author: WIGGINS, Justice.

text:
    In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Arlin C. FALCK, Deceased, Kathleen V. Nelson, Trustee of the Arlin C. Falck Living Trust and Executor of the Last Will and Testament of Arlin C. Falck, Deceased, Appellant.
    No. 03-0367.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Dec. 17, 2003.

      David J. Dutton and Carolyn A. Rafferty of Dutton, Braun, Staack & Heilman, P.L.C., Waterloo, for appellant.
    Robert J. Cowie, Jr. and Donald H. Gloe of Miller, Pearson, Gloe, Burns, Beatty & Cowie, P.L.C., Decorah, for appellee Kirkeby Welding & Machinery.
   WIGGINS, Justice.

Kirkeby Welding & Machinery (Kirke-by) provided Arlin C. Falck (Arlin) welding services during his lifetime. Upon Arlin’s death, Kirkeby filed a claim against the Arlin Falck Living Trust (Trust) for payment of those services. The trial court entered judgment against the Trust in favor of Kirkeby. Ten and one-half months after judgment entry, the Trust filed a motion to set aside the judgment asserting the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to decide the claim. The trial court overruled the motion. The Trust appeals this ruling. For the reasons that follow, we conclude the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the claim and affirm the ruling.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In 1988, Arlin executed a will leaving his property to a testamentary trust for the benefit of his spouse, Maxine, and his only son, Jerry. The 1988 will required the trustee to pay five percent of the initial fair market value of the assets of the trust annually to Maxine and Jerry. Jim L. Nichols (Nichols) and Marquette Bank of Rochester, Minnesota (Marquette) were nominated as co-executors and co-trustees.

Arlin revoked the 1988 will by executing a new will in 1993. The 1993 will left Arlin’s property to the Trust. Arlin created the Trust at the same time he executed the 1993 will.

Arlin amended the Trust in June of 1995. The amendment named Kathleen V. Nelson (Nelson) as the sole trustee. The Trust designated its situs as Caledonia, Minnesota. During Arlin’s lifetime, the Trust paid him its net income. Arlin retained the right to withdraw principal on request. Upon Arlin’s death, Maxine was to receive $30,000 annually and Jerry was to receive $10,000 annually. At Maxine’s death, Jerry’s annual allowance increased to $30,000. Upon the death of Maxine and Jerry, the remainder was to be distributed to various charities.

In July of 1995, Arlin executed a third will. This will revoked all prior wills. It declared Hidalgo County, Texas as Arlin’s residence and domicile. He named Nelson as executor. He left all his property to the Trust.

Arlin died on September 2, 1995. At the time of his death, his assets were valued in excess of $7.5 million. Under the 1988 will, Maxine and Jerry would be entitled to receive over $350,000 annually. The 1995 bequest entitled Maxine and Jerry to receive only $40,000 annually.

Nelson filed the 1995 will for probate in Hidalgo County, Texas on September 6, 1995. On October 31, 1995, Maxine filed the 1988 will for probate in Winneshiek County, Iowa. The Iowa court issued letters of appointment to Nichols and Marquette as co-executors (Executors). On November 27, 1995, Nelson, as trustee of the Trust, filed a petition to set aside the 1988 will, alleging the execution of the 1993 and 1995 wills revoked the 1988 wall. On January 16, 1996, the Executors filed a request asking the trial court to issue an injunction enjoining Nelson from dealing with any of Arlin’s assets.

Meanwhile, Kirkeby filed its claim against the Trust on January 24, 1996. The claim was for $2,813.57. The clerk of court mailed copies of the claim to the Executors.

On January 31, 1996, Nelson filed a motion to dismiss the injunction. She alleged she was not a party to the estate, either individually or in her capacity as trustee, thus the court did not have jurisdiction over her or the Trust. The trial court overruled the motion to dismiss finding that Nelson as trustee had “submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by instituting proceedings in this case, and because she was duly served with the notice of the petition for injunction.”

The Trust filed a motion for summary judgment on March 6, 1996, requesting judgment on its petition to set aside the will. On April 9 the trial court concluded the 1993 and 1996 wills revoked the 1988 will. The court terminated the administration of the estate under the 1988 will and imposed a constructive trust on the assets. It ordered the Executors to preserve the assets of the estate that they collected as a receiver would. The constructive trust was to continue until the 1995 will was admitted to probate in either Iowa or Texas.

The Executors filed their final report on July 9, 1996, requesting substantial fees. The report also listed Kirkeby’s claim. The Trust filed objections to the fee request but not to Kirkeby’s claim.

By this time, Arlin’s death generated litigation in Iowa, Texas, and Minnesota over the distribution of his assets. On August 6, 1996, the trial court entered an order continuing indefinitely the trial on the objections to the final report until the pending litigation concluded.

In October 1997 the parties advised the trial court the pending litigation had been settled. The Trust was a party to the written settlement agreement. The settlement agreement allowed the 1995 will to be probated in Texas. The agreement settled most of the claims made in the litigation. The agreement excluded the settlement of the fee and tax matters arising out of the attempted probate of the 1988 will. There was no mention of Kirkeby’s claim in the settlement agreement. None of the parties gave Kirkeby notice of the settlement.

The Executors filed an amended final report on January 4, 2001. The amended final report listed Kirkeby’s claim. The trial court entered an order requiring notice of the amended final report be given to all interested parties and set the report down for trial. Upon receipt of the amended final report and notice of trial, Kirkeby filed an amended claim against the Trust in the sum of $6,178.19. Accrued interest accounted for the additional sums in Kirkeby’s amended claim. The clerk of court mailed notice of the amended claim to Nichols and Marquette. The Trust did not receive copies of the amended claim. The Trust filed further objections to the fee request contained in the amended final report but did not object to Kirkeby’s claim.

The trial on the objections to the amended final report took place on September 20. Kirkeby offered testimony in support of its claim. The Trust chose not to cross-examine Kirkeby’s witness. It did not call any witnesses or offer any exhibits. Instead, the Trust made the following objection:

First of all, for the record I lodge an objection that there is no estate in Iowa for Arlin Falck. This court has no jurisdiction at this time to make any award on a nonexistent estate. Thirdly, the claim was not timely filed, nor was it timely passed on by anyone who claimed to have authority to allow the claim. [Fourth], the interest charges are usurious and not justified under the law or any private agreement. [Fifth], the exhibits that have been offered which simply deal with finance charges are confusing and start with October, go down to February, and then seem to start over again. I am not a person of numbers, but I am totally at a loss as to how to understand such a document.
I would also point out that in the Final Report there is no request by the Marquette Trust Company or Jim L. Nichols that a different amount, namely $2,897.40, be awarded. So that there is no recommendation or determination by even the people who were deposed as co-executors that this bill be allowed.

The Trust did not make an objection to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over Kirkeby’s claim.

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court issued an order granting the parties additional time to file post-trial briefs. The Trust’s post-trial brief did not mention Kirkeby’s claim.

The trial court awarded fees to the Executors and their attorneys in excess of $300,000. The court also entered judgment against the Trust in the sum of $6,178.16 plus interest on Kirkeby’s claim. The Trust filed a motion to enlarge findings of facts and conclusions of law under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2). This motion did not raise any issues as to Kirkeby’s claim. The motion was overruled and the Trust filed a notice of appeal.

The Trust filed its final appellate brief on August 12, 2002. The Trust did not raise any issues in its brief regarding Kirkeby’s claim.

The Trust collaterally attacked Kirke-by’s judgment by filing a motion to set aside the judgment in September 2002. The Trust claimed the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Kirkeby’s claim. The trial court overruled the motion to set aside the judgment.

II. Challenges to Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

A party can raise subject matter jurisdiction at any time in the proceeding. In re Estate of Dull, 303 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 1981). If a court enters a judgment without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the judgment is void. In re Gardiner, 287 N.W.2d 555, 559 (Iowa 1980). A void judgment is subject to a collateral attack. Hutcheson v. Iowa Dist. Court, 480 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Iowa 1992). Unlike personal jurisdiction, a party cannot waive or vest by consent subject matter jurisdiction. In re Estate of Dull, 303 N.W.2d at 406. A party cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court by an act or procedure. Id.

In Christie v. Rolscreen Co., we distinguished subject matter jurisdiction from the court’s “lack of authority to hear a particular case,” also referred to as “lack of jurisdiction of the case.” 448 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Iowa 1989). “Subject matter jurisdiction” refers to the power of a court to deal with a class of cases to which a particular case belongs. Id. A constitution or a legislative enactment confers subject matter jurisdiction on the courts. Hutcheson, 480 N.W.2d at 263. Although a court may have subject matter jurisdiction, it may lack the authority to hear a particular case for one reason or another. Christie, 448 N.W.2d at 450. In Christie we held a party could raise the court’s authority to hear a particular case at any time during the proceeding. Id.

The court’s authority to hear a particular case was further articulated in State v. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d 481, 482-83 (Iowa 1993). There, we held “where subject matter jurisdiction exists, an impediment to a court’s authority can be obviated by consent, waiver, or estoppel.” Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d at 483 (emphasis in original). Later, we interpreted the Mandicino decision as meaning that “a court’s lack of authority is not conclusively fatal to the validity of an order.” See In re Marriage of Seyler, 559 N.W.2d 7, 10 n. 3 (Iowa 1997). Thus if a party waives the court’s authority to hear a particular case, the judgment becomes final and is not subject to collateral attack. See Morris Plan Co. of Iowa v. Bruner, 458 N.W.2d 853, 855-56 (Iowa Ct.App.1990). These principles are consistent with the well-settled point of law that in the presence of an error or irregularity a party cannot collaterally attack an order or ruling made by the court over which it has subject matter jurisdiction. That judgment is voidable, not void. Davis v. Rudolph, 242 Iowa 589, 595-96, 45 N.W.2d 886, 890 (1951). This law directs us to the question of whether the judgment entered against the Trust on Kirkeby’s claim was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction allowing the Trust to attack it collaterally.

The trial court reasoned Kirkeby as an “interested party” invoked the jurisdiction of the court by filing its claim under Iowa Code section 633.10(4) (2001) which states in relevant part:

The district court sitting in probate shall have jurisdiction of:

4. Trusts and trustees.
a. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection ... the administration of express trusts where the administration of the court is invoked by the trustee, beneficiary, or any interested party....

This section was in effect at the time Kirkebys original claim and the original final report were filed.

The Trust claims the trial court misapplied this subsection because Kirkeby did not have the authority to invoke the jurisdiction of the court under subsection d. Iowa Code section 633.10(4)(d) (2001) states in relevant part:

d. A trust that is administered solely or jointly by an individual trustee or trustees is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court unless jurisdiction is invoked by a trustee or beneficiary, or if otherwise provided by the governing instrument. ...

This argument confuses subject matter jurisdiction with the court’s authority to hear a particular case.

By 2001 when the Executors filed their amended final report and Kirkeby filed its amended claim, the legislature added Iowa Code section 633.6101 to the code. It stated:

1. The court has exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings concerning the internal affairs of a trust.
2. The court has concurrent jurisdiction of actions and proceedings to determine the existence of a trust, actions and proceedings by or against creditors or debtors of trusts, and other actions and proceedings involving trustees and third persons.

By the time of trial in September of 2002, section 633.6101 had been amended effective July 1, 2002. As amended it stated:

The district court has exclusive jurisdiction of proceeding concerning the internal affairs of a trust and of actions and proceedings to determine the existence of a trust, actions and proceedings by or against creditors or debtors of a trust, and any other actions and proceedings involving a trust and third persons.

Iowa Code § 633.6101 (2003). At the time of the July 1, 2002 amendment to Iowa Code section 633.6101, the legislature also added Iowa Code section 633.7101. It provided:

Notwithstanding any Code provision to the contrary, the provisions of this division shall prevail over any other applicable Code provision.

Iowa Code 633.7101 (2003). Section 633.6101 prevails over section 633.10 because it is in the same division of the code as section 633.7101.

At all times during the proceedings the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over Kirkeby’s claim. Iowa Code section 633.10(4)(a) conferred subject matter jurisdiction on the trial court when the original claim and final report were filed. When the amended claim and amended final report were filed and heard, Iowa Code section 633.6101 conferred subject matter jurisdiction on the trial court.

Iowa Code section 633.10(4)(d), if at all applicable, merely provides the procedural mechanism for granting the court authority to hear a particular case. The Trust’s contention that the trial court misconstrued section 633.10 only goes to the court’s authority to hear the case, making the judgment voidable not void. A voidable judgment is not subject to a collateral attack.

Alternatively, the Trust contends it did not receive the required notice of Kirkeby’s claim under Iowa Code section 633.418, which effectively deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. If the trial court entered judgment on defective notice, the Trust cannot attack it collaterally unless there was what in law amounts to no notice. Allen v. First Nat’l Bank, 191 Iowa 492, 495, 180 N.W. 675, 676 (1920).

The trial court issued letters of appointment to the Executors on October 31, 1995. The Trust filed its Petition to Set Aside the Will on November 27, 1995. The Trust voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court by filing its petition. Morse v. Morse, 247 Iowa 1113, 1122-23, 77 N.W.2d 622, 627-28 (1956). The filing of its petition gave the trial court jurisdiction over the Trust for any purpose or for any cause of action properly joined in the proceedings. Jack & Toner v. D.M. & Ft. D. R., 49 Iowa 627, 627 (1878).

Kirkeby filed its claim in duplicate with the clerk on January 24, 1996. The clerk mailed the claim to the Executors as required by Iowa Code section 633.418. Iowa Code section 633.418 did not require the clerk to give notice to the Trust or its attorney of record. On April 9, 1996, the trial court granted the Trust’s motion for summary judgment and terminated the administration of the estate under the 1988 will.

Even though the court terminated the administration of the estate, the court could not discharge the Executors until the Executors served notice of the final report or an application for discharge on all interested parties. Iowa Code § 633.478 (2003). On July 9, 1996, the Executors filed their final report. The final report listed Kirkeby’s claim as being unpaid. See Iowa Code § 633.477(12) (2003) (requiring statement in the final report specifying compliance with statutory requirements pertaining to claims and “whether all claims, including charges, have been paid ... ”). The Executors mailed the final report to the Trust’s attorney of record. The Trust filed objections to the final report but did not make any objections to Kirkeby’s claim.

The Executors filed an amended final report in January of 2001. The amended report listed Kirkeby’s claim as unpaid. The Executors mailed a copy of the amended final report to the attorney of record for the Trust. The Trust filed further objections to the amended report but did not make any objections to Kirkeby’s claim.

The court held the trial on the objections to the amended final report on September 20, 2001. There is no indication in the record that the Trust was surprised the trial included Kirkeby’s claim. Kirke-by and the Trust appeared at trial. Kirke-by presented evidence on its claim. The Trust chose not to offer any evidence. The Trust did not raise an objection that it did not have notice the trial on the claim was being held on September 20. The Trust’s post-trial brief did not raise any issues regarding Kirkeby’s claim.

On November 9, 2001, the trial court found the Trust was subject to its jurisdiction and allowed Kirkeby’s claim against the Trust. The Trust chose not to file a motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2). The Trust chose not to appeal the allowance of Kirkeby’s claim when it appealed the fee award.

It is well-settled law when a party appears at trial in person or by counsel with actual notice of the trial, this is sufficient notice for judgment to be entered against that party. This rule applies even if a claim had not been served on the party and a prayer for relief had not been made in any application. Soppe v. Soppe, 232 Iowa 1293, 1296-97, 8 N.W.2d 243, 245 (1943). Under these circumstances a party cannot collaterally attack a judgment on the grounds it did not receive proper notice of the claim. Id. Even though a judgment may be erroneous, if the court has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the judgment is conclusive on collateral attack. Edgerly v. Sherman, 252 Iowa 352, 359, 107 N.W.2d 72, 76 (1961).

The Trust’s notice of Kirkeby’s claim was sufficient notice to confer jurisdiction on the trial court. The Trust appeared at trial and participated in the proceedings. When a party is present in court or represented by counsel, an order allowing a claim is a final adjudication unless corrected on appeal. See In re DePenning’s Estate, 244 Iowa 690, 702, 58 N.W.2d 9, 15 (1953). Any errors committed by the trial court were subject to a direct appeal by the Trust. The Trust cannot collaterally attack any deficiencies in the trial court’s ruling.

III. Disposition.

Because we conclude the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over Kirkeby’s claim, the Trust cannot attack the judgment collaterally. The trial court was correct in overruling the Trust’s motion to set aside the judgment.

AFFIRMED.

      . The record does not explain the discrepancy between the amount of the claim as filed, $6,178.19, and the amount of the claim as allowed, $6,178.16.

      . The Court of Appeals decided the direct appeal. The only issue raised by the Trust was the fee award to the Executors and their attorneys. The Court of Appeals reversed the fee award. In re Estate of Falck, 665 N.W.2d 440 (Iowa Ct.App.2003) (table).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: STREIT, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Samuel John SPIES, Appellant.
    No. 02-1991.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Dec. 17, 2003.

      Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard J. Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Robert DiBlasi, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
   STREIT, Justice.

Samuel John Spies appeals his convictions for possession and delivery of methamphetamine. Spies claims there was insufficient evidence presented at his bench trial to sustain the delivery conviction. He also alleges he was denied effective assistance of counsel, because his attorney failed to ensure he adequately waived his right to a jury trial. We reject Spies’ sufficiency claim, find his trial attorney did not fail to perform an essential duty, and affirm his convictions.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

Last June, an anonymous informant told Ankeny police a man in the parking lot of Loco Joe’s (a local pool hall and arcade) tried to sell him “crank.” The tipster gave police the man’s license plate number. The police investigated and discovered the plate was registered to Spies.

The police dispatched Officer Curtis Pote to Loco Joe’s. Officer Pote had training and experience in the investigation of the illegal narcotics trade. He recognized “crank” as the street-name for methamphetamine, a controlled substance. See Iowa Code § 124.401 (2001) (designating methamphetamine as a controlled substance).

Pote found Spies’ vehicle, but not the man himself. Working undercover, Pote went into Loco Joe’s and found Spies playing pool. Biding his time, Pote waited for Spies to leave. When Spies left, Pote followed him to his car and asked him if he could give him “any stuff.” Spies said he didn’t know what Pote was talking about.

Pote told Spies a man inside Loco Joe’s had told him Spies could “hook [him] up with some crank.” Spies asked Pote who the man was, and Pote replied he didn’t know. Spies told Pote to go back into Loco Joe’s and point him out.

Once inside, Pote briefly looked around, and then told Spies he couldn’t find the man who had directed him to Spies. Spies asked Pote what he wanted. Pote said he “was looking for a teener.” Spies said he “might be able to help” Pote, but he didn’t know Pote. Spies asked Pote if he was a “narc,” which the latter denied.

Pote asked Spies how much a “teener” would cost. Spies told Pote it would cost him $100. At trial, Pote testified that in his training and experience, a “teener” generally costs $100 in the illegal narcotics business.

Pote asked Spies if he had the methamphetamine with him. Spies said he did not. Instead, Spies said “I have to call my guy.” Using Pote’s cell phone, Spies called someone. Pote heard Spies say

“Hey this is me.”
“I need to get some stuff.”
“The same amount as last time, all right?”
“I’ll see you in a little bit.”

Spies then told Pote “1 can get it. I’ll be back in one-half hour.” Pote attempted to confirm the deal: “You’re getting me a teener for one hundred dollars?” Spies confirmed the deal, and agreed to meet Pote back in the parking lot in a half-hour.

Once Spies left, Pote radioed his fellow officers and instructed them not to stop Spies. Pote wanted to be able to follow Spies, presumably to his supplier. Another officer misunderstood Pote’s request, however, and arrested Spies on an unrelated warrant.

At the police station, Spies asked Pote if he could make a call. Spies did not ask Pote to leave the room, however, and Pote overheard Spies ask someone “to go get the stuff out of the middle drawer of [Spies’] dresser.” Spies said, “You’ll know what it is when you see it.”

Pote confronted Spies, and asked him if he had drugs or drug paraphernalia in his dresser. Spies admitted he did, and consented to a search of his residence. Spies and Pote went to Spies’ place, and Spies showed Pote drug paraphernalia and .25 grams of methamphetamine.

Spies was charged with three offenses: conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, delivery of a controlled substance, and possession of a controlled substance. See Iowa Code §§ 124.401(l)(c )(6), 124.401(5) (2001). Spies filed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial, which both he and his attorney signed. The trial transcript reveals the court also mentioned this waiver to counsel just before trial, although the court did not conduct a colloquy with Spies. After a bench trial, the district court convicted Spies of the delivery and possession charges. The court acquitted Spies of conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine.

On appeal, we are presented with two issues: (1) Did the State present sufficient evidence to sustain Spies’ conviction for delivery of a controlled substance? and (2) Was Spies denied effective assistance of counsel, because of an inadequate jury trial waiver?

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Spies contends there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, he delivered a controlled substance. In order to convict Spies, the State needed to prove (1) Spies delivered methamphetamine and (2) Spies knew the substance he was delivering was a controlled substance. Iowa Code § 124.401; State v. Moore, 529 N.W.2d 264, 265 (Iowa 1995) (citing State v. Osmundson, 241 N.W.2d 892, 893 (Iowa 1976)). The Code defines “deliver” and “delivery” as “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship.” Iowa Code § 124.101(7) (emphasis added).

A. Scope of Review

We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence for errors at law. State v. Cashen, 666 N.W.2d 566, 569 (Iowa 2003) (citing State v. Yeo, 659 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Iowa 2003)). A finding of guilt is binding upon us so long as there is substantial evidence to support it. State v. Lambert, 612 N.W.2d 810, 813 (Iowa 2000). “If a rational finder of fact could conceivably find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence is substantial.” Id. “We review the record in the ‘light most favorable to the State, including legitimate inferences and assumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the evidence in the record.’ ” Cashen, 666 N.W.2d at 569 (quoting State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Iowa 2002)).

B. Analysis — Attempted Transfer

Spies contends that, in order to sustain the delivery conviction, the State needed to prove the existence of the contraband to be sold, i.e., a teener, or the identity of a supplier. Spies points out the State failed to prove either. In the absence of these two facts, Spies alleges the record is barren of any criminality. There is, Spies posits, insufficient evidence to show he intended to keep his promise to Pote. Moreover, Spies’ uncorroborated admissions, standing alone, are insufficient to sustain his conviction. See State v. Polly, 657 N.W.2d 462, 466 n. 1 (Iowa 2003) (citing Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 89, 75 S.Ct. 158, 162, 99 L.Ed. 101, 106 (1954)) (“admissions made after the crime must also be supported with sufficient corroborating evidence”).

We reject Spies’ sufficiency challenge. We have previously held proof of possession is not necessary for proof of delivery. State v. Welch, 507 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Iowa 1993) (“delivery does not require possession”); State v. Grady, 215 N.W.2d 213, 214 (1974) (“possession is not a necessary legal element of delivery”); accord State v. Miller, 535 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa Ct.App.1995) (finding substantial evidence for delivery conviction even though no drugs found). Nor must the State prove the identity of the defendant’s supplier. Iowa Code chapter 124 does not expressly mandate that proof of delivery requires proof of either possession or the identity of a supplier from which possession may be secured. Because “deliver” and “delivery” are defined as “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance,” and transfer is defined as “the conveyance of right, title or interest in either real or personal property from one person to another by sale, gift, or other process” it is sufficient if the defendant attempted to transfer contraband from one person to another. Iowa Code § 124.101(7); Grady, 215 N.W.2d at 214 (citations omitted).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find there is substantial evidence, which does not solely consist of uncorroborated admissions, to show Spies attempted to transfer methamphetamine to Pote. In proving an attempt, the State need only show a rational trier of could find

(1) an intent to do an act or bring about certain consequences which would in law amount to a crime; and
(2) an act in furtherance of that intent which ... goes beyond mere preparation.

4 Robert R. Rigg, Iowa Practice, Criminal Law § 10.3, at 232 (2003) (footnote omitted); accord State v. Roby, 194 Iowa 1032, 1040-45, 188 N.W. 709, 712-15 (1922); see also Fryer v. State, 325 N.W.2d 400, 406 (Iowa 1982) (“The common law principles of attempt require the State to prove (1) intent to commit the crime and (2) slight acts in furtherance of the crime that render voluntary termination improbable.”).

The record shows a rational trier of fact could find Spies (1) intended to transfer methamphetamine to Pote and (2) committed an overt act furthering that intent. Shortly after meeting Pote, Spies participated in a conversation which is consistent with someone attempting to transfer methamphetamine: Spies asked Pote what he needed. When asked how much a teener of crank would cost, Spies said $100, the going-rate for such an amount of methamphetamine. Because Spies did not have the drugs with him, he asked Pote if he could use his cell phone in order to arrange the sale. In addition to the mere fact of the call, Spies’ side of the conversation clearly shows he was attempting to sell drugs from his supplier. The conversation also indicated he had sold drugs before. Spies then confirmed the deal. A rational trier of fact could find these foregoing facts proved Spies intended to transfer methamphetamine to Pote.

Crucially, after Spies confirmed the deal, he told Pote he would be back with the drugs in a half-hour, and drove off in his car. In context, a rational trier of fact could find he left to get the drugs and this last action was an overt act designed to transfer methamphetamine to Pote. As we explained in Roby,

where a person does an act tending to the commission of a crime, but which is prevented from reaching the desired result through the intervention of some cause, he is guilty of an attempt. It is doubtless true that mere acts of preparation not proximately leading to the consummation of the intended crime will not suffice to establish an intent to commit it, especially when made at a distance from the place where the substantial offense is to be committed; and there must be some act moving directly toward the commission of the offense after the preparations are made.
... The overt act must reach far enough towards the accomplishment of the desired result to amount to the commencement of the consummation. It must not be merely preparatory ... While it need not be the last proximate act to the consummation of the offense attempted to be perpetrated, it must approach sufficiently near it to stand either as the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made.

Roby, 194 Iowa at 1043, 188 N.W. at 714 (citations omitted). In getting in his car and driving away, a rational trier of fact could find Spies committed an overt act designed to transfer methamphetamine to Pote; Spies had just confirmed the deal and told Pote he would be back in a half-hour with the drugs. The act of driving towards his supplier, although not “the last proximate act to the consummation” of the transfer of the drugs, could be construed “as the first'or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made.” See id. We therefore find there was sufficient evidence of Spies’ attempting to transfer drugs and to sustain the delivery charge.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Spies claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel because the district court which accepted his jury trial waiver did not conduct an in-court colloquy with him. To ensure jury trial waivers are knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, we have previously stated a court

should inquire into the defendant’s understanding of the difference between jury and nonjury trials by informing the defendant:
1. Twelve members of the community compose a jury,
2. the defendant may take part in jury selection,
3. jury verdicts must be unanimous, and
4. the coui’t alone decides guilt or innocence if the defendant waives a jury trial.

State v. Stallings, 658 N.W.2d 106, 111 (Iowa 2003) (citing United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1432 (10th Cir.1995)). In Stallings, we said the judge “should [also] seek to ascertain whether [the] defendant is under [the] erroneous impression that he or she will be rewarded, by either court or prosecution, for waiving [a] jury trial.” Id. (citing 2 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure § 372, 452-53 n. 22 (3d ed.2000)). Because the district court did not conduct an in-court colloquy which included these five subjects of inquiry, Spies asks us to conclude his counsel failed to perform an essential duty and presume prejudice.

A. Scope of Review

We review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 108. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim fits within “an exception to the general rules of error preservation.” Id. (citing State v. Lucas, 323 N.W.2d 228, 232 (Iowa 1982)). Although such claims are, in general, preserved for post-conviction relief, where the record is adequate we will consider the merits of the claim on direct appeal. Id. (citing State v. Buck, 510 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Iowa 1994)). In the present case, the record is sufficient.

B. Analysis

We begin our analysis with the recognition “there is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance meets professional standards.” State v. Oetken, 613 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Iowa 2000). Bearing this presumption in mind, in order to succeed in his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Spies must show “(1) his counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted.” State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 809 (Iowa 2003). Spies must prove each of these two elements of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Pace, 602 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 1999). Should he fail to prove either element, so too must his ineffective assistance claim fail. See id.

Having duly considered all the arguments of the parties, we conclude Spies’ trial counsel did not fail to perform an essential duty. We need not here repeat the current state of the law of jury trial waivers in Iowa; rather, as we also explained in a companion case filed today, we need only point out this case mirrors a prior case, State v. Lawrence, 344 N.W.2d 227 (Iowa 1984). Well-settled Lawrence doctrine governs the facts of this case. See Liddell, 672 N.W.2d at 811 (applying Lawrence on similar facts).

Unlike Stallings, a case in which the record contained neither a written waiver nor a transcript of an in-court colloquy, here the defendant and his attorney signed and filed a written waiver of Spies’ right to a jury trial. This waiver is part of the record of the case. The trial transcript also reveals this waiver was mentioned by the court to counsel prior to trial. Although no in-court colloquy was conducted, this is clearly not a case in which, like Stallings, “there [was] ... no evidence that the court was even included in the waiver process.” Id. (citing Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 112). Unlike Stallings, here there is evidence the court was included in the waiver process. See Liddell, 672 N.W.2d at 809.

According to Lawrence, the failure of the district court to conduct an in-court colloquy does not violate the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d at 810 (citing Lawrence, 344 N.W.2d at 229-30). In Lawrence, we refused to conclude a jury trial waiver was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent simply because there was no in-court colloquy. See id. In this case, as in Lawrence, the defendant filed a jury trial waiver which he signed. See Lawrence, 344 N.W.2d at 229-30. Although we recognize “our task ... would have been greatly simplified if the trial court had conducted even a brief proceeding in open court at which defendant could attest his waiver,” we must refuse to conclude Spies’ waiver was not knowing and voluntary because there was no in-court colloquy. See id. Instead, “a written jury waiver taken in compliance with [the] rule ... is prima facie evidence that the waiver was voluntary and intelligent. When the defendant subsequently attacks its validity, he bears the burden of proving otherwise.” Id. at 230. Because there is no evidence in the record, nor any allegation on appeal, that his signed, written waiver was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, we refuse to conclude Spies’ trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty. Where the evidence establishes voluntary waiver, trial counsel has no duty to preserve the issue for appeal. See Buck, 510 N.W.2d at 853. Spies’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim must, therefore, fail. Id.

Nor does our partial overruling of Lawrence in Liddell affect our decision in this case. See Liddell, 672 N.W.2d at 811-14 (interpreting “on the record” to require an in-court colloquy). As we explained in Liddell,

it would be patently unfair to adjudge Liddell’s counsel ineffective for failing to foresee [that] decision, which diverges from precedent. “Counsel need not be a crystal gazer; it is not necessary to know what the law will become in the future to provide effective assistance of counsel.”

Liddell, 672 N.W.2d at 814 (quoting Snethen v. State, 308 N.W.2d 11, 16 (Iowa 1981)).

IV. Conclusion

There was sufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain Spies’ conviction for delivery of methamphetamine. Because Spies has failed to show his trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty, we cannot conclude he was denied effective assistance of counsel. His convictions for delivery and possession of methamphetamine must be upheld.

AFFIRMED.

      . In the drug trade, a "teener,” Pote testified, is about 1.75 grams of methamphetamine.


text:
    Michael PECENKA, Appellant, v. FAREWAY STORES, INC., Appellee.
    No. 02-1979.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Dec. 17, 2003.

      Thomas M. Werner, Des Moines, for appellant.
    Kirke C. Quinn of Payer, Jordan, Maho-ney, Jordan, Quinn, Hunziker & Rhodes, L.L.P., Boone, for appellee.
   WIGGINS, Justice.

Michael Pecenka’s employment was terminated at Fareway Stores, Inc. (Fare-way) after he refused to remove an ear stud during the course of his employment: Fareway had an unwritten personal grooming code prohibiting males but not females from wearing earrings or studs. Pecenka sued Fareway for sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). Fareway moved for summary judgment. The district court found Fareway’s personal grooming code was not discrimination based on sex within the meaning of the statutes and dismissed Pecenka’s suit. Pecenka appeals the dismissal of his suit. We affirm.

I.Background Facts and Proceedings.

Pecenka worked for Fareway for three months in 1991. On February 14, 2000, he began working for Fareway again as a part-time driver at the company’s warehouse. His duties included making deliveries to the receiving areas of individual Fareway stores. On April 1, 2001, Fare-way promoted Pecenka to a full-time position working at the company’s warehouse in Boone, Iowa. Pecenka always wore an ear stud while employed by Fareway.

On April 12, 2001, Pecenka’s supervisor informed him that he must remove his ear stud during working hours or cover it with a bandage. Pecenka’s supervisor also told him if he did not comply with this request he would be terminated from his employment. This request was consistent with Fareway’s unwritten personal grooming code prohibiting males but not females from wearing earrings or studs. Pecenka refused to remove his ear stud or cover it during working hours. Pecenka’s refusal caused Fareway to terminate his employment on April 16, 2001.

Pecenka filed a petition in the district court claiming Fareway discriminated against him because of his sex. He alleged that Fareway’s unwritten policy prohibiting males but not females from wearing earrings or studs violated Title VII and the ICRA.

Fareway filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that its unwritten personal grooming code did not qualify as sex discrimination. The district court granted the motion concluding “the degree of sex discrimination engendered by such [grooming] codes and rules is insufficient to trigger the protections of Title VII” and the ICRA. Because the district court did not find actionable discrimination, it did not address whether Fareway’s policy was necessary as a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). Pecenka appealed.

II. Issue.

The issue here is whether Pecenka’s termination from his employment violated Title VIPs or the ICRA’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex.

III. Scope of Review.

We review the district court’s summary judgment rulings for correction of errors at law. Mason v. Schweizer Aircraft Corp., 653 N.W.2d 543, 547 (Iowa 2002). The court views “the factual record in the light most favorable to the resisting party, affording that party all reasonable inferences.” Garofalo v. Lambda Chi Alpha Fraternity, 616 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 2000). Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). If the conflict in the record concerns only “the legal consequences flowing from undisputed facts, or from facts viewed most favorably toward the resisting party,” the matter is properly resolved on summary judgment. City of Akron v. Akron-Westfield Cmty. Sch. Dist., 659 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 2003).

IV. Applicable Statutes.

Our resolution of the issues depends on the construction of the following two statutes. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2001), provides in relevant part:

(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to ... discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees ... in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, ... on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise....

Iowa Code section 216.6 (2001) provides in relevant part:

(1) It shall be an unfair or discriminatory practice for any:
(a) person ... to discharge any employee, ... because of the age, race, creed, color, sex, national origin, religion, or disability of such applicant or employee, unless based upon the nature of the occupation.

Y. Analysis.

The purpose of Title VII is to ensure “persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective of their sex.” Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544, 91 S.Ct. 496, 497-98, 27 L.Ed.2d 613, 615 (1971). Because the ICRA is modeled after the federal legislation, Iowa courts have traditionally looked to federal law for guidance in interpreting it. Vivian v. Madison, 601 N.W.2d 872, 873 (Iowa 1999). Iowa courts, however, are not bound by federal law, despite consistent utilization of the federal analytical framework. See Hulme v. Barrett, 449 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1989).

We have followed the United States Supreme Court in identifying two theories of employment discrimination under Title VII. In order to prove one’s case under Title VII or the ICRA, the plaintiff must rely on a disparate treatment theory or a disparate impact theory. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 453 N.W.2d 512, 516 (Iowa 1990). Disparate treatment is when an employer “treats some people less favorably than others because of their ... sex,” while disparate impact is when an employer’s practice is “facially neutral ... but ... in fact fall[s] more harshly on one group than another.” Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 853 (9th Cir.2000).

Here, Pecenka relies on the disparate treatment theory. His theory of recovery requires a two-step analysis. The court first must determine whether discrimination based on sex has occurred. Dodge v. Giant Food, 488 F.2d 1333, 1335 (D.C.Cir.1973); Hy-Vee Food Stores, 453 N.W.2d at 516-17. If there is no discrimination based on sex, the inquiry ends. However, if discrimination based on sex has occurred, the burden shifts to the employer to show a BFOQ exists to justify the discriminatory practice. Id.

Pecenka contends that the simple fact his employment was terminated for wearing an ear stud, while females were allowed to wear earrings or studs, establishes a prima facie case of unlawful sex discrimination. We disagree. Pecenka must establish his termination was unlawful sex discrimination under the meanings of Title VII or the ICRA. Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir.1975).

There is no meaningful legislative history indicating what the Iowa legislature meant by an “unfair or discriminatory practice” based on sex. Vivian, 601 N.W.2d at 874. The legislative history of the sex discrimination provision of Title VII is not substantial. Nevertheless, the federal courts which have examined Title VII’s legislative history have found personal grooming codes that reflect customary modes of grooming having only an insignificant impact on employment opportunities do not constitute sex discrimination within the meaning of the Act. See, e.g., Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401-02 (6th Cir.1977); Knott, 527 F.2d at 1252; Dodge, 488 F.2d at 1337.

Several federal appellate courts have considered Title VII in the context of personal grooming codes regulating hair length. Every federal appellate court which has considered personal grooming codes prohibiting men but not women from wearing long hair has found the codes to be non-discriminatory within the meaning of Title VII. See Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir.1998); Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir.1996); Barker, 549 F.2d at 401; Earwood v. Cont’l Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir.1976); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir.1976); Knott, 527 F.2d at 1252; Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir.1975); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir.1974); Dodge, 488 F.2d at 1337; Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1126 (D.C.Cir.1973).

We agree with these decisions and their reasoning. The sex discrimination provisions of Title VII and the ICRA were enacted to stop the perpetuation of sexist or chauvinistic attitudes in employment which significantly affect employment opportunities. Title VII and the ICRA were not meant to prohibit employers from instituting personal grooming codes which have a de minimis affect on employment.

Applying these principles to Fareway’s unwritten personal grooming code, we conclude this grooming code did not constitute discrimination based on sex within the meaning of Title VII or the ICRA. This grooming code was never intended to be covered by Title VII’s or ICRA’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex. See Kleinsorge v. Eyeland Corp., 81 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1601 (E.D.Pa.2000) (holding personal grooming code which allows females to wear earrings but prohibits men from wearing earrings does not constitute a violation of Title VII); Capaldo v. Pan Am. Fed. Credit Union, 43 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 37,016 (E.D.N.Y.1987) (holding unwritten personal grooming code which allows females to wear earrings but prohibits men from wearing earrings does not constitute a violation of Title VII); Lockhart v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 102 Or.App. 593, 795 P.2d 602, 604 (1990) (holding personal grooming code which allows females to wear jewelry but prohibits men from wearing facial jewelry was not sexually discriminatory under state statute).

Because there was no discrimination on the basis of sex, our inquiry ends. An employer is not required to justify any business practice unless the sex discrimination has been established. Dodge, 488 F.2d at 1335; Hy-Vee Food Stores, 453 N.W.2d at 516-17. The district court was correct in not requiring Fareway to show a BFOQ.

Alternatively, Pecenka contends the “sex-plus” discrimination analysis found in Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544-47, 91 S.Ct. at 498-99, 27 L.Ed.2d at 616-17, proves his prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of sex.

“Sex-plus” discrimination occurs when employees are classified on the basis of sex plus one other seemingly neutral characteristic. Interpreting [Title VII] to proscribe this type of discrimination ... means that similarly situated individuals of one sex cannot be discriminated against vis-a-vis members of their own sex unless the same distinction is made among those of the opposite sex.

Knott, 527 F.2d at 1250-51.

While Fareway’s personal grooming code makes such a classification, “sex-plus” discrimination has traditionally been applied to employment policies which discriminate on the basis of (1) immutable characteristics, (2) characteristics which are changeable but involve fundamental rights such as child bearing or marriage, and (3) characteristics which are changeable but which considerably affect employment opportunities given to one sex. Barbara Lindemann & Paul Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 457 (3d ed.1996).

Wearing an ear stud is not an immutable characteristic. Pecenka can remove his ear stud or cover it with a bandage. Pe-cenka does not contend wearing an ear stud involves a fundamental right. Nor does he contend that the unwritten personal grooming code perpetuates a sexist or chauvinistic attitude in employment that significantly affects his employment opportunities. We therefore conclude Fare-way’s unwritten personal grooming code prohibiting males but not females from wearing earrings or studs is not unlawful discrimination within the “sex-plus” analysis.

VI. Disposition.

In sum, we conclude that an unwritten personal grooming code prohibiting males but not females from wearing earrings or studs is not unlawful sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII or the ICRA. Because the personal grooming code was not shown to be unlawful discrimination within the meaning of the statutes, it is unnecessary for Fareway to show the existence of a BFOQ. The district court was correct in granting Fareway’s motion for summary judgment.

AFFIRMED.


author: STREIT, Justice. CADY, Justice

text:
    STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Keteris Latron LIDDELL, Appellant.
    No. 02-1563.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Dec. 17, 2003.

      Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney General, William E. Davis, County Attorney, and Marc Gellerman and Robert Bradfield, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
   STREIT, Justice.

Keteris Liddell appeals his conviction and sentence for credit card fraud. Lid-dell alleges he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to challenge the validity of his jury trial waiver. Liddell also claims the district court failed to exercise its discretion when, during sentencing proceedings, the court remarked it had no choice other than to revoke his deferred judgment.

We hold Liddell’s trial counsel did not fail to perform an essential duty, and therefore reject his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Viewing its statements in context, we also find the district court properly exercised its discretion in revoking Liddell’s deferred judgment. We therefore affirm Liddell’s conviction and sentence.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

On August 10, 2000, a woman’s purse with an ATM card was stolen from her office. Keteris Liddell used the stolen ATM card to withdraw $500 from her bank account without her permission. Liddell was charged with credit card fraud, an aggravated misdemeanor. See Iowa Code §§ 715A.6(2), 715A.1(2), 715A.6(1) (2001).

On April 19, 2001, Liddell signed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial. This waiver was filed in the district court, and is part of the record before us. Liddell’s jury trial waiver contained three paragraphs, in which Liddell stated he understood (1) he had a right to a trial by jury of twelve persons; (2) in a jury trial, a guilty verdict must be unanimous and proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) if he waived his right to a jury trial, a judge would decide whether the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and would issue its findings in writing. On June 8, 2001, a bench trial was held. The district court found Liddell guilty as charged.

On July 17, 2001, Liddell came before the district court for sentencing. The court deferred judgment for one year. See generally Iowa Code ch. 907 (setting forth statutory provisions for deferred judgments, sentences, and probation). If Liddell made restitution to his victim, paid court costs, and did not receive any further convictions within the upcoming year, the court would dismiss the case.

Almost exactly a year later, on July 19, 2002, the court held a hearing to determine whether Liddell had complied with the conditions of his probation. The hearing concluded with the court continuing the matter “to allow Defendant to complete the conditions of his deferred judgment.”

On September 27, 2002, the court held another hearing, at which it determined Liddell had not complied with the terms of his probation — even though the court had given him more than a year to do so. The court specifically noted the defendant had not paid restitution to his victim. Clearly frustrated with the defendant’s failure to do so, the court then stated “I don’t have a choice other than to revoke your deferred judgment and sentence.... When we don’t have victim restitution paid, we don’t have a choice.” The court revoked Lid-dell’s deferred judgment and sentenced him to 240 days in jail and a $500 fine. The court then suspended Liddell’s sentence and ordered him to pay the fine, victim restitution, and court costs by February 19, 2003. On September 30, 2002, Liddell appealed.

We are presented with two issues for review: (1) Was Liddell denied effective assistance of counsel, because of an inadequate jury trial waiver? and (2) Did the district court fail to exercise its discretion when it said it did not have a choice other than to revoke Liddell’s probation?

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Liddell alleges he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Relying upon our recent decision in State v. Stallings, 658 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 2003), Liddell claims his trial counsel breached an essential duty because he failed to ensure Lid-dell’s jury trial waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. In support of his claim, Liddell points out the court did not conduct an in-court colloquy with him. He maintains this problem is exacerbated by the fact his written waiver failed to mention (1) he would be able to participate in voir dire and (2) his jury would be drawn from members of the community (as opposed to somewhere else). As a consequence of this alleged failure to perform an essential duty, which he characterizes as a structural error, Liddell urges us to presume prejudice and thus find he was denied effective assistance of counsel.

A. Scope of Review

Appellate review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is de novo. Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 108. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally preserved for post-conviction relief. Id. (citing State v. Buck, 510 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Iowa 1994)). Where we are presented with an adequate record, however, the merits of the claim may be resolved on direct appeal. Id. The record in this case is sufficient for resolution on direct appeal.

B. Analysis

“To establish an ineffective-assistance claim, [the defendant] must show that (1) his counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted.” Id. at 108 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984)). Should Liddell fail to prove either prong, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail. State v. Cook, 565 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Iowa 1997). Because we find Liddell’s trial counsel did not fail to perform an essential duty, we reject his ineffective-assistance claim. In order to properly address Liddell’s arguments, however, it is first necessary to briefly review Stallings, a recent decision regarding the adequacy of jury trial waivers.

In Stallings, the defendant appealed claiming the only evidence he waived his right to a jury trial appeared obliquely in his attorney’s statement of fees for his bench trial. Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 108. The statement of fees indicated Stallings waived his right to a jury during a hearing on a motion to suppress. Id. In spite of the fact Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.17(1) explicitly mandates that “[c]ases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant voluntarily and intelligently waives a jury trial in writing and on the record ...,” the record before us in Stallings contained “no evidence that the court was even included in the waiver process.” Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 112. Recognizing that “the right to a jury trial is ... fundamental to our justice system,” we determined Stallings was “one of those rare cases of a ‘structural’ defect in which prejudice is presumed.” Id. (citing McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 474 (8th Cir.1998)). We held the defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective in failing to ensure the court complied with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.17(1). Id.

Unlike Stallings, in this case Liddell signed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial. This waiver, which contained three paragraphs outlining some of its legal implications, was subsequently filed in the district court. Importantly, then, Lid-dell’s waiver is part of the record before us, even though the court did not conduct an in-court colloquy with the defendant.

Stallings did not, as the State suggests, implicitly overrule State v. Lawrence, 344 N.W.2d 227 (Iowa 1984), and require an in-court colloquy. See Lawrence, 344 N.W.2d at 230 (in-court colloquy not required); see also State v. Combs, 316 N.W.2d 880, 883-84 (Iowa 1982) (stating, in dicta, the rules of criminal procedure have “no such requirement”). United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423 (10th Cir.1995), upon which Stallings repeatedly relied, expressly rejected a per se supervisory order requiring an in-court colloquy. Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1432 (cited in Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 109-11). But see United States v. Scott, 583 F.2d 362, 364 (7th Cir.1978) (adopting supervisory order) (cited in Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 109-10). Rather, Robertson and Stallings “strongly urge[d]” district courts to specifically inform the defendant “of the nature of [the] right [to a jury trial] and the consequences of waiving it.” Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 109-10.

The relevant facts of this case mirror Lawrence, a case which we decided nearly twenty years ago. In Lawrence, we directly addressed whether our rules of criminal procedure require an in-court colloquy to determine whether a defendant’s waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

In Lawrence, the defendant filed a jury trial waiver which both he and his attorney signed. 344 N.W.2d at 229. The court did not, however, conduct an in-court colloquy with the defendant. Id. Citing then Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(1), which in the respects relevant to this appeal is identical to present rule 2.17(1), we said

[Defendant contends the record does not establish that his waiver was knowing and voluntary. The state thinks the rule, as now amended, requires only that a written waiver be placed on record. Under this view participation by the court is not required to ensure that the waiver was voluntary and intelligent. Defendant counters by pointing out that the document itself is silent on defendant’s level of awareness and his volun-tariness.

Id. Although we recognized “our task ... would have been greatly simplified if the trial court had conducted even a brief proceeding in open court at which defendant could attest his waiver,” we refused to conclude Lawrence’s waiver was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. at 230.

After discussing the history of the rule, we stated “[a]n open court proceeding is no longer expressly required....” Noting that “[t]he waiver, bare as it was, was signed by both the defendant and his trial counsel ... [and] it unquestionably was a part of the record,” we held, instead, that

a written jury waiver taken in compliance with [the] rule ... is prima facie evidence that the waiver was voluntary and intelligent. When the defendant subsequently attacks its validity, he bears the burden of proving otherwise.

Id. On this interpretation, “on the record” means nothing more than “in the file.”

Contrary to Liddell’s suggestions, Stall-ings, unlike Lawrence, did not directly address whether “on the record” meant “in the file” or required an in-court colloquy. Both parties correctly point out that in Stallings we stated

the court should inquire into the defendant’s understanding of the difference between jury and nonjury trials by informing the defendant:
1. Twelve members of the community compose a jury,
2. the defendant may take part in jury selection,
3. jury verdicts must be unanimous, and
4. the court alone decides guilt or innocence if the defendant waives a jury trial

Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 111 (citing Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1432). Importantly, in Stallings we also 'urged judges to “ascertain whether [the] defendant is under [the] erroneous impression that he or she will be rewarded, by either court or prosecution, for waiving [a] jury trial.” Id. (citing 2 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 372, 452-53 n. 22 (3d ed.2000)).

As we recognized in both Lawrence and Stallings, an in-court colloquy is an important tool by which a court may ascertain whether a defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 111 (“practical considerations suggest that a written waiver as well as an in-court colloquy should be used to assure a proper waiver”); Lawrence, 344 N.W.2d at 230 (noting its “task ... would have been greatly simplified if the trial court had conducted even a brief proceeding in open court at which defendant could attest his waiver”). Taken together, the five subjects of inquiry mentioned in Stallings constitute a sound method by which a court in an in-court colloquy may determine whether a defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

Given the law as interpreted by Lawrence and left undisturbed by Stall-ings, the failure of the district court to conduct an in-court colloquy with the defendant (let alone an in-court colloquy in strict compliance with the five-part Stall-ings model) does not necessarily offend the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure. Applying settled Lawrence doctrine to the facts of the present case, we conclude Lid-dell has failed to prove his trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty. There is prima facie evidence Liddell waived his right to a jury trial knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, because Liddell personally signed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial which is part of the record before us. Lawrence, 344 N.W.2d at 230. Unlike the waiver filed in Lawrence, Liddell’s jury trial waiver stated he understood (1) he had a right to a trial by jury of twelve persons; (2) in a jury trial, a guilty verdict must be unanimous and proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) if he waived his right to a jury trial, a judge would decide whether the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and would issue its findings in writing. Cf. Lawrence, 344 N.W.2d at 229 (upholding waiver which merely stated “Comes now defendant by his attorney and waives his right to a jury trial in this matter, and requests that this matter be tried to the court.”). Liddell’s waiver is prima facie evidence his waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Id. at 230. Liddell bears the burden to show his waiver was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, but on appeal he fails to point to any evidence to suggest otherwise. Id. Thus we cannot conclude Liddell’s trial counsel breached an essential duty; his ineffective-assistance of counsel claim must fail. Buck, 510 N.W.2d at 853-54 (where evidence establishes voluntary waiver, trial counsel has no duty to preserve issue for appeal and ineffective-assistance claim fails).

Insofar as Liddell’s argument is predicated upon an assumption Stallings stood for the legal proposition that “on the record” in Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.17(1) means something more than “in the file” or, stated somewhat differently, requires more than mere acknowledgement of a written waiver in evidence, we are compelled to reconsider our holding in Lau/rence. After careful review, we now conclude Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.17(1) requires the court to conduct an in-court colloquy with defendants who wish to waive their jury trial rights. Unlike Stall-ings, in which we were not presented with the issue, in this case we now overrule Lawrence in this regard.

In order to determine the meaning of “on the record” in Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.17(1), it is instructive to examine its legislative history. See Lawrence, 344 N.W.2d at 229-30 (detailing history of jury trial waivers in Iowa); Richards v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 362 N.W.2d 486, 488 (Iowa 1985) (legislative history a recognized and instructive tool for determining legislative intent). As we noted in Lawrence,

[t]he right to waive a jury in felony cases is of rather recent vintage in Iowa.... For many years the right of waiver was granted only to defendants charged with no more than indictable misdemeanors and then only if in accordance with strict procedural safeguards in open court.
As originally enacted [in 1976], rule 16(1) provided:
Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in uniting.
Before the new rule became effective, it was amended [in 1977] to read:
Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in a reported proceeding in open court.
... The rule was amended [in 1981] to read:
Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant voluntarily and intelligently waives a jury trial in writing and on the record ...

Lawrence, 344 N.W.2d at 229-30 (citations omitted, emphases in original). In the years after Lawrence was decided, the legislature has amended the rule, but these changes are not relevant to this appeal. Compare Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.17(1) (2002), with 1981 Iowa Acts ch. 206, § 16.

In Lawrence, we concluded “on the record” did not require an in-court colloquy with the defendant. According to this interpretation, “on the record” means nothing more than “in the record.” In reaching our decision, we noted the rule, unlike a prior version, did not expressly require “a reported proceeding in open court.” Lawrence, 344 N.W.2d at 229-30.

Re-examining the legislative history of the rule, we think “on the record” is better understood as requiring some in-court colloquy or personal contact between the court and the defendant, to ensure the defendant’s waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. As the foregoing discussion indicates, prior to enactment “in writing” was deleted and “a reported proceeding in open court” was inserted. The last relevant revision to the rule simply substituted the legislative shorthand of “on the record” for “in a reported proceeding in open court.” Otherwise, “on the record” means nothing more than “in the record,” which the “in writing” requirement already suggests. See State v. Pickett, 671 N.W.2d 866, 870 (2003) (statutes should be construed to avoid absurd or superfluous results); accord State v. Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 463, 793 N.E.2d 473, 478 (2003) (construing “on the record” to require oral findings at sentencing hearings). It should also be noted that we have described literal compliance with the colloquy requirement of rule 2.8(2)(b), which expressly requires the court to “address the defendant personally in open court,” as “personally addressing the defendant on the record.” State v. Moore, 638 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Iowa 2002).

As we recognized in Stallings, “[s]ome federal cases strongly suggest that the court engage in an in-court colloquy in which the court assesses the extent of the defendant’s knowledge and understanding of the waiver.” Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 109 (citations omitted); Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1432; United States v. Christensen, 18 F.3d 822, 825 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 274-75 (6th Cir.1983); see also Cabberiza v. Moore, 217 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (discussing colloquy requirements in federal courts). We have also recognized a preference for in-court colloquies, as “[i]t is clearly the better practice.... ” Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 109 (quoting 2 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 372, at 453-54 (3d ed.2000)).

We do not lightly overrule our precedents. We recognize

[i]t is of the greatest importance that the law should be settled. Fairness to the trial courts, to the legal profession, and above all to citizens generally demands that interpretations once made should be overturned only for the most cogent reasons.... But this does not mean that [the law’s] forward progress should be over the dead bodies of slain and discarded precedents. Legal authority must be respected; not because it is venerable with age, but because it is important that courts, and lawyers and their clients, may know what the law is and order their affairs accordingly.

Stuart v. Pilgrim, 247 Iowa 709, 713, 74 N.W.2d 212, 215-16 (1956). Nonetheless we have recognized “stare decisis does not prevent the court from reconsidering, repairing, correcting or abandoning past judicial announcements when error is manifest, including error in the interpretation of statutory enactments.... ” Miller v. Westfield Ins. Co., 606 N.W.2d 301, 306 (Iowa 2000) (citations omitted). Stare de-cisis “should not be invoked to maintain a clearly erroneous result.” Id. (quoting Kersten Co. v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 207 N.W.2d 117, 121 (Iowa 1973)); see Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 150 (1921) (“when a rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare, there should be less hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment”).

When confronted with a case such as this one, then, a dilemma necessarily ensues. As aptly stated two generations ago,

The problem ... is whether more harm will be done by overruling our previous cases in order to install what we think is clearly the correct principle, or by adhering to an unsound decision in the interest of the rule of stare decisis.

Stuart, 247 Iowa at 713-14, 74 N.W.2d at 216. Mindful of the importance of stare decisis, in this case we must nonetheless overrule Laurrence’s erroneous interpretation of on the record. [T]he right to a jury trial is ... fundamental to our justice system. Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 112. Here the interest in “installing] ... the correct principle” outweighs the reliance interests underpinning the rule of stare decisis.

In conducting an in-court colloquy, it is important to recognize the ultimate standard to be complied with is whether the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. To this end, a court should ascertain whether the defendant understands the difference between jury and non-jury trials, through an in-court colloquy. This inquiry may involve informing the defendant:

1. Twelve members of the community compose a jury;
2. The defendant may take part in jury selection;
3. Jury verdicts must be unanimous;
4. The court alone decides guilt or innocence if the defendant waives a jury trial; and
5. Neither the court nor the prosecution will reward the defendant for waiving a jury trial.

See Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 111 (citing Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1432); 2 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 372, 452-53 n. 22 (3d ed.2000).

We must point out, however, that these five subjects of inquiry are not “black-letter rules” nor a “checklist” by which all jury-trial waivers must be strictly judged. They merely point towards a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. The ultimate inquiry remains the same: whether the defendant’s waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. In this respect, the waiver of a jury trial is no different than a guilty plea; the latter, of course, includes a waiver to a jury trial. See Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.8(2)(6) (guilty plea is a waiver of right to a jury trial). Substantial compliance is acceptable. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 578 (Iowa 2002) (setting forth standard for substantial compliance in guilty plea context). Just as we noted in Stallings that “noncompliance [with a written waiver requirement] will not necessarily invalidate a waiver of the right to trial by jury if the waiver can otherwise be shown to have been entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently,” neither is the failure to recite, in prayer-like fashion, Stallings’ five subjects of inquiry. Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 110 (citing, in part, Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1431).

Our re-examination of our holding in Lawrence in no way disturbs our decision today to reject Liddell’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Under the law in effect at the time, it would be patently unfair to adjudge Liddell’s counsel ineffective for failing to foresee today’s decision, which diverges from precedent. “Counsel need not be a crystal gazer; it is not necessary to know what the law will become in the future to provide effective assistance of counsel.” Snethen v. State, 308 N.W.2d 11, 16 (Iowa 1981). For waivers taking place once this decision is final, however, a trial court must conduct the proceedings “on the record,” in the sense that some in-court colloquy with the defendant is required in order to ensure the defendant’s waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

III. Sentencing

Liddell alleges the district court failed to exercise its discretion when it revoked his probation after he failed to pay restitution to his victim. In support of his claim, Liddell cites the district court’s statements that it had “no choice” but to revoke his probation once it determined Liddell had not made restitution to his victim. Liddell points out a sentencing judge has several options when a defendant fails to comply with the terms of his or her probation, including granting a continuance. See Iowa Code §§ 908.11(6), 907.3(1). Viewing the district court’s statements in context, we reject Liddell’s claim.

A. Scope of Review

We review sentencing challenges for errors at law. State v. Grandberry, 619 N.W.2d 399, 401 (Iowa 2000). “A sentence will not be upset on appellate review unless the defendant demonstrates an abuse of trial court discretion or a defect in the sentencing procedure, such as trial court consideration of impermissible factors.” Id. (citations omitted).

B.AnaIysis

The district court has discretion in sentencing Liddell. See Iowa Code §§ 908.11(6), 907.3(1). “When a court has discretion in sentencing, it must exercise that discretion.” State v. Johnson, 630 N.W.2d 583, 590 (Iowa 2001) (quoting State v. Ayers, 590 N.W.2d 25, 27 (Iowa 1999)). ‘When the court fails to exercise its discretion, the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.” Id.

We disagree with Liddell’s claim the district court’s statements are evidence it erroneously believed it lacked discretion to revoke Liddell’s deferred judgment. Viewed in context, the statements do not show the district court was unaware of the availability of other courses of action or had a policy against granting deferred judgments unless the defendant paid restitution to his victim.

At the first sentencing hearing, the district court considered several factors, including Liddell’s age and prior criminal history, in deferring judgment and sentence. This decision was conditioned upon Liddell making restitution to his victim and paying court costs within one year, as well as not receiving any further convictions during this probationary period. If Liddell failed to abide by the terms of his probation, the court concluded he would not deserve a deferred judgment.

After Liddell failed to make restitution to his victim, despite a court order, a second chance, and over a year to do so, the following exchange took place:

THE COURT: What is this? And you have not even made your victim restitution good now? It is September and you have had over a year. I don’t have a choice other than to revoke your deferred judgment and sentence....
THE COURT: Mr. Giese, anything you want to say before I impose sentence?
MR. GIESE [Liddell’s trial attorney]: No, although he has made some payments.
THE COURT: He has not paid very much for a year. When we don’t have victim restitution paid, we don’t have a choice.

Viewed in context, the court’s comments express its understandable frustration with Liddell’s disregard for the welfare of his victim, whom he had still not repaid. This is not a case in which the sentencing judge announced a policy against granting deferred judgments in the absence of restitution. See, e.g., State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Iowa 1979) (sentencing judge abused discretion in refusing to grant deferred judgments in OMVUI cases in which there was an accident, stating “I have the policy that when there is an accident involved, I do not and will not grant a deferred sentence”). Here, the district court clearly recognized it had discretion in imposing sentence; any suggestion to the contrary fails to recognize the court had already continued the hearing once in order to give Liddell a second chance to meet the terms of his probation.

Instead, in the initial sentencing hearing, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, expressed its willingness to grant Liddell a deferred judgment, on the condition he pay court costs and restitution. When Liddell failed meet one of the conditions of the court’s order, he proved himself an unsuitable candidate for a deferred. Colloquially speaking, the choices Liddell made took the choices from the judge. The court’s statements are not unlike those of a parent, who, after discovering his or her child pummeling a sibling, says “I have no choice but to send you to your room.” The parent is well-aware other options are available, but in the exercise of discretion, thinks a trip to the room is the best punishment on this occasion.

IV. Conclusion

Liddell has failed to show his trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty. We cannot, therefore, conclude he was denied effective assistance of counsel. We also refuse to find the district court abused its discretion in revoking Liddell’s probation. We affirm his conviction and sentence for credit card fraud.

AFFIRMED.

All justices concur except CADY, J., who concurs specially.

CADY, Justice

(concurring specially).

I agree with the result reached by the majority but disagree with that portion of the decision that overrules Lawrence and interprets rule of criminal procedure 2.17(1) to require an in-court colloquy in order for a defendant to waive a jury trial in a criminal case.

Our standard for overruling our precedents is not easily satisfied. We do so “only for the most cogent reasons,” and only when error is manifest. Stuart, 247 Iowa at 714, 74 N.W.2d at 215-16; accord Miller, 606 N.W.2d at 306. The concept of stare decisis is an important bedrock principle in our system of justice and allegiance to precedent is a significant factor in the enduring strength of our judicial system.

My view of the waiver rule is based on my respect for the doctrine of stare decisis and the constitutional roles of the legislature and this court. The legislature has enacted a rule governing waiver of jury trials in a criminal case pursuant to its constitutional role, and we have previously interpreted that rule pursuant to our constitutional role. Although the rulemaking authority now largely rests with this court, the rule at issue was enacted by the legislature and we are obligated to interpret it pursuant to their original intent. See Iowa Code §§ 602.4201, 602.4202.

A brief review of the history of rule 2.17(1) reveals the improvident action of the majority in overruling Lawrence. This history is important because it helps explain the legislative development of rule 2.17(1). At the time our legislature originally enacted rule 2.17(1) in 1976, courts around the nation had begun debating the type of procedure necessary for a defendant to waive the right to a jury trial in a criminal case. The debate focused on whether the waiver should be made in writing or whether an in-court colloquy was needed. Ultimately, what emerged from this debate was that courts preferred an in-court colloquy, but such a strict procedure was not constitutionally required. See Martin, 704 F.2d at 274-75, 2 Wright § 372, at 453-54. We have taken this same position. See Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 109-11.

As originally enacted, rule 2.17(1) required the waiver to be “reported ... in open court.” Thus, our legislature clearly chose the strict in-court colloquy standard initially. Yet, in 1981 our legislature changed the rule to require the waiver to be “in writing and on the record.” In light of the historical background showing there was a constitutionally permissible choice between the two standards, it is most logical to believe our legislature decided to reconsider the in-court colloquy standard it initially adopted and adopt the lesser writing standard. I find no support for the idea formulated by the majority that the legislature intended to adopt both standards by adding the specific “in writing” requirement and replacing the clear language of the original rule with a generic phrase that, under the majority’s analysis, did not truly change the rule’s original meaning.

Moreover, we decided Lawrence three years after the 1981 legislative change to the rule. In Lawrence, we interpreted the generic phrase “on the record” to mean in the record, and held that the rule only required the waiver to be in writing. Significantly, the rule has not been amended since the Laurrence decision by this court or the legislature. This inaction must be viewed as a sign that Lawrence is the accepted position today. See State v. Anderson, 517 N.W.2d 208, 214 (Iowa 1994). If we want to change our longstanding interpretation of the rule originally enacted by the legislature, we should do so by changing the rule itself pursuant to our rulemaking powers, not by overruling our established precedent.

Ultimately, nothing has changed since Lawrence to justify the decision of the majority, and we should not assume that we know more today about the legislative intent behind the language of rule 2.17(1), nineteen years after we decided Lawrence. Instead, we should make our decision today based on those fundamental principles that guide all judicial decision-making, and strike out in a different direction from established precedent “only for the most cogent reasons.” Stuart, 247 Iowa at 714, 74 N.W.2d at 215-16. No such reasons exist to support the decision of the majority in this case.

      . The history of the rule prior to Lawrence will be explained below. After Lawrence was decided, the legislature made substantive changes to the rule, but these amendments are not relevant to this appeal. See, e.g., 1986 Iowa Acts ch. 1106, § 1 (permitting defendants to waive rights to jury trial later than thirty days after arraignment if certain conditions are met). The rule was also renumbered in 2002.

      . It should be noted the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure set forth different standards for accepting a jury trial waiver and a guilty plea. In the guilty plea context, substantial compliance is therefore more particularized. In accepting a jury trial waiver, rule 2.17(1) requires the defendant waive his right to a jury trial knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, in writing and on the record. See Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.17(1); accord Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 110 ("the record should ... establish the defendant made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision on waiver”). Unlike the rule governing the acceptance of a guilty plea, the rule for jury trial waivers does not enumerate specific rights and consequences of which the court must inform the defendant. Compare Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.17(1), with Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.8.

      . "Unless otherwise ordered by the supreme court, no procedendo shall issue for 15 days after an opinion of the supreme court is filed, nor thereafter while a petition for rehearing, filed according to these rules, is pending.” Iowa R.App. P. 6.30.