author: TERNUS, Chief Justice.

text:
    CITY OF MADRID, Iowa, and EMC Insurance Companies, Appellants v. Angela BLASNITZ, Appellee.
    No. 06-0977.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Oct. 5, 2007.
    Rehearing Denied. Nov. 28, 2007.
    Lori A. Brandau and Michael L. Mock of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave, P.C., Des Moines, for appellants.
    Jim Lawyer of Lawyer, Lawyer, Dutton & Drake, LLP, West Des Moines, for ap-pellee.
   TERNUS, Chief Justice.

This appeal involves a workers’ compensation insurer’s challenge to an award of penalty benefits by the workers’ compensation commissioner. The district court ruled the commissioner had applied an incorrect standard in determining the employer’s liability for penalty benefits under Iowa Code section 86.13 (2003). and concluded the case should be remanded to the commissioner for reconsideration of penalty benefits under the appropriate test. Upon the employer’s appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s remand to the commissioner.

We conclude the commissioner’s award of penalty benefits was not supported by substantial evidence because the underlying workers’ compensation claim was fairly debatable as a matter of law under the record before the commissioner. Therefore, we vacate the court of appeals decision, affirm the judgment of the district court in part and reverse in part, and remand the case for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On August 1, 2003, the appellee, Angela Blasnitz, filed a petition for arbitration seeking workers’ compensation benefits for a shoulder injury she was ultimately found to have sustained on January 17, 2003. Her employer, City of Madrid, Iowa, and its workers’ compensation insurer, EMC Insurance Companies, denied her claim, contending she had not sustained a shoulder injury on the date alleged. (We will refer to these parties jointly as the insurer.) An arbitration decision was eventually entered by a deputy workers’ compensation commissioner, awarding disability, medical, and penalty benefits.

On intra-agency appeal, the workers’ compensation commissioner affirmed, adopting the deputy’s decision with some “additional analysis” concerning the penalty benefits issue. Before reviewing the commissioner’s analysis of this issue, it is helpful to summarize the pertinent facts found by the commissioner, as well as the relevant documentary evidence and testimony introduced at the hearing.

In January 2003 the claimant was employed as a police officer for the City of Madrid. On January 17, 2003, she was dispatched to a call at the home of Michael and Susan Palmer to investigate a domestic disturbance. The claimant testified at her workers’ compensation hearing that she slipped and fell in the Palmer home, striking her right shoulder and elbow. At the time of the incident, the claimant was wearing a remote microphone for her patrol vehicle recording system, and she can be heard to fall on the tape. Her fall was not visible on the tape, however.

The claimant stated in answers to interrogatories that she had immediate pain in her shoulder and elbow. The patrol ear tape shows her conducting a vehicle stop after her fall, sometimes using her right arm above her shoulder. She does say “ouch” once while searching the vehicle. The claimant did not record that she sustained an injury when she completed her patrol activity report for her January 17, 2003 shift. The claimant had been injured three times while working for the city before the January 17, 2003 incident, and on each occasion, she had noted her injury in her patrol activity log on the day the injury occurred.

The claimant testified she had a discussion with the police chief the day after her fall regarding an injury to her shoulder. The chief, however, denied he had a conversation with the claimant on January 18 or January 19, as he did not work on either date.

The police chief gave the claimant a three-day suspension on February 19, 2003, for failing to follow an office directive with respect to an unrelated matter. On the final day of her suspension, February 24, 2003, the claimant sought her initial treatment for her shoulder, neck, and arm. She reported to her chiropractor on that date that she had her first symptoms after a fall on her right shoulder approximately three weeks earlier. The claimant wrote a note to her employer the next day, February 25, 2003, stating that she fell “at the 10-16” and hurt her back and shoulder. In response to this note, the insurer authorized medical care with a Dr. Kirkland, who the claimant saw on March 19, 2003. The claimant reported to Dr. Kirkland that she slipped and fell on either January 17, 2003, or December 17, 2002, while responding to a call, but according to his records, she really could not remember. Also on March 19, 2003, the claimant reported to Therapeutic Associates that the injury occurred ninety days prior. On March 26, 2003, she told a physical therapist that she injured her shoulder on January 17, 2003, when responding to a domestic-dispute call. She gave the same history to a physician she consulted on May 7, 2003, who determined the claimant had a rotator cuff tear in her right shoulder. The claimant subsequently had two surgeries to repair the tear.

On three occasions in April 2003, the insurer made surveillance videos of the claimant. In one video, she can be seen bridling, leading, and grooming three horses for approximately ninety minutes, using both arms, sometimes above shoulder level. At one point, she appears to briefly shake her right arm and hold her right shoulder. On May 21, 2003, the insurer took a recorded statement from Mr. Palmer, one of the subjects of the claimant’s January 17 domestic-disturbance call. Mr. Palmer told the insurer that the claimant fell straight down on January 17, 2003, and landed on her bottom. The insurer wrote to the claimant on May 22, 2003, denying her claim.

On June 2, 2003, the claimant called Mr. Palmer and asked him to sign a statement for her because “she was having trouble with the workmen’s comp.” The next day, June 3, 2003, Mr. Palmer gave a second statement to the insurer, stating that on January 17, 2003, “he had turned slightly and he turned back around and claimant had her feet in the air and her back was against the wall.” He explained that he “just wasn’t thinking right” when he gave his first statement. Eventually, Mr. Palmer’s deposition was taken on March 12, 2004. He testified that he did not see the claimant fall on January 17, 2003, but he did offer to help her up after her fall. He further testified she said she was fine, she did not act like she had been injured, and she did not rub her right arm or shoulder. Mr. Palmer also suggested in his deposition that the parties should question his wife about the incident as she was sitting on the couch facing the door where and when the claimant slipped.

The insurer then contacted Mrs. Palmer, who gave a statement on March 17, 2004. Mrs. Palmer stated that she saw the claimant fall and did not recall that the claimant struck her right shoulder or arm in the course of her fall. Mrs. Palmer testified consistently with her statement when her deposition was subsequently taken on May 11, 2004. She testified she saw the claimant fall, but did not see her hit anything. She said the claimant fell straight down on her bottom with her feet straight out in front of her. Mrs. Palmer said her husband asked the claimant if she was okay, and the claimant said she was okay and did not act injured.

In addition to the testimony of the Palm-ers, the police chief testified at the hearing that the claimant told him in mid-2002 that she had been kicked in the right arm by her horse. The police chief said he observed a large bruise on her arm at that time. The police chief and another officer also testified they believed the claimant had been untruthful in the past. Finally, the claimant’s surgeon stated there are activities involved in caring for and showing horses that could cause a rotator cuff tear.

In affirming the deputy’s decision to award penalty benefits, the commissioner stated:

Not every defense or factual dispute is sufficient to constitute the reasonable or probable cause or excuse as contemplated by section 86.13. Only a very unimaginative mind would be unable to find a shred of evidentiary fact that could be pointed to as a reason to deny compens-ability of any claim. Eyewitness accounts of the same incident commonly vary. Memories fade. A view of the totality of the evidence is required to determine whether reasonable or probable cause or excuse existed. Substantial evidence that has a reasonable chance of prevailing is required....

(Emphasis added.) The commissioner then briefly reviewed the evidence, noting the record “contains some inconsistencies.” Notwithstanding these inconsistencies, he concluded:

Claimant was employed as a peace officer, a position that judges and juries typically consider to be one that brings credibility.... When the totality of the facts in this case are considered and weighed, I find that it was not reasonable to consider the untimely evidence from Ms. Palmer to be of sufficient import and reliability to have a reasonable chance of outweighing all the contrary evidence that supported the compensa-bility of claimant’s claim. It cannot be stated better than how the deputy characterized it on page 14 of his decision, “In light of the overwhelming weight of other evidence, Ms. Palmer’s statements do not make claimant’s claim fairly debatable.”

(Emphasis added.)

The insurer sought judicial review of the commissioner’s award of penalty benefits, claiming (1) the commissioner had erroneously imposed a burden on the insurer to show that its position had a reasonable chance of prevailing, and (2) the commissioner’s award of penalty benefits was not supported by substantial evidence. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(c), (/). The claimant argued in response that the commissioner’s standard was merely a restatement of the fairly debatable test, and substantial evidence in the record supported the commissioner’s penalty-benefits award. The district court concluded the commissioner had applied an incorrect legal standard and reversed the award of penalty benefits. The court was unwilling, however, to rule as a matter of law that the compensability of the claimant’s claim was fairly debatable. Instead, the court decided “it would be more appropriate to remand” the case to the commissioner for reconsideration “in light of the appropriate legal standard.” The court observed the commissioner may determine on remand that the issue was fairly debatable or may award penalty benefits in a different amount, and that “decision would then be subject to subsequent judicial review on a substantial evidence standard.”

The insurer appealed the district court’s ruling on the substantial-evidence issue, and the case was transferred to the court of appeals. That court agreed with the district court, ruling the appropriate relief was to remand the case to the commissioner so he could have an opportunity to consider an award of penalty benefits under the correct test. The insurer filed an application for further review, which we granted. The sole issue on appeal is whether the record before the commissioner provides substantial evidence to support an award of penalty benefits. See id. § 17A.19 (10)(/). Stated another way, we must decide whether the compensability of the claimant’s claim was fairly debatable as a matter of law. See Garcia v. Naylor Concrete Co., 650 N.W.2d 87, 91 (Iowa 2002) (“However, in challenging an agency finding, a party may not succeed merely by showing that the evidence would support a different conclusion than the one that the agency reached. In order to succeed, it must be demonstrated that, as a matter of law, the finding that the agency made was not supported by substantial evidence.” (Citation omitted.)).

II. Standard of Review.

“Under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, a reviewing court may reverse the decision of the workers’ compensation commissioner if it is unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.... ” Univ. of Iowa Hosps. & Clinics v. Waters, 674 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Iowa 2004) (citing Iowa Code § 17A.19(10) (2001)). “Substantial evidence”

means the quantity and quality of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact are understood to be serious and of great importance.

Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(/)(1). “In assessing evidentiary support for the agency’s factual determinations, we consider evidence that detracts from the agency’s findings, as well as evidence that supports them, giving deference to the credibility determinations of the presiding officer.” Lange v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 710 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Iowa 2006) (citing Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(/)(3)).

III. Applicable Law.

Penalty benefits in a workers’ compensation case are authorized by section 86.13, which states:

If a delay in commencement or termination of benefits occurs without reasonable or probable cause or excuse, the workers’ compensation commissioner shall award benefits in addition to those benefits payable under this chapter or chapter 85, 85A, or 85B, up to fifty percent of the amount of benefits that were unreasonably delayed or denied.

Iowa Code § 86.13, para. 4. A claimant seeking to recover under this statute must establish “a delay in the commencement of benefits or a termination of benefits.” Keystone Nursing Care Ctr. v. Craddock, 705 N.W.2d 299, 307 (Iowa 2005). The burden then shifts to the insurer “to prove[ ] a reasonable cause or excuse” for the delay or denial. Christensen v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 554 N.W.2d 254, 260 (Iowa 1996). “A reasonable cause or excuse exists if either (1) the delay was necessary for the insurer to investigate the claim or (2) the employer had a reasonable basis to contest the employee’s entitlement to benefits.” Id.

The claimant does not argue the insurer took too long to investigate the claim before its May 23, 2003 denial. Rather, the claimant contends the insurer did not have a reasonable basis to contest her entitlement to benefits. In the Christensen case, we held the “fairly debatable” standard used in the tort of bad-faith denial of insurance claims should be used for purposes of section 86.13 penalty benefits in determining whether a workers’ compensation insurer had a reasonable basis to deny a claimant’s claim. Id.

This court recently stated the following principles with respect to the reasonable-basis element of a bad-faith tort claim:

A reasonable basis exists for denial of policy benefits if the insured’s claim is fairly debatable either on a matter of fact or law. A claim is “fairly debatable” when it is open to dispute on any logical basis. Stated another way, if reasonable minds can differ on the coverage-determining facts or law, then the claim is fairly debatable.
The fact that the insurer’s position is ultimately found to lack merit is not sufficient by itself to establish the first element of a bad faith claim. The focus is on the existence of a debatable issue, not on which party was correct.
Whether a claim is fairly debatable can generally be decided as a matter of law by the court. That is because “ ‘where an objectively reasonable basis for denial of a claim actually exists, the insurer cannot be held liable for bad faith as a matter of law.’ ” As one court has explained, “[cjourts and juries do not weigh the conflicting evidence that was before the insurer; they decide whether evidence existed to justify denial of the claim.”

Bellville v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 702 N.W.2d 468, 473-74 (Iowa 2005) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

IV. Discussion.

It is apparent the commissioner erroneously weighed the evidence in deciding whether the claimant’s claim was fairly debatable. Moreover, the commissioner focused on only one item of evidence— Mrs. Palmer’s statement — in evaluating the reasonableness of the insurer’s denial. Finally, the commissioner improperly suggested the employer should have considered the claimant to be credible simply because she was employed as a peace officer. Using the proper analysis and considering all the facts before the commissioner that would support the insurer’s denial, we conclude the insurer cannot be held liable for penalty benefits as a matter of law.

Several facts and circumstances supported the insurer’s position that the claimant did not injure her shoulder in her January 17, 2003 fall, including the following: (1) Mr. Palmer initially stated the claimant fell straight down and landed on her bottom; (2) Mr. Palmer modified his account of this incident only after the claimant called him, and even then, he continued to testify that the claimant said she was not injured immediately after her fall (in contrast to the claimant’s testimony that she felt immediate pain); (3) Mrs. Palmer stated the claimant fell straight down on her bottom; (4) the claimant’s surgeon testified that, if the claimant fell flat on her bottom and did not hit her arm on anything, the fall would not have caused the injury for which he treated her; (5) the claimant failed to record her injury in her activity log, in contrast to three prior work-related injuries that she noted in her activity logs on the day the injuries occurred ; ■ (6) the police chief denied he was told of the claimant’s injury the day after it occurred, as claimed by the claimant; (7) the claimant failed to seek medical treatment until five weeks after her fall; (8) the claimant gave inconsistent statements to treatment providers as to the date of her injury; (9) although at the hearing the claimant denied using her right arm above shoulder level to conduct a sobriety test in a stop three hours after her fall, her patrol car video tape shows the claimant using her right arm above shoulder level several times during the stop; (10) the claimant stated to the police chief in mid-2002 that she had been kicked in the right arm by her horse, and the police chief observed a large bruise on her arm; (11) the claimant’s surgeon testified there are activities involved in caring for and showing horses that could cause a rotator cuff tear; and (12) the police chief and another police officer believed the claimant had been untruthful at times. Only one conclusion can be drawn from the undisputed existence of the foregoing statements, testimony, and records: the insurer had a reasonable basis to contend the claimant did not sustain a rotator cuff tear when she fell on January 17, 2003.

The claimant argues that many of the facts shown at the hearing were unknown to the insurer when it denied payment for the claimant’s surgery on June 20, 2003, and the facts known by the insurer on that date were not sufficient to render the insurer’s denial reasonable. Contrary to the claimant’s contention, it is uncontroverted in the record that, by June 20, 2003, the insurer had a statement from Mr. Palmer in which he stated the claimant fell straight down on her bottom, and it had medical records in which the claimant gave inconsistent histories of her injury. These facts made the claimant’s claim fairly debatable. Those facts arising later or coming to the attention of the insurer subsequent to June 20, 2003, merely provided further support for the insurer’s decision to persist in its denial.

We note the claimant, in discussing the facts pertinent to the validity of her claim for benefits, ignores Mr. Palmer’s initial statement, apparently due to the fact that he subsequently gave a second statement more favorable to the claimant. But the insurer is not required to accept the evidence most favorable to the claimant and ignore contradictory evidence. See Bellville, 702 N.W.2d at 479 (stating insurer is not required to view the facts in a light most favorable to the claimant); Gilbert v. USF Holland, Inc., 637 N.W.2d 194, 200 (Iowa 2001) (stating employer could reasonably argue later inconsistent version of incident was a fabrication). Here, reasonable persons could discount Mr. Palmer’s assertion that he “just wasn’t thinking right” when he gave his first statement and disbelieve his second statement, concluding Mr. Palmer changed his account of what happened to assist the claimant in recovering workers’ compensation benefits. Similarly, the insurer was not required to believe the claimant simply because she was a police officer, as implied by the commissioner.

The claimant also relies on the fact the commissioner rejected the insurer’s evidence when the commissioner ruled the claimant sustained a shoulder injury on January 17, 2003. But the fact the commissioner was not convinced by the evidence supporting the insurer’s denial does not negate the existence of a genuine dispute with respect to whether the claimant’s January 2003 fall was the cause of her injury. Bellville, 702 N.W.2d at 473 (stating the fact the insurer’s position is ultimately found to lack merit will not by itself establish the insurer had no reasonable basis for its denial of benefits); Gilbert, 637 N.W.2d at 200 (same).

In view of the facts that created a genuine dispute with respect to the cause of the claimant’s rotator cuff tear, we conclude the claimant’s claim was fairly debatable as a matter of law. See Bellville, 702 N.W.2d at 474 (“[I]f it is undisputed that evidence existed creating a genuine dispute ..., a court can almost always decide that the claim was fairly debatable as a matter of law.”). Consequently, the commissioner’s award of penalty benefits was not supported by substantial evidence. See Gilbert, 637 N.W.2d at 201 (“In conclusion, we hold as a matter of law there was a reasonable factual dispute as to the manner in which Gilbert’s injury occurred. Therefore, there is not substantial evidence in the record to support a finding that the compensability of his injury was not fairly debatable.”). The district court should have remanded this case to the commissioner for entry of an order denying penalty benefits.

V. Disposition.

The record before the commissioner established that the claimant’s entitlement to benefits was fairly debatable as a matter of law. Consequently, there is not substantial evidence to support a finding that the insurer’s denial of that claim was “without reasonable or probable cause or excuse” so as to entitle the claimant to penalty benefits. Because there is not substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s award of such benefits, that part of the commissioner’s decision must be reversed.

We vacate the court of appeals decision because that court concluded the penalty-benefits issue should be remanded for a ruling by the commissioner. We affirm that part of the district court’s decision reversing the commissioner’s award of penalty benefits. We reverse that part of the district court judgment remanding the matter to the commissioner for reconsideration of the penalty-benefits claim. Finally, we remand this case to the district court for entry of an order reversing the commissioner’s award of penalty benefits and directing the commissioner to deny the claimant’s request for penalty benefits.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED. DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; CASE REMANDED.

      . The claimant does not contend on appeal that it would be inappropriate to address the substantial-evidence issue in view of the commissioner’s application of the incorrect legal standard, which appeared to be the concern prompting the district court to remand the case back to the commissioner. Therefore, we proceed directly to a discussion of whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the award of penalty benefits. See generally Mosher v. Dep’t of Inspections & Appeals, 671 N.W.2d 501, 514, 518 (Iowa 2003) (concluding (1) agency had incorrectly interpreted the term “dependent adult” as used in governing statute and (2) agency's finding that the nursing home resident was a "dependent adult” was not supported by substantial evidence).

      . On February 20, 2002, the claimant noted in her patrol activity log that she twisted her left ankle on large rocks in a parking lot. On August 2, 2002, she noted in her log that she was assaulted by a suspect and subsequently seen at the Boone County Hospital. On November 30, 2002, the claimant recorded in her activity log that she had dropped a clipboard on the top of her left foot, causing it to turn black and blue.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: APPEL, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Jordan Heath DENTLER, Appellee.
    No. 06-1905.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Dec. 7, 2007.

      Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers and Mary E. Tabor, Assistant Attorneys General, and Alan M. Wilson, County Attorney, for appellant.
    Dustria A. Relph of Chambers Law Firm, Corydon, for appellee.
   APPEL, Justice.

In this case, we must determine whether evidence of alcohol intoxication should be excluded in a criminal proceeding where Iowa law enforcement officers pursued a suspect into Missouri, arrested the suspect in that state, returned the suspect directly to Iowa without first presenting the accused to a Missouri magistrate as required by Missouri’s Fresh Pursuit Statute, and thereafter obtained further incriminating evidence. The district court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress. Under the facts of this case, we hold that the district court erred in applying the exclusionary rule. The decision of the district court, therefore, is reversed.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.

The facts in this case are not disputed. In the summer of 2006, Jordan Dentler and a friend took Dentler’s newly repaired Camero race car out for a test drive. Dentler drove the car along State Line Road in Wayne County, where he “tested the speed of his car and how it was running” and “peeled around.” Wayne County sheriffs deputy Charles Henderson was alerted to the scene by the roar of the engine, observed Dentler’s driving, and pursued the vehicle. Although Henderson signaled with his lights and siren, Dentler did not pull over until shortly after they passed into Missouri.

Henderson called for the assistance of Missouri authorities. Two Missouri law enforcement officers arrived shortly thereafter and assisted in “clearing” the vehicle. An open can of beer was found in the car, which was consistent with a beer can Henderson observed along the side of the road during the pursuit.

Another Wayne County sheriffs deputy also arrived at the scene. This deputy noticed a strong smell of alcohol on Dent-ler’s breath and observed that his eyes were bloodshot and watery. The deputy also elicited an admission from Dentler that he had been drinking an unknown quantity of beer.

At the scene, the Iowa and Missouri officers had a discussion about who would retain Dentler. The Missouri deputies advised Henderson, “Well, you can keep him.” Henderson then admitted, “I didn’t know how that worked, since I chased him, do I get to keep him?” The Missouri deputy then replied, “As far as I’m concerned, you can.” It appears that none of the officers were aware of the proper procedures under Missouri law applicable to the situation.

Henderson issued a citation to Dentler for reckless driving, open container-driver, operating a motor vehicle without registration, and violation of financial liability coverage. He read the defendant his Miranda rights, placed him under arrest, and transported Dentler back to the Wayne County Sheriffs Department in Corydon, Iowa. There, Dentler performed field sobriety tests and voluntarily submitted to a Datamaster Cdm test.

In addition to the traffic violations, the State charged Dentler with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2(2)(5) (2005). Dentler then moved to exclude all evidence obtained after his removal from Missouri. He argued that since he was not presented to a Missouri magistrate prior to his removal as required by Missouri’s Fresh Pursuit Statute, Missouri Revised Statutes section 544.155, all evidence obtained after his removal should be suppressed.

Finding Iowa law silent on the issue, the district court turned to cases from other jurisdictions. The district court found the Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. Sadvari, 561 Pa. 588, 752 A.2d 393 (2000), which held that the exclusionary rule applied where the out-of-state officers failed to present a defendant to a magistrate in the state of arrest prior to extradition, the most persuasive. The district court, therefore, granted the motion to suppress. We granted the State’s application for discretionary review to resolve this issue of first impression in Iowa.

II. Standard of Review.

We review a district court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. To “the extent admission of evidence turns on the interpretation of a statute” or other legal issue, however, our review is for correction of errors at law. State v. Kjos, 524 N.W.2d 195, 196 (Iowa 1994).

III. Discussion.

The sole issue presented in this case is whether the evidence obtained by Iowa officials after Dentler’s arrest in Missouri should be excluded because of the failure of Iowa authorities to present Dentler to a Missouri magistrate. As noted by the district court, there is no Iowa case law on the issue of whether violation of a magistrate provision in a fresh pursuit statute requires application of the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained after the violation. The courts in other states are split.

Some courts have applied the exclusionary rule. For instance, in Sadvari, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the violation of the magistrate provision of Delaware’s Fresh Pursuit Statute required application of the exclusionary rule “as a demonstration of comity” and vindication of Delaware’s “important state interest” in its “sovereignty.” Sadvari, 752 A.2d at 399. The Sadvari court also believed that the exclusionary rule was necessary in light of the “unlawful seizure” of the defendant. Id.-, see also People v. Jacobs, 67 Ill.App.3d 447, 24 Ill.Dec. 370, 385 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1979) (suppressing evidence for failure to take defendant before an Iowa magistrate as required by Iowa’s Fresh Pursuit Statute).

Other courts, however, have refused to apply the exclusionary rule for such violations. The leading case is State v. Ferrell, 218 Neb. 463, 356 N.W.2d 868 (1984). In Ferrell, the defendant was arrested by Nebraska police officers in Iowa, but was not presented to an Iowa magistrate as required by Iowa’s Fresh Pursuit Statute, Iowa Code chapter 806. The Ferrell court emphasized that the validity of the arrest was not affected by the failure to present the accused to an Iowa magistrate. Ferrell, 356 N.W.2d at 871. The court further held that the failure to comply with the magistrate provision did not amount to a due process violation that required the exclusion of evidence. Id.; see also State v. Bonds, 98 Wash.2d 1, 653 P.2d 1024, 1031 (1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831, 104 S.Ct. 111, 78 L.Ed.2d 112 (1983) (holding that an arrest in Oregon by Washington officers and removal to Washington without presentation to an Oregon magistrate did not require exclusion of subsequently obtained evidence).

• This court has not hesitated to apply the exclusionary rule where fundamental constitutional rights have been violated. See State v. Bentley, 739 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa 2007); State v. Harris, 741 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2007). We have embraced the exclusionary rule to ensure that fundamental constitutional rights do not become dead letter, to deter future police misconduct, and to prevent the integrity of the courts from being undermined through the admission of unlawfully obtained evidence. Our strong commitment to the exclusionary rule where constitutional violations are present is further demonstrated by our unequivocal rejection of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for violation of the Iowa Constitution. State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 290 (Iowa 2000), overruled on other grounds by State v. Turner, 680 N.W.2d 601, 606 n. 2 (Iowa 2001).

Our older cases indicate that the exclusionary rule should ordinarily apply only where there has been a constitutional violation or where a statutory right has been violated and the statute itself specifically requires exclusion. State v. Garrow, 480 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Iowa 1992); State v. Johnson, 318 N.W.2d 417, 437 (Iowa 1982). The rationale for limiting the statutory application of the exclusionary rule to occasions where the legislature specifically required exclusion is based upon the notion that the failure of the legislature to include an exclusionary requirement is significant indication of legislative intent.

More recently, however, we have expanded the type of statutory violations that may trigger application of the exclusionary rule. For example, where statutory mandates involve fundamental rights, usually with constitutional overtones, we have held that the exclusionary rule should apply even though not expressly required by the legislature. See State v. Moorehead, 699 N.W.2d 667, 673-75 (Iowa 2005) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies to violations of the statutory right to contact family upon arrest); State v. Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 38, 45-46 (Iowa 2003) (holding that violation of the Vienna convention’s notification requirements did not warrant exclusion because the defendant’s fundamental rights were not implicated); see also Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, — U.S. -, -, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2681, 165 L.Ed.2d 557, 577 (2006) (noting that the United States Supreme Court has suppressed evidence for statutory violations that implicated important Fourth and Fifth Amendment interests).

In addition, even where the statutory right might not be considered fundamental, we have applied the exclusionary rule to statutory violations involving police misconduct. For example, in State v. Kelly, 430 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Iowa 1988), we held that a breath test given more than two hours after arrest in violation of chapter 321J was admissible. In contrast, in Kjos, we held that a breath test administered more than two hours after arrest in violation of the same statute was subject to the exclusionary rule because the police made the false threat of license revocation if the accused failed to comply. Kjos, 524 N.W.2d at 197. See generally George F. Dix, Nonconstitutional Exclusionary Rules in Criminal Procedure, 27 Am. Crim. L.Rev. 53, 74-109 (1989).

In this case, Dentler claims the exclusionary rule should apply because his due process rights were violated by the failure of the deputies to present him to a Missouri magistrate as required by Missouri’s Fresh Pursuit Statute. Specifically, Dentler argues that if he had been presented to a Missouri magistrate rather than simply being transported to Iowa, he would have been released for lack of probable cause. State v. Lloyd, 513 N.W.2d 742, 743 (Iowa 1994) (concluding that law of asylum state applies in determining legality of arrest under fresh pursuit statute).

We disagree. Prior to his transport to Iowa, officers observed Dentler driving erratically. He then eluded officers for a time by driving into Missouri. The deputies also discovered two open cans of beer. When questioned, Dentler admitted to consuming an unknown quantity of beer. His breath smelled of alcohol, and his eyes were watery. Under the law of Missouri, we are convinced that the above facts would have supported a finding of probable cause had Dentler been taken before a Missouri magistrate. Rain v. Dir. of Revenue, State of Missouri, 46 S.W.3d 584, 587 (Mo.App.Ct.2001).

Further, it is undisputed that Dentler was promptly taken before an Iowa judge. Dentler was fully afforded the opportunity to test the validity of his arrest before a neutral magistrate promptly after his arrest. As a result, we do not find a due process violation as claimed by Dentler. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 116, 95 S.Ct. 854, 864, 43 L.Ed.2d 54, 67 (1975); Six Feathers v. State, 611 P.2d 857, 862 (Wyo.1980). Instead, the real issue is whether a violation of Missouri statutory law warrants exclusion of evidence in this case. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61, 87 S.Ct. 788, 790, 17 L.Ed.2d 730, 733 (1967) (noting that mere violations of state law do not establish a due process claim).

In analyzing the issue of whether the exclusionary rule applies, the first question under Iowa law is whether the statute specifically requires the exclusion of evidence. An examination of the Missouri statute reveals that there is no such specific language.

The next question under our case law is whether the statute involves a fundamental right of the defendant. We conclude that the magistrate provision, under the facts of this case, did not involve a fundamental right of the defendant. We hold that in order for a statutory right to be considered fundamental for purposes of the exclusionary rule, the right must be grounded in fundamental fairness toward the accused. Commonwealth v. Lyons, 397 Mass. 644, 492 N.E.2d 1142, 1145 (1986); State v. Burris, 145 N.J. 509, 679 A.2d 121, 127 (1996). As a result, a statutory violation that is at best only remotely related to the gathering of evidence does not ordinarily trigger application of an exclusionary rule. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2681, 165 L.Ed.2d at 578.

Here, the main purpose of the magistrate provision in Missouri’s Fresh Pursuit Statute is not to protect the individual from- overreaching evidence-gathering techniques by government prosecutors, but to vindicate the sovereign rights of the State of Missouri. State v. Wagner, 359 N.W.2d 487, 489 (Iowa 1984); Ferrell, 356 N.W.2d at 872. To the extent an ox is being gored in this case, it belongs to Missouri, not Dentler. The magistrate provision in Missouri’s Fresh Pursuit Statute does not implicate fundamental, personal interests of the defendant.

Ordinarily, a party seeking to invoke the exclusionary rule may not vicariously assert the rights of another. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148, 99 S.Ct. 421, 433, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 404 (1978); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961, 966-67, 22 L.Ed.2d 176, 187 (1969). Moreover, even if Dentler could vicariously assert the sovereign rights of the State of Missouri, it is undisputed that the Missouri officers on the scene acquiesced to the action. While such acquiescence by state law enforcement officials may not give rise to waiver or estoppel as a matter of law, it is a factor that militates against the need for application of the exclusionary rule.

We also note that Dentler makes no claim that a magistrate would have prevented Iowa authorities from proceeding against Dentler because of some fundamental public policy of the State of Missouri that conflicted with Iowa law. His sole claim is that Iowa officers lacked probable cause to arrest him in Missouri and that if he had been presented to a Missouri magistrate, he would have been released. As indicated above, we reject that claim.

A final potential basis for application of the exclusionary rule to a statute that does not explicitly require exclusion is police misconduct that aggravates the underlying statutory violation. Kjos, 524 N.W.2d at 197. Here, however, the record reveals no false representations of law designed to obtain evidence, only confusion on the part of both Missouri and Iowa constables regarding applicable legal requirements. The record also reveals no suggestion or implication that the magistrate provision in Missouri law was willfully violated to advance the gathering of evidence against the accused.

Because Dentler seeks to apply the exclusionary rule to a statutory violation that does not involve fundamental rights, constitutional overtones, or false representations of law or other similar police misconduct, Dentler seeks an expansion of our current law regarding the application of the exclusionary rule. The main argument in favor of such an expansion is concern that without applying the exclusionary rule there will be insufficient deterrence to avoid future violations.

Because the benefits of violating the magistrate provision are so small, however, the incentive for future violations is not very high. If we are proven wrong in this assessment, the Missouri legislature may withdraw its authorization of Iowa peace officers to engage in fresh pursuit. Further, because this opinion is narrowly based on the unique facts of this case, law enforcement officials have no certainty that the exclusionary rule will be held inapplicable under a different state of facts, particularly where the record demonstrates willful misconduct. Finally, in the unlikely event that such violations become a recurrent problem, this court reserves the right to exercise its supervisory powers to exclude evidence in future cases. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. 2439, 2446 n. 7, 65 L.Ed.2d 468, 476 n. 7 (1980); People v. Wolf, 635 P.2d 213, 217 (Colo.1981); Bonds, 653 P.2d at 1032.

IV. Conclusion.

For the above reasons, the suppression order of the district court is reversed and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.


author: WIGGINS, Justice.

text:
    STATE of Iowa, Appellant v. Benjamin David GROVES, Appellee.
    No. 06-1233.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Dec. 7, 2007.

      Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary E. Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Nan Horvat, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
    Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellee.
   WIGGINS, Justice.

Benjamin Groves challenges the constitutionality of the statute that prohibits a sex offender from residing “within two thousand feet of the real property comprising a public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school, or a child care facility.” Iowa Code § 692A.2A (2005). The district court dismissed the trial information finding section 692A.2A violated Groves’ due process rights. Because Groves failed to establish the application of section 692A.2A violates his due process rights, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand the case for trial.

I.Background Facts and Proceedings.

On March 27, 1997, Groves was convicted of lascivious acts with a child in Polk County. In 2002, the legislature passed a statute prohibiting registered sex offenders, such as Groves, from residing “within two thousand feet of the real property comprising a public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school, or a child care facility.” 2002 Iowa Acts eh. 1157, § 1. On January 24, 2006, the State charged Groves with violating the residency restriction contained in section 692A.2A, alleging he lived within 2000 feet of a school.

Groves filed a motion to dismiss raising several constitutional challenges to section 692A.2A. The district court held a hearing on Groves’ motion to dismiss. The parties did not call any witnesses or present any evidence.

The district court overruled all but one of Groves’ constitutional challenges to the statute. In dismissing the trial information the court concluded, “the defendant’s rights to substantive due process have been violated by the application of this statute to him.” The court further found the “residency restrictions are a severe restriction of the defendant’s liberty rights” and characterized his liberty right as the “right to reside somewhere that meets basic 21st century living standards,” which includes “shelter from the elements with heat, electricity, sewer or septic and running water .... ”

The State filed its notice of appeal. In response to the State’s brief, Groves only argued the statute violated his substantive due process rights. He failed to argue any of the other constitutional grounds raised in his motion to dismiss. Therefore, we will only consider his substantive due process argument. See State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Iowa 2005) (deeming certain constitutional arguments waived that had been raised in Seering’s motion to dismiss but not on appeal).

II. Standard of Review.

Our review of a statute’s constitutionality is de novo. Id. We presume statutes are constitutional and the challenger bears the burden to prove the unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. “The challenger has the burden to demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional by negating every reasonable basis for supporting the validity of the statute.” State v. Milner, 571 N.W.2d 7, 12 (Iowa 1997).

III. Analysis.

The State challenges the district court ruling that section 692A.2A violates Groves’ substantive due process rights. In deciding whether one’s substantive due process rights have been violated, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re Detention of Cubbage, 671 N.W.2d 442, 446 (Iowa 2003). The first step is to “identify the nature of the individual right involved” and determine whether that right is fundamental. Id. United States Supreme Court precedent demands we craft “a careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.” Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775-76, 123 S.Ct. 1994, 2006, 155 L.Ed.2d 984, 999 (2003). “This duty arises in part from our related duty to avoid constitutional questions not necessary to the resolution of an appeal.” Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 663 (citing State v. Button, 622 N.W.2d 480, 485 (Iowa 2001)).

Once we identify the nature of the right, the second step is to apply the appropriate test. If we determine the right is fundamental, then we will apply strict scrutiny. Id. Strict scrutiny requires us to determine whether the statute is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 238 (Iowa 2002). If we determine a fundamental right is not implicated, we apply a rational basis review. Id. Under a rational basis analysis, a statute is constitutional if we find a “reasonable fit between the government interest and the means utilized to advance that interest.” Id.

The only right Groves raises in this appeal is the same right discussed by the district court in its opinion — the right to reside somewhere that meets basic 21st century living standards. Both the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and our court have previously reviewed substantive due process challenges to this statute. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 709-16 (8th Cir.2005); Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 662-65. In Doe, the plaintiffs asked the Eighth Circuit to find a fundamental right to choose where one fives; however, the court found no such fundamental right exists. Doe, 405 F.3d at 713-14. In Seering, the defendant asked our court to find a fundamental right to choose where and under what conditions one fives. Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 662-63. We found no such fundamental right exists. Id. at 663-65.

In the present case, we find the right to reside somewhere that meets basic 21st century living standards is no different from the right to choose where and under what conditions one fives. Accordingly, the right Groves asserts in his brief is not a fundamental right. Therefore, for section 692A.2A to withstand Groves’ constitutional challenge, there must only be a reasonable fit between the government interest and the means utilized to advance that interest.

Two years ago the Eighth Circuit and this court found the statute withstood constitutional challenges under the rational basis test. Doe, 405 F.3d at 716; Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 665. Under the record presented in this appeal, we also find the statute to withstand Groves’ constitutional challenge.

Groves chose not to present any evidence in the district court regarding the impact the statute had on him. Without such evidence, we are unable to determine whether the statute precludes him from residing somewhere that meets basic 21st century living standards.

Contrary to the State’s argument, when applying a rational basis test under the Iowa Constitution, changes in the underlying circumstances can allow us to find a statute no longer rationally relates to a legitimate government purpose. See Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 581 (Iowa 1980) (stating “changes in underlying circumstances may vitiate any rational basis” and “the passage of time may call for a less deferential standard of review as the experimental or trial nature of legislation is less evident”). However, Groves failed to present any evidence that would cause us to retreat from our decision in Seering. Therefore, we must conclude Groves has failed to establish the statute does not rationally advance some legitimate government purpose.

IV. Disposition.

Because Groves failed to establish the application of section 692A.2A violated his due process rights, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand the case for trial.

REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.


author: HECHT, Justice.

text:
    In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Glenn W. WOODROFFE, Deceased. Randolph W. Woodroffe and Janice M. Woodroffe, Appellants, v. The Estate of Glenn W. Woodroffe, Elda H. Woodroffe, Jeanne A. Woodroffe, Reginald Woodroffe, Kerwin Woodroffe, and Anita L. Erickson, Appellees. The Estate of Glenn W. Woodroffe and Randolph Woodroffe, a/k/a Randy Woodroffe, Appellants, v. Kerwin Woodroffe, Anita Erickson, and The Unborn or Adopted Children of Glenn W. Woodroffe, Appellees.
    No. 05-0135.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Dec. 7, 2007.

      Robert S. Hatala of Crawford, Sullivan, Read & Roemerman, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellants.
    William H. Napier of Napier, Wolf & Napier, Fort Madison, for appellee Elda H. Woodroffe.
    John H. Smith of Smith, Kultala & Bod-dicker, LLP, Keokuk, for appellee Kerwin Woodroffe.
    M. Carl McMurray, Keokuk, for appel-lee Estate of Glenn W. Woodroffe.

      . Glenn and Randolph received rent payments in lieu of W-2 earnings from GWSM to avoid tax withholding. Randolph also received income from GWSM for the trucking services he provided for the enterprise.

   HECHT, Justice.

This case presents a saga covering three generations of the Woodroffe family. The family created a profitable sawmill business due in large part to the industry and hard work of Glenn Woodroffe. After about thirty years in the business, Glenn attempted during his lifetime to ensure the continuation of the family enterprise beyond his lifetime. By the time of his death in 2002, however, Glenn had failed to establish business and testamentary arrangements necessary to avoid family conflicts over the future ownership of the mill and related assets. Those conflicts survived Glenn and fostered this litigation.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

We find the following facts from the record. Glenn started the family business with a portable sawmill. He incorporated the company, Glenn Woodroffe. Sawmill, Inc. (GWSM), in 1957. Although he start-

Glenn and his wife, Elda, raised five children: Randolph, Jeanne, Reginald, Kerwin, and Anita. Randolph, the eldest child, was active in the family business from an early age. After achieving a college degree in industrial engineering, he returned to work full-time at the mill in 1974. In addition to his long hours of work in the day-to-day operations of the mill, Randolph drove the truck that delivered to customers loads of pallets manufactured by GWSM.

The other Woodroffe family members were involved to a lesser degree in the day-to-day operations of the company. Elda was at times identified in GWSM records as the company’s corporate secretary, but she was unable at trial to recall the duration of her service as an officer. Her role in the company’s operations was clearly insubstantial compared to Glenn’s and Randolph’s. Although Jeanne, Reginald, Kerwin, and Anita performed tasks around the mill during their youth, the record does not provide much detail as to their involvement in the operation.

Although Glenn worked incredibly long hours at the mill and devoted great energy to the business, he was less than fastidious about compliance with corporate formalities. Although corporate tax returns consistently identified Glenn as the sole owner of the company, no stock certificates were ever issued by the company. No records of an initial organizational meeting or subsequent annual corporate meetings were maintained. No assets were transferred to GWSM to capitalize the company when it was organized. Little, if any, effort was made to segregate the company’s assets from the Woodroffe family’s assets. Although almost all of the income-producing machinery, equipment, and building improvements were purchased with funds from GWSM’s bank account, tax deductions for the depreciation of those assets were taken on the personal tax returns of Glenn and Elda, and Randolph and his wife, Janice. Although GWSM paid rent to those individuals for the use of such assets, no corporate records evidence the company ever transferred ownership of the assets to the family members.

Organized under Iowa Code chapter 491 (1954), the corporate existence of GWSM was to terminate after twenty years unless renewed. In 1976, the Secretary of State notified Glenn and his attorneys that the corporation’s existence would expire on January 14,1977, if a certificate of renewal and renewed articles of incorporation were not filed. Although Glenn delivered the notice of impending expiration to his attorney who prepared a draft of the necessary renewal documents, there is no evidence that the documents were ever signed by Glenn and forwarded to the Secretary of State. Consequently, the corporate existence of GWSM expired on January 14, 1977. No annual corporate reports were filed by GWSM after 1976.

Although the de jure existence of GWSM expired in January of 1977, the sawmill business’s operations continued as before. Corporate income tax returns were filed under the name and tax identification number of GWSM; machinery and equipment were purchased and building improvements were constructed with funds from the GWSM bank account; and workers’ compensation and unemployment claims lodged against GWSM were defended as though the corporation still existed.

By the late 1980s, Glenn had begun thinking about how ownership of the business could be transferred, upon his death, to Randolph. He realized he only held a life estate, and that Randolph’s siblings owned a four-fifths remainder interest, in the Lee County real estate upon which the machinery, equipment, and extensive building improvements used by the business, and a home built for Randolph and his wife, Janice, were situated. Because Glenn and Randolph believed it was economically infeasible to move the mill improvements and the home to another location, Randolph sought to acquire his siblings’ remainder interests. In furtherance of this objective, an appraisal of the real estate was undertaken in 1988.

The appraiser was specifically instructed to value the real estate assuming the existence of no mill or residential improvements. The resulting valuation of $42,500 was used by Randolph as the basis for his offers to purchase the remainder interests of his siblings. Although Reginald and Jeanne each conveyed their remainder interests to Randolph for $10,000, Kerwin and Anita did not. Unable to amicably complete the consolidation of the ownership of all of the remainder interests in Randolph, Glenn and Randolph filed a partition action in July of 1991 naming Kerwin and Anita as respondents. In their petition, Glenn and Randolph alleged they had made substantial improvements to the property in good faith; and they requested the court to order the sale of the property, and to award to them the value of the improvements from the sale proceeds.

On August 5, 1992, a consent decree was entered by the district court. It noted the parties had reached an agreement to (1) sell the Lee County real estate at public auction, (2) allocate to Glenn and Randolph from the sale proceeds “the enhanced value due to improvements made to the land by [them] in good faith,” and (3) deposit the balance of the net proceeds in trust for the benefit of Glenn and the remainder-men. To ascertain the “enhanced value” occasioned by the improvements, the parties agreed and the court decreed that two appraisals of the property be undertaken by a specified appraiser: one including the value of the improvements made by Glenn and Randolph; and another disregarding the value of those improvements.

The appraisals contemplated in the August 5 order were not undertaken, however, and the public auction was not held. The petitioners filed an application on August 28,1992, alleging the appraiser identified in the August 5 order believed he was unqualified to conduct the appraisals, and asserting there was “an affordable and alternate procedure” that was likely “to produce greater partition proceeds.”

On October 22, 1992, a new order was entered by the court confirming yet another agreement to resolve the parties’ controversy. This order contemplated that the property would be divided by the parties into five parcels. One of these parcels identified as “Tract A” was “to include the sawmill, the house in which Randolph Woodroffe resides, and all other physical improvements to the land in question.” The other four parcels, denominated “tracts 1, 2, 3, and 4,” and consisting of essentially unimproved land, were to be sold at a private auction at which only the parties could bid. The average price per acre obtained at the auction for tracts 1, 2, 3, and 4 would be the price that Randolph would pay for Tract A. Glenn’s life estate was “not to be affected” by the partition agreement and sale.

The auction was never held, and Glenn and Randolph continued to operate GWSM just as they had before. Kerwin, who had no interest in operating the sawmill, farmed rent-free the unimproved portions of the Lee County real estate. Glenn generally disapproved of Kerwin’s farming practices, and the relationship between Glenn and Kerwin was strained at best.

GWSM owned a wooded tract of real estate in Des Moines County. On September 25, 2000, purporting to act as the president of GWSM, Glenn executed a warranty deed conveying this property to Randolph and Janice. In 2001, a bank requested documentary evidence of the corporate existence of GWSM. Glenn’s counsel contacted the Secretary of State and discovered the company’s corporate charter had expired in 1977. Having learned that the name “Glenn Woodroffe Sawmill, Inc.” was still available, Randolph caused new articles of incorporation for a corporation with that name to be filed in July of 2001. The new articles designated Randolph as the incorporator, registered agent, and sole director of GWSM.

During his last illness, Glenn contacted his attorney and discussed the preparation of a will. Elda subsequently typed and Glenn signed a last will and testament on January 18, 2002. The will, in relevant part, named Elda as executor and bequeathed property to Elda and Randolph:

I give all of my household furnishings, articles of personal use, Certificates of Deposit and automobiles for non-business use to my wife Elda. Also, all machinery, equipment and inventory owned by me at the time of my death, I leave to my wife Elda.
As sole owner of the Glenn Woodroffe Sawmill, Inc. I give all my stock in that business or corporation to my son Randolph W. Woodroffe, who may continue the business after my death.

The will did not include a residuary clause.

Glenn died on April 22, 2002. On July 24, 2002, the district court admitted Glenn’s last will and testament to probate. On January 27, 2003, Elda filed a probate report and inventory listing the Des Moines County real estate, the home in which Randolph and Janice lived, the buildings, machinery, and equipment used in the sawmill operation, and the sawmill inventory among the assets of Glenn’s estate.

On May 8, 2003, Randolph filed an application requesting the appointment of a referee to assist with enforcement of the October 1992 order. Elda resisted the application, contending she had an interest in the improvements on the property and was not bound by the 1992 order as she was not a party to the partition action in which it was entered. Kerwin also resisted the appointment of a referee and asserted the boundaries to tracts A, 1, 2, 3, and 4 had never been agreed to. Kerwin further contended the sawmill improvements were assets of Glenn’s estate because they were not part of the property subject to the private auction contemplated in the October 1992 order. The district court denied Randolph’s application for the appointment of a receiver because the matter involved “too many disputes and questions [that] must be resolved” before an auction could be held.

Randolph and Janice filed a petition for declaratory judgment on October 20, 2003, requesting the court to declare: (1) the Des Moines County property is not an asset of Glenn’s estate because Glenn executed a deed conveying the land from Glenn Woodroffe Sawmill, Inc. to Randolph and Janice on September 25, 2000; (2) the dwelling in which Randolph and Janice reside and the improvements used in the sawmill operation and located on the Lee County property are not assets of Glenn’s estate because they are permanently affixed to “Tract A” which Randolph is entitled to acquire by private auction under the October 1992 order; and (3) the sawmill machinery, equipment, and inventory are not assets of Glenn’s estate because they were owned by GWSM at the time of Glenn’s death, and were bequeathed to Randolph as a consequence of Glenn’s bequest of the GWSM stock. Elda and Kerwin filed separate answers substantially denying the allegations and claiming the October 1992 order is unenforceable.

Because of the close connection between the legal consequences of the October 1992 order filed in the partition action and the appropriate disposition in the declaratory judgment action filed within Glenn’s probate, the matters were consolidated for trial. During the trial, Randolph and Janice offered in evidence exhibits 23, 24, 25, 26, and 26A, consisting of typewritten documents allegedly authored by Glenn. Randolph and Janice claimed the documents evidenced Glenn’s testamentary intent to ensure that Randolph would receive Tract A and the GWSM machinery, equipment, and inventory. The district court sustained Elda’s hearsay objections and the exhibits were not received in evidence.

On November 15, 2004, the district court filed its ruling holding the Des Moines County real estate is an asset of Glenn’s Estate. The court reasoned that the attempted conveyance of that property from GWSM to Randolph and Janice failed because GWSM’s corporate existence expired in January 1977, before the deed was drawn and delivered. The court further concluded the sawmill machinery, equipment, and inventory listed on the probate inventory are also assets of the estate because they were owned by Glenn at the time of his death. The court concluded, however, that the improvements (buildings used in the sawmill operation and the residence in which Randolph and Janice reside) that are permanently affixed to the Lee County real estate are not assets of the estate because their disposition is controlled by the October 1992 order in the partition action.

Randolph, Janice, and Kerwin filed motions to enlarge or amend the district court’s findings, conclusions, and ruling. Randolph and Janice urged the court to (1) rule on their claim that the deed to the Des Moines County real estate should be reformed; (2) conclude the business inventory is an asset of GWSM, and not an asset of the estate; and (3) address the question whether certain grain bins are located on Tract A, and whether their disposition is controlled by the October 1992 order. Kerwin urged the district court to amend its conclusion that the disposition of the improvements located on Tract A must be controlled by the October 1992 order, and joined in the post-trial request of Randolph and Janice that the court should decide the dispute as to the ownership of the grain bins. In its ruling on the respective motions to enlarge or amend the November 15, 2004 findings, conclusions, and ruling, the district court held the deed from Woodroffe Sawmill, Inc. to Randolph and Janice cannot be reformed because any mistake of the parties to the deed was a mistake in the formation of the transaction, not in its expression. The district court also denied relief on the other aspects of the post-trial motions, reasoning that (1) the October 1992 order should be enforced because it accurately memorialized the understanding and intent of the parties to permit Randolph to purchase Tract A which included the improvements permanently affixed to it; (2) the inventory was owned by Glenn at the time of his death because GWSM’s corporate existence expired in 1977, and the inventory was never transferred from Glenn to the new corporation formed in 2001; and (3) the evidence supports the court’s finding that the grain bins were purchased by Glenn, not by Kerwin, and placed on Tract A, the disposition of which was adjudicated in the October 1992 order.

Randolph and Janice appeal from the district court’s determination that the Des Moines County property and the sawmill machinery, equipment, and inventory listed in the probate inventory are assets of the estate. Kerwin and Elda cross-appeal from the court’s conclusion that the disposition of the improvements located on Tract A is controlled by the October 1992 order.

II. Scope of Review.

Partition actions are equitable actions which we review de novo. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1201(1). The declaratory judgment action brought in Glenn’s estate is a matter “tried by the probate court as a proceeding in equity,” Iowa Code § 633.33 (2007), and our review in such cases is de novo. Iowa R.App. P. 6.4. Although the district court made several rulings on evi-dentiary objections, a procedure typically followed in actions at law, “the pleadings, relief sought, and nature of the case” lead us to conclude the proceedings in the district court were equitable proceedings. Passehl Estate v. Passehl, 712 N.W.2d 408, 414 (Iowa 2006) (noting that while a court’s rulings on evidentiary objections is an important test of whether an action was tried in law or equity, it is not dispositive). All of the parties agree our standard of review is de novo.

III. Analysis.

A. Machinery, Equipment, and Inventory. Randolph contends the district court erred in holding the sawmill maehin-ery, equipment, and inventory listed on the estate’s probate inventory were owned by Glenn at the time of his death. Randolph alleges those assets were, at the time of Glenn’s death, assets of GWSM, and that they follow the GWSM stock bequeathed to Randolph. Notwithstanding the expiration of the corporation’s de jure existence in 1977, Randolph contends GWSM lived on for purposes relevant to the case as a de facto corporation. In the alternative, he contends GWSM’s corporate existence should be deemed to extend beyond the expiration of its de jure existence under the doctrine of corporation by estoppel. Elda and Kerwin contend the machinery, equipment and inventory were properly listed in the probate inventory as assets of the estate because, upon the termination of the corporation’s existence in 1977, their ownership passed to Glenn who owned them at the time of his death.

For reasons discussed below, we conclude the only type of corporation Iowa law recognizes is one created pursuant to law-a de jure corporation. Consequently, GWSM’s existence as a corporate entity ended in 1977 when the company failed to file a certificate of renewal and renewal of the articles of incorporation. The inventory, machinery and equipment listed on the estate’s probate inventory were therefore owned by Glenn at the time of his death, and they pass to Elda under Glenn’s will.

At common law, once a de jure corporation’s term of existence ended pursuant to its charter, it could not continue to exist as a de facto corporation or corporation by estoppel. See M.H. McCarthy Co. v. Dubuque Dist. CL, 201 Iowa 912, 916, 208 N.W. 505, 507-08 (1926) (holding a corporation with an expired charter could only continue to act for purposes of winding up business); accord In re Booth’s Drug Store, 19 F.Supp. 95, 96 (W.D.Va.1937) (“The doctrine of the common law was that upon expiration of its charter, a corporation at once lost its identity and its powers; its life was instantly terminated.”); Merges v. Altenbrand, 45 Mont. 355, 123 P. 21, 22 (1912) (holding a corporation failing to follow statutory steps for continued existence was dissolved); 19 Am. Jur.2d Corporations § 2352, at 457 (2007) (“The general rule is that after the expiration of the period of existence specified in its charter, a corporation is ipso facto dissolved and no longer has any existence at all, either de jure or de facto.” (citing Eagle Pass Realty Co. v. Esparza, 474 S.W.2d 624, 625 (Tex.Civ.App.1971))). The legislature did not repeal this common law rule through-its enactment in 1989 of the Iowa Business Corporation Act (IBCA). See Atwood v. Vilsack, 725 N.W.2d 641, 644-45 (Iowa 2006) (“The common law may be repealed by implication in a statute that plainly expresses the legislature’s intent to do so.” (citing Iowa Civil Liberties Union v. Critelli, 244 N.W.2d 564, 568 (Iowa 1976); Wilson v. Iowa City, 165 N.W.2d 813, 822 (Iowa 1969))). Rather, the IBCA plainly evidences a legislative judgment that the only type of corporation that may exist in Iowa is a de jure corporation.

First, the IBCA states, “Unless a delayed or effective date or time is specified, the corporate existence begins when the articles of incorporation are filed.” Iowa Code § 490.203(1); see also 5 Matthew G. Doré, Iowa Practice Series, Business Corporations § 16:9 (2007) (stating IBCA section 490.203 supersedes the de facto corporation and corporation by estoppel concepts). We acknowledge this provision does not speak directly to whether a de facto corporation or corporation by estop-pel may exist after a de jure corporation has expired. It does, however, indicate de facto corporations and corporations by estoppel may not exist prior to the formation of a de jure corporation. The parties do not suggest any reason why, under the IBCA, the period prior to de jure incorporation should be treated differently than the period after the expiration of de jure incorporation.

Second, the IBCA provides for personal liability for transactions that occur in the absence of de jure incorporation: “All persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation, knowing there was no incorporation under this Act, are jointly and severally liable for all liabilities created while so acting.” Iowa Code § 490.204 (emphasis added); see 5 Doré, Iowa Practice Series, Business Corporations § 16:9 (stating IBCA section 490.204 supersedes the de facto corporation and corporation by estoppel concepts). Personal liability in the absence of the existence of a de jure corporation plainly implies neither a de facto corporation nor a corporation by es-toppel is recognized in Iowa.

Our decision is influenced by the historical background of the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), upon which the IBCA is patterned. The MBCA drafters observe the de facto corporation and corporation by estoppel doctrines have been “ “widely criticized as being confusing, result-oriented, overlapping, and involving legal conceptualism that tended to hide the true basis for the decision.’ ” 5 Doré, Iowa Practice Series, Business Corporations § 16:9 (citing Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 2.04, Historical Background (3d ed. 1985 & Supp.)). The drafters expressly state they intended to do away with the de facto corporation concept through provisions mirroring the IBCA provisions cited above. Id. (citing Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 2.04, Historical Background (3d ed. 1985 & Supp.)).

Our decision that the IBCA reflects disfavor toward the doctrines of de facto corporation and corporation by estoppel is consistent with the approach of most other jurisdictions with statutes patterned after the MBCA. See, e.g., Swindel v. Kelly, 499 P.2d 291, 299 n. 28 (Alaska 1972) (“The concept of de facto corporations has been increasingly disfavored, and Alaska is among the states whose corporation statutes are designed to eliminate the concept.”); Booker Custom Packing Co. v. Sallomi 149 Ariz. 124, 716 P.2d 1061, 1068 (Ct.App.1986) (finding the Arizona Business Corporation Act was “inconsistent” with the defendant’s claim that he should not be individually liable because the plaintiffs thought they were dealing with a corporation); Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 447 (D.C.1964) (holding the Business Corporation Act of the District of Columbia “eliminate[s] the concepts of estoppel and de facto corporateness”); Warthan v. Midwest Consol. Ins. Agencies, Inc., 450 N.W.2d 145, 148 (Minn.Ct.App.1990) (“[T]he doctrine of de facto corporations is inapplicable in this state after enactment of [the Minnesota Business Corporation Act].”); Smith v. Halliburton Co., 118 N.M. 179, 879 P.2d 1198, 1207 (Ct.App.1994) (finding the New Mexico Business Corporation Act was “intended to abolish the doctrine of de facto corporations”); Timberline Equip. Co. v. Davenport, 267 Or. 64, 514 P.2d 1109, 1110-12 (1973) (finding, as a result of the Oregon Business Corporation Act, the doctrine of de facto corporations no longer exists in Oregon); Mobridge Cmty. Indus. v. Toure, Ltd., 273 N.W.2d 128, 131 (S.D.1978) (finding a South Dakota law “has the effect of negating the possibility of a de facto corporation”); Thompson & Green Mach. Co. v. Music City Lumber Co., 683 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984) (“We hold that the Tennessee General Assembly, by passage of the Tennessee General Corporations Act of 1968, abolished the concept of de facto incorporation in Tennessee.”); Miller v. Celebration Mining Co., 29 P.3d 1231, 1237 (Utah 2001) (“[T]he common law doctrine of de facto corporations was specifically preempted by [two Utah Business Corporation Act provisions] because of its inconsistent application.”); Equipto Div. Aurora Equip. Co. v. Yarmouth, 134 Wash.2d 356, 950 P.2d 451, 456 (1998) (concluding that the Washington Business and Corporation Act “abolish[ed]” the doctrines of de facto corporation and corporation by estoppel).

GWSM’s articles of incorporation expressly contemplated that the corporation would “terminate” on January 9, 1977, if the corporation’s existence was not renewed. The corporation did not continue to exist after the expiration of its de jure existence as a de facto corporation or under the doctrine of corporation by estop-pel. The corporation’s existence continued after the January 1977 expiration date only to the extent necessary to wind up its business. We next turn to the question of who succeeded to the ownership of GWSM’s machinery, equipment, and inventory, when the corporation’s existence expired.

GWSM’s articles of incorporation filed in 1957 expressly provided for the distribution of assets to shareholders upon dissolution of the corporation:

In the event of dissolution or winding up of the affairs of this corporation ... the assets of the Corporation shall be first applied to the payment of the first preferred stock at par, with all unpaid accumulated dividends thereon and before any payment is made to the holders of the common stock. The remaining assets of the Corporation shall be paid to the holders of the common stock according to their respective shares.

Although GWSM never issued stock, the company’s tax returns consistently identified Glenn as the company’s sole “shareholder.” In addition, it is undisputed in this case that Glenn was the sole owner of the company. Therefore, we conclude Glenn was the owner of the machinery, equipment, and inventory listed on the probate inventory.

Randolph next contends the new corporation organized by him in 2001 under the same name succeeded to the ownership of the expired corporation’s assets. This contention, too, must fail because Randolph failed to establish that any of the assets owned by Glenn were transferred to the new corporation. Therefore, the machinery, equipment, and inventory listed on the estate’s probate inventory were owned by Glenn at the time of his death.

Randolph contends that the district court’s decision that the machinery, equipment, and inventory are assets of Glenn’s estate is inconsistent with Glenn’s clearly expressed intent. In support of this contention, Randolph points to a typewritten note from Glenn to his attorney expressing his testamentary intent that Randolph should receive all of the sawmill machinery except any machinery owned by Reginald. Randolph also points in this context to the language of an unsigned will drafted by Glenn’s attorney after he received the typewritten note from Glenn. Randolph’s reliance upon Glenn’s note and the unsigned will is unavailing, however, because those documents antedated the will executed by Glenn and admitted in probate. “It is well settled in this jurisdiction that if the language of the will is plain, certain and unambiguous, the intention of the testator must be ascertained from the will itself....” In re Thompson’s Estate, 164 N.W.2d 141, 146 (Iowa 1969). Because the will signed in 2002 is unambiguous, Glenn’s intent must be ascertained from within its four corners. That will clearly bequeaths to Elda the machinery, equipment and inventory listed in the probate inventory.

B. Des Moines County Property. The timber land located in Des Moines County was conveyed to GWSM in 1957. Randolph and Janice contend the September 25, 2000 deed executed by Glenn as president of GWSM was a valid conveyance. Alternatively, they assert that if the deed does not constitute a valid conveyance, it should be reformed because the parties to the deed mistakenly believed GWSM existed when the deed was drawn and delivered. Elda and Kerwin contend the real estate is an asset of Glenn’s estate because GWSM did not exist at the time of the attempted conveyance, and the deed is therefore void. Elda and Kerwin oppose reformation of the deed on the ground that the deed, if void, may not be reformed to relinquish Elda’s rights under Iowa Code section 683.211 (2001). Alternatively, they contend the deed, if valid, was nonetheless subject to Elda’s rights under section 633.211.

For the reasons explained in our discussion of the disposition of the sawmill machinery, equipment, and inventory, we conclude GWSM did not exist on September 25, 2000. A deed executed on behalf of a corporation that does not exist is void. See N.H. Fire Ins. Co. v. Virgil & Frank’s Locker Serv., Inc., 302 F.2d 780, 783 (8th Cir.1962) (“A [corporate] deed, executed while the corporation has no legal existence, is a worthless thing.”).

We now turn to Randolph and Janice’s assertion that the parties made a mutual mistake regarding the existence of the corporation, and this mistake merits reformation of their deed. We decline to reform the deed because we lack authority to reform void contracts. Casady v. Woodbury County, 13 Iowa 113, 115 (1862) (refusing to “modify” a void contract, due to lack of authority to do so); see also Springer v. Kuhns, 6 Neb.App. 115, 571 N.W.2d 323, 329 (1997) (“When the parties are asserting rights founded in an illegal and void contract, the court leaves the parties just where they placed themselves .... ”); 66 Am.Jur.2d Reformation of Instruments § 29, at 253 (2007) (“Neither a void contract nor a parol contract can be reformed.”). Because GWSM did not exist at the time of the conveyance of the Des Moines County property, no two parties reached a mutual agreement with regard to the conveyance. We cannot reform the deed to correspond with the contracting parties’ intentions when one of those parties did not even exist; to do so would constitute creation of a contract, not reformation of a contract.

As previously stated, when GWSM dissolved in 1977, Glenn, as the sole shareholder of that corporation, became the owner of the corporate assets. The Des Moines County property was therefore owned by Glenn in 2000 when the ill-fated conveyance was attempted, and at the time of his death. Accordingly, the real estate is an asset of Glenn’s estate, and it is properly listed on the probate inventory.

C. Sawmill Improvements. Elda and Kerwin assert the district court erred in holding the disposition of the numerous sawmill buildings located on the Lee County property shall be controlled by the October 1992 consent ruling. They contend those improvements were not a subject of the ruling, and they should therefore pass to Elda as intestate property pursuant to Iowa Code section 633.211.

Resolution of this claim requires us to interpret the October 1992 consent ruling. Because a consent ruling is viewed as a contract, the rules of contract interpretation apply. Fed. Land Bank of Omaha v. Bollin, 408 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Iowa 1987) (citing World Teacher Seminar, Inc. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 406 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Iowa 1987)). The intent of the parties is controlling, and intent is to be determined from the language of the contract, when possible. Id. (“The objective is to ascertain the meaning and intention of the parties as expressed in the language used. It is the court’s duty to give effect to the language of the contract in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning and not make a new contract for the parties by arbitrary judicial construction.”). Only if we find the contract ambiguous may we resort to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the contract’s meaning. See Clinton Physical Therapy Servs., P.C. v. John Deere, 714 N.W.2d 603, 615-16 (Iowa 2006).

The language of the October 1992 consent decree plainly indicates the parties intended for the improvements to pass as part of Tract A to Randolph. The October 1992 decree states Tract A is to “include the sawmill, the house in which Randolph Woodroffe resides, and all other physical improvements to the land in question,” and it also states that Randolph is to receive Tract A at a price determined by the average of the sale prices received for tracts 1, 2, 3, and 4. The district court found it reasonable to believe, and we find it highly probable, Glenn was willing to forgo any personal remuneration for the value of the improvements to achieve what was clearly his goal for the last fifteen years of his life: to assure that Randolph would succeed him as the owner of the sawmill business and the improvements used to generate its income. The October 1992 consent ruling not only advanced that goal, but it avoided the public auction of the property contemplated by the August 1992 ruling and thereby assured Glenn’s right to use of the sawmill property for the remainder of his lifetime.

Kerwin claims the October 1992 consent decree lacks the definiteness essential for validity because: (1) it states the parties must agree on tract boundaries, but the parties never agreed on these boundaries, and (2) it does not clearly state whether the August decree remains effective. “[A] judgment must be certain and in intelligible form so the parties understand the adjudication.” Wolf v. Murrane, 199 N.W.2d 90, 95 (Iowa 1972) (citations omitted). A judgment may be so indefinite and uncertain that it is void. See Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 74-75, 78 N.W.2d 491, 495-96 (1956) (finding that a provision in a divorce decree was void and that an alleged violation of the provision was not contempt).

Whether or not the parties agreed on the precise metes and bounds of the tracts referred to in the October 1992 consent ruling, the decree clearly brings the improvements in question within the boundaries of Tract A. The decree states that Tract A is to include “the sawmill, the house in which Randolph Woodroffe resides, and all other physical improvements to the land in question” and provides Randolph will buy the tract at a price determined by a specific formula. We conclude the language of the ruling is sufficiently definite to constitute a valid, binding judgment with regard to the allocation of ownership of the improvements.

The October 1992 ruling was clearly intended to supersede the August 1992 ruling. This is in part clear because the two rulings contemplated vastly different solutions to the parties’ conflicts. For example, the August ruling would have required appraisals of the property, while the October decree does not; the August ruling contemplated a public auction, but the October ruling mandates a private auction; and the August ruling would have required Glenn to convey his life estate to a purchaser, but the October ruling states Glenn’s life estate “will not be affected” by the private auction. Because of these differences, it would obviously be impossible for the parties to comply with and for the court to enforce both the August and October 1992 decrees.

Other evidence also amply supports our conclusion the parties intended for the October consent ruling to supersede the earlier ruling. The application that precipitated the October 1992 ruling states the parties viewed the August decree as “unworkable,” due to their inability to locate a qualified appraiser. The application further states the parties desired an “alternate procedure [that] w[ould] likely produce greater partition sale proceeds.” Greg Johnson, Randolph and Glenn’s attorney in the partition action, testified the October decree was intended to supersede the earlier decree.

Kerwin asserts the parties to the October consent ruling agreed the improvements in question were not part of Tract A; instead, he claims the improvements were intended to remain “severed” from the property and to remain the personal property of Glenn. In support of this assertion, Kerwin argues: (1) the Iowa law of “implied license” suggests the improvements retained their character as personal property; (2) under Cornell College v. Crain, 211 Iowa 1348, 235 N.W. 731 (1931), the improvements retained their character as personal property; (3) all the parties to the partition action agreed that the improvements were to remain Glenn’s separate property; and (4) Glenn, individually or through his business, paid for all of the improvements.

Kerwin’s- implied license argument need not be addressed because it was not made before or ruled upon by the district court. See State v. Jefferson, 574 N.W.2d 268, 278 (Iowa 1997) (observing that “ ‘issues must be presented to and passed upon by the district court before they can be raised and decided on appeal’ ” (citing State v. Eames, 565 N.W.2d 823, 326 (Iowa 1997))). The remaining arguments lack merit in light of our interpretation of the October consent ruling. The consent ruling reflects the parties’ intent for Tract A to include improvements. Regardless of whether Glenn paid for the improvements or the improvements could be classified as Glenn’s personal property under Crain, Glenn could, and did, forgo any ownership interest he may have had in the improvements when he agreed to the terms of the October consent ruling.

The Lee County real estate and the improvements permanently attached to it pass to the remaindermen-ehildren pursuant to the October ruling, not to Elda. The ruling requires the sale of Tract A, including the improvements located upon it, to Randolph. Elda, as Glenn’s surviving spouse, has no interest in the life estate of Glenn under section 633.211, as Glenn’s interest in the real estate was extinguished at the time of his death.

D. Hearsay Rulings. Randolph contends the district court erred in excluding exhibits 23, 24, 25, 26, and 26A, which were offered to prove Glenn’s intent as to the disposition of his assets. He asserts the typewritten exhibits were admissible under Iowa Rules of Evidence 5.803(24) (residual hearsay exception) and 5.803(3) (then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition). The writings bear no signature, but Randolph claims they were authored by Glenn because they “sound like” something he would have written, and they appear to have been written on Glenn’s typewriter. Some are dated, while others are not. One of the documents was found shredded in a wastebasket in the company’s business office.

Even assuming these documents were admissible, the district court’s ruling excluding them from evidence did not prejudice Randolph and Janice and no reversible error resulted from their exclusion. See Crane v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry., 160 N.W.2d 838, 846 (Iowa 1968) (concluding exclusion of evidence did not prejudice plaintiff). The exhibits in question would have no impact upon our reasoning or conclusions regarding the disposition of Glenn’s assets. Because Glenn’s will is unambiguous as to his intent regarding the disposition of the machinery, equipment, and inventory, we need not look beyond its express terms to discern his testamentary intent. See In re Thompson’s Estate, 164 N.W.2d at 146 (“It is well settled in this jurisdiction that if the language of the will is plain, certain and unambiguous, the intention of the testator must be ascertained from the will itself.... ”).

IV. Conclusion.

We conclude the corporate existence of GWSM expired in 1977. As a result, the machinery, equipment, and inventory of the sawmill business were owned by Glenn at the time of his death and are therefore properly included as assets of his estate. The deed of the Des Moines County property is void and cannot be reformed. Accordingly, that real estate is also an asset of Glenn’s estate. Tract A, which is to be sold to Randolph pursuant to the October 1992 consent ruling, includes the improvements located on that property. The district court’s exclusion of hearsay, if error, was harmless.

AFFIRMED.

      . The articles of incorporation identified Glenn as the sole officer and director of the ed the company with a portable mill, Glenn eventually had the opportunity to locate the business on real estate located in rural Lee County. In 1959, Charles Woodroffe, Glenn’s father, conveyed that real estate to Glenn, for life, with the remainder interest in equal shares to Glenn’s children living at the time of Glenn’s death. company.

      . This was consistently true until 1994 when the company's tax return claimed some depreciation expense.

      .The funds used to pay for the home were derived from mill revenues, and much of the labor was performed by mill employees, including Randolph.

      . Randolph handled the incorporation of GWSM in July of 2001 because Glenn was then in poor health. It is undisputed that Glenn was the sole owner of the newly-incorporated GWSM.

      . The parties agree Janice's only interest in this litigation is her alleged entitlement to the Des Moines County property.

      . Elda contended the order is unenforceable as to her because she was not a party to the partition action. Kerwin challenged the enforceability of the order because it contemplated the private auction and partition would occur only if the parties reached an agreement as to the boundaries of the several tracts identified in the order; and because the parties were unable to reach such an agreement, the contemplated partition was aborted and cannot be completed. Anita, Reginald, and Jeanne defaulted and are not parties to this appeal.

      . Although the documents were not signed by Glenn, the proponents of the exhibits did offer evidence tending to prove the exhibits, which were found after Glenn's death in the GWSM business office, were typed on the typewriter commonly used by Glenn.

      . The parties agree Janice's only interest in this litigation is her alleged entitlement to the Des Moines County property.