text:
    In re COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Petitioner. Dale Lee Underdahl, Respondent, v. Commissioner of Public Safety, Appellant.
    No. A06-1000.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    July 26, 2007.

      Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Ken B. Peterson, Deputy Attorney General, Jeffrey F. Lebowski, Peter D. Magnuson, Assistant Attorneys General, St. Paul, MN, for Appellant.
    Jeffrey S. Sheridan, Strandemo, Sheridan & Dulas, P.A., Eagan, MN, for Respondent.
   OPINION

PAGE, Justice.

Respondent Dale Lee Underdahl was arrested for driving while intoxicated and submitted to a breath test using the Minnesota model of the Intoxilyzer 5000EN (hereinafter, Intoxilyzer 5000EN). At his implied consent hearing, Underdahl made a discovery motion that included, among the items sought, the “complete computer source code for the [Intoxilyzer 5000EN] currently in use in the State of Minnesota.” In granting the motion, the district court ordered that appellant, the Commissioner of Public Safety, provide Underdahl with an operational Intoxilyzer 5000EN instrument and “the complete computer source code for the operation of the [Intoxilyzer 5000EN].”

In response to the district court’s order, the commissioner petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition to prevent the district court from enforcing the order on the grounds that the district court “exceeded its jurisdictional authority and ordered the production of information clearly not discoverable.” The court of appeals concluded that the district court had jurisdiction over the discovery dispute and that the commissioner failed to establish that the district court improperly issued the discovery order. In re Comm’r of Pub. Safety, Underdahl v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, — N.W.2d —, No. A06-1000, order at 2-3 (Minn.App. July 18, 2006) (denying writ of prohibition). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

Between 1983 and 1997, law enforcement officials in the State of Minnesota used the Intoxilyzer 5000 series 64 and 66 to conduct breath tests of drivers suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol. Jasper v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 642 N.W.2d 435, 437 (Minn.2002). In 1996, the state decided to replace the Intoxilyzer 5000 series 64 and 66 models with a new testing device and issued a request for proposal (RFP) for new breath-testing instruments. In a letter accompanying the RFP, the state explained that the RFP detailed the “relationship to be established between the State and a vendor which provides Evidentiary Breath Alcohol Test Instruments” and specifically indicated that “[t]he RFP also specifle[d] contractual conditions.” In the RFP, the state included a provision titled “ownership of copyright.” According to the parties, that provision is relevant in this case to determine whether the source code for the Intoxilyzer 5000EN is discoverable from the state. The provision reads:

All right, title, and interest in all copyrightable material which Contractor shall conceive or originate, either individually or jointly with others, and which arises out of the performance of this Contract, will be the property of the State and are by this Contract assigned to the State along with ownership of any and all copyrights in the copyrightable material[.] Contractor also agrees, upon the request of the State to execute all papers and perform all other acts necessary to assist the State to obtain and register copyrights on such materials. Where applicable, works of authorship created by Contractor for the State in performance of the Contract shall be considered “works for hire” as defined in the U.S. Copyright Act.

The RFP also requires the winning contractor to agree to provide

information * ⅜ * including statement of all non-disclosure/non-reproduction agreements required to obtain information, fees and deposits required, to be used by attorneys representing individuals charged with crimes in which a test with the proposed instrument is part of the evidence. This part of the contract to be activated with an order from the court with jurisdiction of the case and include a reduced fee schedule for defendants found by the court to be entitled to a publicly funded defense.

CMI Incorporated (CMI) submitted the winning proposal. The parties do not dispute that the commissioner subsequently approved the Intoxilyzer 5000EN model developed by CMI for statewide use. See Minn. R. 7502.0420, subp. 3 (2005).

On February 18, 2006, respondent Dale Lee Underdahl was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Underdahl submitted to a breath test using the Intoxilyzer 5000EN. In an implied consent hearing in Dakota County District Court, Underdahl made a motion seeking additional discovery, including the “complete computer source code” for the Intoxilyzer 5000EN. In its May 2, 2006, order, the district court ordered the commissioner to provide Un-derdahl with an operational Intoxilyzer 5000EN instrument, “together with all necessary peripherals, including, but not limited to, a supply of simulator solution, the simulator apparatus, internal modem, printer, and supply of mouth pieces.” The court also ordered that the commissioner “obtain and provide to [Underdahl’s] counsel the complete computer source code for the operation of the Minnesota model of the Intoxilyzer 5000 currently in use in the State of Minnesota.” The order was based on the district court’s conclusion that the state owned the source code for the Intoxi-lyzer 5000EN model created exclusively for the state. In support of that conclusion, the court cited the “ownership of copyright” provision in the RFP. In reaching that conclusion, the court also stated that it could see no reason “why drivers tested using that instrument should not have full access to all of the information employed by that instrument.”

The commissioner subsequently petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition to prevent the district court from enforcing its discovery order. The commissioner essentially argued that the court of appeals should issue the writ of prohibition because Minn.Stat. § 634.16 (2006), which sets forth a presumption of reliability whereby the results of an infrared breath test are “admissible in evidence without antecedent expert testimony,” divests the district court of jurisdiction to order the additional discovery. In the alternative, the commissioner argued that if the court had jurisdiction, it abused its discretion by ordering discovery of source code that the commissioner claimed was not in its possession, custody, or control and was, therefore, nondiscoverable. The commissioner also argued that due process did not require discovery of the source code because the code was proprietary to CMI and thus unavailable to the state. Underdahl argued that the district court had jurisdiction over his challenge to the reliability of his test results and that the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the additional discovery.

The court of appeals denied the commissioner’s petition, concluding first that the district court had jurisdiction to respond to Underdahl’s challenge to the reliability of his test result. In re Comm’r of Pub. Safety, Underdahl v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, No. A06-1000, at 3. In reaching this conclusion, the court explained that “respondent is raising challenges to his particular test results, which he may do pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b) (2004). These challenges are to be raised in the district court pursuant to MinmStat. § 169A.53, subd. 2 (2004).” Id. at 2. Based on the district court’s finding that the source code was not proprietary, the court of appeals went on to conclude that the district court did not err in ordering discovery of the source code created specifically for the Minnesota model of the Intoxilyzer. Id. at 3. In support of this conclusion, the court noted that the commissioner acknowledged that the state owned some portion of the source code. Id.

A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy and is only used in extraordinary cases. Thermorama, Inc. v. Shitter, 271 Minn. 79, 83-84, 135 N.W.2d 43, 46 (1965). We will issue a writ of prohibition only when one of the following four circumstances applies:

it appears that the court is about to exceed its jurisdiction or where it appears the action of the court relates to a matter that is decisive of the case; where the court has ordered the production of information clearly not discoverable and there is no adequate remedy at law; or in rare instances where it will settle a rule of practice affecting all litigants.

Id. at 84; 135 N.W.2d at 46. The writ sought by the commissioner does not meet this test.

First, we consider whether “it appears that the court is about to exceed its jurisdiction.” Id. “Jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo.” Kellar v. Von Holtum, 605 N.W.2d 696, 700 (Minn.2000), superseded on other grounds by Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03. The commissioner argues, as he did in the court of appeals, that because section 634.16 establishes that an approved breath-testing instrument is presumed reliable, the only way to challenge the reliability of the instrument is to challenge the administrative rule that approved the instrument for statewide use. The commissioner then asserts that, because Minn.Stat. § 14.44 (2006) gives the court of appeals exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to administrative rules, the district court lacked jurisdiction to order discovery of the source code.

Minnesota Statutes § 634.16 provides that:

In any civil or criminal hearing or trial, the results of a breath test, when performed by a person who has been fully trained in the use of an infrared or other approved breath-testing instrument * * *, pursuant to training given or approved by the commissioner of public safety or the commissioner’s acting agent, are admissible in evidence without antecedent expert testimony that an infrared or other approved breath-testing instrument provides a trustworthy and reliable measure of the alcohol in the breath.

(Emphasis added.) Minnesota Rule 7502.0420, subp. 3, is the rule approving the Intoxilyzer 5000EN for use throughout Minnesota. The commissioner reads the presumption of trustworthiness set forth in section 634.16 as taking away the district court’s jurisdiction over challenges to the reliability of individual breath tests performed using the Intoxilyzer 5000EN. This reading is premised on the commissioner’s conclusion that, once the department formally approves a breath-testing device, “[the device] is by definition deemed to be reliable under the statute.” Therefore, the commissioner contends that the only way to challenge the reliability of such tests is to challenge Rule 7502.0420 in the court of appeals under Minn.Stat. § 14.44, which provides that the

validity of any rule may be determined upon the petition for a declaratory judgment thereon, addressed to the Court of Appeals, when it appears that the rule, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair the legal rights or privileges of the petitioner.

(Emphasis added.)

Underdahl asserts that he is challenging his specific test results under Minn.Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b) (2006), not the validity of Rule 7502.0240. Citing to Minn.Stat. § 169A.53, subds. 2 and 3 (2006), Under-dahl argues that section 169A.53 specifically provides him with the right to challenge the validity of his test results in the district court. Section 169A.53, subdivision 2, provides that after a driver receives notice and order of the revocation of his or her license for driving under the influence of alcohol, the driver may seek judicial review of the revocation in the district court in the county where the alleged offense occurred. Section 169A.53, subdivision 3, limits the scope of that judicial review to ten specific issues. Subdivision 3(b)(10), which reads, “Was the testing method used valid and reliable and were the test results accurately evaluated?,” permits the driver to challenge the validity of his or her test results.

The commissioner’s argument that Underdahl may only challenge the reliability of his test results by challenging the rule approving the Intoxilyzer 5000EN for statewide use relies on an overly expansive reading of section 634.16. Under section 634.16, the results of a breath test conducted with an approved testing instrument are admissible and presumed trustworthy and reliable “without antecedent expert testimony.” But section 634.16’s presumption of reliability may be challenged in a proceeding under section 169A.53, subdivision 3(b)(10), which specifically permits a driver to challenge the reliability and accuracy of his or her test results. Because Minn.Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 2, gives the district courts jurisdiction of section 169A.53, subdivision 3(b)(10), proceedings,the commissioner’s argument that the district court lacks jurisdiction in this case necessarily fails.

Second, in order to determine if a writ of prohibition may issue, we consider whether the order at issue relates to a matter that is decisive of the case. Thermorama, 271 Minn. at 84, 135 N.W.2d at 46. Here, we conclude that it does not. The district court’s discovery order addresses whether the source code for the Intoxilyzer 5000EN is discoverable. The issue to be addressed in the underlying implied consent hearing is whether Under-dahl’s test results are valid. Resolution of the pretrial discovery issue, however resolved, will not be dispositive of the underlying issue. It is enough to note that this is a pretrial matter seeking discovery of information that may or may not be admissible at trial.

Third, we consider whether the district court’s order mandated discovery of information that is clearly not discoverable and for which there is no adequate remedy at law. Thermorama, 271 Minn. at 84, 135 N.W.2d at 46. “[A] trial judge has wide discretion to issue discovery orders and, absent clear abuse of that discretion, normally its order with respect thereto will not be disturbed.” Shetka v. Kueppers, 454 N.W.2d 916, 921 (Minn.1990). We review a district court’s order for an abuse of discretion by determining whether the district court made findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying the law. See, e.g., Frauenshuh v. Giese, 599 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn.1999), superseded in part on other grounds by Act of Apr. 27, 2000, ch. 444, art. 1, § 5, 2000 Minn. Laws. 980-984 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 518.18(d)(i) (2006)). “[Discovery rules are remedial and must be construed liberally.” Anderson v. Florence, 288 Minn. 351, 361, 181 N.W.2d 873, 879 (1970). This is so because of the philosophy underlying our discovery rules that “ ‘a lawsuit should be an intensive search for the truth, not a game to be determined in outcome by consideration of tactics and surprise.’ ” Id. at 356, 181 N.W.2d at 876 (quoting David W. Louisell, Discovery and Pre-Trial Under the Minnesota Rules, 36 Minn. L.Rev. 633, 639 (1951-52)).

Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 26.02(a) provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to a claim or defense of any party.” Rule 26.02(a) further provides that the information sought need not be admissible at trial so long as the information sought is “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 34.01 provides that a party may serve a request for production of documents and tangible things “which constitute or contain matters within the scope of Rule 26.02 and which are in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served.” (Emphasis added.) The party objecting to the production of information has the burden of establishing that the sought-after information is immune from discovery. Brown v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 241 Minn. 15, 35-36, 62 N.W.2d 688, 701-02 (1954).

The district court ordered the production of the “complete computer source code” for the Intoxilyzer 5000EN. In support of its order, the district court found that under the contract between the state and CMI, the state owned the source code for the Intoxilyzer 5000EN. The court of appeals concluded that the district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous given the concession in the state’s petition seeking the writ of prohibition that it owned that portion of the source code created exclusively for the Intoxilyzer 5000EN.

The commissioner does not specifically argue that the source code for the Intoxi-lyzer 5000EN is not discoverable under Rule 26.02; rather, the commissioner argues that the source code is not discoverable under Rule 34.01 because the source code is not within the commissioner’s possession, custody, or control. The commissioner argues that ownership of the source code is determined according to the definition of derivative works under 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (Thomson/West 2005). The commissioner argues that under federal copyright law, the state owns only a portion of the source code used in the Intoxilyzer 5000EN and, therefore, cannot comply with the district court’s order to produce the complete source code. Underdahl responds by arguing that the “complete computer source code for the operation of the [Intoxilyzer 5000EN]” is a work for hire pursuant to 17 U.S.C.A. § 101, and that, as such, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it issued its discovery order.

Having carefully reviewed the record presented and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that we cannot decide the copyright issues raised. Although the parties direct us to copyright law regarding works for hire and derivative works, they provide only a superficial application of that law to the facts of this case. Perhaps that is because the factual record before us is inadequate, thereby making any determination regarding either copyright theory impossible.

Resolution of this issue, however, does not require us to apply federal copyright law because we also conclude that the commissioner has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the information sought is clearly not discoverable and that he has no adequate remedy at law. While on the one hand the commissioner argues that ownership of the source code for the Intoxilyzer 5000EN is to be determined under federal copyright law and that under that law he does not have possession, custody, or control of the source code, on the other hand he concedes that the state owns and thus controls some portion of the source code. That concession is supported by the express language of the RFP granting CMI the right to supply the Intoxilyzer 5000EN to the state. Further, given the express language of the RFP that requires CMI to provide the state with “information * * * to be used by attorneys representing individuals charged with crimes in which a test with the [Intoxilyzer 5000EN] is part of the evidence” when production of the information is mandated by court order “from the court with jurisdiction of the case,” it is not clear to us that the commissioner is unable to comply with the district court’s order. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the district court ordered the production of information that is clearly not discoverable.

We conclude that the commissioner failed to demonstrate that he has no adequate remedy at law. The commissioner concedes that he could sue CMI to “force it to turn over ‘the complete computer source code.’ ” However, the commissioner asserts that a lawsuit compelling CMI to turn over the source code does not constitute an adequate legal remedy because the commissioner does not believe he is entitled to the source code and thus a lawsuit seeking it would be frivolous, therefore exposing the commissioner to sanctions. The commissioner asserts that the only other remedy would be to appeal a final order, which he asserts is inadequate because it would not address the “statewide concerns” at issue in this case. We do not agree that the commissioner lacks adequate remedies at law. As discussed above, irrespective of whether the state owns any portion of the source code, CMI agreed, in the RFP, to provide the attorneys representing individuals charged with crimes “in which a test with the [Intoxilyzer 5000EN] is part of the evidence” information necessary to comply with a court’s order. We conclude that the commissioner’s ability to enforce its contract with CMI constitutes an adequate legal remedy.

We turn finally to whether the issue in the case relates to a rule of practice affecting all litigants. Thermorama, 271 Minn. at 84, 135 N.W.2d at 46. It is enough to say that this case does not raise any issue relating to a rule of practice affecting all litigants.

Thus, none of the four circumstances justifying the issuance of a writ of prohibition under Thermorama, 271 Minn. at 84, 135 N.W.2d at 46, are present in this case. We, therefore, hold that the court of appeals properly denied the commissioner’s petition for a writ of prohibition.

Affirmed.

      . This example is not intended to convey that the commissioner has only one adequate legal remedy.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    James E. GLUBA, deceased, by Lorraine GLUBA, Relator, v. BITZAN & OHREN MASONRY and Grinnell Mutual Group, Respondents.
    No. A06-1849.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    July 26, 2007.

      DeAnna M. McCashin, Schoep & McCashin, Chtd., Alexandria, MN, for Employee/Relator.
    Dianne E. Walsh, Heacox, Hartman, Koshmrl, Cosgriff & Johnson, P.A., St. Paul, MN, for Respondents.
    Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Jon K Murphy, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry.
   OPINION

ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice.

James E. Gluba filed a workers’ compensation claim petition with the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry, alleging that he was permanently and totally disabled as a result of a work-related injury. A workers’ compensation judge found that Gluba had a permanent partial disability of 10 percent and was unemployed and unemployable as a result of the injury. The judge nonetheless concluded that Glu-ba was ineligible for permanent total disability benefits under Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 5(2)(c) (2006), which provides that a worker of Gluba’s age and education must have a permanent partial disability rating of 13 percent or greater before permanent total disability benefits may be awarded. Gluba appealed to the workers’ compensation court of appeals (WCCA), which affirmed the workers’ compensation judge. Gluba then filed a second petition seeking permanent total disability benefits. The benefits were again denied by a workers’ compensation judge. Gluba appealed this second denial to the WCCA, arguing, among other things, that section 176.101, subd. 5(2), is unconstitutional. The WCCA upheld the denial of benefits but declined to consider Gluba’s constitutional claim. We granted Gluba’s petition for further review of the constitutional claim. We hold that Gluba has not established that section 176.101, subd. 5(2), violates his right to equal protection.

Relator James E. Gluba of Evansville, Minnesota was born on May 8, 1928. He began working in the construction industry when he was 18 years old. His first employer was Carlson Construction in Evansville, where he worked for more than 30 years. As a mason for Carlson and subsequent employers, Gluba laid bricks and blocks, the latter weighing from 20 to 75 pounds. In the 1980s, Gluba started his own masonry business. While self-employed, Gluba hired Dennis Bitzan and Terry Ohren to assist with one or more projects. In the early 1990s, Gluba tired of managing the books for his own business and began working for Bitzan and Ohren, who had subsequently formed their own business — Bitzan & Ohren Masonry. Gluba typically worked for Bitzan & Ohren Masonry from April through January, though work was sometimes available for him throughout the winter season. On November 26, 1996, Gluba, who was then 68 years old, slipped on an icy plank at a worksite and fell on his left hand and hip on a cement floor.

Shortly after his injury, Gluba sought chiropractic care from Dr. Richard Kast-ner for acute pain in his low back and left leg. Kastner concluded that Gluba had damaged his L5 disk, and imposed bending and lifting restrictions. In March 1997, Kastner released Gluba to return to work with no limitations, but in September he recommended that Gluba stop working because of continuing symptoms involving his L5 disk and left leg. Gluba changed chiropractors that same month and began receiving treatment from Dr. Darryl Moon for ongoing pain in his left hip and leg. At the request of Bitzan & Ohren Masonry’s date-of-injury insurer — then called Grinnel Mutual Reinsurance Company — Gluba was examined by Dr. Richard Bailly, who ordered a CT scan and diagnosed, among other things, a herniated L5 disk. Bailly prescribed physical therapy and a work conditioning program for Gluba. Gluba was discharged from the conditioning program in March 1998 with a recommendation that he return to full-time work handling bricks, but not blocks.

Gluba returned to his job in the spring of 1998 and worked through the spring of 2001, after which time Bitzan & Ohren Masonry offered him no further work. That summer, Gluba secured intermittent employment with Olson Masonry, and worked his last day as a mason on September 3, 2001. Gluba had obtained periodic chiropractic care from Dr. Moon in 1998, 1999, and 2001. On November 19, 2001, Dr. Moon completed a Report of Work Ability in which he stated that as of November 19, 2001 and continuing for an indefinite period, Gluba was completely unable to work.

It appears that Bitzan & Ohren Masonry and its date-of-injury insurer (B & O, collectively) admitted liability for Gluba’s 1996 injury and paid workers’ compensation benefits from December 15, 1996 until September 3, 2001. On February 1, 2002, Gluba filed an Employee’s Claim Petition with the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry, alleging permanent partial disability (PPD) of 13 percent whole body impairment under Minn. R. 5223.0390, subps. 4.E and 4.E.(1), and permanent total disability (PTD) from September 4, 2001 forward. In response, B & O asserted that, among other things, Gluba’s 1996 work injury was no longer a substantial contributing cause of his disability.

A workers’ compensation judge held a hearing on Gluba’s petition on March 5, 2003 in Alexandria, Minnesota. The judge found that Gluba was “permanently and totally disabled as a result of his [1996] work related injury from September 4, 2001 through March 4, 2003,” and that Gluba was “unemployed and unemployable” during the same period. The judge also found that Gluba’s formal education extended only through the eighth grade, and that he had a seventh grade reading capability, a fourth grade spelling capability, and below “normal” scores in “numerical abilities.” The judge stated that Gluba had “performed masonry throughout his entire life” and concluded that Gluba had “few vocational transferable skills” and lived “in an economically depressed area with a general labor market [that] has been described as ‘very, very tough.’ ” Finally, the judge found that Gluba had a 10 percent PPD, of which his work-related injury was a substantial contributing cause.

Based on the foregoing finding, the workers’ compensation judge concluded that Gluba had not met the threshold to qualify for PTD benefits under Minn.Stat. 176.101, subd. 5(2)(c) (2006), which requires that a worker of Gluba’s age and education have a PPD rating of at least 13 percent before PTD benefits may be awarded. Therefore, the judge denied Gluba’s claim for PTD benefits from September 4, 2001 to March 5, 2003 but ordered B & O to pay Gluba PPD benefits commensurate with 10 percent whole body impairment. Gluba appealed the judge’s order to the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA), which upheld the denial of PTD benefits.

Gluba did not appeal the WCCA’s decision, but rather filed a second claim petition on May 7, 2004. In this second petition, Gluba again alleged PTD as of September 4, 2001. He also alleged PPD of 9.25 percent whole body under Minn. R. 5223.0420, subps. 4, 5. The workers’ compensation judge held a hearing on this petition on December 14, 2005. At this hearing, Gluba introduced a letter from Dr. Kurt Hansberry, who assigned Gluba an additional five percent whole body PPD rating for a bladder condition under Minn. R. 5223.0600. The judge found, among other things, that Gluba’s claim for PTD benefits from September 4, 2001 through March 5, 2003 was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The judge also found that although Glu-ba’s claim for PTD benefits as of March 6, 2003 was not procedurally barred, the evidence did not support a PPD rating of greater than 10 percent. Accordingly, the judge concluded that Gluba failed to meet the threshold for receiving PTD benefits under section 176.101, subd. 5(2)(c).

Gluba appealed the denial of his second claim petition to the WCCA, arguing that the workers’ compensation judge erred when he denied Gluba’s PTD claim. Gluba also argued that the threshold requirements of section 176.101, subd. 5(2), are unconstitutional. The WCCA affirmed the workers’ compensation judge with respect to the PTD claim but concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Gluba’s constitutional argument and therefore did not address this argument. Gluba then petitioned our court for review of whether section 176.101, subd. 5(2), violates injured workers’ equal protection rights under the U.S. Constitution or the Minnesota Constitution.

We review a statute’s constitutionality de novo. ILHC of Eagan, LLC v. County of Dakota, 693 N.W.2d 412, 421 (Minn.2005). We presume statutes to be constitutional and exercise our power to declare a statute unconstitutional with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary. Id. “The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute bears the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute violates a constitutional right.” Westling v. County of Mille Lacs, 581 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Minn.1998) (quotation marks omitted).

The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that no state will “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Minnesota Constitution likewise guarantees that “[n]o member of this state shall be disenfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.” Minn. Const, art. I, § 2. We have stated that “[b]oth clauses have been analyzed under the same principles and begin with the mandate that all similarly situated individuals shall be treated alike, but only ‘invidious discrimination’ is deemed constitutionally offensive.” Kolton v. County of Anoka, 645 N.W.2d 403, 411 (Minn.2002) (quoting Scott v. Minneapolis Police Relief Ass’n, 615 N.W.2d 66, 74 (Minn.2000)).

Level of Constitutional Scrutiny

If a constitutional challenge involves neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right, we review the challenge using a rational basis standard under both the state and federal constitutions. Id. Minnesota Statutes § 176.101, subd. 5, the statute that Gluba asserts is unconstitutional, states that

“permanent total disability” means only:
(1) the total and permanent loss of the sight of both eyes, the loss of both arms at the shoulder, the loss of both legs so close to the hips that no effective artificial members can be used, complete and permanent paralysis, total and permanent loss of mental faculties; or
(2) any other injury which totally and permanently.incapacitates the employee from working at an occupation which brings the employee an income, provided that the employee must also meet the criteria of one of the following clauses:
(a) the employee has at least a 17 percent permanent partial disability rating of the whole body;
(b) the employee has a permanent partial disability rating of the whole body of at least 15 percent and the employee is at least 50 years old at the time of injury; or
(c) the employee has a permanent partial disability rating of the whole body of at least 13 percent and the employee is at least 55 years old at the time of the injury, and has not completed grade 12 or obtained a GED certificate.
For purposes of this clause, “totally and permanently incapacitated” means that the employee’s physical disability in combination with any one of clause (a), (b), or (c) causes the employee to be unable to secure anything more than sporadic employment resulting in an insubstantial income. Other factors not specified in clause (a), (b), or (c), including the employee’s age, education, training and experience, may only be considered in determining whether an employee is totally and permanently incapacitated after the employee meets the threshold criteria of clause (a), (b), or (c). The employee’s age, level of physical disability, or education may not be considered to the extent the factor is inconsistent with the disability, age, and education factors specified in clause (a), (b), or (c).

Gluba asserts that the PTD thresholds set forth in subdivision 5(2)(a)-(c) above implicate two suspect classifications: age and disability. He also asserts that the thresholds violate the fundamental right “to live where one chooses.”

With respect to Gluba’s first assertion, we have stated that “[i]t is well settled that legislative classifications based upon age are not suspect classifications” for equal protection purposes. In re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Minn.1986). Similarly, courts have not subjected classifications based on disability to heightened scrutiny. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (“[Classifications based on disability violate [equal protection] if they lack a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.”); see also Kolton, 645 N.W.2d at 411 (applying rational basis review to a classification based on disability when neither party argued for heightened scrutiny).

Further, we do not find persuasive Gluba’s additional assertion that section 176.101, subd. 5(2), violates the fundamental right “to live where one chooses.” Gluba appears to contend that by denying PTD benefits to injured workers who are unemployable in the communities where they live, the thresholds of section 176.101, subd. 5(2) may “force” such workers to leave their hometowns in order to seek work in healthier job markets. The U.S. Constitution prohibits the legislature from burdening a fundamental right absent a compelling governmental interest. See, e.g., Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974). But in this case, we conclude that any burden section 176.101, subd. 5(2), may place on a worker’s right to live where he chooses — to the extent this right is recognized as “fundamental” — is too attenuated to trigger the heightened scrutiny that Gluba seeks.

The foregoing conclusion finds support in United States Supreme Court case law. In Bowen v. Gilliard, the Court declined to apply heightened scrutiny to an Aid to Families with Dependent Children amendment that allegedly burdened the fundamental right of families to determine their own living arrangements. 483 U.S. 587, 601-03, 107 S.Ct. 3008, 97 L.Ed.2d 485 (1987). In support of its decision to apply rational basis review, the Court reasoned that legislation that could indirectly affect families’ choices with respect to living arrangements is distinguishable from legislation that would “directly and substantially” interfere with such choices. Id. (quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638, 106 S.Ct. 2727, 91 L.Ed.2d 527 (1986)). Here, Gluba has not established that section 176.101, subd. 5(2), directly and substantially interferes with a fundamental right. Absent such a showing — and because neither age nor disability is a suspect classification' — we conclude that section 176.101, subd. 5(2), is subject to rational basis review.

Rational Basis Review

When applying rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we inquire “whether the challenged classification has a legitimate purpose and whether it was reasonable [for the legislature] to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose.” Kolton, 645 N.W.2d at 411. But when we apply rational basis review under art. I, § 2 of the Minnesota Constitution, we have sometimes applied a “higher standard.” See Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 881 (Minn.2005); see also Mitchell v. Steffen, 504 N.W.2d 198, 210 (Minn.1993) (Tomlja-novich, J., dissenting) (likening Minnesota’s approach to rational basis review to “mid-level” scrutiny). This higher standard — often characterized as the Minnesota rational basis test, see Scott, 615 N.W.2d at 74 — requires that:

(1) The distinctions which separate those included within the classification from those excluded must not be manifestly arbitrary or fanciful but must be genuine and substantial, thereby providing a natural and reasonable basis to justify legislation adapted to peculiar conditions and needs; (2) the classification must be genuine or relevant to the purpose of the law; that is there must be an evident connection between the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and the prescribed remedy; and (3) the purpose of the statute must be one that the state can legitimately attempt to achieve.

State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn.1991) quoting Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273, 280 (Minn.1981). “The key distinction between the federal and Minnesota tests is that under the Minnesota test ‘we have been unwilling to hypothesize a rational basis to justify a classification, as the more deferential federal standard requires.’ ” State v. Garcia, 683 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Minn.2004) (quoting Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889).

We have generally assessed the constitutionality of workers’ compensation statutes using a formulation of rational basis review that echoes the Minnesota test’s terminology and three-prong structure:

To survive [an equal protection] challenge, a [workers’ compensation] classification must apply uniformly to all those similarly situated; be necessitated by genuine and substantial distinctions between the two groups; and effectuate the purpose of the law.

Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Swanson, 341 N.W.2d 285, 287 (Minn.1983) (quoting Nelson v. State, Dep’t of Natural Res., 305 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Minn.1981)); see also Alcozer v. N. Country Food Bank, 635 N.W.2d 695, 705 (Minn.2001) (applying the same three-prong structure). But for reasons set forth later, we do not interpret this formulation as implicating the “higher standard” of rational basis review that we applied in Russell.

Applying the foregoing formulation, Glu-ba argues that (1) all injured workers who are permanently unable to secure or maintain gainful employment are similarly situated; (2) the differences among such workers in terms of age and educational attainment, and especially, PPD ratings, are not “genuine and substantial” distinctions necessitating different treatment for similarly-situated workers; and (3) the PTD thresholds do not effectuate the purpose of the workers’ compensation law, which is to compensate permanently disabled workers for lost wages. B & 0 argues that (1) the PTD thresholds apply uniformly to all injured workers seeking PTD benefits; (2) the thresholds are necessitated by genuine and substantial distinctions between older, less educated workers and younger, more educated workers; and (3) the thresholds effectuate the workers’ compensation law by facilitating objectivity and efficiency in the awarding of PTD benefits.

Do the classifications in Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 5(2) apply uniformly to all similarly situated persons?

As B & 0 argues, the classifications in this case — that is, the thresholds for PTD benefits under section 176.101, subd. 5(2)(a)-(c) — apply uniformly to all workers whose injuries occurred after October 1, 1995. Act of May 25, 1995, ch. 231, art. 1, § 21, 1995 Minn. Laws 1990-91 (amending section 176.101, subd. 5(2)); see also § 37, 1995 Minn. Laws at 1999 (setting an effective date of October 1, 1995 for the amendment). While Gluba asserts that we should focus on the similarly-situated nature of all workers injured after October 1, 1995 who are permanently and totally unable to secure gainful employment, it is unclear how this focus would change the outcome of the first step in our equal protection analysis. More precisely, just as the thresholds for PTD benefits apply uniformly to all injured workers, they apply uniformly to all workers who may in fact be permanently and totally unemployable.

No employee — regardless of how severely his impairment may limit his wage-earning capacity — is eligible for PTD benefits unless his impairment is among those listed in section 176.101, subd. 5(1), or he meets one of the statutory thresholds. See Metzger v. Turck, Inc., 59 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. 229, 238 (WCCA 1999) (“[U]n-der the 1995 amendments [that established the thresholds], eligibility for permanent total disability benefits is for the first time dependent on some specified level of permanent partial disability.”). We therefore conclude that the classifications set forth in section 176.101, subd. 5(2) apply uniformly to all similarly situated persons. Are subdivision 5(2)’s classifications necessitated by genuine and substantial distinctions among injured workers?

Gluba also argues that the PTD thresholds established by subdivision 5(2) are not necessitated by genuine and substantial distinctions among injured workers. More particularly, Gluba argues that the thresholds are arbitrary because they condition eligibility for PTD benefits on factors not rationally linked to employability. B & O argues that the thresholds are necessitated by genuine and substantial distinctions between older, less educated workers and younger, more educated workers and among workers with varying degrees of physical impairment.

As previously noted, the formulation of rational basis review that we use in workers’ compensation cases shares some common features with the Minnesota rational basis test. But we decline to infer from that formulation’s language or three-part structure that we are to apply a “higher standard” than federal rational basis review to the classifications at issue here. We have consistently concluded that “it is proper to defer to the legislature in matters ‘concerning the desirability of statutory classifications affecting the regulation of economic activity and the distribution of economic benefits.’ ” Alcozer, 635 N.W.2d at 705 (quoting Tibbetts v. Leech Lake Reservation Bus. Comm., 397 N.W.2d 883, 890 (Minn.1986)). For example, we will uphold tax-related classifications unless the challenger proves that “ ‘the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker.’ ” Council of Indep. Tobacco Mfrs. of Am. v. State, 713 N.W.2d 300, 308 (Minn.2006) (quoting Hegenes v. State, 328 N.W.2d 719, 721 (Minn.1983)). We therefore conclude that at the second step of our three-part analysis in this workers’ compensation case, our inquiry must focus on whether the legislature could reasonably have believed in any facts that would support the connection between the PTD thresholds and the employability of injured workers.

With the precise nature of our inquiry now defined, we turn to the history of the statute in question. Before the 1995 amendments that created the PTD thresholds in section 176.101, subd. 5(2), a worker could establish that he was permanently and totally disabled either by (1) proving that he had one of the five impairments now set forth in subd. 5(1); or (2) proving that he sustained an injury that “totally and permanently incapacitate^]” him “from working at an occupation which brings [him] an income.” The pre-1995 version of the statute defined “totally and permanently incapacitated” to mean

that the employee’s physical disability, in combination with the employee’s age, education, training, and experience, causes the employee to be unable to secure anything more than sporadic employment resulting in an insubstantial income.

Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 5(2)(b) (1994). This multi-factored approach to establishing eligibility for PTD benefits represented a codification of our holding in Schulte v. C.H. Peterson Constr. Co., 278 Minn. 79, 83, 153 N.W.2d 130, 133-34 (1967) and other cases. Thomas L. Johnson & Catherine J. Wasson, The Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Act: Amendments by the 1995 Legislature, 22 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 1493,1499 (1996).

Implicit in the pre-1995 definition of “totally and permanently incapacitated” as set forth above is the idea that age and educational attainment affect an injured worker’s wage-earning capacity. Similarly, the definition reveals the legislature’s belief that the nature and extent of a worker’s physical impairment is a relevant factor in determining his employability. When viewed from a deferential perspective, the effect of the PTD thresholds now codified at section 176.101, subd. 5(2)(a)-(c), is simply to formalize these factors— age, educational attainment, and nature and extent of physical impairment — to facilitate objectivity in the awarding of PTD benefits and, potentially, to achieve other purposes such as cost containment and reduction of litigation. This deferential perspective supports a conclusion that the PTD thresholds are not arbitrary but are instead reflective of genuine and substantial distinctions among injured workers in terms of their employability.

We acknowledge that a more searching analysis might cast doubt on the extent to which the thresholds reflect the relative employability of the workers among whom they distinguish. For example, insofar as the thresholds represent an attempt to formalize and make more objective the Schulte factors, they rely on PPD ratings as a rough proxy for physical impairment affecting ability to work. But it could be argued that the PPD ratings are not well suited to serve as such a proxy because the schedule approach that Minnesota uses to calculate the ratings focuses on functional loss of use, which is distinct from ability to work. See 4 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 80.05[7]-[9] (2007). In effect, the PPD rating schedule “presupposes that there is an abstract and uniform measure of ‘disability’ that is valid and fair for all persons, apart from their activities or occupations.” Id. at § 80.05[9] (“What * * * does ‘loss of use’ of three fingers mean? Loss of use for what purpose? For typesetting or for unskilled labor?”). Moreover, the relationship between the PPD ratings and the actual or presumed ability to work is further attenuated by the inclusion of certain internal organ impairments in the PPD rating schedule that may have little or no conceivable effect on earning capacity. See, e.g., Minn. R. 5223.0060, subps. 7.D and 7.E (assigning percentages of disability for impairment of the reproductive and urinary systems); see also Metzger, 59 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. at 238-39 (holding that an employee could, in order to meet the applicable PTD threshold, include among her ratable PPD impairments a nonwork-related hysterectomy performed 25 years before her work injury).

In addition to raising the foregoing concerns, Gluba contends that the PTD thresholds use worker age in an arbitrary manner. Johnson and Wasson summarize the concern this way:

Pursuant to the amended law, an employee with a fifteen percent PPD who was injured at age fifty will meet the threshold requirements. However, [an employee] with a fifteen percent [PPD] rating will not meet those requirements if he was injured at age forty-nine.

Johnson & Wasson, supra, at 1500. We acknowledge the inherent imperfection in a classification that denies PTD eligibility to a 49-year old worker while deeming a 50-year old worker eligible when the two are similarly situated in every other meaningful respect. But other legislative classifications are subject to the same criticism. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. § 181A.04, subd. 1 (2006) (prohibiting employment of minors under the age of 14); Minn.Stat. § 171.04, subd. l(l)(i) (2006) (indicating that a minor must be at least 16 years old in order to qualify for a driver’s license); Minn.Stat. § 490.121, subd. 21d (2006) (setting a mandatory retirement age for judges). As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated and we noted in Hegenes,

When a legal distinction is determined, as no one doubts that it may be, between night and day, childhood and maturity, or any other extremes, a point has to be fixed or a line has to be drawn, or gradually picked out by successive decisions, to mark where the change takes place. Looked at by itself without regard to the necessity behind it the line or point seems arbitrary. It might as well or nearly as well be a little more to one side or the other. But when it is seen that a line or point there must be, and that there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the Legislature must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide of any reasonable mark.

328 N.W.2d at 722 (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41, 48 S.Ct. 423, 72 L.Ed. 770 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).

Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that Gluba has a colorable argument that the PTD thresholds set forth in section 176.101, subd. 5(2), are poor determiners of impaired wage-earning capacity in the contemporary era. But in light of the deference we give when applying rational basis review to classifications affecting the distribution of economic benefits, we are unable to conclude that the legislature could not reasonably have conceived of any factual basis for conditioning PTD eligibility on a combination of age, educational attainment, and PPD ratings. We note that age and educational attainment are longstanding factors in assessing PTD, see Schulte, 278 Minn. at 83, 153 N.W.2d at 133-34, and — as indicated in the dissent in Metzger — legislators could have reasonably believed that “injured workers with a higher [PPD] rating are more likely to be permanently and totally disabled than injured workers with lower [PPD] ratings.” 59 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. at 242 (Pederson, J., dissenting).

Do subdivision 5(2)’s classifications effectuate the purpose of the law?

The purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act as a whole is to “assure the quick and efficient delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to the employers who are subject to [the Act].” Minn.Stat. § 176.001 (2006). Within the broader framework of the Workers’ Compensation Act, the purpose of section 176.101, subds. 4-5, is to provide wage loss benefits to employees who are permanently and totally disabled as defined by the legislature. The legislature’s reasons for amending section 176.101, subd. 5, to add the PTD thresholds are not expressly stated in the amending legislation, but the parties offer a number of theories. Gluba contends that reducing costs for employers subject to the Act was the legislature’s primary aim — a contention amicus shares. The employer and its insurer do not deny that reducing costs played a role in the legislation’s enactment. They also assert that the legislature may have sought to make the criteria for PTD eligibility more objective, thereby achieving the Act’s ultimate purpose of quickly and efficiently delivering benefits to injured workers.

We have indicated that any of the foregoing purposes may be legitimate:

In passing the 1983 amendments [to the Workers’ Compensation Act], the legislature attempted to decrease costs, avoid benefit stacking, reduce litigation, reduce the need for reliance on often conflicting medical testimony, and promote objectivity, consistency, and more uniform results in workers’ compensation decisions. These would appear to be legitimate legislative objectives.

Schmidt v. Modern Metals Foundry, Inc., 424 N.W.2d 538, 541-12 (Minn.1988). Presumably, such purposes are only legitimate to the extent that they do not undermine the fundamental balance the Workers’ Compensation Act strikes between workers’ interests on the one hand and employers’ interests on the other. More specifically, the legislature could take many steps to reduce employers’ costs, but if these steps resulted in the denial of benefits to a sufficiently large proportion of workers who incur severe economic hardship as a consequence of work-related injuries, the workers’ compensation scheme would no longer represent “a reasonable trade-off’ of workers’ common-law tort rights for statutory remedies under the Act. See Schmidt, 424 N.W.2d at 540-41.

As one recent commentator stated concerning attempts by state legislatures to reduce workers’ compensation costs:

To the extent that [cost-reduction measures] significantly * * * heighten the levels of disability necessary for recovery * * * and generally lower the benefits available to workers, these [measures] give rise to questions concerning their effect on the exclusive remedy shield included in the quid pro quo that supports the workers’ compensation system. As employee benefits continue to decrease, at some level, the quid pro quo is thrown out of balance and employer protection from tort liability can no longer be justified.

Easton W. Orr, Jr., Note, The Bargain is No Longer Equal: State Legislative Efforts to Reduce Workers’ Compensation Costs Have Impermissibly Shifted the Balance of the Quid Pro Quo in Favor of Employers, 37 Ga. L.Rev. 325, 329-30 (2002) (footnotes omitted).

It could reasonably be argued that the PTD thresholds in section 176.101, subd. 5(2)(a)-(c), promote objectivity and uniformity in workers’ compensation decisions, thereby effectuating the ultimate purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act by assuring quick and efficient delivery of benefits. It could also be argued that the thresholds keep costs reasonable for employers, which is an express purpose of the Act. The more difficult question is whether the speed, efficiency, and cost reduction that result from the thresholds are achieved by forcing workers who are no longer employable as a result of work-related injuries to seek public assistance, relief from private charities, or other forms of support outside the workers’ compensation system. Such a consequence would undermine the system’s central purpose and design. See 1 Larson & Larson, supra, § 1.04[2] (noting that the American workers’ compensation system is designed such that “the consumer of a particular product ultimately pays the cost of compensation protection for the workers engaged in its manufacture”); see also Franke v. Fabcon, Inc., 509 N.W.2d 373, 376 (Minn.1993) (“Workers’ compensation * * * is social legislation, providing a measure of security to workers injured on the job, with the burden of that expense considered a proportionate part of the expense of production.”).

On the record now before us, we are unable to definitively answer the difficult question set forth above and thereby determine whether the PTD thresholds “effectuate the purpose of the law.” Moreover, this line of inquiry — while consistent with language we have used in other workers’ compensation decisions— would implicate a stricter level of scrutiny than we believe is appropriate in the context of this case. Gluba has not established a record on which we could decide that the PTD thresholds undermine the ultimate purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act, and it is Gluba who bears the burden of proof on his constitutional claim. See Westling, 581 N.W.2d at 819 (“The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute bears the burden of establishing * * * that the statute violates a constitutional right.”). For this reason and the other reasons set forth above, we hold that Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 5(2), does not violate Gluba’s right to equal protection under the U.S. Constitution or the Minnesota Constitution.

Affirmed.

      . Gluba died on May 30, 2005, from causes not related to his work injury, but his widow has continued to pursue his workers’ compensation claims.

      . Minnesota Rule 5223.0390, subp. 4.E, assigns a PPD rating of 10 for radicular pain or radicular paresthesia associated with spinal stenosis that impinges on a lumbar nerve root. Rule 5223.0390, subp. 4.E(1), adds a PPD rating of three when chronic radicular pain or radicular paresthesia persists despite treatment. Gluba ultimately argued to the workers’ compensation judge that his PPD was greater than 13 percent, apparently in light of a February 8, 2002 letter in which Dr. Bailly concluded that Gluba's PPD rating was 22 percent whole body under Minn. R. 5223.0390 and two of its subparts.

      . The judge set March 5, 2003 as the end date for disability benefits based on his conclusion that Gluba had effectively withdrawn from the labor market as of that date and therefore, Gluba's 1996 work injury was no longer a substantial contributing factor to his unemployed and unemployable status. The WCCA ultimately reversed this conclusion, which is not relevant to this appeal.

      . In combination with one another, subparts 4 and 5 of Minn. R. 5223.0420 assign a PPD rating of 9.25 to a person who has a 4/5 strength grade in muscle groups supplied by injured third, fourth, and fifth lumbar nerve roots.

      . See Frankhauser v. Fabcon, Inc., 57 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 239, 252 (WCCA) (holding that a worker may include a ratable PPD from any cause — including non work-related injuries or conditions — in his total PPD rating in order to meet a section 176.101, subd. 5, threshold), aff'd without opinion, 569 N.W.2d 533 (Minn.1997).

      . Gluba argues that because persons with disabilities are a protected class under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. ch. 3 63A (2006), we should treat such persons as a suspect or quasi-suspect class for equal protection purposes. But the authority Gluba cites for this proposition, Karst v. F.C. Hayer Co., Inc., 447 N.W.2d 180, 185-86 (Minn.1989), is inapposite. In Karst, we held that a worker who receives disability benefits from a former employer under the Workers’ Compensation Act cannot sue that employer under the MHRA for refusing to rehire him because of his disability. 447 N.W.2d at 186. Moreover, Karst has been at least partially abrogated by statute. In 1995, the legislature amended the Workers' Compensation Act to allow civil actions by workers against employers for refusal to offer continued employment "when employment is available within the [worker’s] physical limitations.” Act of May 25, 1995, ch. 231, art. 1, § 30, 1995 Minn. Laws 1996 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 176.82, subd. 2 (2006)).

      . The law in effect on the date a worker is injured governs the benefits that worker is eligible to receive. See Joyce v. Lewis Bolt & Nut Co., 412 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Minn.1987).

      . Gluba asserts that the effect of the PTD thresholds is to treat unequally all workers who are "permanently and totally disabled.” It is important to note that "permanently and totally disabled” in the context of the workers’ compensation system is a legal status defined by the legislature. Therefore, contrary to the assumption underlying Gluba’s assertion, workers cannot be characterized as permanently and totally disabled unless they first meet the statutory thresholds.

      . Importantly, we give great deference with respect to tax classifications despite articulating the three-prong Minnesota rational basis test as the applicable standard in tax cases. See, e.g., Council of Indep. Tobacco Mfrs., 713 N.W.2d at 308; Rio Vista Non-Profit Housing Corp. v. County of Ramsey, 335 N.W.2d 242, 245-46 (Minn.1983).


author: ROSS, Judge.

text:
    In the Matter of the CIVIL COMMITMENT OF Richard Arthur WILLIAMS.
    No. A07-185.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    July 24, 2007.

      Brian C. Southwell, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.
    Robert M.A. Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Janice M. Allen, Assistant County Attorney, Anoka, MN, for respondent.
    Considered and decided by PETERSON, Presiding Judge; SHUMAKER, Judge; and ROSS, Judge.
   OPINION

ROSS, Judge.

Richard Williams appeals from an order for indeterminate commitment as a sexually dangerous person and sexual psychopathic personality. Williams argues that the district court erred by admitting evidence based on rule 15 of the Commitment and Treatment Act Rules rather than applying the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, that application of rule 15 violated his due process rights, that clear and convincing evidence does not support one of the district court’s factual findings, and that the court erred by appointing a third examiner. The district court correctly relied on Minnesota Statutes section 253B.08, subdivision 7, which directs the court to admit “all relevant evidence” in a civil-commitment proceeding. The record supports the court’s findings, and the court did not abuse its discretion by appointing a third examiner. We affirm.

FACTS

Anoka County filed a petition in November 2002 to commit Richard Williams as a sexually dangerous person and sexual psychopathic personality. The county based its petition on Williams’s 10-year history of sexual offenses against women.

The record of Williams’s sexual offenses begins in 1979, three years after he was first convicted of burglary. In October 1979, a woman who did not know Williams awakened to find him in her apartment and squeezing the back of her neck. He put his hand over her mouth and indicated that he planned to sexually assault her. When she screamed, Williams wrapped a blanket around her head, threatened to kill her, and then left. Williams pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary and was imprisoned. But 11 days after he was released in March 1982, he was found peeping through the window of another woman.

In April 1984, Williams entered a different woman’s apartment while she slept on her couch. The woman awoke and found Williams standing over her. He brandished a knife and warned her to be quiet. But the woman screamed, and Williams ran from the apartment. The victim then discovered that her jeans had been cut from alongside the zipper up to her waist and that her shirt had also been cut open from its bottom to its collar. Police found semen in the woman’s hair and on the pillow she had been lying on. She concluded that Williams had ejaculated on her before she awoke. Williams pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary. He acknowledged that he entered the woman’s apartment but asserted that he intended only to steal her stereo or television. The court sentenced Williams to 49 months’ imprisonment.

In July 1989, Williams entered another woman’s home. The woman awoke to find Williams shining a flashlight in her face. He tied her arms behind her back using her bra, ordered her to roll over, removed her underpants, and placed a pillowcase over her head. Williams threatened to harm her if she did not cooperate. He digitally penetrated the woman vaginally and rubbed her breasts. After about 15 minutes of this abuse, Williams told her, “That wasn’t so bad.” He then kissed her breast and vagina and left. After a bench trial, the district court found Williams guilty of first-degree burglary and first-degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced him to 202 months’ imprisonment.

At the trial for his offenses against this victim, the court also heard testimony from another woman about Williams’s conduct in September 1982. The woman testified that she had been asleep when she heard her 12-year-old daughter screaming. The girl had awakened to find Williams kneeling next to her bed and masturbating. Her nightgown was cut from the bottom to the waist, and the girl’s mother discovered that her own nightgown had also been cut from the neck to the waist. Williams stole a money order from the apartment, which he cashed the next day.

In 1990, Williams was charged with sexually assaulting yet another woman. In May 1989, the woman had awakened to find Williams in her apartment. He forced her into her bedroom where he removed her clothing at knifepoint, pushed her onto the bed, and ordered her to masturbate. Wielding the knife, he threatened that she either comply, “or I’ll do it for you.” Authorities found his semen on the woman’s underpants. Williams pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal sexual conduct. The district court sentenced him to 36 months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively to his sentence for his July 1989 offenses.

The department of corrections placed Williams on intensive supervised release in November 2002. The department revoked his release for 150 days in June 2003 when he had unauthorized contact with minors. Williams was readmitted to the residential-placement program in October, but he was again terminated from the program in December for repeated dishonesty with staff members and for refusing accountability. The department revoked his release and ordered him to serve another 210 days in prison.

The district court had continued the hearing on the civil-commitment petition several times. On the day the hearing was scheduled to begin in June 2004, Williams proposed that he enter the department of corrections’ sex-offender treatment program while incarcerated. The county agreed, and the court ordered an indefinite continuance. The court held that the county could move to reschedule the hearing if Williams failed to successfully complete treatment. Williams entered the department’s treatment program in September 2004, but he was terminated from it in June 2005 because he failed to accept responsibility for his sexual offenses.

The district court conducted a hearing on the civil-commitment petition in March 2006. It heard testimony from 11 witnesses, including three psychologists appointed to examine Williams. Each of the psychologists opined that Williams is a sexually dangerous person, that he has a sexual psychopathic personality, and that civil commitment is the least-restrictive alternative available. The court agreed and ordered Williams to be indefinitely committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program.

Williams appeals the district court’s order for commitment. He argues that the court erred by using rule 15 of the Commitment and Treatment Act Rules as its standard for admitting evidence, that application of rule 15 violated his due process rights, that clear and convincing evidence does not support the district court’s finding that he committed harmful sexual conduct against his 1979 victim, and that the district court erred by appointing a third examiner at the county’s request.

ISSUES

I. Does the broad admissibility provision of rule 15 of the Commitment and Treatment Act Rules yield to the Minnesota Rules of Evidence or violate due process as applied to this case?

II. Does the record support the district court’s finding that Williams committed harmful sexual conduct in 1979?

III. Does the district court have discretion to appoint more than two. examiners in a civil-commitment proceeding?

ANALYSIS

I

Williams first challenges the district court’s interpretation and application of rule 15 of the Commitment and Treatment Act Rules, arguing that it conflicts with the Minnesota Rules of Evidence and that the district court may not admit hearsay in a commitment proceeding. We review the interpretation of statutes and court rules de novo. Johnson ex rel Johnson v. Johnson, 726 N.W.2d 516, 518 (Minn.App.2007). When a statute’s language is clear, the court must apply its plain meaning. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2006). We also accept the plain meaning of rules. Rubey v. Vannett, 714 N.W.2d 417, 421 (Minn.2006).

The Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act provides that the district court “shall admit all relevant evidence at the [commitment] hearing. The court shall make its determination upon the entire record pursuant to the Rules of Evidence.” MinmStat. § 253B.08, subd. 7 (2006). The Commitment and Treatment Act Rules apply to proceedings under the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act and purport to “supersede any other body of rules otherwise applicable.” Minn. Spec. R. Commitment & Treatment Act l(a)(b). Rule 15 provides that the district court “may admit all relevant, reliable evidence, including but not limited to the respondent’s medical records, without requiring foundation witnesses.” Id. 15.

The plain language of these provisions neither creates the conflict that Williams protests nor mandates the exclusion of hearsay evidence. The focus of these provisions is relevancy. Section 253B.08, subdivision 7, directs the district court to admit all relevant evidence, basing its determination on the rules of evidence. Clear from its context, the statutory language “its determination” refers to the court’s relevancy determination. See Minn. R. Evid. 401403 (defining relevance and providing for the admission and exclusion of relevant evidence). Rule 15 of the Commitment and Treatment Act Rules similarly provides that the guidelines for admissibility are relevance and reliability. Although the statute requires the district court to determine relevancy in accordance with the rules of evidence, the statute does not require application of other rules of evidence. The Commitment and Treatment Act Rules expressly state that they apply to commitment proceedings. Minn. Spec. R. Commitment & Treatment Act 1(a). The district court appropriately relied on section 253B.08, subdivision 7, to admit all relevant evidence, and it appropriately relied on rule 15 and considered the reliability of evidence to determine its relevance to the proceeding.

Williams suggests instead that the statutory language “its determination” refers to the court’s ultimate commitment determination, and therefore the rules of evidence, which are more restrictive, apply to the entire proceeding. We do not find this reading reasonable. The statute directs the court to base its determination on the rules of evidence immediately following the language in the statute that directs the court to admit all relevant evidence. In addition to this contextual reason to reject Williams’s theory, it is also illogical to read the statute to require the court to make its substantive commitment decision based on the rules of evidence. We read the directive to make this determination “upon the entire record” as logically providing the substantive basis for the evidentiary relevance analysis. We note additionally that section 253B.08 is entitled “Judicial commitment; hearing procedures,” and all of the subdivisions within the section address procedural rather than substantive matters. Minn.Stat. § 253B.08 (2006).

Williams argues alternatively that applying rule 15 denied him due process because the court improperly admitted summaries of the victims’ statements regarding the sexual nature of the 1979 and 1984 offenses. He argues that the allegations from 1979 were too remote in time to permit a defense and that in 1984 he was convicted only of burglary. We see no violation of Williams’s right to due process.

Incidents establishing a course of harmful sexual conduct need not be recent and are not limited to those that resulted in a criminal conviction. In re Civil Commitment of Ramey, 648 N.W.2d 260, 268 (Minn.App.2002) (stating that court may consider conduct not resulting in conviction), review denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2002); In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d 366, 374 (Minn.App.1995) (stating that conduct need not be recent), review denied (Minn. May 16, 1995). A presumption of admissibility applies in commitment proceedings, and the district court has discretion to determine the admissibility of evidence. In re Robb, 622 N.W.2d 564, 574 (Minn.App.2001) (stating that district court has discretion to admit evidence absent erroneous interpretation of law), review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2001); In re Morton, 386 N.W.2d 832, 835 (Minn.App.1986) (stating presumption of admissibility). Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. The district court admitted department-of-corrections reports and other assessments that included summaries of victims’ statements and Williams’s criminal history.

Before addressing due process, we emphasize that the district court acted within the rules by admitting the documents. They were relevant to the allegations in the county’s petition because they related to Williams’s sexually charged criminal past. The district court diligently vetted the exhibits Williams objected to and examined the reliability of each statement, line-by-line. The court excluded many statements as unreliable and therefore not probative. The court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the remaining documents. The admitted documents contain statements that were generated closely in time to the events they describe, and they include the accounts of first-hand witnesses, the victims. The record supports the court’s findings of relevancy and reliability. Williams argues that he could not defend against the allegations that the burglaries contained a sexual component because he was charged only with burglary in 1979 and the sex-offense charges were dismissed in the 1984 case. But these facts were also before the district court, which had the opportunity to evaluate the evidence of alleged sexual conduct and to determine the weight to give this evidence based on the court’s careful reliability assessment. If merited, Williams’s argument would require all victims to testify at a commitment hearing. There is no statutory basis for this requirement, and, as this court has recognized, the Confrontation Clause does not apply to commitment proceedings. Irwin, 529 N.W.2d 366 at 373. Williams also does not provide any reason he could not have called these women as witnesses if he wanted to challenge the sexual nature of their accounts.

We reject Williams’s claim of a due process violation. But in doing so, we do not lightly dismiss Williams’s concern about fairness as it regards the consideration of hearsay. We observe that the trustworthiness of evidence is the primary concern of the rules of evidence generally and of the hearsay rule particularly. The purpose of the hearsay rule with its various exceptions is to prevent unreliable evidence from infecting the fairness of process. See generally Minn. R. Evid. 803 1989 comm, cmt; see also id. 102 (identifying fairness as objective of codified evidentiary rules). Likewise, it is well established that fundamental fairness is the touchstone of due process in proceedings where personal liberty is at stake. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 372 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 3053 n. 2, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing prior holding that “a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard was not sufficient to preserve fundamental fairness to candidates for civil commitment in light of their strong interest in avoiding involuntary confinement and psychiatric treatment”); Raino v. State, 255 N.W.2d 398, 399-400 & n. 1 (Minn.1977) (citing federal precedent and noting that juvenile-court due process requires fundamental fairness); State v. Schabert, 218 Minn. 1, 5-10, 15 N.W.2d 585, 587-89 (1944) (applying standard of fundamental fairness in due process challenge to criminal trial proceedings). But we are persuaded that the district court’s thoughtful preview of offered evidence satisfies the concern about trustworthiness of evidence in this case so that admission of the challenged hearsay evidence about Williams’s history of sexual misconduct does not offend his right to a fundamentally fair proceeding.

The petition gave Williams notice that the county planned to rely on the reported events in seeking commitment. The hearing occurred almost three and one-half years after the petition was filed. Williams testified and had an opportunity to refute the allegations. In carefully assessing reliability, the district court served well its role to receive relevant evidence, weigh it, and make findings supported by the record. The hearsay evidence had threshold indicia of reliability for admission, and Williams has not shown that the challenged evidence is false or unreliable. And although the district court made no finding concerning admissibility under rule 807 of the Rules of Evidence because the rule does not apply, the evidence might have been considered under that rule even if it did apply. See Minn. R. Evid. 807 (providing residual exception to hearsay rule). We also note that the district court heard testimony by the examiners, who were allowed to review and rely on all of the county’s proposed exhibits regardless of their potential admissibility. See id. 703(a) (stating that expert opinion may be based on facts or data not admissible in evidence). The district court did not abuse its discretion or violate Williams’s right to due process by receiving the challenged evidence. We turn to Williams’s challenge based on the sufficiency of evidence.

II

The Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act permits civil commitment on clear and convincing evidence that a person is either a sexually dangerous person or a sexual psychopathic personality. MinmStat. §§ 253B.02, subd. 17, .18, subd. 1(a) (2006). A sexually dangerous person is one who has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct, has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction, and as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct. Id. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(a) (2006). To classify a person as a sexual psychopathic personality requires clear and convincing evidence of three criteria: (1) the existence of either emotional instability, impulsive behavior, a lack of customary standards of good judgment, or a failure to appreciate the consequences of personal acts; (2) a habitual course of sexual misconduct that results from the presence of a condition in the first criterion; and (3) an utter lack of power to control sexual impulses such that the person is dangerous to others. Id., subd. 18b (2006).

Williams does not raise a general challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence ■to support the district court’s order for civil commitment. He instead asserts specifically that clear and convincing evidence does not support the district court’s finding that he sexually assaulted his 1979 victim. The court did not expressly find that Williams sexually assaulted the woman, but it found that Williams’s first-degree burglary conviction that resulted from his interaction with her involved harmful sexual conduct. A rebuttable presumption that conduct is harmful sexual conduct attaches to first-degree burglary when the conduct was motivated by sexual impulses “or was part of a pattern of behavior that had criminal sexual conduct as a goal.” Id., subd. 7a(b) (2006).

Clear and convincing evidence supports the court’s finding that Williams committed harmful sexual conduct in 1979. The district court received several exhibits summarizing Williams’s conduct against the 1979 victim, including the presentenc-ing investigation, a parole-violation report that resulted from Williams’s window peeping in 1982, and an assessment report written in 2002. The parole-violation report includes the 1979 victim’s account of the offense. The district court also received a copy of the findings from the bench trial convicting Williams of first-degree burglary and criminal sexual conduct against the July 1989 victim. Four other victims of Williams’s sexual conduct, including his 1979 victim, testified at the trial and provided Spreigl evidence. After detailing Williams’s crime against his July 1989 victim, the court found that Williams had “committed similar crimes in the same geographic area” and cited these women. Clear and convincing evidence supports the district court’s finding that Williams’s conduct against the 1979 victim constituted harmful sexual conduct for the purposes of the civil commitment. The only remaining issue regards the appointment of examining psychologists.

Ill

Williams challenges the district court’s appointment of three examiners. After the county filed its petition, the district court appointed an examiner. The court then granted Williams’s request to appoint a second examiner. In June 2003, the county requested that the court appoint a third examiner. The court granted the request and appointed the psychologist suggested by the county. Williams argues that the district court lacked authority to appoint a third examiner. We disagree.

The Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act requires the district court to appoint an examiner after a commitment petition is filed and to inform the proposed patient of his right to an independent examiner. Minn.Stat. § 253B.07, subd. 3 (2006). If requested, the act requires the court to appoint a second examiner selected by the proposed patient. Id. The Commitment and Treatment Act Rules do not address the court’s authority to appoint examiners. The rules require the court administrator to maintain a list of examiners and require each court-appointed examiner to examine the proposed patient and prepare a separate report stating the examiner’s opinion and the factual basis for the opinion. Minn. Spec. R. Commitment & Treatment Act 1112.

Although these provisions require the court to appoint at least one examiner, and a second if requested, we find no statutory limit on the district court’s discretion to appoint an additional examiner if requested by a party. Rule 11 also appears to contemplate that additional examiners may be requested for court appointment. The rule states that “[i]f a party seeks appointment of an examiner not on the [court administrator’s examiners] list ... the party shall seek approval of the court prior to appointment.” Id. 11. The rule indicates that “a party” may request an examiner, which we read to indicate that either party may make the request. If Williams were correct that section 253B.02, subdivision 3, permits only two examiners, the rule would correspond to the statute only if it referred just to the proposed patient or respondent because the court appoints the first examiner without a request and the second examiner at the patient’s request.

Moreover, Williams does not indicate how the appointment of the third examiner prejudiced him. All three examiners formed the same opinion that Williams is a sexually dangerous person, that he has a sexual psychopathic personality, and that the least-restrictive alternative for meeting his needs and the needs of public safety is commitment to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program. We see no abuse of discretion by the appointment.

DECISION

The district court applied the proper standard when admitting evidence at Williams’s commitment hearing and did not violate his right to due process. The record supports the court’s findings in its order for indeterminate commitment. The court did not abuse its discretion by appointing a third examiner.

Affirmed.


author: DIETZEN, Judge.

text:
    In the Matter of the WELFARE OF the CHILDREN OF N.F. and S.F., Parents.
    No. A07-152.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    July 24, 2007.

      Jill E. Clark, Golden Valley, MN, for appellant N.F.
    Jill M. Waite, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant S.F.
    Michael 0. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Mary Martin Lynch, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health Department.
    Carrie E. Prentice, Assistant Hennepin County Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, for children.
    Howard S. Kleyman, Minneapolis, MN, for GAL.
    Considered and decided by WRIGHT, Presiding Judge; STONEBURNER, Judge; and DIETZEN, Judge.
   OPINION

DIETZEN, Judge.

Appellants N.F. and S.F., the parents of G.F. and C.F., challenge a district court order adjudicating their children in need of protection or services (CHIPS). Appellants argue that the district court erred by concluding that their use of corporal punishment was “physical abuse” and created an injurious or dangerous environment under Minn.Stat. § 260C.007, subds. 6(2), (9) (2006), respectively. Specifically, appellants claim that (1) the record contains no clear and convincing evidence of physical abuse; and (2) the CHIPS statute is unconstitutional as applied to them because they have a fundamental right to use corporal punishment to discipline their children. Because the record contains no clear and convincing evidence of physical abuse or a dangerous environment, we reverse.

FACTS

N.F. (mother) and S.F. (father) are married and are the parents of G.F. and C.F., who were 13 and 12 at the time of the hearing. During 2005, G.F. left home without permission on numerous occasions and, when confronted, either lied about it or refused to say where he had been or what he had done. The parents disciplined G.F. by withdrawing privileges and/or grounding him. But the parents continued to have behavioral problems with G.F. and decided to use corporal punishment. The mother had been told by a social worker that “the law doesn’t say that you can’t use physical force, the law says you can’t leave marks and bruises.”

In June 2005, the parents discussed Bible verses with G.F. that supported the use of corporal punishment. Specifically, they told G.F. that he would be paddled if he left home without permission or if he was disrespectful, that is, had a temper tantrum. He was also told that his father would administer the punishment, would not paddle him when he was angry, and that the number of times he would be paddled would be based on his age — one paddling per year. The parents then posted the Bible verses on the refrigerator as a reminder to G.F.

One evening later that month, the parents told G.F. and C.F. to get ready for bed. Subsequently, C.F. told his father that G.F. had left the house. When G.F. returned home about 10 to 20 minutes later, his father told him that he would get a “hot seat” (spanking) because he left home without permission. At the time, G.F. was 5'2" and 195 pounds. The father used a small maple paddle and paddled the back of G.F.’s upper thighs 12 times with “moderate force.” When G.F. became disrespectful and had a temper tantrum, the father paddled the back of G.F.’s upper thighs 12 more times with “moderate force.” G.F. then grabbed a kitchen knife and threatened to kill himself, but the father was able to take the kitchen knife from G.F. The father then paddled G.F. 12 more times with “moderate force” and sent him to bed. G.F. then climbed out the bedroom window, left home without permission, and was picked up by the local police. G.F. reported to the police that his father had disciplined him.

In July 2005, the county filed a CHIPS petition naming G.F. and C.F., alleging that the discipline administered to G.F. on June 29 constituted physical abuse. The case was submitted on stipulated facts, but the court received the wooden paddle and photos of G.F. into evidence, and took testimony from the father regarding the impact of the proceeding on his employa-bility.

The district court later filed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order for protective supervision. The court found that on June 29 the father had struck the child with a wooden paddle 36 times (12 times on three separate occasions). The court concluded that “striking a child with a wooden paddle 36 times is not reasonable or moderate physical discipline; it is physical abuse.” It adjudicated the children in need of protection or services under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(2), reasoning that G.F. had been a victim of physical abuse and that C.F. resided in the home with the victim and perpetrator. The court also concluded that the children were in need of protection or services under Minn.Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(9), because “the children’s behavior, condition, or environment is such as to be injurious or dangerous to the children or others.” This appeal follows.

ISSUES

1. Was there sufficient evidence of physical abuse, excessive force, or a dangerous living environment to justify the district court’s adjudication of G.F. and C.F. as children in need of protection or services?

2. Is Minn.Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(2) (2006), unconstitutional as applied to appellants?

ANALYSIS

I.

Appellants argue that the district court erred by concluding that the record contained clear and convincing evidence of physical abuse, that the children’s living environment was dangerous or injurious to them and that, therefore, the children were in need of protection or services under Minn.Stat. § 260.007, subd. 6(2) (2006).

Because this case was presented on stipulated facts to the court, the material facts are undisputed. Consequently, we review the application of law to the stipulated facts de novo. Morton Bldgs., Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 488 N.W.2d 254, 257 (Minn.1992); In re Welfare of K.J.K., Jr., 620 N.W.2d 734, 736 (Minn.App.2001), review denied (Minn. Mar. 27, (2001)); see also In re Welfare of Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 54 (Minn.2004) (stating that questions of law, such as the interpretation of the statutory criteria for adjudicating a CHIPS petition, are reviewed de novo). Clear and convincing evidence is required to support a CHIPS petition. Minn.Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 1(a) (2006); Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.04, subd. 1; In re A.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 43, 49 n. 2 (Minn.App.2000).

A. Physical Abuse

Minn.Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(2) (2006), provides that a child is in need of protection or services when the child:

(i) has been a victim of physical or sexual abuse, (ii) resides with or has resided with a victim of domestic child abuse as defined in subdivision 5, (iii) resides with or would reside with a perpetrator of domestic child abuse or child abuse as defined in subdivision 5, or (iv) is a victim of emotional maltreatment as defined in subdivision 8.

Appellants argue that the term “physical abuse” requires proof of a physical injury. The above-quoted statute does not define the term “physical abuse,” but it refers to the definition of “child abuse” in MinmStat. § 260C.007, subd. 5 (2006). Subdivision 5 defines “child abuse” as any act that involves a minor victim and violates statutes that criminalize assault, prostitution, sexual abuse, child pornography, and neglect, endangerment, and malicious punishment of a child. Malicious punishment of a child means “an intentional act or a series of intentional acts with respect to a child, [which] evidences unreasonable force or cruel discipline that is excessive under the circumstances.” Minn.Stat. § 609.377, subd. 1 (2006); see also Minn.Stat. § 609.379, subd. 1(a) (2006) (allowing parents to use “reasonable force” to restrain or correct their children).

Respondent argues that the focus of the CHIPS statute is on the child and that the term “physical abuse” contemplates not only physical injury but also any “bodily harm” including physical pain within the meaning of Minn.Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7 (2006). Subdivision 7 defines “bodily harm” as “physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” While we agree that the focus of the CHIPS statute is the protection of children, we reject respondent’s argument that physical abuse is the equivalent of bodily harm and, therefore, only requires physical pain. Here, the relevant statute, Minn.Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(2)(i), clearly requires physical abuse and couples the term “physical abuse” with “child abuse” as defined in subdivision 5. We conclude that “physical abuse,” like “child abuse,” requires unreasonable force or cruel discipline that is excessive under the circumstances.

We turn then to an application of the law to the stipulated facts. Appellants argue that they have the right to use corporal punishment to discipline their children and that the force used was not excessive. Appellants suggest that we consider the age of the child, the seriousness of the child’s offense, whether the child had notice of the discipline before the offense, the implement used, the degree of force, and any resulting -injury to determine whether the punishment was unreasonable force or cruel discipline that is excessive under the circumstances. Respondent concedes that “parents clearly may use corporal punishment,” but argues that the discipline was excessive. The district court concluded that “striking a child with a wooden paddle 36 times is not reasonable or moderate physical discipline; it is physical abuse,” and, therefore, G.F. was “a victim of physical abuse.”

The statute requires courts to analyze the relevant “circumstances” in determining whether the discipline was excessive. Minn.Stat. § 609.377, subd. 1. We conclude that the relevant circumstances in this case are the child’s age, height, and weight; the seriousness of the infraction; the degree of force used by the parent; and the physical impact of the discipline. At the time of the incident, G.F. was 13 years old and weighed 195 pounds, the force used was “moderate,” and the discipline was not cruel discipline that was excessive.

We recognize that the third set of spankings, administered after G.F. threatened suicide, is troublesome. Spanking a child for wielding a knife and making a suicide threat is probably not an appropriate parental response. But we do not conclude that the third set of spankings constituted physical abuse under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(2). Specifically, we do not conclude that the force used was unreasonable or that it constituted cruel discipline that was excessive. Under certain circumstances, such discipline may constitute emotional maltreatment. But under the statute, emotional maltreatment means the “consistent, deliberate infliction of mental harm” on a child by a parent, which “has an observable, sustained, and adverse effect on the child’s physical, mental or emotional development.” Minn.Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 15 (2006). Emotional maltreatment does not include “reasonable training or discipline administered by the person responsible for the child’s care or the reasonable exercise of authority by that person.” Id. The record contains no evidence that would support a determination of emotional maltreatment. Appellants’ chosen form of discipline for G.F.’s knife wielding and suicide threat may not have been the best approach under the circumstances, but parents, who are in the best position to make those judgments, have a wide degree of latitude regarding the discipline of their children. See SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 823 (Minn.2007) (stating that parents have a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their children that should not be interfered with except for grave and weighty reasons).

B. Dangerous Environment

Appellants argue the district court erred by concluding that the children’s environment was injurious or dangerous to the children within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(9). That statute provides that a child may be in need of protection or services when the child “is one whose behavior, condition, or environment is such as to be injurious or dangerous to the child or others.” The district court concluded that “the childrens’ behavior, condition, or environment is such as to be injurious or dangerous to the children or others,” and that “as evidenced by [G.F.j’s physical abuse, [appellants] have not adequately cared for their children.”

In concluding that the children’s environment was unsafe, injurious, and dangerous the district court relied solely on its prior determination that appellants’ use of corporal punishment was physical abuse. On this record, we see no evidence that suggests an “unsafe,” “injurious,” or “dangerous” environment. Consequently, we reverse the district court’s determination that the children’s environment was unsafe, injurious, or dangerous under the statute.

II.

Appellants argue that Minn.Stat. § 260C.007 is unconstitutional as applied to them because it violates their fundamental right to discipline their children. Because we reverse the CHIPS adjudication, it is not necessary for us to reach this issue, and, therefore, we decline to do so. See State v. Hoyt, 304 N.W.2d 884, 888 (Minn.1981) (stating that constitutional questions should not be addressed unless necessary to dispose of a case).

DECISION

Under Minn.Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(2) (2006), “physical abuse” means unreasonable force or cruel discipline that is excessive under the circumstances. Based on the relevant circumstances set forth in the stipulated facts, the state did not prove the allegations of physical abuse by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, we reverse.

Reversed.

      . The statute errantly references subdivision 8. Rather, subdivision 15 defines "emotional maltreatment.”

      . Subdivision 5 incorporates by reference the statutory definitions of the applicable crimes.

      . Minn.Stat. § 609.02 provides general definitions applicable throughout the criminal code.

      .We also observe that "domestic child abuse,” another term employed by Minn.Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(2), is defined as any "physical injury” to a minor. See Minn. Stat § 260C.007, subd. 13(1). Therefore, the contention that "physical abuse” requires only "physical pain” lacks merit. See also Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7 defining "bodily harm” and distinguishing physical "pain” from physical "injury.”

      . Appellants do not argue that the statute is facially unconstitutional or overbroad.