author: Justice O’Connor Justice Stevens,

text:
    FMC CORP. v. HOLLIDAY
    No. 89-1048.
    Argued October 2, 1990
    Decided November 27, 1990

      O’CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, MARSHALL, Blackmun, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 65. Souter, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

      H. Woodruff Turner argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Charles Kelly.

      Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Christopher J. Wright, Allen H. Feldman, Steven J. Mandel, and Mark S. Flynn.

      Charles Rothfeld argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Thomas G. Johnson and David A. Cicola.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Area Health and Welfare Fund by Anita

        M. D’Arcy, James L. Coghlan, and William J. Nellis; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Harry A. Rissetto, E. Carl Uehlein, Jr., and Stephen A. Bokat; for the National Coordinating Committee for Multiemployer Plans by Gerald M. Feder, David R. Levin, and Diana L. S. Peters; for the Teamsters Health and Welfare Fund of Philadelphia & Vicinity et al. by James D. Crawford, James J. Leyden, Henry M. Wick, Jr., and Jack G. Mancuso; and for Travelers Insurance Co. by A. Raymond Randolph, M. Duncan Grant, and Waltraut S. Addy.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Chiropractic Association by George P. McAndrews and Robert C. Ryan; for the American Optometric Association by Ellis Lyons, Bennett Boskey, and Edward A. Groobert; for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon and Charles Rothfeld; and for the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association by John Patrick Lydon.

      Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Podiatric Medical Association by Werner Strupp; and for the Self-Insurance Institute of America, Inc., by George J. Pantos.

   Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case calls upon the Court to decide whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq., pre-empts a Pennsylvania law precluding employee welfare benefit plans from exercising subrogation rights on a claimant’s tort recovery.

I

Petitioner, FMC Corporation (FMC), operates the FMC Salaried Health Care Plan (Plan), an employee welfare benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA, §3(1), 29 U. S. C. §1002(1), that provides health benefits to FMC employees and their dependents. The Plan is self-funded; it does not purchase an insurance policy from any insurance company in order to satisfy its obligations to its participants. Among its provisions is a subrogation clause under which a Plan member agrees to reimburse the Plan for benefits paid if the member recovers on a claim in a liability action against a third party.

Respondent, Cynthia Ann Holliday, is the daughter of FMC employee and Plan member Gerald Holliday. In 1987, she was seriously injured in an automobile accident. The Plan paid a portion of her medical expenses. Gerald Holli-day brought a negligence action on behalf of his daughter in Pennsylvania state court against the driver of the automobile in which she was injured. The parties settled the claim. While the action was pending, FMC notified the Hollidays that it would seek reimbursement for the amounts it had paid for respondent’s medical expenses. The Hollidays replied that they would not reimburse the Plan, asserting that § 1720 of Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1720 (1987), precludes subrogation by FMC. Section 1720 states that “[i]n actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, there shall be no right of subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant’s tort recovery with respect to . . . benefits . . . payable under section 1719.” Section 1719 refers to benefit payments by “[a]ny program, group contract or other arrangement.”

Petitioner, proceeding in diversity, then sought a declaratory judgment in Federal District Court. The court granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment, holding that § 1720 prohibits FMC’s exercise of subrogation rights on Hol-liday’s claim against the driver. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. 885 F. 2d 79 (1989). The court held that §1720, unless pre-empted, bars FMC from enforcing its contractual subrogation provision. According to the court, ERISA pre-empts § 1720 if ERISA’s “deemer clause,” § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(B), exempts the Plan from state subrogation laws. The Court of Appeals, citing Northern Group Services, Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 833 F. 2d 85, 91-94 (CA6 1987), cert. denied, 486 U. S. 1017 (1988), determined that “the deemer clause [was] meant mainly to reach back-door attempts by states to regulate core ERISA concerns in the guise of insurance regulation.” 885 F. 2d, at 86. Pointing out that the parties had not suggested that the Pennsylvania antisubrogation law addressed “a core type of ERISA matter which Congress sought to protect by the preemption provision,” id., at 90, the court concluded that the Pennsylvania law is not pre-empted. The Third Circuit’s holding conflicts with decisions of other Courts of Appeals that have construed ERISA’s deemer clause to protect self-funded plans from all state insurance regulation. See, e. g., Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F. 2d 182, 186 (CA8 1989); Reilly v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 846 F. 2d 416, 425-426 (CA7), cert. denied, 488 U. S. 856 (1988). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 493 U. S. 1068 (1990), and now vacate and remand.

II

In determining whether federal law pre-empts a state statute, we look to congressional intent. “ ‘Pre-emption may be either express or implied, and “is compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.’”” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 95 (1983) (quoting Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 152-153 (1982), in turn quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977)); see also Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court . . . must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress” (footnote omitted)). We “begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 194 (1985). Three provisions of ERISA speak expressly to the question of pre-emption:

“Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [the saving clause], the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.” § 514(a), as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a) (pre-emption clause).
“Except as provided in subparagraph (B) [the deemer clause], nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.” § 514(b)(2)(A), as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (saving clause).
“Neither an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be' deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.” § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (deemer clause).

We indicated in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724 (1985), that these provisions “are not a model of legislative drafting.” Id., at 739. Their operation is nevertheless discernible. The pre-emption clause is conspicuous-for its breadth. It establishes as an area of exclusive federal concern the subject of every state law that “relate[s] to” an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA. The saving clause returns to the States the power to enforce those state laws that “regulat[e] insurance,” except as provided in the deemer clause. Under the deemer clause, an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA shall not be “deemed” an insurance company, an insurer, or engaged in the business of insurance for purposes of state laws “purporting to regulate” insurance companies or insurance contracts.

Ill

Pennsylvania’s antisubrogation law “relate[s] to” an employee benefit plan. We made clear in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, supra, that a law relates to an employee welfare plan if it has “a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Id., at 96-97 (footnote omitted). We based our reading in part on the plain language of the statute. Congress used the words “‘relate to’ in §514(a) [the pre-emption clause] in their broad sense.” Id., at 98. It did not mean to pre-empt only state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans. That interpretation would have made it unnecessary for Congress to enact ERISA § 514(b)(4), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(4), which exempts from pre-emption “generally” applicable criminal laws of a State. We also emphasized that to interpret the pre-emption clause to apply only to state laws dealing with the subject matters covered by ERISA, such as reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary duties, would be incompatible with the provision’s legislative history because the House and Senate versions of the bill that became ERISA contained limited pre-emption clauses, applicable only to state laws relating to specific subjects covered by ERISA. These were rejected in favor of the present language in the Act, “indicat[ing] that the section’s pre-emptive scope was as broad as its language.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U. S., at 98.

Pennsylvania’s antisubrogation law has a “reference” to benefit plans governed by ERISA. The statute states that “[i]n actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, there shall be no right of subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant’s tort recovery with respect to . . . benefits . . . paid or payable under section 1719.” 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1720 (1987). Section 1719 refers to “[a]ny program, group contract or other arrangement for payment of benefits.” These terms “includ[e], but [are] not limited to, benefits payable by a hospital plan corporation or a professional health service corporation.” § 1719 (emphasis added).

The Pennsylvania statute also has a “connection” to ERISA benefit plans. In the past, we have not hesitated to apply ERISA’s pre-emption clause to state laws that risk subjecting plan administrators to conflicting state regulations. See, e. g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, supra, at 95-100 (state laws making unlawful plan provisions that discriminate on the basis of pregnancy and requiring plans to provide specific benefits “relate to” benefit plans); Alessi v. Raybestos- Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S. 504, 523-526 (1981) (state law prohibiting plans from reducing benefits by amount of workers’ compensation awards “relate[s] to” employee benefit plan). To require plan providers to design their programs in an environment of differing state regulations would complicate the administration of nationwide plans, producing inefficiencies that employers might offset with decreased benefits. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U. S. 1, 10 (1987). Thus, where a “patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program operation,” we have applied the pre-emption clause to ensure that benefit plans will be governed by only a single set of regulations. Id., at 11.

Pennsylvania’s antisubrogation law prohibits plans from being structured in a manner requiring reimbursement in the event of recovery from a third party. It requires plan providers to calculate benefit levels in Pennsylvania based on expected liability conditions that differ from those in States that have not enacted similar antisubrogation legislation. Application of differing state subrogation laws to plans would therefore frustrate plan administrators’ continuing obligation to calculate uniform benefit levels nationwide. Accord, Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., supra (state statute prohibiting offsetting worker compensation payments against pension benefits pre-empted since statute would force employer either to structure all benefit payments in accordance with state statute or adopt different payment formulae for employers inside and outside State). As we stated in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, supra, at 9, “[t]he most efficient way to meet these [administrative] responsibilities is to establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of benefits.”

There is no dispute that the Pennsylvania law falls within ERISA’s insurance saving clause, which provides, “[ejxcept as provided in [the deemer clause], nothing in this sub-chapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance,” § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Section 1720 directly controls the terms of insurance contracts by invalidating any subrogation provisions that they contain. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S., at 740-741. It does not merely have an impact on the insurance industry; it is aimed at it. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 50 (1987). This returns the matter of subrogation to state law. Unless the statute is excluded from the reach of the saving clause by virtue of the deemer clause, therefore, it is not pre-empted.

We read the deemer clause to exempt self-funded ERISA plans from state laws that “regulat[e] insurance” within the meaning of the saving clause. By forbidding States to deem employee benefit plans “to be an insurance company or other insurer ... or to be engaged in the business of insurance,” the deemer clause relieves plans from state laws “purporting to regulate insurance.” As a result, self-funded ERISA plans are exempt from state regulation insofar as that regulation “relate[s] to” the plans. State laws directed toward the plans are pre-empted because they relate to an employee benefit plan but are not “saved” because they do not regulate insurance. State laws that directly regulate insurance are “saved” but do not reach self-funded employee benefit plans because the plans may not be deemed to be insurance companies, other insurers, or engaged in the business of insurance for purposes of such state laws. On the other hand, employee benefit plans that are insured are subject to indirect state insurance regulation. An insurance company that insures a plan remains an insurer for purposes of state laws “purporting to regulate insurance” after application of the deemer clause. The insurance company is therefore not relieved from state insurance regulation. The ERISA plan is consequently bound by state insurance regulations insofar as they apply to the plan’s insurer.

Our reading of the deemer clause is consistent with Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, supra. That case involved a Massachusetts statute requiring certain self-funded benefit plans and insurers issuing group health policies to plans to provide minimum mental health benefits. Id., at 734. In pointing out that Massachusetts had never tried to enforce the portion of the statute pertaining directly to benefit plans, we stated, “[i]n light of ERISA’s ‘deemer clause,’ which states that a benefit plan shall not ‘be deemed an insurance company’ for purposes of the insurance saving clause, Massachusetts has never tried to enforce [the statute] as applied to benefit plans directly, effectively conceding that such an application of [the statute] would be pre-empted by ERISA’s pre-emption clause.” Id., at 735, n. 14 (citations omitted). We concluded that the statute, as applied to insurers of plans, was not pre-empted because it regulated insurance and was therefore saved. Our decision, we acknowledged, “results in a distinction between insured and uninsured plans, leaving the former open to indirect regulation while the latter are not. ” Id., at 747. “By so doing, we merely give life to a distinction created by Congress in the ‘deemer clause,’ a distinction Congress is aware of and one it has chosen not to alter.” Ibid, (footnote omitted).

Our construction of the deemer clause is also respectful of the presumption that Congress does not intend to pre-empt areas of traditional state regulation. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S., at 525. In the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq., Congress provided that the “business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.” 15 U. S. C. § 1012(a). We have identified laws governing the “business of insurance” in the Act to include not only direct regulation of the insurer but also regulation of the substantive terms of insurance contracts. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, supra, at 742-744. By recognizing a distinction between insurers of plans and the contracts of those insurers, which are subject to direct state regulation, and self-insured employee benefit plans governed by ERISA, which are not, we observe Congress’ presumed desire to reserve to the States the regulation of the “business of insurance.”

Respondent resists our reading of the deemer clause and would attach to it narrower significance. According to the deemer clause, “[njeither an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies [or] insurance contracts.” § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Like the Court of Appeals, respondent would interpret the deemer clause to except from the saving clause only state insurance regulations that are pretexts for impinging upon core ERISA concerns. The National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as amici curiae in support of respondent offer an alternative interpretation of the deemer clause. In their view, the deemer clause precludes States from deeming plans to be insurers only for purposes of state laws that apply to insurance as a business, such as laws relating to licensing and capitalization requirements.

These views are unsupported by ERISA’s language. Laws that purportedly regulate insurance companies or insurance contracts are laws having the “appearance of” regulating or “intending” to regulate insurance companies or contracts. Black’s Law Dictionary 1236 (6th ed. 1990). Congress’ use of the word does not indicate that it directed the deemer clause solely at deceit that it feared state legislatures would practice. Indeed, the Conference Report, in describing the deemer clause, omits the word “purporting,” stating, “an employee benefit plan is not to be considered as an insurance company, bank, trust company, or investment company (and is not to be considered as engaged in the business of insurance or banking) for purposes of any State law that regulates insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 383 (1974).

Nor, in our view, is the deemer clause directed solely at laws governing the business of insurance. It is plainly directed at “any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.” § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). Moreover, it is difficult to understand why Congress would have included insurance contracts in the pre-emption clause if it meant only to pre-empt state laws relating to the operation of insurance as a business. To be sure, the saving and deemer clauses employ differing language to achieve their ends — the former saving, except as provided in the deemer clause, “any law of any State which regulates insurance” and the latter referring to “any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies [or] insurance contracts.” We view the language of the deemer clause, however, to be either coextensive with or broader, not narrower, than that of the saving clause. Our rejection of a restricted reading of the deemer clause does not lead to the deemer clause’s engulfing the saving clause. As we have pointed out, supra, at 62-63, the saving clause retains the independent effect of protecting state insurance regulation of insurance contracts purchased by employee benefit plans.

Congress intended by ERISA to “establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern.” Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S., at 523 (footnote omitted). Our interpretation of the deemer clause makes clear that if a plan is insured, a State may regulate it indirectly through regulation of its insurer and its insurer’s insurance contracts; if the plan is uninsured, the State may not regulate it. As a result, employers will not face “ ‘conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans.’” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S., at 99 (quoting remarks of Sen. Williams). A construction of the deemer clause that exempts employee benefit plans from only those state regulations that encroach upon core ERISA concerns or that apply to insurance as a business would be fraught with administrative difficulties, necessitating definition of core ERISA concerns and of what constitutes business activity. It would therefore undermine Congress’ desire to avoid “endless litigation over the validity of State action,” see 120 Cong. Rec. 29942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits), and instead lead to employee benefit plans’ expenditure of funds in such litigation.

In view of Congress’ clear intent to exempt from direct state insurance regulation ERISA employee benefit plans, we hold that ERISA pre-empts the application of § 1720 of Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law to the FMC Salaried Health Care Plan. We therefore vacate the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Souter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

The Court’s construction of the statute draws a broad and illogical distinction between benefit plans that are funded by the employer (self-insured plans) and those that are insured by regulated insurance companies (insured plans). Had Congress intended this result, it could have stated simply that “all State laws are pre-empted insofar as they relate to any self-insured employee plan.” There would then have been no need for the “saving clause” to exempt state insurance laws from the pre-emption clause, or the “deemer clause,” which the Court today reads as merely reinjecting into the scope of ERISA’s pre-emption clause those same exempted state laws insofar as they relate to self-insured plans.

From the standpoint of the beneficiaries of ERISA plans — who after all are the primary beneficiaries of the entire statutory program — there is no apparent reason for treating self-insured plans differently from insured plans. Why should a self-insured plan have a right to enforce a subrogation clause against an injured employee while an insured plan may not? The notion that this disparate treatment of similarly situated beneficiaries is somehow supported by an interest in uniformity is singularly unpersuasive. If Congress had intended such an irrational result, surely it would have expressed it in straightforward English. At least one would expect that the reasons for drawing such an apparently irrational distinction would be discernible in the legislative history or in the literature discussing the legislation.

The Court’s anomalous result would be avoided by a correct and narrower reading of either the basic pre-emption clause or the deemer clause.

hH

The Court has endorsed an unnecessarily broad reading of the words “relate to any employee benefit plan” as they are used in the basic pre-emption clause of § 514(a). I acknowledge that this reading is supported by language in some of our prior opinions. It is not, however, dictated by any prior holding, and I am persuaded that Congress did not intend this clause to cut nearly so broad a swath in the field of state laws as the Court’s expansive construction will create.

The clause surely does not pre-empt a host of general rules of tort, contract, and procedural law that relate to benefit plans as well as to other persons and entities. It does not, for example, pre-empt general state garnishment rules insofar as they relate to ERISA plans. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825 (1988). Moreover, the legislative history of the provision indicates that throughout most of its consideration of pre-emption, Congress was primarily concerned about areas of possible overlap between federal and state requirements. Thus, the bill that was introduced in the Senate would have pre-empted state laws insofar as they “relate to the subject matters regulated by this Act,” and the House bill more specifically identified state laws relating “to the fiduciary, reporting, and disclosure responsibilities of persons acting on behalf of employee benefit plans.” Although the compromise that produced the statutory language “relate to any employee benefit plan” is not discussed in the legislative history, the final version is perhaps best explained as an editorial amalgam of the two bills rather than as a major expansion of the section’s coverage.

When there is ambiguity in a statutory provision preempting state law, we should apply a strong presumption against the invalidation of well-settled, generally applicable state rules. In my opinion this presumption played an important role in our decisions in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U. S. 1 (1987), and Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., supra. Application of that presumption leads me to the conclusion that the pre-emption clause should apply only to those state laws that purport to regulate subjects regulated by ERISA or that are inconsistent with ERISA’s central purposes. I do not think Congress intended to foreclose Pennsylvania from enforcing the anti-subrogation provisions of its state Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law against ERISA plans — most certainly, it did not intend to pre-empt enforcement of that statute against self-insured plans while preserving enforcement against insured plans.

I — I > — I

Even if the “relate to” language in the basic pre-emption clause is read broadly, a proper interpretation of the carefully drafted text of the deemer clause would caution against finding pre-emption in this case. Before identifying the key words in that text, it is useful to comment on the history surrounding enactment of the deemer clause.

The number of self-insured employee benefit plans grew dramatically in the 1960’s and early 1970’s. The question whether such plans were, or should be, subject to state regulation remained unresolved when ERISA was enacted. It was, however, well recognized as early as 1967 that requiring self-insured plans to comply with the regulatory requirements in state insurance codes would stifle their growth:

“Application of state insurance laws to uninsured plans would make direct payment of benefits pointless and in most cases not feasible. This is because a welfare plan would have to be operated as an insurance company in order to comply with the detailed regulatory requirements of state insurance codes designed with the typical operations of insurance companies in mind. It presumably would be necessary to form a captive insurance company with prescribed capital and surplus, capable of obtaining a certificate of authority from the insurance department of all states in which the plan was ‘doing business/ establish premium rates subject to approval by the insurance department, issue policies in the form approved by the insurance department, pay commissions and premium taxes required by the insurance law, hold and deposit reserves established by the insurance department, make investments permitted under the law, and comply with all filing and examination requirements of the insurance department. The result would be to reintroduce an insurance company, which the direct payment plan was designed to dispense with. Thus it can be seen that the real issue is not whether uninsured plans are to be regulated under state insurance laws, but whether they are to be permitted” Goetz, Regulation of Uninsured Employee Welfare Plans Under State Insurance Laws, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 319, 320-321 (emphasis in original).

In 1974 while ERISA was being considered in Congress, the first state court to consider the applicability of state insurance laws to self-insured plans held that a self-insured plan could not pay out benefits until it had satisfied the licensing requirements governing insurance companies in Missouri and thereby had subjected itself to the regulations contained in the Missouri insurance code. Missouri v. Monsanto Co., Cause No. 259774 (St. Louis Cty. Cir. Ct., Jan. 4, 1973), rev’d, 517 S. W. 2d 129 (Mo. 1974). Although it is true that the legislative history of ERISA or the deemer clause makes no reference to the Missouri case, or to this problem— indeed, it contains no explanation whatsoever of the reason for enacting the deemer clause — the text of the clause itself plainly reveals that it was designed to protect pension plans from being subjected to the detailed regulatory provisions that typically apply to all state-regulated insurance companies — laws that purport to regulate insurance companies and insurance contracts.

The key words in the text of the deemer clause are “deemed,” “insurance company,” and “purporting.” It provides that an employee welfare plan shall not be deemed to be an insurance company or to be engaged in the business of insurance for the purpose of determining whether it is an entity that is regulated by any state law purporting to regulate insurance companies and insurance contracts.

Pennsylvania’s insurance code purports, in so many words, to regulate insurance companies and insurance contracts. It governs the certification of insurance companies, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 40, §400 (Purdon 1971), their minimum capital stock and financial requirements to do business, §386 (Pur-don 1971 and Supp. 1990-1991), their rates, e. g., §532.9 (Purdon 1971) (authorizing Insurance Commissioner to regulate minimum premiums charged by life insurance companies), and the terms that insurance policies must, or may, include, e. g., §510 (Purdon 1971 and Supp. 1990-1991) (life insurance policies), §753 (Purdon 1971) (health and accident insurance policies). The deemer clause prevents a State from enforcing such laws purporting to regulate insurance companies and insurance contracts against ERISA plans merely by deeming ERISA plans to be insurance companies. But the fact that an ERISA plan is not deemed to be an insurance company for the purpose of deciding whether it must comply with a statute that purports to regulate “insurance contracts” or entities that are defined as “insurance companies” simply does not speak to the question whether it must nevertheless comply with a statute that expressly regulates subject matters other than insurance.

There are many state laws that apply to insurance companies as well as to other entities. Such laws may regulate some aspects of the insurance business, but do not require one to be an insurance company in order to be subject to their terms. Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law is such a law. The fact that petitioner’s plan is not deemed to be an insurance company or an insurance contract does not have any bearing on the question whether petitioner, like all other persons, must nevertheless comply with the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

If one accepts the Court’s broad reading of the “relate to” language in the basic pre-emption clause, the answer to the question whether petitioner must comply with state laws regulating entities including, but not limited to, insurance companies depends on the scope of the saving clause. In this case, I am prepared to accept the Court’s broad reading of that clause, but it is of critical importance to me that the category of state laws described in the saving clause is broader than the category described in the deemer clause. A state law “which regulates insurance,” and is therefore exempted from ERISA’s pre-emption provision by operation of the saving clause, does not necessarily have as its purported subject of regulation an “insurance company” or an activity that is engaged in by persons who are insurance companies. Rather, such a law may aim to regulate another matter altogether, but also have the effect of regulating insurance. The deemer clause, by contrast, reinjects into the scope of ERISA pre-emption only those state laws that “purport to” regulate insurance companies or contracts — laws such as those which set forth the licensing and capitalization requirements for insurance companies or the minimum required provisions in insurance contracts. While the saving clause thus exempts from the pre-emption clause all state laws that have the broad effect of regulating insurance, the deemer clause simply allows pre-emption of those state laws that expressly regulate insurance and that would therefore be applicable to ERISA plans only if States were allowed to deem such plans to be insurance companies.

Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law fits into the broader category of state laws that fall within the saving clause only. The Act regulates persons in addition to insurance companies and affects subrogation and indemnity agreements that are not necessarily insurance contracts. Yet because it most assuredly is not a law “purporting” to regulate any of the entities described in the deemer clause — “insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies,” the deemer clause does not by its plain language apply to this state law. Thus, although the Pennsylvania law is exempted from ERISA’s pre-emption provision by the broad saving clause because it “regulates insurance,” it is not brought back within the scope of ERISA pre-emption by operation of the narrower deemer clause. I therefore would conclude that petitioner is subject to Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

I respectfully dissent.

       Section 1720 of Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law is entitled “[sjubrogation” and provides:
      “In actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, there shall be no right of subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant’s tort recovery with respect to workers’ compensation benefits, benefits available under section 1711 (relating to required benefits), 1712 (relating to availability of benefits) or 1715 (relating to availability of adequate limits) or benefits in lieu thereof paid or payable under section 1719 (relating to coordination of benefits).”

         Section 1719, entitled “[cjoordination of benefits,” reads:
      “(a) General rule. — Except for workers’ compensation, a policy of insurance issued or delivered pursuant to this subchapter shall be primary. Any program, group contract or other arrangement for payment of benefits such as described in section 1711 (relating to required benefits), 1712(1) and (2) (relating to availability of benefits) or 1715 (relating to availability of adequate limits) shall be construed to contain a provision that all benefits provided therein shall be in excess of and not in duplication of any valid and collectible first party benefits provided in section 1711, 1712 or 1715 or workers’ compensation.
      “(b) Definition. — As used in this section the term ‘program, group contract or other arrangement’ includes, but is not limited to, benefits payable by a hospital plan corporation or a professional health service corporation subject to 40 Pa. C. S. Ch. 61 (relating to hospital plan corporations) or 63 (relating to professional health services plan corporations).”

      The bill introduced in the Senate and reported out of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare would have pre-empted “any and all laws of the States and of political subdivisions thereof insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to the subject matters regulated by this Act.” S. 4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 609(a) (1973). As introduced in the House, the bill that became ERISA would have superseded “any and all laws of the States and of the political subdivisions thereof insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to the fiduciary, reporting, and disclosure responsibilities of persons acting on behalf of employee benefit plans.” H. R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 114 (1973). The bill was approved by the Committee on Education and Labor in a slightly modified form. See H. R. 2,- 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 514(a) (1973).

      H. R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 114 (1973); 1 Leg. Hist. 51.

      S. 4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., §609(a) (1973), reprinted at 1 Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (Committee Print compiled by the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare) 93, 186 (1976) (Leg. Hist.).

       See Comment, State Regulation of Noninsured Employee Welfare Benefit Plans, 62 Geo. L. J. 339, 340 (1973).

      Section 514(b)(2)(B), as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(B), provides:
      “Neither an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.” (Emphasis added.)

       Section 514(b)(2)(A), as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), provides:
      “Except as provided in subparagraph (B) nothing in this subehapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Scalia Justice Stevens,

license: Public Domain

text:
    ARCADIA, OHIO, et al. v. OHIO POWER CO. et al.
    No. 89-1283.
    Argued October 1, 1990
    Decided November 27, 1990

      Sc ALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except SouteR, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 86.

      Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Rex E. Lee, Gregg D. Ottinger, and John P. Williams.

      Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, as respondent under this Court’s Rule 12.2, in support of petitioners. With him on the joint briefs for this respondent and for the Securities and Exchange Commission urging reversal were Acting Solicitor General Roberts, James A. Feldman, William S. Scherman, Jerome M. Feit, Joseph S. Davies, Timm L. Abendroth, and Daniel L. Goelzer.

      Edward Berlin argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Ohio Power Co. were Kenneth G. Jaffe, A. Joseph Dowd, John F. DiLorenzo, Jr.,
      and Edward J. Brady. T. D. Kauffelt filed a brief for respondents LCP Chemicals, Inc., et ah

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Public Power Association et al. by Scott Hempling; and for the Indiana Municipal Power Agency by James N. Honvood.

        James B. Liberman filed a brief for the Registered Holding Co. Group as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

   Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the interpretation of § 318 of the Federal Power Act, as added, 49 Stat. 863, 16 U. S. C. § 825q, entitled “Conflict of jurisdiction,” which governs certain overlapping responsibilities of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the regulation of power companies under the Public Utility Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803.

M

The Public Utility Act subjects some companies that transmit and distribute electric power to overlapping regulatory jurisdiction of the SEC and FERC, successor to the Federal Power Commission (FPC). Title I, known as the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA), 49 Stat. 803, gives the SEC jurisdiction over certain transactions among registered public utility holding companies and their subsidiaries and affiliates. Title II, the Federal Power Act (FPA), 49 Stat. 838, gives FERC jurisdiction over the transmission and sale at wholesale of electric power in interstate commerce. FERC-regulated electric power companies that are subsidiaries or affiliates of registered public utility holding companies are therefore subject to SEC regulation as well. Respondent Ohio Power Company, part of the American Electric Power system (AEP), is one such company; petitioners are 15 small Ohio villages and cities that are AEP’s wholesale customers.

The dispute in this case begins in a series of orders issued by the SEC in the 1970’s, authorizing Ohio Power to establish and capitalize an affiliate, Southern Ohio Coal Company (SOCCO), to secure and develop a reliable source of coal for the whole AEP system. The first order, in 1971, approved the sale and purchase of SOCCO’s stock, and in the course of outlining the conditions of that approval, stated that SOCCO’s charges for coal would be “based on” actual costs. Ohio Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release (HCAR) No. 17383 (Dec. 2, 1971). In 1978, the SEC authorized further investment by Ohio Power, and this time its order indicated that the price of coal “will not exceed the cost thereof to the seller.” Ohio Power Co., HCAR No. 20515 (Apr. 24, 1978), 14 S. E. C. Docket 928, 929. In 1979, in the course of another financing approval order, the SEC noted that Ohio Power would pay SOCCO less than the actual cost of coal if Ohio Power’s after-tax capital costs exceeded a certain level. Southern Ohio Coal Co., HCAR No. 21008 (Apr. 17, 1979). The final order in 1980, approving further SOCCO financing, indicated that “[t]he price at which SOC[C]0’s coal will be sold to AEP system companies will not exceed the cost thereof to the seller.” Southern Ohio Coal Co., HCAR No. 21537 (Apr. 25, 1980).

In 1982, Ohio Power filed rate increases for its wholesale service. FERC initiated a rate proceeding under §§ 205 and 206 of the FPA, 16 U. S. C. §§824d, 824e, and quickly settled all issues save the reasonableness of Ohio Power’s SOCCO coal costs. Pursuant to §206 of the FPA, FERC disallowed that portion of Ohio Power’s coal costs that did not satisfy FERC’s “comparable market” test. Under this test, utilities that purchase coal from affiliates may recover only the price that they would have incurred had they purchased coal under a comparable coal supply contract with a nonaffili-ated supplier. In Ohio Power’s case, FERC found that Ohio Power had paid approximately 50% more than that market price in 1980, approximately 94% more in 1981, and between 24% and 33% more during the period 1982 through 1986. Accordingly, FERC ordered Ohio Power to establish rates calculated to recover from its customers no more than the comparable market price for coal, and to refund prior overcharges. The agency rejected Ohio Power’s argument that the SEC, by the above-mentioned orders, had “approved” the coal charges by SOCCO, and that § 318 of the FPA ousts FERC of jurisdiction to regulate the same “subject matter” by declaring those charges unreasonable and thus unrecoverable in Ohio Power’s wholesale rates. Ohio Power Co., 39 FERC ¶ 61,098 (1987).

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding FERC’s disallowance of the charges to be precluded by §318. Ohio Power Co. v. FERC, 279 U. S. App. D. C. 327, 880 F. 2d 1400 (1989). We granted certiorari. 494 U. S. 1055 (1990).

I — I I — I

As decided by the Court of Appeals, and as argued here, two questions were presented in this case: (1) whether §318 bars all FERC regulation of a subject matter regulated by the SEC, or only such regulation as actually imposes a conflicting requirement; and (2) if an actual conflict is prerequisite, whether it exists here. In our view, however, there is another question antecedent to these and ultimately dis-positive of the present dispute: whether the SEC and FERC orders before us impose requirements with respect to a subject matter that is within the scope of §318. We believe they do not.

Section 318 provides as follows:

“Conflict of jurisdiction
“If, with respect to the issue, sale, or guaranty of a security, or assumption of obligation or liability in respect of a security, the method of keeping accounts, the filing of reports, or the acquisition or disposition of any security, capital assets, facilities, or any other subject matter, any person is subject both to a requirement of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or of a rule, regulation, or order thereunder and to a requirement of this chapter or of a rule, regulation, or order thereunder, the requirement of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 shall apply to such person, and such person shall not be subject to the requirement of this chapter, or of any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, with respect to the same subject matter, unless the Securities and Exchange Commission has exempted such person from such requirement of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, in which case the requirements of this chapter shall apply to such person.” (Emphasis added.)

Crucial to the outcome of the present case is the lengthy conditional clause that begins this section, setting forth a list of subjects “with respect to [which]” duplicative requirements will trigger the pre-emption rule. More specifically, the key to the outcome is the phrase “or any other subject matter,” which we have italicized in the above passage. The Court of Appeals appears to have assumed that it parallels the other phrases setting forth various objects of the prepositional phrase “with respect to.” We do not think it reasonably bears that interpretation.

To begin with, that interpretation renders the preceding enumeration of specific subjects entirely superfluous — in effect adding to that detailed list “or anything else.” Because the other four categories of enumeration are so disparate, the canon of ejusdem generis cannot be invoked to prevent the phrase “or any other subject matter” from swallowing what precedes it, leaving a statute that might as well have read “If, with respect to any subject matter . . . .” Such an interpretation should not be adopted unless the language renders it unavoidable. Here, however, the text not only does not compel that result but positively militates against it.

As the Court of Appeals read § 318, the conditional clause lists five separate areas of duplicative requirements. Bracketed numbers inserted into the text would appear as follows:

“If, with respect to [1] the issue, sale, or guaranty of a security, or assumption of obligation or liability in respect of a security, [2] the method of keeping accounts, [3] the filing of reports, or [4] the acquisition or disposition of any security, capital assets, facilities, or [5] any other subject matter ...”

This reading, however, creates two problems of enumeration: First, it renders the “or” that introduces the fourth category duplicative (“If, with respect to [1], [2], [3], or [4], or [5]”), and second, it produces the peculiar omission of an “or” before the last item listed within the text of the fourth category (“the acquisition or disposition of any security, capital assets, facilities”). In casual conversation, perhaps, such absentminded duplication and omission are possible, but Congress is not presumed to draft its laws that way. The attribution of such imprecision is readily avoided by placing the phrase “or any other subject matter” within the fourth enumeration clause, reading that to embrace “[4] the acquisition or disposition of any security, capital assets, facilities, or any other subject matter.” It is inelegant, perhaps, to refer to “the acquisition or disposition of . . . [a] subject matter,” but that inelegance must be preferred to a reading that introduces both redundancy and omission, and that renders the section’s careful enumeration of subjects superfluous.

Moreover, and most importantly, when § 318 is read in this fashion it takes on a shape that gives meaning to what otherwise seems a random listing of specific subject matters (with “any other subject matter” tagged on at the end). So interpreted, it addresses (as its caption promises) the “Conflict of jurisdiction” within four areas of plainly parallel authority granted both to the SEC, under PUHCA, and to the FPC (FERC), under the FPA. The first category, “the issue, sale, or guaranty of a security, or assumption of obligation or liability in respect of a security,” refers to §'204 of the FPA, 16 U. S. C. §824c, which requires all such transactions to be approved by FERC order, and to §6 of PUHCA, 15 U. S. C. § 79f, which in certain cases requires similar approval by the SEC; the second, “the method of keeping accounts,” refers to §301, 16 U. S. C. §825, which authorizes FERC to prescribe accounts and records, and to § 15, 15 U. S. C. § 79o, which similarly authorizes the SEC; the third, “the filing of reports,” refers to §304, 16 U. S. C. §825c, which authorizes FERC to require “periodic or special reports,” and §14, 15 U. S. C. § 79n, which similarly empowers the SEC; and the fourth, “the acquisition or disposition of any security, capital assets, facilities, or any other subject matter” refers to §203, 16 U. S. C. § 824b, which requires all purchases of securities of other public utilities, and all sales of facilities worth more than $50,000, to be approved by FERC order, and to § 9, 15 U. S. C. § 79i, which requires SEC approval of acquisitions of “securities and utility assets and other interests.” The language of § 318 does not track precisely the language of any of these other sections, but the PUHCA and FPA sections making up each of the four sets are not themselves precisely parallel, so that some alternative formulation to bridge the gap would be expected.

Our reading is confirmed by longtime understanding and practice. An expert commentary upon the specific topic of overlapping SEC and FPC jurisdiction, written about 10 years after passage of the Public Utility Act, assumed as we have that § 318 implicated only the four FPC sections that we have identified. See Welch, Functions of the Federal Power Commission in Relation to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 14 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 81, 88 (1945). And as far as we have been able to determine, in 50 years of administering the FPA, FERC and its predecessor, the FPC, have never decided an issue under § 318 except in connection with orders promulgated under those four sections. Never before this case has §318 been used as a general conflicts provision, policing the entire regulatory border between the two agencies.

It is not necessarily true that § 318 gives the SEC precedence only when the specific sections that we have referred to are the jurisdictional basis for both the FEEC and the SEC action — as they are not, of course, here. But the text of the section, as we have explicated it above, does require that the “same subject matter” as to which the duplicative requirements exist be one of those specifically enumerated, and not some different, more general “other subject matter”— such as what the Court of Appeals relied upon, “[t]he price term of sales contracts between associated companies,” 279 U. S. App. D. C., at 333, 880 F. 2d, at 1406. In the context of the present case, the only enumerated subject matter conceivably pertinent is contained within what we have referred to as the fourth category. To prevail under §318, Ohio Power would have to establish that it has been subjected both to an SEC requirement under PUHCA and to a FERC requirement under the FPA, “with respect to . . . the acquisition or disposition of any security, capital assets, facilities, or any other subject matter.” The acquisition of SOCCO by Ohio Power might fit the quoted description, so that requirements in the SEC orders might qualify; but it is impossible to identify any FERC requirement that is imposed (as §318 demands) “with respect to the same subject matter.” One might say, we suppose, that a FERC rate requirement is imposed “with respect to the disposition” of electric power— though it does some violence to the interpretive rule of ejusdem generis to say that electric power qualifies as an “other subject matter” at the end of a list that includes securities, capital assets, and facilities, see, e. g., Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 588 (1980); id., at 601 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Third National Bank in Nash ville v. Impac Limited, Inc., 432 U. S. 312, 322 (1977). But even if one accepts that FERC’s rate order is a requirement qualifying under § 318, it is still a requirement with respect to a different subject matter from (and not, as §318 requires, “with respect to the same subject matter” as) the acquisition of SOCCO. The combination of SEC requirements with respect to the acquisition of SOCCO and FERC requirements with respect to the disposition of electric power would not bring §318 into play.

Ill

Our conclusion that §318 has no application to this case does not end review of the FERC order. Remaining to be resolved is the alternative ground relied upon by Judge Mik-va’s concurrence in the Court of Appeals, Ohio Power Co. v. FERC, 279 U. S. App. D. C., at 337, 880 F. 2d, at 1410-namely, the argument that FERC’s decision violates its own regulation, which provides that where the price of fuel purchased from an affiliate “is subject to the jurisdiction of a regulatory body, such cost shall be deemed to be reasonable and includable” in wholesale rates. 18 CFR § 35.14(a)(7) (1990). Also available, and unresolved by the Court of Appeals, is the argument that the FERC-prescribed rate is not “just and reasonable” because it “traps” costs which the Government itself has approved — disregarding a governmental assurance, possibly implicit in the SEC approvals, that Ohio Power will be permitted to recoup the cost of acquiring and operating SOCCO. Cf. Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U. S. 953 (1986). We express no view on these questions, and leave them to be resolved by the Court of Appeals.

The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Souter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Marshall joins, concurring.

While I join the Court’s opinion because I am persuaded that its interpretation of the statute is correct, I add this additional explánation of my vote because neither the parties, the interested agencies, nor the Court of Appeals considered the construction of §318 that the Court adopts today.

Even if § 318 were read broadly to give the SEC priority over FERC whenever the requirements of the two agencies conflict, I would come to the same conclusion. The SEC’s orders at issue in this case do not conflict with FERC’s requirement that Ohio Power recover only the market price of coal from its customers. The SEC’s orders approving the creation and capitalization of SOCCO do not require it to pass all coal production costs on to Ohio Power and its affiliates. At most, these orders establish a ceiling requiring that the price SOCCO charges its affiliates for coal remains at or below its costs. The market price for coal during the time relevant to this proceeding has been less than SOCCO’s costs. Consequently, Ohio Power is able to comply with the requirements of both agencies.

There is no risk of conflict between the requirements of the SEC and FERC in this case. The SEC’s orders limit the price which Ohio Power pays its supplier — SOCCO. The FERC’s order, on the other hand, limits what portion of its fuel costs Ohio Power may pass along to its customers. The two agencies’ requirements limit Ohio Power’s financial relationships with different parties — its supplier and its customers. The two requirements also concern different aspects of fuel costs — the amount Ohio Power must pay for its fuel and how much of those fuel costs it can recover directly from its customers.

Finally, it is significant that the Court of Appeals’ reading of § 318 would create a gap in the regulatory scheme that Congress could not have intended. Congress enacted PUHCA to prevent financial abuses among public utility holding companies and their affiliates. Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, 411 U. S. 747, 758 (1973); see also § 1(b) of PUHCA, 15 U. S. C. §79a(b). It entrusted the SEC, the agency with the expertise in financial transactions and corporate finance, with the task of administering the Act. The SEC carries out its duties essentially by monitoring interaffiliate financial transactions and eliminating potential conflicts of interest. See generally Public Utility Holding Company Act: Hearings on H. R. 5220, H. R. 5465, and H. R. 6134 before the Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 2d Sess., 553, 579-583 (1982). Congress enacted the FPA to regulate the wholesale interstate sale and distribution .of electricity. Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, supra, at 758. It entrusted the administration of the FPA to the FPC and later FERC as the agency with the proper technical expertise required to regulate energy transmission. One of the FPA’s principal goals is to ensure that the rates customers pay for their electricity are “just and reasonable.” See §§205, 206(a) of the FPA, 16 U. S. C. §§824d, 824e(a).

Congress enacted PUHCA to supplement, not to supplant, the FPA. Yet, this is the effect that the Court of Appeals opinion would have in those areas in which the two agencies’ authority overlap. In these overlapping areas, the subject matter would come under the scrutiny of only the SEC despite the difference between the goals and expertise of the two agencies. As the Court of Appeals decision would apply in this case, Ohio Power would be allowed to buy coal at prices that would be higher than those paid by any utility not owned by a holding company, and then pass those higher costs along to its customers. I do not believe that Congress intended to relieve utilities owned by holding companies of substantial technical regulation because of their corporate structure. It intended those utilities to be subject to the regulation of both the SEC and FERC as much as practicable. The Court’s construction of § 318 is consistent with this goal.

      The vast majority of these were orders under § 203, in connection with utilities’ requests for approval of merger or of disposition of assets. See Florida Power Corp., 2 FERC ¶61,038, p. 61,092 (1978); Potomac Edison Co., 54 F. P. C. 1465, 1466 (1975); Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 39 F. P. C. 277, 279 (1968); Buckeye Power, Inc., 38 F. P. C. 519, 520 (1967); Buckeye Power, Inc., 38 F. P. C. 253, 259 (1967); Minnesota Power & Light Co., 37 F. P. C. 1059, 1060-1061 (1967); Arkansas Power & Light Co., 35 F. P. C. 341 (1966); Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc., 34 F. P. C. 107, 108 (1965); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 34 F. P. C. 17, 20 (1965); Arkansas Power & Light Co., 32 F. P. C. 1537, 1539 (1964); Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 32 F. P. C. 1263, 1265 (1964); Kentucky Utilities Co., 32 F. P. C. 622, 623 (1964); South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., 29 F. P. C. 1045, 1048 (1963); Philadelphia Electric Co., 28 F. P. C. 1025, 1027 (1962); Arkansas Power & Light Co., 28 F. P. C. 844, 846 (1962); Pennsylvania Electric Co., 27 F. P. C. 81, 84 (1962); Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., 25 F. P. C. 1195, 1196 (1961); Arkansas Power & Light Co., 25 F. P. C. 1151, 1152 (1961); Alabama Power Co., 25 F. P. C. 1018, 1020 (1961); Northern States Power Co., 25 F. P. C. 974, 977 (1961); Central Vermont Public Service Corp., 25 F. P. C. 146, 149 (1961); Northern States Power Co., 24 F. P. C. 457, 460 (1960); Commonwealth Edison Co., 24 F. P. C. 94, 96 (1960); Minnesota Power & Light Co., 23 F. P. C. 868, 869 (1960); Mississippi Valley Public Service Co., 23 F. P. C. 104, 108 (1960); Central Vermont Public Service Corp., 22 F. P. C. 737, 739 (1959); Arkansas Power & Light Co., 22 F. P. C. 457, 458 (1959); Northern States Power Co., 21 F. P. C. 780, 782 (1959); Conowingo Power Co., 21 F. P. C. 511, 513-514 (1959); Philadelphia Electric Power Co., 21 F. P. C. 157, 160 (1959); Wisconsin Michigan Power Co., 20 F. P. C. 358, 360 (1958); Northern States Power Co., 20 F. P. C. 355, 357 (1958); Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc., 20 F. P. C. 205, 206-207 (1958); Orange & Rockland Electric Co., 19 F. P. C. 269, 276 (1958); Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 18 F. P. C. 827, 829 (1957); Northern States Power Co., 18 F. P. C. 532, 536-537 (1957); Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 18 F. P. C. 525, 528 (1957); Northern States Power Co., 18 F. P. C. 395, 397 (1957); Northern States Power Co., 18 F. P. C. 135, 137 (1957); Kentucky Utilities Co., 18 F. P. C. 44, 46 (1957); Amesbury Electric Light Co., 18 F. P. C. 1 (1957); Nantahala Power & Light Co., 17 F. P. C. 899, 901 (1957); Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., 17 F. P. C. 669, 670 (1957); Northern States Power Co., 17 F. P. C. 639, 641 (1957); Georgia Power & Light Co., 17 F. P. C. 324, 327 (1957); Northern States Power Co., 16 F. P. C. 876, 880 (1956); Scranton Electric Co., 15 F. P. C. 1078, 1081 (1956); St. Joseph Light & Poiver Co., 14 F. P. C. 985 (1955); Frontier Poiver Co., 14 F. P. C. 941, 944 (1955); Carolina Aluminum Co., 14 F. P. C. 829, 830 (1955); Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 14 F. P. C. 821, 822 (1955); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co., 14 F. P. C. 706, 711 (1955); Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., 14 F. P. C. 639, 641 (1955); Connecticut River Power Co., 14 F. P. C. 501, 503 (1955); Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 13 F. P. C. 1563, 1564 (1954); Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 13 F. P. C. 1334, 1335 (1954); Rockland Light & Power Co., 13 F. P. C. 1300, 1302 (1954); Kentucky Utilities Co., 13 F. P. C. 907, 908 (1954); West Penn Power Co., 13 F. P. C. 866, 868 (1954); Ohio Edison Co., 12 F. P. C. 1437, 1438 (1953); Lake Superior District Power Co., 12 F. P. C. 1434, 1435 (1953); Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 12 F. P. C. 1394, 1395-1396 (1953); Wisconsin Michigan Power Co., 12 F. P. C. 1318, 1319 (1953); Louisiana Power & Light Co., 12 F. P. C. 1168, 1169 (1953); Kansas City Power & Light Co., 11 F. P. C. 1112, 1113 (1952); Kansas Gas & Electric Co., 11 F. P. C. 1114, 1115-1116 (1952); Potomac Light & Power Co., 11 F. P. C. 1069, 1070 (1952); South Penn Power Co., 11 F. P. C. 1070, 1071 (1952); Missouri Public Service Co., 10 F. P. C. 1120, 1122 (1951); Athol Gas & Electric Co., 10 F. P. C. 729, 731 (1951); Pennsylvania Electric Co., 9 F. P. C. 1304, 1306 (1950); Rhode Island Power Transmission Co., 9 F. P. C. 942, 944 (1950); Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 9 F. P. C. 859, 861 (1950); Northwestern Illinois Gas & Electric Co., 9 F. P. C. 862, 863-864 (1950); Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 9 F. P. C. 617, 619 (1950); Potomac Electric Power Co., 8 F. P. C. 997 (1949); Bellows Falls Hydro-Electric Corp., 7 F. P. C. 777, 780 (1948); Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 6 F. P. C. 428, 429 (1947); Northern Virginia Power Co., 5 F. P. C. 458, 459 (1946); Central Vermont Public Service Corp., 4 F. P. C. 1001, 1002 (1945); Worcester Suburban Electric Co., 4 F. P. C. 929, 930-931 (1945); Wachusett Electric Co., 4 F. P. C. 920, 921 (1945); California Public Service Co., 4 F. P. C. 812, 814 (1944); Utah Power & Light Co., 4 F. P. C. 791, 792 (1944); Indiana General Service Co., 4 F. P. C. 783, 785 (1944); Empire District Electric Co., 4 F. P. C. 665, 669 (1944); Virginia Electric & Power Co., 4 F. P. C. 51, 53-54 (1944); Eastern Shore Public Service Co., 4 F. P. C. 382, 384 (1943); Otter Tail Power Co., 3 F. P. C. 1054, 1056 (1943); Superior Water, Light & Power Co., 3 F. P. C. 960, 962 (1943); Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., 3 F. P. C. 883, 885 (1942); Point Pleasant Water & Light Co., 3 F. P. C. 755, 757 (1942); Eastern Shore Public Service Co., 3 F. P. C. 723, 724 (1942); Florida Power Co., 3 F. P. C. 719 (1942); Virginia Public Service Co., 3 F. P. C. 704, 706 (1942); Associated Maryland Electric Power Corp., 3 F. P. C. 646, 652 (1942); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 3 F. P. C. 629, 631 (1942); In re Pennsylvania Electric Co., 3 F. P. C. 544, 546 (1943); In re Pennsylvania Electric Co., 3 F. P. C. 557, 558 (1943); In re Olcott Falls Co., 3 F. P. C. 310, 312 (1942); South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., 3 F. P. C. 1007, 1011 (1943); Otter Tail Power Co., 2 F. P. C. 935, 936 (1941); In re Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 2 F. P. C. 122, 123 (1940); Lexington Utilities Co., 1 F. P. C. 787 (1939); In re Evans, 1 F. P. C. 511, 515-518 (1937).
      A large number of orders discussing § 318 arose under § 204, in connection with requests for approval of securities sales or issuance. See Buckeye Power, Inc., 38 F. P. C., at 259; Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc., 34 F. P. C., at 108; Philadelphia Electric Co., 28 F. P. C., at 1027; Utah Power & Light Co., 28 F. P. C. 97, 98-99 (1962); Pacific Power & Light Co., 27 F. P. C. 623, 626 (1962); Northern States Power Co., 25 F. P. C. 974, 977 (1961); Northern States Power Co., 24 F. P. C. 457, 460 (1960); Mississippi Valley Public Service Co., 23 F. P. C., at 108; Holyoke Water Power Co., 21 F. P. C. 676, 678 (1959); Conowingo Power Co., 21 F. P. C., at 513-514; Minnesota Power & Light Co., 21 F. P. C. 214, 215 (1959); Northern States Power Co., 20 F. P. C. 355, 357 (1958); Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc., 20 F. P. C., at 207; Orange & Rockland Electric Co., 19 F. P. C., at 275-276; Holyoke Water Power Co., 18 F. P. C. 821, 826 (1957); Northern States Power Co., 18 F. P. C., at 536-537; Kentucky Utilities Co., 18 F. P. C. 44, 46 (1957); Northern States Power Co., 16 F. P. C., at 880; Interstate Power Co., 15 F. P. C. 1355, 1356-1357 (1956); Rockland Light & Power Co., 13 F. P. C., at 1302; Wisconsin River Power Co., 8 F. P. C. 1111, 1112 (1949); In re Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 5 F. P. C. 52, 54 (1946); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 3 F. P. C., at 631; California Electric Power Co., 2 F. P. C. 1099, 1100 (1941); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 2 F. P. C. 1027, 1028 (1941); Otter Tail Power Co., 2 F. P. C. 1022, 1024-1025 (1941); Nevada-California Electric Co., 2 F. P. C. 956, 957 (1941); Otter Tail Power Co., 2 F. P. C., at 937; In re Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 2 F. P. C. 350, 356 (1941); Sierra Pacific Power Co., 2 F. P. C. 839, 841 (1940); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 2 F. P. C. 831, 833 (1940).
      Only a few orders involved § 301 (accounting requirements) and § 304 (reporting requirements). See Appalachian Power Co., 28 F. P. C. 1199, 1223-1237 (1962); Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 14 F. P. C. 858, 859 (1955); Metropolitan Edison Co., 14 F. P. C. 736, 737 (1955); In re Arkan

        sas Power & Light Co., 8 F. P. C. 106, 127-128 (1949); Northern Indiana Public Service Co., 4 F. P. C. 1070, 1071 (1946); In re Superior Water, Light & Power Co., 3 F. P. C. 254, 257 (1942).

       The slight indication in the legislative history that conferees who added the phrase “or any other subject matter” might have intended such a general conflicts provision, cf. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1903, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 75 (1935), is contradicted by the fact that their revision eliminated the word “or” that had previously appeared before “facilities,” rather than the “or” that introduced the fourth category. Compare id., at 63 with S. 2796, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 292 (in House, June 13, 1935), and S. 2796, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 295 (in Senate, May 13,1935). In any case, the legislative history is overborne by the text.

       The same conclusion would follow if we regarded the action qualifying for § 318 treatment to be, not Ohio Power’s acquisition of SOCCO, but Ohio Power’s acquisition of coal (implicit in its acquisition of SOCCO). It remains impossible to find any FERC requirement imposed “with respect to the same” acquisition. The FERC pricing requirement imposed with respect to the disposition of electric power is still not pre-empted by § 318.

       I agree with the Court that the legislative history provides little guidance in interpreting the scope of § 318’s “ ‘other subject matter’ ” language. See ante, at 84, n. 2. The relevant information provided by the legislative history essentially cancels itself out. The Conference Report on the Public Utility Act contains a statement to the effect that the “or other subject matter” language in § 318 should be read as all inclusive. That Report stated: “The conference substitute [of § 318] is enlarged to include any conflict arising under this bill.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1903, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 75 (1935). The revision of § 318 that accompanied that Report, however, contained language that indicates that “or any other subject matter” is a subset of the “acquisition or disposition of” language in that section. That version of §318 provided: “[i]f, with respect to the issue, sale, or guaranty of a security, or assumption of obligation or liability in respect of a security, the method of keeping accounts, the filing of reports, or the acquisition or disposition of any security, capital assets, facilities, or any other subject matter . . . .” Id., at 63.

       See ante, at 75-76.

       See ante, at 76-77.

       For example, §§9 and 10 of PUHCA, 15 U. S. C. §§79i, 79j, require SEC approval before a holding company and any of its affiliates acquire any securities or assets of a utility. The SEC review of such a merger seeks, among other things, to avoid undue concentration of control over utilities. See 15 U. S. C. § 79j(b). Section 203 of the FPA, 16 U. S. C. § 824(b), requires FERC to approve a public utility’s sale, lease, merger, or consolidation of its facilities. FERC’s goals under § 203 of the FPA are to maintain adequate service and coordination of facilities. See Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 42 FERC ¶ 61,240, p. 61,778 (1988). Under the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of § 318, FERC review of any matter involved in a sale of part or all of a utility’s facilities to a holding company would be improper despite the differing focus and goals of the two agencies.


author:
Chief Justice Rehnquist Justice White,
      Justice Stevens,

text:
    IRWIN v. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS et al.
    No. 89-5867.
    Argued October 1, 1990
    Decided December 3, 1990

      Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Black-mun, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 97. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 101. SOUTER, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

      Jon R. Ker, by appointment of the Court, 494 U. S. 1025, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Brian Serr.

      Deputy Solicitor General Roberts argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, and Harriet S. Shapiro.

        Gregory O’Duden, Elaine Kaplan, and Kerry L. Adams filed a brief for the National Treasury Employees Union as amicus curiae urging reversal.

   Chief Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In April 1986, petitioner, Shirley Irwin, was fired from his job by the Veterans’ Administration (VA), which was subsequently redesignated as respondent Department of Veterans Affairs. Irwin contacted an equal employment opportunity counselor and filed a complaint with the VA, alleging that the VA had unlawfully discharged him on the basis of his race and physical disability. The VA dismissed Irwin’s complaint, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) affirmed that decision by a letter dated March 19, 1987. The letter, which was sent to both Irwin and his attorney, expressly informed them that Irwin had the right to file a civil action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., within 30 days of receipt of the EEOC notice. According to Irwin, he did not receive the EEOC’s letter until April 7, 1987, and the letter to his attorney arrived at the attorney’s office on March 23, 1987, while the attorney was out of the country. The attorney did not learn of the EEOC’s action until his return on April 10, 1987.

Irwin filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas on May 6, 1987, 44 days after the EEOC notice was received at his attorney’s office, but 29 days after the date on which he claimed he received the letter. The complaint alleged that the VA discriminated against him because of his race, age, and handicap, in violation of 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq.; 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §621 et seq.; 87 Stat. 390, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §791 et seq.; and the First and Fifth Amendments. Respondent VA moved to dismiss, asserting, inter alia, that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because the complaint was not filed within 30 days of the EEOC’s decision as specified in 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(c). The District Court granted the motion.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 874 F. 2d 1092 (1989). The court held that the 30-day period begins to run on the date that the EEOC right-to-sue letter is delivered to the offices of formally designated counsel or to the claimant, even if counsel himself did not actually receive notice until later. Id., at 1094. The Court of Appeals further determined that the 30-day span allotted under § 2000e-16(c) operates as an absolute jurisdictional limit. Id., at 1096. Accordingly, it reasoned that the District Court could not excuse Irwin’s late filing because federal courts lacked jurisdiction over his untimely claim. Ibid. That holding is in direct conflict with the decisions of four other Courts of Appeals.

We granted certiorari to determine when the 30-day period under §2000e-16(c) begins to run and to resolve the Circuit conflict over whether late-filed claims are jurisdictionally barred. 493 U. S. 1069 (1990).

Section 2000e-16(c) provides that an employment discrimination complaint against the Federal Government under Title VTI must be filed “[wjithin thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken” by the EEOC. The Court of Appeals determined that a notice of final action is “received” when the EEOC delivers its notice to a claimant or the claimant’s attorney, whichever comes first. Id., at 1094. Petitioner argues that the clock does not begin until the claimant himself has notice of his right to sue.

We conclude that Irwin’s complaint filed in the District Court was untimely. As the Court of Appeals observed, § 2000e-16(c) requires only that the EEOC notification letter be “received”; it does not specify receipt by the claimant rather than by the claimant’s designated representative. There is no question but that petitioner appeared by his attorney in the EEOC proceeding. Under our system of representative litigation, “each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have ‘notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.’” Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 634 (1962) (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U. S. 320, 326 (1880)). Congress has endorsed this sensible practice in the analogous provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide that “[wjhenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 5(b). To read the term “receipt” to mean only “actual receipt by the claimant” would render the practice of notification through counsel a meaningless exercise. If Congress intends to depart from the common and established practice of providing notification through counsel, it must do so expressly. See Decker v. Anheuser-Busch, 632 F. 2d 1221, 1224 (CA5 1980).

We also reject Irwin’s contention that there is a material difference between receipt by an attorney and receipt by that attorney’s office for purposes of §2000e-16(c). The lower federal courts have consistently held that notice to an attorney’s office which is acknowledged by a representative of that office qualifies as notice to the client. See Ringgold v. National Maintenance Corp., 796 F. 2d 769 (CA5 1986); Josiah-Faeduwor v. Communications Satellite Corp., 251 U. S. App. D. C. 346, 785 F. 2d 344 (1986). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b) also permits notice to a litigant to be made by delivery of papers to the litigant’s attorney’s office. The practical effect of a contrary rule would be to encourage factual disputes about when actual notice was received, and thereby create uncertainty in an area of the law where certainty is much to be desired.

The fact that petitioner did not strictly comply with § 2000e-16(c)’s filing deadline does not, however, end our inquiry. Petitioner contends that even if he failed to timely file, his error may be excused under equitable tolling principles. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument on the ground that the filing period contained in § 2000e-16(c) is jurisdictional, and therefore the District Court lacked authority to consider his equitable claims. The court reasoned that §2000e-16(c) applies to suits against the Federal Government and thus is a condition of Congress’ waiver of sovereign immunity. Since waivers of sovereign immunity are traditionally construed narrowly, the court determined that strict compliance with §2000e-16(c) is a necessary predicate to a Title VII suit.

Respondents correctly observe that § 2000e-16(c) is a condition to the waiver of sovereign immunity and thus must be strictly construed. See Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S. 310 (1986). But our previous cases dealing with the effect of time limits in suits against the Government have not been entirely consistent, even though the cases may be distinguished on their facts. In United States v. Locke, 471 U. S. 84, 94, n. 10 (1985), we stated that we were leaving open the general question whether principles of equitable tolling, waiver, and estoppel apply against the Government when it involves a statutory filing deadline. But, as Justice White points out in his concurrence, post, at 99, nearly 30 years earlier in Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270 (1957), we held the petitioner’s claim to be jurisdictionally barred, saying that “Congress was entitled to assume that the limitation period it prescribed meant just that period and no more.” Id., at 276. More recently, in Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S. 467, 479 (1986), we explained that “we must be careful not to ‘assume the authority to narrow the waiver that Congress intended,’ or construe the waiver ‘unduly restrictively’ ” (citation omitted).

Title 42 U. S. C. §2000e~16(c) provides in relevant part:

“Within thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken by . . . the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ... an employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his complaint, may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this title . . . .”

The phraseology of this particular statutory time limit is probably very similar to some other statutory limitations on suits against the Government, but probably not to all of them. In the present statute, Congress said that “[w]ithin thirty days ... an employee . . . may file a civil action . . . .” In Soriano, supra, at 271, n. 1, Congress provided that “[e]very claim . . . shall be barred unless the petition ... is filed . . . within six years . . . .” An argument can undoubtedly be made that the latter language is more stringent than the former, but we are not persuaded that the difference between them is enough to manifest a different congressional intent with respect to the availability of equitable tolling. Thus a continuing effort on our part to decide each case on an ad hoc basis, as we appear to have done in the past, would have the disadvantage of continuing unpredictability without the corresponding advantage of greater fidelity to the intent of Congress. We think that this case affords us an opportunity to adopt a more general rule to govern the applicability of equitable tolling in suits against the Government.

Time requirements in lawsuits between private litigants are customarily subject to “equitable tolling,” Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U. S. 20, 27 (1989). Indeed, we have held that the statutory time limits applicable to lawsuits against private employers under Title VII are subject to equitable tolling.

A waiver of sovereign immunity “‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.’” United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 4 (1969)). Once Congress has made such a waiver, we think that making the rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against the Government, in the same way that it is applicable to private suits, amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver. Such a principle is likely to be a realistic assessment of legislative intent as well as a practically useful principle of interpretation. We therefore hold that the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States. Congress, of course, may provide otherwise if it wishes to do so.

But an examination of the cases in which we have applied the equitable tolling doctrine as between private litigants affords petitioner little help. Federal courts have typically extended equitable relief only sparingly. We have allowed equitable tolling in situations where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period, or where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass. We have generally been much less forgiving in receiving late filings where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights. Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U. S. 147, 151 (1984). Because the time limits imposed by Congress in a suit against the Government involve a waiver of sovereign immunity, it is evident that no more favorable tolling doctrine may be employed against the Government than is employed in suits between private litigants.

Petitioner urges that his failure to file in a timely manner should be excused because his lawyer was absent from his office at the time that the EEOC notice was received, and that he thereafter filed within 30 days of the day on which he personally received notice. But the principles of equitable tolling described above do not extend to what is at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly

Affirmed.

Justice Souter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Marshall joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

Although I agree with the Court that the 30-day period under 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(c) begins to run when the notice from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is delivered either to the claimant or the claimant’s attorney, I do not join the portion of the opinion holding that the 30-day time period is subject to equitable tolling, see ante, at 93-96.

As the Court recognizes, see ante, at 94, statutory deadlines for suits against the Government, such as the one in this case, are conditions on the Government’s waiver of sovereign immunity. See, e. g., United States v. Mottaz, 476 U. S. 834, 841 (1986); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111, 117-118 (1979). As such, they must be “‘strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.’ ” Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, 161 (1981) (quoting Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270, 276 (1957)); see also Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273, 287 (1983). In my view, the Court has failed to “strictly observe” the terms of the statute at issue in this case.

Congress did not expressly provide for equitable tolling of the 30-day filing deadline in § 2000e-16(c). The Court, however, holds that like statutes of limitations for suits between private litigants, limitations periods for suits against the Government will now presumptively be subject to equitable tolling. Ante, at 95-96. That holding needlessly reverses at least one of this Court’s prior decisions and is in tension with several others.

Because of the existence of sovereign immunity, we have traditionally held that the Government’s consent to be sued “‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.’” United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 4 (1969)). That rule applies even where there is a contrary presumption for suits against private defendants. Our decision in Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S. 310 (1986), is instructive on this point. There, we held that the Government was not liable under the federal provisions of Title VII for interest. In reaching that conclusion, we reaffirmed the longstanding rule that despite consent to be sued, the Government will not be liable for interest unless there is a separate explicit waiver to that effect. Id., at 316-317. Although the statute in that case provided that the Government was to be liable “the same as a private person” for “costs,” including a “reasonable attorney’s fee,” we stated that “we must construe waivers strictly in favor of the sovereign . . . and not enlarge the waiver ‘beyond what the language requires.’” Id., at 318 (citations omitted). It seems to me that the Court in this case, by holding that the time limit in §2000e-16(c) is subject to equitable tolling, has done exactly what Shaw proscribes — it has enlarged the waiver in § 2000e-16(c) beyond what the language of that section requires.

Not only is the Court’s holding inconsistent with our traditional approach to cases involving sovereign immunity, it directly overrules a prior decision by this Court, Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270 (1957). The question in Sor-iano was whether war tolled the statute of limitations for claims against the Government filed in the Court of Claims. In arguing for equitable tolling, the plaintiff there relied on a case in which this Court had held that war had tolled a limitations statute for purposes of private causes of action. Id., at 275. The Court was not persuaded, stating that “[t]hat case involved private citizens, not the Government. It has no applicability to claims against the sovereign.” Ibid. The Court explained:

“To permit the application of the doctrine urged by petitioner would impose the tolling of the statute in every time-limit-consent Act passed by the Congress. . . . Strangely enough, Congress would be required to provide expressly in each statute that the period of limitation was not to be extended by war. But Congress was entitled to assume that the limitation period it prescribed meant just that period and no more. With this intent in mind, Congress has passed specific legislation each time it has seen fit to toll such statutes of limitations because of war. And this Court has long decided that limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.” Id., at 275-276 (footnote omitted).

As in Soriano, here Congress “was entitled to assume that the limitation period it prescribed [in § 2000e-16(c)] meant just that period and no more.”

The Court deviates from the above cases because it believes that our decisions concerning time requirements “have not been entirely consistent.” Ante, at 94. Even if that belief is well founded, the doctrine of stare decisis demands that we attempt to reconcile our prior decisions rather than hastily overrule some of them. Such an attempt would reveal that Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S. 467 (1986), cited by the Court for the alleged inconsistency, see ante, at 94, is not irreconcilable with the cases discussed above. In Bowen, we allowed equitable tolling against the Government because, among other things, the statutory time period there, set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 405(g), expressly allowed tolling. Section 405(g) requires that a civil action be filed “within sixty days ... or within such further time as the Secretary may allow.” See 476 U. S., at 472, n. 3 (emphasis added). We noted that the provision in that section allowing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to extend the filing deadline expressed Congress’ “clear intention to allow tolling in some cases.” Id., at 480. Moreover, we observed that the regulations promulgated by the Secretary governing extensions of time under that provision were based on equitable concerns of fairness to claimants, further “supporting] our application of equitable tolling.” Id., at 480, n. 12. The statute in this case, unlike the one in Bowen, does not manifest any “clear intention” by Congress to allow tolling and thus should be subject to the rule articulated in Soriano, supra.

Accordingly, I concur in the judgment because I do not believe that equitable tolling is available as a defense to the 30-day filing requirement, and I would not reach the factual issue whether equitable tolling is supported by the circumstances of this case.

Justice Stevens,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

While I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the filing deadline in 42 U. S. C. §2000e-16(c) is subject to equitable tolling and that the petitioner has failed to establish a basis for tolling in this case, I do not agree that the 30-day limitations period began to run when petitioner’s lawyer, rather than petitioner himself, received notice from the EEOC of petitioner’s right to file a civil action.

The Court is entirely correct that notice to a litigant’s attorney is generally considered notice to the litigant after litigation has been commenced. See ante, at 92-93. But the Court overlooks the fact that litigation is usually commenced by service of process on the adverse party himself. Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly require service on the opposing litigant. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4(d). This case involves a notice that is a condition precedent to the commencement of formal litigation. I therefore believe that Congress intended that this notice, like a summons and complaint, be served on the adverse party, not his representative.

The Court contends that reading “the term ‘receipt’ [in § 2000e-16(c)] to mean only ‘actual receipt by the claimant’ would render the practice of notification through counsel a meaningless exercise.” Ante, at 93. By the same logic, however, reading “receipt,” as the Court does, to mean only “receipt by the claimant’s representative” renders “a meaningless exercise” the EEOC’s practice of notifying the claimant personally, a practice codified in EEOC regulations, see 29 CFR § 1613.234(a) (1990). Actually, notifying both the claimant and his representative makes sense regardless of which notice begins the ticking of the limitations clock. Dual notification ensures that all persons concerned with the progress of the action are apprised of important developments. Cf. ibid, (also requiring notification of employing agency). However, a claimant’s representative before the EEOC will not necessarily also represent the claimant in the ensuing civil suit; indeed, the representative in the administrative proceedings need not even be an attorney. See § 1613.214(b). Notice to the claimant is therefore the more logical trigger for the limitations countdown. This construction is not only sensible in light of the notice requirement’s function in the statutory scheme, but is also consistent with our previous admonitions that Title VII, a remedial statute, should be construed in favor of those whom the legislation was designed to protect. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 397-398 (1982); Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522, 527 (1972).

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s judgment. I would instead reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for resolution of the disputed factual issue of when the petitioner himself actually received notice from the EEOC of his right to file a civil action.

      See Martinez v. Orr, 738 F. 2d 1107 (CA10 1984); Milam v. United States Postal Service, 674 F. 2d 860 (CA11 1982); Saltz v. Lehman, 217 U. S. App. D. C. 354, 672 F. 2d 207 (1982); and Boddy v. Dean, 821 F. 2d 346, 350 (CA6 1987).

      See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 394 (1982); Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U. S. 345, 349, n. 3 (1983).

      See Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U. S. 424 (1965) (plaintiff timely filed complaint in wrong court); Herb v. Pitcairn, 325 U. S. 77 (1945) (same); American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah., 414 U. S. 538 (1974) (plaintiff’s timely filing of a defective class action tolled the limitations period as to the individual claims of purported class members).

      See Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal, 359 U. S. 231 (1959) (adversary’s misrepresentation caused plaintiff to let filing period lapse); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392 (1946) (same).

       The Court’s failure to recognize the importance of sovereign immunity in statutory construction also ignores Brown v. GSA, 425 U. S. 820 (1976). In that case, we held that Title VII provisions for federal employees pre-empt other remedies for discrimination in federal employment. We reached that conclusion despite our earlier holding in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454 (1975), that Title VII provisions for private employees did not pre-empt other discrimination remedies. We found Johnson to be “inapposite” because, among other things, “there were no problems of sovereign immunity in the context of the Johnson case.” 425 U. S., at 833.

       The Court also asserts that allowing equitable tolling against the Government “is likely to be a realistic assessment of legislative intent.” Ante, at 95. It is unclear, however, why that likelihood, rather than the opposite, is true. The statute here, for example, was enacted in 1972 when the presumption was, as set forth in Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270 (1957), that statutes of limitations for suits against the Government were not subject to equitable tolling. It is unlikely that the 1972 Congress had in mind the Court’s present departure from that longstanding rule.

         Stare decisis is “of fundamental importance to the rule of law,” Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transportation, 483 U. S. 468, 494 (1987), because, among other things, it promotes stability and protects expectations. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265-266 (1986). Although always an important guiding principle, it has “special force” in cases such as this one that involve statutory interpretation because Congress is in a position to overrule our decision if it so chooses. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172-173 (1989).