author: CADY, Justice.

text:
    EXCEL CORPORATION, Appellee, v. Joseph E. SMITHART, Appellant.
    No. 01-0702.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Dec. 18, 2002.

      Dennis W. Emanuel of.Webber, Gaumer & Emanuel, P.C., Ottumwa, and Anne L. Clark of Hopkins & Huebner, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
    Dorothy L. Kelley, Des Moines, for ap-pellee.
   CADY, Justice.

In this workers’ compensation appeal, we are asked to revisit our rule governing apportionment of disability resulting from multiple work injuries, and our rule governing employer accommodations in determining industrial disability.' The workers’ compensation commissioner awarded benefits to the worker based on a finding of two separate injuries to the same area of the body, refused to apportion the resulting disability, and refused to consider accommodations made by the employer following the injuries. Our review follows review by the district court and the court of appeals. We vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the decision of the district court, and remand the case to the workers’ compensation commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Joseph Smithart began working for Excel Corporation in Ottumwa, Iowa, in 1989. He worked as a laborer, and held a number of different jobs for the company over the years. Smithart performed unskilled manual labor for a variety of other employers prior to his employment with Excel. He was born in 1951 and left school after the ninth grade. Standard intelligence tests showed Smithart functions within the borderline range of mental retardation.

Smithart sustained a number of injuries while working at Excel. Most of the injuries were to his lower back, but he was able to return to work after each episode:

One of the back injuries occurred on November 30, 1995, while Smithart was lifting boxes of meat. He returned to work shortly after the injury, with a fifty pound lifting restriction imposed by his doctor.

Smithart also hurt his back on May 6, 1997, again while lifting boxes. Following this incident, his doctor imposed a twenty-five pound lifting restriction. Medical treatment for his back injuries over the period of his employment has essentially been limited to the administration of pain medication, such as aspirin. He has never had surgery on his back.

Smithart filed nine workers’ compensation claims for benefits based on the injuries to his back. One claim was filed on October 13, 1997, based on his November 30, 1995, injury. He also filed a claim on May 4, 1999, based on the May 6, 1997, incident.

A consolidated hearing on the claims revealed Smithart continued to work at Excel despite his back injuries. Excel always provided him with jobs within his lifting restrictions, and Smithart rarely missed any work, even after the injuries. Medical tests indicated the presence of degenerative disc disease in his back, with a possible herniated disc. One medical doctor gave Smithart a permanent impairment rating of five percent, while another doctor gave him a permanent rating of eight percent.

The workers’ compensation commissioner found Smithart sustained an industrial disability of twenty percent as a result of the November 1995 injury. The commissioner also found Smithart sustained a separate injury in May 1997, supported by the enhanced lifting restriction, resulting in an industrial disability of forty percent. The separate injuries were found to be a part of an ongoing cumulative injury. The commissioner dismissed the remaining seven claims. The commissioner found Smit-hart failed to prove an injury was sustained in six of the claims, and failed to establish a permanent disability in the remaining claim.

The commissioner refused to consider the efforts by Excel to accommodate Smit-hart’s lifting restrictions in determining the industrial disability. Additionally, the commissioner refused to apportion the two disabilities. Consequently, Smithart was awarded one hundred weeks of permanent partial disability benefits for the 1995 injury. In addition, he was awarded 200 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits for the 1997 injury. The benefits were made retroactive to the date of injury, and Excel was directed to pay all accrued amounts in a lump sum with interest.

Excel filed a petition for judicial review. In its review of the case, the district court reversed the decision of the commissioner. The district court found there was no substantial evidence in the record to support an industrial disability of twenty percent for the 1995 injury, and no substantial evidence to support two separate cumulative injuries. The district' court further found no substantial evidence to support a total industrial disability of forty percent. Because of these findings, the district court determined it was unnecessary to address the issue whether the disability awards should have been apportioned.

Smithart filed an appeal from the district court decision, and we transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed the decision of the district court and affirmed the decision of the commissioner. We granted further review.

On further review, Excel claims substantial evidence was lacking to support an award of twenty percent disability for the first cumulative injury and forty percent disability for the second cumulative injury. In support of this claim, Excel points out that Smithart continued to work at Excel at a regular job despite his back problems, and the reduction in his lifting restriction from fifty pounds to twenty-five pounds in 1997 was not based on his permanent inability to lift the greater weight but was a precautionary measure to avoid aggravating his back condition in the future. Excel further argues there was no substantial evidence to support two distinct and discrete disabilities, only evidence of a single degenerative process that was aggravated by the 1997 incident.

Excel also claims that, in the event the two separate awards stand, Iowa Code section 85.36(9)(c) (1997) requires they be apportioned because the two benefit periods overlap. The court of appeals acknowledged an overlap in the benefits, but held that the apportionment under section 85.36(9)(c) only applies when the first injury is not work-related. Excel asserts that the failure to apportion the disabilities resulted in double recovery, and provides a disincentive for employers to reemploy a disabled employee following an injury. Finally, Excel asserts that the failure to consider employer accommodations in determining the amount of an industrial disability punishes employers for their efforts to keep disabled employees employed, and provides a disincentive for an employer to accommodate disabled workers, which ultimately harms the worker.

II. Standard of Review.

An appeal from a district court decision on judicial review of an agency decision “ ‘is limited to determining whether the district court correctly applied the law in exercising its [review]’ ” under Iowa Code section 17A.19(8) (1997). Herrera v. IBP, Inc., 633 N.W.2d 284, 287 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted). We are “ ‘bound by the commissioner’s factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record.’ ” IBP, Inc. v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted).

III. Background of Governing Legal Theories.

Before addressing specific issues raised on appeal, we will review the underlying legal theories driving the central dispute presented on appeal. The parties do not dispute that' Smithart sustained a work-related injury resulting in disability, and that compensation is due. The disagreement concerns the amount of disability and whether the disability resulted from a single injury or two separate and discrete cumulative injuries. The dispute over the number and nature of the injuries arises because the amount of compensation can vary dramatically depending-on whether a disability results from a single injury or from two separate injuries. The reason for the difference in the amount of compensation relates to the impact of the “cumulative injury rule” and the “full-responsibility rule.” We first examine these two rules and then consider their impact on the issues presented on appeal.

We first recognized the “cumulative injury rule” in McKeever Custom Cabinets v. Smith, 379 N.W.2d 368, 373-74 (Iowa 1985). In McKeever, a worker developed a gradual injury to his wrist from a series of work activities beginning when he commenced employment. There was no single disabling injury, but the condition eventually eaused the worker to quit his employment three years later. He then filed a report of injury and instituted a workers’ compensation claim a few months later. The employer argued that the claim was not filed within the two-year statutory period of limitations because the work activity that first gave rise to the injury began when he started his employment. We rejected the argument and adopted a rule that the injury in such a case does not occur until the disability is apparent, such as that tinte when it prevents the employee from working. McKeever, 379 N.W.2d at 374; see also Ellingson v. Fleetguard, Inc., 599 N.W.2d 440, 444 (1999). In doing so, we recognized that workers’ compensation liability was not confined to disabilities arising from accidents, but includes disabilities which gradually develop “over a period of time.” McKeever, 379 N.W.2d at 373. This principle is known as the “cumulative injury rule.” As subsequently developed by other cases, it simply means that when a worker develops a disability over time from work activities, the compensable injury itself occurs when the claimant becomes aware “he or she suffers from a condition or injury” and such “condition or injury was caused by the claimant’s employment.” Herrera, 633 N.W.2d at 288. It is also known as the “gradual injury rule.” McKeever, 379 N.W.2d at 373.

We have also adopted what we call the “full-responsibility rule.” See Second Injury Fund v. Nelson, 544 N.W.2d 258, 265 (Iowa 1995). This rule provides, “[w]hen there are two successive work-related injuries, the employer liable for the second injury ‘is generally held liable for the entire disability resulting from the combination of the prior disability and the present injury.’ ” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Auten, 541 N.W.2d 252, 254 (Iowa 1995)). This rule is actually another way of describing our general rule governing apportionment of disability in workers’ compensation proceedings. See generally Celotex Corp., 541 N.W.2d at 254. Absent a statute, we generally do not apportion the disability of two successive work-related injuries. Id.

These two rules have no doctrinal relationship, but converge to produce different amounts of compensation in those cases where disability results from work-related injuries or conditions to the same area of the body during the course of employment. Generally, the full-responsibility rule means a worker will receive greater total compensation for such an injury if the disability results from two separate injuries causing disability as opposed to a single cumulative injury, or the aggravation of a prior work-injury. See Floyd v. Quaker Oats, 646 N.W.2d 105, 108-09 (Iowa 2002).

For example, if a worker sustains a back injury resulting in a permanent partial disability of twenty percent and later, after returning to work, sustains a second separate back injury resulting in a permanent partial disability of forty percent, the worker is entitled to be compensated for the forty percent disability based on the second injury even though the worker has previously received compensation for the twenty percent disability. Although the worker has a forty percent disability, the worker actually receives a total disability award between the two disabilities of sixty percent.

On the other hand, if multiple injuries to a single area of the body are considered to be cumulative in nature, the employer is only required to pay compensation based on the disability resulting from the cumulative injury. In this situation, the compensation is based on the percentage of disability at the time of the cumulative injury.

In Ellingson, we acknowledged that one benefit to a worker who establishes two separate injuries, as opposed to a subsequent aggravation of a prior injury, is that the second injury claim is compensated using current wages, which will normally provide a higher wage base and result in greater compensation to the worker. See Ellingson, 599 N.W.2d at 444. The present case, however, illustrates even a greater benefit to a worker who establishes two separate injuries, as opposed to a single cumulative injury or an aggravation of a prior injury. If a cumulative injury is established, the employer only pays compensation based on the disability resulting from that single injury. In such a case, the full-responsibility rule does not apply, and the claimant is compensated for the amount of the resulting disability. However, if two separate injuries are established or if two separate cumulative injuries are established, compensation is based on the existence of the two separate disabilities, both of which are recoverable under the full-responsibility rule, unless otherwise provided by statute.

Excel forcefully argues that the rule against apportionment of disability resulting from separate and discrete injuries to the same portion of the body permits a worker to piecemeal a chronic work-related condition to a single area of the body in such a manner that the worker will eventually be awarded benefits for a disability that could exceed one hundred percent of the whole body. As applied to this case, Excel argues it is unfair to be required to pay out total benefits equal to a sixty percent' disability to Smithart when he has only sustained a forty percent disability. Excel adumbrates that such a result will become a powerful disincentive for employers to re-employ injured workers.

We explained the rationale for the full-responsibility rule in Celotex. Celotex Corp., 541 N.W.2d at 254-55. Essentially, it is built on the concept that an industrial disability is not a final indicator of the degree to which a worker can use his or her body to earn wages, and it does not consider the human capacity and spirit to overcome a disability through rehabilitation, adjustments, simple perseverance, or other methods. See id. Thus, regardless of the disability sustained, a worker who returns to work does so as a “working unit.” Id. If the worker has resumed employment for the employer by performing the assigned work, there is no reason to treat the worker as disabled in the event a second disabling injury is sustained. Thus, an employer receives no credit or apportionment for the previous compensation paid'.

The perceived unfairness articulated by Excel not only ignores this “working unit” rationale for the rule against apportionment of successive work-related injuries, but also overlooks the predicate requirement for the full-responsibility rule that each injury resulting in increased disability be separate and discrete. See Floyd, 646 N.W.2d at 109; Ellingson, 599 N.W.2d at 444-45. The separate and discrete requirement prevents a worker from transforming a chronic condition into multiple, injuries, and obtaining the multiple separate recoveries feared by Excel. Thus, employers are protected against paying for the prior disability over and over by the separate and discrete requirement.

Additionally, the distinction between the manner in which compensation is awarded for a single cumulative injury to an area of the body and two separate and discrete injuries to the same area has been partially diffused by section 85.36(9)(c). This section alters our apportionment rule, in some instances, by providing, in relevant part:

In computing the compensation to be paid to any employee who, before the accident for which the employee claims compensation, was disabled and drawing compensation under the provisions of this chapter, the compensation for each subsequent injury shall be apportioned according to the proportion of disability caused by the respective injuries which the employee shall have suffered....

Iowa Code § 85.36(9)(c). Thus, apportionment of disability between two work-related injuries is statutorily permitted when the worker is “disabled and drawing compensation” at the time of the “accident for which the employee claims compensation.” Id.

In this case, the industrial commissioner found Smithart suffered two separate disabilities, and Excel challenges the evidence to support this finding. Before addressing this question, however, we observe that the benefit to the worker of basing a claim for compensation on two separate injuries, as' opposed to one cumulative or gradual injury, must be considered in light of the legislative exception to the full-responsibility rule. If this limitation applies in this case, the impact of the distinction between the existence of a single injury or separate injuries is diminished.

The exception to the full-responsibility rule carved out by our legislature in section 85.36(9)(c) applies in those cases where a worker makes a claim for a work activity injury but was “disabled and drawing compensation” based on a prior injury at the time of the accident giving rise to the claim. The same “working unit” rationale that supports the full-responsibility rule likely supports the statutory exception. If a worker was disabled from a prior injury and still receiving benefits for that prior injury, the worker has not yet, in theory, resumed employment as a “working unit.” Thus, when two injuries occur too close in time, it is the apparent judgment of our legislature that the worker loses his or her entitlement to two separate compensable disabilities and may only recover compensation for the total disability as a result of both injuries.

We recognize section 85.36(9)(c) applies only when the employee is “disabled and drawing compensation” for the first injury at the time of the second injury subject to the compensation claim. Of course, Smithart was not actually receiving compensation at the time of the second injury in this case because the first claim had not yet been adjudicated. Nevertheless, compensation awards are made retroactive to the date of injury and we apply the statute in the same manner. Moreover, the rationale for apportionment of disability applies to either situation. The worker was disabled at the time of the second injury and the second injury occurred before the compensation period for the disability ended.

Nevertheless, the court of appeals held that section 85.36(9)(c) did not apply to this case based on the theory that apportionment takes place only when the prior injury is unrelated to employment. Thus, it reasoned that any statute providing for apportionment is also limited to cases where the prior injury is unrelated to employment. This approach, however, misreads our prior cases.

In developing what we have now labeled as the full-responsibility rule, we made an exception in those cases “where a prior injury or illness, unrelated to the employment, independently produces some ascertainable portion of the ultimate industrial disability” following a second injury. Celotex, 541 N.W.2d at 255. Thus, we permit apportionment where the prior injury was “ ‘unrelated to the employment.’ ” Tussing v. George A. Hormel & Co., 461 N.W.2d 450, 453 (Iowa 1990) (citation omitted). This was a judicially created restriction to the application of the rule. Yet, our legislature created its own exception in those cases where disabilities overlap. This exception stands on its own, and is not affected by our exception involving prior injuries unrelated to employment. Accordingly, whether or not the injury in this case is a cumulative injury, an aggravation of a pri- or injury, or two separate and distinct injuries, Smithart cannot be compensated for more than his ultimate percentage of disability because his periods of disability overlap. The major dispute between the parties, therefore, loses much of its fight, and is reduced to a determination over the base wage to use in calculating benefits. We now turn to the issues presented.

IV. Substantial Evidence.

The standard that must be met to establish two separate- work-related injuries requires a claimant to demonstrate a distinct and discrete “disability attributable to ... work activities” that occurs after an initial injury. Ellingson, 599 N.W.2d at 444. It is not enough for the worker to show disability has been increased by subsequent work activities. Id. These circumstances may serve to increase the disability attributable to the first injury, but do not establish a separate and discrete disability. Id. To establish a separate injury claim, the subsequent condition of the claimant must not be a consequence of the first injury. See id.

Smithart chose to establish separate multiple injuries, as opposed to a single cumulative injury. The workers’ compensation commissioner found the existence of two separate injuries, and we must review each finding of a separate injury. Under our standard of review, substantial evidence supports the finding of an injury sustained on November 30, 1995, resulting in a disability. Smithart experienced a work-related injury to his back and the injury resulted in the imposition of a permanent lifting restriction.

On the other hand,-the only evidence of a separate and discrete injury in this case following the November 30, 1995, injury was the report made by Smithart that his back became sore on May 6, 1997, after lifting boxes, and that his lifting restriction was subsequently reduced from fifty pounds to approximately twenty-five pounds. The commissioner specifically found the disability from the May 6, 1997, incident was manifested by the “change in activity restrictions.” There was no other medical evidence suggesting a discrete injury.

Under our standard of review, we cannot conclude there was substantial evidence to support a finding of two separate and discrete disabilities. If a claimant establishes the existence of an initial disability based on an injury to the lower back resulting in the imposition of a lifting restriction, the mere subsequent imposition of a greater lifting restriction could indicate either a separate and discrete injury or an increase in the disability caused by aggravating work activities. However, a greater lifting restriction is alone insufficient to support the source of disability. Smithart either increased his disability by engaging in subsequent aggravating work activities or suffered a distinct and discrete injury. However, evidence of increased lifting restrictions is insufficient and does not alone support one finding over the other. The claimant has the burden of proof and Smithart failed to sustain his burden of establishing a separate and discrete injury following the initial injury.

On the other hand, we find substantial evidence to support a finding that Smithart suffered an increased permanent partial disability that led to an industrial disability of forty percent. Industrial disability means a reduction in earning capacity. Many factors are considered including “functional impairment, age, intelligence, education, qualifications, experience, and the ability of the employee to engage in [suitable employment].” Second Injury Fund, 544 N.W.2d at 265-66. Considering the type of employment Smit-hart is suited to engage in, as well as his lifting restrictions and functional impairment, we conclude substantial evidence supports a finding of industrial disability of twenty percent based on the 1995 injury which later increased to forty percent based on subsequent aggravating work activities. We reject the suggestion by Excel that the lifting restriction was improperly considered as a factor in determining industrial disability. We find no significant distinction between a lifting restriction based on a worker’s physical inability to lift greater weight and a restriction imposed to prevent the reoccurrence of an existing injury. In both cases, the impact on the worker is the same.

Y. Accommodation.

Excel asserts we should modify our accommodation rule to allow accommodations made by employers to be considered in determining industrial disability. Excel claims the current rule does not provide an incentive for employers to accommodate disabled workers.

We follow the rule that an employer’s accommodation of an employee’s work restrictions may be considered in determining industrial disability only if the accommodation is available to the general labor market. Ellingson, 599 N.W.2d at 445 (citing Murillo v. Blackhawk Foundry, 571 N.W.2d 16, 18-19 (Iowa 1997)). Otherwise, industrial disability “must be based on the injured worker’s present ability to earn in the competitive job market without regard to any accommodation” furnished by the employer. Id. This is also the rule followed in many other states. Murillo, 571 N.W.2d at 18.

Although our rules in the area of workers’ compensation should not. discourage employers from employing workers with disabilities, our accommodation rule exists to properly measure the extent of industrial disability suffered by a worker. The purpose of the rule was not to benefit the employer. To the extent the accommodation rule may motivate a particular employer not to provide an accommodation to a disabled worker because the employer receives no reward for doing so in terms of a reduced compensation payment in the event the employee suffers another injury producing a disability, we find the greater goal of the rule is served by providing workers full compensation. Moreover, employers receive other benefits by accommodating those employees who become disabled while performing work for the employer beyond any direct financial gain. In a broad sense, employee accommodations made by employers are an expression of the employer’s true commitment to its work force, which often instills a corresponding commitment by employees to the employer that provides immeasurable and tangible benefits. This is the value to the employer. We refuse to alter our accommodation rule.

VI. Conclusion.

We conclude substantial evidence exists to support the finding made by the workers’ compensation commissioner that Smit-hart sustained a work-related injury on November 30, 1995. There is also substantial evidence to support the finding that this injury resulted in a twenty percent industrial disability. However, substantial evidence does not exist to support a finding of a second separate and discrete injury on May 6, 1997, but does support a finding that the prior condition was aggravated after November 30, 1995, resulting in an industrial disability of forty percent. We reverse the decision of the district court, vacate the decision of the court of appeals, and remand the case to the workers’ compensation commissioner to determine the amount of compensation consistent with this opinion.'

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSIONER:

All justices concur except NEUMAN, J., who concurs in result only.

      .Subject to some limitations, our apportionment rule does permit apportionment between a disability caused by a work-related injury and a disability caused by a prior non-work-related condition or injury. Second Injury Fund v. Nelson, 544 N.W.2d 258, 264 (Iowa 1995). In a situation of that type, "[t]he employer is liable only for the work-related portion" of the disability. Id. One of the limitations under this rule is that apportionment does not apply if the second injury merely "aggravates the preexisting condition.” Id. at 265. If there is an aggravation, "the employer is liable for the full industrial disability.” Id.

      . Our discussion of these rules is limited to body-as-a-whole disability, and does not include scheduled-member disability. See Floyd v. Quaker Oats, 646 N.W.2d 105, 109-10 (Iowa 2002).

      . The same result occurs in those cases involving an aggravation of a prior condition or disability. When a prior injury has been compensated and the condition is subsequently aggravated so that the disability increases, the worker is entitled to be compensated but only to the extent of the increased disability. Floyd, 646 N.W.2d at 108-09. This can be done in a review reopening proceeding or in an original arbitration proceeding. Id.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: STREIT, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re the MARRIAGE OF Valeta Joan BELGER and David Paul Belger. Upon the Petition of Valeta Joan Belger, Appellee, And Concerning David Paul BELGER, Appellant.
    No. 01-1093.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Dec. 18, 2002.

      Steven Gardner of Kiple, Denefe, Beaver, Gardner & Zingg, L.L.P., Ottumwa, for appellant.
    Valeta Belger, Ottumwa, pro se.

    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Christina Hansen and Karla Leffler, Assistant Attorneys General, for resister-Child Support Recovery Unit.
   STREIT, Justice.

David Belger was ordered to pay child support following the dissolution of his marriage to Valeta Belger. Thirteen years after the court entered the dissolution decree, David retired and began to receive social security retirement benefits. In addition to regular support payments, David’s child began to receive dependent retirement benefits. David sought an offset of his support obligation. The trial court refused the credit and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed. Because we find a child support order should be credited to reflect a dependent child’s receipt of social security dependent retirement benefits on behalf of an obligor parent, .we vacate the court of appeals’ decision, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand.

I. Background and Facts

In 1988, the marriage of Valeta and David Belger was dissolved1 upon entry of a decree pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 598 (1987). The decree provided David must pay child support for his four minor children. In 2001, David retired and began receiving retirement benefits from the Social Security Administration. By 2001, David was only paying child support for one child, Destria. In addition to Destria’s mother receiving child support payments, Destria began receiving dependent benefits on account of David’s retirement. David sought an offset of the $328 monthly support obligations by the $803 monthly social security dependent’s benefits Dest-ria received. The district court refused to order the credit. David appealed. Relying on State ex rel. Pfister v. Larson, 569 N.W.2d 512 (Iowa Ct.App.1997), the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. D,avid sought further review. He argues the court of appeals erred in finding David is not entitled to a child support credit for social security retirement payments the child receives on David’s behalf.

II. Scope of Review

We review cases involving child support obligations de novo. Iowa R.App. P. 4; State ex rel. Nicholson v. Toftee, 494 N.W.2d 694, 695 (Iowa 1993).

III. The Merits

The only issue presented to us on further review is whether a parent’s child support obligation may be credited to reflect social security retirement dependency benefits thfe child contemporaneously receives on behalf of the obligor parent. Valeta argues Iowa Code section 598.22 (2001) does not allow a credit for social security retirement benefits received by the child. David argues our decision in In re Marriage of Hilmo affirming the district court’s, credit for social security disability .dependency benefits should be extended, to allow a credit for similar retirement dependency benefits. See 623 N.W.2d 809, 813-14 (Iowa 2001). We turn first to Iowa Code section 598.22 to determine whether the issue of credits has been resolved by the legislature.

A. Meaning of Iowa Code Section 598.22 '

Valeta argues Iowa Code section 598.22 contains a provision dealing exclusively with which types of benefits may be applied as a credit toward a child support order. Iowa Code section 598.22 provides, in part',

Support payments — clerk of court— collection services center — defaults— security.
All orders or judgments entered ... shall direct the payment of thosé sums to the clerk of the district court.... [A]ll income withholding payments shall be directed to the collection services center 1... Payments to persons other than the clerk of the district court ... do not satisfy the support obligations created by the orders or judgments, except ... for dependent benefits paid to the child support obligee as the result of disability benefits awarded to the child support obligor under the federal Social Security Act....
An order or judgment entered ... [for] support or for income withholding shall be filed with the clerk.:.. [T]he clerk ... shall disburse the payments received ... within two working days of the receipt of the ■ payments.... The clerk ... shall not enter any moneys paid in the record book if not paid directly to the clerk....
If the sums ordered to be paid ... are not paid to the clerk ..., the clerk ... shall certify a default to the court....
Upon ... the failure of a person to make payments ..., the court may require the person to provide security, a bond, or other guarantee which the court determines is satisfactory to secure the payment of the support....
The clerk of the district court in the county in which the order for support is filed and to whom support payments are made ... may require the person obligated to pay support to submit payments by bank draft' or money order if the obligor submits an insufficient funds support payment to the clerk of the district court.

Iowa Code § 598.22.

Valeta isolates one sentence of this lengthy statute to determine the entire statute’s meaning. The sentence Valeta bases her argument upon reads,

Payments to persons other than the clerk of the district court ... do not satisfy the support obligations created ... except ... for dependent benefits paid to the child support obligee as the result of disability benefits awarded to the child support obligor under the federal Social Security Act.

Id. This sentence standing alone could be read to mean section 598.22 is a directive for the computation of child support payments. However, when the statute is read in its entirety, the intent of the legislature is clear.

When construing this statute, we consider the whole statute, including the title. State ex rel. Bd. of Pharmacy Exam’rs v. McEwen, 250 Iowa 721, 725, 96 N.W.2d 189, 191 (1959). The title, “Support payments — clerk of court — collection services center — defaults—security” indicates this statute is intended to address the proper procedures for payment and collection of support payments. See In re Marriage of Yanda, 528 N.W.2d 642, 644 (Iowa Ct.App.1994) (section 598.22 is clear regarding the record-keeping for support payments). This section of the code deals not with the appropriate method of computation of support payments but with the procedures for the collection of support. In re Marriage of Eklofe, 586 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Iowa 1998). Valeta’s interpretation of this statute ignores the numerous other provisions explaining how child support is to be paid and collected.

It is true this statute addresses credits for support obligations, but not as Valeta suggests it does. As applied, section 598.22 means “payments made to individuals or entities other than the clerk of court or the collection services center will not be deemed a credit on the official support record.” Id. Contrary to Valeta’s assertion, the section does not deal with the nature of credits to be made or denied in the calculation of support payments. It does not provide an exhaustive list of the types of payments that may be credited against the non-custodial parent’s 'support obligation.

Though the legislature saw fit to refer to disability benefits in its terms concerning the method of payment of child support, it surely did not intend to exclude retirement benefits as a basis for credit. To use this statute as a means to disallow a credit for all other social security dependency benefits and reheve only those obligor parents receiving disability would be an injustice we assume the legislature did not contemplate. For reasons discussed below, we see no legitimate reason for differentiating between disability and retirement dependency benefits.

B. Credit for Social Security Dependency Retirement Benefits

Though we have not before dealt with the issue of social security retirement dependency benefits, we have determined whether other types of social security payments made to a child should be credited against a parent’s support obligation. We have held social security disability payments made to a dependent child should be credited against the disabled parent’s child support obligation. Potts v. Potts, 240 N.W.2d 680, 682 (Iowa 1976). In Newman v. Newman, we stated the general rule that “a child support award may be offset by social security benefits during the period the benefits are received.... ” 451 N.W.2d 843, 844 (Iowa 1990). More recently, we held social security disability dependency benefits should be considered as part of the disabled parent’s income for purposes of setting child support and affirmed an offset. In re Marriage of Hilmo, 623 N.W.2d at 812-13. In State ex rel. Pfister, the court of appeals held a parent’s child support obligation should not be offset by social security retirement dependency benefits. 569 N.W.2d at 516-17. The district court and court of appeals relied upon this case in their denials of a credit to David’s child support obligation for the social security retirement dependency benefits his child received.

The legislative intent in establishing child support guidelines is to provide for the best interests of the child by determining an adequate level of support for children commensurate with the parents’ income and resources. Iowa Code § 598.21 (2001); In re Marriage of Beecher, 582 N.W.2d 510, 513 (Iowa 1998). A parent’s income serves as the primary ground upon which to determine the appropriate amount of a child support obligation. Consequently, the issue of whether social security benefits should be considered part of the obligor parent’s income for purposes of determining the amount of child support is directly related to the issue of whether a credit should be given for such benefits. See Tori R.A. Kricken, Child Support and Social Security Dependent Benefits: A Comprehensive Analysis and Proposal for Wyoming, 2 Wyo. L.Rev. 39, 49 (2002) (hereinafter Kricken).

The majority of jurisdictions holding, social security benefits are part of the parent’s income have also determined a credit should be given for benefits received by dependent children. See In re Marriage of Hilmo, 623 N.W.2d at 812. But see, e.g., Lopez v. Lopez, 125 Ariz. 309, 609 P.2d 579, 581 (Ariz.Ct.App.1980). The rationale of these courts is that the failure to include the benefits as part of the income “leads to a determination of child support based upon an income figure that does not accurately reflect the income available to the family unit.” Jenkins v. Jenkins, 243 Conn. 584, 704 A.2d 231, 236 (Conn.1998). We previously addressed the issue of what is to be considered part of a parent’s income. We stated:

Although veterans’ disability benefits, social security disability or retirement payments, and workers’ compensation benefits are exempt from federal taxes, they are properly considered as income in determining ... the amount of child support.

In re Marriage of Hilmo, 623 N.W.2d at 811 (quoting In re Marriage of Lee, 486 N.W.2d 302, 305 (Iowa 1992)). As we found in Hilmo, disability benefits are properly considered part of the non-custodial parent’s income. Social security retirement benefits should similarly be considered part of the non-custodial parent’s income for purposes of determining the appropriate amount of child support. Finding retirement dependency benefits are included as income for purposes of calculating child support, we must determine whether the same benefits should be allowed as a credit toward a child support obligation.

When we last examined whether to allow an offset for disability benefits, we cited Miller v. Miller, 890 P.2d 574 (Alaska 1995), as an analogous case dealing with retirement benefits. In re Marriage of Hilmo, 623 N.W.2d at 812. In Miller, the Alaska Supreme Court noted that “[t]he overwhelming majority of states that have considered this issue allow a credit for Social Security benefits paid to dependent children.” Miller, 890 P.2d at 576 (quoting Pontbriand v. Pontbriand, 622 A.2d 482, 484 (R.I.1993)). The court explained,

[although the benefits are payable directly to the child rather than through the contributing parent, the child’s entitlement to payments derives from the parent, ‘ and the payments themselves represent earnings from the parent’s past contributions.

Id. at 577. Because the “benefits were ‘essentially earnings derived [from the ob-ligor father’s] past social security contributions [b]y parallel reasoning, the benefits should be counted as income to [the obli-gor father].” Id. at 578. The Miller court explained that dependent benefits are the “equivalent of child support payments.” Id. at n. 6.

Several other jurisdictions examining this issue have either held or recognized that social security retirement benefits received by a dependent child on the obligor parent’s behalf should be credited toward the obligor parent’s support obligation. See, e.g., Miller, 890 P.2d at 577; Lopez, 609 P.2d at 581; Cash v. Cash, 234 Ark. 603, 353 S.W.2d 348, 350 (Ark.1962); In re Marriage of Bertrand, 33 Cal.App.4th 437, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 151, 152 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App.1995); Jenkins, 704 A.2d at 236; Childerson v. Hess, 198 Ill.App.3d 395, 144 Ill.Dec. 551, 555 N.E.2d 1070, 1073 (Ill.App.Ct.1990); Bradley v. Holmes, 561 So.2d 1034, 1036 (Miss.1990); McClaskey v. McClaskey, 543 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Mo.Ct.App.1976); Brewer v. Brewer, 244 Neb. 731, 509 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Neb.1993); Mask v. Mask, 95 N.M. 229, 620 P.2d 883, 885 (N.M.1980); Lago v. Trabucco, 207 A.D.2d 92, 621 N.Y.S.2d 824, 826 (N.Y.App.Div.1994); Preston v. Preston, 435 Pa.Super. 459, 646 A.2d 1186, 1187 (Pa.Super.Ct.1994); In re Allsup, 926 S.W.2d 323, 328 (Tex.App.1996).

Of the jurisdictions examining this issue, the majority has declined to make a distinction between retirement benefits and disability benefits. See Miller, 890 P.2d at 577; Lopez, 609 P.2d at 581; Cash, 353 S.W.2d at 350; Childerson, 144 Ill.Dec. 551, 555 N.E.2d at 1073. See generally Kricken, 2 Wyo. L.Rev. at 67.

Although most of the relevant cases from other states have addressed the issue in the context of social security disability benefits rather than retirement benefits — the type of benefits at issue here — there appears to be no theoretical basis for distinguishing between the two types of payment.

Miller, 890 P.2d at 577 (citing Childerson, 144 Ill.Dec. 551, 555 N.E.2d at 1073; Lopez, 609 P.2d at 581; Cash, 353 S.W.2d at 350). Common sense dictates that social security disability benefits should not be treated any differently than social security retirement dependency benefits for the purpose of calculating an obligor parent’s support obligation.

Both types of benefits have been earned in part through the obligor parent’s payment of social security taxes.

The “right” to Social Security benefits is in one sense “earned,” for the entire scheme rests on the legislative judgment that those who in their productive years were functioning members of the economy may justly call upon that economy, in their later years, for protection....

Andler v. Andler, 217 Kan. 538, 538 P.2d 649, 653 (Kan.1975) (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1372, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435, 1444 (1960)). Social security disability payments are intended to replace lost income due to the employee’s disability. In re Marriage of Hilmo, 623 N.W.2d at 813. In the same manner, social security retirement benefits are intended to replace lost income due to the employee “reaching an age of possible diminished earning capacity.” In re Allsup, 926 S.W.2d at 328. In the case before us, the dependency benefits received by David’s daughter arose as a result of David’s contributions to the benefits by deduction of wages throughout his working life. Because social security benefits have been earned by the obligor parent and are available funds, it is equitable to treat the benefits as a substitute for child support during the period in which such benefits are received. Potts, 240 N.W.2d at 681.

Allowing a credit for retirement dependency benefits does not jeopardize the intent behind a child support order. “The use of social security payments to satisfy a child-support obligation is merely a change in the manner of payment; the nature of the funds is the same.” McClaskey, 543 S.W.2d at 834. Allowance of a credit for social security retirement dependency benefits does not interfere with the best interests of the dependent child as the child will still receive the entire amount of support ordered in the dissolution decree. From a purely economic perspective, the actual source of the payments is not important to the custodial parent as long as the payments continue to be made in conformance with the dissolution decree. See Miller, 890 P.2d at 577 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 141 Vt. 398, 449 A.2d 947, 948 (Vt.1982)); see also Binns v. Maddox, 57 Ala.App. 230, 327 So.2d 726, 728 (Ala.Civ.App.1976) (because support order is for benefit of the child, even though custodial parent receives the payment, if the sum to be paid by the noncustodial parent is paid by the government via social security benefits, the real purpose of the child support order has been accomplished); Brewer, 509 N.W.2d at 16. An obligor parent is entitled to a credit only up to the extent of his or her obligation for monthly payments of child support made during the period in which the child receives benefits on the obligor parent’s behalf. See Potts, 240 N.W.2d at 682. The excess is regarded as a gratuity to the child under the support order. See Childerson, 144 Ill.Dec. 551, 555 N.E.2d at 1073 (citing Andler, 538 P.2d at 654). A credit is not available if the basis of the social security account is not that of the child support obligor. We overrule State ex rel. Pfister v. Larson to the extent it is in disagreement with our holding.

In his petition for modification, David requested a credit for social security retirement dependency benefits. We consider whether this was the correct procedure for him to follow in order to obtain the credit. Jurisdictions explicitly allowing a credit do so through a variety of procedures. See generally Kricken, 2 Wyo. L.Rev. at 81 (citing J. Eric Smithburn, Removing Nonconforming Child Support Payments from the Shadow of the Rule Against Retroactive Modification, 28 J. Fam. L. 43 (1990)).

In the interests of certainty and protecting the current needs of children in receiving regular and uninterrupted support, the obligor parent has an affirmative duty to seek formal modification of the support order. See, e.g., In re Estate of Patterson, 167 Ariz. 168, 805 P.2d 401, 405 (Ariz.Ct.App.1991) (requiring formal modification hearing to obtain credit for disability benefits); Burnham v. Burnham, 743 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Mo.Ct.App.1987); Arnoldt v. Arnoldt, 147 Misc.2d 37, 554 N.Y.S.2d 396, 398 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1990); Hinckley v. Hinckley, 812 P.2d 907, 911-12 (Wyo.1991). This rule is consistent with the public policy that courts, not the parties, should fix the proper amount of child support. In re Estate of Patterson, 805 P.2d at 405. Requiring an obligor parent to seek a formal modification of the support obligation preserves certainty of judgments. “One of the primary purposes of these uniform guidelines is to provide an efficient, equitable, and predictable method of determining the amount of child support.” See Gilley v. McCarthy, 469 N.W.2d 666, 667 (Iowa 1991).

“[T]he burden of seeking modification of a support order rightfully lies with the parent who seeks to offset a support obligation against social security benefits.” Newman, 451 N.W.2d at 845.

This assignment of responsibility dovetails with the statutory scheme which allows for modification upon proof of a substantial change in circumstances relating to “employment, earning capacity, income or resources of a party.”

Id. (citing Iowa Code § 598.21(8)(a) (1987); In re Marriage of Shepherd, 429 N.W.2d 145, 146 (Iowa 1988)). The changed circumstance warranting modification is the receipt of federal social security benefits the child was not receiving at the time the dissolution decree was entered. Judgments for child support subject to modification may be retroactively modified only from three months after the date the notice of the pending modification petition is served on the opposing party. Iowa Code § 598.21(8) (2001). Retroactive modification would “fly in the face of our longstanding rule that a court has no authority to divest the parties of rights accrued under the original decree.” Newman, 451 N.W.2d at 845. In the case before us, Belger followed the proper procedure for obtaining a credit by filing a petition for modification with the court.

IV. Conclusion

We hold a retired parent must seek formal modification of his or her child support order with the district court. Upon petition for modification, the court shall grant to the obligor parent a credit to reflect the amount of social security retirement dependency benefits a child receives on the obligor parent’s behalf. We vacate the court of appeals decision denying David a credit for the social security retirement dependency benefits his child received on his behalf. We likewise vacate the judgment of the district court. Based upon the record previously made, we remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . The custodial parent in In re Marriage of Hilmo did not appeal the district court’s grant of a credit to the father’s child support obligation reflecting social security disability dependency benefits received by his child. 623 N.W.2d at 811. We therefore affirmed the decision of the court of appeals and judgment of the district court on this issue. Id. at 813-14.

      . Other courts have gone even further holding military benefits paid to the dependents of divorced servicemen discharge the non-custodial parent’s child support obligation. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 254 Ark. 881, 496 S.W.2d 425, 426 (Ark.1973); Andler v. Andler, 217 Kan. 538, 538 P.2d 649, 654 (Kan.1975); Palow v. Kitchin, 149 Me. 113, 99 A.2d 305, 308 (Me.1953); Kipping v. Kipping, 186 Tenn. 247, 209 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tenn.1948). Similarly, other courts have held a parent is entitled to a credit for social security death benefits. See, e.g., Gilford v. Wurster, 24 Ohio App.3d 77, 493 N.E.2d 258, 260 (Ohio Ct.App.1983).


text:
    WARREN COUNTY BOARD OF HEALTH, Plaintiff, v. WARREN COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, Appellee, Vernon Hunerdosse and Bobette Miller, Intervenors-Appellants.
    No. 01-1732.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Dec. 18, 2002.

      Shelley A. Horak.of Shelley Horak and Associates, P.C., Sioux City, and Ward A. Rouse of Duffy, Spellman, Rouse, Lynch & Clark, Des Moines, for appellants.
    Hugh J. Cain of Hopkins & Huebner, P.C., Des Moines¡ and Kevin Parker, County Attorney, for appellee.
   CADY, Justice.

In this appeal, we must determine if a county board of health delegated its authority over employment matters to a county board of supervisors so that .it..had no authority to terminate a public health employee and increase the wages of a public health employee. We conclude the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the board of supervisors. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

This case began as a dispute between the Warren County Board of Health and the Warren County Board of Supervisors over the authority to make-' employment decisions concerning employees of the Warren County Department of Environmental Health and Warren County Health Services. The legal dispute emanated from two separate factual circumstances involving two different employees, who eventually intervened in the lawsuit to pursue the claims.

The first dispute began on July 5, 1997, when the Board of Health voted to raise the wages of an employee of County Health Services, Bobette Miller. Miller was a full time secretary at health services, and the Board of' Health voted to increase her hourly wage based upon her exceptional service. The amount of the raise was within the approved budget for health services and within the line item for salaries. The Board of Health submitted the raise to the Board of Supervisors, who refused to approve the raise. On October 1, 1998, the Board of Health again approved a raise in Miller’s hourly wage. As before, the proposed increase was within the budgeted amount for salaries. As before, the Board of Supervisors refused to approve the raise.

The second dispute began on October 1, 1998, when the Board of Health voted to terminate the employment of the director of the Department of Environmental Health, Rick Wilson. The chairman of the Board of Supervisors subsequently told Wilson that he was not discharged and could continue to serve as the director of the Department of Environmental Health. Consequently, Wilson continued in his employment. The Board of Supervisors later refused to enforce the decision by the Board of Health to terminate Wilson, despite various formal requests by the Board of Health to do so.

The Board of Health then instituted an action in district court against the Board of Supervisors requesting the court to determine the rights of the parties in the disputes and compel the Board of Supervisors to terminate Wilson and increase the wages of Miller. In its answer to the petition, the Board of Supervisors claimed the Board of Health had vested, delegated, or transferred its employment authority to the Board of Supervisors.

The delegation claim was based on the history of past dealings between the Board of Health and the Board of Supervisors. In 1991, the Board of Supervisors developed a county employment manual containing policies and procedures to serve as guidelines for employment matters of county employees. The Board of Health subscribed to the manual. The Board of Supervisors also adopted a county classification and pay plan, which the Board of Health accepted on January 9, 1992. The plan provided for merit step increases in pay according to an employee’s designated grade, with a maximum step level. There was further evidence to suggest that the Board of Health permitted the Board of Supervisors to control various employment decisions regarding other employees in the past. For example, various records of the Board of Supervisors indicated it appointed or approved the hiring of several public health employees in the past, and authorized the Board of Health to hire other employees.

On December 20, 1999, the Board of Health voted to hire a new director of the Department of Environmental Health, Vernon Hunerdosse. Hunerdosse, along with Miller, then moved to intervene in the action filed by the Board of Health. The court granted intervention.

Hunerdosse never assumed the position of director of environmental health. Instead, Wilson continued to hold the position. On January 14, 2000, the Board of Health voted to dismiss the lawsuit against the Board of Supervisors, terminate Hun-erdosse, and confirm Wilson as the director of the Department of Environmental Health. The Board of Health then dismissed its claims against the Board of Supervisors on January 19, 2000.

Both Hunerdosse and Miller, as well as the Board of Supervisors, filed motions for summary judgment. The district court found the Board of Health had delegated its authority over employment matters to the Board of Supervisors by its prior course of conduct, as well as its adoption of the county personnel manual and the county classification and pay plan. The district court granted summary judgment for the Board of Supervisors.

Miller and Hunerdosse appeal. They claim the Board of Health had the exclusive authority over employees who perform county public health functions, and this authority was never delegated or divested to the Board of Supervisors.

II. Scope of Review.

Our review in this case from an order granting summary judgment is for errors at law. Our task is to determine whether the law was properly applied by the district court. See Hansen v. State, 528 N.W.2d 547, 549 (Iowa 1995).

III. Background.

Under our form of government in Iowa, counties are empowered to perform any function to “protect and preserve the rights, privileges, and property ■ of the county or of its residents, and to preserve and improve the peace, safety, health, welfare, comfort, and convenience of its residents” except as limited by the constitution or a statute. Iowa Code § 331.301(1) (1999). This broad power is a part of county home rule, and is vested in the county board of supervisors. Id. § 331.301(2); Iowa Const. amend. 25. The board of supervisors, therefore, serves as the governing body of county government. However, our legislature has carved out an exception in the area of public health. Under chapter 137, jurisdiction over public health matters within a county is granted to county or district boards of health. See generally id. §§ 137.1-.22. These local boards have general powers to enforce state health laws, enforce rules and orders of the state department of health, make and enforce other public health rules and regulations, and “[e]mploy persons as necessary for the efficient discharge of its duties.” Id. § 137.6(4). Additionally, local boards are empowered to provide “personal and environmental health services,” engage in or contract for public health activities and projects with public and private entities and individuals, charge fees for personal health services, and “issue licenses or permits and charge reasonable fees for collection or disposal’ of solid waste” as well as “construction or operation of private water supplies or sewage disposal facilities.” Id. § 137.7.

Like other Iowa counties, Warren County has a local board of health. It is known as Warren County Board of Health. The board consists of five members. See id. § 137.3. Warren County also has a department of environmental health. This department administers various programs such as water waste disposal, private wells, waste tires, radon, and general environmental health matters. Warren County also has a health service department that conducts communicable disease investigations and provides immunizations, screening. clinics, material and health services, health education, and preventative health care.

Given this legislative scheme governing public health matters, the Board of Supervisors does - not assert that the employees of the Department of Environmental Health and the Health Services Department do not perform functions relating to chapter 137 -or that a board of health has no authority to terminate persons employed by the board or to establish wages for public health department employees. Consequently, these are not issues we address on appeal. Instead, the Board of Supervisors asserts that the Board of Health delegated or ceded its authority to make employment decisions to the Board of Supervisors under the facts of this case. Thus, this is the specific issue we address.

IY. Delegation of Authority.

As a general rule, a municipal corporation “cannot surrender, by contract or otherwise, any of its legislative and governmental functions and powers, including a partial surrender” unless authorized by statute. 2A Eugene McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 10.38, at 425 (3d ed. rev.1996) (footnotes omitted); see also id. § 10.39. This is a fundamental principle of government and rests upon sound policies that have “never been seriously questioned.” Id. § 10.38. Thus, a governmental subdivision cannot delegate the right to make decisions it has been empowered to make. See Gabrilson v. Flynn, 554 N.W.2d 267, 276 (Iowa 1996) (public boards generally cannot delegate discretionary power conferred by law). It can, however, delegate its right to perform certain acts and duties necessary to transact and carry out its powers. See Town of Plainfield v. Town of Avon, 757 N.E.2d 705, 711-12 (Ind.Ct.App.2001); Cent. Power & Light Co. v. City of San Juan, 962 S.W.2d 602, 613 (Tex.App.1998). These delegable acts typically involve functions that require little judgment or discretion. See Bunger v. Iowa High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 197 N.W.2d 555, 559-60 (Iowa 1972) (public board may delegate ministerial or administrative functions).

The legislature has given the board of health the specific power to “employ persons as necessary for the efficient discharge of its duties.” Iowa Code § 137.6(4). As a specific enumerated power, it generally would not be subject to delegation absent a legislative declaration. Moreover,' the power to employ includes the power not to employ. Consequently, under our statutory scheme, the power to hire and fire public health employees is given to the board of health, and the question is whether there is authority granted by our legislature to delegate that right to another entity. See Lazuk v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, City & County of Denver, 22 P.3d 548, 552 (Colo.Ct.App.2000) (power to employ and discharge teachers is vested with the school board and not subject to delegation).

The Board of Supervisors argues that section 137.7(2) and chapter 28E permit the Board of Health to delegate its authority. Section 137.7(2) permits the Board of Health to engage in joint operations with public and private agencies and to enter into contracts “for public health activities or projects.” Iowa Code § 137.7(2). Similarly, chapter 28E allows the joint exercise of power by state and local governments. See Barnes v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 341 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Iowa 1983). Chapter 28E, however, requires the parties to enter into an agreement containing specific provisions, and that the agreement be properly filed and recorded. See Iowa Code §§ 28E.5-.8. Section 137.7(2) does not impose similar specific contractual requirements. Instead, it generally permits the board of health to engage in joint operations and contracts with others for public health services. Yet, assuming the Board of Health could delegate its employment authority, there is no evidence in the record to support a finding that the authority was actually delegated.

The employment manual constitutes an agreement by the Board of Health to follow the county employment policies and procedures. However, the parties have not identified any specific provision within the manual that would constitute a specific delegation of the decision-making authority to terminate a public health employee. Instead, the record only reveals the Board of Health agreed to follow certain procedures and guidelines in exercising its power. There is no specific authority given to the Board of Supervisors in the county employment manual to make the decision to terminate public health employees. See Tabor v. Joint Bd. for Enrollment of Actuaries, 566 F.2d 705, 708 n. 5 (D.C.Cir.1977) (certification board did not delegate its authority by merely “[pjermitting association members to short-cut the regular certification process”).

Similarly, the pay plan constitutes an agreement by the Board of Health to follow the county wage procedures as administered by a compensation committee. However, as with the employment manual, there is no provision specifically delegating authority from the Board of Health to the Board of Supervisors to actually approve the step increases that public health employees are eligible to receive each year under the pay plan. The Board of Supervisors asserts that the raises approved by the Board of Health for Miller in this case violated the wage agreement, yet that argument does not address the issue of delegation. The Board of Health may have delegated its authority to set salaries independent of the county pay plan, but there is no indication it delegated specific authority to the Board of Supervisors to approve increases in the wages of public health employees within the provisions of the county pay plan.

It is important to recognize that the.exercise of governmental powers under a claim of delegation is insufficient to prove the delegation itself. See Kohler v. Benckart, 252 S.W.2d 854, 857-58 (Ky.Ct.App.1952); see also McQuillin § 10.39. The delegation must be separately established. The summary judgment record in this case showing the Board of Health participated in the county employment procedures, without more, did not establish a delegation of the specific authority attempted to be exercised by the Board of Supervisors.

Moreover, there was no additional evidence presented in the course of the summary judgment proceedings in this case to support any delegation of authority. Governmental functions are not normally subject to delegation by mere acquiescence or default. See Wilhelm v. Cedar County, 50 Iowa 254, 256 (1878). Delegation of important governmental authority requires a “careful and purposeful consideration by those” empowered to perform the functions. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 1419, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377, 1397 (1959). Even though there was evidence to infer the Board of Health deferred some of its employment decisions to the Board of Supervisors in the past, there is no evidence of a board resolution or other specific transfer of power. We believe such formal action, or other evidence of a clear understanding by the Board of Health, would be essential to the delegation of a power entrusted by the legislature.

Finally, it is important to recognize that once an agency properly delegates its authority, the authority delegated binds the agency, which can only exercise the authority that has been retained. See GTE Int’l Inc. v. Hunter, 649 F.Supp. 139, 147 (D.P.R.1986). In this case, the Board of Health has delegated some authority by agreeing to follow certain employment procedures, but is permitted to exercise authority it did not delegate. Of course, an agency is free to revoke or change a delegation of power, but this must be done by the same type of procedures that created the delegation. See id.

Y. Conclusion.

We reverse the decision of the district court and remand for further proceedings. The claim of delegation of authority does not support summary adjudication. •

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . The district court determined Hunerdosse and Miller had standing to maintain the ac-lion after the dismissal filed by the Board of Health. This issue is not raised on appeal.

      . We recognize that a government subdivision may not delegate a power that it never possessed. Barnes v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 341 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Iowa 1983). Furthermore, we do not consider the role of the Board of Supervisors over budget matters on the competing authority of the Board of Health to "employ persons” to discharge its duties. See Iowa Code § 331.433 (1999) (a county board must submit its estimated budget to the county auditor for inclusion in final county budget); § 331.434(6) (board of supervisors approves department budgets).