author: CADY, Justice.

text:
    AG PARTNERS, L.L.C., Appellee, v. CHICAGO CENTRAL & PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, d/b/a Canadian National/Illinois Central Railroad, Appellant.
    No. 05-1112.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Jan. 26, 2007.

      Edward J. Krug of Krug Law Firm, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
    Tony R. Krall of Hanson, Lulic & Krall, L.L.C., Minneapolis, MN, and Robert W. Brinton of Brinton, Bordwell & Johnson, Clarion, for appellee.
   CADY, Justice.

In this appeal from a judgment for damages based on a claim for negligence, we must decide if the district court, properly overruled a motion for directed verdict on a claim for the costs of repair to damaged property predicated on stipulated evidence of the parties. We find the district court should have granted the motion for directed verdict, but not without further considering Ag Partners’ request to reopen the evidence. As a result, we remand the case for a new trial conditioned on a finding by the district court the trial record should be reopened to permit the introduction of additional evidence of damage. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals in part, vacate in part, and remand the case to the district court for a conditional new trial.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In January of 2001, two empty grain cars owned by Chicago Central & Pacific Railroad (CCP) derailed at Ag Partners’ elevator facility in Fonda, Iowa. The derailed cars struck the steel supports of a grain loading structure, called a “loadout tower,” located adjacent to the train tracks. The loadout tower is an essential component of an elevator operation .because it permits the grain from the. elevator to be loaded onto the train cars. The accident caused damage to the loadout tower and to a conveyer used in the loading operation. Ag Partners had rebuilt parts of the grain loading structure a year prior to the accident to upgrade its operation and improve its business. Following the accident, Ag Partners rebuilt the load-out a second time and sued CCP in January of 2003 for the losses it incurred. These losses included the cost of repairing the loadout, and trucking expenses for transporting the remaining grain to another elevator.

Ag Partners alleged negligence and trespass as theories of recovery in its lawsuit. CCP denied the claims - and raised affirmative defenses, including contract and license defenses that could relieve CCP of liability. CCP also claimed Ag Partners violated the terms of a lease. The parties agreed to bifurcate the trial to hear the defenses separately. As a result, a jury trial was held on the negligence claim in 2004, and the contractual defenses were tried to the court in 2005.

Prior to the jury trial, the parties stipulated to the repair and trucking costs. The stipulation between the parties stated:

That the fair and reasonable cost.to repair the damages to the loadout and conveyer caused by the derailment of 1/14/01 is $290,176.00.
That the fair and reasonable cost for trucking services [to] transport grain from Fonda to Albert City after the derailment of 1/14/01 was $62,481.51. Defendant does not agree that these charges were necessary or incurred because of the derailment.
Defendant continues to deny that it was negligent in causing the derailment or that it is responsible for these damages.

Ag Partners’ attorney read this stipulation at trial as part of its evidence.

At the close of all the evidence, counsel for CCP made a motion for a directed verdict. It claimed Ag Partners failed to prove “the value of the loadout so as to compare the cost of repairing the loadout.” CCP asserted proof of the value of the property repaired is a separate component to the recovery of damages based orTthe cost of repair, and the stipulation did not cover the value of the property.

Ag Partners responded by claiming the stipulation was sufficient to establish its claim for damages. Alternatively, Ag Partners sought to reopen its evidence to submit evidence of value. Counsel for Ag Partners stated:

I think the costs of repair for a brand new loadout and conveyer system that was done approximately one year earlier, which is the testimony, under Iowa law is sufficient. If this was an issue it certainly could have been raised much earlier. The stipulation is more than just it was fair and reasonable, it was fair and reasonable and caused by the derailment and I think we’ve met our burden of proof and if there is any consideration I would simply then ask to reopen, I’ll come bring Bill Lyster back and he can put it into evidence.

The trial court held the stipulation of the fair and reasonable costs of repair did not require further evidence that the value of the property prior to the repairs exceeded the cost of the repairs. The trial court considered the “fair and reasonable” language of the stipulation to mean the parties agreed it was reasonable to make the repairs. Consequently, the trial court overruled the motion for directed verdict, and did not further address Ag Partners’ request to reopen the record to present evidence of the value of the property prior to the accident.

The jury subsequently returned a verdict finding both parties at fault. It determined CCP was seventy percent at fault and Ag Partners was thirty percent at fault. It also found Ag Partners suffered $852,657.51 in total damages. This total was the sum of the stipulated figures for damages to the loadout, ($290,176.00), and damages for trucking costs ($62,481.51).

After the negligence trial the parties presented their- contractual arguments and other defenses to the -court in a second proceeding. The court found CCP failed to establish its defenses. As a result, the district court entered judgment in favor of Ag Partners. It awarded Ag Partners seventy percent of $352,657.51, or $246,860.25.

CCP appealed. It claimed the trial court erred by rejecting its contract and license defenses, as well as its claim that Ag Partners violated the terms of a lease. It also claimed the trial court erred in denying an application for leave to file a counterclaim. Finally, CCP claimed the trial court committed error during the course of the negligence trial by allowing evidence of a subsequent remedial measure by CCP following the derailment, and by failing to direct a verdict in its favor on the claim for repair costs in the absence of evidence of the value of the property. We transferred the case to the court of appeals.

The court of appeals rejected all the claims raised by CCP except one. It found the district court erred by failing to direct a verdict on the claim for the repair costs because Ag Partners had not produced sufficient evidence to show the pre-accident value of the property. Consequently, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment entered by the district court for the trucking costs but reversed the judgment for the repair costs.

We granted Ag Partners’ application for further review of the decision by the court of appeals that reversed the judgment on Ag Partners’ claim for repair costs. CCP did not seek further review.

II. Issues for Review.

“On further review, we can review any or all of the issues raised on appeal or limit our review to just those issues brought to our attention by the application for further review.” Anderson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 2005). Only Ag Partners seeks review from the decision of -the court of appeals. Moreover, its request for review is limited to the claim involving damages based on the cost to repair the loadout. The court of appeals otherwise affirmed the judgment for Ag Partners, and CCP did not request further review of the other issues adversely decided by the court of appeals relating to the judgment. Consequently, we limit our review to the issue and arguments raised by Ag Partners. In support of its application, Ag Partners makes the following arguments: (1) the district court properly denied CCP’s motion for a directed verdict, (2) even if such a decision was error, reversal was not warranted because any error was harmless, and (3) even if such a decision was error and not harmless, the case should be remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages to the loadout under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.26 and our case law.

III. Standard of Review.

“We review the denial of a motion for directed verdict for errors at law.” Rife v. D.T. Corner, Inc., 641 N.W.2d 761, 766 (Iowa 2002) (citing McClure v. Walgreen Co., 613 N.W.2d 225, 230 (Iowa 2000)). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party when ruling on a motion for a directed verdict. Id. The court must overrule the motion if each element of the claim is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. Substantial evidence is “evidence that a ‘reasonable mind would accept as adequate to reach a conclusion.’ ” Bellville v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 702 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Iowa 2005) (quoting Thompson v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 559 N.W.2d 288, 290-91 (Iowa 1997)). Such-evidence may still be adequate even if it is contradicted, Reuter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 469 N.W.2d 250, 251 (Iowa 1991), or “if reasonable minds could deduce different inferences from the evidence presented,” Rife, 641 N.W.2d at 767.

IV. Discussion.

It is a general rule of Iowa law that damage for repairs to property is the fair and reasonable cost of repair “not to exceed the value of the property immediately prior to the loss or damage.” State v. Urbanek, 177 N.W.2d 14, 16 (Iowa 1970). The rationale for this general rule is traced to the fundamental purpose of damages “‘to place the injured party in as favorable a position as though no wrong had been committed.’ ” Hendricks v. Great Plains Supply Co., 609 N.W.2d 486, 494 (Iowa 2000) (quoting Dealers Hobby, Inc. v. Marie Ann Linn Realty Co., 255 N.W.2d 131, 134 (Iowa 1977)). If the cost of repairs were recoverable when it exceeds the value of the property, then the plaintiff could be placed in a better position. See Dealers Hobby, 255 N.W.2d at 134 (alluding that a plaintiff could be placed in a better position when the cost of repairs exceeded the value of the property because the plaintiffs damages would not be “limited to its actual loss” (citing DeWaay v. Muhr, 160 N.W.2d 454, 459 (Iowa 1968))); Urbanek, 177 N.W.2d at 16-17 (noting our rules regarding damages should not allow a plaintiff to have property restored to a better condition than before the accident).

In order for a plaintiff to recover damages for repair costs, the general rule requires the plaintiff to prove the fair and reasonable value of repair costs do not exceed the value of the property prior to the accident. This general rule imposes two elements of proof that normally must be met as a prerequisite to recovery. Ur-banek, 177 N.W.2d at 16-17. It requires the plaintiff to prove both the fair and reasonable costs of repair, and the pre-accident value of the property. If the fair and reasonable repair costs are less than the value of the property prior to the accident, such costs are included in the plaintiffs damage award. If such repair costs exceed the pre-accident value of the property, the damages awarded for repair costs are limited to that value. In both eases, of course, a plaintiff may recover a total damage award greater than the pre-accident value of the property when “special items of damages” have been suffered by the plaintiff. Schutz v. Cullen-Schiltz & Assocs., Inc., 228 N.W.2d 10, 20-21 (Iowa 1975) (“The plaintiffs were entitled to recover this clean up cost as an element of damages separate from the replacement cost of rebuilding their home.”).

In this case, the stipulation was limited to the fair and reasonable cost of repairing the loadout. Thus, it was an agreement by the parties the $290,176.00 in repair costs was not unreasonable or excessive. See Hendricks, 609 N.W.2d at 495 (noting “there was no evidence indicating the replacement costs were excessive”). However, the stipulation did not further address the second component concerning the value of the property prior to the accident, and it cannot be read to include an agreement that the repairs were less than the value of the property prior to the accident.

In Urbanek, we made it clear that both components of cost to repair damages were necessary to recover. 177 N.W.2d at 18. In that case, -the plaintiff only introduced evidence at trial the temporary repairs to the damaged property were “fair and reasonable.” Id. at 15. We rejected this evidence as sufficient to support an award of damages because there was no further evidence “that the value of the [property] prior to the accident measured by any standard was greater than the demonstrated cost of repair.” Id. at 18. We concluded the evidence “fell short of the requirements to meet any of the recognized tests as to the measure of damages.” Id.

The stipulation in this case failed to address the pre-accident value of the property. Moreover, the other evidence presented during the negligence trial failed to establish the value of the property prior to the accident, and no exceptions to the general rule were asserted or established by the evidence. Accordingly, we agree with the court of appeals that Ag Partners failed to meet its burden to submit sufficient evidence of damages for the cost of repairs to be submitted to the jury.

Ag Partners responds that any trial court error was harmless because it introduced ample evidence of the pre-accident value of the property at the second trial. We recognize error committed by a trial court in overruling a motion for directed verdict made at the close of a plaintiffs case-in-chief can be cured by introducing additional evidence to support submission of the issue to the jury prior to the close of all the evidence in the case. See Pressley v. Stone, 214 Iowa 449, 450-51, 239 N.W. 567, 568 (1931) (finding the district court erred in overruling the defendant’s motion for directed verdict at the close of plaintiffs case, but holding “[i]f the trial court was right in its final ruling on the merits of the case, it became quite immaterial whether the court was right in its first ruling or not”); Cushman v. Carbondale Fuel Co., 116 Iowa 618, 622, 88 N.W. 817, 818 (1902) (“If plaintiff, by proper evidence, makes a. good case, we are not going to send it. back for a new trial because it was vulnerable to objection when he first submitted it.”). Yet, this rule still ensures the fact finder’s verdict will ultimately be based upon adequate evidence. However, if we were to apply this rule in this bifurcated case, it would deprive a defendant of the right to have a jury decide the disputed issue. For this reason, we reject the extension of the rule as argued by Ag Partners.

We also reject Ag Partners’ argument that Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.26 requires this case to be remanded. This rule applies only when “the granting of the motion would have terminated the case in favor of the appellant.” Iowa R.App. P. 6.26. Here, the case would not have terminated in favor of CCP because the motion for directed verdict only related to Ag Partners’ claim for loadout damages. Ag Partners still would have recovered damages for its trucking expenses.

Ultimately, we agree with the court of appeals that Ag Partners failed to establish proof of the pre-accident value of the structure. However, we disagree that the remedy on appeal is to dismiss the damage claim, and we therefore vacate the decision made by our court of appeals to enter judgment in favor of CCP regarding the loadout damages. When a party has failed to introduce sufficient evidence at trial on an element of a claim as revealed by a motion for directed verdict made by an opposing party at the close of the evidence, the district court has discretion to grant a motion by a party to reopen its case to supply the -missing evidence. Bangs v. Maple Hills Ltd., 585 N.W.2d 262, 267 (Iowa 1998). A request to reopen the case will be granted when necessary for “ ‘the due administration of justice.’ ” Id. (quoting 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 390, at 587 (1991)). This rule recognizes a trial is about the search for truth and justice. See id. (recognizing the decision to reopen a case is to “ ‘achieve substantial justice’ ” (quoting 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 390, at 583)). Nonprejudicial errors, oversights, or incorrect assumptions by the court or counsel during the trial process should not interfere with that mission.

In this case, the district court never had an opportunity to exercise its discretion to permit Ag Partners to reopen its case because it incorrectly found the stipulation was legally sufficient. Thus, the effect of a dismissal of the claim for repairs on appeal based upon the incorrect ruling by the trial court would be to direct the verdict without permitting the trial court to further consider the request by Ag Partners to submit additional evidence. A party should not have a claim dismissed for insufficient evidence without the court ruling on the party’s request to reopen the case. Accordingly, we conclude the claim for repair costs should be remanded to the district court to determine if Ag Partners’ request to reopen should be granted in light of our law regarding such a decision. See id. (“ ‘No rigid or fixed formula can or should be employed to determine when a motion to reopen is proper since the trial court, which has a feel for the case, can best determine what is necessary and appropriate to achieve substantial justice.’ ” (quoting 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 386, at 583)); State v. Teeters, 487 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Iowa 1992) (listing factors to weigh when deciding whether to reopen).

In considering the scope of the remand, we return the case to the district court to first consider if Ag Partners should be permitted to reopen its case to introduce evidence on the value of the property prior to the incident giving rise to the claim for damages. If the district court grants the request by Ag Partners to reopen the record, a new trial shall be granted limited to the claim for repair costs based on the fault assigned by the jury in the first trial. If the district court does not grant Ag Partners’ request to reopen the record, the judgment regarding loadout damages should be entered in favor of CCP.

V. Conclusion.

We vacate the decision of the court of appeals that remanded the case for an entry of judgment in favor of CCP regarding the loadout damages. We otherwise affirm the decision of the court of appeals, and remand the case to the district court for a conditional new trial and further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The conditional new trial shall be limited to the issue of damages for the cost of repair to the loadout.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

All justices concur except HECHT and APPEL, JJ., who take no part.

      . We will refer to the damaged loadout and conveyer as the "loadout.”

      . CCP did not alert Ag Partners of its objections to the sufficiency of the stipulation of damages to support an award of damages based on the cost of repairs until the motion for directed verdict. This motion was not made until the close of all the evidence at trial pursuant to an agreement by the parties the motion would be “deemed as having been made at the close of the plaintiff's case.” Until that time, Ag Partners, as well as the trial court, assumed the stipulation of damages was sufficient to support an award of damages. In fact, the trial court instructed the jury to use the stipulated amount of the repair cost in determining damages for the repairs to the loadout without objection by CCP.

      . In determining the pre-accident value of property under the cost-of-repair rule, we recognize “the sum [of] all ... the parts” is the proper measure. See Hendricks, 609 N.W.2d at 495. Thus, the "property” in this case would include all the integral parts, whether damaged or not, pertaining to the damaged loadout tower and conveyer, or what we have referred to as the "loadout.” See id. ("[W]e use the value of the home in its entirety ....”).

      . It should be noted the fair and reasonable costs of repair, even though “fair and reasonable,” can sometimes exceed the pre-accident value of the property. Thus, we reject Ag Partners’ contention “fair and reasonable” meant it did not exceed the pre-accident value of the property.

      . In Urbanek, we discussed the type of evidence that can be introduced to help establish the value of property in those cases where the value may be difficult to establish. 177 N.W.2d at 18 (noting " 'wide latitude in the evidence is permissible’ ” to establish actual or intrinsic value when no market value is readily available (citation omitted)). Ag Partners only introduced evidence the loadout had been updated a year prior to the accident, and the project took several months to complete.: Furthermore, Ag Partners did not assert other means to satisfy the value component. See id. at 15-16 (noting "[tjhere was no proof ... offered that the repairs made merely restored the property to its former condition immediately before the accident!,] ” and "if appellee was unable to prove either market value or actual value, it was required to show at least the repairs did not restore the property, to a better condition than it was before the accident”).

      . Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.26 provides in relevant part:
      When a judgment is reversed for error in overruling a motion for directed verdict, ... and the granting of the motion would have terminated the case in favor of appellant, the appellate court may enter or direct the district court to enter final judgment as if such motion had been initially sustained; provided that if it appears from the record that the material facts relating thereto were not fully developed at the trial or if in the opinion of the appellate court the ends of justice will be served thereby, a new trial shall be awarded of such issue or of the whole case.

      . Under special circumstances, we may remand cases in the interest of justice for a new trial when there has been a failure of proof by the plaintiff. See Beeck v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 350 N.W.2d 149, 162-63 (Iowa 1984). We recognize the property would have some value, which would entitle Ag Partners to some amount for the cost to repair damages. However, it is unnecessary to consider this remedy at this time. The error in the trial court proceeding allows us to remand the case for the district court to consider the proper remedy in the exercise of its discretion. As a court of review, our preference is to permit the trial court to make the initial decision, which then enables us to review that decision on a subsequent appeal.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Chief Justice. MEYER, Justice PAGE, Justice

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Wintersun LEMIEUX, Appellant.
    No. A05-554.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Jan. 18, 2007.

      John Stuart, State Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Asst. Public defender, Minneapolis, MN, for Wintersun Lemieux, Appellant.
    Lori Swanson, Atty. Gen., Thomas R. Ragatz, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, MN, Melanie Sue Ford, St. Louis County Atty., Duluth, MN, for the State, Respondent.
   OPINION

ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Chief Justice.

Appellant Wintersun Lemieux was convicted and sentenced in St. Louis County District Court for the crime of first-degree murder in connection with the death of 68-year-old Irwin Teitelbaum. On appeal, Lemieux challenges the admission of evidence as having been derived from an illegal warrantless entry into his residence. Concluding that the entry was justified under the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement, we affirm.

Teitelbaum lived with his wife at 3 East 13th Street in the Harbor View housing complex in Duluth. The housing complex consisted of multi-unit homes, somewhat similar to condominiums with separate entrances and no common hallway. Teitel-baum delivered newspapers for the Duluth News-Tribune for some 15 years, having taken over the route from his sons. As a matter routine, he would pick up the bundle of newspapers as soon as they were delivered. On July 9, 2003, when Teitel-baum’s wife woke up, neither Teitelbaum nor the newspapers were there. She looked out the front window, saw her husband lying motionless on his back with blood all over his face, and called 911. The call came in to dispatch at 6:15 a.m.

Responding officers found Teitelbaum’s body on the sidewalk. He had sustained massive trauma to the head, and there was blood on his clothes and a nearby canvas newspaper bag. He had been disrobed, except for a sock on one foot, and his clothes were scattered around the yard. Around 6:40 a.m., shortly after the officers cordoned off the area with crime scene tape, one of the officers saw Lemieux riding by the crime scene in a USA minivan taxi. The officer called the cab company and found out that the minivan taxi’s fare had originated from 729 West 4th Street. Officers canvassed the area in the “line of sight” of the homicide, but came away with nothing pertinent.

The officer in charge of the investigation, Lieutenant Robert Brasel, convened a major-crime briefing at 10:30 a.m. to discuss what they knew and to “brainstorm” and prioritize what needed to be done. During the meeting, Tawnya Rainey’s name was mentioned. Rainey resided at 15 East 13th Street, about a half block from the crime scene. Rainey was frequently gone from the residence during the summer but would still “pop in and out,” and she also allowed others to stay there so there was a lot of “traffic” through that residence. The officers had previously had problems with that residence, including some criminal behavior; but because Rainey continued to pay the rent, they felt somewhat constrained in what they could do about it. Lieutenant Brasel decided to have an officer go to 15 East 13th Street in an effort to make contact with Rainey' or any other occupants of the residence; he assigned that task to Sergeant Jon Haataja, specifically directing that if nobody was home, no officer was to enter the residence without talking to him (Brasel) first.

Meanwhile, Officer Shana Harris, who was among the first to arrive at the Teitel-baum crime scene but missed the briefing in order to complete her report, returned to Harbor View to do her own canvassing, intending to contact people she knew to see if they could provide any information on the homicide. She asked the Harbor View housing specialist, Susan Jordan, about problem residences, and Jordan brought up Rainey’s name. Officer Harris was familiar with Rainey and had already tried calling her, but Rainey’s phone number had been disconnected. After speaking with Jordan, Harris drove to 15 East 13th Street to do a “knock and talk” with Rainey or anyone else at that residence.

Sergeant Haataja and Officer Harris arrived at 15 East 13th Street at about the same time. When the officers approached the front of the residence, they saw that the screen on the window to the right side of the door had been torn loose, the window had been pushed up, and the door was “slightly open, not latched.” They could hear music playing inside, and a CD sounded like it was skipping. Haataja began pounding on the door loud enough to be heard over the music as Harris shouted out Rainey’s name, calling for her to answer the door. While this was going on, a neighbor from the adjacent dwelling stepped out and told Harris that he had heard someone inside 15 East 13th Street singing “that night.” The officers were concerned that a burglary had occurred. Around noon, approximately 14 minutes after the officers’ arrival, Haataja called Lieutenant Brasel to report what they had observed. Brasel told them to call for backup and to do a “health and welfare” check for possible injured occupants, emphasizing that they were looking for injured persons, not searching or doing anything else. Part of the reason Haataja was given this assignment was that Brasel knew Haataja “understood that.”

Sergeant Haataja and Officer Harris, joined by two other officers, entered the residence with their firearms drawn and did a quick sweep of the floors, “clearing” the rooms as they moved through. As Haataja walked through the kitchen after cheeking the back door to make sure it was locked, he saw Teitelbaum’s electronic benefit transfer (EBT) card in plain view. After the sweep-search, the residence was secured and a search warrant obtained. While Haataja was guarding the back entrance pending the arrival of the search warrant and trying to be of more use, he called Lemieux’s probation officer to see if he had an address for Lemieux. Meanwhile, as Harris was guarding the front entrance, the neighbor told her that Lem-ieux had been staying at the Rainey residence. During the execution of the search warrant, police officers found blood smears, that were later determined to match Teitelbaum’s DNA profile, underneath the exterior window and inside on the banister leading to the basement; miscellaneous items belonging to Teitelbaum below the interior window sill; and a credit union envelope, that contained $180 in cash, with Lemieux’s and Teitelbaum’s fingerprints.

In their investigation, police officers learned that the USA minivan taxi that drove by the crime scene on July 9, 2003, had picked up Lemieux from 729 West 4th Street at 6:35 a.m. Lemieux gave the driver $3 in change, wanted to go to Harbor View, and asked whether the driver had heard “if anything exciting” was “going on.” The driver dropped off Lemieux shortly after driving by the crime scene because the cab fare meter had gone Beyond the amount of money he had given her.

The police also learned that Lemieux showed up at 729 West 4th Street in the early morning hours of July 9, 2003. He was alone, “pretty frantic, breathing hard,” and holding a baseball bat. He had blood on his hands and his clothes. He asked the resident, Tracy Wentland, for a change of clothes, and she showed him where an ex-boyfriend had left some clothing. Lem-ieux left his own clothing in a garbage bag in Wentland’s basement. He told Went-land “the whole story”: that he had hit somebody with the baseball bat, that the man was dead, and that he took the man’s clothing off and threw it in the garbage. Wentland called a cab and gave Lemieux $3 in change for the cab fare. During a warranted search of Wentland’s residence, police officers found Lemieux’s clothing and a baseball bat. Forensic testing of the clothing yielded profiles matching Teitel-baum’s' DNA; and the bat had DNA matching Lemieux’s profile on the shaft and Teitelbaum’s profile on the tip.

Lemieux was arrested in the afternoon of July 9, 2003; and following a Miranda waiver, Lieutenant John Beyer questioned him about his activities over the previous 24 hours. Lemieux said that he had been staying at Rainey’s residence, and that on July 8 he got up at 5 p.m., went downtown, and started drinking. He returned to the residence around 11:30 p.m. He said that he did not have a key, but the door was unlocked. He continued to drink and fell asleep. He denied hurting or fighting with an older man in the Harbor View area but admitted slapping and kicking somebody who was in his mid-twenties. Lemieux wanted to know how his name “[came] up in this;” and when told that his name came up because he was in a cab that morning, he said, “So you have got me in here over that?” The next day, the officer told Lem-ieux that he was going to be charged with second-degree murder and that a grand jury would be convened to seek first-degree murder charges. Lemieux responded, “That’s not right, it wasn’t premeditated.”

Lemieux was indicted by grand jury for first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, and second-degree murder, in violation of Minn.Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(1), (a)(3), and 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2004). While awaiting trial, Lemieux told the police that they “wouldn’t have to go through all of this if [they] would just get him a better deal.” Lemieux went on to say, “I’m not saying I didn’t do it, but you need to get me a better deal.” When asked what he meant by a “better deal,” Lemieux said, “Something other than first-degree.”

Before trial, Lemieux moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the war-rantless sweep-search of 15 East 13th Street, and all evidence derived from that search. Following a three-day omnibus hearing, the district court denied the motion, concluding that the warrantless entry was justified under the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement. At trial, in addition to evidence from the search, the state presented the physical evidence and forensic analysis of the evidence collected from 729 West 4th Street; and also evidence from the crime scene, including Lemieux’s bloody thumbprint on top of the bundle of newspapers, a water bottle with Lemieux’s fingerprints and DNA, and miscellaneous papers with bloody shoe prints similar to the treads on Lemieux’s shoes. There were also Lem-ieux’s police statements. The resident from 729 West 4th Street testified about Lemieux’s confession made in the early morning hours of July 9, 2003, and the taxi driver testified about picking up Lemieux from that residence and driving him by the crime scene. The medical examiner testified that Teitelbaum’s death was caused by blunt-force trauma to the head and neck region, and that he died relatively quickly after the attack started. Witnesses for the defense included a Harbor View resident who, at around 4 a.m. on July 9, 2003, heard people arguing near the Teitelbaum residence; she could not see them, but estimated there were three men. Another Harbor View resident testified that at around 4:50 a.m. on that date, she saw a shirtless, “gangly” young man crashing through the bushes. She saw only one person and did not hear anything, like an argument. The jury found Lemieux guilty as charged, and he was committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections for the mandatory life term.

On appeal from the judgment, Lemieux challenges the admission of evidence derived from the warrantless sweep-search of 15 East 13th Street.

When this court reviews a trial court’s order following an omnibus hearing, determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause as they relate to searches and seizures “should be reviewed de novo on appeal.” State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 382-83 (Minn.1998). The district court’s findings of fact should be reviewed for clear error. Id. at 383.

The Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution guarantee individuals the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. “It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law,’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (footnote omitted). “ ‘[A]t the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home.’ ” Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961)). Nevertheless, the warrant requirement is subject to certain limited exceptions, and law enforcement officers, in pursuing a community-caretak-ing function, “may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency , assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Brigham City v. Stuart, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1947, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006);- see also State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn.1992).

In applying the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement, two principles must be kept in mind: first, that the burden is on the state to demonstrate that police conduct was justified under the exception; and second, that an objective standard should be applied to determine the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that there was an emergency. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d at 223. In determining whether an emergency justified a warrant-less entry, a number of courts had followed a three-prong test articulated in People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607, 609 (1976):

(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property.
(2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence.
(3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.

See, e.g., United States v. Cervantes, 219 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir.2000); People v. Hebert, 46 P.3d 473, 479-80 (Colo.2002); see John F. Decker, Emergency Circumstances, Police Responses, and Fourth Amendment Restrictions, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 433, 532-33 (1999) (proposing a three-prong test as an aid in evaluating justification under the emergency-aid exception). Brigham City, however, rejected the second prong, the subjective motivations of the officers. 126 S.Ct. at 1948 (stating that the officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes).

“But a warrantless search must be ‘strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation’ * ⅜ Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Any search of a residence following a warrantless entry must be “limited by the type of emergency involved. It cannot be used as the occasion for a general voyage of discovery unrelated to the purpose of the entry.” United States v. Moss, 963 F.2d 673, 678 (4th Cir.1992) (holding that even if original entry of cabin had been justified under the emergency-aid exception, search of defendant’s backpack for identification was unreasonable). See also Cervantes, 219 F.3d at 891-92 (holding initial entry of apartment to locate methamphetamine lab under the emergency exception was justified, but subsequent entry by investigator was not, given that “the risk of explosion had been defused”).

When assessing the reasonableness of an emergency-aid search, the officer who conducts the search' is imputed with knowledge of all facts known by other officers involved in the investigation, as long as the officers have some degree of communication between them. See United States v. Twiss, 127 F.3d 771, 774 (8th Cir.1997); see also State v. Riley, 568 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Minn.1997) (using collective-knowledge approach to analyze a war-rantless arrest). Actual communication of information to the officer conducting the search is unnecessary. See Twiss, 127 F.3d at 774.

Here, Lieutenant Brasel testified that he sent Sergeant Haataja to 15 East 13th Street to make contact with anyone using the premises; and Officer Harris testified that she, on her own volition, decided to go to that residence to do a “knock and talk.” While Haataja testified that he was there to do a “welfare check,” the record is not entirely clear as to what he meant by that; but in any event, he adhered to his instructions not to enter the premises without authorization. The district court found that the officers’ purpose in going to the residence was to find out if persons using the premises might have seen or heard something useful to the ongoing homicide investigation and not to gain entry to search for evidence. But once the officers were at the residence, they noted that the window screen was torn loose, the window was pushed up, the door was unlatched, and there was music inside that was skipping; the officers announced their presence, pounded loudly on the door and yelled for someone to answer the door, and they learned that someone had been in the residence that night. The officers were concerned about a “forced entry situation” or burglary and obtained limited authorization for immediate entry to look for possible victims.

Burglary of a dwelling is not “deemed a purely property offense because * * * such an offense always carries with it the possibility of violence and therefore some special risks to human life.” State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Minn.1980). Other courts have concluded that police entry is justifiable under the emergency-aid exception where police have reasonable grounds to believe that a burglary is in progress or has recently occurred. See, e.g., United States v. Lenoir, 318 F.3d 725, 730-31 (7th Cir.2003) (upholding warrant-less entry where defendant who was carrying two high-powered rifles fled from police into nearby home but had trouble entering the door and police reasonably feared for the safety of the home’s occupants); United States v. Tibolt, 72 F.3d 965, 970-71 (1st Cir.1995) (upholding war-rantless entry on reasonable, though mistaken,' belief that residence was the source of security alarm); Murdock v. Stout, 54 F.3d 1437, 1441-42 (9th Cir.1995) (upholding warrantless entry during investigation of suspected burglary, where facts known to police indicated that resident was not responding and circumstances suggested that resident should have been present); Carroll v. State, 335 Md. 723, 646 A.2d 376, 384 (1994) (upholding warrantless entry based on open door, a broken window pane, and information that the resident was away and not expected to return for a day or two); see generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.6(a), at 459-61 (4th ed. 2004) (stating that entry is reasonable “to seek possible victims of violence in premises apparently burglarized recently”); Decker, supra at 490 (stating that “[m]ost courts have applied the emergency doctrine in circumstances where police reasonably believe that a burglary is in progress or has recently occurred”).

Furthermore, here the apparently burglarized residence was in close proximity to a brutal and seemingly random homicide. Ultimately, it was determined that the perpetrator entered the residence through the window: the victim’s blood was under the window on the exterior wall of the residence, the victim’s belongings were inside under the window sill, and, in closing arguments, counsel for both parties acknowledged that the perpetrator gained entry through the window. That the officers later learned Lemieux had entered his own abode is of no moment: “what matters is their reasonable belief’ that a burglary was in progress or had recently occurred at the time of the entry. In re Sealed Case, 153 F.3d 759, 765 (D.C.Cir.1998).

The officers’ search was also limited to the scope of the emergency, sweep-searching the floors for the presence of intruders or injured occupants and departing immediately upon finding the residence unoccupied. And assuming that the officers’ subjective motivations are a relevant state-law consideration, a warrantless search conducted during a criminal investigation does not necessarily preclude application of the emergency-aid exception so long as one of the motives for the warrantless search corresponds to an objectively reasonable emergency. See, e.g., Cervantes, 219 F.3d at 891 (concluding that officer making war-rantless entry to locate a methamphetamine lab during criminal investigation was primarily motivated by concern for the safety of the apartment building’s occupants, as evidenced by the officer’s order that the tenants turn off open flames and evacuate the building); see also Decker, supra at 511-16 (discussing subjective-motivation element). Here, the officers’ war-rantless entry was primarily motivated by concern of a burglary in progress, as evidenced by the call for backup and entry with firearms drawn.

In conclusion, we hold that the police entry of the residence in close proximity to a brutal and seemingly random homicide was justified under the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement because the officers had reasonable grounds to believe that a burglary was in progress or had recently occurred, the entry was motivated primarily to look for possible victims, and the scope of the search was limited to the emergency.

Affirmed.

MEYER, Justice

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. I would not require that an emergency-aid search be supported by evidence establishing probable cause to believe an emergency exists at a particular location, and instead I would inquire whether the emergency-aid search was based on a reasonable belief supported by specific and articulable facts. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the facts of this case give rise to an objectively reasonable belief that an emergency-aid search was justified. Finally, I would conclude that the evidence obtained as a result of that search was improperly admitted, prejudicing defendant Wintersun Lemieux as to two of the three counts against him.

The Minnesota Constitution provides that:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.

Minn. Const, art. 1, § 10; cf. U.S. Const, amend. IV. This constitutional guarantee renders warrantless searches per se unreasonable, subject to limited exceptions. State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 222 (Minn.1992) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). This “per se unreasonable” principle applies with greatest force when it is a home that is to be invaded, as “[cjourts are particularly reluctant to find exceptions to this rule in the context of a warrantless search or seizure in a home.” Id. (citing Payton v. N.Y., 445 U.S. 573, 586,100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)). Despite this reluctance, we have recognized an exception to the warrant requirement in the context of an emergency, stating that “[t]he police may enter a dwelling without a warrant if they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of emergency aid.” Id. at 223. For an emergency-aid search to be justified, the search must be objectively reasonable. Id. (citing Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 364 (8th Cir.1971)). “The court should ask whether with the facts available to the officer at the moment of the * * * search, would a person of reasonable caution believe that the action taken was appropriate.” Id. The state has the burden of showing that the emergency exception applies. Id.

As an initial matter, the majority appears to establish a new test for the emergency-aid exception to the prohibition on unreasonable searches, apparently holding that the facts known to law enforcement officers must establish probable cause to associate the area to be searched with an emergency. State v. Lemieux, supra, at 788. I believe the court errs in indicating that the probable cause standard applies in the emergency-aid search context. Application of the probable cause standard would be a departure from our case law on emergency-aid searches. See, e.g., Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d at 223 (requiring only a reasonable belief in the need to provide emergency aid); see also 3 Wayne R. La-Fave, Search and Seizure § 6.6(a), at 452-53 (4th ed. 2004). More importantly, the probable cause standard, arguably approaching a more-probable-than-not level, is too high. Society needs law enforcement officers, when legitimately acting in their roles as first responders rather than criminal investigators, “to act, not to speculate or meditate” on whether the proper legal standard has been met; “[pjeople could well die in emergencies if police tried to act with the calm deliberation associated with the judicial process.” See Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Cir.1963). Consequently, instead of applying the probable cause standard, I would require that an emergency-aid search be based on a reasonable belief, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a need to render emergency aid justifies the resulting intrusion. See Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d at 223; cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); 3 LaFave, supra § 6.6(a), at 452-53. This standard certainly requires less proof than that sufficient to establish a preponderance of the evidence, cf. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), but it protects liberty interests from arbitrary infringement by requiring a specific factual basis and certainty beyond a mere hunch. In addition, because the state bears the burden of justifying an emergency-aid search and because meritless and opportunistic cries of “emergency!” should not permit officers acting as criminal investigators to evade the requirement of a warrant based on probable cause, a court gauging the propriety of an emergency-aid search should give full and fair scrutiny to all available facts.

Even though the majority apparently applies the higher probable cause standard, it nevertheless determines that it was objectively reasonable for officers to believe a person inside Tawnya Rainey’s house may have needed emergency aid. In support of this conclusion, the majority cites the possibility that Rainey’s house had been burglarized, potentially by Teitelbaum’s murderer. Evidence for this includes the skipping music, the torn screen in an open window, an unlatched front door, the failure of anyone to answer the door, statements by a neighbor indicating that someone had been home the night before, and the house’s proximity to the earlier “brutal and seemingly random” homicide.

I disagree that the facts of this case satisfy the state’s burden of establishing that the search was objectively reasonable, even under a less-than-probable-cause standard. The music and reports of possible occupants are certainly indicative that someone had been inside the house in the recent past. But it seems odd to count the possibility that someone had been inside recently as an affirmative factor necessitating immediate entry rather than a minimum requirement that the state must prove for the search not to be deemed per se unreasonable. In addition, while a torn screen on an open window, an unlatched door, and skipping music may be somewhat unusual, the merely unusual does not indicate actual trouble, and eccentricity alone is not enough to abrogate constitutional guarantees. This is particularly true where invasion of the home is concerned. A reasonable suspicion is not just any suspicion and, accordingly, even if evidence of a burglary alone may be sufficient to justify an emergency-aid search, the facts of this case are insufficient to sustain a reasonable belief that Rainey’s house had been the subject of a random burglary..

Similarly, the facts known by the officers are not sufficient to support an objectively reasonable belief that Teitelbaum’s murderer had left a second victim in need of emergency aid inside Rainey’s house. The majority emphasizes that Teitelbaum’s murder was “brutal and seemingly random,” but, while the nearby homicide is relevant to our analysis, the court neglects to explain why “brutal” murderers are more likely to kill again or how this murder appeared more random than most other homicides. In addition, six hours had passed between the homicide and the time of the emergency-aid search, which gave the murderer ample time to flee and indicated that anyone battered as Teitelbaum had been would already be dead. Most importantly, the majority points to no evidence, aside from the house’s general proximity to the murder scene, connecting Rainey’s house to the homicide. Viewing the circumstances as a whole, I cannot say that the facts of this case justify, warrant-less entry into Tawnya Rainey’s house under an emergency-aid search rationale— there is both too little evidence of an emergency and too little evidence connecting any potential emergency to Ramey’s house.

While the validity of an emergency-aid search is determined by an objective test, “this court will not look kindly upon war-rantless entries of family residences, justified on the flimsiest and most pretextual of excuses.” Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d at 224 (emphasis added). The subjective intent of the officers, although largely unscrutin-ized by the majority, is unquestionably relevant. See State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 369 n. 12 (Minn.2004) (“While not dispositive to our objective evaluation, the absence of any subjective perception of risk by [the officer] is noteworthy.”). That an officer did not actually believe that an emergency-aid search was required is evidence that an emergency-aid search was not in fact objectively reasonable under those circumstances and, when courts are forced to review the facts far removed from the actual events and through second-hand accounts, such information may be of great probative value. In this case, there is ample- evidence that the officers did not actually believe an emergency-aid search was required. The testimony of several officers indicates that initial police interest in Tawnya Rainey’s house was related to gathering information in the course of the homicide investigation. Nevertheless, an emergency-aid, search of Ramey’s house was preliminarily ordered before Officers Haataja and Harris arrived at the house and made the observations that allegedly justified the emergency-aid search. No other residence near the crime scene was the subject of similar concern from the police. Finally, the officers abandoned concern for Tawnya Rai-ney’s welfare immediately after finding evidence that the murderer had in fact been in her house, which was the very possibility that supposedly made the police fear for Rainey’s safety in the first place. Rather than confirming that Tawnya Rainey was safe, the officers immediately picked up the criminal investigation upon exiting the house, if indeed the criminal investigation was ever actually abandoned. This evidence of absence of good faith on the part of the police officers, while not determinative, further undermines the state’s claim of objective reasonableness.

Moreover, permitting an emergency-aid search under the facts of this case would expand the exception beyond the scope previously recognized in our decisions. Tellingly, we appear to have held that an emergency-aid search of a home was proper only two times in the last 30 years. In State v. Terrell, we held that entry was proper when officers entered a home in response to a report that a person had been shot and when the officers subjectively believed that the victim might still be alive. 283 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn.1979). In State v. Bradford, we held that entry was lawful in response to a 911 call reporting that a woman had shot herself. 618 N.W.2d 782, 787, 795 (Minn.2000). In both cases, the evidence was supplied by persons requesting police assistance and indicated a much greater probability of a specific and actual emergency compared to the case now before the court.

The majority cites several foreign cases for the principle that a reasonable belief that an illicit entry has occurred is enough to establish a reasonable belief that someone inside may need emergency care, but, under closer scrutiny, none of these cases support a finding of objective reasonableness in this case. In United States v. Tibolt, the police officers were called to a residence by a security company in response to a security alarm, no one in the house responded to phone calls or on-site efforts to contact occupants, and the officers arrived ivithin ten minutes of activation of the alarm. 72 F.3d 965, 970 (1st Cir.1995). Most importantly, no direct challenge to the objective reasonableness of the search appears to have even been made on appeal. Id. n. 3. In Murdock v. Stout, police were summoned by a neighbor who had actually seen someone run from a neighbor’s house, and officers entered only after finding an open door and evidence that someone was home but non-responsive. 54 F.3d 1437, 1439 (9th Cir.1995). Moreover, the Murdock court “observe[d] that there was no indication here that the officers were using their burglary investigation as a pretext for conducting a search for evidence in Murdock’s house.” Id. at 1442-43. In United States v. Lenoir, the police received a call about a disturbance involving an armed man. 318 F.3d 725, 727 (7th Cir.2003). The responding officers arrived to find a visibly drunk man gripping an assault rifle and a shotgun, and the officers followed him when he fled into a nearby house. Id. Finally, in Carroll v. State, 335 Md. 723, 646 A.2d 376 (1994), the court emphasized the importance of determining whether the officers were “using the situation as an excuse to conduct an unlawful search for evidence,” id. at 382, and, in contrast to the present case, the court ultimately found that there was no evidence in the record indicating that the officers “entered * * * for any reason other than to investigate the suspicious condition.” Id. at 385. These cases all involve additional factors— factors such as third parties requesting help, stronger connections between the anticipated dangers and the suspected victims or suspected locations, apparent good faith on the part of the investigating officers — that distinguish them from the present situation.

While we review the legality of the search de novo, I agree with the district court that, without admissible evidence of the house’s interior being in a state of disarray, the emergency-aid search was unjustified. The remaining evidence of an emergency, including the officers’ apparent failure to subjectively believe that Tawnya Rainey might need aid, is too weak for entry to have been objectively reasonable. Moreover, application of the exception in this case would be out of line with other emergency-aid decisions and would imper-missibly erode constitutional protections from warrantless searches in the very context where they should be the strongest— in one’s home.

Because the emergency-aid search of Tawnya Rainey’s house was improper and because information from that search formed the basis for the search warrant under which evidence against defendant Lemieux was recovered, the evidence from Rainey’s house should not have been admitted at trial. See State v. Nelson, 355 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Minn.1984). Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether the verdicts against Lemieux were surely unattributable to the erroneously admitted evidence — in other words, that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Minn.1997). The evidence obtained from Rainey’s house was the strongest evidence against Lemieux regarding robbery and, consequently, premeditation. While the evidence that Lemieux murdered Teitel-baum is overwhelming, without the evidence from Rainey’s house, the evidence of robbery and premeditation is not, and inclusion of the improperly recovered evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, I would affirm Lemieux’s conviction for second-degree intentional murder but reverse his convictions for first-degree murder and for first-degree murder while committing aggravated robbery.

PAGE, Justice

(concurring in part, dissenting in part).

I join Justice Meyer’s dissenting opinion except as to her conclusion that an emergency-aid search may be justified by mere reasonable suspicion. While I agree with the court that the higher probable cause standard applies to emergency-aid searches, for the reasons stated in Justice Meyer’s dissent, the facts of this case fail to establish reasonable suspicion, much less probable cause.

      . The Duluth police officers were familiar with Lemieux from prior contacts.

      . Professor LaFave observes that when evaluating emergency-aid searches, courts will ask
      whether there were reasonable grounds to believe that some kind of an emergency existed,' that is, whether there is evidence that would lead a prudent and reasonable official to see a need to act. The officer must be able to point to specific and articu-lable facts which, taken with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. But * * * this probable cause requirement, must be applied by reference to the circumstances then confronting the officer, including the need for a prompt assessment of sometimes ambiguous information concerning potentially serious consequences. As one court usefully put it, the question is whether the officers would have been derelict in their duty had they acted otherwise.
      3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.6(a), at 452-53 (4th ed. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

      . Haataja’s pounding on the door caused it to swing open a few inches, and he could see at an angle into the living room, which looked like it had been ransacked. The district court found that the officer's pounding was improperly calculated to open the door, but also found that Harris properly viewed the interior through the front window. In this appeal, the state concedes that the latter finding was clearly erroneous and that what the officers saw through the open door may not be used to support the entry into the residence.

      . The dissent suggests that the warrantless entry to investigate a burglary was a pretext for a warrantless search for evidence of the homicide. In fairness to the investigating officers, as previously indicated, the district court found that the officers’ purpose in going to the residence was to talk to whomever might be there and not to gain entry. But it was the circumstances confronting the officers at the residence that caused their concern as to the need for immediate entry. Officer Haataja testified that "based on the things that we [saw] there,” there was concern that a burglary occurred. Lieutenant Brasel did not provisionally order an emergency-aid search before the officers’ arrival; instead, he testified that he directed the officers “to make contact with the residents, and I specifically directed that absolutely nobody' — if nobody was home — that nobody was going into that apartment without talking to me first, that I was going to make that decision.”

      . In addition, while the majority does not cite this fact explicitly in its analysis, the majority makes vague reference to some possibly crime-related "problems” supposedly linked to Tawnya Rainey's house. The majority does not explain how these ill-defined problems could have been related to Teitelbaum's murder or to any other potential cause of an emergency. Instead, at least some of these "problems” appear to have been unrelated to the emergency supposedly feared by the police. For example, Officer Harris sought out Tawnya Rainey in part because she learned that Rainey's former boyfriend had violated an order for protection at some unknown time, in' some unknown place, and in some unknown manner. It is true that links to criminal activity may potentially have been reason to investigate Ramey’s house in connection with the murder, in which case, as the majority notes, the officers would be "somewhat constrained,” presumably by our constitutional protections from unreasonable search and seizure. However, it is not clear why links to criminal activity might be indicative of the need to render emergency aid, a scenario in which the police are “somewhat” less "constrained.”

      . To the extent that the possibility of a random burglary and entry by Teitelbaum’s murderer are two separate reasons to conduct an emergency-aid search, the majority appears to be "summing” potential threats in a manner unprecedented in our earlier cases. Even if adding threats from separate sources in this manner satisfies the specificity requirement of our reasonable suspicion test, it is not clear whether any limiting principle would prevent the aggregation of many small possibilities of harm to satisfy the reasonableness requirement, thereby permitting police intrusion into a citizen's home without a warrant even when no single serious threat was present. Permitting warrantless searches under such circumstances would both contravene our Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable searches and create an unworkable standard for police officers, citizens, and courts to apply-

      . For example, Officer Harris testified that her original purpose in seeking out Tawnya Rainey was to see "[i]f she could give me anything, you know, any leads, any names that maybe she thought were suspicious.” Moreover, Officer Haataja’s report from July 10, 2004, stated that his interest in finding Tawnya Rainey was related to seeking "information relating to the ongoing investigation.”

      . Lieutenant Brasel clearly contemplated warrantless entry into Tawnya Rainey's house and discovery of evidence related to the homicide when he ordered Officer Haataja to visit the house, testifying that "I realized that if we entered an apartment without a warrant and we did find — although, at that point, it was a big ‘if’ — * * * evidence of a homicide, that there would be an argument made to suppress that, evidence.” Moreover, Lieutenant Brasel also testified that he sent Officer Haa-taja to make contact with Tawnya Rainey precisely because he wouldn't exceed the permitted scope of an emergency-aid search, which might cause evidence to be excluded. Officer Haataja testified that he was sent ”[t]o conduct a welfare check for the resident who lived there” and that "[i]t was my intent to attempt to contact this Tawnya Rainey and to verify that she was — her health and welfare w[ere] okay.”

      . Lieutenant Brasel testified that he had insufficient evidence to order an emergency-aid search before Officers Haataja and Harris arrived at the house.

      . After he found Teitelbaum's bank card, Officer Haataja ordered everyone out of the house and posted guards at the front and back doors to protect the scene until a proper search warrant could be obtained. Officer Haataja then called a parole officer to check on Wintersun Lemieux's whereabouts. Officer Harris left the house and engaged Tawnya Rainey's neighbor in a conversation about the neighbor's upcoming camping trip; this conversation lasted "quite some time.” Officer Harris did eventually call Lisa Rainey, Tawn-ya Rainey’s sister, but Officer Harris did not ask Lisa Rainey about how to contact Tawnya Rainey. While Officer Harris did apparently ask Lisa Rainey to contact Tawnya Rainey herself, Officer Harris’s primary concern in the phone call was related to learning where Wintersun Lemieux could be found. Id. While Officer Mike Erickson did eventually learn that Tawnya Rainey was busy attending a powwow and not staying in her house, he failed to mention this to other officers or include it in his report despite the alleged concern for Tawnya Rainey’s welfare.

      .Officer Mike Erickson testified that he was aware of some connection between the Rai-ney family and Wintersun Lemieux prior to the major crime briefing held at 10:30 a.m. This, along with Officer Haataja’s attempts to immediately track down Lemieux after finding evidence related to the homicide in Tawn-ya Rainey's house, supports the possibility that the entire visit to Tawnya Rainey's house was motivated by an interest in investigating Wintersun Lemieux specifically rather than in investigating the homicide more generally.

      . Moreover, we have held emergency-aid searches to be improper even when an emergency actually appeared to exist but was being attended to by medical professionals, Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d at 223, and when police were summoned by an informant's report that an occupant "may need help,” State v. Fitzgerald, 562 N.W.2d 288, 288 (Minn.1997) (holding that entry was unlawful as it was based on one-day-old information and the circumstances generally did "not suggest the kind of emergency that would justify a warrantless entry ”).


author: /s/ Helen M. Meyer Associate Justice

text:
    In re PETITION FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST Christopher Decker GERRARD, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 282261.
    No. A06-1164.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Jan. 30, 2007.
   ORDER

The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility has filed a petition for disciplinary action alleging that respondent Christopher Decker Gerrard committed professional misconduct warranting public discipline, namely, engaging in the unauthorized practice of law while on suspension for failure to pay the attorney registration fee and on involuntary restricted status for failing to comply with continuing legal education requirements, in violation of Rule 5.5(a), Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC), and failing to cooperate with the Director’s investigation, in violation of Rule 8.1(a) and (b), MRPC, and Rule 25, Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR).

Respondent admits his conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and waives his rights under Rule 14, RLPR. Respondent states that he is not practicing law at this time. Respondent has entered into a stipulation with the Director in which they jointly recommend that the appropriate discipline is a public reprimand and probation, subject to certain terms and conditions.

The court has independently reviewed the file and approves the jointly recommended disposition.

Based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent Christopher Decker Gerrard be, and the same is, publicly reprimanded and placed on probation subject to the following terms and conditions:

(a) Respondent shall cooperate fully with the Director’s Office in its efforts to monitor compliance with this probation and shall promptly respond to the Director’s correspondence by the due date. Respondent shall cooperate with the Director’s investigation of any allegations of unprofessional conduct that may come to the Director’s attention. Upon the Director’s request, respondent shall provide authorization for release of information and documentation to verify compliance with the terms of this probation.
(b) Respondent shall abide by the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct.
(c) Respondent shall maintain total abstinence from alcohol, marijuana, and other mood-altering chemicals, except that respondent may use prescription drugs in accordance with the directions of a prescribing physician who is fully advised of respondent’s chemical dependency before issuing the prescription.
(d) Respondent shall not resume the practice of law without first contacting the Director and participating, at his own expense, in the Director’s random urinalysis program. During this 90-day period, respondent shall submit to random urinalysis for drug screening no more than four times per month at a facility approved by the Director and shall direct the drug screening facility to provide the results of all urinalysis testing to the Director’s Office. Respondent shall cooperate with the phone-in program established by the Director for the random test. Any failure to phone-in in accordance with the random test program shall be considered the same as receipt of a positive test result. Any positive test result will be grounds for revoking this probation. Respondent shall not be eligible to resume practice until he completes 90 days of valid (non-dilute) random urinalyses without testing positive. Respondent has stipulated that resumption of the practice of law without first contacting the Director and complying with the terms of this order shall constitute probable cause for the initiation of a disciplinary investigation into whether respondent has appropriately addressed his chemical dependency and is fit to practice law.
(e) Respondent shall not resume the practice of law without first complying with the requirements of Rule 5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court for Registration of Attorneys (providing for reinstatement after administrative suspension by payment of all delinquent registration fees and an additional late penalty) and with the requirements of Rule 12(D) of the Rules of the Minnesota State Board of Continuing Legal Education (setting forth conditions for transfer from involuntary restricted status to active status).
(f) Before resuming the practice of law, respondent shall provide to the Director and to the probation supervisor, if any, a written plan outlining office procedures designed to ensure that respondent is in compliance with probation requirements. Respondent shall provide progress reports as requested.
(g)Upon resuming the practice of law, respondent shall be on supervised probation for two years under the following additional conditions:
(i) Respondent shall attehd weekly meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or other out-patient alcohol treatment program acceptable to the Director. Respondent shall, by the tenth day of each month, without a specific reminder or request, submit to the Director an attendance verification on a form provided by the Director, which provides the name, address, and telephone number of the person personally verifying respondent’s attendance. Such attendance verification shall also, upon request, be provided to the respondent’s supervisor, if any.
(ii) Respondent shall continue, at his own expense, to participate in the Director’s random urinalysis program. Respondent shall submit to random urinalysis for drug screening no more than four times per month at a facility approved by the Director and shall direct the drug screening facility to provide the results of all urinalysis testing to the Director’s Office. If, after six months, all such tests have been negative, then the frequency of the random tests may be reduced at the Director’s discretion. Respondent shall cooperate with the phone-in program established by the Director for the random test. Any failure to phone-in in accordance with the random test program shall be considered the same as receipt of a positive test result. Any positive test result shall be grounds for revoking this probation.
(iii) Respondent shall be supervised by a licensed Minnesota attorney, appointed by the Director to monitor compliance with the terms of this probation. At least two weeks before resuming the practice of law, respondent shall provide the Director with the names of four attorneys who have agreed to be nominated as respondent’s supervisor. If, after diligent effort, respondent is unable to locate a supervisor acceptable to the Director, the Director will seek to appoint a supervisor. Until a supervisor has signed a consent to supervise, respondent shall on the first day of each month provide the Director with an inventory of active client files as described in paragraph (iv) below. Respondent shall make active client files available to the Director upon request.
(iv) Respondent shall cooperate fully with the supervisor in his or her efforts to monitor compliance with this probation. Respondent shall contact the supervisor and schedule a minimum of one in-person meeting per calendar quarter. During probation respondent shall submit to the supervisor, by the first day of each month, an inventory of all active client files. With respect to each active file, the inventory shall disclose the client name, type of representation, date opened, most recent activity, next anticipated action, and anticipated closing date. Respondent’s supervisor shall file written reports with the Director at least quarterly, or at such more frequently intervals as may reasonably be requested by the Director.
(v) Respondent shall initiate and maintain office procedures that ensure that there are prompt responses to correspondence, telephone calls, and other important communications from clients, courts, and other persons interested in matters that respondent is handling, and that will ensure that respondent regularly reviews each and every file and completes legal matters on a timely basis.

Respondent shall pay $900 in costs and disbursements under Rule 24, RLPR.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Helen M. Meyer Associate Justice