text:
    STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Carissa CAMPBELL, Appellee.
    No. 00-1109.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Sept. 6, 2001.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha E. Boesen, Assistant Attorney General, Darin J. Raymond, County Attorney, and Amy Oetken, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
    Patrick N. Murphy of Murphy & Collins, P.L.C., Le Mars, for appellee.

       Senior Judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2001).

   TERNUS, Justice.

The defendant, Carissa Campbell, was charged with underage possession of alcohol after police officers found her drinking beer in an apartment with several other individuals. See Iowa Code § 123.47(2) (1999). The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that she was exempt from the prohibitions of the statute because she was an adult. We granted the State’s application for discretionary review, and now reverse and remand for reinstatement of the charge.

Iowa Code section 123.47(2) provides that “[a] person or persons under legal age shall not ... individually or jointly have ... beer in their possession or control .... ” “Legal age” is defined in Iowa’s Alcoholic Beverage Control Act as “twenty-one years of age or more.” Iowa Code § 123.3(19). The defendant was nineteen years old at the time of the alleged offense. Thus, although she was no longer a minor under the law, see id. § 599.1 (stating that “[t]he period of minority extends to the age of eighteen years”), she was not of “legal age” under chapter 123.

Despite the fact that the defendant was an underage person and had beer in her possession, the district court dismissed the charge on the basis of a statutory exemption for “beer given or dispensed to a person under legal age within a private home and with the knowledge, presence, and consent of the parent or guardian.” Id. § 123.47(2). The court held that the defendant, “[bjaving attained the age of majority,” was her own guardian. Accordingly, concluded the court, section 123.47(2) did not prohibit the defendant from drinking alcoholic beverages inside a private home.

The State claims that this interpretation of the statutory exemption is wrong. We review the district court’s interpretation of section 123.47(2) for the correction of errors of law. See State v. Eickelberg, 574 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1997). Our goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect to legislative intent. See State v. McCoy, 618 N.W.2d 324, 325 (Iowa 2000). We determine legislative intent from the words chosen by the legislature. See id. At issue in this case is the meaning of the term “guardian” as used in the statutory exemption. When the legislature has not defined a term and it does not have a particular meaning in law, we give the term its ordinary meaning. See id.

The legislature did not provide a definition of the word “guardian” as used in chapter 123. Nonetheless, this term does appear to have a particular meaning in law. Iowa Code chapter 600A addresses the termination of parental rights and eon-tains a definition of the word “guardian.” Section 600A.2 defines “guardian” as

a person who is not the parent of a minor child, but who has been appointed by a court or juvenile court having jurisdiction over the minor child to make important decisions which have permanent effect on the life and development of that child and to promote the general welfare of that child.

Iowa Code § 600A.2 (emphasis added); accord id. § 232.2(21) (defining “guardian” as “a person ... who has been appointed by a court ... to make important decisions which have a permanent effect on the life and development of [a] child and to promote the general welfare of that child”). A comparable definition appears in chapter 633, Iowa’s Probate Code. In this chapter, which deals, in part, with the commencement, administration and termination of guardianships, the legislature has defined a “guardian” as “the person appointed by the court to have the custody of the person of the ward under the provisions of this Code.” Id. § 633.3(20) (emphasis added).

The dictionary definitions of this term are similar to the statutory definitions found in the Iowa Code. The common definition of “guardian” includes “one to whom a person or thing is committed for protection, security, or preservation” and “one who has or is entitled or legally appointed to the care and management of the person or property of another.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1007 (un-abr. ed.1993) (emphasis added). A noted legal dictionary defines the term as “[o]ne who has the legal authority to care for another’s person or property.” Black’s Laiu Dictionary 712 (7th ed.1999) (emphasis added); accord Mellinkojfs Dictionary of American Legal Usage 277 (1992) (defining “guardian” as “a person appointed by court order to take care of the person, property, or both of one unable to do so by reason of minority or incompetence” (emphasis added)).

There is a common theme in the dictionary definitions and the statutory definitions: They consistently contemplate a relationship between two people with one person having the authority or responsibility to care for the other. In addition, the statutory and legal definitions of the term “guardian” anticipate the involvement of the court in appointing a person to that capacity.

We think these definitions are consistent with the legislature’s intent in enacting the statutory exemption found in section 123.47(2). The underlying premise of the prohibition on underage drinking is that a person under the age of twenty-one is not mature enough to drink responsibly. See generally State v. Garman, 250 Iowa 166, 168, 93 N.W.2d 105, 106 (1958) (stating that the purpose of the statutory prohibition against the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors — at that time, persons under the age of twenty-one — was “to prohibit the sale of beer to all persons of immature age”); Iowa Code § 123.1 (stating that chapter 123 was enacted “for the protection of the welfare, health, peace, morals, and safety of the people of the state”). The statute should be liberally construed to accomplish the obvious objective of protecting persons under the legal age from the troublesome consequences of alcohol consumption. See De More v. Dieters, 334 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Iowa 1983) (construing section 123.47 liberally to accomplish the statutory objective of protecting underage persons “from the evils of alcohol”); Iowa Code § 123.1 (stating that the statute “shall be liberally construed for the accomplishment of [the statutory] purpose”). Consistent with the underlying premise of the statutory prohibition against underage drinking, the legislature has provided for a narrow exception when another responsible individual — a parent or guardian — has consented to the underage person’s consumption of alcohol and is present to supervise that person’s drinking. It would be contrary to the legislative scheme to interpret the exemption as allowing the underage person to decide for himself or herself whether, what and how much to drink. The fact that this underage person may be an adult under chapter 599 is of no import. The legislature is free to prohibit or otherwise limit drinking by persons who are eighteen, nineteen, and twenty. See U.S. Const, amend. 21; Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436, 91 S.Ct. 507, 509, 27 L.Ed.2d 515, 518 (1971) (stating that the states’ police power over intoxicating liquors is “extremely broad”).

We reject the defendant’s argument that because the defendant was an adult and therefore not subject to the control of her parents or a guardian, she could not be governed by a rule requiring parental or guardian consent to drinking in a private residence. The legislature has the power to set the age for alcohol consumption differently than the age of majority. Thus, although for other purposes the defendant may not have been subject to parental control, for purposes of drinking alcoholic beverages, she was required to obtain the knowing consent and presence of one of her parents or a court-appointed guardian.

We also find the defendant’s and trial court’s reliance on the cases of H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 101 S.Ct. 1164, 67 L.Ed.2d 388 (1981), and Counts v. Hospitality Employees, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 358 (Iowa 1994), to be misplaced. In Mathe-son, the United States Supreme Court implied that application of a parental notification law to emancipated minors seeking an abortion would be unconstitutional. 450 U.S. at 406, 101 S.Ct. at 1169, 67 L.Ed.2d at 396. This case is distinguishable from the situation before us. A woman has a limited constitutional right to an abortion. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-56, 93 S.Ct. 705, 727-28, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 177-179 (1973). No comparable right to consume alcoholic beverages exists. See U.S. Const, amend. 21.

In Counts, this court held that parents of an emancipated, nineteen-year-old boy could not recover, on a dramshop theory, for care they furnished on account of their son’s injuries. 518 N.W.2d at 369-60 (noting plaintiffs brought suit under Iowa Code section 123.92 (1993)). We reasoned that because the son was an adult, his parents were not legally obligated to provide for his care and, therefore, they sustained no recognizable damages. Id. The parents’ claim for loss-of-consortium damages under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 8 was also rejected, again because the injured child was an adult. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 8 (allowing parents to recover loss-of-consortium damages “resulting from injury to or death of a minor child” (emphasis added)). The trial court in the case before us reasoned that it would be inconsistent to consider a nineteen-year-old person as an adult for purposes of a dramshop action under chapter 123, but consider him or her to “be a minor under another section of the same chapter.” There is no inconsistency, however, because section 123.47(2) regulates persons on the basis of their “legal age,” and the legislature has chosen to define “minority” and “legal age” differently. Therefore, the fact that the viability of both the dramshop theory and rule 8 claim asserted in Counts depended on whether the nineteen-year-old son was a minor has no relevance to whether a nineteen-year-old person, who is not of legal age, can drink in a private residence without the knowledge, consent, and presence of a parent or guardian. The Counts decision is simply inapposite to the issue before the court in the present case.

In conclusion, we think the district court erred in ruling that an adult under the legal age of twenty-one could act as his or her own guardian for purposes of the statutory exemption allowing consumption of alcohol in private residences. This exemption is triggered only when a parent or a guardian — a person appointed by the court to be responsible for the ward — knows of and consents to the drinking and is present when it occurs. Accordingly, we reverse the court’s dismissal of this prosecution and remand for reinstatement of the charge against the defendant.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

SNELL, S.J., participates in lieu of STREIT, J., who takes no part.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CADY, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    CITY OF DES MOINES, Appellant, v. CITY DEVELOPMENT BOARD OF THE STATE of Iowa, Warren County, Iowa, The Iowa Rural Rights Association, Robert Dunn, June Tenhagen, David Van Patten, Raymond E. Phillips, Jr., Steve Klinefelter, Peg Klinefelter, William Don Harbert, Jim Shelley, Wayne Jones, Jo Jones, Bruce Strain, Debbie Cunningham, Car Cunningham, and John Francis Anderson, Appellees.
    Nos. 00-0419.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Sept. 6, 2001.

      See also 628 N.W.2d 820.

      Mark Godwin, Deputy City Attorney, Des Moines, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General and Christie J. Scase, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee City Development Board.
    Robert H. Freilich of Freilich, Leitner & Carlisle, Kansas City, Missouri, and Kevin Parker, Warren County Attorney, for ap-pellee Warren County.
    James E. Van Werden of Hopkins & Huebner, P.C., Adel, for individual appel-lees and appellee Iowa Rural Rights Association.
    John F. Anderson, Des Moines, pro se, appellee.

       Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2001).

   CADY, Justice.

In this appeal, we must decide if the district court had jurisdiction to hear a petition for judicial review of a decision by the City Development Board of Iowa to stay proceedings on a petition for annexation filed by the City of Des Moines. We conclude the district court did not have jurisdiction and affirm the decision of the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In June 1998, the City of Des Moines (Des Moines) filed a petition with the City Development Board of Iowa (Development Board) for involuntary annexation. The Development Board is an administrative agency established to oversee city development in Iowa. Des Moines sought to annex approximately fifteen square miles of land in Warren County. The petition proposed the largest area of annexation in the history of Iowa, and included land near the city of Carlisle. Des Moines and Carlisle had entered into a ten-year written annexation moratorium agreement on July 2, 1990.

Around the same time as the annexation petition was filed by Des Moines, John Anderson and other property owners west of the city of Carlisle also filed a petition for involuntary annexation with the Development Board. They described themselves collectively as residents of “West Carlisle” and sought to annex the city of Carlisle. Additionally, Robert Dunn and many of the other property owners in Warren County, as well as the Iowa Rural Rights Association, filed a motion to dismiss the annexation petition filed by Des Moines. They claimed it contained numerous defects, including a defect in the legal description.

On July 16, 1998, the Development Board dismissed the petition for annexation filed by the residents of “West Car-lisle.” On September 10, 1998, the Development Board denied Dunn’s motion to dismiss and approved the petition filed by Des Moines. However, it also tabled or stayed further action on the Des Moines petition pending judicial review of the decision to dismiss the petition sought by the residents of “West Carlisle.”

Dunn and the other Warren County residents filed a petition for certiorari with the district court challenging the failure of the Development Board to dismiss the annexation petition filed by Des Moines. On March 9, 1999, the district court dismissed the certiorari petition. It concluded judicial review was the exclusive means to review a Development Board decision. Dunn then filed an appeal to this court.

On May 14, 1999, the district court denied the petition for judicial review filed by the residents of “West Carlisle.” Moreover, the prior stay order by the Development Board expired with the issuance of the district court decision. Consequently, the Development Board appealed the district court decision to this court.

In June 1999, Des Moines filed a motion with the Development Board to proceed with its annexation petition and to divide the annexation territory into two parts. On June 17, 1999, the Development Board voted to stay any further action pending resolution of the two cases on appeal to this court.

On July 6, 1999, Des Moines filed a petition for mandamus and writ of certio-rari with the district court challenging the decision by the Development Board to again stay the annexation petition. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion to dismiss on October 15,1999.

On November 4, 1999, Des Moines filed a petition with the district court for judicial review of the decision by the Development Board to stay its annexation petition pending the two appeals to this court. The Development Board moved to dismiss the petition for review. Warren County, the Iowa Rural Rights Association, and the individual property owners also moved to dismiss the petition.

The Development Board claimed judicial review was improper because Des Moines had failed to exhaust all of its administrative remedies and there was no showing that a final agency action would not provide an adequate remedy. In essence, the Development Board claimed Des Moines had to wait until the stay was lifted and the Development Board action was completed before judicial review was available. The other respondents claimed the petition for judicial review filed by Des Moines must be dismissed because it was not filed within thirty days of the Development Board’s original decision on June 17, 1999.

Des Moines filed a resistance to the motions. Among other allegations, Des Moines claimed that it pled sufficient facts to support a showing that final action by the Development Board would not provide an adequate remedy. It also claimed the statutory time limits to seek judicial review did not apply because the stay order was not a final action by the Development Board.

The district court dismissed the petition for judicial review. It determined the thirty-day statutory time limit to seek judicial review did not apply to interlocutory appeals and it had jurisdiction to hear the petition for judicial review. Nevertheless, it found Des Moines failed to show that review of the final agency action would not provide an adequate remedy, and dismissed the petition. Des Moines appealed.

II. Standard of Review.

Our review is for errors at law. See IES Utils. Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 545 N.W.2d 536, 538 (Iowa 1996).

III. Jurisdiction.

Our first obligation in this case is to determine if we have authority to decide the appeal. See State ex rel. Vega v. Medina, 549 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Iowa 1996). A timely petition for judicial review from an administrative decision is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Sioux City Brick & Tile Co. v. Employment Appeal Bd., 449 N.W.2d 634, 638 (Iowa 1989); Foley v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 362 N.W.2d 208, 210 (Iowa 1985). If the district court in this case was without authority to hear the case because the petition for judicial review was untimely, the action must be dismissed. See Sharp v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 492 N.W.2d 668, 669 (Iowa 1992); 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 569, at 558-59 (1994).

The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act is found in Iowa Code chapter 17A, and addresses the subject of judicial review in a comprehensive manner. See Iowa Code § 17A.19 (1997). It first provides that “[a] person or party who has exhausted all adequate administrative remedies and who is aggrieved or adversely affected by any final agency action is entitled to judicial review_” Id. § 17A.19(1). This provision reflects the well-established administrative law doctrine known as the exhaustion of remedies, which exists principally to prevent courts from interfering with the administrative process until it has been completed. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1662, 23 L.Ed.2d 194, 203 (1969). There is, however, an essential exception to this doctrine that permits interlocutory review of an agency decision if the delay in obtaining judicial review until the agency proceeding is completed would deprive the litigant of an adequate remedy. Salsbury Labs. v. Iowa Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 276 N.W.2d 830, 836 (Iowa 1979). This exception is grafted into section 17A.19(1), which provides:

A preliminary, procedural or intermediate agency action is immediately reviewable if all adequate administrative remedies have been exhausted and review of the final agency action would not provide an adequate remedy.

Thus, a party seeking interlocutory review from a decision of an administrative agency must not only establish that waiting for the administrative process to be completed would not provide an adequate remedy, but must also satisfy the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine. Salsbury Labs., 276 N.W.2d at 836.

The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act also establishes a host of rules and procedures governing the judicial review process, including a time limit for the filing of a petition for judicial review. See generally Iowa Code § 17A.19. In a contested case proceeding, this time limit requires a petition for judicial review to be “filed within thirty days after the issuance of the agency’s final decision in that contested case.” Id. § 17A.19(3). On the other hand, “a petition for judicial review of agency action other than the decision in a contested case ... may be filed at any time petitioner is aggrieved or adversely affected by [the] action.” Id. Thus, a petition for judicial review in a contested case proceeding must be filed within thirty days from the “agency’s final decision,” while a petition for judicial review of an agency rule or other noncontested case proceeding may be filed at any time. 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 569, at 558. We have previously determined that the thirty-day rule applicable to the judicial review of agency decisions does not apply by implication to other types of agency action. See Oliver v. Teleprompter Corp., 299 N.W.2d 683, 687 (Iowa 1980).

Des Moines does not claim that the present action falls outside the definition of a contested case proceeding. See Budde v. City Dev. Bd., 276 N.W.2d 846, 850-51 (Iowa 1979) (identifying characteristics of contested case proceedings under chapter 368). Instead, it asserts, as the district court found, that the thirty-day time limit applies only to judicial review from the final agency decision, not interlocutory review of non-final decisions. Under this approach, a non-final agency decision could be appealed at any time up to thirty days after the final judgment was entered.

We recognize our legislature has designated the thirty-day time limit for judicial review under section 17A.19(3) to begin from the issuance of the “agency’s final decision” in the case. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(3). However, even if we assume this designated reference point means the thirty-day time limit under section 17A.19(3) does not apply to petitions for judicial review from interlocutory actions, the position urged by Des Moines overlooks the impact of the companion judicial review requirements found in Iowa Code chapter 368.

Chapter 368 not only creates a state board to oversee city development through such methods as incorporation and annexation, but also establishes the procedure to govern petitions for city development. See generally id. ch. 368. Moreover, the chapter includes its own limited set of provisions for judicial review of the decisions made by the board or a committee established by the board. See id. § 368.22. In particular, section 368.22 allows a city, resident, or property owner to “appeal a decision of the board or a committee ... to the district court.” Id. Additionally, this section provides the “[a]ppeal must be filed within thirty days of the filing of [the] decision....” Id.

This section does not distinguish between appeals from final decisions or appeals from interlocutory decisions. See id. Instead, the time limit imposed by section 368.22 clearly applies to all appeals taken from a board or committee decision in a city development case. Thus, we must determine if the time limit of section 368.22 applies to this case. Des Moines argues the comprehensive provisions of chapter 17A are the exclusive means to seek judicial review of agency action in Iowa, and section 368.22 is inapplicable.

We acknowledge the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act is generally considered to be the exclusive form of judicial review from agency action to the district court. IES Utils., Inc., 545 N.W.2d at 538. This is the first principle expressed in section 17A.19. See Iowa Code § 17A.19 (“judicial review provisions of this chapter shall be the exclusive means”). However, our legislature did not declare section 17A.19 to be the exclusive method for judicial review of agency action in all eases, but only when another statute does not expressly provide otherwise by specific reference to chapter 17A. See id.

Furthermore, we follow the principle that when more than one statute is pertinent to an inquiry, we first consider them together in an attempt to harmonize both statutes. State v. Sullins, 509 N.W.2d 483, 485 (Iowa 1993). A review of section 17A.19 and section 368.22 reveals our legislature clearly intended both statutes to apply to the judicial review of decisions by the Development Board. Section 368.22 specifically provides:

The judicial review provisions of this section and chapter 17A shall be the exclusive means by which a person or party who is aggrieved or adversely affected by agency action may seek judicial review of that agency action.

This language reveals a clear legislative intent for both sections to be given effect, and our preference is to read them together and harmonize them.

The thirty-day time limit to file a petition for judicial review in section 368.22 and the thirty-day time limit to file a petition for judicial review in section 17A.19(3) could be harmonized if the time limit in section 17A.19(3) is read to apply to both final interlocutory decisions and final agency actions. This, of course, is an issue we decline to decide at this time. Nevertheless, even if judicial review of interlocutory decisions is excluded from the thirty-day time limit under section 17A.19(3), so that a conflict exists between the two statutes, section 368.22 would prevail.

When one statute deals with a subject in a general and comprehensive manner and another statute deals with part of the same subject in a more definite and minute way, once again we attempt to harmonize both statutes if possible. Goergen v. State Tax Comm’n, 165 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Iowa 1969). Yet, if any conflict exists, the statute “dealing with the common subject matter in a minute way[ ] will prevail over the general statute ... unless it appears that the legislature intended to make the general [statute] controlling.” Id.

Section 17A.19 clearly deals with the subject of judicial review of agency decisions in a general and comprehensive manner. See generally Iowa Code § 17A.19. The provisions of section 368.22, on the other hand, deal with the same subject of judicial review but only in a minute way. See generally id. § 368.22. Section 368.22 is confined to judicial review in city development proceedings, and targets only such areas as where and when the petition must be filed. See id. The statute only deals with a small portion of the subject of judicial review dealt with in section 17A.19. Thus, even assuming the comprehensive provisions of section 17A.19(3) would be interpreted to conflict with the thirty-day time limit of section 368.22, section 368.22 would control under our recognized doctrine of general and special statutes. In city development proceedings, our legislature has simply determined that all appeals must be filed within thirty days of the filing of the decision without regard to the nature of the appeal. Additionally, there is no indication our legislature intended to make section 17A.19(3) controlling. Instead, our legislature clearly intended both sections to apply. See Goergen, 165 N.W.2d at 787.

IY. Conclusion.

We conclude that all petitions for judicial review filed in district court from a proceeding under chapter 368 are subject to the thirty-day time limit imposed by section 368.22. In this case, Des Moines failed to file its petition for judicial review within thirty days of the decision that is the subject of the petition for judicial review. Accordingly, the district court had no authority over the petition.

AFFIRMED.

SNELL, S.J., participates in lieu of STREIT, J., who takes no part.

      . A petition for annexation is initially submitted to the city development board, which “consists of five members appointed by the governor subject to confirmation by the senate.” Iowa Code § 368.9 (1997). The board determines if the petition is legally sufficient. Id. §§ 368.11, .12. If the board finds the petition meets the statutory requirements, it establishes a committee to determine the merits of the petition. Id. § 368.14. The committee consists of the members of the board and the local representatives appointed by either the county board of supervisors or the city council. Id. The committee conducts a hearing to determine if the development plan should be approved. See id. §§ 368.15-, 17.

      . The thirty-day time limit does not commence from the issuance of the agency’s decision when a timely application for rehearing has been filed. Iowa Code § 17A.19(3). If an application for rehearing has been filed, the petition for judicial review must be filed within thirty days after denial of the application. Id.

      . We decline to address the issue whether the thirty-day time limit under section 17A.19(3) applies only when an appeal is taken from the final judgment of the agency and not from an interlocutory appeal. It is unnecessary to the resolution of this case, and has not been squarely raised or briefed by the parties. We reserve the issue for another case.

      . Statutes have traditionally been classified as either general or special for purposes of interpretation, and are given a different effect on other statutes depending on their classification. See 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 355, at 474-75 (1999). A statute which refers to persons or things as a class is considered a general statute. Crawford v. Iowa State Highway Comm’n, 247 Iowa 736, 739, 76 N.W.2d 187, 189 (1956); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 154, at 203. A statute which relates to a particular person of a class is a special statute. Id. When one statute deals with a subject in generally comprehensive terms and another statute deals with a part of the same subject in a more minute and definite way, to the extent a conflict exists between the two statutes, the special statute prevails over the general statute absent clear legislative expression to the contrary. Crawford, 247 Iowa at 740, 76 N.W.2d at 189. The special act is considered an exception to the general statute. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 355, at 475.


author: NEUMAN, Justice.

text:
    Joe and Lois SANTI, Appellants, v. Mike and Heather SANTI, Appellees.
    No. 00-0181.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Sept. 6, 2001.

      Thomas P. Schlapkohl of Brick, Gentry, Bowers, Swartz, Stoltze, Schuling & Levis, P.C., Des Moines, for appellants.
    Thomas J. Berg, Des Moines, for appel-lees.
    Karen A. Wyle, Bloomington, Indiana, for amicus curiae Coalition for the Restoration of Parental Rights.
    Rochelle Bobroff and Michael Schuster, Washington, D.C. for amicus curiae AARP.

       Senior Judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2001).

   NEUMAN, Justice.

This appeal concerns that portion- of Iowa’s grandparent visitation statute that permits court-ordered visits regardless of whether circumstances such as divorce, the death of a parent, or an adoption have otherwise prompted court intervention in the family’s affairs. See Iowa Code § 598.35(7) (1999). Here, married parents in an intact nuclear family oppose, on constitutional grounds, the paternal grandparents’ asserted right to visit their three-year-old granddaughter over the parents’ objection.

The district court was convinced following hearing that the grandparents met the statutory criteria justifying court-ordered visits. It nevertheless ruled section 598.35(7) unconstitutional on its face because the statute authorizes visits without a threshold finding that the parents are unfit or their decision to deny visits poses substantial harm to the child. In the court’s words, “the state lacks a sufficiently compelling justification for the infringement on the fundamental and natural rights of parents to raise their children as they see fit.”

On our de novo review, we agree that the statute cannot withstand strict scrutiny under article I, sections 8 and 9 of the Iowa Constitution. We therefore affirm the court’s dismissal of the grandparents’ petition, a decision rendering moot the parents’ cross-appeal.

I. Background Facts.

Appellants, Joe and Lois Santi, are the parents of appellee, Mike Santi. Mike and his wife, appellee Heather Santi, are the parents of Taylor Janene Santi. At the time of trial, Joe and Lois were in their mid-fifties, Mike and Heather were in their mid-twenties, and little Taylor was three and a half. All are lifelong residents of Des Moines. Joe works as a scheduling supervisor at Firestone. Lois is an administrative assistant at Drake University. Mike holds an associate degree from Des Moines Area Community College. Heather, a CPA, works as an accounts receivables manager for a local company. Taylor is a happy, well-adjusted child who is adored by her parents and grandparents alike.

So why are these nice folks embroiled in this litigation? The answer is both baffling and heartbreaking. Feelings were hurt early on when Joe and Lois reneged on a promised honeymoon cruise for the newlyweds because Taylor, then an infant, would not be left in their care. After patching up this spat, the parties enjoyed a period of relative harmony during which Joe began routinely babysitting for Taylor on his days off. Old resentments surfaced, however, when Joe and Lois bought Taylor’s first shoes and took her to see Santa Claus without Mike and Heather’s permission. Other disagreements arose over seemingly minor matters such as how much “fast food” Taylor was permitted to eat while staying at her grandma and grandpa’s.

As with many families, there has been tension over how much time must be spent with in-laws at the holidays. But unlike most families, the Santis — both elder and younger — seem unable to get beyond their disagreements, whether great or small. Over time, communication broke down completely. Counseling proved to be of no avail. By the time the case came to trial, Mike and Heather had not permitted Joe and Lois to see Taylor for nearly a year. They simply believed their -lives — and, accordingly, Taylor’s — -were less stressful without the interaction. Joe and Lois were devastated.

II. Legal Proceedings.

Joe and Lois petitioned for grandparent visitation under Iowa Code section 598.35(7). The statute states:

The grandparent or great-grandparent of a child may petition the district court for grandchild or great-grandchild visitation rights when any of the following circumstances occur:
7. A parent of the child unreasonably refuses to allow visitation by the grandparent or great-grandparent or unreasonably restricts visitation. This subsection applies to but is not limited in application to a situation in which the parents of the child are divorced and the parent who is the child of the grandparent or who is the grandchild of the great-grandparent has legal custody of the child.
A petition for grandchild or great-grandchild visitation rights shall be granted only upon a finding that the visitation is in the best interests of the child and that the grandparent or great-grandparent had established a substantial relationship with the child prior to the filing of the petition.

Iowa Code § 598.35(7).

In a preliminary procedural skirmish, Mike and Heather urged the court to find that Joe and Lois had no standing to seek visitation over the parents’ objection. The court ruled that grandparents’ standing was expressly authorized by the statute. It also noted, however, that Mike and Heather raised no constitutional infirmities. Following the court’s cue, Mike and Heather amended their answer to allege the unconstitutionality of section 598.35(7), on its face and as applied to them.

A two-day trial yielded the facts sketched out above. All of the parties testified, as well as interested family members. In addition, Joe and Lois called a psychologist who had counseled the parties over the visitation issue. He ascribed the families’ estrangement principally to Heather’s stubbornness in the face of what she perceived to be controlling behaviors by Joe and Lois. Although he had never met or observed Taylor, he offered his general opinion that severing the bonds between grandchild and grandparent could be potentially detrimental to the child.

After reaffirming the earlier determination that Joe and Lois had standing to sue for visitation, the court addressed the constitutionality of section 598.35(7). It first determined that a parent’s right to the care, custody and control of his or her children is a fundamental right protected by article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. It then determined that the state’s power of parens patriae is implicated only upon a threshold showing of substantial harm to the child. Applying a strict-scrutiny analysis, the court concluded “absent a requirement of harm, Iowa Code § 598.35(7) is unconstitutional because it deprives parents in an intact nuclear family of the fundamental right to determine their child’s upbringing.” Accordingly, the court did not address the issue of whether the statute was unconstitutional as applied.

Joe and Lois moved to expand and enlarge the court’s findings pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 179(b). They asked the court to rule whether they had met their burden of proof under the statute as well as to reconsider its ruling on the statute’s constitutionality. They argued in district court, as they do on appeal, that section 598.35(7) embraces the concept of harm the court found lacking.

The court rejected Joe and Lois’s harm analysis and refused to reconsider its ruling on the statute’s constitutionality. It did, however, find by a preponderance of evidence that (1) Joe and Lois had established a substantial relationship with Taylor before the petition was filed, (2) Mike and Heather had unreasonably denied visitation, and (3) visitation with Joe and Lois would be in Taylor’s best interest. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.

III. Issues on Appeal.

Joe and Lois urge several grounds for reversal. First they contend the Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), holding Washington’s grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional as applied, is not controlling insofar as Iowa’s statute is concerned. Second they challenge the district court’s decision to apply strict scrutiny in its review of section 598.35(7), arguing the intrusion on families posed by grandparent visitation is minimal and requires only satisfaction of the rational basis test. Third they contend that, even applying strict scrutiny, the statute passes constitutional muster because the state need not make a threshold showing of harm to establish a compelling interest in maintaining grandparent-grandchild bonds. Alternatively, if proof of substantial harm must be shown to justify the state’s intrusion in a parent’s decision, they claim the requirement is already embodied in the protections section 598.35(7) affords parents.

Mike and Heather counter that, while Troxel may not control the outcome of this appeal, infirmities identified by the Court in the Washington statute apply with equal force to the statute before us, particularly the fact that section 598.35(7) accords no deference to parental decision making. They also contend the district court properly applied strict scrutiny, stressing Trox-eVs reaffirmation of the fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children without state interference. In doing so, Mike and Heather argue, the Court thereby rejected any argument that court-ordered grandparent visitation creates only minimal intrusion warranting lower-level scrutiny.

IV. Scope of Review.

Because this appeal poses questions of substantive due process and liberty interests in the context of statutory interpretation, we are obliged to review the record de novo, making our own evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. Stanley v. Fitzgerald, 580 N.W.2d 742, 744 (Iowa 1998). Statutes are presumed constitutional, imposing on the challenger the heavy burden of rebutting that presumption. Id, Moreover, if a statute is susceptible to more than one construction, one of which is constitutional and the other not, we are obliged to adopt the construction which will uphold it. Iowa City v. Nolan, 239 N.W.2d 102, 103 (Iowa 1976). A facial attack on a statute, however, implies that it is “totally invalid and therefore, ‘incapable of any valid application.’ ” State v. Brumage, 435 N.W.2d 337, 342 (Iowa 1989) (quoting State v. Duncan, 414 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa 1987)).

V. Analysis.

As we turn to the merits of this controversy, two preliminary questions confront us: Which constitution, state or federal, are we being asked to apply? And what level of constitutional scrutiny does the challenged state action implicate?

A. State or federal? As to the first question, we note that Mike and Heather’s amended answer alleged a substantive due process violation but failed to specify whether their constitutional challenge rested on the Iowa Constitution or the United States Constitution. The court found the statute violated article I, section 1 (and, implicitly, section 9) of the Iowa Constitution. Neither side sought an expansion of the court’s ruling on the point. Accordingly, our review will focus on the import of the pertinent Iowa constitutional provision. We do so mindful of the fact that although the state and federal due process clauses are nearly identical in scope, import and purpose, “it is the exclusive prerogative of our court to determine the constitutionality of Iowa statutes challenged under our own constitution.” Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 187 (Iowa 1999). Thus while federal court analysis of similar provisions in the United States Constitution may prove helpful, those interpretations do not bind us. Id.

B. Level of constitutional scrutiny. Mike and Heather’s substantive due process claim rests on a line of cases, both state and federal, interpreting the concept of due process “to include a substantive component, which forbids the government to infringe certain “fundamental” liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447, 123 L.Ed.2d 1, 16 (1993); accord Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2268, 138 L.Ed.2d 772, 788 (1997); State v. Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d 515, 519 (Iowa 2000). Because this heightened protection, known as strict scrutiny, applies only to those cases implicating fundamental rights, determining whether an asserted right is “fundamental” is the first step in any substantive due process analysis. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722, 117 S.Ct. at 2268, 138 L.Ed.2d at 788; Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d at 519. As noted by the Supreme Court in Glucksberg — a case involving Washington’s ban on assisted suicide — this threshold requirement “avoids the need for complex balancing of competing interests in every case.” 521 U.S. at 722, 117 S.Ct. at 2268, 138 L.Ed.2d at 789. If the right at issue is not deemed fundamental, a reviewing court merely applies the familiar rational basis test to determine whether a reasonable fit exists between the government’s purpose in enacting the statute and the means chosen to advance it. Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d at 519.

Commentators have been quick to point out that the Troxel plurality did not specify the appropriate level of scrutiny for statutes that infringe on the parent child relationship. See, e.g., Bryan Thomas White, Note, Muddling Through the Murky Waters of Troxel: Will Grandparent Visitation Sink or Swim, 39 Fam. & Conciliation Cts. Rev. 104, 108 (2001). Yet the Court left no doubt about the status of parents’ interest in the care, custody, and control of their children, describing it as “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66, 120 S.Ct. at 2060, 147 L.Ed.2d at 56 (relying on Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394-95, 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 606 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 2504, 61 L.Ed.2d 101, 118 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 554, 54 L.Ed.2d 511, 519 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1541-42, 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 35 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 558 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed. 645, 652 (1944); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35, 45 S.Ct. 571, 574, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 1078 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 627, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 1045 (1923)). This court has likewise acknowledged this parental care-taking interest as fundamental. Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 190 (Iowa 1999); In re Bruce, 522 N.W.2d 67, 72 (Iowa 1994); Olds v. Olds, 356 N.W.2d 571, 574 (Iowa 1984).

We note that some courts have viewed grandparental visitation statutes as creating only minimal intrusion on parents’ protected liberty interests, thereby concluding that rational basis review is sufficient. See, e.g., King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky.1992) (not “unreasonable” for state to promote “loving relationship between family members”); Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 209 (Mo.1993) (grandparental visitation rights “less than substantial encroachment on a family”); R.T. v. J.E., 277 N.J.Super. 595, 650 A.2d 13, 16 (1994) (visitation statute “rationally related” to New Jersey’s “legitimate interest ... in promoting grandparent-grandchild relationships”). These pr&-Troxel decisions rest on the recognition that the right to marry and rear children without governmental interference is not unlimited. See, e.g., Herndon, 867 S.W.2d at 208 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386, 98 S.Ct. 673, 681, 54 L.Ed.2d 618, 631 (1978)); King, 828 S.W.2d at 631 (noting parents required by law to see that children are educated, inoculated against disease, free from abuse and restrained when riding in automobiles). But the case before us is not about car seats or vaccinations. We are convinced that the nature of the liberty interest impacted here — the decision by fit, married parents to oppose visitation by third parties outside their nuclear family — is one that, in Iowa, has historically been protected by the highest level of scrutiny. As this court has already observed in connection with a former grandparent visitation statute challenged in In re Bruce,

[tjhere are several policy reasons supporting a limitation on visitation by third parties other than the noncustodial parent. In Olds we noted that the limitation demonstrates a respect for family privacy and parental autonomy. The rule recognizes that the government is ill-equipped to dictate the details of social interaction among family members. It also recognizes that the parenting right is a fundamental liberty interest that is protected against unwarranted state intrusion.

522 N.W.2d at 71 (emphasis added).

We conclude that section 598.35(7) must be reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard. Thus, to withstand challenge under our state constitution, the infringement on parental liberty interests implicated by the statute must be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d at 519.

C. Compelling state interest. At the heart of this case is the question of what compelling state interest, if any, section 598.35(7) advances. By its terms, the statute authorizes the court to override a parental decision about whether, and to what extent, grandparents (or great-grandparents) may visit a grandchild. Visitation may be ordered if (1) the parent unreasonably refuses or restricts visitation, (2) visitation would serve the child’s best interests, and (3) the grandparents or great-grandparents have previously established a substantial relationship with the child. Iowa Code § 598.35(7). Conspicuously absent from the statute is any rationale— compelling or otherwise — for this court-ordered intrusion on parental decision-making. By contrast, other subsections of the visitation statute address impediments to visitation created, or exacerbated by, extraordinary events or prior state involvement in the family. See Iowa Code §§ 598.35(l)-(6) (parents are divorced, petition for dissolution has been filed, parent of the grandchild has died, child placed in foster home, divorce followed by stepparent adoption, child born out of wedlock).

Joe and Lois, supported by amicus curiae AARP, suggest the Iowa law (and others like it around the country) serves to strengthen extended familial bonds in an era plagued by social ills such as divorce, drug use and teen pregnancy. Mike and Heather, along with amicus curiae Coalition for the Restoration of Parental Rights, argue that whatever benefits may accrue from strong grandparent-grandchild relationships in happy families, such benefits are unlikely to result when visitation is imposed over parental objection. The family disruption caused by litigation is not only contrary to the presumed goal of strengthening families, they argue, “such counter-productive measures cannot be deemed even rationally related to that goal, let alone necessary and narrowly tailored.”

Many other state courts have wrestled with this dilemma. A few, as noted in the previous section of this opinion, have regarded grandparent visitation as a minimal intrusion on parents’ liberty interests and therefore upheld their statutes as reasonable governmental regulation under rational basis analysis. E.g., King, 828 S.W.2d at 632-33; Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 210-11; R.T., 650 A.2d at 15-16.

A greater number of courts, applying strict scrutiny, have ruled that their grandparent visitation statutes are unconstitutional to the extent they permit a court to order grandparent visitation over the objections of married, fit parents without a showing of actual or potential harm to the children. E.g., Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271, 1275-77 (Fla.1996) (statute allowing grandparent visitation upon best interest finding unconstitutional under state constitution as impermissible interference with parents’ privacy interest in absence of showing of harm to child); Brooks v. Parkerson, 265 Ga. 189, 454 S.E.2d 769, 771, 773-74 (1995) (statute allowing grandparent visitation on showing of “special circumstances which make such visitation rights necessary to best interests of the child” is unconstitutional infringement of parents’ fundamental liberty and privacy interests because it does not clearly promote children’s health or welfare nor require a showing of harm prior to allowing visitation); In re Herbst, 971 P.2d 395, 398-99 (Okla.1998) (statute allowing grandparent visitation upon showing that visitation in child’s best interest, but not requiring proof of harm, violated parents’ liberty interests under federal and state constitutions); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 579-80 (Tenn.1993) (statute allowing grandparent visitation upon showing that such visitation is in child’s best interest violates state constitutional provision protecting parents’ right to privacy).

The United States Supreme Court weighed in on the matter in Troxel. There the Court faced a Washington state statute authorizing “any person” at “any time” to petition for visitation, which petition could be granted whenever the court found such visitation served the child’s best interest. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67, 120 S.Ct. at 2061, 147 L.Ed.2d at 57 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) (1994)). Describing the statute as “breathtakingly broad,” the Court faulted the law, not only for its nearly unlimited scope, but for its failure to accord any preference to the historical presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. Id. at 68-69, 120 S.Ct. at 2061-62, 147 L.Ed.2d at 58-59. It found the Washington statute exceeded the bounds of the Due Process Clause because it failed to provide any protection for the parent’s “fundamental constitutional right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her own daughter.” Id. at 70, 120 S.Ct. at 2062, 147 L.Ed.2d at 59. The Court then cited with approval state statutes and court decisions that, unlike the Washington statute, protect that fundamental right. See, e.g., Cal. Fam.Code § 3104(e) (West 1994) (rebuttable presumption that grandparent visitation not in child’s best interest if parents agree otherwise); Me.Rev.Stat. Ann., tit. 19A, § 1803(3) (West 1998) (authorizing visitation if in child’s best interest and does not significantly interfere with parent-child relationship or “parent’s rightful authority over the child”); Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285, 291-92 (N.D.1999) (holding visitation statute unconstitutional because it disregards presumption favoring parental decision-making, forcing parents to prove visitation not in child’s best interest).

Summing up, the Court described the compelling interest at stake in Troxel this way:

In an ideal world, parents might always seek to cultivate the bonds between grandparents and their grandchildren. Needless to say, however, our world is far from perfect, and in it the decision whether such an intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in any specific case is for the parent to make in the first instance. And, if a fit parent’s decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent’s own determination.

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70, 120 S.Ct. at 2062, 147 L.Ed.2d at 59.

In post-Troxel decisions, courts of last resort in Maryland and Illinois have likewise held their state visitation statutes unconstitutional where grandparents were required to prove only that visitation was in their grandchild’s best interest without a preliminary finding that the parents opposing the visits were unfit to make that decision. Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill.2d 455, 250 Ill.Dec. 758, 739 N.E.2d 521, 534 (2000); Brice v. Brice, 133 Md.App. 302, 754 A.2d 1132, 1135-36 (2000); see also Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 301-03 (Me.2000) (holding grandparent visitation statute serves compelling state interest in maintaining grandparent-grandchild relationship where grandparents had raised child for period of time, but agreeing with trial court that something more than child’s best interest must be established to serve compelling state interest). But see In re G.P.C., 28 S.W.3d 357, 365-66 (Mo.Ct.App.2000) (holding Troxel not controlling where state’s supreme court previously held rational basis review sufficient based on minimal intrusion of grandparent visitation and other parental protections afforded by visitation statute).

Turning to the Iowa statute before us, we note that while it does not suffer from the patently unconstitutional scope of the Washington statute, it nevertheless fails to accord fit parents the presumption deemed so fundamental in Troxel. Section 598.35(7) places the best interest decision squarely in the hands of a judge without first according primacy to the parents’ own estimation of their child’s best interests. Without a threshold finding of unfitness, the statute effectively substitutes sentimentality for constitutionality. It exalts the socially desirable goal of grandparent-grandchild bonding over the constitutionally recognized right of parents to decide with whom their children will associate.

The district court wisely recognized the statute’s infirmity. The court refused to substitute its judgment about the reasonableness of Mike and Heather’s decision about visitation, even though — applying its own parental instincts — the court believed that withholding visitation with Joe and Lois was unreasonable and not in Taylor’s best interest. It reasoned that it should not assume a parens patrie role without a threshold finding that the parents were unfit to make the visitation decision confronting them. As another state supreme court observed in this context,

[a]n approach requiring a court to make an initial finding of harm to the child before evaluating the “best interests of the child” works ... to prevent judicial second-guessing of parental decisions.

Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 581.

Joe and Lois rightly argue that the district court here, unlike the plurality in Troxel, rested its decision on the conclusion that substantive due process requires a finding of substantial harm to the child before grandparent visitation may be ordered over the parents’ opposition. The court in Troxel declined to reach that question and, on our de novo review, so do we. We believe the analysis is unnecessary because of the historic presumption that fit parents’ decisions will benefit their children, not harm them. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68, 120 S.Ct. at 2061, 147 L.Ed.2d at 58.

We believe that section 598.35(7) is fundamentally flawed, not because it fails to require a showing of harm, but because it does not require a threshold finding of parental unfitness before proceeding to the best interest analysis. It is true that a consideration of potential harm to the child would customarily be included in any best-interest analysis. See Iowa Code § 598.1 (defining “[b]est interest of the child” to include opportunity for maximum visitation with both parents “unless direct physical or significant emotional harm to the child may result from this contact”). But, unlike the other subsections of section 598.35 which contemplate some breakdown between parents before a judge is authorized to make a difficult choice for them, section 598.35(7) permits the court to usurp that judgment over the joint decision of two fit parents. In other words, rather than narrowly tailoring the statute to serve the needs of children with disputing parents, the legislature has broadly swept even fit parents and intact families under the court’s wing. Given the liberty interests at issue, it cannot be permitted to do so. As the Troxel court stated, “the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make childrearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73, 120 S.Ct. at 2064, 147 L.Ed.2d at 61. We hereby interpret article I, sections 8 and 9 of the Iowa constitution to afford fit parents that same protection.

VI. Conclusion.

We are convinced that fostering close relations between grandparents and grandchildren is not a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify court-ordered visitation over the joint objection of married parents in an intact nuclear family. Because Iowa Code section 598.35(7), on its face, permits such state intrusion on fit parents’ fundamental liberty interest in childrearing, we find it facially unconstitutional under article I, sections 8 and '9 of the Iowa Constitution. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of the grandparents’ petition. Our decision renders moot the parents’ cross-appeal. Costs are taxed to the appellants.

APPEAL AFFIRMED; CROSS APPEAL MOOTED.

SNELL, S.J., participates in lieu of STREIT, J., who takes no part.

      . Article I, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution secures to "[a]ll men and women ... certain inalienable rights — among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty ... and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.” Section 9 of the same article states "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”


author: TERNUS, Justice.

text:
    IBP, INC., Appellant, v. Howard HARKER, Appellee.
    No. 99-1708.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Sept. 6, 2001.

      James C. Meehan, Dakota City, NE, for appellant.
    A1 Sturgeon, Sioux City, for appellee.

       Senior Judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602 .9206 (2001).

   TERNUS, Justice.

Iowa’s workers’ compensation statute requires an employer to reimburse an employee for the costs of an independent medical examination (IME) when “an evaluation of permanent disability has been made by a physician retained by the employer and the employee believes this evaluation to be too low.” Iowa Code § 85.39 (1997). In this case, the industrial commissioner ruled that the employer was required to pay for its employee’s IME, even though the employee, not the employer, chose the treating physicians who had rendered disability ratings that the employee thought were too low. The district court affirmed the industrial commissioner’s ruling on judicial review. The employer has appealed. We reverse and remand.

I.Background Facts and Proceedings.

The pertinent facts are essentially undisputed. The appellee, Howard Harker, is an Iowa resident employed as a truck driver by appellant, IBP, inc. On February 6, 1997, Harker was injured in a fall at IBP’s West Point, Nebraska plant. When Harker presented himself to IBP’s health services department, he was advised that under Nebraska law he was allowed to choose his own physician for treatment of his injuries. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-120 (1997). Harker decided to seek treatment from Dr. Merle Muller, to whom he had previously been sent by IPB for an employment physical. The parties agree that Harker chose Dr. Muller and IBP acquiesced in this choice.

Dr. Muller referred Harker to an orthopedist, Dr. Raymond Sherman. Dr. Sherman, in turn, referred Harker to Dr. Leonel Herrera, a neurologist. Over a period of months, Harker saw Dr. Sherman and Dr. Herrera for treatment and rehabilitation. By the end of the summer, both doctors released Harker from their care, stating that he had suffered no permanent impairment as a result of his fall.

Harker then filed a petition with the Iowa industrial commissioner, asking for an IME at IBP’s expense pursuant to section 85.39. IBP resisted, arguing that it had not retained the physicians who had rendered the permanent disability evaluations that were not to Harker’s liking. A deputy industrial commissioner denied Harker’s application, concluding that Harker had already “had an impairment evaluation by his own doctor.”

Harker appealed the deputy’s ruling to the industrial commissioner. The commissioner noted that, although Harker chose his treating physicians, IBP “acquiesced in claimant’s choice of physicianfs]” and paid for their services. The commissioner concluded that Dr. Sherman and Dr. Herrera were “physicians retained by the employer in fulfilling its obligation to provide claimant with medical care,” and, therefore, IBP was obligated to pay for an IME.

IBP sought judicial review of the commissioner’s decision. The district court upheld the commissioner’s ruling, holding that “IBP chose Dr. Mueller [sic] as Hark-er’s employer-retained physician when it acquiesced to his course of medical treatment.” IBP has now appealed to this court.

II. Scope of Review.

The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, Iowa Code chapter 17A, governs our review. See Pirelli-Armstrong Tire Co. v. Reynolds, 562 N.W.2d 433, 436 (Iowa 1997). Section 17A.19 permits a reviewing court to reverse an agency decision when it is “[i]n violation of constitutional or statutory provisions,” or when it is “unsupported by substantial evidence in the record made before the agency when that record is viewed as a whole.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(8). This court applies the standards of section 17A.19(8) to the agency’s actions to determine whether our legal conclusions are the same as those reached by the district court. See Ewing v. Allied Constr. Servs., 592 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Iowa 1999). If our conclusions are the same, we affirm; if they are not, we reverse. See id.

III. Issues on Appeal and Governing Legal Principles.

This case requires the court to interpret the meaning of “retained by the employer” in Iowa Code section 85.39. Based on our interpretation of this language, we must then consider whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the industrial commissioner’s determination that, pursuant to section 85.39, Harker is entitled to an IME at IPB’s expense.

“In reviewing the commissioner’s interpretation of the statutes governing the agency, we defer to the expertise of the agency, but reserve for ourselves the final interpretation of the law.” Second Injury Fund v. Bergeson, 526 N.W.2d 543, 546 (Iowa 1995); accord Henriksen v. Younglove Constr., 540 N.W.2d 254, 256 (Iowa 1995) (“The proper interpretation of the workers’ compensation statute is a question of law for this court.”). Well-established rules govern our interpretation of statutes:

When interpreting a statute, our ultimate goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. We seek a reasonable interpretation that will best effect the purpose of the statute and avoid an absurd result. We consider all portions of the statute together, without attributing undue importance to any single or isolated portion.

John Deere Dubuque Works v. Weyant, 442 N.W.2d 101, 104 (Iowa 1989) (citations omitted).

“To ascertain legislative intent, we look to what the legislature said. We do not speculate as to the probable legislative intent apart from the words used in the statute.” State v. Adams, 554 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Iowa 1996). “Absent legislative definition or a particular and appropriate meaning in law, we give words their plain and ordinary meaning.” State v. Ahitow, 544 N.W.2d 270, 272 (Iowa 1996). The court applies the rules of statutory construction only when the terms of the statute are ambiguous. See William C. Mitchell, Ltd. v. Brown, 576 N.W.2d 342, 347 (Iowa 1998).

A statute is ambiguous if reasonable persons could disagree as to its meaning. “Ambiguity may arise in two ways: (1) from the meaning of particular words; or (2) from the general scope and meaning of a statute when all its provisions are examined.”

Id. (quoting Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc. v. Branstad, 537 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Iowa 1995)). In those cases where ambiguity is found,

“[t]o resolve ambiguity and ultimately determine legislative intent [the court] considers] (1) the language of the statute; (2) the objects sought to be accomplished; (3) the evils sought to be remedied; and (4) a reasonable construction that will effectuate the statute’s purpose rather than one that will defeat it.”

Voss v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 621 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Iowa 2001) (quoting State v. Green, 470 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Iowa 1991)). “[A] statute should be accorded a logical, sensible construction which gives harmonious meaning to related sections and accomplishes the legislative purpose.” McSpadden v. Big Ben Coal Co., 288 N.W.2d 181, 188 (Iowa 1980).

“The primary purpose of the workers’ compensation statute is to benefit the worker and his or her dependents, insofar as statutory requirements permit.” Id. Thus, the court “liberally construe[s] workers’ compensation statutes in favor of the worker.” Ewing, 592 N.W.2d at 691.

IV. Discussion.

For purposes of this case, two provisions of Iowa’s workers’ compensation law have particular importance: Iowa Code section 85.27 and Iowa Code section 85.39. Section 85.27 provides that with respect to injuries compensable under chapter 85, “the employer is obligated to furnish reasonable services and supplies to treat an injured employee, and has the right to choose the care.” Iowa Code § 85.27 (emphasis added). Section 85.39 states in pertinent part:

After an injury, the employee, if requested by the employer, shall submit for examination at some reasonable time and place and as often as reasonably requested, to a physician or physicians authorized to practice under the laws of this state or another state, without cost to the employee; but if the employee requests, the employee, at the employee’s own cost, is entitled to have a physician or physicians of the employee’s own selection present to participate in the examination....
If an evaluation of permanent disability has been made by a physician retained by the employer and the employee believes this evaluation to be too low, the employee shall, upon application to the commissioner and upon delivery of a copy of the application to the employer and its insurance carrier, be reimbursed by the employer the reasonable fee for a subsequent examination by a physician of the employee’s oum choice, and reasonably necessary transportation expenses incurred for the examination....

Id. § 85.39 (emphasis added).

Here, the employee sought to compel the employer to pay for an IME under section 85.39. The only dispute with respect to the application of this statute is whether the physicians giving the “low” disability evaluations were “retained by the employer” within the meaning of the statute. Under the undisputed facts in this case, the answer to this question depends on whether a physician chosen by the employee, but paid by the employer, is “retained by the employer” for purposes of obligating the employer to pay for an IME by a physician of the employee’s choosing.

The legislature did not define the term “retained.” In the decision appealed here and in prior rulings of the industrial commissioner, the commissioner has interpreted the phrase “retained by the employer” to mean “paid for by the employer.” This interpretation is consistent with the common definition of the word “retain,” which is “to keep in pay or in one’s service.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1983 (unabr. ed.1993). As this definition shows, however, “retain” does not necessarily mean “pay for”; it may also mean “in one’s service.” Webster’s defines “service” as “professional or other useful ministrations.” Id. at 2075. “Ministration” is defined as “the action of giving aid, service, or comfort.” Id. at 1439. Certainly a physician chosen by an employee to treat the employee’s injuries could be considered to be in the employee’s service. Because there are two alternative definitions of “retain,” either one of which arguably applies here, we think the statute is ambiguous. Therefore, we turn to rules of statutory construction.

As mentioned previously, in interpreting statutes, we attempt to give effect to legislative intent; we look to all portions of the statute to discern that intent. Once we understand the purpose of the statute, we adopt a meaning, consistent with the language employed by the legislature, that will effectuate that purpose.

The statutes quoted above — sections 85.27 and 85.39 — evidence a legislative attempt to balance the interests of the injured employee and the employer. A noted treatise in the area of workers’ compensation law has described these competing interests with respect to the choice of medical treatment:

The perennial controversy on the “choice of doctor” question is the result of the necessity of balancing two desirable values. The first is the value of allowing an employee, as far as possible, to choose his own doctor. This value stems from the confidential nature of the doctor-patient relation, from the desirability of the patient’s trusting the doctor, and from various other considerations. The other desirable value is that of achieving the maximum standards of rehabilitation by permitting the compensation system to exercise continuous control of the nature and quality of medical services from the moment of injury.

5 Arthur Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Latv § 94.02(2), at 94-13 (2001) (footnotes omitted).

Under the Iowa statute, the employer is given the right to choose who will provide treatment for an employee’s injury. See Iowa Code § 85.27. In addition, the employer is allowed to subject the employee to reasonable medical examinations by other physicians, presumably of the employer’s choosing. See id. § 85.39. The quid pro quo for these employer rights is the right of the employee to have a physician of his choosing present at any IME conducted at the employer’s request and to have an IME conducted by a doctor of his own choice if the physician retained by the employer has given a disability rating unacceptable to the employee. See id. In an apparent attempt to equalize the generally unequal financial positions of the parties, the legislature has said that the employer must pay for the employee’s IME under the latter circumstances. See id.

We conclude that when fhe statute is considered in its entirety, it is apparent that the legislature intended to balance the competing interests of the employee and employer with respect to the choice of doctor. We think, therefore, that the legislature meant to allow the employee to obtain a disability rating from a physician of his “own choice” when the physician chosen by the employer gives a disability evaluation unsatisfactory to the employee. Accordingly, the industrial commissioner and the district court erred in interpreting the language “retained by the employer” to mean “paid by the employer.”

We now consider whether there is substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s finding -that Dr. Sherman and Dr. Herrera were “retained by” IBP. There is no dispute here that these physicians were chosen by Harker. Therefore, under a correct interpretation of section 85.39, these physicians were not “retained by the employer.” There is not substantial evidence in the record to support the commissioner’s contrary finding.

V. Conclusion and Disposition.

We hold that IBP had no obligation under section 85.39 to pay for an IME by a physician selected by Harker because Harker had already obtained, at IBP’s expense, impairment ratings from two physicians that he had chosen. The industrial commissioner erred in her application of the statute to the facts of this case. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the district court affirming the commissioner’s ruling, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

SNELL, S.J., participates in lieu of STREIT, J., who takes no part.

      . Although at first blush our decision may seem inconsistent with the principle that workers' compensation statutes are construed in favor of the worker, we think our interpretation of section 85.39 is most consistent with the entire statutory scheme developed by the legislature. In addition, our decision will encourage employers to acquiesce in an employee's choice of treating physician, a result that advances the employee’s interest in choosing his own doctor.