author: GORDON W. SHUMAKER, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Cory Thomas MARTINSON, Respondent.
    No. A03-1079.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Dec. 9, 2003.

      Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul; and Janelle Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Dennis A. Plahn, Assistant Stearns County Attorney, St. Cloud, for appellant.
    John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN; and Leonard A. Weiler, Assistant District Public Defender, St. Cloud, MN, for respondent.
    Considered and decided by WILLIS, Presiding Judge; TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge; and SHUMAKER, Judge.
   OPINION

GORDON W. SHUMAKER, Judge.

Appellant State of Minnesota contends that the district court abused its discretion by departing durationally downward from the sentencing guidelines, arguing that the court failed to make adequate findings of substantial and compelling circumstances to support the departure. Because the record shows that respondent suffered from an extreme mental impairment, the court did not abuse its discretion. We affirm.

FACTS

On November 22, 2000, respondent Cory Thomas ■ Martinson intentionally swerved his car into the path of oncoming traffic and collided with another vehicle. His wife C.A.M., riding as his passenger, was killed instantly.

The state charged Martinson with second-degree murder and criminal vehicular homicide. The district court ordered a rule 20 mental examination. The examiners, a staff psychologist and a staff psychiatrist at the Minnesota Security Hospital, found Martinson competent to stand trial and gave opinions as to his mental status at the time of the collision.

Martinson ultimately waived a jury trial and asserted a mental-illness defense. The court bifurcated the trial, found Mar-tinson guilty of felony second-degree murder and criminal vehicular homicide, and rejected his mental-illness defense. The court acknowledged Martinson’s major mental illness but did not believe it was “florid” at the time of the collision.

Despite rejecting Martinson’s mental-illness defense, the court found that his “mental condition is a substantial and compelling factor justifying a downward [dura-tional] departure,” and sentenced Martin-son to an executed term of 75 months instead of the presumptive 150 months.

The record available to the court for sentencing showed that Martinson was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the incident and detailed his past psychiatric history. He began to develop delusional paranoia in the late 1990s, which manifested itself in the belief that his former co-workers at Distinguished Craftsmen, Inc., (DCI) had enlisted the help of “mobsters” to track him down and kill him.

In the summer of 2000, Martinson was exposed to a mixture of bleach and toxic cleaning chemicals while training with his army reserve unit. Initially treated for lung irritation, Martinson was eventually diagnosed with psychotic delusions and was hospitalized. Army records indicate he was convinced the army and the psychiatric hospital personnel were attempting to kill him.

After his release, his paranoia became more extensive. He refused to eat food from New York or New Jersey where the “Italian Mafioso” lived, thought poisonous gas was being sprayed into his apartment, and attempted to patch tiny holes in the wall and ceiling with toothpaste. He told evaluators that he discovered a surveillance camera in his television and that he routinely checked his car for bombs before using it.

By the fall of 2000, Martinson believed that C.A.M. was his only source of protection, that she protected him against assassination, and that she was the only one who could provide food that was not poisoned. However, he eventually “discovered” that C.A.M. worked for the CIA or secret service. This discovery led to the belief that her superiors wanted him dead because they preferred unmarried employees.

In November, C.A.M. began to demand that Martinson seek mental-health treatment. He realized that she would leave him if he refused. The psychological report explained that

[h]e was thus caught between the understanding that if he did not seek treatment, he would lose his wife and his sole protector who kept him from harm at the hands of DCI and the Mafia. On the other hand, if he went into the hospital to accede to her demands, the doctors there would kill him. Finally, if he stayed with her, he recognized that she might have her own motivations to do him harm relative to her role with the Feds.

As Martinson and C.A.M. were driving on the morning of the incident, she told him “we have to have a talk.” He later recalled that he “was thinking she was going to let DCI get [him] because she was sick of [him], [He] didn’t know who she was working for. [He] thought it was the Secret Service.” Shortly after his wife’s comments, he turned his wheel abruptly to the left and swerved into oncoming traffic. C.A.M. died immediately.

At trial, Martinson presented a defense of not guilty by reason of mental illness. The district court found he did not establish that his mental condition at the time of the incident satisfied the M’Naghten standard for a mental-illness defense, and rejected the defense. The district court found that respondent suffers from a major mental illness but rejected respondent’s mental-illness defense because his condition was not “florid” at the time of the crimes, and found him guilty. Reciting orally on the record findings as to respondent’s mental illness, the court departed durationally from the presumptive guidelines sentence. The district court sentenced Martinson to a downward durational departure of 75 months in prison instead of the presumptive sentence of 150 months. On appeal, the state challenges the district court’s departure from the sentencing guidelines, claiming the court erred in failing to properly support the decision on the record.

ISSUES

1. Did the court abuse its discretion in departing downward from the sentencing guidelines?

2. Did the court err by failing to provide written findings to support its departure?

ANALYSIS

I.

a. Substantial and Compelling Circumstances

The state contends that the district court abused its discretion in departing durationally from the presumptive guidelines sentence because there are no substantial and compelling circumstances to support a downward departure. This court reviews a departure from the sentencing guidelines for an abuse of discretion. State v. Schmit, 601 N.W.2d 896, 898 (Minn.1999). The district court has broad discretion to depart if substantial and compelling circumstances exist, and this court generally will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn.1981). Mental impairment that causes an offender to lack substantial capacity for judgment when the offense was committed will support a downward departure. Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D.2.a.(3).

Recognizing that the presumptive sentence provided by the sentencing guidelines will not be “appropriate, reasonable, or equitable” in every case, the guidelines commission determined that it was appropriate to allow sentencing courts, on occasion, to depart from the presumptive sentence. Id. cmt. II.D.01. But departures are permitted only when the case involves substantial and compelling circumstances. Id. II.D. The guidelines provide that when “[t]he offender, because of physical or mental impairment, lacked substantial capacity for judgment when the offense was committed,” the sentencing court may use that impairment as a mitigating factor to support a downward departure. Id. II. D.2.a.(3).

When an offender has been diagnosed with paranoia and schizophrenia, the offender’s mental impairment is extreme enough to constitute a mitigating factor. See State v. Wall, 343 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Minn.1984) (stating that diagnosis of paranoia and schizophrenia is a mitigating factor and holding that record failed to support upward durational sentencing departure where defendant lacked substantial capacity for judgment when he committed the offense).

In this case, the record contains ample unrebutted evidence to support a finding that Martinson suffered from an extreme mental impairment. He was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, and the psychologist and psychiatrist who evaluated him on the order of the district court further determined that he was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the incident.

Martinson’s condition is well documented in the record. His paranoia manifested itself in irrational fears that his co-workers hired the Mafia to kill him, that he was under surveillance, and that he was in constant danger of being poisoned. The mental evaluation is supported by army records that state he was convinced the army and hospital personnel were trying to kill him. Finally, his fears were directed at the victim, his wife, whom he believed worked for the CIA or Secret Service and might be willing to kill him to please her superiors. The evaluation clearly explains the dilemma Martinson faced in his own mind when he concluded that his wife was about to leave him.

The expert psychological evidence is un-controverted that, at all relevant times, Martinson suffered from the psychosis of paranoid schizophrenia. His illness frequently manifests itself in delusional paranoia, causing Martinson to perceive threats against his life by co-workers, physicians, and his spouse. His response to the perceived threats is panic and “wholly irrational” behavior. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Martinson’s psychosis is a mild or moderate mental impairment. Rather, there is abundant expert evidence that his condition is sufficiently extreme to meet the requirement that his mental impairment be a substantial and compelling circumstance that provides a basis for a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines.

The district court found that Martinson had a mental illness before, during, and after the incident, and that this illness has impaired him socially and psychologically, both before the act and to the present. The court found specifically that his mental condition was a substantial and compelling factor that justified a downward dura-tional departure. The court did not err in this respect.

b. Proportionality to the Severity of the Offense

The state next argues that the district court’s sentence is not proportional to the severity of the offense of conviction because Martinson murdered his wife and left his child without a mother, who is now dead, and without a father, who is in prison. This court will modify a sentence only if, after consideration of the total record, we have a strong feeling that the sanction imposed is not proportional to the severity of the offense of conviction as aggravated or mitigated by the circumstances of the offense. State v. Schantzen, 308 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn.1981).

The district court may not use an element of the offense to support a departure. State v. Coley, 468 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Minn.App.1991). The fact that Martinson murdered his wife is itself an element of the crime. Therefore, it cannot be used to support an argument that a sentence that is modified because of mitigating factors is out of proportion to the severity of the offense.

In assessing proportionality, this court must consider “whether the defendant’s conduct was significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the crime in question.” State v. Cox, 343 N.W.2d 641, 643 (Minn. 1984). The questions here, then, are whether the defendant’s conduct was more or less serious than the typical offense in which a life is lost and what makes that conduct more or less serious than the typical offense.

The only significant difference between this offense and the typical murder is that the typical murderer has not been diagnosed as being psychotic at the time of the offense. Although the district court did not accept Martinson’s argument that he did not know the nature of the act he committed, or that it was wrong, the court did recognize that his condition impaired him psychologically at the time of the offense. This in itself renders Martinson’s conduct less serious than that of a defendant whose capacity for judgment at the time of the offense was not substantially impaired. Further, the fact that the victim was a parent is not infrequent or atypical.

The state further argues that Martinson’s failure to satisfy the M’Naghten standard for a mental-illness defense caused the pronounced sentence to be disproportional to the crimes of which Mar-tinson was convicted. The district court found that Martinson’s undisputed psychosis was a substantial mitigating factor in his conduct, even though he was not able to satisfy the M’Naghten test.

A defendant may be eligible for a downward departure because of a mental impairment, even absent a M’Naghten defense. See State v. Barsness, 473 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Minn.App.1991) (holding that mentally retarded defendant who was found guilty of second-degree murder and manslaughter qualified for downward sentencing departure), review denied (Minn. Aug. 29, 1991). The sentencing guidelines emphasize this by including as a “catchall” mitigating factor “substantial grounds ... which tend to excuse or mitigate the offender’s culpability, although not amounting to a defense.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D.2.a.(5). In addition, to limit mitigation under section II.D.2.a.(3) to those who meet the M’Naghten standard for a mental-illness defense would effectively nullify the mitigating factor because the only defendants eligible for it would be those who were not legally responsible for their conduct. Therefore, Martinson’s failure to establish a M’Naghten defense does not automatically render him ineligible for departure based on the existence of a mental impairment.

Because the record supports the district court’s determination that Martinson suffered from an extreme mental impairment, and the sentence was not out of proportion to the offense of conviction, we hold that the downward departure was within the district court’s discretion.

II.

The state argues that the district court erred by failing to provide written findings to support the departure.

A district court is required to follow the procedures of the sentencing guidelines when it pronounces a sentence. Minn.Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5(2) (2002). When departing from the sentencing guidelines, “the district court shall make written findings of fact as to the reasons for the departure.” Minn.Stat. § 244.10, subd. 2 (2002). Failure to provide reasons for departure on the record requires remand for imposition of the presumptive guidelines sentence. State v. Getter, 665 N.W.2d 514, 517 (Minn.2003). The requirement to provide written reasons for departure is satisfied when the district court makes oral findings on the record. State v. Bale, 493 N.W.2d 123, 125 (Minn. App.1992).

Because the district court stated on the record that “it is the court’s judgment that the defendant’s mental condition is a substantial and compelling factor justifying a downward dispositional departure,” the district court met the “written findings” requirement.

The state further argues that this oral finding was not specific enough because the district court did not explain why the sentencing departure was “more appropriate, reasonable, or equitable” than the presumptive sentence, as the guidelines require. Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D.

Even if the district court’s express findings were not explained with particularity, this court must affirm the departure if the record contains valid and sufficient reasons to support the departure. State v. Sanchez-Sanchez, 654 N.W.2d 690, 694 (Minn.App.2002).

The district court’s stated reasons for the departure are arguably inadequate because the court merely acknowledged that Martinson clearly had a mental illness that impaired him socially and psychologically, and that his condition constituted the required substantial and compelling factor. It did not explain why the downward departure was required as more appropriate, reasonable, or equitable than the presumptive sentence.

However, as discussed above, the record does contain clear, valid, and sufficient reasons to support the district court’s conclusion. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s departure from the sentencing guidelines.

DECISION

Because the record shows the district court’s downward durational departure was justified by the respondent’s extreme mental impairment, the court did not abuse its discretion in departing from the sentencing guidelines. In addition, because the district court provided oral findings on the record to support the departure, it did not err in failing to provide written findings. Although the findings were inadequate, the departure is supported by the record.

Affirmed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WRIGHT, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE BOARD, Appellant, v. MINNESOTA DEMOCRATIC-FARMER-LABOR PARTY, Respondent (A03-52). State of Minnesota, Campaign Finance And Public Disclosure Board, Appellant, v. Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, Respondent (A03-434).
    Nos. A03-52, A03-434.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Dec. 9, 2003.

      Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Gregory P. Huwe, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.
    Alan W. Weinblatt, Maura J. Shuttle-worth, Weinblatt & Gaylord, PLC, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.
    Considered and decided by WRIGHT, Presiding Judge; HARTEN, Judge; and SHUMAKER, Judge.
   OPINION

WRIGHT, Judge.

Appellant State of Minnesota Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board (the board) brought a declaratory judgment action against respondent Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party (the DFL). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the DFL, concluding that the DFL properly reported that expenditures for certain mailings were multicandi-date expenditures on behalf of three or more candidates. The district court also awarded attorney fees to the DFL under the Minnesota Equal Access to Justice Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 15.471-474 (2000). In these consolidated appeals, the board contends that (1) because a major portion of the multicandidate expenditure supported a single candidate, the multicandidate expenditure must be allocated to each candidate in proportion to the benefit received and (2) the award of attorney fees is unwarranted because the board’s position is substantially justified. Because the plain meaning of Minn.Stat. § 10A.275 (1998) prohibits multicandidate expenditures from being allocated to individual candidates and because the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the board’s position was not substantially justified in light of the plain meaning of the relevant statutory provisions, we affirm.

FACTS

The DFL created two pieces of campaign literature for mailings during the 1998 campaign season. One piece contained an official party sample ballot listing Gail Skare for House of Representatives, “Skip” Humphrey for Governor, Roger Moe for Lieutenant Governor, Mike Hatch for Attorney General, and three other candidates for the respective political offices they sought. The sample ballot contained pictures of Skare, Humphrey, and Hatch, and highlighted voting for Skare on the side with the ballot and mailing address. The other side of the campaign literature depicted a child on a swing with the caption, “Gail Skare Committed to Our Kids.”

The second piece of campaign literature sought financial contributions on behalf of Skare, Humphrey, and Hatch, and highlighted Skare’s positions on health care. On both pieces of campaign literature, more space was given to Skare’s candidacy than to that of the other candidates.

Prior to releasing the mailings, counsel for the DFL sent a letter to the board requesting an advisory opinion as to what would qualify as a sample ballot. The board issued advisory opinion 302 on August 28, 1998, which states, in summary, that only the portion of the campaign literature outlining the sample ballot qualifies for exemption from allocation as a multi-candidate expenditure and the balance of the literature focusing on other candidates would be treated as an expenditure for an individual candidate. On February 1, 1999, in response to questions from the DFL as to what qualifies as a fundraising effort on behalf of three or more candidates, the board stated in advisory opinion 305 that material not clearly focused on multicandidate fundraising efforts but included in the multicandidate fundraising materials “may be recognized separately from the multicandidate expenditure.”

Prior to the 1998 election, the DFL distributed the two pieces of campaign materials and subsequently reported the expenses as multicandidate expenditures. On March 15, 2000, Steve Sviggum filed with the board a complaint on behalf of the House Republican Campaign Committee, alleging that the DFL sample ballot and fundraising materials cost more to produce and distribute than the DFL reported. As a result of investigating the complaint, the board concluded that each campaign item had a portion that qualified as an exempt multicandidate expenditure under Minn.Stat. § 10A.275 (1998) and a portion that was not exempt. The board ordered the DFL to amend its 1998 report of receipts and expenditures to apportion costs associated with the two mailings “as in kind contributions to the Skare Committee.” The DFL declined to do so.

The board initiated a declaratory judgment action in district court. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on stipulated facts. The district court granted the DFL’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case, concluding that (1) Minn.Stat. § 10A.275, which governs multicandidate political-party expenditures, “is unambiguous and not subject to interpretation by the Board” and (2) the DFL’s report of expenditures complied with the statute.

The DFL moved for attorney fees and costs under the Minnesota Equal Access to Justice Act and was awarded attorney fees of $24,456 and costs of $630. The board appealed the summary judgment while the fee motion was pending in district court and later appealed the award of attorney fees and costs. These cases were consolidated.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court err in determining that the DFL’s report of expenditures complied with Minn.Stat. § 10A.275 (1998)?

II. Did the district court err in awarding attorney fees and costs under the Minnesota Equal Access to Justice Act?

ANALYSIS

When the district court grants summary judgment based on the application of a statute to undisputed facts, the result is a legal conclusion, which we review de novo. Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enters., Inc., 581 N.W.2d 855, 856 (Minn.1998).

I.

This dispute requires us to interpret Minn.Stat. § 10A.275 (1998). When interpreting a statute, we must “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2002). In doing so, we first determine whether the statute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous. Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn.2001). We construe words and phrases according to their plain and ordinary meaning. Frank’s Nursery Sales, Inc. v. City of Roseville, 295 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn.1980). A statute is ambiguous only when its language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn.1999). When the legislature’s intent is clearly discernable from a statute’s plain and unambiguous language, statutory construction is neither necessary nor permitted, and we apply the statute’s plain meaning. Minn.Stat. § 645.16; Ed Herman & Sons v. Russell, 535 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Minn.1995).

The statutory scheme at issue here regulates campaign contributions from political parties to candidates for public office and expenditures by those candidates. Section 10A.25 limits spending by candidates who agree to receive a public campaign funding subsidy, and section 10A.27, subdivision 2, limits the amount a political party may contribute to a candidate. Minn.Stat. §§ 10A.25, .27, subd. 2 (1998). In 1998, the political-party contribution limit was $5000 for a state legislative candidate, and multicandidate expenditures were required to be allocated on a reasonable cost basis among the individual candidates, unless the expenditure or contribution benefited three or more candidates. MinmStat. §§ 10A.22, subd. 5; .27, subd. 2; .275, subd. 1 (1998). Section 10A.275, subdivision 1, provides, in relevant part:

Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, the following expenditures by a state political party ... shall not be considered contributions to or expenditures on behalf of any candidate for the purposes of section 10A.25 or 10A.27, and shall not be allocated to any candidates pursuant to section 10A.22, subdivision 5; ...
(b) expenditures for the preparation, display, mailing or other distribution of an official party sample ballot listing the names of three or more individuals whose names are to appear on the ballot; ...
(d) expenditures for any political party fundraising effort on behalf of three or more candidates!)]

Minn.Stat. § 10A.275, subd. 1 (emphasis added). In total, five exceptions to the allocation requirement are set forth in Minn.Stat. § 10A.275, subd. 1. So that compliance with the campaign contribution and expenditure limits can be monitored, Minn.Stat. § 10A.20, subd. 3(g), requires political parties to file reports disclosing expenditures in excess of $100 within one year, including those made on behalf of candidates for political office.

The board argues that, in order to give full effect to the statutory scheme governing campaign expenditures, Minn. Stat. § 10A.275 must be interpreted to require proportional allocation when a multicandidate expenditure benefits primarily one candidate. Failure to allocate a portion of the multicandidate expenditure to the primary candidate beneficiary, the board asserts, renders section 10A.275 in conflict with the statute’s legislative intent. We disagree.

After careful review, we conclude that the statute’s legislative intent, as expressed in the plain, unambiguous language of the statute, is to exempt multi-candidate expenditures by political parties on behalf of three or more candidates from the allocation requirement. Two of the five exceptions to the allocation requirement set forth in section 10A.275, subdivision 1, apply to the DFL expenditures for campaign literature at issue here. Section 10A.275, subdivision 1, specifically provides that, “Notwithstanding any other provisions,” such expenditures “shall not be considered contributions to or expenditures on behalf of any candidate for the purposes of section 10A.25 [setting candidate spending limits] or 10A.27 [setting political party spending limits], and shall not be allocated to any candidates pursuant to section 10A.22, subdivision 5.” Applying the plain meaning of the statutory language, section 10A.275, subdivision 1, unambiguously proscribes allocation of multicandidate expenditures under these circumstances. It is undisputed that one of the items at issue here is “an official party sample ballot listing the names of three or more individuals” who appeared on the 1998 ballot. Minn.Stat. § 10A.275, subd. 1(b). And the other item solicited funds for the DFL “on behalf of three or more candidates.” Id., subd. 1(d). Political-party expenditures for such items are exempt from the allocation requirements of section 10A.22, subdivision 5. See Minn. Stat. § 10A.275, subd. 1.

The board argues that there is nothing in the statute prohibiting it from “deciding that an expenditure should be treated in part as a multicandidate expense and in part as a contribution to a specific candidate.” Citing the 1999 amendment to Minn.Stat. § 10A.20, subd. 3(g), the board maintains that a portion of an expenditure may be allocated to the primary candidate beneficiary. See supra, n. 3 (discussing 1999 amendment to Minn.Stat. § 10A.20, subd. 3(g)). The amendment, which was enacted after the expenditures at issue here, provides that “[a] reporting entity making an expenditure on behalf of more than one candidate for state or legislative office must allocate the expenditure among the candidates on a reasonable cost basis and report the allocation for each candidate.” 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 220, § 23. This provision, however, mirrors the language of Minn.Stat. § 10A.22, subd. 5, which was in effect at the time of the expenditures for the 1998 general election, and which is exempt from the allocation requirement for multieandidate expenditures by operation of Minn.Stat. § 10A.275, subd. 1. Accordingly, even with the statutory revisions, the board lacks the authority to interpret the statute to require allocation under the circumstances presented here.

We are mindful of the board’s concerns that, in the absence of an allocation requirement, multicandidate expenditures by political parties on behalf of three or more candidates that benefit primarily one candidate will circumvent meaningful campaign spending limits. Where, as here, the intention of the legislature is clear from the statutory language, resolution of the board’s concerns is appropriately the province of the legislature, not the judiciary. In light of the statute’s lack of ambiguity, we decline to ignore the language employed by the legislature in order to infer legislative intent from evidence that simply is not present.

Because MinmStat. § 10A.275, subd. 1, prohibits allocation of multicandidate expenditures by a political party for sample ballots listing three or more candidates and fundraising efforts on behalf of three or more candidates, the DFL’s expenditures and reports complied with the statute.

II.

We review awards of attorney fees and costs under the Minnesota Equal Access to Justice Act (MEAJA) with an abuse-of-discretion standard. Donovan Contracting of St. Cloud, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Transp., 469 N.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Minn.App.1991), review denied (Minn. Aug. 2, 1991). This standard of review is the same standard of review employed by the United States Supreme Court in cases involving attorney fees awarded pursuant to the federal Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2003).

A district court has abused its discretion when it has “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, or based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law.” State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 606 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn.App.2000) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Apr. 25, 2000). In determining whether. the district court has abused its discretion, we review the district courts findings to ascertain whether they are supported by the record. Mehralian v. State, 346 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Minn.App.1984), review denied (Minn. July 26, 1984). Findings of fact are clearly erroneous only when we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Gjovik v. Strope, 401 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Minn.1987); see also United States v. True, 250 F.3d 410, 422 (6th Cir.2001) (defining abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing attorney fees awarded under EAJA).

Under the MEAJA, if the prevailing party shows that “the position of the state was not substantially justified,” the district court shall award fees and costs. MinmStat. § 15.472(a) (2002). As defined by the MEAJA, “substantially justified” means “that the state’s position had a reasonable basis in law and faet[] based on the totality of the circumstances before and during the litigation or contested case proceedings.” MinmStat. § 15.471, subd. 8 (2002). Minnesota courts have looked to federal caselaw addressing the EAJA to define the phrase further. Donovan Contracting, 469 N.W.2d at 720. In Pierce v. Underwood, the United States Supreme Court defined “substantially justified” as “[m]ore than merely undeserving of sanctions for frivolousness[.]” 487 U.S. 552, 556, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2550, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988). The board argues that, even if we conclude that the DFL complied with the statute, the board’s position was supported by a reasonable legal basis, and the dispute was genuine.

The district court concluded that the board’s position was based on a misreading of the statute’s clear and unambiguous prohibition against allocation of multican-didate expenditures by a political party on behalf of three or more candidates. In light of the board’s determination that allocation is required notwithstanding the plain language of Minn.Stat. § 10A.275, subd. 1, we conclude that the board’s position did not have a reasonable basis in law and fact and, therefore, was not substantially justified. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the DFL attorney fees and costs under the MEAJA.

DECISION

Because the plain meaning of Minn.Stat. § 10A.275, subd. 1 (1998), proscribes allocation of five specific types of multicandi-date expenditures made by a political party on behalf of three or more candidates, the DFL properly reported its expenditures. The board’s position was not substantially justified, and the district court properly awarded attorney fees and costs to the DFL under the MEAJA.

Affirmed.

      . This portion of the complaint was found to be without merit by the board and is not at issue here.

        . For the purpose of our analysis, we refer to the statutory provisions in effect in 1998, the year in which the DFL's multicandidate expenditures at issue here took place.

      . In 1999, the legislature repealed Minn.Stat. § 10A.22, subd. 5, and amended Minn.Stat. § 10A.275 by replacing the reference to section 10A.22, subdivision 5, with section 10A.20, subdivision 3(g).1999 Minn. Laws ch. 220, § 35. In repealing section 10A.22, subdivision 5, the legislature moved the 1998 statutory provision requiring allocation of multicandidate expenditures among the candidates on a reasonable cost basis from section 10A.22, subdivision 5, to the end of section 10A.20, subdivision 3(g). See 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 220, §§ 23 (amending Minn.Stat. § 10A.20, subd. 3(g)), 51 (repealing Minn. Stat. § 10A.22, subd. 5). Even with these statutory changes, however, section 10A.275, subdivision 1, maintains the same five exceptions to the allocation requirement of section 10A.20, subdivision 3(g), for multicandidate expenditures that were in effect in 1998.


author: STONEBURNER, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Matthew Philip ANDERSON, Respondent.
    No. A03-290.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Dec. 9, 2003.

      Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Jay M. Heffern, Minneapolis City Attorney, Julie L. Delgado-O’Neil, Assistant City Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.
    Robert L. McCormick, University Student Legal Service, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

      Considered and decided by KALITOWSKI, Presiding Judge, STONEBURNER, Judge, and PORITSKY, Judge.

       Retired judge of the district court, serving the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 10.

   OPINION

STONEBURNER, Judge.

Appellant State of Minnesota challenges the district court’s pretrial order granting respondent’s motion to suppress evidence obtained after a traffic stop on the basis that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion for the stop. Because the officer articulated an objective basis for the stop based on a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that has not been otherwise construed by an appellate court, we reverse.

FACTS

A University of Minnesota police officer stopped respondent Matthew Philip Anderson for a suspected violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.18, subd. 11 (2002), after respondent, traveling in the center lane of a three-lane one-way street, passed within three feet of the officer’s squad car that was stopped in the right lane in connection with a previous stop. After respondent was stopped, the officer observed him displaying indicia of intoxication and arrested respondent for driving while impaired. Respondent was charged with driving while impaired in the fourth degree and driving while impaired with a blood alcohol concentration of .10 or more within 2 hours. Respondent was not charged with violating Minn.Stat. § 169.18, subd. 11, which requires that before passing a stopped emergency vehicle “the driver of a vehicle shall safely move the vehicle to a lane away from the emergency vehicle.”

Respondent moved to suppress the evidence obtained by the officer after the stop, arguing that the officer misinterpreted Minn.Stat. § 169.18, subd. 11, and therefore had no objective basis to stop respondent. The district court agreed and granted respondent’s motion to suppress. This appeal followed.

ISSUES

Did the district court err in granting respondent’s motion to suppress evidence obtained after a traffic stop, on the basis that the stop was illegal because the officer did not have an objective basis to reasonably suspect that respondent had violated Minn.Stat. § 169.18, subd. 11 (2002)?

ANALYSIS

1. Standard of review

When the state appeals a pretrial suppression order it “must clearly and unequivocally show that both the trial court’s order will have a ‘critical impact’ on the state’s ability to prosecute the defendant successfully and that the order constituted error.” State v. Scott, 584 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Minn.1998) (quotation omitted). The parties do not dispute that the suppression order in this case precludes prosecution and therefore has a critical impact.

“In reviewing a district court’s determinations of the legality of a limited investigatory stop, we review questions of reasonable suspicion de novo.” State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn.2000). In doing so, findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, “giving due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by the district court.” Id. (quoting State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 383 (Minn.1998)).

To be lawful, a stop “must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d 655, 664 (Minn.App. 2001). “[I]n all stop cases, the decision for the trial court at the suppression hearing depends on whether the officer is able to articulate at the hearing a ‘particular and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’ ” State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Minn.1989) (quoting United, States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). “Ordinarily, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an objective basis for stopping the vehicle.” State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn.1997). An officer may conduct a limited investigative stop when the officer can “point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 87 (quotation omitted). Although the factual basis required to justify an investigatory stop is “minimal,” a stop cannot be based on “mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” Marben v. Dept’t of Pub. Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn.1980) (quotation omitted).

2. Officer’s articulated basis for stop

The officer stopped respondent for a perceived violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.18, subd. 11 (2002), and told respondent that the sole reason he was stopped was the violation of the statute. The statute provides:

When approaching and before passing an authorized emergency vehicle that is parked or otherwise stopped on or next to a street or highway having two or more lanes in the same direction, the driver of a vehicle shall safely move the vehicle to a lane away from the emergency vehicle.

Minn.Stat. § 169.18, subd. 11 (emphasis added). The officer testified that he interpreted this statute to require drivers “to give a buffer lane between [the] emergency vehicle and the driver’s car ... so that an officer has a safety zone.” Under the officer’s interpretation of the statute, respondent was required to move to the far left lane, leaving a full lane between his car and the stopped squad car. Under this interpretation of the statute, the officer observed a violation.

The district court concluded that the statute is not ambiguous and does not require one to leave a buffer lane between the driver and the stopped emergency vehicle. . “It means being in the next lane over from where the police car is stopped, because that is what it says: ‘A driver of a vehicle shall safely move a vehicle to a lane away from the emergency vehicle.’ That does not mean two lanes over and that is sufficient.” Based on this interpretation of the statute, the district court determined that the officer did not have an objective legal basis for suspecting that respondent violated the law. “The objective legal ba,-sis would have been if, the officer’s vehicle was in the centerlane. And that was not there.”

We first hold that the district court erred in concluding that MinmStat. § 169.18, subd. 11, is not ambiguous. At oral argument, counsel for respondent candidly conceded that the officer’s interpretation of Minn.Stat. § 169.18, subd. 11, was not unreasonable. We agree and conclude that because the phrase “a lane away” could mean either in the next lane or a full lane away, the statute is ambiguous. See State v. Stevenson, 656 N.W.2d 285, 238 (Minn.2003) (statute is only ambiguous when language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation). Because respondent was not charged with a violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.18, subd. 11, the issue of the correct interpretation of the phrase “a lane away,” as used in the statute, is not before us. The issue before us is whether the officer had an objective, articulable basis for believing that respondent violated the statute.

The district court based its decision that the officer did not have an objective legal basis for the stop on State v. George, which held that an officer had no objective basis to reasonably suspect that a motorcyclist was operating his factory-equipped motorcycle in violation of a law that states that a motorcycle cannot have more than two headlights. 557 N.W.2d at 578. But the holding in George was fact-specific. And we conclude that George is distinguishable from the case before us because George did not involve an officer’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute. The officer in George mistakenly interpreted an unambiguous statute and therefore had no objective basis for the stop. See id. at 579. But George does hot disturb the long line of cases supporting the general principle that an officer may make a stop if he or she is able to articulate a reasonable, objective basis for that stop. Id. at 578. We- hold that a stop based on a law enforcement officer’s objectively reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that has not been interpreted by an appellate court is valid.

Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the officer’s in-' terpretation of the ambiguity in Minn.Stat. § 169.18, subd. 11, was reasonable. And, based on the officer’s objective observations, he had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that respondent had violated the statute. This stop was therefore not based on whim, caprice, or idle curiosity. The officer had an objectively reasonable legal basis for the stop and articulated that basis at the time of the stop and at the suppression hearing. Because the stop was not illegal, the district court erred by granting respondent’s motion to suppress.

In addition, respondent submitted a motion to strike a portion of appellant’s appendix to its brief as not being part of the record. We agree that under the applicable procedural rules the document was not part of the record before the district court and therefore should not have been included in appellant’s appendix. See Minn. R.Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 8 (record on appeal consists of papers filed in the district court); Minn. R.Crim. P. 28.01, subd. 2 (except as otherwise provided, the rules of civil appellate procedure apply to criminal appeals); Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 130.01, subd. 1 (appendix “shall contain ... portions of the record”).

DECISION

The law enforcement officer had an ar-ticulable, reasonable, objective basis to stop respondent for a suspected violation of Minn.Stat. § 168.18, subd. 11. The district court erred in concluding that the stop was illegal and in granting respondent’s motion to suppress.

Reversed; motion to strike granted.

      . The state does not dispute the district court's finding that the officer's squad car was stopped in the right lane.


author: HALBROOKS, Judge.

text:
    ALLIANCE FOR METROPOLITAN STABILITY, et al., Appellants, Metropolitan Interfaith Council on Affordable Housing, Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN COUNCIL, Respondent, City of Eagan, Defendant.
    No. A03-457.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Dec. 9, 2003.

      Timothy L. Thompson, Ann M. Norton, John Cann, Christine R. Goepfert, St. Paul, MN, for appellants Alliance for Metropolitan Stability, et al.
    Justin D. Cummins, Miller-O’Brien, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant Metropolitan Interfaith Council on Affordable Housing.
    Charles N. Ñauen, William A. Gengler, Lockridge Grindal Ñauen PLLP, Minneapolis, MN, and Nils Grossman, David Theisen, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.
    Considered and decided by KLAPHAKE, Presiding Judge; TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge; and HALBROOKS, Judge.
   OPINION

HALBROOKS, Judge.

Appellants Alliance for Metropolitan Stability (Alliance), Community Stabilization Project (CSP), and Metropolitan Interfaith Council on Affordable Housing (MICAH) challenge the district court’s dismissal of their claims based on lack of standing and lack of a right of action, and the grant of respondent’s motion for summary judgment. Appellants argue that (1) the district court misapplied Stansell v. City of Northfield, 618 N.W.2d 814 (Minn.App.2001), review denied (Minn. Jan. 26, 2001), in ruling that appellants lack standing to sue when standing exists under Minnesota caselaw and where the U.S. Supreme Court recognized organizational standing in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982); (2) the district court misunderstood appellants’ action to involve an implied right of action, rather than an express right of action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act and erred in holding both that a declaratory-judgment action requires an underlying cause of action and that appellants lacked a common-law right of action; and (3) the district court erred in granting summary judgment because the respondent acted arbitrarily when it incorporated Livable Communities Act (LCA) goals in its guidelines. Because we conclude that the district court erred in ruling that the appellants lack standing but was correct in its right-of-action and summary-judgment analyses, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS

Appellant organizations argue that respondent Metropolitan Council (Council) violated the Metropolitan Land Use Planning Act (MLUPA), Minn.Stat. § 473.851-.871 (2002), by providing cities with guidelines for complying with MLUPA that understated cities’ planning obligations. Appellants asked for a declaration of rights under the MLUPA through the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Minn.Stat. ch. 555 (2002). Appellants Alliance, CSP, and MICAH are organizations engaged in educational and advocacy efforts related to affordable housing in metropolitan area communities.

CSP and Alliance claim that the Council’s actions have harmed their missions of promoting more affordable housing and required them to divert staff resources to assist members in obtaining housing and to advocate for changes to the Council’s MLUPA practices. CSP argues the Council’s actions have harmed its members and clients because the shortage of affordable housing directly relates to increased rent. MICAH claims the Council’s actions have impaired its ability to carry out its objectives and have required it to redirect funding of approximately $12,000 toward changing the Council’s actions.

MLUPA requires each city in the metropolitan area to produce a comprehensive plan that contains “objectives, policies, standards and programs to guide public and private land use, development, redevelopment and preservation for all [local] lands and waters.... ” Minn.Stat. § 473.859, subd. 1. A local comprehensive plan includes a required land-use plan showing how the city will provide housing opportunities that meet the city’s share of current and projected local and regional affordable housing need. Minn.Stat. § 473.859, subd. 2. MLUPA also requires that each city’s plan contain a detailed explanation of how it will actually implement the housing element of its plan. Minn.Stat. § 473.859, subd. 4.

The Council is responsible for providing cities with MLUPA guidelines to assist in the cities’ planning for their share of the local and regional need for affordable housing. Minn.Stat. §§ 473.854, .867. These guidelines provide direction by assisting cities in assessing housing supplies, analyzing housing needs and goals, and devising implementation plans. After the local governmental unit creates its comprehensive plan, it must submit it to the Council for review. Minn.Stat. § 473.858, subd. 3. The Council may require modifications of the comprehensive plan when the plan does not conform to the Council’s “metropolitan system plans.” Minn.Stat. § 473.175, subd. 1 (2002). However, housing is not specifically defined as a metropolitan system under the MLUPA.

Although the MLUPA refers to local and regional “needs,” the term “needs” is neither defined in the MLUPA or in any other provision of Minn.Stat. ch. 473 (2002), nor is there specification as to how or by whom “local and regional housing needs” should be determined or measured. But following the enactment of the MLU-PA, the Council developed formulas to assess the need for low- and moderate-income housing on a regional and local basis. Beginning in the late 1970s, based on that formula, the Council calculated affordable housing needs for each community and issued guidelines for local governments to follow to create affordable housing opportunities. By the early 1980s, cities began producing housing elements as part of their comprehensive plans with designations to meet the targets provided by the Council. During the mid-1980s and 1990s, the Council changed its policy and began to exclude any references to affordable housing in its guidelines. Appellants believe that, as a result of this shift, city development in the 1980s and early 1990s lacked the necessary, designated parcels for affordable housing.

In the 1990s, the Minnesota Legislature entered the debate. In 1993, S.F. 449 was introduced in the Minnesota Senate, which would have both mandated the Council to require local governmental units to modify comprehensive plans “inconsistent” with all adopted plans of the Council and created a private right to sue under the MLU-PA. But the bill died in committee. In addition, two amendments were vetoed in 1993 and 1994 that would ■ have required the Council to analyze the need for affordable housing in the area, allocate the need to all metropolitan area cities and towns on a “fair-share basis,” and adopt and execute a plan to “facilitate, coordinate, and, ... cause the development” of affordable housing wherever the need was not totally satisfied. H.F. 671, 78th Leg., § 1, subd. 3(1), (2) & (7) (Minn.1993): Then, in 1995, the legislature enacted the LCA, which allows cities to negotiate affordable-housing goals with the Council to become eligible to apply for funding under certain programs. Minn.Stat. §§ 473.25-.255. The negotiated goals under the LCA must be “consistent with and promote the policies of the metropolitan council as provided in the adopted metropolitan development guide.” Minn.Stat. § 473.254, subd. 2. The legislature, also in 1995, amended the MLUPA to require all cities to update their comprehensive plans, including housing provisions, by the end of 1998. Minn. Stat. § 473.864, subd. 2.

Appellants contend that the Council failed to comply with the current MLUPA mandate by directing cities to develop land-use plans that provide for far fewer affordable-housing units than are needed. They claim that, in implementing the LCA, the Council defined LCA affordable-housing goals so that they were not based on nor related to the affordable-housing “need” referenced in the MLUPA. Appellants point to the fact that the Council stated in 1999 that 115,000 lower-income households will need affordable housing by 2010, yet the directive created by the Council will create no more than 12,885 units. Appellants further argue that the Council’s actions have caused cities to disregard the housing provisions of the MLU-PA, resulting in the reduction of the number of acres of land that cities have set aside for affordable housing.

The guidelines at issue are contained in the Council’s Local Planning Handbook. The Council contends that there is no conflict between its interpretation of the LCA and the MLUPA requirements. The council believes that it made it clear that, when using the guidelines, the MLUPA requirements have not been ignored:

A community’s Housing Action Plan developed under Livable Communities Act criteria may meet the requirements for the housing implementation program required by statute, if it includes adequate programs, fiscal devices and other official controls to meet the community’s goals, as required by the [MLUPA] (see Minn. Stat. sec. 473.859, subd. 2, last sentence).

1997 Local Planning Handbook 51.

Appellants together sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The Council moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. The district court granted Council’s motion to dismiss and held that, as to appellants’ claims against the Council (1) appellants lack standing, (2) the MLUPA does not provide an implied right of action, (3) the usual common-law right of judicial review of agency action does not apply, and (4) relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is not available absent an independent cause of action. The court also impliedly granted Council’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the Council “acted within its legal authority and not in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” This appeal follows.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court err in dismissing appellants’ claim for lack of standing?

II. Did the district court err in dismissing appellants’ claim for lack of a right of action?

III. Did the district court err in granting the Council’s motion for summary judgment?

ANALYSIS

On appeal from a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, this court reviews de novo the legal sufficiency of the claims presented. Barton v. Moore, 558 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn.1997); Leonard v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 605 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Minn.App.2000), review denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 2000). “[T]he only question before [the reviewing court] is whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief.” Barton, 558 N.W.2d at 749. Dismissals are generally disfavored; therefore, a reviewing court should not uphold a dismissal if it is possible on any evidence that might be produced to grant the relief requested. Jacobson v. Bd. of Trs. of the Teachers Ret. Ass’n, 627 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Minn.App.2001), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2001). The court is to presume that all of the alleged facts are true for purposes of deciding the motion. Abbariao v. Hamline Univ. Sch. of Law, 258 N.W.2d 108, 111 (Minn.1977); In re Milk Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 588 N.W.2d 772, 775 (Minn.App.1999). “All assumptions and inferences must favor the party against whom the [motion] is sought.” St. James Capital Corp. v. Pallet Recycling Assocs. of N. Am., Inc., 589 N.W.2d 511, 514 (Minn.App.1999).

I.

Appellants argue that-the district court erred in granting the Council’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing. “Standing, is the requirement that a party has a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy to seek relief from a court.” State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 493 (Minn.1996) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1364-65, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972)). A party has standing if (1) the legislature has conferred standing, by statute, or (2) a party has suffered “injury-in-fact.” Nash v. Wollan, 656 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Minn.App.2003), review denied (Minn. Apr. 29, 2003). A party questioning a statute must show that it is at some disadvantage, has an injury, or an imminent problem. Lee v. Delmont, 228 Minn. 101, 111, 36 N.W.2d 530, 537 (1949). The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted a liberal standard for organizational standing. See Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc. v. Minn. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 301 Minn. 28, 35, 221 N.W.2d 162, 166 (1974) (granting standing to nonprofit consumer-advocate corporation based solely on allegations of economic injury-in-fact to the corporation’s members because without the corporation’s intervention “no one representing the consuming public has any-part in the lawsuit”).

To satisfy the “injury-in-fact” requirement, appellants must demonstrate that they have suffered actual, concrete injuries caused by the challenged conduct. In re Improvement of County Ditch No. 86, 614 N.W.2d 756, 762 (Minn.App.2000), rev’d on other grounds, 625 N.W.2d 813 (Minn.2001). Appellants must have a direct interest in the statute that is different in character from the interest of citizens in general. In re Jury Panel, 276 Minn. 503, 506, 150 N.W.2d 863, 866 (1967); Arens v. Village of Rogers, 240 Minn. 386, 390, 61 N.W.2d 508, 512 (1953). Here, the complaint states that the inadequate supply of and inadequate planning for affordable rental housing resulting from Council policies has injured each of the appellants. More specifically, Alliance claims that the Council’s failure to properly implement the MLUPA has'injured it by substantially interfering with its mission by compelling the organization to divert resources from activities it would otherwise undertake, making it more difficult to educate community members and local governments about their obligations, and hampering its advocacy efforts. CSP claims that the Council has harmed its mission of promoting more affordable housing and has required it to divert staff resources. The executive director of CSP states that the CSP’s work has become extremely difficult because of the shortage of affordable housing, which has resulted largely from the lack of affordable housing development. According to the CSP executive director, this shortage has directly harmed low-income people, especially minority families, who represent many of the CSP’s clients and members. MICAH claims the Council’s actions have impaired its ability to work for the creation of an adequate supply of affordable housing, to address disparities in housing, and to further fair housing through public education, advocacy, and organizing activities. MICAH’s executive director states that the Council’s conduct has forced the organization to shift its focus and redirect approximately $12,000 in staff time to outreach, education, and organizing concerning the Council’s guidelines. She also testified as to specific members of MICAH who have been harmed by the resulting lack of affordable housing.

The Council responds that the appellants’ statements are generalizations and conclusory in nature. The district court agreed, relying on Stansell, 618 N.W.2d at 818. But Stansell is distinguishable from this case. In Stansell, the plaintiffs stated generally that they had “been injured,” see id,., whereas here all three organizations have alleged both that their resources have been diverted and that their educational, advocacy, and placement efforts are impeded by the Council’s understating of housing duties. Further, appellant organizations are different from the general public because the general public does not have a mission to educate and advocate for affordable housing. The fact that affordable housing affects many individuals and communities does not alone make the issues generalized. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-25, 118 S.Ct. 1777, 1786, 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998) (determining that a group of voters suffered an injury when the FEC refused to require another organization to register as a political action committee and file reports, and noting that a harm (the denial of information), though widely shared, can still be sufficiently concrete and specific, and constitute injury-in-fact).

Minnesota courts recognize impediments to an organization’s activities and mission as an injury sufficient for standing. See Snyder’s Drug Stores, 301 Minn, at 35, 221 N.W.2d at 167. Further, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a housing organization with a mission of promoting fair housing suffered a cognizable injury as a result of racial steering practices that frustrated its counseling and referral practices, with a consequent drain on its resources. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 1124, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982) (noting that the allegations constituted “far more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests”). Based on the complaint and the supporting affidavits, we conclude that the appellants have suffered injuries-in-fact and have interests in the MLUPA statute that are different in character from the interests of citizens in general. Therefore, the district court erred in holding that the appellants did not have standing.

Our determination is supported by the well-established notion of associational or organizational standing, which recognizes that an organization may sue to redress injuries on its own behalf or on behalf of its members. Philip Morris, 551 N.W.2d at 497-98. Where an organization attempts to claim an interest in a statute, there are two key questions to ask to determine if organizational standing is more likely: (1) if these organizations were denied standing, would that mean that no potential plaintiff would have standing to challenge the regulation in question? and (2) for whose benefit was the regulation at issue enacted? Snyder’s Drug Stores, 301 Minn, at 33, 221 N.W.2d at 165. Here, it is very unlikely that a city will choose to sue for stricter regulations. As the record indicates, using LCA goals creates less of a demand on the cities to provide for affordable-housing units. Suing to force the Council to use need-based goals will only result in having to increase the amount of affordable-housing units within their city limits. Further, the regulation was enacted to benefit low- and moderate-income home-seekers. These beneficiaries are both members of the appellant organizations and the people that the organizations represent. Therefore, utilizing the Snyder’s Drug Stores’ questions in our analysis, we conclude that appellants have standing.

II.

The appellant organizations also argue that the district court erred in granting the Council’s motion to dismiss for lack of a cause of action because they believe that they have an express cause of action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act provides that “[a]ny person ... whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute” may obtain a declaration as to those rights, status, or legal relations and as to any question of construction or validity of the statute. Minn.Stat. § 555.02 (2002). A party may seek a declaration as to rights, status or legal relations whenever the declaration will terminate a controversy or remove an uncertainty. Minn.Stat. § 555.05 (2002). A declaratory judgment may be entered regardless of whether “further relief is or could be claimed,” and it will lie when “legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise.” Minn.Stat. §§ 555.01, .02 (2002). The purpose of the statute is to settle uncertainty and it is to be liberally construed and administered. Minn.Stat. § 555.12 (2002). However, “[p]rinciples of judicial restraint preclude [courts] from creating a new statutory cause of action that does not exist at common law where the legislature has not either by [a] statute’s express terms or by implication provided for ... liability.” Bruegger v. Faribault County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 497 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Minn.1993). “A statute does not give rise to a civil cause of action unless the language of the statute is explicit or it can be determined by clear implication.” Valtakis v. Putnam, 504 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Minn.App.1993) (citing Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 47 n. 4 (Minn.1990)).

Appellants seek a proper construction of the MLUPA under section 555.02 and a declaratory judgment that the MLUPA does not permit the Council to adopt guidelines that advise cities to substitute lesser housing goals in place of the MLUPA’s requirement of each city’s share of local- and regional-housing need. The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, however, is not an express independent source of jurisdiction. See Brown v. State, 617 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Minn.App.2000), review denied (Minn. Nov. 21, 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 995, 121 S.Ct. 1655, 149 L.Ed.2d 638 (2001); Vrieze v. New Century Homes, Inc., 542 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Minn.App.1996). A party seeking a declaratory judgment must have an independent, underlying cause of action based on a common-law or statutory right. See Brown, 617 N.W.2d at 425; Vrieze, 542 N.W.2d at 67. There is no private right to enforce the MLUPA, and the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act cannot create a cause of action that does not otherwise exist. While we acknowledge that this leaves appellants’ cause without appropriate avenues for review, the statute limits the review procedures. We recognize that appellants’ energy and resources are directly affected by the interpretation and application of the MLUPA and the LCA. Appellants raise a legitimate issue as to what actions the Council must take in creating their guidelines. But the only way for this court to be able to review appellants’ cause as stated is for the MLUPA to be amended to allow for a cause of action. Without such amendment, this court’s hands are tied.

We also conclude a private cause of action is not implied through the MLUPA. In determining whether a private cause of action is implied, we consider three factors: (1) whether the appellants belong to a special class of persons for whose benefit the statute was enacted, (2) whether the legislature indicated an intent to create or deny a private remedy, and (3) whether inferring a private remedy would be consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislation. Flour Exchange Bldg. Corp. v. State, 524 N.W.2d 496, 499 (Minn.App.1994), review denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1995).

The Council argues that appellants do not belong to the special class of persons because, when a statute is phrased as a directive to an agency, “[tjhere [is] far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons.” Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-91, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1954-55, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 289, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 1521, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001) (“Statutes that focus on the person regulated rather than the individuals protected create no implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular class of persons.” (quotation omitted)). Here, Minn. Stat. § 473.854 (2002) provides

[t]he council shall prepare and adopt guidelines and procedures relating to the requirements and provisions of sections 462.355, subdivision 4, 473.175, and 473.851 to 473.871 which will provide assistance to local governmental units and school districts in accomplishing the provisions of sections 462.355, subdivision 4, 473.175, and 473.851 to 473.871.

We agree that this provision states a duty-creating directive to the Council.

Further, it does not appear that there was legislative intent to create a private cause of action. Without statutory intent, “a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.” Alexander, 532 U.S. at 286-87, 121 S.Ct. at 1520. The plain language of the statute does not indicate a private cause of action was intended. Minn.Stat. § 473.866 (2002), entitled “Contested Cases; Administrative and Judicial Review,” states only that the Council’s decision to require modification may be contested by the affected local governmental unit. It does not mention a private cause of action, and it does not indicate intent to broaden reviewability by other actors or for other causes. In addition, when the legislature creates a remedial scheme for enforcement, as it did here, it indicates intent to exclude private enforcement. See, e.g., Semrad v. Edina Realty, Inc., 493 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Minn. 1992); Flour Exeh. Bldg., 524 N.W.2d at 499-500 (stating that “[t]he silence of the legislative history on the subject reinforces our decision not to find such a right of action implicit within the section.” (quotation omitted)).

The final Flour Exchange Bldg, factor is whether inferring a private remedy would be consistent with the underlying purpose of the MLUPA. One of the MLUPA’s purposes is to consolidate and coordinate planning in the metropolitan area. See Minn.Stat. § 473.851 (2002). The Council argues creating a private right of action would have a negative effect on the MLUPA’s purpose. See Nordmarken v. City of Richfield, 641 N.W.2d 343, 349 (Minn.App.2002) (noting local regulation by referendum would encroach on the uniform procedural laws for land-use planning established by the legislature and would undermine the comprehensive and uniform nature of the statutory process), review denied (Minn. June 18, 2002). Appellants argue, on the other hand, that judicial review of the Council’s actions is necessary to restore the accountability and the coordinated metropolitan planning from which the MLUPA’s purpose arose.

While it seems unclear whether creating a private right of action would frustrate the MLUPA’s purpose, the statute is written as a directive. Therefore, there is no presumption of intent to confer rights on a particular class of persons. Because it also appears the legislature did not intend to imply a right of action, we conclude that there is no implied right of action under the MLUPA

Finally, we look at whether appellants have a common-law right to judicial review. There is a presumption that persons injured may seek judicial review of agency decisions in the absence of statutory language to the contrary. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group v. Minn. Envtl. Quality Council, 306 Minn. 370, 376, 237 N.W.2d 375, 379 (1975). In Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, the court stated that

[g]iven an agency obligation to carry out the substantive requirements of the Act, we believe that courts have an obligation to review substantive agency decisions on the merits.... [AJbsent legislative guidance as to reviewability, an administrative determination affecting legal rights is renewable unless some special reason appears for not reviewing.

Id. at 379, 237 N.W.2d at 381 (quotation omitted). Here, we have a Council writing guidelines that assist cities with their affordable-housing planning. Because an administrative determination was never made, we do not have a substantive agency decision to review. Therefore, we conclude the presumption of reviewability does not apply here, and appellants do not have a common-law right to judicial review.

But even if the presumption did apply, the presumption would be set aside because of a showing of “clear and convincing evidence” of a contrary legislative intent. See id. at 377, 237 N.W.2d at 380 (stating “[o]nly upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review” (quotation omitted)). While legislative silence is evidence that the legislature did not intend to override the presumption in favor of judicial review, the “presumption favoring judicial review [is] overcome, whenever the [legislative] intent to preclude judicial review is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme.” Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 2456, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984) (quotation omitted).

[W]hen a statute provides a detailed mechanism for judicial consideration of particular issues at the behest of particular persons, judicial review of those issues at the behest of other persons may be found to be impliedly precluded. In a complex [statutory] scheme ..., the omission of such a provision [for consumer enforcement] is sufficient reason to believe that Congress intended to foreclose consumer participation in the regulatory process.

Id. at 349, 104 S.Ct. at 2456; see also Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 306 Minn, at 377-78, 237 N.W.2d at 380.

Minn.Stat. § 473.866 provides a procedure for an affected governmental unit to challenge a specific Council decision under the MLUPA. Section 473.866 says nothing about private challenges to Council actions other than those requiring cities to alter their comprehensive plans. This provision provides “clear and convincing” evidence of intent to limit judicial review. See Block, 467 U.S. at 347, 104 S.Ct. at 2454 (“In a complex [statutory] scheme ..., the omission of such a provision [for consumer enforcement] is sufficient reason to believe that Congress intended to foreclose consumer participation in the regulatory process.”); Semrad, 493 N.W.2d at 532 (noting that the legislature “expressly grant[ed] enforcement powers to the commissioner of commerce alone and that, while the legislature was aware of the method by which it could create a private right of action, it did not do so”). Because a presumption of reviewability would be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence of legislative intent to not allow reviewability by a private actor, appellants would not have a common-law right to judicial review even if the presumption did apply.

We conclude that appellants neither have an express, an implied, nor a common-law right to judicial review. Therefore, the district court’s dismissal on these grounds is affirmed.

III.

The appellant organizations argue the district court erred in granting the Council’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal from summary judgment, this court asks whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district courts erred in applying the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990). The reviewing court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn.1993). Any doubts about the existence of a material fact are resolved in the nonmoving party’s favor. Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 672 (Minn.2001).

“[T]here is no genuine issue of material fact for trial when the nonmoving party presents evidence which merely creates a metaphysical doubt as to a factual issue and which is not sufficiently probative with respect to an essential element of the non-moving party’s case to permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions.” DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn.1997). No genuine issue of material fact exists “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 69 (alteration in original) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). “[T]he party resisting summary judgment must do more than rest on mere averments.” Id. at 71. A genuine issue for trial must be established by substantial evidence. Id. at 69-70.

Appellants argue that the Council acted arbitrarily and capriciously by adopting guidelines based in part on affordable housing LCA “goals,” rather than basing them on affordable housing “needs.” They assert that, because the effect of using “goals” instead of “needs” creates a huge housing disparity, the Council’s change in policy to use “goals” is unreasonable. The Council states that its justification for making the policy change was that diminished federal funding for low-income housing limits cities’ abilities to produce affordable housing. Further, the Council states it is simply responding to the enactment of the LCA. Therefore, using negotiated “goals” rather than actual “need” is reasonable. Appellants contend that there are material fact issues surrounding the reasonableness of the Council’s actions and that summary judgment is improper at this stage because they need more time for additional discovery on this issue.

Appellants’ memorandum in opposition to defendants’ motions submitted to the district court contains a one-line reference to the need for additional discovery. While they did not formally move the court for additional time or discovery, they did file a Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.06 affidavit stating they needed further factual development on the above issue. The district court did not explicitly rule on the motion, but it implicitly denied the motion by granting the Council’s motion for summary judgment.

A district court’s decision to deny a motion for a continuance to conduct discovery is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Cheme Contracting Corp. v. Wausau, Ins. Cos., 572 N.W.2d 339, 346 (Minn.App.1997), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 1998). A transcript was not provided; therefore review is limited to whether the findings support the district court’s conclusions of law. Bormann v. Bormann, 644 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. App.2002). Generally, continuances should be liberally granted, particularly if the party seeking a continuance had insufficient time to complete discovery. Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 412 (Minn.1982). In deciding whether such a continuance should be granted, the district court must address two issues: (1) whether the plaintiff has been diligent in obtaining or seeking discovery prior to its rule 56.06 motion, and (2) whether the plaintiff is seeking further discovery in the good faith belief that material facts will be uncovered or merely engaging in a fishing expedition. Id.

Here, appellants never made formal discovery requests. Instead, in their rule 56.06 affidavit, they stated that they needed the “full record” from which the Council justifies its actions. This is a rather general and broad request. A rule 56.06 affidavit must be specific about the evidence expected, the source of discovery necessary to obtain the evidence, and the reasons for the failure to complete discovery to date. See Vosbeck v. Lerdall, 245 Minn. 164, 167, 72 N.W.2d 371, 374 (1955). The district court here had considerable documentary evidence and affidavits upon which to base its decision. See McCormick v. Custom Pools, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 471, 477 (Minn.App.1985), review denied (Minn. Dee. 30, 1985) (stating summary-judgment grant before completion of discovery was not premature where additional discovery would have neither aided the district court in determining whether material fact issues existed nor changed the result of the summary-judgment motion). On this record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly denying appellants’ request for additional discovery.

As to the material issues of fact, the record reflects that the term “need” is undefined in the statute. When enacted, the Council created formulas to help determine what each city’s “need” was. Over time, the Council adjusted the formulas to better serve their purpose. Then, after the LCA was enacted, the Council decided to change its policy and stop using “need” formulas, and to start using goal-based guidelines consistent with the LCA.

Governmental bodies have broad discretion, and the courts will not interfere with the decision if there is a rational basis for it, even if the decision is debatable. Larson v. Wash. County, 387 N.W.2d 902, 905 (Minn.App.1986), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 1986). When considering decisions of a governmental unit involving judgment and discretion, the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the governmental unit. City of New Brighton v. Metro. Council, 306 Minn. 425, 430, 237 N.W.2d 620, 624 (1975). If the reasonableness of the action of the governmental unit is “at least doubtful, or fairly debatable,” the court will uphold the action. Miller v. Foley, 317 N.W.2d 710, 714 (Minn.1982) (quoting Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 267 Minn. 221, 226, 125 N.W.2d 846, 850 (1964)). Be cause the term “need” was never defined in the MLUPA, it is reasonable for the Council to react to the new LCA legislation and to enhance its guidelines to reflect what it believes to be the plain meaning of the MLUPA and the LCA and the legislative intent behind both statutes. Because the policy decision involves judgment and discretion, we will not interfere with the Council’s decision. Therefore, there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute.

The final question in the summary-judgment analysis is whether the district court erred in applying the law. State by Cooper, 460 N.W.2d at 4. An agency action is subject to review as to whether the action “was not mistaken as to the applicable law,” as well as to whether the agency acted “arbitrarily, oppressively, or unreasonably.” City of New Brighton, 237 N.W.2d at 624. The MLUPA requires the Council to “prepare and adopt guidelines and procedures relating to the requirements and provisions of sections 462.355, subdivision 4, 473.175, and 473.851 to 473.871 which will provide assistance to local governmental units and school districts in accomplishing the provisions of sections 462.355, subdivision 4, 473.175, and 473.851 to 473.871.” Minn.Stat. § 473.854. The MLUPA requires cities’ comprehensive plans to contain “a housing element containing standards, plans and programs for providing adequate housing opportunities to meet existing and projected local and regional housing needs.” Minn.Stat. § 473.859, subd. 2(c) (2002) (emphasis added). It also must contain a “housing implementation program, ... which will provide sufficient existing and new housing to meet the local unit’s share of the metropolitan area need for low and moderate income housing.” Id., subd. 4(3) (emphasis added). The LCA requires the Council to negotiate goals “that are consistent with and promote the policies of the metropolitan council as provided in the adopted metropolitan development guide.” Minn.Stat. § 473.254, subd. 2.

Appellants contend that the Council acts unlawfully when it provides guidelines based on a city’s LCA goals rather than the city’s share of local and regional housing need. But because “guidelines” and “assistance” are not defined terms, they are left to the Council’s discretion. See Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 306 Minn, at 382, 237 N.W.2d at 382 (noting when term is not defined, the implication is that the legislature intended that the interpretation of that term be within the regulated agency’s discretion). The Council has met its required duties under the statute by preparing and adopting a Local Planning Handbook that includes guidelines providing assistance to cities in satisfying the cities’ affordable-housing obligations. The MLUPA does not indicate who or what entity is to determine “need” and “share,” but the terms appear in the cities’ responsibilities’ provisions, not the Council’s. Further, as the MLUPA reads currently, the Council does not have the power to compel or guarantee that cities will adopt official controls to implement housing plans that satisfy the MLUPA. See Minn.Stat. § 473.175, subd. 1 (2002) (stating the Council only has the authority to require modifications when a local comprehensive plan does not conform with the Council’s “metropolitan system plans”). Therefore, it appears the Council is not the implementing entity here; it is the city’s responsibility to address the “need” for low- and moderate-income housing.

Because the MLUPA does not explicitly or implicitly state that the Council must address regional need in its guidelines, because calculating “need” is discretionary, and because the Council fulfilled its guideline responsibilities, the Council did not violate the MLUPA when it changed its policy. We conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the district court did not err in applying the law. Therefore, summary judgment is affirmed.

DECISION

The district court erred in holding that the appellants do not have standing. The district court did not err in holding that the appellants lack a cause of action, have no genuine issues of material fact, and are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

      . The Council is a public corporation and a political subdivision of the State of Minnesota. Minn.Stat. § 473.123, subd. 1 (2002).

      . Alliance is a grass-roots coalition of religious, environmental, and social justice organizations who together advocate for Twin Cities reform in land-use, housing, transportation, economic development, and environmental policies. Alliance promotes a comprehensive approach to regional problems through public education, capacity building in local communities, and advocacy for public policy change.

      . CSP is a nonprofit organization based in St. Paul, serving clients and members throughout the metropolitan area. Its mission is to foster and preserve affordable rental housing for its clients and members, particularly people of color. CSP’s activities include helping low-income people find affordable housing in the metropolitan area.

      .MICAH is a nonprofit organization based in Minneapolis, whose members are congregations and housing organizations drawn from a broad range of faith communities in the Twin Cities. MICAH works for the creation of more affordable housing through public education, advocacy, and local community organization.

      . Appellants appeal only as to the Council and not the City of Eagan. The City of Eagan also moved to dismiss and for summary judgment in the district court, and both motions were granted.

      . The parties dispute whether the standing issue arose in the context of a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings because additional affidavits were submitted by appellants. It appears that the district court relied only on the pleadings to support its finding. According to Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir.1990), the submission of affidavits in support of standing should not convert the motion to summary judgment, and therefore raise the bar of appellants' proof obligations at such an early stage of the case. Therefore, the standing issue is analyzed here in the context of a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings.

      . Here, appellants' injuries stem from the cities' failure to provide for sufficient affordable housing. Appellants contend that the cities' actions are directly related to the Council's guidelines because the guidelines encourage the cities to ignore their affordable-housing statutory obligations, thereby satisfying any causation requirement. This is supported through affidavit testimony which states that (1) the Council’s MLUPA guidelines contributed to dramatically lower affordable housing production; (2) as a result of Council guidelines, many cities now disregard MLUPA or no longer believe it to be in effect; (3) Council guidelines that demanded more from cities would lead to more affordable housing development; and (4) the Council's failure to provide guidelines in compliance with MLUPA has both resulted in the production of fewer affordable units and has set in place a process that will exacerbate the housing crisis into the future. Because the causal link bétween the Council’s actions and the . organizations’ inju: ries is evidenced in both the complaint and in the supporting affidavits, sufficient causation has been established to pass the dismissal stage.

      . Appellants do not assert a right of action under the MLUPA because there is no private right of action under MLUPA.

      . The court did not expressly grant or deny the Council's motion for summary judgment in its order. Instead, it acknowledged that the issue need not be reached in light of its other rulings, gave a cursory discussion of Council's argument, and found that the Council "acted within its legal authority and not in an arbitrary or capricious manner." Appellants raise the issue that it is unclear whether the district court actually granted summary judgment. The order states that the memorandum "is part of [the] Order and constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law to the extent required by Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.02." While the court did not expressly grant the Council's motion for summary judgment, it concluded that the Council did not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, thereby ruling on the summary-judgment issue.


author: HARTEN, Judge.

text:
    Gloria Jean JOHNSON, Relator, v. COMMISSIONER OF HEALTH, Respondent.
    No. A03-353.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Dec. 9, 2003.

      Christopher K. Sandberg, Lockridge Grindal Ñauen, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, for relator.
    Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Jennifer Lois Beens Harper, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, for respondent.
    Considered and decided by HARTEN, Presiding Judge, HUDSON, Judge, and CRIPPEN, Judge.

       Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 10.

   OPINION

HARTEN, Judge.

Relator asked respondent to set aside her disqualification from providing direct contact services in her job as an adult-daily-living-services attendant. Respondent refused. Because no written findings demonstrate the application of the factors set out in Minn.Stat. § 245A.04, subd. 3b(b) (2002), we reverse and remand.

FACTS

Relator Gloria Johnson has been employed for over ten years as an-adult-daily-living attendant, and has worked in facilities licensed by respondent Minnesota Department of Health (DH) since 1998. Her employment included providing direct contact services. On 16 January 2003, the Minnesota Department of Human Services notified relator that she was disqualified from performing direct care services because a background study revealed that she had been convicted of second-degree assault. The conviction resulted from an incident ten months earlier, in March 2002, when relator cut her son, age 15, in the leg with a kitchen knife during an altercation. In June 2002, relator had pled guilty and been sentenced to serve four years’ probation.

Because the facilities that employed relator were licensed by DH, relator applied to DH to have her disqualification set aside. DH refused to set the disqualification aside, and relator challenges that refusal.

ISSUE

Must a decision on a reconsideration of disqualifications under MinmStat. § 245A.04, subd. 3b (2002) include written findings on the statutory factors?

DECISION

This court may reverse an administrative decision if it was unsupported by substantial evidence or arbitrary and capricious. In re Excess Surplus Stahis of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., 624 N.W.2d 264, 277 (Minn.2001). However, this court reviews de novo errors of law that arise when an agency decision is based on the meaning of words in a statute. In re Denial of Eller Media Co.’s Applications for Outdoor Adver. Device Permits, 664 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn.2003).

An individual who DH has disqualified may request a reconsideration of the disqualification. MinmStat. § 245A.04, subd. 3b(a) (2002).

The [DH] commissioner may set aside the disqualification [from performing direct care services in licensed facilities] ... if the commissioner finds that the individual does not pose a risk of harm to any person served.... In determining that an individual does not pose a risk of harm, the commissioner shall consider [1] the nature, severity, and consequences of the event or events that lead to disqualification, [2] whether there is more than one disqualifying event, [3] the age and vulnerability of the victim at the time of the event, [4] the harm suffered by the victim, [5] the similarity between the victim and persons served by the program [in which the individual is employed], [6] the time elapsed without a repeat of the same or similar event, [7] documentation of successful completion by the individual studied of training or rehabilitation pertinent to the event, and any other information relevant to reconsideration. In reviewing a disqualification under this section, the commissioner shall give preeminent weight to [8] the safety of each person to be served by the [individual] ... over the interests of the [individual]....

Minn.Stat. § 245A.04, subd. 3b(b) (emphasis added). Consideration of these factors is not discretionary. See MinmStat. § 645.44, subd. 16 (2002) (providing that “ ‘[s]hall’ is mandatory).”

Relator argues that DH was obliged not only to consider the statutory factors but to indicate that they had been considered. We agree. See In re Whitehead, 399 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn.App.1987) (“This absence of explanation [for a decision] prompts us to conclude that the commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously”); Reserve Mining v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 364 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Minn.App.1985) (“an agency decision should normally be supported by written findings and reasons, in more than just a conclusory fashion, ... to be sustained on appeal”), review dismissed (Minn. 10 June 1985).

In refusing to set aside relator’s disqualification, DH relied on three of the eight factors: “ — recency of event; — vulnerability of population to be served;— seriousness of event.” But, although DH told relator that it had “considered all of the information that [she] provided in applying the risk of harm factors,” there is no evidence that DH considered information pertaining to the other five factors.

One factor on which there is no finding is whether there is more than one disqualifying event. Here, only one disqualifying event occurred in the ten years relator worked as an assistant. Another factor without a finding is the age and vulnerability of the victim at the time of the event. Relator’s son was then 15 years old and over six feet tall; relator herself is five feet four inches tall and weighs 133 pounds. A third factor is the harm suffered by the victim. Relator’s son was treated and released after the incident, and a social worker reported that both relator and her son undertook counseling to avoid further altercations. A fourth factor is the similarity between the victim and persons served by the program. There was no similarity: the victim was relator’s healthy teenage son, while the persons she serves are adults who, because of age or illness, need help with daily living. Finally, no finding indicated that the DH considered the “documentation of successful completion ... of training or rehabilitation pertinent to the event.” Relator provided a letter from her probation officer attesting to her completion of the conditions of her probation, i.e., a treatment plan of Child Protection Services, an anger management program, and a psychological evaluation and recommended treatment. Because relator had completed the conditions, Child Protective Services had closed the case. Relator also provided a document from Eastside Neighborhood Services saying that she had attended 23 sessions of the Women’s Educational Series, had missed one session, owed no tuition, and was current on her assignments.

The fact that relator, as an irate mother, injured her grown teenage son during an altercation does not, of itself, demonstrate that she poses a risk to the safety of the elderly and ill people she serves as a healthcare professional. Absent written findings and reasons, and provided only with a conclusory explanation of the application of three of the eight factors, we cannot sustain the refusal to reconsider her disqualification. See Reserve Mining, 364 N.W.2d at 415.

We reverse and remand for written findings and reasons in compliance with Minn. Stat. § 245A.04, subd. 3b(b) and applicable caselaw.

Reversed and remanded.

      . In its brief, DH misreads the statute in explaining its application of the "recency of event” reason given for its decision. DH claims that, when relator’s request was reviewed, "less than eight months had passed since her conviction.” But the relevant date is the date of the event, not the date of its judicial disposition. See Minn.Stat. § 245A.04, subd. 3b(b): "the time elapsed without a repeat of the same or similar event.” The event occurred on 15 March 2002; the commissioner's decision is dated 21 March 2003. Therefore, a year had elapsed.

      . DH argues that this court has upheld disqualifications where not all of the factors were applied but relies on no published Minnesota decision to support that argument.