author: TERNUS, Justice.

text:
    PENNSYLVANIA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Jeffrey G. SIMONI and Timothy P. Winders, Appellees.
    No. 00-1001.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    April 3, 2002.

      Lyle W. Ditmars of Peters Law Firm, P.C., Council Bluffs, for appellant.
    Jeffrey A. Silver, Omaha, and Jon M. McCright, Cedar Rapids, for appellees.
   TERNUS, Justice.

This interlocutory appeal concerns the enforceability of a contractual provision to arbitrate certain disputes between the contracting parties, appellant, Pennsylvania Life Insurance Company [hereinafter “Penn Life”], and two of its former agents, appellees, Jeffrey Simoni and Timothy Winders. The district court refused to require arbitration of counterclaims filed by the agents on the basis that it would be more convenient to try the counterclaims at the same time and in the same forum as the company’s claims, which were not subject to the arbitration provision. On this basis, the court denied the company’s motions to dismiss the agents’ counterclaims.

Upon our review, we disagree with the district court’s reasoning that the convenience of the parties can override a contractual provision requiring arbitration. We also reject an alternative basis upon which the agents seek to uphold the district court’s rulings — waiver. We hold that the company did not waive its right to have the claims of the agents arbitrated by filing a lawsuit against the agents on claims not subject to arbitration.

Nonetheless, we uphold the district court’s rulings denying dismissal at this stage of the proceedings. We do so on the basis of the agents’ contention that the arbitration provision is unenforceable because it is contained in an adhesion contract or an employment contract. Whether the written agreement between the parties is an adhesion contract or an employment contract is an issue that cannot be resolved on the pleadings, as is required for a successful motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we affirm and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In 1997 and 1994, respectively, Penn Life entered into “agent agreements” with Simoni and Winders. Pursuant to these agreements Simoni and Winders represented Penn Life in the sale and service of insurance products until their contracts were terminated in 1999 and 1996, respectively.

In March 2000, Penn Life filed petitions against both agents, seeking permanent injunctive relief. Penn Life alleged that Simoni violated paragraph 11 of their agreement, which prohibited an agent from inducing any policyholder to cancel or replace any product of Penn Life for two years after termination of the agent’s contract. With respect to Winders, the company asserted that he violated paragraph 6 of the contract, dealing with the use of trade secrets and confidential information by a former agent. A copy of the agent agreement was attached to each petition.

Both agents responded with a counterclaim. In count I of the counterclaims, they alleged that Penn Life breached the agent agreements by failing to pay the required renewal commissions. This claim was based on paragraph 9 of the parties’ contracts, which provided that after cancellation of the agreements the agents were entitled to receive renewal commissions on the life insurance business produced by the agents while the agreements were in force. In count II of the counterclaims, the agents asserted they were employees of Penn Life and the company had failed to comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act with respect to payment of social security, withholding taxes and overtime. Only count I is at issue in this appeal.

Penn Life filed motions to dismiss count I of each counterclaim, asserting that these claims were subject to the arbitration clause in the parties’ contracts and therefore must be dismissed. This contractual arbitration provision stated in pertinent part:

Any dispute, controversy or claim between the parties hereto arising out of or relating to Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 or 10 of this Agreement or an alleged breach of these sections which the parties are unable to resolve amicably shall be submitted to and settled by arbitration pursuant to the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association.

The agents resisted the company’s motions to dismiss on several grounds: (1) Penn Life had waived its arbitration rights by instituting the present litigation; (2) the arbitration provision was unenforceable because it was part of a contract between an employer and an employee; and (3) the arbitration provision was unenforceable because it was unconscionable and part of an adhesion contract.

The trial court overruled Penn Life’s motions to dismiss. It noted that the company’s claims against the agents and the agents’ counterclaims against the company were interrelated, but the company’s claims were not subject to the arbitration clause. The court reasoned that “[a]ll related causes should be joined so that they can be resolved in one forum at one time.” Therefore, it refused to dismiss the counterclaims so they could be arbitrated stating, “Under the circumstances here fairness to the parties dictates that all the issues between them arising out of the single agreement be resolved in the same forum.”

Penn Life filed applications for interlocutory appeal. While those applications were pending, the district court, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, consolidated the cases filed by Penn Life. This court then granted interlocutory review of the consolidated cases.

II. Scope of Review.

Review of a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss is for correction of errors at law. McCormick v. Meyer, 582 N.W.2d 141, 144 (Iowa 1998). “A motion to dismiss is sustainable only when it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts that could be proved in support of the claims asserted.” Haupt v. Miller, 514 N.W.2d 905, 911 (Iowa 1994). For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the facts alleged in the pleading sought to be dismissed. Id. at 907. Where the facts pertinent to the determinative issue in a motion to dismiss are disputed, the case usually cannot be resolved on such a motion. Hayden v. Ameristar Casino Council Bluffs, Inc., 641 N.W.2d 723, 724 (Iowa 2002).

III. Choice of Law.

Before we address the merits of the court’s dismissal rulings, we first consider the parties’ dispute as to whether Iowa or North Carolina law governs. In amendments to its petitions, Penn Life pled that North Carolina law applied, based on a contractual provision stating that the agreement was to be governed by the law of the state of North Carolina. Although the court noted in its rulings on the motions to dismiss that the contract provided that North Carolina law applied, the court relied solely on Iowa case law to support its decision. It may have done so because, as our review of the record shows, Penn Life failed to prove the law of North Carolina.

Our cases are clear that it is not sufficient to merely plead the applicability of foreign law; it must also be proven. In re Estate of Allen, 239 N.W.2d 168, 169 (Iowa 1976). A party relying on foreign law may ask the court to take judicial notice of foreign statutory law and may introduce into evidence statutes or cases to prove the foreign law. Id.; see Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.415 (setting out procedure for judicial notice of foreign statutes); Iowa Code § 622.61 (2001) (setting out procedure for proving “foreign unwritten law”). Citation to foreign opinions in a party’s brief is not adequate “because it is not the introduction of evidence.” In re Estate of Allen, 239 N.W.2d at 169; accord EFCO Corp. v. Norman Highway Constructors, Inc., 606 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa 2000) (noting that foreign decisional law is not subject to judicial notice, but must be proved).

Here, the choice-of-law question with which we are confronted arose in the context of a motion to dismiss. Therefore, the parties introduced no evidence. Nor is there anything in the record to show that the court took judicial notice of any North Carolina statute. Under these circumstances, we must apply Iowa law to resolve the dispute before us. See EFCO Corp., 606 N.W.2d at 300 (holding that upon failure of party seeking to assert foreign law to prove it, the court presumes the law to be the same as its own); In re Estate of Allen, 239 N.W.2d at 169 (same). Our inability to apply unproven foreign law makes it unnecessary to determine the choice-of-law question presented by the parties on appeal. EFCO Corp., 606 N.W.2d at 300 (refusing to decide whether Texas law governed parties’ dispute because party relying on foreign law had failed to prove it); In re Estate of Allen, 239 N.W.2d at 168 (same). We turn now to the other issues raised on appeal.

IV. Enforceability of Arbitration Provision.

In discussing the enforceability of the arbitration provision contained in the parties’ contracts, we first address the validity of the district court’s rationale for denying Penn Life’s motions to dismiss. Because we find that rationale unpersuasive, we will consider the alternative grounds asserted by the agents to avoid their agreements to arbitrate. First, the agents contend that Penn Life’s commencement of these actions in court operates as a waiver of its right to arbitrate the agents’ claims against the company. Secondly, they argue that the arbitration provision is unenforceable under Iowa Code section 679A.1, which provides that a written agreement to arbitrate is not valid when it is part of a contract of adhesion or a contract between an employer and an employee. See Iowa Code § 679A.1(2)(a), (b). We turn now to the reasoning expressed in the court’s rulings.

A. Convenience of parties. The district court appears to have relied on principles of convenience and judicious use of the parties’ resources in concluding that all claims involving the parties should be tried in one forum. We do not think such concerns can override the express agreement of contracting parties to arbitrate.

Under Iowa statutory law, “[a] provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration a future controversy arising between the parties is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable unless grounds exist at law or in equity for the revocation of the contract.” Id. § 679A.1(2). The agents do not claim there is a basis to revoke the contracts. Therefore, unless the contracts fall within one of the statutory exceptions to section 679A.1(2), the arbitration provision contained in them is enforceable.

There are three instances in which the statute validating arbitration agreements does not apply: (1) contracts of adhesion; (2) contracts between an employer and an employee; and (3) with an exception not pertinent here, tort claims. Id. § 679A.1(2)(a )-(c). Noticeably absent from this list is a provision that allows a party to avoid arbitration where it is more convenient for the parties to litigate the claim in court rather than to arbitrate. Therefore, we do not think the court is at liberty to decline to enforce an arbitration clause because it would be too inconvenient and costly for the parties to .arbitrate their dispute.

This court addressed a similar concern in Wesley Retirement Services, Inc. v. Hansen Lind Meyer, Inc., 594 N.W.2d 22 (Iowa 1999). In that case, like the present case, only part of the dispute between the parties was subject to arbitration. Wesley Retirement, 594 N.W.2d at 24. Although the parties had included an arbitration provision in the written contract between them, we held that the tort claim asserted by the plaintiff was not subject to arbitration under section 679A.1(2)(c). Id. at 26. On the other hand, we affirmed the trial court’s order requiring that the plaintiffs contract claims be arbitrated in accordance with the parties’ agreement. Id. at 31. We rejected the plaintiffs argument that requiring one claim to proceed by arbitration and allowing the other claims to remain in court warranted a different interpretation of the tort claim exception because such bifurcation of the parties’ dispute would generate inefficiencies. Id. at 26. Recognizing that such inefficiencies may result, we noted that it was “still within the power of the parties to minimize these inefficiencies by voluntarily agreeing to have all the claims heard in court or all claims determined in arbitration.” Id.

The same rationale applies here. While there may be inefficiencies in requiring arbitration of some of the claims involving these parties, but not others, that is the agreement made by the parties. Unless on remand the agents show that the arbitration provision is unenforceable under one of the statutory exceptions, the contracts should be applied as the parties agreed. In summary, we reject the reasoning of the district court that the mere in convenience of the parties and the inefficiencies that result from using two forums to resolve their dispute provide a sufficient basis to refuse to enforce the arbitration arrangements they made in their contracts.

We find distinguishable our opinion in County of Jefferson v. Barton-Douglas Contractors, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 155 (Iowa 1979), a case relied upon by the district court and the agents. In County of Jefferson, this court held that the agreement to arbitrate at issue in that case could not be enforced on a statutory basis. 282 N.W.2d at 157. Therefore, we applied the common law principle that an agreement to arbitrate is revocable at any time. Id. This court went on to state that even if the agreement were enforceable, the court would decline to enforce it because of the policy favoring the resolution of related causes in one forum at one time. Id. at 158.

In contrast to the County of Jefferson case, the contracts at issue here are governed by chapter 679A and therefore are irrevocable and enforceable. This court is not at liberty to outweigh the expression of legislative intent in section 679A.1(2) with our own notion that it would be more efficient to litigate multiple disputes in a single forum.

B. Waiver. The agents claim that Penn Life waived its right to arbitrate. The test for waiver of arbitration is twofold. It requires “conduct or activity inconsistent with the right to arbitration and prejudice to the party claiming waiv er Wesley Retirement, 594 N.W.2d at 30. Ordinarily, waiver is a fact question for the court to decide. See id. In the present case, however, the matter can be resolved on the pleadings, as our discussion of this issue will show.

The agents alleged in their resistances to Penn Life’s motions to dismiss that the company had “waived any claim to enforcement of [the contractual arbitration provision] by commencing the instant litigation.” Penn Life asserts that its commencement of litigation cannot, as a matter of law, operate as a waiver under the circumstances of this case. We agree.

The written contracts between the parties required that only claims involving certain parts of the contracts were subject to arbitration. As noted earlier, the claims made by Penn Life against the agents were not subject to the arbitration clause. Therefore, we do not think the company’s filing of the present lawsuits was “inconsistent with the right to arbitration.” Id. Particularly in view of the principle that “evidence of waiver must be compelling,” id., Penn Life’s action does not provide a basis for application of the waiver doctrine. Accordingly, Penn Life can rely on the arbitration provision in the parties’ contracts, to the extent it is enforceable under chapter 679A. That brings us to the final issue raised by the agents — the enforceability of the arbitration clause under section 679A.K2).

C. Statutory exceptions. As we stated above, under Iowa law an arbitration provision contained in a contract of adhesion or an employment contract is not enforceable. See Iowa Code § 679A.l(2)(a), (5). The agents claim that the contracts they had with Penn Life qualify as both adhesion contracts and employment contracts. We first consider the agents’ contention that the contracts were between an employer and an employee.

1. Contract between an employer and an employee. The applicability of section 679A.1(2)(6) turns on whether the defendants were independent contractors or employees. The agreements between Penn Life and the agents state the agents are independent contractors, but the agents allege they were employees. Although the parties’ intent is an important consideration in determining employment status, many factors bear on this issue. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. McCarthy, 572 N.W.2d 537, 542-43 (Iowa 1997). More importantly, whether a person is an independent contractor or an employee is a “factual determination based on the nature of the working relationship and many other circumstances, not necessarily on any label used to identify the parties in the contract.” Harvey v. Care Initiatives, Inc., 634 N.W.2d 681, 684 n. 2 (Iowa 2001). Because a factual dispute exists, we cannot decide at the pleading stage whether the agreements between the parties are ones between an employer and an employee so as to render the arbitration provision unenforceable.

2. Adhesion contract. A contract of adhesion is described as one that is “drafted unilaterally by the dominant party and then presented on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis to the weaker party who has no real opportunity to bargain about its terms.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 cmt. b, at 135 (Rev.1988); accord Hofmeyer v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 640 N.W.2d 225, 230 (Iowa 2001). We have before us nothing more than speculation as to whether the agreements between Penn Life and the defendants qualify as adhesion contracts. There is nothing in the pleadings that indicates who drafted the contracts or the circumstances under which they were signed. We conclude, therefore, that this issue cannot be resolved until a factual record has been developed.

V. Conclusion.

While this court disagrees with the reasoning employed by the district court to support its denial of the plaintiffs motions to dismiss the defendants’ counterclaims, we affirm. Although we conclude that Penn Life has not waived its right to insist on arbitration of the counterclaims, we cannot determine at this stage of the proceedings whether the arbitration clause is enforceable under Iowa Code section 679A.1(2). Factual issues exist as to whether the written contracts between the parties are adhesion contracts or contracts between an employer and an employee. Therefore, Penn Life has failed to show that the agents’ counterclaims are not sustainable “under any state of facts that could be proved in support of the claims asserted.” Haupt, 514 N.W.2d at 911.

Even though we affirm the district court’s denial of the plaintiffs motions to dismiss, our decision does not prejudice Penn Life’s ability to prove North Carolina law and have its applicability to the remaining issues determined in later proceedings. Nor does our decision prevent Penn Life from reasserting its contractual right to arbitrate the agents’ claims for renewal commissions in an application to compel arbitration pursuant to Iowa Code section 679A.2(1). At that time the parties can support their positions with respect to the enforceability of the arbitration provision with the factual background necessary for the court to resolve this issue. We remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

      . The agents also claimed in their resistances that Penn Life was estopped from asserting its arbitration rights because it had sued the agents in court. The agents now agree that their estoppel argument is subsumed in their waiver argument.

      . Iowa Code section 679A.17(1) provides for an appeal as of right from "[a]n order denying an application to compel arbitration made under section 679A.2.” Here, Penn Life chose to file motions to dismiss in lieu of following the procedure set out in section 679A.2. The denial of a motion to dismiss is not a final judgment. State v. Addison, 250 Iowa 712, 719, 95 N.W.2d 744, 748 (1959); see Hodges v. Hodges, 572 N.W.2d 549, 551 (Iowa 1997) (granting permission to appeal denial of motion to dismiss "in advance of final judgment"). Consequently, Penn Life was required to follow the steps to perfect an interlocutory appeal in this court. See generally Iowa R.App. P. 6.2.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Gaila M. Ehlers, Plaintiff, v. Gerald K. SCHIMMELPFENNIG, Appellant, v. EAGLE NATIONAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Appellee.
    No. 00-0858.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    April 3, 2002.

      Gregg Pieper, Fairfield, for appellant.
    Michael J. Moreland of McKay, More-land & Webber, P.C., Ottumwa, for appel-lee.
   PER CURIAM.

This dispute arises in a claim for indemnification by a dog owner, Gerald K. Schimmelpfennig, against his liability insurance company, Eagle National Assurance Corporation (Eagle National), based on the insurer’s refusal to pay a claim or defend a suit against Schimmelpfennig by Gaila M. Ehlers, a dog-bite victim. The district court awarded Schimmelpfennig recovery for attorney fees, deposition costs, and also for Ehlers’ lost wages and medical expenses, which Schimmelpfennig paid after Eagle National refused coverage. The court refused to allow prejudgment interest on these sums. Because we conclude that some prejudgment interest was allowable on the sums recovered, we modify the judgment of the district court.

In response to a third-party petition filed against Eagle National by Schim-melpfennig in Ehlers’ action, the jury entered a special verdict establishing that Eagle National’s pblicy covered the claim. Ehlers recovered damages on the main action, but a new trial was ordered on all claims. The court of appeals affirmed the granting of a new trial on Ehlers’ claim but reinstated the jury’s special verdict confirming Schimmelpfennig’s coverage under the Eagle National policy. Prior to retrial, Eagle National settled and paid Ehlers’ claim against Schimmelpfennig. Schimmelpfennig later sought indemnification for attorney fees and deposition costs incurred in the litigation and for medical expenses and lost wages that he had advanced to Ehlers.

The district court awarded Schimmelp-fennig $12,680 in attorney fees, $67.45 in deposition costs, and $1926 for the medical expenses and lost wages he had paid to Ehlers. In refusing to allow interest on these sums, the district court stated, “[t]he court also does not find that the insurance contract provides for the payment of interest, and therefore interest will not be [allowed] with regard to these matters.”

Schimmelpfennig contends that, based on Iowa Code section 668.13 (1999), he is entitled to interest on the amounts awarded him by way of indemnification at the very latest from the date of filing of his third-party action if not from an earlier time. We made clear in Frunzar v. Allied Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 548 N.W.2d 880, 890 (Iowa 1996), that section 668.13 does not govern interest on judgments in actions based on insurance contracts. Following our holding in Frunzar, the legislature amended Iowa Code section 535.3 so as to incorporate by reference the rate of interest provided in section 668.13. 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 197, § 2. That amendment did not incorporate by reference the provision in section 668.13(1), which provides that interest “shall accrue from the date of the commencement of the action.”

We are convinced that neither section 668.13(1) nor section 535.3 governs the entitlement to interest from a point in time prior to the filing of a petition. We settled the principles that govern entitlement to prefiling interest in Midwest Management Corp. v. Stephens, 353 N.W.2d 76 (Iowa 1984). In that case, we determined:

Generally, “interest runs from the time money becomes due and payable, and in the case of unliquidated claims this is the date they become liquidated, ordinarily the date of judgment.... One exception to this rule is recognized ‘in cases in which the entire damage for which recovery is demanded was complete at a definite time before the action was begun.’ ”

Stephens, 353 N.W.2d at 83 (quoting Mrowka v. Crouse Cartage Co., 296 N.W.2d 782, 783 (Iowa 1980)).

In the present case, Schimmelp-fennig’s contractual damages were both liquidated and complete when he paid the deposition cost, lost wages, and medical expenses for which Eagle National was responsible under its policy. Consequently, he is entitled to interest on the sums advanced from the date of payment. The rate at which this prejudgment interest accrues is five percent per annum, as provided in Iowa Code section 535.2.

We take a different view with respect to Schimmelpfennig’s entitlement to interest on the district court’s attorney-fee award. His damage on that item would not be complete until he paid those attorney fees for which Eagle National was responsible. We have searched the record and can find no indication when, if ever, Schimmelpfennig paid those attorney fees. Consequently, he is only entitled to interest on the attorney-fee portion of his award from March 20, 2000, the date of the district court’s order.

To reconcile our decision with the record facts, Schimmelpfennig is entitled to recover interest on the $67.45 deposition cost from September 10, 1997, the time of payment, at the rate of five percent per an-num. He is entitled to interest on the payment of $1926 for lost wages and medical expenses from July 31, 1996, the time of payment, at the rate of five percent per annum. That interest should run from the dates indicated until March 20, 2000, and be aggregated with the principal amount of the March 20, 2000 judgment. The aggregated total shall draw interest from that date at the rate specified in section 535.3. On return of the procedendo, a corrected judgment shall be entered.

We have considered all issues presented and affirm the district court’s judgment as modified.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.


author: LARSON, Justice.

text:
    HEABERLIN FARMS, INC., Appellee, v. IGF INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.
    No. 00-0754.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    April 3, 2002.

      R. Jefferson Allen and Elizabeth T. Buf-kin of Henke-Bufldn, P.C., Clarksdale, Mississippi, Edward N. McConnell of Dickinson, Mackaman, Tyler & Hagen, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
    Steven P. Wandro and Sandra K. Lyons of Wandro, Lyons, Wagner & Baer, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
   LARSON, Justice.

This case raises novel issues involving the right of an insurer to enforce an arbitration clause in an insurance policy in the face of claims by the insured that (1) the Iowa arbitration statute, Iowa Code § 679A.1 (1999), makes the arbitration clause invalid because the insurance policy is a “contract of adhesion,” and (2) the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307, which would otherwise trump the Iowa statute and require enforcement of the clause, is inapplicable because the defendant insurance company has not satisfied the jurisdictional requirement that the relationship was one “involving commerce.” The district court denied the insurer’s motion to compel arbitration. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.

The plaintiff, Heaberlin Farms, Inc., bought a multiple-peril crop insurance policy from IGF Insurance Company for the 1999 crop year, covering over 1000 acres of corn in Marion County, Iowa. In June 1999 Heaberlin submitted a notice of claim for “prevented planting,” as covered by the insurance policy, on the basis it was too wet for Heaberlin to plant its crops. IGF inspected the fields and determined that the cause of loss was not one covered by the policy. The cause of loss, it said, was flooding from the nearby Red Rock Reservoir, a condition excluded from coverage under the policy. In January 2000 Hea-berlin commenced this breach-of-contract action against IGF for failing to pay its claim. IGF filed a motion to compel arbitration and a motion to stay. The district court denied the motions, and IGF appealed. The denial of a motion to compel arbitration is a final judgment for purposes of appeal. See Iowa Code § 679A.17(1)(a); Des Moines Asphalt & Paving Co. v. Colcon Indus. Corp., 500 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Iowa 1993), overruled on other grounds by Wesley Retirement Servs., Inc. v. Hansen Lind Meyer, Inc., 594 N.W.2d 22, 29 (Iowa 1999).

II. The Issues.

IGF raises three issues: (1) the Iowa law denying arbitration of adhesion contracts is preempted by the Federal Crop Insurance Act (FCIA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 1501-21; (2) the Iowa arbitration statute is also preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307; and (3) the policy was not an adhesion contract so as to be excluded from mandatory arbitration under the Iowa statute.

We reject IGF’s first preemption argument (that the Iowa arbitration statute is preempted by the FCIA) because this issue was not raised below. We find it unnecessary to address IGF’s third claim (that this policy is not an adhesion contract within the meaning of Iowa Code section 679A.1) because of our view that the FAA preempts the Iowa act.

III. The Iowa and Federal Arbitration Statutes.

The Iowa arbitration statute, Iowa Code § 679A.1, provides in relevant part:

2. A provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration a future controversy arising between the parties is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable unless grounds exist at law or in equity for the revocation of the contract. This subsection shall not apply to any of the following:
a. A contract of adhesion.

(Emphasis added.)

Under the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 2,

[a] written provision in any ... contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

(Emphasis added.)

The FAA has been interpreted to be very broad in its scope. The Supreme Court has stated that “[s]ection 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941, 74 L.Ed.2d 765, 785 (1983), and questions as to whether an issue is arbitrable are to be resolved in favor of arbitration. Id. at 24-25, 103 S.Ct. at 941, 74 L.Ed.2d at 785.

The FAA is applicable in state, as well as federal, courts if the interstate nexus requirement is met. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 271-72, 115 S.Ct. 834, 838, 130 L.Ed.2d 753, 763 (1995); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10, 104 S.Ct. 852, 858, 79 L.Ed.2d 1, 12 (1984) (“In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”). The reason the federal act is enforceable in state court is because Congress intended to place arbitration agreements “ ‘upon the same footing as other contracts, where [they] belong[ ].’ ” Southland, 465 U.S. at 16, 104 S.Ct. at 861, 79 L.Ed.2d at 15 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924)); see also William G. Phelps, Annotation, Preemption by Federal Arbitration Act (9 USCS §§ 1 et seq.) of State Laws Prohibiting or Restricting Formation or Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements, 108 A.L.R. Fed. 179, §§ 2-5, at 187-201 (1992).

The issue remains whether the federal act preempts the Iowa act. It is clear that it does if the policy is a “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.” Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 272-75, 115 S.Ct. at 839-40, 130 L.Ed.2d at 763-65. In Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 1654, 134 L.Ed.2d 902, 906 (1996), the Supreme Court said:

The Federal Arbitration Act ... declares written provisions for arbitration “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Montana law, however, declares an arbitration clause unenforceable unless “[n]otice that [the] contract is subject to arbitration” is “typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract.” The question here presented is whether Montana’s law is compatible with the federal Act. We hold that Montana’s first-page notice requirement, which governs not “any contract,” but specifically and solely contracts “subject to arbitration” conflicts with the FAA and is therefore displaced by the federal measure.

(Alterations in original.) (Citations omitted.) The FAA does not exclude adhesion contracts. The Iowa statute, by excluding adhesion contracts, is in conflict with the FAA. Thus, if the federal act is applicable, it preempts the Iowa statute by operation of the Supremacy Clause. Heaberlin argues that the federal act is not applicable here because this contract is not a “transaction involving commerce.” That is the key issue in this case.

IV. Is This Transaction One Involving Interstate Commerce?

Heaberlin claims IGF has not established an interstate-commerce connection. However, the case the plaintiff relies on to support that argument is not persuasive. The district court in that case, Booth v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 285 F.Supp. 920, 925 (D.Neb.1968), rev’d on other grounds, 431 F.2d 212 (8th Cir.1970), ruled that an insurance policy did not implicate interstate commerce. However, on appeal the court of appeals did not address the issue of whether the insurance transactions were a part of interstate commerce because neither party had demanded arbitration. Booth, 431 F.2d at 215. Contrary to the plaintiffs argument, a substantial weight of authority holds that insurance transactions do involve interstate commerce.

Prior to 1944, a long line of cases had held that insurance policies do not involve interstate commerce. In 1944 the Supreme Court traced the history of the relationship between interstate commerce and the insurance industry beginning with a rejection of any interrelationship in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183, 19 L.Ed. 357, 361 (1868) (holding that “issuing a policy of insurance is not a part of commerce”), and concluding with a recognition, based on the economic realities of the insurance industry, that the insurance industry inextricably involves interstate commerce. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 543-47, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 1168-70, 88 L.Ed. 1440, 1451-54 (1944). There, the Court stated:

One reason advanced for the rule in the Paul case has been that insurance policies “are not quantities to be shipped or forwarded from one State to another.” But both before and since Paul v. Virginia, this Court has held that Congress can regulate traffic though it consist of intangibles. Another reason much stressed has been that insurance policies are mere personal contracts subject to the laws of the state where executed. But this reason rests upon a distinction between what has been called “local” and what “interstate,” a type of mechanical criterion which this Court has not deemed controlling in the measurement of federal power. We may grant that a contract of insurance, considered as a thing apart from negotiation and execution, does not itself constitute interstate commerce. But it does not follow from this that the Court is powerless to examine the entire transaction, of which that contract is but a part, in order to determine whether there may be a chain of events which becomes interstate commerce. Only by treating the Congressional power over commerce among the states as a “technical legal conception” rather than as a “practical one, drawn from the course of business” could such a conclusion be reached. In short, a nationwide business is not deprived of its interstate character merely because it is built upon sales contracts which are local in nature. Were the rule otherwise, few businesses could be said to be engaged in interstate commerce.

Id. at 546-47, 64 S.Ct. at 1169-70, 88 L.Ed. at 1453-54 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).

In reaching its conclusion that generally the insurance business is a part of interstate commerce, the Court noted the pervasiveness of the insurance industry:

The modern insurance business holds a commanding position in the trade and commerce of our Nation. Built upon the sale of contracts of indemnity, it has become one of the largest and most important branches of commerce. Its total assets exceed $37,000,000,000, or the approximate equivalent of the value of all farm lands and buildings in the United States. Its annual premium receipts exceed $6,000,000,000, more than the average annual revenue receipts of the United States Government during the last decade. Included in the labor force of insurance are 524,000 experienced workers, almost as many as seek their livings in coal mining or automobile manufacturing. Perhaps no modern commercial enterprise directly affects so many persons in all walks of life as does the insurance business. Insurance touches the home, the family, and the occupation or the business of almost every person in the United States.

Id. at 539-40, 64 S.Ct. at 1166-67, 88 L.Ed. at 1450 (footnotes omitted). Comparative figures, nearly sixty years later, would undoubtedly underscore the Court’s conclusion.

The Court continued:

This business is not separated into 48 distinct territorial compartments which function in isolation from each other. Interrelationship, interdependence, and integration of activities in all the states in which they operate are practical aspects of the insurance companies’ methods of doing business. A large share of the insurance business is concentrated in a comparatively few companies located, for the most part, in the financial centers of the East. Premiums collected from policyholders in every part of the United States flow into these companies for investment. As policies become payable, checks and drafts flow back to the many states where the policyholders reside. The result is a continuous and indivisible stream of intercourse among the states composed of collections of premiums, payments of policy obligations, and the countless documents and communications which are essential to the negotiation and execution of policy contracts.... The decisions which that company makes at its home office— the risks it insures, the premiums it charges, the investments it makes, the losses it pays — concern not just the people of the state where the home office happens to be located. They concern people living far beyond the boundaries of that state.

Id. at 541-42, 64 S.Ct. at 1167, 88 L.Ed. at 1450-51 (footnote omitted).

As of the early 1990s, eighty-five percent of all federal crop insurance was provided by private insurers throughout the country. In those cases the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), a wholly government-owned corporation established by Congress, acted as reinsurer. Kansas ex rel. Todd v. United States, 995 F.2d 1505, 1508 (10th Cir.1993). Such a system, of course, necessitates a flurry of interstate activity relating to federal crop insurance.

The stated purpose of the Federal Crop Insurance Act is “to promote the national welfare by improving the economic stability of agriculture through a sound system of crop insurance and providing the means for the research and experience helpful in devising and establishing such insurance.” 7 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (emphasis added). The act envisions cooperation with local cooperative associations, id. § 1507(c), and a nationwide system of insurance providing “the Corporation may insure, or provide reinsurance for insurers of, producers of agricultural commodities grown in the United States....” Id. § 1508(a)(1). The act covers private insurance providers as well as the national corporation. The act provides “[t]he term ‘approved insurance provider’ means a private insurance provider that has been approved by the Corporation to provide insurance coverage to producers participating in the Federal crop insurance program established under this chapter.” Id. § 1502(b)(2). The principal office of the federal corporation “shall be located in the District of Columbia, but there may be established agencies or branch offices elsewhere in the United States under rules and regulations prescribed by the Board.” Id. § 1503. The Corporation requires that records and reporting information be provided to it. See, e.g., id. § 1508(f)(3) (requiring information necessary to obtain catastrophic risk protection). The activities of the FCIC and its affiliates clearly constitute “the continuous and indivisible stream of intercourse among the states composed of collections of premiums, payments of policy obligations, and the countless documents and communications which are essential to the negotiation and execution of policy contracts.” See South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 541, 64 S.Ct. at 1167, 88 L.Ed. at 1451.

Federal crop insurance legislation is based on the authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause. It has been said that the high-water mark in Congress’s exercise of its power under the Commerce Clause is Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942). See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1630, 131 L.Ed.2d 626, 638 (1995) (Wickard “is perhaps the most far-reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over interstate activity....”). In Wickard the Supreme Court upheld a federal law regulating the allowable acreage that could be planted to wheat, even though Filburn’s harvest of wheat was for purely personal use. The court justified the enactment of the allocation law on the basis that even locally grown and consumed wheat would impact on the total amount of wheat shipped and would thus have a sufficient impact on interstate commerce. According to the Court, the statute was a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125, 63 S.Ct. at 89, 87 L.Ed. at 135.

As a result of Wickard, a very broad view of Commerce Clause power persisted for many years, but the Supreme Court “ended this fifty-eight-year quiescence” in Lopez. See United States v. Taylor, 226 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir.2000). Lopez involved a federal statute that criminalized the possession of guns in a school zone. The Supreme Court struck down the statute because it “is a criminal statute ... that has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31, 131 L.Ed.2d at 638.

Similarly, in the more recent case of United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000), the Court struck down part of the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which created civil liability for the commission of an illegal gender-based act. In doing so, the Supreme Court noted “the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610, 120 S.Ct. at 1750, 146 L.Ed.2d at 671.

The Supreme Court has made it clear that, when a statute regulates purely economic matters, as in Wickard, it is not subject to the constitutional infirmities of the statutes in Lopez and Morrison. See generally Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: The Impact of United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 Tenn.L.Rev. 605, 606 (2001). As the Court said in Lopez, the school-zone gun law

is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with “commerce” or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms. [The gun statute] is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31, 131 L.Ed.2d at 638-39 (footnote omitted). The Court noted, “Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.” Id. at 560, 115 S.Ct. at 1630, 131 L.Ed.2d at 638.

Similarly, in Morrison, the Court distinguished criminal statutes from other statutes purporting to be based on Commerce Clause authority on the ground that the criminal statutes lacked the economic nexus of such cases as Wickard. It said:

Lopez’s review of Commerce Clause case law demonstrates that in those cases where we have sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity’s substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeav- or.

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611, 120 S.Ct. at 1750, 146 L.Ed.2d at 692.

The sale of federal crop insurance clearly has a sufficient economic nexus with interstate commerce, as we have described above, to invoke the arbitration provisions of 9 U.S.C. § 2, despite the limitations recognized by the Supreme Court on Commerce Clause authority as discussed in Lopez and Morrison. As the federal act applies, and is in conflict with the provisions of our state arbitration statute exempting adhesion contracts, it was error for the district court to refuse to enforce the arbitration clause. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.


author: CADY, Justice.

text:
    GREENWOOD MANOR, Lantern Park Nursing and Rehab Center and Parkview Manor, Appellants, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, STATE HEALTH FACILITIES COUNCIL, Appellee, and Coralville Manor, RFMS, Inc., Intervenor.
    No. 00-0994.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    April 3, 2002.

      Robert F. Holz of Davis, Brown, Koehn, Shors & Roberts, P.C., Des Moines, for appellants.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Heather L. Adams, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Robert J. Baudino, Jr. and Kelly D. Hamborg of the Baudino Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for intervenor.
   CADY, Justice.

This appeal requires us to determine whether persons affected by an application for a certificate of need requesting permission to construct a new institutional health facility are entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior to the evaluation of the application by the State Health Facilities Council pursuant to Iowa Code section 135.66 (1999). After holding a public hearing on the application in this case, the Council granted the certificate for construction of the facility. Three nursing centers located within the geographical area of the proposed facility petitioned for judicial review. On judicial review, the district court upheld the Council’s decision to grant the certificate. The district court found an evidentiary hearing was not required because the action of the Council in evaluating the application did not constitute a contested case. On our review, we affirm the decision of the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The dispute in this case centers on the decision of the State Health Facilities Council to grant a certificate of need to Coralville Manor, L.L.C. The certificate of need proposed construction of a 120-bed skilled nursing facility in Coralville, Iowa. Coralville is located near the city of Iowa City, and is a part of Johnson County. The proposed facility would consist of four distinct patient care areas. Twenty-eight beds would be devoted to a chronic confusion and dementing illness (CCDI) unit. The CCDI unit would primarily care for patients with Alzheimer’s disease, and would be separate from the other three units in the facility. The CCDI unit would be aesthetically designed to minimize the disorientation and agitation ordinarily suffered by those afflicted with dementia, particularly Alzheimer’s patients.

The other three units would be composed of intermediate and skilled nursing care patients. One unit would provide intense rehabilitation services, including treatment for stroke victims. Although the entire facility would be certified by Medicaid, twenty beds would be specifically allotted to Medicare/Medicaid patients. Additionally, the facility would have occupational and physical therapy rooms that would provide outpatient services to former residents who have been successfully rehabilitated but still require continuing treatment.

The proposed site of the facility is a five-acre plot of land on Heartland Drive. It is a central location for the residents of Johnson County and the surrounding counties, and is easily accessible by the metropolitan area’s interstate and state highways. Cor-alville Manor also has an option to purchase twenty-five undeveloped acres adjacent to the five-acre plot. Eventually, Coralville Manor would convert the additional twenty-five acres into a retirement community. In addition to the nursing facility, the campus would contain independent living, assisted living, and general retirement centers. The purpose of the campus atmosphere is to permit senior citizens to retire to an area where they can move to different living units to accommodate changes in their physical or mental condition.

Donald Fike is the sole owner of Coral-ville Manor. He is also the sole owner of RFMS, Inc., which has been providing services similar to those proposed by Coral-ville Manor since 1981. Fike owns and operates over 100 facilities in Iowa, Illinois, Florida, Nevada, and South Carolina. Thirteen of these facilities are nursing homes, some of which have special units providing care to Alzheimer’s patients. Many of these nursing facilities are included in a retirement community campus.

Fike determined a need existed in the Johnson County area for a nursing facility specially equipped for treating those afflicted with dementing illnesses. He based this determination on several factors. First, none of the seven nursing facilities in Johnson County had a CCDI unit. Furthermore, the CCDI units in neighboring counties were at or near full capacity. Moreover, the closest CCDI unit was in Cedar Rapids, and that facility only served private pay patients.

In addition, Fike believed Johnson County needed more long-term care beds for the general treatment of aging seniors. The state bed need formula projected a need for 121 long-term care beds in Johnson County. The state bed need formula estimates the number of long-term nursing beds necessary to adequately serve a county’s projected population in five years. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 641-203.5(3)(a)(1), (2) (1987). The Department of Public Health is charged with updating the long-term care bed need calculations each year. Id. r. 641 — 203.5(3)(a)(4). The Council, which is a division of the Department, then uses the figure as a guideline in its review of a certificate of need application. See id. r. 641-203.5(3)(c).

Fike also conducted a phone survey of the seven local nursing facilities in June, September, and December 1998. In each of these months, the vacancy bed total never exceeded six beds. Fike also relied on the reported occupancy rates of the seven facilities over eight quarters. Three of the facilities consistently reported occupancy rate levels near 100%, two between 85 and 90%, and one between 77 and 84%. Although one of the facilities reported levels consistently below 50%, the administrator of that facility testified the occupancy rates have never been that low. In any event, the overall reporting rate for Johnson County, excluding the latter facility’s rates, was 90%. Generally, a nursing facility is considered to be operating at full capacity when its occupancy rates reach the level of 85 to 90%. Fike considered these statistics with other facts showing that Johnson County has the fastest growing elderly population in the state of Iowa.

Coralville Manor filed a letter of intent for the construction of the 120-bed skilled nursing facility in Coralville on January 8, 1998. It received an extension for the letter on December 30, 1998. See id. r. 641-202.2(4) (1997) (letter of intent expires one year after its receipt by the Department, but is subject to renewal). The Department received Coralville Manor’s formal application on February 25, 1999. Contemporaneously with the filing of the application, Coralville Manor notified each of the seven Johnson County nursing facilities of the submission of its certificate of need application. Additionally, the Department sent written notice of the application to all persons deemed to be affected by Coralville Manor’s application. The Department invited the affected persons to comment on the application, either through written statements or an oral presentation to the Council at the hearing on the application. The Department subsequently received numerous letters challenging and supporting the certificate of need.

The Department scheduled a public hearing on the application for June 10, 1999. On the day preceding the hearing, Greenwood Manor, Parkview Manor, and Lantern Park Nursing and Rehab Center filed a motion for a contested case proceeding. These three facilities are located in the geographic area of the proposed facility and, consequently, are considered affected persons. See Iowa Code § 135.61(l)(c) (institutional health facilities “located in the geographic area which would appropriately be served by the new institutional health service proposed in the application” are considered affected persons in certificate of need proceedings). The facilities claimed the decision to grant or deny a certificate of need is a contested case proceeding and, therefore, the Council was required to hold an evidentiary hearing. The Council denied the motion.

Numerous witnesses testified at the hearing on June 10. In addition to Fike, the health care planning consultant to Cor-alville Manor, the local economic developer for the Coralville area, and the mayor and the city administrator for the city of Coral-ville testified in support of the project. These witnesses revealed that the acreage where Coralville Manor planned to build its retirement campus had been specifically identified by the city of Coralville for the development of senior services. In 1997, the city enacted a plan to set aside an area of undeveloped acreage for continuing care retirement centers. The city officials believed the Coralville Manor development matched the plan’s objectives and was needed by the community. In fact, the Coralville City Council adopted a resolution on May 25, 1999, supporting the Coralville Manor nursing home project.

Nine affected parties challenged the certificate. Eight of the parties were operators or administrators of neighboring nursing care facilities. Each person’s testimony echoed two main concerns: a recent decrease in occupancy rates and shortages in health care professionals. They attributed the occupancy rate decreases to the recent surge in popularity of assisted living and independent living centers. Additionally, they detailed the difficulties they often encountered in satisfying their staffing needs, blaming the national shortage in health care personnel. The facility representatives believed their facilities adequately served the community, including those with dementing illnesses, and feared a new center would force them to compete for nurses and certified nurses aides. A representative from All Staff Medical, a medical staffing agency, shared the staffing concerns espoused by the facilities, and elaborated on the specific difficulties she experienced attempting to fill medical employment positions in Johnson County.

In his testimony, Fike acknowledged the recent emergence of assisted living centers in Iowa City. However, Fike did not believe assisted living centers would detract from nursing facilities, because the two centers serve different community needs. For example, a person afflicted with advanced Alzheimer’s disease or recovering from a severe stroke would not receive the necessary treatment in an assisted living center. Fike also recognized the concern over the availability of staff, but believed a good operator would get the necessary staff, as he had done at his other facilities. Moreover, Fike submitted several letters from area health care professionals seeking an employment position with Coralville Manor upon its opening.

After discussing their comments on the application in the presence of the parties, three of the four Council members approved Coralville Manor’s application. On July 2, 1999, the Council filed its written decision granting the certificate of need.

Greenwood Manor, Parkview Manor, and Lantern Park Nursing and Rehab Center petitioned for judicial review pursuant to section 17A.19. The district court concluded there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Council’s decision to grant the certificate of need. Additionally, the district court found the evaluation of the certificate of need application did not constitute a contested case proceeding.

The three affected parties appeal. They claim they have a statutory and constitutional right to a contested case proceeding, and the denial of that right by the Council was unreasonable, arbitrary, and an abuse of discretion. Alternatively, the affected parties contend the Council should not have granted Coralville Manor’s certificate of need.

II. Standard and Scope of Review.

We review a district court decision on a petition for judicial review pursuant to section 17A.19 for errors at law. Bernau v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 580 N.W.2d 757, 763 (Iowa 1998). Thus, our review is limited to whether the district court correctly applied the law. Dickinson County v. City Dev. Comm., 521 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa 1994); Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n, 465 N.W.2d 280, 281 (Iowa 1991); Mercy Health Ctr. v. State Health Facilities Council, 360 N.W.2d 808, 811 (Iowa 1985). We will affirm if we reach the same conclusions as the district court. Dickinson County, 521 N.W.2d at 468. To determine whether our conclusions are aligned with those of the district court, we look to the standards of section 17A.19(8). Office of Consumer Advocate, 465 N.W.2d at 281.

Section 17A.19(8) directs us to grant whatever relief we deem to be appropriate when the decision of an agency is:

a. In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
b. In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
c. In violation of an agency rule;
d. Made upon unlawful procedure;
e. Affected by other error of law;
f. In a contested case, unsupported by substantial evidence in the record made before the agency when that record is viewed as a whole; or
g. Unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

Because we find the proceeding in this case did not involve a contested case, we do not consider whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence under section 17A.19(8)(f). See id. § 17A.19(8)(f); Bernau, 580 N.W.2d at 764; Sindlinger v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 503 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Iowa 1993). Instead, we only look to whether the agency committed an error of law or acted unreasonably, capriciously, or arbitrarily. Sindlinger, 503 N.W.2d at 390.

When determining whether “other agency action” was arbitrary or capricious, we consider whether the decision “was without regard to the law or facts.” Bernau, 580 N.W.2d at 764. We will deem agency action to be unreasonable if the agency acted “ ‘in the face of evidence as to which there is no room for difference of opinion among reasonable minds ... or not based on substantial evidence.’ ” Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman v. Rolfes, 454 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Iowa 1990) (citation omitted). Thus, the unreasonableness standard of reviewing “other agency action” may still require us to consider whether the decision was based on substantial evidence.

III. Overview of Certificate of Need Law.

In 1977, our state legislature established the State Health Facilities Council in response to the National Health Planning and Resource Development Act enacted by Congress in 1974. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300n (1974) (national act); 1977 Iowa Acts ch. 75, §§ 1-21 (codified at Iowa Code §§ 135.61-83 (1978)) (Iowa act). The Act required states to promulgate statutes governing the development of new health care services and facilities in order to qualify for federal funding. See Living Centers-Southeast, Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 138 N.C.App. 572, 532 S.E.2d 192, 193 (2000). Specifically, the states were to create a health planning and development agency to administer a certificate of need program. In re Application for Certificate of Need by HCA Health Servs. of Wyoming, Inc., 689 P.2d 108, 109 (Wyo.1984). In short, the agency would be responsible for determining the need for proposed health services as well as requiring institutions to seek approval before committing substantial capital expenditures to certain projects. Id. The certificate of need program subsequently became part of a national trend to place checks on the spiraling health care costs incurred by health institutions while facilitating the provision of economical and quality health care services to the states’ citizens. See, e.g., Carriage Hill Cabin John, Inc. v. Maryland Health Res. Planning Comm’n, 125 Md.App. 183, 724 A.2d 745, 750 (1999) (Maryland); Living Centers-Southeast, Inc., 532 S.E.2d at 193-94 (North Carolina); Commonwealth, Dep’t of Health v. Rehab Hosp. Servs. Corp., 127 Pa.Cmwlth. 185, 561 A.2d 342, 347-48 (1989) (Pennsylvania); St. Mary’s Hosp. v. State Health Planning & Dev. Agency, 178 W.Va. 792, 364 S.E.2d 805, 808 (1987) (West Virginia); In re Application for Certificate of Need by HCA Health Servs. of Wyoming, Inc., 689 P.2d at 109 (Wyoming).

Similarly, the primary purpose of Iowa’s certificate of need statute is to ensure that the citizens of this state will receive necessary and adequate institutional health services in an economical manner. See 1977 Iowa Acts ch. 75, preamble; Iowa State Dep’t of Health v. Hertko, 282 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Iowa 1979). To accomplish this purpose, the legislature explicitly instructed the Council to avoid unnecessary duplication of institutional services as well as to control the costs of administering these services. See id. To aid the Council, the legislature prescribed detailed procedures governing the application process and delineated specific criteria for the Council to consider in evaluating applications. See 1977 Iowa Acts ch. 75, §§ 4-6. Today, the provisions governing applications for certificates of need are found in Iowa Code sections 135.61 through 135.83.

Thus, before a new institutional health facility may be constructed, the sponsor of the facility must receive a certificate of need from the Department. Id. § 135.63; Iowa State Dep’t of Health, 282 N.W.2d at 747. Although there are exemptions from this requirement, none of them are applicable here. See Iowa Code § 135.63(2). Before applying for a certificate of need, the facility’s sponsor must submit a letter of intent briefly describing the proposal, its geographic location, and approximate cost. Id. § 135.65(1). The sponsor must then file an application no earlier than thirty days after the submission of the letter of intent. Id.

After the Department receives the application, it must provide written notice to all “affected persons” of the application. Id. § 135.66(2); Iowa Admin. Code r. 641— 202.4(4). “Affected persons” include the sponsor of the application as well as each institutional health facility located in the same geographic area as the proposed facility. Iowa Code § 135.61(1)(a), (c). Pri- or to issuing a decision, the Council must conduct a public hearing on the propriety of the certificate. Id. § 135.66(3)(b). All affected persons or their representatives have the opportunity to present testimony to the Council at the public hearing. Id. § 135.66(4); Iowa Admin. Code r. 641-202.6(3). In making its determination, the Council must consider eighteen factors delineated in section 135.64(1) and those additional, but nearly identical, considerations listed in administrative rule 641-203.5(3)(c) (1987). In addition, the Council can grant an application only if it makes four statutorily mandated findings listed in Iowa Code section 135.64(2).

Lastly, the written decision of the Council is considered final agency action. Id. § 135.70; Iowa Admin. Code r. 641-202.11(2)(b) (1997). A dissatisfied person has the option of either requesting a rehearing with the Council or petitioning for judicial review in accordance with section 17A.19. See Iowa Code § 135.70; Iowa Admin. Code r. 641-202.9(1). An affected person need not first have a rehearing application denied in order to petition for judicial review. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 641-202.9(6).

III. Contested Case Proceedings.

The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, embodied in Iowa Code chapter 17A, classifies agency action within three distinct categories: “rulemaking;” “adjudication,” otherwise known as contested case; and “other agency action.” Sindlinger, 503 N.W.2d at 389; Allegre v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 349 N.W.2d 112, 114 (Iowa 1984); Polk County v. Iowa State Appeal Bd., 330 N.W.2d 267, 276 (Iowa 1983). The classification of the agency action determines whether the provisions of chapter 17A govern the action. Rulemaking and contested cases fall within the ambit of the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act. Iowa Code § 17A.1(2). However, only the judicial review provisions of section 17A.19 apply to other agency action. Polk County, 330 N.W.2d at 276. None of the parties in this case contend the Council’s decision constituted rulemaking. Instead, the dispute rests on whether the agency action implicated the contested case provisions of section 17A.12.

A contested case is a proceeding “in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by Constitution or statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for an eviden-tiary hearing.” Iowa Code § 17A.2(5); accord Bernau, 580 N.W.2d at 766; Messamaker v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 545 N.W.2d 566, 567 (Iowa 1996); Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman, 454 N.W.2d at 817-18; Allegre, 349 N.W.2d at 114; Polk County, 330 N.W.2d at 277. On the other hand, other agency action is action that does not constitute rulemaking or a contested case. Sindlinger, 503 N.W.2d at 389; Polk County, 330 N.W.2d at 276-77. It is a residual category. Sindlinger, 503 N.W.2d at 389; Allegre, 349 N.W.2d at 114; Polk County, 330 N.W.2d at 276. Thus, if the statute or constitution does not require a hearing, or if the required hearing does not rise to the level of an evidentiary hearing, the agency action is considered “other agency action.” Allegre, 349 N.W.2d at 114; Polk County, 330 N.W.2d at 277; see L’Enfant Plaza Props., Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 564 F.2d 515, 524 (D.C.Cir.1977).

The importance of the distinction between the categories lies in the due process afforded to parties involved in contested case proceedings. Allegre, 349 N.W.2d at 114; Polk County, 330 N.W.2d at 276. A contested case entitles parties affected by the agency action to an adversarial hearing with the presentation of evidence and arguments and the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and introduce rebuttal evidence. See Iowa Code § 17A.12(4); Lunde v. Iowa Bd. of Regents, 487 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Iowa Ct.App.1992). The underlying purpose of an evi-dentiary hearing is to adjudicate disputed facts pertaining to particular individuals in specific circumstances. Polk County, 330 N.W.2d at 277; Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Definition of Formal Agency Adjudication Under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, 63 Iowa L.Rev. 285, 294 (1977) [hereinafter Bonfield]. At most, other agency action entitles affected parties to an informal hearing. Lunde, 487 N.W.2d at 359. Parties are only entitled to those procedures voluntarily promulgated by the agency, and to the general requirement that the agency act reasonably. Farmers State Bank v. Bernau, 433 N.W.2d 734, 740 (Iowa 1988); Bonfield, 63 Iowa L.Rev. at 290.

We conclude the evaluation of an application for a certificate of need by the Council does not implicate the contested case procedures. Neither a statute nor constitution requires the Council to provide an evidentiary hearing. See Hurd v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 580 N.W.2d 383, 388 (Iowa 1998). Although section 135.66 provides affected persons the opportunity to be heard at a public hearing, Iowa Code § 135.66(3)(b), (4), this hearing does not rise to the level of an evidentiary hearing. The administrative rules governing the Department in certifícate of need proceedings explicitly state that public hearings held pursuant to section 135.66(3)(b) do not constitute contested cases. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 641-202.6. Furthermore, the administrative rules direct district courts ruling on judicial review petitions to treat the Council’s decision as other agency action. See id. We accord administrative rules the force and effect of law as long as they are “reasonable and consistent with legislative enactments.” Harlan Sprague Dawley, Inc. v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review, 601 N.W.2d 66, 69 (Iowa 1999); First Iowa State Bank v. Iowa Dep’t of Natural Res., 502 N.W.2d 164, 168 (Iowa 1993). This well-established principle is supported by the legislature’s delegation of authority to the Council to establish rules not inconsistent with the law that will aid the Council in the enforcement of the certificate of need law provisions. See Iowa Code § 135.11(13); id. § 135.72. We have previously upheld an agency’s provision of less formal hearing procedures than those established in section 17A.12. See, e.g., Sindlinger, 503 N.W.2d at 390.

Additionally, we find the legislature did not intend to create a contested case proceeding when it enacted the comprehensive certificate of need statute. We recognize the legislature does not need to expressly provide for an evidentiary hearing in order to find the requirement of a contested case. Allegre, 349 N.W.2d at 115; Bonfield, 63 Iowa L.Rev. at 312. Yet, we fail to discern any basis in the statute or its factual context impliedly requiring an evidentiary hearing. See id. In fact, by using the word “public” in Iowa Code section 135.66(3)(b) to qualify the type of hearing provided to affected persons, and by giving affected persons the right to present testimony, id. § 135.66(4), the legislature evidenced its intent to exclude the evaluation of a certificate of need application from the contested case requirements. If the legislature wanted to provide for a contested case, it could have so provided. See S.E. Iowa Coop. Elec. Ass’n v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 633 N.W.2d 814, 822 (Iowa 2001); State v. Rodenburg, 562 N.W.2d 186, 188 (Iowa 1997). For example, the legislature specifically commands the Council to adhere to “contested case procedures in accordance with chapter 17A” when determining what sanctions to impose on those who fail to obtain a certificate of need prior to constructing a new health institution and those who violate the terms of an approved certificate. Iowa Code § 135.73(2)(a), (b). Moreover, we are guided by the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” ie., the “expression of one thing is the exclusion of another” thing not similarly mentioned. Marcus v. Young, 538 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Iowa 1995); accord Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 186 (Iowa 1999). Clearly, the use of completely different language in sections 135.66 and 135.73 reflects the deliberate choice of the legislature to provide two different types of hearings for two different types of situations. See Farmers State Bank, 433 N.W.2d at 739; see also Marcus, 538 N.W.2d at 289 (the legislature expresses its intent through the omission as well as the inclusion of certain terms); Callender, 591 N.W.2d at 186 (same). As always, we are guided by what the legislature said, not what it could have said. Marcus, 538 N.W.2d at 289.

Because the statute governing applications for certificates of need does not mandate an evidentiary hearing, there is no statutory right to contested case proceedings. See Bernau, 580 N.W.2d at 767. Consequently, we next address whether affected persons have a constitutional right to an adjudicatory hearing. See id. We examine both the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution to determine whether a contested case proceeding is constitutionally required when reviewing certificate of need applications. See id.; Sindlinger, 503 N.W.2d at 390. For purposes of our review, we deem the Due Process Clauses of our state and federal constitutions to be identical in scope, import, and purpose. See Callender, 591 N.W.2d at 187.

Generally, a person has a constitutional due process right to an eviden-tiary hearing in accordance with contested case procedures if the underlying proceeding involves adjudicative facts. See Bernau, 580 N.W.2d at 767; Office of Consumer Advocate, 465 N.W.2d at 284; Hollinrake v. Iowa Law Enforcement Academy, 452 N.W.2d 598, 602 (Iowa 1990); Allegre, 349 N.W.2d at 115. Conversely, if the agency decision rests on legislative facts, the parties are not constitutionally entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Bernau, 580 N.W.2d at 767; Hollinrake, 452 N.W.2d at 602. Thus, whether due process demands an agency to provide affected persons in certificate of need proceedings an evidentiary hearing depends upon whether the proceedings involve adjudicative or legislative facts.

Adjudicative facts relate to the specific parties and their particular circumstances. Hollinrake, 452 N.W.2d at 602; Allegre, 349 N.W.2d at 115. They involve individualized facts peculiar to the parties, and ordinarily “ ‘answer the questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent....’” Allegre, 349 N.W.2d at 115 (quoting Bonfield, 63 Iowa L.Rev. at 323 (footnotes omitted)). Legislative facts, on the other hand, do not pertain to the specific parties. Id. Instead, legislative facts are generalized factual propositions, often consisting of demographical data and statistics compiled from surveys and studies, which aid the decision-maker in determining questions of policy and discretion. See Bernau, 580 N.W.2d at 767; Allegre, 349 N.W.2d at 115; Polk County, 330 N.W.2d at 277; see also Chevy Chase Citizens Ass’n v. Dist. of Columbia Council, 327 A.2d 310, 313-14 (D.C.1974) (hearing is legislative in nature when the agency seeks to make policy decisions affecting the general public, or a substantial portion thereof, instead of individual parties); McMurray v. City Council of West Des Moines, 642 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Iowa 2002) (legislative facts “involve a determination of what is in the best interests of the public generally”).

We conclude the public hearing on a certificate of need application involves the presentation of legislative facts. The criteria of section 135.64, which the Council is to consider and rely upon in its evaluation, consist largely of generalized facts and statistical data. In determining the need for the proposed facility or service, the Council is to examine the projections derived from the state bed need formula. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 641-203.5(3)(c) (1987). Furthermore, the Council is to consider the availability of adequate resources and of current facilities and services, the relationship of the proposed facility to existing facilities, the geographic area, the accessibility of the facility, the proposed Medicaid utilization, construction costs, current utilization of existing health care providers, and the financial feasibility of the project, among others. See Iowa Code § 135.64(1); Iowa Admin. Code r. 641-203.5(3)(c), (5). The Council also reviews a report compiled by Department staff, which evaluates the specific application against the criteria of section 135.64. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 641-202.4(5) (1997) (Council is to receive staff report at least ten days prior to the scheduled public hearing); see also Chevy Chase Citizens Ass’n, 327 A.2d at 314 (when agency decision involves consultation of staff reports, this factor weighs in favor of finding the hearing to be legislative in nature). Even if the Council does consider individualized information from affected parties when evaluating the legislative-type data, the Council is not adjudging the individual parties’ legal rights. See Hollinrake, 452 N.W.2d at 602; see also Bonfield, 63 Iowa L.Rev. at 291-92 (agency action which affects an individual party’s legal rights constitutes a contested case).

Moreover, even if we found the public hearing of section 135.66 involves the presentation of adjudicative facts, it would fall within two of the exceptions to the evidentiary hearing requirement for proceedings involving adjudicative facts. See Allegre, 349 N.W.2d at 115. First, an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary when there are no disputed relevant facts. Id. at 116. In essence, the parties in this case do not dispute the relevant facts. See Office of Consumer Advocate, 465 N.W.2d at 284; Allegre, 349 N.W.2d at 116. In challenging the need for the proposed facility, the existing facilities focused their opposition on staffing shortages in the health care profession. Fike did not dispute this contention, and, in fact, conceded staffing for the new facility would present a potential obstacle.

Second, an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary when the alleged interest of the party seeking a contested case cannot be described as a life, liberty, or property interest under the Due Process Clause. Allegre, 349 N.W.2d at 115; Bonfield, 63 Iowa L.Rev. at 325. As with all procedural due process inquiries, we must first determine whether the party has a protected interest. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 907, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 31 (1976); Bowers v. Polk County Bd. of Supervisors, 638 N.W.2d 682, 691 (Iowa 2002). The affected parties in this case claim they have a protected property interest in another party’s certificate of need application. We will find a property interest only if there is a legitimate claim of entitlement. 13 Southfield Assocs. v. Michigan Dep’t of Pub. Health, 82 Mich.App. 678, 267 N.W.2d 483, 486 (1978) (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 561 (1972)). A mere abstract desire or unilateral expectation of receiving a benefit are insufficient to establish an entitlement. Id.

The record in this case fails to demonstrate the establishment of a property interest in a certificate of need application. Although the three petitioning nursing facilities allege they have a property interest in operating their facilities, that alleged interest is not involved in a proceeding involving the issuance of a certificate of need to a competing institution. See Cathedral Rock of Granite City, Inc. v. Illinois Health Facilities Planning Bd., 308 Ill.App.3d 529, 242 Ill.Dec. 158, 720 N.E.2d 1113, 1121 (1999). The issuance of a certificate of need does not prohibit the existing local facilities from continuing their operations. See id. We acknowledge that the actual issuance of a certificate of need conveys a property interest on the holder of the certificate. Downriver Nursing Assocs. v. Michigan Dep’t of Pub. Health, 193 Mich.App. 594, 484 N.W.2d 748, 751 (1992). This is evident from the procedural safeguards provided to certificate-of-need-holders faced with the potential revocation or suspension of their certificates. See Iowa Code § 135.73 (Council must invoke contested case procedures before revoking or suspending certificate of need); Cathedral Rock of Granite City, Inc., 242 Ill.Dec. 158, 720 N.E.2d at 1121 (no entitlement to due process protections unless the agency’s action is directed at the long-term care facilities’ own certificate of need); Mercy Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Office of Health Policy, 121 Or.App. 587, 855 P.2d 1156, 1159 n. 6 (1993) (State cannot revoke certificate of need without providing contested case procedures). Nonetheless, until the certifícate is issued, the applicant is in the same position as the other affected parties. See In re Certificate of Need Granted to the Harborage, 300 N.J.Super. 363, 693 A.2d 133, 144 (App.Div.1997) (applicant has “no more than an expectation that it would receive the [certificate of need]”). Thus, at the public hearing on a certificate of need application, neither the applicant nor the other affected parties have a protected property interest.

The three petitioning nursing facilities essentially contend they are entitled to be free from the construction of a new facility because it would infringe upon their existing certificates. However, the interest in keeping a certificate is not equivalent to the interest in precluding potential competitors from providing the same services. Mercy Med. Ctr., Inc., 855 P.2d at 1159 n. 6; see Downriver Nursing Assocs., 484 N.W.2d at 751. An existing care facility does not have a protected property interest in being a competitor of another long-term care facility. See Cathedral Rock of Granite City, Inc., 242 Ill.Dec. 158, 720 N.E.2d at 1120-21; Mercy Med. Ctr., Inc., 855 P.2d at 1159 (legislature did not create “an entitlement to a government sanctioned monopoly”). If we recognized such a property interest, we would contravene the legislature’s goal of ensuring the provision of necessary and adequate health services at a reasonable cost. See In re Application by St. Luke’s Hosp., 414 N.W.2d 297, 299 (S.D.1987).

Even if we assumed affected parties have a protected property interest, they are afforded sufficient due process through the public hearing. See Sindlinger, 503 N.W.2d at 390; Lunde, 487 N.W.2d at 361; see also Cathedral Rock of Granite City, Inc., 242 Ill.Dec. 158, 720 N.E.2d at 1122 (affected persons provided notice of the certificate of need application, the right to present testimony at a public hearing, and the right to seek judicial review). The public hearing provides affected parties an opportunity to present testimony and, at the same time, a review by the Council of their specific challenges. See Alfredo v. Iowa Racing & Gaming Comm’n, 555 N.W.2d 827, 833 (Iowa 1996); Sindlinger, 503 N.W.2d at 390; see also Hurd, 580 N.W.2d at 388-89 (finding interests to be adequately protected by the opportunity to present evidence and information refuting other party’s evidence); Hale v. Petit, 438 A.2d 226, 232 (Me.1981) (cross-examination would not have provided additional benefit to certificate of need proceeding where parties provided sufficient opportunity to present evidence). Additionally, affected parties may submit written statements to be considered by the Council in its review of the application. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 641-202.6(2), (4). Lastly, parties dissatisfied with the Council’s decision may request the Council to reconsider its ruling or seek judicial review. See Iowa Code § 185.70.

Because the Council was not required by-statute or constitution to provide an evi-dentiary hearing, the Council did not abuse its discretion or act unreasonably or arbitrarily in denying the three petitioning facilities’ motion for contested case proceeding. The district court properly concluded the review of a certifícate of need application is not a contested case.

IV. Decision to Grant Certificate of Need.

In reviewing the Council’s decision to grant Coralville Manor’s certificate of need, we must keep in mind that our review of the Council’s decision is severely circumscribed. See On With Life, Inc. v. State Health Facilities Council, 532 N.W.2d 496, 497 (Iowa Ct.App.1995). We ordinarily defer to the expertise and experience of the agency, particularly in areas where the legislature has delegated considerable discretion to the agency. See S.E. Iowa Coop. Elec. Ass’n, 633 N.W.2d at 818; In re Certificate of Need Granted to the Harborage, 693 A.2d at 141. Thus, “judgment calls are the province of the [agency] and not of the courts.” Mercy Health Ctr., 360 N.W.2d at 809; accord On With Life, Inc., 532 N.W.2d at 497.

The petitioning nursing facilities claim the Council ignored the requisite statutory criteria and placed undue emphasis on other irrelevant factors, such as fostering competition. Although the Council must consider the eighteen factors delineated in section 135.64(1) in evaluating an application, this list is not exhaustive. Mercy Health Ctr., 360 N.W.2d at 811; accord Hale, 438 A.2d at 233. The Council is authorized to consider any factors reasonably related to the purposes of the statute and the specific application. See Cathedral Rock of Granite City, Inc., 242 Ill.Dec. 158, 720 N.E.2d at 1124 (agency is free to use its expertise in determining what other considerations are relevant); Mercy Health Ctr., 360 N.W.2d at 811 (Council may consider other factors which directly bear on the factors listed in section 135.64(1)); Hale, 438 A.2d at 233 (may consider any factors rationally related to the statute’s purpose). As mentioned, the legislature declared its objective in creating the Council was to provide orderly, economical, and adequate institutional health services that are accessible, both physically and economically, to all citizens of our state. See Mercy Health Ctr., 360 N.W.2d at 811. When considering the benefits of competition in the context of Coralville Manor’s application, the Council was considering how competition would improve the quality and cost of health care to Johnson County’s citizens. Thus, the Council properly considered competition in its evaluation of the application. Notwithstanding, we do not believe fostering competition was the sole or primary basis upon which the Council reached its decision. See Humana of Tennessee v. Tennessee Health Facilities Comm’n, 551 S.W.2d 664, 670 (Tenn.1977).

Likewise, we find no merit to the argument that the Council ignored the statutory criteria of section 135.66. The review of the application was extremely thorough, and we are satisfied all of the issues raised by the affected persons were fully considered. See Nat’l Nephrology Foundation v. Dougherty, 138 N.J.Super. 470, 351 A.2d 392, 396 (App.Div.1976). The written decision and the recorded comments of the Council members at the public hearing reflect the Council’s deliberate and detailed application of the criteria to Coral-ville Manor’s application. See Cathedral Rock of Granite City, Inc., 242 Ill.Dec. 158, 720 N.E.2d at 1125 (record revealed agency fully considered the important aspects of the proposed project); On With Life, Inc., 532 N.W.2d at 497. The Council’s written decision included the four mandatory findings and reasoned explanations for finding the presence of each factor in the application.

Furthermore, the record contained sufficient evidence upon which the Council could have based its findings. See Cathedral Rock of Granite City, Inc., 242 Ill.Dec. 158, 720 N.E.2d at 1123. The state bed need formula projected a future need for 121 long-term care beds in Johnson County. The record indicated Johnson County is the fastest growing county in the state of Iowa. See Humana of Tennessee, 551 S.W.2d at 670 (record demonstrated that the county in which the proposed health facility would be located was one of the fastest growing counties in the region). Most importantly, the population for those sixty-five years and older in Johnson County had increased 74% since 1980, with no corresponding increase in the number of long-term care beds. Moreover, the occupancy rates of the seven county nursing facilities were consistently high. Additionally, no facility in the county had a CCDI unit, and the CCDI units in neighboring counties were either full and/or only accepted private pay pa-tiente. The only factor somewhat in dispute was the availability of adequate health personnel resources to staff the new facility. Although the representatives from neighboring facilities testified that Coralville Manor would be unable to fill its staffing requirements, both the owner of Coralville Manor and Coralville’s economic developer countered that the staffing issues could be adequately resolved. However, the availability of resources was only one factor to consider, and the Council was not required to accept any parties’ particular projection of future staffing difficulties. See Nat’l Nephrology Foundation, 351 A.2d at 396 (the fact that the agency did not give a factor the weight that a party would have preferred does not mean the agency ignored the appropriate criteria). In short, the Council was not convinced staffing shortages would be as detrimental to Coralville Manor’s facility as the affected parties predicted at the hearing. See On With Life, Inc., 532 N.W.2d at 498.

When examining the Council’s decision in light of all of the evidence presented to the Council, we find the decision to grant the certificate was sufficiently supported by the record. See Dickinson County, 521 N.W.2d at 468. The Council’s decision was not unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or without regard to the law. See Mercy Health Ctr., 360 N.W.2d at 812. Additionally, in making its determination, the Council adhered to the procedural requirements of section 135.66, and the general requirement imposed on agencies to act reasonably. Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman, 454 N.W.2d at 820; Farmers State Bank, 433 N.W.2d at 740; Polk County, 330 N.W.2d at 277.

V. Conclusion.

We conclude the evaluation of a certificate of need application does not constitute a contested case, implicating the requirements of section 17A.12. No statute or constitution requires the Council to provide an evidentiary hearing to those affected by a proposed certificate of need. In addition, we find the Council’s decision to grant Coralville Manor’s application was supported by the record. The district court correctly denied the three petitioning nursing facilities’ petition for judicial review.

AFFIRMED.

All justices concur except TERNUS, J., who takes no part.

      . Greenwood Manor is an eighty-seven-bed intermediate and skilled care nursing facility on the west side of Iowa City. Twelve of the beds are licensed for Medicare patients. The facility was built in 1964.

      . Parkview Manor is a ninety-four-bed facility providing intermediate and skilled nursing care services, as well as stroke rehabilitation treatment. It is located in Wellman, which is twenty-five miles south of Iowa City. Wellman is not a part of Johnson County.

      .Lantern Park Nursing and Rehab Center is a 100-bed intermediate and skilled nursing care center in Coralville, with treatment for stroke and Medicaid patients. Lantern Park was established approximately thirty years ago.

      . The Council must consider the following factors when reviewing an application for a certificate of need:

        a. The contribution of the proposed institutional health service in meeting the needs of the medically underserved, ... as well as the extent to which medically underserved residents in the applicant’s service area are likely to have access to the proposed institutional health service.

        b. The relationship of the proposed institutional health services to the long-range development plan, if any, of the person providing or proposing the services.

        c. The need of the population ... to be served....

        d. The distance, convenience, cost of transportation, and accessibility to health services for persons who live outside metropolitan areas.

        e. The availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of providing the proposed institutional health services.

        f. The immediate and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal ... as well as the probable impact of the proposal on the costs of and charges for providing health services by the person proposing the new institutional health service.

        g. The relationship of the proposed institutional health services to the existing health care system of the area in which those services are proposed to be provided.

        h. The appropriate and efficient use or prospective use of the proposed institutional health service, and of any existing similar services, including but not limited to a consideration of the capacity of the sponsor's facility to provide the proposed service, and possible sharing or cooperative arrangements among existing facilities and providers.
      t. The availability of resources, including, but not limited to, health care providers, management personnel, and funds for capital and operating needs....

        j. The appropriate and nondiscriminatory utilization of existing and available health care providers....

        k. The relationship, including the organizational relationship, of the proposed institutional health services to ancillary or support services.

        l. Special needs and circumstances of those entities which provide a substantial portion of their services or resources, or both, to individuals not residing in the immediate geographic area in which the entities are located....
      m. The special needs and circumstances of health maintenance organizations.

        n. The special needs and circumstances of biomedical and behavioral research projects designed to meet a national need and for which local conditions offer special advantages.

        o. The impact of relocation of an institutional health facility ... on other institutional health facilities ... and on the needs of the population to be served....

        p. In the case of a construction project, the costs and methods of the proposed construction and the probable impact of the proposed construction project on total health care costs.

        q. [concerns the addition of beds only]

        r. The recommendations of staff personnel of the department....
      Iowa Code § 135.64(1).

      . The Council must make the following findings in order to grant a certificate of need:

        a. Less costly, more efficient, or more appropriate alternatives to the proposed institutional health service are not available and the development of such alternatives is not practicable;

        b. Any existing facilities providing institutional health services similar to those proposed are being used in an appropriate and efficient manner;

        c. In the case of new construction, alternatives including but not limited to modernization or sharing arrangements have been considered and have been implemented to the maximum extent practicable;

        d. Patients will experience serious problems in obtaining care of the type which will be furnished by the proposed new institutional health service or changed institutional health service, in the absence of that proposed new service.

        Id. § 135.64(2).

      . "Rulemaking” is "the process for adopting, amending, or repealing a rule.” Iowa Code § 17A.2(11).

      . We observe some courts have found a certificate of need proceeding to constitute a contested case. See, e.g., Carriage Hill Cabin John, Inc., 724 A.2d at 751; Living Centers-Southeast, Inc., 532 S.E.2d at 193; St. Mary’s Hosp., 364 S.E.2d at 808; In re Application for Certificate of Need by HCA Health Servs. of Wyoming, Inc., 689 P.2d at 113-14. However, the legislatures in most of those states have enacted statutes specifically directing courts to treat certificate of need proceedings as contested cases. See Living Centers-Southeast, Inc., 532 S.E.2d at 193; St. Mary’s Hosp., 364 S.E.2d at 808. But see In re Application for Certificate of Need by HCA Health Servs. of Wyoming, Inc., 689 P.2d at 113-14 (finding "public meeting” requirement, as interpreted with the federal requirements, entitled persons affected by certificate of need application to a contested case). Furthermore, some of those states do not permit applications for certificates of need until the public health agency publicly identifies the need for a specific facility or service. See Carriage Hill Cabin John, Inc., 724 A.2d at 749; Living Centers-Southeast, Inc., 532 S.E.2d at 194. Consequently, in most circumstances, the agency in charge of certificate of need proceedings must review competing applications for the granting of one certificate. See Carriage Hill Cabin John, Inc., 724 A.2d at 751 (Commission must conduct comparative review process of competing applications to determine "which of the applicants best satisfied the criteria”); Living Centers-Southeast, Inc., 532 S.E.2d at 194, 197 (finding "genuine issues of fact as to who is the superior applicant” will always arise when agency reviews two or more certificate of need applications vying for the issuance of the same certificate). Notwithstanding, we are not the first court to find certificate of need proceedings do not implicate the formal hearing requirements of contested cases. See, e.g., Hale, 438 A.2d at 231 (even where parties are competing for a certificate of need, "the statutory scheme of [Maine's] Certificate of Need Law as a whole indicates a legislative intent that the hearing and review process be separate from the [Administrative Procedure Act]”); In re Application by St. Luke’s Hosp., 414 N.W.2d at 298 (South Dakota has special rules governing certificate of need applications, which are an exception to the Administrative Procedure Act).
      Moreover, we cannot contemplate what additional benefits the petitioning nursing facilities in this case would have received from cross-examining witnesses. Hale, 438 A.2d at 232. The three petitioning facilities took full advantage of their opportunities to present evidence and statements challenging Coral-ville Manor’s application. See Cathedral Rock of Granite City, Inc., 242 Ill.Dec. 158, 720 N.E.2d at 1122; Hale, 438 A.2d at 232. In short, the petitioning facilities failed to demonstrate how the lack of cross-examination prejudiced them. See Hale, 438 A.2d at 232.