author:
MEYER, Justice.
      PAGE, Justice ANDERSON, Paul H., J.

text:
    ALL PARKS ALLIANCE FOR CHANGE, Appellant, v. UNIPROP MANUFACTURED HOUSING COMMUNITIES INCOME FUND, d/b/a Ardmor Village, Respondent.
    No. A05-912.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    May 24, 2007.
    Rehearing Denied Aug. 2, 2007.

      Kay Nord Hunt, Barry A. O’Neil, Valerie Sims, Lommen, Nelson, Cole, King & Stageberg, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.
    John F. Bonner, III, Robyn K. Johnson, Thomas F. DeVincke, Bonner & Borhart LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondent.
    Teresa Nelson, American Civil Liberties Union of MN, St. Paul, MN, Elizabeth Melton, Ailana McIntosh, Foley & Mansfield, PLLP, Minneapolis, MN, for amicus American Civil Liberties Union of MN.
    Timothy L. Thompson, St. Paul, MN, for amicus Housing Preservation Project.
   OPINION

MEYER, Justice.

Respondent Uniprop Manufactured Housing Communities Income Fund operates a manufactured home park in Lake-ville, Minnesota, known as Ardmor Village. In response to informational leafleting in the park by appellant All Parks Alliance for Change (APAC), respondent Uniprop instituted a rule banning noncommercial solicitation within the park except between the hours of 11 a.m. and 6 p.m., Monday through Friday. In addition, respondent instituted a “no-contact” list of residents, maintained in the park’s management office. After a court trial, the district court ordered that the time during which noncommercial solicitation is permitted be expanded to include Saturdays, and extended the solicitation period to 7 p.m. between May and August. The court of appeals affirmed both the “no-contact” list and the solicitation period established by the district court. We are asked to decide whether the limits placed by the district court on noncommercial speech within the park are “reasonable limits as to time, place and manner” under Minn.Stat. § 327C.13 (2006). We affirm.

Ardmor Village consists of 339 home sites, approximately 280 of which were occupied at the time of trial. Ardmor Park residents are governed by a set of covenants covering such things as occupancy limits, home maintenance, pets, and use of community facilities. Prior to the institution of this lawsuit, the park’s covenants prohibited “peddling, soliciting or conducting any commercial enterprise or profession” within the park but did not regulate noncommercial speech or solicitation.

On April 15, 2003, two volunteers for APAC visited the park. APAC is a Minnesota nonprofit organization formed to educate residents of manufactured home parks about their rights under Minnesota law. The volunteers left flyers, in English and Spanish, on residents’ doorsteps describing APAC and its services and announcing upcoming informational meetings, to be conducted by APAC, concerning the rights of residents of manufactured home parks under Minnesota law. Ardmor Village’s manager confronted the volunteers, told them that soliciting was not permitted in the park, and called the Lakeville police when the volunteers would not leave of their own accord.

In June 2003, volunteers for APAC again visited the park to pass out flyers and again were told to leave. The park manager gave the APAC volunteers a map of the park so that APAC could distribute its leaflets by direct mail, but the map did not indicate which home sites were occupied, nor did the map give the names of residents. APAC mailed flyers to the addresses on the map, but at least 70 of the mailings were returned as undeliverable.

In February 2004, APAC filed suit against respondent Uniprop seeking an order permitting it to distribute leaflets and otherwise “exercise its right of free expression” within the park “during regular business hours and early evenings.” APAC also claimed that park management’s actions violated Minn.Stat. § 327C.13, which bars manufactured home park owners from prohibiting the exercise of the right of free expression for noncommercial purposes within parks, but permits park owners to enforce rules that set “reasonable limits as to time, place and manner” of noncommercial speech. APAC sought an injunction, actual damages in the amount of $590.16 (its costs of the leaflet mailing to park residents), costs, investigation fees, and reasonable attorney fees under Minn.Stat. §§ 327C.15 and 8.31, subds. 1 and 3(a) (2006). APAC also moved for an injunction barring Uniprop from preventing it from leafleting, canvassing, and organizing residents of the park. By order filed on April 2, 2004, the district court issued a temporary restraining order barring Uniprop from interfering with APAC’s leafleting, canvassing, and organizing of residents between the hours of 9 a.m. and 8 p.m., Monday through Saturday. The matter was set for trial in November 2004.

In August 2004, Uniprop distributed to park residents a notice of rule change. Under the revised rule: “Leafleting and canvassing is permitted on Monday through Friday between the hours of 11:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. in the Ardmor Village community for noncommercial purposes only.” In addition, the park instituted a “no-contact” list comprised of “those residents that have chosen not to allow any leafleting, canvassing or door to door solicitation of any kind, regardless of purpose, at their home site.” The rule required any individual wishing to distribute leaflets, canvass, or solicit door-to-door within the park to review the “no-contact” list in the community office in advance.

After a court trial, the district court found that the new rule limiting noncommercial speech unreasonably curtailed APAC’s outreach efforts and presented an unreasonable impediment to forming a resident ' association. The court found that Uniprop’s interest in promoting residents’ quiet and peaceful use of the community was compelling, but concluded that the new rule was not narrowly drawn to achieve that end. The court further concluded that the new rule was not reasonable “in that it would restrict APAC from being able to directly contact residents during the times in which residents are most likely to be home, i.e. on Saturdays during the day.” The court permanently enjoined Uniprop from interfering with APAC’s activities during the hours of 11 a.m. to 6 p.m., Monday through Saturday, from September 1 to April 30 of each year. Between May 1 and August 30, the solicitation period was extended by one hour, to 7 p.m. But the district court upheld the institution of the no-contact list and ordered Uniprop to provide it to APAC on the first day of every other month. Finally, the district court awarded APAC monetary damages in the amount of $590.16 and its attorney fees, costs, and disbursements.

On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. All Parks Alliance for Change v. Uniprop Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. Income Fund, No. A05-912, 2006 WL 618932 (Minn.App. Mar.14, 2006). The court rejected APAC’s argument that Minn.Stat. § 327C.13 incorporates First Amendment principles. Id. at *4. The court also rejected APAC’s argument that there were other means by which the district court could have protected residents’ rights that would have been less restrictive of APAC’s ability to solicit residents. Id. at *5. The court concluded that section 327C.13 requires only that limitations on noncommercial speech be reasonable, and the court concluded that the limits imposed by the district court were reasonable. Id.

We are asked to decide whether the limits placed by the district court on noncommercial solicitation within the park are “reasonable limits as to time, place and manner” under Minn.Stat. § 327C.13. Because this case comes before us following a court trial, our review would ordinarily be limited to determining whether the evidence as a whole fairly supported the district court’s conclusions of law and judgment. Viking Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Viking Fire Prot. Co., 280 Minn. 250, 256, 159 N.W.2d 250, 254 (1968). But neither party in this case has challenged any of the district court’s findings of fact. Accordingly, our review is further limited to whether the district court’s conclusions of law are supported by its findings of fact and whether the district court erred in its conclusions of law. The application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo review. Boubelik v. Liberty State Bank, 553 N.W.2d 393, 402 (Minn.1996).

Neither party challenged on appeal the authority of the district court to rewrite or “blue-pencil” the rule as instituted by park management, and we therefore assume (without deciding) that in altering the rule the district court acted properly. We have previously approved of the judicial modification of noncompete agreements to fit the law. See, e.g., Hilligoss v. Cargill, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 142, 147 n. 8 (Minn.2002); Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 131 n. 1 (Minn.1980). We did so on the theory that in blue-penciling the agreement the court “is merely enforcing the legal parts of a divisible contract rather than making a new contract for the parties.” Bess v. Bothman, 257 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Minn.1977) (citing 6A Corbin, Contracts, § 1390). The Ardmor Village covenants are considered part of the contract between the resident and Uniprop under Minn.Stat. § 327C.02 (2006). But because the parties did not dispute the authority of the district court to blue-pencil the park rule, we are not asked to decide whether the blue-pencil doctrine extends beyond noncompete agreements to other types of contracts, and we express no opinion on the subject.

In order to decide whether the limits on noncommercial speech as rewritten by the district court are reasonable, we must first determine the scope of “reasonable limits as to time, place and manner.” In statutory interpretation, our first inquiry is whether the statute is ambiguous. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2006); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Bjelland, 710 N.W.2d 64, 68 (Minn.2006). A statute is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 698 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn.2005).

The statute at issue in this case, Minn.Stat. § 327C.13, provides:

No park owner shall prohibit or adopt any rule prohibiting residents or other persons from peacefully organizing, assembling, canvassing, leafletting or otherwise exercising within the park their right of free expression for noncommercial purposes. A park owner may adopt and enforce rules that set reasonable limits as to time, place and manner.

Section 327C.13 itself provides no definition of “reasonable limits as to time, place and manner.” But in determining the intent of the legislature as to what constitutes “reasonable limits as to time, place and manner” we are not limited to the language of section 327C.13 alone. Rather, we interpret each section in light of its surrounding sections, in order to avoid conflicting interpretations of the statute. Am. Family Ins. Group v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn.2000). In particular, statutory definitions of words used elsewhere in the statute furnish authoritative evidence of the legislature’s intent and meaning. See Bd. of Ed. of Minneapolis v. Sand, 227 Minn. 202, 210, 34 N.W.2d 689, 694 (1948).

Chapter 327C, titled “Manufactured Home Park Lot Rentals,” includes several provisions that inform the meaning of “reasonable limits as to time, place and manner.” First, section 327C.01, subd. 8 (2006), defines a “reasonable rule” as a park rule:

(a) which is designed to promote the convenience, safety, or welfare of the residents, promote the good appearance and facilitate the efficient operation of the park, protect and preserve the park premises, or make a fair distribution of services and facilities;
(b) which is reasonably related to the purpose for which it is adopted;
(c) which is not retaliatory or unjustifiably discriminatory in nature; and
(d) which is sufficiently explicit in prohibition, direction, or limitation of conduct to fairly inform the resident of what to do or not to do to comply.

Second, sections 327C.02, subd. 2 (2006), and 327C.05, subd. 1 (2006), bar a park owner from adopting or enforcing unreasonable rules. Section 327C.05, subd. 3 (2006), allows a court to declare unreasonable any park rule “if the court finds that the rule fails to meet the standard of section 327C.01, subdivision 8,” referring to the definition of “reasonable rule.” Finally, section 327C.02, subd. 2, bars a park owner from enforcing a rule that is a “substantial modification” of the resident’s original rental agreement. Section 327C.01, subd. 11 (2006), defines “substantial modification”:

“Substantial modification” means any change in a rule which: (a) significantly diminishes or eliminates any material obligation of the park owner; (b) significantly diminishes or eliminates any material right, privilege or freedom of action of a resident; or (c) involves a significant new expense for a resident.

Taken together, these provisions of chapter 327C mean that the limits on solicitation and other noncommercial speech within Ardmor Park must be reasonable (as defined by section 327C.01, subd. 8) and cannot represent a “substantial modification” of residents’ rental agreements (as defined by section 327C.01, subd. 11). Specifically, any limits placed by Uniprop on solicitation and other noncommercial speech within the park: (1) must be designed to either promote the convenience, safety, or welfare of the residents, promote the good appearance and facilitate the operation of the park, protect and preserve the park premises, or make a fair distribution of services and facilities; (2) must be reasonably related to the purpose for which they were adopted; (3) must not be retaliatory or unjustifiably discriminatory in nature; (4) must be sufficiently explicit in prohibition, direction, or limitation of conduct to fairly inform residents of what to do or not to do to comply; and (5) cannot significantly diminish or eliminate any material right, privilege, or freedom of action of a resident. If the limits placed by Uniprop on noncommercial speech within Ardmor Village do not satisfy these requirements, the statute renders them unenforceable.

Having ascertained the meaning of “reasonable limits as to time, place and manner,” we review the district court’s application of those limits to the undisputed facts, as the district court found them. We conclude that the district court’s limits on noncommercial speech and solicitation within Ardmor Village are reasonable as to time, place and manner under Minn.Stat. § 327C.13.

First, as to whether the park’s rule was “designed to promote the convenience, safety, or welfare of the residents, promote the good appearance and facilitate the efficient operation of the park, protect and preserve the park premises, or make a fair distribution of services and facilities,” as required by Minn.Stat. § 327C.01, subd. 8(a), the district court concluded that Uni-prop’s interest in promoting the “quiet and peaceful use of the community” was “compelling.” But on the second prong of the test, whether the rule was “reasonably related to the purpose for which it is adopted,” the district court approved the “no-contact” list instituted by Uniprop but found that the time limits as promulgated by Uniprop were “not narrowly drawn” to achieve the purpose for which they were adopted. APAC did not claim that Uni-prop promulgated the rule in retaliation for its activities within the park, the third prong of the statutory standard. Although a Uniprop witness testified at trial that the rule was instituted in response to APAC’s activities within the park, Uniprop had previously barred any solicitation by APAC at any time. Therefore, a rule permitting APAC to solicit park residents, even during limited periods, cannot be seen as “retaliatory,” as that term is generally construed, because the new rule permitted something that Uniprop previously did not allow. APAC did not dispute that the rule as promulgated by Uniprop was sufficiently explicit to fairly inform residents of what to do to comply, and therefore satisfied the fourth prong of the statutory standard.

Having found that the time limits established by Uniprop for noncommercial speech and solicitation within the park were not reasonably related to the purpose for the limits, the district court blue-penciled the rule to achieve limits that, in the district court’s view, were reasonable. The court expanded the periods during which noncommercial speech and solicitation are permitted in the park to include an extra hour during the summer months and permitted solicitation and canvassing on Saturdays. In addition, while upholding the institution of the “no-contact” list, the court required Uniprop to provide a copy of the list to APAC six times a year. Finally, in response to APAC’s concerns that residents were being improperly coerced or persuaded to sign the “no-contact” list, the court specifically allowed APAC to petition for an evidentiary hearing once 25% of the occupied units had signed on to the list.

We agree with the court of appeals that the rule as rewritten by the district court imposes reasonable limits on the time, place, and manner of noncommercial speech within Ardmor Park. We therefore affirm the court of appeals with respect to the limits on noncommercial speech and solicitation within Ardmor Park, and we hold that the limits as rewritten by the district court are “reasonable limits as to time, place and manner” under Minn.Stat. § 327C.01, subd. 8.

Affirmed.

PAGE, Justice

(dissenting).

While the district court did not make an explicit finding that Uniprop’s rules violated section 327C.13, in order for the district court to have amended Uniprop’s rule restricting noncommercial speech, it had to have found that Uniprop’s rule was in violation of the statute. Absent a statutory violation, the district court had no authority to modify the rule. In upholding the district court’s modification of the rule as a reasonable restriction on noncommercial speech, this court by necessity concludes that the rule adopted by Uniprop violated section 327C.13’s prohibition against unreasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on the right to free expression for noncommercial purposes. I agree with that implicit conclusion, but I do not agree with this court’s conclusion that the district court’s modifications to the rule cure that violation.

Minnesota Statutes § 327C.13 (2006) provides that:

No park owner shall prohibit or adopt any rule prohibiting residents or other persons from peacefully organizing, assembling, canvassing, leafletting or otherwise exercising within the park their right of free expression for noncommercial purposes. A park owner may adopt and enforce rules that set reasonable limits as to time, place and manner.

APAC argues that in enacting section 327C.13 the legislature intended First Amendment principles to apply in determining whether a manufactured park owner’s rule violates free expression. APAC further argues that, in applying First Amendment principles to the facts of this case, Uniprop’s restriction, even as modified by the district court, cannot stand. Uniprop argues that its rule does not violate the statute and that the legislature did not intend for First Amendment principles to apply when reviewing the reasonableness of a park rule. Although Uniprop does not press the argument here, at the district court, Uniprop argued that to apply First Amendment principles to determine whether its rule violates the statute would result in a constitutional violation.

Our review of a lower court’s construction of a statute is de novo. Olmanson v. LeSueur County, 693 N.W.2d 876, 879 (Minn.2005). “The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2006). “When the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.” Id. However, when there is ambiguity we ascertain the legislature’s intent by considering the following factors:

(1) the occasion and necessity for the law;
(2) the circumstances under which it was enacted;
(3) the mischief to be remedied;
(4) the object to be attained;
(5) the former law, if any, including other laws upon the same or similar subjects;
(6) the consequences of a particular interpretation;
(7) the contemporaneous legislative history; and
(8) legislative and administrative interpretations of the statute.

MinmStat. § 645.16. In doing so, the statute’s words and phrases are to be “construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage; but technical words and phrases and such others as have acquired a special meaning * * * are construed according to such special meaning.” Minn.Stat. § 645.08 (2006). When the legislature uses terms of art that have “accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind.” Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 263, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952); see also Minn. & P.R. Co. v. Sibley, 2 Minn. 13, 19, 2 Gil. 1, 8 (Minn.1858) (“When terms of art or peculiar phrases are used, it must be supposed they are used in the sense as understood by persons familiar and acquainted with such terms.”).

In 1973, the legislature enacted an act regulating manufactured home lot rentals. Act of May 18, 1973, ch. 295, §§ 1-7, 1973 Minn. Laws 567-69 (codified at Minn.Stat. §§ 327.41-47 (1974)). Because of what it termed “major abuses of power,” the legislature amended chapter 327 in 1979. See Office of Sen. Gene Merriam, Memorandum re. S.F. No.1918, 1982 Minn. Leg., at 2. The legislature again amended chapter 327 in 1982 to address what Senator Gene Merriam, one of the sponsors of the senate bill, deemed “major problems.” Id.; see Act of March 22, 1982, ch. 526, 1982 Minn. Laws 938, 938-72. The 1982 amendments grew out of an interim study conducted by the House Subcommittee on Housing that included public hearings attended by more than 800 people, which produced more than 15 hours of public testimony. Office of Sen. Gene Merriam, Memorandum re. S.F. No.1918, 1982 Minn. Leg., at 3. The 1982 amendments reflect the concerns voiced by citizens at the public hearings. As background for amending chapter 327C, Senator Merriam noted:

The manufactured home park owner also has an unusual status. Not simply a private land owner or an ordinary landlord, the park owner has come to resemble a private government. Park rules control a wide spectrum of resident conduct, ranging from the length that grass may be allowed to grow, to whether a homemaker can earn some extra income by babysitting neighborhood children, to how many people can live in each private home. In short, a park owner is like an unelected mayor of a bedroom community.

Id. at 1.

Given the legislative history, it is clear that the occasion for the 1982 amendments to chapter 327C, including the enactment of section 327C.13, arose out of continuing legislative concerns about the imbalance of power between manufactured home park owners and park residents. It is also clear that the mischief the legislature sought to remedy was the abuse of power by manufactured home park owners and the object to be obtained was to rectify the imbalance between manufactured home park owners and park residents. Finally, it is clear from the legislative history that, in enacting section 327C.13 as a tool for rectifying that imbalance, the legislature intended to subject restrictions placed on speech by park owners to First Amendment principles. As an author of the amendments, Senator Merriam explained that the proposed amendments were in response to reports of abuses of power connected to this “form of private government.” Id. at 2. He further described manufactured home park owners as being akin to the “unelected mayor of a bedroom community.” Id. at 1. These references strongly suggest that in enacting section 327C.13 the legislature intended for the First Amendment to apply. That suggestion is buttressed by the language used in the statute.

It is no coincidence that, in placing limits on the rights of manufactured home park owners to interfere with the rights of park residents, the legislature used words, phrases, and concepts derived directly from First Amendment jurisprudence. The words, phrases, and concepts embodied in “free expression,” “noncommercial,” “peacefully organizing, assembling, canvassing, leafletting,” and “reasonable limits as to time, place and manner,” when used in reference to limitations on free expression, are all terms of art with special meaning under the First Amendment. Accordingly, I would hold that section 327C.13 extends the application of the First Amendment to manufactured home parks.

In my view, however, this case does not turn on whether we analyze the rule under the First Amendment. I conclude that the rule as modified is unreasonable and violates the statute no matter what standard we apply. As a preliminary matter, as I read the statute, the burden of proving the reasonableness of the restriction at issue in this case lies with Uniprop. “ ‘[T]he burden of proof generally rests on the one who seeks to show he is entitled to the benefits of a statutory provision.’ ” Rehn v. Fischley, 557 N.W.2d 328, 333 (Minn.1997) (quoting In re Application of City of White Bear Lake, 311 Minn. 146, 150, 247 N.W.2d 901, 904 (1976)). The ability to adopt and enforce rules that set reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on free expression is a benefit conferred by section 327C.13. Thus, in order to prevail, Uniprop has the burden of proving that its rule is reasonable.

Minnesota Statutes § 327C.01, subd. 8 (2006), defines what constitutes a reasonable rule under section 327C.13. Under subdivision 8, “reasonable rule” means a park rule that meets all four of the following requirements:

(a) it is designed to promote the convenience, safety, or welfare of the residents, promote the good appearance and facilitate the efficient operation of the park, protect and preserve the park premises, or make a fair distribution of services and facilities;
(b) it is reasonably related to the purpose for which it is adopted;
(c) it is not retaliatory or unjustifiably discriminatory in nature; and
(d) it fairly informs the resident of what to do or not to do to comply.

On the record presented, Uniprop’s rule fails this definition.

The problem here is that Uniprop has failed to meet its burden of showing that its rule is reasonably related to the purpose for which it was adopted. Uniprop asserts two reasons for adopting its rule limiting noncommercial speech: (1) to promote the residents’ peaceful enjoyment of their property; and (2) to further its interest in maintaining a safe neighborhood. There is no question that the reasons asserted by Uniprop are, in the abstract, of the type contemplated by the legislature in enacting section 327C.01, subdivision 8(a). However, there is no evidence in the record indicating that Ardmor Village residents lacked peaceful enjoyment of their property or that the park was unsafe as a result of canvassing or leafleting. Nor is there any evidence in the record suggesting that such canvassing or leafleting was a threat to residents’ peaceful enjoyment of their property or the safety of the park. Indeed, there is no evidence in the record explaining or demonstrating how limiting canvassing or leafleting promotes residents’ peaceful enjoyment or furthers public safety. Absent a showing of the problems to be remedied and how the restrictions imposed by Uniprop remedy those problems, it is impossible to say that the restrictions on free expression are reasonably related to the purpose for which they were adopted as required by Minn.Stat. § 327C.01, subd. 8(b).

Uniprop’s restrictions on noncommercial speech also fail as unreasonable under subdivision 8(c) because they are retaliatory in nature. At the time APAC began distributing information about its organizing efforts at Ardmor Village, the only rule limiting speech at Ardmor was contained in the village’s community covenants. That rule only restricted business activities by residents. ■ No covenant or other rule regulated the exercise of free expression within Ardmor Village. Therefore, when Ard-mor management had APAC removed from the park, it did so in violation of Ardmor’s own rules and regulations. After Ardmor management had APAC removed from the park, APAC obtained a temporary injunction enjoining Uniprop from denying it access to the park. In response to that injunction and APAC’s litigation, Uniprop amended the community covenants for Ardmor Village to limit noncommercial speech, as Manager McGaffey admitted:

[Question]: Now the new policy in fact was prompted by what happened with APAC, correct?
[Answer]: Correct.
[Question]: And this I think you — there are also other solicitors. I think from your depositions some Jehovah Witness people have been out to the park?
[Answer]: Correct.
[Question]: But the policy wasn’t changed because of the meat salesmen or the Jehovah Witnesses that were in the park, correct?
[Answer]: No, they did not prompt us to change our policy.

A rule adopted for the purpose of restricting the ability of an organization like APAC that provides information to manufactured home park residents about their rights as residents without any indication that the organization has interfered with the residents’ quiet enjoyment of their property, engaged in illegal or otherwise disruptive activities, or created an unsafe condition in the manufactured home park is retaliatory and per se unreasonable. The district court’s modifications to Uni-prop’s rule does not change that fact.

Further, Uniprop’s restrictions are unreasonable because they impede the ability of APAC and organizations like it to communicate with residents about their rights as residents in manufactured home parks. Such communications are the type of communication the legislature had in mind when it enacted chapter 327C’s free expression provisions. To allow the owner of a manufactured home park to adopt a rule specifically for the purpose of restricting the ability of park residents to receive information about their rights effectively frustrates the purposes of section 327C.13. Because Uniprop’s rule is contrary to the intent of the legislature and frustrates the purposes of section 327C.13, Uniprop’s rule, even as modified, cannot be allowed to stand.

Finally, the restrictions contained in Un-iprop’s rule violate residents’ rights under section 327C.13 because they close off the possibility of both anonymous and spontaneous speech. Under Uniprop’s rule, anyone seeking to engage in free expression involving canvassing or leafleting within the park must first present himself or herself to park management to view the no-contact list. Beyond stifling anonymity and spontaneity, Uniprop’s restrictions are stunning in their overbreadth. In cutting off anonymous and spontaneous speech, Uniprop’s rule restricts politicians seeking to go door-to-door to solicit votes, residents who would speak out in opposition to the actions of park management, a neighborhood association soliciting participation in a neighborhood watch group, and trick- or-treaters seeking to go door-to-door on Halloween in the same manner that it restricts APAC. This cannot be what the legislature had in mind when it enacted section 327C.13.

For all of the above reasons, I conclude that Uniprop’s rules, even as modified by the district court, are unreasonable and in violation of section 327C.13.

Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

ANDERSON, Paul H., J.

(dissenting).

I join in the dissent of Justice Page.

      . APAC urges us to apply First Amendment principles to our analysis of the park’s restrictions on noncommercial speech. We decline to do so. We apply First Amendment principles only to "state actors,” and there is no indication on this factual record that Uniprop should be considered a "state actor” in the same way that a "company town” was deemed to be a state actor in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946).

      . Although the First Amendment does not govern the right to free expression within a manufactured home park, the U.S. Supreme Court has expressly recognized that the state has the authority to exercise its police power or sovereign right to provide the right to free expression by way of its state constitution or by statutory provision. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980). "It is, of course, well established that a State in the exercise of its police power may adopt reasonable restrictions on private property so long as the restrictions do not amount to a taking without just compensation or contravene any other federal constitutional provision.” Id. The Supreme Court concluded in PruneYard that a provision of the California Constitution providing the public with a right to engage in free expression at a privately owned shopping mall did not amount to a constitutional taking. Id. at 83, 100 S.Ct. 2035. Although the provision infringed on the mall owners' right to exclude, the provision did not amount to a constitutional taking because the exercise of free expression on mall property did not significantly diminish the property value and the property owners maintained the right to adopt time, place, and manner regulations that would minimize interference with commercial functions. Id.

      . The list of prohibited conduct in the Ardmor Community Covenants includes the following: "Business Activities: Peddling, soliciting or conducting any commercial enterprise or profession, by a Resident anywhere within the Community is not permitted.”

      . During trial, Ardmor Village Manager Mary McGaffey testified that when Ardmor management had APAC removed from the park it did so pursuant to a policy prohibiting door-to-door canvassing and leafleting. McGaffey further testified that the rule prohibiting canvassing and leafleting within the park applied in the same way to commercial and noncommercial purposes. There is no evidence in the record to support McGaffey's testimony that, at the time APAC was first removed from Ardmor Village, Ardmor had a rule in place prohibiting noncommercial soliciting or canvassing.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: /s/Sam Hanson Associate Justice

license: Public Domain

text:
    Tamara Joan HAEG, Respondent, v. SEKO WORLDWIDE d/b/a Vast Logistics, Relator, and Minnesota Assigned Risk Plan, adm’d by Berkley Risk Administrators, Respondent, and Regions Hospital, St. Paul Radiology, North Memorial Ambulance Service, and Twin City Anesthesia Associates, Intervenors.
    No. A07-258.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    May 30, 2007.
    Gary L. Meyer, Meyer, Puklich, Merriam & Johnson, Eden Prairie, MN, for Respondent.
    Kris A. Wittwer, Stewart, Zlimen & Jungers, Ltd., Minneapolis, MN, for Relator/Respondent.
    Roderick C. Cosgriff, Heacox, Hartman, Koshmrl, Cosgriff, & Johnson, P.A., Saint Paul, MN, for Intervenors.
   ORDER

Based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals filed January 4, 2007, be, and the same is, affirmed without opinion. See Hoff v. Kempton, 317 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Minn.1982) (explaining that [s]ummary af-firmances have no precedential value because they do not commit the court to any particular point of view, doing no more than establishing the law of the case).

BY THE COURT:

/s/Sam Hanson Associate Justice


author: /s/ Lori S. Gildea Associate Justice

text:
    Bruce GJERDE, Respondent, v. The PILLSBURY CO./GENERAL MILLS, INC., and Self-Insured, adm’d by Liberty Mutual, Ins. Cos., Relators, and Fairview Health Services, Twin Cities Orthopedics, P.A., and HealthPartners, Inc., Intervenors.
    No. A07-370.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    May 30, 2007.
    Robin D. Simpson, Brad M. Delger, Aaf-edt, Forde, Gray, Monson & Hager, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for Relator.
    Thomas A. Klint, William J. Marshall, Babcock, Neilson, Mannella, Klint, P.L.L.P., Anoka, MN, for Respondent.
   ORDER

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals filed January 18, 2007, be, and the same is, affirmed without opinion. See Hoff v. Kempton, 317 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Minn.1982) (explaining that [s]ummary affirmances have no prece-dential value because they do not commit the court to any particular point of view, doing no more than establishing the law of the case).

Employee is awarded $1,200 in attorney fees.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Lori S. Gildea Associate Justice


author: ANDERSON, G. BARRY, Justice.

text:
    David GRANVILLE and Marlyss Granville, as parents and natural guardians of Kailynn Granville, a minor, Appellants, Jacqueline Johnson, as parent and natural guardian of Shanel Andrews, a minor, Appellant, v. MINNEAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, Respondent.
    Nos. A05-1377, A05-1378.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    May 31, 2007.
   OPINION

ANDERSON, G. BARRY, Justice.

Appellants, parents of two children injured at school during gym, brought an action in Hennepin County District Court against the respondent, Minneapolis School District, alleging negligence. The school district asserted immunity from tort liability under Minn.Stat. § 466.12 (2006) and ultimately moved the district court for summary judgment The district court denied the school district’s motion for summary judgment, finding that section 466.12 violates the equal protection guarantees of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. The court of appeals reversed, holding that section 466.12 does not violate either Equal Protection Clause. This court granted review, heard oral argument, and requested supplemental briefing on the issue of whether section 466.12 was revived after it expired in 1974. We hold that it was not revived and the school district is not immune from tort liability.

On November 1, 2001, two Loring Elementary School students were injured while participating in a game of “flashlight tag” during physical education class. Flashlight tag involves turning off all the lights in the gymnasium and shining a flashlight beam around the room while children run in the darkness to avoid it. During the game, the students collided and injuries resulted. Appellants David and Marlyss Granville and Jacqueline Johnson, the parents of the children, filed separate lawsuits against the Minneapolis School District in Hennepin County District Court, alleging negligence.

The school district moved to dismiss the actions on the ground that the school district is immune from tort liability under Minn.Stat. § 466.12, subd. 3a (2006). This statute requires a school district to secure liability insurance if it is able to do so at a cost of $1.50 or less per student per year. The statute confers immunity on a school district if the district is unable to obtain insurance at the statutory rate and the commissioner of insurance certifies that such insurance is unobtainable. The legislature added the $1.50 provision in 1969, and has not changed the dollar amount since. Act of May 27, 1969, ch. 826, § 2, 1969 Minn. Laws 1515, 1515-16. It is undisputed that no school district in the state can currently obtain liability insurance for $1.50 per student. Before appellants’ children were injured, the school district had requested and received certification from the commissioner of commerce (the statutory successor to the commissioner of insurance) that the district could not obtain liability insurance at the $1.50 per student rate.

In response to the school district’s motion to dismiss appellants’ lawsuits on the basis of section 466.12, appellants argued to the district court that the section violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. The district court applied rational basis review, concluded that the statute was constitutional, and dismissed. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s use of the rational basis test, but reversed and remanded for findings on whether the $1.50 provision was relevant to section 466.12’s purpose under current market conditions. Granville v. Minneapolis Public Schools, 668 N.W.2d 227, 235 (Minn.App.2003), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 18, 2003).

On remand, the school district moved for summary judgment in each action and the district court denied the motions by separate, identical orders. The district court concluded that the statute violates the equal protection guarantees of both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions because under current market conditions the $1.50 statutory rate was not rationally related the purpose of protecting governmental entities’ financial stability. The school district appealed. The court of appeals consolidated the actions and reversed, concluding that section 466.12 does not violate the federal or state Equal Protection Clauses because the application of the $1.50 per student rate allows every district in the state to assert immunity. Granville v. Minneapolis Sch. Dish, 716 N.W.2d 387, 394 (Minn.App.2006). This court granted appellants’ petition for review. In their reply brief, appellants argued for the first time that section 466.12 expired in 1974 and was never revived. We questioned the parties at oral argument and requested supplemental briefing on the issue of whether section 466.12 was revived.

I.

Before considering appellants’ challenges under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, we must determine whether section 466.12 is currently in effect. While we generally do not address issues not raised in a petition for review, In re GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 699 N.W.2d 749, 757 (Minn.2005) (citation omitted), this court may take any action that justice may require. Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 103.04. When we are asked to find a statute unconstitutional, there can be little doubt that we must first ask whether the statute is currently in effect. Mindful that appellants first raised this issue in their reply brief, we have given the school district an opportunity to respond at oral argument and in a supplemental brief.

Section 466.12 was enacted in 1963 as part of the Municipal Tort Claims Act, MinmStat. ch. 466 (2006), in which the legislature responded to our abrogation of common law tort immunity for local government units in Spanel v. Mounds View School District No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962). Act of May 22, 1963, ch. 798, § 12, 1963 Minn. Laws 1396, 1400-01. Section 466.12 codified pre-existing common law immunity for school districts and exempted school districts from the provisions of chapter 466 that made local government units liable for their torts. § 12, subd. 1, 1963 Minn. Laws at 1400. But the legislative preservation of tort immunity for school districts was not permanent; section 466.12, subdivision 4 provided that section 466.12 would expire on January 1, 1968. § 12, subd. 4, 1963 Minn. Laws at 1401 (“This section is in effect on January 1, 1964, but all of its provisions shall expire on January 1, 1968.”). In 1965, the legislature extended the reprieve from liability for school districts by changing the expiration date for section 466.12 to January 1, 1970. Act of May 25, 1965, ch. 748, § 1, 1965 Minn. Laws 1126, 1126. Before the 1970 expiration date arrived, the legislature added the $1.50 provision at issue in this case, extending tort immunity for school districts that were unable to purchase insurance for $1.50 per pupil or less. Act of May 27, 1969, ch. 826, § 2, 1969 Minn. Laws 1515, 1515-16. In the same act, the legislature extended the expiration date for section 466.12 to July 1, 1974. § 3, 1969 Minn. Laws at 1516. In 1974, the legislature amended subdivision 4 to postpone the expiration of section 466.12 for towns not exercising municipal powers. Act of April 11, 1974, ch. 472, § 1, 1974 Minn. Laws 1189, 1189-90. But the legislature did not change the July 1, 1974 expiration date for school districts, even though that date was less than three months away. See id. The school district concedes that section 466.12 and its exemption from tort liability expired as to all school districts on July 1,1974.

In 1996 the legislature repealed subdivision 4 (the expiration provision). Act of Mar. 15, 1996, ch. 310, § 1, 1996 Minn. Laws 185,187. The relevant section of the act was titled “Repealer,” and the act was described as “[a]n act relating to state government; repealing obsolete laws.” It appears that the repealer was part of a bookkeeping effort to remove obsolete provisions from the statute books. The only apparent common thread in the over 300 repealed laws is that they involved dates in the past. The 1996 act did not explicitly indicate an intent to revive section 466.12; indeed, it did not express a substantive intent for any of the affected laws.

The school district relies on the repealer to advance the proposition that the immunity provisions of Minn.Stat. § 466.12 were revived and thus the personal injury actions at issue here were barred. Appellants argue that there was no revival of section 466.12. They contend that Minn. Stat. § 645.36 (1996), which states that “[w]hen a law is repealed which repealed a former law, the former law shall not thereby be revived, unless it is so specifically provided,” supports the conclusion that section 466.12 was not revived. Appellants propose that, for revival purposes, there is no meaningful difference between a law that has been repealed and one that has expired, and we agree.

The main argument advanced by the school district is that we must presume that the legislature knew what it was doing with the 1996 act, and therefore we must presume that the legislature intended to revive the rest of section 466.12 when it repealed the expiration provision. We agree that we must presume that the legislature generally knows what it is doing, but this presumption undermines as much as it supports the school district’s position. Applying the school district’s reasoning, we must presume that when the legislature enacted the repealer at issue, it acted with awareness of section 645.36 and that section’s logical implication that repealing a lapsed expiration provision does not revive the underlying law.

The school district contends that we may not apply section 645.36 because the 1996 act is unambiguous. “The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2006). “When the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.” Id. If a statute is ambiguous, however, we look to other factors to determine legislative intent. Id. We agree with the school district that the language of the 1996 act plainly repealed section 466.12, subdivision 4. Ambiguity exists, however, as to whether that repeal revived the rest of the section; it is far from axiomatic that repealing an expiration date revives an expired law. Faced with this ambiguity, we ask what the legislature most likely intended the repeal of subdivision 4 to accomplish.

It is unlikely, at best, that the legislature intended by the repeal of one expiration provision among more than 300 “obsolete laws” to make a significant substantive change in state tort law. If the legislature had intended to enact complete tort immunity for Minnesota school districts, we believe that it would have drafted a statute announcing such immunity rather than reviving a long-expired statute that creates such immunity by setting out a dollar figure unadjusted for 27 years of inflation. Our skepticism is heightened because section 466.12 requires school districts to request certification from the “commissioner of insurance,” an office that no longer exists. The successor to the “commissioner of insurance” is the “commissioner of commerce.” See Act of June 7, 1983, ch. 289, § 114, subd. 1,1983 Minn. Laws 1246,1307 (instructing the revisor of statutes to replace all appearances of the term “commissioner of insurance” with the term “commissioner of commerce”).

The school district raises a variety of arguments that section 466.12 was revived. Urging us not to apply section 645.36, the school district does not suggest any substantive difference between the repeal of a repealer and the repeal of an expiration provision, but instead argues that section 645.36 is an abrogation of common law and therefore limited to its express wording or necessary implication. See Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 513, 521 (Minn.2005) (stating that “if [a] statute is intended to abrogate the common law, the abrogation must be ‘by express wording or necessary implication’ ”) (quoting Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 377-78 (Minn.1990)); 1A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 23:32, at 564 (6th ed.2002) (noting the common law rule of interpretation that the repeal of a repealing statute operates to revive the original enactment). We find this argument unpersuasive. We can find no evidence that repealers were treated differently than expiration provisions at common law, so we find it sensible to treat them similarly under section 645.36. The school district, furthermore, does not direct us to any common law doctrine that would govern the repeal of a lapsed expiration provision in the absence of section 645.36. Accepting the district’s limited reading of section 645.36 would leave us bereft of statutory and common law direction in this case. Unable to perceive any meaningful difference between repeal-ers and expiration provisions in this context, we believe section 645.36 applies.

The school district also asserts that the Minnesota legislature has repealed “numerous” expiration dates in other statutes. But of the four acts cited by the school district, none revived an expired law. For example, two acts repealed future expiration dates. As the intention of the legislature when it amends or repeals the expiration date of an unexpired law is not in question, these examples are not helpful. The third act cited by the school district repealed the June 1,1999, expiration of the powers of a “municipal board” that no longer existed, having been replaced by a different entity elsewhere in the act. The fourth act repealed the June 30, 2001 expiration provision of Minn.Stat. § 144.148 (2000). The repeal was “effective the day following final enactment” of the act, which was signed by the governor on June 30, 2001. Thus, the law expired on June 30, 2001, and the expiration provision was repealed on July 1, 2001. A “day” “comprises the time from midnight to the next midnight.” Minn.Stat. § 645.45 (2006). Section 144.148 therefore expired at midnight as June 30 ended, and the expiration provision was repealed at the same instant as July 1 began. But the repealer at issue was not part of a mass repealer as we have here and, while we do not decide the issue, we think the best interpretation of this confluence of events is that section 144.148 never expired. These four examples do not persuade us that the legislature intended to revive section 466.12 by repealing its expiration provision.

The school district also argues that section 645.36 should not apply because an expiration provision is not akin to a repealer, but rather to a suspension or an exception created by a later statute. Where a suspension or exception is repealed, the original statute becomes effective again, see Strand v. Village of Watson, 245 Minn. 414, 420, 72 N.W.2d 609, 614 (1955), superseded by statute, Act of Feb. 24, 1967, ch. 19, § 10, 1967 Minn. Laws 54, 71-76, as recognized by Mjos v. Village of Howard Lake, 287 Minn. 427, 431-32, 178 N.W.2d 862, 866 (1970), or becomes effective without the exception, see Pepin Tivp. v. Sage, 129 F. 657, 662-63 (8th Cir.1904). The expiration provision in question, however, is not akin to a suspension. A suspension is, by definition, temporary. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1487 (8th ed.2004). Subdivision 4 of section 466.12 however, stated that the section would permanently expire as to school districts on July 1, 1974. Nor is the provision akin to a statutory exception, which “exempt[s] certain persons or conduct from [a] statute’s operation.” Black’s Law Dictionary 604 (8th ed.2004). Subdivision 4 completely ended school district immunity under section 466.12. When the legislature creates a statutory suspension or exception to an existing law, it contemplates that the existing law will continue to operate with the exception or will remain ready to become effective upon removal of the suspension. This was not the case with section 466.12. The legislature allowed that section to expire and made no provision for revival.

The school district also argues that it would be improper to refuse to give effect to section 466.12 because it continues to appear in Minnesota Statutes. In support of this argument, the district cites Minn. Stat. § 3C.13 (2006): “Any volume of Minnesota Statutes, supplement to Minnesota Statutes, and Laws of Minnesota certified by the revisor according to section 3C.11, subdivision 1, is prima facie evidence of the statutes contained in it in all courts and proceedings.” Section 3C.13 does not limit this court to construing statutes as they are printed in Minnesota Statutes; it also instructs us to look to Laws of Minnesota as a prima facie source of the state’s statutes. According to Laws of Minnesota, section 466.12 expired in 1974 and the legislature repealed the expiration provision in 1996. Therefore we can properly interpret the 1996 act and its effects on section 466.12.

As prima facie evidence, the statutes as printed in Minnesota Statutes “will establish a fact or sustain a judgment unless contradictory evidence is produced.” Black’s Law Dictionary 598 (8th ed.2004). “Although the Minnesota Statutes are pri-ma facie evidence of the laws of Minnesota, they are not the laws themselves. The actual laws of Minnesota as passed by the legislature ⅜ * * are contained in the session laws ⅜ * Ledden v. State, 686 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn.App.2004) (citation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 22, 2004). “If the revisor has erred in codifying legislative enactments, it is the duty of the judiciary to give effect to the legislative intent and not to the letter of the law as codified because the revisor lacks the authority to make changes in the law.” Kuiawinski v. Palm Garden Bar, 392 N.W.2d 899, 903 (Minn.App.1986) (citing State v. Village of Pierz, 241 Minn. 37, 41, 62 N.W.2d 498, 501 (Minn.1954)), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 1986).

In Village of Pierz, the legislature revised a statute authorizing the public examiner to undertake an inspection of the books of any village on a petition from its inhabitants. 241 Minn, at 38-39, 62 N.W.2d at 499-500. The amending acts increased the number of required petitioners from 10 freeholders to three freeholders per 100 inhabitants with 10 freeholders minimum. 241 Minn, at 39-40, 62 N.W.2d at 500. The revisor of statutes inserted the new petition requirement but mistakenly deleted the language authorizing the inspection in the first place. 241 Minn, at 40, 62 N.W.2d at 500. The village, which had requested and received an inspection but did not wish to pay for it, argued that under the language of the revised statute as printed, the public examiner had no authority to conduct the inspection. 241 Minn, at 40, 62 N.W.2d at 499-500. We held that

where an ambiguity had arisen by virtue of a deletion, omission, or change of language, it is as much our function to ascertain the legislative intent, if we can, from the language used in the new revision as it is in those cases where we construe a single act of the legislature.

241 Minn, at 40, 62 N.W.2d at 500. In giving effect to the language mistakenly deleted by the revisor, we went on to explain that while the act conferred on the revisor authority to consolidate, simplify, and codify the statutes, “[i]t was not the intention of the legislature to confer upon the revisor authority to make changes in existing laws.” 241 Minn, at 41, 62 N.W.2d at 501. We are not in a position to determine why section 466.12 continues to appear in Minnesota Statutes, but that appearance alone does not require us to give effect to an expired law that was not revived.

Acknowledging that section 466.12 is no longer in force will not significantly disturb the expectations and budgets of Minnesota school districts. The school district does not dispute that it is the only school district to have claimed immunity since 1996; in fact, the school district admitted in testimony by a school officer that it had “laid low” by not telling other districts about the immunity provision for fear that the legislature would abolish it. Apparently, the school district is the only district in the state that had any expectation of immunity under section 466.12. Even so, the school district has been self-insured for tort claims since 1990 and has paid claims it deemed meritorious during that time. We hold that Minn.Stat. § 466.12 (2006) expired in 1974 and was not revived. Because the statute has expired, we need not reach appellants’ arguments that the statute is unconstitutional, and the school district’s pending motion to strike is dismissed as moot.

Reversed and remanded.

      . Also before the court is the school district's motion to strike an equal protection argument that appellants raised for the first time in their reply brief.

      . Other sections repealed by the act include: Minn.Stat. § 412.018, subd. 2 (1994) (granting an option for certain cities to change their incorporation status by July 1, 1975); Minn. Stat. § 446A.10 (1994) (transferring responsibility for a wastewater grant program to the Minnesota public facilities authority as of July 1, 1988); Minn.Stat. § 458.1931 (1994) (stating that a port authority city’s recently-granted power to tax was cumulative with the power it enjoyed on April 28, 1957); Minn. Stat. § 466.10 (1994) (stating that Laws 1963, chapter 798, was not retroactive); Minn.Stat. § 471.9975 (1994) (stating that failure to comply with the requirements of Laws 1984, chapter 651, prior to August 1, 1987, did not give rise to a cause of action); Minn.Stat. § 471.998 (1994) (requiring a report to the commissioner of employee relations by October 1, 1985).

      .Act of Apr. 18, 1988, ch. 551, § 1, 1988 Minn. Laws 507 (repealing Jan. 1, 1989 expiration provision in Minn.Stat. § 469.012, subd. 10 (supp.1987)); Act of June 1, 1981, ch. 356, § 378, 1981 Minn. Laws 1770, 1790 (repealing Act of Mar. 22, 1978, ch. 510, § 10) (imposing June 30, 1981 expiration on Act now codified and amended as Minn.Stat. § 3.9223 (2006)).

      . Act of March 5, 2002, ch. 223, § 29, 2002 Minn. Laws 179, 202 (repealing the expiration of the municipal board’s powers); see § 1, 2002 Minn. Laws at 179 (replacing the Minnesota municipal board with the office of strategic and long-range planning).

      . Act of June 30, 2001, ch. 9, art. 1, § 62, 2001 Minn. Laws 2133, 2181 (2001 1st Sp. Session).