author: STREIT, Justice.

text:
    In re the MARRIAGE OF Beverly Robin ROSENFELD and Martin Sanford Rosenfeld. Upon the Petition of Beverly Robin Rosenfeld, Appellant, and Concerning Martin Sanford Rosenfeld, Appellee.
    No. 02-0165.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Sept. 4, 2003.

      Jill Elizabeth Southworth, Springfield, Missouri, for appellant.
    Alexander R. Rhoads of Babich, Goldman, Cashatt & Renzo, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
   STREIT, Justice.

Martin Rosenfeld and Beverly Goode-Kanawati [formerly Beverly Rosenfeld] have been involved in constant litigation since their divorce in 1990. These cases and the appeals have primarily involved their two children. The case before us concerns Rosenfeld’s application for a modification of child support and Goode-Kanawati’s application for an accounting and delivery of funds. The parties’ dispute centers on two groups of funds that were allegedly set aside for the benefit of their children during the marriage. Ro-senfeld gifted $25,000 to his daughter under the Uniform Transfer to Minors Act. The parents spent $20,000 for bonds to be used for their son’s education. The district court found in the instant case the UTMA funds did not constitute a trust and Rosenfeld, as custodian, had discretion to use the funds for the “support, maintenance, education and benefit” of his daughter. The court found Rosenfeld misappropriated his daughter’s UTMA funds and ordered Rosenfeld to restore $20,000. The district court rejected Goode-Kanawati’s efforts to increase Rosenfeld’s obligation to subsidize his daughter’s college expenses and concluded sufficient educational funds remained in her UTMA account to pay for college. As to the son’s bonds, the court found they did not constitute a trust and belonged to Rosenfeld. The district court found the law in effect during the original dissolution governs Rosenfeld’s obligation to contribute to his son’s college expenses. Finally, the court ordered Ro-senfeld to pay $500 toward Goode-Kana-wati’s trial attorney fees. Goode-Kanawa-ti appealed and Rosenfeld cross-appealed. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision, but ordered Ro-senfeld to restore $45,805 to his daughter’s UTMA account and to pay $1000 to Goode-Kanawati for her appellate attorney fees. We vacate the court of appeals’ decision. We affirm in part the district court’s judgment as modified and reverse in part.

I. Background and Facts

Thirteen years have passed since Martin Rosenfeld and Beverly Goode-Kanawati divorced; they are still entangled in litigation. The district court file is now sixteen volumes and the parties have appeared four times before the Iowa Court of Appeals. See In re Marriage of Rosenfeld, 662 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa Ct.App.2003); In re Marriage of Rosenfeld, 524 N.W.2d 212 (Iowa Ct.App.1994); In re Marriage of Rosenfeld, 535 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994); In re Marriage of Rosenfeld, 485 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa Ct.App.1991).

During their marriage, Goode-Kanawati and Rosenfeld had two children, Natalie born in 1981 and Andrew born in 1987. During the dissolution proceedings, Rosen-feld testified that during the parties’ marriage, they purchased four zero coupon bonds, expected to pay $25,000 per year for four years beginning in 2000, to be used for Natalie’s college education. A mutual fund was also purchased for her benefit to pay the tax on the bonds. These items were given to Natalie under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (UGMA), now called the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (UTMA). See Iowa Code ch. 565B (2001). Rosenfeld also told the court $20,000 of marital funds was used to purchase Iowa Finance Authority Sewage Bonds to be used for Andrew’s education. The bonds were left in Rosenfeld’s name. The dissolution decree provided certain properties set aside for the parties’ two minor children would not be divided between Rosenfeld and Goode-Kanawati. Nonetheless, Rosenfeld was awarded $20,000 of sewage bonds.

In January 1995, the bonds in Natalie’s name were called by the issuer. Rosen-feld, as custodian of the accounts, was paid $40,311 which he placed into his own checking account. Rosenfeld spent those funds. When Natalie graduated from high school in 2000, Martin filed an application for modification of child support and sought to determine the parties’ obligations toward Natalie’s college expenses. Goode-Kanawati filed a separate petition for an accounting of the funds held by Martin for the children. Goode-Kanawati also asked the court to order Rosenfeld to deliver all assets in the children’s custodial accounts to her. The district court consolidated the two cases for trial.

The district court found Rosenfeld violated the UTMA by commingling Natalie’s funds with his own and by failing to keep .adequate records of the disbursements made from the account. The court found Rosenfeld improperly used over $14,000 of the money and determined the funds would have grown at five percent per an-num. The court ordered Rosenfeld to restore $20,000 to Natalie's funds and made Goode-Kanawati custodian of the account. As to the remaining money in the accounts, the court found the funds were sufficient to cover Natalie’s college expenses. The court also found Goode-Ka-nawati did not prove a trust had been established for Andrew. The trial court awarded Goode-Kanawati $500 in attorneys’ fees and $150 for expert witness fees. The court also determined Iowa Code section 598.21(5A) (1999) did not apply to limit the obligation for postsecondary education expenses in this case. Goode-Kanawati appealed and Rosenfeld cross-appealed.

The Iowa Court of Appeals rejected Goode-Kanawati’s claim that trusts had been created on behalf of both the children. The court ordered Natalie’s funds to be partially restored by Rosenfeld and ordered Rosenfeld to pay $500 for appellate attorney fees. We granted Goode-Kanawati’s petition for further review.

II. Scope of Review

Our scope of review of this equitable action is de novo. Iowa RApp. P. 6.4.

III. The Merits

On further review, we must determine whether Rosenfeld, as custodian of Natalie’s UTMA account, properly spent her money. We also address whether the funds in the Iowa Finance Authority Sewage Bonds constituted an express trust for Andrew’s benefit. Finally, we address whether attorney fees and costs should be assessed against Rosenfeld.

A. Status of Natalie’s Funds

On further review, Goode-Kanawati asks this court to look at several issues relevant to the status of Natalie’s UTMA funds. First, she argues the funds in Natalie’s UTMA account constituted a trust for the sole purpose of funding Natalie’s college education. She also seeks reimbursement from Rosenfeld due to his improper use of the UTMA funds.

1. Nature of the UTMA Funds

Goode-Kanawati argued Rosenfeld should only have been permitted to use the UTMA funds for Natalie’s educational expenses, as this was the express purpose of the trust. The district court found because Natalie was given ownership of the bonds and mutual funds under UTMA, Iowa Code chapter 565B controls these transfers.

Goode-Kanawati’s arguments are based upon the premise that the UTMA funds set aside for Natalie’s college education constituted a “restricted use trust.” If the funds constitute a trust, Goode-Kanawati asserts Rosenfeld was only permitted to make expenditures in the interests of the express purpose of the trust, i.e. to provide support for college expenses. We disagree and conclude transfers made to children under UTMA are not trusts.

The purpose of UTMA transfers is to provide a simple way for gifting money to minors while avoiding the complications of establishing a formal guardianship or trust. In re Marriage of Hendricks, 681 N.E.2d 777, 781 (Ind.Ct.App.1997); see also Sternlicht v. Sternlicht, 822 A.2d 732, 737 (Pa.Super.Ct.2003). When a transfer to a minor is made under UTMA, unlike trusts, the donor relinquishes his or her title to the property. See In re Marriage of Hook, 364 N.W.2d 185, 189 (Iowa 1985); Marshall v. United States, 831 F.Supp. 988, 1000 (E.D.N.Y.1993) (UGMA transfer “does not afford any rights, legal or equitable,” to donor); 15 Am.Jur.2d Gifts § 16, at 714 (1999). Once the gift is made, it is irrevocable. In re Marriage of Hendricks, 681 N.E.2d at 781; Sternlicht, 822 A.2d at 737; 15 Am.Jur.2d Gifts § 16, at 715. As such, a gift under UTMA is not a trust per se. Transfers under UTMA are made as a way to gift funds to a minor while giving discretion to a designated custodian to manage the funds. 15 Am.Jur.2d Gifts § 16, at 714.

A transfer under UTMA is governed by Iowa Code section 565B.14(1) which provides:

A custodian may deliver or pay to the minor or expend for the minor’s benefit so much of the custodial property as the custodian considers advisable for the use and benefit of the minor, without court order and without regard to:
а. The duty or ability of the custodian personally or of any other person to support the minor; or
б. Any other income or property of the minor which may be applicable or available for that purpose.

Iowa Code § 565B.14(1) (1999). The custodians of a transfer under UTMA may use their discretion to make expenditures on behalf of the minor. Sutliff v. Sutliff, 339 Pa.Super. 523, 489 A.2d 764, 773 (1985). Goode-Kanawati reads too much into our UTMA statute. Neither the simple creation of an UTMA account, nor the parents’ educational intent in creating the account, transforms the funds into a trust. See id. Rosenfeld’s testimony at trial assuring the court he had taken financial measures to assure his children’s educations did not elevate the UTMA accounts to a trust.

2. Misappropriation of Natalie’s UTMA Funds

In early 1995, Natalie’s bonds gifted to her under UTMA were called. The bonds were liquidated for $40,311. Shortly thereafter, Rosenfeld deposited $40,000 of those funds into his personal checking account. In doing so, Rosenfeld misappropriated Natalie’s UTMA funds.

Rosenfeld provided an accounting of his expenditures. Rosenfeld’s accounting showed he used $51,264.86 from his account to benefit Natalie, Andrew, and the family. Of that amount, Rosenfeld spent $27,402.79 on Natalie for things such as clothing, furniture, travel expenses, Bat Mitzvah expenses, dental expenses, and taxes. The question is whether Rosenfeld is allowed a credit for any of the expenditures made for Natalie.

The precise dates and amounts of the expenditures are difficult to discern from the record. Some expenditures, however, clearly occurred before Rosenfeld deposited Natalie’s UTMA funds into his own personal checking account. For example, Rosenfeld claims that he spent in excess of $13,000 on Natalie’s 1994 Bat Mitzvah. When Rosenfeld paid for Natalie’s Bat Mitzvah, he spent from his own account— only later, when made to account for Natalie’s UTMA funds, does Rosenfeld characterize the Bat Mitzvah expenses as expenditures on behalf of Natalie to lessen his obligation to repay. We refuse to credit such expenditures against Rosenfeld’s subsequent misappropriation of Natalie’s UTMA funds.

Other expenditures were made many years after Rosenfeld deposited Natalie’s funds into his own account. For example, Rosenfeld claims he spent at least $520 in late 2000 on Natalie’s airfare. By the time of these expenditures, however, the UTMA funds had already been used, i.e., deposited into Rosenfeld’s account.

Rosenfeld should receive a credit only for $1426 of expenditures from Natalie’s UTMA account. In 1995, when the bonds were called, Rosenfeld paid $1426 in taxes for Natalie. This amount represents the only allowable expenditure under the rules of UTMA transfers.

Having misappropriated his child’s money, we will not lessen Rosenfeld’s obligation to repay this money by crediting him with amounts he spent on Natalie before the bonds were liquidated or at later times after the funds had been used for other purposes. He will not be deemed to have made some type of restitution for money he spent on his daughter during the six years following the taking.

When a custodian misappropriates UTMA funds, the custodian shall reimburse the child for those funds. Buder v. Sartore, 774 P.2d 1383, 1390 (Colo.1989). At an interest rate of five percent annually, by 2001, Natalie’s funds were worth $51,692.85. Because Rosenfeld misappropriated his daughter’s UTMA funds, he should pay $51,692.85 into an UTMA account for Natalie, naming Goode-Kanawati as account holder with her daughter. We affirm as modified.

3. Funding for Natalie’s College Education

Goode-Kanawati claims the funds in Natalie’s UTMA account are not sufficient to cover Natalie’s college expenses. As such, she requests this court order Rosenfeld to pay whatever is in excess of the UTMA funds. The district court found and we agree, Natalie’s college expenses were approximately $7725 per year for tuition, room, board, fees, and books. Goode-Kanawati asserts it costs $14,000 per year to send Natalie to a four-year public college in North Carolina. The amount suggested by Goode-Kanawati includes the costs of a car, gasoline, clothing, and a telephone. The question is whether Rosenfeld should pay more than the UTMA funds will pay.

Rosenfeld’s obligation to subsidize Natalie’s college expenses is limited by Iowa Code section 598.21(5A). This statute says “[t]he court may order a postsecondary education subsidy if good cause is shown.” Iowa Code § 598.21(5A). The court shall determine “the reasonable costs for only necessary postsecondary education expenses.” Id. Generally, the costs of college include “tuition, room, board, and books.” In re Marriage of Griffin, 570 N.W.2d 258, 260 (Iowa CtApp.1997). Goode-Kanawati asserts the court should conclude Natalie’s expenses for transportation, clothing, and telephone are “reasonable” costs for “necessary” expenses. We do not address this issue.

It can be reasonably argued transportation costs and other incidental living expenses may exceed $7725 per year. See In re Marriage of Vannausdle, 668 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 2003) (“We think our legislature also understood that the necessary postsecondary education expenses includes more than tuition, books, and room and board.”). However, even if we allowed such expenses as “reasonable costs” for “necessary postsecondary educational expenses,” Natalie has sufficient funds gifted to her by her parents to pay these expenses. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said “good cause” under Iowa Code section 598.21(5A) exists for ordering Rosenfeld to contribute more than he has already done in creating Natalie’s accounts. We affirm.

B. Status of Andrew’s Claim

1. Nature of the Iowa Sewage Authority Bonds

Goode-Kanawati argues the Iowa Sewage Authority Bonds taken out to benefit Andrew constituted a trust. Pursuant to Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.14(6)(e), Goode-Kanawati had the burden to prove a trust was established. She failed to do this.

In the dissolution decree, the district court stated:

Martin has invested certain amounts in trust for the benefit of his children by a former marriage and for Natalie and Andrew. These trust funds are for the benefit of the children and the court makes no order as to these.

Though the court made no disposition as to Natalie’s funds, it awarded the Iowa Finance Authority Sewage Bonds to Rosen-feld, listing the bonds and their total value. The court stated the “assets of the parties should be divided equitably.” It appears from the dissolution decree that Goode-Kanawati was awarded at least half of the marital assets. Though the court used the words “trust fund” in the dissolution decree, the fact the court awarded the funds to Rosenfeld indicates the court did not actually conclude the bonds constituted a trust or that the court intended to create a trust by its decree. Although it is well within the power of the court to create such a trust, the court simply did not do this. Rather, the bonds were explicitly awarded to Rosenberg as “the partnership-tax-savings investments and other investments” under the dissolution decree. The bonds have never been in Andrew’s name. Rather, they were Rosenfeld’s property and he rightfully maintained them in his investment portfolio after the dissolution.

2. Determination of College Expenses under Iowa Code section 598.21 (5A)

Rosenfeld argues he is not obligated to pay any more for Andrew’s post-secondary education than the amount the statute requires. Iowa Code section 598.21(5A) limits the amount a parent must pay toward postsecondary education expenses. 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 175, § 190 (codified at Iowa Code § 598.21(5A) (1999)). This section, in part, states a party shall not pay more than one-third of the total cost of postsecondary education expenses. Relying on the one-third limit, in 2001, Rosenfeld and Goode-Kanawati made stipulations regarding the amount to be paid by either party for college if the court was going to follow the method of calculating pursuant to Iowa Code section 598.21(5A). The parties stipulated if any amount was to be paid by either party, it would be $8014 per year.

After trial, the court ruled, in its judgment on Rosenfeld’s application for modification of child support, that section 598.21(5A) did not apply to this case. The court relied upon In re Marriage of Sojka in which we stated, “section 598.21(5A) applies only to dissolution decrees postdating the statute’s enactment.” 611 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Iowa 2000). Because the dissolution decree in the present case was entered in 1990, before section 598.21(5A) was enacted, the trial court ruled the statute did not apply. Rosenfeld cross-appealed the judgment of the trial court arguing the court erred in holding Iowa Code section 598.21(5A) did not control the determination of the parties’ respective obligations toward Andrew’s postsecondary educational expenses. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s conclusion.

In re Marriage of Sojka does not apply to this case, however, because in Sojka, unlike here, the dissolution decree determined parental contributions to the child’s college expenses. Id. at 504. Because the obligations were determined prior to the enactment of the statute, we held section 598.21(5A) did not apply. In the present case, however, Iowa Code section 598.21(5A) is nevertheless applicable because the court did not fix college expenses prior to the enactment of 598.21(5A). See In re Marriage of Harless, 251 N.W.2d 212, 213 (Iowa 1977) (“[Sjtatutes have prospective application only unless a clearly contrary intent appears.”). Therefore, Iowa Code section 598.21(5A) operates to limit the amount of money Rosenfeld is obligated to pay toward Andrew’s college education.

We refuse to enforce, however, the parties’ conditional stipulation to Rosenfeld’s obligation to pay Andrew’s college expenses. The parties made this conditional stipulation in 2001, in the midst of protracted litigation, when Andrew was only fourteen years old. That is, he was still at least four years shy of attending college. There is nothing in the record to indicate Andrew plans on attending college. In recent years, college education expenses have increased between three and six percent each year. With the ever-increasing costs of sending a child to college, it would be difficult to set a specific dollar amount of an obligation four years before the child attends college. Additionally, because Iowa Code section 598.21(5A) applies, the court is required to consider the amount, if any, a child can contribute to his education. It is also premature to calculate Rosenfeld’s obligation to Andrew because we do not know if there will be any scholarships, grants, work-study, or other money available to defray the cost of Andrew’s education.

In the usual context, parties to a dissolution are free to make agreements regarding the future college expenses of their children, which the courts may then enforce. In this case, however, the parties’ stipulation was, in fact, a conditional stipulation, made in the context of protracted litigation, which would only apply if the district court held that a statute applied. Rosenfeld’s postsecondary education contribution should be calculated based upon Iowa Code section 598.21(5A), but we refuse to enforce their stipulation at the present time. To do so would not only be impractical, but, more importantly, not in the best interests of the child. We therefore affirm, but on different grounds.

C. Issue of Attorneys Fees

On further review, Goode-Ka-nawati urges us to order Rosenfeld to pay her trial and appellate attorney fees, in light of Rosenfeld’s misappropriation of Natalie’s UTMA funds and trial tactics. As a general rule in Iowa, however, attorney fees are not allowed in the absence of a statute or contract authorizing such an award. Suss v. Sckammel, 375 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Iowa 1985). The case before us concerns both an accounting of funds action and a modification action. See Iowa Code §§ 565B and 598.

The district court ordered Rosenfeld to pay for Goode-Kanawati’s attorney fees on the modification action, but not the accounting of funds action. With respect to the accounting of funds action, the court correctly pointed out that Iowa Code section 565B (transfers to minors) does not authorize a court to grant attorney fees. Goode-Kanawati urges us to make an exception to the Suss principle in the present case, but we refuse to do.

In modification proceedings, however, “the court may award attorney fees to the prevailing party in an amount deemed reasonable by the court.” Id. § 598.36. As a threshold matter, the trial court found that “each party has the ability, without hardship, to pay his and her own attorney fees.” The court then ordered Rosenfeld to pay Goode-Kanawati $500 as a sanction for discovery violations.

The decision to award attorney fees rests within the sound discretion of the court, and we will not disturb its decision absent a finding of abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Maher, 596 N.W.2d 561, 568 (Iowa 1999). Whether fees ought to be awarded depends, in part, on the ability of the parties to pay. In re Marriage of Guyer, 522 N.W.2d 818, 822 (1994). The record does not show that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Goode-Kanawati $500 in trial attorney fees. We affirm.

Similarly, this Court also has the authority to award appellate attorney fees. See Iowa Code § 598.36; In re Marriage of Maher, 596 N.W.2d at 568. In arriving at our decision, we consider Goode-Kana-wati’s needs, Rosenfeld’s ability to pay, and Goode-Kanawati’s obligation to defend the trial court’s decision on the cross-appeal. See id. The court of appeals awarded Goode-Kanawati $1000 in appellate attorney fees (which Rosenfeld does not contest), but, taking into account the foregoing factors, we increase the award of the court of appeals by $4000, and grant Goode-Kanawati $5000 for her appellate attorney fees.

IV. Conclusion

We affirm the district court’s decision as to Natalie’s funds. The zero coupon bonds gifted to Natalie under UTMA did not constitute a trust. Rosenfeld would not have been restricted to make expenditures out of these funds solely for educational purposes. However, in this case, Rosenfeld did not make expenditures out of these funds for Natalie’s benefit. Even though it was shown he spent money on her after the misappropriation, Rosenfeld will not receive a credit for these expenditures. Rosenfeld must reimburse Natalie for his improper use of the UTMA funds. After this reimbursement, the UTMA accounts are sufficient to fund Natalie’s college education. We also affirm the district court’s decision that the bonds taken out for Andrew’s benefit belong to Rosenfeld. The dissolution court specifically awarded the bonds to Rosenfeld, identifying both the type of bonds and amount. Rosenfeld rightfully maintained the bonds in his own investment portfolio. The district court properly rejected Rosenfeld’s attempt to use the parties’ stipulation to set his obligations for Andrew’s college expenses. Nevertheless, those obligations, if they arise, should be determined pursuant to Iowa Code section 598.21(5A). We affirm, albeit on other grounds. Finally, we affirm the district court’s decision awarding Goode-Kanawati trial attorneys’ fees and we award her $5000 for appellate attorney fees.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED IN PART AS MODIFIED AND REVERSED IN PART.

All justices concur except LAVORATO, C. J., who takes no part.

      . The court stated it was a "reasonable expectation" that "the funds would have grown at a rate of five percent annually."

      . The coupon bonds were liquidated for $40,311.00. The record shows $311 was left in Natalie’s UTMA account.

      . We do not hold the types of expenditures Rosenfeld made for Natalie are disallowed under UTMA, but merely that he was not spending her money for these things.

      . The district court removed Rosenfeld as the custodian of Natalie's UTMA account from which he misappropriated money. As to Natalie's mutual funds, the district court permitted Rosenfeld to remain the custodian. We affirm the district court's judgment in this regard.

      . We should also acknowledge that the legislature has recently amended Iowa Code section 598.21(5A), which now explicitly states that "[a] support order, decree, or judgment entered or pending before July 1, 1997, that provides for support of a child for college, university, or community college expenses may be modified in accordance with this subsection.” Iowa Code § 598.21(5A)(e) (2003). We do not reach this issue, however.

      . Iowa Code section 598.21(5A) provides:
      The court may order a postsecondary education subsidy if good cause is shown.
      a. In determining whether good cause exists for ordering a postsecondary education subsidy, the court shall consider the age of the child, the ability of the child relative to postsecondary education, the child’s financial resources, whether the child is self-sustaining, and the financial condition of each parent. If the court determines that good cause is shown for ordering a postsec-ondary education subsidy, the court shall determine the amount of subsidy as follows:
      (1) The court shall determine the cost of postsecondaiy education based upon the cost of attending an in-state public institution ... and shall include the reasonable costs for only necessary postsecondary education expenses.
      (2) The court shall then determine the amount, if any, which the child may reasonably be expected to contribute....
      (3) The child’s expected contribution shall be deducted from the cost of postsecondary education and the court shall apportion responsibility for the remaining cost of post-secondary education to each parent. The amount paid by each parent shall not exceed thirty-three and one-third percent of the total cost of postsecondary education.
      Iowa Code § 598.21(5A).

      . See In re Marriage of Vannausdle, 668 N.W.2d at 889, n. 1.

      . Recent statistics indicate the average annual cost at a four-year public college in Iowa is $14,237. See Iowa College Student Aid Commission, Typical Undergraduate Student Expenses at 1 (2003). This figure is based on data for the 2003-04 academic year. It varies considerably from the average annual costs at the same institutions in the 2001-02 academic year: $11,108. See Iowa College Student Aid Commission, Typical Undergraduate Student Expenses at 1 (2001).

      .Goode-Kanawati alleges that she has spent in excess of $56,000 pursuing this action.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Larry Dean WHITE, Appellant.
    No. 02-0919.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Sept. 4, 2003.

      Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Arthur Adams, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Laura Roan, Scott Brown, and Cristen C. Odell, Assistant Attorneys General, and Brent Symens, County Attorney, for ap-pellee.
   STREIT, Justice.

In a bone-chilling ordeal of life-threatening intimidation, Heather Nelson was held at gunpoint by her estranged husband, Larry White, for over three hours. During this time, White forced Nelson to watch a videotape in which White repeatedly threatened Nelson with violence and murder. White did not physically abuse Nelson during the terrorizing event. White appeals his convictions of first-degree burglary and kidnapping. He argues the infliction of mental anguish alone is not sufficient to constitute the “torture” element of first-degree kidnapping. White also contends the district court erred in admitting evidence of a prior assault between him and Nelson. White claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a judgment of acquittal based on the lack of evidence to prove White confined Nelson with the specific intent to inflict serious injury and to torture her. Because we find the court properly admitted the prior acts evidence, mental anguish alone is sufficient to constitute “torture” for first-degree kidnapping, and there is substantial evidence in the record to support White’s convictions, we affirm. '

I. Background and Facts

Larry White and Heather Nelson separated after' nine years of marriage. In September 2001, two days after Nelson moved out, White went to Nelson’s home and the two fought. White slammed Nelson’s head into the side of the house. Later that day on the telephone, White threatened to get a gun and shoot Nelson.

One month later on October 20, 2001, during the early morning hours, White broke into Nelson’s home while she was gone. He brought with him a camcorder, a package of videotapes, a shotgun, and shells. White set up the camera in Nelson’s bedroom and videotaped himself for two-and-a-half hours. The State accurately characterized the contents of the tapes as a “repetitive litany of self-pity, obsession, and homicidal ideation directed toward his wife and her male friends.” After Nelson came home around 8:00 a.m., White forced her into the upstairs bedroom. While the video camera was still recording, White threatened to shoot off Nelson’s knee. He ordered her into a chair and questioned her about her sexual activities since their separation. Nelson screamed and pleaded for her life. White turned the tape off and forced Nelson downstairs to view the videotapes in their entirety. As Nelson watched, White pointed the gun at her. Nelson admitted their marital problems were her fault and said other things “to make White feel good.” Nelson asked White for the videotape and he gave it to her before leaving the house.

White was charged with first-degree kidnapping and first-degree burglary in violation of Iowa Code sections 710.1, 710.2, and 713.3 (2001). The court denied White’s motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of the assault that occurred two days after their separation. A jury convicted White and he appeals.

II. The Merits

White argues the district court erred in admitting evidence of a prior assault between him and Nelson and in finding sufficient evidence to support a finding that he intentionally inflicted torture and serious injury upon Nelson. White also brings a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for his attorney’s failure to move for a judgment of acquittal based on the lack of evidence to prove White confined Nelson with the specific intent to inflict serious injury.

A. Prior Bad Acts

White argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of White’s assault on the victim one month prior to the crime. He asserts the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. We review rulings on the admission of evidence of prior bad acts for an abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 569 N.W.2d 113, 116 (Iowa 1997).

The circumstances surrounding the pri- or assault are as follows. Two days after Nelson moved into her own house, White showed up unannounced and uninvited. He called her a “slut” and a “whore.” Nelson and White got into a physical struggle on her porch. Nelson slapped White. He held her by her wrists up against the house. He held her wrists so tight Nelson heard one of them “pop.” White “gritted his teeth and held his breath and just got red in the face and started to shake in anger.” White let go of Nelson’s wrists, but then put his hands on her head. He drew Nelson close and then hit her head against the side of the house. Nelson “saw stars” and collapsed. After White left, Nelson called him. White said he had a gun and as soon as he could find some shotgun shells, he was going to come back to Nelson’s house and shoot her. While Nelson and White were on the telephone, Nelson heard White rummaging through drawers and objects breaking. When White eventually returned to Nelson’s house, he was arrested by the police.

The State sought to introduce the evidence of the prior bad act as being relevant to the issue of White’s specific intent. The trial court agreed and allowed the evidence in, subject to a limiting instruction. In general, evidence of one crime cannot be used to prove another crime occurred. Evidence which is intended only to show the defendant is a bad person and should therefore be convicted of the charged crime must be excluded. State v. Delaney, 526 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Iowa Ct.App.1994). However, if the evidence of crimes, wrongs, or bad acts is relevant to issues other than the defendant’s propensity to commit crime, it may be admissible. Iowa R. Evid. 5.404(b). For example, the evidence may be admissible as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Id. To be admissible, the evidence must be relevant “ ‘to prove some fact or element in issue other than the defendant’s criminal disposition.’ ” State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 239 (Iowa 2001) (quoting State v. Castaneda, 621 N.W.2d 435, 440 (Iowa 2001)). The second requirement for admissibility is that the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect engendered by showing the defendant has committed other crimes. Id.

Initially, White claimed a defense of diminished responsibility. At trial, he claimed he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder from losses in his life that occurred in the early 1990s and that this disorder prevented him from forming specific intent. In the present case, to prove the charge of first-degree kidnapping, the State had to prove White had specific intent to inflict serious injury upon and to torture Nelson. To prove the charge of first-degree burglary, the State had to prove White had specific intent to commit an assault upon breaking into Nelson’s house. The State argued the defense of diminished responsibility put White’s specific intent in direct issue with the evidence of the prior assault being relevant.

To determine the admissibility of the proffered evidence, we first must analyze whether the evidence was relevant to the crime charged. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the evidence of the prior act was relevant. A fiercely contested issue at trial was White’s specific intent as it was necessary for both the charges of burglary and kidnapping. White’s prior acts of banging Nelson’s head against a wall and threatening to shoot her are undoubtedly relevant to the charges before us. Evidence of White’s prior intentional, violent acts toward the victim, aggravated by his prior death threats, makes it more probable White intended to cause Nelson serious injury on the day in question. See Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d at 242 (citing State v. Haskins, 573 N.W.2d 39, 45-46 (Iowa Ct.App.1997) (finding evidence of prior assault against victim relevant to intent of defendant charged with attempted murder of victim)). The evidence of the prior bad act is relevant to the instant charge of kidnapping because it tends to negate White’s claim of diminished responsibility. That is, the evidence makes it more probable that White’s actions were the product of intentional, voluntary decisions to inflict serious injury upon Nelson and to subject her to torture. These were not the actions of a man incapable of forming intent. Rather, White’s history shows a pattern of willful, abusive behavior. The concern of more consequence is whether the probative value of the prior act is outweighed by the danger of prejudice.

Having found the evidence is relevant to the charges before us, we now turn to whether the probative value is outweighed by the prejudicial effect. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it,

[a]ppeals to the jury’s sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish, or triggers other mainsprings of human action that may cause the jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the case.

2 Joseph M. McLaughlin Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 403.04[1][c], at 403-40 to 403-44 (2d ed.2001). When weighing the probative value of the evidence against the danger of prejudice, the court must consider

on the one side, the actual need for the other-crimes evidence in the light of the issues and the other evidence available to the prosecution, the convincingness of the evidence that the other crimes were committed and that the accused was the actor, and the strength or weakness of the other-crimes evidence in supporting the issue, and on the other hand, the degree to which the jury will probably be roused by the evidence to overmastering hostility.

Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d at 240 (quoting State v. Wade, 467 N.W.2d 283, 284-85 (Iowa 1991)). There must be clear proof the defendant committed the prior bad act. Id. (citing Brown, 569 N.W.2d at 117).

We must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in deciding the probative value of the evidence outweighed its inherently prejudicial effect. White contested whether he had specific intent to cause Nelson serious injury or torture her. At trial, he asserted because of depression and post-traumatic stress syndrome, he was unable to form the requisite intent to commit burglary and kidnapping. He claimed his acts must be interpreted in light of his then existing diminished capacity. Evidence of the prior bad acts is extrinsic evidence the jury could consider in determining whether White had formed specific intent in the later incidents of burglary and kidnapping. The evidence is of the nature that it had a tendency to make the existence of White’s specific intent on October 20, 2001, more probable than it would be without the evidence of his prior violent acts and verbal threats to kill Nelson. See Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d at 239 (quoting Brown, 569 N.W.2d at 116).

As a final matter, there was clear proof White committed the prior acts. He did not dispute them at trial. This fact supports the admission of the evidence. Moreover, in the context of this trial, evidence of White slamming Nelson’s head into a wall and threatening to kill her is not likely to arouse the jury’s sense of horror. Admittedly, the jury could have been swayed by unfair prejudice from the admission of the evidence. However, the prior acts were not the focus of the trial. Within the scope of the entire trial, the State spent little time developing the prior acts evidence. The prior acts were substantially less brutal than White’s acts of October 20. Consequently, the prior acts evidence would not rouse the jury to “overmastering hostility.” Id. (citing State v. Larsen, 512 N.W.2d 803, 808 (Iowa Ct.App.1993)). On balance, we cannot say the trial court did not fairly weigh the relevant factors in deciding whether to admit the prior acts evidence. The court’s resolution of this difficult balancing approach was reasonable and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

White argues there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for first-degree kidnapping. Specifically, he contends mental anguish unaccompanied by physical injury or. sexual abuse is not “torture” within the meaning of Iowa Code section 710.2. Our review is for correction of errors of law. State v. Kotlers, 589 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Iowa 1999).

The Iowa Code provides first degree kidnapping is “when the person kidnapped, as a consequence of the kidnapping, suffers serious injury, or is intentionally subjected to torture or sexual abuse.” Iowa Code § 710.2. In the present case, there is no evidence of serious injury or sexual abuse. Therefore, the State had the burden to prove White intentionally subjected Nelson to “torture” as is contemplated by section 710.2. We have repeatedly addressed cases involving both mental suffering accompanied by either physical injury or sexual abuse. See, e.g., State v. Siemer, 454 N.W.2d 857 (Iowa 1990); State v. Simmons, 454 N.W.2d 866 (Iowa 1990); State v. Schertz, 830 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1988); State v. Schertz, 328 N.W.2d 320 (Iowa 1982); State v. Cross, 308 N.W.2d 25 (Iowa 1981); State v. Kirchner, 600 N.W.2d 330 (Iowa Ct.App.1999). However, whether mental torture alone is enough to constitute “torture” as it is used in section 710.2 is an issue of first impression in Iowa.

We had occasion in State v. Cross to discuss the definition of torture. We relied upon “[cjommentators on the criminal code [who] suggest ‘torture’ ordinarily means ‘the intentional infliction of pain (either) mental or physical.” 308 N.W.2d at 27 (citing Dunahoo, The New Iowa Criminal Code: Part II, 29 Drake L.Rev. 491, 554 n. 570 (1980); J. Yeager and R. Carlson, 4 Iowa Practice: Criminal Law and Procedure § 236 (1979)). Torture is defined by the dictionary as “anguish of body or mind.” Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1242 (10th ed.2002).

A survey of case law from other jurisdictions shows “torture” is generally interpreted to encompass physical and/or mental anguish. See, e.g., Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F.Supp.2d 1322, 1346

(N.D.Ga.2002) (the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment defines “torture” as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him ... information or a confession....”); Hale v. Gibson, 227 F.3d 1298, 1335 (10th Cir.2000) (for purposes of “heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator” to murder, torture includes the infliction of either great physical anguish or extreme mental cruelty); People v. Hines, 194 Colo. 284, 572 P.2d 467, 470 (1977) (class one felony kidnapping is whether the victim is inflicted with “bodily injury,” which includes “impairment of mental condition”); In re A.G., 325 Ill.App.3d 429, 258 Ill.Dec. 835, 757 N.E.2d 524, 529 (2001) (in context of CINA action, “torture” of children “includes conduct that involves solely the infliction of emotional harm, mental pain and suffering, mental anguish and agony”); State v. Wisowaty, 137 N.H. 298, 627 A.2d 572, 578 (1993) (Class A felony kidnapping is where the victim suffers a “serious injury” which includes “psychological injuries and mental anguish”); State v. Ryan, 248 Neb. 405, 534 N.W.2d 766, 793 (1995) (element of “torture” which makes murder “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel and therefore a capital offense,” is found “where the victim is subjected to serious physical, sexual or psychological abuse before death”).

It would be contrary to legislative intent and common sense to find “torture” must include an element of physical injury. It is reasonable to assume the legislature was aware of the duality of the term “torture” and would have explicitly limited it to physical torture if that was what the legislature had intended the term to mean. In re AG., 258 Ill.Dec. 885, 757 N.E.2d at 524, 528-29. Furthermore, other Iowa Code sections lend support to the conclusion that “torture” encompasses mental anguish unaccompanied by physical injury. Iowa Code section 702.18 defines “serious injury” to include “[disabling mental illness,” or extensive bodily injury. Iowa Code § 702.18(l)(<z), (6). We conclude “torture” as it is used in Iowa Code section 710.2 includes mental anguish unaccompanied by physical or sexual assault. In other words, “torture” is either physical and/or mental anguish.

There is substantial evidence showing "White intentionally tortured Nelson. "When she arrived home, Nelson took a shower. As she dried her hair, Nelson saw the bathroom door move and slowly open. She saw the barrel of a shotgun in the mirror. Nelson dropped the hairdryer and turned around. There stood her estranged husband standing at the threshold with a shotgun. White forced Nelson at gunpoint upstairs to her bedroom. She was so consumed with fear that "White was going to shoot her, Nelson walked backwards up the stairs. All the while, White pointed the shotgun at Nelson’s chest.

At the top of the stairs, Nelson saw the video recorder. She saw the red light was on and knew she was being taped. ’ She saw shotgun shells lined up in a row on the stand near the television. Nelson believed she was going to die. White ordered Nelson to sit on the bed or he would shoot her knee. As he said this, White pointed the gun at Nelson’s knee. White then placed a chair in front of the video recorder and ordered Nelson to sit there. Nelson moved to the chair. At all times, White kept the shotgun pointed at her. He interrogated her. He accused her of sexual infidelity. He demanded she tell the truth about having intimate relationships with other men. Nelson answered his questions. She was hysterical; she was trembling uncontrollably, crying and sobbing, wailing and screaming, and begging for her life. Nelson said, “I don’t want you to kill me,” and White responded, “Then answer my questions.” Nelson pleaded to him not to kill her because their children needed her. White responded, “They’ll be alright.” When Nelson asked White why he was doing this to her he said, “I’ll be in jail as soon as I leave if I don’t shut you up-You can’t keep your mouth shut.”

At some point, White turned off the video recorder and forced Nelson downstairs. This time, Nelson went down the stairs sideways, terrified White would shoot her in the back. White forced Nelson, at gunpoint, into the living room. White put a videotape in the VCR and turned on the television. He forced Nelson to watch the two and a half hours of videotape White recorded as he waited for Nelson to come home. The tape was replete with explicit statements of White’s intent to kill Nelson, his accusations against her, and vulgar name-calling. White stayed with Nelson as she viewed the entire two and a half hour video. As Nelson watched the tapes and heard the homicidal ideations of her husband, White repeatedly cocked and uncocked the shotgun. She heard White say on the tape he was going to torture her. She heard White say he was going to shoot her wheh she returned home. Nelson believed White was going to hurt her. At one point, White allowed Nelson to go into the kitchen for a cigarette and pop. He pointed the gun at Nelson and followed her into the kitchen with it. Some time after Nelson returned 'to the living room, White acted like he was going to let Nelson go. He unloaded the shotgun. “When the tape was finished, White said to Nelson “You can go. You can go call the police if you want to.” Nelson started walking for the door and reached for her cell phone. "White jumped up from the recliner and came after Nelson. He grabbed the cell phone out of her hand and blocked the door so Nelson could not leave. He reloaded the shotgun and ordered Nelson back into the living room. Nelson told White everything was her fault and that she deserved what White had done to her. She told him things to boost his ego. White left the house without his shotgun and shotgun shells.

These facts support the jury’s conclusion that Nelson was “torture[dj” within the meaning of Iowa Code section 710.2. This case is more than just a threat with a gun. The record shows repeated acts of terror against Nelson. A psychiatrist who examined the videotapes testified White looked and behaved like a “caged animal.” The psychiatrist remarked about "White’s behavior when he was waiting for Nelson to return home. White repeatedly checked the window for headlights. Every time a car approached the house and "White saw the headlights, he became visibly nervous. He watched carefully to determine if it was Nelson coming home. The psychiatrist testified White was “upset” and was ready “for what we call fight or flight.”

When Nelson came home, White laid in wait for her as she showered. He crept around the upstairs, tiptoeing so as not to be detected. Holding his shotgun, he hid behind a wall. White intentionally held Nelson at gunpoint for three hours. He made her watch the tape containing his repeated threats to hurt her — to murder her. White forced Nelson to listen to every minute of his two and a half hour videotaped diatribe. Nelson heard the following statements:

“I don’t want to kill her. I don’t know what else to do.”
“Don’t know if I’m going to shoot her, shoot her and then me, or shoot her and leave.”
“I want to scare the f* * * out of her for once.
“The more I think about it, the more I want to kill them.”
“She’s got the devil in her.”
“I’m not going to shoot anyone but her probably.”
“Sometimes I want to shoot her in the f* ⅜ *ing p* * *y( hiow ⅛ away from her. She doesn’t need it.”
“I’m not even sure this gun will shoot. I hope it does.... Feel pretty stupid trying to shoot somebody and it doesn’t even work.”
“I’ve always wanted to shoot her and now I really feel like it.”

"White said that he might leave after he killed Nelson to think about killing himself. White said, “I might have some time after someone finds her.” He also apologized to his parents and Nelson’s parents. He said to them, “I’m sorry I have to do this.” White also made threatening statements directly to Nelson. As Nelson listened to the threats, White repeatedly cocked and uncocked his shotgun in front of her.

These were not impulsive or out of control acts. Rather, everything White did and said bespeaks of purposeful behavior. White used a shotgun to terrorize Nelson. White repeatedly called Nelson demeaning names such as “slut” and “whore.” White portrayed himself on the tape as an innocent victim of his wife’s deception. He reiterated that he didn’t want to kill Nelson, but he didn’t have a choice. He said he “can’t cure this problem,” referring to Nelson’s deception. White said he couldn’t live “with her screwing other guys.” He said, “[Heather] ruined my life. My life has no meaning.” White was extremely jealous. He constantly talked about the other men in Nelson’s life. He questioned why he wasn’t good enough for her. White said Nelson had “rejected” him. White had used physical violence in the past. He used this fact as additional power to control Nelson in a nonphysical manner. Because of White’s past use of physical force, there is an implied threat in his verbally abusive statements made to Nelson in person and on videotape.

In sum, in this case, we are confronted with an overwhelming case of domestic violence resulting in kidnapping. Because there is substantial evidence of White terrorizing Nelson, we affirm.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

White argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict on the issue of his specific intent to inflict serious injury upon Nelson. We review claims of ineffective assistance de novo. State v. Polly, 657 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Iowa 2003). To prove an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, White must show by a preponderance of the evidence: (1)trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty; and (2) prejudice resulted from counsel’s error. Id. (citing State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Iowa 2002)). Failure to demonstrate either element is fatal to a claim of ineffective assistance. Id. We begin our discussion with the presumption that counsel acted competently. A claim of ineffective assistance is more likely to prevail when counsel lacked diligence as opposed to the exercise of judgment. Id. (citing Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001)).

As stated above, to prove first-degree kidnapping, the State was required to show beyond a reasonable doubt White confined Nelson with the specific intent to inflict serious injury on her. Iowa Code § 710.1(3). “Serious injury,” means any of the following:

a. Disabling mental illness.
b. Bodily injury which does any of the
following:
(1) Creates a substantial risk of death.
(2) Causes serious permanent disfigurement.
(3) Causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.

Id. § 702.18. For the reasons stated below, we conclude White’s trial counsel was not ineffective for .failing to move for a directed verdict. ■ ..

There was no likelihood that had counsel moved for a directed verdict, the court would have granted the motion. There was overwhelming evidence of White’s specific intent to inflict serious injury upon Nelson. Those comments are discussed in our discussion above regarding the torture element of first-degree kidnapping. White’s comments made in front of Nelson also support the conclusion White had specific intent to inflict serious injury upon her. White’s comments show he had intent not only to inflict “disabling mental illness” on Nelson, but also his intent to inflict bodily injury which “creates a substantial risk of death,” “causes serious permanent disfigurement,” and “causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” See id.

In addition to the above direct proof of White’s intent to inflict serious injury upon Nelson, there is also supporting circumstantial evidence. White broke into Nelson’s home armed with a shotgun and ammunition. White waited upstairs in Nelson’s bedroom for her to return home. When he heard a door close downstairs, White tiptoed around the upstairs, hid behind a wall, and held onto his shotgun. White was waiting for the moment he could spring on Nelson with the loaded shotgun. All of the circumstances surrounding this event indicate White had specific intent to shoot her. Based upon this evidence, the trial court likely would have denied the motion for a directed verdict. As such, White’s trial counsel did not fail in an essential duty. White’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.

III. Conclusion

To prove the torture element of first-degree kidnapping, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt White intentionally subjected Nelson to torture. Mental torture unaccompanied by physical injury or sexual assault is criminalized under Iowa Code section 710.2. There was substantial evidence upon which the jury could have found White guilty of first-degree kidnapping and first-degree burglary. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior acts evidence. Finally, White failed to prove the elements of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

AFFIRMED.

      . The time surrounding a couple's separation is the point in their relationship when violence is most likely to occur. Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Extent, Nature and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence, National Institute of Justice and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (July 2000) available at http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfilesl/jij/ 181867.txt; see also Anne L. Ganley, Ph.D., Domestic Violence Cases in the Civil Court: A National Model for Judicial Education, 20, The Family Violence Prevention Fund (1992). In the case before us, not only were Nelson and White separated, but a no-contact order was in place against White. Approximately four in ten domestic abuse perpetrators who are sentenced to jail for violence against a current or former spouse had a no-contact order in place when they committed the crime. United States Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, Violence by Intimates: Analysis of Data on Crimes by Current or Former Spouses, Boyfriends, and Girlfriends (March 1998) available at http://www.ojp.us-doj. gov/bj s/pub/acsii/vi/txt.

      . A charge of kidnapping, in general, is when: the person either confines a person or removes a person from one place to another, knowing that the person who confines or removes the other person has neither the authority nor the consent of the other to do so; provided, that to constitute kidnapping the act must be accompanied by one or more of the following:
      1. The intent to hold such person for ransom.
      2. The intent to use such person as a shield or hostage.
      3. The intent to inflict serious injury upon such person, or to subject the person to a sexual abuse.
      4. The intent to secretly confine such person.
      5.The intent to interfere with the performance of any government function.
      Iowa Code § 701.1. Specifically, in the case before us, the State had the burden to prove White kidnapped Nelson with the intent to inflict serious injury upon her. Id. § 710.1(3). Then, to prove first-degree kidnapping, the State was required to prove White kidnapped Nelson, and as a consequence of the kidnapping, Nelson was intentionally subjected to torture. Id. § 710.2.

      . The psychiatrist testified "fight or flight” is "when a person’s really stressed to have tight muscles and your eyes get wide and your pulse rate goes up and your blood pressure goes up and you're ready to either fight or take a hike.” The psychiatrist testified these were the intense emotions he saw in White as he waited for Nelson to come home.