author: CADY, Justice.

text:
    IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD, Complainant, v. James Franklin HALL, Jr., Respondent.
    No. 06-1320.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    March 5, 2007.

      Charles L. Harrington and Laura M. Roan, Des Moines, for Complainant.
    Donna Ruth Beary, Des Moines, for Respondent.
   CADY, Justice.

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board (Board) charged James F. Hall, Jr. with numerous violations of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. The Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa (Commission) found Hall violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. It recommended Hall be suspended from the practice of law for a minimum period of fifteen months. On our review, we find Hall violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, and we suspend his license to practice law indefinitely, with no possibility of reinstatement for twelve months.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

James F. Hall, Jr. is an Iowa lawyer. He was admitted to the practice of law in Iowa in 2002. Hall was raised in Des Moines, and enjoyed a variety of success in his life prior to practicing law. Hall was an exceptional multi-sport high school athlete and a one-time Olympic hopeful in track. He served in the United States Navy, and is a veteran of the Gulf War. He was the first member of his family to attend and graduate from college.

Hall began his legal career as a sole practitioner in Des Moines. Within a short period of time, he moved from Des Moines and began practicing law in Waterloo as a sole practitioner. The demands on his time were great, and he began, unknowingly at first, to exhibit signs of what would later be identified as depression and bipolar disorder. He also had little understanding of the intricacies of an office practice, or the need to fully train and supervise staff. He had no real mentor within the profession, and primarily associated with people that provided little professional guidance. There was evidence that some people he associated with used illegal drugs in his home. The confluence of these circumstances, as well as others, foretold the disaster that would lie ahead. This cataclysm eventually unfolded in an eight-count complaint filed by the Board in 2006, and a hearing before the Commission that set forth the evidence largely supporting the complaint. Hall currently lives in Des Moines and practices with another lawyer in an office sharing arrangement.

Hall’s office practice in Waterloo was marked by disorganization and, at times, chaos. On one occasion in 2005, Hall signed the names of two clients to their bankruptcy petitions after he had traveled to the federal courthouse in Cedar Rapids to file the petitions and discovered the signatures were missing. He did not obtain permission from the clients to sign their names, and did not understand he was not permitted to sign the petitions for his clients. See 11 U.S.C. § 110(e)(1) (2006) (“A bankruptcy petition preparer shall not execute any document on behalf of a debtor”). Hall then told conflicting accounts of the matter to the bankruptcy judge and later to the Commission.

Hall also neglected client cases on numerous occasions. Between 2003 and 2005, Hall neglected four separate cases after filing notices of appeal with this court. He repeatedly missed filing deadlines and received default notices from the clerk of court. On one occasion, his neglect resulted in the dismissal of the appeal. Hall also neglected a case involving a claim for wrongful discharge he undertook on behalf of a client named Marsha Lewis. After agreeing to handle the case, Hall made little or no effort to advance the client’s claim. He also misrepresented the status of the case to the client and later failed to promptly turn over the client file after the client obtained new counsel. Similarly, Hall neglected a case on behalf of a client named Kristen Campbell after agreeing to represent the client on an insurance claim involving the death of her husband. He failed to return numerous phone calls from the client and did little or no legal work in the case. He also failed to turn over the client file after the client obtained new counsel. The papers in the file had not been returned to the client as of the date of the hearing before the Commission. Hall was unable to locate the file or the papers belonging to the client.

Hall maintained a trust account in his practice, but repeatedly mismanaged the account and failed to comply with trust account requirements. He did not maintain a proper ledger of deposits and withdrawals, and repeatedly used the account to deposit and withdraw personal funds. He also permitted a paralegal in his office to deposit and withdraw funds. In 2004, for example, Hall deposited the proceeds from a personal loan into the trust account, and then periodically used the account to pay a variety of business and personal obligations. Hall also deposited other personal funds into the trust account from time to time. At times, Hall used the trust account more for his personal dealings than for client matters. Nevertheless, there was no evidence he failed to maintain an adequate amount of personal funds in the account when he withdrew funds for personal matters.

Hall handled other financial matters in unorthodox ways. On two occasions, Hall was paid fees or advances from clients that were never deposited in the trust account. The Commission, however, found Hall had earned the fees by the time they were paid by the client. On another occasion in August 2004, Hall received a settlement check from an insurance company on behalf of a client in the amount of $3500. Instead of depositing the check in his trust account, Hall went to the bank with his client to negotiate the check. The fee arrangement apparently entitled the client to $2000. Hall deposited the check into his office account at the bank and paid his client $2000 in cash. A few days later, Hall transferred $3000 from his trust account into his office account. When Hall’s trust account was later audited by the Client Security Commission, Hall falsely told the auditor the $8000 that had been transferred from the trust account represented the settlement proceeds.

Finally, Hall repeatedly failed to respond to Board inquiries in response to the various complaints filed against him.

II.Board Complaint.

The Board charged Hall with multiple violations of the rules of professional responsibility. Count I involved the bankruptcy petitions and alleged Hall violated six separate provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, including DR 1-102(A)(4) (misrepresentation); DR 1-102(A)(5) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); DR 1-102(A)(6) (conduct adversely reflects unfitness to practice); and DR 7-102(A)(5) (false statement of law or fact). Count II involved the neglect in the four appellate cases and alleged Hall violated four code provisions, including DR 6 — 101(A)(3) (neglect of a client’s legal matter). Count III involved other cases of neglect, and alleged Hall violated ten separate code provisions, including DR 6 — 101(A)(3), DR 1-102(A)(5), and DR 2-110(A)(2) (return client papers). Counts V and VI involved the trust account violations, and alleged Hall violated code provisions including DR 9-102(A) (client funds required to be placed in trust account and a lawyer shall not deposit funds of the lawyer into the trust account); DR 9-103(A) (maintain ledger or record of client funds); DR 9-102(B)(3) (maintain complete records and render an accounting to client); and DR 1-102(A)(4). Count V also alleged misappropriation of client funds in violation of DR 1 — 102(A)(4). Count VIII involved the failure to cooperate with the Board in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6).

Count IV alleged Hall submitted an excessive fee claim in a case. Count VII alleged Hall used a controlled substance.

The Commission found the Board established the violations under Counts I, II, III, V, VI, and VIII. It found the Board failed to establish Counts IV and VII. It also found Hall did not misappropriate client funds as alleged in Count V. It recommended Hall be suspended from the practice of law for fifteen months. As a condition of reinstatement, the Commission recommended Hall undergo a mental health evaluation and disclose the name of a licensed attorney who would be willing to serve as a mentor to him to provide guidance following any reinstatement. It also recommended Hall attempt to locate and return the papers and records belonging to Kristen Campbell.

III. Scope of Review.

We review attorney disciplinary matters de novo. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Bernard, 653 N.W.2d 373, 375 (Iowa 2002). We give the findings of the Commission weight, but are not bound by them. Id.

IV. Violations.

We agree with the findings and conclusions made by the Commission in its detailed report. In particular, the evidence showed Hall violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility as found by the Commission. He engaged in misrepresentation and conduct that adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law by signing his name to the bankruptcy petitions and later telling inconsistent accounts of his misconduct. This conduct violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, including DR 1 — 102(A)(6) and DR 1-102(A)(4). He neglected client matters in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3) by his failure to comply with the rules of appellate practice in four separate cases. He also neglected client matters in two other cases, misrepresented the status of the cases to his clients, and failed to promptly return client papers. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Freeman, 603 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Iowa 1999) (obligation to turn over client papers to successor counsel). He also failed to respond to numerous notices from the Board in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Kallsen, 670 N.W.2d 161, 167 (Iowa 2003) (failing to respond in a timely manner).

It is clear Hall also maintained his trust account in violation of the requirements of DR 9-102. He used the trust account to deposit personal funds and to pay personal and business expenses. The commingling of his personal funds with his trust account violated DR 9-102(A) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He also failed to maintain a proper ledger and other records to demonstrate compliance with the trust account requirements in violation of DR 9-103. To compound matters he knowingly misrepresented the nature of at least one trust account transaction to the Client Security Commission auditor in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4). See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Mattson, 558 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Iowa 1997).

Y. Discipline.

In determining the appropriate level of discipline, we focus on “the nature of the alleged violations, the need for deterrence, the protection of the public, maintenance of the reputation of the [Bar] as a whole, and the respondent’s fitness to continue” to practice law. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Walters, 646 N.W.2d 111, 113-14 (Iowa 2002). We consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id. In the end, we impose discipline based on the particular facts of each case. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. McKittrick, 683 N.W.2d 554, 563 (Iowa 2004).

Our prior cases reveal the discipline we impose for neglect normally ranges from a public reprimand to a six-month suspension. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Hohenadel, 634 N.W.2d 652, 655-56 (Iowa 2001). In this case, the neglect was visited on numerous clients, and was frequently compounded by misrepresentations to clients. The neglect also visited harm on clients. Hall further compounded his neglect by failing to turn over client files after termination of the attorney-client relationship.

Hall engaged in other acts of misrepresentation. He improperly signed his client’s names on bankruptcy petitions in violation of federal law, and told conflicting stories of the account to minimize his culpability. Likewise, he misrepresented the circumstances of a suspicious transaction involving his trust account to an auditor from the Client Security Commission. Dishonesty, deceit, and misrepresentation by a lawyer are abhorrent concepts to the legal profession, and can give rise to the full spectrum of sanctions, including revocation. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Ackerman, 611 N.W.2d 473, 474 (Iowa 2000); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Stein, 603 N.W.2d 574, 576 (Iowa 1999). An honest lawyer is essential to the legal profession. See Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Bauerle, 460 N.W.2d 452, 453 (Iowa 1990). Generally, neglect combined with incidents of misrepresentation give rise to a lengthy suspension from the practice of law. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Ruth, 656 N.W.2d 93, 100 (Iowa 2002).

The failure to comply with the trust account requirements is also a serious matter. We have said that the commingling of trust funds with personal or office funds is strictly prohibited. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Herrera, 560 N.W.2d 592, 594 (Iowa 1997). Moreover, the overall manner in which Hall operated the trust account was outrageously deficient. It reflected his overall approach to the practice of law, and revealed his general unfitness to be a lawyer at this time.

We have recognized the rigors of the practice of law and the difficulties that can be encountered by attorneys. See McKittrick, 683 N.W.2d at 563. These difficulties are multiplied exponentially for young lawyers who venture into the practice as sole practitioners. This factor, perhaps more than any other, may help explain the disaster Hall encountered in his practice of law. This also explains the recommendation by the Commission that Hall be required to identify and become associated with a lawyer to serve as a mentor and counselor before resuming his legal practice. Additionally, Hall struggled with burgeoning mental health issues. These matters contributed to his misconduct, and can ultimately serve to mitigate sanctions. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Sullins, 648 N.W.2d 127, 135 (Iowa 2002).

The scope and type of misconduct engaged in by Hall — profuse client neglect, repeated misrepresentations, trust account failures, failure to return client property, failure to respond to the Board, and general law office mismanagement — has been documented by us in a host of prior disciplinary cases, including our recent case of Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Joy, 2007 WL 543021, 728 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa 2007) (filed February 23, 2007) (listing similar cases). These cases reveal we generally discipline lawyers who engage in this misconduct by suspending them from the practice of law for a period between one and three years. Id. Of course, the point where the discipline ultimately falls within the range depends on the particular facts and circumstances as revealed in each ease. In the end, this case can be distinguished from the others. Ultimately it seems to reveal less about an unethical lawyer than one who was confused, alone, and unprepared for the voyage he undertook, and quickly found himself well over his head in the dangerous and sometimes treacherous currents of the practice of law. Under all the circumstances, we conclude Hall should be suspended from the practice of law indefinitely, with no possibility of reinstatement for twelve months.

The conditions of reinstatement recommended by the Commission are reasonable, and will be considered upon any application for reinstatement by Hall. Moreover, we support the concept of mentoring for all new lawyers, especially those who have recently graduated from law school and choose to begin their careers as a sole practitioner. The lack of education and guidance on the intricacies of the practice of law is often, as in this case, a recipe for disaster for new lawyers. Consequently, all new lawyers who decide to engage in the practice of law as a sole practitioner would benefit immeasurably from a mentor, just as they would benefit from obtaining continuing legal education on office practices before opening a law office as a sole practitioner. The profession, and the public, would benefit by including such education in continuing legal education programs for new lawyers.

VI. Conclusion.

We suspend Hall’s license to practice law in Iowa indefinitely, with no possibility of reinstatement for a period of twelve months from the date of filing of this opinion. The suspension imposed applies to all facets of the practice of law as provided by Iowa Court Rule 35.12(3), and requires notification to clients as provided in Iowa Court Rule 35.21. The costs of this proceeding are taxed against Hall pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.25(1).

LICENSE SUSPENDED.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WIGGINS, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    John ARNDT, Appellee, v. CITY OF LE CLAIRE and HIGHLAND INSURANCE GROUP, Appellants.
    No. 05-1694.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    March 5, 2007.

      William D. Scherle and Alexander E. Wonio of Hansen, McCIintock & Riley, Des Moines, for appellants.
    Daniel D. Bernstein of William J. Bri-briesco and Associates, Bettendorf, for ap-pellee.
   WIGGINS, Justice.

The Iowa workers’ compensation commissioner found the claimant’s injuries were not work related. On judicial review, the district court reversed the decision of the commissioner finding substantial evidence did not support the commissioner’s decision. The employer and insurer appealed and our court of appeals affirmed. On further review, we find the district court and the court of appeals improperly weighed the evidence in reversing the commissioner’s decision. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand the case for the district court to enter a judgment affirming the decision of the commissioner.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

At the time of his alleged injury, John Arndt worked for the City of Le Claire as the public works supervisor. Arndt claims when he was at work on June 14, 2001, while climbing onto a road grader, he slipped on some grease and fell backward. When attempting to break his fall, Arndt twisted his knee and popped his shoulder. There were no witnesses to the incident. After the fall, Arndt claims he went back to the garage and told another City employee, Colleen Rhodes, that he twisted his knee. Arndt alleges the next day he told Ed Choate, his supervisor, that he injured his knee by falling off a road grader. Choate told Arndt to go see a doctor. Arndt told Choate he did not want to see a doctor at that time. He stated he would rather “wait it out and see if it was a little sprain.” Choate did not fill out an employer’s first report of injury form at this time.

On June 28 Arndt had an appointment with a chiropractor he had previously seen. On this visit, Arndt reported to the chiropractor he “twisted [his] right knee one month ago.” Arndt did not seek any additional treatment until October when he began to see the chiropractor more regularly. On his October 1 visit, Arndt reported right knee and right shoulder pain. On October 5 Arndt again visited the chiropractor and stated his right shoulder was better, but still sore. On October 8 Arndt saw the chiropractor for another follow-up visit. The chiropractor noted Arndt expressed he had pain when he stood for a long period of time and his right knee would swell.

In October Arndt told Choate his knee was “really bad, swollen up all the time and [it was] hard to get [his] pants on and off at night.” Choate told Arndt if he sought medical treatment to avoid making a workers’ compensation claim. He also told Arndt to have his own insurance pay for any treatment. Choate testified he thought because Arndt was seeing a doctor at a point in time that was so far removed from the injury date, he was unsure if workers’ compensation would cover the bill.

On October 25 Arndt saw an orthopedic specialist. At the orthopedist’s office, Arndt completed a medical history information form. On the form, he indicated his own private insurance would pay for his medical treatment, not his employer’s workers’ compensation insurance. He also put a question mark on the line provided for the patient to indicate the date of the accident or the onset of symptoms. Arndt testified when he was filling out the form, he did not know the exact date he was injured. The orthopedist’s office took a history from Arndt. The history reflected Arndt told the orthopedist’s nurse that he “slipped off of a ladder at home and twisted his knee and injured his shoulder.” The history continues,

[a]pparently as he fell he forcefully twisted the knee and felt a twinge along the medial aspect of the knee. He grabbed the ladder to stop his fall and forcefully pulled hard on the shoulder. This episode occurred 4 months ago.

The orthopedist diagnosed Arndt with injuries to his right shoulder and knee. These injuries required Arndt to have surgery on his knee and shoulder.

In December Choate determined a workers’ compensation claim could be filed for Arndt’s injury. Choate filled out an employer’s first report of injury on December 6. The report listed the date of injury as June 14, 2001, and that Arndt first reported the injury to Choate on June 15.

On February 11, 2002, Arndt filed a notice and petition claiming workers’ compensation benefits for the injuries he claimed to have sustained while falling off a road grader at work on June 14, 2001. During the hearing, the deputy workers’ compensation commissioner accepted the employer’s first report of injury into the record. In doing so, the deputy commissioner stated he put the report into the record only for the purpose allowed by Iowa Code section 86.11 (2001).

In addition to Arndt’s medical records, the City introduced a letter from the orthopedist regarding the cause of Arndt’s injuries. The letter stated:

[Arndt’s] history was taken by the office nurse in which he stated that he slipped off a ladder, twisted [his] knee and grabbed [the] ladder and pulled [his] shoulder at home.
For the date of accident, or onset of symptoms, he put a question mark. When he came into the office he gave the receptionist his regular insurance card and stated this was under his insurance.
He never stated, at any time, during any of his visits to the office, that this was a work comp claim and we had no way of knowing. He has never given anyone any information at any of the visits to the office. He initialed his patient information sheet for the receptionist upon arrival of each visit. The very purpose of asking the patient to initial the patient information sheet on each return visit is to clarify any changes in insurance or work comp status. The patient is asked upon arrival to the office for his appointment to review the patient information sheet to see if there are any changes in address, phone number, insurance or work comp status.

The deputy workers’ compensation commissioner found Arndt did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he “sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of employment on June 14, 2001.” The deputy commissioner found there were too many inconsistencies regarding when the accident occurred. The deputy commissioner also found “[a]s late as October 25, 2001, [Arndt] reported to medical personnel that his injury was on a ladder at home and was to be covered by his private insurance.”

Arndt appealed the decision to the Iowa workers’ compensation commissioner. The commissioner found at best, there was equipoise of evidence. Therefore, he affirmed the deputy commissioner’s finding that Arndt had not met his burden of proof.

Arndt sought judicial review of the commissioner’s decision. The district court reversed the commissioner’s decision, finding “there was not substantial evidence in the record to support the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner or the decision of the Deputy Commissioner in the arbitration decision.”

The City appealed and we transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals issued an opinion affirming the district court decision. The City petitioned for rehearing and the court of appeals granted the petition. On rehearing the City argued the court of appeals based its decision “in whole or in part on evidence not admitted at trial.” The City asserted the employer’s first report of injury was admitted into evidence for the sole purpose of establishing when the employer received notice of the injury, and “notice was not an issue in this case and therefore the report was not formally admitted into evidence and is not a valid part of the record made at the hearing.” The court of appeals addressed this concern and “disagree[d] that notice was not an issue in this case.” The court of appeals found

[t]he fact that Arndt reported the injury to his employer on the day after he claimed he was injured is a fact the deputy commissioner found relevant enough to include in his findings and a fact that we believe we may consider notwithstanding the strictures of Iowa Code section 86.11.

Then the court of appeals found substantial evidence did not support the commissioner’s decision. The court of appeals reasoned,

[t]o affirm the agency decision, we would have to ignore the date on which the employee notified the employer of his injury as found by the deputy commissioner, as well as testimony from the employer’s representative confirming that a work-related injury occurred on June 14, 2001.

The City petitioned for further review, which we granted.

II. Scope of Review.

A district court reviews agency action pursuant to the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act. IBP, Inc. v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Iowa 2001) (citing Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)). When we review a district court decision reviewing agency action, our task is to determine if we would reach the same result as the district court in our application of the Act. City of Des Moines v. Employment Appeal Bd., 722 N.W.2d 183, 189-90 (Iowa 2006).

The district court may reverse or modify an agency’s decision if the agency’s decision is erroneous under a ground specified in the Act and a party’s substantial rights have been prejudiced. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10). The district court or an appellate court can only grant Arndt relief from the commissioner’s decision if a determination of fact by the commissioner “is not supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole.” Id. § 17A.19(10)(f). Just because the interpretation of the evidence is open to a fair difference of opinion does not mean the commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. ABC Disposal Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 681 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Iowa 2004). An appellate court should not consider evidence insubstantial merely because the court may draw different conclusions from the record. Fischer v. City of Sioux City, 695 N.W.2d 31, 33-34 (Iowa 2005).

III. Analysis.

The claimant has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury arose out of and was in the course of the claimant’s employment. Dunlavey v. Econ. Fire and Cas. Co., 526 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Iowa 1995). The commissioner found Arndt failed to prove his injury arose out of and was in the course of his employment.

The district court, however, found there was evidence in the record supporting Arndt’s claim his injury was work related. This evidence consisted of Arndt’s testimony that his injuries occurred when he fell off a road grader on June 14, 2001, and the testimony of his supervisor, Choate, that on the day after the alleged injury, Arndt reported to Choate he was injured by falling off a road grader at work. Choate testified on June 15, the day after the alleged accident, he believed Arndt when Arndt told him that his injury occurred on June 14 by falling off a road grader. Additionally, on the day of the hearing, Choate testified he still believed Arndt was truthful when Arndt told him that the injury occurred on June 14 by falling off a road grader.

In addition to the evidence the district court relied on to reach its decision, the court of appeals relied on the employer’s first report of injury to support Arndt’s claim his injury occurred on June 14. The City claims the court of appeals was wrong to consider the first report to prove Arndt’s injury occurred on June 14. We agree.

The deputy commissioner admitted the first report into the record for the “very limited purpose” allowed by Iowa Code section 86.11 when Arndt’s attorney referred to the employer’s first report of injury during Arndt’s testimony. The Code provides the filing of an employer’s first report of injury with the workers’ compensation commissioner “shall be without prejudice to the employer.” Iowa Code § 86.11. Section 86.11 allows the first report of injury to be admitted in evidence or used in any trial or hearing before any court, the workers’ compensation commissioner, or a deputy workers’ compensation commissioner for the limited purpose of showing the employer had notice of the occurrence of an injury as required by section 85.23. Id. § 86.11. Accordingly, the court of appeals incorrectly relied on the first report of injury as evidence of the injury date.

When the district court reviewed the record, it determined Arndt’s medical records did not constitute substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s decision because the nurse who took Arndt’s history did not testify. The court of appeals agreed with the district court and stated, “the district court simply considered all the record evidence and determined that the employer’s admissions of a work-related injury on June 14, 2001 trumped the qualitatively weaker statements attributed to Arndt by medical personnel.” (Emphasis added.)

The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act defines substantial evidence as:

the quantity and quality of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact are understood to be serious and of great importance.

Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(l). The commissioner admitted Arndt’s medical records into evidence without objection. The commissioner was entitled to give the medical records the weight he felt they deserved.

Making a determination as to whether evidence “trumps” other evidence or whether one piece of evidence is “qualitatively weaker” than another piece of evidence is not an assessment for the district court or the court of appeals to make when it conducts a substantial evidence review of an agency decision. See Tim O’Neill Chevrolet, Inc. v. Forristall, 551 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Iowa 1996) (stating under a substantial evidence review it is not the task of the reviewing court “to weigh the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses”). It is the commissioner’s duty as the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and decide the facts in issue. See Dunlavey, 526 N.W.2d at 853 (stating in deciding whether to accept the opinion of an expert witness “[t]he commissioner as trier of fact has the duty to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the evidence, together with the other disclosed facts and circumstances, and then to accept or reject the opinion”). The reviewing court only determines whether substantial evidence supports a finding “according to those witnesses whom the [commissioner] believed.” Tim O’Neill Chevrolet, Inc., 551 N.W.2d at 614 (emphasis added). Consequently, both the district court and the court of appeals improperly weighed the evidence to overrule the commissioner’s findings.

Contrary to the district court’s and court of appeals’ opinions, we find there is substantial evidence in the record to support the commissioner’s finding that Arndt failed to prove his injury arose out of and was in the course of his employment. One piece of evidence supporting the commissioner’s decision is Arndt’s statement to his chiropractor that his injury occurred one month before his June 28 visit to the chiropractor. This places Arndt’s injury date to be around May 28, not June 14 as he claims.

Another piece of evidence supporting the commissioner’s decision is the orthopedist’s medical records. These records include a history taken from Arndt indicating Arndt told the orthopedist’s nurse that his injury occurred when he slipped off a ladder at home, twisted his knee, and injured his shoulder.

A final piece of evidence supporting the commissioner’s decision is the information form filled out by Arndt at the orthopedist’s office. On the form, Arndt marked the space provided to inform the office of the date or the onset of symptoms with a question mark. He also indicated on the form his own private insurance, not his employer’s workers’ compensation insurance, would be paying for his medical treatment.

Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the workers’ compensation commissioner’s decision finding Arndt’s injury did not arise out of and was not in the course of his employment.

IY. Disposition.

Because the district court and the court of appeals improperly weighed the evidence to overrule the workers’ compensation commissioner’s finding that Arndt’s injury did not arise out of and was not in the course of his employment, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand the case for the district court to enter a judgment affirming the decision of the workers’ compensation commissioner.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.

All justices concur except HECHT, J., ' who takes no part.


text:
    MIDWEST CHECK CASHING, INC., d/b/a EZ Money Check Cashing, Appellee, v. Erin E. RICHEY, Appellant.
    No. 04-1653.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    March 5, 2007.

      Carlton G. Salmons and Tom W. George of Gaudineer, Comito <& George, West Des Moines, for appellant.
    Hugh J. Cain of Hopkins and Huebner, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
   CADY, Justice.

In this discretionary review from a decision by the district court that affirmed a judgment entered by a magistrate in an action by a delayed deposit services business to collect a “payday” loan, we must determine if the applicable statutory requirements were followed in the case and whether the “payday” loan statute is constitutional. On our review, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Background Pacts and Proceedings.

Erin E. Richey (Richey) obtained a $400 loan from Midwest Check Cashing, Inc. (Midwest) in March of 2002. Midwest is a business engaged in delayed deposit services, which provides customers with what is commonly known as “payday” loans. Midwest is licensed to operate the business by the State superintendent of banking. Richey had obtained similar loans in the past from Midwest when she resided at 1228 East 13th Street in Des Moines. At the time of this transaction in March 2002, however, Richey resided at 712 13th Street in West Des Moines.

As a previous customer, Richey was familiar with the “payday” loan process. Under this process, the customer gives a postdated personal check made payable to the business engaged in delayed deposit services in return for the receipt of cash. The amount of the check is greater than the amount of cash the customer immediately receives from the company. The difference in the two amounts represents the transactional fee charged by the company for giving the customer the cash in advance of negotiating the check. In this case, Richey made a check payable to Midwest for $450, postdated it two weeks into the future, and immediately received $400 from Midwest. Midwest, of course, agreed to wait two weeks before cashing the check. At this time, Richey would presumably have enough money in her account to honor the check. The “payday” loan allows a customer with a checking account to obtain money by writing a check without adequate funds in the checking account at the time the check is written.

The check given to Midwest by Richey accurately reflected the address of her current West Des Moines, residence. However, Richey also signed a disclosure agreement as a part of the transaction. The agreement disclosed Midwest loaned Richey $400 and imposed a $50 fee for the transaction. It also disclosed this $50 fee represented the equivalent of a 325.89% annual percentage rate (APR) on the $400 loan over two weeks. Finally, the agreement erroneously indicated Richey’s current address as her former Des Moines residence, but included an acknowledgement that “all statements made in this agreement are true, complete, and correct.” Nevertheless, Richey signed the agreement.

Midwest negotiated Richey’s check two weeks after the transaction by depositing it in its bank account. The check was not paid because of insufficient funds in Rich-ey’s checking account. As a result, Midwest sent Richey a letter of notice to cure default. The letter was sent to her previous Des Moines address shown on the disclosure agreement.

Midwest brought a small claims action to collect the debt after Richey failed to respond to the notice to cure. Richey eventually filed an answer and counterclaim in the action. The counterclaim sought damages and attorney fees based in part on Richey’s claim that she did not receive the notice to cure mailed by Midwest.

At the small claims hearing, a representative from Midwest explained the procedure followed by the company in a “payday” loan transaction. In particular, she testified if a check given by a customer shows an address of the customer different from the address in its computer records, then the customer is asked if the address in its records is correct. If the address is not correct, the computer records are then changed to reflect the correct address. In this way, the office records are relied upon by the business to reflect the customer’s correct information.

Midwest called Richey as a witness. She testified on direct examination that Midwest never asked her to verify her current address during the transaction. Richey then contradicted herself on cross-examination when she recalled that Midwest did indeed ask her if the address on the check was correct. Yet, on redirect examination, Richey again testified that Midwest never asked about her current address.

Richey further testified she never received the notice to cure, and had no other contact with Midwest regarding the transaction. Richey testified she believed the check she gave to Midwest had been paid.

The small claims court ruled in favor of Midwest and against Richey on her counterclaim. It found Richey failed to provide her correct address to Midwest. Richey appealed to the district court. She claimed the transaction was governed by the Iowa Consumer Credit Code (ICCC), not the Delayed Deposit Services Licensing Act (DDSLA). Richey challenged the constitutionality of the DDSLA, and further challenged the validity of the notice to cure given by Midwest.

The district court affirmed the judgment. It found the ICCC did not override the more specific provisions of the DDSLA, and as a result the DDSLA governed Richey’s transaction. It further found Richey’s constitutional challenges to the DDSLA were without merit because Richey could not prove the requisite state action in order to succeed. In addition, the district court noted Richey could not show dissimilar treatment of similarly situated individuals, and even if these prerequisites could be met, the DDSLA was rationally related to the government’s interest. Finally, the district court found Richey provided Midwest with an incorrect address by signing the disclosure statement.

Subsequently, Richey applied for discretionary review to the Iowa Supreme Court pursuant to Iowa Code section 631.16 (2005). See Iowa R.App. P. 6.201 (stating the requirements for an application for discretionary review). We granted her application.

II. Issues.

On appeal, Richey makes two basic arguments. First, the ICCC governs her transaction and the transaction failed to satisfy the ICCC’s requirements. Second, if the DDSLA governed her transaction, section 583D.9 of the DDSLA is unconstitutional.

III. Standard of Review.

“On discretionary review of a small claims action, our standard of review depends on the nature of the case. If the action is a law case, we review the district judge’s ruling on error.” Hyde v. Anania, 578 N.W.2d 647, 648 (Iowa 1998) (citation omitted). The parties agree Richey’s statutory arguments must be reviewed on assigned errors. See City of Ames v. Regency Builders, Inc., 653 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Iowa 2002) (reviewing at law and noting the parties agree). The parties also agree Richey’s constitutional arguments must be reviewed de novo. See Simonson v. Iowa State Univ., 603 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Iowa 1999) (“Our review of a district court’s judicial review ruling is ordinarily for correction of errors at law. When constitutional issues are raised, however, we must make an independent evaluation of the totality of the evidence and our review in such cases is de novo.” (Citation omitted.)).

IV. Application of the ICCC to “Payday” Loans.

Richey claims the “payday” loan transaction is governed by the ICCC, and the transaction violated the ICCC in three ways. First, she argues Midwest failed to comply with the notice to cure provisions under the ICCC. Next, Richey argues the disclosure agreement inaccurately stated the interest rate, or at least was deceptive and misleading in stating the interest rate, under the provisions of the ICCC. Last, Richey argues the interest charged is unconscionable and violates the limitations imposed by the ICCC. Thus, we must first decide if the ICCC applies to “payday” loan transactions.

“Payday” loans are specifically governed by the “Delayed Deposit Services Licensing Act.” The Iowa legislature enacted the statute in 1995. 1995 Iowa Acts ch. 139, §§ 1-16 (codified as amended in Iowa Code §§ 533D.1-.16 (2007)). The DDSLA specifically applies to licensed delayed deposit service businesses, or “payday” loan companies, and explicitly excludes transactions involving banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, industrial loan companies licensed under chapter 536A, and any affiliate of these financial organizations. Iowa Code § 533D.16 (recognizing organizations not regulated by chapter 533D). The provisions of the DDSLA clearly governed the transaction between Midwest and Richey in this case.

On the other hand, consumer credit transactions in Iowa have long been governed by the ICCC. The ICCC predates the DDSLA, and governs all consumer credit transactions in Iowa not specifically excluded under the statute. The ICCC specifically applies to “acts, practices or conduct in this state in the solicitation, inducement, negotiation, collection, or enforcement of a transaction, without regard to where it is entered into or modified.” Id. § 537.1201(l)(c). The transaction between Midwest and Richey satisfies this definition. Additionally, the express exclusions under the statute do not include delayed deposit services. See id. § 537.1202 (indicating what chapter 537 does not apply to). Under the ICCC, a “payday” loan would normally satisfy the definition of a “consumer loan.” See id. § 537.1301(14).

Consequently, it is clear the ICCC applies to “payday” loans to the extent the statute does not conflict with the specific provisions of the DDSLA. The ICCC provides that “no part of [the ICCC] shall be deemed to be impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation if such a construction can be reasonably avoided.” Id. § 537.1104 (emphasis added). The DDSLA was enacted after the ICCC and was passed to govern delayed deposit services. When the provisions of the DDSLA specifically govern the issues in this case and conflict with the provisions in the ICCC, the provisions of the DDSLA must prevail unless such a construction could be reasonably avoided. Id. We now apply this principle to Richey’s arguments.

Richey argues Midwest failed to properly provide her with a notice to cure default under the ICCC. Both parties agree the DDSLA does not include a notice to cure requirement prior to bringing suit. Thus, the ICCC’s notice provisions are not contradicted or impliedly repealed by the DDSLA, and there is no need to “reasonably avoid” applying the DDSLA. See id.

Moreover, the ICCC’s notice to cure provisions “appl[y] to actions or other proceedings to enforce rights arising from consumer credit transactions.” Id. § 537.5102. The parties concede this is a consumer credit transaction. Id. § 537.1301(12) (defining “consumer credit transaction”). Thus, Midwest must comply with the notice to cure provisions of the ICCC. See id. § 537.5110(1) (“[T]he obligation of a consumer in a consumer credit transaction is enforceable by a creditor only after compliance with this section.”).

The ICCC requires a creditor to provide a notice to cure to a consumer before bringing any legal action, so long as “the consumer has a right to cure the default.” Id. § 537.5110(2). It is undisputed Richey had a right to cure default. See id. § 537.5110(3) (recognizing the circumstances when a consumer has the right to cure a default). The ICCC also provides that if Midwest failed to follow the appropriate procedures, its petition shall be dismissed. Id. § 537.5110(7).

Section 537.5111 sets forth the requirements for a notice to cure. A creditor gives notice to a consumer “when the creditor ... mails the notice to the consumer at the consumer’s residence.” Id. § 537.5111(3). The consumer’s residence is defined as

the address given by [the debtor] as the [debtor’s] residence in a writing signed by the [debtor] in connection with a transaction until the [debtor] notifies the person extending credit of a different address as the [debtor’s] residence, and it is then the different address.

Id. § 537.1201(4) (emphasis added). Thus, the creditor must mail the notice to cure to the address given by the debtor in a writing signed by the debtor in connection with the transaction. However, if the debtor later notifies the creditor of a different address, then the notice to cure must be mailed to the different address.

Richey claims the check presented to Midwest satisfied both statutory definitions of a consumer residence for the purpose of mailing a notice to cure. First, she claims the check presented to Midwest, together with her oral confirmation that the address on the check was her current residence, constituted a “writing signed by the debtor in connection with [the] transaction.” Id. Second, she claims the check, together with her oral confirmation that the address on the check was her current residence, constituted notice to the creditor of a different address.

Both arguments by Richey are predicated on her testimony that she orally told Midwest during the course of the transaction that the address on her check was her current residence. Yet, the magistrate who presided over the hearing necessarily rejected this testimony, as did the district court. The evidence revealed that, pursuant to office protocol, Midwest would have placed the check address on the disclosure agreement if Richey had confirmed during the transaction that her check address was the correct address. By finding Richey failed to give Midwest her correct address during the course of the transaction, the magistrate, and the district court, necessarily rejected Richey’s testimony that she told Midwest the address on the check was her current residence. See Brichacek v. Hiskey, 401 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Iowa 1987) (“When no motion to enlarge or amend is made, we assume as fact an unstated finding that is necessary to support the judgment.”). Moreover, Richey then signed the disclosure statement containing an address purporting to be her residence, and there was no testimony that Richey later notified Midwest she lived at a residence different from the address on the disclosure agreement. Under the circumstances, Richey’s residence for the purpose of mailing a notice to cure was the address on the disclosure statement signed by Richey in connection with the transaction. Midwest mailed the notice to cure to this address, and therefore complied with our statutory requirements.

Of course, the fact remains Richey presented Midwest with a check that revealed her correct address. While Richey has not argued this fact alone is sufficient, we find that simply providing a check with a different address, under the circumstances of this case, is not sufficient notice to comply with section 537.1201(4). Under section 537.1201(4), Richey’s residence remained her Des Moines address until she notified Midwest of her West Des Moines address.

Richey next argues Midwest’s disclosure statement inaccurately disclosed her rate of interest under the ICCC. In her reply brief, however, Richey admits she erroneously computed the interest rate, and Midwest’s computation was correct. As a result, Richey now claims the interest rate on the disclosure agreement was not inaccurate, but deceptive and misleading under the ICCC. The ICCC requires the APR be disclosed according to the federal Truth in Lending Act. Iowa Code § 537.3201; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (2006). Yet, these provisions of the ICCC do not apply because the more specific DDSLA provides interest rate notice requirements of its own. See Iowa Code § 533D.9(2). Richey has not argued these requirements were not met. Furthermore, even if we accepted Richey’s argument under the ICCC, we are not persuaded an admittedly accurate interest rate could be deceptive and misleading, or that a deceptive and misleading rate would enable Richey to prevail in this matter.

Last, Richey claims the interest rate charged by Midwest is unconscionable. Section 537.5108 of the ICCC allows a court to refuse to enforce a consumer credit agreement when the terms were unconscionable at the time of the transaction or if the agreement was induced by unconscionable conduct. See Paglia v. Elliott, 373 N.W.2d 121, 126 (Iowa 1985) (finding unconscionability under the criteria in section 537.5108); see also Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Campney, 357 N.W.2d 613, 618 (Iowa 1984) (listing factors to determine unconscionability). Richey, however, makes no claim that the transaction in this matter was induced by unconscionable conduct. The only claim raised by Richey is that the amount of fees she paid pursuant to her agreement with Midwest is substantively unconscionable. See Casey v. Lupkes, 286 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Iowa 1979) (recognizing the test for when a bargain is unconscionable). The only factual findings of the district court related to the claim were the date Richey presented Midwest with her post-dated check, the amount of the check, the face amount of the loan, and the date the check could be cashed.

In support of her claim, Richey cites section 537.2401(1) of the ICCC, which limits charges to twenty-one percent on consumer transactions. However, it is not possible to reasonably avoid applying the limitations in section 533D.9 of the DDSLA to this transaction. See Iowa Code § 537.1104. Therefore, the limitations of the DDSLA apply, and the limitations of the ICCC do not provide Richey with a basis for relief.

Richey also cites a number of cases and law review articles raising policy issues regarding the payday loan industry. See, e.g., Charles A. Bruch, Taking the Pay Out of Payday Loans: Putting an End to the Usurious and Unconscionable Interest Rates Charged by Payday Lenders, 69 U. Cin. L.Rev. 1257 (2001); Creóla Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 Minn. L.Rev. 1 (2002). By enacting section 533D.9, however, the legislature has directly addressed the policy question of the level at which fees for payday loans become per se impermissible. Moreover, the fees Midwest imposed were permissible under the DDSLA. While the existence of a legislative provision permitting fees on payday loans may not necessarily defeat all claims of uncon-scionability, the court on this record will not entertain what amounts to a facial challenge of the legislature’s policy determinations contained in section 533D.9 of the DDSLA.

V. Constitutional Arguments.

Richey challenges section 533D.9 of the DDSLA as unconstitutional for five reasons. She believes section 533D.9 violates Article I, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution (the inalienable rights clause), and the equal protection and due process clauses of both the Iowa and federal constitutions. Section 533D.9 imposes limits on the charges lenders like Midwest can impose, and requires the disclosure of certain terms. The constitutionality of this section is an issue of first impression for the court. We initially note “statutes are cloaked with a presumption of constitutionality,” and the challenger “bears a heavy burden, because it must prove the unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Iowa 2005).

A. Whether Section 533D.9 is Unconstitutional Under Article I, Section 1 of the Iowa Constitution.

Article I, section 1, of the Iowa Constitution provides:

All men and women are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights — among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.

Iowa Const, art. I, § 1. This is known as the “inalienable rights clause.” We most recently discussed this clause in Atwood v. Vilsack, 725 N.W.2d 641 (Iowa 2006). In Atwood, we noted the clause “secures[s] to the people of Iowa common law rights that pre-existed Iowa’s Constitution.” 725 N.W.2d at 651. We also recognized the following:

It is well established that the protections of Iowa’s inalienable rights clause are not absolute. The clause does not prevent all legislative action taken pursuant to the police power that benefits the community and impacts an inalienable right (i.e. a common law or natural right). Instead, it prevents only arbitrary, unreasonable legislative action that impacts an inalienable right.

Id. at 652 (citations omitted). Thus, the question is whether section 533D.9 impacts an inalienable right and is arbitrary and unreasonable.

Section 533D.9 impacts a property right. But it is far removed from the type of legislation that is arbitrary and unreasonable. Instead, and in accordance with all the provisions of the DDSLA, section 533D.9 creates protections for consumers and imposes limits on delayed deposit services. As Midwest points out, the largest check (or total amount of two checks) a delayed deposit lender can hold from a customer is $500. Iowa Code § 533D.10(l)(a), (6). Thus, the most that can be borrowed in a delayed deposit transaction is $445, if the maximum $55 is charged as a fee in accordance with section 533D.9(1). If the check is returned for insufficient funds or otherwise not paid, the most the customer will pay is $70, representing a $15 charge for the returned check. Id. § 533D.9(2)(d). Section 533D.9(1) prohibits a lender from charging more than $15 on the face amount of the first one-hundred dollars, and more than 10% on everything thereafter. Id. § 533D.9(1). Finally, the procedure must be fully disclosed to the customer. Id. § 533D.9(2), (3). While these limitations are not as protective as Richey would like, the statute is not arbitrary or unreasonable. A law that permits a business to engage in the “payday” loan procedure with these limitations does not violate article I, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution.

B. Whether Section 533D.9 is Unconstitutional Under our State and Federal Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.

In this case, there is no fundamental right or protected class involved. Therefore, our analysis of Richey’s substantíve due process and equal protection claims is ultimately similar to our evaluation of the inalienable rights clause. The reasonableness of section 583D.9 is at issue again, and we must specifically determine whether it passes constitutional muster under a rational basis review. See Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 662 (noting when no fundamental right is involved, “a statute need only survive a rational basis analysis” to meet the requirements of substantive due process); Grovijohn, 643 N.W.2d at 204 (“If the claimed dissimilar treatment does not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right, any classification made by the statute need only have a rational basis [to meet the requirements of equal protection].”). Moreover, although Richey bases her claims on both the Iowa and federal constitutions, we need not interpret them differently in this case. See Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 817, 819 (Iowa 2005) (noting we would not apply different analyses under the Iowa and federal constitutions when the parties have not articulated a reason for doing so); State v. Davis, 304 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Iowa 1981) (“The Supreme Court of Iowa is the final arbiter of the meaning of the Iowa Constitution, but when the federal and state constitutions contain similar provisions, they are usually deemed to be identical in scope, import, and purpose. Special respect and deference is accorded United States Supreme Court interpretations of similar language in the federal constitution.”).

“Rational basis review requires only that the law ‘be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.’ ” State v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 264, 277 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Sanchez, 692 N.W.2d at 817-18); see Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 662 (noting rational basis review “requires us to consider whether there is a ‘reasonable fit between the government interest and the means utilized to advance that interest’ ” (quoting State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 238 (Iowa 2002))). We have also recognized “ ‘[w]hen social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude, and the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.’ ” Sanchez, 692 N.W.2d at 817 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313, 320 (1985)). While rational basis review is deferential to the legislature, “ ‘it is not a toothless one.’ ” Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Iowa 2004) (citation omitted).

The State has a legitimate interest in protecting borrowers or limiting the fee delayed deposit lenders can charge. Section 533D.9 is certainly rationally related to this purpose. Section 533D.9(1) specifically limits the amount lenders can charge, and subsection (2) requires disclosure of all important terms. Iowa Code § 533D.9(1), (2). Moreover, Chapter 533D imposes important restraints on delayed deposit lenders that would otherwise not be imposed or complied with. See, e.g., id. § SSSD.lOi/1) (prohibiting a lender from imposing any other fees than those allowed in section 533D.9(1) and (2)). While some, and certainly Richey in this case, believe the limits and protections in section 533D.9 authorize usurious terms, this is a concern that should be taken to the legislature, not the courts. See Sanchez, 692 N.W.2d at 817. We hold section 533D.9 passes rational basis review, and is therefore not a violation of equal protection or substantive due process.

VI. Conclusion.

We find the interest rate notice and limitation provisions of the DDSLA governed the transaction in this case and its provisions were met. Where the notice to cure provisions of the ICCC governed this transaction, its provisions were also met. We further find section 533D.9 of the DDSLA is constitutional. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

      . After writing the $450 check to Midwest, Richey’s checks were stolen. The thief wrote over $8000 in fraudulent checks, and as a result, Richey opened a new checking account. Because of the theft, she had considerable confusion regarding her finances and the consequences of the check she wrote to Midwest. She assumed it had cleared because she had not heard from Midwest.

      . We note our basic principles of statutory construction also require this result. See Burton v. Univ. of Iowa Hosps. & Clinics, 566 N.W.2d 182, 189 (Iowa 1997) (recognizing three principles of statutory construction); Kelly v. State, 525 N.W.2d 409, 411-12 (Iowa 1994) ("When a general statute is in conflict with a specific one, the more specific statute generally prevails, irrespective of the time of its enactment. In case of irreconcilable conflict between two statutes, the later one controls.”).

      . It appears Midwest met the requirements. At the time of this transaction, section 533D.9(2) required Midwest to give Richey notice of (1) the fee, (2) the APR on the first one-hundred dollars, (3) the APR on subsequent one hundred dollars if different from the APR on the first one hundred dollars, (4) the date the check will be deposited, and (5) any penalty to be charged if the check bounces. The disclosure agreement Richey signed stated these requirements. Now, however, the current statute eliminates the second and third requirements noted above, and instead requires “[t]he annual percentage rate as computed pursuant to the federal Truth in Lending Act.” 2006 Iowa Acts ch. 1042, § 31 (codified at Iowa Code § 533D.9(2)(&) (2007)).

      . Section 533D.9(1) provides:
      A licensee shall not charge a fee in excess of fifteen dollars on the first one hundred dollars on the face amount of a check or more than ten dollars on subsequent one hundred dollar increments on the face amount of the check for services provided by the licensee, or pro rata for any portion of one hundred dollars face value.
      Iowa Code § 533D.9(1).

      . The face amount of Richey's check was $450. The fee charged was $50. A $15 fee was charged on the first one hundred dollars, and three additional charges of $10 (representing a 10% fee) were charged for the remaining three one hundred dollars loaned. These four charges totaled $45. Then 10% of the remaining loan amount ($50) added $5 to the fee. This resulted in a total fee of $50, and was permissible under section 533D.9(1).

      . Of course, evaluations of substantive due process and equal protection are not equivalent to an evaluation of the inalienable rights clause, nor are the evaluations of due process and equal protection equivalent to each other. First of all, due process and equal protection claims require a showing of state action. See, e.g., Jensen v. Schreck, 275 N.W.2d 374, 384 (Iowa 1979) ("A threshold question in a Fourteenth Amendment challenge is whether state action is involved We have never explicitly required a showing of state action under Iowa's inalienable rights clause. See, e.g., Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 176 (Iowa 2004) ("Thus, in determining whether the challenged statute violated article I, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution, we must determine (1) whether the right asserted ... is protected by this clause, and (2) whether [the statute] is a reasonable exercise of the state’s police power.” (citing Steinberg-Baum & Co. v. Countryman, 247 Iowa 923, 929-30, 77 N.W.2d 15, 18-19 (1956))). Regarding substantive due process, it must first be determined what right is involved, and then apply the corresponding test. See, e.g., Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 662. Regarding equal protection, it must first be determined if a classification is involved, and if so, apply the corresponding test. See, e.g., Grovijohn v. Virjon, Inc., 643 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Iowa 2002).
      We seriously doubt Richey has shown sufficient state action to bring her substantive due process and equal protection claims. We also seriously doubt Richey has shown she has been sufficiently classified to prevail in her equal protection claim. See Rosen v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 539 N.W.2d 345, 352 (Iowa 1995) (requiring a plaintiff to prove he or she "is similarly situated with persons who have been treated differently”). Nevertheless, because all of her constitutional claims are ultimately bound by a common thread of reasonableness, we will assume there was sufficient state action and a classification in order to review the statute under the rational basis test.


author: /s/Helen M. Meyer Associate Justice

text:
    In re Petition for DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST David Lawrence McCORMICK, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 259500.
    No. A06-2420.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    March 14, 2007.
   ORDER

The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility has filed a petition for disciplinary action alleging that respondent David Lawrence McCormick committed professional misconduct warranting public discipline. The petition alleges that respondent agreed to file an appeal on behalf of a client and advised the client that it was not necessary to comply with the terms of the client’s criminal probation while the appeal was pending. Respondent failed to properly file the appeal, and as a result, the appeal was dismissed. Relying on respondent’s advice, the client did not respond to his probation officer’s attempts to contact him, and the client was sentenced to jail time and fined as a result. Additionally, respondent failed to respond to the client’s efforts to contact him and failed to cooperate with the Director’s investigation of the client’s complaint against him. This conduct violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct and Rule 25 of the Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR).

Respondent admits his conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility and waives his rights under Rule 14, RLPR. On March 7, 2006, we suspended respondent for a minimum of 90 days in connection with neglect of other client matters and conditioned reinstatement on complying with the petition and hearing process of Rule 18(a) — (d), RLPR. In re McCormick, 710 N.W.2d 563, 563 (Minn.2006). Respondent has entered into a stipulation with the Director in which they jointly recommend that the appropriate discipline for the violations admitted as part of this disciplinary petition is an extension of respondent’s current suspension so that respondent may not petition for reinstatement for 30 days after the date of filing of this order.

The court has independently reviewed the file. The Director has informed us that as of May 2, 2006, respondent had not complied with Rule 26, RLPR (requiring that respondent provide the Director with proof that respondent has given notice of his suspension to clients, opposing counsel, and tribunals). We therefore extend respondent’s current suspension indefinitely and allow respondent to petition for reinstatement no sooner than 30 days from the date of filing of this order, but condition reinstatement upon compliance with our earlier order, as set forth below.

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent David Lawrence McCormick is suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. Respondent may petition for reinstatement no sooner than 30 days after the date of filing of this order, subject to the following conditions:

(a) The reinstatement hearing provided for in Rule 18, RLPR, is not waived. (b) Respondent shall comply with Rule 26, RLPR (requiring notice of suspension to clients, opposing counsel, and tribunals), and shall provide proof of compliance to the Director as required by Rule 26.
(c) Reinstatement to active practice shall be contingent upon respondent’s successful completion of the professional responsibility portion of the bar examination and satisfaction of all continuing legal education requirements under Rule 18(e), RLPR.
(d) Following reinstatement, respondent shall be subject to supervised probation for a period of two years as set forth in our March 7, 2006, order.
(e) Paragraphs a, b, c, d, e, and i of our March 7, 2006, order (requiring respondent to cooperate with the Director’s office, to abide by the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, to be supervised by another attorney and to cooperate with that attorney’s supervision, to institute office procedures, and to pay $900 in costs) continue to apply.

Respondent shall pay an additional $900 in costs under Rule 24(d), RLPR, and shall pay restitution to the client referenced above in the amount of the fine and any court costs imposed on the client by the district court.

BY THE COURT:

/s/Helen M. Meyer Associate Justice