author: MEYER, Justice. GILBERT, Justice ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Justice HANSON, Justice

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Darryl Andre HARRIS, Appellant.
    No. C4-01-1487.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Aug. 21, 2003.

      Lawrence W. Pry, Asst. State Public Defender, Minneapolis, for Appellant.

      Mike Hatch, Attorney General, James B. Early, Asst. Attorney General, St. Paul, Alan Mitchell, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Respondent.
   OPINION

MEYER, Justice.

A St. Louis County jury convicted appellant Darryl Andre Harris of first-degree felony murder and attempted first-degree murder. A judicial officer presided, without objection, over most of the pretrial proceedings, as well as all aspects of the trial, including sentencing. On appeal, Harris argues that his convictions must be reversed and a new trial ordered because the judicial officer did not have jurisdiction to hear and try cases of first-degree murder. We reverse the convictions, holding that the assignment of a felony-level trial to a judicial officer pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 487.08, subd. 5 (2002), is unconstitutional. Harris is entitled to a new trial.

On February 22, 2000, Harris, John Horton, and Lucas Johnson went to the apartment of David Voegeli and Licolle Behan for a drug transaction. At the apartment were Voegeli, Behan, David Greenwood, and Efftimia Mylonas. According to witnesses, Harris entered the apartment, pulled out a gun, and declared that it was a robbery. He instructed everyone to drop to the floor and empty their pockets. A struggle over the gun ensued and at least two shots were fired, one paralyzing Voegeli and the other fatally wounding Greenwood. According to Harris, Voegeli, Greenwood, Horton, and Johnson attacked Harris after he walked into the apartment, and Harris shot Voegeli and Greenwood in self-defense.

A grand jury indicted Harris for first-degree felony murder, second-degree intentional murder, second-degree unintentional murder, attempted first-degree felony murder, attempted second-degree intentional murder, and first-degree assault. The case was assigned to a judicial officer rather than a district court judge. Neither party objected to the assignment, and the judicial officer presided over most of the pretrial proceedings, as well as the entire trial. The jury found Harris guilty on all charges. The judicial officer sentenced Harris to life in prison for first-degree murder and to a consecutive term of 180 months for attempted first-degree murder.

On appeal, Harris contends that he is entitled to a new trial before a judge of the district court because the judicial officer lacked jurisdiction to hear and try the case. The state contends that Harris waived any objection to assignment of his case to a judicial officer and, in any event, it was not plain error for the chief judge of the district to assign the judicial officer to hear and try the case. Because the issue of a judicial officer’s authority to preside over a felony trial involves purely legal questions, we review the issue de novo. See State v. Wolf, 605 N.W.2d 381, 386 (Minn.2000). Before considering a judicial officer’s proper jurisdiction, we review the background of the judicial officer position within Minnesota’s court system.

A. A History of Judicial Officers in Minnesota

In 1971, the legislature abolished most municipal courts in favor of county courts and authorized the appointment of judicial officers by county courts. Act of June 7, 1971, ch. 951, 1971 Minn. Laws 1985,1985-2011 (codified at Minn.Stat. §§ 487.01-487.41 (1971)); see generally Marlene Johnson & John M. Stuart, Minnesota’s Judicial Officers: A Short History of an Endangered Species, Bench & Bar of Minn., Dec. 1979, at 28, 27-28 (explaining the work of judicial officers and how the position was created). Minnesota Statutes § 487.08 (1971) provided:

When the judicial business of a county-court requires, the county court may appoint one or more part time judicial officers who shall be learned in the law and whose salary shall be fixed by the county court, with the approval of the county board or boards of the counties of the district, and paid by the county. They shall serve at the pleasure of the county court. They shall hear and try such matters as shall be assigned to them by the county court judge.

The judicial officer’s work was seen as a continuation of the services provided by the municipal court, and the positions were created both to handle excess work load and provide short-term employment for probate and municipal judges who did not become county court judges. Johnson & Stuart, supra, at 27-28.

Under the 1971 legislation, a county court judge’s jurisdiction was limited to probate matters, juvenile matters, family court proceedings, civil cases where the amount in controversy did not exceed $5,000, quiet title and mortgage foreclosures, forcible entry and unlawful detainer actions, ordinance violations, minor criminal offenses, and preliminary hearings for any criminal matter occurring in the county. Act of June 7,1971, ch. 951, §§ 14-19, 1971 Minn. Laws 1985, 1992-94. Because county courts did not have jurisdiction over felony matters, a judicial officer appointed under Minn.Stat. § 487.08 could not preside over a felony matter. See id.

In 1977, the legislature abolished the office of judicial officer. Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 432, § 25, 1977 Minn. Laws 1147, 1161. Before the effective date of abolition, however, the 1978 legislature amended the statute to grandfather in existing personnel, authorizing persons holding the office of judicial officer on January 1, 1978, in certain counties to “continue to serve at the pleasure of the chief judge of the district under the terms and conditions of their appointments.” Act of April 5, 1978, ch. 750, § 3, 1978 Minn. Laws 907, 908-09 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 487.08 (1978)). The 1978 act also brought judicial officers under the controlling authority of the chief judge of the judicial district by providing that their salaries would be fixed by the chief judge, that they would be subject to the administrative authority and assignment powers of the chief judge, and that they would hear and try such matters as the chief judge may assign. Minn.Stat. § 487.08, subd. 5 (1978). The 1978 act would have gradually phased out judicial officers through retirement, resignation, or termination of the assignment, but did allow for the appointment of temporary judicial officers for terms to expire no later than July 31, 1981. Act of April 5, 1978, ch. 750, § 6, 1978 Minn. Laws 907, 910.

As part of the same act, the legislature mandated that the supreme court, or an agency designated by it, review and study, among other things, whether the offices of judicial officer and referee should be retained or abolished; and if it was recommended that these offices should be retained, whether the powers and duties should be modified. Id., § 8, 1978 Minn. Laws at 910. On October 1, 1980, the Minnesota Supreme Court Judicial Planning Committee submitted its report to the legislature. Minn. Supreme Court Judicial Planning Comm., Report on the Use of Para-Judicial Personnel in the Minnesota Courts (Oct. 1, 1980) (hereinafter “Committee Report”).

The committee recommended that “[n]o vacancy in the office of judicial officer should be filled, nor new office created.” Id. at 13. The committee noted that following the transfer of assignment powers to the chief judge of the district court in 1978, district court cases were being assigned to judicial officers. Id. at 12-13. The committee stated:

Statutory authority for judicial officers to hear, try, and issue final orders on any matter assigned, together with current assignment practices in the various districts, leads to the conclusion that judicial officers are utilized as functional equivalents of judges.

Id. at 12. In recommending the elimination of the judicial officer position, the committee was concerned that “judicial officers are not judges yet they are engaged in judging.” Id. The committee further explained:

The Minnesota Constitution and fundamental organization of the judiciary contemplate courts staffed with duly elected judges, accountable to the public. * * * Simply stated, the argument is that “people have a right to a judge.”

Id. The committee acknowledged that the judicial officer position provided additional judicial personnel to meet rising caseloads, but advised that “[cjaseload requirements should be accommodated not by counties appointing judicial officers, but by the Legislature creating judgeships.” Id. at 13. The committee also noted that elimination of the judicial officer position would be consistent with recent legislation intended to consolidate, unify, and standardize the court system throughout the state. Id. Accordingly, the committee recommended that the office of judicial officer be abolished when all “grandfathered” positions were vacated or terminated. Id.

Notwithstanding the committee’s recommendations, the legislature did not entirely eliminate the position of judicial officer nor did it modify the duties and powers of judicial officers. Following the Committee Report, the 1981 legislature updated the grandfather provision, providing that persons holding the office of judicial officer on January 1, 1981, in certain counties “may continue to serve at the pleasure of the chief judge of the district under the terms and conditions of their appointment.” Act of June 6, 1981, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 4 art. 3, § 5, 1981 Minn. Laws 2479, 2526 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 487.08, subd. 2 (1982)). Although the same act prescribed the duties and powers of referees, see id. at § 4 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 484.70, subd. 7 (1982)), the legislature did not further address the duties and powers of judicial officers.

The 1982 legislature preserved judicial officer positions in St. Louis, Steele, and Carlton counties, granting authority to the chief judge in those districts to fill any vacancies arising in the office of judicial officer so long as the position existed on January 1, 1981. Act of March 28, 1982, ch. 608, § 2, 1982 Minn. Laws 1457, 1457 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 487.08, subd. 2 (1982)). As of May 1992, the only judicial officer position that remained filled in Minnesota was in St. Louis County. Minn. R.Crim. P. 4 cmt.

B. The Judicial Officer’s Jurisdiction

With this background, we come to our first question. Did the legislature intend to grant authority in the chief judge of a judicial district to assign any district court matter to a judicial officer? The purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine the intent of the legislature. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2002); State v. Larivee, 656 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn.2003).

Harris contends that the judicial officer never had jurisdiction to hear and try his case because the legislature never intended to expand the judicial officer’s jurisdiction from minor criminal cases heard by the county courts to felony level cases under the jurisdiction of the district courts. Harris asserts that a judicial officer is limited to hearing and trying county court matters under the plain meaning of MinmStat. § 487.08 (2002), which states that judicial officers — until their positions are abolished — are to “continue to serve at the pleasure of the chief judge of the district under the terms and conditions of their appointment.” Harris argues that permitting judicial officers to serve “under the terms and conditions of their appointment” refers to their original appointment in county court, and they are permitted to serve so long as they are assigned county court cases. See Minn.Stat. § 487.08, subd. 2 (2002). Alternatively, “terms and conditions” could merely refer to administrative matters such as compensation and benefits and not concern a judicial officer’s jurisdiction.

We conclude that the “terms and conditions” language likely refers to administrative matters and does not express legislative intent about jurisdiction. If the legislature had intended to limit the jurisdiction of judicial officers, it could have included language to that effect. Indeed, the section on referees, enacted as part of the same act, also states that persons holding the office of referee in certain districts “may continue to serve at the pleasure of the chief judge of the district under the terms and conditions of their appointment,” yet contains explicit restrictions on the authority of referees to hear certain contested trials. Act of April 5, 1978, ch. 750, § 2, 1978 Minn. Laws 907, 908 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 484.70, subd. 1 (2002)). Because referees were allowed to continue to serve “under the terms and conditions of their appointment” with limitations on their authority being expressly stated, we conclude that the legislature did not intend “terms and conditions” to define a referee’s jurisdictional limits. In re Butler, 552 N.W.2d 226, 281 (Minn.1996) (“where words of a law are not explicit, the intent of the legislature may be ascertained by considering other laws upon the same or similar subjects”). Similarly, we conclude that the legislature did not intend “terms and conditions” to define a judicial officer’s jurisdictional limits.

Furthermore, Minn.Stat. § 487.08, subd. 5 (2002), subjects judicial officers to the authority of the chief judge of the judicial district:

All judicial officers are subject to the administrative authority and assignment power of the chief judge of the district as provided in section 484.69, subdivision 3. They shall be learned in the law, and shall hear and try matters as assigned to them by the chief judge.

Under section 484.69, the chief judge of each district has the administrative authority to assign any judge any matter in any court of the judicial district. Minn.Stat. § 484.69, subd. 3 (2002). The state contends that the chief judge’s authority to assign matters to judicial officers is without limitation; if the legislature had intended to limit judicial officers to the kinds of cases they formerly heard in county court, the legislature would have said so explicitly. We agree. By the end of 1980, the legislature was made aware of the general jurisdiction of the district courts and that judicial officers were being utilized as the functional equivalent of judges. See Committee Report, supra, at 12. Had the legislature intended to modify the duties and powers of judicial officers, it would have done so explicitly, as it did for referees. See Act of June 6, 1981, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 4 art. 3, § 4, 1981 Minn. Laws 2479, 2526; see Phelps v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 537 N.W.2d 271, 274 (Minn.1995) (declining to read into statute restrictions that the legislature did not include). We therefore conclude the legislature intended to permit the chief judge of the district court to assign any district court or county court matter to a judicial officer under MinmStat. §§ 487.08 and 484.69.

C. Constitutional Limits on Jurisdiction

We arrive at our next question. Does granting authority to the chief judge of a district to assign any district court matter to a judicial officer, including a felony jury trial, violate the Minnesota Constitution? In construing articles of the constitution, we have stated:

“The rules governing the courts in construing articles of the State Constitution are well settled. The primary purpose of the courts is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature and people, in adopting the article in question. If the language used is unambiguous, it must be taken as it reads, and in that case there is no room for construction. The entire article is to be construed as a whole, and receive a practical, common sense construction.”

Rice v. Connolly, 488 N.W.2d 241, 247 (Minn.1992) (quoting State ex rel. Chase v. Babcock, 175 Minn. 103, 107, 220 N.W. 408, 410 (1928)). We provide a brief history of the development of the judicial power of the state to provide context for our analysis.

The Minnesota Constitution vests judicial power of the state in the various courts. The original Minnesota Constitution of 1857 provided:

The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts, courts of probate, justices of the peace, and such other courts, inferior to the supreme court, as the legislature may from time to time establish by a two-thirds vote.

Minn. Const, of 1857, art. VI, § 1. Accordingly, the original language permitted the legislature to establish additional courts so long as they were inferior to the supreme court. In 1956, article VI, section 1, was amended to provide:

The judicial power of the state is hereby vested in a supreme court, a district court, a probate court, and such other courts, minor judicial officers and commissioners with jurisdiction inferior to the district court as the legislature may establish.

Minn. Const, of 1857, art. VI, § 1 (1956). This amendment changed the definition of an inferior court. Before the amendment, a court was inferior so long as its jurisdiction was inferior to the supreme court; after the change, a court or judicial officer was inferior if their jurisdiction was inferi- or to the district court. After further amendment, Minn. Const, art. VI, § 1, currently provides:

The judicial power of the state is vested in a supreme court, a court of appeals, if established by the legislature, a district court and such other courts, judicial officers and commissioners with jurisdiction inferior to the district court as the legislature may establish.

The district court has “original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases.” Minn. Const, art. VI, § 3. This felony first-degree murder case falls within the district court’s original jurisdiction. See Minn. Stat. § 484.01, subd. 1 (2002); Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.01, subd. l(l)(a); State v. Sailor, 257 N.W.2d 349, 351 (Minn.1977). Granting judicial officers the power to hear and try all civil and criminal cases may improperly infringe on the district court’s original jurisdiction. “The legislature’s delegation of an area of the district court’s original jurisdiction calls for this court’s close scrutiny.” Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Minn.1999) (holding that the legislature infringed on the original jurisdiction of the district courts when it empowered administrative law judges to decide child support matters).

Harris maintains that allowing a judicial officer to hear and try a first-degree murder case puts the officer “on the same footing” as a district court judge, in violation of the constitution’s clear mandate that judicial officers have jurisdiction inferior to the district court. We have a common understanding of courts of inferior jurisdiction, and dictionary definitions are instructive and supportive of our understanding. Webster’s defines an inferior court as “a court having limited and specified rather than general jurisdiction.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1158 (1993). Am inferior court is also termed “lower court.” Id. at 1341. Conciliation court is an example of a contemporary court of inferior jurisdiction. See Minn.Stat. § 491A.01 (2002) (addressing establishment, powers, and jurisdiction of conciliation court division of district court). County and municipal courts also are familiar to us as historical examples of such inferior courts. See Minn.Stat. ch. 487 (2002) (addressing county courts); Minn. Stat. ch. 488A (2002) (addressing municipal courts for Hennepin and Ramsey Counties).

If an inferior court is one that has limited and specified rather than general jurisdiction, then it naturally follows that for a judicial officer to remain inferior to the district court under article VI, the judicial officer must have limited and specified jurisdiction. In other words, the judicial officer must be a person having limited rather than general jurisdiction.

The state maintains that a judicial officer may be assigned any district court matter, yet remain “inferior” in jurisdiction to the district court because his jurisdiction is granted on a case-by-case basis. According to the state, “The judicial officer receives whatever jurisdiction he has when the chief judge assigns him a case.” Since the judicial officer has only “dependent” jurisdiction — jurisdiction that is dependent on assignment by the chief judge — it is by definition inferior to the district court’s jurisdiction.

To say that the judicial officer’s jurisdiction is inferior because he can only hear cases assigned to him by the chief judge begs the question, however, because Minn. Stat. § 487.08, subd. 5, does not expressly limit the authority of the chief judge to assign matters to the judicial officer, stating only that judicial officers “shall hear and try matters as assigned to them by the chief judge.” District court judges are subject to the same assignment authority by the chief judge of the district. Minn. Stat. § 484.69, subd. 3 (stating that “[t]he chief judge may assign any judge of any court within the judicial district to hear any matter in any court of the judicial district”). As we see it, the question is not whether the judicial officer’s jurisdiction is independent of the district court; the question is whether his jurisdiction is sufficiently limited or specified so that his authority is inferior to the district court. We cannot say that this judicial officer did not entirely assume the role of a district court judge.

The record reveals that the judicial officer presided over most of the pretrial proceedings, as well as Harris’s entire trial, including jury selection, ruling on eviden-tiary objections, and instructing the jury. He also sentenced Harris to life in prison. His order of judgment was appealable in the same manner as all other final orders of the district court. In sum, he presided over this entire felony trial and was utilized as the functional equivalent of a district court judge.

The power of the judicial officer to hear and try this felony level case was not limited and specific. Rather, the judicial officer exercised jurisdiction over a complex felony trial in which substantive constitutional issues were generally implicated. If judicial officers are allowed to preside over one of the weightiest matters within the district court’s jurisdiction — a first-degree murder trial — then there is no effective limit to the judicial officer’s jurisdiction.

Statutes are presumed constitutional, and we will exercise our power to declare a statute unconstitutional “with extreme caution,” State v. Larsen, 650 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Minn.2002), and only when there is no reasonable alternative construction available. See In re Cold Spring Granite Co., 271 Minn. 460, 467, 136 N.W.2d 782, 787 (1965). Given the history of judicial officers in Minnesota and the unambiguous language of Article VI, we conclude that there is no reasonable alternative available. Therefore, we hold that the legislative grant of authority to the chief judge of a judicial district to assign any district court matter to a judicial officer pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 487.08, subd. 5, violates Article VI, Section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution, because the grant of authority runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that judicial officers be inferior in jurisdiction to the district court.

D. Harris is Entitled to a New Trial

Next, we must determine whether Harris is entitled to a new trial because the judicial officer lacked authority to preside over his trial. Harris did not raise the issue of the judicial officer’s authority until this appeal. The state urges us to apply plain error analysis and uphold the conviction. Harris, on the other hand, maintains that the judgment is void where the court lacks jurisdiction. We decline to adopt either of these analyses.

Ordinarily we limit our review of errors to which the defendant did not object at trial to those constituting plain error affecting substantial rights. See State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740-41 (Minn.1998); Minn. R.Crim. P. 31.02. In a case involving a fundamental question of judicial authority, however, we believe that plain error analysis is inappropriate. Under similar circumstances, the United States Supreme Court recently concluded that plain error analysis did not apply where the question was whether the participation of a non-Article III judge on an appeals panel invalidated the panel’s judgment. Nguyen v. United States, - U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 2130, 2137, 156 L.Ed.2d 64 (2003). The Solicitor General conceded that the panel of the Court of Appeals was improperly constituted, yet urged the court to apply plain error analysis because petitioners had failed to object to the panel’s composition before the cases were submitted for decision. Id. at 2135. The Nguyen court declined to apply plain error analysis because “to ignore the violation of the designation statute in these cases would incorrectly suggest that some action (or inaction) on petitioners’ part could create authority Congress has quite carefully withheld.” Id. at 2137. The court explained that the composition of the panel violated a statutory provision that “embodies weighty congressional policy concerning the proper organization of the federal courts” and that “[e]ven if the parties had expressly stipulated to the participation of a non-Article III judge in the consideration of their appeals, no matter how distinguished and well qualified the judge might be, such a stipulation would not have cured the plain defect in the composition of the panel.” Id.; cf. N. Power Line, Inc. v. Minn. Envtl. Quality Council, 262 N.W.2d 312, 321 (Minn.1977) (stating that parties cannot confer subject-matter jurisdiction on a court by consent).

Even more substantial issues are present here, because this case involves the unconstitutional delegation of authority to a judicial officer to preside over a complex felony trial. We cannot discount the constitutional defect in the authority of the judicial officer simply because Harris failed to raise the issue at trial. Accordingly, we conclude that Harris is entitled to a new trial before a district court judge.

Although we look with disfavor upon Harris’s delay in raising the issue of the judicial officer’s lack of authority until after his conviction, we nonetheless believe that it would be unjust not to consider his claim on direct appeal. We are mindful, however, of the potential consequences of our ruling on other felony trials over which a judicial officer has presided. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 cmt. d (1982) (stating that in the context of collateral attacks on jurisdiction, the interests at stake “are governmental and societal, not those of the parties,” and the question is whether the public interest “is sufficiently strong to permit a possibly superfluous vindication of the rule by a litigant who is undeserving of the accompanying benefit that will redound to him”). In deciding whether to give our ruling retroactive effect, public interest considerations are paramount. For example, we have approved the de facto existence of a municipal court to protect the public and to prevent confusion, uncertainty, and disorder, even though the act establishing the court was held unconstitutional. Marckel Co. v. Zitzow, 218 Minn. 305, 310, 15 N.W.2d 777, 780 (1944). Similarly, in nullifying the administrative child support process created by the legislature, we gave our ruling prospective application, concluding that retroactive application would be very disruptive without advancing the constitutional principle. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d at 727; see also State v. Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65, 72 (Minn.2002) (providing reasons that prospective application of holding is appropriate in a criminal case). Accordingly, because of the reliance by the parties and courts on this judicial officer’s authority in other cases, and the potentially disruptive effect of retroactivity on the administration of justice, we limit application of our holding to this case and to pending and future cases.

Reversed and remanded.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, GILBERT, J.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., and HANSON, JJ.

GILBERT, Justice

(concurring in part, dissenting in part).

I concur with the majority that the legislature intended to permit the chief judge of the district to assign this felony matter to a judicial officer under Minn.Stat. §§ 487.08 and 484.69. I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion as to the constitutional power of a judicial officer to preside over this felony case. Even if the statute under which the judicial officer exercised authority is held unconstitutional, we should follow our long held precedent regarding de facto courts and the defendant should not receive a new trial. Any error must be reviewed for plain error. Here, if there was error, it was harmless and the jury verdict surely cannot be attributed to this alleged error. Furthermore, the objection should have been raised at any of the number of proceedings held by this judicial officer; that was not done and any objection was waived. The appellant received a fair trial and the jury verdict should be affirmed.

The majority incorrectly concludes that Minn.Stat. § 487.08, subd. 5, violates Article VI, § 1 of the Minnesota Constitution, because it runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that a judicial officer’s jurisdiction be inferior to that of the district court. I cannot agree with the majority’s assertion that where the judicial officer’s jurisdiction in any given case is completely dependent on the assignment power of the chief judge of the district, the jurisdiction of the judicial officer is not inferior to that of the district court. Where the judicial officer’s jurisdiction is coextensive, but entirely dependent upon the chief judge of the judicial district, the judicial officer’s jurisdiction is necessarily inferior. As such, contrary to the holding of the majority, Minn.Stat. § 487.08, subd. 5, does not operate in violation of the Minnesota Constitution.

The majority states, “If judicial officers are allowed to preside over one of the weightiest matters within the district court’s jurisdiction — a first-degree murder trial — then there is no effective limit to the judicial officer’s jurisdiction.” The majority ignores the obvious “effective limit” on the judicial officer’s jurisdiction, the fact that the chief judge of the judicial district completely controls the jurisdictional limits of the judicial officer pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 487.08, subd. 5. Minnesota Statutes § 487.08, subd. 5, provides that a judicial officer “shall hear and try matters as assigned to them by the chief judge.” Although a chief judge “may assign any judge of any court within the judicial district to hear any matter,” Minn.Stat. § 484.69, subd. 3, a district judge is not dependent on that assignment power. Minn.Stat. § 484.01, subd. 1. In contrast to a judicial officer, “district courts shall have original jurisdiction in all civil actions within their respective districts, in all cases of crime committed or triable therein, in all special proceedings not exclusively cognizable by some other court or tribunal.” Minn.Stat. § 484.01, subd. 1.

The majority also states, “Granting judicial officers the power to hear and try all civil and criminal cases may improperly infringe on the district court’s original jurisdiction.” Again, the majority has ignored that the legislature provided that the judicial officer can only have jurisdiction over cases the chief judge of the judicial district has assigned to him. The majority, then, must be concerned that the district court will infringe on its own jurisdiction, but declines to describe how this could result. Such an unfounded and illogical worry cannot support overruling an act of the legislature and nullifying an otherwise fair trial.

The majority’s mistaken premise may stem from an improper reliance on Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Minn.1999), which the majority quotes to support its conclusion that the judicial officer’s jurisdiction may infringe on the district court’s jurisdiction. In Holmberg, the legislature had created an administrative hearing process that infringed on the district court’s original jurisdiction. We stated that “the administrative child support process raises grave separation of powers concerns.” Id. at 725. Under the child support adjudication scheme challenged in Holmberg, matters previously handled by the judiciary were improperly assigned for hearing by administrative law judges in the executive branch. Id. at 722. And it allowed non-attorneys (child support officers) to engage in the practice of law. Id. at 722 and 726. Here, there is no evidence of any improper infringement by the executive or legislative branches on the district court’s power in any sense of the imagination. Rather, the authority to assign this case was vested with the judiciary. Minn. Stat. § 487.08, subd. 5. The legislature merely allowed the chief judge of the district court to exercise discretion to assign cases to a judicial officer, also a member of the judiciary. Minnesota Statutes § 487.08, subd. 5, does not infringe on the original jurisdiction of the district court and should not be held unconstitutional.

The majority states, “we decline to define the outer limits of a judicial officer’s jurisdiction because that is a legislative function.” Unfortunately, under the majority’s rationale the outer limit of the judicial officer’s jurisdiction remains a mystery, regardless of any action taken by the legislature. Nor does the majority address the inconstancy arising from this ruling, which prohibits the judicial officer from presiding over a felony trial, but leaves intact his power to handle important parts of felony cases, including the first appearance, bail setting and conditions, probable cause determinations, taking oaths and testimony, appointing public defenders, handling Rule 8 appearances, establishing release without bail, holding hearings for violation of conditional release and accepting pleas. Thus, the legislature and the chief judge of the district court are left to guess what matters, if any, can be assigned to the judicial officer, so as to assure that his jurisdiction is sufficiently “inferior,” such that this court will not overturn the result.

Even if Minn.Stat. § 487.08, subd. 5, is held to be unconstitutional, at a minimum, we should follow the de facto court precedent that has been well-settled law in this state since 1884. This court has held:

But we may go so far as to lay down this proposition, that where a court or office has been established by an act of the legislature apparently valid, and the court has gone into operation, or the office is filled and exercised under such act, it is to be regarded as a de facto court or office. In other words, that the people shall not be made to suffer because misled by the apparent legality of such public institutions.

Burt v. Winona & St. Peter Railroad Co., 31 Minn. 472, 477, 18 N.W. 285, 287-88 (1884).

Sixty years following the decision in Burt, establishing the law of de facto courts, we reiterated our adherence to the principle that the acts of a judge acting under authority of an apparently valid statute are final and binding. “The theory that there may be a defacto court antecedent to the time the law creating the court is declared unconstitutional has become settled policy in this state since the issue first came before the court in Burt v. Winona & St. P.R. Co.” Marckel Co. v. Zitzow, 218 Minn. 305, 306, 15 N.W.2d 777, 778 (1944) (citation omitted) (second emphasis added). This judicial officer’s position has been established by an apparently valid act of the legislature and has operated for a number of years. This case was assigned to this judicial officer by the chief judge of the district and our rules of court have added to his responsibility. As such, “it is to be regarded as a de facto court.” Burt, 31 Minn. at 477, 18 N.W. at 287. There is nothing to distinguish the legal principle we clearly articulated in Burt from the one involved here, “antecedent to the time the law creating the court is declared unconstitutional” the court’s actions are final and binding. Zitzow, 218 Minn. at 306, 15 N.W.2d at 778.

The majority’s decision to overrule the 119-year-old precedent on de facto courts by ignoring it, however, still should not result in overturning the appellant’s first-degree murder conviction had the majority also not chosen to abandon our traditional plain error analysis. The majority looks to Nguyen v. United States, - U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 2130, 156 L.Ed.2d 64 (2003), which is distinguishable from this case. Nguyen involved appointing a non-Article III judge as a member of a Ninth Circuit appellate panel in violation of a federal statute. Id. at 2133-34. In contrast to the congressional limitation, our legislature has left it up to the court to assign appropriate cases to this judicial officer, which our rules of criminal procedure have only further expanded. In fact, our Rules have empowered this judicial officer to perform many of the significant felony-level responsibilities that are carried out by the district court, which we now find to be unconstitutional. If some of the felony-level judicial responsibility assumed by this court official is unconstitutional because his jurisdiction is not inferior to the district court, why would not this same rationale render all of his efforts exercised under our rules unconstitutional? Rather than follow our precedent, the majority creates a new standard to bypass plain error review “in a case involving a fundamental question of judicial authority.”

The majority may have bypassed over our traditional plain error analysis in part because even if there was error, it was not plain, nor one that affected substantial rights. A number of factors indicate that if any error occurred in this trial, it was not plain error: the appellant’s two defense lawyers did not raise an objection at trial; the state allowed the case to proceed through a lengthy trial; the chief judge of the district assigned this case to this judicial officer; and the court of appeals did not sua sponte raise the issue in the two felony cases presided over by this officer that have been reviewed by that court in the past 3 years. State v. Bauer, 642 N.W.2d 760 (Minn.App.2002); State v. Barnes, 618 N.W.2d 805 (Minn.App.2000).

It is important in this analysis to remember the constitutional requirements of a judge. Although this judicial branch employee was appointed to this position, he meets the constitutional requirements of a judge. The constitutional requirements of our judges are that they be learned in the law, and that they be a resident of the district where they are presiding. Minn. Const, art VI, §§ 4, 5. The judicial officer who tried this case meets the constitutional and statutory requirements: he is learned in the law and a resident of the district and is employed by the judicial branch. Furthermore, this officer is under the jurisdiction of the Board on Judicial Standards. See Rules of Board of Judicial Standards, Definitions (defining judge as “any judge, judicial officer * * ⅜ employed in the judicial branch.”). He is also governed by the code of judicial conduct. Minn.Code Jud. Conduct. He has for many years exercised the powers of a district court judge in a wide variety of cases with the approval of the court of appeals and this court. This fact is demonstrated by the number of this judge’s cases that have been decided by both the court of appeals and this court.

The other constitutional requirements for a felony trial have also been met. This case was venued in the proper county, the trial was held in the appropriate courthouse and was tried to a jury with no objections as to the jury or the jury panel. See Minn. Const, art I, § 6. The trial appears to have been in full compliance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to notices, time limits, scheduling, and the actual conduct of the trial.

If there was an error, it surely was not an error that could be classified as a traditional structural error. There was no allegation that this judicial officer was not learned in the law, was incompetent, was biased, or made any procedural errors in handling pretrial issues, voir dire, jury selection or instructions. The judicial officer in this case handled at least 7 separate days of pretrial issues, plus a 9 day jury trial covering 2 weeks, which resulted in the jury rendering a guilty verdict, all without objection. There were also two presumably competent defense lawyers present at all hearings representing the appellant and at no time was there ever any objection or even question about the proceedings being handled by this duly sworn judicial officer. In fact, it appears that the judicial officer handled all of the pretrial and trial proceedings except the initial arraignment, which was handled by a district court judge. Indeed, on appeal, other than the jurisdiction of this judicial officer, there was only one issue raised by appellant’s counsel in the midst of many other rulings and proceedings that occurred in the pretrial and trial context. The only other issue raised on appeal relates to whether this judicial officer abused his discretion when he excluded an out-of-court statement by an allegedly critical defense witness who refused to testify because he feared retaliation by the victims’ families. Importantly, this issue has been preserved for appeal and has been presented to this court for review based on the full transcript of what transpired at trial. This ruling by the judicial officer is of course subordinate to this court if we decided there was an abuse of discretion. We can review that issue on its full merits.

In terms of best practices, prospectively, a defendant should be informed that he may elect to have a district court judge try his case as opposed to this judicial officer. The record should include an explanation of the differences in appointed or elected positions and case assignments. This explanation should be placed on the record and include a defendant’s waiver. However, the absence of this record in the present case does not mean appellant’s trial was defective.

Finally, if there was an objection to having this qualified judicial officer hear this case, the objection should have been made known prior to the commencement of the trial. An objection is deemed waived if raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392, 398 (Minn.2001). There is no support for the assertion that the work of this judicial officer has undermined the trust or confidence of the practitioners aiid citizens of St. Louis County in our system of justice. In fact, two defense lawyers sat on their hands through trial knowing well of this issue that was presented only on appeal. Ironically, the article relating to judicial officers authored by John M. Stuart and cited by the majority pointed out this constitutional issue nearly 25 years ago, stating “it may be inappropriate for non-elected officials to exercise identical powers to that of the county court judges.” Marlene Johnson & John M. Stuart, Minnesota’s Judicial Officers: A Short History of an Endangered Species, Bench & Bar of Minn. 23, 28 (Dec.1979).

Stuart is the State Public Defender and the attorney of record for appellant. Stuart was of the opinion in 1979 that there were “very few complaints, if any, about constitutional problems arising from the appointive nature of the office.” Id. Rather, he pointed out, “a possible problem by the appointive process is that judicial officers are not subject to the assignment power of the chief judges of the districts in which they serve.” Id. Now, after the possible assignment problem has been corrected by the legislature and appellant is saddled with an unsatisfactory trial result, the appellant and his counsel, who were from the same office throughout this proceeding (at the district court and on appeal), are requesting a second bite at the judicial apple. Contrary to what the majority concludes, the interests of justice require that we affirm this conviction. “[T]he people shall not be made to suffer because misled by the apparent legality of such public institutions.” Burt, 31 Minn. at 477, 18 N.W. at 288.

ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Justice

(concurring in part, dissenting in part).

I join in part with Justice Gilbert’s dissent and conclude that the trial court — a judicial officer — was a de facto court when, under longstanding practice and the color of legislative authority, he presided ably and without objection over the trial of Harris. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court as valid and binding under Marckel Co. v. Zitzow, 218 Minn. 305, 15 N.W.2d 777 (1944). When, as in Marckel, the order and judgment of a municipal court are valid and binding even when operating under a statute later declared unconstitutional, so also the judgment of a judicial officer is valid and binding when he operates under long-accepted practice and longstanding statutory authority, now declared unconstitutional. Marckel, 218 Minn. at 310-11, 15 N.W.2d at 780.

HANSON, Justice

(concurring in part, dissenting in part).

I join in the concurrence and dissent of Justice Russell Anderson.

      . In 1973, the legislature authorized county courts to appoint full-time judicial officers. Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 679, § 5, 1973 Minn. Laws 1817, 1823.

      . The 1978 act provided: "All judicial officers are subject to the administrative authority and assignment power of the chief judge of the district as provided in section 484.69, subdivision 3.” Act of April 5, 1978, ch. 750, § 3, 1978 Minn. Laws 907, 909. The referenced section provided in part:
      The chief judge [of each judicial district] may assign any judge of any court within the judicial district to hear any matter in any court of the judicial district. When a judge of a court is assigned to another court he is vested with the powers of a judge of the court to which he is assigned.
      Minn.Stat. § 484.69, subd. 3 (1978).

      . The dissent is not troubled by a judicial officer assuming the role of a district court judge because, in the words of the dissent, "The judicial officer who tried this case meets the constitutional and statutory requirements [of a judge].” This characterization compels us to note that because Judicial Officer Maher was neither elected nor appointed by the Governor, he met neither of the requirements for a judge set forth in Article VI, §§ 7 and 8 of the Minnesota Constitution. In addition, the constitution sets a district court judge’s term of office at six years and prevents the legislature from reducing a judge's salary during the term of his or her office. Minn. Const, art. VI, § 5. Judicial Officer Maher's term of office and salary is not constitutionally protected. Therefore, Judicial Officer Maher met none of the requirements and received none of the protections of a district judge.

      . Our holding is not inconsistent with the assignment of certain non-felony trials and other preliminary matters to a judicial officer. However, we decline to define the outer limits of a judicial officer’s jurisdiction because that is a legislative function. See Minn. Const, art. VI, § 1.

      . The dissent would also uphold the conviction by applying the de facto court doctrine, even though neither party has asked us to do so. Because of the unique facts of this case, our de facto court precedent simply is not applicable here. A de facto judge is a "judge operating under color of law but whose authority is procedurally defective." Black’s Law Dictionary 845 (7th ed.1999). Typically, we have applied the de facto judge doctrine when there is a technical defect in the judge’s statutory authority. For example, we have found a judge to have de facto authority where he signed findings in a case just after his successor had taken the oath of office, Carli v. Rhener, 27 Minn. 292, 292-93, 7 N.W. 139, 139 (1880), and we have upheld the de facto authority of a justice of the peace where he filed his bond and oath with the village clerk of the county seat, rather than with the clerk of court, Canty v. Bockenstedt, 170 Minn. 383, 389, 212 N.W. 905, 907 (1927). See also Marckel Co. v. Zitzow, 218 Minn. 305, 310, 15 N.W.2d 777, 780 (1944) (approving the de facto existence of a municipal court where a two-thirds majority of the senate had not voted for the bill establishing the court as required by the constitution at the time).
      We have never applied the de facto doctrine in a case where the defect in the underlying statute "is not merely technical but embodies a strong policy concerning the proper administration of judicial business.” See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 535-36, 82 S.Ct. 1459, 8 L.Ed.2d 671 (1962) (plurality opinion). Here we are confronted “with a question of judicial authority more fundamental than whether 'some effort has been made to conform with the formal conditions on which [a judge’s] particular powers depend.’ ” Nguyen v. United States, - U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 156 L.Ed.2d 64 (2003) (recognizing a "difference between an action which could have been taken, if properly pursued, and one which could never have been taken at all”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we decline to apply the de facto judge doctrine in these circumstances. Cf. id. at 2135-36 (declining to apply the de facto officer doctrine to uphold the judgment of an improperly constituted panel of the court of appeals).
      Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, our decision does not overrule this court’s precedent on de facto courts and judges. We do not apply the doctrine to the assignment of a felony trial to a judicial officer because such an assignment is an action that could never have been properly pursued.

      . See Minn. R.Crim. P. 4.01; 4.02, subd. 5(1), (2); 4.03, subd. 1; 4.03, subd. 2; 5.01; 5.02, subd. 1(2); 5.03; 5.05; 5.06; 6.02; 6.03; 8.01.

      . See Minn. R.Crim. P. 4.01; 4.02, subd. 5(1), (2); 4.03; 4.03, subd. 2; 5.01; 5.02, subd. 1(2); 5.03; 5.05; 5.06; 6.02; 6.03; 8.01.

      . The majority quotes a portion of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 cmt. d, in the concluding paragraph. The majority would be well served by looking to the sentence immediately following the language quoted from comment d. The sentence states, "[t]he public interest is of that strength [requiring reversal of conviction] only if the tribunal's excess of authority was plain or has seriously disturbed the distribution of governmental powers or has infringed a fundamental constitutional protection.” Thus, the very section of the Restatement cited by the majority supports undertaking a plain error analysis, which the majority has abandoned. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 cmt. d.

      . See, e.g., Bauer, 642 N.W.2d 760; State v. Cyrette, 636 N.W.2d 343 (Minn.App.2001); Myers v. Hearth Technologies, Inc., 621 N.W.2d 787 (Minn.App.2001); State v. Barnes, 618 N.W.2d 805; Minnesota Teamsters Public & Law Enforcement Employees' Union, Local No. 320 v. County of St. Louis, 611 N.W.2d 355 (Minn.App.2000); St. Louis County v. S.D.S., 610 N.W.2d 644 (Minn.App.2000); Demolition Landfill Services, LLC v. City of Duluth, 609 N.W.2d 278 (Minn.App.2000); Baker v. State, 590 N.W.2d 636 (Minn.1999); Follmer v. Duluth, Missabe and Iron Range Ry. Co., 585 N.W.2d 87 (Minn.App.1998); In re Matter of Welfare of C.A.W., 579 N.W.2d 494 (Minn.App.1998); Nat'l Audubon Soc. v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn.App.1997); State v. Brodie, 532 N.W.2d 557 (Minn.1995); State v. Brodie, 529 N.W.2d 395 (Minn.App.1995).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WILLIS, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC., Appellant, v. Edward R. CHOJNACKI, et al., Defendants, Tamara M. Chojnacki, Respondent.
    No. C6-03-121.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Aug. 19, 2003.

      Mark E. Greene, Frank A. Janes, Stand-ke Greene & Greenstein, Ltd., Minneton-ka, for appellant.
    Joel R. Welder, Wollschlager, Tow, Welder & Ringquist, P.A., Fairmont, for respondent.
    Considered and decided by WILLIS, Judge, HUDSON, Judge, and FORSBERG, Judge.

       Retired, judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 10.

   OPINION

WILLIS, Judge.

In a mortgage-foreclosure action, appellant challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to respondent, arguing that the district court erred by concluding that the mortgage held by appellant was not a purchase-money mortgage and therefore not exempt from the spousal-signature requirement of Minn.Stat. § 507.02 (2002). Because we conclude that the district court did not err, we affirm.

FACTS

This dispute arises out of an attempt by appellant Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. to foreclose its mortgage on property that is the homestead of respondent Tamara M. Chojnacki (“respondent”). The facts are largely undisputed.

In December 1995, respondent’s then-husband, Edward R. Chojnacki (“Cho-jnacki”), purchased the property in question under a contract for deed. He satisfied the terms of the contract in December 1996 and received a warranty deed. In 1997, Chojnacki and respondent executed two mortgages on the homestead. Fire destroyed the house on the land in April 1998, and Chojnacki and respondent used the insurance proceeds to satisfy the two mortgages.

In October 1998, Chojnacki and respondent borrowed more than $85,000 from Greentree Financial for the purchase and installation of a mobile home on the land. They secured the loan with a mortgage on the land and a security interest in the mobile home.

In June 1999, Chojnacki borrowed $92,850 from Wells Fargo and secured the loan with a mortgage on the homestead. Although the mortgage document refers to Chojnacki as “a married person,” respondent did not sign it. With $84,984.04 of the proceeds from the Wells Fargo loan, Chojnacki satisfied the balance of the loan secured by the Greentree mortgage.

Chojnacki and respondent dissolved their marriage in February 2002. The district court found that Chojnacki had “clearly committed waste on the real property of the marital estate” and “[f]or this reason and Wife’s poor financial condi-' tion,” the court determined that a disproportionate division of real property was warranted. The court awarded respondent the homestead “free and clear of any claim” by Chojnacki but subject to all “judgments, mortgages, and other encumbrances.”

Chojnacki had defaulted on the Wells Fargo loan in early 2001, and Wells Fargo began foreclosure proceedings against him and respondent in July' 2001. Wells Fargo’s initial petition for a declaratory judgment and foreclosure stated that its mortgage was a “refinance of an existing mortgage rather than a purchase money mortgage,” and Wells Fargo sought an order declaring the mortgage valid “despite the failure to comply with Minn.Stat. § 507.02.” In an amended petition; Wells Fargo contended that its mortgage was a' purchase-money mortgage because it had “replaced the Green Tree purchase-money mortgage as the first mortgage on the premises.”

Chojnacki did not respond to Wells Fargo’s petition, and Wells Fargo obtained a default judgment against him in January 2003. Respondent filed a cross-claim against Wells Fargo, seeking a declaratory judgment that the mortgage was defective because she had not signed it. Respondent and Wells Fargo moved for summary judgment, and in November 2002, the district court granted summary judgment to respondent. This appeal follows.

ISSUE

Did the district court err by concluding that Wells Fargo’s mortgage was not a purchase-money mortgage for purposes of MinmStat. § 507.02 (2002)?

ANALYSIS

Wells Fargo argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment because (i) the mortgage was a pur-cháse-money mortgage, which is exempt from the spousal-signature requirement in Minn.Stat. § 507.02 (2002); (2) respondent is estopped from'denying the validity of the mortgage because she ratified it; and (8) Wells Fargo should be equitably subro-gated to Greentree’s rights as a purchase-money mortgagee. On appeal from summary judgment when the parties agree that the material facts are not in dispute, appellate review is limited to determining whether the district court erred in its application of the law. Reads Landing Campers Ass’n v. Township of Pepin, 546 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Minn.1996). When the district court grants summary judgment based on its application of statutory language to undisputed facts, its conclusion is one of law, and our review is de novo. Lefio v. Hoggsbreath Enters., Inc., 581 N.W.2d 855, 856 (Minn.1998).

Application ofMinn.Stat. § 507.02

Wells Fargo argues that its mortgage is exempt from section 507.02, which provides:

If the owner is married, no conveyance of the homestead, except a mortgage for purchase money unpaid thereon, * * * shall be valid without the signatures of both spouses.

Minn.Stat. § 507.02. A mortgage is a “conveyance” for purposes of section 507.02. See Minn.Stat. § 507.01 (2002). Wells Fargo contends that its mortgage is a purchase-money mortgage, and therefore exempt from the spousal-signature requirement, because the proceeds of the Wells Fargo loan were used to satisfy the Greentree loan, which respondent and Chojnacki used to purchase their mobile home.

Section 507.02- does not define “purchase-money mortgage.” In Marin v. Knox, 117 Minn. 428, 431, 136 N.W. 15, 16 (1912), the supreme court determined that the mortgage at issue in. that case was a purchase-money mortgage because the loan secured by the mortgage was used to satisfy the balance of the purchase price for a parcel of land. The court noted that the deed to the land was not delivered to the buyer until the seller had received all of the purchase price. Id.; see also 4 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property 37.28[1] (2003) (stating that “the key to * * * characterization” as a purchase-money mortgage “is that the loan funds are used to make the purchase of the property possible”). Here, there was no unpaid balance of the purchase price for the land because, at the time Wells Fargo made its loan, respondent and Chojnacki already owned the land free of any encumbrances. And they paid the full purchase price of the mobile home with the proceeds of the loan that was secured by the Green-tree mortgage. The Wells Fargo mortgage could not be a purchase-money mortgage because it was not given to secure any unpaid portion of the purchase price of the land or the mobile home. See O’Halloran v. Marriage, 167 Minn. 443, 445, 209 N.W. 271-72 (1926).

Wells Fargo cites Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. v. Newton, 646 N.W.2d 888 (Minn.App.2002), review denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 2002), for the proposition that its mortgage is a purchase-money mortgage. In Newton, this court held that a mortgage that secured a loan used to pay off a contract for deed was a purchase-money mortgage. See id. at 899. Wells Fargo contends that the only difference between the facts in Newton and the facts here is that Newton involved the satisfaction of a contract for deed, while Chojnacki used the loan to satisfy a mortgage, and that this difference is of no significance. But we conclude that this is a significant difference. In- Newton, a portion of the purchase price had not yet been paid when the buyer executed the. mortgage because she still owed about $55,000 under the contract for deed. See id. at 891. Before she paid a portion of the funds from the mortgage loan to the seller and satisfied the contract for deed, see id., legal title remained in the seller, and the buyer had only equitable title, see In re S.R.A., Inc., 219 Minn. 493, 507, 18 N.W.2d 442, 450 (1945). Here, as we noted earlier, respondent and Chojnacki used the Greentree loan to satisfy the unpaid purchase price of the mobile home, and they thereby received both legal and equitable title, leaving Greentree’s interest to be that of a lienholder. See Romanchuk v. Plotkin, 215 Minn. 156, 161, 9 N.W.2d 421, 424-25 (1943).

Finally, Wells Fargo’s suggested interpretation of section 507.02 yields an absurd result, which wé presume the legislature does not intend. See MinmStat. § 645.17(1) (2002). Under Wells Fargo’s reading, any mortgage would be a purchase-money mortgage so long as some portion of the funds from the loan secured by the mortgage was used to satisfy a loan for purchase money. Accordingly, even a second or third refinance mortgage would be a purchase-money mortgage, and therefore exempt from the signature requirement, because it would be used to satisfy a mortgage that satisfied another mortgage that satisfied the first mortgage, which secured the loan for the purchase money. Given that the spousal-signature requirement “evidences the clear and unambiguous legislative policy of ensuring” the security of the homestead, Dvorak v. Mating, 285 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Minn.1979), it is unlikely that the legislature intended such a far-reaching exception to the signature requirement.

Estoppel by Ratification

Wells Fargo further contends that respondent ratified the mortgage and is therefore estopped from contesting its validity. Ratification occurs when a person with “full knowledge of all the material facts, confirms, approves, or sanctions, by affirmative act or acquiescence, the originally unauthorized act of another.” Anderson v. First Nat'l Bank of Pine City, 303 Minn. 408, 410, 228 N.W.2d 257, 259 (1975) (citing Fox v. Morse, 255 Minn. 318, 96 N.W.2d 637 (1959); Strader v. Haley, 216 Minn. 315, 12 N.W.2d 608 (1943)). A person ratifies his unauthorized signature upon an instrument if he receives and retains the proceeds or the benefits of the unauthorized signature. Strader, 216 Minn. at 328, 12 N.W.2d at 614.

We are not convinced that respondent’s conduct constituted a ratification of the Wells Fargo mortgage. She stated that she learned of the Wells Fargo mortgage only after receiving notice in the mail that the Greentree mortgage had been satisfied, and she said she was “mad” about Chojnacki’s actions. When respondent became aware that the mortgage was likely invalid because it lacked her signature, she filed a cross-claim against Wells Fargo and sought to have the mortgage declared invalid.

Further, estoppel is an equitable remedy, N. Petrochemical Co. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 277 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Minn.1979), and we conclude that application of an equitable remedy should not allow Wells Fargo to avoid the spousal-signature requirement of section 507.02. “[A] court of equity will not disregard statutory law or grant relief prohibited thereby.” Kingery v. Kingery, 185 Minn. 467, 470, 241 N.W. 583, 584 (1932); see also U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Minnesota State Zoological Bd., 307 N.W.2d 490, 497 (Minn.1981) (denying equitable relief when it would circumvent statutory restrictions). Section 507.02 unambiguously requires the signatures of both spouses for non-purchase-money mortgages. To hold that respondent is estopped from asserting the protection of the requirement would be to circumvent the requirement.

Equitable Subrogation

Finally, Wells Fargo argues that it should be equitably subrogated to Greentree’s rights as a purchase-money mortgagee. Under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, a person who has discharged the debt of another may succeed in substitution to the rights and position of the satisfied creditor. First Nat’l Bank of Menahga v. Schunk, 201 Minn. 359, 363, 276 N.W. 290, 292-93 (1937). This equitable principle will be applied in the interest of substantial justice when one party provides funds used to discharge another’s obligations if (1) the party seeking subro-gation has acted under a justifiable or excusable mistake of fact and (2) injury to innocent parties will otherwise result. Carl H. Peterson Co. v. Zero Estates, 261 N.W.2d 346, 348 (Minn.1977).

Wells Fargo has not shown that it acted under a justifiable or excusable mistake of fact. The document evidencing the mortgage from ChojnacM identifies him as “a married person,” and Wells Fargo provides no explanation for its failure to obtain respondent’s signature. Indeed, Wells Fargo’s initial foreclosure petition acknowledged its failure to comply with section 507.02.

Further, allowing the Wells Fargo mortgage to be equitably subrogated to the Greentree mortgage would circumvent the spousal-signature requirement in the same way that applying estoppel by ratification would. We decline, therefore, to do so.

DECISION

The Wells Fargo mortgage is not a purchase-money mortgage and is not, therefore, exempt from the spousal-signature requirement in Minn.Stat. § 507.02 (2002). Further, respondent did not ratify the mortgage, and Wells Fargo is not entitled to equitable subrogation.

Affirmed.


author: MINGE, Judge.

text:
    In re ESTATE OF Patricia D. KING, Deceased.
    No. C7-02-2112.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Aug. 26, 2003.

      David R. Marshall, Crystal M. Ovsak, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, for appellant Robert Glaisyer.
    Scott D. Eller, Robert D. Maher, Best & Flanagan, L.L.P., Minneapolis, for respondent Joseph Glaisyer.
    Stanley M. Rein, Elizabeth S. Wright, Dorsey & Whitney, L.L.P., Minneapolis, for respondents U.S. Bank and William King.
    Considered and decided by STONEBURNER, Presiding Judge, HARTEN, Judge, and MINGE, Judge.
   OPINION

MINGE, Judge.

In a dispute over valuation of a minority block of stock in a closely held corporation for purposes of determining equal distribution of assets pursuant to a will and trust, the district court upheld the trustees’ determination that they were required to use the fair market value approach, which discounted for lack of control and lack of marketability. Appellant claims that since the block of stock, together with the other stock the respondent already owns, will give respondent control of the closely held corporation, the district court erred by approving this fair market valuation approach. Appellant argues that the district court should have directed the trustees to use the investment value approach, which would recognize the value to the respondent of the control of the corporation that decedent’s minority block of stock would give. Because the fair market value approach is an acceptable method for determining the value of a minority block of stock, because the trustees prefer that method, and because the trustees have discretion to select a valuation approach, we affirm.

FACTS

Patricia D. King died in 1996; respondents William A. King and U.S. Bank National Association were appointed her personal representatives. By the terms of her will, and following a disclaimer by her sister, the residue of her estate was devised to her personal representatives as trustees for the benefit of, and for distribution in equal parts to, her two nephews: respondent Joseph Glaisyer and his brother appellant Robert Glaisyer. A significant part of that residue was a minority block of stock in Capitol Securities Corporation (CSC).

CSC is a closely held corporation. When King died, she owned 726 shares of CSC stock. Virtually all remaining shares were held by appellant Robert and respondent Joseph Glaisyer. Joseph owned 645 shares, and Robert owned 468 shares. Joseph is president and CEO of CSC. The trust provides:

[T]o the extent possible, all shares of stock of Capitol Securities Corp. included in the residue of the trust shall be allocated to the share of the residue of the trust to be distributed to my nephew, Joseph L. Glaisyer * * *.

The trust grants the trustees the authority to “determine values” but does not specify a method.

Appraisers determined that, based on the net value of the assets of CSC, its stock was worth $3,880 per share. The parties do not dispute this value. The personal representatives then determined the fair market value of the shares held by King at her death by applying a 45% discount because the shares represent a minority interest and are not readily marketable. The revised plan of distribution uses the resulting fair market value of $2,134 per share. The same value and valuation method had been used in valuing the shares for estate tax purposes.

Robert objected to the use of the fair market value approach in valuing King’s CSC stock. He claimed that receipt of the King shares would give Joseph not a'minority block of stock, but control of CSC, that control carried with it substantial value, and that as a result, use of the fair market approach would defeat King’s intent that assets be equally divided between him and Joseph. Robert advocated use of the investment value method of determining the value of the King block of stock. This investment approach would value the CSC stock according to its value to the recipient. Robert argued that the value to Joseph of that stock should be based on the net value of CSC’s assets, which was, at a minimum, $3,880 per share.

At trial, the drafter of King’s trust testified that there were no discussions with King regarding the method of valuation. The attorney for King’s trustees and personal representatives testified that the fair market value method was the proper appraisal method for trustees to use when determining the distribution. It assumes there is a willing buyer and a willing seller for the block of stock. It looks at the value of what the transferor has, not the benefit that the transferee receives. Robert’s appraiser testified that determining the value of shares under the investment value method, which determines value based on the benefit to Joseph as transferee, would be more appropriate under the circumstances.

The district court found that King’s direction that CSC shares be allocated to Joseph’s share made clear her intent that Joseph would have control of CSC. The court also found that, “[b]eyond the obvious intent that the portions be equal, there is no evidence of any intent concerning valuation methodology, and no facts from which an inference of Decedent’s intent concerning such methodology can be drawn.”

The court went on to find that the use of the fair market value method, including marketability and minority discounts, is commonly accepted in the business and legal world and is used for federal estate and gift tax purposes; that it was used in the estate’s tax returns; that although the investment value method is within the range of reasonable valuation methods that could be chosen by the personal representatives, it is not commonly used; that the co-personal representatives acted reasonably and impartially; that the issue is whether the' method chosen by the co-personal representatives is reasonable and impartial; and that in this case, that choice was both reasonable and.impartial. Based on these findings, the district court approved the distribution. This appeal followed.

ISSUE

Did the district court err in approving the trustees’ use of the fair market value approach to valuing the CSC stock in decedent’s estate?

ANALYSIS

“[S]o long as the trustees act in good faith, from proper motives, and within the bounds of reasonable judgment,” we will not interfere with their decisions. United States v. O’Shaughnessy, 517 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Minn.1994). This court will not substitute its discretion for the discretion of the trustee save when it is necessary to prevent an abuse of discretion such as where the trustee is given discretion in distributing income and corpus. In re Campbell’s Trusts, 258 N.W.2d 856 (Minn.1977); see also Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 187 cmt. a (1959) (discussing the discretion afforded trustees).

Appellate courts review a district court’s findings of fact concerning wills and trusts under a clearly erroneous standard and .review conclusions of law de novo. In re Trust Created Under Agreement with Lane, 660 N.W.2d 421, 425-26 (Minn.App.2003). When reviewing a district court’s findings of fact, this court views the record in the light most favorable to the judgment of the district court. Rogers v. Moore, 603 N.W.2d 650, 656 (Minn.1999). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn.1999) (quotation omitted).

“The trustee may distribute property and money in divided or undivided interests and adjust resulting differences in valuation.” Minn.Stat. § 501B.81, subd. 26 (2002). “[Ijmpartiality [toward beneficiaries] governs exercise of trustees’ powers * * *.” In re Great N. Iron Ore Props., 263 N.W.2d 610, 621 (Minn.1978). And the method used by trustees to determine the value of trust assets must be reasonable. See Minn.Stat. § 524.3-906(a)(3) (2002) (stating that the personal representative may ascertain value of an estate’s assets for distribution “in any reasonable way”); O’Shaughnessy, 517 N.W.2d 574, 577 (stating that trustees’ acts must be within the bounds of reasonable judgment).

“The citadel of will and trust construction, before which all other rules of construction must bow, is the elusive ‘intent of the trustor or testator.’ ” In re Trusts Created by Agreement with Harrington, 311 Minn. 403, 405, 250 N.W.2d 163, 165 (1977) (citation omitted). The primary concern of the court is to give effect to the intent of the testator as expressed in the plain language of the will. In re Shields, 552 N.W.2d 581, 582 (Minn.App.1996), review denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 1996). A testator’s intention must “be ascertained from the language of his will, which may have a meaning controlled by surrounding circumstances or context.” In re Holden’s Trust, 207 Minn. 211, 215, 291 N.W. 104, 106 (1940).

Appellant argues that the district court’s finding that the trustees’ use of the fair market value method to assess CSC stock was within the trustee’s discretion is clearly erroneous because the method of valuation was unreasonable, partial, and contrary to the intent of Patricia King. We disagree.

Appellant has failed to demonstrate why the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Instead, appellant seems to argue that the investment value method would be a better method of determining the value of the stock. But it is not the province of this court to determine which method of valuation is the best; we determine whether the district court’s findings regarding valuation and distribution are clearly erroneous.

Appellant has not demonstrated that the fair market value method is unreasonable. And other jurisdictions have held that the fair market value method is a reasonable method to determine the value of trust assets. See, e.g., Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Stone, 348 Mass. 345, 203 N.E.2d 547, 551 (1965) (stating that trustee must divide up trust property in accordance with fair market value of property at the time of the distribution in kind); In re Sturdevant, 340 N.W.2d 888, 891 (N.D.1983) (holding that fair market value is a reasonable method to establish value of trust’s interests in corporations). We also point out that, although not mandatory, the consistency of the trustees’ use of the same method for estate tax purposes and for distribution of trust assets promotes simple and efficient resolution of estate-related matters. Further, that the IRS found the values used to be reasonable contributes to our conclusion that the court’s finding of reasonableness is not clearly erroneous.

Appellant relies on the case of Clement v. Larkey, 314 Ark. 489, 863 S.W.2d 580 (1993), to assert that the investment method should have been used in this case. Clement is similar to this case in that it involved valuation of a controlling block of corporate stock and use of the investment approach by the personal representatives. Id. at 580. However, Clement did not hold that actual benefit to the recipient is the only reasonable method by which shares can be evaluated; it only determined that such a method was reasonable and appropriate under the facts of that particular case. Id. at 582-83. The court in Clement recognized the discretion of the personal representatives; it did not decide that the fair market value method is unreasonable. Id. Here, the district court determined that both the investment value method and the fair market value method were reasonable valuation approaches and held that the trustees could use either method.

Although the investment value method is a reasonable method, mandating that it be used could create some awkward situations. For example, if a decedent leaves a farm to two heirs “equally” and one heir already operates a farm adjacent to the decedent’s farm, the inherited land would be of greater value to him than to the heir who does not own or farm any neighboring land. Under the investment value method, the personal representatives would need to determine the distribution of land based on its value to each heir. In the case before us, use of the investment value method would result in the brothers having a different -per share value attached to the same stock. The shares of stock needed to become the controlling shareholder would be valued differently from the shares in excess of those needed for control. At least hypothetically, that one share at the point of achieving control would have tremendous value to Joseph compared to other shares. Carried to- a logical extreme, the investment value method might present formidable complications for those attempting to reasonably and impartially distribute assets to beneficiaries who own an interest in the same business or neighboring property. The trustees had the discretion to avoid such a valuation trap. Thus, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by approving the fair market valuation method used by the trustees.

Appellant further argues that the valuation method used by the trustees is contrary to the intent of the testator. Appellant claims that because of the greater value of CSC stock to Joseph, the assets distributed to him are worth more than those going to appellant and that this inequity runs contrary to King’s intent that each should receive an equal share of her estate. The language of the trust does not indicate that a particular method of valuation is preferred, and trial testimony does not indicate that King had any particular method of valuation in mind. There is nothing in the record indicating that King’s intent was that the trust assets should be of equal value to the beneficiaries. Both valuation methods at issue distribute the assets equally — one based on the- Value of the assets to the testator and one based on the value to each of the transferees. There is no indication that the method used is contrary to King’s intent.

Finally, appellant contends that because either the investment or the fair market method of valuing assets could have been used, the belief of the trustees that the law required use of the fair market value method prejudiced their choice and denied appellant a reasonable opportunity to have his perspective considered. We decline to accept this argument. Appellant fails to provide any authority suggesting that trustees must know the extent of their discretion when determining the method of valuing trust assets. In any event, the respondent trustees’ vigorous defense on appeal of the use of the fair market value method demonstrates a commitment to that approach even in circumstances when the option to use the investment valuation method was available to them.

DECISION

The district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the trustees’ use of the fair market value method was reasonable and within their discretion. That the trustees initially may have thought that they did not have discretion to use the investment method of valuation does not affect the decision in this case.

Affirmed.

      . Generally, determining what is reasonable is a question of fact. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Hertzberg, 511 N.W.2d 25, 27 (Minn.App.1994) (holding that determining whether a sale is commercially reasonable is a question of fact), review denied (Minn. Mar. 31, 1994); Ryan v. Bigos Props., 351 N.W.2d 680, 681 (Minn.App.1984) (stating that reasonable value of attorney's services is a question of fact).

      . The parties have not raised or addressed, and therefore we do not consider, the accuracy of the discount used to obtain the fair market value of CSC stock. Furthermore, we note that there are additional questions not addressed by the parties, including whether, under the investment value method, the corporate stewardship duty of majority shareholder toward the minority shareholders limits Joseph’s ability to reap the full benefit Robert attributes to Joseph's majority block of stock. The possible impact of this and other principles of fairness and good faith on the value of the stock to Joseph were not directly discussed by the parties and are not addressed in this opinion.


author: G. BARRY ANDERSON, Judge.

text:
    Reed M. ROLOFF, Relator, v. COMMISSIONER OF the DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, Respondent.
    No. C1-02-2204.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Aug. 26, 2003.

      Ann Juergens, Henry Wang, Certified Student Attorney, William Mitchell Law Clinic, St. Paul, for relator.
    Lee B. Nelson, M. Kate Chaffee, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul, for respondent.
    Considered and decided by HALBROOKS, Presiding Judge, SHUMAKER, Judge, and G. BARRY ANDERSON, Judge.
   OPINION

G. BARRY ANDERSON, Judge.

Relator brings this certiorari appeal challenging the determination made by the Employment and Economic Development Commissioner’s representative that relator was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits. Relator argues it was error for the representative to conclude that under Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 4(c) (2002), an application for primary social security disability benefits bars receipt of Minnesota unemployment benefits. We affirm the decision of the commissioner’s representative.

FACTS

Prior to suffering a massive stroke in 1998, relator Reed M. Roloff lived in Florida and was employed as a biomedical engineer designing custom wheelchair equipment. The stroke caused Roloff to experience short-term memory loss, kidney disease, vision problems, loss of strength on his left side, and allergy-related asthma. Such problems such as difficulty concentrating, lack of stamina and fatigue have made it difficult for Roloff to function in the workplace. And as a result of the stroke, Roloff is unable to lift more than 20 pounds. Due in part to the complications caused by the stroke, Roloff decided to move to Minnesota to live with his parents. Roloff began receiving disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (SSA) in August 1998. In June 1999, the SSA determined Roloff was no longer disabled and discontinued the benefits.

Roloff had considerable difficulty maintaining employment after losing the disability benefits. Between June 1999 and November 2001, Roloff had four jobs. In December 2001 Roloff began receiving unemployment compensation benefits. Roloff also sought help obtaining new employment from various social service agencies. Many of these providers suggested Roloff once again apply for social security disability benefits. Based on this advice, Roloff applied for disability benefits on March 22, 2002. The SSA denied Roloffs application in May 2002.

On May 23, 2002, Roloff was notified by the State of Minnesota that he was no longer eligible to receive unemployment compensation because he had applied for disability benefits. One week later, Roloff was informed that because he had received unemployment compensation while seeking disability benefits he had been “overpaid” and must reimburse the state for the unemployment compensation he received while seeking disability benefits from SSA.

Roloff decided to appeal both SSA’s denial of his request for disability benefits and the state’s determination that he was ineligible for unemployment compensation and demand for reimbursement. Roloff appealed the SSA decision on July 23, 2002, and on July 31 he was informed that the decision to deny him disability benefits had been affirmed. Roloff decided not to pursue his claim for disability benefits any further.

In August 2002, following a hearing on Roloff s appeal of the state’s determination of ineligibility and its demand for repayment, an unemployment law judge found that because Roloff was seeking social security disability benefits he was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation between March 17, 2002, and August 3, 2002. The unemployment law judge also ordered Roloff to repay the money he received when ineligible.

The commissioner’s representative upheld the ineligibility determination and ordered Roloff to reimburse the state $1,735 for unemployment compensation he received while ineligible. This certiorari appeal followed.

ISSUE

Did the commissioner’s representative err in concluding that relator’s application for primary social security disability benefits made him ineligible for unemployment compensation during the period relator was actively seeking social security benefits?

ANALYSIS

Whether an appellant was properly disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation is a mixed question of law and fact. Carlson v. Augsburg College, 604 N.W.2d 392, 393 (Minn.App.2000). Findings of fact made by the commissioner’s representative are reviewed in the light most favorable to the representative’s decision and are not to be disturbed if there is evidence to support them. Ress v. Abbott Northwestern Hosp., Inc., 448 N.W.2d 519, 523 (Minn.1989). But the representative’s determination that a person was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. Id.

The facts are not in dispute here. Both parties agree that Roloff was receiving unemployment compensation when he applied for social security disability benefits. But Roloff challenges the representative’s conclusion that he was ineligible for unemployment compensation while he was seeking disability benefits.

At the center of this controversy is Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 4(c) (2002), which provides in part

an applicant shall be ineligible for unemployment benefits for any week with respect to which the applicant is receiving, has received, or has filed for primary social security disability benefits,

(emphasis added).

Roloff argues that, despite the specific language of the statute, the mere fact that he applied for disability benefits does not preclude him from receiving unemployment compensation. When interpreting the meaning of a statute, courts are to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2002); Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 715 (Minn.1999). “Every law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 ‘When interpreting a statute, we first look to see whether the statute’s language, on its face, is clear or ambiguous.” Am. Family Ins. Group v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn.2000) (citation omitted). “A statute is only ambiguous when the language therein is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. (citation omitted). “When the words of a law * * * are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing [its] spirit.” Minn.Stat. 645.16.

Contrary to Roloffs thorough argument, the meaning of the statute is clear. If a person has -filed for social security benefits, that person is not eligible to receive unemployment compensation. Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 4(c). The statute does not define what acts constitute filing for social security benefits. But “file” has generally been defined as “entering] (a legal document) on public official record.” The American Heritage Dictionary 680 (3d ed.1992). This definition encompasses Roloffs act of applying for disability benefits.

Roloff was receiving unemployment compensation when he applied for disability benefits. In light of this undisputed evidence and the plain language of Minn. Stat § 268.085, subd. 4(c), we must conclude that the representative’s decision was correct and should be affirmed. Similarly, because the meaning of the statute is plain on its face, Roloffs argument that the representative’s interpretation would lead to absurd results and his suggestion that this court examine the statute’s legislative history are misplaced. See Mueller v. Comm’r of Economic Sec., 638 N.W.2d 91, 93 n. 1 (Minn.App.2001) (“Courts should turn to a statute’s legislative history to determine how it should be construed only when the language of the statute is ambiguous/’).

Roloff raises a series of additional challenges to the representative’s decision. In particular, Roloffs argues that the representative ignored controlling legal authority when interpreting Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 4(c). Roloff relies on Dep’t. of Employment. Sec. v. Zroker, 280 Minn. 286, 159 N.W.2d 190 (1968), to support this argument.

In Zroker, the supreme court interpreted a statutory provision very similar to the one at issue here. The Zroker court was asked to determine whether receipt of a workers’ compensation settlement precludes receipt of unemployment payments in light of Minn.Stat. § 268.08, subd. 3, which states

[a]n individual shall not be eligible to receive benefits for any week with respect to which he is receiving, has received, or has filed a claim for remuneration in an amount equal to or in excess of his weekly benefit amount in the form of
(3) compensation for loss of wages under the workmen’s compensation law of this state or any other state or under a similar law of the United States * * *.

Zroker, 280 Minn, at 289, 159 N.W.2d at 192 (quotation omitted) (emphasis added). Ultimately, the Zroker court did not decide whether receipt of the settlement disqualified an applicant for unemployment compensation purposes because there was no evidence of receipt of workers’ compensation proceeds while receiving unemployment compensation. Id.

Roloff argues that because he did not receive disability benefits while he was receiving unemployment compensation, similar to Zroker, he should not be ineligible for benefits. But there are significant differences between this case and Zroker. In Zroker, the relator received a lump-sum settlement payment, representing a 66-week period of disability. Id. at 288, 159 N.W.2d at 191. But the relator only sought the workers’ compensation settlement after his eligibility for unemployment compensation had expired. Id. And although the relator received a payment representing more than five years of disability, there was no evidence that the period of disability overlapped with the period during which he received unemployment compensation. Id. at 289, 159 N.W.2d at 192. Here, because Roloff actually sought the disability benefits while receiving unemployment compensation, Zroker is neither controlling nor helpful.

Similarly, Roloffs reliance on Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys., Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999), is also misplaced. In Cleveland, the United States Supreme Court held that the receipt of social security disability insurance (SSDI) did not automatically preclude a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Id. at 807, 119 S.Ct. at 1604. The Supreme Court in Cleveland was addressing the interplay between two federal statutes. Here, the issue is simply limited to the scope of a single Minnesota statute.

Cleveland, at best, is helpful simply to suggest an alternative route the Minnesota legislature could have taken. But this road not taken does not alter the clear legislative mandate. The legislature chose to disqualify a person who receives or applies for unemployment benefits while applying for social security benefits. Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 4(c). The legislature also elected to make these applicants ineligible even though they may never receive a social security disability award, leaving the applicant without any means of assistance. This may be a less than perfect public policy choice but it “does not * * * render the statute invalid.” Shreve v. Deft. of Econ. Sec., 283 N.W.2d 506, 508 (Minn.1979) (quoting Idaho Dep’t. of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100, 101, 98 S.Ct. 327, 328, 54 L.Ed.2d 324 (1977)).

Finally, Roloff argues that the commissioner’s representative took subdivision 4(c) out of context from the rest of the statute. Roloff contends that because he did not receive disability benefits he was not required to reimburse the state for the unemployment compensation he received while ineligible. See Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 4(e) (stating “any applicant who receives primary social security old age or disability benefits for periods that the applicant has been paid unemployment benefits shall be considered overpaid those unemployment benefits * * *.”). But Roloffs argument ignores the requirement in Minn.Stat. § 268.18, subd. 1 (2002), that any improper payment of funds made to an applicant must be repaid even if the payment resulted from an error made by the applicant or an employee of the department. To interpret Minn.Stat. § 268.085, subd. 4, as Roloff suggests would be to disregard the specific direction of the legislature as set out in Minn.Stat. § 268.18.

DECISION

Because Minn. Stat § 268.085 provides that applying for social security disability benefits bars contemporaneous receipt of unemployment benefits, the commissioner’s representative properly concluded that Roloff was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.

Affirmed.

      . The parties do not dispute that relator’s application was for primary social security disability benefits, and thus we refer to primary social security disability benefits and social security disability benefits interchangeably.

      . Roloff actually appealed three separate Department of Economic Security (DES) decisions: (1) the initial determination of ineligibility (DES No. 10616-02); (2) determination that Roloff had been overpaid between March and April 2002 (DES No. 10617-02); and (3) the determination that he had been overpaid in April and May 2002 (DES No. 10618-02). As of July 1, 2003, the Commissioner of Economic Security is now known as the Commissioner of Employment and Economic Development and the Minnesota Department of Economic Security is now known as the Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development.