author: STREIT, Justice.

text:
    John A. KLINGE, Appellee, v. Kevin BENTIEN, Appellant.
    No. 04-0843.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Dec. 15, 2006.

      Reed H. Glawe of Gislason & Hunter, New Ulm, MN, for appellant.
    John A. Klinge, Farmersburg, pro se, appellee.
   STREIT, Justice.

Ambrose Bierce once described litigation as “[a] machine which you go into as a pig and come out of as a sausage.” This adage is certainly true in the present case. Two pig farmers attempting to resolve their contract dispute in small claims court, ended up in district court and now our court. Because mediation of farm disputes is mandatory, the decision of the small claims court is void. We reverse and remand for dismissal without prejudice.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

John Klinge and Kevin Bentien entered into an oral contract concerning the raising and feeding of pigs. Bentien purchased feeder pigs and placed them at Klinge’s farm to be cared for until they reached market weight. Klinge sued Bentien in small claims court for $3000 claiming he was not fully compensated under the terms of the contract. Bentien countersued for $5000 alleging Klinge’s negligence killed 100 pigs. Neither party requested mediation under Iowa Code chapter 654B before the commencement of the action or any time thereafter.

The parties appeared before the small claims court for trial. Neither party was represented by counsel. The small claims court ruled in favor of both parties. The court ordered a judgment be entered in favor of Klinge against Bentien in the amount of $3000. Likewise, the court ordered a judgment be entered in favor of Bentien against Klinge in the amount of $5000.

Klinge appealed the judgment against him to the Clayton County District Court. Bentien did not appeal the judgment against him. Again, neither party was represented by counsel. The district court requested “written statements” from both parties. Based upon those statements, the district court found insufficient evidence to support either claim. It found the small claims court “should have dismissed both the claim and the counterclaim.” However, since Bentien did not appeal the judgment against him, the district court held the $3000 judgment “must stand.” Consequently, the district court only reversed the small claims court with respect to Ben-tien’s claim against Klinge.

Shortly after the ruling, Bentien consulted an attorney for the first time about this case. The next day, Bentien’s attorney sent a letter to the district court along with a copy to Klinge. The purpose of the letter was to bring chapter 654B of the Iowa Code to the court’s attention. Ben-tien’s attorney represented to the court chapter 654B required the parties in this case to submit to mediation before filing suit. See Iowa Code § 654B.3 (2005). Since neither party requested mediation, the attorney reasoned the court “lacks jurisdiction.” “[I]n light of this new information,” the attorney requested the court to dismiss the matter “ab initio with respect to both parties.”

In response, the district court sent a letter to Bentien’s attorney and a copy was sent to Klinge. It first noted neither party raised the issue of mediation in small claims court or on appeal to the district court. The court then refused “to take any further action with regard to this case.”

Bentien applied for discretionary review, which this court granted. On appeal, Ben-tien seeks the reversal of the district court’s ruling as well as the dismissal of both Klinge’s and Bentien’s claims without prejudice on the basis both the small claims court and the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and/or authority to hear either claim. Alternatively, Bentien alleges the district court made “several errors in the assessment of the record on appeal and in not allowing the parties to submit additional evidence.” Because we hold both courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we need not determine whether the district court properly reviewed the evidence.

II. Standard of Review

A “court has inherent power to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the proceedings before it.” Tigges v. City of Ames, 356 N.W.2d 503, 512 (Iowa 1984) (citing Walles v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 252 N.W.2d 701, 710 (Iowa 1977)). Our scope of review of rulings on subject matter jurisdiction is for correction of errors at law. Id.

III. Merits

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction versus Lack of Authority

The issue before us is whether Klinge’s failure to file a request for mediation with the farm mediation service as required by section 654B.3 deprives the small claims court of subject matter jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction is the power “ ‘of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong, not merely the particular case then occupying the court’s attention.’ ” Christie v. Rolscreen Co., 448 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Iowa 1989) (quoting Wederath v. Brant, 287 N.W.2d 591, 594 (Iowa 1980)). Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by constitutional or statutory power. In re Estate of Falck, 672 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Iowa 2003) (citing Hutcheson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 480 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Iowa 1992)). The parties themselves cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on a court by an act or procedure. Id. (citing In re Estate of Dull, 303 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 1981)). Unlike personal jurisdiction, a party cannot waive or vest by consent subject matter jurisdiction. Id. (citing In re Estate of Dull, 303 N.W.2d at 406).

Lack of subject matter can be raised “at any time.” State v. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d 481, 482 (Iowa 1993) (citing State v. Ryan, 351 N.W.2d 186, 187 (Iowa 1984)). If a court enters a judgment without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the judgment is void and subject to collateral attack. In re Estate of Falck, 672 N.W.2d at 789 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Rosenberg v. Jackson, 247 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Iowa 1976) (setting aside a four-year-old default judgment because the court lacked “jurisdiction”).

Since Christie, we have been careful to distinguish between subject matter jurisdiction and a court’s authority to hear a particular case. See, e.g., In re Estate of Falck, 672 N.W.2d at 789-90; Fed. Am. Int’l, Inc. v. Om Namah Shiva, Inc., 657 N.W.2d 481, 484-85 (Iowa 2003); In re Marriage of Seyler, 559 N.W.2d 7, 10 n. 3 (Iowa 1997); Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d at 482. In Christie, we said:

A court may have subject matter jurisdiction but for one reason or another may not be able to entertain the particular case. In such a situation we say the court lacks authority to hear that particular case. Sometimes we have referred to “lack of authority to hear the particular case” as lack of jurisdiction of the case.

Christie, 448 N.W.2d at 450.

The significance of this distinction becomes evident when issues of waiver arise. In contrast to subject matter jurisdiction, “a court’s lack of authority is not conclusively fatal to the validity of an order.” In re Marriage of Seyler, 559 N.W.2d at 10 n. 3. Consequently, an order entered without authority is voidable rather than void. In re Estate of Falck, 672 N.W.2d at 790. “Thus if a party waives the court’s [lack of] authority to hear a particular case, the judgment becomes final and is not subject to collateral attack.” Id; see Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d at 483 (“[W]here subject matter jurisdiction exists, an impediment to a court’s authority can be obviated by consent, waiver or es-toppel.”).

B. Mandatory Mediation Proceedings Under Section 654B.3

We now turn to section 654B.3. Bentien argues section 654B.3 applies to the present case. He alleges the small claims court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because Klinge failed to satisfy the requirements set forth in section 654B.3(1). Section 654B.3 provides:

A person who is a farm resident, or other party, desiring to initiate a civil proceeding to resolve a dispute, shall file a request for mediation with the farm mediation service. The person shall not begin the proceeding until the person receives a mediation release ....

Iowa Code § 654B.3(1 )(d) (emphasis added).

Before addressing the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, we must determine whether this provision in fact applies to the present case. According to the statutory definitions, a “dispute” is a “controversy between a person who is a farm resident and another person which ... relates to ... [t]he performance of either person under a care and feeding contract, if both persons are parties to the contract.” Id. § 654B.l(2)(a). A “farm resident” is a “person holding an interest in farmland, in fee, under a real estate contract, or under a lease, if the person manages farming operations on the land.” Id. § 654B.1(5). An “other party” is a “person having a dispute with a farm resident.” Id. § 654B.1(8). And finally, a “care and feeding contract” is “an agreement, either oral or written, between a farm resident and the owner of livestock, under which the farm resident agrees to act as a feeder by promising to care for and feed the livestock on the farm resident’s premises.” Id. § 654B.1(1).

In the present case, it is undisputed both parties are farmers and Bentien’s pigs (the subject of the contract) were kept at Klinge’s farm. Klinge is a “farm resident” and the contract at issue is a “care and feeding contract.” Since the parties’ dispute involves a “care and feeding contract,” we find section 654B.1 is applicable. Thus, Klinge was required to file a mediation request and receive a mediation release before filing this suit in small claims court.

C. Consequences for Failing to Request Mandatory Mediation

Bentien argues Klinge’s failure to file a mediation request and receive a mediation release deprived the small claims court of subject matter jurisdiction. We treat Bentien’s letter to the district court as a motion to dismiss. Halverson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 532 N.W.2d 794, 799 (Iowa 1995) (noting failure to attach a label to a motion does not determine its legal significance because “we look to the motion’s content to determine the motion’s real nature”). We must decide whether it was error not to dismiss both claims.

In 1999, a federal district court examined section 654B.3. Rutter v. Carroll’s Foods of the Midwest, Inc., 50 F.Supp.2d 876, 881-82 (N.D.Iowa 1999). Because neither appellate court in Iowa had passed on the question of whether obtaining a mediation release under chapter 654B is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction or authority, the court in Rutter predicted how this court would interpret section 654B.3. Id. at 882. Instead of using our terminology, the court in Rutter used “jurisdictional prerequisite” to refer to subject matter jurisdiction and “condition precedent” to refer to the authority of a court to hear a case. Id. The court concluded obtaining a mediation release under chapter 654B

is a “condition precedent” to suit, not a jurisdictional prerequisite. As such, the defect of failing to obtain such a release does not affect the claimant’s standing or the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, but is instead curable after suit has been filed.

Id. at 882-83 (emphasis added). As a result, the court stayed the case in order for the plaintiffs to attempt to cure the defect. Id. at 883. We see the merit in our learned friend’s conclusion, although we would have articulated the issue as a matter of the court’s authority to hear the particular case rather than a condition precedent to suit.

However, in 2000 the legislature amended section 654B.3 by stating that filing a mediation request and obtaining a mediation release “are jurisdictional prerequisites to a person filing a civil action ... to resolve a dispute subject to this chapter.” 2000 Iowa Acts ch. 1129, § 2 (codified at Iowa Code § 654B.3(1)(&)).

The timing of the amendment, the use of the federal court’s term “jurisdictional prerequisites,” and the introductory statement to the bill indicate the legislature intended a different result than that of the Rutter decision. When interpreting a statute, we are obliged to examine both the language used and the purpose for which the legislation was enacted. Fjords North, Inc. v. Hahn, 710 N.W.2d 731, 739 (Iowa 2006) (citing Albrecht v. Gen. Motors Corp., 648 N.W.2d 87, 89 (Iowa 2002) (“We seek to interpret statutes consistently with their language and purpose, and avoid interpretations that are unreasonable.”))- The explanation accompanying the introduced version of the amendment sheds light on the legislature’s intention. It states:

This bill amends the mandatory mediation provisions of two Code sections relating to resolution of farm disputes. The bill specifies that the mediation requirements in Code sections 654A.6 and 654B.3 are jurisdictional prerequisites that must be satisfied before a case can be filed under the chapters. A 1999 federal district court ruling held that the current Code language did not prevent the filing of a suit under chapter 654B prior to mediation of the dispute.

H.F. 2521; see City of Cedar Rapids v. James Properties, Inc., 701 N.W.2d 673, 677 (Iowa 2005) (‘We give weight to explanations attached to bills as indications of legislative intent”). It is obvious from this explanation the legislature intended to respond to Rutter. See id. (citing Midwest Auto. III, LLC v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 417, 425-26 (Iowa 2002) (“[A]n amendment to a statute raises a presumption that the legislature intended a change in the law.”)).

The polestar of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislative intent of a statute. We “consider the objects sought to be accomplished and the evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied, seeking a result that will advance, rather than defeat, the statute’s purpose.”

State v. Schultz, 604 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa 1999) (citations omitted). We must conclude the legislature intended obtaining a mediation release from the farm mediation service to be a prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction. Klinge’s failure to file a mediation request and obtain a mediation release before filing his claim deprived the small claims court of subject matter jurisdiction. As a result, both the small claims court order and the district court’s decision are void. The district court should have granted Bentien’s motion to dismiss.

IV. Conclusion

Section 654B.3 requires a “farm resident” to file a request for mediation with the farm mediation service and obtain a mediation release before filing suit if the matter involves a livestock “care and feeding contract.” Because Klinge failed to satisfy these requirements before filing suit, the small claims court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear his claim and Bentien’s counterclaim. Consequently, both the decision of the small claims court and the decision of the district court on review are void.

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR DISMISSAL.

All justices concur except APPEL, J., who takes no part.

      . Abrose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary 79 (2003).

      . The legislature may create jurisdictional prerequisites to subject matter jurisdiction. In this case, the parties are not deprived of their day in court. The legislature has merely made a policy decision that farm disputes shall be mediated before a suit is filed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MEYER, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    ISLES WELLNESS, INC., n/k/a Minneapolis Wellness, Inc., et al., Appellants, v. PROGRESSIVE NORTHERN INSURANCE CO., a Delaware corporation doing business in the State of Minnesota, Respondent, Allstate Indemnity Company, a Delaware corporation doing business in the State of Minnesota, Defendant.
    Nos. A-04-485, A-04-486, A-04-487, A-04-488, A-04-489.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Dec. 7, 2006.

      Michael J. Weber, Weber Law Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellants.
    Richard S. Stempel, Stempel & Doty, PLC, Hopkins, MN, for Respondent.
   OPINION

MEYER, Justice.

This case presents the question whether operating a chiropractic clinic in violation of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine voids all contracts between the client and its patients’ insurers as a matter of public policy. On remand from our decision holding that the corporate practice of medicine doctrine applies to chiropractors, the court of appeals ruled that the clinics’ outstanding claims for chiropractic services were void as against public policy. We reverse and remand to the district court for resolution of the remaining issues.

Jeanette Couf is the sole shareholder of three clinics, Isles Wellness, Inc., n/k/a Minneapolis Wellness, Inc., MN Licensed Physical Therapists, Inc., n/k/a A Licensed Physical Therapy, Inc., and Licensed Massage Therapists, Inc., n/k/a Twin Cities Licensed Massage Therapy, Inc. (collectively the clinics or Wellness). The clinics were incorporated as general business corporations under the Minnesota Business Corporation Act, Minn.Stat. ch. 302A (2004) and operated from 2000 to 2003. Couf is not a licensed chiropractor; however, the services provided by her climes were provided by licensed chiropractors.

The clinics provided $300,000 worth of chiropractic, massage, and physical therapy services to 49 patients (collectively referred to as the patients) as part of the patients’ economic loss benefits available under the Minnesota No-Fault Insurance Act. Although Progressive Northern Insurance Co. and Místate Indemnity Co. (collectively the insurers) initially paid for services provided by the clinics, the insurers stopped paying for the clinics’ services in 2002. Eventually, each of the 49 patients assigned their claims against the insurers to the clinics.

This litigation began in 2003 when the clinics, after acquiring the claims assigned by their patients, filed five complaints against the insurers alleging breach of contract and unfair claims practices. The insurers counterclaimed alleging, among other things, that the clinics were operating in violation of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. This case is a consolidation of five cases brought by the clinics for unpaid services. The outcome of this consolidated case will resolve all claims the 49 patients have against the insurers.

The district court granted the insurers’ motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. Relying on Granger v. Adson, 190 Minn. 23, 250 N.W. 722 (1933), the district court concluded that because the clinics were operating in violation of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, Wellness’s contracts were illegal, against public policy, and void. The district court then concluded that the insurers were not obligated to pay any outstanding bills to Wellness.

On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the district court, concluding that the corporate employment of chiropractors, massage therapists, and physical therapists did not violate the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 689 N.W.2d 561, 565 (Minn.App.2004). We then determined that the corporate practice of medicine doctrine did apply to chiropractors, but not to massage therapists or physical therapists. Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 513, 524 (Minn.2005) (Isles Wellness I). We remanded this case to the court of appeals to determine whether the insurers were required to pay the outstanding amounts billed for chiropractic services provided by Wellness. Id.

On remand, the court of appeals determined that outstanding claims for chiropractic services were void as against public policy. Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., No. A04-485, etc., order op. at 2-3 (Minn.Ct.App. Feb. 23, 2006). We granted review to determine whether operating a chiropractic clinic in violation of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine voids all contracts between the plaintiffs and the insurers as a matter of public policy.

This case presents a question of law. When the issue presented is purely an issue of law, we review the question de novo. Karst v. F.C. Hayer Co., 447 N.W.2d 180, 181 (Minn.1989); A.J. Chromy Constr. Co. v. Commercial Mech. Servs., Inc., 260 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Minn.1977).

Not every illegal contract must be voided in order to protect public policy. Hart v. Bell, 222 Minn. 69, 75, 23 N.W.2d 375, 379 (1946); see also Dick Weatherston’s Assoc. Mech. Servs., Inc. v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 257 Minn. 184, 191, 100 N.W.2d 819, 824 (1960) (“Justice and sound public policy do not always require the literal and arbitrary enforcement of a licensing statute.”); Hollister v. Ulvi, 199 Minn. 269, 280, 271 N.W. 493, 498-99 (1937) (recognizing that “ ‘the power of the courts to declare a contract void for being in contravention of sound public policy is a very delicate and undefined power, and, like the power to declare a statute unconstitutional, should be exercised only in cases free from doubt.’ ”) (quoting Cole v. Brown-Hurley Hardware Co., 139 Iowa 487, 117 N.W. 746, 747 (Iowa 1908)). Rather, we examine each contract to determine whether the illegality has so tainted the transaction that enforcing the contract would be contrary to public policy. Hart, 222 Minn, at 75, 23 N.W.2d at 379. As a general rule, “a contract is not void as against public policy unless it is injurious to the interests of the public or contravenes some established interest of society.” In re Estate of Peterson, 230 Minn. 478, 483, 42 N.W.2d 59, 63 (1950).

The question in this case is whether enforcing the contract between the insurers and Wellness would be contrary to public policy. We have recognized several public policy reasons for the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. Isles Wellness I, 703 N.W.2d at 517. Among the public policy considerations in applying the corporate practice of medicine doctrine are “concerns raised by the specter of lay control over professional judgment, commercial exploitation of health care practice, and the possibility that a health care practitioner’s loyalty to a patient and an employer will be in conflict.” Id. The Gran-ger court emphasized these public policy considerations when it stated, “[w]hat the law intends is that the patient shall be the patient of the licensed physician, not of a corporation or layman. The obligations and duties of the physician demand no less. There is no place for a middleman.” Granger, 190 Minn, at 27, 250 N.W. at 723; see In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 257, 232 N.W. 318, 319 (1930) (stating that “neither a corporation nor a layman not admitted to practice can practice law nor indirectly practice law by hiring a licensed attorney to practice law for others for the benefit or profit of such hirer.”). But, in affirming the underlying public policy reasons for the corporate practice of medicine doctrine in Isles Wellness I, we expressed some doubt about the continued viability of the underlying public policy rationale, stating, “[w]e agree with the clinics that some of the policy considerations originally supporting the corporate practice of medicine doctrine need re-examination.” 703 N.W.2d at 524.

The insurers contend that the corporate practice of medicine doctrine voids all contracts as a matter of public policy. To support this argument, the insurers maintain that under Granger and Ottemess violating the corporate practice of medicine doctrine per se renders all contracts void as a matter of public policy. The insurers contend that allowing Wellness to receive payment in spite of its violation of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine would render the doctrine ineffectual because it would allow clinics to incorporate in violation of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, provide services, receive retrospective payment, and improperly re-incorporate to continue the process.

The clinics maintain that fairness prevents the invalidation of their contracts because the clinics provided reasonable and necessary services by licensed chiropractors. Further, they argue that at the time services were rendered it was not clear whether the corporate practice of medicine doctrine existed in Minnesota. The clinics also assert that Granger is distinguishable from this case because Granger involved an unlicensed individual serving clients, whereas in this case only licensed healthcare professionals actually provided services. Wellness maintains that because it substantially complied with Minnesota law by hiring licensed professionals to provide services, their contracts should not be voided, noting that Minnesota law permits this court to uphold contracts made in violation of the law if fairness permits.

This court’s jurisprudence does not support creating a per se rule, which would void all contracts entered into in violation of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine as a matter of public policy. Neither Granger nor Ottemess definitively addresses whether the corporate practice of medicine doctrine voids all contracts entered into as part of the illegal corporate practice by licensed individuals. The Granger court voided Granger’s contracts as a matter of public policy. 190 Minn, at 27, 250 N.W. at 724. However, the court did so after determining that Granger, an unlicensed individual, was practicing healing in violation of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine and state licensing statutes. Id. at 26, 250 N.W. at 723. Looking at the underlying public policy of protecting the public health, the danger of Gran-ger’s unlicensed practice justified voiding all of his contracts.

In Ottemess this court examined the issue of corporate practice of law by a properly licensed attorney. 181 Minn, at 255-56, 232 N.W. at 318-19. Otterness was a licensed attorney who provided legal services to private individuals and shared the attorney fees paid for these services with his employer, a bank. Id. at 256, 232 N.W. at 319. The court concluded that this was misconduct on the part of both Ottemess and the bank, but it did not address the contractual implications of this misconduct. Id. at 257, 232 N.W. at 319. Otterness was before the court as an attorney discipline matter only. Id. at 258, 232 N.W. at 320. By the time the case reached this court, Otterness was no longer engaged in the corporate practice of law and any improper lawyer-client contracts no longer existed. Id. Therefore, this court did not have the opportunity to examine the validity of the illegal contracts.

Outside of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, Minnesota law permits voiding contracts if they are in violation of public policy, but it does not require such an action. See, e.g., Weatherston’s Assoc. Mech. Servs., Inc., 257 Minn, at 191, 100 N.W.2d at 824. In Weatherston’s; the court addressed a breach of contract suit involving services performed by an unlicensed engineer. I'd. at 189-90, 100 N.W.2d at 823. Although the unlicensed practice of a statutorily licensed profession generally mandated voiding any existing agreements or contracts, this court examined the public policy behind the licensing statute, which was to protect the public health and welfare and protect the public against incompetence and fraud. Id. Based on the underlying public policy and examining the contract in the context of the specific facts of the case — that the defendant had sought the plaintiffs services and knew the plaintiffs qualifications and that the plaintiff was not registered as an engineer — this court determined that the public policy for the licensing statute had no bearing on the case and refused to void the contract. Id. at 191-92, 100 N.W.2d at 824-25.

Similarly, in Lew Bonn Co. v. Herman, we addressed the question of whether the failure to file an electrical plan as required by city ordinance precluded recovery by the contractor. 271 Minn. 105, 105-06,135 N.W.2d 222, 223 (1965). Although the electrical plans were not filed as required by the ordinance, a city electrical inspector had been on site and had the opportunity to examine the plans. Id. at 107, 135 N.W.2d at 224. We recognized that entering a contract in violation of a statute generally voids the contract, but we were also mindful of “principles of justice” and refused to void a contract where there was no indication that the contract was entered into with bad motives or an intent to violate the law. Id. at 108-09, 135 N.W.2d at 225-26. Based on the facts, we concluded that the legislature did not intend a slight violation to result in the forfeiture of just debt, noting that the record did not indicate any obvious intent to try to violate the statute. Id. at 109, 135 N.W.2d at 226.

In this case, we conclude that categorically voiding the contracts would not serve the public policy reasons underlying the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. Permitting insurance companies to avoid liability under their insurance contracts does little to protect patients from the “specter of lay control over professional judgment.” Isles Wellness I, 703 N.W.2d at 517. We will not void a contract unless it is established that the corporation’s actions show a knowing and intentional failure to abide by state and local law. Such a rule is consistent with public policy jurisprudence that requires the court to determine whether the illegality has so tainted the transaction as to make it void under public policy. Moreover, by recognizing the potential for fraudulent claims and invalidating contracts that are tainted by illegality, this approach fairly balances the protection of insurers from fraudulent medical providers and the prevention of a windfall to an insurer from minor technical violations of the doctrine.

Nothing in this case indicates a knowing and intentional violation of the laws of this state. Rather, the record shows an obvious intent to try to comply with Minnesota law. Prior to incorporation, Couf contacted the Minnesota Board of Chiropractic Examiners (MBCE) in order to determine if there was any prohibition against lay ownership of a corporate chiropractic practice. The MBCE indicated the only statute that may affect Couf was the Minnesota Professional Firms Act and advised Couf to consult counsel, which Couf did. Coufs counsel advised her that a corporate practice issue did not exist. Based upon these facts, we cannot conclude that public policy necessitates voiding the contracts entered into by the plaintiffs. Moreover, given the lack of clarity regarding the applicability of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine to chiropractors before this court’s decision in Isles Wellness I, the interests of justice do not favor declaring the contracts void.

The decision of the court of appeals is reversed and this case is remanded to the district court for resolution of the remaining issues.

Reversed and remanded.

      . In making this determination, the court of appeals misconstrued our statement that we were "affirming] the district court's grant of summary judgment to the extent it relates to the clinic’s practice of chiropractic” as affirming the district court's conclusion that the outstanding claims for chiropractic services are void as against public policy. The court of appeals did not engage in any further analysis of the issue. In the interests of judicial economy, we will consider the question.

      . Indeed, this court was divided in Isles Wellness I on the question of whether the doctrine applied to chiropractors, with three justices concluding in dissent that the corporate practice of medicine doctrine was not firmly grounded in Minnesota common law. Isles Wellness I, 703 N.W.2d at 524-26 (Hanson, Page, and Meyer, JX, concurring in part, dissenting in part).


author: /s/Helen M. Meyer Associate Justice

text:
    In re Petition for Transfer to Disability Status of Mark Howard GARDNER, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 228801.
    No. A06-2192.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Dec. 20, 2006.
   ORDER

The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility and respondent Mark Howard Gardner have entered into a stipulation for transfer of respondent to disability inactive status under Rule 28(a), Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR), without further proceedings, coupled with a stay of pending disciplinary investigations concerning respondent. The stipulation and a petition for transfer to disability inactive status have been filed in the above-entitled matter.

The court has reviewed the petition and stipulation and concludes that transfer to disability inactive status and a stay of the pending disciplinary proceedings are appropriate.

Based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that effective immediately respondent Mark Howard Gardner is transferred to disability inactive status under Rule 28, RLPR. During the period that respondent is on disability inactive status, respondent may not render legal advice, discuss legal matters with clients, or otherwise engage in the practice of law. Although respondent is not currently practicing law, respondent shall complete the process of providing notice of his disability inactive status as required under Rule 26, RLPR, to the extent applicable.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the pending disciplinary proceedings concerning respondent are stayed until such time as respondent petitions for reinstatement to the practice of law under Rule 28(d) and Rule 18, RLPR. Upon filing of a petition for reinstatement, unless otherwise ordered by this court, the parties shall first proceed under Rule 18. If respondent is reinstated to the practice of law, the Director shall then proceed to complete the pending disciplinary proceedings that are stayed by this order.

BY THE COURT:

/s/Helen M. Meyer Associate Justice


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    In re Petition for DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST William Albert PLUMMER, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 291365.
    No. A06-1352.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Dec. 21, 2006.

      Timothy Michael Burke, Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility, St Paul, MN, for Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility.
    William Albert Plummer, St Paul, MN, pro se.
   OPINION

PER CURIAM.

The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility filed a petition for disciplinary action against respondent, William A. Plummer, alleging that Plum-mer (1) failed to attend an administrative hearing, failed to communicate with his client in the matter, and failed to return the client’s file; (2) failed to notify his client and a tribunal of his suspension; and (3) failed to cooperate with the Director’s investigation of his misconduct. Plummer failed to answer the petition, the allegations are deemed admitted, and the only issue we now consider is the appropriate discipline to impose.

On January 9, 2004, Plummer was retained by MM to represent her in a social security disability matter. On multiple occasions, Plummer failed to return MM’s calls seeking to provide him with information or seeking a status report on her case.

On December 15, 2005, we suspended Plummer from the practice of law for 60 days for professional misconduct unrelated to his representation of MM. The rules required that Plummer give notice of his suspension to each client, opposing counsel or pro se party, and tribunals in which he had litigation pending. Rule 26(b), Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR). The rules also required that Plummer provide proof to the Director of compliance with the notification requirement. Rule 26(e), RLPR. Plummer did not notify MM or the Social Security Administration of his suspension, and failed to file with the Director’s office an affidavit documenting his compliance with the order and Rule 26, RLPR.

Following Plummer’s suspension, a hearing was scheduled for January 18, 2006, with regard to MM’s Social Security claim. Although Plummer wrote to the Office of Hearings and Appeals on December 22, 2005, advising that he no longer represented MM, he did not advise that he was suspended nor did he provide a copy of the letter to MM. In another letter dated January 16, 2006, Plummer wrote to the judge assigned to MM’s matter, stating, “I understand I am still listed as the attorney of record in [MM’s] matter. Please correct your records.” Again, Plummer did not indicate that he was suspended, nor did he provide a copy of the letter to MM. MM appeared for the January 18 hearing, not knowing that Plummer had advised the court that he no longer represented her. She reviewed her file and learned from Plummer’s December 22 letter that he no longer represented her. Plummer did not attend the hearing and MM unsuccessfully represented herself. Later that day, Plummer called MM and left a message and MM returned the call, also leaving a message. Plummer never returned MM’s call, despite her repeated attempts thereafter to contact him by phone. MM also called Plummer requesting that he return her file but, again, he did not return her calls, nor did he ever return the file. MM reported Plummer’s conduct to the Director’s Office and learned, for the first time, that Plummer had been suspended in December 2005.

After receiving MM’s report, the Director initiated an investigation of Plum-mer, mailing to Plummer notice of the investigation and a request that he respond within 14 days of the notice. Plum-mer failed to respond, and the Director wrote Plummer’s counsel on February 23, 2006, advising that a response had not been received and again requesting a written response. The Director again wrote to Plummer and his counsel on March 3 and March 14, and received no response. The March 14 letter to Plummer was sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, and Plummer acknowledged receipt of the certified letter on March 15.

On April 24, 2006, the Director sent notice to Plummer of the charges of unprofessional conduct, a notice of pre-hearing meeting, and notice of Panel assignment. Plummer failed to respond and failed to attend the scheduled pre-hearing on May 15, 2006. On June 17, 2006, the Director’s petition for disciplinary action was served upon Plummer. Plummer failed to answer the petition and the Director subsequently served and filed a motion for summary relief pursuant to Rule 13(b), RLPR, to which Plummer failed to respond. By order of August 10, 2006, we granted the Director’s motion, deemed the allegations of the petition admitted, and set the matter for briefing and oral argument. Plum-mer has submitted no briefs to this court and failed to appear for oral argument.

In his representation of MM, Plummer violated Rules 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 (communication), 1.16(d) (declining or terminating representation), 3.2 (expediting litigation), and 8.4(c) (misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC). By his failure to cooperate in the Director’s investigation of his misconduct and his failure to report his suspension, Plummer also violated Rules 3.4(c) (fairness to opposing party and counsel involving knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal), 8.1(b) (bar admission and disciplinary matters— requirement to respond to a disciplinary authority’s demand for information), MRPC, and Rules 25 (required cooperation), 26 (duties of disciplined lawyer), RLPR. The only issue before this court is the appropriate discipline to be imposed.

The purpose of discipline for professional misconduct is not to punish the attorney, but rather to protect the public, to protect the judicial system, and to deter future misconduct. In re Vaught, 693 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn.2005). To determine the appropriate discipline, we consider (1) the nature of the misconduct; (2) the cumulative weight of the rule violations; (3) the harm to the public; and (4) the harm to the legal profession. In re Muenchrath, 588 N.W.2d 497, 500 (Minn.1999). We look to similar cases for guidance, but impose discipline on a case-by-case basis after considering both aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Vaught, 698 N.W.2d at 890.

We agree with the Director’s recommendation that Plummer, who is currently suspended, be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law for a minimum of 12 additional months and that he be required to comply with Rule 18, RLPR, should he apply for reinstatement.

In prior discipline cases, we have concluded that an attorney’s pattern of client neglect and lack of communication, and failure to cooperate with disciplinary investigation and proceedings typically warrants an indefinite suspension. In In re Olson, we indefinitely suspended an attorney for a minimum of two years for neglect of two client matters, one a Social Security matter, and for a complete lack of cooperation with the Director’s office. 545 N.W.2d 35, 37-38 (Minn.1996). In In re Pucel, we indefinitely suspended an attorney for her neglect and failure to communicate with a client, failure to maintain a client’s funds in trust, failure to account for and return a client’s funds, and failure to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation. 588 N.W.2d 741, 743 (Minn.1999). Similarly, in In re Kinnunen, we indefinitely suspended an attorney for a minimum of 18 months for his failure to pursue his client’s claims, to communicate with clients, and to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation. 502 N.W.2d 773, 773-75 (Minn.1993).

As in the cases above, Plummer neglected and failed to communicate with a client, and failed completely to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation and proceedings. Further, Plummer has been disciplined previously and was suspended from the practice of law at the time of his misconduct related to MM. After a disciplinary proceeding, we expect “a renewed commitment * * * to comprehensive ethical and professional behavior,” In re Shaw, 396 N.W.2d 573, 575-76 (Minn.1986), which Plummer has not demonstrated. For these reasons, we impose the following discipline:

(1) Respondent William A. Plummer is suspended indefinitely from the practice of law pursuant to Rule 15, RLPR, and he shall comply with the notice requirements of Rule 26, RLPR. Respondent Plummer shall not be eligible to apply for reinstatement to the practice of law before 12 months from the date of filing of this opinion.

(2) Should respondent apply for reinstatement, he shall be required to provide proof of his fitness to practice law by complying with the requirements of Rule 18, RLPR.

(3) Respondent shall pay to the Director a sum of $900 for costs pursuant to Rule 24, RLPR.

So ordered.

      . We disciplined Plummer for the following acts of professional misconduct: unintentionally misapplying and failing to safeguard funds that came into his possession as a representative payee for a minor Social Security beneficiary; commingling personal and client funds in his trust account; failing to maintain proper trust account books and records; depositing an advance fee payment into his business account instead of his trust account; disbursing client funds from the trust account by way of cash held back from a deposit rather than by a check; and failing to cooperate fully in the disciplinary investigation.

      . Plummer is currently still suspended from the practice of law based on his earlier professional misconduct, as he never petitioned this court for reinstatement under Rule 18, RLPR, which requires an affidavit stating that the suspended lawyer complied with Rules 24 and 26, RLPR.


author: ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Chief Justice.

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Daniel Joseph MELDE, Appellant. and State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Alan J. Myers, Appellant.
    Nos. A05-1553, A05-1604.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Dec. 21, 2006.

      Paul W. Rogosheske, Thuet, Pugh, Ro-gosheske & Atkins, Ltd., South St. Paul MN, Douglas V. Hazelton, Hazelton Law Offices, Minneapolis MN, for Appellant Daniel Joseph Melde.
    Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul MN, Peter A. MacMillan, Michele R Wallace, MacMillan, Wallace & Athanases, PA, Minneapolis MN, Raymond F. Schmitz, Olmsted County Attorney, David F. McLeod, Assistant County Attorney, Rochester MN, for Respondent State of Minnesota.
   OPINION

ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Chief Justice.

In these two cases, consolidated for review, the question is whether the Minnesota Implied Consent Advisory, Minn.Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 2 (2004), violates a driving-while-impaired (DWI) arrestee’s procedural due process rights because it fails to adequately notify the arrestee of the consequences of refusing to submit to chemical testing. The district courts concluded that the advisory violated appellants’ due process rights and dismissed the test-refusal charges. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the dismissals of the test-refusal charges and remanded the cases for trial. Concluding that the advisory violates neither federal nor state procedural due process guarantees, we affirm.

State v. Melde

In the early morning hours of November 14, 2004, appellant Daniel Joseph Melde was arrested in Hennepin County on probable cause for driving while impaired. He was a repeat DWI offender. Melde was transported to the Crystal Police Department where the arresting officer read to Melde the implied consent advisory that contained the standard warning that refusal to take a test is a crime, and Melde understood it. He was given the opportunity and sufficient time to contact an attorney. He contacted his high school hockey coach because he did not have the “wherewithal” to retain an attorney; but due to the time of day, the coach could not find an attorney and advised Melde to refuse testing. Melde refused testing. He was subsequently charged by complaint in Hennepin County District Court with gross-misdemeanor second-degree DWI for test-refusal, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2004), and Minn.Stat. § 169A.25 (2004), and with gross-misdemeanor third-degree DWI for driving while impaired, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2004), and Minn.Stat. § 169A.26 (2004). The district court granted Melde’s motion to dismiss the gross-misdemeanor test-refusal charge, concluding that “by failing to advise arrestees of the enhanced criminality and penalties that result from refusal,” the implied consent advisory “violates the due process requirements of both the United States and Minnesota State Constitutions.”

State v. Myers

On December 4, 2004, at approximately 2:09 a.m., a state trooper stopped to investigate a vehicle stopped on the shoulder of Highway 52 just north of Oronoco in Olmsted County. The trooper identified the driver as appellant Alan J. Myers, and after determining that there was probable cause for an arrest, the trooper arrested Myers for DWI. The trooper transported Myers to the Zumbrota Police Department where, at approximately 2:45 a.m., he read to Myers the standard implied consent advisory. Myers requested the opportunity to speak with an attorney and was provided access to a telephone and a telephone book. After several unsuccessful attempts to contact an attorney, for a period lasting upwards of 50 minutes, several readings by the trooper of the implied consent advisory, and a lengthy question-and-answer discussion about the advisory, Myers insisted upon consulting with an attorney before testing, and the trooper determined that Myers refused to submit to testing.

Myers was charged by complaint in Olmsted County District Court with gross-misdemeanor third-degree DWI for test-refusal, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2, and Minn.Stat. § 169A.26, and with misdemeanor fourth-degree DWI for driving while impaired, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1), and Minn.Stat. § 169A.27 (2004). The district court granted Myers’ motion to dismiss the test-refusal charge, concluding that the implied consent advisory violated his due process rights because it did not inform Myers that a test refusal is a gross misdemeanor that may result in harsher penalties than a test failure.

On the state’s pretrial critical-impact appeals of the district courts’ orders in each case, the court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding in both cases that the failure to inform a DWI arrestee that test-refusal is a gross misdemeanor that may result in harsher penalties than a test-failure does not violate due process. State v. Myers, 711 N.W.2d 113, 119 (Minn.App.2006); State v. Melde, No. A05-1553, 2006 WL 619099, at *2 (Minn.App. Mar.14, 2006). We granted appellants’ petitions for further review in each case and consolidated the appeals. Appellants contend that the implied consent advisory violates procedural due process under the federal and state constitutions because it does not adequately inform the DWI ar-restee of the consequences of a refusal to submit to chemical testing.

I.

The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. The Minnesota Constitution also provides that “[n]o person shall be * * * deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” Minn. Const, art. I, § 7. Essential to the guarantee of due process is fundamental fairness. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976) (relying on fundamental fairness principles in holding that the Due Process Clause forbids the use of a defendant’s silence after Miranda warnings for impeachment at trial).

We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. State v. Benniefield, 678 N.W.2d 42, 45 (Minn.2004). Minnesota statutes are presumed constitutional. State v. Barker, 705 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn.2005). We will declare a statute unconstitutional “only when absolutely necessary.” State v. Belli, 564 N.W.2d 560, 566 (Minn.1997).

Minnesota’s implied consent law declares that any person operating or in physical control of a motor vehicle within this state or on any boundary water is deemed to have consented to a chemical test to determine the presence of alcohol, controlled substances, or hazardous substances if arrested for driving while impaired. Minn.Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 1(b)(1) (2004). At the time a chemical test is administered, the arrestee must be advised of the following: (1) that Minnesota law requires testing to determine if the arrestee is under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances, or hazardous substances; (2) that refusal to take a test is a crime; (3) that a test will be compelled if the officer has probable cause to believe the arrestee has violated the criminal vehicular homicide and injury laws; and (4) that the arrestee has the right to consult with an attorney, but that this right is limited to the extent that it cannot unreasonably delay administration of the test. Minn.Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 2.

II.

Under the federal constitution, due process does not permit the government to mislead individuals as to either their legal obligations or the penalties they might face should they fail to satisfy those obligations. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437-39, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344 (1959) (holding that due process did not permit the prosecution of individuals who refused to testify before a legislative commission after being led to believe, albeit erroneously» by commission members that they would be protected by the privilege against compelled self-incrimination). In reliance in part on Raley, we concluded that a misleading implied consent advisory violates federal due process. McDonnell v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 848, 853-55 (Minn.1991) (holding unconstitutional a portion of the implied consent advisory as applied to an individual misled by the advisory).

As a corollary, an implied consent advisory that contains no misleading assurances would not violate federal due process. In South Dakota v. Neville, police officers asked a driver arrested on probable cause for DWI to submit to chemical testing and warned him that he could lose his license if he refused. 459 U.S. 553, 555, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983). The driver refused. Id. at 555-56, 103 S.Ct. 916. South Dakota law specifically provided that evidence of test-refusal was admissible at trial. Id. at 556, 103 S.Ct. 916. Nevertheless, the driver sought to suppress evidence of the test-refusal. Id. The suppression motion was granted for several reasons, including the officers’ failure to advise that test-refusal could be used at trial. Id.

On certiorari review, the United States Supreme Court held, inter alia, that admission of evidence of test-refusal in a DWI prosecution did not violate federal due process even though the driver had not been warned that his test-refusal could be used against him at trial. Id. at 566, 103 S.Ct. 916. The Court noted that unlike Miranda warnings, which are of constitutional dimension, any right to refuse testing was a “matter of grace bestowed” by the legislature. Id. at 565-66, 103 S.Ct. 916. The Court acknowledged that the officers did not inform the driver that a test-refusal could be used against him at trial, but thought it “unrealistic to say that the warnings given here implicitly assure a suspect that no consequences other than those mentioned will occur.” Id. at 566, 103 S.Ct. 916. The Court further noted, “[i]mportantly, the warning that he could lose his driver’s license made it clear that refusing the test was not a ‘safe harbor,’ free of adverse consequences.” Id.

Minnesota’s implied consent advisory, like the South Dakota advisory in Ne-ville, contains no implicit misleading assurances of the relative consequences of a test-refusal, instead notifying the arrestee that refusal to submit to testing is a crime. This warning makes it clear that a test-refusal is not a “safe harbor.” In view of Neville, we conclude that the lack of more specific warnings as to the consequences of a test-refusal does not violate federal due process, particularly given that Minnesota drivers have a limited right to counsel before testing.

III.

In reliance on Davis v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 517 N.W.2d 901 (Minn.1994), appellants also contend that Minnesota’s implied consent advisory violates due process under the state constitution. We have construed the Minnesota Constitution as affording greater protection than its federal counterpart, although we do not do so cavalierly. State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 210 (2005).

In Davis, we addressed the adequacy of the implied consent advisory as amended in response to Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828 (1991). 517 N.W.2d at 902. Friedman held that under the Minnesota Constitution, DWI arrestees have a limited right to a reasonable amount of time in which to attempt to consult with counsel before complying with implied consent testing or refusing to do so. 473 N.W.2d at 837. In Davis, we noted that before Friedman, the advisory informed DWI arrestees that (a) Minnesota law requires that the person take a test to determine if the person is under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance; (b) if testing is refused, the person’s driver’s license will be revoked for a minimum of one year; (c) if the test is taken and the results indicate an alcohol concentration of .10 or more, the person’s driver’s license will be revoked for a minimum of 90 days; (d) whether the test is taken or refused, the person may be subject to criminal penalties for DWI; (e) after testing the person may consult with an attorney; (f) after testing the person has the right to obtain additional tests by someone of the person’s own choosing; and (g) the refusal to take a test may be offered in evidence against the person at trial. Davis, 517 N.W.2d at 902 (citing Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subds. 2(b)(l)-(4), 2(b)(6)-(7) (Supp.1991)). After Friedman, the legislature amended the advisory, eliminating (b), (c), (d), (f), and (g); retaining (a) and (e); and adding that refusal to take a test is a crime. Id. (citing Act of May 24, 1993, ch. 347, § 10, 1993 Minn. Laws 2450, 2457-58(codified at Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 2(b) (Supp.1993))).

As a result, the implied consent advisory read to the drivers in Davis warned only that “refusal to take a test is a crime,” the same language used in the current advisory. The Davis court considered, among other things, whether the implied consent advisory violated state due process because drivers were not warned that a test-refusal would result in the revocation of their licenses. Id. In considering whether we should construe the Due Process Clause of the state constitution as requiring a more complete implied consent advisory, we noted first that arrestees who consulted with counsel “probably” had no practical basis to complain about the lack of a more detailed advisory, as chemical testing is required by law and attorneys cannot ethically advise an arrestee not to comply with the law. Id. We also noted, however, that those who either do not or cannot reach counsel “have a practical basis for arguing that if they had been given a proper advisory they might have taken the test.” Id. Nevertheless, while expressing concern about the deficiencies of the advisory as amended, we were unwilling at that time to say that the advisory violated procedural due process under the state constitution. Id.

Appellants assert that because post-Dams legislation has elevated the test-refusal offense to a gross misdemeanor, the time has come for us to hold the advisory constitutionally deficient. However, the concern raised by Davis involved the advisory’s lack of any warning about a significant consequence for test refusal, namely the loss of driving privileges. In Davis, we explained that “ ‘[e]ven a day’s loss of a driver’s license can inflict grave injury upon a person who depends upon an automobile for continued employment in his job.’ ” 517 N.W.2d at 905 (quoting Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 21, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). But the failure to warn of the consequences of test-refusal did not violate the federal constitution, and we declined to extend broader coverage under the state constitution. Id. Since at least 1991, the advisory has warned that refusal to submit to testing is a crime. Id. at 902. Thus, unlike the appellants in Davis who complained about a complete lack of warning that license revocation would result from test-refusal, appellants in this case were explicitly warned that test-refusal is a crime.

That the legislature has by operation of law allowed arrestees the “option” of test-refusal does not necessarily implicate the underlying procedural due process concerns normally attendant to the waiver of rights of constitutional dimension, see Neville, 459 U.S. at 565-66,103 S.Ct. 916, and appellants have articulated no principled basis for a more expansive reading of the state constitution.

As indicated, the advisory already warns that test-refusal is a crime. To go beyond that to inform an arrestee that the crime is a gross misdemeanor might be appropriate, but it is not an issue of constitutional imperative. It would appear that the advisability of a more detailed implied consent advisory should more appropriately be directed to the legislature for debate and deliberation. We therefore conclude that the lack of a more specific implied consent advisory as to the consequences of a refusal to submit to chemical testing does not violate state due process.

Affirmed.

      . As a general rule, an appellate court will not reverse the determination of the district court unless " 'the state demonstrates clearly and unequivocally that the trial court has erred in its judgment and that, unless reversed, the error will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial.' ” State v. Edrozo, 578 N.W.2d 719, 722 (Minn.1998) (quoting State v. Webber, 262 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Minn.1977)).

      . Minnesota Statutes § 169A.51, subd. 1(a), provides:
      Any person who drives, operates, or is in physical control of a motor vehicle within this state or on any boundary water of this state consents, subject to the provisions of sections 169A.50 to 169A.53 (implied consent law), and section 169A.20 (driving while impaired), to a chemical test of that person’s blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol, controlled substances, or hazardous substances. The test must be administered at the direction of a peace officer.

      . Minnesota Statutes § 169A.51, subd. 2, provides:
      At the time a test is requested, the person must be informed:
      (1)that Minnesota law requires the person to take a test:
      (i) to determine if the person is under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances, or hazardous substances;
      (ii) to determine the presence of a controlled substance listed in schedule I or II, other than marijuana or tetrahydrocannabi-nols; and
      (iii) if the motor vehicle was a commercial motor vehicle, to determine the presence of alcohol;
      (2) that refusal to take a test is a crime;
      (3) if the peace officer has probable cause to believe the person has violated the criminal vehicular homicide and injury laws, that a test will be taken with or without the person's consent; and
      (4) that the person has the right to consult with an attorney, but that this right is limited to the extent that it cannot unreasonably delay administration of the test.

      . The Supreme Court has also held that state-compelled blood testing does not violate the right against self-incrimination, the right to due process, the right to counsel, or the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 759, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). But due process concerns could be implicated should the police initiate physical violence, refuse reasonable requests for a different form of testing, or respond to resistance with inappropriate force. Id. at 760, n. 4, 86 S.Ct. 1826

      . We have previously noted the various principled bases articulated for construing state constitutions as affording broader protection, including:
      variations in text, constitutional history, early state precedent construing the applicable provision of the state constitution, relatedness of the subject matter to state-level enforcement, presence of issues that are unique to the state, and a determination that a more expansive reading of the state constitution represents the better rule of law.

        State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 97-98 (Minn.1999).

      . Prior to August 2003, test-refusal and test-failure with no aggravating factors were misdemeanors. Minn.Stat. § 169A.27 (2002). But as of August 1, 2003, test-refusal with no aggravating factors is a gross misdemeanor, while test-failure with no aggravating factors remains a misdemeanor. Act of May 28, 2003, ch. 2, § 5, 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Special Sess. 1384, 1446 (codified at Minn.Stat. §§ 169A.26-27 (2004)). The enhanced penalties for test-refusal appear to correspond to the previously enhanced penalties, to a gross misdemeanor level, for test-failure with an alcohol concentration of .20 or more. Act of May 15, 2000, ch. 478, art. 1, §§ 2 and 9, 2000 Minn. Laws 1484, 1485, 1490 (codified at Minn.Stat. §§ 169A.03, subd. 2, 169A.26, subd. 1 (2004)). Presumably this was done to obviate whatever advantage a DWI arrestee with an alcohol concentration of .20 or more might attain in refusing to comply with testing.


author: GILDEA, Justice.

text:
    Richard BREZA, Appellant, v. CITY OF MINNETRISTA, Respondent.
    No. A04-2286.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Dec. 21, 2006.

      Gary A. Van Cleve, Jessica B. Rivas, Larkin Hoffman Daly & Lindgren, Ltd., Bloomington, MN, for Appellant.
    George C. Hoff, Justin L. Templin, Hoff, Barry & Kuderer, P.A., Eden Prairie, MN, for Respondent.
    Donald D. Smith, Christopher P. Renz, Thomsen & Nybeck, P.A., Edina, MN, for Amicus Curiae Minnesota Association of Realtors.
    Susan L. Naughton, League of Minnesota Cities, St. Paul, MN, for Amicus Curiae League of Minnesota Cities.
    Joseph G. Springer, Robert J. Shainess, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for Amicus Curiae Builders Association of the Twin Cities.
   OPINION

GILDEA, Justice.

Appellant Richard Breza filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus. The district court issued a writ directing the City of Minnetrista to grant Breza an exemption from state law requirements relating to wetlands. The court of appeals reversed and we granted Breza’s petition for review. We affirm.

Breza bought property on Lake Minne-tonka, in the City of Minnetrista, in 1997. The property is located on Halstead Bay, in the shoreland protection zone of Lake Minnetonka, and a large portion of the property consisted of wetlands. Breza contracted to build a home on the property and the builders applied for a permit, which they received from the city on January 28, 1997. The permit specifically stated that “[f]ill is prohibited from wetlands.” Breza testified that he never saw the permit.

In July 2000, Breza had 15 to 20 dump truck loads of fill placed in the wetland behind his home. In August 2000, Breza placed an additional four cubic yards of fill in the wetland, and covered the area with sod. The total area of wetland Breza filled covered approximately 5,737 square feet. In December 2000, Breza received a cease and desist order from the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, directing him to “immediately cease and desist any activity draining or filling the wetland.” The order also informed him that “[i]f you believe that an exemption applies to your activity or if you believe the area is not a wetland, then you should immediately apply to the Local Government Unit for an exemption or no-loss determination.” The order provided that if Breza did not apply for an exemption or a no-loss determination within three weeks, or if his application were denied, then restoration may be required.

Breza filed an application for an exemption with the city on December 29, 2000. In his application and attached letter, Bre-za indicated that “[o]n approximately August 4 & 5 there was approximately 4 cubic yards of black dirt in the back yard and sod placed over that area. * * * I would like to apply for an exemption.” By letter dated January 16, 2002, the city informed Breza that the city had denied his exemption application. The letter also indicated that the city would not be able to determine the “next steps and [Breza’s] options” until the snow melted.

In a letter dated April 8, 2002, the city informed Breza that “the fill in this wetland will need to be removed rather than replaced via creation of another wetland off site or purchase from a wetland bank.”

Breza responded to the city and cited Minn.Stat. § 15.99 (2000). Breza maintained that section 15.99 required that the city act on his application within 60 days. Because the city had not acted on his application within this time period, Breza contended that his exemption application had been granted.

The city agreed that it had violated section 15.99 by taking longer than 60 days to respond to Breza’s application and that as a result, Breza’s application for an exemption was automatically granted. The city claimed, however, that the only exemption Breza qualified for under the Wetland Conservation Act was a 400 square foot de minimis exemption, and therefore that was the full extent of the exemption that was granted by operation of section 15.99 when the city failed to respond within the 60-day time period.

On August 22, 2002, the Commissioner of Natural Resources ordered Breza to restore approximately 5,337 square feet (the original 5,737 square foot area filled, minus the 400 square foot exemption) of the filled land to its natural wetland state. This restoration order directed that prior to September 15, 2002, Breza must either submit a restoration plan, submit an application for approval of a replacement plan, or request an exemption or no-loss determination.

Breza did not submit either a restoration plan or a replacement plan. But he was given an opportunity to meet with the Minnetrista City Council on February 3, 2003. Prior to the meeting, Breza presented the city council with a proposal, whereby he would restore 2,860 square feet of the wetland on his property and make a cash payment to the city of $4,800 to be used for restoration elsewhere. The city council rejected Breza’s proposal.

Breza sought a writ of mandamus from the district court. The district court found that Breza “applied for an exemption for the 5,757 square feet that had been filled,” and that the city took more than one year to respond to the application. The court held that Breza’s request was approved by operation of law under Minn. Stat. § 15.99, and issued a writ of mandamus compelling the city to approve his exemption request. The city appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which reversed. Breza v. City of Minnetrista, 706 N.W.2d 512, 519 (Minn.App.2005). That court held'that because the city did not have the authority to grant an exemption for more than 400 square feet, the city had fully satisfied its official duties and a writ of mandamus was therefore not appropriate. Id. at 518-519.

I.

Breza brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus. To be entitled to mandamus relief, Breza must show that: 1) the city “failed to perform an official duty clearly imposed by law”; 2) he “suffered a public wrong” and was specifically injured by the city’s failure; and 3) he has “no other adequate legal remedy.” See N. States Power Co. v. Minn. Metro. Council, 684 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Minn.2004). The district court’s decision to issue the writ was based on the determination that Bre-za’s application was approved by operation of law. When a decision on a writ of mandamus is based solely on a legal determination, we review that decision de novo. See Castor v. City of Minneapolis, 429 N.W.2d 244, 245 (Minn.1988). In order to determine whether Breza’s application was approved by operation of law, this court must construe section 15.99 as well as portions of the Wetland Conservation Act (WCA). Statutory construction is also subject to de novo review. Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 865, 869 (Minn.2006).

We first examine the scope of relief the city could have granted had it approved Breza’s application within the section 15.99 deadline. We note that the application simply requested an exemption, with no specification beyond the description that “there was approximately 4 cubic yards of black dirt in the back yard and sod placed over that area.” There was no suggested restoration plan, request for approval of a replacement plan, or request for a no-loss determination.

The starting point for our analysis is the principle, drawn from the Minnesota Constitution, that municipalities, like the City of Minnetrista, possess no inherent powers and are purely creatures of the legislature. See Minn. Const, art. XII, § 3 (“The legislature may provide by law for the creation, organization, administration, consolidation, division and dissolution of local government units and their functions * * ⅜.”). Thus, municipalities possess only those powers that are conferred by statute or implied as necessary to carry out legislatively conferred powers. See Minnetonka Electric Co. v. Village of Golden Valley, 273 Minn. 301, 304, 141 N.W.2d 138, 140 (1966) (ruling that where state legislature has preempted the field, municipal ordinance that conflicted with state law could not operate); Village of Brooklyn Center v. Rippen, 255 Minn. 334, 336, 96 N.W.2d 585, 587 (1959) (ruling that village did not have implied power to license boats). The City of Minnetrista therefore has no inherent power to give Breza permission to fill wetland that state law does not allow to be filled.

We turn next to an examination of relevant statutory provisions to determine the scope of authority vested in the city with respect to wetland conservation. In the WCA, the legislature articulated its finding that

the wetlands of Minnesota provide public value by conserving surface waters, maintaining and improving water quality, preserving wildlife habitat, providing recreational opportunities * * * and enhancing the natural beauty of the landscape, and are important to comprehensive water management.

Minn.Stat. § 103A.201, subd. 2(b) (2004). In the Water Law, the legislature also set forth a “wetland policy” statement declaring that

it is in the public interest to preserve the wetlands of the state to conserve surface waters, maintain and improve water quality, preserve wildlife habitat, reduce runoff, provide for floodwater retention, reduce stream sedimentation, contribute to improved subsurface moisture, enhance the natural beauty of the landscape, and promote comprehensive and total water management planning.

MinmStat. § 103A.202 (2004). Finally, the legislature found that it is in the public interest to “achieve no net loss in the quantity, quality, and biological diversity of Minnesota’s existing wetlands.” Minn. Stat. § 103A.201, subd. 2(b)(1).

To achieve the goal of no net loss of wetlands, the WCA provides that “[w]et-lands must not be drained or filled, wholly or partially, unless replaced by restoring or creating wetland areas of at least equal public value under [an approved] replacement plan.” Minn.Stat. § 103G.222, subd. 1(a) (2004). The city has authority under the WCA to approve, where appropriate, replacement plans in which property owners drain or fill wetlands and replace the lost wetlands with newly created or restored wetlands in another location. Minn. Stat. § 103G.2242, subd. 1(b) (2004) (“[A] replacement plan must be approved by a resolution of the governing body of the local government unit * * *.”).

Finally, the legislature has defined ten specific types of activities for which an exemption from the no-filling-without-replacement prohibition can be approved. Local government units (LGUs) like the city have the authority to grant exemptions. Minn. R. 8420.0210 (1999) (“Local government units may offer exemption certificates as part of the wetland program in their jurisdiction.”).

The city argues that the only exemption the legislature authorized it to approve for Breza’s property under the WCA is a 400 square foot de minimis exemption. See MinmStat. § 103G.2241, subd. 9(a)(5) (2000) (authorizing exemption of 400 square feet for property “in the shoreland wetland protection zone”). We agree. By applying for an exemption, Breza was asking the city to find that the activity he engaged in was exempt from the requirement that the filled wetland on his property be replaced. See MinmStat. §§ 103G.222, subd. 1(a), 103G.2241 (2000). In order for the city to affirmatively approve Breza’s requested exemption, the filling of the wetland on his property would have to have qualified as one of the exempted activities under the statute. Because Breza’s property is located in the shoreland protection zone of Lake Minne-tonka, the only exemption Breza qualified for under the WCA was the 400 square foot de minimis exemption. The city had no authority, under the WCA, to allow fill covering more than 400 square feet to remain in the wetland on Breza’s property. Had the city granted Breza’s application within the section 15.99 deadline, under the WCA it could not have allowed Breza to retain more than the 400 square feet of fill covered by the subdivision 9(a)(5) de minimis exemption.

The city has already recognized that the 400 square foot de minimis exemption was granted due to its failure to act on Breza’s application within 60 days as required by MinmStat. § 15.99. Breza does not contend that any of the other exemptions under section 103G.2241 apply to his application. He also concedes that the city did not have the authority under the WCA to grant him permission to fill 5,737 square feet of wetland on his property.

But Breza argues that the WCA is not the only relevant source of authority. He relies on Minn.Stat. § 15.99 and argues that the consequence of the city’s failure to act on his application within 60 days must be that his entire request to fill 5,737 square feet of wetland was granted. He argues that the plain language of section 15.99 mandates this result.

There is no dispute that section 15.99 applies here. The legislature specifically incorporated the section’s 60-day timeline into the WCA. See MinmStat. § 103G.2242, subd. 4 (2004) (“Upon receiving and considering all required data, the local government unit * * * must act on all replacement plan applications, banking plan applications, and exemption or no-loss determination requests in compliance with section 15.99.”). There likewise is no dispute that the city failed to act within the timeline required by section 15.99. The question before us is whether the granting of Breza’s application by operation of section 15.99, confers on Breza greater relief than the city was authorized to grant had it acted on time. We turn now to that question.

II.

The version of section 15.99 in effect when Breza applied for an exemption provided, in relevant part:

[E]xcept as otherwise provided in this section and notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, an agency must approve or deny within 60 days a written request * * * for a permit, license, or other governmental approval of an action. Failure of an agency to deny a request within 60 days is approval of the request.

Minn.Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2. “Agency” is defined as a “city, county, town, * * * and any other political subdivision of the state.” Id., subd. 1(b).

We examined section 15.99 in American Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309 (Minn.2001). In that case, we reeog-nized that the 60-day deadline in section 15.99 was “definitive.” 636 N.W.2d at 313. The court of appeals has also construed section 15.99 in a number of cases, and Breza is correct to note that these eases have strictly enforced the 60-day rule by consistently holding that an agency’s failure to comply with the section 15.99 time-line results in automatic approval of the request at issue. See, e.g., Kramer v. Otter Tail County Bd. of Comm’rs, 647 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn.App.2002).

Breza also relies on two eases that involve claims that the LGU approvals violated a city ordinance or state statute. See Gun Lake Ass’n v. County of Aitkin, 612 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Minn.App.2000) (“Rela-tors allege that the grant of the * * * application is defective because the county failed to abide by relevant statutes and ordinances * * ⅜.”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 13, 2000); Moreno v. City of Minneapolis, 676 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn.App.2004) (“On appeal to this court, [appellants] argue that the city erred by approving the * * * application because the application was defective and violated Minneapolis zoning ordinances.”). In these cases, the planning commissions of the LGUs acted on requests and those actions were appealed to the full governing bodies of the LGUs by other affected parties. Gun Lake, 612 N.W.2d at 180; Moreno, 676 N.W.2d at 2. In both cases, the governing bodies of the LGUs denied the appeals after the 60-day time limit and the affected parties appealed to the court of appeals. Gun Lake, 612 N.W.2d at 180; Moreno, 676 N.W.2d at 3.

In Gun Lake, the court of appeals held that because section 15.99 required the request to be granted, the LGU did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying the appeal of the decision of its planning commission. 612 N.W.2d at 182. The court of appeals extended the rationale of Gun Lake one step further in Moreno. Without any analysis, the Moreno court simply concluded that because section 15.99 compelled the granting of the request, it could not be an error of law for the LGU to deny the appeal. 676 N.W.2d at 7. Neither Gun Lake nor Moreno confronted or analyzed the issue of what happens when an approval under section 15.99 conflicts with the substantive authority given to the LGU in state law. We proceed to that analysis now.

Breza argues that the language of section 15.99 specifically addresses the impact of the 60-day rule on other inconsistent law. He argues that the clause “notwithstanding any other law to the contrary” in section 15.99, subd. 2, is preemptive in nature and makes clear that even if the city did not have the legal authority to approve the application under the WCA, it is nonetheless approved by operation of section 15.99.

The city argues that section 15.99 is a timing statute and cannot operate to give substantive authority to LGUs that they do not already possess. The city argues that Breza’s argument takes the clause “notwithstanding any other law to the contrary” out of context. The city points out that that clause modifies only the sentence of which it is a part, and not the entire paragraph. Section 15.99 reads “notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, an agency must approve or deny within 60 days a written request.” The city argues that this simply means that the 60-day rule applies, notwithstanding any other timing rules to the contrary.

The plain language of the statute supports the city’s position. If the legislature wanted section 15.99 to preempt all other substantive law, it would have said “if an agency fails to deny a request within 60 days, the request is approved notwithstanding any other law.” Instead, the notwithstanding clause preempts only other timelines.

The consequence of the city’s failure to act within 60 days is that any deficiencies that might have existed in Breza’s exemption application are deemed waived, and the application is approved. The breadth of the exemption approved, however, is limited by the scope of the city’s authority to grant an exemption, as defined in the WCA. See Minnetonka Elec. Co., 273 Minn, at 304, 141 N.W.2d at 140. In Breza’s case, state law gave the city authority to grant Breza a 400 square foot exemption, and that is the extent of the city’s authority under state law. We hold that Minn.Stat. § 15.99 cannot operate to grant a broader exemption.

The city has recognized that Breza was granted a 400 square foot exemption, the broadest exemption authorized under the WCA based on Breza’s application. Accordingly, the city has performed the clear responsibility required of it by section 15.99, and a writ of mandamus compelling the city to grant a larger exemption is an error of law.

Affirmed.

      . The parties stipulated that the property is located within the shoreland protection zone of Lake Minnetonka.

      . A no-loss determination is a determination that the proposed activity does not result in a loss of wetlands. Minn. R. 8420.0220 (1999). Such a determination does not apply to this case.

      . A wetland bank is a system whereby individuals can deposit credits (in the form of restored or created wetlands) into a bank to be sold to other individuals who are required to replace wetlands. The purchase of wetland credits is done in lieu of replacement. Wetland credits must be purchased directly from the individual who deposited the credits into the wetland bank. See Minn. R. 8420.0740 (1999).

      .At the time Breza submitted his application, section 15.99 provided that "[ejxcept as otherwise provided in this section and notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, an agency must approve or deny within 60 days a written request ⅝ ⅜ * for a permit, license, or other governmental approval of an action. Failure of an agency to deny a request within 60 days is approval of the request." Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2 (2000).

      . The record does not reflect why it took the city more than a year to respond to Breza's application.

      . There is a slight discrepancy in the number of square feet for which Breza claims to have applied (5,737) and the number of square feet that the district court found covered by his application (5,757). There is also arguably a discrepancy between the text of Breza’s application, which requested an exemption for "4 cubic yards” of fill, and the district court’s finding that he applied for an exemption for 5,757 square feet. But the city does not ask us to examine whether the district court’s finding on the scope of the exemption requested is clearly erroneous. Accordingly, that question is not before us.

      . The relevant laws governing wetland conservation are found primarily in the Wetland Conservation Act of 1991, ch. 354, 1991 Minn. Laws 2794 (codified in scattered sections of Minn.Stat. chs. 103A-103G), as well as in additional provisions of the Water Law, Minn.Stat. chs. 103A-103G (2004). Rules implementing the Wetland Conservation Act were developed by the Board of Water and Soil Resources. See Minn. R. 8420.0100-8420.1060 (1999) ("This chapter implements the Wetland Conservation Act of 1991 * * *.")

      . The WCA and its implementing rules include detailed requirements for replacement plans and the process by which local government units may consider such plans for approval. See Minn.Stat. §§ 103G.222 (2000), 103G.2242 (2000); Minn. R. 8420.0230 (1999), 8420.0520 (1999), 8420.0540 (1999).

      . The exemptions include 1) certain agricultural activities; 2) public drainage systems; 3) activities exempt under federal regulations; 4) activities in a restored wetland under a contract or easement allowing the landowner the right to drain the restored wetland; 5) activities in wetlands that were incidentally created; 6) certain utilities and public works projects; 7) certain forestry activities; 8) certain development projects approved within five years before July 1, 1991; 9) de minims activity; and 10) wildlife habitat improvement. Minn.Stat. § 103G.2241 (2000).

      .Within the seven-county metropolitan area, “local government unit” is defined as including "a city council, [or] a town board.” Minn.Stat. § 103G.005, subd. 10e(2) (2000).

      . Breza argues that it is not beyond the city's authority to grant his application because even if he did not qualify for an exemption, the WCA allows wetlands to be filled or drained as long as they are replaced by wetlands of equal value. But Breza concedes that he never submitted a replacement plan to the city that met the requirements of the WCA. Rather, he applied only for an exemption. When Breza submitted his application to the City of Minnetrista in December 2000, he proposed no replacement plan. He likewise submitted no replacement plan in response to the August 2002 notice he received from the Department of Natural Resources. In February of 2003, Breza did submit a proposal to the Minnetrista City Council to restore slightly more than half of the wetlands on his property and to pay the city $4,800. This proposal was in essence an offer to settle the dispute with the city; it was not, Breza concedes, a replacement plan. See Minn.Stat. §§ 103G.222, 103G.2242; Minn. R. 8420.0230, 8420.0520, 8420.0540 (collectively discussing replacement plans). Accordingly, that the city may have had authority in the abstract to consider replacement plans has no relevance to our decision here.

      . In American Tower, we construed section 15.99, subd. 3(f) (2000), which provides for extensions of the 60-day deadline. 636 N.W.2d at 311. The city in that case had provided in an application form that the 60-day deadline was extended in all cases for an additional 60 days. Id. We held that the city had no statutory authority to grant itself an extension to rule on applications before it even received the applications. Id. at 313.

      . Because the statutory language is clear, we do not resort to legislative history. We note, however, that if we were to resort to legislative history, we have been directed to no authority indicating the legislature intended section 15.99 to expand the substantive authority given to LGUs.

      . The city notes that the legislature amended section 15.99 to incorporate references to specific statutes that give LGUs different time frames in which to act. The city contends that these changes reinforce the legislature’s intent that section 15.99 preempts other time-lines, and not other substantive law. See Minn.Stat. § 15.99 (2004) ("Except as otherwise provided in this section, section 462.358, subdivision 3b [providing deadlines of 120 and 60 days for preliminary and final action on subdivision applications], or chapter 505 [providing other deadlines for actions related to plats], and notwithstanding any other law to the contraiy, an agency must approve or deny within 60 days a written request * * *■”)■

      . We note that this case does not involve an issue on which the city has discretion, such as approval of a replacement plan submitted under the WCA or the operation of city rules or ordinances that the city has authority to modify. This opinion should not be read to indicate how we might view the application of Minn.Stat. § 15.99 in matters of discretionary decision-making by LGUs. We leave that question for another day.

      . To the extent Gun Lake and Moreno can be read to suggest a contraiy result, they are overruled.