author: SANDSTROM, Justice.

text:
    2006 ND 214
    Ervin EICHHORN, Petitioner and Appellant v. The WALDO TOWNSHIP BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, COUNTY OF RICHLAND, State of North Dakota, and Harry Emde, Robert M. “Shotz” Kinn, and Gerald Wirtz, constituting the members of said board and the duly designated Waldo Township Overseers of Highways, Respondents and Appellees and The Richland County Water Resource District, a body politic and corporate, Intervenor and Appellee.
    No. 20050295.
    Supreme Court of North Dakota.
    Oct. 17, 2006.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 7, 2006.

      Jonathan T. Garaas, Garaas Law Firm, Fargo, ND, for petitioner and appellant.
    Corey J. Quinton, Oppegard, Wolf & Quinton, Moorhead, MN, for respondents and appellees.
    Duane R. Breitling, Ohnstand Twichell, P.C., Fargo, ND, for intervenor and appel-lee.
   SANDSTROM, Justice.

[¶ 1] Ervin Eichhorn appealed from a district court order permitting the Rich-land County Water Resource District (“District”) to intervene in his action against Waldo Township (“Township”) and from a judgment dismissing his petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Township to install a larger culvert under a township road. We hold the district court did not err in permitting the District to intervene and did not abuse its discretion in denying Eichhorn’s request for a writ of mandamus. We affirm.

I

[¶ 2] Eichhorn owns Richland County land described as the northeast quarter of section 13, township 130 north, range 49 west, in Waldo Township. The northeast corner of Eichhorn’s land is bordered by two Township roads, an east-west road along the northern edge and a north-south road along the eastern edge of his property.

[¶ 3] Richland County Drain No. 65 (“Drain 65”) runs north and south along the western edge of section 13 and is located one mile west of the northeast corner of section 13. A lateral drain, which flows into the main channel of Drain 65 at a 90-degree angle, runs along the northern edge of section 13 for a distance of one mile. Drain 65 and its lateral drain were established under a July 14, 1960, “Amended Order Establishing Drain” issued by the Richland County Water Conservation and Flood Control Commission. Drain 65 and the lateral drain were designed to change the water flow in the northern part of section 13 to flow from east to west. The lateral drain enters the main channel of Drain 65 through two 36-inch culverts with “flap-gates.” Additionally, a right-of-way deed dated September 27, 1960, was executed by Ervin Eich-horn’s parents and predecessors in interest, Floyd and Clara Eichhorn, granting Richland County a right-of-way “for the laying out, construction, and maintenance of a public drain” in the northeast quarter of section 13, described in part as:

BEGINNING AT A POINT 33 FEET WEST AND 33 FEET SOUTH OF THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF SECTION 13-130-49; THENCE SOUTH A DISTANCE OF 33 FEET; THENCE WEST A DISTANCE OF 2607 FEET; THENCE NORTH A DISTANCE OF 33 FEET; THENCE EAST A DISTANCE OF 2607 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING AND CONTAINING 2.0 ACRES, MORE OR LESS.

[¶ 4] A 30-inch culvert also presently exists under the east-west Township road in the northeast corner of Ervin Eieh-horn’s land in section 13. The record reflects this culvert initially was not part of the lateral drain but was installed by Waldo Township at the request of the Rich-land County Water Management District after November 1965. According to the November 9, 1965, minutes of a meeting of the Board of Commissioners of the Rich-land County Water Management District, the Board passed a motion indicating that in order to provide “some temporary relief’ from a drainage problem to Floyd Eichhorn, a culvert should be installed in the northeast corner of section 13 and one approach should be removed along the north side of the northwest quarter of section 13 on the lateral to Drain 65. The minutes also state the Board would pay for the removal of the approach and Waldo Township would install the culvert.

[¶ 5] Ervin Eichhorn claimed a history of flooding on his property. In May 1998, he filed a complaint with the District, asserting there was an “unauthorized construction of a dike, dam or other device for purposes of water conservation, flood control, regulation, watershed improvement for storage of water.” Eichhorn claimed “those dikes, or roads acting as dikes because of inadequate culverts, have not received the necessary permit and, therefore, pursuant to the statute must be removed.” In a subsequent letter clarifying his complaint, Eichhorn explained “[t]he dikes between Section 1 and 6, the dike in Section 31, and the road without adequate culverts between Section 13 and 18 act as dikes forcing more than 12½ acre feet of water through an unnatural course which is prohibited absent a permit.” The District denied Eichhorn’s request for removal of the “dikes.” Eichhorn appealed the District’s decision to the district court, but in 1999, he stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice of his appeal.

[¶ 6] In 2001, because of continuing concerns about flooding on his property, Eichhorn requested the State Engineer to determine the appropriate stream crossing standards under N.D.C.C. § 24-03-08 for the northeast corner of section 13. In a November 5, 2001, letter, State Engineer Dale Frink responded that based upon the appropriate stream crossing standards, “the minimum design event for culverts through the township road located on the north edge of Section 13 is a 10-year event.... The flow for the 10-year event at the northeast corner of Section 13 was determined to be 51 cfs [cubic feet per second].” Eichhorn also obtained calculations from the State Engineer’s representative, Randy Gjestvang, which indicated a possible solution to meet the discharge requirement of 51 cfs was the installation of a 42-inch culvert in place of the existing 30-inch culvert.

[¶ 7] In April 2002, Eichhorn, through his counsel, sent a letter to the Township and the District, notifying them of the State Engineer’s determination under N.D.C.C. § 24-03-08 and requesting the Township take action to make the culvert in the northeast corner meet these standards. When no action was taken, Eich-horn sent another letter to the Township and the District to remind each governmental entity of their statutory obligations and his need for relief. Neither the Township nor the District responded.

[¶ 8] The District, however, did seek assistance from the State Engineer by requesting comments regarding whether, based on the State Engineer’s November 5, 2001, letter, specific proposed improvements to Drain 65 would meet the design criteria for the stream crossing, particularly because the northern edge of section 13 also included the lateral drain. In an October 10, 2002, letter, the State Engineer stated:

The statute [N.D.C.C. § 24-03-08] does not direct the State Engineer to design or size the crossing. The design process is more appropriately the responsibility of the road or drain authority.
In this particular case, it would appear that improvements that allow the water to more efficiently enter Drain # 65 may be the best alternative for all parties. Some of the alternatives under consideration may require a permit.

[¶ 9] In late 2002, Eichhorn began this action against the Township for a writ of mandamus to compel the Township to install a larger culvert in the Township road under N.D.C.C. §§ 24-03-06 and 24-03-08. The District moved to intervene, contending the proposed culvert was part of the lateral drain to Drain 65, over which the District has authority and jurisdiction. The district court permitted the District to intervene. In October 2004, the District moved for summary judgment, arguing Eichhorn’s action was barred by res judi-cata based upon his 1999 stipulated dismissal of his appeal of the District’s prior denial of his request for removal of “dikes.” The district court denied the District’s motion as untimely.

[¶ 10] At a November 2004 hearing, Eichhorn presented testimony from Bruce Miller, who was Eichhorn’s tenant on the property in 2003 and 2004. Miller had documented significant flooding that occurred on Eichhorn’s property in June 2003 after approximately seven to nine inches of rain had fallen during the night. The District and Township presented testimony from the District’s engineer for Drain 65 and from a representative from the state engineer’s office who had conducted the investigation and drafted the letters for the state engineer. The district court denied Eichhorn’s request for a writ of mandamus and a judgment was entered dismissing his action.

[¶ 11] The district court had jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. §§ 27-05-06 and 32-34-01. Eichhorn’s appeal was timely under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 6, and N.D.C.C. §§ 28-27-01 and 28-27-02.

II

[¶ 12] Eichhorn argues the district court erred in allowing the District to intervene in this mandamus action under N.D.R.Civ.P. 24(a), which governs a party’s intervention as a matter of right, and states:

Upon timely application anyone must be permitted to intervene in an action if: (i) a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (ii) the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.

[¶ 13] In considering whether a party may intervene in an action as a matter of right under N.D.R.Civ.P. 24(a), we review any findings of fact made by the district court under the clearly erroneous standard of review in N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a). See State v. Family Life Servs., Inc., 1997 ND 37, ¶ 6, 560 N.W.2d 526. However, the ultimate question whether a party has a right to intervene is a question of law that is fully reviewable on appeal. See id.; Fisher v. Fisher, 546 N.W.2d 354, 355 (N.D.1996). Intervention has historically been liberally granted in North Dakota. See Braatelien v. Burns, 74 N.D. 29, 32, 19 N.W.2d 827, 828 (1945).

[¶ 14] Here, the district court specifically found: “Although [Eichhorn] argues that the Culvert Site [in the northeast corner of Section 13] is independent of Drain # 65, the state engineer has clearly indicated the impact of a new culvert will cause the flow of water to enter into the drain which [the District] is mandated to maintain.” The court also quoted from the November 2001 letter from State Engineer Frink to Eichhorn, which stated: “The drainage pattern in this area has been altered. Richland County Drain # 65, located one mile west of the site, intercepts much of the runoff that would have naturally flowed to this area.” The court concluded, because the District has a statutory obligation to maintain Drain 65, it “logically follows” that the District has an interest in the flow patterns which might affect the drain, and the alternative plans contemplated by the state engineer’s letters would affect Drain 65.

[¶ 15] Although Eichhorn argues the District had no right to intervene in this mandamus action and its interests would be adequately represented by the Township, we agree with the district court’s analysis in permitting the District to intervene. The lateral drain to Drain 65 runs along the northern edge of section 13, and changing the culvert in the northeast corner of section 13 would likely affect the water flow involving Drain 65. The District has jurisdiction of Drain 65 and its drainage area, and the District is required to maintain the drains within its jurisdiction, particularly when laid within the limits of a public road. Section 61-16.1-42, N.D.C.C., which permits drains to “be laid along, within the limits of, or across any public road or highway,” states: “In instances where drains are laid along or within the rights of way of roads or highways, the drains shall be maintained and kept open by and at the expense of the water resource district concerned.” See also N.D.C.C. § 61-21-31.

[¶ 16] The district court properly concluded the District has an interest relating to the “property or transaction that is the subject of the action” under N.D.R.Civ.P. 24(a), and the District is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect that interest. As a matter of law, we conclude the District has a right to intervene in this action, and the district court did not err in permitting the intervention.

Ill

[1Í17] Eichhorn argues the district court erred in denying his petition for a writ of mandamus.

[¶ 18] Section 32-84-01, N.D.C.C., governs the issuance of a writ of mandamus, and provides:

The writ of mandamus may be issued by the supreme and district courts to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station....

[¶ 19] A petitioner for a writ of mandamus must demonstrate a “clear legal right” to performance of the particular act sought to be compelled by the writ. Ward County Farm Bureau v. Poolman, 2006 ND 42, ¶8, 710 N.W.2d 423. The petitioner must further demonstrate there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Wutzke v. Hoberg, 2004 ND 42, ¶ 3, 675 N.W.2d 179. A writ of mandamus may be issued to compel official action by a governmental entity but not to compel an official’s discretionary actions. See Midland Produce Co. v. City of Minot, 70 N.D. 256, 257, 294 N.W. 192, 193 (1940) (writ of mandamus will not lie unless the legal right to performance of the particular act sought to be compelled is clear and complete and will not lie to control official discretion). To be enforceable by mandamus, the duty must be clearly and preemptively enjoined by law; the law must not only authorize the act, but must require it to be done. Id.

[¶ 20] The issuance of a writ of mandamus is left to the district court’s sound discretion. Kenmare Educ. Ass’n v. Kenmare Pub. Sch. Dist., 2006 ND 136, ¶ 9, 717 N.W.2d 603; Wutzke, 2004 ND 42, ¶ 3, 675 N.W.2d 179. A district court abuses its discretion if its decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, if it misapplies or misinterprets the law, or if it is not the product of a rational mental process by which the facts and the law relied upon are considered together for the purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable interpretation. See Kenmare Educ. Ass’n, at ¶ 9; Fandrich v. Wells County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 2000 ND 181, ¶ 7, 618 N.W.2d 166.

[¶ 21] In deciding whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Eichhorn’s request for a writ of mandamus, we must examine whether Eich-horn had a “clear legal right” to require the Township to install a larger culvert under the Township road.

[¶ 22] The statutory powers of the Township and the District are found in N.D.C.C. Titles 24 and 61, respectively. The issue here involves the interplay of township powers and obligations with those of a water resource district and how these joint obligations are met when the state engineer, under the authority of N.D.C.C. § 24-03-08, has determined the stream crossing standards for a particular piece of affected property. Sections 24-03-06 and 24-03-08, N.D.C.C., impose a duty upon a township to construct or reconstruct township roads in a way that does not obstruct the natural flow and drainage of surface waters. See, e.g., Fandrich, 2000 ND 181, ¶ 19, 618 N.W.2d 166; Ness v. Ward County Water Res. Dist., 1998 ND 191, ¶ 14, 585 N.W.2d 793; Kadlec v. Greendale Twp. Bd. of Twp. Supervisors, 1998 ND 165, ¶ 18, 583 N.W.2d 817. Specifically, N.D.C.C. § 24-03-08 (emphasis added) provides:

Whenever and wherever a highway under the supervision, control, and jurisdiction of the department or under the supervision, control, and jurisdiction of the board of county commissioners of any county or the board of township supervisors has been or will be constructed over a watercourse or draw into which flow surface waters from farmlands, the state engineer, upon petition of the majority of landowners of the area affected or at the request of the board of county commissioners, township supervisors, or a water resource board, shall determine as nearly as practicable the design discharge that the crossing is required to carry to meet the stream crossing standards prepared by the department and the state engineer. When the determination has been made by the state engineer, the department, the board of county commissioners, or the board of township supervisors, as the case may be, upon notification of the determination, shall install a culvert or bridge of sufficient capacity to permit the water to flow freely and unimpeded through the culvert or under the bridge. The department, county, and township are not liable for any damage to any structure or property caused by water detained by the highway at the crossing if the highway crossing has been constructed in accordance with the stream crossing standards prepared by the department and the state engineer.

[¶ 23] In Fandrich, 2000 ND 181, ¶¶ 21-22, 618 N.W.2d 166, this Court summarized the effect and legislative intent of these statutes:

Effective August 1, 1999, the Legislature amended N.D.C.C. §§ 24-03-06 and 24-03-08. Section 24-03-06, N.D.C.C., was amended to replace the requirement that highways be constructed in accordance with “scientific highway construction and engineering,” with the phrase, “the stream crossing standards prepared by the department and the state engineer.... ” 1999 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 248, § 1. The statute was also amended to provide “[i]n the construction of highways the natural flow and drainage of surface waters to the extent required to meet the stream crossing standards prepared by the department and the state engineer may not be obstructed .... ” Id. (amended language emphasized). The statute was further amended to protect government entities and others from liability for damages “caused to any structure or property by water detained by the highway at the crossing if the highway crossing has been constructed in accordance with the stream crossing standards prepared by the department and the state engineer.” Id. Section 24-03-08, N.D.C.C., was similarly amended to delete reference to the “maximum quantity of water, in terms of second feet, which such watercourse or draw may be required to carry,” and replace it with the phrase, “design discharge that the crossing is required to carry to meet the stream crossing standards prepared by the department and the state engineer.” 1999 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 248, § 2. It was further amended to prohibit damage liability “if the highway crossing has been constructed in accordance with the stream crossing standards prepared by the department and the state engineer.” Id.
The legislative history of the amendments reflects the reason for the changes was to promote uniformity throughout the state by having stream crossing standards prepared by the Department of Transportation and the state engineer. See Hearing on H.B. 1310 Before the Senate Political Subdivisions Committee, 56th N.D. Leg. Sess. (February 26, 1999) (testimony of State Engineer David Sprynczynatyk). Local political subdivisions were uncertain about their engineering responsibilities. Because a road cannot be engineered to take into consideration all conceivable flood events, the political subdivisions were forced to perform “a balancing act between landownersf] rights and the economics of maintaining quality roads at a price the township can afford.” Hearing on H.B. 1310 Before the House Political Subdivisions Committee, 56th N.D. Leg. Sess. (January 21, 1999) (testimony of Ted D. Seibel, Wells County State’s Attorney). Subsequent amendments to statutes may be used in ascertaining the legislative intent of earlier versions of the statutes. See, e.g., Effertz v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 525 N.W.2d 691, 698 (N.D.1994). The amendments to the statutes suggest the concept of reasonableness permeates the statutory mandates, and the amendments merely assigned the responsibility for determining the measure of reasonableness to the Department of Transportation and the state engineer.

[¶ 24] Although a township may not construct or reconstruct township roads to obstruct the natural flow and drainage of surface waters, there is no duty to provide “perfect” drainage. See Huber v. Oliver County, 1999 ND 220, ¶ 17, 602 N.W.2d 710; Little v. Burleigh County, 82 N.W.2d 603, 613 (N.D.1957). There is an implied standard of reasonableness in applying N.D.C.C. §§ 24-03-06 and 24-03-08. Fandrich, 2000 ND 181, ¶ 20, 618 N.W.2d 166. In Fandrich, at ¶ 23 (internal quotations omitted), prior to the formal promulgation of stream crossing standards, this Court explained that for purposes of a reasonableness analysis, the stream crossing standards “qualify as evidence of established engineering standards or sound engineering design practice.” We have also recognized that it is neither practical nor feasible to provide drainage structures sufficient to cope with cataclysmic events. Huber, 1999 ND 220, ¶ 17, 602 N.W.2d 710.

[¶ 25] Our statutes also envision cooperation between townships and water resource district boards. See, e.g., Ness, 1998 ND 191, ¶ 17, 585 N.W.2d 793 (citing N.D.C.C. §§ 24-06-34 and 61-16.1-09(21)). Under N.D.C.C. § 24-03-06, township boards, not water resource districts, have supervisory authority to decide whether to install a culvert beneath a township road to preserve a natural drain-way for surface waters. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Benson County Water Res. Dist., 2000 ND 182, ¶ 9, 618 N.W.2d 155 (quoting Ness, at ¶ 13). “While water resource districts have been given broad powers to control waters within their jurisdictions, see N.D.C.C. § 61-16.1-09(5-7) and (16), they have not been given authority to make the decision to install a culvert under a township road in a natural watercourse. Rather, water resource districts have the authority to direct a township to install a culvert to accommodate a drain.” Burlington Northern, at ¶ 9 (quoting Kadlec, 1998 ND 165, ¶ 15, 583 N.W.2d 817).

[¶26] In denying Eichhorn’s petition for a writ of mandamus, the district court found:

5. Section 61-21-31 of N.D.C.C. authorizes the construction of drains within the limits of or across any public road or highway, but not to the injury of such road.
6. Richland County Drain # 65 is a legal drain established pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 61-21 of the North Dakota Century Code and as such the jurisdiction and control over this legal drain is vested in the Richland County Water Resource District.
7. A part of Richland County Drain # 65 consists of a 1 mile long East to West channel, located on the North edge of Section Thirteen (13), Township One Hundred Thirty (130), Range Forty-nine (49), Richland County, North Dakota.
8. By Right-of-Way Deed dated September 27, 1960, Richland County procured two (2) acres of right-of-way on the North edge of the Northeast Quarter (NE 1/4) of said Section Thirteen (13). Said Right-of-Way Deed was duly recorded by the Richland County Register of Deeds. The Right-of-Way Grantors were the parents of the Petitioner in the case before the Court.
9. The design and plans for the aforementioned one mile long East-West channel, located on the North edge of [section 13] provided for the flow of surface water from the Northeast corner of [section 13] westerly one mile to the main channel of Richland County Drain #65.
10. The design and plans for this legal drain provide for NO North-South culvert at the Northeast corner of said Section Thirteen (13).
11. A representative of the Office of the State Engineer performed an investigation as to runoff patterns and a hydrological analysis of the surface water runoff that migrated to the northeast corner of Section 13 in Waldo Township for the purpose of determining a ten (10) year reoccurrence interval.
12. A ten year reoccurrence interval would be produced by a three-inch rainfall in a 24-hour period.
13. An outlet that would accommodate 51 c.f.s. would meet the requirements of the stream crossing standards that are contained in Article 89-14 of the North Dakota Administrative Code.
14. The culverts providing access into Richland County Drain # 65, located at the northwest corner of Section 13 of Waldo Township provide 100 c.f.s. of outlet for the surface water runoff migrating to the northeast corner of Section 13.
18. The event complained of by [Eichhorn] was an overnight rain fall of some seven (7) to nine (9) inches in amount.
19. The event complained of by [Eichhorn] exceeded the 100-year flood event and could possibly have qualified as a 500-year flood event.
20. That the event complained of was a cataclysmic event.

[¶ 27] The district court concluded that although Eichhorn would like a larger culvert installed at the northeast corner of section 13, the two culverts providing access to Drain 65 already provide 100 cfs of outlet for the surface water runoff migrating to the northeast corner of section 13. The court further concluded that the Township and the District had met the surface water runoff requirements mandated by the statutory scheme.

[¶ 28] Eichhorn contends that the District’s attempted intervention and its alleged attempt to “supplant” the Township goes against established precedent. Eich-horn argues the district court’s conclusion that the Township and the District are engaged in a “joint operation” is not supported by this Court’s opinion in Burling ton Northern, 2000 ND 182, 618 N.W.2d 155. Burlington Northern, however, is not controlling. That case involved an appeal from a water resource district’s order requiring the installation of culverts through a township road and a railroad. Id. at ¶¶ 3-4. Under the circumstances of that case, this Court concluded, in part, the water resource district did not have authority to order a township to install a culvert. Id at ¶ 9. Here, Eichhorn is not appealing from any order of the District, but is instead requesting a writ of mandamus to compel the Township to install a larger culvert. There is no evidence the District has ordered the Township to do or not to do anything. We have previously recognized our statutes envision cooperation between the Township and the District. See Ness, 1998 ND 191, ¶ 17, 585 N.W.2d 793. Here, we are not faced with circumstances in which a township and a water resource district are failing to cooperate. On the contrary, both the Township and the District are united in opposing Eichhorn’s demand for a larger culvert at the northeast corner of section 13.

[¶ 29] In Kadlec, 1998 ND 165, ¶32, 583 N.W.2d 817, a case involving review of a grant of mandamus, we affirmed a district court judgment granting a landowner’s request for a writ of mandamus directing the township board of supervisors to install a culvert through a township road adjacent to his land. In that case, the water resource district denied a request by a landowner and a township to place a culvert under a road, and on appeal, the case hinged on which entity had authority over installation of the culvert. Id. at ¶ 10. We held the township had a statutory duty to install a culvert to prevent the obstruction of the natural drainage of surface water, and the township, not the water resource district, had the supervisory authority to decide whether to put a culvert under the township road. Id. at ¶ 15. We affirmed the district court decision granting a writ of mandamus, concluding the landowner had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Id. at ¶¶ 26-27. In Kadlec, however, it was undisputed by the parties that there was no legal drain involved. Id. at ¶ 15.

[¶ 30] Kadlec does not control our resolution of this case. In Kadlec, only the water resource district, not the township, contested the district court’s issuance of the writ. Furthermore, in Kadlec, this Court underscored the very “peculiar circumstances” of that case, including that Kadlec’s and the township’s efforts to install the culvert had been simply overridden by the water resource district, even though the water resource district was not authorized under law to make that decision. In this case, the district court denied Eichhorn’s request for a writ of mandamus and specifically found that Drain 65 is affected, mandating the District’s involvement. Here, unlike in Kadlec, both the Township and the District have opposed Eichhorn’s efforts to have a larger culvert installed in the Township road, where the drainage area includes a legal drain.

[¶ 31] Eichhorn argues the District should not be involved in the Township’s culvert decision, because the present culvert is not within the identified boundaries of Drain 65 and, despite the right-of-way deed conveying a two-acre tract of land to the south and west of the township roads, the lateral drain does not include any portion of the Township road, which is entirely located within the congressional section line recognized in N.D.C.C. § 24-07-03. Both the Township and the District, however, have maintained that the culvert in the northeast corner of section 13 is part of the lateral to Drain 65. The district court specifically found that the lateral drain extended one mile along the north edge of section 13. There is evidence in the record to support this finding.

[¶ 32] The “Amended Order Establishing Drain” describes Drain 65 as: “including a Lateral to the main drainage ditch along the North (N) side of Section Thirteen (13), Township One Hundred Thirty (130), Range Forty-nine (49), a distance of one (1) mile.” This description defines the lateral as extending the entire length of the section. There is statutory authority permitting a legal drain to be established along or within the limits of a township road. See N.D.C.C. §§ 61-16.1-42 and 61-21-31. At the November 2004 hearing, Damon DeVillers, a civil engineer with Interstate Engineering employed by the District, testified about the location and drainage area for Drain 65 and its lateral drain:

Q Can you describe for the Court the location of that lateral?
A In the north half of Section 13, T-130 North Range, 49 West.
Q In other words, the lateral is suppose to accommodate 10.0 square miles of drainage?
A Correct.
A The second page has an approximate drainage area map showing the drainage area for Drain 65 — for this lateral for Drain 65 and Drain 65, shows a location map of Drain 65, shows some more planted profile elevations, just shows the—
Q Does it show the amount of excavation that would be estimated in that lateral?
A Yes, it does.
Q And how much material was to be excavated, if you can tell from those plans?
A It shows excavation Lateral # 1, 18,312 cubic yards.
Q Of material?
A Correct.
Q And that’s to accomplish bringing the water from the northeast corner of 13 to Drain 65.
A Correct.
A The dash line on the drainage area for Section 13 shows that it is approximately a thousand feet in from the northeast corner of Section 13 where the drainage area comes to. That does not show that the lateral ends at that point. The lateral itself — the stationing on the lateral itself is shown on sheet number one, which shows the lateral going all the way from the northwest corner in Drain 65 all the way to the northeast corner of Section 13. That’s the length of lateral. When I talked about stationing, it shows the beginning of the lateral on the west end at station 1 + 00 and the one end of the lateral at the east end at station 53 + 00 is the section line.

[¶ 33] Randy Gjestvang, a water resource engineer for the State Water Commission, who conducted the investigation of the site to come up with the ten-year flow characteristics for section 13, explained his consideration of the lateral drain:

Q And what did you find or determine, with your investigation, the area, that contributed to the northeast corner of Section 13, was in size?
A 9.4 square miles.
Q The 9.4 square miles that you talk about, can you give us an idea of how much of that was east of Drain 65?
A East of Drain 65. Probably about three miles of it. Three square miles.
Q What — what were you able to determine about flow characteristics?
A Flow characteristics, the 10-year flow in that area was what I determined was 51 cubic feet per second.
Q Did there come a time when you prepared a draft of a letter to be considered by the State Engineer and the regulatory division of the State Water Commission?
A Yes, I did prepare a draft of a letter. I think it was probably in October of 2001.
Q (By Mr. Breitling) Mr. Gjestvang, I take it then that you did not report to the regulatory division or to Mr. Frink, the State Engineer, that the channel along the north edge of 13 was apart of Drain 65?
A I did not report that it was a lateral of Drain 65.
Q That’s because you didn’t know that it was, true?
A That’s correct.
Q In other words, when the water that normally would go northeast is shut off in Drain 65 and forced north, as long as there’s an outlet provided, that’s not a violation of the stream crossing standards, true?
A That is true.
Q And that same example pertains to any opening existing now in the northeast corner of Section 13, true?
A That is true.

[¶ 34] Although Eichhorn attempts to challenge the description and boundaries of what is included in the lateral to Drain 65, the evidence presented to the district court establishes that the culvert is within the area of the lateral drain to Drain 65. Moreover, a request for mandamus requires Eichhorn to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief requested and is not an appropriate proceeding to challenge the parameters and boundaries of a previously established drain. Cf. Kadlec, 1998 ND 165, ¶¶ 34-36, 583 N.W.2d 817 (Vande-Walle, C.J., concurring) (citing Olson v. Cass County, 253 N.W.2d 179 (N.D.1977), and discussing exhaustion of remedies requirement).

[¶ 35] Eichhorn asserts that once the state engineer determined the stream crossing standards to be 51 cfs for the northeast corner of section 13, the Township was required to install a larger culvert. Eichhorn argues the existing culvert in the northeast part of section 13 does not provide sufficient drainage to meet the stream crossing standards specified by the state engineer in his November 2001 letter. The district court, however, specifically found that the culverts leading into Drain 65 from the lateral provide sufficient drainage to meet the stream crossing standards.

[¶ 36] Further, the court concluded the Township and the District were exercising their official discretion by refusing to mandate or install a larger culvert in the northeast portion of section 13 after determining Drain 65 and its lateral meet stream crossing standards. The district court reasoned that although better drainage could be provided for section 13, the law did not require perfect drainage. The court also found that the rain event, which Eichhorn claimed demonstrated the drainage problems and the failure to meet the stream crossing standards on his property, was a cataclysmic event, and in excess of a 100-year flood, not a 10-year event as contemplated by the stream crossing standards for a township road. The court therefore concluded that the statutory-scheme did not mandate a culvert be installed.

[¶ 37] This case involves more than simply the interpretation of an unambiguous statute, but rather also involves the discretion and cooperation of the Township and the District in meeting the stream crossing standards as provided by the state engineer. The district court did not act arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably, nor did it misinterpret the law in denying Eichhorn’s request for a writ of mandamus. We conclude Eichhorn failed to show a “clear legal right” requiring issuance of a writ of mandamus, and the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition.

[¶ 38] We conclude the district court’s decision denying Eichhorn’s petition for a writ of mandamus was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious and was not a misapplication or misinterpretation of the law. Because considerable discretion lies within the Township and the District to address the water flow issues, Eichhorn has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right. We have also considered Eich-horn’s other issues raised on appeal and conclude the district court properly dismissed Eichhorn’s petition for a writ of mandamus.

IV

[¶ 39] The district court order and judgment are affirmed.

[¶ 40] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, C.J., DANIEL J. CROTHERS, MARY MUEHLEN MARING, and CAROL RONNING KAPSNER, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    2006 SD 88
    Gary JOHNSON d/b/a Johnson Electric Company, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Charles E. LIGHT, Jr., a/k/a Chuck Light, Defendant and Appellant, and Fullerton Lumber Company d/b/a Fullerton Building Center, Defendant and Appellee, and Yankton County, Defendant.
    No. 23926.
    Supreme Court of South Dakota.
    Considered on Briefs on Aug. 28, 2006.
    Decided Oct. 4, 2006.

      David M. Hosmer, Yankton, SD, for plaintiff and appellee Gary Johnson.
    Charles E. Light, Jr., Bartow, FL, Pro Se appellant.
    William J. Klimisch of Goetz and Klim-isch, Yankton, SD, for defendant and ap-pellee Fullerton Lumber Company.
   PER CURIAM.

[¶ 1.] Charles E. Light Jr. (Light) appeals a circuit court judgment in a foreclosure action. Light claimed he had a vendor’s lien on the property that had priority over two mechanic’s liens. The court determined that Light’s vendor’s lien on the property was extinguished when Light accepted a quitclaim deed to the property prior to the foreclosure. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

[¶ 2.] On April 24, 2000, Connie Schenkel (Schenkel) purchased real property from Light by negotiating a contract for deed. According to the contract for deed, Schenkel agreed to purchase the real property for $300,000. Light subsequently recorded the contract for deed in the Office of the Register of Deeds on April 25, 2000. The parties have stipulated that under this contract for deed with Schenkel, Light retained a vendor’s lien.

[¶ 3.] Thereafter, Schenkel began construction of a “go-cart race track” on the real property. Schenkel contracted with Johnson Electric Company (Johnson) to bring power to the site and to construct outdoor lighting. Johnson fully performed on this contract on June 30, 2000. Schenk-el also contracted with Fullerton Lumber Company (Fullerton) for lumber and various other materials necessary for operation of the track. Fullerton also fully performed on the contract. Although Light did not officially authorize the contracts or personally request any labor or materials, Light was aware of the construction of a “go-cart race track” on the real property.

[¶ 4.] Light received a down payment of $10,000 from Schenkel but received no further principal payments on the contract. Light commenced a foreclosure action against Schenkel on or about October 2, 2000. Schenkel also failed to pay Johnson and Fullerton for the materials and labor they furnished. Johnson and Fullerton each properly recorded mechanic’s liens on October 16, 2000 and October 17, 2000, respectively. Both of these mechanic’s liens attached to the real property.

[¶ 5.] Ultimately, Schenkel filed a petition for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy. Light’s foreclosure action was stayed by the bankruptcy court and was never pursued to judgment. On February 20, 2001, the bankruptcy court rejected the contract for deed, and Schenkel was discharged from all personal claims by Johnson, Fullerton and Light. The bankruptcy court concluded that Schenkel’s discharge only discharged her personal liability on the debts and that any valid hen attaching to the real property before the petition date was unaffected by the discharge.

[¶ 6.] On September 7, 2001, Light obtained a quitclaim deed from Schenkel for purposes of clearing the chain of title. Schenkel signed the quitclaim deed, transferring her interest in the real property to Light. The quitclaim deed was recorded on October 31, 2001. Light claimed that his intent, by receiving delivery of the deed and recording the same, was to clear any liens from the title to the real property and not to waive his vendor’s lien.

[¶ 7.] In May of 2004, Johnson commenced an action against Light to foreclose on his mechanic’s lien. Johnson later joined Fullerton as a necessary party. Fullerton then cross-claimed against Light in order to foreclose on its mechanic’s lien. As a defense, Light claimed that his vendor’s lien had priority over the two mechanic’s hens in the foreclosure action.

[¶ 8.] The circuit court ruled against Light. The court concluded that the vendor’s lien had priority over the mechanic’s liens prior to acceptance of the quitclaim deed. However, the court determined that when Light intentionally drafted, received delivery of, and recorded Schenkel’s quitclaim deed, Light’s vendor’s hen was extinguished. Thus, the mechanic’s hens of Johnson and Fullerton gained priority. The circuit court ordered a sheriffs sale of the real property for satisfaction of all hens. After the sale, the court directed distribution of the proceeds first to Johnson in the amount of $23,330.16 and Fullerton in the amount of $7,984.66, with the remainder to Light. The court also awarded Johnson and Fullerton attorney fees.

[¶ 9.] On appeal, Light raises the issue of whether the circuit court erred when it concluded that Light’s acceptance of the quitclaim deed terminated his vendor’s hen.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[f 10.] “A vendor’s lien and the right to its enforcement are purely statutory in South Dakota.” Weaver v. Blake, 300 N.W.2d 52, 55 (S.D.1980) (citing SDCL 44-6-1). “ ‘Construction of a statute is a question of law and is, therefore, fully reviewable without deference to the interpretation made by the trial court.’ ” State v. Schroeder, 2004 SD 21, ¶ 5, 674 N.W.2d 827, 829 (quoting Delzer v. Penn, 534 N.W.2d 58, 61 (S.D.1995)). This Court employs the de novo standard of review for issues of statutory construction. State v. Asmussen, 2006 SD 37, ¶ 12, 713 N.W.2d 580, 586. “ ‘Statutory construction is used to discover the true intention of the law which is ascertained primarily from the language expressed in the statute.’” Id. (quoting Martinmaas v. Engelmann, 2000 SD 85, ¶ 49, 612 N.W.2d 600, 611). Whether a waiver has occurred is a mixed question of law and fact. Christensen v. Christensen, 2003 SD 137, ¶ 12, 672 N.W.2d 466, 470. “Mixed questions of law and fact that require the reviewing Court to apply a legal standard are reviewable de novo.” State ex rel. Bennett v. Peterson, 2003 SD 16, ¶ 13, 657 N.W.2d 698, 701.

DECISION

[¶ 11.] “A vendor’s hen is the equitable right which the seller impliedly retains to subject the land conveyed as security for payment of the purchase money.” Weaver, 300 N.W.2d at 54. “Such a hen exists unless it clearly appears from the circumstances attending the transaction that the vendor intended to waive or not to rely upon his equitable rights.” Id. A vendor’s hen may be waived by acts or omissions of the vendor. Smith v. Danforth, 54 S.D. 250, 257, 223 N.W. 59, 62 (1929). However, “ ‘in order to constitute a waiver, there must be some act or omission on the part of the vendor inconsistent with his assertion of the lien and evincing his intention to waive it.’” Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, the act or omission should be such that it “ ‘would render it inequitable [for the vendor] to thereafter attempt to assert it.’ ” Id.

[¶ 12.] Although South Dakota has not explicitly ruled on the effect of acceptance of a quitclaim deed on a vendor’s lien, several cases have addressed the effect of acceptance of a quitclaim deed on a recorded real estate purchase agreement and a contract for deed. According to Preheim v. Ortman, demanding a quitclaim deed is “unequivocal conduct inconsistent with the continuance of the recorded real estate purchase agreement.” 331 N.W.2d 62, 64 (S.D.1983). The Preheim Court concluded that the asking for and delivery of the quitclaim deed amounted to a mutual rescission of the purchase agreement and terminated the parties’ rights thereunder, including any cause of action for breach of contract. Id. Similarly, the demand and receipt of a quitclaim deed was held to mutually rescind rights under a contract for deed. Morrell Employees Federal Credit Union v. Mehlhaff, 376 N.W.2d 59, 61 (S.D.1985) (the quitclaim transaction expressly extinguished the interest acquired and served to terminate and release the contract for deed).

[¶ 13.]. In this case, Light accepted the quitclaim deed seven months after Schenk-el was discharged from the debt in bankruptcy. Although Light claims he never acquiesced to waive his vendor’s lien, his actions assert the contrary. According to South Dakota law, acceptance of a quitclaim deed rescinds a purchase agreement and a contract for deed, along with the rights thereunder. Preheim, 331 N.W.2d at 64; Morrell Employees Federal Credit Union, 376 N.W.2d at 61. Light’s right to a vendor’s lien arose from and was dependent on the contract for deed. Because the contract for deed was rescinded by the quitclaim deed from Schenkel, all Light’s rights under the contract for deed weré extinguished.

[¶ 14.] Thus, Light’s action of accepting the quitclaim deed manifested his intent not to rely on the vendor’s lien, which arose from the contract for deed. The purpose of the vendor’s lien was to provide the real property as security in the instance of Schenkel’s default. Because Schenkel quitclaimed her rights to the real property back to Light, there was no further need for security. Any rights to the property Schenkel may have had under the contract for deed were terminated by her quitclaim deed to Light. Thus, Light’s acceptance of the quitclaim deed not only terminated the contract for deed but also extinguished his vendor’s lien and allowed the mechanic’s liens to gain priority.

[¶ 15.] Because this Court concludes acceptance of the quitclaim deed terminated Light’s vendor’s lien, it is not necessary to address the other issues raised on appeal.

[¶ 16.] Pursuant to SDCL 44-9-42, Johnson’s request for appellate attorney’s fees in the amount of $3,118.91 is granted.

[¶ 17.] Affirmed.

[¶ 18.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SABERS, KONENKAMP, ZINTER, and MEIERHENRY, Justices, participating.

      . The purchase price was to be paid with a down payment of $10,000 and the balance of $290,000 to be paid, together with interest at the rate of 9 percent per annum, in 12 monthly interest only payments of $2,175 and 180 monthly principal payments of $2,941.37.

      . SDCL 44-6-1 provides: "One who sells real property has a special or vendor's lien thereon, independent of possession, for so much of the price as remains unpaid and unsecured otherwise than by the personal obligation of the buyer.”

      . Light did not raise and the circuit court did not consider the issue of forfeiture. " 'Issues not addressed or ruled upon by the trial court will not be addressed by this Court for the first time on appeal.’ ” Wandler v. Lewis, 1997 SD 98, ¶ 16, 567 N.W.2d 377, 381-82 (citation omitted).


author: LAVORATO, Chief Justice.

text:
    IOWA AG CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., an Iowa Corporation, and Iowa Select Farm, an Iowa Limited Liability Partnership, Appellants, v. IOWA STATE BOARD OF TAX REVIEW, Appellee.
    No. 04-1836.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Sept. 15, 2006.

      Burns Mossman of Nyemaster, Goode, West, Hansell & O’Brien, P.C., Des Moines, for appellants.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Marcia Mason, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
   LAVORATO, Chief Justice.

Iowa Ag Construction Co., Inc. (Iowa Ag) and Iowa Select Farms, L.L.P. (Iowa Select) appeal from a district court decision affirming the decision of the Iowa State Board of Tax Review (Board). The Board held that property used in pork production was not exempt from Iowa sales or consumer use tax under Iowa Code section 422.45(26), (39) (2001). Because we agree with the conclusions the district court reached, we affirm.

I. Background Facts.

Iowa Ag constructed buildings for De-Coster Farms. Hog confinement buildings built by Iowa Ag were always owned by Austin J. DeCoster. Some of these buildings were leased to Iowa Select.

In the hog confinement business, different buildings are used for confining hogs of different ages to isolate disease and control the environment. Hog operations use farrowing facilities. In those facilities sows give birth to pigs, and those pigs stay with the sow for three to four weeks. Hog operations also use nurseries in which pigs are confined until they reach a weight of forty or fifty pounds. Finishing facilities are also used to confine pigs weighing 50 to 250 pounds.

A typical hog confinement building is 200 to 280 feet in length and forty feet wide. The foundation is made of poured concrete, with walls from one to four feet high. These walls have a two-inch ledge to allow for installation of slatted concrete flooring or nursery floor frames. Piers in the pits are poured concrete walls that run the length of the building. The pit walls and piers support the slats or nursery floor frames. The pigs and the people tending the pigs walk into a hog confinement building on the same level where the concrete slats or nursery floor frames are located. Below the slatted or nursery flooring is a manure pit that is between one and four feet deep.

Farrowing and nursery barns consist of separate rooms because of the need to regulate the temperature in the rooms. In finishing barns, which are open, the hogs are separated into pens.

Nursery flooring is used in farrowing and nursery buildings. Nursery flooring is galvanized steel mesh wire cut to fit a frame. The frames are typically four-by-eight feet or six-by-ten feet and weigh 144 pounds and 270 pounds, respectively. The frame rests on top of concrete beams and is attached by a “J” bolt to the pen dividers. Bolts are used to secure the flooring to the floor frame in the corners. There are four bolts for each frame. Nursery flooring suspends pigs from their waste, which falls through the wire mesh to the pit below. The nursery flooring is designed to separate the animals from then-waste thereby keeping them clean and dry.

Concrete slats are used in finishing buildings. These slats are usually four by ten feet or four by eight feet. A four by ten feet slat weighs about 1340 pounds. The slats are designed to separate the hogs from their waste, which falls through the floor into the waste pit. The weight of the slat holds it in place on the two-inch ledge in the wall of the building.

Exhaust fans are located in the sides or ends of buildings or in pits to exchange air. Ventilation is necessary for the pigs’ proper growth. The exhaust fans are made of fiberglass and vary in size and weight from eleven inches square to fifty-three inches square and weigh from 19 pounds to 287 pounds. The wall fans are inserted into a hole in the wall. Four to eight screws or bolts attach the fan to the building. If a fan is removed, a square opening would be left in the building. The size of the opening would match the size of the fan. The pit fans typically sit on top of a rectangular concrete box that is part of the pit structure and located outside the building. A ventilation controller turns the fans on and off, and a motor powers the fans.

Curtains are used in the hog confinement buildings and are part of a system that, together with other equipment in the building, provide proper ventilation for the animals. These buildings are built with rectangular openings along the sides of the buildings to provide for natural ventilation. The curtains are made of vinyl over a polyethylene material, woven together in strands. The curtains can be raised or lowered manually.

Curtain controllers control the ventilation within the hog confinement buildings. A curtain controller receives information from thermostats or sensors inside and outside the building. Based on that information, the curtain controller causes fans to go off and on and the curtains to go up and down. The controller can also control heaters and water misters that drip water on the animals.

The controller is usually attached to a control board in the center of the building with two to four one-half-inch screws. The controller has three wires coming in to it, and the number of wires going out would depend on how many items the controller was to control.

A curtain machine raises and lowers the curtains. The curtain machine replaces a hand crank. The curtain machine weighs between 100 and 150 pounds and is usually attached to the outside of the confinement building with six screws or bolts. Three electrical wires provide power to the curtain machine, and additional wires connect it to the curtain and ventilation controller. The curtain machine has a cable attached to a drum, which is operated by electrical power. When the drum turns, the cable lifts or lowers the curtains on the side of the building.

As part of the biosecurity procedures at Iowa Select and DeCoster Farms, personnel who work in the hog confinement buildings are required to shower every morning upon arrival before entering a hog confinement building. Both Iowa Select and DeCoster Farms provide uniforms for their employees, which are worn by the employees and are washed on-site. These procedures are necessary because hogs are susceptible to disease that is easily carried and transmitted by clothing.

At each building, refrigerators are used to keep medications for hogs at the proper temperature. Such medication might include immunizations or vitamin or mineral supplements that need refrigeration to maintain effectiveness.

Today, most hogs are bred artificially. After semen is collected and delivered to the farm, the semen must be stored at a specific temperature. A special refrigerator is used at the Iowa Select and De-Coster Farms to store the semen.

Iowa Select uses mowers to cut grass and weeds around the hog confinement buildings for rodent control. Mowers are also used around sewage lagoons located on the site as required by the Iowa Department of Natural Resources. The agency requires the mowing so that its employees can properly inspect the lagoons to determine if there are any cracks, leaks, or degradation around the outside of the lagoons. The mowers were used more than fifty percent of the time to cut grass and weeds to control rodents and to mow grass around the lagoons.

II. Proceedings.

On November 23, 1999, as a result of a field audit, the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance (department) sent Iowa Ag a notice of assessment for sales/nse tax, covering the period from April 1, 1992, through June 30, 1998. The tax, penalty, and interest amounted to $1,414,714.51. On January 5, 2000, Iowa Ag filed a protest, disputing the entire amount of the assessment.

On November 23, 1999, as a result of a field audit, the department sent Iowa Select a notice of assessment for sales/use tax covering the period from January 1, 1993, through December 31, 1998. The tax, penalty, and interest amounted to $708,410.87. On April 7, 2000, Iowa Select filed a protest, disputing the entire amount of the assessment. Later, Iowa Select paid the assessment under protest and filed a claim for refund of the amount paid.

Iowa Ag and Iowa Select agreed to consolidate the two cases. An administrative law judge (ALJ) heard the case. The issues pertinent to the appeal before this court were whether certain items of property described above were exempt from tax pursuant to Iowa Code section 422.45(39) and whether other items of property described above were exempt from tax pursuant to Iowa Code section 422.45(26). The department appealed the ALJ’s proposed decision to the director, who issued an order reversing a part of the ALJ’s proposed decision. Iowa Ag and Iowa Select [hereinafter taxpayers] appealed the director’s order to the Board.

Following a hearing, the Board issued its decision. The Board concluded that the following items of property pertinent to the appeal to this court and described above were subject to tax: nursery flooring, concrete slats, exhaust fans, curtains, curtain controllers, curtain machines, washers, dryers, refrigerators, and mowers.

The taxpayers filed a petition for judicial review in the district court. The taxpayers alleged that the Board erred in its legal conclusion that the property described was subject to tax. Following a hearing, the district court affirmed the Board’s decision. It is from this ruling that the taxpayers appeal.

III. Issues.

The first issue is whether the following items of property are exempt from Iowa sales/use tax pursuant to Iowa Code section 422.45(39): nursery flooring, concrete slats, exhaust fans, curtains, curtain controllers, curtain machines, washers, dryers, and refrigerators.

The second issue is whether the mowers are exempt from such tax pursuant to Iowa Code section 422.45(26).

IV. Scope of Review.

Our review of agency action is governed by the standards set forth in Iowa’s Administrative Procedure Act. See Iowa Code §§ 17A.15(3), 17A.19(1), 421.1(4), 422.55(1); Grimm v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 331 N.W.2d 137, 139-40 (Iowa 1983) (per curiam). “In exercising its judicial review power, the district court acts in an appellate capacity.” Mycogen Seeds v. Sands, 686 N.W.2d 457, 463 (Iowa 2004). When we review the district court’s decision, “we apply the standards of chapter 17A to determine whether the conclusions we reach are the same as those of the district court.” Id. at 464. “If they are the same, we affirm; otherwise we reverse.” Id.

The issues here involve the agency’s interpretation of law, its factual determinations, and its application of law to the facts. Regarding the agency’s interpretation of the law, the court may grant relief if the taxpayers’ “substantial rights have been prejudiced because the agency’s action meets any one of several statutory criteria.” See Midwest Auto. Ill, LLC v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 417, 421 (Iowa 2002).

Several administrative rules represent the agency’s interpretation of Iowa Code section 422.45(26), (39). Although we give weight to the agency’s interpretation, the meaning of a statute is always a matter of law for us to determine. See City of Marion v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 643 N.W.2d 205, 206 (Iowa 2002).

Iowa Code section 17A.19(11) prescribes the deference that we should accord the view of the agency. See id. at 206-07. Iowa Code section 17A.19(ll)(c) provides that we should give appropriate deference to the view of the agency “with respect to particular matters that have been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(ll)(c). A statutory provision provides that “[t]he director [of revenue and finance] shall have the power and authority to prescribe all rules not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, necessary and advisable for its detailed administration and to effectuate its purposes.” Id. § 422.68(1). We therefore conclude that the interpretation of section 422.45(26), (39) has been vested in the agency. Consequently, we must give the agency’s interpretation of this statute through its administrative rules the deference directed by Iowa Code section 17A.19(ll)(c). See City of Marion, 643 N.W.2d at 206-07. That deference requires us to uphold the agency’s interpretation unless that interpretation is “irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)©.

Regarding the agency’s factual determinations, the court may grant relief if the taxpayers’ substantial rights have been prejudiced because the agency action is

[biased upon a determination of fact clearly vested by a provision of the law in the discretion of the agency that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole.

Id. § 17A.19(10)(¡0.

For purposes of our review,
“[substantial evidence” means the quantity and quality of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact are understood to be serious and of great importance.

Id. § 17A.19(10)(/)(1). “In assessing evi-dentiary support for the agency’s factual determinations, we consider evidence that detracts from the agency’s findings, as well as evidence that supports them, giving deference to the credibility determinations of the presiding officer.” Lange v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 710 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Iowa 2006); see Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(/)(3).

As to the agency’s factual determinations regarding the applicability of the exemptions in section 422.45(26), (39), such determinations are clearly vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency. The case was tried as a contested case proceeding in which factual findings were made based on evidence produced. See Iowa Code § 422.54(2). We are therefore bound by the agency’s findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence. See Lange, 710 N.W.2d at 246-47. We can reverse the agency action regarding findings of fact only if they are not supported by substantial evidence. Mycogen Seeds, 686 N.W.2d at 465. By applying this requirement, we are giving “appropriate deference to the view of the agency with respect to particular matters that have been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(ll)(c); see also Mycogen Seeds, 686 N.W.2d at 465.

Because factual determinations are bylaw clearly vested in the agency, it follows that application of the law to the facts is likewise vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f); see also Mycogen Seeds, 686 N.W.2d at 465. We can therefore reverse the agency’s application of the law to the facts only if we determine such application was “irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(to ); see also Mycogen Seeds, 686 N.W.2d at 465. By applying this standard, we are likewise giving “appropriate deference to the view of the agency with respect to particular matters that have been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(ll)(c); see also Mycogen Seeds, 686 N.W.2d at 465.

In assessing the validity of the agency action, we apply “the standards of review provided in [Iowa Code section 17A.19], as applied to the agency action at the time that action was taken.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(6); see Marovec v. PMX Indus., 693 N.W.2d 779, 782 (Iowa 2005). This accords with the long-standing rule that “ ‘statutes controlling appeals are those that were in effect at the time the judgment or order appealed from was rendered.’ ” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Caselman, 657 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Iowa 2003) (quoting Ontjes v. McNider, 224 Iowa 115, 118, 275 N.W. 328, 330 (1937)).

Iowa Code section 422.45 was repealed effective July 1, 2004. 2003 Iowa Acts 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 2, §§ 151, 205. A new sales tax exemption section was created, which became effective July 1, 2004. Id. ch. 2, §§ 96, 205 (codified at Iowa Code § 423.3 (2005)).

The Iowa legislature passed Senate File 2268 and the Governor signed it on June 2, 2006. 2006 Iowa Legis. Serv. S.F. 2268 (West). Senate File 2268 added a new subsection providing for tax refunds for several items of property at issue here. Id. We express no opinion on this provision.

Because we are dealing with issues of tax exemption, we must keep in mind that any doubts as to tax exemptions must be resolved in favor of taxation. Dial Corp. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 634 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Iowa 2001).

With these principles in mind, we consider the issues before us.

V. Exemption Afforded by Iowa Code Section 422.45(39).

A. Applicable law. Iowa Code section 422.45(39) exempts from sales tax

[t]he gross receipts from the sale or rental of farm machinery and equipment, including auxiliary attachments which improve the performance, safety, operation, or efficiency of the machinery and equipment and replacement parts, if all of the following conditions are met:
a. The implement, machinery, or equipment is directly and primarily used in livestock or dairy production
b. The implement is not a self-propelled implement ....
c. The replacement part is essential to any repair or reconstruction necessary to the farm machinery’s or equipment’s exempt use in livestock or dairy production ....

Iowa Code § 422.45(39) (emphasis added).

Section 423.4(4) exempts from use tax “[t]angible personal property, the gross receipt from the sale of which are exempted from the retail sales tax by the terms of section 422.45, except [as to subsections not relevant here] .... ”

Rule 701 — 18.48 of the Iowa Administrative Code implements Iowa Code section 422.45. Iowa Admin. Code r. 701— 18.48(8). This rule defines “equipment” as

tangible personal property (other than a machine) directly and primarily used in livestock or dairy production. It may be characterized as property which performs a specialized function which, of itself, has no moving parts or if it does possess moving parts, its source of power is external to it.

Id. r. 701 — 18.48(1)®.

Iowa Administrative Code rule 701— 18.48(l)(c)(l) provides that real property is not machinery or equipment:

(1) Real property. The ground or the earth is not machinery or equipment. A building is not machinery or equipment. Therefore, tangible personal property which is sold for incorporation into the ground or a building in such a manner that it will become a part of the ground or the building is taxable. Generally, property incorporated into the ground or a building has become a part of the ground or the building if removal of the property from the ground or building will substantially damage the property, ground, or building or substantially diminish the value of the property, ground, or building. Fence posts embedded in concrete and electrical wiring, light fixtures, fuse boxes, and switches are examples of property sold for incorporation into the ground or a building, respectively. The property referred to in 18.48(l)(c)(l) can be identified by applying the following test: Assume that the property is being sold to a contractor rather than a person engaged in livestock or dairy production. If sold to a contractor, would the retailer be required to consider the property “building material” and charge the contractor sales tax upon the purchase of this building material. If this is the case, sale of the property is not exempt from Iowa tax law. Iowa department of revenue and finance rule 701 — 19.3(422, 423) contains a characterization of “building material” and a list of specific examples of building material.

Id. r. 701 — 18.48(l)(c)(l) (citation omitted).

As pertinent here, rule 701 — 19.3, referred to in rule 701 — 18.48(l)(c)(l), states that the term

“building materials” ... means materials used in construction work, and is not limited to materials used in constructing a building with sides and covering. The term may also include any type of materials used for improvement of the premises or anything essential to the completion of a building or structure for the use intended.

Id. r. 701 — 19.3(1) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

Rule 701 — 19.3(3) lists typical items regarded as building materials. The list is not intended to be exclusive. Id. r. 701— 19.3(3). The list regards as building materials floor coverings “which are shaped to fit a particular room or area and which are attached to the supporting floor with cement, tacks or tack strips or by some other method making a permanent attachment ....” Id. (emphasis added). In contrast, the rule notes that carpeting, whether attached to the floor or not, is not considered as a building material and that rugs, mats, and linoleum types of floor coverings that are not attached but are simply laid on finished floors are not considered as building materials. Id.

Iowa Administrative Code rule 701— 19.10 distinguishes between equipment and real property after installation:

Distinguishing machinery and equipment from real property. A construction contract may include many activities, but it does not include a contract for the sale and installation of machinery or equipment. Machinery and equipment includes property that is tangible personal property when it is purchased and remains tangible personal property after installation. Generally, tangible personal property can be moved without causing damage or injury to itself or to the structure, it does not bear the weight of the structure, and it does not in any other manner constitute an integral part of a structure. Manufactured machinery and equipment which does not become permanently annexed to the realty remains tangible personal property after installation.

Id. r. 701 — 19.10 (emphasis added).

Rule 701 — 19.10(2) lists “property which, under normal conditions, becomes a part of realty.” The list, which is nonexclusive, includes “improvements to buildings, including awnings, canopies, ... floors (including computer room floors), ... storm doors and windows, door controls, air curtains, ... and heating, cooling and ventilation systems.” Id. r. 701— 19.10(2)(c) (emphasis added). While the administrative rule does not define the word “integral,” we think rule 701— 19.10(2) was intended to define the term when it used the language “property which, under normal conditions, becomes a part of realty.” This language tracks the ordinary meaning of “integral”: “of, relating to, or serving to form a whole.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1173 (unabr. ed. 2002); see also Hough v. Iowa Dep’t of Personnel, 666 N.W.2d 168, 173 (Iowa 2003) (noting the court’s practice of looking “to the ordinary, commonly understood meaning of the [undefined statutory] word” and using a dictionary to ascertain the meaning).

“Directly and primarily” in section 422.45(39)(a) are defined in rule 701— 18.48(1). Rule 701 — 18.48(l)(e) pertinently provides that

[i]f the machinery or equipment is used in livestock or dairy production, to be “directly” so used, that use must constitute an integral and essential part of production as distinguished from a use in production which is incidental, merely convenient to or remote from production. The fact that machinery or equipment is essential or necessary to livestock or dairy production does not mean that it is also “directly” used in production. Machinery or equipment may be necessary to livestock or dairy production but so remote from it that it is not directly used in that production.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 701 — 18.48(l)(e) (emphasis added). The statute does not define “directly,” but rule 701 — 18.48(l)(e)’s definition of the term tracks with the dictionary meaning of “direct”: “marked by absence of an intervening agency, instrumentality, or influence.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 327 (10th ed. 2002).

Rule 701 — 18.48(l)(e)(3) lists nonexclusive examples of machinery and equipment that are not considered to be directly used in livestock or dairy production. One pertinent use includes “[m]achinery or equipment used to ... repair other machinery or equipment directly used in livestock or dairy production.” Iowa Admin. Code r. 701 — 18.48(l)(e)(3)(l).

In addition, the rule defines “primarily used in livestock or dairy production”:

Machinery or equipment is “primarily used in livestock or dairy production” if of the total time that unit of machinery or equipment is used, more than [fifty] percent of the time is in livestock or dairy production. If a unit of machinery or equipment is used more than [fifty] percent of the time for production and the balance of time for other business purposes, the exemption applies.

Id. r. 701 — 18.48(1)(/).

The rule also lists the following pertinent nonexclusive example of machinery and equipment directly used in livestock or dairy production: “Machinery and equipment used in the conception ... of livestock or dairy animals (e.g., artificial insemination equipment).” Id. r. 701— 18.48(l)(e)(2)(2) (emphasis added).

B. The merits. The Board began its analysis by stating that it evaluated the nursery flooring, concrete slats, exhaust fans, curtains, curtain controllers, and curtain machines on the basis of the permanency or degree of annexation of the structure to other real property under rules 701 — 18.48, 701 — 19.3, and 701 — 19.10, as those rules are set out above. The Board then determined that each of these items of property had to be addressed in terms of those rules on an individual basis. We turn now to the Board’s findings and conclusions and our analysis of the same.

1. Nursery flooring and slats. The Board noted that rule 701 — 19.3 gives examples of items typically regarded as building materials such as floors that are shaped to fit a particular room or area and that are attached to the supporting floor in some permanent fashion. The Board compared this type of flooring to rugs, mats, or other flooring that are not so attached. The Board made specific findings that nursery flooring and slats (1) are not rugs, floor mats, or flooring coverings that are simply laid but not attached to finished floors; (2) constitute the floor of the building that separates the hogs from the waste pit below; and (3) are attached to the real property to an extent as to become part of the property. Based on these findings, the Board concluded these items were not exempt from tax.

According to the evidence, the buildings in question were constructed for the purpose of operating a hog confinement business. The evidence supports a reasonable inference that the nursery flooring and concrete slats were essential to the completion of the building for the use intended and for that reason were building materials and therefore subject to tax. See Iowa Admin. Code rs. 701 — 18.48(l)(c)(l), 701— 19.3(1). The nursery flooring and concrete slats also fit the intended meaning of “floors” in rule 701 — 19.3(3), meaning they are building materials. Accordingly, they meet the definition of “building materials” and therefore are subject to tax. See id. r. 701 — 18.48(l)(c)(l). They also fit the intended meaning of “floors” in rule 701— 19.10(2)(c), that describes “property which, under normal conditions, becomes a part of realty.” As such, the nursery flooring and concrete slats are “an integral part of a structure,” within the meaning of rule 701 — 19.10. The nursery flooring and concrete slats therefore fall outside the meaning of tangible personal property not subject to tax. See id. r. 701 — 19.10.

We conclude substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings. We further conclude that the Board’s interpretation of section 422.45(39), as implemented by the administrative rules considered by the Board, was not irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. Nor was its application of the law to the facts irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.

2. Exhaust fans. As to the exhaust fans, the Board found that, after the fans were installed into the walls of the building, “they became part of the real property.” The Board further found that these items perform the same functions as a window and are necessary because of the specialized construction of the building. Finally, removing these items, the Board found, would be consequential to the building environment. For all of these reasons, the Board concluded these items were not exempt from tax.

As mentioned, the fans vary in size and weight from eleven inches square to fifty-three inches square and weigh from 19 pounds to 287 pounds. The fans are inserted into a hole in the wall and are attached to the building with screws or bolts. Their removal would leave a hole the size of the fan. The fans are a necessary part of the ventilation system, which is essential for the animals’ health and proper growth. This evidence supports the Board’s findings that the fans are necessary because of the specialized construction of the building, and their removal would be consequential to the building environment. A reasonable inference from these findings is that the fans are essential to the completion of the building for the use intended and are for that reason considered building materials and therefore subject to tax. See id. rs. 701— 18.48(l)(c)(l), 701 — 19.3(1).

We note that windows and window screens are listed as typical items meeting the description of “building materials” in rule 701 — 19.3(8). Windows and cooling and ventilation systems qualify as “property which, under normal conditions, becomes a part of realty.” Id. r. 701— 19.10(2)(c). The exhaust fans here serve a similar purpose as windows, window screens, and cooling and ventilation systems. We therefore conclude the fans meet the “building materials” description in rule 701 — 19.3(3) and are therefore for that further reason subject to tax. See id. r. 701 — 18.48(l)(c)(l). The fans also meet the definition of “property which, under normal conditions, becomes a part of realty” in rule 701 — 19.10(2). As such, the fans are an “integral part of a structure,” within the meaning of rule 701 — 19.10. The fans therefore fall outside the parameters of tangible personal property not subject to tax. See id. r. 701 — 19.10.

We conclude substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings. We further conclude that the Board’s interpretation of section 422.45(39), as implemented by the administrative rules considered by the Board, was not irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. Nor was its application of the law to the facts irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.

3. Curtains, curtain machines, and ventilation controllers. The Board found these items are necessary for controlling temperature in the confinement building. The Board further found that these items became part of the hog confinement structure once they were installed. For that reason, the Board found these items did not retain tangible personal property status. Consequently, the Board concluded these items were not exempt from tax.

The evidence showed that the curtains, curtain machines, and ventilation controllers together with the exhaust fans provide proper ventilation for the animals, as found by the Board. The curtain controller is attached to a control board in the center of the building with screws. The curtain machine is attached to the outside of the building with screws or bolts.

A reasonable inference from this evidence is that these items are necessary and essential to the completion of the buildings for the use intended and for that reason are building materials and therefore subject to tax. See id. rs. 701— 18.48(l)(c)(l), 701 — 19.3(1). Air curtains and cooling and ventilation systems are listed in rule 701 — 19.10(2)(c) as “property which, under normal conditions, becomes a part of realty.” The items in question clearly meet this description. As such, the items are an “integral part of a structure” within the meaning of rule 701—19.10. The items therefore fall outside the parameters of tangible personal property not subject to tax. See id. r. 701—19.10.

We conclude substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings. We further conclude that the Board’s interpretation of section 422.45(39), as implemented by the administrative rules considered by the Board, was not irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. Nor was its application of the law to the facts irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.

4. Washers and dryers. Regarding the washers, dryers, and refrigerators, the Board analyzed the exemption issue as to whether those items were used directly and primarily in livestock production as set out in Iowa Code section 422.45(39) as implemented by the administrative rules.

As mentioned, personnel who work in the hog confinement buildings at Iowa Select and DeCoster Farms must shower every morning before entering a hog confinement building. The personnel must also wear uniforms provided by their employers, and these uniforms are washed on-site. These procedures are necessary to protect the animals from disease that is easily carried and transmitted by clothing.

The Board found that the washers and dryers are one step removed from being “directly and primarily used in livestock production.” The Board therefore concluded that these items were not exempt from tax.

While it may be necessary for the taxpayers to have these items, this is not the test. The test is that the items must not be remote from the production process. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that these items are one step removed from being directly used in livestock production. The use of washers and dryers is analogous to maintaining or repairing equipment directly used in livestock production, which is not a direct production use. See id. r. 701— 18.48(1)(e)(3)(l); Dain Mfg. Co. v. Iowa State Tax Comm’n, 237 Iowa 531, 538, 22 N.W.2d 786, 790-91 (1946) (holding that drill grinding machine used to service machinery or equipment directly used in processing property was not considered to be directly used in the processing).

We conclude substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings. We further conclude that the Board’s interpretation of section 422.45(39), as implemented by the administrative rules considered by the Board, was not irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. Nor was its application of the law to the facts irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.

5. Refrigerators. The evidence revealed there were two types of refrigerators used. One was for storage of medications and another was for storage of semen. The Board found the refrigerators were not directly used in livestock production because they were one step removed from being directly used in production as required by the statute. They were one step removed, the Board found, because “[i]t is the semen, medication and vaccinations that are used, not the refrigerator.” For these reasons, the Board concluded these items were not exempt from tax.

The refrigerators used to store the medication were necessary to preserve the medication’s effectiveness. However, as with the washers and dryers, this is not the test. The test is that the refrigerators must not be remote from the production process. And like the washers and dryers, the use of these refrigerators is analogous to repairing or maintaining equipment directly used in the production process. We conclude substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that these refrigerators were not directly used in livestock production.

We reach the same conclusion for the same reasons regarding the refrigerators used to store the semen. As mentioned, rule 701 — 18.48(l)(e)(2)(2) provides that artificial insemination equipment is directly used in the production of livestock because it is equipment used in the conception of livestock. As the Board found, refrigerators are not directly used in the production of livestock; rather, it is the semen itself that is directly so used. Unlike artificial insemination equipment, the refrigerators are clearly one step removed from the production of livestock.

We conclude substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings. We further conclude that the Board’s interpretation of section 422.45(39), as implemented by the administrative rules considered by the Board, was not irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. Nor was its application of the law to the facts irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.

VI. Exemption Afforded by Iowa Code Section 422.45(26).

A. Applicable law. Iowa Code section 422.45(26) exempts from sales tax

[t]he gross receipts from the sale or rental of farm machinery and equipment, including auxiliary attachments which improve the performance, safety, operation, or efficiency of the machinery and equipment and replacement parts, if the following conditions are met:
a. The farm machinery and equipment shall be directly and primarily used in production of agricultural products.
b. The farm machinery and equipment shall constitute self-propelled implements or implements customarily drawn or attached to self-propelled implements or the farm machinery or equipment is a grain dryer.
c.The replacement part is essential to any repair or reconstruction necessary to the farm machinery’s or equipment’s exempt use in the production of agricultural products.

Iowa Code § 422.45(26) (emphasis added).

B. The merits. What remains to be considered are the mowers. The Board determined these items were not exempt pursuant to Iowa Code section 422.45(26), which exempts from tax farm machinery directly and primarily used in the production of agricultural products. Production of agricultural products means “a farming operation undertaken for profit by raising crops or livestock.” Iowa Admin. Code r. 701 — 18.44(2)(a) (emphasis added). Therefore, the administrative rules applicable to livestock production have application to the mowers.

The taxpayers rely on section 422.45(26) because the exemption in section 422.45(39) does not apply to “self-propelled implements] or implements] customarily drawn or attached to self-propelled implements” whereas the exemption in section 422.45(26) does apply to such implements. Compare Iowa Code § 422.45(39)(6), with Iowa Code § 422.45(26)(6). The mowers here are either pulled by a tractor or are rider mowers.

Iowa Select uses mowers to cut grass around the hog confinement buildings and on the farm for rodent control. Iowa Select also mows around sewage lagoons to abide by an Iowa Department of Natural Resources regulation requiring mowing there to enable the agency to inspect lagoons. These uses consumed well over fifty percent of the mowers’ use.

The Board found that the mowers were one step removed from being used directly in the production of livestock. Our reasoning that substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings regarding the washers, dryers, and refrigerators applies here with equal force.

We conclude substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings. We further conclude that the Board’s interpretation of section 422.45(26), as implemented by the administrative rules considered by the Board, was not irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. Nor was its application of the law to the facts irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.

VII. Disposition.

Because we reach the same conclusions the district court reached, we affirm its decision affirming the decision of the Board. We have carefully considered all of the issues. Those we have not addressed were either not properly preserved or lack merit.

AFFIRMED.