, it is not disputed that at the time of his direct appeal Carney was aware of the strategy his counsel pursued at trial, including what evidence had been presented to the jury and what evidence had been withheld. Thus, Carney’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is Knaffla-barred unless Carney can demonstrate that it falls within one of the two established exceptions.

Because the legal basis for Carney to bring an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was available on direct appeal, the first exception does not apply. But, under the second Knaffla exception, a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel known but not raised at the time of direct appeal may be brought in a postcon-viction petition if the claim cannot be “evaluated by an appellate court on direct appeal based on the briefs and trial court transcript, without any additional factfind-ing.” Robinson v. State, 567 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Minn.1997); Torres v. State, 688 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn.2004) (“A claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that can be decided on the basis of the trial court record must be brought on direct appeal and is procedurally barred when raised in a postconviction petition.”); see also Dukes, 621 N.W.2d at 255.

Thus, the issue before us is whether any information beyond the briefs and trial court record is needed to resolve Carney’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. If so, Carney is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to develop a proper record. If not, his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was properly barred under Knaffla by the postconviction court.

We have previously held that an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was not Knaffla-barred, despite an appellant’s failure to raise it on direct appeal, when it involved attorney-client communications and required additional factfinding. See Robinson, 567 N.W.2d at 494-95 (concluding that where an attorney allegedly failed to communicate two plea offers, an eviden-tiary hearing was required to determine “whether in fact the trial attorney communicated the plea offers.”); Dukes, 621 N.W.2d at 255 (concluding that an eviden-tiary hearing was required to establish whether the appellant had consented to his attorney’s decision to concede appellant’s guilt). But, “not all ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are alike.” Torres, 688 N.W.2d at 572. In this case, Carney’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim does not concern attorney-client communications. Rather, Carney’s claims focus on trial strategy issues.

Specifically, Carney argues that his attorney’s decision not to investigate his medical history in more detail, and not to present expert medical testimony regarding Carney’s mental state, was strategically unsound. Carney claims that such testimony would have corroborated his claim that he was depressed and acted in the heat of passion when he shot Voeller. Carney argues that had his counsel presented expert testimony, the district court may have given a heat of passion manslaughter instruction. According to Carney, his claims are not procedurally barred under Knaffla because, although he knew of the general facts underlying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim at the time of his direct appeal, additional factfinding is necessary to determine the merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

We conclude that Carney’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim can be decided on the basis of the briefs and trial court record, and thus should have been brought prior to — or at the time of— his direct appeal. See Robinson, 567 N.W.2d at 495. In deciding ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, we review whether “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Opsahl, 677 N.W.2d at 421 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable, Boitnott v. State, 631 N.W.2d 362, 370 (Minn.2001), and we give particular deference to trial strategy. State v. Lahue, 585 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Minn.1998). We have acknowledged that “it is ‘all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.’ ” State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 844 (Minn.2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Thus, we “ ‘judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct,’ ” with a high degree of deference. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d at 844 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052).

The trial court record and the briefs indicate that Carney’s counsel’s representation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. In this case, very few facts were disputed. Carney’s actions on the morning of the shooting were corroborated by a number of witnesses, and the shooting itself took place in a public space, with a number of onlookers. Given the volume of evidence regarding Carney’s activities the day of the shooting- — particularly the undisputed fact that Carney shot Voeller twice in the head at close range with a shotgun — his counsel had few plausible defense strategies from which to choose. Carney concedes in his postcon-viction petition that his counsel investigated a “Zoloft defense,” and, based on the recommendation of an expert, concluded that presenting such a defense was not a reasonable tactic. Instead, Carney’s counsel chose to present the case under a heat of passion theory.

Carney was aware throughout trial that his counsel pursued neither an involuntary intoxication defense nor a defense based on expert medical testimony regarding Carney’s mental health, and stated in his petition for postconviction relief that prior to trial he agreed with his counsel’s strategy “to concede that he was the person who fired the fatal shot causing the victim’s death.” This indicates that he not only was aware of his counsel’s strategy, but that he approved of it. Given the facts of this case and the high degree of deference we give to questions of trial strategy, we conclude that the trial record and briefs clearly establish that no additional fact-finding would have been required to decide Carney’s ineffective" assistance of trial counsel claim, and that therefore the second Knaffla exception does not apply. We thus hold that the postconviction court did not abuse'its discretion in concluding that Carney’s claim is barred under Knaffla.

Affirmed.

      . In Torres, we reiterated that the “best procedure” for raising an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim that cannot be decided on the trial court record "is to file a petition for postconviction relief before appeal.” 688 N.W.2d at 572, n. 1 (quoting Robinson, 567 N.W.2d at 495 n. 3 (citing Roby, 531 N.W.2d at 484, n. 1)).