author: RANDALL, Judge.

text:
    In re the Marriage of Beverly J. McCONNELL, petitioner, Respondent, v. Stanley R. McCONNELL, Jr., Appellant.
    No. A04-2387.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    March 14, 2006.

      Marcia J. Rowland, Chadwick and Mertz, P.S.C., Chanhassen, MN, for appellant.
    Anthony L. Brown, Thomas C. Kayser, Randall M. Tietjen, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.
    Considered and decided by RANDALL, Presiding Judge; PETERSON, Judge; and HUSPENI, Judge.

       Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 10.

   OPINION

RANDALL, Judge.

On appeal from the district court’s award of temporary maintenance, appellant-husband argues that .the record does not support the district court’s findings that husband could become self-supporting and that no evidence of husband’s disability was presented. We reverse and remand.

FACTS

The parties were married in 1987 and divorced in 2004. At the time of dissolution, they had no minor children. Wife was age 42, and husband was age 55.

Wife was employed as a legal secretary earning an annual income of $32,000 working 37.7 hours per week. Wife had previously earned additional income from overtime and part-time jobs. But her ability to work overtime had been diminished by her employer, and she had quit her outside employment to focus on maintaining her position as a legal secretary, which was in jeopardy. The district court imputed income to wife based on a 40-hour work week. The district court found that wife’s reasonable monthly living expenses are $1,543 and that her net monthly income, after deductions for medical and dental insurance and taxes, is $2,142.

Before and during the marriage, husband was employed for 25 years by the Minneapolis Public Housing Authority (MPHA) as a service worker performing maintenance tasks, including lawn mowing, snow plowing, and cleaning and repairing apartments. After husband left his employment with MPHA for health reasons in about 1993, MPHA held his job open until 1996, but he was unable to return. Husband was not employed at the time of dissolution.

The following is undisputed medical evidence that the district court put in its findings:

[Husband] suffers from diabetes, coronary artery disease with myocardial infarctions at the ages of 38 and 39, kidney transplant with end stage renal disease, high blood pressure, cataracts, double below-knee amputations, finger amputations, and complete dentures. He has received social security disability since December 1993. His only source of income is his social security disability payment of $1,265 per month, from which $59 is deducted for supplemental Medicare. His net monthly income is $1,206. Although $258 per month of his benefits are taxable income, he did not owe taxes on this income in 2003.
... This is a 16 1/2 year marriage. Since [husband’s] disability status determination, he has been largely absent from the work force. He is unable to do his previous job as a service worker II for the Minneapolis Public Housing Authority. He has been out of the work force for about ten years. His earning capacity has been permanently diminished by his medical condition and resulting physical disability, not due to absence from the work force due to caretaking of children or home. His lost income has been partially replaced by social security benefits.

Based on husband’s efforts to earn income by attempting various home-based sales businesses and working in a family-owned restaurant, the district court, in the face of its own findings listed above, found that husband was capable of becoming self-supporting “after a short period of re-entry into the work force” and awarded him temporary maintenance of $715 per month for a period of four years.

ISSUE

Did the district court abuse its discretion in awarding husband temporary, rather than permanent, maintenance?

ANALYSIS

A district court’s maintenance award will not be reversed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn.1982). Minn.Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2004), sets forth factors to be considered when determining the amount and duration of a maintenance award. No single factor is dispositive and each case must be determined on its own facts. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d at 39. The basic consideration is the financial need of the spouse receiving the maintenance, and the ability to meet that need balanced against the financial condition of the spouse providing that maintenance. Novick v. Novick, 366 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Minn.App.1985).

Findings of fact concerning spousal maintenance must be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. Gessner v. Gessner, 487 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn.App.1992). Factual findings are clearly erroneous when they are “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Tonka Tours, Inc. v. Chadima, 372 N.W.2d 723, 726 (Minn.1985).

Husband argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that, based on husband’s efforts to earn income through home-based enterprises and part-ownership of a restaurant, husband is capable of working full time and becoming self-supporting. Husband argues that the record does not support the district court’s finding that, based on these past efforts, husband “could work at employment such as a greeter, phone salesperson, customer service representative, cashier, or parking ramp attendant.” We agree. The record does not contain evidence regarding the availability of such jobs; the physical requirements of such jobs; or whether husband could actually perform such jobs with his physical limitations. The finding that husband could become self-supporting by working at such employment is pure spec: ulation and not supported by any evidence in the record. The record shows that, other than earning about $500 spiling prepaid legal services,, husband has not held profitable employment since leaving his job with the MPHA in about 1993 (12 years ago), a job to which he was unable to return because his total disability made him incapable of performing it.

Wife concedes that the district court erred in finding that “[n]o medical records or disability documentation were presented by either party” and that “[t]he social security determination of disability was not in evidence.” The record contains medical records documenting husband’s physical-health problems and disability and a Social Security Administration record stating that husband is disabled. While the social-security disability determination is not “conclusive”" evidence for purposes of determining spousal maintenance, it is reasonable evidence supporting husband’s claim that he -is unable to become self-supporting.

Appellant has the burden of proving his need for spousal maintenance. See Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn.1997) (stating that “[ijmplicit in Minn.Stat. § 518.552 is that- the spouse seeking maintenance must demonstrate the need therefore”). But if uncertainty exists as to a spouse’s future earning potential, then the court must award permanent maintenance. Minn.Stat. § 518.552, subd. 3 (2004); Duffey v. Duffey, 416 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Minn.App.1987), review denied (Minn. Feb. 24, 1988); Musielewicz v. Musielewicz, 400 N.W.2d 100, 104 (Minn.App.1987), review denied (Minn. Mar. 25, 1987).

“[Pjoor health is a proper reason for awarding permanent maintenance.” Safford v. Safford, 391 N.W.2d 548, 550 (Minn.App.1986); see also Lynch v. Lynch, 411 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Minn.App.1987) (affirming a permanent-maintenance award when the parties enjoyed an affluent lifestyle during the marriage and the obligee, a homemaker during the parties’ almost 30-year marriage, was “chronically ill and presently disabled with no clear prognosis for recovery, without professional training or academic credentials, and competitively unemployable”), review denied (Minn. Oct. 30, 1987); Cich v. Cich, 428 N.W.2d 446 (Minn.App.1988); Doherty v. Doherty, 388 N.W.2d 1 (Minn.App.1986) (affirming a permanent-maintenance award when obli-gee submitted medical records that provided the trial court with substantial evidence regarding her health problems and was 55 years old, she had been involved in a long-term marriage, had outmoded job skills, and resided in an area with a limited job market). Appellant’s health is not “poor” — It is nonexistent.

Husband presented sufficient evidence to support an award of permanent, maintenance. While we decline to hold that a permanent award is required as a matter of law, in analyzing “temporary” versus “permanent” maintenance, the district court failed to credit the undisputed evidence documenting husband’s profound debilitating physical health problems and then based the temporary award on speculative findings regarding husband’s ability to become self-supporting.

DECISION

We reverse the temporary maintenance award and remand for reconsideration as to both the amount and duration of maintenance in light of the undisputed evidence documenting husband’s health problems. On remand, the district court may at its discretion reopen the record to take additional evidence on the issue of maintenance.

Reversed and remanded.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CRIPPEN, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. A.C.H., Respondent.
    No. A05-1405.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    March 21, 2006.

      Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, and Doug Johnson, Washington County Attorney, Richard D. Hodsdon, Assistant County Attorney, Stillwater, MN, for appellant.
    Randy V. Thompson, Nolan, MacGregor, Thompson & Leighton, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.
    Considered and decided by MINGE, Presiding Judge, TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge, and CRIPPEN, Judge.
   OPINION

CRIPPEN, Judge.

The state appeals an order granting respondent’s petition to expunge executive-branch records, contending that the proceedings were not decided in favor of respondent. Because the expungement in the circumstances of this case is not permitted by statute or pursuant to the court’s inherent powers, we reverse.

FACTS

In July 2001, respondent A.C.H. and three other young adults stole golf equipment from Tartan Park Golf Course. Approximately two months after the theft, and after they admitted their offense and attempted restitution, the youths were charged with felony theft. Police eventually recovered nearly all the items, and respondent’s share of restitution amounted to $65.65.

Respondent subsequently entered a guilty plea. During the proceedings, when questioned by the prosecutor, respondent replied, “Yes” to the statement that the youths were “stealing” property and acknowledged as “[cjorreet” the statement that he made no claim of innocence. Following the plea and admission, although its validity is evident in the record, the district court announced, “I don’t accept the plea at this point in time.” The court explained that upon respondent’s completion of a diversion program, he would be discharged without a conviction. One year later, after successfully completing the diversion program, the complaint was dismissed.

On respondent’s 2005 petition, the district court granted expungement, citing both statutory authority and the court’s inherent authority.

ISSUE

Is the court permitted to expunge executive-branch records after the defendant has entered a guilty plea and admitted his guilt?

ANALYSIS

The district court has the authority to grant expungement statutorily and through its inherent power. State v. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Minn.2000).

1. Statutory Expungement

Under Minn.Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3 (2004), a petition seeking expungement to seal specific records may be filed “if all pending actions or proceedings were resolved in favor of the petitioner.” This court reviews de novo the question of law whether pending actions or proceedings were resolved in a petitioner’s favor. State v. Davisson, 624 N.W.2d 292, 295 (Minn.App.2001), review denied (Minn. May 15, 2001).

On the one hand, it is well settled under Minnesota law that a stay of prosecution in advance of a plea is resolved in favor of a defendant when the complaint later is dismissed. State v. C.P.H., 707 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Minn.App.2006). On the other hand, dismissal after acceptance of a plea and a finding of guilt, most commonly when imposition of sentencing is stayed, is not a resolution in the defendant’s favor; we have reached this result where a guilty plea was followed by a court finding of guilt but without an actual adjudication of the conviction. Davisson, 624 N.W.2d at 296.

Respondent contends that the cases establish a bright line whereby the matter is resolved in favor of the defendant so long as the court does not uphold the guilty plea, either with announcement of a finding or an adjudication. He argues that this approach, tantamount to applying the statute whenever there is no conviction, upholds the sound public policy of the statute.

Examining the proceedings, it is evident that respondent’s plea and admission provided the court a lawful basis for an adjudication followed by sentencing or a stay of sentencing. And the absence of a court finding or adjudication does nothing to diminish the extent to which respondent made himself subject to the sentencing powers of the court. In the later event of any violation of conditions of the stayed acceptance of the plea, the court remained empowered, without any further steps, to adjudicate and sentence in the case. Because these circumstances substantially resemble those when merely the sentence is stayed, we conclude that proceedings were not resolved in respondent’s favor.

This decision harmonizes with Davisson, where the district court stayed adjudication but after having first made a finding of guilt. Id. at 294. Later, after the matter was dismissed without further adjudication, the district court denied defendant’s request for expungement. Id. Affirming the decision, this court held that the resolution was not in defendant’s favor. Id. at 297. In the immediate case, as in Davisson, the district court stay did not diminish the extent to which the defendant had submitted himself to the powers of the court.

Addressing relevant policy concerns, respondent emphasizes the aim of the statute is to extend a second chance to minor offenders. He asserts that expungement does little harm to law-enforcement records because, even if the records are expunged, law enforcement can access the records through an ex parte court order. We are in no position to act on these policy concerns and thereby disregard precedents such as Davisson; P.A.D., and Froysland in resolving this case.

Finally, respondent argues that there is evidence of legislative intent supporting expungement of his records under Minn. Stat. § 609A.02. Respondent’s rationale dwells on Minn.Stat. § 299C.11, an ex-pungement statute directed at a specific form of recordkeeping. Because the legislature narrowed the scope of that statute, which provides for destruction or return of records, by expressly stating that diversion decisions were not resolved in the defendant’s favor, respondent reasons that the legislature signaled a broader scope for Minn.Stat. § 609A.02, for which this exclusion was not made and which provides for the less-severe remedy of sealing the records. But this reasoning is speculative, unsupported by precedent, and in conflict with both the plain meaning of MinmStat. § 609A.02 and the established practice of using the interpretation of the resolved-in-favor language in MinmStat. § 299C.11 in construing the same clause in Minn.Stat. § 609A.02. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d at 259.

2. Inherent Power

Appellant also argues that the district court erred when it used its inherent power to expunge respondent’s non-judicial records from the executive branch. A district court’s exercise of inherent judicial power to expunge is a matter of equity, which this court reviews under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d at 261.

The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized inherent expungement authority “affecting court records and agents of the court” but has directed that the courts “proceed cautiously in exercising that authority in order to respect the equally unique authority of the executive and legislative branches of government over their constitutionally authorized functions.” State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353, 358-59 (Minn.1981). This court reiterated that “the function of preparing and maintaining criminal records is a unique constitutional function of the executive branch.” State v. Schultz, 676 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Minn.App.2004) (quoting State v. T.M.B., 590 N.W.2d 809, 812 (Minn.App.1999)), review denied (Minn. June 16, 1999).

The Schultz court upheld the determination that a court’s inherent power to expunge non-judicial executive records exists only where there is “evidence of an injustice resulting from an abuse of discretion in the performance of a governmental function.” Id. (citing T.M.B., 590 N.W.2d at 813). Enlarging this observation, the court restated that intrusion into the executive function could occur only when “essential to the existence, dignity, and function of the court,” a circumstance arising “only when a petitioner’s constitutional rights have been violated.” Id.

Respondent argues that P.A.D. announces broader standards than stated in T.M.B. and Schultz. Expressly recognizing this prospective citation of P.A.D., the Schultz court demanded that it “must be read cautiously [and] construed narrowly.” Schultz, 676 N.W.2d at 343.

On the standards last enunciated in Schultz, there is no authority for the district court to expunge the executive-branch records of respondent. Respondent has not shown that his constitutional rights are at stake or that other extraordinary cause requires the court’s exercise of authority over records of the executive branch.

Finally, respondent argues that C.A. implies the district court’s authority to order that records held by the executive branch, which are currently available to the public, be classified non-public, limiting their use to law enforcement needs. This argument, which might more properly be brought under the Data Practices Act, was not presented to the district court and cannot be addressed in this appeal. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (1988).

DECISION

Although the district court did not accept respondent’s guilty plea, respondent pleaded guilty and admitted to committing the crime. In these circumstances, even though the court elected against acting on the plea when it was submitted, the resolution was not in favor of the defendant, and expungement of executive-branch records, therefore, was not authorized.

Reversed.

       Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 10.

      . The state does not dispute the district court's order that respondent’s judicial records be expunged and sealed.

      . See City of St. Paul v. Froysland, 310 Minn. 268, 276, 246 N.W.2d 435, 439 (1976); see also State v. P.A.D., 436 N.W.2d 808, 809-10 (Minn.App.1989) (stating that where a defendant pleaded guilty, the district court stayed the imposition of her sentence, and eventually her conviction was vacated and dismissed, defendant was not entitled to expungement), review denied (Minn. May 12, 1989). Respondent questions the authority of these precedents insofar as they address the similar resolved-in-favor clause stated in Minn.Stat. § 299C.11 (2004), an expungement statute directed to specific records. Respondent speculates, as discussed elsewhere in this opinion, that Minn.Stat. § 299C.11 is viewed more narrowly than Minn.Stat. § 609A.02 because the former statute provides for destruction or return of records, not merely sealing them. But there is no authority for acting on this distinction between these statutes, and the appellate courts, as appellant observes, have found section 299C.11 "instructive in understanding the statutory language set forth in section 609C.02, subd. 3." Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d at 259.

      . Respondent points to State v. M.B.M., 518 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Minn.App.1994), where we addressed the limited application of Minn. Stat. § 299C.11. But M.B.M. upheld sealing under the unique language of Minn.Stat. § 152.18 (2004), which does not rest on the concept of proceedings resolved in favor of the petitioner. Id. M.B.M. does not address Minn.Stat. § 609A.02 and does not suggest an interpretation of this section in a fashion that conflicts with our analysis in this case and in others determining whether a proceeding is resolved in favor of the defendant.


author: KAPSNER, Justice.

text:
    2006 ND 41
    STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Ronald Rudolph ERNST, Defendant and Appellant.
    No. 20050395.
    Supreme Court of North Dakota.
    Feb. 23, 2006.
    Trent W. Mahler (on brief), Assistant State’s Attorney, Courthouse, Fargo, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.
    Ronald R. Ernst (on brief), pro se, Bismarck, ND, defendant and appellant.
   KAPSNER, Justice.

[¶ 1] Ronald R. Ernst appeals from an order denying his motion to reverse his conviction. We affirm.

[¶ 2] Ernst pled guilty to indecent exposure and was sentenced to twelve months in prison. While in prison, Ernst filed grievances and verbal complaints with the State Penitentiary about female prison guards watching him shower naked. He then filed a motion in the district court claiming that the State should be “es-topped from complaining of my conduct when they authorize and condone peeping tomettes [female prison guards].” The State requested the motion be denied because it presented no new evidence and because Ernst had previously filed numerous post-conviction relief actions. The court interpreted Ernst’s motion as an attempt to withdraw his guilty plea and found Ernst failed to show the withdrawal of his guilty plea was necessary to prevent a manifest injustice. On appeal, Ernst argues the writ of audita querela supports a reversal of his conviction. The State argues the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ernst’s motion and that the writ of audita querela is not applicable to this case.

[¶ 3] Black’s Law Dictionary defines audita querela as a “writ available to a judgment debtor who seeks a rehearing of a matter on grounds of newly discovered evidence or newly existing legal defenses.” Black’s Law Dictionary 141 (8th ed.2004). Literally, audita querela means “the complaint having been heard.” Id. In civil cases, the writ of audita querela has been abolished by N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b). As early as 1768, William Blackstone noted that the ancient common law writ of audita querela was “quite out of practice” and was “rendered useless.” William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries *405-06. In a limited number of criminal and immigration cases in the federal courts, the writ of audita que-rela is available provided a defendant can show “a legal, as contrasted with an equitable, objection to a conviction that has arisen subsequent to the conviction and is not redressable pursuant to another post-conviction remedy.” 7 Am.Jur.2d Audita Querela § 4 (1997); see also Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Availability and Appropriateness of Audita Querela Relief in Connection with Immigration and Naturalization Proceedings, 105 A.L.R. Fed. 880 (1991). Post-conviction relief in this state is governed by the Uniform PosU Conviction Procedure Act. See N.D.C.C. ch. 29-32.1. Correction or reduction of sentence is governed by N.D.R.Crim.P. 35.

[¶ 4] Ernst has not provided a legal objection to his conviction or sentence. Ernst’s complaint regarding female prison guards watching him shower does not support his position. See Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1209, 111 S.Ct. 2807, 115 L.Ed.2d 979 (1991) (concluding that opposite-sex surveillance of male inmates is constitutionally permissible because minimal intrusions on prisoner’s privacy were outweighed by institutional concerns for safety and equal employment opportunity). Ernst cites Ejelonu v. INS, 355 F.3d 539, 547 (6th Cir.2004) for the proposition that an equitable reason to vacate a judgment is sufficient for the issuance of a writ of audita querela. Ejelonu v. INS has since been vacated by Ejelonu v. INS, No. 01-3928, 2004 U.S.App. LEXIS 15581 (6th Cir. July 27, 2004); see also Deleon v. Gonazales, No. 05-1469, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12060, at *8-10 (E.D.Pa. May 16, 2005) (acknowledging the Ejelonu decision, but expressing doubt that the writ of audi-ta querela could be based upon purely equitable circumstances).

[¶ 5] Ernst has not established any basis for relief under our post-conviction relief , statute or under N.D.R.Crim.P. 35.

[¶ 6] We affirm.

[¶ 7] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, C.J., DALE V. SANDSTROM, DANIEL J. CROTHERS, and MARY MUEHLEN MARING, JJ., concur.


author: LARSON, Justice.

text:
    IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD, Complainant, v. Richard E. MUNDY, Respondent.
    No. 05-1858.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    March 3, 2006.
    Charles L. Harrington and Laura M. Roan, Des Moines, for complainant.
    Frank J. Nidey of Nidey Peterson Er-dahl & Tindal, PLC, Cedar Rapids, for respondent.
   LARSON, Justice.

Richard E. Mundy was charged by our attorney disciplinary board in a two-count complaint with violating our Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. On our review of the recommendations and findings of the Grievance Commission, we order that Mundy’s license be suspended for at least three months.

I. Facts.

The board and Mundy entered into an agreement under which they stipulated to all underlying facts, waived a hearing before the Grievance Commission, and agreed to a three-month suspension. The respondent was sixty-two at the time of the commission proceedings and has practiced law since 1970. Mundy is suffering from deepening depression, and according to his agreed statement of facts, “[bjecause of his medical condition Respondent is not currently fit to practice law.”

II. The Complaint.

A. Neglect of a client’s matter. The board charged, in Count I, that Mun-dy was guilty of neglect of a client’s matter. In June 2000 Joel Kroon hired Mun-dy to file a dissolution petition on his behalf, which Mundy did the following month. Shortly thereafter, Kroon moved to Florida, and Mundy’s representation began to deteriorate. Mundy failed to comply with court orders in connection with discovery and mediation. He also failed to notify Kroon, during his representation of him, that he had been placed under suspension by this court for failing to file his annual commission reports. The record does not show why Mundy failed to meet these responsibilities, but it would be reasonable to assume it was a result of his depression.

In April 2002 the court entered a dissolution decree. As a part of the decree, Mundy was ordered to pay Kroon’s ex-wife her share of the marital assets and attorney fees from his trust account. Mundy failed to do so, and on August 1, 2002, Kroon was cited for contempt of court. For several months prior to this, Kroon had attempted to reach Mundy, but Mun-dy did not return telephone calls or respond to Kroon’s correspondence. The funds were ultimately paid by the respondent, but not until these grievance proceedings had been commenced by his unhappy dissolution client, Joel Kroon.

The Kroon complaint was filed with the board on August 15, 2002. On August 20 the board mailed a notice of the complaint to Mundy. Mundy acknowledged receipt of the certified letter on August 23, but he did not respond. On September 17 and November 14, 2002, the board mailed second and third notices. Mundy still did not respond.

B. The insufficient-funds checks. The board charged, in Count II, that Mun-dy had written insufficient-funds checks to our client security and continuing legal education commissions and had failed to make the checks good.

III.The Commission Report.

As to Count I, the commission found that Mundy had violated DR 1-102(A)(1) (violation of disciplinary rule), DR 1-102(A)(5) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), DR 1-102(A)(6) (conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law), DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglect of client’s legal matter), DR 7-101(A)(l) (failure to seek lawful objectives of a client), DR 7-101(A)(2) (failure to carry out contract of employment), DR 7-101(A)(3) (prejudice or damage to client during course of representation), DR 7-102(A)(8) (knowingly engaging in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a disciplinary rule), and DR 9-102(B)(4) (failing to promptly pay or deliver funds, securities, or other properties in lawyer’s possession).

As to Count II, involving the insufficient-funds checks, the commission found that Mundy’s actions violated DR 1-102(A)(1), DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), as well as DR 1-102(A)(5) and DR 1-102(A)(6).

The commission recommended that Mundy’s license be suspended for three months. Further, as a requirement of readmission he should be required to show his fitness to practice law by including evidence from all health-care professionals who had treated him concerning his depression. The commission also recommended that Mundy be ordered to make restitution to the client security and continuing legal education commissions for the insufficient-funds cheeks.

In Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Moorman, 683 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa 2004), we noted that when the neglect of a client’s legal matter is the primary infraction, discipline generally ranges from a public reprimand to a six-month suspension.

In determining the sanction to be imposed here, we consider the stipulation of the parties, which established that Mundy suffers from severe depression and is presently not practicing law. We also consider other cases involving lawyers with depression. In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Maxwell, 705 N.W.2d 477, 480 (Iowa 2005), we stated that depression does not minimize the seriousness of an attorney’s unethical conduct, but it is to be considered in the imposition of discipline. In Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Grotewold, 642 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Iowa 2002), we imposed a sixty-day suspension in a case involving a lawyer suffering from depression who neglected client matters, misrepresented a matter to the court, and failed to respond to the board. In Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Adams, 623 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa 2001), a lawyer suffering from depression had neglected legal matters, failed to deposit a retainer and advances into trust accounts, failed to account for client property, and misrepresented to the client to cover up neglect. We ordered a minimum three-month suspension, noting that the attorney was suffering from depression. In Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Sherman, 637 N.W.2d 183, 188 (Iowa 2001), the attorney had committed previous violations and was suffering from depression. We suspended his license for a minimum of three months and required that, upon application for reinstatement, he provide medical proof that he is mentally fit to resume the practice of law. In Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Paulos, 410 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Iowa 1987), we ordered a lawyer’s license suspended for a minimum of six months. We required that upon application for reinstatement the attorney include “satisfactory evidence that [he] is no longer suffering from any physical or emotional illness that would interfere with the timely completion of legal business entrusted to him.”

Based on the parties’ stipulation, including Mundy’s admission that he is currently under suspension in connection with his failure to effectively file his annual reports and that he is not psychologically fit to practice law at the present time, we believe that suspension is warranted. We agree with the commission that Mundy violated the disciplinary rules as set out above. Mundy and the board stipulated that a set three-month suspension is warranted, but we believe this should be a minimum. We therefore suspend his license for a minimum period of three months from the date of the filing of this opinion. This suspension shall apply to all facets of the practice of law. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.12(3). Upon any application for reinstatement, Mundy shall establish that he has not practiced law during the period of his suspension, that he meets all the requirements of Iowa Court Rule 35.13, that he has paid the costs of this proceeding, and that he has made restitution to the client security trust fund and the commission on continuing legal education for all sums owed to them. He shall also demonstrate by competent medical evidence that he is psychologically and mentally capable of practicing law.

LICENSE SUSPENDED.

      . In addition to the facts stipulated to by the parties, other facts in the board's complaint are deemed admitted by Mundy's failure to answer the board’s complaint. See Iowa Ct. R. 36.7.


author: CADY, Justice.

text:
    FJORDS NORTH, INC., Appellant, v. Randy HAHN, Susan Hahn and H & H Homebuilders, Appellees.
    No. 04-0564.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    March 10, 2006.

      Daniel DenBeste and Robert M. Hogg of Elderkin & Pirnie, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
    Michael J. Pitton of Martinek & Pitton, Iowa City, for appellees.
   CADY, Justice.

This case stems from a dispute between a real estate developer and an owner of a lot in its development over the construction of a house claimed to be in violation of restrictive covenants recorded by the developer in 1980. The developer brought an action to enjoin the homeowner’s construction. The homeowner moved for summary judgment, claiming the applicable limitation period to bring the action had expired. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in the homeowner’s favor. The developer appeals.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Fjords North, Inc. is the developer of a subdivision near North Liberty, Iowa named Fjords North Addition. H&H Home Builders, Inc., a corporation partially owned by Randy and Susan Hahn, is the owner of lot 52 in the Fjords North Addition.

Fjords North filed a set of restrictive covenants for the development on March 26, 1980 with the Johnson County recorder. One of the covenants provided:

No building shall be erected on any lot unless the design and location is in harmony with existing structures and locations. Plans and specifications of proposed houses and their locations on the site shall be submitted to Fjords North, Inc., the developer, for its written approval before commencement of construction. This restriction is to apply to all future home owners in this area. In any case no dwelling shall be permitted on any lot described herein having total living area of less than 2,000 square feet.

The covenants further stated:

[Tjhese covenants are to run with the land and shall be binding upon all of the parties and all persons claiming under them for ten (10) years, at which time said covenants shall automatically be extended for successive periods of ten (10) years unless by vote of the majority of the owners of the lots it is agreed to change said covenants in whole or in part.

The first lot in the development was sold by deed recorded on April 2, 1980, and the developer has been selling other lots since that time.

On March 22, 2001, Mark Pattison, an officer of the Fjords North Homeowners’ Association, filed a document with the Johnson County recorder entitled “Claim to Extend Use Restrictions Pursuant to § 614.24 of the Iowa Code.” The claim indicated it was filed for the purpose of extending the time to bring an action to enforce the use restrictions for the development an additional twenty-one years. See Iowa Code § 614.24 (2001) (“No action based on any claim arising or existing by reason of the provisions of any ... contract ... reserving or providing for ... use restrictions in and to the land therein described shall be maintained either at law or in equity ... after twenty-one years from the recording of such ... contract ... unless the claimant shall ... file a •verified claim with the recorder of the county wherein said real estate is located within said twenty-one year period.”). It further stated that Pattison held a present fee simple interest in lot 51 of the development, platted and recorded in book 19, page 67 of the Johnson County plat records, and that the use restrictions were set forth in restrictive covenants dated January 31, 1980 and recorded March 26, 1980 in book 570, page 14.

On December 29, 2002, Randy Hahn submitted plans for a house he planned to build on lot 52 to the Homeowners’ Association for approval. After Hahn failed to receive a prompt response to the plans from the Homeowners’ Association, he began construction on January 7, 2003 by digging and pouring the foundation for the house. The association then objected to Hahn’s plans and opined that the proposed home was not in harmony with the existing homes in the development, in violation of the restrictive covenants. The Association, through its attorney, demanded that Hahn cease construction. Hahn continued to build the house.

On January 21, 2003, Fjords North filed a petition in district court seeking damages and temporary and permanent in-junctive relief. The Hahns answered the petition. They asserted they complied with the covenants, Fjords North unreasonably failed to timely approve their plans, and the covenants had expired. The court held a hearing on Fjords North’s application for a temporary injunction on March 19. On March 20, the court denied the application on three grounds. The court found no evidence that Fjords North would be irreparably harmed if construction continued, no evidence that other remedies were inadequate, and no likelihood that Fjords North would succeed on the merits.

The Hahns then moved for summary judgment. They asserted the verified claim filed by Pattison failed to comply with the statutory requirement that a claim to extend the time to file an action set forth the “time and manner” in which the claimant’s interest was acquired. They pointed out the claim only identified the date the subdivision’s original restrictive covenants were recorded, without further describing the time and manner that Pattison’s interest in the restrictive covenants was acquired.

Fjords North resisted the summary judgment motion on three alternative grounds. First, it argued that the “time and manner” requirement did not apply to claims filed after July 4, 1966. Second, it asserted the claim substantially complied with the “time and manner” requirement. Third, it argued that the notice should be reformed to cure any defects. The district court granted summary judgment, and Fjords North appealed.

II. Standard of Review

The standard of review for rulings granting summary judgment is well known:

“We review a ruling on a motion for summary judgment for correction of errors at law. ‘A motion for summary judgment should only be granted if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, ’he pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ”

Otterberg v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 696 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Iowa 2005) (citations omitted).

III. Discussion

Iowa Code section 614.24, also known as the Stale Uses and Reversions Act (SURA), provides, in relevant part:

No action based on any claim arising or existing by reason of the provisions of any deed or conveyance or contract or will reserving or providing for any reversion, reverted interests or use restrictions in and to the land therein described shall be maintained either at law or in equity in any court ... after twenty-one years from the recording of such deed of conveyance or contract or after twenty-one years from the admission of said will to probate unless the claimant shall, personally, or by the claimant’s attorney or agent, ... file a verified claim with the recorder of the county wherein said real estate is located within said twenty-one year period. In the event said deed was recorded or the will was admitted to probate more than twenty years prior to July 4, 1965, then said claim may be filed on or before one year after July 4, 1965. Such claims shall set forth the nature thereof, also the time and manner in which such interest was acquired.

Iowa Code § 614.24. If a claim is properly filed, it extends or preserves the time to bring an action on the claim for an additional twenty-one years. See id. § 614.25 (“The filing of such claim shall extend for a further period of twenty-one years the time within which such action may be brought by any person entitled thereto, and successive claims for further like extensions may be filed.” (Emphasis added.)). We have said the purpose of this statute was to simplify land transfers in Iowa by shortening the title-search period for these types of claims. Compiano v. Kuntz, 226 N.W.2d 245, 248 (Iowa 1975); Presbytery of Se. Iowa v. Harris, 226 N.W.2d 232, 235 (Iowa 1975). Yet, the statute allows interested persons to keep stale reversionary and use restrictions alive if they desire. See H.F. 115, 61st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 1965). The statute is to be applied liberally to further its purposes. Calamus Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Rusch, 299 N.W.2d 489, 490 (Iowa 1980).

Restrictive covenants are contracts. Compiano, 226 N.W.2d at 249; 20 Am.Jur.2d Covenants, Etc. § 149, at 668 (2005). Consequently, they are covered by section 614.24. As one commentator explained,

Covenants, especially neighborhood planning covenants, generating proprietary rights in equity frequently outlive their utility and if unlimited as to time, become mere clogs on title. Such interests are ordinarily beneficial either to the land affected or to adjacent lands, facilitating the highest and best use, when created, and may remain beneficial for more than a century.... Limitations on land use running in perpetuity may well become not only clogs on title, but clogs on alienation and utilization of land.

Arthur E. Ryman, Jr., The Iowa “Stale Uses and Reversions Statute”: Parameters and Constitutional Limitations, 19 Drake L.Rev. 56, 60-61 (1969).

We begin our analysis of the issues on appeal by examining the statute. The complete statute is written in two paragraphs, but only the first paragraph is relevant to this appeal. The first sentence of this paragraph sets forth the objective and scope of the statute. See Iowa Code § 614.24, para. 1 (“No action based upon any claim arising or existing by reason of the provisions of any deed or conveyance or contract or will reserving or providing for any reversion, reverted interests or use restrictions in and to the land therein described shall be maintained either at law or in equity in any court to recover real estate in this state or to recover or establish any interest therein or claim thereto, legal or equitable, against the holder of the record title to such real estate in possession after twenty-one years from the recording of such deed of conveyance or contract or after twenty-one years from the admission of said will to probate unless the claimant shall, personally, or by the claimant’s attorney or agent, or if the claimant is a minor or under legal disability, by the claimant’s guardian, trustee, or either parent or next friend, shall file a verified claim with the recorder of the county wherein said real estate is located within said twenty-one year period.”). It declares that actions based on claims arising from a reversion interest, reverted interest, or use restriction contained in any deed, conveyance, contract, or will may not be brought after twenty-one years from the recording of the deed, conveyance, or contract, or the admission of the will into probate, unless the claimant files a verified claim with the county recorder within the twenty-one-year period. Id. Thus, the statute applies to claims based on three types of provisions (reversion interests, reverted interests, and use restrictions) contained in one of four types of instruments (deed, conveyance, contract, or will). Id.

■ The second sentence of the first paragraph contains a retroactivity provision. See id. (“In the event said deed was recorded or will was admitted to probate more than twenty years prior to July 4, 1965, then said claim may be filed on or before one year after July 4, 1965.”). The statute was enacted in 1965 and became effective July 4 of that year. 1965 Iowa Acts ch. 428, § 1; see Iowa Const, art. Ill § 26 (1965) (stating default effective date for statutes is July 4); see also 1965 Iowa Acts ch. 480 (amending constitution to change default effective date from July 4 to July 1; submitting amendment for voter approval in 1966 election). Without a ret-roactivity provision, existing claims beyond the limitation period would be precluded. However, the legislature specifically made the statute applicable to claims to extend actions based on instruments recorded or admitted into probate more than twenty years prior to July 4, 1965 and gave persons claiming an interest based on these instruments one year after the effective date of the statute to file their claims with the county recorder.

The third sentence of the first paragraph describes the requirements of a verified claim. See Iowa Code § 614.24, para. 1 (“Such claims shall set forth the nature thereof, also the time and manner in which such interest was acquired.”). It provides that the claims must set forth the “nature thereof, also the time and manner in which such interest was acquired.” Id.

The last two sentences of the first paragraph set forth who may be a claimant. See id. (“For the purposes of this section, the claimant shall be any person or persons claiming any interest in and to said land or in and to such reversion, reverter interest or use restriction, whether the same is a present interest or an interest which would come into existence if the happening or contingency provided in said deed or will were to happen at once. Said claimant further shall include any member of a class of persons entitled to or claiming such rights or interests.”). The claimant must be a person who has a present interest or future interest in the land or in the reversion, reverted interest, or use restriction, and includes any member of a class claiming such an interest. Id.

The primary argument by Fjords North is that the third sentence — describing the requirements for what must be included in a verified claim — only applies to claims described in the second sentence, the ret-roactivity provision. Fjords North relies on the following language contained in the second and third parts of the statute:

In the event said deed was recorded ... more than twenty years prior to July 4, 1965, then said claim may be filed on or before one year after July 4, 1965. Such claims shall set forth the nature thereof, also the time and manner in which such interest was acquired.

Id. Fjords North argues that the phrase “[s]uch claims” means the requirements set forth in that sentence only apply to claims referred to in the preceding sentence — i.e., claims based on deeds recorded before July 4, 1945. Fjords North relies on the last-antecedent rule to support this argument. It postulates the legislature wanted to' impose specific requirements only to help identify ancient claims under the retroactivity provision that may have been recorded prior to the modern recording system.

Under the last-antecedent rule, “[rjefer-ential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intent appears, refer solely to the last antecedent.” 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:33, at 369 (6th ed.2000) [hereinafter Singer]; accord Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Shell Oil Co., 606 N.W.2d 376, 380 (Iowa 2000) (“Under the doctrine of last preceding antecedent, qualifying words and phrases refer only to the immediately preceding antecedent, unless a contrary legislative intent appears.” (citing State of Iowa ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 448 N.W.2d 335, 345 (Iowa 1989))). Moreover, it has been held that use of the word “such” normally shows the legislature intended to limit the clause to the last antecedent subject. See People v. Clark, 10 Cal.App.4th 1259, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 209, 212-13 (1992) (“ ‘Such’ is used in statutes to make clear that the second reference is to exactly the same concept mentioned previously.” (citing People v. Jones, 46 Cal.3d 585, 250 Cal.Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165 (1988))); Eagle Hill Corp. v. Comm’n on Hosps. & Health Care, 2 Conn.App. 68, 477 A.2d 660, 665 (1984) (“The use of the word ‘such’ in grammatical usage refers to the last antecedent.” (citing LaProvidenza v. State Employees’ Ret. Comm’n, 178 Conn. 23, 420 A.2d 905 (1979))); In re De Lescaille’s Estate, 187 N.W.2d 741, 744 (Iowa 1971) (“The word ‘such’ ordinarily refers back to the last antecedent.” (citing United States v. Legg, 157 F.2d 990, 992 (4th Cir.1946); In re Wallace’s Estate, 98 Cal.App.2d 285, 219 P.2d 910 (1950))); McArtor v. State, 699 P.2d 288, 290 (Wyo.1985) (“The accepted rule of construction is that ‘such’ refers to the character of that which immediately precedes it unless a contrary legislative intent is evidenced.” (Citations omitted.)).

However, the last-antecedent rule is not inflexible, and it does not apply where the entire act reveals that the qualifying sentence applies to several preceding subjects. Singer § 47:33, at 372. Ultimately, we look to the intent of our legislature.

When the statute in this case is read in context, it is obvious that the nature-, time-, and manner-of-the-claim requirements apply to all claims, not just those claims covered under the retroactivity provision. The statute first declares that stale claims can be extended by filing a verified claim within the twenty-one-year period, and then it declares that claims otherwise extinguished because they predated the effective date of the statute by more than twenty years can be extended through the retroactivity provision. Iowa Code § 614.24. Thus, the statute addresses the two circumstances when claims can be extended. After these two circumstances are described, the statute then describes the necessary contents of the verified claims to extend by referring to “[s]uch claims” in the plural. Id. This approach, and the plural use of the word “claims,” reveals that the claim requirements set forth in the third sentence of the statute apply to the two circumstances just described, not merely the most immediate circumstance. Thus, the language of the statute supports the conclusion that all verified claims must meet the requirements imposed by the third sentence of the statute. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe the legislature had heightened concerns about ancient deeds or the past recording system. It is obvious that the statute sought to require some minimal content in verified claims so that all claims sought to be extended could be properly identified.

Fjords North next argues that the claim filed in this case adequately complied with the statutory requirements for a claim. Ultimately, it asserts that the statute only requires substantial compliance with the statutory terms.

Before we address the substantial-compliance argument, it is necessary to step back and identify the information required to be contained in a verified claim filed under the statute. The district court and the parties viewed the statute to require the verified claim to describe the nature of the underlying claim and the time and manner in which the claimant’s interest was acquired.

The relevant language of the statute at the heart of this case provides: “Such claims shall set forth the nature thereof, also the time and manner in which interest was acquired.” Id. (emphasis added). We have already determined that the phrase “[s]uch claims” refers to all verified claims to extend the time to file an action. The statute then proceeds to identify the three essential components of a verified claim in terms of nature, time, and manner. We will consider each component in turn.

In describing the first requirement of a verified claim, the legislature used the phrase “the nature thereof.” Having determined that the immediately preceding phrase “[s]uch claims” refers to verified claims to extend, the phrase “the nature thereof’ that follows can only refer to the nature of the claim sought to be preserved by the claimant. As previously indicated, the first part of the statute makes it clear that it only applies to actions based on claims arising from “provisions” in various instruments that reserve or provide “for any reversion, reverted interests or use restrictions.” Id. Thus, “the nature” of a claim refers to one of the three types of interests — a reversionary interest, a reverted interest, or an interest in a use restriction — the statute permits to be extended. A claimant satisfies the nature-of-the-claim requirement by describing which of the three interests is sought to be preserved. In this case, the statutory interest sought to be preserved is a use restriction.

The second and third components involve the “time and manner in which such interest was acquired.” This language presents a more difficult analysis. In interpreting these requirements, we begin with the phrase “such interest.” Consistent with the statute as a whole, the legislature used the word “such” to refer to the “interest” just mentioned in the first component. This means the “time and manner” components relate to the acquisition of the reversionary interest, reverted interest, or the interest in a use restriction required to be identified by the first component. However, the parties and the district court read the phrase “was acquired” that follows to mean the second and third components require the claimant to set forth the time and manner in which the claimant’s interest was acquired. We think this view fails to consider the purpose of the statute and means the claimant would be required to disclose information largely irrelevant to the statutory scheme. We seek to interpret statutes consistently with their language and purpose, and avoid interpretations that are unreasonable. Albrecht v. Gen. Motors Corp., 648 N.W.2d 87, 89 (Iowa 2002).

Generally, the “time and manner” in which a claimant acquired one of the three types of interests governed by the statute is not relevant to the statutory scheme. The fourth part of the statute requires the claimant to have an interest in the claim at the time the verified claim is filed, but the relevant time under the statutory scheme to limit or extend claims is based on the time the instrument containing the particular interest is either recorded or admitted to probate. See Iowa Code § 614.24. These events start the twenty-one-year limitation period in which to bring an action or to file a claim to extend a limitation. Thus, the date the claimant acquired the interest is inconsistent with a limitation and preservation scheme geared from the date an instrument containing the interest was recorded. For example, an interest arising from a deed is acquired when the deed is executed, which may or may not be the date of recording. See 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds § 270, at 252 (2002) (“[A]n interest in real property is legally and effectively transferred by the delivery of a deed or other document of conveyance even if the document is not recorded.”). Similarly, an interest in a will is acquired at the moment of death of the testator, not the time the will is admitted into probate. See In re Estate of Micheel, 577 N.W.2d 407, 410 (Iowa 1998) (“A will is ambulatory in the sense that it speaks from and takes effect on the date of testator’s death.” (Citations omitted.)). Moreover, the date a person acquires an interest in a restrictive covenant to a subdivision may have little relationship to the time when the restrictive covenant was first recorded. See Compiano, 226 N.W.2d at 248 (stating that in the case of “a restricting instrument on several lots ..., followed by deeds to the lots,” promises in the covenants “do not arise until the first deed is given”). This case is a good example. Pattison acquired his interest in the covenant some time after it was recorded when he obtained a deed to a lot in the subdivision, but the twenty-one-year limitation period for the restrictive covenant began in 1980. Thus, these examples show that the date of acquisition of the interest sought to be extended can have little relationship to the scheme provided by the statute to extend the interest. Our legislature would not have required a claim to extend time to bring an action arising from a particular interest to provide information that is largely irrelevant and confusing to the statutory scheme. See State v. Petithory, 702 N.W.2d 854, 859 (Iowa 2005) (stating we interpret statutes in a commonsense manner and avoid absurd results (citing State v. Anderson, 636 N.W.2d 26, 35 (Iowa 2001); Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 520 (Iowa 2003)).

Instead, we think the words “was acquired” within the phrase “the time and manner in which the interest was acquired” relate to the acquisition of one of the three interests reserved or provided for in one of the four instruments. In other words, the “time and manner” requirement seeks to identify the deed, conveyance, contract, or will wherein the particular interest sought to be extended— reversionary interest, reverted interest, or use restriction — was acquired in the abstract sense, not when the particular claimant acquired his or her interest. The second and third components of the statute must be read in this light.

Therefore, the “manner in which such interest was acquired” requires the claimant to identify one of the four instruments covered under the statute containing the relevant interest sought to be extended. Iowa Code § 614.24. Likewise, the “time ... in which such interest was acquired” requires the claimant to identify the time the particular instrument was recorded. Id. Moreover, the “was acquired” phrase in this time component only relates to the acquisition of the particular interest within a particular instrument. The phrase itself does not impose a time element. The element of time is covered under the “time and manner” phrase, and requires the claimant not only to identify the particular deed, conveyance, contract, or will containing the reversionary interest, reverted interest, or use restriction (manner the interest was acquired) but also the time when the deed, conveyance, contract or will was recorded or admitted into probate. Id.

In summary, a claimant with an interest, as defined in the statute, may extend the time to file an action based on a reversion-ary interest, reverted interest, or use restriction by filing a verified claim within twenty-one years from the date the deed, conveyance, contract, or will providing for the reversionary, reverted, or use-restriction interest was recorded or admitted to probate. The verified claim must set forth the nature of the interest (identify whether it is a reversionary, reverted, or use-restriction interest), the manner the interest was acquired (identify the deed, conveyance, contract, or will) and the time the deed, conveyance, or contract was recorded or if acquired by will, the time the will was probated.

Under either a strict-compliance or substantial-compliance standard, the verified claim filed by Pattison satisfied the statute. The claim identified a use restriction as the claim sought to be extended. It also identified the restrictive covenants containing the restriction, by book and page, as well as the date it was recorded. We recognize that section 614.24 is not necessarily applicable to restrictive covenants at the time they are recorded. Compiano, 226 N.W.2d at 248. However, our view of when the statute applies to restrictive covenants does not affect what our legislature may require to be contained in a verified claim to extend the time to bring actions on restrictive covenants. The legislature has simply deemed it important for a claim to extend the limitation period to identify the actual document containing the restrictions.

IV. Conclusion

We conclude the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the Hahns. The claim filed by Pattison complied with the statute. We reverse the decision of the district court and remand the case for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . The full text of the statute continues as follows:
      No action based upon any claim arising or existing by reason of the provisions of any deed or conveyance or contract or will reserving or providing for any reversion, reverted interests or use restrictions in and to the land therein described shall be maintained either at law or in equity in any court to recover real estate in this state or to recover or establish any interest therein or claim thereto, legal or equitable, against the holder of the record title to such real estate in possession after twenty-one years from the recording of such deed of conveyance or contract or after twenty-one years from the admission of said will to probate unless the claimant shall, personally, or by the claimant's attorney or agent, or if the claimant is a minor or under legal disability, by the claimant's guardian, trustee, or either parent or next friend, shall file a verified claim with the recorder of the county wherein said real estate is located within said twenty-one year period. In the event said deed was recorded or will was admitted to probate more than twenty years prior to July 4, 1965, then said claim may be filed on or before one year after July 4, 1965. Such claims shall set forth the nature thereof, also the time and manner in which such interest was acquired. For the purposes of this section, the claimant shall be any person or persons claiming any interest in and to said land or in and to such reversion, reverter interest or use restriction, whether the same is a present interest or an interest which would come into existence if the happening or contingency provided in said deed or will were to happen at once. Said' claimant further shall include any member of a class of persons entitled to or claiming such rights or interests.
      The provisions of this section requiring the filing of a verified claim shall not apply to the reversion of railroad property if the reversion is caused by the property being abandoned for railway purposes and the abandonment occurs after July 1, 1980. The holder of such a reversionary interest may bring an action based upon the interest regardless of whether a verified claim has been filed under this section at any time after July 4, 1965.
      Iowa Code § 614.24. Close examination of the statute reveals two inconsistencies. First, while the first sentence of the statute refers to "reverted interests/' the fourth sentence refers to "reverter interest.” Id. Second, while the statute refers to "deed or conveyance or contract or will,” later in the same sentence, it refers to "deed of conveyance or contract.” Throughout this opinion, we will use the words of the statute as it is written, although we suspect these inconsistencies are likely the result of a scrivener's error that has remained on the books since the statute was enacted over forty years ago.

      . The second paragraph of the statute excludes certain reversionary interests in railroad property. See id., para. 2 ("The provisions of this section requiring the filing of a verified claim shall not apply to the reversion of railroad property if the reversion is caused by the property being abandoned for railway purposes and the abandonment occurs after July 1, 1980. The holder of such a reversion-ary interest may bring an action based upon the interest regardless of whether a verified claim has been filed under this section at any time after July 4, 1965.”).


author: STREIT, Justice.

text:
    Julie M. BOYLE, Appellant, v. ALUM-LINE, INC., Appellee.
    No. 04-0677.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    March 10, 2006.

      Karl G. Knudson of Knudson Law Office, Decorah, Mark B. Anderson, Cresco, and James P. Moriarty of Moriarty Law Offices, P.C., Cresco, for appellant.
    Donald H. Gloe of Miller, Pearson, Gloe, Burns, Beatty, Cowie & Shidler, P.L.C., Decorah, for appellee.
   STREIT, Justice.

A welder claims she was sexually harassed by her fellow workers who could not get past her gender. Julie Boyle appeals the adverse verdicts in her sexual discrimination and retaliatory discharge claims brought under federal and state civil rights acts. Boyle contends the district court erred in three ways: (1) by denying her Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) hostile-work-environment claim for sexual harassment in the workplace without determining and applying the proper standard of proof, (2) by improperly instructing the jury on the effect her “at-will” employment had on her employer’s ability to terminate her employment, and (3) by denying her ICRA claim for retaliatory discharge without making any factual findings. Because we find there was not substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision regarding the ICRA hostile-work-environment claim, the jury instruction was improper, and the court failed to apply a correct legal analysis to the retaliatory discharge claim, we reverse and remand with instructions for further proceedings.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

Alum-Line, Inc. hired Boyle in August of 2001 to work as a welder. Alum-Line is an Iowa corporation with three plants engaged in the manufacture of trailers and related items. Boyle worked briefly at one plant, but was transferred two months later to a different plant. Boyle was the only female worker in the second plant. Her foreman’s name was Wayne Hansmeier. Hansmeier was supervised by the plant manager, Chris Orr. Boyle and Han-smeier worked on the production floor, while Orr worked in an office overlooking the production floor. Orr’s supervisor was Gary Gooder, the president of Alum-Line.

Boyle claims she was subjected to numerous incidences of sexual harassment while working at this plant. She claims she was routinely subjected to pornographic and demeaning images of women — some of which depicted women performing sexual acts with beer cans and animals. Many times, when she laid on her back to work underneath a trailer, one coworker would yell comments about her being in a “promotable position.” Also, a fellow coworker once shined a flashlight on her chest and said “I can warm those for you.” Boyle claims she reported the flashlight incident to Orr, but he declined to do anything about it. Boyle again complained to Orr when Hansmeier responded to a question from Boyle with harsh profanity. Orr responded to this complaint by reprimanding both Hansmeier and Boyle. Weeks later, Boyle claims she went to Gooder to complain after a coworker put his hand down her blouse. Gooder allegedly sent her to Orr. Boyle claims Orr’s only response to her complaint was “We’ve had some complaints and I’m investigating.” Gooder and Orr claim Boyle never made any complaints about sexual harassment. The only complaint they acknowledge pertained to the incident involving harsh language.

On April 23, 2002, approximately one week after Boyle allegedly complained about her coworker putting his hand down her blouse, Gooder and Orr told Boyle her employment was terminated. Gooder and Orr said she was terminated because her coworkers had complained they were uncomfortable working with her because she was sexually harassing them.

In 2003, Boyle filed a petition seeking damages under the ICRA and under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The petition contained four distinct claims: (1) sexual discrimination through a hostile work environment under the ICRA, (2) retaliatory discharge under the ICRA, (3) sexual discrimination through a hostile work environment under Title VII, and (4) retaliatory discharge under Title VII. Pursuant to the law at the time of the case, the federal claims were tried to a jury while the state claims were simultaneously tried to the district court. See Smith v. ADM Feed Corp., 456 N.W.2d 378, 380 (Iowa 1990) (holding there is no right to a jury trial under the ICRA), overruled by McElroy v. State, 703 N.W.2d 385 (Iowa 2005).

Boyle proposed a retaliatory discharge jury instruction, but the court ultimately did not instruct the jury on this issue. Boyle did not object to the court omitting the instruction. However, Boyle did object to the court’s jury instruction which stated Alum-Line had the right to discharge Boyle “for any reason.” The court overruled this objection and gave the instruction to the jury.

In a special verdict, the jury concluded there was a hostile work environment, but also determined Alum-Line took steps reasonably calculated to stop the sexual harassment. Based on this finding, the district court entered judgment for Alum-Line on the Title VII hostile-work-environment claim. The court made identical findings of fact and entered judgment denying Boyle’s ICRA hostile-work-environment claim. The court pointedly refrained from making any findings as to her ICRA retaliatory discharge claim. Not having been instructed on such a claim, the jury did not make any findings on the Title VII retaliatory discharge claim.

Boyle filed post-trial motions requesting, among other things, the court amend its decision on the Iowa Civil Rights Act claim to find Alum-Line did not take steps reasonably calculated to end the sexual harassment, and Alum-Line discharged the plaintiff in retaliation for lodging her last complaint of sexual harassment.

The district court denied all of Boyle’s motions and stated its “findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and are consistent with the jury’s factual findings [on the federal claim].”

Boyle filed an appeal contending the district court erred in three ways. First, it erred in denying her ICRA hostile-work-environment claim without determining and applying the proper standard of proof. Second, it erred in instructing the jury on the effect her at-will employment had on Alum-Line’s ability to terminate her employment. Third, it erred by not making any factual findings when it denied her ICRA claim for retaliatory discharge.

The court of appeals reversed and remanded to the district court for retrial solely on Boyle’s Title VII claim of sexual discrimination through a hostile work environment. It affirmed the judgment of the district court on all other issues. We granted further review.

II. The Merits

A. Iowa Civil Rights Act Hostile-Work-Environment Claim

In Farmland Foods v. Dubuque Human Rights Commission, we set forth the elements of an ICRA hostile-work-environment claim:

To establish a hostile work environment, the plaintiff must show: (1) he or she belongs to a protected group; (2) he or she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on a protected characteristic; and (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Additionally, if the harassment is perpetrated by a nonsupervisory employee, the plaintiff must show the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action.

672 N.W.2d 733, 744 (Iowa 2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The district court entered findings of fact which established that Boyle was subjected to a hostile work environment. The court determined:

[Boyle] was subjected to sexual harassment by her co-worker’s offensive sexual language and conduct at work.... The conduct by [Boyle’s] co-workers was based on her gender.... The conduct by [Boyle’s] co-workers was directed to [Boyle] and was unwelcome and uninvited.... The conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive so that a reasonable person would find [Boyle’s] work environment to be hostile- [Alum-Line] knew of the sexual harassment....

However, the court found Boyle failed to prove all of the elements of a claim for sexual harassment in the workplace because Alum-Line “did take steps reasonably calculated to stop the sexual harassment.” Boyle argues there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that Alum-Line took steps reasonably calculated to stop the sexual harassment.

Our review of claims tried to the district court under the ICRA is for correction of errors at law. Falczynski v. Amoco Oil Co., 533 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Iowa 1995) (“Our review of discrimination claims tried to the court is at law.”). The district court’s findings of fact are entitled to the weight of a special verdict and are binding on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. Lynch v. City of Des Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Iowa 1990). If there is no substantial evidence to support a finding upon which the lower court arrives at a challenged conclusion of law, the finding is not binding on this court. Offermann v. Dickinson, 175 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Iowa 1970).

Before we analyze the disputed finding of fact, we first analyze the court’s conclusion that “a reasonable person would find [Boyle’s] work environment to be hostile.” Throughout trial, Alum-Line contended Boyle only made one complaint which conceivably related to sexual harassment. This one complaint related to an argument between Boyle and Hansmeier over blueprint measurements on a trailer. Boyle complained to Orr when Hansmeier told her to “look at the f* * *ing plan.” Alum-Line argues this one instance led to the judge’s conclusion that Boyle was subjected to a hostile work environment.

This argument is not consistent with the court’s actual findings. First of all, the heated exchange between Boyle and Hansmeier involved only one coworker while the court’s finding of fact repeatedly refers to the harassers as “co-workers.” Second, this single incident was insufficient to find conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive so that a reasonable person would find the plaintiffs work environment to be hostile. To establish the harassment was severe or pervasive, Boyle had to show she subjectively perceived the conduct as abusive and that a reasonable person would also have found the conduct to be abusive or hostile. Farmland Foods, 672 N.W.2d at 744. Also, because “hostile-work-environment claims by their nature involve ongoing and repeated conduct, not isolated events,” the court had to find there was more than just one instance of inappropriate conduct. Id. at 745. Boyle’s sole complaint regarding the confrontation with Hansmeier does not satisfy either of these tests. Because the court found there was a hostile work environment, we conclude the court determined Boyle was subjected to other instances of offensive sexual language and conduct at Alum-Line.

We next focus our attention on the last two findings of fact — “[t]he defendant knew of the sexual harassment,” and “[t]he defendant did take steps reasonably calculated to stop the sexual harassment.” Orr stated he only received one complaint from Boyle concerning a hostile work environment. That complaint pertained to the incident when Hansmeier told Boyle to “look at the f* * *ing plan.” Both Han-smeier and Boyle were reprimanded over the incident. Beyond this reprimand, Alum-Line took no others steps to curtail sexual harassment in the workplace while Boyle worked for Alum-Line. Indeed, the crux of Alum-Line’s defense was that Boyle did not notify either Gooder or Orr that she was being sexually harassed, but if she had, Alum-Line would have taken such a complaint seriously and investigated it thoroughly.

When comparing these factual findings, we cannot find substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that Alum-Line took “steps” reasonably calculated to stop the sexual harassment. One reprimand by Orr over an isolated incident is not substantial evidence to support a finding that Alum-Line took steps to stop the “severe or pervasive” sexual harassment. Because there was not substantial evidence to support a finding that Alum-Line took remedial action to stop the sexual harassment, we necessarily conclude, as a matter of law, that Alum-Line failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action once it knew of the sexual harassment.

The district court’s remaining factual findings support a judgment for Boyle under the elements of an ICRA hostile-work-environment claim. See generally Novak Equip., Inc. v. Hartl, 168 N.W.2d 924, 927 (Iowa 1969) (stating a finding of insufficient evidence to support the court’s judgment on one factual finding entitles the appellant to a reversal for entry of judgment in the appellant’s favor unless there were issues presented but not decided by the court). Upon remand, the district court shall enter judgment in favor of Boyle on her ICRA hostile-work-environment claim. The court shall then determine damages based upon the existing trial record.

B. Title VII Hostile-Work-Environment Claim

Boyle brought a simultaneous hostile-work-environment claim under Title VII. McElroy v. State, 637 N.W.2d 488, 499 (Iowa 2001) (hereinafter McElroy I). To establish the Title VII hostile-work-environment claim, Boyle had to prove to a jury the same elements as those set forth in the ICRA hostile-work-environment claim: (1) she was a member of a protected group; (2) she was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex; and (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment. Beard v. Flying J, Inc., 266 F.3d 792, 797-98 (8th Cir.2001). If the harassment was perpetrated by a nonsupervisory employee, she had to additionally show Alum-Line “knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action.” See Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 631 (8th Cir.2000).

The jury was not asked to determine generally whether Boyle proved her Title VII hostile-work-environment claim; instead, the jury was only instructed to enter written findings on predetermined issues in the case. The jury made the following findings: (1) Boyle was subjected to sexual harassment by offensive sexual language and conduct, (2) the conduct was based on gender, (3) the conduct was directed at her and was unwelcome and uninvited, (4) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive so that a reasonable person would find Boyle’s work environment to be hostile, (5) Alum-Line knew of the sexual harassment, and (6) Boyle did not prove Alum-Line failed to take steps reasonably calculated to stop the sexual harassment.

Boyle contends the jury’s sixth finding was a result of an improper jury instruction.

We review alleged errors in jury instructions for correction of errors at law. State v. Anderson, 636 N.W.2d 26, 30 (Iowa 2001); Iowa R.App. P. 6.4. A court’s instructions to the jury “must convey the applicable law in such a way that the jury has a clear understanding of the issues it must decide.” Thompson v. City of Des Moines, 564 N.W.2d 839, 846 (Iowa 1997). Reversal is generally required in cases where an instruction is confusing or conflicting. McElroy I, 637 N.W.2d at 500.

Boyle claims the district court erred when it gave, over her objection, instruction no. 17 to the jury. Jury instruction no. 17 stated:

The plaintiff was an employee at will with the defendant. This means that the employer had the right to terminate the plaintiffs employment at any time, for any reason, with or without just cause. Therefore, you need not decide whether the employer had just cause for terminating her employment. The mere fact that her employment was terminated does not establish her claim for damages.

Boyle claims this instruction is legally incorrect because it does not provide any exception to the rule that an at-will employee can be terminated for any reason. Boyle contends this jury instruction could have led the jury to conclude that Alum-Line’s termination of Boyle’s employment was a step reasonably calculated to stop the sexual harassment.

Jury instruction no. 17 was an inaccurate statement of the law because there are a number of exceptions to the at-will employee doctrine based on public policy and legislative enactment. For example, in Borschel v. City of Perry, 512 N.W.2d 565, 567 (Iowa 1994), we held

Discharge of an employee because of age, race, creed, color, sex, national origin, religion, or disability is an unfair employment practice. Remedies are provided employees who are discharged in violation of [the Iowa Civil Rights Act].

(Internal citations omitted.) Also, in Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558, 560-61 (Iowa 1988), we stated,

We deem [the Iowa workers’ compensation statute] to be a clear expression that it is the public policy of this state that an employee’s right to seek ... compensation ... for work-related injuries should not be interfered with regardless of the terms of the contract of hire. To permit the type of retaliatory discharge which has been alleged in this case to go without a remedy would fly in the face of this policy.

We also conclude the improper jury instruction was prejudicial to Boyle. The jury’s first five factual findings indicate Boyle was subjected to severe or pervasive sexual harassment in the form of sexual language and conduct. The jury’s sixth finding indicates the jury somehow determined Alum-Line took steps reasonably calculated to stop the sexual harassment. But, as discussed above, beyond the one incident where Alum-Line reprimanded both Boyle and Hansmeier, Alum-Line took no steps to stop any sexual harassment because it claims it received no reports of sexual harassment from Boyle.

Because instruction no. 17 incorrectly states a person can be terminated for “any reason,” there is a strong possibility the jury viewed Boyle’s termination as a step taken by Alum-Line that was “reasonably calculated to stop the sexual harassment.” It was no leap of logic to make this conclusion because Boyle’s termination was certainly effective at ending the sexual harassment. Therefore, we strike the jury’s sixth factual finding and reverse the trial court’s judgment based upon that finding.

As discussed above, the district court’s findings of fact support a judgment for Boyle under the elements of her ICRA hostile-work-environment claim. Because the elements for the Title VII claim mirror the elements of the ICRA claim, we conclude, under the doctrine of res judicata, that the court must also find for Boyle on her Title VII hostile-work-environment claim. See Heidemann v. Sweitzer, 375 N.W.2d 665, 667 (Iowa 1985) (“Issue preclusion, one application of the broader concept of res judicata, prevents a party to a prior action from relitigating in a subsequent action an issue raised and resolved in the prior action.”). Accordingly, the court shall enter judgment in favor of Boyle on her Title VII hostile-work-environment claim and enter damages in conformance with the damages determined by the court on the ICRA hostile-work-environment claim. See 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 772 (1997) (“Even though a plaintiff may have separate concurrent or successive rights of action arising out of the same transaction, he can have only one full satisfaction, which, when obtained, bars all further actions.”).

C. Iowa Civil Rights Act Retaliatory Discharge Claim

Boyle also contends the district court erred in denying her ICRA retaliatory discharge claim without making any factual findings regarding the claim.

When the district court decided the ICRA retaliatory discharge claim, it explicitly refrained from making any findings as to whether Boyle’s discharge “was in retaliation for her own complaint of harassment, because the court does not believe that it needs to resolve these fact questions to decide this part of the case.” The court went on to make a conclusion of law that “there [was] no claim or cause of action for retaliatory discharge in this context.” The court’s statement that it did not need “to resolve these fact questions to decide this part of the case” indicates it likely determined the retaliatory claim was moot because it found Boyle did not prove the hostile-work-environment claim. However, a retaliatory discharge claim under both the ICRA and Title VII requires that the plaintiff prove three elements, all of which are distinct from any claim for sexual harassment. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ICRA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she was engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) the employer took adverse employment action against him or her, and (3) there was a causal connection between his or her participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment action taken. Estate of Harris v. Papa John’s Pizza, 679 N.W.2d 673, 678 (Iowa 2004); Channon v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 861-62 (Iowa 2001).

Even though her hostile-work-environment claim failed in the original trial, Boyle still presented enough evidence to warrant a decision on her retaliatory discharge claim. First, Boyle exercised her right to complain about the instances of sexual harassment. See Channon, 629 N.W.2d at 865. Second, she suffered an adverse employment action when her superiors terminated her employment. Evidence supporting the third element, causal connection between the complaint and her discharge, was also tendered through circumstantial evidence — she was discharged for allegedly sexually harassing other employees one week after she complained that a coworker put his hand down her blouse. While mere coincidence of timing does not conclusively establish this element, the timing of the action, combined with all the other circumstances present in this case, entitles her to a ruling on her retaliatory discharge claim. See Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir.1999) (“Generally, more than a temporal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action is required to present a genuine factual issue on retaliation.”).

Even though Boyle presented this evidence at trial, Alum-Line contends Boyle “waived” her claim for retaliatory discharge. In essence, because Boyle waived the Title VII retaliatory discharge claim by not objecting when the court presented her with proposed jury instructions not addressing the claim, Alum-Line contends this waiver carried over to the ICRA claim.

We do not find Boyle waived her ICRA retaliatory discharge claim. Boyle clearly pled a retaliatory discharge claim under Title VII and the ICRA. She also presented evidence demonstrating she was eligible for relief for retaliatory discharge. When the district court held there was “no claim or cause of action for damages under Iowa law for retaliatory discharge in this context,” Boyle filed a rule 1.904(2) motion asking the court to enlarge or amend its findings and conclusions on this claim. The court did not address this issue in its post-trial order, but the issue was still adequately preserved for review on appeal. As aptly stated in Boyle’s appellate brief:

No matter how badly a plaintiffs counsel errs in the jury instruction phase of a Title VII case tried simultaneously with an ICRA case, a plaintiff should be entitled to a correct decision of her ICRA case by an independent trial judge correctly applying Iowa law and arriving at fact-findings based upon his [or her] own weighing of the evidence.

Alum-Line also argues Boyle waived her ICRA retaliatory claim during the following discussion with the court:

to the extent there are any matters related to the plaintiffs claim against the defendant that were not submitted to the jury that are required by Iowa law to be decided by the Trial Court without a jury, those matters will be submitted [tomorrow].

The next day the court said:

The court is making an opportunity available now to present whatever trial may be necessary and argument that may be necessary to submit the nonjury issues under state law for the court for decision incorporating by reference the evidence presented to the jury and supplementing the record with whatever other documents or arguments or anything else that counsel believe is necessary.

Boyle’s attorneys indicated they did not wish to present any additional evidence or make any additional arguments, stating it was their belief the evidence and arguments presented to the jury were sufficient. Following Boyle’s statements, Alum-Line made the following argument:

To me the only issue to be tried under Iowa law contains the same elements to prove hostile environment, sexual harassment, and that’s the only issue that has been raised by the — by the evidence. No other issue has been raised by the evidence. There isn’t sufficient evidence to support any other type. There’s no retaliatory discharge issue raised.

(Emphasis added.) Boyle was given an opportunity to respond to this argument, but declined. Alum-Line contends this brief discussion sufficiently waived Boyle’s retaliatory claim.

We find no merit to Alum-Line’s argument that Boyle waived her retaliatory .claim by standing silent. Such a rule would require attorneys to waste precious court time repeating, ad nauseum, their entire case to the court whenever a judge asked “is there anything else?” Also, we find it plausible Boyle did not contradict Alum-Line’s contention that there was no retaliatory discharge claim as she felt it was unnecessary because she had clearly pled the retaliation claim and presented evidence at trial to establish her case. Also, it is clear, in context, that Alum-Line’s statement that “[tjhere’s no retaliatory discharge issue raised” was an argument that the issue was not raised by the evidence. This was not a statement of issues for the court to rule upon that was agreed to by Boyle’s non-response.

The district court’s conclusion of law that there was “no claim or cause of action for damages under Iowa law for retaliatory discharge in this context” was flawed. A court cannot determine there is no claim or cause of action for damages when it makes no findings concerning the elements of the plaintiffs case. See Falczynski, 533 N.W.2d at 234. This failure to apply a correct legal analysis to the claim is reversible error. See id. We therefore vacate the trial court’s decision and remand for reconsideration so that the same district court judge can, on the existing trial record, make findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment on the ICRA retaliatory discharge claim. See id.

III. Conclusion

The judgment on Boyle’s ICRA retaliatory discharge claim is reversed and remanded so the same district court judge can issue further findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment on the existing trial record. On remand, the court shall also enter an order granting judgment to Boyle on her ICRA hostile-work-environment claim; enter an order granting judgment in favor of Boyle on her Title VII hostile-work-environment claim; and, based upon the existing trial record, determine damages.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

      . Having waived any claim of error based on the trial court's failure to instruct on her Title VII retaliatory discharge claim, Boyle does not contend she should have the opportunity to relitigate this matter. She has therefore abandoned any opportunity to retry this issue.

      . Months after Boyle was terminated, Alum-Line’s workers viewed a presentation on sexual harassment, but there were no presentations given during her eight months of employment.

      . The rule 1.904 motion requested, among other things, "that the Court amend its findings of fact to include a finding that the Defendant discharged the Plaintiff in retaliation for lodging her last complaint of sexual harassment with the Defendant.”

      . When a district court fails to rule on an issue properly raised by a party, the party who raised the issue must file a motion requesting a ruling in order to preserve error for appeal. Meier v. Senecaut III, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). A rule 1.904(2) motion is the proper method "to preserve error 'when the district court fails to resolve an issue, claim or other legal theory properly submitted for adjudication.’" Id. at 539 (quoting Explore Info. Servs. v. Iowa Ct. Info. Sys., 636 N.W.2d 50, 57 (Iowa 2001)). In this instance Boyle’s post-trial motion sufficiently alerted the district court to its omission, and therefore the error was preserved for our review.

      . The present case can be contrasted with an open court colloquy where the defendant tells the court that the plaintiff has dropped a claim from the lawsuit. If the plaintiff had not decided to drop the claim, we would expect the plaintiff to correct the defendant’s statement.