author: ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice.

text:
    Wayne HAUSCHILDT, et al., Appellants, v. Dennis J. BECKINGHAM, et al., Respondents.
    No. A03-218.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Sept. 16, 2004.

      Vernon J. Vander Weide, Thomas V. Seifert, Head, Seifert & Vander Weide, Eric J. Magnuson, Rider Bennett Egan & Arundel, LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.
    Thomas J. Lyons, Thomas J. Lyons & Associates, P.A., Thomas J. Lyons, Jr., Consumer Justice Center, P.A., Little Canada, MN, Guy M. Burns, Jonathan S. Coleman, Johnson, Blakely, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Respondent.
   OPINION

ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice.

In October 2002, plaintiff-appellants Wayne Hauschildt and Patti Richmond Hauschildt, former depositors in the West Publishing Employees’ Preferred Stock Association, commenced an action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated against defendant-respondents who were officers of the association’s Governing Board. The Hauschildts’ complaint concerned events in late 1998. They allege that the officers failed to timely bring claims related to an allegedly improper 1992 dividend distribution, thus allowing the statute of limitations to expire. The Hauschildts’ action is related to an earlier class action, Davies v. West Publishing Co., in which the Hauschildts were named parties and class members. In a 2001 decision rendered in Davies, the Minnesota Court of Appeals answered three certified questions allowing the statute of limitations to be asserted against claims based on 15 dividend distributions the association made from 1967 to 1993. Citing the decision in Davies, the officers moved to dismiss the Hauschildts’ action under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). The Dakota County District Court granted the officers’ motion to dismiss after finding, inter alia, that under collateral estoppel and res judicata, the effect of the earlier Davies judgment was to bar the Hauschildts’ action. The court of appeals reversed. We affirm the court of appeals.

The West Publishing Employees’ Preferred Stock Association (WPSA) was an unincorporated voluntary association formed in 1913. From the outset, membership in WPSA was limited to West employees. Employees were considered WPSA members even if they had no active account or had no funds on deposit with WPSA. A governing board made investment decisions for WPSA. The eight-member board consisted of six officers, who were usually senior West executives, and two other members elected at the WPSA annual meeting.

West employees could deposit money with WPSA through payroll deductions and receive a variable interest rate on their deposits. WPSA earnings in excess of that distributed as interest to depositors resulted in an unallocated surplus from which dividends were occasionally distributed. Initially, WPSA distributed these dividends on a pro rata basis that was determined by the balance of each member’s account. This practice changed in 1967 when WPSA began to pay dividends to all members without regard to whether they had deposit balances or whether they had ever made any deposits. Sixteen of these per capita distributions were made between 1967 and 1996 in amounts between $100 and $250 per member. Each distribution was accompanied by a written disclosure that the same dollar amount dividend was being paid “to every Association member in the permanent employ of West Publishing Company or West Services, Inc.”

The last two per capita distributions were made on December 18, 1992 and November 29, 1996 in the amounts of $150 and $250 per member, respectively. The record indicates that the 1992 and 1996 distributions collectively totaled over $2.2 million. Of this $2.2 million, over $1 million was paid to West employees who had no deposits. Approximately $370,000 was paid to certain depositors in excess of the amount they would have received had the dividends been distributed on a pro rata basis. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. § 50.17 (1994) (requiring, in part, that distributions to members of a savings bank’s surplus be made pro rata). The 1992 distribution totaled $749,100 and was given to 4,994 members. The 1996 distribution totaled $1,479,750 and was given to 5,919 members.

In 1996, West was acquired by The Thomson Corporation. At some time after the acquisition and merger, West and WPSA’s board retained outside counsel to review the history and purposes of WPSA. At an October 1, 1998 WPSA board meeting, outside counsel advised the board that WPSA was operating in possible violation of state and federal regulations for financial and/or savings institutions. Counsel also advised the board that WPSA should have made the unallocated surplus distributions pro rata in accordance with the deposits rather than per capita. Counsel told the board that six years appeared to be the longest applicable statute of limitations for any claims arising from the failure to make the distributions pro rata. At this same meeting, the board adopted a resolution detailing how the unallocated surplus would be distributed and proposing to members that WPSA be dissolved.

Two weeks later, on October 15, 1998, the WPSA board held a special meeting. At this meeting, outside counsel advised the board that “WPSA should have from time to time in the past distributed some part of its unallocated surplus in accordance with deposits, but WPSA did not- do so.” The board then refined the distribution plan adopted at the October 1 meeting and adopted resolutions that superceded the October 1,1998 resolutions.

The next day, October 16, WPSA held its annual meeting. Approximately 60 people attended this meeting. The meeting’s minutes reflect that Board President Dennis Beckingham — a West Executive Vice President, West’s Chief Financial Officer, and one of the defendants in the case at bar — “commented about the status” of WPSA. According to the minutes, Becking-ham explained that WPSA had been started before there were any state or federal laws governing such investment organizations. He stated that the board had learned that WPSA was “not in compliance with current laws regulating these types of organizations.” He also stated that the board had requested help from outside counsel to bring WPSA into compliance with the law and to investigate dissolution of the association. Beckngham also “assured the members that their money is not at risk.”

In response to questions from members, Beckngham explained that the dissolution process may take from three to six months depending on federal and state regulatory agencies, and that the board “has bent over backwards to recommend a plan [for distribution of funds] that is fair and equitable to all members.” When asked if there could be penalties for noncompliance, Beckngham replied that the board did not know, but it “hope[d] this will be viewed as an honest mistake. Although [WPSA] is not in compliance with the law, members have benefited from its operation. The Board inherited this situation and is takng prudent action.” In response to other questions, Beckngham stated that about 2,600 members used WPSA, and the distribution of any existing surplus would go only to those with balances on certain record dates “over the past 6 years.” The minutes of the annual meeting do not indicate whether members were told at any time during the meeting specifically how WPSA was not in compliance with the law or whether members were told that the past per capita distributions were improper.

Following the annual meeting, Beekng-ham, in an October 30 letter to WPSA members, again addressed the status of WPSA and issues related to its dissolution. Beckngham again assured members that their individual funds were not at risk and stated that the board “has had and will continue to have the best interests of the members in mind during any dissolution or merger process.” The only information in the letter regarding why dissolution had been proposed was a repetition of the statements made at the annual meeting that WPSA was established in 1913 and that the board recently discovered that WPSA “does not comply with current laws regulating such organizations.”

WPSA’s outside counsel sent a letter, dated December 10,1998, to the Minnesota Commissioner of Commerce. The letter described the nature of WPSA’s noncompliance and proposed various steps to either bring WPSA into compliance or to dissolve the association. The letter requested that the commissioner take no action against WPSA. Six months later, pursuant to a June 18, 1999 consent decree with the commissioner, WPSA ceased operation and paid a $100,000 penalty to the state.

The Davies Litigation

On June 14,1999, Lawrence K. Davies, a former West employee, commenced a class action in Dakota County District Court naming West Publishing Company as the defendant. Davies alleged that West controlled and operated WPSA. Davies asserted that WPSA was a de facto trust controlled by West for the benefit of employee depositors and therefore West was required to disclose its noncompliance with various regulations. Davies also claimed that West used WPSA funds to make below market-rate loans to itself that were a benefit to West, but a loss to WPSA. Davies further alleged that West had withheld material information about WPSA’s operation from depositors and that the WPSA surplus was being used to fund periodic all-employee bonuses via the per capita distributions.

Davies’ complaint enumerated three specific counts against West. The first count was for a breach of fiduciary duty. Davies asserted that West “(1) failed to report to WPSA depositors how WPSA’s funds were invested; (2) failed to disclose to WPSA depositors that they were entitled to profits and gains beyond the published interest rate; and (3) failed to pay depositors the profits and gains resulting from the investments on a pro rata basis.” The second count demanded an accounting to WPSA depositors of how WPSA’s funds were invested and used. The third count articulated a cause of action based on West’s alleged conversion of WPSA funds for its own use. Although WPSA was not named as a defendant by Davies in his initial complaint, WPSA and West filed a joint answer to the complaint and jointly counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment and dismissal of the complaint.

During the Davies litigation, the district court certified three questions to the Minnesota Court of Appeals. How the court of appeals ruled on these questions is of central importance in evaluating the appeal that is currently before us. The issues presented via the certified questions were: (1) whether WPSA’s per capita distributions were exempted from statutes of limitations; (2) if the statute of limitations applied, then whether the continuing violations doctrine tolled the statute of limitations; and (3) if the continuing violations doctrine did not apply, then whether equitable estoppel tolled the statute of limitations. Davies v. West Publ’g Co., 622 N.W.2d 836, 840 (MinmApp.), rev. denied (Minn. May 29, 2001). The court of appeals answered the certified questions to the effect that (1) the WPSA distributions were not exempted from statutes of limitations; (2) each distribution was independent and therefore a continuing violation did not exist to toll the statute; and (3) equitable estoppel did not apply because information regarding the nature and source of the distributions accompanied each distribution and thus there was not actionable misrepresentation as to the source or nature of the distributions. Id. at 842-43. Based on the court of appeals’ decision, the district court, on November 7, 2001, granted West and WPSA’s “request for partial summary judgment that any claims concerning the distributions by [WPSA] that took place before June 11, 1993 are barred by the statutes of limitation.”

The Hauschildt Litigation

Appellants Wayne Hauschildt and Patti Richmond Hauschildt are former long-term employees of West who had made deposits into WPSA. The Hauschildts are also named plaintiffs and class members in the Davies litigation. In October 2002, the Hauschildts commenced a putative class action naming the 1998 WPSA board officers individually as defendants. The Hauschildts claim that the officers breaeh: ed their fiduciary and other duties by allowing “statutes of limitations to run and failing] to pursue valid claims against West Publishing Company or the predecessor Officers of WPSA on behalf of the [p]laintiffs.”

The Hauschildts allege that the officers’ employment by West created a potential conflict of interest with their duties as WPSA board members. The Hauschildts also assert that the board “improperly used WPSA surplus funds for the benefit of West” by “deelar[ing] periodic bonuses” — i.e., the per capita distributions — to all West employees. They claim that the purpose of the bonuses was “to engender good will and loyalty toward West.” The Hauschildts allege that the officers had actual notice thát the distributions violated state and federal laws based on information and advice presented by the board’s outside counsel at the board meetings on October 1 and 15,1998. They also contend that despite having actual notice that claims existed, the officers failed to commence legal action against West or former WPSA officers regarding the 1992 distribution. The Hauschildts assert that this failure allowed the six-year statute of limitations, on the 1992 distribution to expire before the depositors themselves could bring an - action. It is their position that the officers’ failure to act was “driven by the [officers’] irreconcilable conflict of interest,” whereby the officers sought to protect West from exposure to liability. The Hauschildts note that the board specifically announced to regulators that WPSA would not seek to recover any of the improper distributions.

The Hauschildts complain that the WPSA board nevér disclosed to its members the following material information: (1) that WPSA’s per capita distributions were illegal; (2) that the statute of limitations was running against claims related to those distributions; (3) that the board had waived any right to seek disgorgement; (4) that the board would make no effort to seek restoration of the improper distributions; and (5) that the officers had “an irreconcilable conflict of interest between their loyalty to their employer, West, and WPSA’s members.” The Hauschildts contend these “omissions and misrepresentations were negligent, reckless, and/or fraudulent.”

The Hauschildts presented three counts in their complaint focusing on the officers’ actions in 1998. Their first count is a cause of action for a breach of fiduciary duty by the officers in failing to timely pursue claims and placing their own interests before those of WPSA depositors. The second count is a cause of action for negligence and gross negligence. The Hauschildts assert that the officers, as a quorum of the board, owed and breached a duty of due care, good faith, and fair dealing, which included, without limitation, specific duties to pursue a claim against West and to keep WPSA members informed of the association’s illegal operations. The third count articulates a cause of action for misrepresentation by omission. The Hauschildts assert that the officers had special access to facts surrounding the potential claims and failed to tell the Hauschildts of the material facts that legal claims existed, that the statute of limitations was running, and that the officers and the board were taking no action. The Hauschildts’ action was assigned to the same district court judge to whom the Davies action had been assigned.

The officers moved to dismiss. The district court granted this motion with prejudice. The court, adopting much of the officers’ memorandum as its own, found that the Hauschildts were collaterally es-topped from making any claims based on the 1992 distribution because such claims were barred by the statute of limitations. It also found that the Hauschildts could not assert that the statute of limitations was tolled or that the officers are estopped from asserting such a defense as “[tjhese issues were litigated in Davies and were resolved against plaintiffs.” The court noted that its own order for partial summary judgment in Davies barred “any claims” without regard against whom they may be asserted.

The court of appeals reversed. Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 668 N.W.2d 916, 920 (Minn.App.2008). The court of appeals held that, despite its holding in Davies, collateral estoppel fails to apply “because the parties are neither the same nor in privity with one another.” Id. at 919. The court also noted that while the issues in Davies and this case are predicated on similar facts, they are not identical. The court said:

In the Davies case, the cause of action was primarily for breach of duty in making the distributions themselves. * * * The present case is for breach of duty, negligence, and gross negligence in failing to act in WPSA depositors’ best interests, specifically including an alleged cover-up in 1998 to shield past improprieties.

Id. Thus, the court held, “res judicata fails because the causes of action are different in the two cases.” Id. The court also noted that the district court’s conclusions on other issues — e.g., the existence of a fiduciary relationship — were premature and more properly addressed after completion of discovery. Id. We granted the officers’ petition for review as to the pre-clusive effect of the partial summary judgment in Davies.

I.

When reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e), we consider whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief. Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn.2003). Our standard of review is de novo. Id. In evaluating a district court’s ruling on a Rule 12.02(e) motion, “we will not uphold a * * * dismissal ‘if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.’ ” Martens v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 616 N.W.2d 732, 739-40 (Minn.2000) (quoting Northern States Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 395, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (1963)).

The district court dismissed the Haus-childts’ complaint on the grounds that the statute of limitations barred claims related to the 1992 distribution. The court then found that res judicata and collateral es-toppel barred the Hauschildts from arguing that the statute of limitations. was tolled.

Res judicata and collateral estop-pel are related doctrines. ■ Fundamental to both doctrines “is that a ‘right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction * * * cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies * * ” Kaiser v. Northern States Power Co., 353 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Minn.1984) (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979)). Although the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, each doctrine is distinct in its effect. Res judi-cata, also known as “claim preclusion,” while based on the same principle as collateral estoppel, is the broader of the two and applies more generally to a set of circumstances giving rise to entire claims or lawsuits. Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modem Legal Usage 169 (2d ed.1995). Once there is an adjudication of a dispute between parties, res judicata prevents either party from relitigating claims arising from the original circumstances, even under new legal theories. Wilson v. Comm’r of Revenue, 619 N.W.2d 194, 198 (Minn.2000); Hauser v. Mealey, 263 N.W.2d 803, 806-07 (Minn.1978). Collateral estoppel, characterized by Garner as being “a miniature of res judicata,” applies to specific legal issues that have been adjudicated and is also commonly and accurately known as “issue preclusion.” Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modem Legal Usage 169; see also Ellis, 319 N.W.2d at 703 n. 3, 704; Hauser, 263 N.W.2d at 806.

We have observed that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel is to be rigidly applied. Wilson v. Comm’r of Revenue, 619 N.W.2d 194, 198 (Minn.2000); Johnson v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 608, 613 (Minn.1988). Instead, the focus is on whether their application would work an injustice on the party against whom the doctrines are urged.- Johnson, 420 N.W.2d at 613-14. In particular, the United States Supreme Court has cautioned that res judicata should be invoked only after careful inquiry because it “may govern grounds and defenses not previously litigated” and therefore “blockades unexplored paths that may lead to truth.” Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 132, 99 S.Ct. 2205, 60 L.Ed.2d 767 (1979).

II.

Whether collateral estoppel precludes litigation of an issue is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo. Care Inst., Inc.-Roseville v. County of Ramsey, 612 N.W.2d 443, -446 (Minn.2000) (CIIR). For collateral estoppel to apply, all of the following prongs must be met:

(1) the issue must be identical to one in a prior adjudication; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the estopped party was a party or was in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the estopped party was given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue.

Id. at 448.

Here, the pivotal question is whether the issues decided in Davies are identical to any issue raised in the Haus-childts’ cause of action such that all or part of the Hausehildts’ action is collaterally estopped. The issue on which collateral estoppel is to be applied must be the same as that adjudicated in the prior action and it must have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment in that action. Ellis v. Minneapolis Comm’n on Civil Rights, 319 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Minn.1982); Hauser, 263 N.W.2d at 808. The issue must have been distinctly contested and directly determined in the earlier adjudication for collateral estoppel to apply. See Kaiser, 358 N.W.2d at 902.

As the motion to dismiss was argued by the officers and decided by the district court in Davies, the relevant determination by the court of appeals was that equitable estoppel did not toll the six-year statute of limitations on claims arising from each per capita distribution. Davies, 622 N.W.2d at 843. The court of appeals noted that a necessary element of equitable estoppel is a misrepresentation and then explained that

there are no facts in the record to establish a misrepresentation with regard to WPSA’s distribution of surplus funds. The record indicates that all WPSA depositors received letters with each distribution, informing them that (1) the distributions were being paid out of money earned from successful investment of WPSA funds; (2) all full-time West employees were members of WPSA; and (3) the same distribution amount was being paid to all WPSA members. Thus, all members of respondent class had notice that all full-time West employees were receiving the same amount of money, earned from WPSA investments, regardless of whether they had deposited money with WPSA. These undisputed facts lead us to conclude as a matter of law that there was no actionable misrepresentation regarding the nature or source of the challenged distributions. Therefore, the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply to toll the statute of limitations.

Id. at 842. Thus, the court of appeals has determined that each distribution did not involve misrepresentation by WPSA. Undoubtedly, the identical issue prong of collateral estoppel would apply if the Haus-childts also were asserting that the WPSA officers misrepresented the nature and source of the 1992 distribution. However, this is not the case here.

The officers contend that key underlying factual issues were resolved against the Hauschildts and other class members in Davies. This contention focuses on the court of appeals’ conclusion in Davies that there was no actionable misrepresentation concurrent to each distribution. Id. The officers have attempted to extend the reach of this conclusion. They assert that there could be no subsequent “cover-up” by the board regarding the 1992 distribution because the Hauschildts were “not uninformed” as to the nature of the individual distributions. The officers emphasize that the Hauschildts were constructively “aware of their injury” at the time of the 1992 distribution and could have commenced their suit at that time. Arguing that the Hauschildts’ “core allegation” is that depositors were uninformed as to the nature and source of the per capita distributions, the officers assert that this allegation is the same as in Davies. Notably, the officers do not argue against the merits of the Hauschildts’ claim for recovery of the improperly made distributions — only that the claim on the 1992 distribution is now barred by the expiration of the statute of limitations.

Insofar as the statute of limitations is concerned, the Hauschildts áre not making a claim on the 1992 distribution. Instead, the Hauschildts assert that the failure of the officers in 1998 to bring an action on behalf of depositors resulted in no legal action being commenced before the expirar tion of the statute of limitations. In essence, the issues raised by the Hauschildts concern the officers’ acts and omissions starting in October 1998. The Hauschildts assert that in 1998 a claim existed against West and the WPSA board for the recovery of the money improperly distributed in 1992. They argue that the officers chose not to take legal action and failed to disclose to depositors the fall nature of WPSA’s noncompliance and that the statute of limitations was about to expire for any claims on the 1992 distribution. The Hausehildts specifically complain that in 1998 the officers breached their fiduciary duty to depositors, that the officers’ acts and omissions in 1998 constituted negligence and gross negligence, and that the officers are liable for their 1998 misrepresentation by omission. They assert that the officers’ “withholding of material information made it impossible for WPSA depositors to make knowing and informed choices as to their claims against West and WPSA’s 1992 Governing Board.” As demonstrated by the court of appeals’ opinion, these issues were not distinctly contested or directly determined by the court in Davies. See 622 N.W.2d at 842-43. Nor were these issues necessary and essential to the Davies decision.

With respect to the issues raised by the Hausehildts, if a valid claim on the 1992 distribution existed in 1998, then the 1992 distribution serves only as a measure of damages for the Hausehildts’ claim and not as their claim in and of itself. The determination in Davies that the statute of limitations on the 1992 distribution expired in December 1998 does not affect the Hausehildts’ present claim that the officers’ 1998 acts and omissions prevented the Hausehildts from timely filing a claim on the 1992 distribution. In this sense, the Hausehildts’ claim against the officers as fiduciaries is analogous to a claim of legal malpractice. In a legal malpractice claim, one element concerns the defendant attorney’s negligence or breach of contract in representing the plaintiff in a claim against a third party. Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 150, 179 N.W.2d 288, 293-94 (1970). A second necessary element is that, but for the attorney’s conduct, the former client would have been successful in the prosecution or defense of the claim against the third party. Id. at 150, 179 N.W.2d at 294. Applying these concepts, a claim stemming from the 1992 distribution represents the case-within-a-case that the Hausehildts must prove in order to succeed in their action against the officers. See Rouse v. Dunkley & Bennett, P.A., 520 N.W.2d 406, 409-10 (Minn.1994).

Finally, we note that the officers’ argument, that they are not liable because the Hausehildts constructively knew of the existence of a claim on the 1992 distribution, is not persuasive. The officers, who were sophisticated executives from a premier legal research and information business, imply that even they did not know of the basis for the claims until October 1998. Given this position, it is difficult for the officers to assert that the Hausehildts reasonably should have had the knowledge that the officers concede that even they did not have.

For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the issues raised in the Haus-childts’ complaint are not the same as those adjudicated in Davies. Thus, we conclude that the Hauschildts’ action is not barred by collateral estoppel. Therefore, we hold the district court erred when it dismissed the Hauschildts’ action under collateral estoppel.

III.

As an alternative argument to collateral estoppel, the officers contend that res judicata bars the Hauschildts’ claim. Whereas collateral estoppel concerns issues that were actually litigated, determined, and were essential in a prior action, res judicata concerns circumstances giving rise to a claim and precludes subsequent litigation — regardless of whether a particular issue or legal theory was actually litigated. Hauser, 263 N.W.2d at 806-07. Res judicata is a finality doctrine that mandates that there be an end to litigation. Dorso Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Am. Body & Trailer, Inc., 482 N.W.2d 771, 773-74 (Minn.1992). Under res judicata, a party is “required to assert all alternative theories of recovery in the initial action.” Id. at 774. Res judicata not only applies to all claims actually litigated, but to all claims that could have been litigated in the earlier action. State v. Joseph, 636 N.W.2d 322, 327 (Minn.2001). In Youngstown Mines Corp. v. Prowt, 266 Minn. 450, 466, 124 N.W.2d 328, 340 (1963) (quoting Veline v. Dahlquist, 64 Minn. 119, 121, 66 N.W. 141,142 (1896)), we stated:

A judgment on the merits constitutes an absolute bar to a second suit for the same cause of action, and is conclusive between parties and privies, not only as to every matter which was actually litigated, but also as to every matter which might have been litigated therein.

Application of res judicata to preclude a claim is a question of law that we review de novo. CIIR, 612 N.W.2d at 446. Res judicata applies as an absolute bar to a subsequent claim when (1) the earlier claim involved the same set of factual circumstances; (2) the earlier claim involved the same parties or their privies; (3) there was a final judgment on the merits; (4) the estopped party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter. Joseph, 636 N.W.2d at 327; accord Wilson, 619 N.W.2d at 198. All four prongs must be met for res judicata to apply. See Joseph, 636 N.W.2d at 327-29.

Here, the first prong is determinative. With regard to this prong, we have explained that “a plaintiff may not split his cause of action and bring successive suits involving the same set of factual circumstances.” Hauser, 263 N.W.2d at 807. Central to considering this prong is what is meant by “claim” or “cause of action.” A claim or cause of action is “a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing.” Martin ex rel. Hoffv. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn.2002) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 214 (7th ed.1999)). The two terms can be used interchangeably. See Black’s Law Dictionary 214 (7th ed.1999). Therefore, the focus of res judicata is whether the second claim “arise[s] out of thé same set of factual circumstances.” Hauser, 263 N.W.2d at 807 (emphasis added); see also Meagher ex rel. Pension Plan v. Bd. of Trustees of Pension Plan, 921 F.Supp. 161, 167 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (stating “the facts surrounding the occurrence which constitutes the cause of action — not the legal theory upon which [plaintiff] chose to frame his complaint — must be identical in both actions to trigger res judicata.” (emphasis in original), affd, 79 F.3d 256 (2d Cir.1996)).

The “common test for determining whether a former judgment is a bar to a subsequent action is to inquire whether the same evidence will sustain both actions.” McMenomy v. Ryden, 276 Minn. 55, 58, 148 N.W.2d 804, 807 (1967). In addition, claims cannot be considered the same cause of action if “the right to assert the second claim did not arise at the same time as the right to assert the. first claim.” CIIR, 612 N.W.2d at 447.

Here, the evidence that would sustain the Hauschildts’ present action would be the same as in Davies only to the extent that the propriety of the 1992 distribution is a common question. Entirely different evidence is necessary to sustain the Hauschildts’ claim that the officers’ 1998 acts and omissions were a breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, or a misrepresentation by omission. Indeed, in Davies, the court of appeals’ discussion regarding the statute of limitations did not consider any facts or circumstances from 1998. See Davies, 622 N.W.2d at 839, 842. Moreover, the right to assert a claim based on the 1998 acts and omissions arose after the right to a claim arose based on the 1992 distribution. Therefore, we conclude that res judicata does not apply to the Haus-childts’ claim against the officers. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred when it dismissed the Hauschildts’ claim under res judicata.

Affirmed.

      . Minnesota Statutes § 50.17, subd. 1, previously required the board of every savings bank with a surplus of 15 percent of its deposits to, at least once every three years, "divide proportionately the excess among its depositors as an extra dividend.” Minn.Stat. § 50.17, subd. 1 (1994) (amended 1995) (emphasis added). This requirement to pay the excess to depositors pro rata was eliminated following a 1995 amendment. The new language of § 50.17 does not discuss the distribution of surplus. See Minn.Stat. § 50.17 (Supp.1995).

      . According to a December 10, 1998 letter to the Commissioner of Commerce from WPSA's outside counsel, all West employees were members of WPSA. Beckingham’s ''2,600'' figure roughly corresponds to the number of employees — 2,515—with deposits rather than all actual members.
      As of October 31, 1998, WPSA had assets of approximately $20.2 million, of which approximately $11.4 million was attributable to deposit balances, with the remaining $8.8 million being unallocated surplus. At that time, there was a total of 4,725 WPSA members. Of these, there were 2,515 (53%) with balances on accounts totaling $11.4 million, including accrued interest, and 2,210 (47%) with account-balances of zero.

      . We recently noted that an analogous concept — that everyone is presumed to know the law' — "does not necessarily apply [as a defense for] a fiduciary, who may have an expanded obligation to inform the beneficiary of the legal implications of their dealings.” Brekke v. THM Biomedical, Inc., 683 N.W.2d 771, 778 (Minn.2004). This treatment of fiduciary relationships is also illustrated by our decision in Toombs v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 801 (Minn.1985). In Toombs, a fiduciary attempted to assert a statute of limitations defense, but we held that the statute of limitations was tolled by the fiduciary's withholding from the beneficiary facts that a possible legal right existed and that the fiduciary had elected not to seek a court determination of those rights. Id. at 809-10. Our reference to fiduciaries does not predetermine that there was a fiduciary-beneficiary relationship. Because of the posture in which this case came to us, we are assuming for purposes of the motion to dismiss that the Hausehildts' allegations to that effect are true.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PETERSON, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Eric James McDONNELL, Appellant, Daniel A. Wall, Appellant.
    Nos. A03-1358, A03-1512.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Aug. 24, 2004.

      Mike Hatch, Attorney General, James B. Early, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN: Thomas F. Murtha, Aitkin County Attorney, Aitkin, MN; and Robin W. Finke, Swift County Attorney, Benson, MN, for respondent.
    John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, for appellants.
    Considered and decided by PETERSON, Presiding Judge; ANDERSON, Judge; and FORSBERG, Judge.

       Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 10.

   OPINION

PETERSON, Judge.

In these consolidated appeals, appellants challenge their convictions of first-degree driving while impaired, arguing that a 2003 amendment to Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 21, that excluded a license suspension for underage drinking and driving from the definition of “prior impaired driving-related loss of license” and became effective on August 1, 2003, should be retroactively applied to their driving violations, which occurred before August 1, 2003, because the amendment clarified, rather than changed, existing law. Alternatively, appellants argue that if the 2003 amendment does not retroactively apply to violations that occurred before August 1, 2003, they should benefit from the mitigating effect of the amendment because their convictions were not final on the effective date of the amendment. We affirm.

FACTS

Following an incident on January 2, 2003, appellant Eric James McDonnell was charged with first-degree driving while impaired (alcohol concentration over .10) in violation of Minn.Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(5), 169A.24 (2002). At that time, McDonnell’s driving record included two license suspensions for underage drinking and driving. McDonnell 'moved to dismiss for lack of probable cause, arguing that his license suspensions for underage drinking and driving could not be used as a basis for charging him with first-degree driving while impaired. The district court found that because the license suspensions for underage drinking and driving occurred pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 171.18 (2002), the suspensions are prior impaired driving-related losses of license under Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 21(1) (2002), that provide a basis for charging McDonnell with first-degree driving while impaired. Therefore, the district court denied McDonnell’s motion.

In May 2003, the legislature amended Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 21, to exclude from the statutory definition of “prior impaired driving-related loss of license” any license suspension arising from a violation of Minn.Stat. § 169A.33 (2002), which is the statute that prohibits underage drinking and driving. 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 2, art. 9, § 1 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 21(c) (2003)). McDonnell moved for reconsideration of his motion to dismiss in light of the statutory amendment. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion without making any findings.

The case was submitted to the district court for a trial on stipulated facts pursuant to State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854 (Minn.1980), and the district court found McDonnell guilty of first-degree driving while impaired.

Following an incident on April 24, 2003, appellant Daniel A. Wall was charged with two counts of first-degree driving while impaired (impaired and alcohol concentration over .10) in violation of Minn.Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(1), (5), 169A.24. At that time, Wall’s driving record included one license suspension for underage drinking and driving. Wall moved to dismiss for lack of probable cause, arguing that his license suspension for underage drinking and driving could not be used as a basis for charging him with first-degree driving while impaired. The district court found that a license suspension for underage drinking and driving pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 171.18, subd. 1(12), is a prior impaired driving-related loss of license under Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 21, and, therefore, the license suspension could be used as a basis for charging Wall with first-degree driving while impaired. The district court denied Wall’s motion. Wall waived his right to a jury trial, and his case was submitted to the district court for trial on stipulated facts. The court found Wall guilty of both counts of first-degree driving while impaired.

McDonnell and Wall appealed their convictions, and this court granted their motions to consolidate the appeals.

ISSUE

1. Does the 2003 amendment to Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 21, which excluded a license suspension for underage drinking and driving from the definition of “prior impaired driving-related loss of license,” retroactively apply to appellants’ driving-while-impaired violations?

2. Should the 2003 amendment to Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 21, which excluded a license suspension for underage drinking and driving from the definition of “prior impaired driving-related loss of license,” be applied to mitigate the punishment for appellants’ violations because appellants’ convictions were not final when the amendment became effective?

ANALYSIS

1. In Minnesota,
It is a crime for any person to drive, operate, or be in physical control of any motor vehicle within this state or on any boundary water of this state:
(1) when the person' is under the influence of alcohol; [or] ..
(5) when the person’s alcohol concentration at the time, or as measured within two hours of the time, of driving, operating, or being in physical control of the motor vehicle is 0.10 or more [.]

MinmStat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1), (5) (2002).

For a driver who has previously been involved in certain impaired-driving incidents, driving a motor vehicle while impaired is a first-degree offense. The first-degree driving-while-impaired statute states:

A person who violates section 169A.20 (driving while impaired) is guilty of first-degree driving while impaired if the person:
(1) commits the violation within ten years of the first of three or more qualified prior impaired driving incidents; or
(2) has previously been convicted of a felony under this section..

MinmStat. § 169A.24, subd. 1 (2002) (emphasis added). “ ‘Qualified prior impaired driving incident’ includes prior impaired driving convictions and prior impaired driving-related losses of license.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 22 (2002).

Based on their driving records, both appellants were charged with first-degree driving while impaired. McDonnell does not dispute that his driving record includes August 1998 and September 2002 license revocations for driving with an alcohol concentration over .10 and license suspensions following underage-drinking-and-driving convictions in December 1997 and May 1999, and Wall does not dispute that his driving record includes March 2000 and September 2001 driving-while-impaired convictions and license revocations and an April 2001 license suspension following an underage-drinking-and-driving conviction. But, based on an amendment to Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 21, that the legislature enacted after appellants were charged, appellants argue that none of their license suspensions for underage drinking and driving can be used as a basis for charging them with first-degree driving while impaired.

When appellants were charged, the statutory definition of “prior impaired driving-related loss of license” included a driver’s-license suspension under Minn.Stat. § 171.18. Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 21(1) (2002). Minn.Stat. § 171.18, subd. 1 (2002), describes 12 circumstances under which the commissioner of public safety may suspend a driver’s license. One of these circumstances is that the licensee “has been found to have committed an offense under section 169A.33.” MinmStat. § 171.18, subd. 1(12) (2002). It is an offense under section 169A.33 “for a person under the age of 21 years to drive, operate, or be in physical control of a motor vehicle while consuming alcoholic beverages, or after having consumed alcoholic beverages while there is physical evidence of the consumption present in the person’s body.” MinmStat. § 169A.33, subd. 2 (2002).

After appellants were charged, the legislature amended the definition of “prior impaired driving-related loss of license” by adding a paragraph to Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 21, which states, in part, “ Trior impaired driving-related loss of license’ does not include any license action stemming solely from a violation of section 169A.33 (underage drinking and driving) _” 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 2, art. 9, § 1 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 21(c) (2003)). If this amendment applies to appellants’ violations, none of appellants’ license suspensions for underage drinking and driving is a “prior impaired driving-related loss of license,” and there is no basis for charging appellants with first-degree impaired driving because appellants’ violations were not committed within ten years of three or more qualified prior impaired-driving incidents as required under Minn.Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(1). Without the license suspensions for underage drinking and driving, each appellant has only two qualified prior impaired-driving incidents during the ten years before his current violation.

Appellants argue that although this amendment became effective on August 1, 2003, which was after the violations for which they were charged, the amendment should be retroactively applied to their violations because the amendment clarifies the legislature’s intent with respect to using a license suspension for underage drinking and driving as a basis for charging a driver with first-degree driving while impaired. See State v. Lilleskov, 658 N.W.2d 904, 908 (Minn.App.2003) (stating “an amendment that merely clarifies the legislature’s intent may be applied retroactively”).

The state argues that appellants forfeited their argument that the statutory amendment should be retroactively applied as a clarifying amendment because this issue was not raised in the district court. See Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn.1996) (stating appellate courts generally will not decide issues that were not raised before the district court). But the record indicates that at trial, McDonnell’s counsel argued that the statutory amendment should be applied retroactively because the amendment clarified the legislature’s intent. Therefore, because each appellant’s driving record presents the question whether a license suspension for underage drinking and driving may be used as a basis for charging the appellant with first-degree driving while impaired, we will address the merits of both appellants’ arguments in the interests of justice and judicial economy. Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 103.04.

Statutory construction is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. State v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696, 698 (Minn.2003). There is a “general presumption that the legislature intends to change the law when they enact ah amendment.” State v. Wickner, 673 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Minn.App.2004), review denied (Minn. Mar. 30, 2004). “The presumption of legislative change is rebutted when the language of an amendatory statute is intended to clarify rather than enlarge the powers of the original statute.” Id. (quotation omitted). But, “[n]o law shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the legislature.” Minn.Stat. § 645.21 (2002).

The 2003 legislation that amended Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 21, by excluding a license suspension for underage drinking and driving from the definition of “prior impaired driving-related loss of license” contains an effective-date provision, which explicitly states that the amendment “is effective August 1, 2003, and applies to violations committed on or after that date.” 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 2, art. 9, § 1. This explicit legislative statement that the 2003 amendment to Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 21, applies to violations committed on or after August 1, 2003, demonstrates that the legislature did not clearly and manifestly intend the amendment to be retroactive. Therefore, there is no basis for us to construe the amendment to be retroactive, and we conclude that the amendment does not apply to the violations for which appellants were charged with first-degree driving while impaired.

2. Citing State v. Coolidge, 282 N.W.2d 511, 514 (Minn.1979), appellants argue in the alternative that because their convictions were not final on the effective date of the 2003 amendment, they should benefit from the mitigating effects of the amendment. In Coolidge, the supreme court held that where a defendant in a criminal case is convicted under a statute that is subsequently repealed or amended so as to mitigate punishment, the more recent statute is to be applied to the acts committed before its effective date, so long as no final judgment has been reached. Id. at 514-15.

But the principle stated in Coolidge applies only in the absence of a contrary statement of intent by the legislature. Edstrom v. State, 326 N.W.2d 10, 10 (Minn.1982). As we have already explained, the effective-date provision of the 2003 legislation that amended Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 21, explicitly states that the amendment applies to violations that occur on or after August 1, 2003. Therefore, because there is a legislative statement of intent that the amendment does not apply to appellants’ violations, the principle stated in Coolidge does not apply to appellants even though their convictions were not final on the effective date of the amendment.

DECISION

Because the violations for which appellants were charged with first-degree driving while impaired occurred before August 1, 2003, the 2003 amendment to Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 21, that excluded a license suspension for underage drinking and driving from the definition of “prior impaired driving-related loss of license” does not apply to the violations. Because there is a legislative statement of intent that the 2003 amendment to Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 21, does not apply to appellants’ violations, appellants should not benefit from the mitigating effects of the amendment even though appellants’ convictions were not final before the amendment’s effective date.

Affirmed.

      . Although McDonnell presented the amendment issue to the district court, the district court made no findings on the issue. When an appellate court is able to infer findings from the district court’s conclusions, a remand is not necessary. State v. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn.1983). We infer from the denial of McDonnell's motion, that the district court found that the amendment was not a clarifying amendment that could be applied retroactively.


author: MINGE, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Paul Anthony BAXTER, Respondent.
    No. A04-676.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Sept. 14, 2004.

      Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Thomas F. Murtha, IV, Aitkin County Attorney, Aitkin County Courthouse, Aitkin, MN, for Appellant.
    Eric J. Nelson, Allan H. Caplan & Associates, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondent.
    Considered and decided by RANDALL, Presiding Judge; WILLIS, Judge; and MINGE, Judge.
   OPINION

MINGE, Judge.

The state appeals from a pretrial order denying its motion to amend the complaint to add two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and to change one of the original counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct to criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, arguing that the denial has a critical impact on the outcome of the trial and that the district court clearly-erred. We affirm.

FACTS

The state alleges that on several specific occasions from January 1990 to February 1991, respondent Paul Baxter engaged in sexual intercourse with a minor female. At the time of the alleged instances, the female was 14 and 15 years old, and respondent was 23 and 24 years old.

On September 10, 1991, respondent was charged with three counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn.Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) (1990). Respondent failed to appear for trial and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Twelve years later, respondent was arrested in another state.

Approximately nine months after his arrest and on the morning of the jury trial in the matter, the state moved to amend its complaint, which would result in charging respondent with three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. l(h)(v), (g) (1990), and two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn.Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b). The district court denied the state’s motion to amend and granted the state’s motion to appeal from that ruling.

ISSUE

Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying the state’s motion to amend the complaint?

ANALYSIS

The district court has broad discretion to grant or deny leave to amend a complaint, and its ruling will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn.1993). In reviewing pretrial prosecution appeals, this court will reverse the district court’s determination only if the state can clearly and unequivocally demonstrate “that the [district] court has erred in its judgment and that, unless reversed, the error will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial.” State v. Webber, 262 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Minn.1977). “Interpretation of the rules of criminal procedure is a question of law, which we review de novo.” State v. Whitley, 649 N.W.2d 180, 183 (Minn.App.2002).

A. Critical Impact

Critical impact is a threshold showing that must be made in order for an appellate court to have jurisdiction. State v. Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 550 (Minn.1987). The state satisfies the critical-impact test when the district court’s order is based on an interpretation of a rule that bars further prosecution of a defendant. Whitley, 649 N.W.2d at 183.

We conclude that the critical-impact requirement is met in the present case on a single-behavioral-incident theory. Offenses are found to be part of a single-behavioral incident if they arise from a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct, occur at substantially the same time and place, manifest an indivisible state of mind, and if the conduct involved is motivated by a desire to obtain a single criminal objective. State v. Chidester, 380 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Minn.App.1986), review denied (Minn. Mar. 21, 1986). The single-behavioral-incident statute states that “if a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses and a conviction or acquittal of any one of them is a bar to prosecution for any other of them.” Minn.Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2002). In other words, retrial is barred by Minn.Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1, if (1) the defendant’s course of conduct consists of a single behavioral incident, and (2) the defendant was either convicted of or acquitted on any count arising from that incident. State v. Schmidt, 612 N.W.2d 871, 876-77 (Minn.2000). The single-behavioral-incident statute protects criminal defendants from both multiple prosecutions and multiple sentences for offenses resulting from the same behavioral incident. State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 397, 141 N.W.2d 517, 520 (1966). The supreme court explained in Johnson that the “drafters, as well as the legislature, intended ... to broaden the protection afforded by our constitutional provisions against double jeopardy.” Id. at 400,141 N.W.2d at 522.

Here, the series of incidents that were the basis for the charges in the original complaint are the exact same incidents that are the basis for the added counts in the proposed amended complaint. Because they are part of the same behavioral incidents, the state would be barred from prosecuting on the additional counts at a later time if the respondent is convicted on all counts in the original complaint. Because of this potential bar, the denial of the state’s motion does have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial.

B. District Court Error

The second prong in a pretrial prosecution appeal requires a showing that the district court erred in its judgment. Whitley, 649 N.W.2d at 183. When reviewing pretrial orders, this court may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred. State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn.1999).

Here, the district court denied the state’s motion because it found that the amended complaint was untimely. The district court also noted that the amended complaint could have a significant impact on sentencing.

(i) Separation-of-Powers Doctrine

The state first argues that the district court’s conduct interfered with the prosecutor’s charging authority, thereby violating the separation-of-powers doctrine. The state asserts that the district court should have issued a summons and allowed the amendment because the facts set forth in the amended complaint showed probable cause to believe the additional crimes had been committed. See Minn. R.Crim. P. 3.01 (“If it appears from the facts set forth in writing in the complaint and any supporting affidavits or supplemental sworn testimony that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it, a summons or warrant shall be issued.”). At a very minimum, the state asserts that the district court should have made a probable-cause determination.

The separation-of-powers doctrine is premised on the belief that “too much power in the hands of one governmental branch invites corruption and tyranny.” Wulff v. Tax Court of Appeals, 288 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Minn.1979). Thus, the judiciary generally cannot interfere with the prosecutor’s charging authority because that power is solely delegated to the executive branch. State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 254 (Minn.1996). “Notwithstanding the separation of powers doctrine, there has never been an absolute division of governmental functions in this country, nor was such even intended.” Irwin v. Surdyk’s Liquor, 599 N.W.2d 132, 137 (Minn.1999) (quotation omitted). For example, although a court cannot interfere with the prosecutor’s charging authority, it retains broad discretion over how the case proceeds once it is filed. State v. Johnson, 514 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn.1994). This includes the power to grant or deny the prosecutor’s request to amend the complaint. Id.; see also Warrick v. Giron, 290 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Minn.1980) (“The decision whether to permit a party to amend pleadings rests within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed in the absence of clear abuse of such discretion.”).

We conclude that the district court’s inherent authority to grant or deny a motion to amend a complaint does not interfere with the prosecutor’s authority to charge because the prosecutor’s authority to charge only lasts until the time of filing. See Johnson, 514 N.W.2d at 556. Furthermore, the district court’s authority to grant or deny a motion to amend a complaint does not preclude the prosecutor from requesting a trial continuance. Because here, the district court acted within its inherent powers and did not interfere with the prosecutor’s charging power, we find no violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine.

(ii) Basis for Denial

The state also argues that the district court erred by considering the difference in penalties between the crimes charged in the original and the amended complaints. See State v. Chryst, 320 N.W.2d 721, 722 (Minn.1982) (“[T]he prosecutor may prosecute under any statute that the defendant’s acts violate without regard to the penalty.”). While the district court did note the potential sentencing consequences of amending the complaint if the defendant were to be found guilty of the new charges, its primary reason for denying the state’s motion was because the motion was untimely.

The state argues that the district court erred in denying its motion for being untimely because the motion was made prior to the commencement of trial. The state cites Minn. R.Crim. P. 3.04, subd. 2, which states:

During pre-trial proceedings affecting any person arrested under a warrant or appearing in response to a summons issued upon a complaint, the proceedings may be continued to permit a new complaint to be filed and a new warrant or summons issued thereon, provided the prosecuting attorney promptly moves for such continuance on the ground:
(b) that on the basis of the evidence presented at the proceeding it appears that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed a different offense from that charged in the complaint and that the prosecuting attorney intends to charge the defendant with such offense.

The state also asserts that prior cases have allowed amendments to complaints, even shortly before jury selection. See State v. Smith, 313 N.W.2d 429, 430 (Minn.1981).

Minn. R.Crim. P. 3.04, subd. 2, does not state that any motion to amend a complaint made prior to trial must be granted. Instead, the rule gives the district court discretion to allow amendments to the complaint and the continuance of pretrial proceedings. While some courts have allowed amendments to complaints up to the point of jury selection, this does not negate the fact that a district court retains broad discretion over how a case proceeds once it is filed. Johnson, 514 N.W.2d at 556. This includes the power to grant or deny a prosecutor’s request to amend the complaint. Id. The inquiry into whether a court should grant or deny such a motion is factual and case specific.

While rule 3.04 does not make timeliness paramount, the rule recognizes the importance of timeliness by stating that proceedings may be continued to permit the issuance of a new complaint, provided the prosecution “promptly” moves for a continuance. Minn. R.Crim. P. 3.04, subd. 2. Here, respondent made a demand for a speedy trial on January 14, 2004. After several continuances and hearings, the state moved to amend the complaint three months later on the morning of the trial. This matter had been pending for approximately nine months since respondent’s arrest. While the state contends the amendment was delayed because of information they received from an interview with the victim, the state waited to interview the victim for more than a month after she had been located. Even after the state interviewed the victim and presumably knew that it would file an amended complaint, the state waited five more days until the day of the trial to notify anyone of its intention to seek an amendment to the complaint.

The district court has broad discretion in civil actions to accept or deny motions to amend complaints and to consider timeliness. See Sheehan v. St. Peter’s Catholic Sch., 291 Minn. 1, 6, 188 N.W.2d 868, 871 (1971) (concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to amend when motion was made on eve of trial, two years after answer was served, and no reason was given for delay); LOL Fin. Co. v. Romain Corp., 352 N.W.2d 841, 844 (Minn.App.1984) (concluding the district court did not abuse discretion when motion was made only eight days before trial). The district court has a parallel responsibility for the conduct of criminal proceedings. In Smith, the court allowed a “housekeeping” amendment, which did not charge an additional or different offense. 313 N.W.2d at 430. Here, the amendment would add an additional count — first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Such an amendment would require that additional elements of a crime be proven, would permit the presentation of additional defenses, and would allow for a greater penalty. This is more than a mere “housekeeping” amendment. The district court had discretion to deny appellant’s motion to amend.

DECISION

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to amend the complaint.

Affirmed.


author: KLAPHAKE, Judge.

text:
    Allan G. CEDERBERG, Appellant, v. CITY OF INVER GROVE HEIGHTS, Respondent.
    No. A04-214.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Sept. 21, 2004.

      Allan G. Cederberg, Inver Grove Heights, MN, pro se appellant.
    Tona T. Dove, Levander, Gillen & Miller, P.A., South St. Paul, MN, for respondent.
    Considered and decided by KLAPHAKE, Presiding Judge, KALITOWSKI, Judge, and HUDSON, Judge.
   OPINION

KLAPHAKE, Judge.

Pro se appellant Allan G. Cederberg challenges the district court’s dismissal of his appeal from a special assessment imposed on his residential property by respondent City of Inver Grove Heights (the city). The district court dismissed the appeal as untimely after determining that appellant failed to comply with the mandatory jurisdictional requirements of Minn. Stat. § 429.081 (2002). The court also determined that appellant’s attempt to join additional affected property owners was improper and invalid.

Because the district court timely received the appeal papers on June 9, 2003, even though the papers were not stamped “filed” until June 24, 2003, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the appeal. Because appellant’s attempt to join additional affected property owners was improper under Minn. R. Civ. P. 20.01, we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing these additional parties. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to consider whether the city acted unlawfully by imposing a special assessment that exceeds the benefit to appellant’s property.

FACTS

In December 2002, the city council adopted a resolution ordering certain improvements to 82nd Street that included grading, gravel base, drainage culverts, bituminous surfacing, and related appurtenances. The improvements were to be funded by special assessments to be paid by all affected property owners, including appellant. In April 2003, appellant and four other property owners submitted their objections to the proposed project.

Proper notice was sent to all affected property owners, including appellant, for a May 12, 2003 hearing. Notice also was published. The notices stated:

An owner may appeal an assessment to the District Court pursuant to Minnesota Statute, Section 429.081, by serving notice of the appeal upon the Mayor or the Clerk of the City within thirty (30) days after the adoption of the assessment and filing such notice with the District Court within ten (10) days after service upon the Mayor or the Clerk.

At the assessment hearing, the assessments were approved and adopted by the city council. On May 15, appellant was provided with a “Statement of Special Assessments.”

On June 9, 2003, appellant served the City Clerk with a “Petition Against Local Improvements and Assessment,” which objected to the assessment and requested the district court “to hear this appeal.” A copy of the petition was also stamped “received” by the district court on June 9, suggesting that appellant, or someone else, personally delivered it to the Dakota County District Court on that date. For some reason, the petition was not stamped “filed” by the district court administrator until two weeks after its receipt, on June 24, 2003.

The city moved for summary judgment and dismissal, arguing that appellant failed to comply with the mandatory time limits of Minn.Stat. § 429.081 (2002), because the appeal was not “filed” with the district court within 10 days after it was served on the city. The city also argued that appellant’s attempt to join additional property owners was invalid, because these additional owners did not personally sign the appeal papers and because their issues were not identical.

On December 17, 2003, the district court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment. The court determined that it had no jurisdiction over the appeal because appellant failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Minn.Stat. § 429.081 and because his attempt to join additional property owners was improper and invalid. This appeal followed.

ISSUES

1. Did the district court err in determining that appellant failed to timely file his appeal with the district court administrator as required by Minn.Stat. § 429.081 (2002)?

2. Did the district court properly determine that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a joint appeal, where the issues of the additional property owners were not identical?

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is properly granted when there are no genuine issues of material fact and either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is granted. Nord v. Herreid, 305 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Minn.1981).

I.

In order to perfect an assessment appeal, an aggrieved party must first serve a notice of appeal on the city clerk within 30 days after the city adopts the assessments. The party must then file the notice of appeal with the district court administrator within 10 days after service upon the city clerk. Minn.Stat. § 429.081 (2002). These appeal requirements are mandatory and strictly construed. Wessen v. Village of Deephaven, 284 Minn. 296, 298, 170 N.W.2d 126,128 (1969); Village of Edina v. Joseph, 264 Minn. 84, 93-94, 119 N.W.2d 809, 816 (1962).

Here, it is undisputed that appellant timely served his appeal on the city clerk on June 9, 2003. It is also undisputed that his appeal papers were stamped “received” by Dakota County District Court on the same day, June 9, 2003. For unknown reasons, the papers were not stamped “filed” until June 24, 2003, two weeks later, well beyond the 10-day time limit set out in Minn.Stat. § 429.081.

A document is “filed” when it is “deliver[ed] ... to the court clerk or record custodian for placement into the official record.” Black’s Law Dictionary 642 (7th ed. 1999). The document must be delivered to the clerk at his office or at the place where it is required to be filed. Schulte v. First Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis, 34 Minn. 48, 51, 24 N.W. 320, 321 (1885) (stating that “mere delivery of the paper to the clerk to be filed, at a place other than his office, where it was required to be filed, even though the proper endorsement was put upon the paper, did not constitute a filing in that office”).

Cases from other jurisdictions hold that the actual date of fifing is the date upon which a pleading or a document is delivered or handed to the clerk to be filed, and that the clerk’s endorsement as to the date of fifing is merely the best evidence of the date of fifing and is presumed correct so long as it is not challenged. Lavan v. Philips, 184 Ga.App. 573, 362 S.E.2d 138, 139 (1987); see also Valio v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm’rs, 311 Ill.App.3d 321, 244 Ill.Dec. 136, 724 N.E.2d 1024, 1029 (2000) (stating that document is filed when it is delivered to proper officer with intent of having document kept on file by such officer in proper place, and that “ministerial tasks such as stamping a pleading ‘Filed’ are unnecessary to perfect a filing”); Wallace v. Wallace, 708 So.2d 1190, 1191 (La.App.1998) (stating that pleading is filed when it is delivered to clerk of court for that purpose and that clerk’s failure to endorse and file pleading is not imputable to litigant). These jurisdictions further hold that the “critical date is the date the document is received; and, once the document is delivered, the person fifing the document is not responsible for the disposition of the document by the clerk’s office.” Euge v. Golden, 551 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Mo.App.1977); see also NCD, Inc. v. Kernel, 308 Ill.App.3d 814, 242 Ill.Dec. 419, 721 N.E.2d 698, 701 (1999) (disagreeing with argument that litigant has duty to ensure that clerk file-stamps pleading and places it in court file).

Minnesota case law does not address this particular issue. In Greer v. City of Eagan, 486 N.W.2d 470, 471 (Minn.App.1992), five days after serving their notice of appeal on the city clerk, the property owners mailed their notice of appeal to the district court for filing. But the notice was not stamped “received” by the district court until 11 days after it had been served on the city; it was stamped “filed” 12 days after it had been served on the city. Id. The property owners argued that their appeal should be considered timely because under Minn. R. Civ. P. 6.05, the 10-day period may be enlarged by three days to allow for their service by mail. This court rejected the property owners’ argument, noting that rule 6.05 discusses service of papers, not filing. Greer, 486 N.W.2d at 471. This court further concluded that its decision was generally consistent with other cases dealing with appeals under Minn.Stat. § 429.081. Greer, 486 N.W.2d at 472-73 (discussing other cases). Nothing in Greer or the other cases discussed in Greer precludes us from holding that appellant timely filed his appeal with the district court. The evidence here establishes that the appeal papers were received by the district court on June 9, 2003, which was well within the 10-day time limit of Minn.Stat. § 429.081, even though the papers were not stamped “filed” until June 24, 2003.

The city offers no explanation for the two-week delay, but appellant suggests that the delay occurred because “[t]he District Court has thirty days to review the Appeal for Material Fact, Date of File and Justification.” Under Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04, however, a court “administrator shall not refuse to accept for filing any paper presented for that purpose solely because it is not presented in proper form as required by any court rule or practice.” Rule 5.04 thus supports the conclusion that a paper is filed when it is presented to the court administrator for that purpose and that the administrator may not delay filing to review the paper for proper form. See Carlson v. Cal. Dep’t of Fish & Game, 68 Cal.App.4th 1268, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 601, 606 (1998) (holding that clerk of court did not have authority to reject filing of complaint that complied with state requirements, merely because complaint failed to comply with local rule).

We therefore conclude that the district court erred in determining that the appeal was not timely filed. Because it is undisputed that appellant’s appeal papers were received by the district court on June 9, his appeal was timely, even though his papers were not stamped “filed” until June 24, 2003.

II.

Appellant argues that his attempt to join additional parties in this appeal is allowed under Minn. R. Civ. P. 20.01. But joinder is generally inappropriate in assessment appeals concerning benefits and damages because “each of the[se] issues ... would necessarily be resolved on the basis of the particular facts relevant to each individual landowner’s property.” Bisbee v. City of Fairmont, 593 N.W.2d 714, 718 (Minn.App.1999) (quoting Lenz v. Coon Creek Watershed Disk, 278 Minn. 1, 19, 153 N.W.2d 209, 222 (1967)). Here, the petition states that “[w]e make notice that the tax assessment of $13,989.00 of each individual for a total of $209,835 greatly exceeds any increase in property value resulting from this project.” This, and other statements made by appellant, suggests that the property owners are claiming that the increases in their market values are less than the assessments imposed upon them. These challenges necessarily involve distinct facts relevant to each individual parcel of property. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing the additional property owners from this appeal.

Finally, appellant argues that the city acted unlawfully by imposing a special assessment that exceeds the benefit to his affected property. If proven, this presents a valid challenge to a special assessment. See Carlsoiir-Lang Realty Co. v. City of Windom, 307 Minn. 368, 370, 240 N.W.2d 517, 519 (1976) (stating that property owner may challenge assessment by introducing evidence that amount of assessment exceeds benefit to property). The district court never reached this issue and granted summary judgment solely on the basis of the untimeliness of the appeal and the invalidity of the attempted joinder of additional property owners. Issues not presented or decided by the district court cannot be considered on appeal. Thiele v. Stick, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn.1988). We therefore remand for further proceedings on this issue.

DECISION

Because the appeal papers were received by the district court within the 10-day time limit set out in Minn.Stat. § 429.081, the district court erred in determining that this appeal was not timely filed. Because the issues raised here involve different parcels and different facts, the district court did not err in dismissing the additional property owners whom appellant attempted to join. Because the district court granted summary judgment solely on the timeliness of the appeal and did not reach the underlying factual issues, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

      . In the alternative, the city also argued that these additional property owners cannot be joined because none of them personally signed any documents relative to the appeal. We do not believe this is necessarily fatal to the attempted joinder. Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.01 provides that if a party to an action is not represented by a lawyer, the pleadings "shall be signed by the party.” While appellant's attachment of a photocopy of the other property owners’ signatures from another document fails to strictly comply with rule 11.01, the rule further allows the striking of an unsigned paper only when "omission of the signature is [not] corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the ... party.” Thus, a pleading should be stricken only if a party refuses to provide a signature after a request or order to do so is made. 1 David F. Herr & Roger S. Haydock, Minnesota Practice § 11.4, at 263 (2002). Here, it is unclear whether the additional property owners were ever given an opportunity to personally sign the defective petition.