author: TERNUS, Justice.

text:
    Carol MILLER, Dorothy Miller, Robert Dwyer, Holly Dwyer, Linda Franck, and Debra Litts, Appellees, v. Kenneth ROHLING, Todd Rohling and Jana Rohling, Appellants.
    No. 04-0706.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Aug. 25, 2006.

      Rand S. Wonio of Lane & Waterman LLP, Davenport, for appellants.
    Steven J. Kahler of Schoenthaler, Ro-berg, Bartelt & Kahler, Maquoketa, for appellees.
    Paul S. Swinton of Morain, Burlingame & Pugh, P.L.C., West Des Moines, for amici curiae Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, Iowa Institute for Cooperatives, Agribusiness Association of Iowa, and Iowa Corn Growers Association.
    Christina L. Gruenhagen, West Des Moines, for amicus curiae Iowa Farm Bureau Federation.
   TERNUS, Justice.

The appellants, Kenneth Rohling, Todd Rohling, and Jana Rohling, appeal an adverse judgment for nuisance damages entered after a bench trial on claims asserted by the appellees, Carol Miller, Dorothy Miller, Robert Dwyer, Holly Dwyer, Linda Franck, and Debra Litts. The defendants contend the trial court erroneously found their grain drying and storage activities constituted a nuisance. They also challenge the court’s calculation of damages and award of attorney fees, which together totaled over $190,000. Although we find the evidence sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of a nuisance, we do not think the record fully sustains the trial court’s damage awards or the recovery of attorney fees. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for entry of a new judgment consistent with this opinion.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The parties own various parcels of land in a commercial area of Wheatland, Iowa. Prior to the defendants’ purchase of their property in 1992, the site had been used for a commercial grain storage and drying facility. The defendants also used the property for the storage and drying of grain, but only for their own crops. When the defendants bought the land, there were three grain bins, a grain dryer, and associated equipment on the property. The defendants added two additional bins, one in 1996 and one in 1999. After this lawsuit was filed in 2003, they erected two more, for a total of seven grain bins at the site.

The plaintiffs live on residential lots in the vicinity of the defendants’ property. In addition, the Dwyers own a rental property adjacent to the lot on which they reside. According to the plaintiffs, grain dust, corn chaff, and beeswings are released, primarily during the harvest season, when grain is transferred to and from the defendants’ bins. The plaintiffs testified these emissions have increased since 1998 and physically accumulate on their properties to the extent the fugitive dust interferes with the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of then- land. The plaintiffs further assert noise from the grain dryer and truck traffic is annoying and makes it difficult for them to sleep and converse in their homes.

The plaintiffs brought this nuisance suit to recover damages and obtain injunctive relief in 2003 after the Wheatland city council issued a building permit allowing the defendants to erect two additional grain bins. Following the district court’s refusal to order a temporary injunction, the defendants built two new bins and made improvements to the conveying system in all but one bin. These improvements were intended to enclose the system for filling the bins, thereby eliminating the open transfer system that allowed debris to escape into the air.

The plaintiffs’ claims proceeded to a bench trial in March 2005. In addition to testifying to the complaints outlined above, the plaintiffs introduced into evidence a videotape that showed corn chaff, bees-wings and dust on outdoor furniture, on a grill, on a fence, and floating in one of the plaintiffs’ swimming pools. The plaintiffs asked for damages for the annoyance, discomfort, and inconvenience caused by the emissions and noise emanating from the defendants’ land, as well as for the cost of additional cleaning necessitated by the particulate matter settling on the plaintiffs’ property and personal belongings. No bills or receipts were presented at trial to document any out-of-pocket expenses.

Based on this evidence, the trial court found the use of the defendants’ bins in 2001, 2002, and 2003 constituted a temporary nuisance. The court determined plaintiff Dorothy Miller had testified to the most credible list of cleanup expenses, with the exception of the cost of rodent control. Using Miller’s testimony as a basis, the court awarded each plaintiff $1670 for cleanup in each of the three years in which the defendants operated a nuisance. On the plaintiffs’ claims for loss of use and enjoyment of their property, the court determined a reasonable figure for such loss was $6 per hour for sixteen hours per day for a period of ninety days, totaling $8640 per year per plaintiff. In addition, the court awarded plaintiff Holly Dwyer $1900 in lost rental value based on evidence Dwyer reduced the rent charged to a tenant due to the grain residue falling onto the rental property. In summary, each plaintiff was awarded $30,930 in compensatory damages, with the exception of Holly Dwyer, who was awarded $32,830. In addition to the compensatory damage awards, the court ordered the defendants to pay $4000 towards the plaintiffs’ attorney fees, notwithstanding the absence of any demand for such fees.

II. Scope of Review.

The plaintiffs brought this action at law. See Weinhold v. Wolff, 555 N.W.2d 454, 459 (Iowa 1996) (indicating action to recover nuisance damages may be brought at law or in equity). Our review of the trial transcript confirms that the case was tried as a law action. Therefore, our review is for correction of errors of law. See In re Estate of Boyd, 634 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Iowa 2001) (“The scope of review depends on how the case was tried in the district court.”); Iowa R.App. P. 6.4. Under this scope of review, “[t]he trial court’s findings of fact are binding on us if supported by substantial evidence.” Bates v. Quality Ready-Mix Co., 261 Iowa 696, 699, 154 N.W.2d 852, 854 (1967). We view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment.” Id.

III. Existence of a Nuisance.

Iowa has statutory nuisance provisions that are supplemented by the common law of nuisance. See Perkins v. Madison County Livestock & Fair Ass’n, 613 N.W.2d 264, 271 (Iowa 2000). Under the Iowa Code and under common law, the use of property or structures in such a manner as to unreasonably interfere with another’s reasonable use and enjoyment of his property or in such a manner as to injure another’s health is a nuisance. See id.; Iowa Code §§ 657.1, 2 (2003). We apply the following rules and analysis in determining whether one’s use of his property constitutes a nuisance:

Whether a lawful business is a nuisance depends on the reasonableness of conducting the business in the manner, at the place, and under the circumstances in question. Thus the existence of a nuisance does not depend on the intention of the party who created it. Rather, it depends on the following three factors: priority of location, the nature of the neighborhood, and the wrong complained of....
A fact finder uses the normal person standard to determine whether a nuisance involving personal discomfort or annoyance is significant enough to constitute a nuisance. The normal-person standard is an objective standard....
“... If normal persons living in the community would regard the invasion in question as definitely offensive, seriously annoying or intolerable, then the invasion is significant.”

Weinhold, 555 N.W.2d at 459 (citation omitted).

The defendants argue that although the trial court found the defendants had priority of location, it gave insufficient consideration to that fact. After reviewing the record, we disagree that the defendants had priority of location as that term is used in a nuisance analysis. It is true the defendants’ property was being used for grain drying and storage prior to any of the plaintiffs acquiring an interest in their property with the exception of Dorothy Miller. But priority of location refers not to who lived on or owned their property first, but “whether the complaining party moved to the nuisance.” Perkins, 613 N.W.2d at 271. Thus, the relevant point in time at which to examine priority of location is just prior to the commencement of the nuisance-producing activities. See id. at 271-72 (examining whether plaintiffs acquired their property before defendant began using fairgrounds for races, not whether plaintiffs owned their property before defendant established fairgrounds).

Here, the plaintiffs claimed the grain debris from the defendants’ property did not interfere with the use and enjoyment of their property until the emissions began to increase after 1998. The trial court found there was no unreasonable interference until 2001. The evidence showed these dates coincided with increased storage capacity at the site and a corresponding increase in the amounts of grain being loaded and unloaded at that location. There was no evidence the grain storage and drying activities bothered neighboring properties prior to the late 1990s. By that time, all of the plaintiffs had moved into their homes. Therefore, the plaintiffs, not the defendants, had priority of location. Id. at 272 (holding “use of the fairgrounds that is claimed to constitute a nuisance did not begin until after the plaintiffs were already on their properties,” so “plaintiffs have priority of location”); see Higgins v. Decorah Produce Co., 214 Iowa 276, 282, 242 N.W. 109, 112 (1932) (holding complainant, who acquired property adjacent to poultry plant that was subsequently enlarged to an extent that the increased odors and noise constituted a nuisance, was not estopped from maintaining nuisance action).

Even though the trial court erred in deciding the defendants had priority of location, that error does not help the defendants. The plaintiffs’ priority of location is a circumstance that weighs heavily in the 'plaintiffs’ favor. Weinhold, 555 N.W.2d at 459-60; Bates, 261 Iowa at 704, 154 N.W.2d at 858. Thus, contrary to the defendants’ contention that the priority-of-location factor precludes the existence of an actionable nuisance, this factor supports the trial court’s decision.

The defendants also contend the trial court’s nuisance finding cannot stand in view of the court’s determination that the area in question was commercial in nature. But that determination does not preclude the finding of a nuisance. See Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 180 (Iowa 2004) (finding evidence sufficient to support finding of nuisance even though defendant’s “confinement operation was a customary enterprise in the neighborhood”); Bates, 261 Iowa at 704, 154 N.W.2d at 858 (affirming finding of nuisance notwithstanding commercial character of neighborhood). It is only one factor for the court to consider. See Weinhold, 555 N.W.2d at 459. Nor does the existence of similar businesses in the area preclude a finding that the defendants’ establishment was a nuisance given the differing testimony on whether the other grain operations in town created the complained of emissions. See Bates, 261 Iowa at 704, 154 N.W.2d at 858 (stating evidence showed “other commercial enterprises in the area created no excessive noise or dust” and “the noise and dust complained of by plaintiffs ... came from defendant’s plant”).

Although the testimony was conflicting, there was evidence the material coming from the defendants’ property significantly increased when the defendants enlarged their grain-storing capacity and increased their grain activities on the property. There was also credible testimony that the emissions during harvest season were so pervasive that they blanketed not only the plaintiffs’ vehicles and personal property located outside their residences, but also filtered into the interior of the plaintiffs’ homes. These deposits, according to the plaintiffs, required constant house cleaning and were so significant that the plaintiffs used brooms and shovels to remove the material from their yards and driveways. The plaintiffs also testified they could not work outside at times because there was so much particulate matter in the air that they could not breathe. Although the defendants introduced the testimony of witnesses who said the emissions from the defendants’ grain site were not that bothersome, it was for the trial court to determine which testimony was most credible. See Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 722, 82 N.W.2d 151, 158 (1957). Based upon our review of the record, we cannot say the trial court erred in determining a person of normal sensibilities would be disturbed and substantially annoyed by the invasion of dust, corn chaff and beeswings from the defendants’ operations during harvest season. In addition, evidence of the noise caused by vehicles hauling grain and by the grain dryer and of the effect of this noise on the plaintiffs provides further record support for the trial court’s determination the defendants’, activities caused significant personal annoyance to the plaintiffs. Because substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding of a nuisance, we are bound by that finding on appeal.

IV. Compensatory Damages.

The defendants challenge the trial court’s award of compensatory damages on four bases: (1) the court erred in using a mathematical formula to calculate the damages for interference with use and enjoyment of property; (2) there was no factual basis for the court’s determination that the defendants’ activities interfered with the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their property on ninety days each year; (3) there was no factual basis for the court’s determination that each plaintiff suffered equally from the defendants’ activities; and (4) there is insufficient evidence to support the award of cleanup expenses.

We start with the general measure of damages for a temporary nuisance: “the diminution in the rental value of the property caused by the nuisance, plus any special damages.” Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers’ Supply Co., 252 Iowa 1102, 1115, 109 N.W.2d 695, 702 (1961). Special damages include the “ ‘personal inconvenience, annoyance, and discomfort caused by the existence of a nuisance.’ ” Weinhold, 555 N.W.2d at 465 (citation omitted). It also includes the reasonable cost of removing offensive nuisance deposits. See Earl v. Clark, 219 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Iowa 1974). There is no “precise rule for ascertaining [special] damages”; the amount must be based upon the sound judgment of the fact finder giving impartial consideration to the evidence. Wein-hold, 555 N.W.2d at 465. This court will not disturb a damage award if “there is any reasonable basis in the record” to support it. Id. We now address the specific complaints made by the defendants.

A. Use of formula. Plaintiff Holly Dwyer testified the plaintiffs felt they were entitled to compensation for 16 hours a day for the 140 days a year that they were unreasonably bothered by the defendants’ activities. She explained the 16-hour figure was based on the fact that “most normal people would be out of their home a period of eight hours a day.” The 140-day figure was based on the days of peak emissions during harvest season. She also testified they believed a rate of $10 per hour for this annoyance and inconvenience was fair. The other plaintiffs adopted this formula without further elaboration. The court calculated the plaintiffs’ damages for loss of use and enjoyment using a rate of $6 per hour for 16 hours a day for 90 days a year.

The defendants claim this reasoning was erroneous, citing our cases stating that damages for pain and suffering cannot be measured by any exact or mathematical standard. It is true no precise formula exists for determining damages for physical or mental pain and suffering. See Oldsen v. Jarvis, 159 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Iowa 1968) (“It is of course true, as the jury was instructed, that damages for pain and suffering cannot be measured by any exact or mathematical standard and rest in the sound discretion of the jury based upon a fair and impartial consideration of the evidence.”). Nonetheless, the use of a mathematical formula, while not required, is not forbidden.

This court has refused to find any error in counsel’s use of a per diem formula to support the amount requested by a plaintiff for intangible damages in personal injury cases. See Cardamon v. Iowa Lutheran Hosp., 256 Iowa 506, 512, 128 N.W.2d 226, 230 (1964) (finding no prejudicial error in counsel’s argument that plaintiffs’ pain and suffering was worth $2 per hour); Corkery v. Greenberg, 253 Iowa 846, 854-55, 114 N.W.2d 327, 332 (1962) (holding per diem argument by plaintiffs attorney not improper). We noted in Corkery that it was possible the jury used “some modification” of the formula suggested by plaintiffs counsel in setting plaintiffs recovery. 253 Iowa at 855, 114 N.W.2d at 332. Even so, we found no reversible error. Id.

We see no distinction here where a per diem calculation was used by the court in determining reasonable compensation for loss of use and enjoyment of property. See generally Weinhold, 555 N.W.2d at 465 (analogizing special damages in nuisance case to intangible damages in personal injury cases). The court did not commit reversible error in relying on a mathematical formula to compute the plaintiffs’ damages.

B. Awarding damages for ninety days of interference. The defendants contend there was no factual basis for the court’s determination that the defendants’ activities interfered with the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their property on ninety days each year. The plaintiffs claimed the defendants’ activities constituted a nuisance during harvest season. The parties disputed how long harvest season lasted. The plaintiffs argued it was 140 days long, from August through December. The defendants testified it was between seven and eight weeks, beginning in mid-September and ending by December. In its ruling, the trial court resolved the conflicting testimony, concluding there was increased usage of the property from September through December but awarding damages only for ninety days in view of the fact that on some days during this time period activities on the property would be limited due to weather conditions and equipment breakdowns. We think the trial court’s finding that the defendants interfered with the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their property ninety days a year is supported by substantial evidence.

C. Identical loss-of-use-and-enjoyment damages. The trial court awarded each plaintiff $8640 per year for loss of use and enjoyment. The defendants claim the damages sustained by each plaintiff cannot be equal as each plaintiff lived in different proximity to the defendants’ property and was impacted differently by the defendants’ grain storage activities. Cf. Wambsgans v. Price, 274 N.W.2d 362, 366 (Iowa 1979) (“Mental anguish is suffered individually, not jointly, and differs greatly from person to person.”).

Our review of the record supports the trial court’s implicit finding that the impact of the emissions and noise on the plaintiffs’ properties was largely the same, notwithstanding some minor variances in the proximity of each residence to the nuisance. On the other hand, the record also demonstrates that plaintiff Carol Miller was clearly not affected by the emissions to the same extent as the other plaintiffs.

Carol Miller did not reside in her Wheatland home full-time. She testified she is a joint owner of the home occupied by her mother, plaintiff Dorothy Miller. Carol said she principally resides in Illinois, but stays with her mother in Wheat-land one or two weeks each month. There was no evidence that Carol suffered, any magnified inconvenience or annoyance not encountered by the other plaintiffs. Under this state of the record, we agree with the defendants that the trial court’s decision to award the same compensatory damages to Carol Miller as the court gave to the other plaintiffs is not supported by the evidence. Based on Carol’s testimony that she resided in Iowa approximately one-third of the time-, the record only supports loss-of-use-and-enjoyment damages equal to one-third the sum awarded by the trial court. Therefore, we reverse the judgment in favor of Carol Miller and remand this case for entry of a judgment in her favor that includes reduced loss-of-use- and-enjoyment damages in the total amount of $8640.

D. Identical cleanup expenses. The trial court awarded each plaintiff $1670 per year for cleanup expenses. We conclude the record does not support separate awards of $1670 per year in cleanup expenses to both Dorothy Miller and Carol Miller, who were joint owners of the same property. The trial court’s judgment resulted in double recovery of these damages. We have already reversed the judgment in favor of Carol Miller due to insufficient evidentiary support for the award of loss-of-use-and-enjoyment damages. Upon remand, the new judgment entered for Carol Miller shall not include cleanup expenses.

We think the evidence is also insufficient to support an award of three years of cleanup expenses to Holly Dwyer for the rental property. Debra Flynn leased the rental property from the Dwyers for approximately two years during the period in which defendants operated a nuisance. Flynn’s testimony established that she was responsible for cleanup of the premises during her tenancy. She testified she paid no rent for the first three months she occupied the rental house in compensation for her cleanup of the property, installation of some flooring, and inside painting. Thereafter, she negotiated a reduction in her rental payments to compensate her for the ongoing necessity of cleaning up the chaff and other debris emanating from the defendants’ facilities. In assessing the damages sustained by Holly Dwyer, the trial court awarded Holly $5010 for three years of cleanup expenses. The record supports recovery of such expenses for only one year because for two years the tenant was responsible for cleaning up the premises. Accordingly, upon remand, the judgment for Holly Dwyer should include only one year of cleanup expenses.

E. Proof of cleanup expenses. The defendants claim error regarding the trial court’s computation of cleanup expenses due to the absence of any documentary evidence of the costs of cleaning up the particulate matter deposited on the plaintiffs’ properties. With some exceptions, the plaintiffs testified they personally cleaned their homes, yards, vehicles and other items of personal property, so there were no bills to document this work. Those plaintiffs who hired persons to clean did not produce any documentation of this expense. Nonetheless, the trial court concluded based upon the testimony of the plaintiffs concerning the deposits on then-property and the effort required to clean up such deposits that “the expenses as outlined by Dorothy Miller for the extra cleanup required” were “the most reasonable” and the “list best supported by the evidence.”

The trial court’s action was appropriate under the following principles:

If the record is uncertain and speculative whether a party has sustained damages, the fact finder must deny recovery. But if the uncertainty is only in the amount of damages, a fact finder may allow recovery provided there is a reasonable basis in the evidence from which the fact finder can infer or approximate the damages.

Sun Valley Iowa Lake Ass’n v. Anderson, 551 N.W.2d 621, 641 (Iowa 1996) (citations omitted). Applying this rule, we have held that a plaintiffs testimony as to the reasonable value of extra labor necessitated by the defendant’s conduct is sufficient to support an award of damages. See Doden v. Housh, 251 Iowa 1271, 1277-78, 105 N.W.2d 78, 82 (1960); Jaeger v. Hackert, 241 Iowa 379, 390-91, 41 N.W.2d 42, 49 (1950). In Doden, we stated the fact the plaintiffs testified “ ‘about’ so many hours of extra work were performed rather than to an exact number from a memorandum [did] not defeat recovery.” 251 Iowa at 1278, 105 N.W.2d at 82. We also found no error in the allowance of the cost of telephone calls based on testimony that the calls cost “[m]aybe $5.00 at the most.” Id.

Similarly, the plaintiffs’ testimony in this case established a reasonable basis from which the court could approximate the damages sustained by the plaintiffs. Each plaintiff testified to the approximate time he or she spent cleaning fugitive debris from his or her property and personal belongings. Each plaintiff also testified to the reasonable value of his or her time. When a plaintiff had an out-of-pocket expense resulting from the defendants’ nuisance, the witness testified to the approximate amount of the expense and the witness’s payment of the charge. Cf. Pexa v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 686 N.W.2d 150, 156 (Iowa 2004) (holding “reasonable value of medical services can be shown by evidence of the amount paid for such services”). This testimony, found credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support the court’s award of damages for cleanup expenses, with one exception we now address.

Our review of the evidence revealed one particular in which the trial court’s award of cleanup damages is not supported by the record. Miller included in her list of expenses a $500 cost for replanting flower beds. She testified this sum represented the replacement cost of flowers for a six-year period. Consequently, the annual expense was only $84. Because the trial court included the full $500 amount in its $1670 per-year damage figure, $416 of the annual cleanup expenses awarded by the court are not supported by the evidence. Upon remand, the amount awarded to each plaintiff for cleanup expenses must be reduced by $1248 ($416 per year for three years).

V. Attorney Fees.

The trial court ordered the defendants to pay $4000 toward the plaintiffs’ attorney fees, a ruling the defendants assign as error on appeal. “Generally, attorney fees are recoverable only by statute or under a contract.” Costello v. McFadden, 553 N.W.2d 607, 613 (Iowa 1996). Iowa’s statutory nuisance law — Iowa Code chapter 657 — makes no provision for the recovery of attorney fees. See Iowa Code ch. 657. Nor is there any contract between the parties authorizing an award of attorney fees.

There is “a rare exception” to the general rule against the recovery of attorney fees when the defendant “ ‘has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.’ ” Hockenberg Equip. Co. v. Hockenberg’s Equip. & Supply Co., 510 N.W.2d 153, 158 (Iowa 1993) (citation omitted). There is no allegation of such conduct on the part of the defendants in this case, the trial court made no finding of such conduct, and there is no evidence to support such a finding.

The award of attorney fees was error. The judgment for these fees is, therefore, reversed.

VI. Summary and Disposition.

The trial court did not err in finding the defendants’ grain drying and storage activities constituted a nuisance. The evidence supports the trial court’s award of damages for loss of use and enjoyment of property in the sum of $8640 per year to each plaintiff with the exception of plaintiff Carol Miller. Because Carol Miller resided at the affected property only one-third of the time and there was no evidence of any loss peculiar to her, her damages for loss of use and enjoyment were necessarily one-third of the damages sustained by the other plaintiffs.

With the exception of $416 of the $500 annual allowance for replanting flower beds, the evidence supports the trial court’s determination of the cleanup costs for the affected properties. The record does not, however, support an award of cleanup expenses on the Dwyer rental property for more than one year. Finally, the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to the plaintiffs.

Based on the errors in the trial court’s calculation of damages, we reverse the judgment and remand for entry of new judgments in favor of the plaintiffs in the following amounts: Carol Miller, $8640; Dorothy Miller, $29,682; Robert Dwyer, $29,682; Holly Dwyer, $29,074; Linda Franck, $29,682; and Debra Litts, $29,682. The recovery of attorney fees shall be eliminated entirely from the judgment.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

      . "Beeswings” are "very thin filmy pieces of bran.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 197 (unabr. ed.2002).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: HANSON, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    FIN AG, INC., Respondent, v. HUFNAGLE, INC., f/k/a P & H Trucking, et al., Defendants, Kent Meschke Poultry Farms, Inc., Appellant.
    No. A04-2176.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Aug. 10, 2006.

      John Brakke, Vogel Law Firm, Fargo, ND, for Respondent.
    Britton David Weimer, Blackwell Igba-nugo, P.A., John G. Berg, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.
    Paul A. Banker, Esq., Lindquist & Ven-num P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN, for Ami-cus Curiae.
   OPINION

HANSON, Justice.

This case concerns the impact of grain “fronting” on the respective rights of buyers of farm products and those who hold a security interest in those products. The security interest holder, respondent Fin Ag, Inc., brought suit against the buyer, appellant Kent Meschke Poultry Farms, Inc. (Meschke), for conversion of corn grown by the debtors, Larry and Ronda Buck, doing business as Buck Farms (Buck). The corn had been sold to Mesch-ke in the names of third persons not involved with the debt to Fin Ag. The district court granted summary judgment to Fin Ag, holding that, under 7 U.S.C. § 1631 (2000) — enacted as part of the federal Food Security Act of 1985(FSA) — the registration of Fin Ag’s security interest in Buck’s name put Meschke on notice of the interest and that the appearance of third persons as the sellers did not protect Meschke from the security interest created by Buck. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Buck had constructive possession of the corn and Meschke had constructive knowledge of the security interest against Buck’s corn. Meschke sought further review, arguing that section 1631 requires actual, not constructive, possession or knowledge and that a buyer from a disclosed seller takes title free of a security interest that is in the name of an undisclosed owner. We affirm.

A. The Statutory Framework.

To develop a proper framework for the analysis of this case, we must consider the interaction between the state and federal statutes that address the conflict between the rights of buyers of farm products and the rights of those who hold a security interest in those farm products. Because the Minnesota statutes governing security interests in farm products have been revised from time to time, it is helpful to first consider what that interaction was when Congress first enacted 7 U.S.C. § 1631 in response to perceived shortcomings in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).

Prior to 1985, the UCC generally reflected a policy that favored the rights of the holders of security interests, presumably to promote the availability of credit on reasonable terms. Thus, UCC section 9-201 recognized that “a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors.” U.C.C. § 9-201 (1972) (amended 2000), 3A U.L.A. 651-52 (2000). And the general rule embodied in UCC section 9-306 was that a security interest in goods continues despite the sale of those goods by the debtor. U.C.C. § 9-306 (1972) (amended 2000), 3B U.L.A. 33-34 (2002). That general rule was subject to an exception under UCC section 9-307, where a “buyer in the ordinary course of business” could take the goods free of some security interests, but only those that were “created by his seller.” U.C.C. § 9-307 (1972) (amended 2000), 3B U.L.A. 154 (2002). But that exception did not apply to buyers of “farm products.” Id. Thus, the UCC protected buyers in the ordinary course of business only from security interests created by the buyer’s seller; and buyers of farm products were excluded from even this narrow protection.

The practical effect of the exclusion of farm products from UCC section 9-307 was that buyers of farm products became guarantors of their seller’s debt. As a result, more than a third of the states amended UCC section 9-307 in various ways, generally attempting to reduce the bias in favor of lenders by providing mechanisms that would assist buyers in protecting their interests. Charles W. Wolfe, Section 1324 of the Food Security Act of 1985: Congress Preempts the ‘Farm Products Exception” of Section 9-807(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 55 UMKC L.Rev. 454, 461-64 (1987). The various state amendments were not consistent with one another and diluted the uniformity goals of the UCC. Wolfe, supra, at 455, 461-64.

Congress became concerned with the impact of the UCC on buyers of farm products and with the inconsistent amendments to UCC section 9-307 by many states. Wolfe, supra, at 463. Often, buyers of farm products did not know of a security interest or have any practical way to discover it and thus were required to pay twice for the product — once to the seller and a second time to the security holder if the seller defaulted on the debt. See 7 U.S.C. § 1631(a). To address this situation, Congress in 1985 enacted 7 U.S.C. § 1631 (titled “Protection for purchasers of farm products”). Where it applies, section 1631 preempts all conflicting state laws. See 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d) (prefacing the statutory rule by stating “notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law”).

The title and congressional findings of section 1631 suggest that it was intended to protect buyers of farm products from having to make “double payment for the products, once at the time of purchase, and again when the seller fails to repay the lender.” 7 U.S.C. § 1631(a)(2). But the protection actually provided by section 1631 was not as sweeping as the statement of intent might suggest. As explained below, section 1631 did not provide that the buyer would take free of all security interests, but instead only established a notice system that provided a mechanism for buyers to protect themselves from some, but not all, security interests.

Section 1631 established, contrary to the UCC, that a buyer of farm products in the ordinary course of business takes free of security interests created by the seller. Section 1631(d) provides:

Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section and notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a buyer who in the ordinary course of business buys a farm product from a seller engaged in farming operations shall take free of a security interest created by the seller, even though the security interest is perfected; and the buyer knows of the existence of such interest.

7 U.S.C. § 1631(d) (emphasis added). Notably, section 1631(d) adopted the same narrow scope of protection as provided in section 9-307 of the UCC — it only provides protection against a security interest “created by the seller.” Therefore, this language provides no protection for a buyer of farm products from any valid security interest that was created by someone other than the immediate seller.

The federal statute does provide exceptions to section 1631(d). 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e). Under these exceptions a buyer of farm products takes subject to a security interest created by the seller when notice has been given by one of three specified notice procedures. Id. Two of the notice procedures apply where states have established central filing systems to provide notice to registered farm product buyers. Id.

Minnesota created such a central filing system in 1992. See generally Act of April 27, 1992, ch. 525, 1992 Minn. Laws 1322, 1322-34 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. ch. 336A (2004)). Under Minnesota’s system, a lender is authorized to register the security interest with the Secretary of State by filing an “effective financing, statement.” Minn.Stat. § 336A.04, subd. 1 (2004). The Secretary of State compiles a list of debtors whose farm products are subject to security interests and makes this list available to registered farm products dealers and to others on request. Minn.Stat. § 336A.08 (2004). Before purchasing farm products, a buyer is expected to check the list. Cf. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(2, 3).

At the time of the transactions at issue here, Minnesota’s version of UCC section 9-307 had been modified from the uniform provision. Between 1986 and 2001, Minnesota’s version of that section eliminated the exclusion for buyers of farm products from the buyer in the ordinary course exception, meaning that a buyer of farm products could take free of a security interest “created by his seller” if he qualified as a “buyer in the ordinary course of business.” See Act of March 14, 1986, ch. 322, § 2, 1986 Minn. Laws 20, 21 (codified as Minn.Stat. § 336.9-307 (1998)); Act of April 11, 2000, ch. 399, art. I, § 40, 2000 Minn. Laws 569, 610 (codified as Minn. Stat. § 336.9-320 (2004)).

To summarize, under 7 U.S.C. § 1631 a buyer of farm products in the ordinary course of business (1) takes free of security interests created by the seller, unless notice of the seller-created security interest has been given by one of three specific notice procedures, which include the Minnesota central filing system provided under chapter 336A; but (2) takes subject to security interests created by someone other than the seller. Similarly, under Minnesota’s version of the UCC applicable at the time of the subject transactions, a buyer of farm products in the ordinary course of business (1) takes free of security interests created by the seller, but (2) takes subject to a security interest created by someone other than the seller.

B. The Summary Judgment Record.

With this legal framework in mind, we turn to the undisputed facts in this record. In 1999, Fin Ag made an operating loan of $249,995 to Buck. As collateral for this loan, Buck granted Fin Ag a security interest in Buck’s corn crops for 1999. Fin Ag filed UCC financing statements in Hubbard and Wadena Counties (where the crops were grown), but not in Itasca County (where the Bucks resided). Fin Ag also filed an “effective financing statement” with the Minnesota Secretary of State, which caused the security interest to be listed in Minnesota’s central filing system. See Minn.Stat. § 336A.04 (2004).

Meschke purchased several loads of corn that were produced by Buck. Because Meschke is a registered farm products dealer, he received an electronic copy of Minnesota’s listing from the central filing system of sellers whose grain is subject to security interests. See Minn.Stat. § 336A.11 (2004). Meschke learned from the central filing system that Buck’s corn was subject to a security interest held by Fin Ag. When Meschke bought corn directly from Buck, he generally included Fin Ag’s name on the check. But twice Meschke bought corn directly from Buck without making the check payable to both Buck and Fin Ag; the amount of these sales was $7,129.24. Meschke does not dispute Fin Ag’s claims with regard to these two payments.

Meschke was also offered corn by persons who claimed that the sellers were, variously, Mark Tooker, Mickey Buck, Paul Zuk, and Ryan Buck (collectively the Tookers). The Tookers were not listed in the central filing as having corn that was subject to any security interest. Meschke made payment for this corn solely in the names of the Tookers. Meschke bought corn from the Tookers on seven separate occasions and paid a total of $38,443.85. Each of the checks to the Tookers was subsequently deposited into Buck’s bank account but was not applied to Buck’s debt to Fin Ag.

When Buck failed to repay the Fin Ag loan, Fin Ag sued Meschke for conversion of Fin Ag’s collateral in the corn that was involved in the Tooker sales and the two Buck sales. Fin Ag moved for summary judgment against Meschke. Meschke opposed the motion, arguing that he was entitled to take the corn free of Fin Ag’s security interest under 7 U.S.C. § 1631 because he did not receive notice of Fin Ag’s security interest when he checked the central filing system for the names of the Tookers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Fin Ag, awarding damages for the seven Tooker sales and two Buck sales in the amount of $45,573.09, plus costs and interest. The court of appeals affirmed, and we granted Meschke’s petition for review.

I.

We review a grant of summary judgment to determine whether there are any genuine, issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in applying the law to the facts. Westrom v. Minn. Dep’t of Labor and Indus., 686 N.W.2d 27, 32 (Minn.2004). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted. Hickman v. SAFECO Ins. Co. of Am., 695 N.W.2d 365, 369 (Minn.2005). Statutory construction is a question of law subject to de novo review. Vlahos v. R & I Constr. of Bloomington, Inc., 676 N.W.2d 672, 679 (Minn.2004).

The record submitted in connection with Fin Ag’s motion for summary judgment does not fully explain the circumstance under which the Tookers became involved with the sales to Meschke. Conceivably, the Tookers could have been involved in any one of three capacities: (1) as agents selling on behalf of Buck as an undisclosed principal; (2) as “commission merchants” or “selling agents,” defined terms under 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(3, 8) (2000); or (3) as owners of the corn, selling on their own behalf. Although there may be genuine issues of fact concerning which of those three capacities applies to the sales to Meschke, Fin Ag argues that those issues of fact are not material, and do not preclude summary judgment, because Mesch-ke would take the corn subject to Fin Ag’s security interest under each of these alternative capacities.

Fin Ag’s argument requires us to consider how section 1631 works in the situation of “fronting” sales. The parties describe “fronting” as being where a seller of farm products that are subject to a security interest has a third party sell them under the third party’s name. Here, Meschke bought the corn from the Took-ers and, when Meschke checked the central filing system, he found no security interests listed in the Tookers’ names. As a result, both Meschke and Fin Ag can be viewed as innocent parties in the sense that they each did everything they were required or expected to do under the FSA.

Meschke advances several policy-based arguments that emphasize how difficult it is for a buyer of farm products to discover a security interest in a fronting situation. We recognize that difficulty, but we are constrained to apply the plain language of the statutes, as enacted by Congress and the Minnesota Legislature, and to follow where they lead. The difficulty with those statutes, as highlighted earlier, is that the protection for the buyer is narrowly limited by the clause “created by the seller.”

The presence of this limitation in UCC section 9-307 has received much criticism, both from the courts and scholars. See William H. Lawrence, The “Created by His Seller” Limitation of Section 9-309(1) of the UCC: A Provision in Need of an Articulated Policy, 60 Ind. L.J. 73, 73-74 (1984-85). Yet, all efforts to eliminate or amend this clause have failed since the UCC was rewritten in 1957. See Richard H. Nowka, Section 9-302(a) of Reviewed Article 9 and The Buyer in the Ordinary Course of Pre-Encumbered Goods: Something Old and Something New, 38 Bran-déis L.J. 9, 23-24 (1999-2000). And, as noted, Congress essentially incorporated this clause in section 1631 when it attempted to correct some of the other shortcomings, from the perspective of buyers, of UCC section 9-307.

Neither Congress nor the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have enunciated a policy reason for this clause. See Nowka, su/pra, at 23. But the Official Comment to section 9-320, when revised and renumbered in 2000, makes it clear that the “created by the buyer’s seller” clause is a serious limitation on the rights of buyers in the ordinary course of business, citing this example:

Manufacturer, who is in the business of manufacturing appliances, owns manufacturing equipment subject to the perfected security interest in favor of Lender. Manufacturer sells the equipment to Dealer, who is in the business of buying and selling used equipment. Buyer buys the equipment from Dealer. Even if Buyer qualifies as a buyer in the ordinary course of business, Buyer does not take free of Lender’s security interest under subsection (a) [of section 9-320], because Dealer did not create the security interest; Manufacturer did.

U.C.C. § 9-320, official cmt. 3 (2000), 3 U.L.A. 219-20 (2002).

The inclusion of the “created by the seller” clause in section 1631 means that the statute does not provide protection for buyers in a fronting situation where the security interest from which protection is sought was not created by the fronting parties. Under the facts of this case, no matter what factual assumptions we make, there are none under which Meschke could take the corn free of Fin Ag’s security interest. This is because if we view Buck as the seller, we must conclude that Meschke’s rights are subject to Fin Ag’s security interest under section 1631 because Fin Ag filed an “effective financing statement” that put Meschke on notice of Fin Ag’s security interest in Buck’s products. And, if we view the Tookers as the sellers, we must conclude that Meschke’s rights are subject to Fin Ag’s security interest, under either section 1631 or Minnesota’s UCC, because both statutes only protect a buyer from a security interest created by the seller and not from a security interest created by an undisclosed owner, which continues in the product despite the sale.

II.

We first analyze the transactions under 7 U.S.C. § 1631. As noted, the rule under section 1631 is that a qualified buyer takes free of a security interest “created by the seller.” 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d). Thus, the first question is who was Meschke’s “seller.” Section 1631 does not define “seller.” See 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c). Under our facts, Meschke’s “seller” could be either Buck (as the undisclosed principal of the sale) or the Tookers (as those who were identified as the sellers when the transactions occurred). But we need not resolve that ambiguity because neither alternative would allow Meschke to take the corn free of Fin Ag’s security interest under section 1631.

The court of appeals treated Buck as the seller, concluding that Buck had constructive possession of the corn and Meschke had constructive knowledge of Fin Ag’s security interest in Buck’s corn. We doubt that constructive notice or constructive knowledge are viable concepts under section 1631, but we need not reach that issue. If we consider the application of section 1631 under each alternative — with either Buck as the seller or the Tookers as the sellers — we come to the same conclusion.

If we view Buck as the seller, assuming that the Tookers sold the corn as agents for Buck as an undisclosed principal, the exception in section 1631(e) for a security interest as to which notice has been given would apply because Meschke received notice of Fin Ag’s interest against Buck, and Meschke did not secure a waiver of the interest from Fin Ag. See 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(3). Accordingly, Mesch-ke’s interest in the corn would be subject to Fin Ag’s security interest. See id.

If we treat the Tookers as the sellers, assuming that the Tookers sold the corn on their own behalf, we need to consider whether they sold the corn as a “commission merchant” or as “selling agents,” as defined by section 1631, or as owners, having taken title to the corn (by purchase or gift).

If the Tookers sold the corn as “commission merchants” or as “selling agents,” section 1631 provides that such a merchant or agent is subject to the security interest created by the seller if the “commission merchant or selling agent has failed to register with the Secretary of State” and the “secured party has filed an effective financing statement that covers the farm products being sold” in a state that has a central filing system. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(g)(2)(C). There is no evidence that the Tookers registered as commission merchants or as selling agents.

If the Tookers took title to the corn and sold to Mesehke on their own behalf, they would have taken title subject to Fin Ag’s security interest because Fin Ag filed an effective financing statement with the Secretary of State and there is no evidence that the Tookers registered with the Secretary of State. See 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(2). And if the Tookers took title to the grain subject to Fin Ag’s security interest, their sale to Mesehke would only be free of any security interest created by the Tookers, and would be subject to Fin Ag’s security interest because it was created by Buck. See 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d).

Thus, if the transaction is governed by section 1631 and we consider all of the factual scenarios possible on this record, we must conclude that Mesehke took the corn subject to Fin Ag’s security interest.

The only other possible analysis that could be made is to assume that the transfer of possession by Buck to the Tookers transformed the corn from a “farm product,” covered by section 1631, to “inventory,” not covered by section 1631. Because that analysis is not made under section 1631, we will discuss it under the analysis of the UCC below. See 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(5).

III.

It is possible that the corn ceased being a “farm product” and became “inventory” after it was acquired from Buck to the Tookers. See, e.g., United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 813-15 (5th Cir.1971) (holding that the sale of cotton by a farmer to his wholly owned ginning company meant that the cotton became inventory and was no longer a farm product); Baker Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Long Creek Meat Co., Inc., 266 Or. 643, 513 P.2d 1129, 1132 (1973) (holding that, after slaughtering, cattle were no longer “farm products” but inventory); First Bank of N.D. v. The Pillsbury Co., 801 F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that the sale of grain by a farmer to his wholly owned elevator company converted the grain from a farm product to inventory). If so, a subsequent sale by the Tookers to Mesehke would be governed by Minn.Stat. § 336.9-307 (1998), not section 1631, which only applies to “farm products.” But the result would be the same because Minn.Stat. § 336.9-307 (1998), like section 1631, provides no protection for security interests not “created by the seller.”

Mesehke argues that the burden of hidden liens should be on the lender, who has an “ongoing relationship with the debtor” and is “able to monitor the debtor’s activities, including sales through intermediaries.” Mesehke relies on the Eighth Circuit decision in First Bank, 801 F.2d at 1038, for the proposition that, because lenders know that the goods they are financing may become inventory that will be purchased by innocent buyers in the ordinary course of business, the risk of such transactions should be placed on the lenders. Although we recognize the policy considerations that underlie Meschke’s argument, we are constrained to conclude that the Minnesota Legislature has made other policy choices. As a result, we conclude that First Bank does not constitute good law, at least under Minnesota’s version of the UCC.

First Bank involved a situation where the farmer sold grain in which the bank had a security interest to a grain elevator that the farmer owned but did not operate. First Bank, 801 F.2d at 1037. The grain elevator then commingled the grain with other grain, and sold a portion of the commingled grain to Pillsbury. Id. The farmer and the grain elevator later went bankrupt, and the bank sued Pillsbury for conversion of the bank’s collateral. Id. at 1037-38. The North Dakota UCC was the applicable law and it provided: “A buyer in the ordinary course of business * * * other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations takes free of a security interest created by his seller.” Id. at 1038 (quoting N.D. CentCode § 41-09-28(1) (1983)). The Eighth Circuit first concluded that the grain was not a “farm product” in the sale between the grain elevator and Pillsbury by treating the elevator as a separate legal person who was not engaged in farm operations and thus was selling “inventory” that had lost its character as a farm product. Id. But, for purposes of applying the “created by his seller” limitation, the Eighth Circuit treated the farmers as the sellers, stating:

In our case, it is clear that the elevator was the marketing agency for the [farmers]. Because the [farmers] were the owners of the elevator, and this fact was well known to .the bank, we find that the lien was in fact and in law created by Pillsbury’s seller.

Id. at 1040.

In sum, for the purposes of the “created by his seller” limitation, the Eighth Circuit considered the farmers to be “the seller” because they owned the grain elevator, but for the purposes of the “farm product” exclusion, the Eighth Circuit considered the separately incorporated grain elevator to be “the seller.” Id. at 1038, 1040. The Eighth Circuit relied on Hext, 444 F.2d 804. First Bank, 801 F.2d at 1038, 1040. One commentator supports the analysis made in Hext arguing:

Severance of the security interest under this analysis appears to depend on an inconsistent manipulation of the agency status of the auctioneer. On one hand, the agency relationship removes the collateral from the farmer’s control so as to convert it from farm products into inventory. On the other hand, the agency relationship relates the collateral back to the farmer in order to avoid the created-by-his-seller limitation. Even if manipulation of the agency concept were the basis of the argument, this would not constitute a dispositive criticism in light of the desirability of the result, as well as the inherent flexibility and remedial nature of agency doctrine. In fact, the solution results directly from the Code’s system of collateral classification which allows property to change categories. Since the present transformation — -from farm products to inventory — follows from a change in possession, it fully comports with the pervasive Article 9 policy of keying alterations of property rights to observable physical events. Under this approach, the courts can still control collusive practices by reference to the prerequisites of buyer-in-the ordinary-course status.

Robert Dugan, Buyer-Secured Party Conflicts Under Section 9-807(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 46 U. Colo. L.Rev. 333, 355-56 (1975). But another commentator criticizes the Hext analysis stating:

The court in Hext failed to distinguish that the security interest was created by the farmer and not the seller. That the court was willing to look past this fact indicates a blatant bias towards buyers of farm products and portrays a type of judicial circumvention which is used to avoid the farm products exception.

Wolfe, supra, at 480 n. 183.

We cannot follow the Eighth Circuit down a path that would require us to define seller two different ways in the same analysis without a significant indication that this was the legislature’s intent. No such indication exists here. Accordingly, if we examine the transactions under the UCC, we must conclude that Meschke took the corn subject to Fin Ag’s security interest.

IV.

As an alternative argument, Meschke points out that Fin Ag did not file its financing statement in the correct county, and claims that the security interest therefore was not perfected. Fin Ag argues that, while it did not file in the correct county, its security interest was still perfected under the “good faith” exception to the filing rule.

To perfect a security interest, the lender must file a UCC-1 financing statement. See Minn.Stat. §§ 336.9-302, 336.9-401 (1998). Under Minnesota law as it existed in 1999, the required place of filing depended on the nature of the collateral as well as the identity and residence of the debtor. See Minn.Stat. § 336.9-401 (1998). For crops, the lender was required to file its UCC-1 financing statement in the county of the debtor’s residence. Minn. Stat. § 336.9-401(l)(b) (1998). But, if the lender has filed in an incorrect place, or in fewer than all of the required locations, the security interest can still be considered effective if the filing satisfied a good faith exception:

A filing which is made in good faith in an improper place or not in all of the places required by this section is nevertheless effective with regard to any collateral as to which the filing complied with the requirements of this article and is also effective with regard to collateral covered by the financing statement against any person who has knowledge of the contents of such financing statement.

Minn.Stat. § 336.9-401(2) (1998) (emphasis added).

Although Fin Ag did not file its financing statement in the correct county, it fulfilled the terms of the good faith exception because it is undisputed that Meschke knew of Fin Ag’s security interest in Buck’s farm products from the electronic listing of Minnesota’s central filing system, which he had actually accessed. Meschke had made checks payable to both Fin Ag and Buck for some of the corn sold directly by Buck, based on the information provided to Meschke from the central filing system. Thus, Fin Ag’s security interest was effective against Meschke.

Affirmed.

      . A "buyer in the ordinary course of business” was defined as "a person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third parly in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind.” U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1972) (amended 2000), 1 U.L.A. 155 (2002).

      . Although the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws modified Article 9 in 2000, the only relevant change to section 9-307(1) was to renumber it as section 9-320(a). Compare U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1972), 3B U.L.A. 154 (2002), with U.C.C. § 9-320(a) (2000), 3 U.L.A. 218 (2002). Prior to the passage of the FSA, Minnesota followed the recommended uniform provisions by adopting the general rule that security interests continue in the goods after they are sold, providing an exception for buyers in the ordinary course, and excluding buyers of farm products from that exception. See Minn.Stat. §§ 336.9-306, 336.9-307 (1984). In 2001, Minnesota renumbered the buyer in the ordinary course of business exception to be Minn.Stat. § 336.9-320(a) (2004), following the 2000 changes to the UCC.

      . As noted below, Minnesota was counted as one of those states for changes it made to the UCC in 1986. Wolfe, supra, at 461 n. 51, 462 n. 63.

      . Following revisions to Article 9 of the UCC, the Minnesota legislature rewrote much of Minnesota’s Article 9-based statutes in 2000, at which time section 336.9-307 was repealed and reenacted as section 336.9-320, which again excludes a buyer of farm products from the protection for a buyer in the ordinary course. Act of April 14, 2000, ch. 399, art. 1, §§ 40 (reenactment), 140 (repeal), 2000 Minn. Laws 569, 610, 677.

      . Mark Tooker and Paul Zuk were employees of the Bucks. The parties agree that Mickey and Ryan Buck were Ronda and Larry Buck’s minor children.

      . One commentator suggests the following:
      Thus, the policy underlying the "created by his seller” language is to limit the exception to security interest validity codified in section 9-307(1) to cases in which the secured party has clothed the debtor with the indi-cia of apparent authority to sell the goods. Nonpossessory inventory financing establishes apparent authority in dealer-debtors to sell to buyers in ordinary course because (1) the intended result of inventory financing is sale of the collateral to third persons, (2) the sale is facilitated by entrusting the collateral to dealer-debtors in the business of selling goods of the kind compromising the collateral, and (3) most of these sales are made pursuant to actual secured party authorization. Debtor sales of consumer goods and equipment are distinguishable. Improper sales of these categories of collateral generally do not occur, nor are they expected to occur; therefore, secured parties have been relieved of the burden of policing such sales. The absence of apparent authority to sell is the justification for continuing the validity of the security interest in such situations even against a buyer in ordinary course of business.
      Lawrence, supra, at 87.

      . A "commission merchant” is defined as "any person engaged in the business of receiving any farm product for sale or commission, or for or on behalf of another person.” 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(3) (2002). A "selling agent” is defined as "any person, other than a commission merchant, who is engaged in the business of negotiating the sale and purchase of any farm product on behalf of a person engaged in farming operations." 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(8) (2002). The Tookers could qualify as one or the other, depending on the terms under which they made the sale for Buck, if they were in the business of making/receiving products for sale, or of making such a sale.


author: /s/Lorie S. Gildea Associate Justice

text:
    Neil PROCHNOW, Relator, v. ROBERT GIBB & SONS, INC., and Cincinnati Insurance Cos., Respondents, and St. Francis Medical Center, Meritcare Hospital, Meritcare Medical Group, and United States Veterans Affairs, Intervenors.
    No. A06-991.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Aug. 23, 2006.
    James E. Lindell, Lindell & LaVoie, LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Relator.
    Timothy S. Crom, Matthew P. Bandt, Jardine, Logan & O’Brien, PLLP, Lake Elmo, MN, for Respondent.
   ORDER

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals filed April 27, 2006, be, and the same is, affirmed without opinion. See Hoff v. Kempton, 317 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Minn.1982) (explaining that, “summary af-firmances have no precedential value because they do not commit the court to any particular point of view,” doing no more than establishing the law of the case).

BY THE COURT:

/s/Lorie S. Gildea Associate Justice

MEYER, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


author: /s/Alan C. Page Associate Justice

text:
    Douglas KURTZ (deceased), by Dawn GILLMAN, Respondent, v. LAKES MEDI VAN, INC., and State Fund Mutual Ins. Co., Relators, and American Family Mutual Insurance Group, Intervenor.
    No. A06-952.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Aug. 23, 2006.
    Andrew W. Lynn, Lynn, Scharfenberg & Associates, Minneapolis, MN, for Relator.
    Daniel B. Honsey, Kraft, Walser, Hettig, Honsey & Kleinman, PLLP, Hutchinson, MN, for Respondent.
   ORDER

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals filed April 25, 2006, be, and the same is, affirmed without opinion. See Hoff v. Kempton, 317 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Minn.1982) (explaining that, “summary af-firmances have no precedential value because they do not commit the court to any particular point of view,” doing no more than establishing the law of the case).

Employee is awarded $1,200 in attorney fees.

BY THE COURT:

/s/Alan C. Page Associate Justice


author: RANDALL, Judge.

text:
    Shirley NICHOLS, Relator, v. RELIANT ENGINEERING & MANUFACTURING, INC., Respondent, Department of Employment and Economic Development, Respondent.
    No. A05-2165.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Aug. 29, 2006.

      Shirley Nichols, East Bethel, MN, pro se relator.
    David M. Wilk, Sarah L. Beuning, Larson King, LLP, Saint Paul, MN, respondent Reliant Engineering & Mfg., Inc.
    Linda Alison Holmes, Department of Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul, MN, respondent DEED.
    Considered and decided by WILLIS, Presiding Judge, LANSING, Judge, and RANDALL, Judge.
   OPINION

RANDALL, Judge.

Relator challenges the decision by the unemployment law judge (ULJ) affirming his earlier decision that relator quit her job without good reason caused by the employer and was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Relator argues that: (a) she did not quit; and (b) if she did, she had good reason to do so based on the physical and verbal abuse by a co-worker, of which her employer was aware. We reverse.

FACTS

Relator was employed by Reliant Engineering & Manufacturing, Inc. (Reliant Engineering) for approximately eight-and-one-half years as an administrative assistant. She left her place of employment July 21, 2005.

During her employment with Reliant Engineering, relator had a strained relationship with one particular co-worker, Scott Stach (Stach), who worked as a press brake operator in a different area of Reliant Engineering’s building. The difficulties with Stach began in late March or early April, of 2004. On that occasion, relator noticed that Stach was swearing and in a bad mood. Relator joked that he did not seem very happy, to which Stach stated that he was not happy because “you are f-ckin’ out here you b-tch.” There were a number of other employees of Reliant Engineering within the vicinity who heard' this and laughed at Stach’s comments. Stach attempted to apologize to relator on the following work day. Relator refused to accept the apology, demanding that it be made in front of the individuals who were present when the original comments were made.

Relator alleges that from that point forward, Stach was cold toward her. For instance, Stach would intentionally let doors close after him rather than holding them for her. In one instance, relator was carrying a chair and when Stach refused to hold the door for her, the door closed, hit the chair she was carrying, and pushed it into her chest. The company testified oral warnings were issued to Stach for this and other complaints made by relator regarding his behavior.

At another time, Stach was operating a forklift in the vicinity of relator who was standing in a “safe zone”, a demarcated area where no operated vehicle is supposed to travel for the safety of pedestrians and employees of Reliant Engineering. Stach backed the forklift into the safe-zone and came close to relator. Relator was alerted to the danger the forklift to her posed by another individual. Relator again complained to management. Stach was issued a reprimand for improper operation of the forklift and notice of this was placed in his employee file. Relator claimed she was not informed of any disciplinary action taken against Stach.

In the last encounter with Stach, relator was in the company’s break-room talking on the telephone. Stach kicked open the door of the break-room; this is a common, but disapproved of, occurrence at Reliant Engineering. This startled relator who screamed aloud. Relator admitted that Stach immediately apologized and stated that he was unaware she was behind the door. The break-room has windows surrounding its doors, but it is unclear whether relator would have been visible from the outside.

Upon exiting the break-room, relator went back to her desk and informed her supervisor, Pam Perales (Perales), that Stach deliberately kicked in the door at her. Relator then returned to Stach’s area of Reliant Engineering’s building and confronted him personally about kicking the door open. In response to relator asking if Stach thought it was funny to scare her half-to-death Stach responded by stating “get away from me you f-ckin’ b-tch if not I’ll hit you with this part” (a “four foot by two foot” paddle-like metal part with sharp edges as described by relator).

Relator asked Perales and Stach’s supervisor “what [they were] going to do about [Stach].” Relator told Perales that she couldn’t “put up with [this] any longer” and that she was “scared to know what [Stach is] gonna do [ ] next.” Finally, relator stated “I’m going to go, I have to leave.” After gathering her lunch box and purse, relator left the office. She returned moments later to retrieve another personal item and noticed that Perales and Askren were in the shop area of the building. Unbeknownst to relator, Perales and As-kren were at this time discussing the best course of action to take. Reliant Engineering testified that they planned to call an employee-wide meeting that afternoon to discuss the dangers of kicking open doors and planned to speak with Stach personally again regarding his behavior toward relator.

Management of Reliant Engineering testified that oral and written warnings had been issued to Stach. There was conflicting testimony regarding whether relator was informed that Stach was disciplined for his actions. The ULJ determined that “Reliant [Engineering] was under no obligation to inform Nichols of the action they had taken and probably would have been violating Stach’s rights to confidentiality if they had done so.” Reliant Engineering reportedly attempted to contact relator approximately five times the day following these events; receiving a busy signal on her home telephone line, they did not attempt to contact her again. After being unsuccessful in their attempts to contact relator, and having received no contact from relator themselves, Reliant Engineering sent her last pay check with a letter relaying their conclusion that relator had terminated her employment by leaving and not remaining in contact regarding her employment status. This action was consistent with Reliant Engineering policy that stated “absence of one (1) day without notifying the company shall constitute termination without notice.”

Relator applied for unemployment benefits. The Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) initially found that relator was not disqualified from receiving benefits. Reliant Engineering appealed this decision, and a ULJ reversed DEED’S earlier decision. The ULJ noted “improper conduct of a coworker is only considered a good reason to quit caused by the employer ... if the employer is aware of the conduct and fails to take timely and appropriate action.” In the findings of fact, the ULJ found that relator “confronted Stach personally rather than allowing Reliant [Engineering] to deal with the situation” on more than one occasion. This led the ULJ to the conclusion that “The preponderance of the evidence is that Reliant [Engineering] acted appropriately in investigating and acting on Nichols’ complaints.... ” The ULJ determined that relator quit without good reason or exception to statutory disqualification. On relator’s petition, the ULJ reconsidered, but affirmed his earlier decision. This certiorari appeal followed.

ISSUE

Did the unemployment law judge err in determining that verbal abuse and threatened physical harm by a co-worker, of which her employer was aware, did not provide good reason to quit her employment and, thus, disqualifying her from receiving unemployment benefits?

ANALYSIS

The department’s proceedings were conducted under the new procedure. The former procedure required the unemployment law judge (ULJ) to conduct an evi-dentiary hearing and reach a decision. Minn.Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1 (2004). The employee, employer, or the senior unemployment review judge (SURJ) (previously the commissioner’s representative) on his own motion could obtain de novo review by the SURJ of the ULJ’s decision. Id., subd. 2 (2004). Recently, the legislature amended the procedure. 2005 Minn. Laws ch. 112, art. 2 § 34. The ULJ still conducts the evidentiary hearing. MinmStat. § 268.105, subd. 1 (Supp.2005). Now, additional departmental review is conducted after a request for reconsideration, which may be filed by the employer, the employee, or the commissioner, and is decided by the same ULJ who conducted the eviden-tiary hearing. Minn.Stat. § 268.105, subd. 2(a) (Supp.2005).

An employee who quits without good reason caused by the employer is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Minn.Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1(1) (Supp.2005). The standard of review for unemployment law judge decisions issued on and after June 25, 2005 has been restated by the Minnesota Legislature at Minn.Stat. § 268.105, sub. 7(d) (Supp. 2005). The legislature stated:

The Minnesota Court of Appeals may affirm the decision of the unemployment law judge or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusion or decision are:
5. unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record; or
6. arbitrary and capricious

The determination that an employee quit without good reason attributable to the employer is a legal conclusion, but the conclusion must be based on findings that have the requisite evidentiary support. See Zepp v. Arthur Treacher Fish & Chips, Inc., 272 N.W.2d 262, 263 (Minn.1978) (interpreting predecessor statute and requiring “good cause” attributable to employer).

A. Whether relator quit her employment with Reliant Engineering

In this case, it was determined by the ULJ that relator quit her employment with Reliant Engineering. ‘Whether an employee has been discharged or voluntarily quit is a question of fact.” Midland Elec., Inc. v. Johnson, 372 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Minn.App.1985). Factual findings will not be disturbed as long as they are substantially supported by the evidence. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(5). When witness credibility and conflicting evidence are at issue, we defer to the decision-maker’s ability to weigh the evidence and make those determinations. Whitehead v. Moonlight Nursing Care, Inc. 529 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn.App.1995).

Relator left her place of employment after informing her supervisor that she had to leave. After gathering up personal belongings, she left and did not make contact with Reliant Engineering for two days. Reliant Engineering’s personnel policy states that: “absence of one (1) day without notifying the company shall constitute termination without notice.” After two days of relator missing work without contacting her employer, Reliant Engineering argued that it is reasonable to assume relator had quit.

The ULJ rejected relator’s argument that Reliant Engineering had a duty to contact her to ascertain if she had indeed quit. The ULJ also determined that the manner in which relator gathered her belongings and the words she used, specifically regarding not being able “to put up ■with [this] any longer” and “[going] to go, [having] to leave,” were indicative of an individual who was leaving her employment. Based on this determination, along with relator’s failure to contact or return to work for two days, and her apparent lack of intention to return to work unless Reliant Engineering called her, the ULJ held that relator had quit her job. The conclusion that she quit is supported in the record.

B. Whether relator quit her employment for good reason

An employee who quits her employment is disqualified from all unemployment benefits, unless it was based on a good reason caused by the employer. Minn.Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1. “A good reason caused by the employer for quitting is a reason: (1) that is directly related to the employment and for which the employer is responsible; (2) that is adverse to the worker; and (3) that would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than remaining in the employment.” Minn.Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a) (2004). The legislature sought to insure that employers were given an opportunity to address problems encountered by employees by addressing the definition of good reason, stating: “If an applicant was subjected to adverse working conditions by the employer, the applicant must complain to the employer and give the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the adverse working conditions before that may be considered a good reason caused by the employer for quitting.” Minn.Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(c) (Supp.2005). Relator argues that she had a good cause to quit because she was being harassed by a co-worker; she informed her employer of this harassment; the employer failed to take any effective action.

1. Good reason directly related to relator’s employment and for which employer is responsible

To support a claim for unemployment benefits when a relator has quit her employment, the relator must show a good reason that is directly related to the employment and for which the employer is responsible. MinmStat. § 268.095 subd. 3(a)(1). This court has held that harassment may constitute good reason if the employer has notice and fails to take timely and appropriate measures to prevent harassment by a co-worker. Wetterhahn v. Kimm Co., 430 N.W.2d 4, 5-6 (Minn.App.1988) citing McNabb v. Cub Foods, 352 N.W.2d 378 (Minn.1984); Tru-Stone Corp. v. Gutzkow, 400 N.W.2d 836 (Minn.Ct.App.1987). In Wetterhahn, the employer took no affirmative steps within its disciplinary procedures to chastise a harassing employee. 430 N.W.2d 4, 6-7. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that

once [a] relator was provided with the expectation of assistance from [her] employer in eliminating alleged fear of harm from a co-worker, the burden was upon [her] to fully apprise the employer of the continuing facts giving rise to that fear. Without this full knowledge, it [is] reasonable for the employer to assume that the problem had been corrected.

Larson v. Dep’t of Economic Security, 281 N.W.2d 667, 669 (Minn.1979).

Relator claims that the repeated harassment by Stach provided a good reason as required by Minn. Stat § 268.095, subd. 3(a), (c). Relator complained of Stach’s behavior from the first time Stach used derogatory obscenities toward her. She continued to complain regarding Stach’s failure to hold doors open for her and his overall demeanor towards her. Relator complained to Reliant Engineering regarding the improper maneuvering of the forklift in the safe-zone and voiced concern over her personal safety in this instance. Finally, relator complained about Stach kicking in the door on her last day at Reliant Engineering. In each instance, relator complained to her manager or the vice-president of the company. Relator’s duty to complain further, noted in Larson, regarding what she saw as continued harassment was easily satisfied.

For a determination of good reason to quit based on Stach’s continued behavior, it must be shown that the company failed to take appropriate affirmative steps (warn, discipline, etc.) to relieve relator of future improper behavior by Stach. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(c); See also Wetterhahn, 430 N.W.2d at 6-7. The company claims it issued oral and written warnings to Stach for his improper maneuvering of the forklift and other actions. While it appears that Reliant Engineering “warned” Stach, it is obvious these “discussions” with Stach were woefully inadequate. Stach’s improper behavior toward relator continued.

After repeated documented complaints without seeing any effective action by the company, it was reasonable for relator not to expect any satisfaction to arise from her complaints. Relator desired, and was entitled to, a speedy and effective reaction by Reliant Engineering to her complaints. This did not occur. Reliant Engineering was derelict in its less-than-definitive steps taken to change Stach’s behavior.

2. Good reason adverse to relator

The next factor in deciding if relator is qualified for unemployment benefits is whether the good reason was adverse to the relator. Minn.Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a)(2). The initial confrontation between relator and Stach was instigated by relator and when an apology was attempted for the inappropriate response, it was denied by relator. Reliant Engineering testified that they spoke with Stach following this incident. Relator was not informed of this conversation and would have had no knowledge of its occurrence but for testimony given by Reliant Engineering management before the ULJ.

Each individual alleged instance of Stach’s harassing behavior toward relator does not appear to have been effectively handled by management. The cumulative effect of the incidents was harmful to relator.

Relator informed Reliant Engineering about each of the incidents. At some point, Reliant Engineering had a duty to curb this escalation. While Reliant Engineering testified that in the more severe instances, Stach was spoken to regarding his actions, the record shows the ineffectiveness of whatever discussions Reliant Engineering had with Stach.

Stach’s actions with the forklift deserve special attention. Stach drove the forklift into a restricted area set aside for pedestrian use only. A reasonable argument can be made that Stach meant to inflict an intentional scare upon relator. With the forklift, Stach intentionally created an occupational work hazard and could have been fired on the spot for this incident. This incident borders on egregious, as Stach created a work hazard for relator and all other employees within the restricted area.

Relator does not appear to contend that Stach intended to physically injure her when he kicked open the break-room door. Viewed in the context of every other incident between relator and Stach, it is reasonable to assume that Stach wanted to harass relator. Relator immediately complained to the company management and saw no immediate signs that they were interested in taking steps to rein in Stach. Reliant Engineering was investigating the incident and attempting to decide what actions they would take this time when relator left for the last time.

Employees are entitled to feel safe and protected in their workplace. This is a classic case of an employer’s failure to correct adverse working conditions which they had notice of as required under Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 8(c). The ULJ’s determination that these instances were isolated in nature and were not a form of continuing harassment is unsupported in the record.

3. An average reasonable worker would have been compelled to quit and become unemployed rather than remaining in the employment of Reliant Engineering

The final consideration when deciding if relator left her employment for good cause is whether the good reason would drive “an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than remain in the employment.” Minn.Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a)(3) (2006). The correct standard for determining whether relator’s concerns were reasonable is “the standard of reasonableness as applied to the average man or woman, and not to the supersensitive.” Ferguson v. Department of Employment Servs., 311 Minn. 34, 44 n. 5, 247 N.W.2d 895, 900 n. 5 (1976).

The basis for relator’s decision to quit her employment with Reliant Engineering centered around relator’s complaints regarding Stach’s continuing harassing actions, their escalation, and Reliant Engineering’s failure to correct this adverse working condition. We conclude that Stach’s actions and the failure of Reliant Engineering to effectively address Stach’s behavior when given a reasonable opportunity to do so would have compelled an average, reasonable worker, here relator, to quit.

The evidence does not support the ULJ’s determination that a reasonable person would have remained employed after being subjected to Stach’s continuing inappropriate actions with an employer failing to take the effective steps needed to correct the problem.

DECISION

Relator had good cause to quit her employment with Reliant Engineering. The record shows that relator kept her employer informed of continuing problems with a co-worker. The record supports relator’s claim of intentional and continuing harassment. Reliant Engineering failed to take the necessary steps to correct this problem after being afforded a reasonable opportunity to do so.

Relator quit for good reason caused by the employer. She is entitled to unemployment benefits.

Reversed.


author: SHUMAKER, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jonathan David EAKINS, Appellant.
    No. A05-1453.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Aug. 29, 2006.

      Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, and Jennifer M. Inz, Gregerson, Ro-sow, Johnson & Nilan, Ltd., Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.
    Howard S. Carp, Borkon, Ramstead, Mariani, Fishman & Carp, Ltd., Minneapolis, MN, and Teresa Nelson, Legal Counsel, ACLU-MN, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.
    Considered and decided by ROSS, Presiding Judge; SHUMAKER, Judge; and WRIGHT, Judge.
   OPINION

SHUMAKER, Judge.

Appellant Jonathan David Eakins was cited for owning a motor vehicle that failed to stop at the warning lights and stop-signal arm of a school bus. On appeal, he argues that the statute is unconstitutional because it violates the owner’s right to due process by creating an irrebuttable presumption or an irrational rebuttable presumption that the owner of the car was the driver, or by criminalizing car ownership generally. He also argues that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated during the evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

FACTS

At about 3:50 p.m. on October 28, 2004, school-bus driver Alexander Karisik stopped his bus on a public street in Eden Prairie to allow children to get off. Approximately 150 feet before his stop, Kari-sik activated his flashing amber lights. By the time he stopped the bus, he had activated his flashing red lights and had extended the bus’s stop-signal arm. He then noticed a car coming from the opposite direction that did not appear to be slowing down. In disregard of the flashing red lights and the stop-signal arm, the driver passed by the bus and continued down the road. Karisik could not describe the driver but he was able to identify the car as a gray Pontiac sedan with Minnesota license plate number GZX-636. After Karisik completed a “School Bus Arm Violation Form,” an Eden Prairie police officer investigated and determined that the car was registered to appellant Jonathan David Eakins. The officer mailed a citation to Eakins charging him with being the owner of a vehicle that violated the school-bus-safety law. Minn.Stat. § 169.444, subd. 1 (2004).

Eakins pleaded not guilty and moved to dismiss the charge. The court denied the motion, held a bench trial, and found Eakins guilty of the petty misdemeanor of being the owner of a violating vehicle. On appeal, Eakins challenges his conviction and the constitutionality of that portion of the statute that penalizes the owner of a vehicle for a violation of the school-bus-safety law.

ISSUES

1. Does Minn.Stat. § 169.444, subd. 6 (2004), violate a defendant’s right to due process under the United States Constitution or Minnesota Constitution by creating an irrebuttable presumption or a limited but illegitimate rebuttable presumption that the owner was the driver of the vehicle, or by criminalizing car ownership generally?

2. Does Minn.Stat. § 169.444, subd. 6, impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defendant to prove that he was not the owner of the vehicle?

3. Was Eakins compelled to testify at the evidentiary hearing to prove that he was not the owner of the motor vehicle and was the evidence sufficient to show Eakins was the owner of the vehicle?

4. Was the evidence sufficient to establish a violation of section 169.444 (2004)?

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality of the Law

Minn.Stat. § 169.444, subd. 6 (2004), provides that if a motor vehicle is operated so as to violate the school-bus-safety law by not stopping when a bus’s red lights are flashing and its stop-signal arm is extended, “the owner of the vehicle ... is guilty of a petty misdemeanor.” The law provides exceptions if another person is convicted of the violation or if the vehicle was stolen. Id.

Eakins contends that the law is unconstitutional in that it denies due process by creating an improper presumption or by criminalizing motor-vehicle ownership. He argues that the statute creates a presumption “that the owner of the vehicle was the driver at the time of the violation.” He also urges that the law unconstitutionally forces the owner of a violating motor vehicle to testify against himself.

Eakins relies almost entirely on criminal-easelaw authorities and principles of criminal law in support of his arguments. But in Minnesota a statutory violation for which no penalty of incarceration is permissible is not classified as a crime. See Minn.Stat. § 609.02, subd. 1 (2004) (defining “crime” as conduct for which imprisonment may be imposed); Minn.Stat. § 609.02, subd. 4a (2004) (providing that a petty misdemeanor is punishable only by a fine and not by incarceration). Thus, even if the statute here creates a presumption of some sort, it does not run afoul of the proscription against presumptions in criminal eases, at least for purposes of our analysis of the constitutionality of the statute under review.

Furthermore, we interpret petty-misdemeanor traffic regulations not as criminal statutes but “as we would interpret a public health and safety statute, that is, liberally to ‘effect [its] purpose.’ ” State v. Jones, 649 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Minn.App.2002) (quoting State v. Bissonette, 445 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Minn.App.1989)).

The constitutionality of a statute is purely a question of law, which is reviewed de novo on appeal. State v. Wright, 588 N.W.2d 166, 168 (Minn.App.1998), review denied (Minn. Feb. 24, 1999). Statutes are presumptively constitutional and “should be declared unconstitutional only when absolutely necessary.” Estate of Jones by Blume v. Kvamme, 529 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Minn.1995) (quotation omitted). A party who challenges a statute as being unconstitutional must prove the alleged unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, section 7, of the Minnesota Constitution, no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. When a statute does not involve a suspect classification or a fundamental right, it need only be related rationally to a legitimate governmental purpose to survive a due-process challenge. Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 552 N.W.2d 281, 288 (Minn.App.1996), review denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 1996). Eakins has not argued that motor-vehicle ownership is either a suspect classification or a fundamental right for purposes of due-process analysis.

“Legislation will fail rational basis review only when it rests on grounds irrelevant to the achievement of a plausible governmental objective.” Id. Under the Minnesota Constitution, legislation is constitutional as long as it “serves to promote a public purpose; is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious interference with a private interest; and the means chosen bear a rational relation to the public purpose sought to be served.” Id.

Eakins argues that, before the statute in question can “be constitutional, there must be some rational connection linking the status of an owner (not the status as a motorist) with the activity of illegally passing a bus.”

We can discern the broad purpose of section 169.444 (2004) through labels and content. The section is titled “Safety of school children; Duties of other drivers.” Subdivision 1, describing the duty to stop, is titled “Children getting on or off school bus.” The statute requires drivers to stop for school buses when children are getting on or off and provides penalties for the failure to do so. Thus, the aim of the statute is to protect school children from being struck by motor vehicles when the children are on or near streets and highways because they are entering or leaving school buses.

Eakins does not seem to quarrel with the obvious broad safety purpose of the statute but rather he disputes the connection of that purpose to the mere status of being a vehicle owner who might not also have been the driver who violated the school bus safety duties.

The school-bus-safety law in section 169.444 can be violated only through the instrumentality of a motor vehicle. The law encourages drivers to take special precautions when children are on or near a road by sanctioning the failure to do so. But the owner of a motor vehicle might allow another to operate it, and the operator might do so unsafely. By sanctioning the owner, if the driver cannot be held accountable, the law encourages owners of motor vehicles to allow usage by only those operators who are law-abiding and who will not likely violate safety laws. It further encourages owners to instruct operators to be careful and to obey traffic laws. The aim of the statute is to protect the safety of school children. By applying its reach to both the user of the instrumentality that can harm those children and the owner who can decide who shall be allowed to be a user, the legislature has taken a clearly rational measure to discourage the unsafe operation of motor vehicles while school children are getting on and off school buses. Put more bluntly, the owner of a car is more likely to withhold use of that car from an unsafe driver if the owner knows that he can be held civilly responsible for certain traffic violations of the driver. And, of course, without the instrumentality of the motor vehicle being operated by an unsafe driver in the presence of school children, the children are protected at least from one significant danger.

Additionally, legislation in Minnesota in which a vehicle owner may have civil liability for traffic violations by a driver who is not also the owner is not unprecedented. For example, owners of motor vehicles that fail to yield to emergency vehicles or violate railroad-crossing signals may be found guilty of petty misdemeanors in the absence of convictions of the actual drivers. MinmStat. § 169.20, subd. 5b(a) (2004) (owner liable if vehicle fails to stop for railroad-crossing signal). Likewise, a vehicle owner may be liable for accidents involving a nonowner driver. Minn.Stat. § 170.54 (2004).

With respect to Eakins’s contention that the statute “criminalizes” mere car ownership, we reiterate that the statute provides no criminal penalty for the owner and note that the statute sanctions only car usage but also imposes liability on both the actual user and the party who made the use possible. There is no penalty for mere ownership of a motor vehicle.

Eakins contends that the statute creates an unconstitutionally impermissible presumption that he, as owner of the vehicle, was also the driver. The statute creates no presumption whatsoever, but rather reaches two classes of individuals connected with the instrumentality used to violate the law, namely, the actual user of the instrumentality and the owner who has the right to allow or disallow the use of the instrumentality. No presumption arises under the statute as to either class, and there is no vicarious liability imposed. The owner is penalized, not vicariously but directly, because his instrumentality was used to violate the law.

Eakins’s final constitutional challenge is that section 169.444 shifts the burden of proof to the owner to prove that he is not guilty and compels him to testify against himself.. The statute requires the state to prove a violation of the statute and the identity of the owner of the vehicle used to violate the statute. The owner has no burden of proof at all. But he may by way of defense show that he was not the owner of the vehicle, or that the vehicle was stolen, or that another has already been convicted of the violation, or he may present evidence as to the identity of the likely driver. Furthermore, he may challenge the vehicle-identification evidence without actually testifying. We find nothing in this law that requires an owner to prove anything or to testify against himself. Rather, he has all the same options any defendant charged with violating a statute has, including applicable affirmative defenses.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Eakins challenges his conviction, arguing that “there was a sketchy identification of the defendant’s alleged motor vehicle.” He questions the accuracy and the reliability of the testimony of the bus driver who discarded both his notes and his tape-recorded description before the trial.

This court applies the same standard regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to the review of a trial without a jury as it does to a jury trial. State v. Totimeh, 433 N.W.2d 921, 924 (Minn.App.1988), review denied (Minn. Feb. 22, 1988). Our review is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the determination, was sufficient to allow the fact-finder to make that determination. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn.1989). We also must assume that the fact-finder believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. State v. McKenzie, 511 N.W.2d 14, 17 (Minn.1994).

Eakins notes that the evidence showed that the weather and lighting conditions were poor and the bus driver “was obviously distracted.” He also indicates that it was raining, the roads were wet, and the bus driver testified that he believed the driver had enough time to stop but did not attempt to do so. He argues that these facts raise an issue of whether the driver had some impediment to seeing the stop-signal arm and the suggestion that the court would have to assume that the driver saw the arm and chose to ignore it.

There was evidence that the bus’s flashing red lights were on and the stop-signal arm was extended well before the ear approached the bus, that the car did not stop, that the bus driver saw and copied down the license number, and that Eakins was the registered owner of that car. There was sufficient evidence to establish the elements of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Eakins raises conjecture as to credibility, but he shows no reason as to why or how the court might have resolved credibility issues improperly. Furthermore, credibility determinations are the exclusive province of the district court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of clear error. DeMars v. State, 352 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn.1984).

DECISION

Minn.Stat. § 169.444, subd. 6(a) (2004), does not create a presumption that the owner of the vehicle was the driver of the car, nor does it criminalize car ownership generally. Because this statute is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of protecting school children riding school buses, it does not violate a defendant’s due-process rights under both Minnesota and the United States constitutions. Additionally, the evidence was sufficient to show both a violation of the school-bus-safety law and the identity of the registered owner of the violating vehicle.

Affirmed.