author: PAUL H. ANDERSON, Justice. STRINGER, Justice PAGE, Justice RUSSELL A. ANDERSON, Justice

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, petitioner, Appellant, v. R.M.H., Respondent.
    No. C0-99-559.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Aug. 24, 2000.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 3, 2000.
   OPINION

PAUL H. ANDERSON, Justice.

The issue before us is whether the State of Minnesota has jurisdiction to enforce its speeding and driver’s license laws against an Indian who commits these offenses on a state highway located on the reservation of a tribe of which the Indian is not an enrolled member. The district court concluded that Minnesota does have jurisdiction over an Indian who is not an enrolled member of the tribe on whose reservation the offenses occurred. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that federal law does not distinguish between tribes and reservations in granting a state jurisdiction over offenses committed on an Indian reservation. We reverse the court of appeals.

On October 29, 1998, R.M.H., then 15 years old, drove a motor vehicle on a state highway within the boundaries of the reservation of the White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians. A Becker County police officer stopped R.M.H. for driving 14 miles per hour in excess of the posted 50 mile-per-hour speed limit. After the stop, the officer gave R.M.H. a citation for violating Minn.Stat. § 169.14 (1998) (speeding) and Minn.Stat. § 171.02 (1998) (driving without a license).

R.M.H. appeared in Becker County District Court on February 24, 1999, for both offenses. During that appearance, R.M.H. stipulated that he was driving 14 miles per hour in excess of the speed limit and was driving without a valid driver’s license. R.M.H. and the state then stipulated that R.M.H. was not an enrolled member of the White Earth Band, although his mother is a member of the band. Finally, they stipulated that R.M.H. is an enrolled member of the Forest County Potawatomi Community in Crandon, Wisconsin and that the offenses occurred within the boundaries of the White Earth Reservation.

Following the district court’s acceptance of this stipulation, R.M.H. moved the court to dismiss the charges against him on jurisdictional grounds. R.M.H. argued that under Pub.L. 280, 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1998), and this court’s decision in State v. Stone, 572 N.W.2d 725 (Minn.1997), Minnesota did not have jurisdiction over these traffic offenses. More specifically, R.M.H. argued that the state lacked jurisdiction because he is an Indian for the purposes of federal law, the offenses occurred in “Indian country,” and the offenses were civil/regulatory. The state disagreed, arguing that neither Pub.L. 280 nor Stone applies here because R.M.H. is not an enrolled member of the White Earth Band. The district court agreed with the state, concluding that R.M.H. was subject to state jurisdiction. The court then denied R.M.H.’s motion to dismiss, found him guilty of the cited offenses, and ordered him to pay fines and surcharges totaling $167.50.

The court of appeals reversed the district court, concluding that Pub.L. 280, which grants Minnesota jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country, does not differentiate between tribes or reservations. See State v. R.M.H., 602 N.W.2d 411, 412 (Minn.App.1999). In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals cited our decision in Topash v. Commissioner of Revenue, 291 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn.1980). More specifically, the court of appeals stated that, in Topash, this court “recognized, in a different context, that Public Law 280 makes no distinctions among Indians of various tribes.” R.M.H., 602 N.W.2d at 412 (citing Topash, 291 N.W.2d at 682). The court of appeals then held that, under Stone, the state lacked subject matter jurisdiction over R.M.H.’s traffic offenses. See R.M.H., 602 N.W.2d at 413. On appeal to this court, the state challenges the court of appeals’ holding that Minnesota lacked subject matter jurisdiction over R.M.H.’s offenses.

I.

We review issues of jurisdiction de novo. See Minnesota Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Metropolitan Council, 587 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Minn.1999). State jurisdiction over Indians is governed by federal statutes or case law. See Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 728; see also National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855-56, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985). The United States Supreme Court has approved an analytical framework for determining whether state law applies to an Indian in Indian country. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207, 210, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987) (“public policy test” superceded by Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988) with respect to Class III gaming, see generally United States v. E.C. Invs., Inc., 77 F.3d 327 (9th Cir.1996)). Under this framework, state law does not generally apply to tribal Indians on their reservation absent express consent from Congress. See id. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 1083. However, even absent such express consent, a state may exercise its authority if the operation of federal law does not preempt it from doing so. See id. at 215, 107 S.Ct. 1083.

In State v. Stone, we resolved an issue similar to the one we face here. 572 N.W.2d 725 (Minn.1997). Therefore, the same analytical framework that we applied in Stone is appropriate here. In Stone, the state charged enrolled members of the White Earth Band with violating state traffic laws while on their reservation and the band members contested state jurisdiction over their offenses. Id. at 728. In order to determine whether Congress had expressly consented to state jurisdiction, we first examined Pub.L. 280, which expressly grants Minnesota broad criminal and limited civil jurisdiction over specified areas of Indian country. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a); see also Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 1083. We held that Pub.L. 280 did not expressly grant Minnesota jurisdiction because we determined that the charged offenses were civil/regulatory rather than criminal in nature. See Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 731. Recognizing that “[t]he Supreme Court has not established a per se rule prohibiting the exercise of state jurisdiction * * in the 'absence of an express congressional grant of jurisdiction,” we then addressed whether exceptional circumstances existed so that Minnesota could nonetheless exercise jurisdiction. See id. at 731-32. We ultimately concluded that the state lacked jurisdiction over the offenses committed by these enrolled members of the White Earth Band. See id.

In this case, we are presented with the question of whether the same legal principles that barred state jurisdiction in Stone apply where the offender is an Indian, but is not an enrolled member of the governing tribe. Here, as in Stone, we first must look to Pub.L. 280 to determine whether Congress has expressly consented to Minnesota’s jurisdiction over R.M.H.’s traffic offenses. In the absence of such express consent, we then would have to determine whether federal law preempts state jurisdiction.

Public Law 280 grants Minnesota jurisdiction over offenses “committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country” within Minnesota, except on the Red Lake Indian Reservation. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a). This grant of jurisdiction was intended to combat the problem of lawlessness on reservations and a lack of tribal law enforcement. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976). The Supreme Court defined the parameters of Pub.L. 280 in Cabazon when it held that Pub.L. 280 grants states “broad criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians within all Indian country within the State.” Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 1083. The Court then approved the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that a state statute is “criminal/prohibitory,” and therefore within Pub.L. 280’s grant of jurisdiction, if the statute is generally intended to prohibit certain conduct. Id. at 209, 107 S.Ct. 1083 (citing Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir.1982)), Conversely, the Court held that a statute does not fall within Pub.L. 280’s grant of jurisdiction if it generally permits the conduct at issue, subject to regulation. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209, 107 S.Ct. 1083. In the latter case, the statute is properly classified as “civil/regulatory” and Pub.L. 280 does not expressly grant the state jurisdiction to enforce the statute on an Indian reservation. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209, 107 S.Ct. 1083 (quoting Barona, 694 F.2d at 1185).

We specifically addressed Pub.L. 280’s scope with respect to certain traffic laws in Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 725. There, we characterized the laws at issue, which included driving without a valid driver’s license and speeding, as civil/regulatory. See id. at 728, 731. Accordingly, we concluded that, under Pub.L. 280, Minnesota did not have authority to enforce its civil/regulatory traffic laws that occurred on the White Earth Reservation against enrolled members of the White Earth Band. See Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 732. Further, we concluded that exceptional circumstances did not exist to warrant state jurisdiction over a tribal member absent an express federal grant. See id. Therefore, we held that the state lacked jurisdiction over the offenses. See id.

Citing Stone, R.M.H. argues that Minnesota does not have jurisdiction over his traffic offenses because they are civil/regulatory. The state argues that R.M.H.’s offenses do not fit within the ambit of Pub.L. 280. Rather than focusing on the nature of R.M.H.’s offenses, the state argues that Pub.L. 280 does not apply to R.M.H. because he is not an “Indian” for the purposes of federal law. Consequently, while R.M.H. and the state focus on different aspects of Pub.L. 280, they both argue that this federal statute does not expressly grant Minnesota jurisdiction over R.M.H.’s offenses. We agree with this conclusion, which is consistent with our decision in Stone. Therefore, we hold that R.M.H.’s driving without a license and speeding offenses are civil/regulatory and do not fit within Pub.L. 280’s express grant of jurisdiction to Minnesota. See Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 731. Because we reach this result under our holding in Stone, it is not necessary for us to address the state’s argument that R.M.H. is not an “Indian” for the purposes of Pub.L. 280.

II.

Having concluded that Pub.L. 280 does not grant Minnesota jurisdiction over R.M.H.’s traffic offenses, we turn to the next part of our analysis. Here, as in Stone, we must consider whether, absent express consent, Minnesota nonetheless may exercise its jurisdiction over R.M.H.’s offenses. As previously noted, a state may exercise jurisdiction on a tribal reservation absent express federal consent if the operation of federal law does not preempt it from doing so. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 215, 107 S.Ct. 1083. Therefore, we must consider whether federal law preempts Minnesota from exercising jurisdiction over R.M.H.’s traffic offenses which were committed on a state highway located on the White Earth Reservation.

A state may be preempted by federal law from exercising jurisdiction over activity undertaken on a reservation or by tribal members. See id. at 216, 107 S.Ct. 1083. “State jurisdiction is preempted * * * if ⅛ interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority.” New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334, 103 S.Ct. 2378, 76 L.Ed.2d 611 (1983). Although Indian tribes still possess “attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territoryf-,]” United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978) (superceded by Indian Civil Rights Act 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1983 & Supp.1998) as to inherent power of Indian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians, see United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir.1998)) (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975)), this right of tribal self-government is ultimately subject to the broad power of Congress. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143, 100 S.Ct. 2578, 65 L:Ed.2d 665 (1980).

The Supreme Court stated in Cabazon that “ ‘under certain circumstances a State may validly assert authority over the activities of nonmembers on a reservation, and ... in exceptional circumstances, a State may assert jurisdiction over the on-reservation activities of tribal members.’ ” 408 U.S. at 215, 92 S.Ct. 2308 (quoting Mescalero, 462 U.S. at 331-32, 103 S.Ct. 2378). In Stone, we held that such “exceptional circumstances” were not present when Minnesota sought to exercise its jurisdiction over civil/regulatory traffic offenses committed on a tribal reservation by enrolled members of the governing tribe. See Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 732. Because a state’s jurisdictional relationship to a person on a tribal reservation varies depending on whether that person is an enrolled member of the tribe, we must first ascertain R.M.H.’s status in relation to the White Earth Band by examining relevant federal authority.

At this point, it is important to reiterate that it is undisputed that R.M.H. is not an enrolled member of the White Earth Band. Although R.M.H. may be eligible for membership with the White Earth Band because his mother is an enrolled member, this is not an issue here. R.M.H. stipulated that at the time of the offenses he was not an enrolled member of the White Earth Band. Therefore, for the purposes of our review, R.M.H. is a nonmember Indian; that is to say, he is an Indian who is not an enrolled member of the governing tribe — the White Earth Band — on whose reservation his traffic offenses occurred.

Tribal sovereignty is “dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the States.” Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 1083 (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980)). Therefore, in order to ascertain the scope of tribal sovereignty in a given situation, federal case law controls. See National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 855-56, 105 S.Ct. 2447. This conclusion mandates that we look to a series of Supreme Court cases under which the Court has provided a framework for understanding and applying the concept of Indian sovereignty as it relates to nonmember Indians. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 684-85, 110 S.Ct. 2053, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990) (stating that Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978), and Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 313, 98 S.Ct. 1079, as well as subsequent cases provide the analytic framework for resolution of the issue of whether sovereignty retained by tribes in their independent status within our scheme of government includes the power of criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers). Analysis of these cases reveals that Indian sovereignty is at its strongest in the context of self-governance, that is, authority over members of the governing tribe. In contrast, the strength of Indian sovereignty is less with respect to authority over nonmembers of the governing tribe, including nonmember Indians.

In Oliphant, the Supreme Court discussed the general nature of Indian sovereignty in the context of determining whether Indian tribal courts have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 435 U.S. 191, 206, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978). The Court described Indian tribes as being “quasi-sovereign” by virtue of their incorporation into the United States. See id. at 208-09, 98 S.Ct. 1011 (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 15, 8 L.Ed. 25 (1831)). The Court later described this retained sovereignty as that needed to control and to preserve a tribe’s own internal relations, customs, and social order. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 685-86, 110 S.Ct. 2053. As a result of this limitation on tribal sovereignty, the Court reasoned that Indian tribes do not retain the power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States, except to the extent allowed by Congress. See id. at 211, 110 S.Ct. 2053.

The Supreme Court next interpreted and applied its reasoning and holding in Oliphant in Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 313, 98 S.Ct. 1079. The Court stated in Wheeler that Indian sovereignty “exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.” Id. at 323, 98 S.Ct. 1079. Therefore, Indian tribes only “possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.” Id. In Wheeler, the Court further explained that limitations on jurisdiction

rest on the fact that the dependent status of Indian tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with their freedom independently to determine their external relations. But the powers of self-government, including the power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal laws, are of a different type. They involve only the relations among members of a tribe. Thus, they are not such powers as would necessarily be lost by virtue of a tribe’s dependent status.

Id. at 326, 98 S.Ct. 1079 (emphasis added).

The Court subsequently applied Oli-phant in the context of nonmember Indians when it addressed whether a tribe could prohibit hunting and fishing by nonmembers of the tribe on reservation land owned by non-Indians. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981). In Montana, the Court stated that “[tjhough Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority in criminal matters, the principles on. which it relied support the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.” Montana, 450 U.S. at 565, 101 S.Ct. 1245 (footnote omitted). The Court therefore concluded that a tribe also retained authority over conduct of non-Indians if that conduct threatens or directly affects the political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of the tribe. See id. at 566, 101 S.Ct. 1245 (citing Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386, 96 S.Ct. 943, 47 L.Ed.2d 106 (1976)). Because such interests were not implicated under the facts before it in Montana, the Court held that the tribe did not have jurisdiction to regulate hunting or fishing on reservation land owned by nonmembers of the tribe. See id. at 566-67, 101 S.Ct. 1245.

The Supreme Court again addressed Indian tribal jurisdiction when it considered whether the State of Washington could tax purchases on a reservation by Indians who are not members of the governing tribe. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 152, 100 S.Ct. 2069. The Court concluded that the mere fact that a nonmember of the governing tribe comes within the definition of an Indian does not exempt that Indian from state taxing jurisdiction. See id. at 161, 100 S.Ct. 2069. The Court said:

Federal statutes, even given the broadest reading to which they are reasonably susceptible, cannot be said to pre-empt Washington’s power to impose its taxes on Indians not members of the Tribe. * * * [T]he mere fact that nonmembers resident on the reservation come within the definition of “Indian” for purposes of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, * * * does not demonstrate a congressional intent to exempt such Indians from state taxation.
Nor would the imposition of Washington’s tax on these purchasers contravene the principle of tribal self-government, for the simple reason that nonmembers are not constituents of the governing Tribe. For most practical purposes those Indians stand on the same footing as non-Indians resident on the reservation.

Id. at 160-61, 100 S.Ct. 2069 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that “[federal statutes, even given the broadest reading to which they are reasonably susceptible, cannot be said to pre-empt [a state’s] power to impose its taxes on Indians not members of the Tribe.” Id. at 160, 100 S.Ct. 2069. Accordingly, the Court held that the state’s interest in taxing nonmember Indians’ purchases outweighed any tribal interest. See id.

The Supreme Court in Oliphant and its progeny framed Indian jurisdiction over other Indians in terms of a tribe’s retained power of self-governance over its own tribal members. See, e.g., Montana, 450 U.S. at 565, 101 S.Ct. 1245; Colville, 447 U.S. at 161, 100 S.Ct. 2069. Conversely, the Court has held that by nature of its dependent status, a tribe does not retain inherent sovereign powers over nonmembers of the tribe. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565, 101 S.Ct. 1245. The court has stated that “[T]ribes are not mere fungible groups of homogenous persons among whom any Indian would feel at home.” Duro, 495 U.S. at 695, 110 S.Ct. 2053. Further, the Court stated in Colville that nonmember Indians who reside on a tribal reservation are, for practical purposes, the same as non-Indians. 447 U.S. at 161, 100 S.Ct. 2069.

We therefore conclude that, when comparing federal and state interests to determine whether federal law preempts Minnesota’s jurisdiction over R.M.H., regulation of nonmember Indians warrants different consideration than does regulation of member Indians. More specifically, R.M.H., as a nonmember Indian, is not entitled to the same insulation from state government authority on the White Earth Reservation as are enrolled members of the White Earth Band because the White Earth Band’s sovereign interest is not as strongly implicated as it would be with an enrolled member. Further, because R.M.H. is a nonmember Indian, Minnesota is less likely to be preempted from exercising its authority over his traffic offenses than over the same offenses committed by an enrolled member of the White Earth Band. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 214-15, 107 S.Ct. 1083; see also, e.g., Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323, 98 S.Ct. 1079 (“Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn * * * by-implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.”).

Our analysis rests heavily on the status of R.M.H. as a nonmember Indian. R.M.H. sought to overcome this distinction by relying on our decision in Topash v. Commissioner of Revenue, 291 N.W.2d 679 (Minn.1980). More specifically, R.M.H. asserts that because he is a member of a federally recognized tribe — the Forest County Potawatomi Community— he is an Indian who is entitled to the same insulation from state government authority as a member of the White Earth Band. Essentially, he argues that he is an “Indian” for the purposes of federal law because under our decision in Topash, the term “Indian” does not distinguish between tribes. 291 N.W.2d at 682. We now note, however, that the precedential value of this part of our decision in Topash has been negated by the line of Supreme Court decisions beginning with Oliphant.

In Topash, we considered whether Minnesota had authority to collect income tax from a nonmember Indian who was living and working on, the Red Lake Indian Reservation. Id. at 680. In reaching our decision, we looked to Pub.L. 280 as a point of reference and noted that it refers to “Indians” without distinguishing between tribes and was intended to “protect Indians, of whatever tribe, from state government interference * Topash, 291 N.W.2d at 682-83. We then held that federal Indian jurisdiction includes all Indians regardless of their membership status and therefore preempts state jurisdiction to tax a nonmember Indian. See id.

Our conclusion in Topash that Indian jurisdiction includes Indians of all tribes conflicts with how the Supreme Court has defined Indian sovereignty in Oliphant and its progeny, which cases lead to a distinction between nonmember Indians and Indians who are members of the tribe on whose reservation they reside. Our reasoning in Topash is specifically refuted by the Supreme Court’s decision in Col-ville, where the Court reached the opposite result. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 161, 100 S.Ct. 2069. Because Supreme Court cases conflict with part of our decision in Topash, we conclude that Topash is no longer controlling on this issue.

We next proceed to compare federal and state interests to determine whether state law conflicts with federal interests so that federal law preempts Minnesota’s jurisdiction over R.M.H.’s traffic offenses. When we do so, we must continue to bear in mind our earlier conclusion that, as a nonmember Indian, R.M.H. is not entitled to the same insulation from state government authority on the White Earth Reservation as are enrolled members of the White Earth Band.

Because of the unique nature of tribal sovereignty, our inquiry into whether federal law preempts state law “is not dependent on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but [calls] for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in [this] specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law.” Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145, 100 S.Ct. 2578. Further, in this area of the law, a preemption analysis rests “principally on a consideration of the nature of the competing interests at stake” and rejects “a narrow focus on congressional intent to preempt state law as the sole touchstone.” Mescalero, 462 U.S. at 334, 103 S.Ct. 2378.

The Supreme Court has stated that the goals of tribal self-government, self-sufficiency, and economic development are overriding goals. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 216, 107 S.Ct. 1083; see also Mescalero, 462 U.S. at 344, 103 S.Ct. 2378. These goals reflect an interest in protecting a tribe’s retained sovereignty over its members and its territory. See Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142, 100 S.Ct. 2578. Accordingly, the Court has emphasized that “there is a significant geographical component to tribal sovereignty” and has “consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations.” Id. at 151, 100 S.Ct. 2578 (quotations omitted). The Court also has held that state law may be preempted if it relates to an area that is so pervasively regulated by the federal government that state regulation would obstruct federal policies. See id. at 148, 100 S.Ct. 2578. Therefore, we must focus on the specific factual context in which this case comes before us and then weigh the competing interests at stake. Here, we are presented with a nonmember of the White Earth Band who committed civil/regulatory traffic offenses on a state-operated and maintained highway located within the boundaries of the White Earth Reservation.

Using these specific facts, we first determine whether state jurisdiction over R.M.H. threatens the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government. Supreme Court cases suggest that tribal interest in self-governance is limited to relations between a tribe and its own members, not all Indians generally. See, e.g., Duro, 495 U.S. at 695, 110 S.Ct. 2053; Colville, 447 U.S. at 160-61, 100 S.Ct. 2069; Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211, 98 S.Ct. 1011. Further, state jurisdiction does not significantly affect a tribe’s retained sovereignty over its territory because this federal interest is significantly diminished where, as here, the state exercises jurisdiction over a person who is not a member of the tribe. See, e.g., Colville, 447 U.S. at 161, 100 S.Ct. 2069 (concluding that imposition of state sales and cigarette taxes on Indians not members of the tribe does not “contravene the principle of self-government, for the simple reason that nonmembers are not constituents of the governing Tribe”). For these reasons, we conclude that granting Minnesota jurisdiction over R.M.H.’s traffic offenses does not threaten the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government.

Next, we determine whether state jurisdiction threatens the economic development and self-sufficiency of the White Earth Band. In Colville, although the Supreme Court acknowledged that a tribe has the authority to tax transactions occurring on its lands that affect its members, it concluded that such authority does not oust a state from any power to tax on-reservation cigarette purchases by a person not a member of the tribe. 447 U.S. at 152, 155, 100 S.Ct. 2069. Accordingly, the Court held that federal law does not preempt a state’s sales and cigarette taxes on on-reservation purchases by nonmembers of the tribe. See id. at 155-62, 100 S.Ct. 2069. The White Earth Band’s economic interest in regulating traffic offenses against nonmembers of the tribe is minimal compared to a tribe’s economic interest in taxing on-reservation purchases. Therefore, like the Court in Col-ville, we conclude that state jurisdiction over R.M.H.’s offenses does not unduly impinge on the White Earth Band’s economic development and self-sufficiency.

Finally, we determine whether state jurisdiction over R.M.H.’s offenses relates to an area pervasively regulated by federal law. We conclude that it does not. The federal government has not imposed a detailed scheme of traffic regulations on tribal reservations and has demonstrated little interest in enforcement of traffic laws on state-operated and maintained highways. Here, there is no federal regulatory scheme so pervasive as to preclude state jurisdiction. '

Juxtaposed with what we conclude is a diminished federal interest in tribal self-government, self-sufficiency, and economic development is Minnesota’s strong interest in regulating the safe flow of traffic on its state-operated and maintained highways. Minnesota’s interests, when compared with the federal interests, are more than sufficient to justify state jurisdiction over civil/regulatory traffic offenses committed on a state highway on an Indian reservation by an Indian who is not an enrolled member of the governing tribe. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443-44, 98 S.Ct. 787, 54 L.Ed.2d 664 (1978) (“In no field has this [federal] deference to state regulation been greater than that of highway safety regulation.”). Accordingly, we conclude that the federal interest in tribal self-government, self-sufficiency, and economic development is not contravened by state authority over R.M.H.’s traffic offenses. Therefore, we hold that the court of appeals erred when it held that Minnesota did not have jurisdiction over R.M.H.’s traffic offenses.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

STRINGER, Justice

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. Our guiding rule of law is the broad principle that the state does not have jurisdiction over the conduct and affairs of Indians while in Indian country in the absence of a specific grant of Congressional authority to the states to act in derogation of the principles of tribal sovereignty, see California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987), or where state interests are sufficient to justify the exercise of state authority. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334, 103 S.Ct. 2378, 76 L.Ed.2d 611 (1983).

Public Law 280 confers to Minnesota, and a few other states, jurisdiction to punish offenses committed by Indians in Indian country. See Pub.L. 280, 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1998). In Cabazon however, the Supreme Court limited the grant of jurisdiction under Pub.L. 280 to criminal offenses and excluded from state jurisdiction the regulation of conduct that was civil in nature. See 480 U.S. at 209, 107 S.Ct. 1088. We applied this formulation in State v. Stone where we held that nine different motor vehicle violations were civil/regulatory in nature, including proof of insurance and driving without a license, because they do not pertain to fundamental issues of traffic safety on highways such as driving while intoxicated or reckless driving. 572 N.W.2d 725, 731 (Minn.1997). As civil/regulatory offenses they could not be the subject of state enforcement. See id.

The theory of the state is simply that because R.M.H. is not a member of the White Earth Tribe he should be subject to jurisdiction of the state highway regulations, and is premised on the grant of jurisdiction under Public Law 280. But Pub.L. 280 makes no distinction between member and non-member Indians: “[The state] shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in * * * Indian country.” Pub.L. 280, 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a); see also Topash v. Commissioner of Revenue, 291 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn.1980) (“Pub.L. 280 * * * refer[s] to “Indians” without distinguishing between tribes. The broad general policy is to protect Indians, of whatever tribe, from state government interference.”) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). When the majority agrees with the state and holds that Pub.L. 280 does not grant the state jurisdiction over R.M.H. it implicitly, if not explicitly, holds that Pub.L. 280, as Congress’s express grant of jurisdiction to the states over criminal offenses, is federal law that does preempt the state from asserting jurisdiction. In light of the Court’s mandate that “statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit,” Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766, 105 S.Ct. 2399, 85 L.Ed.2d 753 (1985), and because Pub.L. 280 unambiguously fails to distinguish between member and non-member Indians, state jurisdiction over R.M.H. is plainly lacking. The holding of the majority regarding the applicability of Pub.L. 280 thus ends the discussion of preemption.

Even if it were appropriate to go on to compare the interests of competing sover-eignties, I would reach the same result. The majority relies on Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980), a case concerning state authority to collect state taxes from nonmember Indians making purchases on an Indian reservation. The majority puts heavy emphasis on the Colville Court distinguishing between member and nonmember Indians for state taxing purposes, and concludes that “nonmember Indians warrant different considerations than do member Indians” for purposes of state jurisdiction over traffic enforcement. This is a five foot leap over a ten foot ditch however, as the majority provides no reasoning as to why state interests in taxing purchases on reservations are similar to, bear on, or have anything to do with the state’s interest in regulating traffic- offenses-and the Supreme Court has in fact ruled that a state’s interest in tax cases is unique. See, e.g., Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 215, n. 17, 107 S.Ct. 1083 (noting that the area of state taxation of Indian tribes is a “special area” in which the Court has adopted a “per se rule”); see also Mescalero v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 36 L.Éd.2d 114 (1973) (making reference to “the special area óf state taxation”). The federal government obviously has no interest in local traffic enforcement, and the question becomes whether the state’s interest in traffic enforcement should be greater than that of the White Earth Band. I do not believe that it is our prerogative to determine that it is, as the interest of both is strong, and tribal governments have the additional interest of retaining sovereignty over the people and conduct on their reservation as well as recognizing the rights of members of all Indian nations. See, e.g., Mescalero, 462 U.S. at 334-335, 103 S.Ct. 2378.

Congress and the Supreme Court have given states a clear directive in Pub.L. 280 and Cabazon that shapes and defines state jurisdiction over certain Indian activities on Indian reservations. An attempt to carve out broader jurisdiction than has been granted to the states is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s mandate that tribal sovereignty is “dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the States.” Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 1083 (quotation omitted). The rule of the majority undermines this carefully crafted conferral of limited state jurisdiction as applied in Cabazon and challenges well-established principles of Indian autonomy and self-government. See 480 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 1083 (“Indian tribes retain attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory”) (quotation omitted). It overlooks “traditional notions of Indian sovereignty and the congressional goal of Indian self-government, including its ‘overriding goal’ of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency * * *[,]” Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 216, 107 S.Ct. 1083 (quoting Mescalero, 462 U.S. at 334-335, 103 S.Ct. 2378). Finally, by ignoring the guidance provided by Congress and the Supreme Court regarding Pub.L. 280, we as a court ignore the long established and well respected dual federal and state court structure where both institutions ideally embody in their opinions “sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).

PAGE, Justice

(dissenting).

I join in the dissent of Justice STRINGER.

RUSSELL A. ANDERSON, Justice

(dissenting).

I join in the dissent of Justice STRINGER.

      . It appears from the record that R.M.H.'s speeding offense was in the nature of a petty misdemeanor. See Minn.Stat. § 169.89, subd. 1 (1998).

      . R.M.H. stipulated that he committed these offenses on the White Earth Reservation, but we note that there is a discrepancy in the record about where the traffic offenses occurred. The traffic citation indicates that the offenses occurred on Minnesota Highway 224, one mile east of Ogema, Minnesota. However, the court transcript reflects that R.M.H. later stipulated that he was driving on Minnesota Highway 59. This discrepancy, however, does not affect the ultimate outcome of this case because both locations are within the boundary of the White Earth Reservation.

      . It is not clear from the record whether R.M.H. is eligible for membership in the White Earth Band by virtue of his mother being an enrolled member of the band. The issue of R.M.H.’s eligibility for membership in the White Earth Band was not raised and is not a factor in deciding the issue before the court in this case.

      . Public Law 280, 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) states: (a) Each of the States or Territories listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of the State or Territory to the same extent that such Stale or Territory has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State or Territory, and the criminal laws of such State or Territory shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State or Territory:
      sfc ⅜ ⅛ #
      Minnesota.All Indian country within the State, except the Red Lake Reservation.

      . The dissent mischaracterizes our conclusion that Pub.L. 280 does not expressly grant Minnesota jurisdiction over R.M.H.’s offenses when it states that “the majority * ⅜ * implicitly, if not explicitly, holds that Pub.L. 280, as Congress’s express grant of jurisdiction to the states over criminal offenses, is federal law that does preempt the state from asserting jurisdiction.” Based on this mischaracterization, the dissent then concludes that a preemption anafysis is unnecessary. As noted earlier, Pub.L. 280 expressly grants Minnesota broad criminal and limited civil jurisdiction over specified areas of Indian country. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a). The dissent fails to recognize the marked difference between an express grant and an express prohibition. While Pub.L. 280 does not expressly grant Minnesota jurisdiction over R.M.H.’s offenses, it does not expressly prohibit such jurisdiction. Therefore, as in Stone, we must proceed with a'preemption analysis. Thus, by focusing only on Pub.L. 280, the dissent falls short in its analysis of the underlying principles of tribal sovereignty as they apply to this case.

      . The dissent erroneously concludes that it is only proper to analyze the distinction between member and nonmember Indians in the context of Pub.L. 280. However, in this case, Cabazon and Stone dictate that this distinction be analyzed in the broader context of preemption.

      . At the onset of our discussion of the nature of Indian sovereignty, we note that the Supreme Court has not consistently utilized the same nomenclature when addressing this issue. As a result, some of the Court's decisions have not clearly differentiated between nonmember Indians, non-Indians, and Indians.

      . The dissent questions the propriety of our use of Colville to "compare the interests of 'competing sovereignties,” implying that distinguishing between member and nonmember Indians for state taxing purposes does not involve considerations similar to those involved in state jurisdiction over traffic enforcement. In response to this contention, we refer to Duro where the Supreme Court considered whether an Indian tribe may assert criminal jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian and used its analysis in Colville of the distinction between member and nonmember Indians in relation to self-government as support for its holding. 495 U.S. at 686-87, 690, 110 S.Ct. 2053.

      . The majority inappropriately relies on Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 110 S.Ct. 2053, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990), Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tube, 435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978) and United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978) where the Supreme Court established a framework for determining the parameters of tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-member Indians. In Duro however the Supreme Court drew a distinction between tribal authority over non-member Indians, not an issue here, and the broad grant of federal jurisdiction with respect to "Indians as a single large class,” as Pub.L. 280 provides. Duro, 495 U.S. at 689-90, 110 S.Ct. 2053.

      . In Cabazon the Supreme Court concluded that Pub.L. 280 did not grant the state jurisdiction to regulate gambling on Indian reservations but went on to a preemption analysis. However, there the Court was determining whether the state had jurisdiction over gambling through a legal basis other than Pub.L. 280. Here there is no question, in light of State v. Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 731, that the state does not have jurisdiction over minor traffic offenses committed by Indians on reservations. Now to ignore the plain language of Pub.L. 280 by holding that it does not apply to non-member Indians undermines not only Pub.L. 280 but also Stone.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LANCASTER, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    WEBB BUSINESS PROMOTIONS, INC., Respondent, v. AMERICAN ELECTRONICS & ENTERTAINMENT CORP., petitioner, Appellant.
    No. C2-99-269.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Sept. 14, 2000.

      Katherine L. Mackinnon, St. Louis Park, for appellant.
    Kay Nord Hunt, Lommen, Nelson, Cole & Stageberg, P.A., Minneapolis, for respondent.
   OPINION

LANCASTER, Justice.

This is an action for breach of contract between appellant, American Electronics & Entertainment Corp. (AE&E) and respondent, Webb Business Promotions, Inc. (Webb). Webb sued AE&E for breach of contract. AE&E asserted the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction under Minn.Stat. § 336.3-311 (1998). Following a court trial, the district court found that there was no accord and satisfaction, concluding that there was an absence of good faith in the tender and no mutual agreement. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that mutual agreement is not required for an accord and satisfaction. We reverse the court of appeals and remand the matter to the district court.

We are presented in this case with two questions: First, did the district court err in imputing AE&E’s bad faith in the underlying sales contract to AE&E’s offer of an accord and satisfaction? Second, did the court of appeals err in holding that because mutual agreement is not explicitly enumerated in Minn.Stat. § 336.3-311, such agreement is not necessary to create an enforceable accord and satisfaction?

On May 16, 1995, AE&E entered into a contract with Target Corporation (Target). The agreement called for Target to purchase 300,000 units of three-pack MGM blank videotapes from AE&E, and AE&E was to provide 300,000 units of promotional merchandise (calendars, pencils and the like) as a “free gift with purchase” with each pack of videotapes. Subsequently, on May 24, 1995, AE&E executed a written contract with Webb in which Webb agreed to provide the 300,000 units of promotional merchandise to AE&E at a contract price of $684,000. In order to fulfill its part of the agreement between Webb and AE&E, Webb borrowed approximately $400,000 from First National Bank of Farmington, which in turn acquired a right of assignment of all funds due to Webb from AE&E. The contract between AE&E and Webb provided that AE&E would be responsible for any and all defects with respect to the MGM blank videotapes, that Webb would be expected to absorb $30,000 in advertising, packing, and shipping costs, and that delivery of the promotional merchandise was due on or before July 15, 1995.

On May 24, 1995, AE&E sent Webb purchase order # 604 for the 300,000 units of promotional merchandise. Purchase order # 604 specifically stated that it was “conti[n]gent upon Target[’s] purchase order” with AE&E. Target’s agreement with AE&E permitted Target to cancel its purchase order if the product was not up to Target’s quality standards or at Target’s sole convenience any time prior to shipping. AE&E never informed Webb of the conditions under which Target could cancel its purchase order with AE&E.

On May 4, 1995, more than two weeks before Webb entered into its contract with AE&E, Target requested that AE&E submit a sample of the MGM videotapes for quality testing. AE&E complied with the request. On May 31, 1995, approximately two weeks after Target issued its purchase order to AE&E, the quality testing service recommended that Target “stay away” from the MGM brand of videocassette “until they improve their quality.” Target immediately notified AE&E that the tapes failed the quality test. On June 9, 1995, AE&E requested and Target agreed to retest the videotapes at AE&E’s expense. On June 23, 1995, the quality tester sent Target a second report, stating that the tapes were “satisfactory,” but still had problems with consistency.

A few days prior to the July 15, 1995, delivery date for the promotional merchandise to AE&E from Webb, Target notified AE&E that it was canceling the transaction. In response, AE&E sent a representative to Target in an attempt to renegotiate the deal with Target. AE&E never notified Webb of the failed quality tests. AE&E was successful in renegotiating the deal but was only able to persuade Target to purchase 85,000 units of the videotape and promotional merchandise combination, instead of the 300,000 units originally agreed to. At trial, a Target representative testified that the primary reason for the reduction in the order was the poor test results of the MGM videotapes, but Target also considered the recent reduction in industry sales of blank videotapes.

On July 20, 1995, six days after the 300,000 units of promotional merchandise had arrived at the packaging location, AE&E sent a letter notifying Webb that based on Target’s cancellation and renegotiation of its purchase order, AE&E was canceling its order with Webb and would thereafter place orders with Webb on a weekly basis. Alan Webb, not knowing the terms of the arrangement between AE&E and Target, requested that AE&E cancel the order entirely and sue Target for breach. Alan Webb then contacted First National Bank of Farmington to let it know the status of the deal with AE&E. The bank directed him to follow through with the replacement order.

Webb ultimately agreed to deliver 85,000 units to AE&E based on Target’s order to AE&E, although AE&E never issued an additional purchase order to Webb. Upon' delivery, Webb submitted invoice # 11374 to AE&E for approximately $190,000 for payment by August 24, 1995. On September 20,1995, because Webb had not yet received payment for invoice # 11374, Alan Webb placed a phone call to AE&E’s vice president, Linda Tsai. Alan Webb requested immediate payment of the invoice. In response, Tsai asserted that the invoice was incorrect and that AE&E would deduct various costs from the payment, which would result in a payment of approximately $150,000 for the 85,000 units of promotional merchandise.

On September 20, 1995, AE&E sent a letter to Webb explicitly referencing purchase order # 604, referring to terms of the original May 24, 1995, agreement, and informing Webb that AE&E intended to deduct certain amounts for re-packaging and shipping from the total amount owed to Webb based upon the May 24 agreement. The letter also stated that AE&E intended to pay Webb on September 21, 1995,' and that “[b]y accepting and cashing the check, Webb is assumed to agree that this is the final settlement and AE&E will owe nothing to Webb.” On September 21, 1995, AE&E submitted a check as payment to Webb in the amount of $150,677. The check was accompanied by a letter stating in part, “[p]er our phone conversation * * * I am sending you the check as your favor [sic] * * *. Please be awared [sic] that this is a final check, AE&E will have no obligation to Webb as long as the check is cashed by Webb.” After discussions regarding Alan Webb’s concerns about accepting the check, First National Bank told him to accept the check. Alan Webb therefore accepted and deposited the check and gave the funds to the bank. In November 1995, AE&E sent a check for approximately $3,000 to Webb as a refund for unspent funds that it had withheld for shipping and packing costs.

Webb brought suit for breach of contract against AE&E seeking recovery of money due to him under the May 24, 1995, agreement as originally stated in purchase order # 604. AE&E asserted the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction. At trial Webb asserted that the check for $150,677 was accepted to resolve the dispute surrounding the second agreement for delivery of the 85,000 units, and was not intended to resolve the claims relating to AE&E’s breach of the first agreement for 300,000 units referenced by purchase order # 604. Further, Webb asserted that the check offering the accord and satisfaction was tendered in bad faith because AE&E had purposely withheld information from Webb with respect to the testing of the videotapes and because AE&E misinformed Webb about the terms of the contract between AE&E and Target. AE&E responded that the check and the accompanying communications clearly referenced purchase order # 604 and the May 24 agreement, and stated that the payment was intended to resolve all claims that Webb had against AE&E. AE&E argued that the original purchase order was expressly contingent on Target’s order to AE&E and it was therefore entitled to reduce the amount of the order based on Target’s change in its order to AE&E.

The district court found that AE&E breached its contract with Webb by anticipatory repudiation, that Webb did not know that Target’s order with AE&E was cancelable at any time, and that AE&E’s agent withheld the truth from Webb regarding the poor quality of the videotapes. The district court went on to find that if Webb had known of the quality failure of the videotapes when it first occurred, it could have ceased delivery as early as May 31,1995. The district court concluded that AE&E acted in bad faith by wrongfully concealing material facts from Webb by failing to reveal: Target’s request to test the tapes in early May 1995; the terms of sale and conditions of the contract between AE&E and Target; the true reason why Target cancelled its purchase order on July 14, 1995; and the results of the quality assurance tests. The court also found that AE&E acted in bad faith by affirmatively representing to Webb that the tape quality had never been questioned by Target. Finally, the court concluded that the parties did not mutually agree that Webb was accepting the payment in full satisfaction of all outstanding claims. The district court therefore held that Webb’s acceptance of AE&E’s check for $150,677 did not constitute an accord and satisfaction.

The court of appeals held that the district court did not err in concluding that there was no accord and satisfaction because AE&E tendered its check with the knowledge that there were “outstanding obligations in dispute,” and therefore the accord and satisfaction cheek was not tendered in good faith. Webb Bus. Promotions, Inc. v. American Elees. & Entertainment Corp., No. C2-99-269, 1999 WL 810452, at 7 (Minn.App. Oct.12, 1999). The court of appeals also held that mutual agreement is not required for an accord and satisfaction. See id.

I.

An accord is a contract in which a debtor offers a sum of money, or some other stated performance, in exchange for which a creditor promises to accept the performance in lieu of the original debt. See Don Kral Inc. v. Lindstrom, 286 Minn. 37, 39, 173 N.W.2d 921, 923 (1970). See generally Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 281 (1981); 6 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1276 (West 1962). The satisfaction is the performance of the accord, generally the acceptance of money, which operates to discharge the debtor’s duty as agreed to in the accord. See Don Kral Inc., 286 Minn, at 39, 173 N.W.2d at 923. See generally Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 281; 6 Corbin, swpra, § 1276. The purpose of accord and satisfaction is to allow parties to resolve disputes without judicial intervention by discharging all rights and duties under a contract in exchange for a stated performance, usually a payment of a sum of money. See U.C.C. § 3-311 cmt. 3 (1990), reprinted in Minn.Stat. Ann. § 336.3-311 (West.Supp.2000) (“Section 3-311 is based on a belief that the common law rule produces a fair result and that informal dispute resolution by full satisfaction checks should be encouraged.”). See generally Weed v. Commissioner of Revenue, 550 N.W.2d 285, 288 (Minn.1996); Roaderick v. Lull Eng’g Co., 296 Minn. 385, 389, 208 N.W.2d 761, 764 (1973).

An enforceable accord and satisfaction arises when a party against whom a claim of breach of contract is asserted proves that (1) the party, in good faith, tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the claim; (2) the instrument or an accompanying written communication contained a conspicuous statement to the effect that the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the claim; (3) the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute; and (4) the claimant obtained payment of the instrument. See Minn.Stat. § 336.3-311(a)-(b).

AE&E claims the district court erred in finding that it did not offer the accord in good faith. The district court found that AE&E acted in bad faith through several concealments and misrepresentations regarding the quality testing, AE&E’s contract with Target, and the reasons for cancellation. The district court found that AE&E breached its contract with Webb, the breach was in bad faith, and therefore the tender of the check to Webb by AE&E in offering the accord and satisfaction was in bad faith.

Whether there has been an accord and satisfaction is a question of fact. See Bloomer v. Bloomer, 289 Minn. 481, 484, 185 N.W.2d 520, 522 (1971). The findings of the trial court, as the trier of fact, will not be reversed on appeal unless they are “manifestly and palpably” contrary to the evidence. Butch Levy Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Sallblad, 267 Minn. 283, 293, 126 N.W.2d 380, 387 (1964). However, “[findings of fact which are controlled or influenced by error of law are not final on appeal and will be set aside.” In re Holden’s Trust, 207 Minn. 211, 227, 291 N.W. 104, 112 (1940).

Good faith is demonstrated when the party tendering the instrument offers a check with the intent to honestly enter into an accord and satisfaction while observing reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. See Minn.Stat. § 336.3-103(a)(4) (1998). The focus of the good faith inquiry is on the offer of the accord, and not on the actions of the parties in performing the underlying contract. See Minn.Stat. § 336.3-311(a)(i); cf. U.C.C. § 3-311 cmt. 4 (1990), reprinted in Minn. Stat. Ann. § 336.3-311.

Bad faith is not necessarily established by a failure to disclose facts about the underlying dispute that would have led to rejection of the offer of an accord. By accepting a certain sum of money to discharge a debt, the creditor waives a cause of action relating to the original debt. See Roaderick, 296 Minn, at 389, 208 N.W.2d at 764; Weed, 550 N.W.2d at 288; see also Youngstown Mines Corp. v. Prout, 266 Minn. 450, 463, 124 N.W.2d 328, 338 (1963) (“In order for an accord and satisfaction to exist, there must be an honest dispute between the parties, [and] a tender with the explicit understanding of both parties that it was in full payment of all demands * * (emphasis added)). Therefore, part of the consideration for the accord is the creditor’s waiver of claims that may entitle it to more than what the debtor is offering in the accord. Once the creditor accepts the accord and performs the satisfaction, the validity of the accord and satisfaction may not be challenged unless the party challenging the accord can demonstrate that the elements of the accord and satisfaction have not been satisfied. See Don Kral Inc., 286 Minn. at 39-40, 173 N.W.2d at 923 (stating that where an accord constitutes a binding contract, the original liability is discharged, but where the accord is not fully performed, the original liability remains).

In support of their arguments regarding good faith both parties rely on McMahon Food Corp. v. Burger Dairy Co., 103 F.3d 1307 (7th Cir.1996). In Illinois, as in Minnesota, a party must prove that he or she acted in good faith in tendering an instrument in full satisfaction of a claim. See 810 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/3-311 (West 1992). In McMahon Food Corp., McMahon and Burger Dairy had an ongoing business relationship. See 103 F.3d at 1310. The debtor (McMahon), in tendering the instrument for the offer of the accord, purposely misled the creditor about the amount in dispute. See id. at 1310-12. In attempting to resolve a dispute regarding multiple transactions, McMahon purposely led Burger Dairy to believe that previous disputes had already been resolved, when in fact they had not. See id. at 1311. As a result, the accord and satisfaction that was offered misrepresented the actual amount in dispute. The bad faith was directly related to the tender of the accord, and not purely related to McMahon’s actions with respect to the underlying contracts, and the district court found accord and satisfaction to be unenforceable. See id. at 1313,1317.

The court in McMahon affirmed the district court’s finding that McMahon had acted in bad faith and taken advantage of Burger Dairy by misinforming it about the total amount in dispute “ ‘at the time payment was tendered.’ Id. at 1313 (citation omitted). McMahon therefore failed to meet section 3-311(a)’s good faith requirement. See id. In contrast, the district court here relied exclusively on AE&E’s misrepresentations and concealment of facts related to the underlying sales contract. The district court made no findings relating specifically to AE&E’s tender of the instrument offering the accord. Moreover, neither Webb nor the district court established a connection between AE&E’s conduct as it related to the underlying sales contract and its offer of the accord. We conclude, therefore, that the district court erred as a matter of law in finding AE&E’s tender of its check to Webb under Minn.Stat. § 386.3-311 was in bad faith. See generally Shema v. Thorpe Bros., 240 Minn. 469, 62 N.W.2d 86 (1953). It may be possible that fraud or misrepresentation relating to an underlying contract is so pervasive that the fraud infects the good faith offer of an accord. However, where the district court fails to draw any connection between fraud in the underlying contract and the tender of the accord, such as in this case, those circumstances are not present. Because the district court’s finding- of bad faith was controlled by an error of law, we set the finding aside. See In re Holden’s Trust, 207 Minn. at 227, 291 N.W. at 112.

The court of appeals reasoned that because AE&E offered the accord with the knowledge that there were outstanding obligations in dispute, good faith was lacking. Section 336.3 — 311(a)(ii) requires that there be a bona fide dispute as to the amount of the claim or that the claim was unliquidated for an accord and satisfaction to be valid. The purpose of entering into an accord and satisfaction is to settle these disputed claims. Therefore, the existence of a dispute regarding the amount of the underlying claim cannot constitute bad faith for purposes of an accord and satisfaction.

We reverse the decision of the court of appeals and hold that the district court erred as a matter of law in finding that AE&E’s offer of the accord to Webb was in bad faith based on the conduct relating to the underlying sales contract. Because the district court did not focus on the formation of the accord and satisfaction in determining good faith, we remand to the district court for that determination.

II.

We turn now to the second issue: Did the court of. appeals err in holding that because mutual agreement is not explicitly enumerated in Minn.Stat. § 336.3-311, such agreement is not necessary to create an enforceable accord and satisfaction?

Under common law, accord and satisfaction may not be found where mutual agreement is lacking. See Butch Levy Plumbing and Heating, Inc., 267 Minn. at 290-91, 126 N.W.2d at 385-86; 6 Corbin, supra, § 1277. For an accord and satisfaction to be enforceable, the payment must be offered in full satisfaction of the debt, and the payment must be accepted as the same. See Butch Levy Plumbing and Heating, Inc., 267 Minn. at 290-91, 126 N.W.2d at 385-86; Youngstown Mines Corp., 266 Minn. at 463-64, 124 N.W.2d at 338-39.

As noted above, Minn.Stat. § 336.3-311 was intended to codify the common law elements of accord and satisfaction. See U.C.C. § 3-311 cmt. 3, reprinted in Minn. Stat. Ann. § 336.3-311; supra note 4. The common law elements include the basic contractual requirement of mutual agreement and therefore the court of appeals erred in holding that mutual agreement was not necessary for an accord and satisfaction under Minn.Stat. § 336.3-311.

AE&E argues that even if we conclude that mutual agreement is a separate element of an accord and satisfaction under the U.C.C., it is demonstrated here by the conduct of the parties. The district court made no specific factual findings with respect to the formation of the accord and satisfaction. The court simply concluded that the parties did not agree that Webb was accepting payment in full satisfaction.

The agreement necessary to form a contract need not be express, but may be implied from circumstances that clearly and unequivocally indicate the intention of the parties to enter into a contract. See Shema, 240 Minn. at 465, 62 N.W.2d at 90. Minnesota Statutes § 336.3-311(a) and (b) require a conspicuous statement that the tender of payment is offered as full satisfaction of the claim. By obtaining payment under that conspicuous statement, the creditor has communicated his agreement to the transaction. Performance of the statutory requirements therefore demonstrates a mutual agreement to effectuate a contract in which the creditor accepts payment from the debtor that serves to discharge claims against the debtor.

We hold that once the elements of section 336.3-311(a) and (b) are met, mutual agreement of the parties to enter into an accord and satisfaction is presumed as a matter of law. The presumption may be rebutted where the party challenging the accord and satisfaction can demonstrate, for example, some ambiguity in the language of the instrument or the accompanying communication such that a reasonable person would not have understood that payment was meant to discharge the obligation. See, e.g., Imperial Elevator Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 163 Minn. 481, 487-88, 204 N.W. 531, 533-34 (1925).

Because the district court did not make findings regarding the formation of the accord and satisfaction, or determine whether ambiguity exists with respect to the offer of an accord that would defeat' a finding of mutual agreement on the accord and satisfaction, we remand this case to the district court for findings as to whether any ambiguity existed sufficient to rebut the presumption of mutual agreement.

We hold that the district court erred in imputing bad faith to an accord and satisfaction from conduct relating only to the underlying contract. We also hold that mutual agreement is .required for an enforceable accord and satisfaction.

Reversed and remanded.

      . Minnesota Statutes § 336.3-311 provides in relevant part:
      (a) If a person against whom a claim is asserted proves that (i) that person in good faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the claim, (ii) the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute, and (iii) the claimant obtained payment of the instrument, the following subsections apply.
      (b) Unless subsection (c) applies, the claim is discharged if the person against whom the claim is asserted proves that the instrument or an accompanying written communication contained a conspicuous statement to the effect that the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the claim.

      . Alan Webb is the president and sole shareholder of Webb Business Promotions.

      . Subsections (c) and (d) of the statute except certain situations from a binding accord and satisfaction, but those situations are not alleged to apply here. See Minn.Stat. § 336.3-311 (c)-(d) (1998).

      . In 1990 the common law doctrines of accord and satisfaction were codified into section 3-311 of the U.C.C. which, in turn, was adopted by the legislature in 1992. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-311 cmt. 3, reprinted in Minn.Stat. Ann. § 336.3-311 (noting section 3-311 follows the common law rule with minor variations to reflect modem business conditions); Act of Apr. 24, 1992, ch. 565, § 39, 1992 Minn. Laws 1816, 1842, codified at Minn.Stat. § 336.3-311 (1998); 6 Corbin, supra, § 1279 (outlining common law requirements for accord and satisfaction).

      .All of the examples of bad faith tender in the comments to section 3-311 of the U.C.C. relate solely to the offer of the accord, not to any conduct relating to the underlying contract. The examples are as follows:
      For example, suppose an insurer tenders a check in settlement of a claim for personal injury in an accident clearly covered by the insurance policy. The claimant is necessitous and the amount of the check is very small in relationship to the extent of the injury and the amount recoverable under the policy. If the trier of fact determines that the insurer was taking unfair advantage of the claimant, an accord and satisfaction would not result from payment of the check because of the absence of good faith by the insurer in making the tender. Another example of lack of good faith is found in the practice of some business debtors in routinely printing full satisfaction language on their check stocks so that all or a large part of the debts of the debtor are paid by checks bearing the full satisfaction language, whether or not there is any dispute with the creditor. Under such a practice the claimant cannot be sure whether a tender in full satisfaction is or is not being made. Use of a check on which full satisfaction language was affixed routinely pursuant to such a business practice may prevent an accord and satisfaction on the ground that the check was not tendered in good faith under subsection (a)(i).
      U.C.C. § 3-311 cmt. 4, reprinted in Minn.Stat. Ann. § 336.3-311.


author: Alan C. Page Associate Justice

text:
    In re Petition to Transfer to Disability Status of Patricia JAMBOIS, an Attorney at Law of the State of Minnesota.
    No. C5-00-1455.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Sept. 22, 2000.
   ORDER

The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility has filed a petition seeking to transfer Patricia Jambois to disability inactive status on the grounds that she has been found to be an incapacitated person in two judicial proceedings and may be immediately transferred to disability status pursuant to Rule 28(b), Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR).

Based upon an independent review of the documents attached to the petition,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent is transferred to disability inactive status effective immediately. She may seek reinstatement pursuant to Rules 18 and 28(d), RLPR, upon proof that she is psychologically fit to resume the practice of law. All pending disciplinary investigations are stayed until respondent seeks reinstatement pursuant to Rules 18 and 28(d), RLPR.

BY THE COURT:

Alan C. Page Associate Justice


author: Kathleen A. Blatz Chief Justice

text:
    In re MINNESOTA MICROSOFT ANTITRUST LITIGATION.
    No. C3-00-1454.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Sept. 25, 2000.
   ORDER

Defendant Microsoft Corporation has moved for an order transferring and consolidating before a single district court judge in Hennepin County District Court all present and future cases in Minnesota state district courts involving antitrust claims against Microsoft similar to those alleged in Mednick v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. No. C0-00-1276 (Ramsey County Dist'. Ct.) and Gordon v. Microsoft Corp, Civ. No. 00-5994 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct.). Numerous similar cases in federal district courts have been consolidated for pretrial proceedings before a single federal district court judge, the Honorable J. Frederick Motz. Judge Motz has scheduled an October 24, 2000 meeting with state court judges to whom similar cases are assigned to discuss coordination of pretrial procéed-ings in the various federal and state court cases.

A necessary component in addressing Microsoft’s motion is an evaluation of the judicial resources that will be demanded by these cases. It is likely that a more accurate evaluation will be possible after the October 24, 2000 coordination meeting.

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Microsoft Corporation’s motion for transfer and consolidation be, and the same is, stayed until after the. October 24, 2000 coordination meeting.

BY THE COURT:

Kathleen A. Blatz Chief Justice


author: WILLIS, Judge RANDALL, Judge

text:
    In the Matter of the WELFARE OF S.N.R.
    No. C2-00-179.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Sept. 1, 2000.
    Review Denied Nov. 15, 2000.

      Mark D. Fiddler, Vincent & Fiddler, P.L.C., Minneapolis, for appellant Carole Freeman.
    Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, Nancy Jones, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, for respondent Hen-nepin County Department of Children and Family Services.
    Joseph Plumer, Michael Garbow, Cass Lake, for respondent Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe.
    Candace Barr, Niemi & Barr, P.A., Minneapolis, for respondents Joseph & Theresa Myers.

      Sonia Miller-Van Oort, Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., Minneapolis, for Guardian Ad Litem.
    Considered and decided by WILLIS, Presiding Judge, RANDALL, Judge, and PARKER, Judge.

       Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 10.

   OPINION

WILLIS, Judge

Appellant Carole Freeman argues that the juvenile court erred in concluding that the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994), is applicable to adoption proceedings involving S.N.R. and in granting summary judgment to respondent Hennepin County Department of Children and Family Services and dismissing Freeman’s petition to adopt S.N.R. We affirm.

FACTS

S.N.R. was born in April 1993. Soon after her birth, respondent Hennepin County Department of Children and Family Services (“HCDCFS”) placed S.N.R. in the licensed foster care of C.G., whose partner was appellant Carole Freeman. S.N.R.’s mother, who was an enrolled member of the Leech Lake band of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, died in 1997. In August 1997, S.N.R.’s father’s parental rights were terminated, and the Commissioner of Human Services became her guardian and legal custodian. In early 1998, HCDCFS contracted with the Professional Association of Treatment Homes (“PATH”) to conduct an adoption study to evaluate C.G. and Freeman’s potential to serve as adoptive parents. The recommendation of the study was favorable. But in the spring of 1998, C.G. and Freeman’s relationship deteriorated, the two separated, and S.N.R. remained with C.G. Freeman then obtained a license to serve as a foster-care provider, and in August 1998 HCDCFS placed S.N.R. in foster care with Freeman.

HCDCFS again contracted with PATH to conduct an adoption study, this time with Freeman as the sole potential adoptive parent. Before the issuance of the written report, which HCDCFS understood would be unfavorable to Freeman, HCDCFS decided that it would not approve adoption by Freeman. In January 1999, the juvenile court held hearings regarding HCDCFS’s motion to remove S.N.R. from Freeman’s care, place her temporarily in the care of her siblings’ then-foster parents, and then place her with respondents Joseph and Theresa Myers, the siblings’ prospective adoptive parents. The court ordered that S.N.R. remain in Freeman’s care and that S.N.R. have monthly visits with her siblings.

In March 1999, Freeman petitioned to adopt S.N.R. In June 1999, Lillian Reese, the Director of Family Services of respondent Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe, notified Hennepin County that the band recognized S.N.R. and her siblings “as members of the Leech Lake Reservation.” As a result of this notification, HCDCFS moved the juvenile court to find that the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994) (“ICWA”), was applicable to the proceedings. In July 1999, the band moved, under the ICWA, to intervene in the juvenile court proceedings. The Myerses moved to intervene in the proceedings and to be allowed to petition to adopt S.N.R.

The juvenile court heard the motions on August 6, 1999. The court granted the band’s motion to intervene on a permissive basis, scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether S.N.R. is in fact an “Indian child” within the meaning of the ICWA, and postponed consideration of the other motions. Following a September 3, 1999, hearing, the court issued an order determining that all further adoption proceedings were subject to the ICWA, granting the band’s motion to intervene as a matter of right, and granting the Myerses’ motion to intervene and to be allowed to petition to adopt S.N.R.

In December 1999, HCDCFS moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of Freeman’s petition to adopt S.N.R. On January 7, 2000, the juvenile court granted summary judgment for HCDCFS and dismissed Freeman’s petition. Freeman appeals from the September 1999 and January 2000 orders.

ISSUES

1. Did the juvenile court err in concluding that a tribal determination that a child is eligible for membership in that tribe is conclusive evidence that the child is an “Indian child” under the ICWA?

2. Did the juvenile court err in granting summary judgment to HCDCFS and dismissing Freeman’s petition to adopt S.N.R. because Freeman could not demonstrate good cause to deviate from the placement preferences established by the ICWA?

ANALYSIS

On appeal from summary judgment, this court must determine if there are any genuine issues of material fact and if the juvenile court erred in its application of the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn.1990). We review the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn.1993).

Freeman argues that the juvenile court erred in concluding that the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994) (“ICWA”), is applicable to adoption proceedings involving S.N.R. Freeman also argues that the court erred in granting summary judgment to HCDCFS and in dismissing Freeman’s petition to adopt S.N.R. after concluding that Freeman could not meet the adoption requirements set forth by the ICWA. We review these conclusions in order.

I. Applicability of the ICWA.

Freeman argues that the juvenile court erred in concluding the ICWA is applicable to adoption proceedings involving S.N.R. To determine whether the ICWA is applicable,

[fjirst, it must be determined that the proceeding is a “child custody proceeding” as defined by the Act. Once it has been determined that the proceeding is a child custody proceeding, it must then be determined whether the child is an Indian child.

In re Paternity of J.A.V., 536 N.W.2d 896, 900 (Minn.App.1995) (quoting In re Appeal of Maricopa Juvenile Action No. A-25525, 136 Ariz. 528, 667 P.2d 228, 231 (1983)), aff'd 547 N.W.2d 374 (Minn.1996). The ICWA defines “child custody proceeding” to include adoptive placements. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(l)(iv) (1994). Thus, it is clear that the proceedings here are child-custody proceedings under the ICWA.

Section 1903 of the ICWA defines “Indian child” as

any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian Tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.

§ 1903(4). It is undisputed that S.N.R. is not currently a member of an “Indian tribe” and that her mother, T.R., was an enrolled member of the Leech Lake Band. Freeman challenges the juvenile court’s conclusion that because the Leech Lake Band has determined that S.N.R. is eligible for band membership, and such determinations are conclusive evidence of eligibility under the ICWA, S.N.R. is an Indian child. We review this question of law de novo.

The Bureau of Indian Affairs has published guidelines to assist state courts in their implementation of the ICWA. See Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed.Reg. 67,584, 67,585 (1979) [hereinafter BIA Guidelines]. The BIA Guidelines provide that under the ICWA, “[t]he determination by a tribe that a child * is or is not eligible for membership in that tribe * * * is conclusive.” 44 Fed.Reg. at 67,586 (§ B.l(b)(i)). While the BIA Guidelines are not binding on courts, unless Congress specifically invests the bureau with the authority to implement rules pursuant to the Act, Minnesota appellate courts have consistently utilized the Guidelines to answer as a matter of law questions unanswered by the language of the ICWA itself. See, e.g., In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn. 1994); id. at 364-65; In re Adoption of M.T.S., 489 N.W.2d 285, 287-88 (Minn.App.1992); In re Welfare of M.S.S., 465 N.W.2d 412, 418-19 (Minn.App.1991). And a number of other jurisdictions have eon-eluded that a tribal determination that a child is a member of a tribe or eligible for membership in a tribe is conclusive evidence that the child is an “Indian child” under the ICWA. See, e.g., In re Junious M., 144 Cal.App.3d 786, 193 Cal.Rptr. 40, 43 (1983); In re Shawboose, 175 Mich.App. 637, 438 N.W.2d 272, 273 (1989); In re Adoption of Riffle, 277 Mont. 388, 922 P.2d 510, 513 (1996); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t v. Tucker, 76 Or.App. 673, 710 P.2d 793, 797 (1985); People in Interest of J.J. and S.J., 454 N.W.2d 317, 327-28 (S.D. 1990); In re M.C.P., 153 Vt. 275, 571 A.2d 627, 634 (1989); In re Dependency of Colnar, 52 Wash.App. 37, 757 P.2d 534, 535-36 (1988); see also In re Baby Boy Doe, 123 Idaho 464, 849 P.2d 925, 931 (1993) (stating that court must make “its own determination” regarding eligibility where neither tribe nor BIA has made conclusive determination regarding eligibility).

Freeman concedes that the Leech Lake Band has the authority to determine its own membership. She argues, however, that when applying the ICWA, a juvenile court “must be satisfied that the Tribe has made an appropriate ‘determination’ ” to give that determination conclusive effect and that, therefore, the juvenile court “must inquire” whether the tribe correctly applied its internal standards to determine that a child is eligible for membership.

To support this contention, Freeman first cites United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir.1979), which concludes that enrollment in a tribe is not “necessarily determinative” of “Indian” status under 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 597 F.2d at 1263. But Broncheau seeks to answer a question entirely different from the one before us. In Broncheau and the cases it cites, the appellants alleged that the federal courts had no jurisdiction over their alleged crimes because the federal government did not demonstrate that they were Indians who committed an offense against other Indians under 18 U.S.C. § 1153 or its predecessor statute, on the ground that either they were not enrolled in a tribe or they had requested that their names be removed from a tribe’s roll. 597 F.2d at 1262-63; see United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 953 (9th Cir.1974) (arguing section 1153 not applicable because appellant had requested that his name be withdrawn from roll); Ex Parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir.1938) (arguing 18 U.S.C. § 548 not applicable because individual was not enrolled member of tribe). These cases do not involve the ICWA or a tribal determination of its membership. Rather, those courts determined that lack of enrollment is not determinative of whether section 1153 applies. See Broncheau, 597 F.2d at 1262-63 (finding that federal government’s failure to demonstrate that appellant was enrolled member is not determinative regarding applicability of section 1153); Ives, 504 F.2d at 953 (finding that because lack of enrollment is not determinative, appellant’s argument that section 1153 did not apply because he requested that his name be withdrawn from tribe’s roll was irrelevant); Ex Parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28 at 31 (holding that “lack of enrollment * * * is not determinative of [Indian] status”).

Freeman next cites a section of Bron-cheau in which the court discusses a claim that section 1153 is unconstitutional because the term “Indian” is not statutorily defined and is therefore unconstitutionally vague. 597 F.2d at 1263. The court dismissed this claim because the term “Indian” in section 1153 has been judicially defined, citing cases in which courts have reviewed a number of factors to determine whether a party is an Indian under section 1153. Id. But in contrast with section 1153, Congress indicated that through the ICWA it sought to protect the interests of Indian tribes with respect to their children. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (stating “that there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children”); 25 U.S.C § 1902 (stating that the ICWA implements a policy of promoting “the stability and security of Indian tribes”); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (providing that tribe has right to intervene in any foster-care-placement or parental-right-termination proceeding involving child who is member or eligible for membership in that tribe); cf. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 44-45, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 1606, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989) (stating that in passing the ICWA Congress was concerned with “the rights of Indian communities vis-a-vis state authorities”). And a tribe’s right to determine its membership for tribal purposes “has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community.” Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978); see Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 1257, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981) (noting that although they have “lost many of the attributes of sovereignty,” “the Indian tribes retain their inherent power to determine tribal membership”).

Freeman next cites three cases from other states in support of her argument that the district court must review the internal processes through which the tribe reached its determination that S.N.R. is a tribal member. But analysis of those cases shows that, in addition to the fact that none is binding authority here, none compels the conclusion appellant would have us arrive at. In the first of these cases, the court made its own determination of a child’s eligibility for tribal membership but only because the tribe was unable to do so. See Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d at 930-31. In the second case, the tribe determined that a child was not eligible for membership because his ancestry was uncertain. In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 111 N.J. 155, 543 A.2d 925, 933 (1988). Describing the tribe’s eligibility determination as a “current refusal to enroll” the child, and thus “not determinative of his status as an Indian child under the ICWA,” the court concluded that the basis of the tribe’s eligibility-determination, the child’s ancestry, was a question of fact that could only be resolved at an evidentiary hearing. Id. But this conclusion does not support appellant’s contention for three reasons: (1) all of the court’s statements addressing whether the child was an Indian child under the ICWA are dicta: the court resolved the appeal on other grounds; (2) the court’s treatment of the tribe’s decision-making process as a “current refusal to enroll” the child rather than as a determination of eligibility suggests a situation more akin to Baby Boy Doe, where the tribe was unable to reach an eligibility determination, than to the current case, where the tribe has clearly made such a determination; and (3) the court states that “the tribe’s refusal to enroll [the child] is not determinative of his status as an Indian child” without citing any supporting legal authority. As noted above, although lack of enrollment has been held not to be determinative of Indian status under other laws, these cases do not involve the ICWA or a tribe’s determination of its membership. And in the third ease, Angus v. Joseph, 60 Or.App. 546, 655 P.2d 208 (1982), the court did not address whether a tribe’s determination that a child is a member or eligible for membership is conclusive evidence that a child is an Indian child under the ICWA. 655 P.2d at 211-12.

Freeman also cites a report of the United States Senate Committee on Indian Affairs discussing a proposed amendment to the ICWA, in which the committee argued that the ICWA should be amended to provide that when a tribe seeks to intervene in a child-placement proceeding, the tribe shall include in its motion “a statement documenting the membership or eligibility for membership of the Indian child.” S.Rep. No. 105-156, at 23 (1997). But the Committee’s stated intent in adding this requirement was to “provide assurances to other parties involved with Indian children that Indian tribes will follow a specified set of rules based upon their own membership requirements,” not to authorize a court to inquire into the validity of a tribe’s determination. Id. And even if we were to interpret this proposed amendment to authorize such inquiries, the fact that the Committee would find it necessary to amend the ICWA to provide the courts with such authority indicates that the ICWA currently does not provide such authority. Cf. Northern States Power Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 571 N.W.2d 573, 575-76 (Minn.1997) (stating that where legislature amends statute, courts generally presume that legislature intends a change in the law). Additionally, we note that the Committee found the proposition that “tribal determinations of membership under tribal law are conclusive for the purpose of determining whether a child is an Indian child subject to the ICWA” to be “[c]onsistent with long-standing and fundamental principles of Federal Indian law.” S.Rep. No. 105-156, at 23.

The ICWA is to be “liberally construed in favor of a result that is consistent” with “deferring to tribal judgment” and furthering Congressional purposes in passing the statute. BIA Guidelines, 44 Fed.Reg. at 67,584-85. And the purpose of the ICWA is, in part, to curtail state encroachment on the authority of the Indian tribes with respect to their children. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 45 n. 17, 109 S.Ct. at 1606 n. 17. Freeman cites no case from any jurisdiction where, as she requests we require the district court to do here, a court has reviewed the internal processes through which a tribe has reached its determination that a child is a member or eligible for membership in that tribe. And “there is perhaps no greater intrusion upon tribal sovereignty than for a [non-tribal] court to interfere with a sovereign tribe’s membership determinations.” Smith v. Babbitt, 875 F.Supp. 1353, 1361 (D.Minn.1995). We conclude, therefore, that a tribal determination that a child is a member or eligible for membership in that tribe is conclusive evidence that a child is an “Indian child” under section 1915.

Thus, we conclude that a court seeking to determine whether a child is an “Indian child” under the ICWA is initially faced with a question of fact. The court must determine whether a tribe has concluded that a child is a member of, or eligible for membership in, an Indian tribe. This inquiry is not to be an investigation of the tribe’s application of its membership standards to a particular child. See, e.g., Smith, 875 F.Supp. at 1361; BIA Guidelines, 44 Fed.Reg. at 67, 586 (§ B.l(b)(i)). Rather, the court must determine whether the party who states that the child is a member or eligible for membership in a tribe is authorized to make such statements on the tribe’s behalf. See Angus, 655 P.2d at 212.

Here, the band submitted a resolution of the Leech Lake Reservation Tribal Council that provides that

the Reservation Tribal Council has delegated its membership determinations for purposes of implementing [the ICWA] to Lillian Reese * * ⅜ for at least the past ten years.

Resolution No. 00-26 (“Re: Tribal Membership”), Leech Lake Reservation Tribal Council (Aug. 19, 1999). And Reese testified that

[a]fter reviewing all of the information available to me, I have made the determination that [S.N.R.] is eligible for membership in the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe.

We conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the Leech Lake Band has concluded that S.N.R. is eligible for membership in the band. Thus, the juvenile court did not err in concluding that S.N.R. is an Indian child within the meaning of the ICWA and that, therefore, the ICWA is applicable to her adoption proceedings.

II. Dismissal of Freeman’s Petition to Adopt S.N.R.

Freeman next argues that, even if the ICWA applies to adoption proceedings involving S.N.R., the juvenile court erred in dismissing her petition. Section 1915 of the ICWA provides:

In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child’s extended family; (2) other member’s of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian families.

25 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

[A] determination that good cause exists to avoid the placement preferences of section 1915 should be based upon a finding of one or more of the factors

established by the BIA Guidelines. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 363. The BIA Guidelines provide that good cause not to follow the ICWA placement preferences must be based on one or more of the following factors:

(i) The request of the biological parents or the child when the child is of sufficient age.
(ii) The extraordinary physical or emotional needs of the child as established by testimony of a qualified expert witness.
(iii) The unavailability of suitable families for placement after a diligent search has been completed for families meeting the preference criteria [of section 1915(a) ].

BIA Guidelines, 44 Fed.Reg. at 67,594 (§ F.3(a)). And a party who does meet the placement preferences of the ICWA who seeks to adopt an Indian child bears the burden of establishing good cause to depart from those preferences. Id. at 67,-594 (§ F.3(b)).

Freeman' does not qualify as a member of S.N.R.’s extended family, as a member of the Leech Lake Band, or as a member of another Indian tribe, and Freeman did not argue to the juvenile court, and does not argue here, that she qualifies as a preferred placement. Freeman did not provide the testimony of a qualified expert witness that is required to demonstrate good cause on the basis of extraordinary physical or emotional needs of S.N.R. that would allow the juvenile court to place S.N.R. with Freeman. See S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 364-65. And she did not attempt to demonstrate that, after a diligent search, there were no suitable families available for placement meeting the preference criteria of section 1915. We conclude, therefore, that the juvenile court did not err in granting summary judgment to HCDCFS and dismissing Freeman’s petition to adopt S.N.R.

DECISION

The district court did not err in concluding that the determination of the Leech Lake Band that S.N.R. is eligible for membership in the band is conclusive evidence that S.N.R. is an Indian child within the meaning of the ICWA and that, therefore, the ICWA applied to adoption proceedings involving her. And because Freeman failed to provide the testimony of a qualified expert witness that is necessary to demonstrate good cause to deviate from the placement preferences of the ICWA, the court did not err in granting HCDCFS summary judgment and in dismissing Freeman’s petition to adopt S.N.R.

Affirmed.

RANDALL, Judge

(concurring specially)

I concur in the result.

      . At the August 6 hearing, Freeman introduced a number of documents from the Leech Lake Band and the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe. In a September 1990 letter addressed to Hennepin County from the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, a representative of the tribe's Human Services Division stated that S.N.R.’s siblings "are not eligible for enrollment in our Tribe with the information provided to us by your Agency.” In a May 1993 document, a child-welfare worker of the Leech Lake Band stated that S.N.R. "is eligible for enrollment in this tribe.” A December 1994 document from the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe noted that S.N.R. and her siblings did not possess the "1/4 [Minnesota Chippewa Tribe blood quantum] eligibility for enrollment.” In January 1995, a social worker from Leech Lake Family Services stated that the children "are not eligible for enrollment in the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe.” But in the June 1999 letter from Reese described above, she stated that since the 1995 letter the band "has adopted a policy of recognizing individuals as members based on their descent from tribal members,” that S.N.R.’s mother was a member of the Leech Lake Band, and that, therefore, the band recognized the children as members.

      . The ICWA defines "Indian tribe” to include any tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the services provided to such entities by the Secretary of the Interior. § 1903(8), (11). Because the Leech Lake Band has been recognized as eligible for such services, the band is an Indian tribe for the purposes of the ICWA. See Indian Entities Recognized as Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 60 Fed.Reg. 55, 270, 55, 272 (1997).

      . In Angus, the court stated that “the testimony of a representative of tribal government would be probative evidence of membership.” 655 P.2d at 212. But the court was reviewing a district court’s findings that a child’s parents were members of different tribes and that the child was eligible for membership in both tribes. 655 P.2d at 211-212. The record supporting the district court’s findings was not solely limited to a determination of membership by the tribes. 'Id. at 212-13. And neither the district court nor the appellate court reviewed the internal processes of the tribe, as Freeman would have us require the district court to do here. Id.

      . Where the district court is not presented with a tribal determination that a child is a member of, or eligible for membership in, the tribe, the court must engage in further fact-finding, the outlines of which we need not discuss here. See Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d at 933.

      . Freeman argues that the juvenile court erred in "dismissing appellant’s adoption petition based upon the Myerses’ preferred-placement status under the ICWA." We do not construe the juvenile court's decision to be based on that ground. Rather, the juvenile court concluded correctly that Freeman, as a party who does not qualify as an ICWA preferred placement and who petitions to adopt an Indian child, has the burden of establishing good cause to depart from those preferences and, because Freeman failed to provide the required expert-witness testimony, she could not satisfy her burden of establishing that S.N.R. has extraordinary physical or emotional needs meriting departure from those placement preferences. See S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 362, 364-65. Regardless of whether the court based its decision on the ground Freeman asserts, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment if it can be sustained on any ground. See Myers Through Myers v. Price, 463 N.W.2d 773, 775 (Minn.App.1990), review denied (Minn. Feb. 4, 1991). We need not, therefore, address whether the Myerses qualify as a preferred placement under the ICWA.