author: NEUMAN, Justice.

text:
    Myra Kaye HAYDEN, Appellant, v. AMERISTAR CASINO COUNCIL BLUFFS, INC., Employer, and Royal Insurance, Insurance Carrier, Appellees.
    No. 00-1236.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Feb. 27, 2002.
    Sheldon M. Gallner and Laura L. Pat-termann of Sheldon M. Gallner, P.C., Council Bluffs, for appellant.
    Dennis R. Riekenberg and Janice E. Weis of Cassem, Tierney, Adams, Gotch & Douglas, Omaha, Nebraska, for appellees.
   NEUMAN, Justice.

This case concerns a decision by the workers’ compensation commissioner to summarily dismiss, on jurisdictional grounds, a claim filed by a casino supervisor for alleged injuries arising out of and in the course of her employment by a riverboat gambling casino. The district court affirmed the dismissal and the employee appealed. Because resolution of the controversy turns on a fact-specific inquiry not satisfied by the record made here, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. Petitioner, Myra Kaye Hayden, filed an “Original Notice and Petition” with the workers’ compensation commission naming her employer, Ameristar, and alleging an industrial disability. Hayden’s petition recited the following facts:

[On January 26, 1996] [c]laimant was exiting from the employee bathroom when she slipped and fell on a metal or steel floor that was wet from mopping injuring her right knee, as a result of abnormal gait, she developed lower back pain.

Ameristar responded by moving to substitute the proper parties. Pertinent to this appeal, Ameristar then moved to dismiss the action on jurisdictional grounds. It claimed that Hayden’s work as a supervisor at the Ameristar Casino brought her within the definition of “seaman” under federal maritime law. The motion went on to assert that “[fjederal maritime law, including the Jones Act, supersedes state workers’ compensation laws applicable to seamen, and as such, provides the exclusive remedy for injured seamen.”

Hayden resisted the motion to dismiss, claiming the boat operated by Ameristar Casino has gambling as its primary purpose and does not, therefore, pass the “primary purpose” test for determining whether Hayden’s alleged injury falls under the Jones Act. Hayden also contested whether her activities were sufficiently connected to any “traditional maritime activity” so as to invoke Jones Act jurisdiction.

The deputy commissioner sustained Am-eristar’s motion to dismiss. The deputy determined, among other things, that Hayden’s role as a casino supervisor qualified her as a “seaman” because “[s]he had a substantial employment-related connection to ... a vessel in navigation.” The vessel, the deputy found, “was fully crewed and capable of navigating on the river.” From these “facts” and others like them, the deputy concluded that Hayden’s exclusive remedy for workplace injuries rests with federal maritime law, thus requiring dismissal of her state action.

The deputy’s decision was affirmed on interagency review and by the district court on judicial review under Iowa Code chapter 17A (1999). This appeal by Hayden followed.

II. Except in situations not pertinent here, our rules of civil procedure govern contested case proceedings before the workers’ compensation commission. Iowa Admin. Code r. 876 4.35(86) (2000). Ameristar’s motion to dismiss, urging the workers’ compensation commissioner’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction, is authorized by rule of civil procedure 88(a)(1). Unlike other motions to dismiss embraced by rule 88, pre-answer jurisdictional challenges may be supported by “[ajffidavits and other evidentiary showings.” Moyer v. City of Des Moines, 505 N.W.2d 191, 193 n. 3 (Iowa 1993). When jurisdictional fact findings are made by the tribunal (whether agency or trial court), they enjoy the status of a jury verdict, binding on subsequent review if supported by substantial evidence. EFCO Corp. v. Norman Highway Constructors, Inc., 606 N.W.2d 297, 300 n. 1 (Iowa 2000); Johnson v. Aeroil Prods. Co., 255 Iowa 931, 933, 124 N.W.2d 425, 426 (1963).

III. The record before us contains no “evidentiary showings.” Yet the jurisdictional issue before the commissioner, and now facing us, involves a “mixed question of law and fact.” Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 369, 115 S.Ct. 2172, 2190, 132 L.Ed.2d 314, 338 (1995); accord Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 554, 117 S.Ct. 1535, 1540, 137 L.Ed.2d 800, 809 (1997). The facts pertinent to that inquiry, including Hayden’s alleged status as a “seaman” and the alleged “maritime” nature of her employment, are hotly contested. They are not matters resolvable by reference to her petition.

Evidently the commissioner relied on assertions made and conclusions drawn in Ameristar’s brief in support of its motion. But the record before us contains neither testimony nor affidavits to support those assertions or the commissioner’s reliance upon them. Thus there is no substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s jurisdictional ruling or the district court’s subsequent affirmance of it. See Moyer, 505 N.W.2d at 192-93 (remanding for trial where defendants “made no evidentiary record disputing the [petition’s] allegations”); cf. EFCO Corp., 606 N.W.2d at 300 (affirming fact finder’s jurisdictional decision based on contents of contract and testimony by corporate officer). The case must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings before the agency.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

      . Ameristar's motion to substitute parties merely clarified that Hayden's employer is Ameristar Casino Council Bluffs, Inc., and its insurance carrier is not NTA, Inc., as stated in the petition, but Royal Insurance of Orlando, Florida. These matters of clarification are not at issue on appeal.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LARSON, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Toby BROWN, Appellant, v. QUIK TRIP CORPORATION and CNA Insurance, Appellees.
    No. 00-0868.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Feb. 27, 2002.

      Thomas M. Wertz of Wertz & Leehey, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
    Peter J. Thill and Deborah A. Dubik of Betty, Neuman & McMahon, L.L.P., Davenport, for appellee.
   LARSON, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court affirming the workers’ compensation commissioner’s denial of benefits in a “mental/mental” injury case. We vacate the ruling of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand to the workers’ compensation commissioner.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.

Toby Brown was an employee of Quik Trip Corporation, working at a gas station/convenience store. In the early morning of January 18, 1994, he was working alone, finishing the night shift, when an altercation broke out among customers. One of the customers was shot in the leg. Brown was not physically involved in the incident, but he observed it, and he had to clean up the blood from the shooting. Brown went several times to the police station to identify the individuals involved, and he was called to testify in court with regard to the events of that day.

Six days after the shooting incident, Brown, again working alone, was the victim of a robbery at a different Quik Trip at approximately 1 a.m. The robber grabbed Brown by the arm, swung him around, stuck an object that Brown thought to be a gun in Brown’s back, and demanded all of the money, which Brown gave to him. Brown was told to get down, and he did. The robber left but returned and said, “I told you to get the ... down or I’m going to blow your ... head off.” Brown laid spread-eagle on the floor until the phone rang; it was the security organization calling in response to a silent alarm that Brown had triggered. Brown later testified

a lot of things went through my mind when that guy had the gun to my back.... Where [were] my kids going to be. You know, am I going to walk out of here. Am I going to be all right when I walk out of here. Is there going to be — you know, is he going to hit me, shoot me, or — it just really scared me.

Following these two events, Brown began suffering from shakiness, upset stomach, tight chest, nervousness, and jumpiness. In February of 1995 he began seeing a counselor. Later, he saw Dr. Wayne Alberts for treatment of sores that had begun to develop in his mouth. In August of 1995 Brown began consulting Dr. Allen Whitters, a psychiatrist referred to him by Dr. Alberts, to help control the anxiety that contributed to the mouth sores. Dr. Whitters reported Brown suffers from delayed post-traumatic stress disorder, attributable to the 1994 incidents at the Quik Trip stores. Dr. Whitters further stated that the additional trauma of the robbery aggravated the effect of the shooting, so the cumulative effect was more traumatic than the sum of the two events.

A deputy workers’ compensation commissioner found Brown had sustained a mental/mental injury (a mental injury caused merely by psychological stress or trauma without an accompanying physical injury) arising out of and in the course of his employment. Quik Trip appealed to the commissioner, who reversed the decision of the deputy and concluded Brown did not meet his burden to prove legal causation. Brown sought judicial review, and the district court affirmed. On appeal the court of appeals reversed and remanded the ease to the commissioner to determine anew whether Brown had established legal causation. Two judges dissented on the ground Brown had met the legal-causation test and the remand should be limited to ascertaining the extent of his industrial disability.

II. Standard of Review.

When reviewing a commissioner’s decision, a district court is required to review all of the evidence and determine whether substantial evidence supports the commissioner’s decision. Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(f)(1) (1999) defines substantial evidence as

the quantity and quality of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact are understood to be serious and of great importance.

On appeal we apply the standards of section 17A.19 to the agency action and determine whether our conclusions are consistent with those of the district court. Bearce v. FMC Corp., 465 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Iowa 1991).

III. Legal Principles Underlying “Mental!Mental” Cases.

We held in Dunlavey v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 526 N.W.2d 845 (Iowa 1995), that a purely mental injury is com-pensable without an accompanying physical injury under certain circumstances. Dunlavey requires that a claimant establish both medical causation and legal causation. Id. at 853-58.

In this case, it is undisputed that Brown suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder, and Quik Trip does not contest his claim of medical causation. The issue is whether Brown also established legal causation. In Dunlavey we recognized a purely mental injury as a “personal injury” under Iowa Code section 85.3(1) (1993), and thus compensable. The question raised in Dunlavey was how to prove a compensable mental injury because, obviously, every job could be considered traumatic at times. See Shope v. Indus. Comm’n, 17 Ariz.App. 23, 495 P.2d 148, 150 (1972) (Allowing recovery for gradual buildup of emotional stress would “literally open Pandora’s Box permitting compensation to any disgruntled employee who leaves his job in a huff because of an emotional disturbance.”).

Under Dunlavey a worker must prove he “has a mental injury which was caused in fact by mental stimuli in the work environment.” 526 N.W.2d at 847. We referred to this element as medical or factual causation. Id. The claimant in Dunlavey produced medical evidence to support this element. However, we reversed in Dunla-vey because we held the industrial commissioner and district court applied the wrong test for legal causation. Id. The test for legal causation under Dunlavey is whether the claimant’s stress was “of greater magnitude than the day-to-day mental stresses experienced by other workers employed in the same or similar jobs, regardless of their employer.” Id. at 858. Here, the industrial commissioner and district court applied the legal-causation test of Dunlavey and rejected Brown’s claim because he had not shown his stress was greater than that of other workers employed in the same or similar jobs. In fact, Brown did not even introduce evidence regarding stress experienced by other workers in similar jobs. Quik Trip contended this was fatal to his claim, and the industrial commissioner and district court agreed.

We believe the proof of legal causation for recovery under a mental/mental injury does not require evidence of stress experienced by similarly situated workers if the event or events giving rise to the claim are readily identifiable under a test we will discuss later. This conclusion is consistent with Dunlavey, which did not involve a readily identifiable stress factor such as in this case. The “unusual stress” test adopted by us in Dunlavey was based on a decision by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Graves v. Utah Power & Light Co., 713 P.2d 187, 193 (Wyo.1986). In Graves the Wyoming Supreme Court explained its rationale for the unusual-stress test:

‘Where a mental injury occurs rapidly and can be readily traced to a specific event, ... there is a sufficient badge of reliability to assuage the Court’s apprehension. Where, however, a mental injury develops gradually and is linked to no particular incident, the risk of groundless claims looms large indeed.”

Graves, 713 P.2d at 192 (quoting Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Pub. Safety, 404 A.2d 1014, 1018 (Me.1979)). As the Graves court noted,

[i]f we allowed workers to recover for long-term mental injuries when those injuries were triggered by everyday work stress, then almost all mental injuries would be compensable from the worker’s compensation fund. There are very few workers with nontraumatic mental problems who cannot show that job stress contributed to their problems. The employers would become insurers for almost all mental illnesses suffered by their employees.
In addition, the district courts would have great difficulty distinguishing between legitimate claims of mental injury and malingering.

Id. (citation omitted).

Both Graves and Dunlavey are distinguishable because in those cases the stress was not based on specific traumatic incidents. In fact, subsequent to the Graves case, the Wyoming Supreme Court found in favor of a claimant’s mental/mental claim, even though no similarly situated employee had testified. See Johnson v. State ex rel. Worker’s Comp. Div., 798 P.2d 323, 324-25 (Wyo.1990). In Johnson the claimant was a truck driver who, while driving in hazardous winter conditions, lost control of his vehicle and narrowly avoided a collision with another vehicle. Id. at 324. While Johnson suffered no physical injuries, he started having nightmares and suffered from insomnia and depression. Id. The Wyoming court observed, as to legal causation, that:

The accident also satisfies the requirement that the mental injury resulted from a situation or condition that is of greater magnitude than the day-to-day stresses and tensions all employees usually experience. While it may be normal for and expected of over-the-road truck drivers to encounter hazardous, wintery driving conditions on Wyoming highways, involvement in an accident when driving in those conditions or any weather conditions falls beyond any day-today stress and tensions. It was the accident and not the driving in hazardous conditions that caused Johnson’s injuries.

Id. at 326.

This rationale is supported by a respected authority who notes that claims based on a sudden event may not require proof of “normal” working conditions, observing:

The least troublesome cases are those involving sudden fright and fear since this kind of experience would be rated unusual in comparison with any norm. Except for the adventurous heroes that inhabit the world of one-hour television thrillers, continuous terror, shock, and dramatic brushes with death are not the normal routine of life.

Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 44.05[4][a], at 44-50 (2001).

The appropriate test under the circumstances of the present case is not whether the stress is greater than that experienced by similarly situated employees, as we required in Dunlavey. When a claim is based on a manifest happening of a sudden traumatic nature from an unexpected cause or unusual strain, the legal-causation test is met irrespective of the absence of similar stress on other employees. See Tocco v. City of Great Falls, 220 Mont. 221, 714 P.2d 160, 163-64 (1986) (applying similarly worded statutory test). Quik Trip concedes medical causation has been established. It relies solely on Brown’s failure to produce testimony of similarly situated employees to establish his claim of legal causation. However, the two violent events occurring in Brown’s employment with Quik Trip satisfied the test as outlined above. These events were sudden, traumatic, and unexpected. Quik Trip, in fact, does not contend otherwise.

We conclude the claimant satisfied the requirement for establishing legal causation. We therefore vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand to the workers’ compensation commissioner to determine the extent of Brown’s disability.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED.

All justices concur except NEUMAN and TERNUS, JJ., who take no part.

      . This line of cases was superceded by statute in Wyoming in 1994, when Wyoming Statutes section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(J) (Lexis 1999), was enacted excluding from workers’ compensation coverage ”[a]ny mental injury unless it is caused by a compensable physical injury, [and] it occurs subsequent to or simultaneously with, the physical injury....” See Sechrist v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 23 P.3d 1138, 1139-40 (Wyo.2001).


author: LAVORATO, Chief Justice.

text:
    The SONS OF THE UNION VETERANS OF THE CIVIL WAR, DEPARTMENT OF IOWA; Save Iowa Civil War Monuments Foundation, and Dennis Sasse, Appellants, v. GRISWOLD AMERICAN LEGION POST 508, Appellee, City of Griswold, Iowa, Defendant.
    No. 00-0681.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Feb. 27, 2002.

      Ronald W. Feilmeyer of Cambridge, Feilmeyer, Landsness, Chase & Jones, P.L.C., Atlantic, for appellants.
    James P. Barry of Otto, Lorence & Barry, P.L.C., Atlantic, and Richard J. Howard of Howard Law Firm, Atlantic, for appellee Griswold American Legion Post 508.
   LAVORATO, Chief Justice.

The battle before us today is not one of life or death. It is not a battle for freedom. Rather, it is a battle to keep a symbol of those things — a Civil War cannon — in Griswold, Iowa. The historic Civil War cannon first arrived in Griswold nearly a century ago. When the Griswold American Legion Post 508 decided to sell the cannon, the plaintiffs decided to fight back. The plaintiffs lost their first battle in the district court, and they now appeal the district court’s ruling on summary judgment in favor of the defendants. While we understand the great historic significance of the Civil War cannon, and the plaintiffs’ desire to keep the cannon in Griswold, the law dictates a different outcome. Therefore, we affirm.

I. Scope of Review.

Our review of a summary judgment ruling is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 4; Bailey v. Batchelder, 576 N.W.2d 334, 337 (Iowa 1998). Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party shows no genuine issue of material fact exists, and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c); Bennett v. MC No. 619, Inc., 586 N.W.2d 512, 516 (Iowa 1998). The court examines the record before the district court to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the court correctly applied the law. Schoff v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 604 N.W.2d 43, 45 (Iowa 1999).

Ordinarily, the record for summary judgment purposes includes the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits. Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c). Here, the court had the benefit of all these documents as well as photographs and vintage and recent newspaper articles.' In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the parties invited the district court to consider “anything that’s in [the] file” and to “make a final determination as to ownership of the cannon.”

II. Facts.

The following undisputed facts appear from all the documents in the record.

One of the plaintiffs in this case, The Sons of the Union Veterans of the Civil War, Department of Iowa (Sons of the Civil War), is a national organization chartered by Congress. Another plaintiff, Save Iowa Civil War Monuments Foundation (Foundation), is an Iowa nonprofit corporation that supports the repair- and protection of Civil War monuments. The remaining plaintiff, Dennis Sasse, is a resident of Griswold. The defendant is the Griswold American Legion Post 508 (American Legion) located in Griswold. The City of Griswold, a named defendant, did not participate in the hearing on the summary judgment motion at issue in this case, nor has it participated in this appeal.

In 1911, Congressman Walter I. Smith arranged for the government to donate a cannon to the local Grand Army of the Republic, Worthington Post No. 9 (also known as the Cass County Veteran’s Association) (hereinafter “GAR”). The cannon arrived in Griswold in early May of 1911. The three-inch, wrought iron cannon was manufactured in 1863 by Phoenix Iron Co. of Phoenixville, Pennsylvania, and used in the Civil War. The plan was to construct a “suitable mounting” out of cement for public display of the cannon in Griswold City Park.

On August 26, 1920, the GAR met with the American Legion. Minutes from that meeting reflect that the GAR agreed to turn over all of its property to the American Legion. Among the property listed was “one cannon.” Minutes from a September 7, 1920, meeting of the American Legion indicate that the American Legion accepted the GAR property.

The record is unclear of the cannon’s exact location since its arrival in Griswold in 1911. The best indication from the record is that the cannon remained in the Griswold City Park until 1941, when it was placed in front of the American Legion Club in Griswold. In 1965, the American Legion placed the cannon and pedestal on display in front of its new building. In 1981, the American Legion sold its building and the cannon was put back in the Griswold City Park.

The American Legion removed the cannon from the park in 1998, intending to sell it to a Pennsylvania collector for $16,000. In addition, the American Legion is to receive from the collector a “shoota-ble replica” of the cannon’s barrel, valued at $7000. Completion of the sale depends on the outcome of this lawsuit. The American Legion plans to use the proceeds from the sale to (1) add additional scholarship money for area students and (2) increase its current sponsorship of Griswold students to Boys State from four to five. Once the cannon’s value became public knowledge, the American Legion moved the cannon to a “secure location” for “protective custody” because it feared someone might steal it.

Over the years, members of the American Legion have provided maintenance and upkeep on the cannon, regardless of its location. The cannon was last fired in 1979.

Numerous plaques, writings, or symbols are incorporated into the concrete pedestal that supported the cannon in the Griswold City Park. Poured into the concrete on the front of the pedestal are the words “Presented by Worthington Post No. 9, GAR, Griswold Iowa, '61 '65.” A brass plaque attached to the front of the pedestal reads, “Dedicated to All Veterans of All Wars and Conflicts, Dedicated May 25, 1992, Cass County Veterans Memorial Fund.” On one side of the pedestal, the American Legion emblem appears. A brass emblem on the other side of the pedestal reads, “Spanish War Veterans 1888-1902, Porto Rocoio Cuba Philpine Island.” The cannon barrel rested in the top of the pedestal and fastened down at approximately a ten-tó fifteen-degree upwards angle.

A comparison of more recent photos with an older photo indicates a new pedestal must have been constructed sometime between 1911 and 1961. For example, the old photo shows a large plaque on one side of the pedestal. The plaques on the side of the current pedestal are much smaller. In addition, there is no plaque on the front of the pedestal in the old photo. The cannon in the old photo appears to be resting on top of the pedestal, with no upward angle indicated.

III.Proceedings.

The Sons of the Civil War and the Foundation filed a petition for declaratory judgment, asking the court to (1) declare the cannon the property of the Sons of the Civil War or the City of Griswold; (2) direct and find that the American Legion has no right, title, and interest in the cannon; and (3) restrain the American Legion from selling or otherwise disposing of the cannon. Dennis Sasse was later added as a plaintiff, and the City of Griswold was added as a defendant.

The three plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that newspaper reports and plaques on the cannon’s pedestal “clearly indicate” the cannon was dedicated to the public, and therefore became public property. The district court denied the motion, ruling there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the ownership of the cannon.

The American Legion then filed a motion for summary judgment. It asserted that, because the plaintiffs and the City of Griswold could not claim any ownership interest in the cannon, and the American Legion could prove ownership, the American Legion was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The district court found that the cannon was given to the GAR, and the GAR intended to give it to the American Legion when the GAR transferred its property to the American Legion. Further, the court found that no “public dedication” of the cannon took place. The court granted the American Legion’s motion for summary judgment.

It is from this ruling that the plaintiffs appeal.

IV. Issue.

The plaintiffs raise only one issue on appeal. They argue that the district court erred in concluding that there had been no dedication of the cannon to the public. Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that the GAR and the American Legion gave up any rights in the cannon when it was dedicated to the public in the early 1900s and again when it was rededicated in 1992. The cannon, they conclude, thus became public property, and the American Legion gave up any rights it may have had to sell the cannon.

In contrast, the American Legion contends the GAR’s transfer of the cannon to it shows the GAR’s intent to transfer the cannon it owned. “Had [the GAR] dedicated the cannon to the public it would not have taken the time to transfer it to the [American] Legion.” Moreover, the American Legion argues, it has maintained the cannon since 1920, and it is the only party that has shown any ownership interest in the cannon.

V. Analysis.

A. Dedication.

“Dedication” is “the setting aside of land for a public use.” 23 Am. Jur.2d Dedication § 1, at 5 (1983) (emphasis added). The Iowa cases cited by both parties, and relied upon by the district court, also address the issue of dedication of land. See, e.g., Henry Walker Park Ass’n v. Mathews, 249 Iowa 1246, 1252-59, 91 N.W.2d 703, 707-11 (1958) (holding street and parking lot had been dedicated to public use and accepted by the public); City of Sioux City v. Tott, 244 Iowa 1285, 1293, 60 N.W.2d 510, 515 (1953) (“A common law dedication of land for a public purpose is well recognized in law.”) (emphasis added); De Castello v. City of Cedar Rapids, 171 Iowa 18, 19, 153 N.W. 353, 355 (1915) (“A dedication is a devotion to public use of land, or an easement in it.”) (emphasis added). Thus, it is not accurate to describe a gift or donation of personal property as a “dedication.” City of Chattanooga, Tenn. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 298 F.Supp. 1, 9 (E.D.Tenn.1969). We are, therefore, not convinced that the “dedication” analysis is appropriate in the context of personal property such as the cannon at issue here. However, because “dedication” was the legal theory relied upon by the parties and the district court, we will analyze the issue in terms of “dedication.”

According to Iowa case law, dedication requires three elements: (1) intent to dedicate, (2) dedication, and (3) acceptance by the public or the party to whom the dedication is made. De Castello, 171 Iowa at 21, 153 N.W. at 355. Dedication can be either express or implied. Id. “An express dedication is evidenced by some explicit or positive declaration, or manifestation of intent to surrender the land.” Id. An implied dedication is shown “by some act or course of conduct on the part of the owner from which a reasonable inference of intent may be drawn.” Id. Both express and implied dedication require a showing of “some unequivocal act indicating clearly an intent” to dedicate the property, and an “actual setting aside of the physical property to the public use.” Id. at 22, 153 N.W. at 355.

“[T]he dedication must be to the public use, and the acceptance must likewise be by the public.” Henry Walker Park Ass’n, 249 Iowa at 1256, 91 N.W.2d at 710. The acceptance may be by some formal action or by public use. Id. at 1253, 91 N.W.2d at 708. Acceptance of the dedication may be implied. De Castello, 171 Iowa at 22, 153 N.W. at 355. For example, the party accepting the dedication may do “some act which unequivocally shows an intent to assume jurisdiction over the thing dedicated.” Id. at 23, 153 N.W. at 355.

The extent of the dedication is determined from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the situation. Id. at 22, 153 N.W. at 355. Evidence necessary to establish dedication

may not be predicated on anything short of deliberate, unequivocal, and decisive acts and declarations of the owner, manifesting a positive and unmistakable intention to permanently abandon his property to the specific public use.
In order to constitute a dedication, the evidence must be clear, satisfactory, and convincing, and the acts proved must not be consistent with any other construction than that of dedication; and the same rule applies to the acceptance of the dedication. Mere permissive use of a way, no matter how long continued, will not amount to a dedication. The user is presumed to be permissive, and not adverse.

Culver v. Converse, 207 Iowa 1173, 1175, 224 N.W. 834, 835-36 (1929) (citations omitted).

The district court first determined that the United States awarded the cannon as a gift to the GAR, and the GAR accepted the cannon in 1911. Those two facts are undisputed.

The court also determined “no genuine issue of material fact exists as to GAR’s intent to lawfully transfer title in the cannon to the [American] Legion.” We agree. GAR minutes dated August 26, 1920, indicate that the GAR transferred its property, which included “one cannon,” to the American Legion. The same minutes further indicate that all of the property listed (eleven guns, thirty-two tents, one cannon, and one flag) except the cannon, was “to be returned to Cass Co. Veterans’ Association, in case the Legion does not continue to have charge of the Reunions.” (Presumably, “reunions” referred to reunions of Civil War veterans.) In short, as the district court concluded, this evidence establishes as a matter of law that the GAR gave the cannon to the American Legion in 1920.

The district court next addressed whether the cannon was ever dedicated to the public. Given the high level of proof required on this element, we agree with the district court that as a matter of law there was no such dedication. There was no evidence that the GAR or the American Legion ever surrendered the cannon to public use. There is no evidence of an express dedication, such as a public dedication ceremony in which either the GAR or the Legion unequivocally gave up control of the cannon for public use.

The “dedicated to” plaques on the concrete pedestal make no declaration or reservation to the public in general. The “dedicated to” language in this context is consistent with a symbolic gesture. See, e.g., Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary 520 (1994) (defining “dedicate” to mean in one sense “to offer formally (a book, piece of music, etc.) to a person, cause, or the like in testimony of affection or respect, as on a prefatory page”). In that sense, the “dedicated to” language does not begin to approach the level of evidence “manifesting a positive and unmistakable intention to permanently abandon” the cannon. See Culver, 207 Iowa at 1175, 224 N.W. at 835.

Moreover, there is no evidence of an acceptance of such dedication by the public. What record there is on this point indicates the American Legion has maintained the cannon since it received it in 1920 and has determined where and how the cannon would be displayed. The city has done nothing that would “unequivocally show[ ] an intent to assume jurisdiction” over the cannon. See De Castello, 171 Iowa at 23, 153 N.W. at 355. To the contrary, the city denied possession or ownership of the cannon, and stated it would not “bring any action” regarding the cannon.

VI. Disposition.

While we understand the plaintiffs’ desire to keep this historic piece of property in Griswold, the evidence falls considerably short of generating a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of dedication. The district court therefore correctly granted the American Legion’s motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, we affirm its ruling.

AFFIRMED.


author: STREIT, Justice.

text:
    Liberato A. IANNONE and Dolores P. Iannone, Appellees, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND FINANCE, Appellant.
    No. 00-0411.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Feb. 27, 2002.

      Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Harry M. Griger, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Lucille M. Hardy, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
    Glenn L. Smith, David C. Craig and Tamara K. Hackmann of Finley, Alt, Smith, Scharnberg, Craig, Hilmes & Gaff-ney, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees.
   STREIT, Justice.

The Iowa Department of Revenue appeals from the district court ruling on judicial review reversing the agency’s method of calculating interest on an assessment of Liberato and Dolores Ian-nones’ income tax liability for their amended returns. Iannones claim the Department incorrectly interpreted the controlling statutory provisions of the Iowa Code in calculating the amount upon which interest shall accrue. Iannones contend the 1982 and 1983 overpayments and the 1984 carryback should be credited against their 1984 underpayment in determining the total amount of the tax upon which to assess interest. The Department contends the controlling statute does not provide authority to net the previous carrybacks together with the 1984 underpayment. Because we agree with the Department’s statutory interpretation, we reverse the district court ruling reversing the Department’s tax assessment.

I. Background and Facts

Liberato and Dolores Iannones filed individual income tax returns for the calendar years 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987. In May of 1995, Iannones filed amended tax returns for the years 1982-1987 to reflect the changes resulting from an Internal Revenue Service audit. The amended return showed an Iowa net operating loss (NOL) for the 1985 tax year. The 1985 NOL was carried back to 1982. See Iowa Code § 422.9(3)(a) (1995). Because the carryback was not exhausted in 1982, the NOL was then carried over to 1983. The carryback resulted in a $15,990 overpayment in 1982 and a $6672 overpayment in 1983. Again, the carryback was not exhausted and so the carryback was applied to 1984. This carryback, however, did not result in an overpayment. Rather, the remaining NOL only partially reduced the 1984 tax due by the NOL-created tax adjustment of $2,816. After applying the 1984 carryback to the tax due, Iannones owed a total of $26,287 for the 1984 tax year. In 1995, Iannones paid $13,622 which was applied to their individual 1984 income tax liabilities.

The Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance (Department) calculated the amount of interest Iannones owed the Department based on the total 1984 underpayment. The critical part of the Department’s calculation involved interpretation of Iowa Code section 422.25(3). The Department interpreted this section to mean the Department was required to calculate interest on a year-by-year basis, rather than reducing the 1984 underpayment by the 1982 and 1983 overpayments. Based on this interpretation, the Department calculated the interest due for Iannones’ 1984 underpayment of tax on the basis of the full amount of the underpayment. Ian-nones contested the Department’s assessments. Specifically, Iannones argued the statutory provision authorized an overpayment of taxes from earlier years caused by the application of the net operating loss to offset the underpayment. If this method of calculating interest is used, the State would owe Iannones $806.68 on the amended returns. However, if the Department’s method of calculation is used, Iannones would owe the State interest in the amount of $16,364.57 and a total tax assessment of $20,279.57 for the amended returns.

The matter was submitted to the Department to be reviewed by an administrative law judge. The judge affirmed the Department’s assessment. In response, Iannones filed a petition for judicial review of the judge’s findings pursuant to Iowa Code section 17A.19(3) (1999).

On judicial review of the agency’s actions, the district court reversed the decision of the administrative law judge. The issue before the district court was whether the 1982 and 1983 overpayments, in addition to the 1984 carryback, should be used to reduce the 1984 underpayment for purposes of calculating interest pursuant to Iowa Code section 422.25(3). The Department argued interest calculations must be made on a tax-year-by-tax-year basis. To the contrary, Iannones argued the NOL carrybacks which resulted in overpayment for 1982 and 1983 should be combined and credited against the 1984 underpayment. The district court agreed with Iannones and accordingly reversed the Department’s decision. The court determined Iannones were entitled to their claimed income tax refund of $806.68 with interest. The Department appeals.

II. Standard of Review

On judicial review of a final agency action, our review is limited to correcting any errors of law made by the Department. Iowa Code § 17A.19(8). We must determine “whether the district court correctly applied the law in exercising its section 17A.19(8) judicial review function.” Ahrendsen ex rel. Ahrendsen v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 613 N.W.2d 674, 676 (Iowa 2000). We give weight to the agency’s findings, but are only bound by them if supported by substantial evidence. IBP, Inc. v. Iowa Employment Appeal Bd., 604 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Iowa 1999). Evidence is substantial if á reasonable person would accept it as adequate to reach the same findings. Id. If our conclusions are the same as those of the district court’s, we must affirm. Norland v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 412 N.W.2d 904, 908 (Iowa 1987). Under section 17A.19(8),

relief may be granted only if agency action was “unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious,” or is characterized by abuse of discretion. To be arbitrary or capricious, the agency action must be taken without regard to the law or consideration of the facts of the case. To constitute abuse of discretion, the action must be unreasonable and lack rationality.

Allen v. State Dep’t of Personnel, 528 N.W.2d 583, 587 (Iowa 1995) (citations omitted). When challenging a tax assessment, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to show the Department’s assessment was erroneous. Iowa Code § 421.60(6)(b), (c) (1995); Nymann v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 465 N.W.2d 890, 893 (Iowa 1991); Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 479 N.W.2d 255, 258 (Iowa 1991); Assoc. Leasing, Inc. v. Iowa State Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 456 N.W.2d 210, 213 (Iowa 1990); Richards v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 360 N.W.2d 830, 831 (Iowa 1985) (citing City of Ames v. State Tax Comm’n, 246 Iowa 1016, 1025, 71 N.W.2d 15, 21 (1955)).

III. The Merits

The only issue before us on appeal involves interpretation of Iowa Code section 422.25 (1995) and the correct method of calculation of interest under this section. This section dictates the calculations of interest for each of the tax years involved in this case. The Department argues each tax year stands alone for calculation of tax liabilities and the interest on those same tax liabilities. Iannones argue the 1982 and 1983 NOL overpayments should be combined and credited against the 1984 underpayment of tax before interest is calculated.

Iowa Code section 422.25 requires the Department to calculate two types of interest. The first type is the calculation of the amount of interest owed to a taxpayer on any overpayments in a given tax year. Here, the Department was obligated to calculate the interest owed Iannones on the NOL carryback-created overpayments in 1982 and 1983. Pursuant to statute, Iannones are entitled to interest on the overpayments calculated from the date the amended returns for 1982 and 1983 were filed. See Iowa Code § 422.25(3). The Department properly awarded Iannones $3389.88 in interest for the 1982 overpayment and $1414.46 in interest for the 1983 overpayment.

The second type of interest is the amount of interest owed the State by taxpayers on any underpayments in a given tax year. In the case before us, this involves the calculation of interest Iannones owe the State for the 1984 underpayment. Before we turn to the controlling statutory provisions, we briefly examine the purpose of carrybacks.

Carryback provisions permit “an adjustment of an earlier [tax year] liability upon the basis of subsequent events.” Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 759, 81 S.Ct. 864, 868, 6 L.Ed.2d 72, 76 (1961). Statutory provisions allowing the carryback of NOLs to non-loss years are limited exceptions to the general rule of basic year-by-year accounting. Id. The United States Supreme Court has characterized such provisions as “exceptional relief measure[s].” Id. at 758-59, 81 S.Ct. at 868, 6 L.Ed.2d at 76. Such an exceptional relief measure “contemplates that the initial tax obligation was not incorrectly or mistakenly imposed but was actually due, but that an adjustment may be made upon the basis of the taxpayer’s gain or loss in the succeeding year or years.... ” Id. Moreover, carry-back provisions are in the nature of an exemption from the taxes otherwise owed in the year in which the carryback is applied. Id.

Inasmuch as income tax exemptions exist by virtue of the grace of the legislature, their existence is not to be easily implied, and a taxpayer seeking an exemption is required to establish that the claimed exemption is unmistakably within the spirit and intent of the statute, and the provision of exemption must be strictly construed against the claimant.

71 Am.Jur.2d State and Local Taxation § 410, at 409-10 (2001); see also Ballstadt v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 368 N.W.2d 147, 148-49 (Iowa 1985) (tax exemption statutes are to be strictly construed resolving all doubts in favor of taxation); 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 264, at 336-37 (2001) (“an exemption must be created or conferred in clear and plain language since an exemption only exists by virtue of constitutional or statutory authority”). Considering the nature and purposes behind carrybacks, we now turn to the issue before us.

After applying the NOL-created carry-back to 1982 and 1983, the remainder was applied to the 1984 tax year. This time, however, the NOL-created carryback only partially reduced the taxable income for 1984. The central issue in this appeal focuses on the appropriate method of interest calculation for the 1984 underpayment. On appeal, Iannones argue they should be excused from paying the full amount of interest they would otherwise have owed the State for their 1984 underpayment. In so arguing, they assert the NOL carryback years should be netted together for interest calculation purposes. However, the “subsequent cancellation of the duty to pay this assessed deficiency does not cancel in like manner the duty to pay the interest on that deficiency.” Manning v. Seeley Tube & Box Co. of New Jersey, 338 U.S. 561, 565, 70 S.Ct. 386, 389, 94 L.Ed. 346, 349 (1950).

Iannones’ interpretation of the relevant statutes violates general rules of accounting. Specifically, Iannones contend the tax years in their case should not be treated separately. However, “taxable income is computed on the basis of the taxpayer’s taxable year; generally, this covers an accounting period of twelve months....” 47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 22, at 87 (2001); see also 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 437, at 494 (2001); 71 Am.Jur.2d State and Local Taxation § 512, at 775 (2001). “Each taxable year must be regarded as an independent unit for income tax purposes.” 47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 22, at 88 (2001). Statutes may allow an exception to the general rules of accounting, but the exception must be clearly present in the statute. See Ballstadt, 368 N.W.2d at 148-49; 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 264, at 336-37 (2001). On appeal, we must determine whether the controlling statutory provisions contain such a manifest intent to allow an exception to the annual rule of accounting when a NOL has occurred and affected an earlier underpayment.

There are two different methods of interest calculation to employ when a NOL has occurred that affected an earlier underpayment. The appropriate method depends on the time frame during which interest is to be calculated. For interest calculation between the due date of the underpayment to the last day of the taxable year for the underpayment, Iowa Code section 422.25(3) controls. This section provides

when the net operating loss ... carry-back to a prior year eliminates or reduces an underpayment of tax due for an earlier year, the full amount of the underpayment of tax shall bear interest ... from the due date of the tax for the earlier year to the last day of the taxable year in which the net operating loss ... occurred.

Iowa Code § 422.25(3) (emphasis added). Then, after the last day of the taxable year in which the NOL occurred, interest is based on “additional tax” owed. Id. § 422.25(2). Under the present facts, we calculate the additional tax starting after December 31, 1985, i.e., the last day of the NOL year. Additional tax is the full amount of tax due less the tax adjusted as a result of the NOL-created carryback to the 1984 tax year.

With regard to the interest calculation on the 1984 underpayment between the date the underpayment was due and December 31, 1985, Iannones argue Iowa Code section 422.25(3) allows them to subtract from the total amount of their 1984 underpayments the 1982 and 1983 carry-backs. However, nothing in the language of the statute supports their contention. Section 422.25(3) applies exclusively to the time between the due date of the 1984 tax to the last day of the taxable year in which the NOL occurred, ie., 1985. The section clearly provides the taxpayer shall pay interest on “the full amount of the underpayment.” (Emphasis added.) Carry-backs are only allowed to the extent authorized by statute. Bulova Watch Co., 365 U.S. at 758-59, 81 S.Ct. at 868, 6 L.Ed.2d at 76. “In the absence of a clear legislative expression to the contrary, the question of who properly should possess the right of use of the money owed the Government for the period it is owed must be answered in favor of the Government.” Manning, 338 U.S. at 566, 70 S.Ct. at 389, 94 L.Ed. at 349-350. Since income taxes are generally calculated on an annual accounting basis, the taxpayer must show specifically the language of the statute allowing for deviance from the general rule. Iannones have not pointed to a particular statutory provision explicitly allowing a netting procedure to be employed in the calculation of interest on an underpayment. We decline to read this authority into the statute. See 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 264, at 337 (2001) (“courts have no power to create an exemption from taxation by judicial construction” (citing City of Chicago v. Illinois Dep’t of Revenue, 147 Ill.2d 484, 487, 168 Ill.Dec. 841, 842, 590 N.E.2d 478, 479 (1992))).

As regards the calculation of interest after December 31,1985, another statutory provision is controlling. Iowa Code section 422.25(2) provides the general rule for interest calculation on underpayments. This section provides,

In addition to the tax or additional tax determined by the department ..., the taxpayer shall pay interest on the tax or additional tax at the rate in effect under section 421.1 ..., computed from the date the return was required to be filed.

Iowa Code § 422.25(2). Interest on underpayments calculated after the last day of the taxable year in which the NOL occurred shall be calculated on the total underpayment from the date the return should have been filed to the date of payment. Id. Applied to the case before us, Iannones owe the State interest on the “additional tax” for the 1984 tax year. The additional tax is the full amount of the original 1984 underpayment of tax reduced by the tax adjusted as a result of the NOL. Pursuant to section 422.25(2), the Department correctly took the full amount of the 1984 tax due and netted it with the tax adjustment resulting from the 1984 NOL carryback to calculate the “additional tax due” for 1984. The State properly charged Iannones interest on that amount from the last day of the 1985 loss year to the date paid.

IV. Conclusion

The district court erred in reversing the Department’s assessment of interest owed by Iannones to the State of Iowa. We therefore reverse the district court and úphold the Department’s assessment of interest on Iannones’ 1984 underpayment.

REVERSED.

      . In 1984, after the remaining carryback was applied to the tax due, Iannones owed a total of $26,287 in tax and $19,452.62 in interest on that tax, totaling $45,739.62.

      . These numbers reflect the amount of interest and total tax assessment through May 31, 1997. Iannones do not challenge the actual tax due calculations based on their taxable income for each year involved in this appeal. The numbers discussed are for illustrative purposes only.


author: CADY, Justice.

text:
    Gregg D. MILLER, Appellant, v. MARSHALL COUNTY and Marshall County Board of Supervisors, Appellees.
    No. 00-0341.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Feb. 27, 2002.

      Dennis D. Jerde of Davis, Brown, Koehn, Shors & Roberts, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
    Chester C. Woodburn III of Hansen, McClintock & Riley, Des Moines, and William B. Serangeli of Smith, Schneider, Stiles, Hudson, Serangeli, Mallaney <⅞ Shindler, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees.
   CADY, Justice.

Under Iowa’s county home rule statute, a county is not authorized to lease real property when the lease payments are to be made payable from the general fund without first giving notice of the public’s right to petition for a referendum if the principal amount of the lease exceeds certain limits based on the population of the county. See Iowa Code § 331.301(10)(e)(1), (2) (1993). This appeal requires us to decide if this statute authorizes a county to enter into a lease of real property without first following the petition procedures when the principal amount of the lease over the entire term exceeds the threshold limit under the statute but is below the limit on an annual basis. The district court held the county was not authorized to enter into the lease and that the lease was unenforceable. We affirm the district court on our review.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Gregg Miller owns a building in Mar-shalltown, Iowa, known as the “Rude Budding.” He purchased the building after prolonged discussions with the Marshall County Board of Supervisors (Board). The Board wanted Miller to purchase the building and lease it to Marshall County (County) so the County could consolidate its county offices and operations located in various places throughout Mar-shalltown into a central location.

The Board eventually agreed to lease the Rude Building from Miller, and Miller agreed to purchase the building and make substantial renovations to accommodate the needs of the county. The Board and Miller entered into a written lease agreement on November 28, 1994. The lease covered a period of ten years, with an annual rent of $424,666.00. The lease was to commence once Miller completed the renovations, which the parties agreed would be no later than July 1, 1997. The lease also gave the County the option to renew the lease, as well as the right of first refusal in the event Miller desired to sell the budding during the term of the lease. The lease also contained a termination clause in the event of a fire or other casualty. Additionally, the lease included a separability clause. This clause provided:

Landlord and Tenant intend and believe that each provision in this Lease comports with all applicable local, state and federal laws and judicial decisions. However, if any provision or provisions, or if any portion of any provision or provisions, in this Lease is found by a court of law to be in violation of any local, state or federal ordinance, statute, law, administrative decision or judicial decision, or public policy, and if such court should declare such portion, provision or provisions of this Lease to be illegal, invalid, unlawful, void, or unenforceable as written, then it is the intent of both Landlord and Tenant that such portion, provision or provisions shall be given force to the fullest possible extent that they are legal, valid, and enforce- . able, that the remainder of this Lease shall be construed as if such illegal, invalid, unlawful, void, or unenforceable portion, provision or provisions were not contained herein, and that the rights, obligations and interests of Landlord and Tenant under the remainder of this Lease shall continue in full force and effect.

In the summer of 1995, after Miller began renovating the building to accommodate the county’s needs, the Board determined it had no authority to enter into the lease without notifying the public of its right to petition for an election. The Board then instituted proceedings to enter into a lease by giving the appropriate public notice. See id. § 331.301(10)(e)(2)(a). The notice resulted in the timely filing of a petition with a sufficient number of eligible signatures, forcing the Board to either abandon the lease or direct the county commissioner of elections to call a special election on the question whether to enter into the lease. See id. § 331.301(10)(e)(2)(b). The Board determined a referendum would not succeed and notified Miller it was abandoning the lease.

Miller filed a petition for damages against the County and the Board based on the theories of breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, promissory estop-pel, unjust enrichment, detrimental reli-anee, quantum meruit, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. The County and the Board moved to dismiss the action. The district court dismissed all the claims against the County and the Board except breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation. The County and the Board then moved for summary judgment on the two remaining claims.

The district court granted summary judgment. It found Miller had no claim for breach of contract because the lease was void. It held the Board had no authority to enter into the lease at the time it was executed, and did not subsequently acquire authority pursuant to the governing statutes. The district court found the separability clause did not make the obligation to pay rent under the lease enforceable up to the amount of the statutory spending limit. The district court also dismissed the negligent misrepresentation claim.

Miller appeals from that portion of the summary judgment decision that dismissed his claim for breach of contract. ' He claims the Board had authority to enter into the lease because the statutory spending limits only applied to the principal amount of the annual rent payments and the district court erred by interpreting the statute to mean the spending limits applied to the aggregate of all payments under the term of a lease. Miller also claims the district court erred when it refused to enforce the lease for one year under the separability clause.

II. Standard of Review.

We review the decision to grant summary judgment for errors at law. First State Bank v. Clark, 635 N.W.2d 29, 30 (Iowa 2001); Harvey v. Care Initiatives, Inc., 634 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Iowa 2001). Likewise, we review issues of statutory interpretation for errors. State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 616 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 2000); State v. Schultz, 604 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa 1999). When the facts underlying a summary judgment ruling are not disputed, as in this case, our task is to determine whether the district court correctly applied the law to the undisputed facts. First State Bank, 635 N.W.2d at 30; Nicodemus v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 612 N.W.2d 785, 787 (Iowa 2000).

III. Section 331.301(10)(e).

Section 331.301 frames the general scope of a county’s power, and sets explicit limits on the county’s authority to act. Goodell v. Humboldt County, 575 N.W.2d 486, 492 (Iowa 1998). In particular, section 331.301(10) limits the authority of a county to enter into lease and lease-purchase contracts. See Madrid Lumber Co. v. Boone County, 255 Iowa 380, 383, 121 N.W.2d 523, 525 (1963). Before a county may enter into a lease of real or personal property, it is required to follow the terms and procedures set forth in section 331.301(10). See Lytle v. Ames, 225 Iowa 199, 205, 279 N.W. 453, 456 (1938).

One statutory term requires the county to follow a special procedure to enter into a lease or a lease-purchase contract for real property payable from the general fund when “the principal amount of the lease or lease-purchase contract exceeds” certain enumerated limits. Iowa Code § 331.301(10)(e)(2). This term is one of two general requirements set forth in section 331.301(10)(e), which provides, in relevant part:

The board may authorize a lease or lease-purchase contract which is payable from the general fund and which would not cause the total of lease and lease-purchase payments of the county due from the general fund of the county in any future year for lease or lease-purchase contracts in force on the date of the authorization, excluding payments to exercise purchase options or to pay the expenses of operation or ownership of the property, to exceed ten percent of the last certified general fund budget amount in accordance with the following procedures....

The. statute then describes the procedures that must be followed by a county to ■ acquire authorization to enter into a lease or a lease-purchase agreement for personal property payable from the general fund, as well as lease agreements for real property payable from the general fund. See id. For leases involving personal property, the board must follow the same procedures applicable to the county for the issuance of essential county purpose bonds. Id. § 331.301(10)(e)(1); see id. § 331.443(2) (board must first provide notice of proposed action and receive objections from residents or property owners of the county). When the lease agreement involves real property, however, the same procedure applies only “if the principal amount of the lease-purchase contract does not exceed the following limits:”

(a) Four hundred thousand dollars in a county having a population of twenty-five thousand or less.
(b) Five hundred thousand dollars in a county having a population of more than twenty-five thousand but not more than fifty thousand.
(c) Six hundred thousand dollars in a county having a population of more than fifty thousand but not more than one hundred thousand.
(d) Eight hundred thousand dollars in a county having a population of more than one hundred thousand but not more than two hundred thousand.
(e) One million dollars in a county having a population of more than two hundred thousand.

Id. § 331.301(10)(e)(1).

A different procedure, however, applies “to authorize a lease or lease-purchase contract for real property which is payable from the general fund if the principal amount of the lease or lease-purchase contract exceeds the limits.... ” Id. § 331.301(10)(e)(2). This procedure requires the county to first give “notice of the meeting to discuss entering into the lease” and “the right to petition for an election.” Id. § 331.301(10)(e)(2)(a). The notice must be published “at least ten days prior to the discussion meeting.” Id. A second meeting must then be held by the county to propose taking action on the lease. Id. However, this second meeting must not be held less than thirty days following the discussion meeting. Id. If a petition is filed within thirty days after the first meeting, the board can either abandon the lease or request the county commissioner of elections to hold a special election on the propriety of entering into the lease. Id. § 331.301(10)(e)(2)(b). These procedural requirements seek to protect taxpayers from large public expenditures by providing them the opportunity to be heard on the matter. See Wesley Retirement Servs., Inc. v. Hansen Lind Meyer, Inc., 594 N.W.2d 22, 26 (Iowa 1999).

Thus, in a county with a population of more than 25,000 but less than 50,000, as in Marshall County, the election procedures must be followed if the principal amount exceeds $500,000. Iowa Code § 331.301(10)(e)(1)(b). If the principal amount exceeds $500,000, the board must institute proceedings before entering into the lease. Id. § 331.301(10)(e)(2)(a).

The question we face is whether the legislature intended the term “principal amount” to apply to the amount of the lease payments over the full term of the lease or over a one-year period of the lease. In interpreting statutes, we seek to effectuate the legislature’s intent. IBP, Inc. v. Barker, 633 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Iowa 2001); Iowa Dist. Ct., 616 N.W.2d at 578. When a statute is unambiguous, we need not look beyond the plain meaning of the express statutory terms. Schultz, 604 N.W.2d at 62; 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46:01, at 123 (6th ed.2000) [hereinafter Singer], However, if a statute is ambiguous, we must utilize the rules of statutory interpretation. Schultz, 604 N.W.2d at 62; William C. Mitchell, Ltd. v. Brown, 576 N.W.2d 342, 347 (Iowa 1998). We deem a statute to be ambiguous when reasonable minds could disagree as to its meaning. State ex rel. Miller v. Midwest Pork, L.C., 625 N.W.2d 694, 700 (Iowa 2001); Schultz, 604 N.W.2d at 62. There are two ways in which an ambiguity may arise: from (1) the meaning of a specific term; or (2) the overall meaning of a statute when its provisions are considered in their totality. IBP, Inc., 633 N.W.2d at 325; William C. Mitchell, Ltd., 576 N.W.2d at 347.

In determining the particular meaning of a statutory term, we seek to find a reasonable construction that serves the statute’s purpose. State v. Anderson, 636 N.W.2d 26, 35 (Iowa 2001). We look to what the legislature actually said, not to what it should or could have said. Schultz, 604 N.W.2d at 62; Wesley Retirement Servs., Inc., 594 N.W.2d at 25. Thus, when the language of a statute is plain, we do not read words or restrictions into a statute that are not readily apparent from the express terms. Wesley Retirement Servs., Inc., 594 N.W.2d at 25; 2A Singer, § 46:01, at 118. Furthermore, we may “consider the context in which the words are used.” William C. Mitchell, Ltd., 576 N.W.2d at 347.

Because the legislature did not define “principal amount,” we give the term its common and ordinary meaning. IBP, Inc., 633 N.W.2d at 325; State ex rel. Miller, 625 N.W.2d at 699; 2A Singer, § 46:01, at 124, 129. In doing so, we may consider dictionary definitions. William C. Mitchell, Ltd., 576 N.W.2d at 347-48. If the term has a well-settled legal meaning, we may assume the legislature was aware of this meaning when it enacted the statute. 2A Singer, § 46:04, at 152.

“Principal” has been defined as “[t]he capital sum of a debt or obligation, as distinguished from interest or other additions to it.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1192 (6th ed.1990). In other words, it is the “sum of money owed as a debt, upon which interest is calculated.” The American Heritage Dictionary 985 (2d college ed.1985). It refers to the aggregate amount of an obligation. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1073 (5th ed.1979) (“principal” refers to the total amount of debt due, e.g., the face value of a mortgage or promissory note).

Nevertheless, Miller believes the legislature intended the limits to apply to the aggregate amount of the lease payments on a yearly basis. As support for his argument, he points to the language preceding the procedural requirements of section 331.301(10)(e) that imposes the threshold ten percent rule based upon “the total of lease and lease-purchase payments of the county due from the general fund of the county in any future year .... ” Iowa Code § 331.301(10)(e) (emphasis added).

To the contrary, we do not find the language of the ten percent rule applicable to the procedural requirements at issue in this case. The ten percent requirement under section 331.301(10)(e) is an overall limitation on the amount of the general county funds that can be devoted to lease and lease-purchase payments. It is derived from the same limitations imposed upon cities. Compare id. § 364.4(4)(e), with id. § 331.301(10) (1991). This limitation means a county has no authority to enter into a new lease agreement payable from the general fund if the new lease agreement would “cause the total of lease and lease-purchase payments of the county due from the general fund of the county in any future year from lease or lease-purchase contracts in force” at the time authorization is sought to enter into the new lease “to exceed ten percent of the last certified general fund budget amount....” Id. § 331.301(10)(e) (1993). The phrase “in any future year” is not used to confine the cost component of a lease to a period of a year, but merely helps define the comprehensive limitation on the amount of general funds that can be devoted to all leases of property. The phrase only relates to the relationship between lease payments and the annual general fund budget, and only applies to the ten percent rule. This rule is unrelated to the procedural requirements applicable to lease agreements, and the use of the phrase “in any future year” by the legislature does not mean the principal amount limitations applicable to the procedural requirements were intended to apply on an annual basis. If anything, the absence of any reference to “years” in setting forth the procedural requirements for leases reveals the legislature did not intend to regulate the amount of the lease payments on a yearly basis. We assume the legislature intends different meanings when it uses different terms in different portions of a statute. See 2A Singer, § 46:06, at 194. If the legislature wanted to refer to annual payments in both qualifications, it could have done so. See State v. Wagner, 596 N.W.2d 83, 87-88 (Iowa 1999). Moreover, Miller’s interpretation requires us to concentrate on only one part of the statute, and to consequently ignore our rules of statutory interpretation. We must read each provision of a statute together, without according undue importance to any single provision. IBP, Inc., 633 N.W.2d at 325; 2A Singer, § 46:05, at 154-56. Each term is to be given effect, so that no single part is rendered insignificant or superfluous. 2A Singer, § 46:06, at 186, 190-92.

We believe the intent of the legislature is best revealed by considering the comprehensive approach under the county home rule statute which grants authority to counties to engage in real estate transactions. The procedures applicable to the lease and lease-purchase of real property mirror, to a great extent, the approach for the issuance of general county bonds by a county for the purchase of real estate. The procedures that a county must follow to issue general county bonds depend on the purpose of the bonds under sections 331.442 and 331.443. General county bonds for essential county purposes can be issued by a county following a hearing by the board to receive objections. Iowa Code § 331.443(2). On the other hand, general county bonds for general county purposes require a special election, unless the board gives public notice of its proposal to issue the bond at least ten days prior to the meeting to take action on the proposal and a petition for election is not filed prior to the meeting. Id. § 331.442(2), (5).

It is important to observe that the construction or purchase of a public building is defined either as an essential county-purpose or a general county purpose depending upon the cost. Id. §§ 331.441(b)(5), 331.441(c)(9). Moreover, the cost limits are exactly the same for the lease of a building under section 331.301(10)(e)(1). See id. § 331.441(b)(5). Thus, if a county with a population over 25,000 but less than 50,000 wants to issue general county bonds to construct or remodel a public building at a cost less than $500,000, the special election provision does not apply. However, if the building costs exceed $500,000, the special election procedures apply. This is the same procedural scheme put in place by the legislature for leases.

The similarity between the statutory authority to enter into the lease of a building and the statutory authority to issue bonds for the construction of a building is significant. If the “principal amount” language under section 331.301(10)(e) only applied to annual lease payments, a county would be authorized, without following the election procedures, to enter into a lease or a lease-purchase agreement for a building over a period of years and incur an obligation to pay the lessor an amount in excess of $500,000 over the term of the lease, as long as the annual lease payments were less than $500,000. On the other hand, the county could not issue bonds to construct or purchase the same building for the same total cost without following the public election provisions. We think this interpretation would lead to an absurd result, and we decline to interpret statutes in such a manner. Anderson, 636 N.W.2d at 35; low a Dist. Ct., 616 N.W.2d at 578; Schultz, 604 N.W.2d at 62. Instead, we interpret statutes involving related subject matter consistently and harmoniously. IBP, Inc., 633 N.W.2d at 325; Iowa Dist. Ct., 616 N.W.2d at 578; 2B Singer, § 51.01, at 170.

We conclude the limits set forth in section 331.301(10)(e)(1) apply to the principal amount of the lease or lease-purchase contract over the term of the lease. This interpretation is consistent with the overall approach to the lease and purchase of real estate under the county home rule statute, and best reflects the intent of our legislature.

This interpretation means the lease entered into in this case was void. A fundamental requirement for the enforcement of a municipal contract is that the municipality must have exercised its authority to enter into the contract within the scope of the powers conferred by statute. Air Quality Prods., Inc. v. State, 96 Cal.App.3d 340, 157 Cal.Rptr. 791, 796 (1979); Marco Dev. Corp. v. City of Cedar Falls, 473 N.W.2d 41, 42-43 (Iowa 1991) (citing 56 Am.Jur.2d Municipal Corporations § 503, at 554-56 (1971)); 10A Eugene McQuillen, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 29.91, at 2 (3d ed.1999) [hereinafter McQuillen], If a municipality fails to appropriately exercise its authority or comply with statutory procedures, the contract is void. Ryan v. Warren Township High Sch. Dist. No. 121, 155 Ill.App.3d 203, 109 Ill.Dec. 843, 510 N.E.2d 911, 912 (1987); Cornick v. Southwest Iowa Broadcasting Co., 252 Iowa 653, 656-57, 107 N.W.2d 920, 921-22 (1961); Iowa Elec. Co. v. Inc. Town of Winthrop, 198 Iowa 196, 203, 198 N.W. 14, 17 (1924); 10A McQuillen, § 29.91, at 3. The municipality may then refuse to comply with the terms of the void contract. Marco Dev. Corp., 473 N.W.2d at 43. Additionally, the municipality is not estopped from denying the validity of the void contract. Ryan, 109 Ill.Dec. 843, 510 N.E.2d at 913; Marco Dev. Corp., 473 N.W.2d at 42; Iowa Elec. Co., 198 Iowa at 204, 198 N.W. at 18; 10A McQuillen, § 29.104.30, at 70. Likewise, the municipality cannot cure the defect through ratification. Bozied v. City of Brookings, 638 N.W.2d 264, 269 (S.D.2001); 10A McQuillen, § 29.104.30, at 70.

It is also irrelevant that the other party has detrimentally relied upon the municipal contract, by fully or partially performing the contract or making expenditures, even if the municipality benefited from the other party’s reliance. 10A McQuillen, § 29.104.30, at 71; see Marco Dev. Corp., 473 N.W.2d at 43; Iowa Elec. Co., 198 Iowa at 204, 198 N.W. at 18; see also Air Quality Prods., Inc., 157 Cal.Rptr. at 796-97 (even if party established prima facie case, municipality not contractually liable). Consequently, the municipality is not required to restore the status of the party, pay damages, or provide any other type of remedy to the contracting party. 10A McQuillen, § 29.91, at 3 & n. 15; see Marco Dev. Corp., 473 N.W.2d at 43; Thompson v. L. J. Voldahl, Inc., 188 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Iowa 1971). The rationale supporting this well-established principle is that those who contract with a municipality are charged with notice of the limits on the authority of the municipality. See Marco Dev. Corp., 473 N.W.2d at 43; Thompson, 188 N.W.2d at 380; Burns & McDonnell Eng’g Co. v. Iowa City, 225 Iowa 1241, 1247, 282 N.W. 708, 711 (1938); Citizens’ Bank v. City of Spencer, 126 Iowa 101, 105, 101 N.W. 643, 645 (1904); 10A McQuillen, § 29.91, at 3 & n. 14, § 29.104.30, at 70. If the party fails to take notice of the statutory limits, the party is bound at the party’s own peril. Marco Dev. Corp., 473 N.W.2d at 43; 10A McQuillen, § 29.104.30, at 71. Moreover, this principle coincides with the presumption that parties incorporate applicable statutes into their contracts. See Cornick, 252 Iowa at 656, 107 N.W.2d at 921. In addition, if we permitted parties to enforce void contracts, we would essentially allow municipalities to do indirectly what they are statutorily prohibited from doing directly. Inc. City of Humboldt v. Knight, 255 Iowa 22, 29, 120 N.W.2d 457, 461 (1963).

The principal amount of the payments in the ten-year lease agreement between the Board and Miller exceeded the $500,000 limit on Marshall County’s authority to enter into lease agreements. Because the Board failed to follow the requisite statutory procedures triggered by the lease terms, the Board did not have the authority to enter into the contract with Miller. See Marco Dev. Corp., 473 N.W.2d at 44; Lytle, 225 Iowa at 212, 279 N.W. at 457. Consequently, the contract was void and unenforceable. Although we sympathize with Miller for the large expenditures he made in reliance on the Board’s representations, the law does not grant him a right of action for breach of contract. Miller had notice that the municipality was exceeding the bounds of its authority and, therefore, must bear the loss.

IV. Separability Clause.

Generally, when a portion of an agreement is deemed invalid, the remaining portions of the agreement can be enforced as long as they can be separated from the illegality. 10A McQuillen, § 29.95, at 11. For example, if the invalid portion is merely incidental to the primary purpose of the contract, the contract remains in effect. See id. However, if the contract would not have been entered into independent of the invalid portion, the entire contract is void. Id. at 11 & n. 4; see also Equity Control Assocs., Ltd. v. Root, 638 N.W.2d 664, 671 (Iowa 2001) (a contract is not separable if it intends each and all of its parts to be interdependent); In re Estate of Claussen, 482 N.W.2d 381, 383 (Iowa 1992) (same); Quarton v. Am. Law Book Co., 143 Iowa 517, 533, 121 N.W. 1009, 1015 (1909) (same).

In this case, we are not confronted with the situation where a portion of the contract is declared illegal. Instead, the Board did not have the authority to contract with Miller without first fulfilling the statutory requirements. Because the contract in its entirety is void, there is nothing left to sever. See 10A McQuillen, § 29.95, at 11 (where “good” and “bad” parts of contract are inseparable, the contract as a whole is deemed invalid). Consequently, neither the separability clause in the lease agreement nor the general doctrine of separability can save the municipal contract in this case.

V. Conclusion.

Under the facts of this case, the Board did not have the authority to enter into the lease agreement with Miller. Because we find the agreement is void in its entirety, the separability clause does not apply. We affirm the decision of the district court.

AFFIRMED.

      . The distinction in the approach between the authority of a county to issue general county bonds for the purchase of real estate and the authority of a county to lease real estate can be found in the time period citizens are given to file a referendum petition for an election. Under the election procedure applicable to county authorization to issue general county bonds, the statute provides for ten days notice to citizens of their right to petition for an election. Iowa Code § 331.442(5)(a). On the other hand, under the election procedures applicable to county authorization to enter into a real estate lease, our legislature allows citizens forty days to file a referendum petition for an election. Id. § 331.301(10)(e)(2)(a). We recently held that the ten-day period provided for Polk County residents to accumulate 17,417 signatures necessary to file a petition for an election on the issuance of general county bonds did not offend the due process clause under our Iowa Constitution. See Bowers v. Polk County Bd. of Supervisors, 638 N.W.2d at 692-95 (Iowa 2002). For county bonds, the petition must be signed by not less than that number of eligible electors in the county equal to “ten percent of the votes cast in the county for the office of president of the United States or governor [in] the preceding general election, unless otherwise provided by state law.” Iowa Code § 331.306. The same provision applies to lease agreements, except the legislature has specifically provided that a petition shall not require more than 1000 signatures. Id. § 3 31.301 (10)(e)(2)(b).