author: WIGGINS, Justice.

text:
    CITY OF FAIRFIELD, Iowa, Appellant, v. HARPER DRILLING COMPANY and National Fire Insurance Company of Hartford, Appellees.
    No. 03-1067.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Jan. 14, 2005.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 22, 2005.

      Ivan T. Webber of Ahlers & Cooney, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
    Benjamin B. Ullem and John F. Fatino of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, and G. Steven Ruprecht of Niewald, Wal-deck & Brown, Kansas City, Missouri, for appellees.
   WIGGINS, Justice.

In this case, we must decide whether a city can forfeit the bidder’s bond of a contractor whose bid the city accepted subject to the approval of another agency. The district court held the city could not forfeit the bidder’s bond, dismissed the city’s petition, and exonerated the bond. The city appealed and we transferred the case to the court of appeals, which reversed the district court. On further review, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the decision of the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The parties agree the undisputed facts reveal the City of Fairfield requested bids for a public improvement involving the Jordan Well Project. The contract-letting documents required the successful bidder to file a bond or other surety in an amount equal to ten percent of the amount of the proposal as liquidated damages in the event the successful bidder did not enter into a contract with Fairfield within ten days after the award of the contract. This language was required to be included in the contract-letting documents by Iowa Code section 384.97(5) (2001). Additionally the contract-letting documents required:

The successful bidder must complete the Minority, Women’s, and Small Rural Area Business Enterprise Utilizations Worksheet and submit it to the loan recipient prior to contract award, with documentation demonstrating compliance with the affirmative steps for MBA/WBE/SBRA participation in order to be deemed responsible if an eight percent fair share for Minority and Women’s Business Enterprises is not proposed.

The contract-letting documents also contained a notice of bid acceptance, which Fairfield was to use to notify the successful bidder its proposal was accepted by the city. The notice of bid acceptance contained language notifying the successful bidder that if the successful bidder failed to execute an agreement for the project, Fairfield would consider the failure to enter into the agreement as a forfeiture of the bidder’s bond.

Harper Drilling Company (Harper) submitted a sealed bid to complete the project for $719,584. National Fire Insurance Company of Hartford (National) issued a bidder’s bond for $71,958.40 on Harper’s behalf, and Harper submitted the bidder’s bond with its bid. Fairfield opened the bids on February 25, 2002. On March 4, the city engineer recommended Fairfield accept Harper’s bid “subject to the concurrence of the Iowa Department of Natural Resources” (DNR). At the March 11 city council meeting, the council passed a resolution containing the following language, “Be it further resolved that said award of contract to Harper ... is conditionally awarded and is subject to concurrence with the award of contract by the Iowa Department of Natural Resources.” Fair-field did not issue a notice of bid acceptance to Harper. Instead, the council forwarded Harper’s proposal to the DNR for its concurrence.

On March 19, the DNR wrote Fairfield and informed it that Harper’s proposal did not conform to the MBE/WBE requirements contained in the proposal; thus, it could not concur in the award of the contract. On March 25, the city engineer informed Harper of the DNR’s position, asked Harper for additional information, and informed Harper to “respond as soon as possible as the contract cannot be awarded until [the DNR] receives this information.” For reasons unknown, Harper failed to provide the MBE/WBE compliance documentation. On March 29, Harper requested its bidder’s bond be returned because the contract-letting documents provided for the return of the bidder’s bond if more than thirty days elapsed from the proposal, and the proposal was not accepted by Fairfield. Fairfield retained the bidder’s bond, unconditionally accepted the second lowest bidder’s bid, and brought an action against Harper and National. In its action against Harper and National, Fairfield alleged Harper failed to enter into the contract after it was awarded the contract for the project; thus, Harper and its bonding company, National, owed Fairfield ten percent of Harper’s proposal, $71,958.40, as liquidated damages.

Fairfield moved for summary judgment. Harper and National filed resistances and a cross motion for summary judgment. Fairfield resisted the cross motion for summary judgment. The district court denied Fairfield’s motion but granted summary judgment to Harper and National and exonerated the bidder’s bond. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case to the district court for entry of summary judgment in favor of Fairfield. We granted Harper and National’s application for further review.

II. Issue.

We must determine whether any of the parties are entitled to summary judgment under the undisputed facts of this case.

III. Scope of Review.

Our review of a court’s granting or denying a motion for summary judgment is for correction of errors at law. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 687 N.W.2d 272, 274 (Iowa 2004). If there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate. Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 171 (Iowa 2004). We can resolve a matter on summary judgment if the record reveals a conflict only concerns the legal consequences of undisputed facts. Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Iowa 2003).

IV. Analysis.

Division VI of Iowa Code chapter 384 governs the contract-letting procedures for public improvements. Istari Constr., Inc., v. City of Muscatine, 330 N.W.2d 798, 799 (Iowa 1983). Section 384.97 requires a governing body to include in its notice to bidders

[t]hat each bidder shall accompany the bid with a bid security as defined in this subsection and as specified by the governing body, as security that the successful bidder will enter into a contract for the work bid upon .... The bidder’s security shall be in an amount fixed by the governing body, and shall be in the form of a cashier’s or certified check drawn on a bank in Iowa or a bank chartered under the laws of the United States, or a certified share draft drawn on a credit union in Iowa or chartered under the law of the United States, or the governing body may provide for a bidder’s bond with corporate surety satisfactory to the governing body. The bid bond shall contain no condition except as provided in this section.

Iowa Code § 384.97(5) (emphasis added). This provision was included in Fairfield’s contract-letting documents. The resolution of the question before us turns on our interpretation of the phrase “successful bidder” contained in section 384.97(5).

Our goal in interpreting a statute is to determine the legislature’s intent when it enacted the statute. State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 2004). “We do not speculate as to the probable legislative intent apart from the words used in the statute.” State v. Adams, 554 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Iowa 1996); accord State v. Welton, 300 N.W.2d 157, 160 (Iowa 1981) (stating, “when a statute is plain and its meaning is clear, courts are not permitted to search for meaning beyond its expressed terms”). We apply a plain and rational meaning consistent with the subject matter of the statute if the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous. ABC Disposal Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 681 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Iowa 2004). Absent a statutory definition or an established meaning in the law, we give words in a statute their ordinary and common meaning by considering the context within which they are used. Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004).

The dictionary defines “successful” as “1: resulting or terminating in success.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 2282 (unabr. ed.2002). “Success” is defined as “3a: The degree or measure of attaining a desired end.” Id. Thus, the plain meaning of the words “successful bidder” requires that the governing body accept the bidder’s bid. Interpreting the “successful bidder” as the bidder whose bid is accepted by the governing body is consistent with the statutory scheme of the contract-letting procedures contained in division VI,of chapter 384.

The legislature requires all bidders to include a bond or other surety when bidding on a project to guarantee the successful bidder will in a timely manner enter into a contract with the governing body if the governing body accepts the bidder’s bid. Iowa Code § 384.97(5). Once a governing body accepts a bid, the governing body no longer has the need to retain the bidders’ bonds of the bidders whose bids were not accepted; thus, section 384.100 provides, “[t]he checks or bidder’s bonds of the unsuccessful bidder must be promptly returned to the bidders by the governing body as soon as the successful bidder is determined or within thirty days whichever is sooner.” Iowa Code § 384.100. By referring to the bidder whose bid is not accepted as the “unsuccessful bidder,” and the bidder whose bid has been accepted as the “successful bidder” in section 384.100, the legislature clearly intended the bidder whose bid is accepted by the governing body to be the “successful bidder.”

Having determined the successful bidder is the bidder whose bid the governing body accepted, we must next determine whether Harper was the successful bidder under the undisputed facts in this record. In most instances, if the total cost to a city of a public improvement exceeds $25,000, the governing body must follow the procedures in division VI of chapter 384 and advertise for sealed bids. Iowa Code § 384.96. Under this requirement

[t]he advertisement is nothing more than a solicitation of bids or proposals for doing the work or furnishing the materials, similar to an invitation to bid on a public contract that is not an offer to contract but a solicitation for an offer, the contractor’s bid is the offer to contract. Thus, a bid, even the lowest responsible one, submitted in response to an invitation for bids, is only an offer that until accepted does not give rise to a contract between the parties.

64 Am.Jur.2d Public Works and Contracts § 52, at 685 (2001).

A governing body’s acceptance of a bidder’s proposal to enter into a contract must be absolute and unconditional to be binding upon the parties. Horsfield Const. Inc. v. Dubuque County, 653 N.W.2d 563, 571 (Iowa 2002); Jameson v. Joint Drainage Dist., 191 Iowa 920, 922, 183 N.W. 512, 513 (1921). If the governing body conditionally accepts a bid, no binding award of a contract exists between the governing body and the bidder. Istari, 330 N.W.2d at 800. An award does not create a contract when the governing body conditions its validity on the approval of another agency. Id.

After Fairfield opened the bids on the Jordan Well Project, Fairfield referred the bids to the city engineer for review. The city engineer recommended Harper’s bid be accepted subject to the concurrence of the DNR. Instead of passing a resolution to accept Harper’s bid and notify Harper of its acceptance with the notice of bid acceptance contained in the contract-letting documents, Fairfield passed a resolution awarding the contract to Harper subject to the DNR’s concurrence in the award of the contract. Had the city utilized the notice of bid acceptance contained in the contract-letting documents, Harper would have had ten days to enter into the contract and furnish the required performance bond and certificates of insurance.

The DNR reviewed Harper’s proposal and determined it could not concur in awarding the contract to Harper. Upon receipt of the DNR’s determination, the city engineer informed Harper that Fair-field could not award a contract to Harper until Harper complied with the MBE/ WBE requirements. The DNR’s refusal to concur in the award of the contact to Harper prevented Fairfield from accepting Harper’s bid and forming a binding contract between the parties. Therefore, Harper was not the successful bidder, and as a matter of law, Fairfield is not entitled to the bidder’s bond for Harper’s failure to enter into a contract when Fairfield conditionally accepted Harper’s proposal.

V. Disposition.

Because Harper was not the successful bidder under Iowa Code section 384.97(5), Fairfield is not entitled to any recovery for Harper’s failure to enter into a contract based upon Harper’s bid for the Jordan Well Project. Therefore, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the decision of the district court.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    MOLO OIL COMPANY, Mulgrew Oil Co., and DRBE Properties, L.L.C., Appellants, and Dodds River Terminal, Inc., v. THE CITY OF DUBUQUE, Iowa, and the City Council of the City of Dubuque, Iowa, Appellees.
    No. 03-1623.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Feb. 18, 2005.

      Michael J. Coyle, Douglas M. Henry, and Norman J. Wangberg of Fuerste, Ca-rew, Coyle, Juergens & Sudmeier, P.C., for appellants.
    Barry A. Lindahl, Corporation Counsel, and James A. O’Brien, Jr., Assistant City Attorney, for appellees.
   WIGGINS, Justice.

The plaintiffs in this appeal are Molo Oil Company, Mulgrew Oil Company, and DRBE Properties, L.L.C. (collectively referred to as “landowners”). The landowners filed a petition seeking certiorari, declaratory, and injunctive relief after the City of Dubuque adopted an amendment to its zoning ordinance as part of the city’s master plan to transform the Ice Harbor area from an industrial area into a pedestrian-oriented environment. The amendment made the landowners’ businesses nonconforming uses. The district court denied the landowners’ requested relief, concluding the amendment to the zoning ordinance was a proper exercise of the city’s police power. The district court also concluded it was without authority to decide whether the actions of the city constituted a taking without just compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 18 of the Iowa Constitution for the reason that the landowners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Because we agree with the district court’s decision, we affirm it.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Each landowner owns or leases property south of the Ice Harbor abutting the Mississippi River in Dubuque. Before April 15, 2002, the landowners’ properties were zoned heavy industrial. The landowners use their properties consistent with a heavy industrial zoning classification. The zoning ordinance described the general purpose and description of a heavy industrial district as follows:

The HI Heavy Industrial District is intended to provide appropriate locations for those industrial uses which by their nature tend to generate levels of smoke, dust, noise, or odors that render them incompatible with virtually all other land uses. The Council finds that the continued operation and development of such quasi-nuisance uses is necessary to the economic health and public welfare of the community, but that the potentially harmful impacts of such uses upon surrounding activities requires them to be physically isolated or “buffered” from adjacent uses that may be adversely affected. For this reason, the HI Heavy Industrial District will be mapped only in areas where topographic features of adjacent Light Industrial Districts mitigate the effects of the zone upon nearby uses. This District is also designed to accommodate the expansion of existing uses and provide for infill of vacant parcels but is not generally intended to be an expandable district other than through the use of a planned unit development district as provided in Section 3-5.5 of this Ordinance.

Dubuque Mun.Code app. 3-4.2 (1999).

In 1989, the city designated the north side of the Ice Harbor as an urban renewal district. Some time after 1996, the city hired an urban designer to create a master plan for the Ice Harbor area. The designer’s report determined the most appropriate use for the Ice Harbor area was not heavy industrial. After receiving the report, the city began to encourage redevelopment of the area on the north side of the Ice Harbor and to create a master plan and design for the entire Ice Harbor area. Beginning in 2001, the property north of the Ice Harbor, which was also zoned heavy industrial, underwent a major redevelopment and urban renewal effort. A $188 million campus developed, consisting of a river walk, expansion of a muser um/aquarium complex, construction of a hotel/indoor water park, and construction of an education and conference center.

The city adopted the Port of Dubuque Master Plan in March 2002. The plan stated, “the total project build out for both

the North and South Port areas is anticipated to take approximately eighteen to twenty years.” The master plan suggested changing the character of the area south of the Ice Harbor away from industrial uses to a pedestrian-oriented environment with places for employment and residential uses above office spaces. The master plan reflected the city’s conclusion that industrial uses on the south side of the Ice Harbor were no longer compatible with recent recreational and commercial uses authorized by the city in the area north of the Ice Harbor, because the area south of the Ice Harbor is not physically isolated or buffered from the area north of the Ice Harbor. Other reasons supporting the conclusion the area south of the Ice Harbor was no longer suitable for industrial uses were the area had access problems due to the need to cross a set of railroad tracks, and the riverfront was not needed by the industrial uses located in the area.

To implement the master plan, on April 15, 2002, the city council passed an ordinance reclassifying the landowners’ properties from heavy industrial to planned unit development (PUD). The PUD ordinance covered the entire Port of Dubuque area, including the areas located to the north and south of the Ice Harbor. Under the terms of the ordinance, the city allowed the landowners to continue to operate as nonconforming uses with conditions. For example, a nonconforming use cannot expand in gross floor area nor change in use from one nonconforming use to another nonconforming use without a variance. If more than fifty percent of a nonconforming use is destroyed, the landowner cannot rebuild without a variance. This fifty-percent rule is more restrictive than the seventy-five percent rule contained in the city’s general zoning ordinance. Finally, there are also restrictions regarding signage, outdoor storage, and screening.

The landowners brought this action against the city and the city council on May 10, 2002, seeking certiorari, declaratory, and injunctive relief. The landowners claimed the ordinance was arbitrary, capricious, or an unreasonable exercise of the city’s police power, and the adoption of the PUD resulted in a taking of their properties without just compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 18 of the Iowa Constitution.

After a bench trial, the district court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law and decree denying the landowners any relief. The district court concluded the ordinance was a proper exercise of the city’s police powers. In regards to the landowners’ taking argument, the district court determined it could not address this issue because the landowners did not exhaust their administrative remedies. The landowners appeal.

II. Issues.

On appeal, the landowners argue the ordinance adopting the PUD is an invalid exercise of the city’s police power. They also argue the enactment of the PUD ordinance constitutes a taking of the landowners’ properties without just compensation. In response to the landowners’ claim that the ordinance is a taking, the city argues we cannot decide this issue until the landowners exhaust their administrative remedies.

III. Scope of Review.

On appeal, we consider and review a case in the same manner as the district court tried the case. Bricker v. Maytag Co., 450 N.W.2d 839, 840-41 (Iowa 1990). Although the landowners filed the case in equity, the parties and the district court tried this case as a certiorari proceeding. A certiorari proceeding is “governed by the rules applicable to appeals in ordinary actions.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1412. Thus, our review is limited to correction of errors at law, and we are bound by the findings of the trial court if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Iowa R.App. P. 6.14(6)(a); accord Osage Conservation Club v. Bd. of Supervisors, 611 N.W.2d 294, 296 (Iowa 2000).

IV. Is the Enactment of the PUD Ordinance by Dubuque an Invalid Exercise of the City’s Police Power?

It is well-settled law that zoning decisions are “an exercise of the police powers delegated by the State to municipalities.” Neuzil v. City of Iowa City, 451 N.W.2d 159, 163 (Iowa 1990). Iowa Code section 414.3 provides zoning regulations “shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed ... to encourage efficient urban development patterns ... [and] to promote health and the general welfare.” Iowa Code § 414.3 (2001). Section 414.3 also provides zoning regulations

shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, as to the character of the area of the district and the peculiar suitability of such area for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such city.

Id.

“ ‘[A zoning] ordinance is valid if it has any real, substantial relation to the public health, comfort, safety, and welfare, including the maintenance of property values.’” Shriver v. City of Okoboji, 567 N.W.2d 397, 401 (Iowa 1997). Zoning ordinances carry with them a strong presumption of validity. Perkins v. Bd. of Supervisors, 636 N.W.2d 58, 67 (Iowa 2001). The party asserting the invalidity of the zoning regulation has the burden of proving the zoning regulation is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory. Id. If the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is fairly debatable, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the legislative body. Id.; see also Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388, 47 S.Ct. 114, 118, 71 L.Ed. 303, 311 (1926); Shriver, 567 N.W.2d at 401. The reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is fairly debatable when for any reason it is open to dispute or controversy on grounds that make sense or point to a logical deduction, and where reasonable minds may differ; or where the evidence provides a basis for a fair difference of opinion as to its application to a particular property. Neuzil, 451 N.W.2d at 163-64.

The landowners argue we must balance the possible public good against the harm to the landowners to determine whether the zoning was unreasonable as applied to the landowners. We appeared to use this test in F.H. Uelner Precision Tools & Dies, Inc. v. City of Dubuque, 190 N.W.2d 465, 468-69 (Iowa 1971), to overturn a zoning ordinance downzoning an industrial district to a residential district. We do not believe the validity of a zoning statute depends on the balancing test used in F.H. Uelner Precision Tools & Dies, Inc.

A property owner does not have a vested right in the continuation of a particular zoning classification. Quality Refrigerated Servs. Inc. v. City of Spencer, 586 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Iowa 1998). In reviewing an ordinance, we are predominantly concerned about the general purpose of the ordinance, not any hardship that may result in an individual case. Shriver, 567 N.W.2d at 401. To the extent the balancing test used in F.H. Uelner Precision Tools & Dies, Inc. is inconsistent with the fairly debatable standard applied in Neuz-il, Shriver, and Perkins, it is overruled.

Applying the fairly debatable standard to this case, the district court found that the city retained experts in urban planning and design to formulate the Port of Du-buque Master Plan. After reviewing the reports of the experts and receiving input from its citizens at public hearings, the city concluded the rezoning (1) encouraged efficient urban development patterns; (2) promoted the health and general welfare by prohibiting new or expanded development that would be incompatible with the commercial, recreational, and residential uses in the area north of the Ice Harbor; and (3) was made with a view to encourage the most appropriate use of the land.

These conclusions are supported by substantial evidence showing industrial uses by their nature tend to generate levels of smoke, dust, noise, or odors rendering them incompatible with most other uses, and there is no way to adequately screen the area north of the Ice Harbor from the area south of the Ice Harbor. Substantial evidence also supports the finding by the district court that the area south of the Ice Harbor had access problems due to the railroad tracks, and the businesses located in the area were not using the riverfront in connection with their business operations. Finally, substantial evidence supports that the economic impact to the area south of the Ice Harbor would add a substantial number of new jobs to the area and increase property values in the area by at least $40 million, resulting in a million dollars per year in added tax revenue to the city.

Although the landowners contend the city rezoned the area to force them to relocate, substantial evidence supports the district court’s conclusion that the reasonableness of the zoning ordinance is fairly debatable. Therefore, we agree with the district court’s determination that the city’s enactment of the PUD ordinance was a proper exercise of its police power.

V. Does the Enactment of the PUD Ordinance by Dubuque Constitute a Taking of the Landowners’ Property Without Just Compensation?

In its petition, the landowners allege, “the adoption of the ordinance constitutes an improper condemnation or taking of the [landowners’] property....” In essence, the landowners’ claim is for inverse condemnation. An inverse condemnation occurs when a government body takes an owner’s property without the institution of formal condemnation proceedings under our statutes. Scott v. City of Sioux City, 432 N.W.2d 144, 145 n. 1 (Iowa 1988).

A person may not be “deprived of property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation” under the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution. U.S. Const, amend. V. The Fifth Amendment prohibition of taking private property for public use without just compensation applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Chi, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239, 17 S.Ct. 581, 585-86, 41 L.Ed. 979, 985 (1897). The Iowa Constitution has a similar provision providing that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation first being made.... ” Iowa Const, art. I, 18.

A “taking” under the federal and Iowa constitutions is not limited to the appropriation of a fee. A taking occurs when there is even a minimal, permanent physical occupation of real property. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 3175, 73 L.Ed.2d 868, 882 (1982). A government action that does not intrude upon or occupy the property, but affects and limits the use of the property, can also be a taking. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43 S.Ct. 158, 160, 67 L.Ed. 322, 326 (1922). “[W]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Id.

Before we can address the landowners’ claim of inverse condemnation, we must determine if the matter is ripe for adjudication. Iowa Coal Mining Co. v. Monroe County, 555 N.W.2d 418, 432-34 (Iowa 1996). If the inverse condemnation claim is not ripe for adjudication, the court does not have the authority to hear the case and must dismiss it. Id. at 432. Exhaustion of one’s administrative remedies is a condition precedent to ripeness. Id. at 433. As we have previously stated:

In a state inverse condemnation proceeding like the present one, it is inaccurate to talk in terms of exhaustion of state remedies because the proceeding itself is a state remedy. Our only concern in such a proceeding is whether there has been finality, the other condition precedent to ripeness. Finality equates to exhaustion of administrative remedies under the challenged regulatory ordinance so that a final, reviewable decision must be made regarding the use of the property. A court can make no determination of the takings claim until the regulatory authority under the ordinance makes that final decision.

Id. at 434. With these principles in mind, we must determine if the landowners’ inverse condemnation claim is ripe for adjudication by examining whether the landowners exhausted their administrative remedies.

The PUD ordinance declared the existing industrial uses in the area south of the Ice Harbor are not compatible with the retail, institutional, and entertainment uses envisioned for the Port of Dubuque. It therefore made all the industrial uses in the area south of the Ice Harbor nonconforming uses. Although the PUD ordinance restricts the expansion of these nonconforming uses, the ordinance allows existing businesses to operate as long as there is no change in use or an expansion of an existing use.

The general zoning ordinance of Du-buque contains provisions that may grant the landowners relief from the no-change or expansion provisions of the PUD ordinance. One such provision allows the zoning administrator to interpret the provisions of the PUD ordinance. Dubuque MumCode app. § 5-4 (1989). If a business wants to make a change in its operation, it can request an opinion from the zoning administrator as to whether the proposed change would comply with the PUD ordinance. If the business is not satisfied with the zoning administrator’s decision, the business owner has a right to appeal the decision to the board of adjustment. Id. § 5-5. If the business does not obtain relief from the board of adjustment, the board’s actions are subject to judicial review by filing a petition for certiorari. See Iowa Code § 414.15.

Another provision of the general zoning ordinance allows a person to seek a variance to the PUD ordinance from the board of adjustment. See Iowa Code § 414.7; Dubuque MumCode app. § 5-2. Again, if the person is not satisfied with the board of adjustment’s decision on his or her request for a variance, he or she may seek judicial review of the board’s decision by filing a petition for certiorari. See Iowa Code § 414.15. Only after a property owner exhausts his or her appeals would a court be in a position to determine the inverse condemnation claim because at that point the allowable use of the property would be finally determined.

In the present case, Dubuque passed the PUD ordinance on April 15, 2002. Instead of seeking relief from the PUD ordinance through the zoning administrator or the board of adjustment, the landowners filed their petition on May 10, 2002. Under these circumstances, the landowners’ inverse condemnation claim is not ripe for adjudication, because the city has never had the opportunity to make a final and reviewable decision regarding the uses of the landowners’ properties that the city would actually allow with the PUD ordinance in effect. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s determination that the landowners did not exhaust their administrative remedies. For this reason, the landowners’ claim of inverse condemnation is not ripe for adjudication, and we must dismiss this claim on the ground the district court did not have authority to hear the case. See Iowa Coal Mining Co., 555 N.W.2d at 436.

VI. Disposition.

We affirm the district court’s judgment because the enactment of the PUD ordinance by the City of Dubuque was a valid exercise of its police power, and the district court did not have authority to hear the landowners’ inverse condemnation claim.

AFFIRMED.

      . Originally, there were two other plaintiffs involved in this action, Iowa Oil Co., who dismissed its claim before trial, and Dodds River Terminal, Inc., who leased its land from Dubuque and has not appealed the district court ruling.

      . As discussed in division V, the failure of a party to exhaust its administrative remedies in the context of an inverse condemnation claim is a condition precedent to ripeness.

      . This zoning ordinance provides the general purpose and description of the PUD district is intended to encourage flexible and innovative design in the development of appropriate sites as integrated project units. Regulations for this district are designed:
      (1) To allow a workable, interrelated mix of diverse land uses;
      (2) To encourage flexibility in design for efficiency and cost savings for the developer and the community;
      (3) To maximize the potential for large-scale office, residential, commercial and industrial development and at the same’ time reduce to a minimum the impact of the development on surrounding land uses and the natural environment;
      (4) To encourage new development to preserve and utilize existing land characteristics and features which offer visual recreational benefits or other amenities;
      (5) To promote the economic, attractive, innovative„and harmonious arrangement and design of new buildings, streets, utilities and other improvements or structures;
      (6) To provide a living, working and shopping environment within the layout of the site that contributes to a sense of community and a coherent lifestyle;
      (7) To provide for the creation and preservation of more and larger useable public or common open spaces that would normally be provided under conventional development;
      (8) To encourage the careful design and planning of larger development projects;
      (9) To give developers reasonable assurances regarding project approvals before the unnecessary expenditure of design efforts, while providing the city with appropriate assurances that approved PUDs will retain the character envisioned at the time of project approval.
      Dubuque Mun.Code app. § 3-5.5.

      . In In re Estate of Falck, we discussed the difference between subject matter jurisdiction and the lack of authority to hear a case as follows:
      "Subject matter jurisdiction'' refers to the power of a court to deal with a class of cases to which a particular case belongs. A constitution or a legislative enactment confers subject matter jurisdiction on the courts. Although a court may have subject matter jurisdiction, it may lack the authority to hear a particular case for one reason or another.
      672 N.W.2d 785, 789-90 (Iowa 2003).


author: TERNUS, Justice.

text:
    Joyce CHRISTY, M.D., Individually and as Next Friend and Parent of Cole Hocker, Alex Hocker, and Erin Hocker, and as the Executor of the Estate of Daniel L. Hocker, Deceased, Appellant, v. Daniel E. MIULLI, D.O., an Individual, Douglas R. Koontz, M.D., P.C., a/k/a Iowa Neurological Surgery, P.C. and f/k/a Neurological Surgery, P.C., and Mercy Hospital Medical Center, legally known as Catholic Health Initiatives Iowa, Corp., Appellees.
    No. 03-2055.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Feb. 18, 2005.

      Jerry Crawford and Jim Quilty of Crawford Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant.
    Barry G. Vermeer and Loree A. Nelson of Gislason & Hunter L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellees Miulli and Koontz P.C.
    Roberta M. Anderson of Schroeder & Anderson, Mason City, for appellee Catholic Health Initiatives.
   TERNUS, Justice.

Nearly three years after her husband’s death, plaintiff, Joyce Christy, filed a wrongful death action against the physician who had performed a biopsy procedure on her husband a week before he died, the physician’s employer, and the hospital where the procedure took place. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs suit on the defendants’ summary judgment motions, ruling the statute of limitations barred the claims asserted by Christy. On appeal, the plaintiff contends the district court erroneously rejected her argument that the statute of limitations was tolled under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. She also asserts the court applied the wrong statute of limitations to the loss-of-parental-consortium claims she brought on behalf of the decedent’s minor children. Upon our review of the record and the controlling legal principles, we affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs wrongful death claim and loss-of-spousal-eonsortium claim against the hospital, reverse the dismissal of these claims made against the physician and his employer, and reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the children’s loss-of-consortium claims as to all defendants.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The facts viewed most favorably to the plaintiff reveal the following events pertinent to our consideration of this appeal. See generally Cubit v. Mahaska County, 677 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Iowa 2004) (stating court, in considering summary judgment ruling, “View[s] the entire record in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party [and] indulge[s] in every legitimate inference that the evidence will bear’ in favor of the nonmoving party” (citation omitted)). On September 21, 1998, the defendant, Daniel Miulli, D.O., performed a brain biopsy on the plaintiffs husband, Daniel Hocker, for a suspected brain tumor. The procedure took place at Mercy Hospital Medical Center, which is operated by the defendant, Catholic Health Initiatives Iowa, Corp. At some point during the operation, Hocker developed a brain hemorrhage and his condition worsened significantly. Nonetheless, Dr. Miulli would later state in the medical records that the procedure had been performed without complication. Post-operatively, Hocker was admitted to the intensive care unit of the hospital, where, after a series of additional complications, he died on September 28,1998.

In the period immediately following the biopsy procedure, Dr. Miulli told Christy of the bleeding that had taken place, but wrongly represented to her that the hemorrhage occurred some distance away from the biopsy site. He suggested that perhaps an unrelated infectious process such as viral encephalitis caused the bleeding. (After this lawsuit was filed, Dr. Miulli conceded the cause of Hocker’s death was Dr. Miulli’s error in performing the biopsy in the wrong location, thereby causing the hemorrhage.) Dr. Miulli repeated his false report of what had occurred in the medical records, including recording a final diagnosis of viral encephalitis.

In the spring of 1999, the Mayo Clinic examined the decedent’s brain and prepared a pathology report. This report, provided to Christy, confirmed the presence of a brain tumor but did not mention viral encephalitis. Christy testified in a deposition that the absence of any discussion of viral encephalitis in the Mayo Clinic report did not raise any questions in her mind because she did not know whether the examination conducted by that institution could have identified encephalitis in the brain tissue. Christy later discussed this report with a Des Moines oncologist to learn whether there were any hereditary aspects to her husband’s brain tumor that might be of concern to their children, but she did not further investigate the cause of her husband’s death.

In August 1999, an investigator with the Iowa Board of Medical Examiners contacted Christy about Dr. Miulli’s treatment of her husband. Christy informed the investigator that she thought Dr. Miulli had provided excellent care to her husband. Later, when she told Dr. Miulli that the board had been asking questions about him, Dr. Miulli explained that a competing neurosurgeon had raised some questions, leading Christy to believe it was “a usual turf war kind of thing that you see in medicine all the time.” (The plaintiff is also a medical doctor, specializing in family practice.) During this same conversation Dr. Miulli told Christy about his purported finding of a correlation between viral conditions and patients with brain tumors, and that he was interested in doing a research project on the alleged connection.

Nearly three years after Hocker’s death Christy had a conversation with a friend of hers that led to the filing of the present lawsuit. In July 2001 a friend reported to Christy that an anesthesiologist involved in Hocker’s biopsy had stated that no one had checked the coordinates for the biopsy location and that the bleeding occurring during the procedure was related to the site where the biopsy was performed, contrary to what Dr. Miulli had consistently stated. Once Christy had this information she promptly filed this action against the defendants in August 2001.

Christy brought a claim for wrongful death as the executor of her husband’s estate and also filed loss-of-consortium claims on her own behalf and on behalf of the couple’s three minor children. She alleged in her petition that Dr. Miulli’s representations concerning the cause of her husband’s death misled her and caused her to belatedly discover the actual cause of the decedent’s death. After conducting discovery, the defendants filed motions for summary judgment, alleging the suit had not been filed within the applicable statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims, Iowa Code section 614.1(9)(a) (1999). Christy contended Dr. Miulli’s fraudulent concealment of the true cause of Hocker’s death tolled the statute of limitations, and in any event, the children’s loss-of-consortium claims were timely filed under the statutes of limitations set forth for minors in section 614.1(9)(6) or section 614.8. The district court concluded the lawsuit had not been timely filed notwithstanding Christy’s claim of fraudulent concealment, and that the extended limitations periods did not apply to the children’s claims. The court dismissed Christy’s suit against all the defendants, and she then filed this appeal.

II. Scope of Review.

Summary judgment is appropriate- “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). “A fact question is generated if reasonable minds can differ on how the issue should be resolved.” Walker v. Gribble, 689 N.W.2d 1G4, 108 (Iowa 2004). We review the district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment for correction of errors of law. Schlote v. Dawson, 676 N.W.2d 187, 188 (Iowa 2004).

III. Wrongful Death and Loss-of-Spousalr-Consortium Claims. ■

A. The parties’ contentions. The parties agree the statute of limitations for medical malpractice contained in section 614.1(9)(a) governs the claim brought on behalf of Hocker’s estate and Christy’s claim for loss of spousal consortium. (To simplify our discussion, we will sometimes refer to these claims jointly as the wrongful death claim.) Paragraph (a) of section 614.1(9) provides in relevant part:

9. Malpractice.

a. Except as provided in paragraph “b ”, those [actions] founded on injuries to the person or wrongful death against any physician and surgeon ... or a hospital licensed under chapter 135B, arising out of patient care, [must be brought] within two years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in writing of the existence of, the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action, whichever of the dates occurs first, but in no event ... more than six years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or occurrence alleged ... to have been the cause of the injury or death....

Iowa Code § 614.1(9)(a). The parties also appear to agree that the limitations period commences on the date the plaintiff has knowledge of the death giving rise to the cause of action and not when the plaintiff learns of the wrongful act that caused the death. See Schultze v. Landmark Hotel Corp., 463 N.W.2d 47, 48 (Iowa 1990) (holding, in wrongful death case, that statute of limitations in section 614.1(9) “commences on the date the death is discovered” (emphasis added)). Thus, unless the defendants are prevented from relying on the statute-of-limitations defense, the plaintiffs wrongful death claim is barred because it was filed more than two years after Hocker died.

That brings us to the plaintiffs contention that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment applies in this case to toll the medical malpractice statute of limitations. She cites our decision in Koppes v. Pearson, 384 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa 1986), where this court held the plaintiffs in a medical malpractice case would be permitted to prove fraudulent concealment to avoid the six-year limitation on medical malpractice claims. 384 N.W.2d at 388. In response, the defendants contend the doctrine of fraudulent concealment is restricted under the medical malpractice statute of limitations just like the discovery rule. They rely on our recent statement in Schlote that “[a] plaintiff in a medical malpractice case must show the defendant did some affirmative act to conceal the injury rather than the cause of action.” Schlote, 676 N.W.2d at 195. Thus, the defendants argue, the plaintiff must show the defendants concealed her husband’s death, a showing she cannot make. Upon a close examination of the underpinnings of the fraudulent concealment doctrine, it becomes apparent that the plaintiff has the better argument.

B. Applicable principles of fraudulent concealment. A review of our cases reveals two lines of authority concerning the legal effect of a tortfeasor’s misrepresentations to an injured party that cause the injured party to file suit beyond the statutory period. Under one series of cases, the analysis rests on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. See, e.g., Meier v. Alfa-Laval, Inc., 454 N.W.2d 576, 578-80 (Iowa 1990); Beeck v. Aquaslide ‘N’ Dive Corp., 350 N.W.2d 149, 157 (Iowa 1984); King v. Knudson, 209 Iowa 1214, 1217, 229 N.W. 839, 841 (1930). These cases hold that equitable estoppel is a recognized defense to the application of the statute of limitations. Meier, 454 N.W.2d at 578; Beeck, 350 N.W.2d at 157. Equitable es-toppel prevents a defendant “from asserting the bar of the statute of limitations” based on “his agreement, representations, or conduct.” DeWall v. Prentice, 224 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Iowa 1974). “There must be conduct amounting to false representation or concealment, and a party relying thereon must be thereby misled into doing or failing to do something he would not otherwise have done or omitted.” Id. (citation omitted); accord Beeck, 350 N.W.2d at 159 (“An estoppel may be based on fraudulent concealment.” (citing Gruener v. City of Cedar Falls, 189 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Iowa 1971))).

Under another line of cases the doctrine of fraudulent concealment is discussed without reference to its equitable estoppel roots and has evolved into a concept more akin to, yet ostensibly distinct from, the discovery rule. See, e.g., Van Overbeke v. Youberg, 540 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Iowa 1995); Koppes, 384 N.W.2d at 386. The following statement of the rule in Koppes illustrates this point:

“[Wjhere the party against whom a cause of action existed in favor of another, by fraud or actual fraudulent concealment prevented such other from obtaining knowledge thereof, the statute would only commence to run from the time the right of action was discovered, or might, by the use of diligence, have been discovered.”

Koppes, 384 N.W.2d at 386 (quoting Dist. Township of Boomer v. French, 40 Iowa 601, 603 (1875)). This expression of the fraudulent concealment doctrine combines principles of equitable estoppel (a party’s fraud or fraudulent concealment prevents another from knowing he has a cause of action) with a form of discovery rule (the statute is tolled until the injured party discovers or by the exercise of diligence could have discovered the cause of action). The odd blending of these concepts is perhaps explained by the fact that the original articulation of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment predated this court’s adoption of the discovery rule.

In any event, we think a more solid analytical framework is provided by confirming the doctrine of fraudulent concealment as a form of equitable estoppel. By adhering to this foundation for fraudulent concealment, the indispensable elements of ■this doctrine can be uniformly identified and consistently applied. Moreover, the distinctions between the defense of fraudulent concealment and the discovery rule become more apparent, thereby avoiding the confusion that arises from the hybridization of these concepts in some of our cases. Under this view, fraudulent concealment does not affect the running of the statutory limitations period; rather, it es-tops a defendant from raising a statutfe-of-limitations defense. See 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 380, at 688 (2000).

Having identified the essential character of the fraudulent concealment doctrine, we think the resolution of the present dispute becomes clear. As this court noted in Koppes, Schultzé, and Schlote, section 614.1(9) was adopted by the legislature to restrict the breadth of the discovery rule in medical malpractice cases. Schlote, 676 N.W.2d at 194; Schultze, 463 N.W.2d at 50; Koppes, 384 N.W.2d at 387. Thus, neither the statute itself nor the legislature’s underlying intent is pertinent to the fraudulent concealment doctrine when it is properly viewed as a species of equitable estoppel. That is because equitable estoppel has nothing to do with the running of the limitations period or the discovery rule; it simply precludes a defendant from asserting the statute as a defense when it would be inequitable to permit the defendant to do so. See 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 399, at 705 (“Equitable estoppel bars a defendant from pleading the running of statute of limitations if the plaintiff is induced to refrain from bringing a timely action by the defendant’s fraud, misrepresentation, or deception.”). See generally id. § 381, at 689 (stating equitable tolling focuses on plaintiffs knowledge, whereas equitable estoppel focuses on the defendant’s conduct). Based on the distinct and independent nature of the fraudulent concealment doctrine, we think this court was correct when it held in Koppes that “[cjlaims fraudulently concealed from the patient were not targeted by [section 614.1(9)].” Koppes, 384 N.W.2d at 387.

The same reasoning leads us also to conclude that section 614.1(9) does not affect the showing required to successfully rely on the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. To put the same limitations on the fraudulent concealment doctrine that we are obligated by the language of section 614.1(9) to place on the discovery rule would ignore the “separate and distinct” character of the fraudulent concealment doctrine and the discovery rule. See Kop- pes, 384 N.W.2d at 387. See generally 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 381, at 689.

In addition, we are convinced such limitations on the doctrine of fraudulent concealment would be inconsistent with the theory underlying this concept. This doctrine is intended to prevent a party from benefiting from “the protection of a limitations statute when by his own fraud he has prevented the other party from seeking redress within the period of limitations.” Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex.1983) (cited in Koppes, 384 N.W.2d at 387). It should not matter what particular fact is concealed so long as the defendant’s conduct prevents the timely filing of the claim and the other prerequisites for equitable estoppel are established. We now consider whether the question of the defendants’ fraudulent concealment is capable of summary adjudication in this case.

C. Existence of genuine issue of material fact. The foundational elements of equitable estoppel are well established:

(1) The defendant has made a false representation or has concealed material facts; (2) the plaintiff lacks knowledge of the true facts; (3) the defendant intended the plaintiff to act upon such representations; and (4) the plaintiff did in fact rely upon such representations to his prejudice.

Meier, 454 N.W.2d at 578-79; accord Beeck, 350 N.W.2d at 158. With respect to the first element, a party relying on the doctrine of fraudulent concealment must prove the defendant did some affirmative act to conceal the plaintiffs cause of action independent of and subsequent to the liability-producing conduct. See 51 Am. Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 387, at 694-95. Furthermore, the plaintiffs reliance must be reasonable. See Holman v. Omaha & C.B. Ry. & Bridge Co., 117 Iowa 268, 274, 90 N.W. 833, 834 (1902) (stating “estoppel would only be effective so long as the [plaintiff] reasonably relied upon defendant’s representations as an excuse for not instituting the action”); 51 Am. Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 384, at 691-92 (“The representation or conduct must have been relied upon reasonably, justifiably, and in good faith.”). The circumstances justifying an estoppel end when “[the] plaintiff [becomes] aware of the fraud, or by the use of ordinary care and diligence should have discovered it.” Faust v. Hosford, 119 Iowa 97, 100, 93 N.W. 58, 59 (1903). At that point the plaintiff must file suit “within a period of time not exceeding the original statutory period applicable to the particular cause of action.” 51 Am. Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 386, at 694. The plaintiff bears the burden to prove equitable estoppel by a clear and convincing preponderance of the evidence. Meier, 454 N.W.2d at 578.

Turning to the present case, we note the plaintiff makes no claim of misrepresentation or concealment by the hospital. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot rely on the fraudulent concealment doctrine to avoid the bar of the two-year statute of limitations as to this defendant. Accordingly, the district court correctly ruled as a matter of law that the plaintiffs wrongful death claim and loss-of-spousal-consortium claim against the hospital were untimely filed and should be dismissed.

As for the remaining defendants, the parties make no attempt to distinguish Koontz P.C., Dr. Miulli’s employer, from Dr. Miulli. Koontz P.C. has not argued that it should not be bound by the alleged misrepresentations made by Dr. Miulli. Therefore, we treat Koontz P.C. and Dr. Miulli together for purposes of considering whether summary judgment was appropriate on the wrongful death claim.

Dr. Miulli does not dispute there is sufficient evidence in the record upon which reasonable minds might conclude he made affirmative misrepresentations concerning the circumstances and cause of Hocker’s death that prevented Christy from discovering, information that would have prompted her to file a wrongful death claim. He claims instead that Christy was put on inquiry notice more than two years prior to her commencement of this action when she received the Mayo Clinic report that did not mention viral encephalitis. He asserts she would have discovered her cause of action then if she had exercised due diligence.

To support his argument, Dr. Miulli primarily relies on our now-disavowed cases that include the discovery rule in the definition of fraudulent concealment. He uses this language to incorporate the concept of inquiry notice into the fraudulent concealment doctrine. As we ' have now made clear, however, the discovery rule and inquiry notice are distinct from the doctrine of fraudulent concealment and the plaintiffs duty to exercise diligence to discover the defendant’s concealment. See Schultze, 463 N.W.2d at 51 (“in the. absence of fraud the two-year statutory period provided sufficient time to examine medical records and ascertain facts regarding the cause of death to determine if defendants committed any acts of malpractice” (emphasis added)). An illustration will show that the mere existence of inquiry notice does not necessarily suspend the estoppel produced by a defendant’s fraudulent concealment. For example, if a. patient on inquiry notice investigates by asking questions of .his physician, who then misrepresents the facts that would give rise to a cause of action, the physician is in no position to subsequently fault the par tient who reasonably relies on the truth of the physician’s statements and as a consequence delays filing suit. See Faust, 119 Iowa at 101, 93 N.W. at 59 (stating plaintiff “had the right to rely on the statements of her trusted agent”); 51 Am; Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 390, at 697 (stating fiduciary relationship may excuse plaintiffs failure to inquire or- investigate “because of his or her trust and confidence in the fiduciary”). On- the other hand, a patient’s knowledge of pertinent facts and circumstances may affect-the reasonableness of his continued reliance on a tortfea-sor’s representations. See 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 382, at 690.

We think there is a genuine issue of material fact- in the present case as to whether Christy had knowledge of facts and circumstances more, than two years prior to filing suit that put her on notice of Dr. Miulli’s alleged fraud or that made her continued reliance on Dr. Miulli’s representations unreasonable. Although the Mayo Clinic report Christy received in the spring of 1999 did not mention viral encephalitis, there is evidence from which a jury could conclude that the. absence of any discussion of viral encephalitis- in that report was not necessarily an indication that Hocker did not suffer from that condition at the time of his death so as to alert Christy that the defendant may have deceived her. Moreover, there is evidence Dr. Miulli actively continued his concealment after Christy received the pathology report. Christy testified Dr. Miulli assured her in the summer of 1999 that the board investigation was instigated by a competitor, thereby implying there was no merit to the complaint. She said he also told her at that time that he had seen additional cases of viral infections in patients with brain tumors. We have held that fraudulent concealment can be established by proof the “defendant not only affirmatively misrepresented the [pertinent facts], but made statements calculated to throw [the] plaintiff off her guard, and to cause her to abstain from making inquiries.” Faust, 119 Iowa at 99-100, 93 N.W. at 58. A fact finder could conclude Dr. Miulli’s statements to Christy in the summer of 1999 were intended to do just that: dispel any suspicions that would have led the plaintiff to investigate her husband’s death. A fact finder might also reasonably conclude Christy had no reason to make further inquiries until she received additional information in the summer of 2001 directly contradicting what Dr. Miulli had told her.

We conclude the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Dr. Miulli on his statute-of-limitations defense. Although the district court correctly ruled the two-year limitations period had expired as a matter of law by the time Christy filed suit, Christy has generated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dr. Miulli is estopped by his acts of concealment from raising this affirmative defense. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment granted to Dr. Miulli and Koontz P.C. on the plaintiffs claims for wrongful death and loss of spousal consortium.

IV. Loss-of-Parental-Consortium Claims.

We now consider whether the district court correctly dismissed the children’s loss-of-consortium claims. The court applied section 614.1(9)(a.), quoted above, rather than section 614.1(9)(6 ), which provides:

An action subject to paragraph “a” and brought on behalf of a minor who was under the age of eight years when the act, omission, or occurrence alleged in the action occurred shall be commenced no later than the minor’s tenth birthday or as provided in paragraph “a ”, whichever is later.

Iowa Code § 614.1(9)(6). The undisputed facts establish that the decedent’s three minor children were under the age of eight years at the time of their father’s biopsy and were under the age of ten years at the time this suit was filed. Therefore, if paragraph (6) governs, their claims for loss of consortium are timely as a matter of law.

The defendants contend, however, that paragraph (6) applies only when the minor suffered personal injuries from the alleged malpractice. When, as here, the defendants argue, the claim is one for loss of consortium brought by the executor of the decedent’s estate, paragraph (a) governs. The plaintiff disagrees with this interpretation of section 614.1(9) and suggests as an alternative that section 614.8(2) applies to extend the limitations period for one year from the minor’s attainment of majority. See Iowa Code § 614.8(2). We address the latter issue first.

Section 614.8(2) provides:

Except as provided in section 611.1, subsection 9, the times limited for actions in this chapter, except those brought for penalties and forfeitures, are extended in favor of minors, so that they shall have one year from and after attainment of majority within which to commence an action.

Iowa Code § 614.8(2) (emphasis added). The language, “[e]xcept as provided in section 614.1, subsection 9,” first appeared in section 614.8 in 1997 at the same time the legislature added paragraph (6) to section 614.1(9). 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 197, §§ 6-7. It is apparent the legislature intended that medical malpractice actions brought on behalf of a minor be governed by section 614.1(9), not section 614.8. Because section 614.8 does not apply to the present case, we direct our attention to section 614.1(9).

As noted above, the defendants claim paragraph (b) of section 614.1(9) applies only when the minor was the patient who received the allegedly negligent care. This argument finds no support in the language of the statute, which encompasses medical malpractice actions “brought on behalf of a minor” with no qualifications or exceptions. “ ‘If the statutory language is plain 'and the meaning clear, we do not search for legislative intent beyond the express terms of the statute.’ ” Am. Legion v. Cedar Rapids Bd. of Review, 646 N.W.2d 433, 437 (Iowa 2002) (citation omitted). Therefore, a claim brought by an executor or administrator on behalf of the minor for loss-of-consortium damages falls within the scope of the statute.

The defendants contend, however, that our “feasible joinder” rule requires that a minor’s loss-of-consortium claim be governed by the same limitations period applicable to the injured or deceased parent’s claim. The “feasible join-der” principle requires that consortium claims be brought with the primary injury or death claim unless the plaintiff can show it was not feasible for the consortium claim to be joined with the primary claim. See Beeck v. S.R. Smith Co., 359 N.W.2d 482, 486 (Iowa 1984). This rule is not based on the idea that the executor' or administrator of the deceased parent’s estate owns the cause of action. See id. Indeed, our cases make clear that a loss-of-parental-consortium claim is independent of the wrongful death claim and belongs to the child. See In re Estate of Sylvester, 559 N.W.2d 285, 288 (Iowa 1997); Bloomquist v. Wapello County, 500 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 1993). The joinder rule is simply designed “to reduce a multiplicity of suits and the possibility of double recovery.” S.R Smith, 359 N.W.2d at 487. Moreover, this court has specifically refused to make joinder mandatory. See Madison v. Colby, 348 N.W.2d 202, 209 (Iowa 1984).

Based on these principles, we held in S.R. Smith that a child’s claim for loss of parental consortium is governed by the statute of limitations applicable to minors, even though the claim should be brought by the injured parent when feasible. 359 N.W.2d at 487. We think the same result is appropriate in a wrongful death case. The child is entitled to any recovery obtained by the executor on the child’s behalf, and the executor is merely the conduit for achieving that recovery. The child’s claim should be governed by the statute of limitations applicable to minors. Here, that statute is paragraph (b) of section 614.1(9).

Although this holding may result in a child’s claim being prosecuted independently if the wrongful death claim is already barred under paragraph (a) of section 614.1(9), we do not think this situation violates the feasible joinder rule, literally or in spirit. Joinder is not required when it is not feasible. Clearly, if the underlying claim for injury or death is barred by the statute of limitations, then it would not be feasible to join a viable loss-of-consortium claim with the underlying claim. Cf. In re Marriage of Hutchinson, 588 N.W.2d 442, 450 (Iowa 1999) (holding joinder of child’s loss-of-parental-consortium claim was not feasible where injured parent refused to sue her doctors). Furthermore, there is no possibility of a multiplicity of suits or double recovery when the wrongful death claim has not been and cannot be pursued.

In conclusion, we hold section 614.1(9)(6) applies to the loss-of-consortium claims filed by Christy on behalf of the decedent’s minor children. The district court erred in ruling their claims were barred by the statute of limitations set forth in section 614.1(9)(a).

V. Summary and Disposition.

The two-year statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiffs wrongful death claim and loss-of-spousal-consortium claim — section 614.1(9)(a) — began to run on the date the plaintiff knew of her husband’s death, and consequently these claims were barred by the time the present action was filed three years later. Nonetheless, if Christy can establish the elements of equitable estoppel based on Dr. Miulli’s fraudulent concealment, she can prevent him from relying on the statute as an affirmative defense. Because there are no facts that would support a finding of misrepresentation or concealment by the hospital, we affirm the summary judgment in favor of the hospital on the wrongful death and loss-of-spousal-consortium claims. Because there are genuine issues of material fact as to the plaintiffs allegations of fraudulent concealment by Dr. Miulli, we reverse the district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of Dr. Miulli and Koontz P.C. on these claims.

The minors’ loss-of-parental-consortium claims are governed by the statute of limitations contained in section 614.1(9)(6). The undisputed facts establish that these claims were timely filed. The district court erred in ruling otherwise. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of the defendants on the loss-of-parental-consortium claims.

We remand this case for further proceedings.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

      . Our decision in this case requires that we withdraw our dicta in Schlote that a plaintiff relying on fraudulent concealment must show the defendant concealed the injury giving rise to the plaintiff's claim. 676 N.W.2d at 195. This action does not, however, undermine the continuing validity of the balance of our opinion in Schlote.

      . A person is on inquiry notice for purposes of the discovery rule when "he gains information sufficient to alert a reasonable person of the need to investigate.” Ranney v. Parawax Co., 582 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Iowa 1998). Once a person has inquiry notice, he is held to have knowledge "of all facts that would have been disclosed by a reasonably diligent investigation.” Id. •

      . Under Iowa case law, a minor’s loss-of-parental consortium claim must be brought by the administrator or executor of a deceased parent's estate. Madison v. Colby, 348 N.W.2d 202, 209 (Iowa 1984). Here, the minors' claims were brought by Christy as "next friend and parent." The defendants argue that we should analyze the minors’ claims as though they had been brought by the proper parly, asserting the minors should obtain no advantage with respect to the applicable statute of limitations by virtue of Christy’s failure to bring their claims in her capacity as executor of Hocker’s estate. We agree, and so our analysis assumes that the loss-of-parental-consortium claims are brought by the executor of the deceased parent’s estate.

      . The defendant argues that interpreting the section 614.1(9)(fc) to include claims brought by administrators or executors would lead to the absurd result that there would be no statute of limitations applicable to a deceased minor’s claim because the deceased minor would never have a tenth birthday so as to terminate the limitations period. But it is this precise situation that has led courts in other states to hold that a limitations statute such as section 614.1(9)(b) applies only to living children. See Randolph v. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 793 N.E.2d 231, 234 (Ind.Ct.App.2003); Awve v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 181 Wis.2d 815, 512 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Wis.Ct.App.1994); cf. Holt v. Lenko, 791 A.2d 1212, 1215 (Pa.Super.Ct.2002) (employing same reasoning to conclude general tolling provision for minors applied only to living minors).


author: MEYER, Justice.

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Lashazo REESE, Jr., Appellant.
    No. A03-1887.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    March 3, 2005.

      Ann McCaughan, Office of State Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.
    Mike Hatch, Attorney General' — -Criminal Division, Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Darrell C. Hill, Asst. Ramsey County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for Respondent.
   OPINION

MEYER, Justice.

Lashazo Reese, Jr. appeals his conviction after a jury trial of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, and second-degree attempted murder. Reese claims he was denied his constitutional right to present a complete defense because the trial court refused to allow an expert witness to give an opinion as to the effects of long-term drug use on a victim’s ability to give reliable testimony. Reese also seeks to vacate one of the two judgments of conviction for first-degree murder. We affirm Reese’s convictions of first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree attempted murder, and vacate the conviction of first-degree felony murder.

On the evening of August 28, 2002, Reese went to an apartment building on Arcade Street in St. Paul, Minnesota, to sell drugs to acquaintances. There he met Juanita de la Rosa and accompanied her to her apartment to transact business with her. In the early morning hours of August 29, 2002, Jermaine Talley arrived at de la Rosa’s apartment in a state of extreme inebriation. He attempted to buy drugs from Reese with a roll of cash. Reese did not make a sale to Talley, but gave Talley his phone number on a slip of paper. De la Rosa placed the slip of paper containing Reese’s phone number in her Bible. Talley then fell asleep on de la Rosa’s couch with the roll of cash in his hand.

According to de la Rosa, Reese then went into her bathroom. De la Rosa followed Reese to the bathroom to ask him to leave the apartment. When de la Rosa opened the bathroom door, she saw a blanket from her storage area on the bathroom floor. She saw Reese pull a gun from his pants. She turned to flee, but Reese grabbed her and closed the bathroom door. Reese hit her on the head three times with the gun. De la Rosa fell face down on top of the blanket. Reese then put the gun to the back of her neck and shot her three times. De la Rosa lay motionless, pretending to be dead.

According to de la Rosa, Reese then left the bathroom and a short time later she heard a shot from the living room. She then heard Reese leave the apartment. De la Rosa made her way to a neighboring apartment, where a neighbor assisted her in calling 911. First responders received the call at 3:00 a.m. Talley was found dead on the couch where he had been sleeping, the roll of cash missing. Neither the money nor the murder weapon was ever recovered.

De la Rosa’s story was corroborated in certain respects by physical evidence, such as the presence of Reese’s phone number in the Bible, the blanket on the bathroom floor, and the location of a beer can that Reese and de la Rosa had used as a crack pipe earlier in the evening. There was also circumstantial evidence implicating Reese in the shootings. Jean Duncan, a tenant in the apartment next door to de la Rosa, testified to hearing de la Rosa screaming, followed by the sound of three gunshots. A few minutes later, Duncan saw a man wearing a gray tee-shirt leaving de la Rosa’s apartment. Duncan recognized the shirt as the same one Reese had been wearing earlier that evening. Another neighbor, Denise Larson, testified to hearing a “loud boom.” Larson helped de la Rosa call 911 after de la Rosa came to her door, screaming for help. Cassie Smith, a friend of Reese’s with whom Reese stayed in the days after the shootings, testified that Reese was “edgy” during those days, that he told her he was in “big trouble,” and that he talked about a man who had died, a woman pistol-whipped in a bathroom, and the money. Another friend of Reese’s, Gregory Star-wood, testified that Reese called him shortly after the shooting and told him that he had killed a man after the man refused to pay a drug debt. According to Starwood, Reese asked for his help in getting out of town.

Reese’s testimony sharply conflicted with de la Rosa’s account of the shootings. Reese claimed that he left de la Rosa’s apartment shortly after 2:00 a.m. and was not present when the shootings took place. Two alibi witnesses corroborated his story.

During discovery, Reese requested de la Rosa’s medical records. He received all records dating from the time of the shootings but also inadvertently received several records from a prior hospitalization in 2000. The prior records described de la Rosa’s drug and alcohol use and included a summary of the results of several neurological and psychological tests performed on de la Rosa. The state filed a motion in limine, requesting exclusion of all of de la Rosa’s prior medical records. Reese filed a counter-motion requesting an in camera review of the prior records and a determination that those records could be admitted into evidence as “relevant to [de la Rosa’s] competence and ability to testify.” Reese also sought permission to have his medical expert review de la Rosa’s prior medical records for the purpose of giving an opinion regarding whether her drug use may have affected her memory and reliability. De la Rosa did not consent to the evidentiary use of her prior medical records.

The trial court made a preliminary ruling, subject to change after de la Rosa’s testimony, that admission of the records would be denied because the records were protected by medical privilege. The trial court also ruled that Reese’s expert could testify generally about the physiological effects of drug use and paint sniffing on the brain. However, the expert was prevented from testifying in particular about the effects of drug use upon de la Rosa because that opinion would invade the province of the jury.

Before trial, Reese renewed his motion for in camera review of de la Rosa’s complete medical and psychiatric records, admission of the prior medical records into evidence, and permission to elicit expert testimony as to “the effects of Ms. De La Rosa’s prolonged exposure to drugs and/or chemicals, paint sniffing, depression, and other relevant information” on her ability to function and' recall events. Reese claimed that these requests were necessary to effectively challenge de la Rosa’s reliability and that the evidence would show that this eyewitness’s reliability was “compromised because of her extensive paint-sniffing and crack cocaine use.” The state, for its part, filed a motion to preclude Reese from offering “any expert testimony as to the mental ability of a witness or of that witness’s ‘competent’ memory of the events of August 28-29, 2002.”

During trial, Reese twice renewed his request for an in camera review of de la Rosa’s prior medical records and argued that expert testimony would be helpful to the jury because of the unfamiliarity to the layperson of the “effects of paint sniffing” over time. The trial court reviewed the records in camera and ruled that they were not admissible but that they could be used for the limited purpose of cross-examination and impeachment of de la Rosa. The court further ruled that an expert witness could testify as to the effects of paint sniffing generally, but could not review de la Rosa’s prior medical records or give an expert opinion as to the reliability of her testimony.

Reese did not call an expert witness to the stand but did use de la Rosa’s prior medical records to impeach her testimony about her history of drug use, depression, and drinking. After a three-day trial, Reese was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree murder during the commission of an aggravated robbery, and attempted second-degree murder. The court imposed a mandatory life sentence for the first-degree premeditated murder and a 151-month commitment to the Commissioner of Corrections for the attempted second-degree murder, to be served consecutively. The court also ordered Reese to pay $7,584.66 in restitution for funeral expenses of the decedent.

I.

Reese claims that his constitutional due process right to present a meaningful defense was seriously undermined by the trial court’s refusal to allow expert testimony about de la Rosa’s ability to process information reliably. Reese suggests that examination of de la Rosa’s prior medical records would have led his expert to testify that a person with de la Rosa’s history was not capable' of processing information reliably. Reese argues that the excluded medical evidence was potentially exculpatory and relevant to his defense that he did not commit the shootings because it could have established that de la Rosa was unreliable and mistaken in her identity of the shooter.

It is well established that a criminal defendant has a constitutional due process right to present a meaningful defense. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); Bixler v. State, 582 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn.1998). This right is comprised, at a minimum, of the right to examine the witnesses against the defendant, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038. However, the defendant must still comply with established rules of evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in assessing guilt or innocence. State v. Wolf, 605 N.W.2d 381, 384 (Minn.2000).

A trial court has broad discretion as to evidentiary matters and we will not overturn a trial court’s rulings on such matters on appeal absent a clear abuse of this discretion. State v. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d 466, 475 (Minn.1999). Admission of expert testimony is considered to rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed unless there has been clear error. State v. Koskela, 536 N.W.2d 625, 629 (Minn.1995).

Several established rules of evidence are pertinent to the issue of the expert testimony sought by Reese. First, Rule 702 states that expert testimony is admissible if it “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Minn. R. Evid. 702. We have read this rule as a helpfulness requirement: if the subject of the testimony is within the knowledge or experience of a lay jury and the expert would not be able to deepen the jury’s understanding, then the testimony does not meet the helpfulness requirement and is not admissible. State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn.1980). Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403 acts as an additional filter, allowing exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 403.

Reese argues that his expert’s testimony about the “long-term neurological effects” of paint sniffing is beyond the knowledge and experience of the average jury, and that therefore it meets the helpfulness requirement. The state concedes that this may be so, but notes that the trial court was willing to allow Reese’s expert to testify generally as to the effects of paint sniffing. The state notes that the only testimony the trial court excluded was a specific application to de la Rosa, based on the expert’s review of de la Rosa’s prior medical records. According to the state, specific expert testimony about the long-term effects of paint sniffing on de la Rosa’s ability to process information reliably would amount to a determination of de la Rosa’s credibility. The state argues that since only a jury may assess witness credibility, the trial court’s decision to exclude this specific testimony comports with prior case law and the trial court’s sound discretion.

We agree that assessment of witness credibility is a jury function. See Minn. R. Evid. 608 (credibility of a witness may only be attacked or supported by opinion or reputation evidence concerning the witness’s truthfulness, and only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by the adversary); see also 10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice — Jury Instruction Guide, Criminal, CRIMJIG 3.12 (4th ed.1999) (jury members are the sole judges of whether a witness is to be- believed and of the weight to be given a witness’s testimony). An expert witness may not testify as to the credibility of a specific witness, though the expert may be able to testify generally as to certain psychological or physiological conditions that may affect credibility, if such testimony is beyond the knowledge and experience of an average jury. See Koskela, 536 N.W.2d at 630 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting expert testimony to general information about the nature of schizoid personality disorder rather than specifically assessing the defendant, because whether the defendant fit the disorder profile was a question for the jury); State v. Ritt, 599 N.W.2d 802, 812 (1999) (holding that the trial court was within its discretion in excluding expert testimony about the effects of coercive interrogation on a particular defendant,, saying that this was a question for the jury’s determination); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Minn.1982) (stating that expert opinions concerning a witness’s capacity to perceive the world around him or her “are generally inadmissible because such opinions invade the jury’s province to make credibility determinations.”). Given this' general rule, we must determine whether any exceptions apply. “Expert testimony concerning the credibility of a witness should be received only in ‘unusual cases.’ ” Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 231.

Whether an expert witness may give an opinion that a victim’s drug use has affected that victim’s ability to give reliable testimony is a matter of first impression in this state. In other circumstances, we have held that an expert could not give an opinion on an ultimate fact. In State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn.1989), we held that expert testimony was allowed on battered woman syndrome, but that such testimony was to be limited to “a description of the general syndrome and the characteristics which are present in an individual suffering from the syndrome. The expert should not be allowed to testify as to the ultimate fact that the particular defendant actually suffers from battered woman syndrome.” Id. at 799. We reasoned that this final determination was a jury question. Id. Similarly, in Koskela we held that the trial court’s decision to allow expert testimony as to the nature of schizoid personality disorder, but not as to whether the defendant fit the disorder, was well within the trial court’s discretion and was not erroneous. 536 N.W.2d at 630.

In only one case have we held that an expert could give an opinion that a victim’s allegations were not fabricated. In State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn.1984), we held that an expert could offer an opinion that a specific minor complainant’s allegations about sexual abuse were not fabricated, in addition to testifying about the behavior and symptoms typically exhibited by sexually abused children. Id. at 606. We noted that “[i]n most cases, even though an expert’s testimony may arguably provide the jury with potentially useful information, the possibility that the jury may be unduly influenced by an expert’s opinion mitigates against admission.” Id. at 610. In Myers, however, the defendant had called the child complainant’s credibility into question by cross-examining the child’s mother as to the child’s truthfulness, thereby “opening the door” to the expert’s opinion testimony as to the child’s truthfulness. Id. at 611. The expert’s opinion testimony was allowed because “[hjaving sought * * * to discredit the child’s credibility by showing that the child’s mother (the ultimate ‘expert’ with respect to the complainant) did not believe [the child] for several months, the defendant must be said to have waived objection to responsive opinion testimony[.]” Id. at 611-12.

Reese’s case is factually dissimilar to Myers. In this case, Reese attempted to establish through expert testimony that long-term drug use can affect a person’s reliability and that in the opinion of the expert de la Rosa’s long-term drug use had caused her to be an unreliable witness. While it is true that attacking de la Rosa’s credibility was central to the defense strategy, her credibility was clearly susceptible to cross-examination, particularly since her prior medical records were made available for impeachment purposes. This court has been “very reluctant to allow experts to testify about matters that are generally for the jury’s determination and are susceptible to cross-examination.” Ritt, 599 N.W.2d at 812. The ultimate question was whether de la Rosa was a credible witness and on that question the jury should be the sole judge of whether a witness is to be believed and the weight to be given the witness’s testimony. This is not the “unusual case” contemplated by Saldana. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the expert witness’s testimony.

II.

We turn to the second eviden-tiary issue: whether the trial court erred in limiting the disclosure of de la Rosa’s prior medical records based on medical privilege. Generally, a crime victim’s past medical records are protected from disclosure by the physician-patient privilege. Minn.Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(d) and (g) (2004). However, “the medical privilege, like other privileges, sometimes must give way to the defendant’s right to confront his accusers.” State v. Kutchara, 350 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Minn.1984). This court has held that the proper procedure is generally for the trial court to review the medical records at issue in camera to determine whether the privilege must give way. Id. “The in camera approach strikes a fairer balance between the interest of the privilege holder in having his confidences kept and the interest of the criminal defendant in obtaining all relevant evidence that might help in his defense.” State v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68, 71-72 (Minn.1992) (quoting State v. Paradee, 403 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Minn.1987)).

In the present case, the trial court performed an in camera review of de la Rosa’s prior medical records, as requested by Reese. The trial court allowed Reese to use the records for the limited purpose of impeaching de la Rosa’s testimony, but prohibited further disclosure of the records. The trial court refused to allow Reese’s expert to review the records. It was not error to refuse to allow the expert access to the prior records because the expert could not properly base an opinion on them; i.e., the expert was limited to testifying about the effects of long-term drug use generally, not as it relates to de la Rosa specifically. The court conducted an in camera review of the records, and determined that Reese could use them for impeachment purposes, but struck a balance in the interest of de la Rosa’s medical privilege and ruled the records themselves to be inadmissible. This evidentiary decision was well within the trial court’s discretion and we find no error.

III.

The appellant argues that the trial court erred in entering judgments of conviction for both first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree murder during the commission of an aggravated robbery. The state concurs that the trial court erred.

Minnesota Statutes § 609.04 (2004) provides that “[u]pon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both.” Thus, the statute bars more than one conviction for the same offense by a defendant against the same victim on the basis of the same act. State v. Ture, 353 N.W.2d 502, 517 (Minn.1984); see also State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn.1984); State v. Koonsman, 281 N.W.2d 487, 489-90 (Minn.1979). Therefore, a defendant may not legally be convicted of two counts of first-degree murder when both convictions are for the same offense, are on the basis of the same act, and involve the same victim. Ture, 353 N.W.2d at 517. Based on the plain language of the statute and our previous decisions interpreting the statute, we hold that the trial judge erred in entering judgments of conviction for both murder charges, and we vacate the judgment of conviction for first-degree murder during the commission of an aggravated robbery.

In a pro se supplemental brief, Reese also requests that we “preserve his rights” as to four legal claims: ineffective assistance of counsel; “witness tampering on behalf of D.A.’s office”; credibility of witnesses; and denial of admissible evidence. Reese argues that because he has been in segregation since April 4, 2004, he has been unable to provide any case law to develop his positions on these issues. The claims of denial of admissible evidence and credibility of witnesses have been presented by Reese’s counsel and decided above. As to the remaining two claims, we have held that once a direct appeal has been taken, “all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976). But Reese’s claims may be presented on postconviction appeal under the interests of justice exception to the Knaff-la rule, if Reese can establish that fairness so requires. See Fox v. State, 474 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn.1991).

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

      . De la Rosa had provided a signed medical release to allow the defense access to her medical records from the time of the shootings.