author:
LARSON, Justice.
      TERNUS, Justice

text:
    In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Francis CARLISLE, Deceased. Dorthy L. Carlisle, Surviving Spouse, Appellant, v. Kathy Hundoble and Cindy Schmidt, Coexecutors of the Estate of Francis Carlisle, Appellees.
    No. 01-1992.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Nov. 14, 2002.
    Brian C. Ivers of McDonald, Stonebraker, Cepican & Woodward, A P.C., Davenport, and Eric M. Knoernschild of Hinter-meister & Knoernschild, Muscatine, for appellant.
    Steven J. Havercamp, Rachel R. Watkins Schoenig, and Curt A. Oppel of Stanley, Lande & Hunter, Muscatine, for ap-pellees.
   LARSON, Justice.

Dorthy Carlisle appealed from a district court ruling that her surviving-spouse benefits under Iowa Code chapter 633 (1999) had been extinguished by a prior decree of separate maintenance. We disagree and therefore reverse and remand.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.

Francis and Dorthy Carlisle had been married for sixty-five years when, in 1998, Dorthy fell and broke her hip. She wanted to install a bathroom on the first floor of their home to accommodate her resulting disability. Francis refused because it would be too expensive to cut into the limestone walls of their home. Dorthy moved in with her daughter. On August 16, 1999, she filed a petition for legal separation and maintenance. Francis answered and counterclaimed for a decree of dissolution. Francis acknowledged that his wife “has been a wonderful lady and this action should never have happened.” Nevertheless, he wanted a dissolution because he did not want Dorthy to request more property from him.

On May 23, 2000, the district court entered a decree of separate maintenance. The court’s opinion stated that, “There has not been a breakdown in the marital relationship to the extent that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed.” (Emphasis added.)

Iowa Code section 598.21(1) provides:

Upon every judgment of annulment, dissolution, or separate maintenance the court shall divide the property of the parties and transfer the title of the property accordingly.

Pursuant to this statute, the court divided the parties’ assets, including their home on thirty-four acres of land, which the court divided as tenants in common. The decree provided that, when Francis was no longer able to reside in the home, it would be sold and the proceeds divided. The decree stated, “Each party shall keep the property currently in their possession free and clear of any claim on behalf of the other.”

Francis died on August 6, 2001, leaving a will dated July 25, 2000. The will specifically excluded Dorthy: “I am purposely making no provision in my Will for my wife, Dorthy L. Carlisle or my daughter, Linda L. Grander, or one of my grandchildren .... ” The executor of Francis’ estate filed this petition for a declaratory ruling to determine Dorthy’s rights in Francis’s estate.

The district court ruled that, following entry of a separate-maintenance decree, Dorthy was not a “surviving spouse” and therefore she (1) could not elect against Francis’s will, Iowa Code § 633.236; (2) could not elect to occupy the homestead as a surviving spouse, Iowa Code § 633.240; and (3) was not entitled to support as a surviving spouse, Iowa Code § 633.374. The court’s opinion stated in part:

It seems illogical for the Decree of Separate Maintenance to divide marital property, to extinguish all rights Dorthy Carlisle had in Francis Carlisle’s resulting separate property, but then to have the interest in their marital property reborn as a result of his death.

II. Disposition.

Francis’s estate and Francis’s niece, as a beneficiary under his will (collectively “the estate”), rely primarily on Iowa Code section 598.20:

When a dissolution of marriage is decreed the parties shall forfeit all rights acquired by marriage which are not specifically preserved in the decree.

According to the estate’s argument, Dorthy lost her spousal rights- under chapter 633 because those rights were not “preserved” in the separate-maintenance decree. We do not agree. Section 598.20 applies by its terms. only to dissolution actions. The estate rejects this interpretation of section- 598.20, arguing that Iowa Code section 598.28 makes section 598.20 applicable to separate-maintenance actions as well as dissolution actions. Section 598.28 provides:

A petition shall be filed in separate maintenance and annulment actions as in actions for dissolution of marriage, and all applicable provisions of this chapter in relation thereto shall apply to separate maintenance and annulment actions.

Section 598.28, however, cannot be given the broad application urged by the estate. The operative words in section 598.28 are “all applicable provisions of this chapter in relations thereto shall apply to separate-maintenance ... actions.” Many of the provisions of chapter 598- are necessarily applicable to separate-maintenance actions as well as dissolutions because of the need to provide a detailed procedural framework to a cause of action that previously existed only at common law. See In re Marriage of Kurtz, 199 N.W.2d 312, 314 (Iowa 1972) (“Under the Iowa law before adoption of ... chapter 598 ... a cause of action for separate maintenance was not statutory in contrast to divorce actions.”). We believe the Code sections that are applicable to all dissolution, separate-maintenance, and annulment eases are those that are procedural in nature. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 598.2 (jurisdiction and venue); § 598.4 (caption of petition); § 598.5 (contents of petition); § 598.7 (verification and evidence); § 598.8 (hearing procedures); § 598.9 (residence and failure of proof); § 598.13 (financial statements); and others.

Other sections in chapter 598 are clearly not applicable to separate-maintenance actions. These statutes go beyond procedure and determine substantive rights of the parties. For example, section 598.17 applies by its terms only to dissolution decrees. It applies the requirements of a breakdown of the marriage in order to obtain a dissolution decree. Applying section 598.17 to a separate-maintenance action would be inconsistent with the purpose of section 598.17, which is to terminate the marital relationship as opposed to preserving it in a separate-maintenance action.

Section 598.20, the statute at issue in this case, is another example of a provision that is not applicable to separate-maintenance actions. First, it suggests by its language that a dissolution decree is a condition precedent to application of the statute. It provides “[w]hen a dissolution of marriage is decreed.” (Emphasis added.) In contrast to this limited scope, the legislature could have provided a broad scope to section 598.20, as it did in three subsections of the very next section. Subsection (1) of section 598.21, which is applicable to the division of property, begins: “ Upon every judgment of annulment, dissolution or separate maintenance the court shall divide the property of the parties .... ” (Emphasis added.) Identical language is repeated in subsection (3) dealing with spousal support and subsection (4)(a) dealing with child support.

Further militating against the application of section 598.20 to separate-maintenance decrees is the fact that this section does not mention any rights that would be forfeited under chapter 633. We believe if the legislature had intended to cut off rights of a surviving spouse that are provided by chapter 633, it would have at least referred to that chapter and would not have left it to implication by the interpretation of a dissolution provision in another chapter of the Code. In order for us to say the wife is not entitled to the benefits of a surviving spouse, we would have to say, as the district court did, that “Dorthy Carlisle is not a surviving spouse.” We do not believe that is correct.

We conclude that Dorthy Carlisle is a surviving spouse for purposes of chapter 633, and she did not lose those rights by reason of section 598.20 through a separate-maintenance action. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for entry of an order applying this ruling.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

All justices concur except TERNUS and CADY, JJ., and LAVORATO, C.J., who dissent.

TERNUS, Justice

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent because I believe the majority has misinterpreted Iowa Code section 598.28. That statute provides:

A petition shall be filed in separate maintenance and annulment actions as in actions for dissolution of marriage, and all applicable provisions of this chapter in relation thereto shall apply to separate maintenance and annulment actions.

Iowa Code § 598.28 (emphasis added). The determinative issue in this case is whether the emphasized language has the effect of making section 598.20, providing for the forfeiture of marital rights upon a dissolution of marriage, applicable to separate maintenance actions. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, I think it does.

The majority interprets section 598.28 to make applicable to separate maintenance actions any procedural provision of that chapter governing dissolution actions. I think the language of section 598.28 indicates a much broader scope, an interpretation supported by our case law.

Nearly identical statutory language was at issue in Ricard v. Ricard, 143 Iowa 182, 121 N.W. 525 (1909). In that case, the husband had filed a petition seeking annulment of his marriage on the basis that his wife was already married to a gentleman by the name of “Count Predosa.” Ricard, 143 Iowa at 183, 121 N.W. at 525. His wife sought alimony. Id. The court stated “the statute does not make specific provision for alimony in cases of this kind.” Id. (noting the only provision for alimony in annulment cases was for “the innocent party,” a status not enjoyed by Mrs. Ri-card). Nonetheless, the court relied on the predecessor to section 598.28, Iowa Code section 3183 (1897), as authorizing the court to award alimony in annulment cases pursuant to the statute allowing alimony in divorce cases. Ricard, 143 Iowa at 183-84, 121 N.W. at 525. The court quoted section 3183, which provided:

A petition shall be filed in such cases [annulment] as in actions for divorce, and all the provisions of this chapter in relation thereto shall apply to such cases, except as otherwise provided.

Iowa Code § 3183 (1897) (emphasis added). Noting that there was provision made in the law “for the allowance of alimony in the case of divorce,” our court concluded:

[I]f the section of the statute which we have set out above [section 3183] is to be given any force or effect at all, it must be held that alimony may be awarded in proper cases brought to annul a marriage alleged to be illegal.

Ricard, 143 Iowa at 184, 121 N.W. at 525.

Contrary to the limited scope given the present-day statute by the majority, this court clearly interpreted the predecessor statute to make substantive provisions of chapter 598 that apply to dissolution actions equally applicable to annulment actions. I think the language of section 598.28 calls for a similar interpretation. There is simply nothing in the statute itself that supports its restriction to procedural matters only.

The language “all applicable provisions of this chapter in relation thereto ” refers to the prior words, “actions for dissolution of marriage.” Thus, the language “all applicable provisions of this chapter in relation thereto” encompasses the provisions of chapter 598 that apply to “actions for dissolution of marriage.” When this concept is substituted for the language, “all applicable provisions of this chapter in relation thereto,” the statute would read: all provisions of chapter 598 that apply to actions for dissolution of marriage “shall apply to separate maintenance ... actions.” See Ricard, 143 Iowa at 184, 121 N.W. at 525 (interpreting nearly identical predecessor statute in this fashion).

Section 598.28 just cannot mean, as the majority asserts, that only 'procedural provisions of chapter 598 that apply to dissolution actions “shall apply to separate maintenance ... actions.” Such a narrow interpretation of the statute is simply not supported by the words chosen by the legislature. Like it or not, section 598.28 makes section 598.20 applicable to separate maintenance actions because section 598.20is “[an] applicable provision[ ] of this chapter in relation [to actions for dissolution of marriage],” which, by the express terms of section 598.28, “shall apply to separate maintenance ... actions.”

The simple fact that section 598.20 refers only to dissolution actions is no support for the majority’s position. If the disputed language of section 598.28 is to have any meaning, it must make applicable to separate maintenance actions provisions of chapter 598 that, by their express terms, do not otherwise apply to separate maintenance actions. Thus, the mere fact that section 598.20 refers only to dissolution actions does not prevent section 598.28 from expanding the scope of section 598.20to include separate maintenance actions. That is exactly what this court did in Ricard in applying a statute allowing alimony in divorce cases to annulment actions.

Although there may be provisions of chapter 598 governing dissolution that so clearly conflict with express requirements for separate maintenance actions that a choice must be made as to which statute prevails, such a conflict can be resolved by application of legal principles addressing the resolution of such conflicts. See Iowa Code § 4.7 (providing that a special statute prevails over a more general provision). In the present case, though, there is nothing inconsistent in applying section 598.20to separate maintenance actions. See Boyd v. Boyd, 58 Ill.App.2d 1, 207 N.E.2d 350, 355 (1965) (holding, in absence of statute requiring this result, that where the court awarded separate maintenance and divided the parties’ property, “[t]he decree ha[d] the effect of destroying the inchoate dower interest of [the husband] in that property”). See generally Ricard, 143 Iowa at 184, 121 N.W. at 525-26 (discussing soundness of applying divorce alimony statute to annulment action). Under section 598.21, property of the parties in a separate maintenance action is divided by the court and awarded to the parties in the same manner followed in dissolution actions and using the same criteria applied in dissolution actions. See Iowa Code § 598.21 (providing for division of property in annulment, separate maintenance and dissolution proceedings). It is entirely consistent, then, to treat the property rights of one party upon the death of the other party the same in separate maintenance actions as in dissolution actions. That is what section 598.28 requires.

As the majority notes, prior to the adoption of chapter 598, a cause of action for separate maintenance was not statutory. See In re Marriage of Kurtz, 199 N.W.2d 312, 314 (Iowa 1972). Under the common law, a court entertaining a suit for separate maintenance had no authority to divide the parties’ property or otherwise adjudicate their property rights. See 41 Am. Jur.2d Husband and Wife § 211, at 141 (1995). Thus, when Iowa incorporated separate maintenance actions into chapter 598, it expanded the scope of such actions to allow adjudication of property rights, just as in dissolution actions. Applying section 598.20, then, is consistent with the statutory separate maintenance action in Iowa, which permits the court in a separate maintenance action to decide the identical property issues that are adjudicated in dissolution actions. Section 598.28 and section 598.20 have the effect of simply making any division of property by the court final and not subject to redistribution to the other party under the probate code, an eminently reasonable and fair result.

I would affirm.

LAVORATO, C.J. and CADY, J„ join in this dissent.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CADY, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    IOWA SUPREME COURT BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT, Complainant, v. Alan L. BERNARD, Respondent.
    No. 02-0731.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Nov. 14, 2002.

      Norman G. Bastemeyer and Charles L. Harrington, Des Moines, for complainant.
    Alan L. Bernard, Cedar Rapids, respondent, pro se.
   CADY, Justice.

This case is before us on a report of a division of the Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa. The Grievance Commission found Alan L. Bernard violated the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility by committing a criminal act, making a false statement to the Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct, and neglecting client matters. The Commission recommended a one-year suspension. Upon our respectful consideration of the matter, we find Bernard violated the Code of Professional Responsibility as alleged, and suspend his license to practice law indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for one year.

I. Commission Report.

Alan Bernard was admitted to practice law in Iowa in 1980. He maintained an office in Des Moines as a sole practitioner, and primarily engaged in criminal defense work.

Unfortunately, Bernard developed an addiction to alcohol during his years of practice. To compound matters, he began using methamphetamine in 1999, and became addicted to the drug within a short period of time. In the months that followed, Bernard was frequently tardy for court appearances and, at other times, failed to appear without explanation. In January 2000, a judge reported his delinquent actions to the Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct by filing a written complaint.

A few weeks later, Bernard was arrested by Marion County law enforcement officers for the crime of delivery of methamphetamine. He was subsequently charged with multiple counts of the.crime. The arrest and prosecution were prominently reported by the print media.

The Board promptly notified Bernard of the neglect complaint filed against him. Bernard submitted a written response to the Board. In his response, he denied any current or past “methamphetamine substance abuse problem.”

In November 2000, Bernard was suspended from practicing law under Iowa Court Rule 121 for failing to file a client security statement with the Client Security and Attorney Disciplinary Commission, and to pay the annual fee. The following month, he pled guilty to two counts of an amended charge of possession of methamphetamine, a serious misdemeanor. Bernard was sentenced in January 2001. He was ordered to serve twenty days of a suspended jail sentence and was placed on probation for two years.

Bernard entered a drug and alcohol treatment program following the sentencing. He completed the program and has regularly attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings since that time. He has maintained his sobriety. He later moved to Cedar Rapids, where he began work as the director of stadium operations and sales for the Cedar Rapids Kernels baseball team, an affiliate of the Anaheim Angels.

The Board filed a two-count complaint against Bernard on February 5, 2002. The first count alleged criminal misconduct involving possession of methamphetamine. The second count alleged two grounds of professional misconduct. The first was client neglect and the second, involved making a false response to the Board. The false statement concerned his denial of a substance abuse problem in the written response to the original neglect complaint. Bernard admitted the allegations, including the false response to the Board. At the hearing before the Commission, Bernard testified he made the false statement because he was in denial of his drug problem at the time.

The Commission concluded Bernard committed misconduct. It found the misconduct involving the criminal convictions for possession of methamphetamine violated Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1 — 102(A)(1) (violation of disciplinary rule) and (6) (conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to practice law). It found the conduct involving his late and missed court appearances and false statement to the Board violated DR 1-102(A)(1), (4) (conduct involving dishonesty or misrepresentation), (5) (conduct prejudicial to administration of justice), and (6) and DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglect of client’s legal matter). The Commission recommended Bernard be suspended for one year.

II.Scope of Review.

We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Mulford, 625 N.W.2d 672, 679 (Iowa 2001). We are not bound by the findings of the Commission, but we give them weight. Id. We also “consider the discipline recommended by the Commission,” but are not bound to follow it. Id. The Board has the burden to prove disciplinary violations by a “ ‘convincing preponderance of the evidence.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).

III. Violations.

Bernard did not-dispute the relevant facts or that his conduct violated our Code of Professional Responsibility. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Stefani, 616 N.W.2d 550, 552-53 (Iowa 2000) (unlawful possession of controlled substance constitutes a violation); In re Edwards, 694 N.E.2d 701, 713 (Ind.1998) (unjustified failure to appear at court hearing violates rules of professional conduct); Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Hall, 463 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Iowa 1990) (false statement to -committee violates rules of professional conduct). He did claim his false statement to the Board was a product of his addiction, and he was in a state of denial at the time the statement was made. Nevertheless, his drug and alcohol addiction does not excuse his conduct. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Grotewold, 642 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Iowa 2002) (false statement constituted misrepresentation despite state of depression suffered by lawyer).

We agree with the conclusion of the Commission that Bernard’s conduct violated the Code of Professional Responsibility as alleged. We turn to consider the appropriate discipline.

IV. Discipline.

“In determining the appropriate discipline, we consider ‘the nature of the alleged violations, the need for deterrence, protection of the public, maintenance of the reputation of the [bar] as a whole, and the respondent’s fitness to continue in the practice of law.’ ” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Hohenadel, 634 N.W.2d 652, 655 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted). We also take into account “both aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Mears, 569 N.W.2d 132, 134 (Iowa 1997).

Our prior disciplinary cases have not collectively considered the nature of the violations involved in this case in a single proceeding. However, we have suspended a lawyer for six months for possession of cocaine and failure to respond to the Board. See Stefani, 616 N.W.2d at 553. We recently suspended an alcoholic lawyer for four months based on client neglect and misrepresentation to a judge. See Hohenadel, 634 N.W.2d at 657. Even more recently, we imposed a sixty-day suspension in a case involving a lawyer suffering from depression who neglected client matters, misrepresented a matter to the court, and failed to respond to the Board. See Grotewold, 642 N.W.2d at 296. Notwithstanding, “there is no standard discipline for a particular type of attorney misconduct.” Hohenadel, 634 N.W.2d at 655. Each case rests on its own facts, viewed in light of the relevant governing considerations.

In considering the nature of the violations in this case, we have stated that misrepresentation by a lawyer “constitutes a grave and serious breach of professional ethics.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Stein, 603 N.W.2d 574, 576 (Iowa 1999). Similarly, criminal conduct committed by lawyers, including drug and substance abuse crimes, constitutes serious violations of our code of ethics. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Ruth, 636 N.W.2d 86, 89 (Iowa 2001); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Giger, 37 P.3d 856, 864 (Okla.2001) (conduct by a lawyer involving the use of illegal drugs “is incompatible with the practice of law”). This conduct not only adversely impacts the fitness of a lawyer to practice law, it impugns the reputation of the profession as a whole.

We recognize Bernard has had no prior disciplinary problems. We also recognize that he eventually acknowledged his addiction, sought treatment, and has maintained sobriety. Yet, the discipline we impose must reflect the serious nature of his misconduct. We also give respectful consideration to the Commission’s recommendation. See Mulford, 625 N.W.2d at 679.

In view of the relevant factors, together with all aggravating and mitigating circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the Commission that a one-year suspension is appropriate. We suspend Bernard’s license to practice law indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for one year. This suspension applies to all facets of the practice of law. Iowa Ct. R. 35.12. Upon any application for reinstatement, Bernard must establish that he has not practiced law during the suspension period and that he has in all other ways complied with the requirements of Iowa Court Rule 35.21. Costs of this action are taxed to Bernard pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.25.

LICENSE SUSPENDED.


author: STREIT, Justice.

text:
    IOWA SUPREME COURT BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT, Complainant, v. Douglas D. DAGGETT, Respondent.
    No. 02-0951.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Nov. 14, 2002.

      Norman G. Bastemeyer and Charles L. Harrington, Des Moines, for complainant.
    Douglas D. Daggett, Crestón, pro se.
   STREIT, Justice.

Douglas D. Daggett, an Iowa attorney, is charged with neglecting his client’s legal matters, making a misrepresentation to the court, and failing to respond to the complaints against him. The Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct filed a complaint against Dag-gett with our Grievance Commission alleging he violated several ethical rules. The Commission recommended we suspend Daggett’s license to practice law for sixty days. Our review is required by Iowa Court Rule 35.10 (2002). We concur with the Commission’s findings and recommended sanction.

I. Background and Facts

Douglas D. Daggett has practiced law in Union County since May 1997. On December 23, 1999, the Black Hawk County district court appointed Daggett to handle an appeal for Raymond Birden who had previously been found in contempt of court for violating a no-contact order. On February 3, 2000, Daggett filed a motion to extend the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari with our court. We granted the motion, giving Daggett until March 1, 2000, to file such petition.

March 1 passed and Daggett did not file the petition for certiorari. On March 10, the Iowa Supreme Court clerk issued a notice of default. Daggett had fifteen days to remedy the situation. If Daggett failed to do so, Birden’s appeal would be dismissed pursuant to Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.19(1) (2001). . Because Daggett did not file the appeal, on April 19, 2000, the clerk entered an order dismissing the appeal. Birden was incarcerated.

After the clerk dismissed Birden’s petition, Daggett filed an application in district court for appointment of new counsel to represent Birden. He also filed an application requesting Birden’s immediate release from custody. During a hearing on the motion, Daggett told Associate District Court Judge Moothart he filed an application for reinstatement of the certiorari proceedings with our court. Daggett said the matter was pending and he was awaiting a ruling on the application. In reality, Daggett prepared an application for reinstatement but did not actually file it with our court. Daggett knew his representations to the judge were false.

In June 2000, Birden filed a pro ■ se motion in Judge Moothart’s court for reconsideration. Birden asserted Daggett never filed an application for reinstatement of the certiorari action. The judge entered an order directing Daggett to file a written response by July 10, 2000. Dag-gett did not file a response to his client’s allegations.

In both July and August 2000, the Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct served notices of complaint on Daggett. The Board sent a follpw-up letter to Daggett in September, but Dag-gett failed to respond to the complaint. The Board then filed the petition for disciplinary action.

Daggett testified during hearings on the matter. He admitted most of the factual allegations made by the Board. Daggett asserted that his professional problems stemmed from his depression related to the dissolution of his marriage. He testified he was in the process of scaling back his law practice because he did not believe he could adequately represent all of his clients.

II. Scope of Review

We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Rauch, 650 N.W.2d 574, 576 (Iowa 2002); Iowa Ct. R. 35.10. We give respectful consideration to the Grievance Commission’s findings and recommendations, but are not bound by them. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Grotewold, 642 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Iowa 2002). The Board has the burden to prove misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. Id.

III. Violations

The Commission found Daggett committed multiple violations of our rules of professional responsibility. Daggett does not contest any of the relevant facts or that his conduct violated our ethical rules. His violations are based on neglect of his client’s legal matter, a misrepresentation to the court, and failure to respond to the Board’s inquiries. See DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), (5) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), and (6) (conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to practice law); DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglect of client’s legal matters); DR 7-101(A) (lawyer shall not fail to seek the lawful objectives of a client or fail to carry out a contract of employment for professional services); DR 7-106(A) (lawyer shall not disregard a standing order of a tribunal). The Commission recommended we suspend Daggett’s license to practice law for sixty days. We agree with the Commission’s findings and recommendation.

A. Neglect of a Client’s Legal Matters

First, Daggett neglected his client’s legal matters by faffing to comply with appellate deadlines. See Iowa Supreme Ct Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Hohenadel, 634 N.W.2d 652, 653-54 (Iowa 2001) (neglect of criminal appeal and personal injury action). Such conduct not only constitutes neglect, but also amounts to conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. See DR 1-102(A)(5); Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Thomas, 495 N.W.2d 684, 686 (Iowa 1993).

Throughout Daggett’s representation of Birden, Daggett failed to completely address and follow-through with his duties in prosecuting Birden’s appeal. Daggett did not file the certiorari petition. Even after the supreme court clerk alerted Daggett to this error, Daggett did not respond. He did not file an application for reinstatement of the appeal. Daggett violated DR 1-102(A)(5) (conduct prejudicial to administration of justice) and (6) (conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to practice law), DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglect), and DR 7-101(A) (lawyer shall not fail to seek lawful objectives of a client or fail to carry out contract of employment).

B. Misrepresentation

The Commission also found Dag-gett made a misrepresentation to the court. The court held a hearing on Bir-den’s application for appointment of new counsel and immediate release from custody. During the hearing, the court inquired as to the status of the application for reinstatement. The court said to Dag-gett “you’re indicating that you have an application to reinstate these matters filed with the Supreme Court?” Daggett responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” He said the application was pending and they were currently awaiting a ruling on the application. In fact, though Daggett had prepared the application, he did not file it. Daggett’s statement at best reflects his belief that he would quickly file the application after speaking with the judge at the hearing. Regardless of Daggett’s intentions, his misrepresentation speaks of knowingly deceiving the court. Daggett admits he made a misrepresentation before the court. His “casual, reckless disregard for the truth” warrants discipline. See Grotewold, 642 N.W.2d at 293; accord Rauch, 650 N.W.2d at 578-79; Hohenadel, 634 N.W.2d at 655-56 (citing Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Adams, 623 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Iowa 2001); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Stein, 603 N.W.2d 574, 576 (Iowa 1999)); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Alexander, 574 N.W.2d 322, 326-27 (Iowa 1998).

As we have said before,

[fundamental honesty is the base line and mandatory requirement to serve in the legal profession. The whole structure of ethical standards is derived from the paramount need for lawyers to be trustworthy. The court system and the public we serve are damaged when our officers play fast and loose with the truth.

Rauch, 650 N.W.2d at 579 (citing Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Lesyshen, 585 N.W.2d 281, 288 (Iowa 1998)). Because honesty is crucial to the judicial process and administration of justice, a misrepresentation by a lawyer “generally results ‘in a lengthy suspension of the license to practice law.’ ” Hohenadel, 634 N.W.2d at 656 (quoting Stein, 603 N.W.2d at 576). We find the Board proved by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that Daggett violated DR 1-102(A)(4) for conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.

C. Failure to Respond

The Commission asserts Daggett did not comply with a court order. In a letter, Birden informed the court that Dag-gett lied when he said he filed the application for reinstatement. The court ordered Daggett to “file a written response to the allegations contained in the defendant’s letter by July 10, 2000.” Daggett did not respond. He argues that a response was unnecessary because he admitted to the facts. Daggett also asserts he thought the court’s order was not mandatory but that it was merely a request for a voluntary statement. By not complying with the court’s clear order, Daggett violated DR 1 — 102(A)(5) (conduct prejudicial to administration of justice) and DR 7-106(A) (lawyer shall not disregard a standing order of a tribunal).

Daggett also did not respond to the Board’s inquiries in this matter. Despite the three opportunities the Board gave Daggett to answer, he did not. Daggett violated DR 1-102(A)(5) (conduct prejudicial to administration of justice) and (6) (conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to practice law).

IV. Sanction

In fashioning an appropriate sanction we consider “ ‘the nature of the alleged violations, the need for deterrence, protection of the public, maintenance of the reputation of the [bar] as a whole, and the respondent’s fitness to continue in the practice of law.’ ” Hohenadel, 634 N.W.2d at 655 (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Freeman, 603 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Iowa 1999)). We also give weight to both aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Sherman, 637 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Iowa 2001).

Daggett offers his domestic difficulties as a mitigating circumstance. We have before recognized that an attorney’s depression may have an impact on his or her professional performance. However, “the personal problems of a lawyer that may contribute to the commission of unethical conduct do not excuse the misconduct.” Grotewold, 642 N.W.2d at 295 (citing Adams, 623 N.W.2d at 818; Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Thompson, 595 N.W.2d 132, 134 (Iowa 1999)).

Daggett has one previous ethical infraction resulting in a public reprimand. In February 1999, Daggett was reprimanded for failing to respond to the Board’s investigation of an earlier complaint in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) (conduct prejudicial to administration of justice) and (6) (conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law). Given Daggett’s prior reprimand for his failure to respond to the Board’s inquiries, he surely was aware that future similar conduct would warrant a sanction.

Another aggravating circumstance is the fact that Daggett’s neglect of Birden’s case harmed his client. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Jay, 606 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2000) (harm to client is an aggravating factor warranting more serious sanction). Daggett admits his neglect caused Birden’s appeal to be dismissed for want of prosecution. As a direct consequence of the dismissal of the certiorari matter, Birden’s appeal bond was revoked and he was taken back into custody.

Daggett not only neglected his client, but tried to conceal his neglect by lying to the court. Neglect standing alone typically warrants discipline ranging from a public reprimand to a six-month suspension. Hohenadel, 634 N.W.2d at 655 (citing Freeman, 603 N.W.2d at 603). When neglect is compounded by an attorney’s misrepresentation, however, a more severe sanction is necessary. Id.; see also Grotewold, 642 N.W.2d at 294 (sixty-day suspension for misrepresentation and neglect where record did not indicate link between serious depression and falsehoods on the court); Rauch, 650 N.W.2d at 580 (one-year suspension for misrepresentation, neglect and improper ex parte communications); Hohenadel, 634 N.W.2d at 652 (four-month suspension for neglect of appeal and misrepresentation to the court). Daggett’s misconduct is compounded by his failure to respond to the court order and his failure to cooperate with the Board. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Sullins, 648 N.W.2d 127, 135-36 (Iowa 2002).

We conclude the facts warrant suspension of Daggett’s license to practice law. We suspend his license with no possibility of reinstatement for a period of sixty days from the date of the filing of this opinion. We shall reinstate Daggett’s license to practice law on the day after the sixty-day suspension period expires. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.12(2). The costs of this action are assessed against Daggett in accordance with Iowa Court Rule 35.25. Automatic reinstatement shall not be ordered until all costs assessed have been paid. Id.

LICENSE SUSPENDED.

      . Automatic reinstatement is subject to the following exceptions.
      The board of professional ethics and conduct may file and serve within the suspension period an objection to the automatic reinstatement of the attorney. The filing of an objection shall stay the automatic reinstatement until ordered otherwise by the court. If the board files an objection, the court shall set the matter for hearing and the clerk shall enter written notice in conformance with rule 35.13, except that the court may waive the requirement of a 60-day waiting period prior to the hearing date.
      Iowa Ct. R. 35.12(2).


author: CADY, Justice. LARSON, Justice

text:
    MASTER BUILDERS OF IOWA, INC.; Associated Builders and Contractors of Iowa, Inc.; Des Moines Construction Council; Associated General Contractors of Iowa; Meisner Electric, Inc.; Shaw Electric, Inc.; Bruce Peterson; and Ronald Wayne Stratton, Appellants, v. POLK COUNTY, Iowa and Board of Supervisors of Polk County, Appellees, Central Iowa Building and Construction Trades Council, Intervenor-Appellee.
    No. 02-1005.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Nov. 14, 2002.
    As Corrected Nov. 22, 2002.

      John A. Tempter, Greg A. Naylor, and Jeffrey D. Ewoldt of Pingel & Templer, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellants.
    John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Michael O’Meara, Assistant County Attorney, for appellees.
    Nolden Gentry and Bruce H. Stoltze of Brick, Gentry, Bowers, Swartz, Stoltze, Schuling & Levis, P.C., Des Moines, and Robert J. Henry, G. Gordon Atcheson and Charles R. Schwartz of Blake & Uhlig, P.A., Kansas City, Kansas, for intervenor-appellee.
    Mark T. Hedberg of Hedberg, Owens & Hedberg, Des Moines, and Victoria L. Bor and Jonathan D. Newman of Sherman, Dunn, Cohen, Leifer & Yellig, P.C., Washington, D.C., for amici curiae Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO, and Iowa State Building & Construction Trades Council.
    Ralph Potter, Assistant County Attorney, Dubuque, Thomas F. Kintigh, City Attorney, Ottumwa, and Victoria Siegel, County Attorney, Ottumwa, for amici curiae Dubuque County, Iowa, City of Ottum-wa, Iowa, and Wapello County, Iowa.
   CADY, Justice.

In this appeal, we must decide whether a county may legally utilize a project labor agreement to effectuate the completion of a large-scale public works project. We conclude that the use of such an agreement is permissible under current Iowa and federal law and affirm the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The Iowa Events Center (Events Center) is the planned centerpiece of a series of public works projects meant to advance the profile and prestige of Polk County both inside and outside the state. The Events Center is actually three projects in one: a newly constructed 16,000-seat arena, a newly constructed 100,000 square foot exhibition hall, and a renovation of Veterans Memorial Auditorium. The project was initially budgeted at a cost of $212 million and was slated to open in late 2004.

The cost and scale of the Events Center project caused Polk County, through the actions of the Polk County Board of Supervisors (collectively Board), to pursue a mixture of methods to fund and then construct the project. Polk County applied for and was awarded fifty million dollars from the Vision Iowa fund. The Board also issued general obligation municipal bonds, an undertaking that prompted this court’s first consideration of issues surrounding the Events Center project. See Bowers v. Polk County Bd. of Supervisors, 638 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 2002). At the same time the Board pursued funding, it also began to consider the methods by which the project could be completed in a timely and fiscally responsible manner. One possible method brought to the Board’s attention was the implementation of a project labor agreement (PLA).

The PLA option was first presented to the Board by representatives of the Central Iowa Building and Construction Trades Council (CIBCTC), who began contacting Board members individually before October 2001. On October 18, 2001, the Board received a letter from CIBCTC representatives further advocating the use of a PLA. That letter was followed by a letter from representatives of Master Builders of Iowa, Associated Builders and Contrae-tors, Des Moines Construction Council, and Associated General Contractors of Iowa (collectively Master Builders) stating a number of objections to the adoption of such an agreement. By late fall 2001, lobbying of varying degrees by both sides of the issue clearly had become an undercurrent to the Board’s consideration of a PLA for the Events Center project.

Eventually, the Board requested that the construction manager hired to supervise the project, Weitz-Turner, undertake its own evaluation of the propriety of a PLA. On November 20, 2001, Weitz-Tur-ner issued a report, in the form of a letter to the Board, in response to the Board’s request. The report listed various advantages of a PLA, but also listed disadvantages and a number of other factors that Weitz-Turner advised the Board to consider before making a final decision on adoption of such an agreement. One week later, the Board approved a resolution directing the negotiation of an Events Center PLA. Negotiations soon were undertaken between representatives of Polk County and CIBCTC. On January 8, 2002, the Board considered and adopted, by a vote of 4-1, a resolution calling for the incorporation of the fully negotiated and finalized PLA into all future Events Center construction contracts.

On January 22, 2002, Master Builders filed a petition for declaratory judgment and temporary and permanent injunctive relief in the Iowa District Court for Polk County, naming Polk County and the Board as defendants and challenging the legality of the Events Center PLA on a number of grounds. This petition was subsequently amended to add additional plaintiffs. CIBCTC also moved for intervention and was allowed to intervene as a defendant.

Central among the plaintiffs’ challenges was the claim that the Events Center PLA violated the state’s right-to-work and competitive bidding laws. They also asserted a number of claims under federal law, including arguments that the PLA was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and violated constitutional rights of due process, equal protection, and free association. A hearing on the matter was held, commencing on June 2, 2002. After completion of the hearing, each party submitted its own proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. On June 28, 2002, the court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law and order, finding in favor of the Board on each of the five argument areas advanced by Master Builders.

Master Builders made timely notice of appeal to this court. We expedited our consideration of this appeal given the importance of the issues presented and the great public cost attendant to further delay of the disposition of this matter.

II. Standard of Review.

The parties dispute the standard of review with which we should consider the findings of the district court. The petition in this action was styled as one for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. We review actions for injunctive relief de novo. Owens v. Brownlie, 610 N.W.2d 860, 865 (Iowa 2000). Our review of actions for declaratory judgment depends on how the action was tried to the district court. Id. To determine the proper standard of review, we must consider the “pleadings, relief sought, and nature of the case [to] determine whether a declaratory judgment action is legal or equitable.” Nelson v. Agro Globe Eng’g, Inc., 578 N.W.2d 659, 661 (Iowa 1998). In addition, we consider “whether the court ruled on evidentiary objections” as an important, although not dispositive, test of whether the case was tried in law or equity. Id.

Balancing these factors leads to the conclusion that this case was fully tried in equity. Master Builders has pursued relief from the adoption and incorporation of the PLA into Events Center construction contracts and has not pursued monetary relief of any sort. Both the pleadings and the relief sought were focused on declaratory and injunctive relief, both equitable remedies. Moreover, although the district court ruled on some evidentiary objections in the course of trial, the objections were minor and did not have significant effect on the proceedings. Although we prefer that a trial judge refrain from such rulings, we do not believe the rulings in this trial altered the true nature of the district court proceedings. Sille v. Shaffer, 297 N.W.2d 379, 380-81 (Iowa 1980). Because this matter was tried by the district court wholly in equity, we review this appeal de novo. Iowa R.App. P. 6.4; Owens, 610 N.W.2d at 865.

III. Background of Project Labor Agreements.

A PLA is a “ ‘prehire’ collective bargaining agreement” used by a project owner to set the terms under which a contractor who successfully bids on the project proceeds in all labor relations connected to its subsequent work on the project. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Pub. No. GAO/GGD-98-82, Project Labor Agreements: The Extent of Their Use and Related Information at 1 (1998) [hereinafter U.S.G.A.O.]; N.Y. State Chapter, Inc. v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 88 N.Y.2d 56, 643 N.Y.S.2d 480, 483, 666 N.E.2d 185 (1996); see also Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dept., AFL-CIO v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28, 30 (D.C.Cir.2002). A PLA is considered a prehire agreement because it “can be negotiated before employees vote on union representation or before the contractor hires any workers” and typically “provides that only contractors and subcontractors who sign [the] prenegotiated agreement with the union can perform project work.” U.S.G.A.O., at 1; N.Y. State Chapter, Inc., 643 N.Y.S.2d at 483, 666 N.E.2d 185. In most industries, the NLRA outlaws such agreements. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a), (b) (2000). PLAs, however, operate under the “construction industry” exception to the NLRA, which allows prehire agreements because of “the short-term nature of employment which makes posthire collective bargaining difficult, the contractor’s need for predictable costs and a steady supply of skilled labor, and a longstanding custom of prehire bargaining in the industry.” Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Assoc. Builders & Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 231, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 1198, 122 L.Ed.2d 565, 578 (1993); 29 U.S.C. § 158(f).

When utilized, a PLA is incorporated into every contract entered into for a project. Moreover, PLAs are comprehensive in their coverage of contraetor/labor issues:

Their provisions generally (1) apply to all work performed under a specific contract or project, or at a specific location; (2) require recognition of the signatory unions as the sole bargaining representatives for covered workers, whether or not the workers are union members; (3) supersede all other collective bargaining agreements; (4) prohibit strikes and lockouts; (5) require hiring through union referral systems; (6) require all subcontractors to become signatory to the agreement; (7) establish uniform work rules covering overtime, working hours, dispute resolution, and other matters; and (8) prescribe craft wages, either in the body of the agreement or in an appendix or attachment.

U.S.G.A.O., at 4. For this reason, they are often presented as “the ideal bargain between the interests of the contractors and employees and the developer and the owner of the project.” Jolie M. Siegel, Comment, Project Labor Agreements and Competitive Bidding Statutes, 3 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 295, 297-98 (2001).

With this background in mind, we turn to the challenges presented to the PLA in this case. Many of the issues presented by this appeal have not previously been presented to this court but have a long and conflict-laden past.

IV. The Right-to-Work Statute.

The passage by Congress of the Labor Management Relations (Tafb-Hart-ley) Act (Act) in 1947 altered the nature of labor relations in the United States and produced more than a half-century of social, political, and jurisprudential repercussions that form the battleground on which this appeal has developed. The Act constituted an all-encompassing revision of labor relations law meant to reform the labor practices that had arisen under previous labor relations acts. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 151. In passing the Act, Congress reasserted its prominence in the field of labor relations, save for a few areas in which the states retained leeway to define the contours of labor relations within their borders. See id. One of these exceptions, found in § 14(b) of the Act and codified at 29 U.S.C. § 164(b), is integral to the first area of dispute between the parties in this appeal. Id. § 164(b). Section 164(b) provides,

Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.

Id.

Prior to passage of the Act, some states, including Iowa, had passed constitutional amendments or statutes barring discrimination in employment based on union affiliation. In adopting § 164(b), Congress refrained from preempting these state laws that protected the “right to work.” See H.R.Rep. No. 80-510 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1135, 1166. Soon thereafter, in companion cases, the United States Supreme Court upheld three states’ right-to-work laws against challenges by unions and union members that such laws “denie[d] them freedom of speech, assembly or petition, impair[ed] the obligation of their contracts, or depriv[ed] them of due process of law.” Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 540, 69 S.Ct. 258, 259, 93 L.Ed. 222, 224 (1949); see also Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. N.W. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 69 S.Ct. 251, 93 L.Ed. 212 (1949). Perhaps bolstered by the sanction of Congress and the Court, other states joined those that had already passed a right-to-work law, eventually bringing the total number of states with such a law to twenty-two.

The words of the principle Iowa statutory provision, unaltered since its initial adoption, mirror those of other states in stating:

It is declared to be the policy of the state of Iowa that no person within its boundaries shall be deprived of the right to work at the person’s chosen occupation for any employer because of membership in, affiliation with, withdrawal or expulsion from, or refusal to join, any labor union, organization, or association, and any contract which contravenes this policy is illegal and void.

Iowa Code § 731.1 (2001). Additional provisions apply this same policy in particular fields or provide limited exceptions. See id. §§ 731.1-.9.

The appellants argue that the Events Center PLA violates the letter and spirit of chapter 731. For this reason, they assert that any current contracts in which the PLA has been incorporated are void and future contracts cannot include its terms. The appellants particularly attack a provision of the PLA that dictates the method by which “core” employees of contractors working on the Events Center project would be referred to the job site for employment:

ARTICLE IV
UNION RECOGNITION AND EMPLOYMENT
Section 5. To ensure that all enterprises will have an opportunity to employ their “core” employees on this Project, the parties agree that in those situations where a Contractor not a party to the current collective bargaining agreement with the signatory Union having jurisdiction over the affected work is a successful bidder, the Contractor may request by name, and the Local will honor, referral of persons who have applied to the local union for Project work and who meet at least one of the following qualifications:
(a) possess any license required by the city, county, state or federal law for the Project work to be performed;
(b) have worked a total of at least 1,000 hours in the appropriate construction craft during the prior 3 years; or
(c) were on the Contractor’s active payroll for at least sixty (60) out of the 180 calendar days prior to the contract award.
The Union will refer to such Contractor one journeyperson employee from the hiring hall out-of-work list for the affected trade or craft, and will then refer one of such Contractor’s “core” employees as a journeyperson and shall repeat the process, one and one in accordance with the following table:
Total Crew Size % of Core Employees
1-14 50%
20 40%
25 36%
33 30%
50 22%
60 20%
77 17%
100 14%
Thereafter, all additional employees in the affected trade or craft shall be hired exclusively from the hiring hall out-of-work list(s), which are open to any individual, regardless of Union membership.

The appellants assert that this section of the PLA effectively creates a “union hiring hall,” the operation of which violates chapter 731. Id. Union hiring halls have been objected to by non-union employers and employees in a variety of contexts and have been found to violate some states’ right-to-work laws. See Kaiser v. Price-Fewell, Inc., 235 Ark. 295, 359 S.W.2d 449, 453-54 (1962); Bldg. Trades Council v. Bonito, 71 Nev. 84, 280 P.2d 295, 297 (1955); Branham v. Miller Elec. Co., 237 S.C. 540, 118 S.E.2d 167, 170 (1961); Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 175 v. Walker, 236 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tex.Civ.App.1951). Although there may be merit to appellants’ characterization of the mechanism created by this section of the PLA, we disagree with the appellants’ contention that such an arrangement violates Iowa’s right-to-work law. Indeed, we can find no violation of the right-to-work law arising from the inclusion of the PLA in Events Center contracts for three reasons.

First of all, we do not agree that the right-to-work law has the scope that the appellants assert it does. All right-to-work laws, including Iowa’s, operate within a limited sphere carved from the pervasive federal regulations created in part by the Taft-Hartley Act. In carving the exception for state right-to-work laws in the Act, Congress noted the specific type of laws it intended to save from preemption:

Many States have enacted laws or adopted constitutional provisions to make all forms of compulsory unionism in those States illegal. It was never the intention of the National Labor Relations Act, as is disclosed by the legislative history of the act, to preempt the field in this regard so as to deprive the States of their powers to prevent compulsory unionism. Neither the so-called “closed shop” proviso in section 8(3) of the existing act nor the union shop and maintenance of membership proviso in section 8(a)(3) of the conference agreement could be said to authorize arrangements of this sort in States where such arrangements were contrary to the State policy. To make certain that there should be no question about this, section 13 was included in the House bill. The conference agreement, in section 14(b), contains a provision having the same effect.

H.R.Rep. No. 80-510 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1135, 1166.

Although we have no clear proof of the actual intent of the legislature in passing Iowa’s right-to-work law, we find Congress’ reference to state right-to-work laws at the time instructive. Accordingly, we find that Iowa’s right-to-work law is in place only to prevent “compulsory unionism,” or “conditions that would come into effect only after an individual is hired” and require the employee to join a union or pay the equivalent of dues to a union to maintain employment. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 416-17, 96 S.Ct. 2140, 2145, 48 L.Ed.2d 736, 744 (1976); see also Walles v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AF of L-CIO, 252 N.W.2d 701, 706-07 (Iowa 1977); Ludwig v. Armour & Co., 158 N.W.2d 646, 650 (Iowa 1968). No such condition exists under the terms of the Events Center PLA. Moreover, to give the statute a broader reading that encompasses the provisions of the PLA would take it outside of the scope of permissible state lawmaking condoned by Congress in 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) and into an area that is almost surely preempted by federal law. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245-46, 79 S.Ct. 773, 780, 3 L.Ed.2d 775, 783-84 (1959); see also Walles, 252 N.W.2d at 707; Ludwig, 158 N.W.2d at 651. We find that the right-to-work law does not have the sweep asserted by the appellants, is not preempted by federal law, and does not require the invalidation of the Events Center PLA.

There are also two further reasons why we conclude the PLA does not violate the right-to-work law. The use of union hiring halls in a bargaining agreement such as a PLA is not per se invalid. See Local 357, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 365 U.S. 667, 673, 81 S.Ct. 835, 838, 6 L.Ed.2d 11, 16-17 (1961). Only if such a device is used to discriminate between union and non-union members will it run afoul of the law. See id. at 674-75, 81 S.Ct. at 839, 6 L.Ed.2d at 17-18; Laborers’ Int’l Union of N.Am., Local No. 107 v. Kunco, Inc., 472 F.2d 456, 459 (8th Cir.1973); Local 514, Transp. Workers Union v. Keating, 212 F.Supp.2d 1319, 1326 (E.D.Okla.2002); State ex rel. Assoc. Builders & Contractors v. Jefferson County Bd. of Comm’rs, 106 Ohio App.3d 176, 665 N.E.2d 723, 726 (1995). There is simply not enough evidentiary support in the record to conclude that such discrimination has or will occur in relation to the Events Center PLA. See Local 357, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 365 U.S. at 675, 81 S.Ct. at 839, 6 L.Ed.2d at 17-18; Ketcher v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 115 F.Supp. 802, 817 (E.D.Ark.1953); Holley v. Painters Local Union No. 318, 376 S.W.2d 44, 47-48 (Tex.Ct.App.1964).

At first blush, it appears that the hiring hall provision provides a discriminatory advantage to union workers over non-union workers based on the formulas provided for referring workers to the job site. First, the referral formula calls for “one journeyperson employee from the hiring hall out-of-work list for the affected trade or craft” to be assigned before referral of “one of such Contractor’s ‘core’ employees.” Second, the formula calls for a decreasing apportionment of core employees based on the total crew size needed. Both of these provisions have the potential to discriminate, but they do not discriminate solely by their incorporation into the PLA.

The PLA states explicitly that the hiring hall lists “are open to any individual, regardless of Union membership.” For this reason, it is feasible that the first part of the formula could result in the selection of either a union or non-union worker off of the hiring hall list. There is no evidence in the record that selection from the hiring hall list guarantees selection of a union employee over a non-union employee, or vice versa. It is also far from clear whether the apportionment of union and nonunion workers under the second portion of the formula would be discriminatory. Although it would appear likely that “a Contractor not a party to the current collective bargaining agreement with the signatory Union having jurisdiction over the affected work” will turn out to be a non-union contractor, the record includes evidence that there are union contractors not party to the indicated agreements whose employees would have to be assigned through the core employee referral system to work on site. Thus, union and non-union employees may be subject to the referral process and the apportionment of workers may proceed without discrimination due to union status. Ultimately, there is no evidence that the provisions of the PLA, on its face, are discriminatory.

Moreover, and finally, the PLA specifically provides,

The Contractor and Union agree that they will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, marital status, union membership or physical or mental disability in any manner prohibited by law or regulation....

This form of non-discrimination clause has been found to be a sufficient protection against potential discrimination that may arise from the use of a union hiring hall by a number of courts, including the United States Supreme Court. See Local 357, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 365 U.S. at 675, 81 S.Ct. at 839, 6 L.Ed.2d at 18. We find no reason to depart from this established line of authority. See id.; Laborer’s Int’l Union of N.Am., Local No. 107, 472 F.2d at 458-59; Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Tom Joyce Floors, Inc., 353 F.2d 768, 771 (9th Cir.1965); Ketcher, 115 F.Supp. at 817.

Ultimately, we find that the Events Center PLA does not violate Iowa’s right-to-work law. We underscore, however, that any employee, non-union or union, retains the right to pursue redress of any employment discrimination with the National Labor Relations Board. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (unfair labor practice for an employer “by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization”).

Y. The Competitive Bidding Statute.

Under Iowa law, “[wjhen the estimated cost of a public improvement ... exceeds [$50,000] the [county board of supervisors] shall follow the contract letting procedures provided for cities in sections 384.95 to 384.103.” Iowa Code § 331.341. Sections 384.95 to 384.103 include a number of factors and steps to be considered in the contract letting process. Id. §§ 384.95-.103. The focus here is on section 384.99, which provides in part, “[t]he contract for the public improvement must be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder.” Id. § 384.99 (emphasis added). Both parties agree that the inclusion of the word responsible in the standard for awarding contracts implies a measure of discretion on the part of a political subdivision in its consideration of what bid to ultimately accept for a project. Where the parties differ is in their interpretation of the point at which such discretion may be exercised.

Master Builders argues that the Board’s power arises only after bidding has concluded and then'exists to give the Board the discretion to balance considerations of cost as well as the ability of a bidding party to complete the work in a “responsible” manner before choosing the successful bidder. The Board argues that the language of the statute implies discretion throughout the bidding process, including discretion to define what constitutes a responsible bidder. Under this theory, the Board asserts, the adoption of the PLA is an appropriate exercise of discretion given its effect of defining a responsible bidder as one who will work under the conditions set forth in the PLA.

Although we have not had the opportunity to'fully consider the appropriate timing for the exercise of the discretion accorded a county in operating under the lowest responsible bidder standard, we have had a number of opportunities to consider the standard generally. See City of Des Moines v. Master Builders of Iowa, 498 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Iowa 1993); Istari Constr., Inc. v. City of Muscatine, 330 N.W.2d 798, 800-01 (Iowa 1983); Dunphy v. City Council, 256 N.W.2d 913, 921 (Iowa 1977); Everds Bros. v. Gillespie, 256 Iowa 317, 320-22, 126 N.W.2d 274, 276-77 (1964); Horrabin Paving Co. v. City of Creston, 221 Iowa 1237, 1243, 262 N.W. 480, 484 (1935); Wigodsky v. Town of Holstein, 195 Iowa 910, 916-17, 192 N.W. 916, 919 (1923); Urbany v. City of Carroll, 176 Iowa 217, 221-22, 157 N.W. 852, 854 (1916); Miller v. City of Des Moines, 143 Iowa 409, 418-23, 122 N.W. 226, 230-31 (1909). The paramount purpose of the competitive bidding statute is to protect the public as taxpayers, and that purpose must not be impaired in interpreting the statute. See Garling Constr., Inc. v. City of Shellsburg, 641 N.W.2d 522, 523 (Iowa 2002); Elview Constr. Co. v. North Scott Cmty. Sch. Dist., 373 N.W.2d 138, 141 (Iowa 1985); Kunkle Water & Elec., Inc. v. City of Prescott, 347 N.W.2d 648, 655 (Iowa 1984); Wigodsky, 195 Iowa at 917, 192 N.W. at 919; Miller, 143 Iowa at 420, 122 N.W. at 230. We believe the approach advanced by Master Builders would impair the statute’s purpose.

We have determined previously that the competitive bidding statute operates to “provide a [county] with the best results at the lowest possible price.” City of Des Moines, 498 N.W.2d at 704 (emphasis added). Finding the lowest possible price between bids is a simplistic and mechanical process limited to unsealing and comparing submitted bids. Determining the bid that will provide the best results requires greater discretion. It would be a waste of public resources — and thus a harm to the public as taxpayers — to require an entity such as the Board to simply react to whatever bids are produced in deciding what contractor is the most responsible and is most likely to produce the best results. See Assoc. Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Comm’n, 21 Cal.4th 352, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 981 P.2d 499, 507 (1999); Queen City Constr., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 604 N.W.2d 368, 374 (Minn.Ct.App.1999); A. Pickett Constr., Inc. v. Luzerne County Convention Ctr. Auth., 738 A.2d 20, 24 (Pa.Cmwlth.Ct.1999). The Events Center PLA pre-defines the universe of responsible bidders as those that can and will operate under its terms thus allowing the Board to peremptorily designate the contractors it has determined will produce the best results. This does not mean that the Board is later constrained in choosing what contractor is the lowest responsible bidder. It simply means that the discretion to determine what constitutes the best results for a public contract exists throughout the contract letting process.

Although we make our own interpretation of Iowa’s competitive bidding statute, our approach is consistent with the approaches taken by other, state courts that have considered and upheld a PLA under their state’s competitive bidding statute. See San Francisco Airports Comm’n, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 981 P.2d at 506-707; John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. City of Malden, 430 Mass. 124, 713 N.E.2d 955, 961-62 (1999); Queen City Constr., Inc., 604 N.W.2d at 378; Assoc. Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. S. Nev. Water Auth., 115 Nev. 151, 979 P.2d 224, 228-29 (1999); N.Y. State Chapter, Inc., 643 N.Y.S.2d at 485-87, 666 N.E.2d 185 (upholding one of two challenged PLAs under the state law); State ex rel. Assoc. Builders & Contractors, 665 N.E.2d at 727; A. Pickett Constr., Inc., 738 A.2d at 24; Assoc. Builders & Contractors of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Department of Admin., 787 A.2d 1179, 1189-90 (R.I.2002). Only two courts have invalidated PLAs for violating the state’s competitive bidding law. See Tormee Constr., Inc. v. Mercer County Improvement Auth., 143 N.J. 143, 669 A.2d 1369, 1372 (1995); George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 137 N.J. 8, 644 A.2d 76, 95 (1994); N.Y. State Chapter, Inc., 643 N.Y.S.2d at 488-89, 666 N.E.2d 185 (striking one of two challenged PLAs under the state law). Both of these jurisdictions applied competitive bid standards that placed greater emphasis on competition or the actions of the political subdivision in the bidding process as compared to Iowa’s statute. Tormee Constr., Inc., 669 A.2d at 1371; George Harms Constr. Co., 644 A.2d at 90-91; N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 643 N.Y.S.2d at 485, 666 N.E.2d 185; see also San Francisco Airports Comm’n, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 981 P.2d at 509. Iowa law places greater emphasis on protecting the public as taxpayers. See Garling Constr., Inc., 641 N.W.2d at 523; Wigodsky, 195 Iowa at 917, 192 N.W. at 919. Although this protection could include emphasizing competition in an effort to produce the absolute lowest cost for a project, the choice in prioritization is in the discretion of the political subdivision letting the contract. In this situation, the choices made by the Board do not violate the competitive bidding law.

VI. Preemption Under the National Labor Relations Act.

As discussed previously, federal labor regulations, codified as the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187, form a pervasive network of regulations intended to cover most, although not all, facets of labor relations in the United States. See Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480, 75 S.Ct. 480, 488, 99 L.Ed. 546, 557 (1955). Not surprisingly, the scope of the NLRA often results in preemption of state labor regulation, subject to the limited exceptions found in the act. The United States Supreme Court has articulated two approaches for determining whether preemption of a state labor law should occur. See Colfax Corp. v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth., 79 F.3d 631, 633 (7th Cir.1996) (describing the two types of NLRA preemption, commonly referred to as “Garmon” and “Machinists ” preemption). The Court also has stated,

When a State owns and manages property ... it must interact with private participants in the marketplace. In so doing, the State is not subject to preemption by the NLRA because pre-emption doctrines apply only to state regulation.

Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 507 U.S. at 227, 113 S.Ct. at 1196, 122 L.Ed.2d at 576 (emphasis in original). Therefore, if we determine that the Board has operated in a proprietary mode, as opposed to a regulatory mode, in adopting the PLA, preemption does not apply. See id.

Master Builders asserts that the Board’s adoption of the PLA was a regulatory action. The appellants point in particular to a provision of the PLA providing, “the owner may, at any time, and at its sole discretion, determine to build or modify additional projects under this agreement not currently proposed.” This provision, they argue, is written in such a manner as to allow the Board to apply the terms of the Event Center PLA to subsequent labor contracts, thus making the PLA a regulatory scheme preempted under the NLRA. Master Builders also cites statements in the record by individual Board members that it believes indicate a regulatory purpose behind the passage of the PLA. The Board responds to these assertions by taking issue with Master Builders’ characterization of the PLA clause and the statements of Board members, and by arguing that the Board’s use of the PLA constitutes proprietary action.

We conclude that the actions of the Board in adopting the PLA are proprietary and are not preempted by the NLRA. Master Builders strains to find regulatory motives in the words of the PLA and the actions of the Board that we simply believe do not exist. Although we agree that the language cited by the appellants as allowing for the extension of the PLA to other projects is ambiguous, the enabling resolution for the PLA limits its use to the Events Center project alone. Failure to so limit the PLA would be a serious breach of the public trust and likely also would be a violation of the law. See Iowa Code §§ 21.l-.il. We will not assume that the Board has integrated a clause in the PLA that would allow such a blatant action.

Moreover, we do not consider the comments of the individual Board members to be sufficient evidence of regulatory intent. We join other courts in refusing to hunt for a regulatory motive if the ultimate action of the governmental entity is proprietary such as is the case here in the “contracting for services on a specific project.” See Colfax Corp., 79 F.3d at 634-35; Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1335-36 (D.C.Cir.1996); Legal Aid Soc’y v. City of New York, 114 F.Supp.2d 204, 237 (S.D.N.Y.2000). Sanctioning the continual second-guessing of the actions of a political subdivision in situations such as this would undermine the very principles of discretion already discussed.

VII. Preemption Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.

The appellants assert a second preemption argument, arguing that the Events Center PLA operates as an intrusion into employee benefit plan regulation in contravention of the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), ERISA provisions “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.” A state law under ERISA “includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any State.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1). We determined in our discussion of preemption under the NLRA standards that the actions of the Board in adopting the PLA were proprietary in nature. For that reason, the adoption of the PLA does not constitute state law and is not preempted under ERISA. See Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Metro. Water Dist., 159 F.3d 1178, 1183 (9th Cir.1998); Minn. Chapter of Assoc. Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. County of St. Louis, 825 F.Supp. 238, 243 (D.Minn.1993).

VIII. Constitutional Claims.

Master Builders asserts violations of three constitutional rights: Due Process, Equal Protection, and Free Association. U.S. Const, amends. V; XIV, § 1; I. We consider each of these claims in turn.

1. Due Process.

The Iowa Constitution provides, “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Iowa Const, art. I, § 9. This provision of the Iowa Constitution mirrors the provisions of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const, amends. V, XIV, § 1. Accordingly, we interpret both the Iowa and federal Due Process Clauses in the same fashion, including approaching due process questions under a rubric differentiating between “procedural” and “substantive” due process. Bowers, 638 N.W.2d at 690.

Master Builders asserts that the adoption of the PLA has resulted in the denial of procedural due process because the appellants, as taxpayers, were deprived of a property right in getting the lowest possible price for the Events Center without sufficient notice or opportunity to be heard. The determination of whether an infringement of procedural due process rights has occurred is a two-step inquiry requiring us to first determine whether a protected liberty or property interest is involved and then consider what process is due before a deprivation of that interest. Id. at 691.

Assuming, although not deciding, that a taxpayer has a property interest in receiving the lowest possible price on a public contract, we struggle to find how the appellants were truly denied notice and opportunity to be heard in adoption of the PLA. The record reflects that the appellants began to protest the adoption of the PLA with the Board in fall 2001 prior to the adoption of the resolution incorporating the PLA, the Board authorized the negotiation of the PLA at an open meeting attended by representatives of the appellants who were given an opportunity to object to the PLA during the course of the meeting, the appellants had the opportunity to object at the public meeting during which the resolution adopting the PLA was approved, the appellants have had an opportunity to seek redress from the adoption of the PLA in the court system, and there is no evidence in the record to clearly support the assertion that the Board had predetermined that the PLA would be adopted before actually passing the enabling resolution, as the appellants have alleged. Given the extensive opportunities offered to the appellants to be heard before and after the adoption of the PLA, we conclude they suffered no deprivation of their due process rights.

2. Equal Protection.

The United States Constitution prohibits states from denying to “any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. Similarly, the Iowa Constitution prohibits laws that “grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.” Iowa Const, art. I, § 6. Much like the Due Process Clauses, these two clauses are deemed to be the same “in scope, import, and purpose” and are interpreted in the same manner. Bowers, 638 N.W.2d at 689. The purpose of equal protection is to ensure that similarly situated persons are treated the same. Id. The key to analyzing equal protection questions is the determination of the level of scrutiny and review to which the action in question must be subjected. “Unless a suspect class or a fundamental right is involved,” a classification made by a state actor “need only have a rational basis.” Id.

Master Builders believes that the Board’s conduct operated to discriminate against non-union contractors due to the allegedly pro-union provisions of the PLA. However, the appellants are not a protected class under equal protection principles nor is a fundamental right involved. Accordingly, the Board’s action in adopting the PLA need only meet rational basis scrutiny and be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. We believe the Board’s actions meet such scrutiny.

Moreover, as we have discussed at length, the PLA states on its face that discrimination on the basis of union status is prohibited and there is no evidence that discrimination has or will occur in relation to the PLA. As the appellants themselves point out in their brief, the provisions of the PLA are problematic for union and non-union contractors alike. There is no disparate impact on individuals in one or the other group or a violation of the Master Builders’ right to equal protection under the law.

3. Free Association.

Master Builders also argues that the PLA forces non-union contractors to affiliate with union contractors in contravention of the non-union contractors’ right to not associate with particular persons. U.S. Const, amend. I; see also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3252, 82 L.Ed.2d 462, 475 (1984). Although a measure of the PLA incorporates provisions that may be seen by some as “union practices,” we do not believe that the PLA prevents the appellants “from freely expressing their ‘merit shop philosophy’ and opposition to unions, nor does it coerce ‘pro-union’ expressions or association.” San Francisco Airports Comm’n, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 981 P.2d at 517. Contractor members of the appellant organizations may feel disinclined to bid or do work under the provisions of the PLA, but “the First Amendment does not oblige the government to minimize the financial repercussions of such a choice.” Id. (citing Lyng v. Int’l Union, U. Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 368, 108 S.Ct. 1184, 1190-91, 99 L.Ed.2d 380, 389-90 (1988)). The adoption of the PLA does not impinge on the appellants’ free association rights.

IX. Conclusion.

We can find no infirmity with the PLA or its adoption by the Board, or the district court’s similar finding. Iowa’s right-to-work law bars compulsory unionism, which is not instituted or condoned by the PLA. Iowa’s competitive bidding law allows for broad discretion on the part of a political subdivision in pre-defining the universe of acceptable bidders for a public contract, discretion that covers the decision to adopt the PLA. The Board’s utilization of the PLA is a proprietary function that escapes preemption under the NLRA and ERISA. Further, none of the decisions or actions surrounding the adoption of the PLA has violated Master Builders’ constitutional rights. We conclude that the use of the PLA for the Iowa Events Center is permissible under current Iowa and federal law and the district court’s finding of the same should be affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

All justices concur except LARSON, J., who dissents.

LARSON, Justice

(dissenting).

I dissent because I believe this PLA violates both the letter and the spirit of our right-to-work law, Iowa Code section 731.1:

It is declared to be the policy of the state of Iowa that no person within its boundaries shall be deprived of the right to work at the person’s chosen occupation for any employer because of membership in, affiliation with, withdrawal or expulsion from, or refusal to join, any labor union, organization, or association, and any contract which contravenes this policy is illegal and void.

(Emphasis added.)

The Board argues for a narrow interpretation of the statute, one that the majority appears to adopt:

The right-to-work statutes prohibit a narrow range of conduct, essentially confined to the refusal to hire an applicant or the termination of an existing employee because of his status as a member or nonmember of a labor organization.

This statute is not as limited in its protection of free choice as the Board suggests. The statute protects the right to work — not just the right to enter into or keep a contract of employment based on union or nonunion status. In other words, in a worker’s relationship with an employer, it should make no difference if the worker is union or nonunion. The majority suggests this is no problem here and there will be no discrimination against nonunion workers. I believe this is unrealistic for the reasons I will discuss later.

Under the PLA, all hiring must be done through union hiring halls and in accordance with a crew ratio provision in the PLA. Under the PLA, an employer will be limited on the number of his own employees (referred to as core employees) who may be used on a project. All remaining workers must be taken from the union hall with no initial choice on the part of the employer.

A small employer with fourteen or fewer core employees may use 50% of its regular employees. With larger employers, however, the percentage of core employees is reduced proportionately to the size of the contractor’s workforce. A contractor who has 100 core employees and needs all of them may use only fourteen of them. The balance is to be provided through the union hiring hall. The balance of the employer’s core employees, if the employees want to work on their own employer’s project, will have to go through the union hall. They, together with all other available workers, including nonemployees of the company, union and nonunion, seek to go to work for an employer with whom they already had a job. The Board contends this is no problem because the agreement requires the union hall to refer workers on a nondiscriminatory basis— nonunion as well as union. I believe it is naive to think this is a meaningful protection for nonunion workers because union officials determine which workers in the hiring pool are “qualified” to do' the job.

The majority discounts this reality by pointing to a provision in the PLA that prohibits the hiring hall from discriminating against nonunion workers. However, it will be easy for union personnel to prefer their own members over nonunion workers on the subjective ground they are more qualified.

The majority contends that the Supreme Court case of Local 357, International Brotherhood of Teamsters supports the Board’s argument that an antidiscrimi-nation agreement in the PLA will legitimize this arrangement. I believe that case is inapposite because it did not provide for selection of employees on the same basis as the present case. In fact, the PLA in Local 357, International Brotherhood of Teamsters provided that the assignment out of the union hiring hall would be done on the basis of seniority' — an objective standard as compared to the determination of “qualification,” as provided in the PLA in this case. See Local 357, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 365 U.S. at 669, 81 S.Ct. at 836, 6 L.Ed.2d at 14.

The effect of this PLA is to create an uneven playing field for certain employers and their workers, based on their nonunion status. It therefore violates the words and the spirit of our right-to-work law, and the case should be reversed on that ground.

      . PLAs have been used on public projects dating back to at least 1938. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Pub. No. GAO/GGD-98-82, Project Labor Agreements: The Extent of Their Use and Related Information at 4 (1998) [hereinafter U.S.G.A.O.]. In 1993, the United States Supreme Court determined that a PLA is not preempted under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (2000), unless the governmental entity owning the project acts in a regulatory capacity in its utilization of the PLA. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Assoc. Builders & Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 227, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 1196, 122 L.Ed.2d 565, 576 (1993). Anecdotal evidence indicates that PLAs have been used more frequently in the aftermath of the Court's decision. U.S.G.A.O., at 3.

      . Iowa’s right-to-work law was approved April 28, 1947, and became effective May 1, 1947. 1947 Iowa Acts ch. 296, at 390. The Taft-Hartley Act was passed over a presidential veto on June 23, 1947 and became effec-live on August 22, 1947. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 162, 152 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 135, 168, 155.

      . Ariz. Const, art. XXV; Ark. Const, amend. 34; Fla. Const, art. I, § 6; Kan. Const, art. 15, § 12; Miss. Const, art. 7, § 198-A; Neb. Const, art. XV, §§ 13-15; Okla. Const, art. XXIII, § 1A; S.D. Const, art. VI, § 2; Ala. Code §§ 25-7-6, -30 to -36 (2000); Ariz.Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 23-1301 to -1307 (West 1995); Ark.Code Ann. §§ 11-3-301 to -304 (Michie 2002); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 447.01, 447.17 (West 2002); Ga.Code Ann. §§ 34-6-20 to - 28 (Harrison 1998); Idaho Code §§ 44-2001 to -2012 (Michie 1997); Iowa Code §§ 731.1-.9 (2001); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-831 (2000); La.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 23:881-:889, 23:981 — :987 (West 1998 & Supp.2002); Miss. Code Ann. § 71-1-47 (1999); Neb.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 48-217 to -219, 48-911 (Michie 2002); Nev.Rev.Stat. 613.230-.300 (2001); N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 95-78 to -84 (2001); N.D. Cent.Code § 34-01-14 (1987); S.C.Code Ann. §§ 41-7-10 to -90 (Law.Co-op.1986); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 60-8-3 to -8, 60-10-10 (Mi-chie 1993); Xenn.Code Ann. § 50-1-201 to - 204 (1999); Tex. Lab.Code Ann. §§ 101.051-.053, 101.301-.303 (Vernon 1996); Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-34-1 to -17 (2001); Va.Code Ann. §§ 40.1-58 to -69 (Michie 2002); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-7-108 to -115 (Michie 2001); see generally 48 Am.Jur.2d Labor & Labor Relations § 660 (1994).

      . Although we find insufficient evidence of discrimination to invalidate the Events Center PLA, we recognize the quandary faced by a non-union worker in the aftermath of our decision. As one commentator has noted:
      ... One need not be a cynic to observe that a union which bears the burden of maintaining a hiring hall or referral system will be tempted to favor its adherents or prospective adherents when employment opportunities arise. The employer who makes an exclusive delegation of clearance or referral for employment to a union would indeed by naive if he did not anticipate this result.
      Most important of all, the applicant for employment — the fellow who is looking for a job — is directly and seriously affected. He isn’t troubled with statutory schemes or legal analysis. He knows only that if his particular skill lies in an area encompassed by a union hiring hall or exclusive referral system, he gets his job through the union or he may not eat. For the average mortal, an empty stomach is a persuasive advocate. If union membership or adherence to union policy is the only road to employment, then other considerations dwindle in importance. The free choice which the [Taft-Hartley] act is designed to guarantee' — the right to join or not to join a union, to be a good, bad or indifferent member, to support or to oppose union policies — becomes a luxury that the worker cannot afford.
      Jerome D. Fenton, Union Hiring Halls Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 9 Lab. L.J. 505, 506-07 (1958).

      . We recognize, of course, that, historically, the legislature has provided different standards to apply in awarding municipal contracts depending on the status of the political subdivision letting a contract and the nature of the public improvement to be completed. See Iowa Code §§ 391.31 ("lowest bidder”), 391A.17 ("lowest bidder”), 397.18 ("best interest of the municipality”), 417.51 ("lowest responsible bidder”) (1971). However, in 1972, the legislature adopted the Iowa Home Rule Amendment, and in so doing, selected the "lowest responsible bidder” standard as the standard under which all contracts for public improvements were to be considered. 1972 Iowa Acts ch. 1088, § 180 (retaining a provision allowing for explicit consideration of the "best interests of the city” for "contracts relating to public utilities”). Although the test for determining a successful bidder has changed over time, the paramount purpose of the competitive bidding statute has not.

      . We have also stated previously that another purpose of the competitive bidding statute is to " 'forestall fraud, favoritism and corruption in the making of contracts.' ” Istari Constr., Inc. v. City of Muscatine, 330 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Iowa 1983) (citation'omitted). A longstanding objection to PLAs is that such agreements are an expression of favoritism toward union labor. Although the competitive bidding statute addresses favoritism, it does so only in the context of ensuring a competitive bidding process. The Events Center PLA applies to all bidders and does not discriminate between those of union or non-union affiliation. Therefore, the PLA does not, on its face, promote fraud, favoritism, or corruption in the actual bidding process, and any assertion to the contrary is more anecdotal than factual. We must rely on the agreement to be performed as it is written.


author: /s/ KATHLEEN A. BLATZ Chief Justice

text:
    In re WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ATTORNEY FEES ON CERTIORARI.
    No. C8-84-1051.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Nov. 20, 2002.
   ORDER

Where upon review on certiorari of a decision or order of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals, an award of compensation is affirmed, or modified and affirmed, or an order disallowing compensation is reversed, the Supreme Court may allow reasonable attorney fees incident to the review. The allowance of reasonable attorney fees is made a part of the judgment order. Minn.Stat. § 176.511, subd. 5 (2002). The amounts allowed under the statute by this court have not been adjusted since 1988 and shall now be increased.

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that $1,200 in attorney fees shall be allowed where briefs are filed and the matter is considered on the en bane nonoral calendar and $1,600 in attorney fees shall be allowed where briefs are filed and the matter is considered on the en banc oral calendar. This fee schedule shall be effective January 1, 2003, on all appeals filed thereafter.

/s/ KATHLEEN A. BLATZ Chief Justice


text:
    In re Petition for DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST Ronald L. KOPESKA, an Attorney at Law of the State of Minnesota.
    No. C2-01-1472.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Nov. 20, 2002.
   ORDER

On January 17, 2002, this court suspended respondent Ronald L. Kopeska from the practice of law for a period of six months. Respondent has filed an affidavit with the Office of the Lawyers Professional Responsibility stating that he has complied with the all of the conditions for reinstatement. The Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility has filed an affidavit stating that respondent has complied with the conditions of the suspension order and that it does not object to reinstatement.

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent Ronald L. Kopeska is reinstated to the practice of law in the State of Minnesota effective the date of this order.

BY THE COURT

Paul H. Anderson Paul H. Anderson Associate Justice


text:
    In re STUDENT PRACTICE RULES.
    No. C6-02-1906.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Nov. 20, 2002.
   ORDER

The University of St. Thomas School of Law, on behalf of its students, has petitioned the court for a one-year exemption from the requirement in Minn. Student Prac. R. 1.02(1) that a student must be enrolled at a Minnesota law school “approved by the American Bar Association” to practice as a certified student attorney under Minn. R. Student Prac. R. 1.01.

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for an exemption from Minn. Student Prac. R. 1.02(1) is granted, and students enrolled at the University of St. Thomas School of Law who otherwise satisfy all conditions of eligibility may practice under the supervision of a member of the bar as provided in Minn. Student Prac. R. 1.01. This exemption expires October 1, 2003, or upon a decision from the American Bar Association on the University of St. Thomas School of Law’s application for provisional accreditation, whichever occurs sooner.

BY THE COURT

Kathleen A. Blatz Kathleen A. Blatz Chief Justice