text:
    2006 SD 92
    Katherine MELSTAD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Harvey M. KOVAC and Raider Industries, Incorporated, Defendants and Appellees.
    No. 23891.
    Supreme Court of South Dakota.
    Argued Aug. 29, 2006.
    Decided Oct. 25, 2006.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 7, 2006.

      Terry L. Pechota of Pechota Law Office, Rapid City, South Dakota, Attorney for plaintiff and appellant.
    James C. Robbennolt, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorney for defendants and ap-pellees.
    Jack Der Hagopian of Der Hagopian Law Office, Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorney/lienholder and appellee.
   MEIERHENRY, Justice.

[¶ 1.] Harvey M. Kovac (Kovac) and Raider Industries, Inc. (Raider) made a motion to enforce a settlement agreement of a personal injury lawsuit brought by Katherine Melstad (Melstad). Melstad claims that she did not expressly authorize her attorney, Jack Der Hagopian (Der Ha-gopian), to settle her negligence action against Kovac and Raider, and that the trial court erred in determining that she had authorized the settlement. We affirm.

[¶ 2.] Melstad’s claim sought recovery for personal injuries suffered as a result of a collision with a semi-truck near Vermillion, South Dakota on July 28, 1998. Mel-stad’s first attorney filed suit on July 9, 2001, against Kovac, the driver of the truck, and Raider, the owner of the truck. After Melstad’s first attorney withdrew because of communication difficulties, she hired Der Hagopian to represent her. Melstad and Der Hagopian entered into a written contract providing for contingent fees of one third (1/3) of the gross amount received by settlement or judgment. A jury trial was scheduled for October 5, 2004. Prior to trial, the parties tried to mediate but failed to reach a settlement. Nevertheless, they continued to negotiate. After several offers and counteroffers, the parties settled the case on the eve of trial for $325,000. However when Melstad received the written settlement agreement, she refused to sign it claiming that she had not given Der Hagopian authority to settle for that amount. .Kovac and Raider then made a motion in circuit court to enforce the settlement.

[¶ 3.] After dismissing Der Hagopian, Melstad appeared pro se at two hearings to request continuances until she could retain new counsel. She subsequently retained new counsel, and the motion to enforce the settlement was tried to the court. The evidence presented at the hearing consisted of deposition testimony of Der Hagopian, affidavits and live testimony of Melstad, along with other exhibits and affidavits submitted by the parties.

[¶ 4.] Based on the evidence, the trial court determined that Melstad had consented to the settlement agreement and that it should be enforced. The trial court ordered Kovac and Raider to pay Melstad $325,000 as well as Melstad’s mediation fees in return for a full and complete release by Melstad of any and all further claims against Kovac and Raider arising out of the collision.

[¶ 5.] After enforcing the settlement agreement, the court took evidence on Der Hagopian’s motion to enforce his attorney’s lien. The trial court granted Der Hagopian’s motion in the amount of $113,900.79, with interest running from October 4, 2004. Melstad appeals and presents the following issues:

ISSUES

1. Whether the trial court erred by concluding that the settlement agreement was enforceable absent Melstad’s written authorization.
2. Whether the trial court erred by finding that Melstad’s counsel had authority to settle Melstad’s case for $325,000.00.
3. Whether the trial court erred by finding that there was a meeting of the minds and mutual assent on all essential terms of the settlement agreement.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 6.] We review the trial court’s findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard. Under SDCL 15-6-52(a), “[findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, may not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Under this standard, “clear error is shown only when, after a review of all evidence, ‘we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’ ” Walker v. Walker, 2006 SD 68, 720 N.W.2d 67, 70 (quoting Midzak v. Midzak, 2005 SD 58, ¶ 14, 697 N.W.2d 733, 737-38). “[W]e are not free to retry the case as if it had never been heard before.” In re Guardianship and Conservatorship of A.L.T. & S.J.T., 2006 SD 28, ¶37, 712 N.W.2d 338, 347. Therefore, the trial court’s finding that Der Hagopian had express authority to. settle is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Conclusions of law are reviewed under a de novo standard of review and no deference is given to the trial court’s conclusions of law. Credit Collection Services v. Pesicka, 2006 SD 81, ¶ 5, 721 N.W.2d 474, 477.

DECISION

Written Authority to Settle

[¶ 7.] Melstad claims that authority to settle her claim needed to be in writing in order to be valid. In support of her argument she points to provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code and the Rules of Professional Conduct.

[¶ 8.] Melstad first argues that a provision of the Uniform Commercial Code codified in SDCL 57A-1-206(1) governs the transaction and requires written authority for an attorney to settle a claim on behalf of a client. The statutory provision upon which she relies applies to the enforcement of a sale of personal property over $5000.00 in value. The statute provides as follows: ■

(1) Except in the cases described in subsection (2) of this section a contract for the sale of personal property is not enforceable by way of action or defense beyond five thousand dollars in amount or value of remedy unless there is some writing which indicates that a contract for sale has been made between the parties at a defined or stated price, reasonably identifies the subject matter, and is signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent.
(2) Subsection (1) of this section does not apply to contracts for the sale of goods (§ 57A-2-201) nor of securities (§ 57A-8-113) nor to security agreements (§ 57A-9-203).

SDCL 57A-1-206.

[¶ 9.] Melstad argues that the transaction is analogous to a sale of personal property since a cause of action is something of value and can be owned. Thus, she argues, an attorney receiving the cause of action from a client is like a sale of personal property and would fall under SDCL 57A-1-206(1), which requires the contract to be in writing. Melstad has not cited nor are we aware of any jurisdiction that has adopted this analysis. A similar argument was made and rejected in Wende v. Orv Rocker Ford Lincoln Mercury Inc., 530 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Iowa Ct.App.1995). The Iowa Appellate Court determined that “the settlement of a personal injury lawsuit is not a contract for the sale of personal property, nor would it typically fall within any specific article of the commercial code.” Id. We also decline to consider a personal injury settlement as a contract for a sale of personal property and find no merit in Melstad’s assertion that a provision in the commercial code requires an attorney to obtain a client’s written authority to settle a lawsuit on the client’s behalf.

[¶ 10.] Melstad next contends that because Rule 1.5(c) of the South Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct requires contingent fee agreements to be in writing, an attorney’s authority to settle must also be in writing. Melstad relies on SDCL 59-2-3, which provides, “authority to enter into a contract ... required by law to be in writing, can only be given by an instrument in writing.” SDCL 59-2-3. Here, the key to whether the statute applies depends on which agreement constitutes the underlying contract — the settlement agreement or the contingent fee agreement. Melstad argues that the underlying contract is the contingent fee agreement. Kovac and Raider identify the underlying contract as the settlement agreement. Under the facts of this case, the underlying contract is clearly the settlement agreement between Melstad and defendants Kovac and Raider. Since the law does not require personal injury settlement agreements to be in writing, it necessarily follows that a lawyer’s authority to settle on behalf of a client also need not be in writing. Consequently, SDCL 59-2-3 does not apply.

[¶ 11.] We have previously cautioned that getting a client’s written approval to settle a case may be advisable to avoid misunderstanding and liability. Northwest Realty Co. v. Perez, 80 S.D. 62, 119 N.W.2d 114, 116 (1963). Nevertheless, we acknowledged that written authority to settle a case was not required. Id. Obviously, written approval would have alleviated the kind of.problems found in the present case. However, beyond the mere advisory language in Northwest Realty, no relevant statute or case law requires an attorney to obtain express written authority to settle a client’s case. Cf. Cook v. Surety Life Ins., 79 Hawai'i 403, 903 P.2d 708, 717 (Haw.Ct.App.1995) (basing the requirement that an attorney obtain express written authority from a client to settle on a statute expressly requiring a writing). As in Northwest Realty, whether an attorney has authority to settle a client’s case depends on a factual determination of the communications between them. 119 N.W.2d at 117. Therefore, the trial court appropriately considered the testimony and other evidence in determining whether Melstad had authorized Der Hagopian to settle her claim against Kovac for $325,000.

Authority to Settle

[¶ 12.] While an attorney “may negotiate for and advise settlement of controversy,” the decision to settle belongs to the client. Id. at 116. The client must expressly give her attorney the authority to settle, and the law of agency determines whether the attorney has received such authority. See Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Sullivan, 430 N.W.2d 700, 701 (S.D.1988); Petersen v. Petersen, 90 S.D. 666, 245 N.W.2d 285, 288 (1976). Authority to enter into a contract on behalf of the principal can be created by express authorization from the principal or by the acquiescence of the principal in the actions of the agent. See Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 430 N.W.2d at 701-02; Petersen, 245 N.W.2d at 288 (stating that a client makes his attorney’s unauthorized act his own by failing to disavow it at the first instance). The question before the trial court was whether Melstad had expressly authorized her attorney to settle for the final amount. After considering all the evidence, the trial court determined that she had. The trial court specifically found that Melstad gave Der Hagopian express authorization to settle for $325,000 and “only later did she change her mind and [attempt] to repudiate the settlement.” Melstad contends that the trial court erred when it made that finding.

[¶ 13.] A review of the record supports the trial court’s determination that Mel-stad expressly authorized her attorney to settle for the final amount. Settlement negotiations first began when the parties attempted mediation. While Melstad demanded $1,500,000, Kovac and Raider offered $125,000. After Kovac and Raider increased their offer to $250,000, Melstad reduced her demand to $750,000. At the same time she advised Der Hagopian that she would go no lower than $650,000. Up to this point, Melstad and Der Hagopian agree about what transpired between them. They disagree as to the content and timing of their communications thereafter.

[¶ 14.] Der Hagopian’s version included a conversation two days before trial on October 3, 2004. Der Hagopian claimed that in that conversation Melstad authorized him to lower the demand to $500,000, which he then communicated to opposing counsel on the morning of October 4, 2004. Der Hagopian’s telephone records of October 3, 2004, showed that on that date, Der Hagopian and Melstad had spoken at least three times and his paralegal and Melstad had spoken at least seven times.

[¶ 15.] In order to get the other side to increase the offer, Der Hagopian testified that he convinced Melstad to let him reduce her demand to $450,000. The counteroffer of $450,000 is acknowledged in a faxed letter from opposing counsel to Der Hagopian at approximately 3:15 p.m. October 4, 2004. In that same letter Kovac and Raider increased their offer to $300,000. Der Hagopian testified that he discussed the offer with Melstad and that she eventually authorized him to accept $300,000. Before accepting the offer, however, Melstad wanted Der Hagopian to make a counter offer of $325,000 plus costs of the mediation. Kovac and Raider accepted the counter offer of $325,000 plus mediation costs, which ultimately became the terms of the settlement agreement.

[¶ 16.] Der Hagopian subsequently contacted the clerk of courts and witnesses to inform them of the settlement. On October 5, 2004, the settlement agreement was put into writing and faxed to Kovac and Raider’s counsel and Melstad. On October 7, 2005, Der Hagopian provided Melstad with the settlement papers and a release for her signature; however, she indicated that she did not know if she would sign the documents. On October 18, 2004, Melstad informed Der Hagopian that she would not be signing the settlement agreement. On November 9, 2004, Der Hagopian moved to withdraw from the case and filed notice of an attorney’s lien. On November 30, 2004, the trial judge entered an order releasing Der Hagopian from further representation of Melstad.

[¶ 17.] Melstad disputes Der Hagopi-an’s version of their communications. She first denied speaking to Der Hagopian on October 3, 2004, which was the date Der Hagopian claimed she agreed to reduce her demand to $500,000. Her first affidavit stated that she had not talked to Der Hagopian on Sunday, October 3, 2004. However after phone records from October 3, 2004, established that numerous telephone calls took place between Melstad and Der Hagopian or his paralegal, she then changed her testimony. In a second affidavit she stated as follows:

What I meant to say was that I had not talked with Der Hagopian about a new settlement amount on Sunday, October 3, 2004. Our discussions on Sunday had to do primarily with witnesses.

She also testified briefly before the court that she had not agreed to the $325,000 settlement amount. She claims that she could not have settled for that amount because after paying her attorney’s fees and past medical expenses, she would have been left with only $79,000 for future medical expenses, future wage losses, pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life.

[¶ 18.] After considering all the evidence, the trial court found Der Hagopi-an’s version to be more credible. The court rendered its decision at the end of the hearing and explained in detail its findings. Specifically it found Der Hagopi-an was “in constant communication with his client ... by telephone and fax machine.” The court made the following oral finding:

Mr. Der Hagopian went back to [Mel-stad] and discussed with her the fact that defendants would not offer more than $300,000 and the Court finds from the evidence and finds Mr. Der Hagopi-
an’s testimony to be.credible, that she ultimately authorized him ■ to settle for the $300,000 in the afternoon of Monday, the 4th of October. And there was a discussion that he would go back at $325,000 and see if he could get that, but that he had authorization to settle for $300,000 from the defendants — or with the defendants on behalf of the plaintiff.

At a later hearing concerning the enforcement of the attorney’s lien, the trial court specifically addressed Melstad’s lack of credibility:

[I]t has become clear to the Court through the course of these proceedings and the way that Melstad has conducted herself in Court, that Melstad’s version of reality cannot be relied upon as accurate.

[¶ 19.] We will not substitute our judgment for the judgment of the trial court. Having had the advantage of hearing live testimony and having had the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the parties, the trial court was in the better position to resolve the conflicting testimony regarding the communications between Melstad and Der Hagopian. Thus, the finding that Melstad authorized Der Hagopian to settle for $325,000 is supported by the evidence in the record and was not clearly erroneous.

Terms of the Settlement Agreement

[¶ 20.] Melstad next contends that the trial court erred in finding there was a meeting of the minds and mutual assent on all essential terms of the settlement agreement. This contention stems from the failure to specify whether the $325,000 settlement would be partially satisfied by the $5000 that had already been paid to Melstad as a result of mediation. The trial court found that the settlement reached by the parties was for $325,000 new money in addition to Kovac and Raider paying the plaintiffs share of mediation costs.

[¶21.] “To form a contract, there must be a meeting of the minds or mutual assent on all essential terms.” Jacobson v. Gulbransen, 2001 SD 33, ¶ 22, 623 N.W.2d 84, 90. “Mutual assent refers to a meeting of the minds on a specific subject” and “does not exist ‘unless the parties all agree upon the same thing in the same sense.’ ” Read v. McKennan Hosp., 2000 SD 66, ¶25, 610 N.W.2d 782, 786 (quoting SDCL 53-3-3). To determine whether there was mutual assent, “the court looks at the words and conduct of the parties.” Jacobson, 2001 SD 33, ¶ 22, 623 N.W.2d at 90. Whether the parties had a meeting of the minds is a question of fact. Id. Therefore, the trial court’s finding will be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard and great deference will be given to the trial court’s determination that an agreement existed between the parties. In re Estate of Neiswender, 2003 SD 50, ¶ 14, 660 N.W.2d 249, 252. The trial court determined that a valid settlement agreement existed between the parties giving Melstad $325,000 plus the costs of mediation in exchange for a full release executed by Melstad.

[¶ 22.] “Minor points implementing the agreement, though not listed, can be implied as necessary to carry out the terms of the agreement.” In re Estate of Eberle, 505 N.W.2d 767, 770 (S.D.1993). Although the agreement did not specify whether the $325,000 was partially satisfied by the previous $5000 payment, the parties did mutually assent to the essential terms of the agreement. The trial court considered the deposition testimony of Der Hagopian, the settlement agreement, and the communications between the parties in reaching its finding that the $325,000 was to be new money. Thus, the trial court’s finding of mutual assent to the material terms of the settlement agreement was based on the words and conduct of the parties and was not clearly erroneous.

[¶ 23.] Melstad raises one final issue with regards to Der Hagopian’s attorney’s lien. She contends that the trial court’s ruling to enforce the lien was premature because the enforceability of the settlement agreement was on appeal. In light of our holding to affirm the trial court’s enforcement of the settlement agreement, Melstad’s argument is without merit.

[¶ 24.] Affirmed.

[¶ 25.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SABERS, KONENKAMP, and ZINTER, Justices, concur.

      . Der Hagopian had filed a motion to withdraw; however, when Melstad appeared pro se at the summary judgment motion, she informed the court that she had dismissed him as her attorney.

      . Melstad argues that we are required to apply a de novo standard of review because the trial judge made findings based solely on deposition testimony and documentary evidence. However, the 2000 amendment of SDCL 15-6-52(a) makes no distinction between findings based on oral evidence and findings based on documentary evidence.

      . In its entirety, SDCL § 59-2-3 requires certain forms of authority to be evidenced by a writing: "An oral authorization is sufficient for any purpose, except that an authority to enter into a contract, other than a negotiable instrument, required by law to be in writing can only be given by an instrument in writing.”

      . The American Bar Association’s Law Practice Management Section recently published an article entitled, Dealing with Difficult Clients, which provides sound advice on ways attorneys can prevent conflicts with difficult clients. The article addressed the particularly relevant concept of documentation in the following excerpt:
      Documenting ... means recording sufficient details to assist you in a future disagreement. The record you make is not of any use if there are insufficient details to assist you.... In notes and meetings or conversations with the client, be sure to record the information and advice you gave the client, not only the information the client gave you. Where there is a dispute between lawyer and client, this area may, in fact, be the biggest area of disagreement, and is also among the least documented. In litigation between the lawyer and client, where ... that advice is not documented, courts have often preferred the evidence of the client on this issue.
      Carol Curtis, Dealing With Difficult Clients, A.B.A. Section of Law Practice Management, April 2005, available at http://www.abanet. org/lpm/lpt/articles/mgt04054.html.

      . The American Bar Association's Section on Litigation issued a publication entitled, "Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations” which reiterates the requirement that an attorney must receive a client's authorization to settle the client's case. While the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility do not specifically mandate that this authorization be in writing, the publication does suggest that "lawyers who received authorization to negotiate a settlement and enter a final agreement on behalf of their client should consult the law of the relevant jurisdiction to determine whether the client's delegation of such ultimate settlement authority must be in writing....” Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations, ABA Section of Litigation (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/ litigation/ethics/ settlementnegotiations.pdf. South Dakota has adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and no other relevant authority requires an attorney to obtain a client's written authorization to settle.

      . Specifically, SDCL 16-18-11 provides as follows:
      An attorney and counselor at law has power to bind his client to any agreement in respect to any proceeding within the scope of his proper duties and powers; but no evidence of any such agreement is receivable except the statement of the attorney himself, his written agreement signed and filed with the clerk, or an entry thereof upon the records of the court.

      . Evidence in the record indicates that Mel-stad's injuries were severe, but that issues of preexisting disease, prior accidents and contributory negligence were also raised.

      . An October 4, 2004, fax from Der Hagopian to Melstad references Melstad’s prior offer of $500,000 and then goes on to discuss the fact that Melstad had subsequently wanted to revise the $500,000 offer to include medical and legal expenses of $300,000.

      . The trial court indicated that it was unable to determine whether she had authorized the $450,000 amount. However, the trial court was able to find that she had authorized the final offer.

      .At this time, Melstad began inquiring with Der Hagopian and a Professor at the University of South Dakota School of Law about the enforceability of an unsigned settlement agreement. On October 18, 2004, Der Hago-pian advised Melstad that if the trial court found the existence of a valid settlement agreement, it could be enforced.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LARSON, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD, Complainant, v. Edward M. CONRAD, Respondent.
    No. 06-1145.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Nov. 17, 2006.
    Charles L. Harrington and Laura M. Roan, Des Moines, for complainant.
    Edward M. Conrad, Sigourney, pro se.
   LARSON, Justice.

Edward Conrad, an attorney from Sig-ourney, was cited by the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board with violations of several disciplinary rules. Our Grievance Commission found, based largely on stipulated facts, that Conrad had failed to render an accounting to a client as requested and failed to respond to the board’s notices of his client’s ethical complaint. The commission recommended a public reprimand, but we conclude he should be suspended for one month.

I. Review.

In attorney disciplinary matters, our scope of review is well established:

Where “no appeal is taken or application for permission to appeal is filed ... [we] proceed to review de novo the record made before the commission and determine the matter without oral argument or further notice to the parties.” “We give respectful consideration to the Grievance Commission’s findings and recommendations, but are not bound by them.”
The Board must prove attorney misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. This burden is less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but more than the preponderance standard required in the usual civil case. Once misconduct is proven, we “may impose a lesser or greater sanction than the discipline recommended by the grievance commission.”

Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Lett, 674 N.W.2d 139, 142 (Iowa 2004) (citations omitted).

II. Facts.

The parties’ stipulation of facts shows the following: Conrad has been a licensed lawyer in Iowa since 1989. On April 1, 2004, he was employed by Shane Williams to petition for modification of a dissolution decree. Conrad received an advance fee of $1000, which he deposited in his trust account. When Williams became dissatisfied with the respondent’s services, he requested an accounting on two occasions. Conrad failed to provide the accounting until after this complaint was filed on December 7, 2004.

On December 17, 2004, the board sent a notice of William’s complaint and asked for the respondent’s reply. The respondent received the notice on December 22, 2004, but did not respond. On January 13, 2005, the board sent a second notice to Conrad. This notice advised him that, pursuant to court rules, the respondent must respond within ten days or the board could file a complaint with the Grievance Commission. The respondent acknowledged receipt of this letter on January 31, 2005, but still did not respond.

III. The Violations Charged.

The parties stipulated that the respondent violated the following disciplinary rules: DR 1 — 102(A)(1) (a lawyer shall not violate a disciplinary rule); DR 1— 102(A)(5) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice); DR 1 — 102(A)(6) (a lawyer shall not engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law); DR 9 — 102(B)(3) (a lawyer shall render an accounting to his client).

IV.Sanction.

The parties did not stipulate as to the sanction to be imposed. The board argues that a thirty-day suspension is warranted, based on the respondent’s failure to render an accounting to his client and his failure to cooperate in the board’s investigation, together with a public reprimand in 2005 (based on a similar pattern of conduct — neglect of a probate matter and failure to cooperate with the disciplinary process).

The respondent, on the other hand, points out that his client was not damaged by his ethical lapses, and he enjoys substantial respect among the local bench and bar. He noted that one judge observed that the respondent had “learned his lesson.” The respondent argues that another public reprimand is the appropriate sanction. In similar cases involving neglect of legal matters combined with failure to respond to board notices, we have imposed sanctions ranging from a public reprimand to fairly lengthy suspensions. For example, in Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Daggett, 653 N.W.2d 377 (Iowa 2002), the lawyer failed to comply with appellate deadlines, misstated facts to a trial court, failed to respond to a trial court’s order, and failed to respond to inquiries by the board. He was sanctioned with a sixty-day suspension. In Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Scieszinski, 599 N.W.2d 472 (Iowa 1999), the attorney was found to have failed to file annual reports in probate proceedings, failed to respond to district court notices of delinquency, and failed to respond to the board’s notices. We ordered a public reprimand. In Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Lemanski, 606 N.W.2d 11 (Iowa 2000), we held that an attorney’s neglect of his client’s case, failing to disburse an account for client funds, and failing to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation warranted a one-month suspension. In Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Sprole, 596 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 1999), we held that an attorney’s neglect of clients’ matters warranted a suspension for two months. In Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Scheetz, 568 N.W.2d 663 (Iowa 1997), an attorney’s neglect of a client’s interests and failure to cooperate with the board’s investigation warranted a public reprimand. In the recent case of Iowa Supreme Court Att’y Disciplinary Board v. Ireland, 723 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 2006), the respondent had neglected two legal matters, resulting in financial loss to a client, and had previously received a private admonition and a public reprimand, both based on neglect of clients’ cases. However, unlike the present case, the respondent had not ignored notices from the board. We imposed a minimum suspension of three months. Ireland, 723 N.W.2d at 442.

Upon consideration of the range of sanctions imposed in our prior cases, we conclude that this respondent’s license should be suspended for a minimum of one month. We reach that conclusion because of Conrad’s pattern of client neglect and failure to cooperate with the board as evidenced by this case and the case leading to his prior reprimand.

We order that this respondent’s license to practice law be suspended for a period of thirty days. We will reinstate the respondent’s license to practice law upon the expiration of the thirty-day suspension, subject to the limitations of Iowa Court Rule 35.12(2). The costs of this action are assessed against the respondent in accordance with Iowa Court Rule 35.25. Automatic reinstatement shall not be ordered until all costs have been paid.

LICENSE SUSPENDED.


author: STREIT, Justice. CADY, J.

text:
    In the Interest of J.E., Minor Child, R.E., Mother, Appellant. v. State of Iowa, Appellee.
    No. 06-0459.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Nov. 17, 2006.

      Michael 0. Carpenter of Webber, Gau-mer & Emanuel, P.C., Ottumwa, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, and Jason Helm, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
    Robert E. Breckenridge and Kenneth A. Duker of Breckenridge & Duker, P.C., Ot-tumwa, guardians ad litem for minor child.
   STREIT, Justice.

Due to a mother’s neglect of her ten-year-old son, a juvenile court terminated her parental rights. The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the juvenile court’s decree. Because the child cannot be safely returned to his mother’s care and because termination is in the child’s best interests, we vacate the court of appeals’ decision and affirm the decree of the juvenile court.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

Jerimiah was born on April 17, 1996. He is of low intelligence and suffers from attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (AD/HD). He operates on a much younger level than his age and is unable to make good or safe decisions. Jerimiah also has heart arrhythmia. He requires medication and a low-sugar, no-caffeine diet.

His mother is Robyn and his father is alleged to be either Luther of La Plata, New Mexico or Kevin of Lakeside, Arizona. Jerimiah does not have a relationship with either man. Robyn has five other children: Cody, born January 28, 1989; Cory, born September 18, 1990; Elyjah, born September 19, 1992; Cheya-na, born September 12, 2000 and Sava-nah, born July 14, 2002. Robyn’s two daughters live with their father, Michael, in Ottumwa. During the juvenile court proceedings, Elyjah lived with his father, Luther, in New Mexico part of the time.

Jerimiah first came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) on July 7, 2004 when he was taken into custody by law enforcement and placed in foster care. On that date, Robyn had left Jerimiah home alone for up to fourteen hours. Jerimiah was eight years old at the time. Concerned neighbors called the police because Jerimiah did not know where his mother was or how to contact her. Two neighbors reported Jeri-miah was often alone from morning until bedtime. He spent long periods of time at their homes because he was hungry and scared. Jerimiah told one of the neighbors his mother threw all of their food away because their home did not have electricity. While the police officers were interviewing Jerimiah in the front lawn, Robyn drove by. She paused and then drove on. She was later arrested for driving while barred. Robyn does not have her driver’s license due to unpaid fines ($5877).

During the investigation of this incident, Robyn admitted to a police officer her home did not have electricity. She consented to a drug test, which came back positive for opiates. Robyn said she had fallen the week before in a parking lot and was taking Tylenol 3 as a result. Her friend also gave her a pill to help with the pain. The test was negative for other substances. Robyn told a police officer she worked every day and had to do community service hours.

A subsequent Child Protective Assessment verified the neighbors’ allegations. This was the third founded report for denial of critical care based on Robyn’s failure to properly supervise Jerimiah.

Two days after Jerimiah was removed from the home, Robyn and Jerimiah’s brothers moved because Robyn did not have money to pay the electric bill. They lived for about two weeks at the home of their pastor and then moved to the Crisis Center. In mid-August they moved to a rented home on Kruger Street in Ottum-wa. Due to a $700 unpaid electric bill, Robyn had to have the utilities placed in a friend’s name. At the end of March 2005 the family moved again to their current home on South Van Burén in Ottumwa. Robyn’s gas was shut off in June 2005 because she did not pay her bill. She was able to get the gas turned back on within a few days. Robyn was unemployed throughout the juvenile court proceedings except when she worked at Burger King for three months. The family receives welfare, food stamps, and medical assistance from DHS.

Jerimiah was adjudicated a child in need of assistance on October 12, 2004, as defined in Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2) (2003) and remained in the care and custody of DHS. Numerous services were provided to the family by DHS. Services included parent skill development services for Robyn, psychological evaluation of Robyn, psychiatric evaluation of Jerimiah, and individual therapy for Robyn and Jeri-miah. Robyn accepted these services but her participation was inconsistent. At times, Robyn was not awake or was not prepared for parent skills sessions which were conducted in her home. She was also inconsistent in attending Jerimiah’s medical and psychiatric appointments although she was requested to do so.

At the department’s behest, Robyn began seeing a therapist but failed to regularly attend her appointments. She was diagnosed with AD/HD, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Robyn acknowledged physical and child sexual abuse by her father. Her mother died of a heart attack when Robyn was just two years old. She dropped out of school in the eleventh grade when she became pregnant.

DHS continues to have concerns with Robyn’s parenting ability. At the beginning of this case, Robyn told the in-home provider she relates to her children more as a peer than a parent. Robyn admitted she does not feel she needs to be a parent to her children all of the time “because she doesn’t want to bitch at them.” The DHS reports Robyn is not affectionate toward Jerimiah and there is not much interaction between the two of them.

At first, DHS limited Robyn to supervised visits with Jerimiah. Robyn progressed to partially unsupervised visits on October 25, 2004. Jerimiah’s foster parents agreed to take Jerimiah to Robyn’s home for visits and the in-home provider would be present for the second half of the visits. The unsupervised part of the visit was discontinued on November 16, 2004 because Robyn was not keeping her appointments with her therapist and the in-home provider was concerned Robyn was not able to consistently provide a structured environment. Robyn did not regularly have activities and meals planned for Jerimiah during the visits. On February 2, 2005, DHS resumed partially unsupervised visits. Approximately three weeks later, DHS once again limited Robyn to supervised visits with Jerimiah because she was not attending her therapy appointments, was not calling Jerimiah daily as she had been requested to do, and she missed a parenVteacher conference.

In March 2005, DHS resumed partially unsupervised visits because Robyn was calling Jerimiah more consistently and was keeping her therapy appointments. She met with Jerimiah’s teacher. She went to the library and checked out a book on parenting without prompting. Robyn even walked five miles in order to visit Jerimi-ah.

DHS granted Robyn unsupervised overnight visits with Jerimiah in May 2005. A permanency hearing was held on July 8, 2005, at which time Robyn was given an additional six months to pursue reunification. On August 4, 2005, Robyn’s visits with Jerimiah were increased from one overnight to three overnights a week. However, DHS once again limited Robyn to supervised visits after she was arrested for shoplifting at Wal-Mart on August 8, 2005. Jerimiah was in the store with Robyn and saw her get arrested. Robyn initially lied and told the social worker Jerimiah was not with her. Robyn testified at the termination hearing she lied out of fear DHS would terminate her parental rights. Jerimiah told a child protective worker it is okay for his mom to steal if she needs food for her children.

Besides shoplifting, Robyn has made other poor decisions. In December 2004, Robyn was ticketed for allowing her son Cody to drive without a license. In March 2005, Robyn was charged with violating the compulsory school attendance law for her son Cody. According to the school attendance officer, Cory had missed thirty-one days of school by the month of March. Robyn pled guilty and was fined $100. On May 9, 2005, Robyn returned Jerimiah to his foster home thirty to sixty minutes early without notifying the foster parents. Neither foster parent was home so Robyn left Jerimiah in the care of a teenage foster boy. A few days later, Jerimiah told Robyn the boy sexually abused him while they were alone. Additionally, Robyn considered allowing a truck driver, whose last name she did not know, pick up Elyjah in New Mexico and return him to Ottumwa. After the in-home provider advised Robyn her idea was too risky, Robyn took a bus to New Mexico to pick him up herself.

The State filed a petition for termination of parental rights on October 31, 2005. The juvenile court held a termination hearing on November 21, 2005. The in-home provider for the family testified there is a lack of bonding between Jerimiah and his mother. However, Jerimiah has repeatedly stated he misses his mom and siblings and wants to be home with them. Jerimi-ah thinks Robyn is the “best mom ever.” DHS recommended termination because Robyn is unable to provide a consistent, stable, and structured home environment for Jerimiah. Although Robyn has been able to make progress for short periods of time, she is unable to sustain those changes.

DHS acknowledges Jerimiah has a close relationship with his brothers. During visits Jerimiah usually played with his brothers. They would play video games, play sports, draw, talk, joke around, play with action figures or watch movies. At the termination hearing, Cody testified about his bond with Jerimiah. He said “we miss him a lot every day .... There’s always a void.”

Jerimiah is a sweet and loving child. He is personable and gets along well with other children. He likes to give and receive attention. Despite his special needs, DHS considers Jerimiah to be adoptable.

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of Robyn, Kevin and Luther (the alleged fathers) on March 7, 2006. Only Robyn appealed. The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the termination of her parental rights on September 7, 2006. The court “questionfed] whether the State has proved the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence” because the court believed DHS made no effort to assist Robyn with child care. Moreover, the court was “not willing to find that Jerimi-ah’s best interests will be served by termination” because of his strong bond with his brothers.

II. Scope of Review

We review termination of parental rights de novo. In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 2002) (citing In re S.N., 500 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Iowa 1993)). We give weight to the factual determinations of the juvenile court but we are not bound by them. In re T.A.L., 505 N.W.2d 480, 482 (Iowa 1993) (citing In re M.M., 483 N.W.2d 812, 814 (Iowa 1992)). Grounds for termination must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 661 (Iowa 2000). Our primary concern is the best interests of the child. In re K.N., 625 N.W.2d 731, 733 (Iowa 2001).

In seeking out those best interests, we look to the child’s long-range as well as immediate interests. This requires considering what the future holds for the child if returned to the parents. When making this decision, we look to the parents’ past performance because it may indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the future.

In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997) (citations omitted).

III. Merits

A. Whether Jerimiah Can be Returned to Robyn’s Care

The juvenile court terminated Robyn’s parental rights pursuant to section 232.116(1)00 of the Iowa Code. Under section 232.116(1)(/), parental rights may be terminated if the court finds all of the following have occurred:

(1)The child is four years of age or older.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102.

It is undisputed Jerimiah satisfies the first three elements. Robyn only contends the State has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence Jerimiah cannot be returned to her custody.

A parent may lose custody of his or her child if the court finds there is clear and convincing evidence “[t]he child cannot be protected from some harm which would justify the adjudication of the child as a child in need of assistance .... ” Iowa Code § 232.102(5)(a). A “child in need of assistance” means in part “an unmarried child ... [w]hose parent, guardian, other custodian, or other members of the household in which the child resides has physically abused or neglected the child, or is imminently likely to abuse or neglect the child.” Id. § 232.2(6)(6). In the present case, there are thankfully no allegations Robyn physically abused Jerimiah. However, the record is replete with evidence of neglect. We have previously said “our statutory termination provisions are preventative as well as remedial.” In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Iowa 1990). They are designed to prevent probable harm to the child and the State is not required to wait until actual harm has occurred before moving to terminate a parent’s rights. Id. (citing In re A.M.S., 419 N.W.2d 723, 726 (Iowa 1988)).

Robyn argues her ability to care for her other sons rebuts the juvenile court’s finding that Jerimiah cannot be safely returned to her home. This contention ignores Jerimiah’s age and special needs. See In re T.J.O., 527 N.W.2d 417, 421 (Iowa Ct.App.1994) (citing In re E.B.L., 501 N.W.2d 547, 553 (Iowa 1993) (“Even though a mother may be able to parent some of her children does not necessarily mean she is capable of providing appropriate care to all her children. The special needs and best interests of each child must be evaluated.”)). At the time of the termination hearing, Jerimiah’s brothers were sixteen (Cody), fifteen (Cory) and thirteen (Elyjah) years old. Jerimiah was only nine years old. Unlike his brothers, Jeri-miah has special needs that require extra attention. Due in part to his low intelligence, he lacks knowledge about concepts most kids his age would understand. Jeri-miah is unable to make good or safe decisions. He requires constant supervision and thrives on structure. His heart condition also requires medication and frequent doctor visits. While his older brothers may be able to fend for themselves, Jeri-miah cannot.

Robyn has a history of leaving Jerimiah home alone for long periods of time. He was placed in foster care after neighbors complained Jerimiah would often come to their homes looking for comfort and food. He did not know where his mom was or how to contact her. One neighbor reported Jerimiah has been to her home from early morning to late at night before without anyone coming to look for him.

Robyn has failed to demonstrate she can provide adequate supervision and care for Jerimiah. At the time Jerimiah was taken into custody by DHS, Robyn told a police officer Jerimiah was home alone because she worked every day and did community service. However, Robyn told her therapist she had not worked since 1999 when the family lived in Arizona. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record regarding community service. If she did have a community service obligation, we do not know why or the number of hours. Robyn has never explained her long absences from the home. This makes us doubt she would be more attentive to Jerimiah’s needs if he is returned to her. See In re J.W.D., 456 N.W.2d 214, 218-19 (Iowa 1990) (finding termination warranted because mother was unable to meet the needs of her child who was of low-average intellectual functioning and behind developmentally).

The court of appeals stated “there is little evidence Jerimiah would not be safe in [Robyn’s] care if she had assistance with child care at times she was required to be absent from the home.” But based on the record, Robyn is not required to be away from home much because she is unemployed. Robyn never requested assistance with child care. Moreover, two of the founded reports of neglect happened while Robyn was nearby. The first one involved Jerimiah being left in a car with his two younger sisters. The other involved Jeri-miah playing with a burning pile of trash. Robyn’s erratic sleep patterns also interfere with her ability to supervise Jerimiah. Finally, the shoplifting incident demonstrates Robyn continues to put Jerimiah at risk despite the services provided by DHS. Robyn has not benefited from the services while Jerimiah continues to live in foster care. We find there is clear and convincing evidence Jerimiah cannot be returned to Robyn’s custody at the present time or in the reasonably near future.

B. Whether it is in Jerimiah’s Best Interests to Terminate Robyn’s Parental Rights

Having found section 232.116(1)(f) satisfied, we must still determine whether terminating Robyn’s parental rights is in Jerimiah’s best interests. In re S.J., 451 N.W.2d 827, 832 (Iowa 1990) (“While we have indicated that children should not be made to suffer indefinitely in parentless limbo, the child’s best interest may dictate to the contrary.”); see Iowa Code § 232.116(2) (requiring the court to “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child” when determining whether to terminate the rights of a parent). Jerimiah has a close relationship with his older brothers. He misses them and they likewise miss him. We have previously stated a preference to keep siblings together. In re A.M.S., 419 N.W.2d at 734 (stating “siblings should not be separated without good and compelling reasons”). However, this preference is not absolute. Our ultimate concern is the best interests of the child. Robyn argues it is in Jerimiah’s best interests to be with his family. We are certainly cognizant of the importance of family integrity. This consideration, although valid, cannot overcome the clear and convincing evidence it is in Jerimiah’s best future interests to be free for adoption so he may be placed in a permanent and stable home with consistent care. He deserves the chance to start a new life even though this means he has to leave behind the relationships he has with his mother and brothers. We find that despite Jeri-miah’s bond with his brothers, it is in his best interests to terminate Robyn’s parental rights.

We note this is not one of the more egregious cases of neglect or abuse. See, e.g., In re J.K., 495 N.W.2d 108, 110-11 (Iowa 1993) (parents were severe, chronic drug and alcohol abusers); In re A.R.S., 480 N.W.2d 888, 889-90 (Iowa 1992) (children sexually abused by their mother and three of her male friends); In re Interest of C & K, 322 N.W.2d 76, 77-78 (Iowa 1982) (children lived in deplorable conditions). Nor do we question Robyn’s love for her children. Nonetheless, our legislature has established a limited time frame for parents to demonstrate their ability to be parents. In this case, the standard is twelve months. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f). “The legislature adopted the standard in the belief that this period must be reasonably limited because, ‘beyond the parameters of chapter 232, patience with parents can soon translate into intolerable hardship for their children.’ ” In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d at 175 (quoting In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987)). “ ‘Children simply cannot wait for responsible parenting.’ ” Id. (quoting In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d at 495). “It is simply not in the best interests of children to continue to keep them in temporary foster homes while the natural parents get their lives together.” Id. (citing In re J.L.P., 449 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Iowa 1989)). Robyn was given approximately sixteen months to demonstrate her ability to care for Jerimi-ah. She continues to struggle with the same problems identified at the beginning of the juvenile court proceedings. She has not benefited from DHS’s services and Jerimiah continues to suffer. She is unable to provide the structure and consistency Jerimiah needs in order to be safe and reach his full potential.

IV. Conclusion

The State has proven by clear and convincing evidence Jerimiah cannot be returned to Robyn’s custody presently or in the near future. Despite Jerimiah’s bond with his brothers, it is in his best interests to terminate Robyn’s parental rights so he may be placed in a permanent home with adults who can properly care for him. We therefore agree with the district court Robyn’s parental rights should be terminated.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.

All justices concur except CADY, J., who concurs specially, and HECHT, J., who takes no part.

CADY, J.

(concurring specially).

I write separately to emphasize the “best interests of the child” standard has taken on a new meaning, within the last decade, which must be considered by courts in using the standard to make decisions to terminate parent-child relationships.

A child’s safety and the need for a permanent home are now the primary concerns when determining a child’s best interests. See In re K.M., 653 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Iowa 2002) (noting “the child’s safety and need for a permanent home” are “the concerns that clearly impact a child’s best interests”). This has not always been the case, and reflects a broader change in our country’s national policy regarding child welfare laws. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493-94 (Iowa 2000) (recognizing and summarizing the effect of national legislation on Iowa’s child welfare laws). Before 1997, child welfare laws — including Iowa’s — focused on reuniting the family unit. Id. at 493 (noting our prior legislation sought “to prevent and eliminate the need for removal,” and “[t]he focus [wa]s on services to improve parenting”); see, e.g., Deck v. State Dep’t of Human Resources, 113 Nev. 124, 930 P.2d 760, 765 (1997) (noting the district court put in place a reunification plan that continued unsuccessfully for five years); In re M.B., 388 Pa.Super. 381, 565 A.2d 804, 810 (1989) (“One of the primary purposes of the Juvenile Act is to preserve the unity of the family whenever possible.”). Subsequently, and after Congress’s enactment of the Adoptions and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), national and state child welfare laws emphasized the importance of timely providing children with appropriate custodial care. See In re K.M., 653 N.W.2d at 608 (“In recent years the focus in termination cases has shifted somewhat from reunification of the family to the child’s best interests.”); In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 493-95 (summarizing the change); see also In re Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 334-35 (Pa.Super.1998) (recognizing the impact of ASFA).

More specifically, ASFA dramatically changed the manner in which this country treats children who have been removed from the care of their parents and placed into foster care. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub.L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The legislation sets firm deadlines for reunification, followed by prompt efforts to terminate parental rights if those deadlines are not met. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) (2006) (outlining the instances when termination of parental rights are required). ASFA’s goals seek to prevent children from languishing in foster care by requiring parents to assume their parental responsibility quickly. See In re C.M., 652 N.W.2d at 208 (“[T]he new federal law shifted the focus from family reunification to ‘time-limited family reunification services.’ ” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 629(a)(7))); 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) (requiring the state to file a petition to terminate parental rights if the child has remained in foster care “for 15 of the most recent 22 months”).

Iowa reacted to this federal legislation and adopted many changes to our child welfare laws in 1998. See S.F. 2345, 77th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Iowa Code chapters 232, 237, 600). Among those changes are additions to Iowa Code § 232.116, which provides the grounds by which a court may terminate parental rights. Iowa Code § 232.116 (2005). Prior to ASFA, Iowa Code § 232.116(2) stated “the court shall give primary consideration to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child” when determining whether to terminate parental rights. Iowa Code § 232.116(2) (1997). After ASFA, that subsection now reads “the court shall give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2) (emphasis added); see In re K.M., 653 N.W.2d at 606 (recognizing this distinction and holding the amended changes constitutional).

Our response to ASFA did not change the approach we have always taken in parental termination proceedings. Then and now, “our primary concern is the best interests of the child.” In re S.O., 483 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Iowa 1992) (citing In re Dameron, 306 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Iowa 1981)). But our response to ASFA has significantly, and not too subtly, identified a child’s safety and his or her need for a permanent home as the defining elements in a child’s best interests. See In re K.M., 653 N.W.2d at 608 (“[T]he amendment did not change the role of a child’s best interests in the termination decision. They are now and have long been of paramount importance in such matters. Rather, the [response to ASFA] simply articulated the concerns that clearly impact a child’s best interests: the child’s safety and need for a permanent home.”).

In bygone days, the best interests of a child was a broad concept that embraced a multitude of considerations, and prominently focused on the need to keep families together and to avoid the termination of parental rights if at all possible. No more. We are obligated to incorporate this new policy into the case before us, and it inevitably leads us to the proper result and our disposition. The old policies underlying our previous notions of a child’s best interests cannot be used by courts to circumvent the new policies that are meant to keep children from languishing in foster care. We must apply this new rationale with earnest in each case, as we have here, pursuant to the policies established by our legislature.

      . Michael obtained a civil restraining order on Robyn. Cheyana was diagnosed as "failure to thrive” and there is a founded report of Robyn not providing adequate medical care for her.

      . There was a founded report of denial of critical care concerning Jerimiah and his brother, Cody. On July 9, 2003, Robyn started an uncontained fire outside in order to bum some trash. She went inside leaving Cory and Jerimiah outside. At the time, Jerimiah was seven and Cory was twelve. Jerimiah played in the fire with a stick and burned a neighbor boy who had to be taken to the emergency room by his parents. There was also a founded report of denial of critical care concerning Jerimiah and his two younger sisters. On December 19, 2002, Robyn left Jeri-miah and the girls in a vehicle unattended for five to fifteen minutes while she was in her landlord’s home. Jerimiah was six and a half years old at the time and Cheyana and Sava-nah were two years old and five months old respectively. Robyn was unable to drive the children home because her driver's license was suspended.

      . Robyn was also arrested for shoplifting at Econo Foods on July 24, 2005.

      . To Robyn's credit, she immediately contacted DHS and consoled Jerimiah. She was veiy supportive of Jerimiah and fully cooperated with the child protective assessment and police investigation. Jerimiah was placed in a different foster home.


author: CADY, Justice.

text:
    IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD, Complainant, v. Mary Margaret SCHUMACHER, Respondent.
    No. 06-1256.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Nov. 17, 2006.

      Charles L. Harrington and Wendell J. Harms, Des Moines, for complainant.
    Nathan C. Moonen of Moonen Law Office, Epworth, for respondent.
   CADY, Justice.

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board (Board) charged Mary M. Schumacher with numerous violations of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. The charges primarily stemmed from her neglect in three separate cases. The Grievance' Commission (Commission) found Schumacher violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. It recommended - she be suspended from the practice of law for a period not less than nine months. On our review, we find Schumacher violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and impose an indefinite suspension not less than six months.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Mary M. Schumacher is an Iowa lawyer. She practices law in Dubuque. She was privately admonished in 1988 for handling a client matter when not competent to do so.

These proceedings arise as a result of three separate complaints filed with the Board against Schumacher. The Board, in response, filed a three-count complaint against Schumacher. The basic facts of each count were not disputed, and the matter was ultimately submitted to the Commission on a stipulation entered into by the parties. Schumacher acknowledged she violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, and agreed her conduct warranted a suspension.

The first complaint involved Schumacher’s representation of a client in an action to modify a decree for dissolution of marriage. Schumacher was retained by the client in August 2001, and received a retainer of $750. However, she subsequently took little action on the case other than to obtain certified copies of some court documents and to prepare a petition. The client finally terminated the attorney-client relationship in December 2002 due to the lack of progress made in the case, and requested a refund of the retainer. The client then filed a complaint with the Board in February 2002, and Schumacher failed to respond to three separate notices of the complaint from the Board. Schu-macher did not return the retainer to the client until after the Board filed its complaint.

The second complaint also involved Schumacher’s representation of a client in an action to modify a decree of dissolution of marriage. The client had experienced a loss of income after changes in his employment, and sought Schumacher’s assistance in January 2003 to modify the child support provisions in his dissolution of marriage decree. Schumacher filed a modification petition in February 2003, but did little to pursue the action after that time despite frequent attempts by the client for her to do so. Schumacher repeatedly failed to return phone calls to the client and to respond to his letters. The case was set for trial in August 2003 and subsequently continued several times. The client filed a complaint with the Board in November 2003. The petition was finally heard by the court in March 2004, resulting in a decrease in the child support payments. As before, Schumacher failed to respond to three separate notices of the complaint from the Board.

The third complaint involved Schumacher’s services as an attorney for an executor in an estate. Schumacher opened the estate in January 2000. However, she failed to perform numerous essential services in a timely manner, and simply failed to perform other services. Several reports to the court were both untimely and incomplete. The inheritance tax returns and estate tax returns were filed late, resulting in a substantial penalty. Schumacher eventually paid the penalty with her personal funds, totaling over $14,000. Schu-macher also repeatedly failed to respond to inquiries by beneficiaries and attorneys representing beneficiaries. A successor executor was eventually appointed to close the estate in 2005, and to correct mistakes in the fiduciary income tax returns, resulting in additional taxes and penalties. For the third time, Schumacher failed to respond to three notices from the Board concerning the complaint.

II. Commission Proceedings

The Board charged Schumacher with numerous violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The violations in count I included DR 1 — 102(A)(1) (violation of a disciplinary rule), DR 1-102(A)(6) (conduct that adversely reflects on the practice of law), and DR 9-102(B)(4) (failure to promptly pay client funds). The violations in count II included DR 1-102(A)(1), DR 1-102(A)(5) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), DR 1-102(A)(6), and DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglect of client matters). The violations in count III included DR 1-102(A)(1), (5), and (6), DR 6-101(A)(l) (handling legal matters without assistance when not competent), and DR 6-101(A)(3).

The Commission found Schumacher violated each provision of the Code. It recommended she be suspended from the practice of law for a period not less than nine months.

III. Scopé of Review

Our review of attorney disciplinary actions is de novo. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Bernard, 653 N.W.2d 373, 375 (Iowa 2002). We give weight to the findings of the Commission, but are not bound by them. Id.

IV. Violations

The conduct in this case involved various forms of neglect and incompetence. Schu-macher failed to perform essential tasks for her clients in a timely manner. She procrastinated again and again, despite the urgency of the task or the repeated complaints of dissatisfaction by clients or attorneys. Additionally, both her actions and inactions in the estate proceeding revealed a lack of competency to handle such matters. Schumacher violated the rules as alleged by the Board. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Ireland, 723 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 2006) (attorney disciplined for failing to deliver a will to a client and for neglecting client’s case in civil rights litigation).

Y. Discipline

We consider numerous factors in determining appropriate discipline, including the nature of the violation, the need for deterrence and public protection, the preservation of the legal profession’s reputation, and the lawyer’s fitness to continue practicing law. Id. at 441-42 (citing Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Honken, 688 N.W.2d 812, 820 (Iowa 2004); low a Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Hohenadel, 634 N.W.2d 652, 655 (Iowa 2001)). Additional considerations include harm to a client, multiple incidences of neglect, and past history of discipline. Id. at 442 (citing Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Pracht, 656 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Iowa 2003); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Lane, 642 N.W.2d 296, 302 (Iowa 2002); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Adams, 623 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Iowa 2001)).

We have observed that discipline generally ranges from a public reprimand to a six-month suspension when neglect of client matters is the principal violation. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Moorman, 683 N.W.2d 549, 553 (Iowa 2004). While this case involves a broad range of violations, each was bound together by the common thread of neglect and procrastination. Schumacher neglected to do the work necessary to properly represent her clients, or neglected to do it in a competent and thoughtful manner. She even failed to respond to Board inquiries, just as she failed to respond to client and attorney inquiries. Neglect permeated nearly all aspects of the cases involved in this action, and even spilled into the arena of incompetency. The nature of the conduct exhibited by Schumacher adversely reflects on her fitness to practice law, and seriously undermines public .confidence in the legal profession.

While there may be underlying reasons not disclosed to us in the record to explain the misconduct that occurred in this case, we conclude the discipline imposed should fall on the high end of the general range of discipline we have imposed in the past. The neglect was pervasive and involved three separate cases. See Pracht, 656 N.W.2d at 126. Harm was visited on clients and third parties. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Jay, 606 N.W.2d 1, 2-4 (Iowa 2000). The reputation of the legal system has suffered. Consequently, we conclude Schumacher should be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law with no possibility of reinstatement for six months. This discipline is consistent with our prior cases, and is warranted under the particular facts and circumstances.

VI. Conclusion

We suspend Schumacher’s license to practice law with no possibility of reinstatement for a period not less than six months from the date of the filing of this opinion. The suspension applies to all facets of the practice of law. Iowa Ct. R. 35.12(3) (“Any attorney suspended shall refrain, during such suspension, from all facets of the ordinary law practice .... ”). Upon any application for reinstatement, Schumacher shall have the burden to prove she has not practiced during the period of suspension and that she meets all requirements of Iowa Court Rule 35.13. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.13 (providing the procedure on application for reinstatement). The costs of this proceeding are taxed against Schumacher, including the costs of the depositions admitted as evidence pursuant to the stipulation of the parties.

LICENSE SUSPENDED.

All justices concur except TERNUS, C.J., who takes no part.


author: WIGGINS, Justice. '

text:
    IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD, Complainant, v. Gary D. IVERSEN, Respondent.
    No. 06-0747.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Nov. 17, 2006.

      Charles L. Harrington and David J. Grace, Des Moines, for complainant.
    Timothy J. Luce of Anfínson & Luce, Waterloo, for respondent.
   WIGGINS, Justice. '

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board filed a complaint alleging Gary D. Iversen violated numerous rules of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers by not filing federal or state income tax returns for 1992 to 2001 and by not paying his Iowa income taxes for 1996 and 1997. The Grievance Commission filed its report finding the Board had proven the factual allegations of the complaint as well as Iversen’s violations of the Code by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. The Commission recommended we suspend Iversen’s license; to practice law indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for two years. On our de novo review, we agree with the Commission that the Board has proven by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that Iversen’s conduct violated the Code. Accordingly, we suspend Iversen’s license to practice law in this state indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for one year.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

We admitted Iversen to the Iowa bar in 1977. He presently maintains a law office in Waterloo, Iowa. His major areas of practice include preparation of tax returns, real estate, and probate matters. On December 1, 2005, the Board filed a complaint against Iversen alleging various violations of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. The Board claimed: (1) as of February 18, 2003, Iver-sen had not filed federal or state income tax returns for the years 1992 through 2001; (2) on or about May 1, 1997, Iversen failed to pay his Iowa income tax for the year 1996; and (3) on or about May 1, 1998, Iversen failed to pay his Iowa income tax for the year 1997.

In connection with these claimsj the Board alleged Iversen violated Iowa Code sections 422.25(5), 714.8(10), 714.10(1), and 714.11(1) (1997). The Board alleged in October 2003 Iversen pled guilty to the crimes of fraudulent practice in the second degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 422.25(5), 714.8(10), and 714.10 and fraudulent practice in the third degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 422.25(5), 714.8(10), and 714.11. The Board further alleged the court granted Iversen a deferred judgment and placed him on probation for sixty months.

Accordingly, the Board charged Iversen with violating the following provisions of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers: DR 1-102(A)(3) (providing a lawyer shall not engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude); DR 1-102(A)(4) (providing a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); DR 1-102(A)(5) (providing a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice); and DR 1-102(A)(6) (providing a lawyer shall not engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the fitness to practice law). The Board noted it intended to invoke issue preclusion in proving the allegations of the complaint.

In his answer, Iversen admitted to not filing federal or state income tax returns for 1992 to 2001 and to not paying his Iowa income taxes for 1996 and 1997. He also admitted to his guilty plea. In response to the Board’s requests for admission, Iver-sen stated he had “no specific knowledge as to inaccuracies in the minutes, but having not interviewed the witnesses regarding the specifics, he [was] unable to admit whether the facts [were] accurate.” Iver-sen further stated, however, that “the deferred judgment granted in the [criminal case] was based on facts similar to those set forth in the minutes” and he would not object to them.

At the hearing on the complaint, the Board and Iversen appeared to agree the focus was not on Iversen’s conduct, but rather on the issue of the appropriate sanction. In his testimony, Iversen admitted to not filing his federal and state tax returns beginning in 1992, but stated he has since filed them. He testified he made an estimated tax payment in 1993 for the year 1992. He further explained he is not sure he knows why he did not file the 1992 returns, alluding to financial and marital issues. Initially, Iversen chose not to file his earlier returns thinking he would “catch up.” After he failed to file the first few returns, Iversen stated by that point he felt he was in a hole that he could not get himself out of financially and began to fear the tax authorities would destroy his law practice.

Iversen acknowledged his conduct would not reflect the advice he would give to his clients and that he was not as responsive to the state as he should have been. He claimed he has not had any prior ethical violations, has been attentive to the needs of his clients, and has attempted to limit his work in view of his probable suspension. He appears to have cooperated with the disciplinary authorities. Iversen mentioned he was “obviously very embarrassed by pretty stupid decisions and just lack of taking action” and expressed a desire to practice law again. Witnesses who testified at Iversen’s sentencing hearing opined that Iversen is a well-respected attorney.

The Commission found although Iversen was required to file both federal and state income tax returns for the years 1992 through 2001, he did not file such returns and paid no income taxes, except for one estimated tax payment in 1993. The Commission further found Iversen was charged in Black Hawk County with two counts of fraudulent practice in the first degree (class “C” felonies) and two counts of tax evasion (class “D” felonies), and as a result of a plea agreement under which two of the original counts were reduced and the other two counts were dismissed, Iversen pled guilty to one count of fraudulent practice in the second degree (a class “D” felony) and one count of fraudulent practice in the third degree (an aggravated misdemeanor).

•The Commission also found Iversen was granted a deferred judgment with five years of supervised probation and was ordered to make restitution to the state in the amount of $207,743.41. Additionally, Iversen has not paid any of the approximate $180,000 to $200,000 in back taxes which he owes to the federal government and there is no payment plan to do so at this time. Finding the allegations of the complaint were sufficiently proven in light of Iversen’s answer, response to requests for admission, and testimony at the hearing, as well as by issue preclusion under Iowa Court Rule 35.7(3), the Commission concluded Iversen violated DR 1-102(A)(3), (4), (5), and (6).

The Commission noted the following mitigating factors: (1) Iversen appears to be respected by his peers; (2) there is nothing in the record showing his clients were harmed; (3) Iversen was cooperative in the disciplinary process and acknowledged his misconduct; (4) Iversen showed concern for his clients’ interests as he anticipated a suspension of his license; (5) it appears Iversen does not have any previous ethical violations; (6) Iversen expressed remorse and embarrassment; (7) Iversen would like to pay his tax obligations (estimated to be between $300,000 and $400,000); (8) Iversen would like to resume the practice of law; and (9) Iver-sen did not offer excuses or attempt to assign blame elsewhere, nor does he attribute his misconduct to mental or physical conditions, substance abuse, or gambling.

The Commission noted the following aggravating factors: (1) Iversen had no explanation for his conduct except for lack of money; (2) he admitted he would have advised a client differently under the same circumstances; (3) the misconduct continued for at least ten years during which Iversen did not attempt to address the growing problem; (4) Iversen did not take corrective action until his misconduct was discovered by the tax authorities; (5) Iver-sen did not fully cooperate with the tax authorities; (6) Iversen has held himself out to the public as an attorney with special expertise in tax matters; therefore, his conduct harms the public’s confidence in the tax system and legal profession; and (7) Iversen managed to keep other personal financial obligations relatively current while disregarding the income tax laws. The Commission recommended Iversen receive a two-year suspension of his license to practice law.

II. Scope of Review.

This court reviews attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Walker, 712 N.W.2d 683, 684 (Iowa 2006). The Board must prove ethical violations by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. Id. “Although we .consider the Commission’s factual findings and discipline recommendations, they do not bind us.” Id. (citation omitted).

III. Analysis.

Under Iowa Court Rule 35.7(3), principles of issue preclusion may be used in a lawyer disciplinary case where certain conditions exist. These conditions include:

a. The issue has been resolved in a civil proceeding that resulted in a final judgment, or in a criminal proceeding that resulted in a finding of guilt, even if the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board was not a party to the prior proceeding.
b. The burden of proof in the prior proceeding was greater than a mere preponderance of the evidence.
c. The party seeking preclusive effect has given written notice to the opposing party, not less than ten days prior to the hearing, of the party’s intention to invoke issue preclusion.

Iowa Ct. R. 35.7(3). These conditions have been met here, meaning Iversen is barred from relitigating the issue of his criminal conduct in this disciplinary action.

Iversen pled guilty to the crimes of fraudulent practice in the second degree (a class “D” felony) and fraudulent practice in the third degree (an aggravated misdemeanor) in connection with his failure to pay his taxes and file his returns. See Iowa Code §§ 422.25(5), 714.10, 71411. The court ordered Iversen to pay $207,743.41 in restitution to the state and gave him a deferred judgment and probation. Iversen also owes an additional $180,000 to $200,000 to the federal government. In sum, Iversen’s total tax liability is close to $400,000. Moreover, Iversen admitted he did not file his income tax returns and failed to pay his income taxes in his answer to the complaint, his answer to the requests for admission, and his testimony at the hearing.

We have said where “ ‘a lawyer’s income exceeds the sum triggering the tax return filing requirement, failure to file a tax return constitutes misrepresentation of that income’ in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4).” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Profl Ethics & Conduct v. Runge, 588 N.W.2d 116,118 (Iowa 1999) (citation omitted). Additionally, we have recognized this sort of “ ‘misrepresentation is a deceitful offense involving moral turpitude’ in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3).” Id. (citation omitted). “It is also conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) and conduct that adversely reflects on the fitness to practice law in violation of DR 1-102(A)(6).” Id. (citation omitted).

Accordingly, on our de novo review of the record we find the facts as found by the Commission and conclude Iversen’s conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(3), (4), (5), and (6).

IV. Sanction.

Although Iversen is barred from relitigating his criminal conduct, he is “permitted to present evidence of mitigating facts and circumstances ... concerning any sanction to be imposed.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. D.J.I., 545 N.W.2d 866, 877 (Iowa 1996). The Commission recommended Iv-ersen’s conduct warrants a suspension of his license to practice law for two years; however, “the matter of sanction is solely within the authority of this court.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Sloan, 692 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Iowa 2005).

In determining the sanctions a lawyer must face as a result of his or her misconduct, we have stated:

The goal of the Code of Professional Responsibility is “to maintain public confidence in the legal profession as well as to provide a policing mechanism for poor lawyering.” When deciding on an appropriate sanction for an attorney’s misconduct, we consider “the nature of the violations, protection of the public, deterrence of similar misconduct by others, the lawyer’s fitness to practice, and [the court’s] duty to uphold the integrity of the profession in the eyes of the public.” We also consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances present in the disciplinary action.

Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Honken, 688 N.W.2d 812, 820 (Iowa 2004) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). In this case, Iversen’s misconduct consisted of failing to file his income tax returns and failing to pay his taxes.

We have said “[i]t is as wrong for a lawyer to cheat the government as it is for him to cheat a client.” Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Strack, 225 N.W.2d 905, 906 (Iowa 1975). “We have many times repeated the principles which apply to disciplinary cases based on failure to file tax returns on time. License suspensions have been imposed ranging from sixty days to three years.” Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Baudino, 452 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Iowa 1990). Although we adapt sanctions to the unique facts of each case, sanctions imposed in other tax cases are helpful. Runge, 588 N.W.2d at 118.

An aggravating factor to consider in determining the proper sanction is Iversen did not file his federal or state income tax returns for the years 1992 through 2001, a period of almost ten years. We may view such an “almost routine failure to file tax returns” as a pattern of conduct justifying an increased sanction. See Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Cook, 409 N.W.2d 469, 469-70 (Iowa 1987). Nor can Iversen “be credited with reporting his misconduct to the committee before the investigation began.” See Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Belay, 420 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Iowa 1988).

On the other hand, there may be some mitigating factors present in this case. It is important to note that Iversen has not had any prior ethical violations. See Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Nadler, 467 N.W.2d 250, 254 (Iowa 1991) (stating prior disciplinary action taken against a lawyer is considered in determining the proper discipline). It is apparent from the record that Iversen is well respected as an attorney and “we do not overlook an attorney’s devoted service to the profession.” See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Frerichs, 671 N.W.2d 470, 478 (Iowa 2003). Additionally, Iversen seems to have fully cooperated with the Board and the Commission in the investigation of this matter. See Belay, 420 N.W.2d at 785. Although Iver-sen cannot explain why he did not file his returns, he did make occasional references to financial and marital issues. Nevertheless, “[o]ur profession certainly cannot excuse misconduct on the basis of personal problems.” See Cook, 409 N.W.2d at 470.

Another mitigating consideration is that Iversen acknowledged his misconduct and does not attempt to shift the blame for his actions elsewhere. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Fleming, 602 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 1999). It is also significant Iversen’s actions do not appear to have caused harm to others. See Honken, 688 N.W.2d at 821. Finally, we have recognized that many of our tax violation cases involve false certifications on annual questionnaires to the client security commission, which is a separate ethical violation. See Belay, 420 N.W.2d at 784-85. Thus, when there is not an issue of false certification, “the sanction imposed should logically be less severe.” Id.

We note the outcome of Iversen’s criminal prosecution does not affect our determination of the appropriate sanction. See Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Cody, 412 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Iowa 1987) (noting a distinction between the appropriate punishment for a crime and the appropriate sanction for an attorney’s misconduct, and basing the appropriate sanction, in part, on the concerns of “[the attorneyl’s fitness to practice law, the need to deter others from similar conduct, and our assurance to the public that the courts will maintain the ethics of our profession”).

In an attorney discipline case where the attorney willfully and knowingly failed to file state and federal income tax returns “in a consistent pattern spanning eight years,” resulting in a criminal conviction for failing to file a required federal return, we stated:

Obedience to the law symbolizes respect for law. To the extent those licensed to operate the law’s. machinery knowingly and repeatedly violate essential statutes, there inexorably follows an intensified loss of lay persons’ respect for law. This we can neither condone nor tolerate.

Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Bromwell, 221 N.W.2d 777, 778-79 (Iowa 1974). As to the gravity of the offense, we noted while there was no proof that the attorney’s motive was to defraud the state or federal government of tax revenues, “one who is familiar with income tax laws and whose gross income exceeds the sum which triggers the filing requirement impliedly misrepresents that income when he willfully elects not to file.” Id. at 780. In that case, we found “there [was] an element of deceit involved which, coupled with a deliberate election to violate statutes which [are the] foundation [of] the economic structure of our government, impels the conclusion [that the attorney] has committed an offense involving moral turpitude.” Id.

Considering the nature of the violations, protection of the public, deterrence of similar misconduct by others, the lawyer’s fitness to practice, our duty to uphold the integrity of the profession in the eyes of the public, aggravating circumstances, mitigating circumstances, and our survey of other disciplinary cases, we believe attorney misconduct similar to Iversen’s tends to warrant a sanction less than that recommended by the Commission. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Wickey, 619 N.W.2d 319, 321 (Iowa 2000) (imposing a six-month suspension for an attorney’s failure to timely file his Iowa income tax returns for four years and his failure to pay Iowa income taxes); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Doughty, 588 N.W.2d 119, 119—20 (Iowa 1999) (imposing an eighteen-month suspension for an attorney’s failure to file state and federal income tax returns for ten years which resulted in federal misdemeanor convictions); Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Munsinger, 264 N.W.2d 731, 732 (Iowa 1978) (imposing a one-year suspension for an attorney’s willful and knowing failure to file state income tax returns for eleven years which resulted in criminal convictions; the court noted the attorney made a false report to the client security and attorney disciplinary commission); Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Kelly, 250 N.W.2d 388, 388-89 (Iowa 1976) (imposing a one-year suspension for an attorney’s failure to file state and federal income tax returns for six years which resulted in criminal convictions for failure to file and pay state income taxes). Accordingly, the appropriate sanction is to suspend Iversen’s license to practice law for one year.

V. Disposition.

In light of the above facts and circumstances surrounding Iversen’s conduct, we suspend Iversen’s license to practice law in this state indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for one year. Upon any application for reinstatement, Iversen must establish he has not practiced law during the suspension period and he has in all ways complied with the requirements of Iowa Court Rule 35.13. Iversen must also comply with the notification requirements of Iowa Court Rule 35.21. Finally, the costs of this action are taxed against Iver-sen pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.25.

LICENSE SUSPENDED.

All justices concur except HECHT, J., who takes no part.