author: Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 89-7188.
    No. 89-7355.
    No. 89-7430.
    No. 89-7444.
    No. 89-7468.
    No. 89-7473.
    No. 89-7476.
    No. 89-7491.
    No. 89-7570.
    No. 89-7577.
    No. 89-7616.
    No. 89-7617.
    No. 89-7632.
    No. 89-7638.
    No. 89-7640.
    No. 89-7661.
    No. 89-7672.
    No. 89-7719.
    No. 89-7732.
    No. 89-7786.
    No. 89-7793.
    No. 89-7806.
    No. 89-7835.
    No. 89-7839.
    No. 89-7884.
    No. 90-5003.
    No. 90-5015.
    No. 90-5027.
    No. 90-5029.
    No. 90-5051.
    No. 90-5066.
    No. 90-5328.
    No. 90-5109.
    No. 90-5123.
    No. 90-5148.
    Deboue v. Louisiana. Eyler v. Illinois. Abu-Jamal v. Pennsylvania. Jones v. Missouri. Bradley v. Alabama. Resnover v. Indiana. Ryan v. Nebraska. Callahan v. Alabama. Davis v. Kemp, Warden. Lowery v. Indiana. Pitts v. Georgia. Brewer v. Ohio. Smith v. Virginia. Hall v. Georgia. Martin v. Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. Giarratano v. Procunier, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections. Lang v. California. Breakiron v. Pennsylvania. Scott v. Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. Finney v. Kemp, Warden. McMillin v. Missouri. O’Shea v. Pennsylvania. Collins v. Zant, Warden. Thompson v. California. Jackson v. California. Sattiewhite v. Texas. Gary v. Georgia. Amrine v. Missouri. Bell v. South Carolina. Moore v. Oklahoma. Fields v. Illinois. Hawkins v. Illinois. Franklin v. Illinois. Jamison v. Ohio. Green v. South Carolina. Clemmons v. Missouri. Powell v. Ohio. Savino v. Virginia. Hightower v. Georgia. Reed v. Florida. Weeks v. Alabama. Canaan v. Indiana. Jacobs v. Texas. Moreland v. Ohio. Schneider v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. La.;

Sup. Ct. Ill.;

Sup. Ct. Pa.;

Sup. Ct. Mo.;

Sup. Ct. Ala.;

Sup. Ct. Ind.;

Sup. Ct. Neb.;

Sup. Ct. Ala.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. Ind.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. Ohio;

Sup. Ct. Va.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

C. A. 11th Cir.;

C. A. 4th Cir.;

Sup. Ct. Cal.;

Sup. Ct. Pa.;

C. A. 11th Cir.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. Mo.;

Sup. Ct. Pa.;

C. A. 11th Cir.;

Sup. Ct. Cal.;

Sup. Ct. Cal.;

Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. Mo.;

Sup. Ct. S. C.;

Ct. Crim. App. Okla.;

Sup. Ct. Ill.;

Sup. Ct. Ill.;

Sup. Ct. Ill.;

Sup. Ct. Ohio;

Sup. Ct. S. C.;

No. 90-5152.

No. 90-5171.

No. 90-5211.

No. 90-5217.

No. 90-5222.

No. 90-5236.

No. 90-5297.

No. 90-5305.

No. 90-5444.

No. 90-5453.

Sup. Ct. Mo.;

Sup. Ct. Ohio;

Sup. Ct. Va.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. Fla.;'

Ct. Crim. App. Ala.;

Sup. Ct. Ind.;

Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;

Sup. Ct. Ohio; and

Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 89-7188, 552 So. 2d 355; No. 89-7355, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 549 N. E. 2d 268; No. 89-7430, 521 Pa. 188, 555 A. 2d 846; No. 89-7444, 784 S. W. 2d 789; No. 89-7473, 547 N. E. 2d 814; No. 89-7476, 233 Neb. 74, 444 N. W. 2d 610; No. 89-7491, 557 So. 2d 1311; No. 89-7577, 547 N. E. 2d 1046; No. 89-7616, 259 Ga. 745, 386 S. E. 2d 351; No. 89-7617, 48 Ohio St. 3d 50, 549 N. E. 2d 491; No. 89-7632, 239 Va. 243, 389 S. E. 2d 871; No. 89-7638, 259 Ga. 412, 383 S. E. 2d 128; No. 89-7640, 891 F. 2d 807; No. 89-7661, 891 F. 2d 483; No. 89-7672, 49 Cal. 3d 991, 782 P. 2d 627; No. 89-7719, 524 Pa. 282, 571 A. 2d 1035; No. 89-7732, 891 F. 2d 800; No. 89-7793, 783 S. W. 2d 82; No. 89-7806, 523 Pa. 384, 567 A. 2d 1023; No. 89-7835, 892 F. 2d 1502; No. 89-7839, 50 Cal. 3d 134, 785 P. 2d 857; No. 89-7884, 49 Cal. 3d 1170, 783 P. 2d 211; No. 90-5003, 786 S. W. 2d 271; No. 90-5015, 260 Ga. 38, 389 S. E. 2d 218; No. 90-5027, 785 S. W. 2d 531; No. 90-5029, 302 S. C. 18, 393 S. E. 2d 364; No. 90-5051, 788 P. 2d 387; Nos. 90-5066 and 90-5328, 135 Ill. 2d 18, 552 N. E. 2d 791; No. 90-5109, 135 Ill. 2d 78, 552 N. E. 2d 743; No. 90-5123, 49 Ohio St. 3d 182, 552 N. E. 2d 180; No. 90-5148, 301 S. C. 347, 392 S. E. 2d 157; No. 90-5152, 785 S. W. 2d 524; No. 90-5171, 49 Ohio St. 3d 255, 552 N. E. 2d 191; No. 90-5211, 239 Va. 534, 391 S. E. 2d 276; No. 90-5217, 259 Ga. 770, 386 S. E. 2d 509; No. 90-5222, 560 So. 2d 203; No. 90-5236, 568 So. 2d 864; No. 90-5297, 541 N. E. 2d 894; No. 90-5305, 787 S. W. 2d 397; No. 90-5444, 50 Ohio St. 3d 58, 552 N. E. 2d 894; No. 90-5453, 787 S. W. 2d 718.

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 89-7631.
    Parker v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certio-rari denied.

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

It is well established “that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient” to support conviction. Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1, 18 (1978). Nonetheless, the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded in this case that reversal for failure to prove an essential element of one statutory formulation of capital murder poses no bar to reprosecution under another statutory formulation of the same offense, because the State’s decision to prosecute a defendant under the “wrong” murder statute is mere “trial error.” Because I believe that this conclusion reflects a profound misreading of our double jeopardy precedents, I would grant the petition.

I

Petitioner was twice tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for murdering James and Sandra Warren. He was initially convicted for felony murder on the theory that he had murdered the Warrens while burglarizing their home. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed. See Parker v. State, 292 Ark. 421, 731 S. W. 2d 756 (1987) (Parker I). Reviewing the statutory elements of felony murder, the court concluded that the State’s felony-murder statute “cannot be read to encompass the facts of this case.” Id., at 425, 731 S. W. 2d, at 758. The Arkansas capital felony-murder statute requires the State to prove that the defendant caused the death of another “in the course of and in furtherance of the [underlying] felony.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5 — 10—101(a)(1) (1987 and Supp. 1989). “The state’s proof,” the court explained, “showed that [petitioner] followed Mr. Warren into the house for only one purpose — to commit the murders of the Warrens.” Parker I, 292 Ark., at 425, 731 S. W. 2d, at 758. “The killings were obviously a form of criminal homicide of some degree, but they were not ‘in the course of and in furtherance of’ the [charged] burglary as required to be capital felony murder.” Ibid. The court noted that, under these facts, the State should have prosecuted Parker for ordinary capital murder rather than felony capital murder. Id., at 425-426, 731 S. W. 2d, at 758.

Taking this last observation as an invitation to retry Parker, the State subsequently prosecuted Parker for “caus[ing] the death of two ... or more persons in the course of the same criminal episode.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-101(a)(3) (1987). On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s contention that his reprosecution was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause and affirmed petitioner’s conviction. See Parker v. State, 300 Ark. 360, 779 S. W. 2d 156 (1989) (Parker II). Reviewing its disposition in Parker I, the court concluded that it had reversed petitioner’s original conviction not because the evidence was insufficient, but because the State had committed the “trial error” of “charging and trying [petitioner] under the wrong capital murder provision.” Parker II, supra, at 363-364, 779 S. W. 2d, at 157. Consequently, the court held, its decision in Parker I posed no double jeopardy bar to reprosecuting petitioner under the applicable provision of the Arkansas capital murder statute. Parker II, supra, at 363-364, 779 S. W. 2d, at 157-158.

II

Our precedents recognize that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars reprosecution following reversal for insufficiency of the evidence but not following reversal for trial error. Burks, supra, at 15-17; accord, Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U. S. 33, 39 (1988). The question posed by this petition is whether the original conviction of petitioner under the “wrong” capital murder statute was “trial error” in the sense in which our decisions have used that term.

We discussed the difference between insufficiency of the evidence and trial error in Burks v. United States, supra. Reversal of a conviction is based on insufficiency of evidence, we explained, when the basis of the appellate court’s disposition is the State’s “failure of proof at trial.” Id., at 16; accord, Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U. S. 40, 43 (1981). Reversal for trial error — “incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, . . . pros-ecutorial misconduct” or the like — “does not constitute a decision . . . that the government has failed to prove its case,” but only “that a defendant has been convicted through a judicial process which is defective.” Burks v. United States, 437 U. S., at 15 (emphasis added).

Under these principles, there should be no serious question that petitioner’s conviction in Parker I was reversed for insufficiency of the evidence, not trial error. Based on “the facts of th[e] case,” and on the “state’s proof,” the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that the murders with which petitioner had been charged “were not [committed] ‘in the course of and in furtherance of’ the [charged] burglary.” 292 Ark., at 425, 731 S. W. 2d, at 758. Even respondent thus concedes that petitioner’s conviction was reversed because the State “failed to prove its case” with regard to an essential element of Arkansas’ capital felony-murder statute. Brief in Opposition 3 (“According to the Court’s opinion, the State adequately proved burglary and murder, but failed to prove that the murders were committed during the course of or in furtherance of the burglary” (emphasis added)).

In my view, the preclusive effect of this determination cannot be avoided by characterizing as “trial error” the State’s decision to prosecute petitioner under the “wrong” capital murder statute. Such a ruling, under these circumstances, amounts to the proposition that it is trial error to prosecute a defendant under a statute for which the State does not have enough evidence to convict, a semantic sleight of hand that deprives the distinction between “trial error” and “evidentiary insufficiency” of any meaning. The unmistakable teaching of our double jeopardy jurisprudence is that the State may not avail itself of a second trial to remedy its mistake when it prosecutes a defendant for an offense that it is unable to prove. See, e. g., Burks v. United States, supra, at 11 (“The Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding”).

The apparent source of the Arkansas Supreme Court’s confusion on this issue was its misreading of this Court’s decision in Montana v. Hall, 481 U. S. 400 (1987) (per curiam). In Hall, the defendant’s original conviction for incest had been reversed on the ground that the state incest statute had not been in effect on the date of the charged criminal act. When the State subsequently charged the defendant under the state sexual assault statute, the State Supreme Court ruled that the reprosecution was barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause. This Court reversed. Characterizing the initial prosecution of the defendant under “the wrong statute” as “a defect in the charging instrument,” the Court held that reversal on that basis did not bar reprosecution under the applicable sexual assault statute, id., at 404, which the State Supreme Court had determined to be comprised of the same elements as the state incest statute, id., at 402. Respondent argues that in this case, too, the decision to prosecute petitioner for felony murder “was[,] in effect, a deficiency in the charging instrument” that should not bar reprosecution under a different murder statute. Brief in Opposition 5.

In my view, the reasoning in Hall is wholly inapposite to this case. In Hall, the Court concluded that the State had prosecuted the defendant under the “wrong” statute not because the State could not prove that the defendant had violated the state incest statute, but because that statute was legally inapplicable to the defendant’s conduct; indeed, this Court stressed that “[tjhere [was] no suggestion” in the decision reversing the defendant’s original conviction “that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to convict [for incest].” 481 U. S., at 403. In this case, the “inapplicability” of the capital felony-murder statute to petitioner’s conduct was factual, not legal.

The suggestion in Hall that the defendant’s conviction had been reversed because of a “a deficiency in the charging instrument” is also unavailing in this case. This was an appropriate characterization of the State’s decision in Hall to charge the defendant under the incest statute instead of the (legally identical) sexual assault statute, because the inapplicability of the incest statute would have required the dismissal of the State’s information had this challenge been properly raised by pretrial motion. In contrast, the grounds for reversal of petitioner’s original conviction was the failure of the State’s proof at trial; nothing in the Arkansas Supreme Court’s opinion in Parker I indicates that the capital felony-murder count against petitioner was legally deficient as charged.

I would grant the petition in order to clarify the limited implications of Hall’s suggestion that prosecution under the “wrong” statute can be trial error for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Consequently, I dissent.

Ill

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting), I would also grant the petition for certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

       The court affirmed petitioner’s convictions for numerous other offenses, including attempted first-degree murder, burglary, kidnaping, and attempted capital murder, for which he was sentenced to life plus 130 years’ imprisonment. These convictions are not at issue in the instant petition.

       The petition for certiorari was not timely filed under this Court’s Rule 13, which requires that a petition be filed within 90 days of the entry of judgment by a state court of last resort. However, the time requirements of our Rules are not jurisdictional in criminal cases and may be waived by the Court “in the exercise of its discretion when the ends of justice so require.” Schacht v. United States, 398 U. S. 58, 64 (1970); see Sanabria v. United States, 437 U. S. 54, 62, n. 12 (1978). In this case, petitioner’s court-appointed counsel was relieved immediately following the affirmance of his second conviction, and there appears to be some question whether petitioner knowingly and competently waived his right to seek further review. In light of these circumstances, and in light of the manifest conflict between the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court and this Court’s precedents on the effect of reversal for insufficient evidence, I would waive the time requirements of Rule 13.

      The Arkansas Supreme Court in Parker II did not hold, and the respondent does not now argue, that petitioner’s prosecution for “causing the death of two or more persons in a single criminal episode” was a different offense for double jeopardy purposes from the offense of capital felony murder for which petitioner was originally convicted. Such a contention would be hard to sustain, for the State clearly reproved the conduct for which petitioner was originally convicted — breaking into the Warrens’ home and killing them — in order to establish essential elements of the offense of causing the death of two or more persons in a single criminal episode. See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U. S. 508 (1990). In other words, if Parker I did indeed reverse petitioner’s felony-murder conviction for insufficient evidence, the State would not be free to prosecute petitioner for the same offense by merely charging him under a different statute, which is apparently what took place here.


text:
    No. 89-7671.
    Hunter v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

This petition for certiorari presents the significant issue whether, and under what circumstances, a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to judicially immunized testimony useful to establishing his defense. I have previously expressed my view that this Court should resolve the conflict of lower court authority on this question. See Autry v. McKaskle, 465 U. S. 1085, 1087-1088, and n. 3 (1984) (opinion dissenting from denial of certiorari). This petition underscores the importance of settling that conflict because it frames the issue in the most compelling possible setting: the penalty phase of a capital proceeding.

Petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. At trial, petitioner requested the court to confer use immunity upon his girl friend, who declined on Fifth Amendment grounds to testify on petitioner’s behalf. Petitioner proffered at both the guilt and the penalty phases that his girl friend’s testimony would show that petitioner was mentally distressed at the time of the charged murder. The trial court refused to grant immunity, and the California Supreme Court affirmed its ruling.

The manner in which the California Supreme Court disposed of petitioner’s claim highlights the confusion engendered by this Court’s failure to resolve definitively the judicial immunity issue. Noting the conflict among the lower courts, the California Supreme Court sought to avoid the question of a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to judicially immunized testimony by ruling that petitioner had failed to meet the threshold showing established by Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F. 2d 964, 972 (CA3 1980), the first decision to recognize such a right. “[T]he proffered testimony,” the court explained,

“did not meet Smith’s requirement that the evidence be ‘clearly exculpatory and essential.’ At best, the evidence was cumulative of the extensive testimony of other defense witnesses.” 49 Cal. 3d 957, 974, 782 P. 2d 608, 617 (1989).

The court dismissed in similar terms petitioner’s claim that he was entitled to have his girl friend’s immunized testimony as mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the capital trial:

“Even assuming, without purporting to decide, that the trial court had the authority to confer use immunity on the proposed witness, we cannot conclude on this record that the court erred. There is nothing in the record to demonstrate [petitioner] was denied highly relevant mitigating evidence, or to reveal the nature of that evidence. Even assuming that the evidence would have generally related to [petitioner’s] state of mind on the morning of the murder, we cannot find that the absence of [the girl friend’s] testimony prejudiced [petitioner]. The jury had already been presented evidence of [petitioner’s] purported depression at the guilt phase through the testimony of two psychiatrists.” Id., at 980-981, 782 P. 2d, at 621 (emphasis added).

In my view, the question whether petitioner had a right to judicially immunized testimony at the penalty phase of the proceedings cannot be avoided on these terms. The California Supreme Court was mistaken in presuming that it could resolve the disposition of petitioner’s claim to judicially immunized testimony at the penalty phase of a capital proceeding by the same standard used to assess a defendant’s right to immunized testimony at trial. It is well established that a criminal defendant’s entitlement to present useful evidence is at its strongest in the capital sentencing context; this Court has repeatedly emphasized that the State may not exclude “any relevant mitigating evidence offered by the defendant as the basis for a sentence less than death.” Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 318 (1989) (emphasis added); accord, Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U. S. 1, 4 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 114-115 (1982). Assuming that a criminal defendant does have the due process right to judicially immunized testimony recognized by the Third Circuit in Smith, the assessment whether a capital defendant has satisfied the threshold showing of need must take account of that defendant’s heightened entitlement to present all mitigating evidence to the sentencer. Cf. Green v. Georgia, 442 U. S. 95, 97 (1979) (holding that exclusion of mitigating evidence at penalty phase of capital proceeding through operation of generally applicable state hearsay rule denied defendant “a fair trial on the issue of punishment” and thus violated due process). A court could not, in my view, deny the defendant’s request, as the California Supreme Court did, simply because the mitigating testimony sought by the defendant was not “highly relevant” or because overlapping evidence “had already been presented” to the sentencer. In sum, if a defendant has a right to judicially immunized testimony, petitioner’s death sentence cannot stand.

I would grant the petition so that this Court can determine whether a criminal defendant has a due process right to judicially immunized testimony, and, if so, what standards govern immunized-testimony requests in capital sentencing proceedings. Consequently, I dissent from the denial of certiorari.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting), I would also grant the petition and vacate the death penalty in this case even if I did not regard the petition as presenting a question independently meriting this Court’s review.


text:
    No. 89-7777.
    Kellogg, as Next Friend to Lonchar v. Zant, Warden.
   Super. Ct. Ga., Butts County. Motion of petitioner to consolidate this case with No. 89-7838, Hamilton, as Natural Mother and Next Friend to Smith v. Texas, denied. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.


text:
    No. 90-45.
    Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of American Medical Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-47.
    White v. Frank, Postmaster General.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White and Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 90-51.
    Aetna Life Insurance Co. et al. v. Kane, Individually and as Guardian, Next Friend, and on Behalf of Kane, a Minor.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent to strike supplemental brief to petition denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-98.
    Franklin et al. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of National Association of Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-107.
    Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co. et al. v. F. T. P. et al.
   Ct. App. Ky. Motion of respondent F. T. P. for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 90-166.
    Wright, Commissioner of Insurance of Kentucky, as Liquidator of Delta America Re Insurance Co. v. Arion Insurance Co., Ltd., et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motions of National Association of Insurance Commissioners and Roxani Gillespie, Insurance Commissioner of California, for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-198.
    Anderson et al. v. Beatrice Foods Co.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Motions of Harvard Law School Environmental Law Society et al. and American College of Real Estate Lawyers for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5050.
    Covillion v. Aetna Life & Casualty et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari before judgment denied.


text:
    No. 90-5195.
    Boggs v. Muncy, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. The Court having voted to deny the petition for writ of certiorari at the time of the denial of the application for stay of execution, [497 U. S. 1043], the petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.


text:
    No. 90-5374.
    Sindram v. Nissan Motor Corp. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 88-6294.
    No. 89-1733.
    No. 89-1768.
    No. 89-1812.
    No. 89-6228.
    No. 89-7445.
    Oliver et ux. v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, Macon, Mississippi, Foreman v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., Shipley et ux. v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Delaware et al., Espinueva v. Garrett, Secretary of the Navy, Elzy v. Smith, Warden, et al., Littlejohn v. South Carolina,
   490 U. S. 1023;

497 U. S. 1025;

496 U. S. 938;

497 U. S. 1005;

493 U. S. 1049; and

497 U. S. 1028. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 89-700.
    Astroline Communications Company Limited Partnership v. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc., et al.,
   497 U. S. 547. Motion of respondent Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc., to waive this Court’s Rule 44.1 denied. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 89-1623.
    Gardner v. Newsday, Inc.,
   496 U. S. 931. Petition for rehearing denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    October 2, 1990
    No. 89-1983.
    Petaluma Valley Hospital et al. v. Taylor.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s


text:
    October 9, 1990

    No. 89-7724.
    Perez-Castillo v. United States.

      Justice SoutER took no part in the consideration or decision of the orders announced on this date except for the order making allotment of Justices among the Circuits, see ante, p. vi.

   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.


text:
    No. 89-1952.
    Jones v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U. S. 1 (1990).


text:
    No.-.
    Foe et al. v. Cuomo, Governor of New York, et al.
   Motion of petitioner Wilma Woe for permission to use a pseudonym and to seal name granted. Motion of Wilma Woe for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Motion of counsel to allow petitioner R. L. by T. C. L. leave to proceed in forma pauperis without an affidavit of indigency executed by petitioner denied without prejudice to petitioner executing an affidavit in support of a motion for leave to proceed informa pauperis.


text:
    No.-.
    No.-.
    Ampatiellos v. City of New York et al.; and Bator v. United States.
   Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.


text:
    No. D-920.
    In re Disbarment of Dodge.
    [For earlier order herein, see 497 U. S. 1045.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. 111,
    Orig.
    Delaware v. New York.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 803.]
   First Interim Report and Fee Application approved, and payment shall be made to “Thomas H. Jackson, Special Master” by the party jurisdictions in the total amount of $23,629.10. It is further ordered that the parties shall bear these costs equally, with each jurisdiction which is a party or which has a pending application to intervene at the date of this order contributing an equal share. It is further ordered that each party jurisdiction may make payment either to the firm of Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin, as coordinating counsel for this purpose, or may make payment directly or via separate counsel to the Special Master. It is further ordered that each party jurisdiction’s payment of fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to this order shall be due within 45 days from the date hereof.


text:
    No. 112,
    Orig.
    Wyoming v. Oklahoma.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 803.]
   Motion of the Special Master for allowance of fees and expenses granted, and the Special Master is awarded $43,275.79 to be paid equally by the parties.


text:
    No. 89-1541.
    Dole, Secretary of Labor v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 497 U. S. 1002.] Motion of Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 89-1679.
    Summit Health, Ltd., et al. v. Pinhas.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 496 U. S. 935.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 89-1715.
    Burns v. Reed.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 497 U. S. 1023.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 89-1784.
    Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania et al. v. Ben Cooper, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 497 U. S. 1023.] Motion of United Missouri Bank of Kansas City, N. A., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion of the United States for leave to intervene granted.


text:
    No. 90-315.
    In re Murgo et al.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 89-1717.
    Florida v. Bostick.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 90-97.
    American Hospital Assn. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 90-333.
    Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 89-7645.
    Hernandez v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted limited to the following questions:

“1. Whether a prosecutor’s proffered explanation that prospective Latino jurors were struck from the venire because he suspected they might not abide by official translations of Spanish language testimony constitutes an acceptable ‘race neutral’ explanation under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986)?
“2. Where a trial court has accepted the prosecutor’s proffered explanation as being race neutral, what standard of review is to be applied by reviewing courts?”


text:
    No. 90-5193.
    Mu’Min v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer-tiorari granted limited to Questions 1 and 2 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 90-5551.
    Schad v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 89-1873.
    No. 89-2027.
    No. 90-4.
    Maryland Higher Education Loan Corporation v. Cavazos, Secretary of Education, et al.; South Carolina State Education Assistance Authority v. Cavazos, Secretary of Education, et al.; and North Carolina et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below. 897 F. 2d 1272.


text:
    No. 89-1893.
    Bell & Murphy & Associates, Inc., et al. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Receiver for First RepublicBank Dallas, N. A., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1925.
    No. 90-189.
    Air Line Pilots Assn., International, AFL-CIO, et al. v. Landry et al.; and Landry et al. v. Air Line Pilots Assn., International, AFL-CIO, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 901 F. 2d 404.


text:
    No. 89-1931.
    Howitt v. United States Department of Commerce.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-7842.
    Hamilton, as Natural Mother and Next Friend to Smith v. Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-13.
    Ohio Student Loan Commission v. Cavazos, Secretary of Education, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-54.
    Dray v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-56.
    De Cuellar v. Brady, Secretary of the Treasury, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-70.
    May Department Stores Co. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-71.
    Hackler et al. v. Langenkamp.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-76.
    Juzwin et ux. v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd., Successor to Johnson’s Co., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-80.
    Penta v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-84.
    Education Assistance Corp. v. Cavazos, Secretary of Education.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-99.
    Italiano v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-119.
    Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-190.
    Dodson v. Superior Court of Connecticut, Hartford-New Britain Judicial District.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-200.
    Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., dba Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Mitchell.
   Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-203.
    Berry v. United States.
   Ct. Mil. App. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-220.
    De Souza v. Schultz.
   Cir. Ct. Arlington County, Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-223.
    Oyler v. Jones, District Judge, District Court of Johnson County, Kansas.
   Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-239.
    United Transportation Union v. United Transportation Union, Local 74.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-245.
    Sharp et al. v. Kansas.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-248.
    San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798, International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO v. City and County of San Francisco et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-254.
    Alabama Department of Revenue v. Pilot Petroleum Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-258.
    Weslo, Inc. v. Diversified Products Corp. et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-262.
    Sims v. Mulcahy.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-266.
    Brailey v. Alderman.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-268.
    Shedbalkar v. Shedbalkar.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-269.
    Lunde v. Helms et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-274.
    Teamsters Local Union No. 776 v. Rite Aid Corp.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-275.
    Franco v. American Gas Association Laboratories et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-276.
    Cosgrove v. Kansas State Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services.
   Ct. App. Kan. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-277.
    Wrenn v. McFadden et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-278.
    Strong v. Board of Education of Uniondale Union Free School District et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-279.
    McCowan et ux. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-280.
    Kinney v. Connecticut.
   App. Ct. Conn. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-282.
    Pavao v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-284.
    Boatmen’s National Bank of St. Louis, as Successor in Interest to Centerre Bank, N. A., fka First National Bank of St. Louis v. Carver, Trustee.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-287.
    Dunkley et ux. v. Rega Properties, Ltd., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-288.
    New York State Teamsters Joint Council 18 et al. v. New York State Teamsters Council Health and Hospital Fund et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-290.
    Eubanks v. Getty Oil Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-292.
    Mullen v. City of Belton, Missouri, et al.
   Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-294.
    Sandlin v. Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-296.
    Love Church v. City of Evanston, Illinois.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-297.
    Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-299.
    Waste Conversion, Inc. v. Pennsylvania.
   Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-301.
    Coffee v. Seaboard System Railroad, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-302.
    Peten v. United States.
   Ct. Mil. App. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-303.
    Le Bup Thi Dao et al. v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance of California et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-304.
    Centennial School District et al. v. Gregoire et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-305.
    Krain v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal, 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-311.
    Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., et al. v. Ruocco.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-313.
    Polyak v. Hulen et al.; and Polyak v. Boston et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-314.
    Grant v. Federal Land Bank of Jackson, Louisiana, et al.
   Ct. App. La., 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-316.
    Linkous v. Johnson, Trustee.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-317.
    Pruitt v. PPG Industries, Inc.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-318.
    Tinnon et al. v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-319.
    Zagano v. Fordham University et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-320.
    Pervis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-322.
    Vallance v. Brewbaker.
   Cir. Ct. Mich., County of Cheboygan. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-325.
    Freeport Transport, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America et al.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-330.
    Wilcox v. Terrytown Fifth District Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-331.
    Corinth Pipeworks S. A. v. Gulf Consolidated Services, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-359.
    Anthony v. City of Chicago.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-362.
    Smith v. United States Air Force.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-371.
    Morales v. Kansas State University et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-378.
    Jackson v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-386.
    Keith v. Rice, Secretary of the Air Force.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-390.
    Butler v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-397.
    Green v. Foley.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-398.
    Helms et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-406.
    Wrenn v. Droske et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-412.
    Edgar v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-415.
    St. Charles Associates v. Lujan, Secretary of the Interior.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-418.
    Gollner v. Office of Personnel Management.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5134.
    Conway v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5153.
    De La Torre v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5162.
    Manley v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5163.
    Jenkins v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5207.
    Schwartz v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5209.
    Stewart v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5362.
    Rodriguez-Doshi v. General Services Administration et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5376.
    Flanders v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5381.
    Watts v. Armontrout, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5382.
    Scott v. Icenogle et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5385.
    Richardson v. Henry et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5386.
    Thomas v. Evans et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5390.
    Tigner v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5400.
    Hoch v. Montana.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5410.
    Sindram v. Ryan et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5411.
    Powlowski v. Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5413.
    Olivarez v. Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5417.
    Andino v. Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5420.
    Dixon v. Fox et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5430.
    Glaude v. State Bar of California et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5431.
    Singleton v. Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5437.
    Balmer et ux. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5438.
    Sparks v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5441.
    Madden v. NBD Mortgage Co. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5447.
    Hall v. Ney.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5448.
    London v. Arington et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5449.
    Mohiuddin v. Alabama Department of Industrial Relations et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5450.
    Nubine v. Cooley et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5451.
    Cooper v. Jones et al.
   Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5455.
    Green v. Smith, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5456.
    Sindram v. Sweeney et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5462.
    Turner v. AT&T Communications.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5463.
    Schrader v. Whitley, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5467.
    Fields v. Fowler et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5469.
    Moore v. Stewart Title of California et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5475.
    Jones v. City of Hamtramck et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5478.
    Rhones v. Borg, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5481.
    Brown v. Chavis, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5484.
    Abdul-Akbar v. Delaware.
   Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5485.
    Allen v. Montgomery County Jail et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5487.
    White v. McGinnis.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5490.
    Williams v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 9th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5493.
    Boudette v. Arizona.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5494.
    Brown v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5495.
    Cathers v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5496.
    Russell v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5497.
    Royster v. Kean et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5503.
    Hollingsworth v. California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5504.
    Mays v. Grayson, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5517.
    Ford v. Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5528.

      Elliott v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5532.
    Johnson v. Farmers Insurance Group et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5534.
    Colella v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5539.
    Norelin v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5547.
    Beachum v. Tansy, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5548.
    Soto v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5557.
    Kissick v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5561.
    Manns v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5564.
    Martinez v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5568.
    Restrepo v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5569.
    Feathers v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5570.
    Perez v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5571.
    Tapp v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5572.
    Bookman v. Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5573.
    Croom v. Henman.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5579.
    Assaad-Faltas v. University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5584.
    Oliver v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5592.
    Garrett v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5593.
    Lattimore v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5595.
    Vickers v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5597.
    Van Omen v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5600.
    Yehuda v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5601.
    Ringstad v. Wannamaker, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5611.
    Blakely v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5616.
    Fragoso v. United States; Delgado v. United States; and Casiano v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5619.
    Cruz v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5620.
    Armas v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5626.
    Mitchell v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5629.
    Mann v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5630.
    Lewis v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5645.
    Rodriguez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5646.
    Sylvester et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5647.
    Sherman v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5654.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5665.
    Theodoropoulos v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5673.
    White v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5679.
    Crossfield et al. v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5684.
    Lyle v. Jabe, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5689.
    Bourke v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5693.
    Sanchez v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5696.
    Giles v. Green, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5700.
    Dyer v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5742.
    Cary v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1876.
    Florida v. Jones.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-20.
    Hawaii v. Lincoln.
   Sup. Ct. Haw. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1901.
    Prince Edward School Foundation v. Hermitage Methodist Homes of Virginia, Inc.

      See also note *, p. 892.

   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 89-1988.
    No. 89-1989.
    No. 89-1990.
    No. 89-2000.
    No. 89-2016.
    Berkshire Gas Co. et al. v. Associated Gas Distributors et al.; Tennessee Small General Service Customer Group et al. v. Associated Gas Distributors et al.; Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Associated Gas Distributors et al.; National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Associated Gas Distributors et al.; and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Associated Gas Distributors et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of Interstate Natural Gas Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in No. 89-2016 granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 282 U. S. App. D. C. 142, 893 F. 2d 349.


text:
    No. 89-2001.
    No. 90-131.
    Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. et al. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. et al.; and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of Interstate Natural Gas Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 282 U. S. App. D. C. 386, 895 F. 2d 791.


text:
    No. 89-7745.
    Dyke v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 90-249.
    Fee et ux., Individually and as Next Friends of Fee, a Minor v. Herndon.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 89-7782.
    No. 90-5356.
    No. 90-5460.
    No. 90-5471.
    No. 90-5477.
    No. 90-5488.
    No. 90-5591.
    Willis v. Texas. Burger v. Zant, Warden. Jones v. Tennessee. Laney v. Tennessee. Pope v. Thompson, Warden. Wickline v. Ohio. Spencer v. Virginia.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. Tenn.;

Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.;

Sup. Ct. Va.;

Sup. Ct. Ohio; and

Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 89-7782, 785 S. W. 2d 378; No. 90-5460, 789 S. W. 2d 545; No. 90-5488, 50 Ohio St. 3d 114, 552 N. E. 2d 913; No. 90-5591, 240 Va. 78, 393 S. E. 2d 609.

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


author: Justice Marshall, Justice Stevens,

text:
    No. 89-7838.
    Hamilton, as Natural Mother and Next Friend to Smith v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Motion of Chris Lonchar Kellogg for leave to intervene denied. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall,

with whom Justice Blackmun joins,

concurring.

I agree with Justice Stevens that the issue raised in this petition is important and merits resolution by this Court. I write to express my frustration with the Court’s failure to avail itself of the ordinary procedural mechanisms that would have permitted us to resolve that issue in this case.

It is already a matter of public record that four Members of this Court voted to grant certiorari before petitioner was executed. See Hamilton v. Texas, 497 U. S. 1016 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay). According to established practice, this fact should have triggered a fifth vote to grant petitioner’s application for a stay of his execution. Indeed, this result flows naturally from the standard by which we evaluate stay applications, a central component of which is “whether four Justices are likely to vote to grant certiorari.” Coleman v. Paccar Inc., 424 U. S. 1301, 1302 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers) (emphasis added); see also Maggio v. Williams, 464 U. S. 46, 48 (1983) (per curiam) (same).

In my view, the Court’s willingness in this case to dispense with the procedures that it ordinarily employs to preserve its jurisdiction only continues the distressing rollback of the legal safeguards traditionally afforded. Compare Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370, 387-388 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing diminution in standard used to assess unconstitutional jury instructions in capital cases); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 912-914 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court’s endorsement of summary appellate procedures in capital cases); Autry v. McKaskle, 465 U. S. 1085, 1085-1086 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (criticizing expedited consideration of petitions for certiorari in capital cases).

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Blackmun joins, concurring.

This petition for a writ of certiorari raises important, recurring questions of law that should be decided by this Court. These questions concern the standards that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates in a hearing to determine whether a death row inmate is competent to waive his constitutional right to challenge his conviction and sentence and whether he has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of this right.

James Edward Smith was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Harris County, Texas, in 1984. Smith had a substantial history of mental illness, and his mental difficulties prompted a finding by the Texas trial court that he was not competent to represent himself on appeal. Pet. for Cert., Exh. 2, p. 13, Exhs. 4-8, 10-12. After his conviction, Smith vacillated between forceful insistence on prosecuting his own appeal and equally forceful insistence on abandoning any challenge to his conviction or his sentence. Pet. for Cert., Exh. 2, pp. 10-11, Exh. 11, p. 2.

Petitioner is Smith’s natural mother. Proceeding as Smith’s “next friend,” she attempted to establish her standing to litigate on her son’s behalf and to have his execution stayed until his competence was established after a full adversarial hearing. She was unsuccessful. On May 23, 1990, without notice to petitioner, the Texas trial court held a nonadversarial hearing, made a finding that Smith was competent to make a decision regarding his execution, and set his execution for 12:01 a.m. on June 26, 1990. Pet. for Cert., Exh. 3.

On June 22, over the dissent of Justice Teague, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed petitioner’s “Emergency Application for Stay of Execution and Objections to Trial Court’s Prior Proceedings.” Ex Parte Hamilton, No. 18,380-02 (en banc) (per curiam). On June 24, petitioner filed in this Court her petition for a writ of certiorari and her application for a stay of Smith’s execution. Four Members of the Court voted to grant certiorari and to stay the execution. Nevertheless, the stay application was denied, and Smith was executed on schedule.

Smith’s execution obviously mooted this case. The Court has therefore properly denied the petition for a writ of certiorari. This denial, however, does not evidence any lack of merit in the petition; instead, the reason for the denial emphasizes the importance of confronting on the merits the substantial questions that were raised in this case.

      See Autry v. Estelle, 464 U. S. 1, 2 (1983) (per curiam) (“Had applicant convinced four Members of the Court that certiorari would be granted on any of his claims, a stay would issue”); Darden v. Wainweight, 473 U. S. 928, 928-929 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring in granting of stay); Straight v. Wainwright, 476 U. S. 1132, 1133, n. 2 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in denial of stay, joined by Burger, C. J., Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ.) (noting that “the Court has ordinarily stayed executions when four Members have voted to grant certiorari”); id., at 1134-1135 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of stay, joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.) (“[W]hen four vote to grant certiorari in a capital case, but there is not a fifth vote to stay the scheduled execution, one of the five Justices who does not believe the case worthy of granting certiorari will nonetheless vote to stay; this is so that the ‘Rule of Four’ will not be rendered meaningless by an execution that occurs before the Court considers the case on the merits”).

      “Teague, J., notwithstanding that such might, but probably only will cause a slight delay in carrying out applicant’s obvious desire to carry into effect his long held death wish, as well as his strong belief that he will be reincarnated after he is killed, but believing that this Court, at least implicitly, has ruled that in a case such as this one, where the reasonable probability that the defendant is not competent to request that he be put to a premature death, or, to put it another way, to commit legal suicide through the hands of others, has been raised, it is necessary for the trial court to conduct a full adversarial hearing’ on the issue. Given the possible favorable evidence now available, a ‘full adversarial hearing’ should now be conducted in this cause. See Ex parte Jordan, 758 S. W. 2d 250 (Tex. Cr. App. 1988). Also see Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399 . . . (1986).” Ex Parte Hamilton, No. 18,380-02 (Tex. Crim. App., June 22, 1990) (Teague, J., dissenting from order denying application for stay).

       See Hamilton v. Texas, 497 U. S. 1016 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay).

       See Singleton v. Commissoner, 439 U. S. 940, 942 (1978) (opinion of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).


text:
    No. 90-9.
    MCI Communications Corp. et al. v. United States et al.

      See also note *, p. 892.

   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 90-263.
    Adams et vir v. Leisure Dynamics, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondents for taxation of attorney’s fees and costs denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-289.
    F L Aerospace Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of Mid-America Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-298.
    Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Motions of American College of Real Estate Lawyers, Oregonians in Action, and American Farm Bureau Federation for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5177.
    Hooper v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 90-5395.
    House v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

In both Mills v. Maryland, 486 U. S. 367 (1988), and McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U. S. 433 (1990), we vacated a death sentence based on jury instructions that, reasonably construed, prevented the jury from considering any mitigating circumstance it did not unanimously find to exist. Because I believe the instructions in this case suffer from the same infirmity, I would grant the petition for certiorari.

Petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. At the penalty phase of his capital proceeding, the trial judge instructed the jury that it could not impose the death penalty unless it found “unanimously that one or more . . . aggravating circumstances have been proven,” Union Cty. C. C. A. No. 28 (Tenn. Crim. App., Dec. 15, 1989), p. 2 (emphasis added). Next, the judge directed the jury to “consider as heretofore indicated any mitigating circumstances.” Id., at 3 (emphasis added). The form provided to the jury for recording a death sentence stated, “We, the jury, unanimously find that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to outweigh the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances. . . .” Id., at 5 (emphasis added). Finding that the instructions did not require juror unanimity on mitigating factors, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Id., at 6.

Assessment of petitioner’s challenge to the disputed instructions is governed by our decisions in Mills v. Maryland, supra, and McKoy v. North Carolina, supra. In those decisions, we made clear that a rule preventing individual jurors from crediting mitigating circumstances not unanimously found to exist violated the cardinal principle of our capital jurisprudence that “ ‘the sentencer may not... be precluded from, considering “any relevant mitigating evidence.’”” Mills, supra, at 374-375 (quoting Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U. S. 1, 4 (1986), in turn quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 114 (1982)); see McKoy, supra, at 439-440. The only issue in this case is whether the instructions furnished to petitioner’s jury should be viewed as imposing a unanimity requirement.

In my view, our decision in Mills speaks directly to this question. In Mills, the jury received a verdict form listing each potential mitigating and aggravating circumstance along with corresponding “yes” and “no” boxes. The trial judge instructed the jurors to mark “yes” if they unanimously concluded that an aggravating circumstance had been proved; otherwise they were to mark “no.” 486 U. S., at 378. The judge also instructed the jury that it had to be unanimous to mark “yes” for any mitigating factor. Id., at 378, and n. 11. Mills challenged the constitutionality of his death sentence on the ground that the instructions required death if the jury unanimously found an aggravating circumstance but could not agree unanimously as to the existence of any particular mitigating circumstance. Id., at 371. The Maryland Court of Appeals rejected this challenge, construing the verdict form to require unanimity in order to mark “no” with respect to a given mitigating circumstance, and not to preclude each juror from individually weighing any nonunanimous mitigating circumstance in considering whether to impose a death sentence. Id., at 372-373.

Because we could not conclude, “with any degree of certainty, that the jury did not adopt [Mills’] interpretation,” id., at 377, we vacated his death sentence. We emphasized that nothing in the instructions or the form clarified for the jury that it could do something other than answer “no” if it could not reach unanimity on a particular mitigating circumstance. Id., at 378-379, and n. 11. Thus, the verdict forms and instructions used in Mills created the “intuitively disturbing” possibility that a sole juror could have precluded the remaining eleven jurors from considering mitigating circumstances which they all believed to exist. Id., at 373-374. The prospect that a single, holdout juror could have blocked such consideration, and consequently required the jury to impose the death penalty, was an outcome “we dare[d] not risk.” Id., at 384. We concluded that it would be the “height of arbitrariness” to uphold a death sentence in such circumstances. Id., at 374.

The jury instructions in this case present the same impermissible risk. After charging the jury that it had to find aggravating circumstances “unanimously,” the trial judge instructed the jury to consider mitigating circumstances “as heretofore indicated.” The natural inference from the words “as heretofore indicated” is that findings of mitigating circumstances, like findings of aggravating circumstances, had to be unanimous. Moreover, as in Mills, the trial court did not instruct the jury on what it should do if it could not reach a unanimous conclusion on a potential mitigating circumstance. Nowhere did the instructions even remotely suggest that jurors were free to exercise individual judgment in considering nonunanimous mitigating factors. Rather, the jury appears to have been guided in the opposite direction by the “as heretofore indicated” language. The inference that nonunani-mous mitigating factors must be disregarded entirely is reinforced by the trial judge’s repeated statements that the jury could impose the death penalty only if it found “unanimously” that no mitigating circumstances outweighed any aggravating circumstances. Under these circumstances, reasonable jurors could justifiably have believed that they were not to consider any mitigating circumstance unless all jurors unanimously found it to exist.

Like the postverdict construction furnished by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Mills, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusion that jurors remained free under Tennessee law to consider nonunanimous mitigation factors is beside the point. The decisive issue under Mills is whether the jury could plausibly have read the instructions to require unanimity as to the existence, of each mitigating circumstance. Because there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury in this case so understood the challenged instructions, Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370, 381 (1990), I would grant the petition for certiorari and reverse.

Even if I did not believe that this case otherwise merited review, adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting), I would grant the petition for certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

      In pertinent part, the jury instructions read as follows:
      “Your verdict must be unanimous as to either form of punishment [death or life imprisonment]. . . .

      “No death penalty shall be imposed unless you find unanimously that one or more of the following specified statutory aggravating circumstances have been proven . . . beyond a reasonable doubt.

      “In arriving at the punishment, the jury shall consider as- heretofore indicated any mitigating circumstances which shall include but not be limited to ... .

      “If the jury unanimously determines that at least one statutory aggravated circumstance or several statutory circumstances have been proved . . . and said circumstance or circumstances are not outweighed by any sufficiently substantial mitigating circumstances, the sentence shall be death.

        “[T]he jury must include in its finding, that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to outweigh the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances so found.
      Upon such unanimous finding, each member of the jury shall affix his or her signature to said written findings and then return the said written verdict to the Court.

      “You will be provided with two punishment forms. . . .
      “[On the Punishment of Death Form, should the jury impose the death sentence, it was required to attest:] We, the jury, unanimously find that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to outweigh the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances listed above. . . .

      “You may take the charge with you.” Union Cty. C. C. A. No. 28, pp. 2-5 (emphasis added).
      According to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, these instructions conform to the language and structure of the then-effective Tennessee capital punishment statute, Tenn. Code Ann. §39-2-203 (1982). See Union Cty. C. C. A. No. 28, p. 5. This provision has since been repealed and recodified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204 (Supp. 1990).


text:
    No. 89-1719.
    Pantoja et al. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp. et al.,
   497 U. S. 1024. Motion of petitioner Chris Pedersen for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    October 12, 1990
    No. 89-2013.
    Cling Surface Co., Inc. v. Gean et ux.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.


text:
    A-256.
    Kopp et al. v. Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, et al.
   Application for stay of enforcement of injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    October 15, 1990
    No. 89-1986.
    Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. G. Amador Corp.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.


text:
    No. 90-272.
    No. 90-332.
    Brooks et al. v. Georgia State Board of Elections et al.; and Georgia State Board of Elections et al. v. Brooks et al.
   Affirmed on appeals from D. C. S. D. Ga. Reported below: 775 F. Supp. 1470.


text:
    No. 90-5183.
    Cary v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Eichman, 496 U. S. 310 (1990).


text:
    No. 90-5454.
    Draper v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Clermont County. Certiorari dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No.-.
    Laliberte v. United States.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied.


text:
    No.-.
    In re Stern.
   Application for readmission to the Bar, presented to Justice Marshall, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Justice Stevens would grant the application.


text:
    No.-.
    Waters v. Maryland.
   Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis without an affidavit of indigency executed by petitioner granted.


text:
    No. A-259.
    Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc., et al. v. North Carolina.
   Ct. App. N. C. Application for recall and stay of mandate, addressed to Justice Marshall and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-879.
    In re Disbarment of Anderson.
    [For earlier order herein, see 494 U. S. 1052.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-899.
    In re Disbarment of Donnelly.
    [For earlier order herein, see 495 U. S. 945.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-902.
    In re Disbarment of Metz.
    [For earlier order herein, see 495 U. S. 955.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-910.
    In re Disbarment of Hendrickson.
    [For earlier order herein, see 496 U. S. 923.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-918.
    In re Disbarment of Lovell.
    [For earlier order herein, see 497 U. S. 1045.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-923.
    In re Disbarment of Morrow.
    [For earlier order herein, see 497 U. S. 1046.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-939.
    In re Disbarment of Mazzocone.
   It is ordered that Carl M. Mazzocone, of Philadelphia, Pa., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-940.
    In re Disbarment of Moore.
   It is ordered that Robert Allen Moore, of Brownsville, Tex., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-941.
    In re Disbarment of Ausburn.
   It is ordered that J. Mack Ausburn, of Big Spring, Tex., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-942.
    In re Disbarment of Logan.
   It is ordered that Jon Gregory Logan, of Holton, Kan., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-943.
    In re Disbarment of Fraser.
   It is ordered that Bruce Cameron Fraser, of Winston-Salem, N. C., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-944.
    In re Disbarment of Russell.
   It is ordered that Alan H. Russell, of Van Nuys, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-945.
    In re Disbarment of Heavy.
   It is ordered that Edward Emmet Heavy, of San Francisco, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-946.
    In re Disbarment of Richardson.
   It is ordered that Donald J. Richardson, Jr., of San Francisco, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 111,
    Orig.
    Delaware v. New York.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 893.]
   Motion of South Carolina for leave to intervene and adopt complaint referred to the Special Master.


text:
    No. 89-1027.
    No. 89-1028.
    Norfolk & Western Railway Co. et al. v. American Train Dispatchers’ Assn. et al.; and CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Railway Carmen et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 494 U. S. 1055.] Motion of respondents American Train Dispatchers’ Association et al. to dismiss denied.


text:
    No. 89-1784.
    Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania et al. v. Ben Cooper, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 497 U. S. 1023.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted to be divided as follows: 30 minutes for petitioners; 20 minutes for respondent; and 10 minutes for the Solicitor General. Request for additional time for oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 90-5537.
    In re Thomas.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 90-96.
    Siegert v. Gilley.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 88-7247.
    Lankford v. Idaho.
   Sup. Ct. Idaho. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted limited to Question II presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 89-1922.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-2029.
    Shell Oil Co. v. Leonardini.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-7600.
    Harris v. Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.'


text:
    No. 89-7683.
    Young v. Florida et al.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-7775.
    Martin v. Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-7779.
    Tijerina v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-7789.
    Castillo v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-7833.
    Williams v. Gooding et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-7867.
    McNabb v. Jones, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-7873.
    McQuillion v. Koenig, Chairman, California Board of Prison Terms.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-61.
    Johnson v. United States.
   Ct. Mil. App. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-144.
    Safe Flight Instrument Corp. v. Sundstrand Data Control, Inc.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-145.
    Lyons v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-147.
    Fryman v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-162.
    Rockford Memorial Corp. et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-182.
    No. 90-351.
    V-1 Oil Co. v. Gerber; and Gerber v. V-1 Oil Co.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certio-rari denied. Reported below: 902 F. 2d 1482.


text:
    No. 90-191.
    Buckley et al. v. Ellis.
   Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-326.
    Datapoint Corp. v. Northern Telecom, Inc.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-329.
    Harris et al. v. Traylor Bros., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-335.
    Sparks v. Character and Fitness Committee of Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-337.
    Valley v. Valley.
   Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-338.
    Coffey v. PSLJ, Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-339.
    Celotex Corp. v. Johnson et ux.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-343.
    McMurry v. Amos, Chancery Clerk, Copiah County, Mississippi, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-346.
    Toledo Police Patrolman’s Assn., Local 10, I. U. P. A., et al. v. City of Toledo et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-347.
    Van Dyken v. Montana.
   Sup. Ct. Mont. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-348.
    New Era Publications International, ApS v. Carol Publishing Group.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-349.
    Rathert et al. v. Village of Peotone, Illinois, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-352.
    Navratil, Individually and Guardian ad Litem for Navratil, a Minor v. California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-353.
    Camaione v. Borough of Latrobe.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-381.
    Deere & Co. v. Kennedy et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-399.
    Wrenn v. United States et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-426.
    Gantner et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-442.
    Pontani v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-452.
    Conti v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-469.
    Bejasa v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-471.
    WPIX, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-487.
    Zzie v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5011.
    Herrera v. Burroughs et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5016.
    Anderson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5060.
    Wells v. Lacke et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5115.
    Royal v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5141.
    Whittlesey v. Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5143.
    Stewart v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5198.
    Reliford v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5266.
    Sisco v. County of Los Angeles et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5270.
    Vernor v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5521.
    Steele v. Federal Land Bank of Jackson et al.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5522.
    Tippitt v. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5525.
    Harris v. Rowe et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5533.
    Shury v. Rocco.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5543.
    Malumphy v. Lewis, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5545.
    Hill et ux. v. General Motors Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5552.
    Shrader v. Hopkins et al.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5553.
    Schlicher v. Young et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5555.
    Sulak v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5558.
    Holsey v. Baumgarten et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5559.
    Holsey v. Maryland Parole Commission et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5562.
    Love v. Monroe County Presentment Agency.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5563.
    McCollum et ux. v. Williams Leasing, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5565.
    Muldowney v. Pennsylvania.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5634.
    Moore v. Duckworth, Superintendent, Indiana State Reformatory, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5638.
    Rondon v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5642.
    Lionel F. v. City of New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5652.
    Spencer v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5670.
    Frick v. United States et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5713.
    Phillips v. Nuth, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5715.
    Chavarriaga-Torres v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5718.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5719.
    Neely v. Vaughn, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution and Diagnostic and Classification Center at Graterford, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5720.
    Lang v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5722.
    Grimm v. Murray, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5735.
    Boley v. Iowa.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5776.
    Stomner v. Kolb, Superintendent, Fox Lake Correctional Institution, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice White,

text:
    No. 89-1902.
    Pryba et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

dissenting.

One of the questions presented in this case is the nature of the agreement necessary to sustain a conviction under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) conspiracy statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1962(d). Section 1962(d) provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c)” of §1962. Here, petitioners were convicted under that statute for conspiring to violate § 1962(a), which provides in relevant part:

“It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity ... to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.”

Title 18 U. S. C. § 1961(5) defines the term “pattern of racketeering activity” to require at least two acts of racketeering activity.

The trial court in this case instructed the jury that to convict petitioners of RICO conspiracy, the Government had to prove that “ ‘each defendant agreed to personally commit or aid and abet two or more acts of racketeering in violation of Section 1962(a) or that each defendant agreed that another coconspirator would commit two or more acts of racketeering in violation of 1962(a).’” 900 F. 2d 748, 760 (CA4 1990) (emphasis added). In affirming petitioners’ convictions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit joined a majority of Courts of Appeals in holding that a conviction for RICO conspiracy does not require that the defendant personally agree to commit two or more predicate acts of racketeering; rather, it is sufficient if the defendant agrees to the commission of the predicate acts by another co-conspirator. See ibid.

As the Fourth Circuit acknowledged, ibid., two Courts of Appeals have adopted a contrary view, holding that a RICO conspiracy conviction requires that the defendant have agreed to personally commit two or more predicate acts. See United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F. 2d 913, 921 (CA2), cert. denied sub nom. Rabito v. United States, 469 U. S. 831 (1984); United States v. Winter, 663 F. 2d 1120, 1136 (CA1 1981), cert. denied, 460 U. S. 1011 (1983). I have voted in the past to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals on this issue. See Adams v. United States, 474 U. S. 971 (1985) (dissenting opinion). As I noted there, if the majority view is correct, “Congress’ intent is being frustrated in those circuits which adhere to the narrower view of RICO conspiracy.” Id., at 973. On the other hand, if the minority view is correct, “defendants are being exposed to conviction for behavior Congress did not intend to reach under § 1962(d).” Ibid. To resolve the conflict, I would grant certiorari, limited to Question 5 presented in the petition for certiorari.


text:
    No. 89-7634.
    No. 90-5047.
    No. 90-5101.
    No. 90-5403.
    McKenna v. Nevada. Bennett v. Nevada. Porter v. Pennsylvania. Herrera v. Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
   Sup. Ct. Nev.;

Sup. Ct. Nev.;

Sup. Ct. Pa.; and

C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 89-7634, 106 Nev. 1032; No. 90-5047, 106 Nev. 135, 787 P. 2d 797; No. 90-5101, 524 Pa. 162, 569 A. 2d 942; No. 90-5403, 904 F. 2d 944.

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 90-221.
    No. 90-232.
    Mattox, Attorney General of Texas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al.; and Attorney General of California et al. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-rari denied.

Justice Blackmun would dismiss the petitions for writs of certiorari as moot.

Reported below: 897 F. 2d 773.


text:
    No. 90-323.
    Carriers Container Council, Inc. v. Mobile Steamship Assn., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of International Longshoremen’s Association et al. for leave to file a brief as arnici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-327.
    Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York et al. v. Kanakis et ux.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Motion of American Council of Life Insurance et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-370.
    Republic National Bank of Miami v. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of American Bankers Association et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 90-5605.
    Wisniewski v. Kennard et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White and Justice Black-mun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 88-7619.
    Robertson v. California,
   493 U. S. 879 and 985. Motion of petitioner for leave to file second petition for rehearing denied.

Justice Souter took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.