author: Justice Kennedy Justice Scalia, Justice Blackmun,

text:
    ITEL CONTAINERS INTERNATIONAL CORP. v. HUDDLESTON, COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE OF TENNESSEE
    No. 91-321.
    Argued October 14, 1992
    Decided February 23, 1993

      Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined, and in all but Parts IV and V of which Scalia, J., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 78. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 82.

      Philip W. Collier argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Andrew L. Frey, Charles Rothfeld, and Lisa D. Leach.

      Charles W. Burson, Attorney General of Tennessee, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were John Knox Walkup, Solicitor General, and Daryl J. Brand, Assistant Attorney General.

      Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. On the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Acting Assistant Attorney General Bruton, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Kent L. Jones, Gary R. Allen, and Ernest J. Brown.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland by William Karas and David H. Coburn; for Asia North America Eastbound Rate Agreement et al. by Stanley O. Sher and David F. Smith; and for the Institute of International Container Lessors et al. by Thomas S. Martin and Edward A Woolley.

        R. Frederic Fisher, Barry J. London, and Lawrence N. Minch filed a brief for the Pacific Merchant Shipping Association et al. as amici curiae.

   Justice Kennedy

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we consider the validity of a state tax affecting cargo containers used in international trade, a subject we have addressed once before. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434 (1979). We sustain Tennessee’s sales tax on leases of containers owned by a domestic company and used in international shipping.

I

The use of large steel containers to transport goods by-truck, rail, and oceangoing carrier was a major innovation in transportation technology. In 1990, the United States shipped, by value, 60% of its marine imports and 52% of its marine exports in these containers. Itel Containers International Corporation, the petitioner here, is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in California. Itel’s primary business is leasing cargo containers to participants in the international shipping industry, and all its leases restrict use of its containers to international commerce. The leases are solicited and negotiated through Itel marketing offices in California, Illinois, New Jersey, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington, and the leased containers are delivered to lessees or their agents in many of the 50 States, including Tennessee. The Tennessee deliveries occur either at Itel’s Memphis terminal or at several designated third-party terminals.

In December 1986, the Tennessee Department of Revenue assessed $382,465 in sales tax, penalties, and interest on the proceeds Itel earned from leased containers delivered in Tennessee for the period of January 1983 through November 1986. Itel paid under protest and filed an action for a refund, challenging the constitutionality of the Tennessee tax under the Commerce Clause, the Import-Export Clause and the Supremacy Clause. The last challenge to the tax was based on an alleged conflict both with federal regulations and with two international conventions to which the United States is a signatory. Customs Convention on Containers, Dec. 2, 1972, [1975] 988 U. N. T. S. 43 (hereinafter 1972 Container Convention); Customs Convention on Containers, May 18, 1956, [1969] 20 U. S. T. 301, T. I. A. S. No. 6634 (hereinafter 1956 Container Convention). The Tennessee Chancery Court reduced the assessment to $158,012 on state-law grounds but rejected Itel’s constitutional claims.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, Itel maintained that the Tennessee tax is pre-empted by the Container Conventions and their implementing federal regulations. The court concluded, however, that congressional regulation of cargo containers is not pervasive and that Congress has not otherwise acted to bar state sales taxes on cargo container leases. Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Card well, 814 S. W. 2d 29, 34 (1991). Instead, the court held, Congress merely prohibits the imposition of federal customs duties on containers, and that prohibition does not pre-empt Tennessee’s sales tax, which is not a customs duty. Id., at 35-36.

Itel also claimed that Tennessee’s tax violates the Foreign Commerce Clause principles announced in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, because the tax “prevents the Federal Government from ‘speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments’ ” and “creates a substantial risk of international multiple taxation.” Id., at 451. The state court rejected this argument because the tax is imposed only upon a discrete transaction— the transferred possession of cargo containers within Tennessee — and therefore does not risk multiple taxation or impede federal regulation of foreign trade. 814 S. W. 2d, at 36-37.

Last, Itel argued that the tax violates the Import-Export. Clause because it prevents the Federal Government from speaking with one voice in international affairs and is a tax on exports that is per se impermissible under Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U. S. 69 (1946). The court dismissed Itel’s one voice argument for reasons similar to those given in its Commerce Clause analysis, 814 S. W. 2d, at 38, and held the Tennessee tax does not violate Richfield’s per se restriction because it is not a direct tax on the value of goods destined for export. 814 S. W. 2d, at 33. We granted certiorari, 502 U. S. 1090 (1992), and now affirm.

II

Itel’s primary challenge is that the imposition of the Tennessee sales tax is proscribed by both the 1972 and 1956 Container Conventions. The Conventions restrict the authority of signatories to tax cargo containers by requiring signatory nations to grant the containers “temporary admission” into their borders, subject to exportation “within three months from the date of importation” unless this period is extended by customs authorities. 1972 Container Convention, Arts. 3 and 4; 1956 Container Convention, Arts. 2 and 3. Temporary admission status permits the containers to enter a nation “free of import duties and taxes” under the 1972 Convention and “free of import duties and import taxes” under the 1956 Convention. 1972 Container Convention, Art. 1; 1956 Container Convention, Art. 2.

The Conventions define these key phrases in similar terms. The 1972 Convention defines “import duties and taxes” to mean “Customs duties and all other duties, taxes, fees and other charges which are collected on, or in connex-ion with, the importation of goods, but not including fees and charges limited in amount to the approximate cost of services rendered.” 1972 Container Convention, Art. 1. The 1956 Convention defines “import duties and import taxes” to mean “not only Customs duties but also all duties and taxes whatsoever chargeable by reason of importation.” 1956 Container Convention, Art. 1. Itel does not claim the Tennessee sales taxes on its container leases is a “Customs dut[y]” under either Convention. Rather, it says that because its containers would not be available for lease, and hence taxation, in Tennessee but for their importation into the United States, the Tennessee tax must be a tax “collected on, or in connexion with, the importation of goods” in contravention of the 1972 Convention and a tax “chargeable by reason of importation” in contravention of the 1956 Convention.

We cannot accept Itel’s interpretation of the Container Conventions. Our interpretation must begin, as always, with the text of the Conventions. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U. S. 392, 397 (1985). The text, instead of supporting Itel’s broad construction, makes clear that it is the reason a State imposes a tax, not the reason for the presence of the containers within a State’s jurisdiction, that determines whether a tax violates the Container Conventions. The Conventions thus disallow only those taxes imposed based on the act of importation itself. In contrast, Itel’s interpretation would bar all taxes on containers covered by the Conventions, because each covered container is, by definition, in the United States as a result of its temporary importation. This reading makes superfluous the Conventions’ qualifying language that the only taxes proscribed are those “collected on, or in connexion with, the importation of goods” and those “chargeable by reason of importation.” 1972 Container Convention, Art. 1; 1956 Container Convention, Art. 1.

In an attempt to counteract the interpretation that the Conventions prohibit only those taxes based on the importation of containers, Itel asserts that the consistent practice of other signatory nations and a prior interpretation of the 1956 Convention by the United States prove that signatory nations read the Conventions to proscribe all taxes on containers within their borders. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U. S. 276, 294-295 (1933). Itel, however, overstates the probative value of these actions.

As evidence that other signatory nations free cargo containers of all domestic taxation, Itel places primary reliance on the Economic Community Sixth Directive and the United Kingdom Value Added Tax (VAT), as illuminated in an ami-cus brief filed by the United Kingdom. Brief for United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae 7-9. Under the European VAT system, no direct tax, be it a VAT, sales, or use tax, is imposed on the value of international container leases. See Sixth Council Directive of May 17, 1977, Arts. 14(1)(i) and 15(13), reprinted in CCH Common Mkt. Rep. ¶¶ 3165P and 3165Q.

The value of international container leases, however, is included in the cost of transporting goods, which in turn is added to the value of the goods when calculating VAT tax liability. Itel admits this is tantamount to an indirect tax on the value of international container leases, but claims the distinction between an indirect tax (paid by the consumer of import goods) and a direct tax on the container itself (paid by either the lessor or lessee of the container) is significant. Whether or not, in the abstract, there is a significant difference between direct and indirect taxation, the Container Conventions do not distinguish between the two methods or differentiate depending upon the legal incidence of a tax. For example, the first declaration in both Convention Protocols of Signature states that inclusion of the weight or value of containers in the weight or value of goods for calculating import duties and taxes upon those goods conflicts with the Conventions, even though this would be only an indirect tax on the containers and the legal incidence of the tax would not fall on the container lessor or lessee. 1972 Container Convention, Protocol of Signature, [1975] 988 U. N. T. S., at 74; 1956 Container Convention, Protocol of Signature, [1969] • 20 U. S. T., at 326. The Conventions, in short, prohibit both direct and indirect taxes imposed based on the importation of a container, but permit direct and indirect taxes imposed on some other basis.

As further evidence in support of its position, Itel points to the statements of signatory nations objecting to Tennessee’s taxation of container leases. With all due respect to those statements, we adhere to our interpretation. We are mindful that 11 nations (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), each a signatory to at least one Container Convention, have sent a diplomatic note to the United States Department of State submitting that they do not “impose sales taxes (or equivalent taxes of different nomenclatures) on the lease of cargo containers that are used in international commerce among the Contracting Parties to the Conventions.” App. to Brief for United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae la. The meaning these nations ascribe to the phrase “equivalent taxes” is not clear. For purposes of calculation and assessment, the European VAT system, enacted in most of the objecting nations, is by no means equivalent to a sales tax. See Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 498 U. S. 358, 365-366, n. 3 (1991). But as we discussed above, for the purpose of determining whether a tax is one based on importation, the European VAT system is equivalent to Tennessee’s sales tax system — that is, neither system imposes a tax based on the act of importation. Only this latter form of equivalence is relevant under the Container Conventions.

Directing our attention to the amicus brief filed by the United States in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434 (1979), Itel next claims the United States Government once interpreted the 1956 Container Convention to prohibit all domestic taxes on international cargo containers. Even if this were true, the Government’s current position is quite different; its amicus brief in this case expresses agreement with our interpretation of both the 1972 and the 1956 Container Conventions. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12.

In its amicus brief in Japan Line, moreover, the United States did not say that the 1956 Container Convention prohibited the imposition of any domestic tax on international cargo containers. Its position was simply that under the 1956 Convention the United States gave containers “the same status it gives under the customs laws to articles admitted to a ‘bonded manufacturing warehouse.’” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, O. T. 1978, No. 77-1378, p. 25 (quoting 19 U. S. C. §1311). Starting from this premise the Government argued that, like state taxes on goods in customs bonded warehouses destined for foreign trade, see McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U. S. 414, 428-429 (1940), state taxes on containers would frustrate a federal scheme designed to benefit international commerce. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Japan Line, at 27-29, and n. 22. We declined, and continue to decline, to adopt this expansive view of McGoldrick and the pre-emptive effect of the Container Conventions. See infra, at 70-71. And, in any event, the Government’s pre-emption argument in Japan Line does not conflict with its present interpretation that the Container Conventions themselves are violated only by a tax assessed upon the importation of containers.

Tennessee’s sales tax is imposed upon the “transfer of title or possession, or both, exchange, barter, lease or rental, conditional, or otherwise, in any manner or by any means whatsoever of tangible personal property for a consideration.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-102(23)(A) (Supp. 1992). It is a sales tax of general application that does not discriminate against imported products either in its purpose or effect. Indeed, its assessment bears no relation to importation whatsoever. The tax is not pre-empted by the 1972 or 1956 Container Convention.

Ill

Itel next argues that the application of Tennessee’s sales tax to its container leases is pre-empted because it would frustrate the federal objectives underlying the Container Conventions and the laws and regulations granting favored status to international containers, in particular 19 U. S. C. §1322 and 19 CFR § 10.41a (1992). See Hines v. Davido-witz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941) (state law pre-empted when it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”). The federal regulatory scheme for cargo containers, it claims, parallels the regulatory scheme creating customs bonded warehouses which we have found to pre-empt most state taxes on warehoused goods. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U. S. 130 (1986); Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U. S. 145 (1982); McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., supra.

Itel’s reliance on these decisions is misplaced. In McGold-rick and its progeny, we stated that Congress created a system for bonded warehouses where imports could be stored free of federal customs duties while under the continuous supervision of local customs officials “in order to encourage merchants here and abroad to make use of American ports.” Xerox Corp., supra, at 151. By allowing importers to defer taxes on imported goods for a period of time and to escape taxes altogether on reexported goods, the bonded warehouse system “enabled the importer, without any threat of financial loss, to place his goods in domestic markets or to return them to foreign commerce and, by this flexibility, encouraged importers to use American facilities.” R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., supra, at 147. This federal objective would be frustrated by the imposition of state sales and property taxes on goods not destined for domestic distribution, regardless of whether the taxes themselves discriminated against goods based on their destination. Xerox Corp., supra, at 150-154. See also R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., supra, at 144-147; McGoldrick, supra, at 428-429.

In contrast, the federal regulatory scheme for containers used in foreign commerce discloses no congressional intent to exempt those containers from all or most domestic taxation. In Japan Line we said that the 1956 Container Convention acknowledged “[t]he desirability of uniform treatment of containers used exclusively in foreign commerce” and “reflect[ed] a national policy to remove impediments to the use of containers.” 441 U. S., at 452-453. But we did not hold that the Convention and the federal regulatory scheme for cargo containers expressed a national policy to exempt containers from all domestic taxation. Rather, we relied on the federal laws, along with proof of an international customary norm of home port taxation and California’s creation of an asymmetry in international maritime taxation, for our conclusion that California’s ad valorem property tax violated the Foreign Commerce Clause by impeding the Government’s ability to “ ‘spea[k] with one voice’ ” in conducting our Nation’s foreign affairs. Ibid.

Itel does not better its pre-emption argument by claiming that the federal regulatory scheme for containers, like the customs bonded warehouse scheme, is so pervasive that it demonstrates a federal purpose to occupy the field of container regulation and taxation. We doubt that the container regulatory scheme can be considered as pervasive as the customs warehouse scheme. The latter provides for continual federal supervision of warehouses, strict bonding requirements, and special taxing rules, see 19 U. S. C. §§ 1555 and 1557; 19 CFR pt. 19 (1992), whereas the former is limited more to the general certification and taxing of containers, see 19 U.S.C. §1322; 19 CFR §§ 10.41a and 115.25-115.43 (1992). Even if Itel were correct on this point, however, we have not held that state taxation of goods in bonded warehouses is pre-empted by Congress’ intent to occupy the field of bonded warehouse regulation. In fact, in R. J Reynolds we specifically held that the bonded warehouse statutes and regulations did not evidence such a purpose. 479 U. S., at 149. So, too, we cannot conclude that in adopting laws governing the importation of containers Congress intended to foreclose any and all concurrent state regulation or taxation of containers.

The precise federal policy regarding promotion of container use is satisfied by a proscription against taxes that are imposed upon, or discriminate against, the importation of containers. We find that Tennessee’s general sales tax, which applies to domestic and foreign goods without differentiation, does not impede the federal objectives expressed in the 1972 and 1956 Container Conventions and related federal statutes and regulations.

IV

A

Itel’s third challenge to Tennessee’s tax on container leases is that the tax violates the Foreign Commerce Clause as interpreted by Japan Line. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. We began our analysis in Japan Line with a reformulation of the Foreign Commerce Clause test:

“In addition to answering the nexus, apportionment, and nondiscrimination questions posed in Complete Auto [Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 279 (1977)], a court must also inquire, first, whether the tax, notwithstanding apportionment, creates a substantial risk of international multiple taxation, and, second, whether the tax prevents the Federal Government from ‘speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.’” 441 U. S., at 451.

Without passing on the point, we assumed the California property tax in question would have met the test of Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977). See 441 U. S., at 451. Proceeding to the two foreign commerce requirements we had identified, we found the California tax incompatible with both. We held that because Japan had the established right, consistent with the custom of nations, see id., at 447, to tax the property value of the containers in full, California’s tax “produce[d] multiple taxation in fact,” id., at 452. We held further that California’s tax prevented the United States from speaking with one voice in foreign affairs, in that “[t]he risk of retaliation by Japan, under these circumstances, [was] acute, and such retaliation of necessity would be felt by the Nation as a whole.” Id., at 453.

Four years later we again addressed whether a California tax offended the Foreign Commerce Clause, this time in the context of a unitary business income tax. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U. S. 159 (1983). Although recognizing that California’s income tax shared some of the same characteristics as the property tax involved in Japan Line, see 463 U. S., at 187, we nevertheless upheld it based on two distinguishing characteristics.

First, the problem of double taxing in Container Corp., “although real, [was] not the ‘inevitable]’ result of the California [income] taxing scheme.” Id., at 188 (quoting Japan Line, supra, at 447). On the other hand, “[i]n Japan Line, we relied strongly on the fact that one taxing jurisdiction claimed the right to tax a given value in full, and another taxing jurisdiction claimed the right to tax the same entity in part — a combination resulting necessarily in double taxation.” 463 U. S., at 188. That the Japan Line Court adopted a rule requiring States to forgo assessing property taxes against foreign-owned cargo containers “was by no means unfair, because the rule did no more than reflect consistent international practice and express federal policy.” Container Corp., supra, at 190.

Second, we noted that “in [Container Corp.], unlike Japan Line, the Executive Branch ha[d] decided not to file an ami-cus curiae brief in opposition to the state tax.” 463 U. S., at 196. Together with our conclusion that the California income tax did not result in automatic double taxation, the Government’s nonintervention suggested that the tax presented no serious threat to United States foreign policy. See id,., at 196.

B

Before reconciling the holdings of Japan Line and Container Corp., we first address the Complete Auto test, a test we assumed, arguendo, was satisfied by the tax in Japan Line. 441 U. S., at 451. A state tax satisfies the Complete Auto Domestic Commerce Clause test “when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State.” Complete Auto, supra, at 279. Because Itel accepts the Supreme Court of Tennessee’s conclusion that “Tennessee’s sales tax meets the four-fold requirements of Complete Auto,” 814 S. W. 2d, at 36, we need not retrace that court’s careful analysis. We do note, however, that Tennessee’s compliance with the Complete Auto test has relevance to our conclusion that the state tax meets those inquiries unique to the Foreign Commerce Clause. That the tax is a fair measure of the State’s contacts with a given commercial transaction in all four aspects of the Complete Auto test confirms both the State’s legitimate interest in taxing the transaction and the absence of an attempt to interfere with the free flow of commerce, be it foreign or domestic.

C

We proceed to evaluate the tax under Japan Line's two Foreign Commerce Clause factors. Left to decide whether Tennessee’s tax rests on the Japan Line or the Container Corp. side of the scale, we have no doubt that the analysis and holding of Container Corp. control.

Itel asserts that Tennessee’s law invites multiple taxation of container leases because numerous foreign nations have a sufficient taxing nexus with the leases to impose equivalent taxes, and many nations in fact would do so were it not for the Container Conventions’ prohibitions. As an initial matter, of course, we have concluded that the Conventions do not prohibit Tennessee’s sales tax or equivalent taxes imposed by other nations. To the extent Tennessee has invited others to tax cargo container leases, foreign sovereigns, in an exercise of their independent judgment, have chosen not to accept.

Furthermore, the Foreign Commerce Clause cannot be interpreted to demand that a State refrain from taxing any businéss transaction that is also potentially subject to taxation by a foreign sovereign. “Japan Line does not require forbearance so extreme or so one-sided.” Container Corp., supra, at 193. Tennessee has decided to tax a discrete transaction occurring within the State. See Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U. S. 1, 9 (1986). And, according to its interpretation of its revenue code, which we accept, Tennessee credits against its own tax any tax properly paid in another jurisdiction, foreign or domestic, on the same transaction. Tenn. Code Ann. §67-6-313(f) (1989). By these measures, Tennessee’s sales tax reduces, if not eliminates, the risk of multiple international taxation. Absent a conflict with a “consistent international practice [or]... federal policy,” Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 190, the careful apportionment of a state tax on business transactions conducted within state borders does not create the substantial risk of international multiple taxation that implicates Foreign Commerce Clause concerns.

Itel further claims that if other States in this country follow Tennessee’s lead and tax international container leases, the United States will be unable to speak with one voice in foreign trade because international container leases will be subject to various degrees of domestic taxation. As a consequence, Itel insists, container owners and users will be hit by retaliatory foreign taxes. To the extent Itel is arguing that the risk of double taxation violates the one voice test, our response is the same as above: Tennessee’s tax does not create the substantial risk of international multiple taxation that implicates Foreign Commerce Clause concerns.

To the extent Itel is arguing that taxes like Tennessee’s engender foreign policy problems, the United States disagrees. The Federal Government, in adopting various conventions, statutes, and regulations that restrict a State’s ability to tax international cargo containers in defined circumstances, has acted on the subject of taxing cargo containers and their use. It has chosen to eliminate state taxes collected in connection with the importation of cargo containers. The state tax here does not fall within that proscription, and the most rational inference to be drawn is that this tax, one quite distinct from the general class of import duties, is permitted. Unlike in Japan Line or Container Corp., moreover, the United States has filed an amicus brief defending Tennessee’s law: “Far from conflicting with international custom, the Tennessee tax appears to promote it. The Tennessee tax thus does not interfere with our ability ‘to speak with one voice’ on this issue involving foreign commerce.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24. This submission “is by no means dispositive.” Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 195-196. But given the strong indications from Congress that Tennessee’s method of taxation is allowable, and with due regard for the fact that the nuances of foreign policy “are much more the province of the Executive Branch and Congress than of this Court,” id., at 196, we find no reason to disagree with the United States’ submission that Tennessee’s tax does not infringe the Government’s ability to speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with other nations. “It would turn dormant Commerce Clause analysis entirely upside down to apply it where the Federal Government has acted, and to apply it in such a way as to reverse the policy that the Federal Government has elected to follow.” Wardair Canada, supra, at 12.

V

Itel’s final avenue of attack on the Tennessee tax is that, as applied to international container leases, it violates the Import-Export Clause. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 2. Our modern Import-Export Clause test was first announced in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U. S. 276, 285-286 (1976):

“The Framers of the Constitution ... sought to alleviate three main concerns by committing sole power to lay imposts and duties on imports in the Federal Government, with no concurrent state power: [1] the Federal Government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments, and tariffs, which might affect foreign relations, could not be implemented by the States consistently with that exclusive power; [2] import revenues were to be the major source of revenue of the Federal Government and should not be diverted to the States; and [3] harmony among the States might be disturbed unless seaboard States, with their crucial ports of entry, were prohibited from levying taxes on citizens of other States by taxing goods merely flowing through their ports to the other States not situated as favorably geographically.” Ibid, (footnotes omitted).

The first and third components in this formulation mirror inquiries we have already undertaken as part-of our Foreign Commerce Clause analysis. That is, the one voice component of the Michelin test is the same as the one voice component of our Japan Line test. Japan Line, 441 U. S., at 449-450, n. 14. And the state harmony component parallels the four Complete Auto requirements of the Foreign and Domestic Commerce Clause. Department of Revenue of Wash. v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U. S. 734, 754-755 (1978) (“The third Import-Export Clause policy ... is vindicated if the tax falls upon a taxpayer with a reasonable nexus to the .State, is properly apportioned, does not discriminate, and relates reasonably to services provided by the State”). Having concluded that the Tennessee tax survives Commerce Clause scrutiny, we must conclude the tax is consistent with the first and third component of our Michelin test.

This leaves only Michelin’s second component: ensuring that import revenues are not being diverted from the Federal Government. We need.not provide a detailed explanation of what, if any, substantive limits this aspect of Michelin places on state taxation of goods flowing through international channels, for the tax here is not a tax on importation or imported goods, but a tax on a business transaction occurring within the taxing State. The tax does not draw revenue from the importation process and so does not divert import revenue from the Federal Government. For similar reasons, we reject the argument that the tax violates the prohibition on the direct taxation of imports and exports “in transit,” the rule we followed in Richfield Oil, 329 U. S., at 78-79, 84. Even assuming that rule has not been altered by the approach we adopted in Michelin, it is inapplicable here. Tennessee’s sales tax is levied on leases transferring temporary possession of containers to third parties in Tennessee; it is not levied on the containers themselves or on the goods being imported in those containers. The tax thus does not divert import revenue from the Federal Government because “the taxation falls upon a service distinct from [import] goods and their value.” Washington Stevedoring, supra, at 757. See also Canton R. Co. v. Rogan, 340 U. S. 511, 513-514 (1951).

VI

For the reasons we have stated, we hold that Tennessee s sales tax, as applied to Itel’s international container leases, does not violate the Commerce, Import-Export or Supremacy Clause. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join all of the Court’s opinion except those sections disposing of the petitioner’s “negative” Foreign Commerce Clause and Import-Export Clause arguments (Parts IV and V, respectively). As to those sections, I concur only in the judgment of the Court.

I have previously recorded my view that the Commerce Clause contains no “negative” component, no self-operative prohibition upon the States’ regulation of commerce. “The historical record provides no grounds for reading the Commerce Clause to be other than what it says — an authorization for Congress to regulate commerce.” Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U. S. 232, 263 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U. S. 167, 202-203 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). On stare decisis grounds, however, I will enforce a self-executing, “negative” Commerce Clause in two circumstances: (1) against a state law that facially discriminates against interstate commerce, and (2) against a state law that is indistinguishable from a type of law previously held unconstitutional by this Court. These acknowledgments of precedent serve the principal purposes of stare decisis, which are to protect reliance interests and to foster stability in the law. I do not believe, however, that either of those purposes is significantly furthered by continuing to apply the vague and open-ended tests that are the current content of our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence, such as the four-factor test set forth in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 279 (1977), or the “balancing” approach of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970). Unlike the prohibition on rank discrimination against interstate commerce, which has long and consistently appeared in the precedents of this Court, see New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 273 (1988), those tests are merely the latest in a series of doctrines that we have successively applied, and successively discarded, over the years, to invalidate nondiscriminatory state taxation and regulation — including, for example, the “original package” doctrine, see Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100 (1890), the “uniformity” test, see Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232, 279-280 (1873); cf. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia ex rel. Society for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 12 How. 299, 319 (1852), the “directness” test, see Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485, 488-489 (1878), and the “privilege of doing interstate business” rule, see Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U. S. 602, 609 (1951). Like almost all their predecessors, these latest tests are so uncertain in their application (and in their anticipated lifespan) that they can hardly be said to foster stability or to engender reliance deserving of stare decisis protection.

I have not hitherto had occasion to consider an asserted application of the negative Commerce Clause to commerce “with foreign Nations” — as opposed to commerce “among the several States” — but the basic point that the Commerce Clause is a power conferred upon Congress (and not a power denied to the States) obviously applies to all portions of the Clause. I assume that, for reasons of stare decisis, I must apply the same categorical prohibition against laws that facially discriminate against foreign commerce as I do against laws that facially discriminate against interstate commerce — though it may be that the rule is not as deeply rooted in our precedents for the former field. I need not reach that issue in the present case, since the Tennessee tax is nothing more than a garden-variety state sales tax that clearly does not discriminate against foreign commerce. As with the Interstate Commerce Clause, however, stare decisis cannot bind me to a completely indeterminate test such as the “four-factored test plus two” found in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 446-451 (1979), which combines Complete Auto with two additional tests.

Japan Line, like Complete Auto and Pike, ultimately asks courts to make policy judgments — essentially, whether nondiscriminatory state regulations of various sorts are “worth” their effects upon interstate or foreign commerce. One element of Japan Line, however, the so-called “speak with one voice” test, has a peculiar effect that underscores the in appropriateness of our engagement in this enterprise of applying a negative Commerce Clause. Applied literally, this test would always be satisfied, since no state law can .ever actually “prevent this Nation from ‘speaking with one voice’ in regulating foreign commerce,” Japan Line, supra, at 451 (emphasis added), or “interfere with [the United States’] ability ‘to speak with one voice,’ ” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24 (emphasis added). The National Government can always explictly pre-empt the offending state law. What, then, does the “one voice” test mean? Today, the Court relies on two considerations in determining that Tennessee’s tax passes it: (1) that federal treaties, statutes and regulations restrict a State’s ability to tax containers in certain defined circumstances, and the state tax here does not fall within those proscriptions; and (2) that the Government has filed an amicus brief in support of the State. Ante, at 75-76. The first of these considerations, however, does not distinguish the ad valorem property tax invalidated in Japan Line, which would also not violate the Container Conventions or the relevant federal statutes and regulations as construed in today’s opinion, ante, at 65-66, 71. The second consideration does distinguish Japan Line, and it thus appears that a ruling on the constitutionality of a state law ultimately turns on the position of the Executive Branch. Having appropriated a power of Congress for its own use, the Court now finds itself, at least in the area of foreign commerce, incompetent to wield that power, and passes it off (out of “due regard” for foreign-policy expertise) to the President. Ante, at 76. I certainly agree that he is better able to decide than we are which state regulatory interests should currently be subordinated to our national interest in foreign commerce. Under the Constitution, however, neither he nor we were to make that decision, but only Congress.

Petitioner’s Import-Export Clause challenge is, for me, a more difficult matter. It has firm basis in a constitutional text that cannot be avoided by showing that the tax on imports and exports is nondiscriminatory. See Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U. S. 69, 76 (1946). To come within this constitutional exemption, however, the taxed good must be either an import or an export “at the time the tax accrued.” Id., at 78. I do not think a good can be an export when it will be used in this country, for its designed purpose, before being shipped abroad. In Rich-field, the Court held that California could not impose its nondiscriminatory sales tax on a shipment of oil that was being exported to New Zealand. The tax accrued upon the delivery of the oil to the purchaser, which was accomplished by pumping the oil into the hold of the vessel that would transport it overseas. The Richfield Court noted not only that no portion of the oil was “used or consumed in the United States,” id., at 71, but also that “there was nothing equivocal in the transaction which created even a probability that the oil would be diverted to domestic use,” id., at 83. With respect to the containers at issue in the present case, by contrast, it was entirely certain that after the time at which the tax accrued (viz., upon delivery of the empty containers to the lessee) they would be used in this country, to be loaded with goods for export. See Brief for Petitioner 7 (“[E]aeh [leased] container initially was used to export American goods to foreign ports”). It could not be said, when the tax attached, that “the process of [their] exportation ha[d] started.” Richfield, supra, at 82. Because I find that the containers at issue were not protected by the Import-Export Clause, I need not consider whether the Tennessee tax would satisfy the test set forth in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U. S. 276 (1976).

For the reasons stated, I concur in the Court’s conclusion that Tennessee’s tax is not unconstitutional under the Foreign Commerce Clause or the Import-Export Clause.

Justice Blackmun,

dissenting.

It is established “that a treaty should generally be ‘construe[d] . . . liberally to give effect to the purpose which animates it’ and that ‘[e]ven where a provision of a treaty fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting, the other enlarging, rights which may be claimed under it, the more liberal interpretation is to be preferred.’” United States v. Stuart, 489 U. S. 353, 368 (1989), quoting Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech, 311 U. S. 150, 163 (1940); see also Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U. S. 47, 51-52 (1929). This Court recognized in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434 (1979), that the Container Conventions reflect a “national policy to remove impediments to the use of containers as ‘instruments of international traffic.’ ” Id., at 453, quoting 19 U. S. C. § 1322(a); see Customs Convention on Containers, Dec. 2, 1972, [1975] 988 U. N. T. S. 43 (hereinafter 1972 Convention); Customs Convention on Containers, May 18, 1956, [1969] 20 U. S. T. 301, T. I. A. S. No. 6634 (hereinafter 1956 Convention). Tennessee’s tax clearly frustrates that policy.

In concluding that Tennessee’s tax is not prohibited, the majority studiously ignores the realities of container leasing. All petitioner’s containers are dedicated to international commerce, which means that they spend no more than three months at a time in any one jurisdiction. See 1972 Convention, Art. 4; 1956 Convention, Art. 3. Furthermore, transferring containers to new lessees is an integral part of any container-leasing operation. A major advantage of leasing rather than owning a container is that a shipper may return the container to the lessor at or near the shipment destination without having to provide for the return transport of the container. J. Tan, Containers: The Lease-Buy Decision 13 (London, International Cargo Handling Co-ordination Association, 1983). The lessor then transfers the container to another shipper who needs to carry goods from that location or transports the container to another location where it is needed. Leased containers like those of petitioner are constantly crossing national boundaries and are constantly being transferred to new lessees at the ends of their journeys. Whether Tennessee taxes the act of importation or the act of transfer makes little difference with respect to leased containers. Each kind of tax imposes substantial “impediments to the use of containers as ‘instruments of international traffic.’” Japan Line, 441 U. S., at 453, quoting 19 U. S. C. § 1322(a), and each, in my view, is prohibited by the Container Conventions.

This is also the view of the other signatory nations to the Conventions. Their consistent practice is persuasive evidence of the Conventions’ meaning. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U. S. 392, 396 (1985), quoting Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U. S. 423, 431-432 (1943) (“ ‘[Treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to . . . the practical construction adopted by the parties’”). Neither Tennessee nor the United States as amicus curiae can point to any other jurisdiction that directly taxes the lease of containers used in international commerce. Under the European Value Added Tax (VAT) system, as the majority acknowledges, ante, at 66, no direct tax is imposed on the value of international container leases.

In an attempt to make international practice fit its reading of the Conventions, the majority mistakenly equates the European VAT on goods with Tennessee’s tax on containers. See ante, at 66-67. The European VAT is analogous to an American sales tax but is imposed on the value added to goods at each stage of production or distribution rather than on their sale price. See Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 498 U. S. 358, 365-366, n. 3 (1991). The act of transporting goods to their place of sale adds to their value and the cost of transportation is reflected in their price. • An American sales tax reaches the cost of transportation as part of the sale price of goods. The European VAT taxes the cost of transportation as part of the value added to goods during their distribution. Tennessee’s analogue to the European VAT is its sales tax on goods imported by container, not its direct tax on the proceeds of container leases. Petitioner does not argue that Tennessee must refrain from imposing a sales tax on goods imported by container. It argues, instead, that like every other party to the Conventions, Tennessee may not impose a direct tax on containers themselves.

Even if Tennessee’s tax did not violate the Container Conventions, it would violate the Foreign Commerce Clause by preventing the United States from “speaking with one voice” with respect to the taxation of containers used in international commerce. See Japan Line, 441 U. S, at 452; Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U. S. 159, 193 (1983). This Court noted in Japan Line that the Conventions show “[t]he desirability of uniform treatment of containers used exclusively in foreign commerce.” 441 U. S., at 452. Tennessee’s tax frustrates that uniformity.

The Court correctly notes that the Solicitor General’s decision to file an amicus brief defending the tax “‘is by no means dispositive.’” Ante, at 75, quoting Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 195-196. Indeed, such a submission, consistent with the separation of powers, may not be given any weight beyond its power to persuade. The constitutional power over foreign affairs is shared by Congress and the President, see, e. g., U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 11 (Congress shall have the power to declare war); Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (President shall have the power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties); and Art. II, §3 (President shall receive ambassadors), but the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations is textually delegated to Congress alone, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. “It is well established that Congress may authorize States to engage in regulation that the Commerce Clause would otherwise forbid,” Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131, 138 (1986) (emphasis added), but the President may not authorize such regulation by the filing of an amicus brief.

While the majority properly looks to see whether Congress intended to permit a tax like Tennessee’s, it mistakenly infers permission for the tax from Congress’ supposed failure to prohibit it. Ante, at 75-76. “[Tjhis Court has exempted state statutes from the implied limitations of the [Commerce] Clause only when the congressional direction to do so has been ‘unmistakably clear.’ ” Taylor, 477 U. S., at 139, quoting South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U. S. 82, 91 (1984). “The need for affirmative approval is heightened by the fact that [Tennessee’s tax] has substantial ramifications beyond the Nation’s borders.” Id., at 92, n. 7. Not only does the majority invert this analysis by finding congressional authorization for the tax in congressional silence, but it finds silence only by imposing its own narrow reading on the Conventions.

The majority invites States that are constantly in need of new revenue to impose new taxes on containers. The result, I fear, will be a patchwork of state taxes that will burden international commerce and frustrate the purposes of the Container Conventions. I respectfully dissent.

       See Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U. S. 324, 344 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269 (1988); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dept. of Treas

        ury, 498 U. S. 358, 387 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, N. J. Dept. of Treasury, 490 U. S. 66, 80 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266, 304 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

       See American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U. S. 167, 204 (1990); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298, 320-321 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

       The Import-Export Clause provides: “No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws ....” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 2.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Kennedy

license: Public Domain

text:
    UNITED STATES v. DUNNIGAN
    No. 91-1300.
    Argued December 2, 1992
    Decided February 23, 1993

      Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Paul J. Larkin, Jr., argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Mueller, and Deputy Solicitor General Bryson.

      Brent E. Beveridge argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
   Justice Kennedy

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is whether the Constitution permits a court to enhance a defendant’s sentence under United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §3C1.1 (Nov. 1989), if the court finds the defendant committed perjury at trial. We answer in the affirmative.

I

Respondent, Sharon Dunnigan, was charged in a single count indictment with conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846. After entering a plea of not guilty, she stood trial.

The case in chief for the United States consisted of five witnesses who took part in, or observed, respondent’s cocaine trafficking during the summer of 1988. The first witness was Freddie Harris, a cocaine dealer in Charleston, West Virginia. Harris testified that respondent traveled between Charleston and Cleveland, Ohio, numerous times during the summer in question to purchase cocaine for him. He further stated that either he or his associate John Dean accompanied respondent on several of these trips. Dean was the second witness, and he recounted his trips to Cleveland with respondent during the same period to purchase cocaine. He also described meetings with both respondent and Harris for the purpose of delivering cocaine.

Three more Government witnesses followed. Andre Charlton testified that respondent, at her own apartment, delivered several ounces of cocaine to Charlton and Harris. Charlton also attested to receiving cocaine from Dean which Dean said he and respondent had bought in Cleveland. Tammy Moore testified next. She described conversations during which respondent vouched for the high quality of the cocaine in Cleveland and suggested Moore accompany her on a trip to Cleveland. Then came the testimony of Wynema Brown, who repeated respondent’s admissions of trips to Cleveland to purchase cocaine for Harris. Brown also stated she saw cocaine powder at respondent’s apartment and witnessed respondent and her daughter convert the powder into crack cocaine for the daughter to sell. This ended the Government’s case in chief.

Respondent elected to take the stand and was the sole witness in her own defense. She denied all criminal acts attributed to her. She admitted going to Cleveland with Harris once but claimed it was for an innocent purpose, not to buy or sell cocaine. She admitted knowing John Dean but denied traveling with him to Cleveland. Last, she denied knowing that cocaine was brought into or sold from her apartment. On cross-examination, the Government questioned respondent regarding the testimony of the five prosecution witnesses. Respondent denied their inculpatory statements and said she had not possessed or distributed cocaine during the summer in question or at any other time. The Government also asked whether Edward Dickerson had been in her apartment or bought crack cocaine from her. Respondent answered no.

The defense rested, and the Government began its rebuttal with the testimony of Dickerson. He testified to purchasing crack cocaine from respondent on July 12, 1988, in a transaction monitored by law enforcement authorities. The Government also recalled Moore, who claimed respondent sold her crack cocaine about five times and provided cocaine powder to her and respondent’s daughter to convert into crack cocaine for resale. According to Moore, the money from the resale was paid over to respondent. The jury returned a verdict of guilty.

Respondent was sentenced pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1989). Her base offense level was set at 22, and the Government requested that the base be increased by two offense levels under USSG §3C1.1, entitled “willfully obstructing or impeding proceedings,” because respondent perjured herself at trial. After arguments from both sides, the District Court ruled on the request:

“The court finds that the defendant was untruthful at trial with respect to material matters in this case. The defendant denied her involvement when it is clear from the evidence in the case as the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that she was involved in the conspiracy alleged in the indictment, and by virtue of her failure to give truthful testimony on material matters that were designed to substantially affect the outcome of the case, the court concludes that the false testimony at trial warrants an upward adjustment by two levels.” App. 29.

Based upon the enhanced offense level 24 and a criminal history category I, the District Court sentenced respondent to 51 months’ incarceration, which was at the low end of the Guidelines range.

Respondent appealed her sentence, and the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision to increase respondent’s offense level under USSG §3C1.1. 944 F. 2d 178 (CA4 1991). The Court of Appeals did not take issue with the District Court’s factual findings or rule that further findings were necessary to support a §3C1.1 enhancement. Instead, the court held that a §3C1.1 enhancement based on a defendant’s alleged perjury at trial would be unconstitutional. The court reasoned that “every defendant who takes the stand and is convicted [would] be given the obstruction of justice enhancement.” Id., at 183. Citing some of the incentives for an accused to elect not to testify, including the risk of impeachment by prior convictions, the court ruled that a mechanical sentencing enhancement for testifying was unconstitutional: “With an automatic §3C1.1 enhancement added to the ante, the defendant may not think testifying worth the risk.” Id., at 184.

Referring to United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41 (1978), where we upheld a sentence increase based on an accused’s false testimony at trial, the Court of Appeals found that precedent distinguishable on two grounds. First, in Gray-son we justified the sentence increase as based on the District Court’s assessment of the defendant’s greater need for rehabilitation. Id., at 51-53. The Court of Appeals thought this justification was inapplicable, viewing the §3C1.1 enhancement as a punishment for obstructing justice without the time and expense of a separate perjury prosecution. 944 F. 2d, at 184. Second, the Grayson Court cautioned that “[n]othing we say today requires a sentencing judge to enhance, in some wooden or reflex fashion, the sentences of all defendants whose testimony is deemed false.” 438 U. S., at 55. According to the Court of Appeals, “[t]he guidelines supply precisely the ‘wooden or reflex’ enhancement disclaimed by the Court,” 944 F. 2d, at 184, and this rigidity “makes the §3C1.1 enhancement for a disbelieved denial of guilt under oath an intolerable burden upon the defendant’s right to testify in his own behalf,” id., at 185.

Over a dissent by four of its judges, the Court of Appeals declined to rehear the case en banc. 950 F. 2d 149 (CA4 1991). We granted certiorari. 504 U. S. 940 (1992).

II

A

Sentencing Guideline §3C1.1 states in full: “If the defendant willfully impeded or obstructed, or attempted to impede or obstruct the administration of justice during the investigation or prosecution of the instant offense, increase the [defendant’s] offense level by 2 levels.” USSG §3C1.1 (Nov. 1989). See also USSG §3C1.1 (Nov. 1992). Both parties assume the phrase “impede or obstruct the administration of justice” includes perjury, and the commentary to §3C1.1 is explicit in so providing. In pertinent part, the commentary states:

“This section provides a sentence enhancement for a defendant who engages in conduct calculated to mislead or deceive authorities or those involved in a judicial proceeding, or otherwise to willfully interfere with the disposition of criminal charges, in respect to the instant offense.
“1. The following conduct, while not exclusive, may provide a basis for applying this adjustment:
“(c) testifying untruthfully or suborning untruthful testimony concerning a material fact,... during a preliminary or grand jury proceeding, trial, sentencing proceeding, or any other judicial proceeding.” USSG §3C1.1, comment., n. 1(c) (Nov. 1989).

See also USSG 53C1.1, comment., n. 3(b) (Nov. 1992) (“The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of the types of conduct to which this enhancement applies: . . . (b) committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury”).

Were we to have the questioh before us without reference to this commentary, we would have to acknowledge that some of our precedents do not interpret perjury to constitute an obstruction of justice unless the perjury is part of some greater design to interfere with judicial proceedings, In re Michael, 326 U. S. 224, 228 (1945); Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, 383 (1919). Those cases arose in the context of interpreting early versions of the federal criminal contempt Btatute, which defined contempt, in part, as “misbehavior of any person ... as to obstruct the administration of justice.” 28 U. S. C. §385 (1940 ed.) (Judicial Code §268), derived from the Act of Mar. 2, 1831, Rev. Stat. § 725. See also 18 U. S. C. §401(1) (same).

In Hudgings and Michael, we indicated that the ordinary task of trial courts is to sift true from false testimony, so the problem caused by simple perjury was not so much an obstruction of justice as an expected part of its administration. See Michael, 326 U. S., at 227-228. Those cases, however, were decided against the background rule that the contempt power was to be confined to “‘the least possible power adequate’ ” to protect “the administration of justice against immediate interruption of its business.” Id., at 227 (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231 (1821)). In the present context, on the other hand, the enhancement provision is part of a sentencing scheme designed to determine the appropriate type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has been resolved. The commission of perjury is of obvious relevance in this regard, because it reflects on a defendant’s criminal history, on her willingness to accept the commands of the law and the authority of the court, and on her character in general. Even on the assumption that we could construe a sentencing guideline in a manner inconsistent with its accompanying commentary, the fact that the meaning ascribed to the phrase “obstruction of justice” differs in the contempt and sentencing contexts would not be a reason for rejecting the Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of that phrase. In all events, the Commission’s interpretation is contested by neither party to this case.

In determining what constitutes perjury, we rely upon the definition that has gained general acceptance and common understanding under the federal criminal perjury statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1621. A witness testifying under oath or affirmation violates this statute if she gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory. See § 1621(1); United States v. Debrow, 346 U. S. 374, 376 (1953); United States v. Norris, 300 U. S. 564, 574, 576 (1937). This federal definition of perjury by a witness has remained Unchanged in its material respects for over a century. See United States v. Smull, 236 U. S. 405, 408, and n. 1 (1915) (tracing history of § 1621’s predecessor, Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 125, 35 Stat. 1111). It parallels typical state-law definitions of perjury, see American Law Institute, Model Penal Code §241.1 (1985); 4 C. Torcía, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 601 (14th ed. 1981), and has roots in the law dating back to at least the Perjury Statute of 1563, 5 Eliz. I, ch. 9, see Gordon, The Invention of a Common Law Crime: Perjury and the Elizabethan Courts, 24 Am. J. Legal Hist. 145 (1980). See also 1 Colonial Laws of New York, 1664-1719, ch. 8, pp. 129-130 (reprinting “An Act to prevent wilfull Perjury,” enacted Nov. 1, 1683).

Of course, not every accused who testifies at trial and is convicted will incur an enhanced sentence under §3C1.1 for committing perjury. As we have just observed, an accused may give inaccurate testimony due to confusion, mistake, or faulty memory. In other instances, an accused may testify to matters such as lack of capacity, insanity, duress, or self-defense. Her testimony may be truthful, but the jury may nonetheless find the testimony insufficient to excuse criminal liability or prove lack of intent. For these reasons, if a defendant objects to a sentence enhancement resulting from her trial testimony, a district court must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to, or obstruction of, justice, or an attempt to do the same, under the perjury definition we have set out. See USSG §6A1.3 (Nov. 1989); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 32(c)(3)(D). See also Burns v. United States, 501 U. S. 129, 134 (1991). When doing so, it is preferable for a district court to address each element of the alleged perjury in a separate and clear finding. The district court’s determination that enhancement is required is sufficient, however, if, as was the case here, the court makes a finding of an obstruction of, or impediment to, justice that encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding of perjury. See App. 29 (“The court finds that the defendant was untruthful at trial with respect to material matters in this case. [B]y virtue of her failure to give truthful testimony on material matters that were designed to substantially affect the outcome of the case, the court concludes that the false testimony at trial warrants an upward adjustment by two levels” (emphasis added)). Given the numerous witnesses who contradicted respondent regarding so many facts on which she could not have been mistaken, there is ample support for the District Court’s finding.

B

We turn next to the contention that an enhanced sentence for the willful presentation of false testimony undermines the right to testify. The right to testify on one’s own behalf in a criminal proceeding is made explicit by federal statute, 18 U. S. C. §3481, and, we have said, it is also a right implicit in the Constitution, see Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U. S. 44, 51-53 (1987); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U. S. 157, 164 (1986).

Respondent cannot contend that increasing her sentence because of her perjury interferes with her right to testify, for we have held on a number of occasions that a defendant’s right to testify does not include a right to commit perjury. Id., at 173; United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620, 626 (1980); Grayson, 438 U. S., at 54. Nor can respondent contend §3C1.1 is unconstitutional on the simple basis that it distorts her decision whether to testify or remain silent. Our authorities do not impose a categorical ban on every governmental action affecting the strategic decisions of an accused, including decisions whether or not to exercise constitutional rights. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U. S. 357, 365 (1978); McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 216-217 (1971); United States v. Knox, 396 U. S. 77, 82-83 (1969).

No doubt to avoid these difficulties, respondent’s argument comes to us in a different form. It is that §3C1.1 carries a risk that a district court will order enhancement even when a defendant’s testimony is truthful, either because the court acts without regard to the truth or makes an erroneous finding of falsity. That §3C1.1 creates such a risk, respondent claims, makes the enhancement unconstitutional. This argument does not survive scrutiny.

The concern that courts will enhance sentences as a matter of course whenever the accused takes the stand and is found guilty is dispelled by our earlier explanation that if an accused challenges a sentence increase based on perjured testimony, the trial court must make findings to support all the elements of a perjury violation in the specific case. And as to the risk of incorrect findings of perjury by district courts, that risk is inherent in a system which insists on the value of testimony under oath. To uphold the integrity of our trial system, we have said that the constitutionality of perjury statutes is unquestioned. Grayson, supra, at 54. See also Nix, supra, at 173-174; Havens, supra, at 626-627. The requirement of sworn testimony, backed by punishment for perjury, is as much a protection for the accused as it is a threat. All testimony, from third-party witnesses and the accused, has greater value because of the witness’ oath and the obligations or penalties attendant to it. Cf. G. Neil-son, Trial By Combat 5 (1891) (“A means of ensuring the truth in human testimony has been a thing desired in every age”).

Neither can we accept respondent’s argument that the §3C1.1 sentence enhancement advances only “the impermissible sentencing practice of incarcerating for the purpose of saving the Government the burden of bringing a separate and subsequent perjury prosecution.” Grayson, supra, at 53. A sentence enhancement based on perjury does deter false testimony in much the same way as a separate prosecution for perjury. But the enhancement is more than a mere surrogate for a perjury prosecution. It furthers legitimate sentencing goals relating to the principal crime, including the goals of retribution and incapacitation. See 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a)(2); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 367 (1989). It is rational for a sentencing authority to conclude that a defendant who commits a crime and then perjures herself in an unlawful attempt to avoid responsibility is more threatening to society and less deserving of leniency than a defendant who does not so defy the trial process. The perjuring defendant’s willingness to frustrate judicial proceedings to avoid criminal liability suggests that the need for incapacitation and retribution is heightened as compared with the defendant charged with the same crime who allows judicial proceedings to progress without resorting to perjury.

Weighed against these considerations, the arguments made by the Court of Appeals to distinguish Grayson are wide of the mark. The court is correct that rehabilitation is no longer a goal of sentencing under the Guidelines. 28 U. S. C. § 994(k); Mistretta, supra, at 367. Our lengthy discussion in Grayson of how a defendant’s perjury was relevant to the potential for rehabilitation, however, was not meant to imply that rehabilitation was the only permissible justification for an increased sentence based on perjury. As we have said, the §3C1.1 enhancement serves other legitimate sentencing goals. Neither does our cautionary remark that the enhancement in Grayson need not be imposed “in some wooden or reflex fashion” compel invalidation of § 3C1.1, as the Court of Appeals believed. When contested, the elements of perjury must be found by the district court with the specificity we have stated, so the enhancement is far from automatic. And that the enhancement stems from a congressional mandate rather than from a court’s discretionary judgment cannot be grounds, in these circumstances, for its invalidation. See Chapman v. United States, 500 U. S. 453, 467 (1991); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79, 92 (1986).

Upon a proper determination that the accused has committed perjury at trial, an enhancement of sentence is required by the Sentencing Guidelines. That requirement is consistent with our precedents and is not in contravention of the privilege of an accused to testify in her own behalf. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.


author: Chief Justice Rehnquist

text:
    NEGONSOTT v. SAMUELS, WARDEN, et al.
    No. 91-5397.
    Argued January 11, 1993
    Decided February 24, 1993

      Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined, and in all but Part II-B of which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined.

      Pamela S. Thompson argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.

      Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were John W. Campbell, Deputy Attorney General, and Timothy G. Madden, Special Assistant Attorney General.

      William K. Kelley argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Acting Assistant Attorney General O’Meara, Edwin S. Kneedler, and Edward J. Shawaker

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe of the Fort Totten Indian Reservation et al. by Bertram E. Hirsch; and for the Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska et al. by Melody L. McCoy.

   Chief Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented in this case is whether the Kansas Act, 18 U. S. C. §3243, confers jurisdiction on the State of Kansas to prosecute petitioner, a Kickapoo Indian, for the state-law offense of aggravated battery committed against another Indian on an Indian reservation. We hold that it does.

► — I

Petitioner, Emery L. Negonsott, is a member of the Kickapoo Tribe and a resident of the Kickapoo Reservation in Brown County, Kansas. In March 1985, he was arrested by the county sheriff in connection with the shooting of another Indian on the Kickapoo Reservation. After a jury trial in the Browm County District Court, petitioner was found guilty of aggravated battery. Kan. Stat. Ann. §21-3414 (1988). The District Court set the conviction aside, however, on the ground that the Federal Government had exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute petitioner for the shooting under the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1153. The Kansas Supreme Court reinstated petitioner’s conviction, holding that the Kansas Act conferred jurisdiction on Kansas to prosecute “all crimes committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations located in Kansas.” State v. Nioce, 239 Kan. 127, 131, 716 P. 2d 585, 588 (1986). On remand, the Brown County District Court sentenced petitioner to imprisonment for a term of 3 to 10 years.

Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254, reasserting his claim that Kansas lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him for aggravated battery. The District Court dismissed his petition, 696 F. Supp. 561 (Kan. 1988), and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, 933 F. 2d 818 (1991). The Court of Appeals found the language of the Kansas Act ambiguous as to “whether Congress intended to grant Kansas courts concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over the crimes enumerated in the [Indian] Major Crimes Act, or whether by the second sentence of the Kansas Act Congress intended to retain exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts over those specific crimes.” Id., at 820-821. After examining the Act’s legislative history, however, the Court of Appeals resolved this ambiguity in favor of the first construction, and held that Kansas had jurisdiction to prosecute petitioner for aggravated battery. Id., at 821-823. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between the Courts of Appeals, 505 U. S. 1218 (1992), and now affirm.

II

Criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed in Indian country,” 18 U. S. C. § 1151, “is governed by a complex patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law.” Duro v. Reina, 495 U. S. 676, 680, n. 1 (1990). The Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1152, extends the general criminal laws of federal maritime and enclave jurisdiction to Indian country, except for those “offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian.” See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 288 (1982 ed.). These latter offenses typically are subject to the jurisdiction of the concerned Indian tribe, unless they are among those enumerated in the Indian Major Crimes Act. Originally enacted in 1885, the Indian Major Crimes Act establishes federal jurisdiction over 13 enumerated felonies committed by “[a]ny Indian . . . against the person or property of another Indian or other person ... within the Indian country.” § 1153(a). As the text of § 1153, see n. 2, supra, and our prior eases make clear, federal jurisdiction over the offenses covered by the Indian Major Crimes Act is “exclusive” of state jurisdiction. See United States v. John, 437 U. S. 634, 651 (1978); Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary, 368 U. S. 351, 359 (1962); United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 384 (1886).

Congress has plenary authority to alter these jurisdictional guideposts, see Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 470-471 (1979), which it has exercised from time to time. This ease concerns the first major grant of jurisdiction to a State over offenses involving Indians committed in Indian country, the Kansas Act, which provides in full:

“Jurisdiction is conferred on the State of Kansas over offenses committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations, including trust or restricted allotments, within the State of Kansas, to the same extent as its courts have jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State in accordance with the laws of the State.
“This section shall not deprive the courts of the United States of jurisdiction over offenses defined by the laws of the United States committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations.” Act of June 8, 1940, eh. 276, 54 Stat. 249 (codified at 18 U. S. C. §3243).

Passed in 1940, the Kansas Act was followed in short order by virtually identical statutes granting to North Dakota and Iowa, respectively, jurisdiction to prosecute offenses committed by or against Indians on certain Indian reservations within their borders. See Act of May 31, 1946, ch. 279, 60 Stat. 229; Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 759, 62 Stat. 1161.

Kansas asserted jurisdiction to prosecute petitioner for aggravated battery under the Kansas Act. Petitioner challenges the State’s jurisdiction in this regard. He contends that Congress added the second sentence of the Kansas Act to preserve the “exclusive” character of federal jurisdiction over the offenses enumerated in the Indian Major Crimes Act, and since the conduct resulting in his conviction for aggravated battery is punishable as at least two offenses listed in the Indian Major Crimes Act, Kansas lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him in connection with the shooting incident. According to petitioner, the Kansas Act was intended to confer jurisdiction on Kansas only over misdemeanor offenses involving Indians on Indian reservations. To construe the statute otherwise, petitioner asserts, would effect an “implied repeal” of the Indian Major Crimes Act. Moreover, petitioner continues, the construction adopted by the Court of Appeals below is at odds with the legislative history of the Kansas Act as well as the canon that statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of Indians.

A

“Our task is to give effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has been expressed in reasonably plain terms, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U. S. 564, 570 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). In analyzing petitioner’s contentions, then, we begin with the text of the Kansas Act itself. The first sentence confers jurisdiction on “Kansas over offenses committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations ... to the same extent as its courts have jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State in accordance with the laws of the State.” §3243. Standing alone, this sentence unambiguously confers jurisdiction on Kansas to prosecute all offenses — major and minor — committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations in accordance with state law. Petitioner does not assert otherwise. Instead, he rests his ease on the second sentence of the Kansas Act, which states that nothing in the Act shall “deprive” federal courts of their “jurisdiction over offenses defined by the laws of the United States.” Ibid. But the most logical meaning of this proviso, we believe, is that federal courts shall retain their jurisdiction to try all offenses subject to federal jurisdiction under 18 U. S. C. §§ 1152 and 1153, while Kansas courts shall have jurisdiction to try persons for the same conduct when it violates state law.

This interpretation is quite consistent with the first sentence’s conferral of jurisdiction on Kansas over all offenses committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations in accordance with state law. The Court of Appeals referred to this state of affairs in terms of Kansas courts having “concurrent jurisdiction” with federal courts over the offenses enumerated in the Indian Major Crimes Act. See 933 F. 2d, at 820-821. But the Kansas Act does not confer jurisdiction on Kansas to prosecute individuals for the federal offenses listed in the Indian Major Crimes Act; it confers jurisdiction to prosecute individuals in accordance with state law for conduct that is also punishable under federal law pursuant to the Indian Major Crimes Act. Strictly speaking, then, federal courts retain their exclusive jurisdiction to try individuals for offenses covered by the Indian Major Crimes Act, and in this sense, the Kansas Act in fact confers only concurrent “legislative” jurisdiction on the State to define and prosecute similar offenses.

Our reading of the Kansas Act is the only one that gives effect “to every clause and word of [the] statute.” Moskal v. United States, 498 U. S. 103, 109-110 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioner’s construction of the Act’s second sentence renders federal jurisdiction exclusive whenever the underlying conduct is punishable under federal law pursuant to either 18 U. S. C. §§ 1152 or 1153. Kansas is left, then, with jurisdiction over only those minor offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of another. This result can hardly be reconciled with the first sentence’s unqualified grant of jurisdiction to Kansas to prosecute all state-law offenses committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations. Moreover, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, our construction of the Kansas Act does not work an “implied repeal” of the Indian Major Crimes Act. As we have noted, federal courts retain their exclusive jurisdiction to try individuals for major federal crimes committed by or against Indians in Indian country. In any event, to the extent that the Kansas Act altered the jurisdictional landscape, the alteration is not merely by implication: The Act explicitly conferred jurisdiction on Kansas over all offenses involving Indians on Indian reservations.

B

Although we think resort to secondary materials is unnecessary to decide this case, the legislative history of the Kansas Act supports our construction. Both the House and Senate Reports accompanying the Act consist almost entirely of a letter and memorandum from Acting Secretary of the Interior, E. K. Burlew, to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Indian Affairs Committees, which provide a background account of the forces leading to the enactment of the Kansas Act. See H. R. Rep. No. 1999, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.); S. Rep. No. 1523, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) (hereinafter S. Rep.). According to Acting Secretary Burlew, in practice, Kansas had exercised jurisdiction over all offenses committed on Indian reservations involving Indians, “even where the criminal act charged constituted one of the major offenses listed in [the Indian Major Crimes Act],” because such offenses were otherwise left unenforced by the concerned tribes (who were without tribal courts). H. R. Rep., at 4; S. Rep., at 3. The Indian tribes of Kansas did not object to this scheme, but welcomed it. When the authority of the Kansas courts to entertain such prosecutions was called into question, the tribes “expressed a wish that the jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the State courts be continued.” H. R. Rep., at 4; S. Rep., at 4. Thus, the Kansas Act was designed to “merely confirm a relationship which the State has willingly assumed, which the Indians have willingly accepted, and which has produced successful results, over a considerable period of years.” H. R. Rep., at 5; S. Rep., at 5.

Since Kansas had exercised jurisdiction over offenses covered by the Indian Major Crimes Act, and the Kansas Act was enacted to ratify the existing scheme of de facto state jurisdiction over all offenses committed on Indian reservations, it follows that Congress did not intend to retain exclusive federal jurisdiction over the prosecution of major crimes. In view of the experimental nature of the Kansas Act, Congress simply intended to retain jurisdiction over offenses already subject to federal jurisdiction under 18 U. S. C. §§1152 and 1153 in the event that the Kansas Act did not solve the identified enforcement problem (i. e., in case the State declined to exercise its jurisdiction). This explanation squares with Acting Secretary Burlew’s conclusion that, although the Kansas Act’s “proposed relinquishment of jurisdiction to the State of Kansas appropriately extends to those offenses which are provided for in existing Federal statutes as well as those which are not,” “[t]he prosecution in the Federal courts of those offenses which are now open to such prosecution will not be precluded under the bill in any particular instance where this course may be deemed advisable.” H. R. Rep., at 5; S. Rep., at 4.

Petitioner argues that Congress’ amendments to the original version of the bill which became the Kansas Act confirm that it did not intend to confer jurisdiction on Kansas over conduct covered by the Indian Major Crimes Act. As originally drafted, the bill provided “[t]hat concurrent jurisdiction is hereby relinquished to the State of Kansas to prosecute Indians and others for offenses by or against Indians or others, committed on Indian reservations in Kansas,” and explicitly stated that the Indian Major Crimes Act as well as other statutes granting federal jurisdiction over offenses committed in Indian country “are modified accordingly.” 86 Cong. Rec. 5596 (1940). Congress eventually deleted the original bill’s reference to “concurrent jurisdiction” as well as its reference to the effect of the bill on the Indian Major Crimes Act. Rather than supporting petitioner’s construction of the Kansas Act, however, we think these amendments are in accord with our reading of the statute.

The amendments to the original bill were proposed by Acting Secretary Burlew in his letter and memorandum to the committee chairmen in order to reflect more accurately the “legal situation as it now exists or as intended to be created.” H. R. Rep., at 3; S. Rep., at 2. He explained:

“The bill proposes to relinquish concurrent jurisdiction to the State of Kansas, intending thereby to give the State jurisdiction of all types of crimes, whether major or minor, defined by State law. However, the Federal Government has exercised jurisdiction only over major crimes. Therefore, strictly speaking, this is not a case of relinquishing to a State a jurisdiction concurrent with that of the United States, but a case of conferring upon the State complete criminal jurisdiction, retaining, however, jurisdiction in the Federal courts to prosecute crimes by or against Indians defined by Federal law.” Ibid.

Thus, the original bill was amended to make clear that the statute conferred jurisdiction on Kansas over more offenses than were subject to federal jurisdiction under existing federal law, and not, as petitioner suggests, to narrow the category of offenses subject to prosecution in state court to minor offenses excluded from federal jurisdiction under 18 U. S. C. § 1152.

There is no explanation in the legislative history why Congress deleted the original bill’s reference to the effect of the statute on the Indian Major Crimes Act and adopted the general language of the second sentence of §3243 in its place. But we think it is likely that Congress simply thought it preferable to refer generally to the fact that the Act did not “deprive” federal courts of their jurisdiction over offenses defined by federal law, rather than to list the specific statutes pursuant to which the Federal Government had exercised jurisdiction to prosecute offenses committed by or against Indians in Indian country. In any event, to the extent one may draw a negative inference from Congress’ decision to delete the specific reference to the effect of the Kansas Act on the Indian Major Crimes Act, we think this is too slender a reed upon which to rest departure from the clear import of the text of the Kansas Act.

c

Finally, we find petitioner’s resort to general principles of Indian law unavailing. Petitioner cites our opinion in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373 (1976), for the proposition that “laws must be liberally construed to favor Indians.” Brief for Petitioner 11. What we actually said in Bryan, was that “ ‘statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes .. . are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians.’ ” 426 U. S., at 392 (quoting Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U. S. 78, 89 (1918)). Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals’ construction of the Kansas Act harms Indians by eliminating the historically exclusive stewardship of the Federal Government over major crimes committed by Indians in Indian country, and subjecting Indians to the possibility of dual prosecution by state and federal authorities.

It is not entirely clear to us that the Kansas Act is a statute “passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes.” But if it does fall into that category, it seems likely that Congress thought that the Act’s conferral of criminal jurisdiction on the State would be a “benefit” to the tribes in question. We see no reason to equate “benefit of dependent Indian tribes,” as that language is used in Bryan, with “benefit of accused Indian criminals,” without regard to the interests of the victims of these crimes or of the tribe itself. But in any event, for the reasons previously discussed, we think that the Kansas Act quite unambiguously confers jurisdiction on the State over major offenses committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations, and we therefore have no occasion to resort to this canon of statutory construction. See South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U. S. 498, 506 (1986).

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

      Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join all but Part II-B of this opinion.

       See Youngbear v. Brewer, 415 F. Supp. 807 (ND Iowa 1976), aff’d, 549 F. 2d 74 (CA8 1977). In Youngbear, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a lower court ruling that the State of Iowa lacked jurisdiction to prosecute the Indian defendant under a similarly worded statute conferring jurisdiction on Iowa over offenses committed by or against Indians on certain Indian reservations within the State, see Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 759, 62 Stat. 1161, for conduct punishable as an offense enumerated in the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1153.

       The Indian Major Crimes Act provides in full:
      “(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnaping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
      “(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not defined and punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense was committed as are in force at the time of such offense.” 18 U. S. C. § 1153.

       The Indian Major Crimes Act does not explicitly refer to the offense of aggravated battery, but it lists “assault with a dangerous weapon” and “assault resulting in serious bodily injury.” 18 U. S. C. § 1153(a). These offenses are defined at 18 U. S. C. §§ 113(c) and (f). We assume, for the sake of deciding this case, that the state-law offense for which petitioner was convicted, Kan. Stat. Ann. §21-3414 (1988), is comparable to one or both of these federal offenses.

        Amici Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska et al. allege that at least one tribe, the Potawatomi Indian Tribe, opposed the Kansas Act. Brief for Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska et al. as Amici Curiae 17. According to amici, the Tribe sent a telegram to the Chairman of the House Committee on Indian Affairs, Representative W. Rogers, voicing its opposition to the Act, which was followed by an exchange of several letters. See id., at 17-18. This correspondence is not contained in the reprinted legislative history of the Act, but instead rests in the National Archives. Although one of Chairman Rogers’ letters to the Tribe states: “ ‘Your letters are being filed with the House Committee on Indian Affairs,’” id., at 17 (quoting letter of May 10, 1939), we have no way of knowing to what extent, if at all, the Tribe’s opposition to the Kansas Act was brought to the attention of other Members of Congress. Therefore, we regard the background account set forth in the House and Senate Reports as conclusive for purposes of discerning Congress’ understanding of the forces leading to the introduction of the bill which became the Kansas Act.