author: Justice Blackmun Chief Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    McCARTHY v. MADIGAN et al.
    No. 90-6861.
    Argued December 9, 1991
    Decided March 4, 1992

      Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 156.

      Paul M. Smith argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.

      Deputy Solicitor General Mahoney argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Mueller, Amy L. Wax, Victor D. Stone, and William D. Braun.

   Justice Blackmun

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue in this case is whether a federal prisoner must resort to the internal grievance procedure promulgated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons before he may initiate a suit, pursuant to the authority of Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), solely for money damages. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that exhaustion of the grievance procedure was required. 914 F. 2d 1411 (1990). We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals. 499 U. S. 974 (1991).

I

While he was a prisoner in the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, petitioner John J. McCarthy filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas against four prison employees: the hospital administrator, the chief psychologist, another psychologist, and a physician. McCarthy alleged that respondents had violated his constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment by their deliberate indifference to his needs and medical condition resulting from a back operation and a history of psychiatric problems. On the first page of his complaint, he wrote: “This Complaint seeks Money Damages Only.” App. 7.

The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that petitioner had failed to exhaust prison administrative remedies. Id., at 12. Under 28 CFR pt. 542 (1991), setting forth the general “Administrative Remedy Procedure for Inmates” at federal correctional institutions, a prisoner may “seek formal review of a complaint which relates to any aspect of his imprisonment.” § 542.10. When an inmate files a complaint or appeal, the responsible officials are directed to acknowledge the filing with a “signed receipt” which is returned to the inmate, to “[c]onduct an investigation,” and to “[rjespond to and sign all complaints or appeals.” §§ 542.11(a)(2) to (4). The general grievance regulations do not provide for any kind of hearing or for the granting of any particular type of relief.

To promote efficient dispute resolution, the procedure includes rapid filing and response timetables. An inmate first seeks informal resolution of his claim by consulting prison personnel. § 542.13(a). If this informal effort fails, the prisoner “may file a formal written complaint on the appropriate form, within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date on which the basis of the complaint occurred.” § 542.13(b). Should the warden fail to respond to the inmate’s satisfaction within 15 days, the inmate has 20 days to appeal to the Bureau’s Regional Director, who has 30 days to respond. If the inmate still remains unsatisfied, he has 30 days to make a final appeal to the Bureau’s general counsel, who has another 30 days to respond. §§542.14 and 542.15. If the inmate can demonstrate a “valid reason for delay,” he “shall be allowed” an extension of any of these time periods for filing. § 542.13(b).

Petitioner McCarthy filed with the District Court a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing that he was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies, because he sought only money damages which, he claimed, the Bureau could not provide. 1 Record, Exh. 7. The court denied the motion. App. 14.

The Court of Appeals, in affirming, observed that because Bivens actions are a creation of the judiciary, the courts may impose reasonable conditions upon their filing. 914 F. 2d, at 1412. The exhaustion rule, the court reasoned, “is not keyed to the type of relief sought, but to the need for preliminary fact-finding” to determine “whether there is a possible Bivens cause of action.” Ibid. Accordingly, “‘[although the administrative apparatus could not award money damages . . . , administrative consideration of the possibility of corrective action and a record would have aided a court in measuring liability and determining the extent of the damages.’” Ibid., quoting Goar v. Civiletti, 688 F. 2d 27, 29 (CA6 1982) (emphasis in original). Exhaustion of the general grievance procedure was required notwithstanding the fact that McCarthy’s request was solely for money damages.

II

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is one among related doctrines — including abstention, finality, and ripeness — that govern the timing of federal-court deci-sionmaking. Of “paramount importance” to any exhaustion inquiry is congressional intent. Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U. S. 496, 501 (1982). Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U. S. 561, 579 (1989); Patsy, 457 U. S., at 502, n. 4. But where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs. McGee v. United States, 402 U. S. 479, 483, n. 6 (1971). See also Patsy, 457 U. S., at 518 (White, J., concurring in part) (“[Ejxhaustion is ‘a rule of judicial administration,’. .. and unless Congress directs otherwise, rightfully subject to crafting by judges”). Nevertheless, even in this field of judicial discretion, appropriate deference to Congress’ power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under which a claim may be heard in a federal court requires fashioning of exhaustion principles in a manner consistent with congressional intent and any applicable statutory scheme. Id., at 501-502, and n. 4.

A

This Court long has acknowledged the general rule that parties exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from the federal courts. See, e. g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 50-51, and n. 9 (1938) (discussing cases as far back as 1898). Exhaustion is required because it serves the twin purposes of protecting administrative agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency.

As to the first of these purposes, the exhaustion doctrine recognizes the notion, grounded in deference to Congress’ delegation of authority to coordinate branches of Government, that agencies, not the courts, ought to have primary responsibility for the programs that Congress has charged them to administer. Exhaustion concerns apply with particular force when the action under review involves exercise of the agency’s discretionary power or when the agency proceedings in question allow the agency to apply its special expertise. McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 194 (1969). See also Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S. 467, 484 (1986). The exhaustion doctrine also acknowledges the commonsense notion of dispute resolution that an agency ought to have an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into federal court. Correlatively, exhaustion principles apply with special force when “frequent and deliberate flouting of administrative processes” could weaken an agency’s effectiveness by encouraging disregard of its procedures. McKart v. United States, 395 U. S., at 195.

As to the second of the purposes, exhaustion promotes judicial efficiency in at least two ways. When an agency has the opportunity to correct its own errors, a judicial controversy may well be mooted, or at least piecemeal appeals may be avoided. See, e. g., Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U. S. 34, 37 (1972); McKart v. United States, 395 U. S., at 195. And even where a controversy survives administrative review, exhaustion of the administrative procedure may produce a useful record for subsequent judicial consideration, especially in a complex or technical factual context. See, e. g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 765 (1975) (exhaustion may allow agency “to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review”).

B

Notwithstanding these substantial institutional interests, federal courts are vested with a “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise the jurisdiction given them. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817-818 (1976). “We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.” Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821). Accordingly, this Court has declined to require exhaustion in some circumstances even where administrative and judicial interests would counsel otherwise. In determining whether exhaustion is required, federal courts must balance the interest of the individual in retaining prompt access to a federal judicial forum against countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion. “[A]dministrative remedies need not be pursued if the litigant’s interests in immediate judicial review outweigh the government’s interests in the efficiency or administrative autonomy that the exhaustion doctrine is designed to further.” West v. Bergland, 611 F. 2d 710, 715 (CA8 1979), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 821 (1980). Application of this balancing principle is “intensely practical,” Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S., at 484, citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 331, n. 11 (1976), because attention is directed to both the nature of the claim presented and the characteristics of the particular administrative procedure provided.

C

This Court’s precedents have recognized at least three broad sets of circumstances in which the interests of the individual weigh heavily against requiring administrative exhaustion. First, requiring resort to the administrative remedy may occasion undue prejudice to subsequent assertion of a court action. Such prejudice may result, for example, from an unreasonable or indefinite timeframe for administrative action. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 575, n. 14 (1973) (administrative remedy deemed inadequate “[m]ost often . . . because of delay by the agency”). See also Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U. S., at 587 (“Because the Bank Board’s regulations do not place a reasonable time limit on FSLIC’s consideration of claims, Coit cannot be required to exhaust those procedures”); Walker v. Southern R. Co., 385 U. S. 196, 198 (1966) (possible delay of 10 years in administrative proceedings makes exhaustion unnecessary); Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U. S. 587, 591-592 (1926) (claimant “is not required indefinitely to await a decision of the rate-making tribunal before applying to a federal court for equitable relief”). Even where the administrative decisionmaking schedule is otherwise reasonable and definite, a particular plaintiff may suffer irreparable harm if unable to secure immediate judicial consideration of his claim. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S., at 483 (disability-benefit claimants “would be irreparably injured were the exhaustion requirement now enforced against them”); Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752, 773 (1947) (“impending irreparable injury flowing from delay incident to following the prescribed procedure” may contribute to finding that exhaustion is not required). By the same token, exhaustion principles apply with less force when an individual’s failure to exhaust may preclude a defense to criminal liability. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 497, n. 5 (1977) (plurality opinion); McKart v. United States, 395 U. S., at 197.

Second, an administrative remedy may be inadequate “because of some doubt as to whether the agency was empowered to grant effective relief.” Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S., at 575, n. 14. For example, an agency, as a preliminary matter, may be unable to consider whether to grant relief because it lacks institutional competence to resolve the particular type of issue presented, such as the constitutionality of a statute. See, e. g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S., at 497, n. 5; Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 76 (1976). In a similar vein, exhaustion has not been required where the challenge is to the adequacy of the agency procedure itself, such that “ 'the question of the adequacy of the administrative remedy . . . [is] for all practical purposes identical with the merits of [the plaintiff’s] lawsuit.’ ” Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 63, n. 10 (1979) (quoting Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S., at 575). Alternatively, an agency may be competent to adjudicate the issue presented, but still lack authority to grant the type of relief requested. McNeese v. Board of Ed. for Community Unit School Dist. 187, 373 U. S. 668, 675 (1963) (students seeking to integrate public school need not file complaint with school superintendent because the “Superintendent himself apparently has no power to order corrective action” except to request the Attorney General to bring suit); Montana National Bank of Billings v. Yellowstone County, 276 U. S. 499, 505 (1928) (taxpayer seeking refund not required to exhaust where “any such application [would have been] utterly futile since the county board of equalization was powerless to grant any appropriate relief” in face of prior controlling court decision).

Third, an administrative remedy may be inadequate where the administrative body is shown to be biased or has otherwise predetermined the issue before it. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S., at 575, n. 14; Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639, 640 (1968) (in view of Attorney General’s submission that the challenged rules of the prison were “validly and correctly applied to petitioner,” requiring administrative review through a process culminating with the Attorney General “would be to demand a futile act”); Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 201 U. S. App. D. C. 165, 170-171, 627 F. 2d 1151, 1156-1157 (1979) (bias of Federal Trade Commission chairman), cert. denied, 447 U. S. 921 (1980). See also Patsy v. Florida International University, 634 F. 2d 900, 912-913 (CA6 1981) (en banc) (administrative procedures must “not be used to harass or otherwise discourage those with legitimate claims”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U. S. 496 (1982).

Ill

In light of these general principles, we conclude that petitioner McCarthy need not have exhausted his constitutional claim for money damages. As a preliminary matter, we find that Congress has not meaningfully addressed the appropriateness of requiring exhaustion in this context. Although respondents’ interests are significant, we are left with a firm conviction that, given the type of claim McCarthy raises and the particular characteristics of the Bureau’s general grievance procedure, McCarthy’s individual interests outweigh countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion.

A

Turning first to congressional intent, we note that the general grievance procedure was neither enacted nor mandated by Congress. Respondents, however, urge that Congress, in effect, has acted to require exhaustion by delegating power to the Attorney General and the Bureau of Prisons to control and manage the federal prison system. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 4001(b) and 4042. Brief for Respondents 3, 16; Tr. of Oral Arg. 41-42. We think respondents confuse what Congress could be claimed to allow by implication with what Congress affirmatively has requested or required. By delegating authority, in the most general of terms, to the Bureau to administer the federal prison system, Congress cannot be said to have spoken to the particular issue whether prisoners in the custody of the Bureau should have direct access to the federal courts.

Respondents next argue that Congress, by enactment of §7 of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 94 Stat. 352, 42 U. S. C. § 1997e, has articulated a policy favoring exhaustion of the prison grievance procedure prior to the filing of a constitutional claim against prison officials. Section 1997e imposes a limited exhaustion requirement for a claim brought by a state prisoner under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, provided that the underlying state prison administrative remedy meets specified standards. See Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U. S., at 507-512. Section 1997e has no direct application in this case, because at issue here is a Bivens claim by a federal prisoner against federal prison officials. We find it significant that Congress, in enacting § 1997e, stopped short of imposing a parallel requirement in the federal prison context.

Section 1997e is not only inapplicable to Bivens claims, but — by its own terms — cuts against respondents’ claim that the particular procedure now at issue need be exhausted. First, unlike the rule of exhaustion proposed here, §1997e does not authorize dismissal of an action for failure to exhaust. Instead, it provides that the action is to be stayed for a maximum of 90 days. See § 1997e(a)(l). Second, § 1997e does not mechanically require exhaustion in every case where an acceptable state procedure is in place. Rather, it directs federal courts to abstain “if the court believes that such a [waiting] requirement would be appropriate and in the interests of justice.” § 1997e(a)(l). In other words, if an inmate fails to meet filing deadlines under an administrative scheme, a court has ample discretion to determine that exhaustion nonetheless should be forgone. Third, in contrast to the absence of any provision for the award of money damages under the Bureau’s general grievance procedure, the statute conditions exhaustion on the existence of “effective administrative remedies.” It is difficult to see why a stricter rule of exhaustion than Congress itself has required in the state prison context should apply in the federal prison context.

Respondents also argue that requiring exhaustion is appropriate because Bivens relief gives way when necessary to accommodate either the effective functioning of Government or an articulated congressional policy. Brief for Respondents 15. We have recognized that a Bivens remedy does not lie in two situations: (1) where Congress has provided an equally effective alternative remedy and declared it to be a substitute for recovery under the Constitution, and (2) where, in the absence of affirmative action by Congress, special factors counsel hesitation. Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 18-19 (1980). As to the first exception, Congress did not create the remedial scheme at issue here and that scheme, in any case, as noted above, cannot be considered to be equally effective with respect to a claim for money damages. As to the second exception, respondents appear to confuse the presence of special factors with any factors counseling hesitation. In Carlson, the Court held that “special factors” do not free prison officials from Bivens liability, because prison officials do not enjoy an independent status in our constitutional scheme, nor are they likely to be unduly inhibited in the performance of their duties by the assertion of a Bivens claim. Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S., at 19.

Interpreting the “special factors” exception in Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U. S. 412 (1988), and in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367 (1983), the Court found the Bivens remedy displaced because Congress had legislated an elaborate and comprehensive remedial scheme. Schweiker, 487 U. S., at 425; Bush, 462 U. S., at 388. “When the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.” Schweiker, 487 U. S., at 423. Here Congress has enacted nothing.

B

Because Congress has not required exhaustion of a federal prisoner’s Bivens claim, we turn to an evaluation of the individual and institutional interests at stake in this case. The general grievance procedure heavily burdens the individual interests of the petitioning inmate in two ways. First, the procedure imposes short, successive filing deadlines that create a high risk of forfeiture of a claim for failure to comply. Second, the administrative “remedy” does not authorize an award of monetary damages — the only relief requested by McCarthy in this action. The combination of these features means that the prisoner seeking only money damages has everything to lose and nothing to gain from being required to exhaust his claim under the internal grievance procedure.

The filing deadlines for the grievance procedure require an inmate, within 15 days of the precipitating incident, not only to attempt to resolve his grievance informally but also to file a formal written complaint with the prison, warden. 28 CFR §542.13 (1991). Then, he must successively hurdle 20-day and 30-day deadlines to advance to the end of the grievance process. §542.15. Other than the Bureau’s general and quite proper interest in having early notice of any claim, we have not been apprised of any urgency or exigency justifying this timetable. Cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 435 (1944) (“The sixty days’ period allowed for protest of the Administrator’s regulations cannot be said to be unreasonably short in view of the urgency and exigencies of wartime price regulation”). As a practical matter, the filing deadlines, of course, may pose little difficulty for the knowledgeable inmate accustomed to grievances and court actions. But they are a likely trap for the inexperienced and unwary inmate, ordinarily indigent and unrepresented by counsel, with a substantial claim.

Respondents argue that the deadlines are not jurisdictional and may be extended for any “valid” reason. See 28 CFR §§ 542.13(b) and 542.15 (1991). Yet the regulations do not elaborate upon what a “valid” reason is. Moreover, it appears that prison officials — perhaps the very officials subject to suit — are charged with determining what is a “valid” reason.

All in all, these deadlines require a good deal of an inmate at the peril of forfeiting his claim for money damages. The “first” of “the principles that necessarily frame our analysis of prisoners’ constitutional claims” is that “federal courts must take cognizance of the valid constitutional claims of prison inmates.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 84 (1987). Because a prisoner ordinarily is divested of the privilege to vote, the right to file a court action might be said to be his remaining most “fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 370 (1886). The rapid filing deadlines counsel strongly against exhaustion as a prerequisite to the filing of a federal-court action.

As we have noted, the grievance procedure does not include any mention of the award of monetary relief. Respondents argue that this should not matter, because “in most cases there are other things that the inmate wants.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. This may be true in some instances. But we cannot presume, as a general matter, that when a litigant has deliberately forgone any claim for injunctive relief and has singled out discrete past wrongs, specifically requesting monetary compensation only, that he is likely interested in “other things.” The Bureau, in any case, is always free to offer an inmate administrative relief in return for withdrawal of his lawsuit. We conclude that the absence of any monetary remedy in the grievance procedure also weighs heavily against imposing an exhaustion requirement.

In the alternative, respondents argue that, despite the absence of any provision in the general grievance procedure for the award of money damages, such damages in fact are available for most prisoners asserting Bivens claims. As to Bivens claims that could have been brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), respondents contend that a grievance asking for money damages can be “converted” by prison officials to a FTCA claim for which prison officials are authorized, under 28 CFR § 543.30 (1991), to award money damages. This “conversion” authority does not appear in the regulations having to do with the grievance procedure, which raises substantial doubt that an inmate would have sufficient notice as to how his claim would be treated. In any event, respondents have not pointed to anything in the record showing that prison officials have a practice of converting a claim filed under the general grievance procedure to a claim under the FTCA procedure. We agree with petitioner that it is implausible to think that they do. The availability of a money damages remedy is, at best, uncertain, and the uncertainty of the administrative agency’s authority to award relief counsels against requiring exhaustion. See Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 626 (1946); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Board of Comm’rs of Weld County, 247 U. S. 282, 287 (1918).

We do not find the interests of the Bureau of Prisons to weigh heavily in favor of exhaustion in view of the remedial scheme and particular claim presented here. To be sure, the Bureau has a substantial interest in encouraging internal resolution of grievances and in preventing the undermining of its authority by unnecessary resort by prisoners to the federal courts. But other institutional concerns relevant to exhaustion analysis appear to weigh in hardly at all. The Bureau’s alleged failure to render medical care implicates only tangentially its authority to carry out the control and management of the federal prisons. Furthermore, the Bureau does not bring to bear any special expertise on the type of issue presented for resolution here.

The interests of judicial economy do not stand to be advanced substantially by the general grievance procedure. No formal factfindings are made. The paperwork generated by the grievance process might assist a court somewhat in ascertaining the facts underlying a prisoner’s claim more quickly than if it has only a prisoner’s complaint to review. But the grievance procedure does not create a formal factual record of the type that can be relied on conclusively by a court for disposition of a prisoner’s claim on the pleadings or at summary judgment without the aid of affidavits.

C

In conclusion, we are struck by the absence of supporting material in the regulations, the record, or the briefs that the general grievance procedure here was crafted with any thought toward the principles of exhaustion of claims for money damages. The Attorney General’s professed concern for internal dispute resolution has not translated itself into a more effective grievance procedure that might encourage the filing of an administrative complaint as opposed to a court action. Congress, of course, is free to design or require an appropriate administrative procedure for a prisoner to exhaust his claim for money damages. Even without further action by Congress, we do not foreclose the possibility that the Bureau itself may adopt an appropriate administrative procedure consistent with congressional intent.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.

Chief Justice Rehnquist,

with whom Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the Court’s holding that a federal prisoner need not exhaust the procedures promulgated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. My view, however, is based entirely on the fact that the grievance procedure at issue does not provide for any award of monetary damages. As a result, in cases such as this one where prisoners seek monetary relief, the Bureau’s administrative remedy furnishes no effective remedy at all, and it is therefore improper to impose an exhaustion requirement. See McNeese v. Board of Ed. for Community Unit School Dist. 187, 373 U. S. 668, 675 (1963); Montana National Bank of Billings v. Yellowstone County, 276 U. S. 499, 505 (1928).

Because I would base the decision on this ground, I do not join the Court’s extensive discussion of the general principles of exhaustion, nor do I agree with the implication that those general principles apply without modification in the context of a Bivens claim. In particular, I disagree with the Court’s reliance on the grievance procedure’s filing deadlines as a basis for excusing exhaustion. As the majority observes, ante, at 146-147, we have previously refused to require exhaustion of administrative remedies where the administrative process subjects plaintiffs to unreasonable delay or to an indefinite timeframe for decision. See Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U. S. 561, 587 (1989); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 575, n. 14 (1973); Walker v. Southern R. Co., 385 U. S. 196, 198 (1966); Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U. S. 587, 591-592 (1926). This principle rests on our belief that when a plaintiff might have to wait seemingly forever for an agency decision, agency procedures are “inadequate” and therefore need not be exhausted. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, supra, at 587.

But the Court makes strange use of this principle in holding that filing deadlines imposed by agency procedures may provide a basis for finding that those procedures need not be exhausted. Ante, at 152-153. Whereas before we have held that procedures without “reasonable time limit[s]” may be inadequate because they make a plaintiff wait too long, Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, supra, at 587, today the majority concludes that strict filing deadlines might also contribute to a finding of inadequacy because they make a plaintiff move too quickly. But surely the second proposition does not follow from the first. In fact, short filing deadlines will almost always promote quick decision-making by an agency, the very result that we have advocated repeatedly in the cases cited above. So long as there is an escape clause, as there is here, and the time limit is within a zone of reasonableness, as I believe it is here, the length of the period should not be a factor in deciding the adequacy of the remedy.

       Compare Hessbrook v. Lennon, 777 F. 2d 999 (CA5 1985) (exhaustion required), and Brice v. Day, 604 F. 2d 664 (CA10 1979) (same), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1086 (1980), with Muhammad v. Carlson, 739 F. 2d 122 (CA3 1984) (exhaustion not required), and Goar v. Civiletti, 688 F. 2d 27 (CA6 1982) (same).

       Certain categories of filings, however, “will not be accepted” under the general procedure. These include, among others, “tort claims.” See 28 CFR §642.12 (1991). The Bureau of Prisons has interpreted this “tort claims” exception to include claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, but not constitutional claims for relief recognized under the Bivens case. Brief for Respondents 3, n. 1. Claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act are governed by a separate administrative procedure. See §§543.30 to 643.32.

       McCarthy actually had initiated a grievance prior to filing his complaint in the District Court. Brief for Petitioner 5, n. 7. But he did not exhaust the procedures at that time and, in any event, he concedes that that grievance related to his request for a private cell and not to the medical issues at the heart of his federal complaint. After his initial grievance was dismissed, he filed a grievance with respect to the medical issues. It was accepted, even though it was late, but was denied by the warden on the merits. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. McCarthy’s subsequent appeal to the Bureau’s regional office was rejected because it was filed late. Id., at 16; Brief for Petitioner 5, n. 7.

       The Conference Committee Report states: “It is the intent of the Congress that the court not find such a requirement [of exhaustion] appropriate in those situations in which the action brought . . . raises issues which cannot, in reasonable probability, be resolved by the grievance resolution system ....” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-897, p. 16 (1980).
      The Attorney General, charged under the statute with certifying the adequacy of state administrative remedial schemes, has provided by regulation: “The [state] grievance procedure shall afford a successful grievant a meaningful remedy.” 28 CFR §40.6 (1991) (emphasis added). At the time of promulgating these regulations, the Department of Justice observed on the public record: “Presumably, where monetary relief was the sole adequate remedy and could not be obtained through a grievance procedure, exhaustion would not be appropriate.” 46 Fed. Reg. 3846 (1981).

       Petitioner concedes that if his complaint contained a prayer for injunc-tive relief, exhaustion principles would apply differently. Brief for Petitioner 20, n. 20. Were injunctive relief sought, the grievance procedure probably would be capable of producing the type of corrective action desired. Additionally, because of the continuing nature of conduct subject to injunctive relief, the short filing deadlines would pose less difficulty because the limitations period would be triggered anew by ongoing conduct.

       Respondents contend that Bivens claims are almost always categoriza-ble as FTCA claims, especially in view of the Attorney General’s concession that corrections guards are “law enforcement” officers within the meaning of the exception to the intentional-tort exception of the FTCA. Tr. of Oral Arg. 41. As to those claims that are not categorizable as FTCA claims, respondents concede that the Bureau of Prisons has no authority to offer a monetary settlement. Id., at 40. Instead, they contend that the Department of Justice has a general settlement authority under the federal regulations that might be exercised to dispose of general grievance claims. 28 CFR § 50.16(c)(2) (1991). Nothing in the record indicates that this authority has ever been exercised to recompense a prisoner with a Bivens claim. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that a monetary settlement would be made in the course of an administrative proceeding, because the regulation provides that “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances” a monetary settlement will not be paid “before entry of an adverse verdict, judgment, or award.” § 50.15(c)(3).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Chief Justice Rehnquist Justice Blackmun, Justice Thomas,

license: Public Domain

text:
    DAWSON v. DELAWARE
    No. 90-6704.
    Argued November 12, 1991
    Decided March 9, 1992

      Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Blackmun, Stevens, O’ConnoR, Scalia, Kennedy, and SouteR, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 169. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 169.

      Bernard J. O’Donnell argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Brian J. Bartley.

      Richard E. Fairbanks, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, and Gary A. Myers and Loren C. Meyers, Deputy Attorneys General.

        Michael A. Bamberger, Stuart Altschuler, John A. Powell, Steven R. Shapiro, and Jonathan Lang filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

        Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Mueller, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, and Robert A. Long, Jr., filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

   Chief Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented in this case is whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the introduction in a capital sentencing proceeding of the fact that the defendant was a member of an organization called the Aryan Brotherhood, where the evidence has no relevance to the issues being decided in the proceeding. We hold that they do.

Shortly after midnight on December 1, 1986, petitioner David Dawson and three other inmates escaped from the Delaware Correctional Center near Smyrna, Delaware. Dawson stole a car and headed south, while the other three inmates stole another car and drove north. Early that morning, Dawson burglarized a house near Kenton, Delaware, stealing a motorcycle jacket, several pocket watches, and containers of loose change. He then proceeded to the home of Richard and Madeline Kisner, located about half a mile from the burglary site. Mrs. Kisner was alone in the house, preparing to leave for work. Dawson brutally murdered Mrs. Kisner, stole the Kisners’ car and some money, and fled further south.

He reappeared later that evening at the Zoo Bar in Milford, Delaware, wearing a motorcycle jacket that was too big for him. While at the bar, Dawson introduced himself to Patty Dennis, and told her that his name was “Abaddon,” which he said meant “[o]ne of Satan’s disciples.” App. 80-81. Dawson was subsequently asked to leave the bar. Later that evening, a Delaware state police officer responded to a call to investigate a one-car accident. The car involved in the accident had been stolen from a location near the Zoo Bar and had been driven into a ditch, but the driver had left the scene. The police began a house-to-house search for Dawson, and found him at 5:25 the next morning, on the floor of a Cadillac parked about three-tenths of a mile from the accident site.

A jury convicted Dawson of first-degree murder, possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, and various other crimes. The trial court then conducted a penalty hearing before the jury to determine whether Dawson should be sentenced to death for the first-degree murder conviction. See Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §4209 (1987). The prosecution gave notice that it intended to introduce (1) expert testimony regarding the origin and nature of the Aryan Brotherhood, as well as the fact that Dawson had the words “Aryan Brotherhood” tattooed on the back of his right hand, (2) testimony that Dawson referred to himself as “Abaddon” and had the name “Abaddon” tattooed in red letters across his stomach, and (3) photographs of multiple swastika tattoos on Dawson’s back and a picture of a swastika he had painted on the wall of his prison cell. Dawson argued that this evidence was inflammatory and irrelevant, and that its admission would violate his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Before the penalty phase began, the parties agreed to a stipulation regarding the Aryan Brotherhood evidence. The stipulation provided:

“The Aryan Brotherhood refers to a white racist prison gang that began in the 1960’s in California in response to other gangs of racial minorities. Separate gangs calling themselves the Aryan Brotherhood now exist in many state prisons including Delaware.” App. 132.

In return for Dawson’s agreement to the stipulation, the prosecution agreed not to call any expert witnesses to testify about the Aryan Brotherhood. Although Dawson agreed to the stipulation in order to avoid presentation of this expert testimony, it is apparent from the record and from the opinion of the Supreme Court of Delaware that he continued to assert that the admission of the stipulated facts into evidence violated the Constitution. 581 A. 2d 1078 (1990). At the penalty hearing, the prosecution read the stipulation to the jury and introduced evidence that Dawson had tattooed the words “Aryan Brotherhood” on his hand. The trial judge permitted the prosecution to present the evidence related to the name “Abaddon” as well, but excluded all of the swastika evidence. In addition, the prosecution submitted proof of Dawson’s lengthy criminal record. Dawson, in turn, presented mitigating evidence based on the testimony of two family members and on the fact that he had earned good time credits in prison for enrolling in various drug and alcohol programs. The jury found three statutory aggravating circumstances, each making Dawson eligible for the death penalty under Delaware law; it determined (1) that the murder was committed by an escaped prisoner, (2) that the murder was committed during the commission of a burglary, and (3) that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain. See id., at 1102, and n. 27. The jury further concluded that the aggravating evidence outweighed the mitigating evidence, and recommended that Dawson be sentenced to death. The trial court, bound by that recommendation, imposed the death penalty.

The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the convictions and the death sentence. The court rejected Dawson’s claim that the evidence concerning the Aryan Brotherhood and his use of the name “Abaddon” should have been excluded from the penalty hearing. It observed that having found at least one statutory aggravating factor, the jury was “required to make an individualized determination of whether Dawson should be executed or incarcerated for life, based upon Dawson’s character, his record and the circumstances of the crime,” and that it was desirable for the jury to have as much information before it as possible when making that decision. Id., at 1102-1103 (emphasis in original). The court acknowledged that the Constitution would prohibit the consideration of certain irrelevant factors during the sentencing process, but stated that “ ‘ [planishing a person for expressing his views or for associating with certain people is substantially different from allowing... evidence of [the defendant’s] character [to be considered] where that character is a relevant inquiry.’” Id., at 1103. Because the evidence relating to the Aryan Brotherhood and the name “Abaddon” properly focused the jury’s attention on Dawson’s character, and did not appeal to the jury’s prejudices concerning race, religion, or political affiliation, the court upheld its introduction during the penalty phase. We granted certiorari, 499 U. S. 946 (1991), to consider whether the admission of this evidence was constitutional error. We hold that its admission in this case was error and so reverse.

We have held that the First Amendment protects an individual’s right to join groups and associate with others holding similar beliefs. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 507 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 460 (1958). Because his right to associate with the Aryan Brotherhood is constitutionally protected, Dawson argues, admission of evidence related to that association at his penalty hearing violated his constitutional rights. Relying on our statement in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862 (1983), that an aggravating circumstance is invalid if “it authorizes a jury to draw adverse inferences from conduct that is constitutionally protected,” he contends that the Constitution forbids the consideration in sentencing of any evidence concerning beliefs or activities that are protected under the First Amendment. Id., at 885.

We think this submission is, in the light of our decided cases, too broad. These cases emphasize that “the sentencing authority has always been free to consider a wide range of relevant material.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 820-821 (1991); United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443, 446 (1972) (“[A] judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come”); Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241 (1949). We have previously upheld the consideration, in a capital sentencing proceeding, of evidence of racial intolerance and subversive advocacy where such evidence was relevant to the issues involved. In Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939 (1983), for example, we held that a sentencing judge in a capital case might properly take into consideration “the elements of racial hatred” in Barclay’s crime as well as “Barclay’s desire to start a race war.” See id., at 949 (plurality opinion); id., at 970, and n. 18 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).

One year later, in United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45 (1984), we held that the Government could impeach a defense witness by showing that both the defendant and the witness were members of the Aryan Brotherhood, and that members were sworn to lie on behalf of each other. We held the evidence admissible to show bias, even assuming that membership in the organization was among the associational freedoms protected by the First Amendment. Though Abel did not involve a capital sentencing proceeding, its logic is perfectly applicable to such a proceeding. We therefore conclude that the Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning one’s beliefs and associations at sentencing simply because those beliefs and associations are protected by the First Amendment.

Although we cannot accept Dawson’s broad submission, we nevertheless agree with him that, in this case, the receipt into evidence of the stipulation regarding his membership in the Aryan Brotherhood was constitutional error. Before the penalty hearing, the prosecution claimed that its expert witness would show that the Aryan Brotherhood is a white racist prison gang that is associated with drugs and violent escape attempts at prisons, and that advocates the murder of fellow inmates. If credible and otherwise admissible evidence to that effect had been presented, we would have a much different case. But, after reaching an agreement with Dawson, the prosecution limited its proof regarding the Aryan Brotherhood to the stipulation. The brief stipulation proved only that an Aryan Brotherhood prison gang originated in California in the 1960’s, that it entertains white racist beliefs, and that a separate gang in the Delaware prison system calls itself the Aryan Brotherhood. We conclude that the narrowness of the stipulation left the Aryan Brotherhood evidence totally without relevance to Dawson’s sentencing proceeding. .

As an initial matter, the second sentence of the stipulation, when carefully parsed, says nothing about the beliefs of the Aryan Brotherhood “chapter” in the Delaware prisons. Prior to trial, the prosecution acknowledged that there are differences among the various offshoots of the Aryan Brotherhood, stating that “there are cells or specific off-shoots within various local jurisdictions that don’t see eye to eye or share a union, if you will.” App. 33. But the juxtaposition of the second sentence with the first sentence, which describes the Aryan Brotherhood in California prisons as a “white racist prison gang,” invited the jury to infer that the beliefs of the Delaware chapter are identical to those of the California chapter.

Even if the Delaware group to which Dawson allegedly belongs is racist, those beliefs, so far as we can determine, had no relevance to the sentencing proceeding in this case. For example, the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was not tied in any way to the murder of Dawson’s victim. In Barclay, on the contrary, the evidence showed that the defendant’s membership in the Black Liberation Army, and his consequent desire to start a “racial war,” were related to the murder of a white hitchhiker. See 463 U. S., at 942-944 (plurality opinion). We concluded that it was most proper for the sentencing judge to “tak[e] into account the elements of racial hatred in this murder.” Id., at 949. In the present case, however, the murder victim was white, as is Dawson; elements of racial hatred were therefore not involved in the killing.

Because the prosecution did not prove that the Aryan Brotherhood had committed any unlawful or violent acts, or had even endorsed such acts, the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was also not relevant to help prove any aggravating circumstance. In many cases, for example, associational evidence might serve a legitimate purpose in showing that a defendant represents a future danger to society. A defendant’s membership in an organization that endorses the killing of any identifiable group, for example, might be relevant to a jury’s inquiry into whether the defendant will be dangerous in the future. Other evidence concerning a defendant’s associations might be relevant in proving other aggravating circumstances. But the inference which the jury was invited to draw in this case tended to prove nothing more than the abstract beliefs of the Delaware chapter. Delaware counters that even these abstract beliefs constitute a portion of Dawson’s “character,” and thus are admissible in their own right under Delaware law. Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 4209(d) (1987). Whatever label is given to the evidence presented, however, we conclude that Dawson’s First Amendment rights were violated by the admission of the Aryan Brotherhood evidence in this case, because the evidence proved nothing more than Dawson’s abstract beliefs. Cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 414 (1989) (“[T]he government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable”). Delaware might have avoided this problem if it had presented evidence showing more than mere abstract beliefs on Dawson’s part, but on the present record one is left with the feeling that the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was employed simply because the jury would find these beliefs morally reprehensible. Because Delaware failed to do more, we cannot find the evidence was properly admitted as relevant character evidence.

Nor was the Aryan Brotherhood evidence relevant to rebut any mitigating evidence offered by Dawson. We have held that a capital defendant is entitled to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence that he proffers in support of a sentence less than death. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 114 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion). But just as the defendant has the right to introduce any sort of relevant mitigating evidence, the State is entitled to rebut that evidence with proof of its own. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S., at 825 (“[T]he State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in”) (internal quotation marks omitted); id., at 860 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In this case, Dawson’s mitigating evidence consisted of testimony about his kindness to family members, as well as evidence regarding good time credits he earned in prison for enrolling in various drug and alcohol programs. Delaware argues that because Dawson’s evidence consisted of “good” character evidence, it was entitled to introduce any “bad” character evidence in rebuttal, including that concerning the Aryan Brotherhood. The principle of broad rebuttal asserted by Delaware is correct, but the argument misses the mark because, as stated above, the Aryan Brotherhood evidence presented in this case cannot be viewed as relevant “bad” character evidence in its own right.

The dissent takes us to task for failing to recognize the broader implications of membership in a prison gang, and for extending the protection of the First Amendment to evidence introduced at a sentencing hearing. The material adduced by the dissent as to the nature of prison gangs — similar to the evidence which the prosecution in this case at one time considered adducing by expert testimony, supra, at 165 — would, if it had been presented to the jury, have made this a different case. But we do not have the same confidence as the dissent does that jurors would be familiar with the court decisions and studies upon which it relies. Regarding the reach of the First Amendment, the dissent correctly points out that it prevents the State from criminalizing certain conduct in the first instance. But it goes further than that. It prohibits a State from denying admission to the bar on the grounds of previous membership in the Communist Party, when there is no connection between that membership and the “good moral character” required by the State to practice law. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of N. M., 353 U. S. 232 (1957). It prohibits the State from requiring information from an organization that would impinge on First Amendment associational rights if there is no connection between the information sought and the State’s interest. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958). We think that it similarly prevents Delaware here from employing evidence of a defendant’s abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried.

The question whether the wrongful admission of the Aryan Brotherhood evidence at sentencing was harmless error is not before us at this time, and we therefore leave it open for consideration by the Supreme Court of Delaware on remand. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738 (1990).

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Delaware and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Blackmun,

concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion, but write separately to note my understanding that the Court, by the penultimate paragraph of its opinion, ante, at 168-169, does not require application of harmless-error review on remand.

This Court previously has declined to apply harmless-error analysis to certain categories of constitutional error. See, e. g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, 100 (1986) (racial discrimination in the selection of a petit jury); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 261-262 (1986) (racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U. S. 39, 49-50, and n. 9 (1984) (right to a public trial); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 535 (1927) (trial before an impartial judge). Because of the potential chilling effect that consideration of First Amendment activity at sentencing might have, there is a substantial argument that harmless-error analysis is not appropriate for the type of error before us today. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S. 570, 587 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (“[Violations of certain constitutional rights are not, and should not be, subject to harmless-error analysis because those rights protect important values that are unrelated to the truth-seeking function of the trial”). The parties did not address this issue, and it is better left for the Supreme Court of Delaware on remand.

Justice Thomas,

dissenting.

To rebut mitigating character evidence introduced by petitioner Dawson at his capital sentencing hearing, the State of Delaware proved that Dawson belonged to the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang. The Court holds that the gang membership evidence “ha[d] no relevance to the issues being decided in the proceeding” and that admission of the evidence violated the First Amendment. Ante, at 160. I respectfully dissent.

I

Dawson’s membership in the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang had relevance at sentencing. Under Delaware law, after a jury finds a statutory aggravating factor, it may consider “all relevant evidence in aggravation or mitigation” relating to either the crime or the “character and propensities” of the defendant. Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1) (1987). Under this provision, Dawson’s character became an issue in determining whether he should receive the death penalty.

To prove his good character, as the Court observes, Dawson introduced evidence that he had acted kindly toward his family and that he had earned good time credits while in prison. Ante, at 162. Dawson also introduced evidence of his membership and participation in various respectable organizations, including the Green Tree Program (described only as a “drug and alcohol program”), Alcoholics Anonymous (not described at all), and certain therapy and counseling groups (also not described at all). App. 79. Dawson did not call any expert witnesses to clarify the nature of these organizations or their activities.

The State attempted to rebut Dawson’s mitigating character evidence in part by showing that Dawson also belonged to a prison gang called the Aryan Brotherhood. A stipulation read to the jury explained:

“The Aryan Brotherhood refers to a white racist prison gang that began in the 1960’s in California in response to other gangs of racial minorities. Separate gangs calling themselves the Aryan Brotherhood now exist in many state prisons including Delaware.” Id., at 132.

I do not consider the evidence of Dawson’s gang membership irrelevant to his character.

A

The Court asserts that the gang membership evidence had no relevance because it did nothing more than indicate Dawson’s “abstract” racist “beliefs.” Ante, at 167. The Court suggests that Dawson’s membership in a prison gang would be relevant if the gang had endorsed or committed “unlawful or violent acts” such as drug use, escape, or the murder of other inmates. Ante, at 165, 166. Yet, because the State failed to prove the Aryan Brotherhood’s activities, the Court reasons, the jury could do no more than infer that Dawson shared the gang’s racist beliefs. Ibid. I disagree. In my judgment, a jury reasonably could conclude from Dawson’s membership in a prison gang that he had engaged in some sort of forbidden activities while in prison. The evidence also tended to establish future dangerousness and to rebut Dawson’s attempt to show that he was kind to others.

Jurors do not leave their knowledge of the world behind when they enter a courtroom and they do not need to have the obvious spelled out in painstaking detail. Just as defense counsel may assume when introducing mitigating evidence that a jury understands the nature of a church choir, a softball team, or the Boy Scouts, so too may a prosecutor assume when rebutting this evidence that a jury knows the nature of a prison gang. The concept of a prison gang is not so mysterious that it requires an encyclopedic definition or a greater explanation than any of the other organizations to which Dawson belonged, such as Alcoholics Anonymous or the Green Tree Program. Cf. Jones v. Hamelman, 869 F. 2d 1023, 1028 (CA7 1989) (testimony of a purported expert unnecessary to explain a prison gang once the record established its existence); United States Dept, of Justice, Prison Gangs: Their Extent, Nature and Impact on Prisons 10 (1985) (discussing the “extensive” media coverage of prison gangs).

In stating that Dawson belonged to a prison gang, the stipulation implied much more than that he shared the gang’s abstract racist creed; it indicated that Dawson had engaged in prison gang activities, and that he had the character of a person who engages in these activities.

“One of the distinguishing characteristics of the prison gang is the virtual absence of any non-criminal, non-deviant activities. Gang members engage in some institutional pastimes, weight lifting being one of the more notable, but in general their activities are criminal or deviant in nature. The gang member is completely immersed in being a career prison gangster, leaving little time and less inclination for other than asocial behavior.” U. S. Dept. of Justice, supra, at x-xi.

Denying that Dawson’s gang membership told the jury anything about his activities, tendencies, and traits — his “character” — ignores reality. What Judge Easterbrook remarked when others attempted to distinguish gang membership from gang activities, someone reading the Court’s opinion might say today:

“Who do they think they are fooling? What elements of ‘membership’ — as opposed to ‘activity’ — take place [in the prison]? What are prison gangs for, except to engage in forbidden ‘activity’? Surely [they] do not believe that prison gangs meet every month to discuss The Critique of Pure Reason and debate how Stanley Tiger-man’s buildings differ from those of the Bauhaus school. Gangs affiliate for mutual support, but not the kind contemplated by the National Labor Relations Act.” David K. v. Lane, 839 F. 2d 1265, 1278 (CA7 1988) (concurring opinion).

In my view, the stipulation was relevant to Dawson’s character because it explained that the Aryan Brotherhood was a prison gang and that Dawson was a member. That evidence, I submit, supports an inference that while in prison, Dawson engaged in the kind of unlawful activity mentioned by the Court.

The description of the Aryan Brotherhood as a “racist” prison gang conveyed additional information about Dawson’s character. In Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939 (1983), the plurality found it relevant that a black gang conspired not merely to commit crimes, but to commit them against white persons out of racial hatred. See id., at 949. Even if Dawson’s white racist prison gang does not advocate “the murder of fellow inmates,” ante, at 165, a jury reasonably could infer that its members in one way or another act upon their racial prejudice. The stipulation itself makes clear that the Aryan Brotherhood does not exist merely to facilitate formulation of abstract racist thoughts, but to “respon[d]” to gangs of racial minorities. The evidence thus tends to establish that Dawson has not been “a well-behaved and well-adjusted prisoner,” Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U. S. 1, 4 (1986), which itself is an indication of future dangerousness, see Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U. S. 164, 178 (1988) (plurality opinion); id., at 186 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).

The stipulation also tends to rebut Dawson’s evidence of good character. In capital cases, we have held that the sentence imposed should reflect a “ ‘reasoned moral response’ ” not only to the crime, but also to the “‘background’” and “ ‘character’ ” of the defendant himself. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 328 (1989) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U. S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring). In determining Dawson’s “personal culpability,” Penry, supra, at 327, the jury surely would want to know about the various activities, traits, and tendencies that distinguish him as a “uniquely individual human bein[g],” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 304 (1976). Dawson introduced mitigating character evidence that he had acted kindly towards his family. The stipulation tencied to undercut this showing by suggesting that Dawson’s kindness did not extend to members of other racial groups. Although we do not sit in judgment of the morality of particular creeds, we cannot bend traditional concepts of relevance to exempt the antisocial.

B

The Court’s opinion suggests that the Constitution now imposes a double standard for determining relevance: a standard easy for defendants to satisfy, but difficult for prosecutors. Under Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982), and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion), a capital defendant has a right to introduce all relevant mitigating evidence. Capital defendants, as a result, regularly introduce character evidence that allows juries to consider their abstract beliefs and associational rights. Dawson, for example, introduced evidence that he associated with Alcoholics Anonymous and other groups. Other defendants have introduced comparable evidence regarding their religious practice and fraternal organizations. See, e. g., Jordan v. State, 518 So. 2d 1186, 1188 (Miss. 1987) (membership in a church); Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 236, 731 P. 2d 192, 231 (1986) (same); Deputy v. State, 500 A. 2d 581, 598 (Del. 1985) (religious rebirth); People v. Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d 744, 797, 755 P. 2d 310, 340 (1988) (same); Evans v. McCotter, 790 F. 2d 1232, 1242, and n. 10 (CA5 1986) (conversion to Christianity); State v. Beuke, 38 Ohio St. 3d 29, 43, 526 N. E. 2d 274, 289 (1988) (former membership in the Cub Scouts). I see no way to hold that this evidence has relevance, but that Dawson’s gang membership does not.

A double standard for determining relevance may distort the picture presented to the jury. In this case, Dawson himself chose to introduce evidence of certain good character traits. Unless the State had responded with evidence of other, bad traits, the jury could not possibly have made a fair and balanced determination. Membership in Alcoholics Anonymous might suggest a good character, but membership in the Aryan Brotherhood just as surely suggests a bad one. The jury could not have assessed Dawson’s overall character without both.

Just last Term, in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808 (1991), the Court condemned a similar distortion. Overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482 U. S. 496 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U. S. 805 (1989), we held that the Eighth Amendment does not generally prohibit the introduction of victim impact evidence. See Payne, supra, at 827. We reasoned that allowing the jury to consider the defendant, but not the victim, would create an unbalanced picture. Quoting a dissenting opinion in Booth, we stated: “‘[T]he State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his family.’ ” Payne, supra, at 825 (quoting Booth, 482 U. S., at 517 (White, J., dissenting)); see also 482 U. S., at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Many citizens have found one-sided and hence unjust the criminal trial in which a parade of witnesses comes forth to testify to the pressures beyond normal human experience that drove the defendant to commit his crime .... Perhaps these sentiments do not sufficiently temper justice with mercy, but that is a question to be decided through the democratic processes of a free people, and not by the decrees of this Court”). Whatever distortion was produced in requiring an exclusive focus on the defendant’s character, at least nothing in Booth prevented the jury — as does today’s decision — from fairly and fully assessing that character.

II

The Court acknowledges that Delaware could have avoided any First Amendment problem simply by presenting evidence that proved something more than Dawson’s abstract beliefs. Ante, at 167. For the reasons that I have stated, I believe that Delaware has made such a showing. I therefore see no First Amendment violation under the Court’s analysis. The Court, however, goes on to make several further assertions about the First Amendment that I find troubling and unnecessary in this case.

A

Both Dawson and the State, as noted above, had a right to develop the issue of “character” at the sentencing proceeding. See Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1) (1987); Eddings, supra, at 113-114. In applying the First Amendment, however, the Court declines to decide whether abstract beliefs may constitute a portion of character. “Whatever label is given to the evidence,” the Court asserts, “we conclude that Dawson’s First Amendment rights were violated ... in this case-” Ante, at 167. As a consequence, to the extent that abstract beliefs make up part of a person’s character, the decision today limits the aspects of character that sentencing authorities may consider.

We long have held that the Constitution permits courts and juries to consider character evidence in sentencing proceedings. See Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 247 (1949). Until today, we have never hinted that the First Amendment limits the aspects of a defendant’s character that they may consider. To the contrary, we have emphasized that the sentencing authority “may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.” United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443, 446 (1972).

In Williams, for example, we upheld a New York law that encouraged the sentencing judge to consider evidence about the defendant’s “past life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities,” 337 U. S., at 245, a phrase easily broad enough to encompass a substantial amount of First Amendment activity. Writing for the Court, Justice Black specifically identified religion and interests as sentencing considerations that may “give the sentencing judge a composite picture of the defendant.” Id., at 250, n. 15.

More recently, in Franklin v. Lynaugh, all five Members of the Court who addressed the issue agreed that religious activity may bear upon a defendant’s character. See 487 U. S., at 186 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (“Evidence of... religious devotion might demonstrate positive character traits”); id., at 190 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Evidence of . . . regular church attendance” is relevant to character). Although the opinions in Franklin endorsed consideration of religious activity as a mitigating factor, the endorsement necessarily disfavors abstention from religious activity, which the First Amendment also protects.

The Court nowhere explains why courts and juries may consider some First Amendment protected activities when assessing character, but they cannot consider others. Today’s decision, moreover, does not define the boundaries of permissible inquiry into character. If the Court means that no First Amendment protected activity “ca[n] be viewed as relevant ‘bad’ character evidence in its own right,” ante, at 168, then today’s decision represents a dramatic shift in our sentencing jurisprudence.

B

Once the Court concludes that the gang membership evidence “has no relevance to the issues being decided in the [sentencing] proceeding,” ante, at 160, I also have difficulty seeing what the First Amendment adds to the analysis. If the Court considers the evidence irrelevant, the problem is not that Delaware law bases the sentencing decision on impermissible issues, but rather that Dawson may not have received a fair trial on the permissible issues in the proceeding. The Due Process Clause, not the First Amendment, traditionally has regulated questions about the improper admission of evidence.

As we stated in Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940), the requirement of due process always has protected “the weak, or . . . helpless political, religious, or racial minorities and those who differed” by ensuring that “no man’s life, liberty or property be forfeited as criminal punishment for violation of [the] law until there ha[s] been a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a public tribunal free of prejudice, passion, excitement, and tyrannical power.” Id., at 236-237. We have made clear, in particular, that when a state court admits evidence that is “so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S., at 825; see Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 168, 179-183 (1986).

Our decision in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of N. M., 353 U. S. 232 (1957), which the Court incorrectly cites, illustrates the point. In Schware, the New Mexico Supreme Court denied an applicant admission to the bar on grounds that he lacked good moral character. Evidence showed that the applicant had belonged to the Communist Party 15 years earlier. The Court erroneously states that Schware held that admitting proof of the applicant’s membership in the Communist Party violated the First Amendment. Ante, at 168. Schware, in fact, did not decide that admitting the Communist Party evidence abridged any right of free political association. See 353 U. S., at 243, n. 13. It held, instead, that the state court erred in admitting the Communist Party evidence because it had no relevance to the applicant’s moral character after so many years. See id., at 246. Due process, the Court concluded, prohibited the state court to find the applicant morally unfit to practice law without any relevant evidence. See id., at 247.

Applying familiar evidentiary standards in Dawson’s case, the trial judge recognized that the “real issue” in admitting the gang membership evidence was whether its “probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” App. 52. The Delaware Supreme Court, likewise, examined the record to determine whether the gang membership evidence “improperly appealed] to the juror’s passions and prejudices concerning race, religion, or political affiliation.” 581 A. 2d 1078, 1103 (1990). The standards employed by these courts went further than the fundamental unfairness standard stated in Payne and therefore satisfied the requirements of due process. Dawson has presented no convincing argument, based on the record as a whole, that the courts misapplied these standards to the facts of his case. For these reasons, I would affirm.

       Indeed, in the case of an organization claiming to be part of the Aryan Brotherhood, the jury very well may not have needed even the explanation that the stipulation provided. Courts regularly have noticed that the Aryan Brotherhood is “a singularly vicious prison gang,” United States v. Fountain, 840 F. 2d 509, 516 (CA7 1988) (Easterbrook, J.) (citing other cases), that it has a “hostility to black inmates,” United States v. Silverstein, 732 F. 2d 1338, 1341 (CA7 1984) (Posner, J.) (citing secondary sources), and that it originated “during the prison racial violence of the 1960’s,” United States v. Mills, 704 F. 2d 1553, 1555 (CA11 1983). The Aryan Brotherhood gangs also have received substantial attention in both popular and scholarly writings. See, e. g., Matthee, Stronger Prison Gang Influence Cited, L. A. Times, July 10,1987, part 1, p. 34, col. 1 (describing members of the Aryan Brotherhood as “among the most violent prisoners”); Goodgame, Mayhem in the Cellblocks, Time, Aug. 12, 1985, p. 20 (describing the Aryan Brotherhood’s “inflexible ethic of vengeance”); J. Fox, Organizational and Racial Conflict in Maximum-Security Prisons 136 (1982) (identifying the Aryan Brotherhood as an “extremist” organization like the Ku Klux Klan); United States Dept, of Justice, Prison Gangs: Their Extent, Nature and Impact on Prisons 65-190 (1985) (discussing the activities of the Aryan Brotherhood in the prisons of 14 States). Even if the jury were unaware of the Aryan Brotherhood in particular, it was surely aware of the nature of prison gangs generally.

       In federal court, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(2)(A) permits the presentence report following a criminal conviction to contain “information about the history and characteristics of the defendant. . . that may be helpful in imposing sentence.” The Advisory Committee Note to the original version of this Rule, 18 U. S. C. App., p. 795, refers to a report that we endorsed in Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 250, n. 15 (1949): Administrative Office of the United States Courts, The Presentence Investigation Report, Pub. No. 101 (1943). This report explains: “Centuries of human experience have given testimony to the dynamic qualities of religion. Religion may be a significant, decisive factor in enabling an individual to overcome his difficulties.” Id., at 10. The report also suggests that courts consider the defendant’s “fraternal and social organizations.” Ibid. A more recent edition of this report retains comparable instructions. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, The Pre-sentence Investigation Report, Pub. No. 105 (1984).


author: Justice O’Connor

text:
    GENERAL MOTORS CORP. et al. v. ROMEIN et al.
    No. 90-1390.
    Argued December 10, 1991
    Decided March 9, 1992

      O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Kenneth S. Getter argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Stephen M. Shapiro, Mark I. Levy, James D. Holzhauer, Charles A. Rothfeld, Lawrence C. Marshall, John M. Thomas, Theodore Souris, Martha B. Good-loe, and Daniel G. Galant.

      Theodore Sachs argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondents Romein and Gonzalez were
      Robert M. Weinberg and Laurence Gold. Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, pro se, Gay Secor Hardy, Solicitor General, and Thomas L. Casey, Assistant Solicitor General, filed a brief for respondent Kelley.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Citizens Insurance Co. of America et al. by Donald S. Young and Kathleen McCree Lewis; for the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., et al. by David A Strauss, William H. Crabtree, Dwight H. Vincent, J. Walker Henry, and Rachelle G. Silberberg; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Scott G. Campbell, Daniel J. Popeo, and Richard A. Samp.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Starr, Christopher J. Wright, Richard H. Sea-mon, Allen H. Feldman, Kerry L. Adams, and Ellen L. Beard; and for the Council of State Governments et al. by Richard Ruda and David Shapiro.

   Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 1987, the Michigan Legislature enacted a statute that had the effect of requiring petitioners General Motors Corporation (GM) and Ford Motor Company (Ford) to repay workers’ compensation benefits GM and Ford had withheld in reliance on a 1981 workers’ compensation statute. Petitioners challenge the provision of the statute mandating these retroactive payments on the ground that it violates the Contract Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution.

I

Since at least 1974, workers’ compensation law in Michigan has been the subject of legislative study and bitter debate. VanderLaan & Studley, Workers’ Compensation Reform: A Case Study of the Legislative Process in Michigan, 14 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 451, 452-454 (1981). “Literally dozens of conflicting legislative proposals” were offered each year, and all were fought to a standstill by competing interest groups. Id., at 453. The legislative logjam was finally broken in 1980, when the Governor and four legislative leaders began a series of negotiations leading to an agreement on reforms. “Neither side was able to obtain everything it wanted — possibly a good indication of the degree of balance this compromise represents.” Id., at 458.

Among other things, the 1980 legislation raised maximum weekly benefits to 90% of the state average weekly wage, and provided workers injured before 1980 an annual supplemental adjustment of their benefits of up to five percent. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§418.355(2), 418.352(1) (West 1982). In 1981, the legislature enacted a statute allowing employers to decrease workers’ compensation benefits to those disabled employees eligible to receive wage-loss compensation from other employer-funded sources. §418.354. This provision, allowing what is called “benefit coordination,” is at the heart of the controversy in this case.

The benefit coordination provision did not specify whether it was to be applied to workers injured before its effective date, March 31, 1982. Petitioners took the position that the 1981 law allowed them to reduce workers’ compensation benefits to workers injured before March 31, 1982, who were receiving benefits from other sources. For example, GM cut respondent Romein’s weekly payment by $132 per week, and Ford cut respondent Gonzalez’ payment by $176 per week. The lower state courts disagreed with petitioners’ interpretation, holding that coordination was allowed only for employees injured after 1982. See, e. g., Franks v. White Pine Copper Div., Copper Range Co., 122 Mich. App. 177, 185, 332 N. W. 2d 447, 449 (1982). Both Houses of the Michigan Legislature passed a concurrent resolution declaring that the coordination provisions were “not designed to disrupt benefits which were already being received by an employee prior to the effective date of this act or benefits resulting from injuries incurred prior to the act’s effective date.” See Senate Con. Res. 575, adopted by the Senate on April 1, 1982, and by the House on May 18, 1982; 1982 Senate J. 626, 706-707; 1982 House J. 1262. The same year, a bill was introduced in the Michigan Senate to amend the statute in this respect, but it was not passed. Senate Bill 834, introduced on May 26, 1982.

Meanwhile, petitioners continued to attempt to persuade the Michigan courts that the 1981 statute should be applied to workers injured before its effective date. In 1985, petitioners’ interpretation was accepted by the Michigan Supreme Court. Chambers v. General Motors Corp., decided with Franks v. White Pine Copper Div., Copper Range Co., 422 Mich. 636, 375 N. W. 2d 715. The court held that the benefit coordination provision applied to all payment periods after its effective date, regardless of the date the employee had been injured. The court also held that application of the coordination provisions to employees injured before 1982 did not violate the Contract Clause or the Due Process Clause.

After the decision in Chambers, employers who had not coordinated benefits for employees injured before 1982 began to demand reimbursement from these employees. See Jones, Firms Cut Checks for Disabled Workers, Detroit Free Press, Nov. 29, 1985, p. 3A. The Michigan Legislature responded almost immediately by introducing legislation to overturn the court’s decision. On October 16, 1985, before the Michigan Supreme Court had ruled on the motion for rehearing in Chambers, House Bill 5084 was introduced. As amended and passed by the House on January 29, 1986, the bill repudiated the Chambers decision, declared that employers who had not coordinated benefits before the Chambers decision could not seek reimbursement from affected employees, and required employers who had coordinated benefits before Chambers to reimburse their employees. Meanwhile, the Senate passed its own version of the bill, Senate Bill 67, also disapproving the Chambers decision and providing that employers could not require employees to reimburse them for benefits not coordinated after 1982. The Senate bill was amended by a Conference Committee to provide for reimbursement of benefits withheld as a result of coordination, putting employers who had coordinated benefits for previously disabled workers in the same position as those who had not. House Legislative Analysis of Senate Bill 67, p. 2 (May 7, 1987). The amended Senate bill passed into law on May 14, 1987. 1987 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 28.

As a result of the 1987 statute, petitioners were ordered to refund nearly $25 million to disabled employees. They protested that the provision requiring reimbursement of benefits withheld was unfairly retroactive and violated the Contract Clause and the Due Process Clause. The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the statute against these challenges, on the ground that the employers had no vested rights in coordination for Contract Clause purposes, and that the retroactive provisions furthered a rational legislative purpose. 436 Mich. 515, 462 N. W. 2d 555 (1990). We granted certio-rari, 500 U. S. 915 (1991), and now affirm.

l — i

Article I, § 10, of the Constitution provides: “No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” Petitioners claim that the 1987 statute requiring reimbursement of benefits withheld in reliance on the 1981 coordination provisions substantially impaired the obligation of the contracts with their employees.

Generally, we first ask whether the change in state law has “operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.” Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U. S. 234, 244 (1978); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U. S. 400, 411 (1983). This inquiry has three components: whether there is a contractual relationship, whether a change in law impairs that contractual relationship, and whether the impairment is substantial. Normally, the first two are unproblematic, and we need address only the third. In this case, however, we need not reach the questions of impairment, as we hold that there was no contractual agreement regarding the specific workers’ compensation terms allegedly at issue.

The contracts allegedly impaired by the 1987 statute are employment contracts entered into after collective bargaining between petitioners and respondents. It is undisputed that the contracts themselves were formed before the 1981 law was enacted requiring benefit coordination. It is also undisputed that the contracts make no express mention of workers’ compensation benefits. Petitioners argue that the workers’ compensation law is an implied term of the contracts, because the parties bargained for other compensation with workers’ compensation benefits in mind. This implied term that was allegedly impaired by the 1987 statute is defined as a promise to pay the amount of workers’ compensation required by law for each payment period. Once performance of this obligation is completed by making payments for any disability period, petitioners claim that they have a settled expectation that cannot be undone by later state legislation. Because the 1987 statute “reopens” these closed transactions, petitioners contend its retroactive provisions violate the Contract Clause.

The Michigan Supreme Court held that the term suggested by petitioners was not an implied term of the employment contracts between petitioners and respondents. We “accord respectful consideration and great weight to the views of the State’s highest court,” though ultimately we are “bound to decide for ourselves whether a contract was made.” Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 100 (1938). The question whether a contract was made is a federal question for purposes of Contract Clause analysis, see Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U. S. 556, 561 (1942), and “whether it turns on issues of general or purely local law, we can'not surrender the duty to exercise our own judgment.” Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U. S. 364, 380 (1926). In this case, however, we see no reason to disagree with the Michigan Supreme Court’s conclusion.

While it is true that the terms to which the contracting parties give assent may be express or implied in their dealings, cf. Garrison v. City of New York, 21 Wall. 196, 203 (1875), the contracting parties here in no way manifested assent to limiting disability payments in accordance with the 1981 law allowing coordination of benefits. The employment contracts at issue were formed before the 1981 law allowing coordination of benefits came into effect. Thus, there was no occasion for the parties to consider in bargaining the question raised here: whether an unanticipated reduction in benefits could later be restored after the “benefit period” had closed.

Petitioners argue that their right to rely on past payment periods as “closed” is a contractual term “incorporated” by law into the employment contracts, regardless of the assent, express or implied, of the parties. While petitioners cite passages from our prior decisions that “ ‘the laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract . . . enter into and form a part of it/ ” Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 429-430 (1934) (quoting Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 550 (1867)), that principle has no application here, since petitioners have not shown that the alleged right to rely on past payment periods as closed was part of Michigan law at the time of the original contract. Though Michigan courts, in awarding interest on unpaid workers’ compensation awards, had held that such awards were more analogous to contractual damages than tort damages, see, e. g., Wilson v. Doehler-Jarvis Division of National Lead Co., 358 Mich. 510, 517-519, 100 N. W. 2d 226, 229-230 (1960); Brown v. Eller Outdoor Advertising Co., 139 Mich. App. 7, 14, 360 N. W. 2d 322, 326 (1984), Michigan law does not explicitly imply a contractual term allowing an employer to depend on the closure of past disability compensation periods. Moreover, such right does not appear to be so central to the bargained-for exchange between the parties, or to the enforceability of the contract as a whole, that it must be deemed to be a term of the contract.

Contrary to petitioners’ suggestion, we have not held that all state regulations are implied terms of every contract entered into while they are effective, especially when the regulations themselves cannot be fairly interpreted to require such incorporation. For the most part, state laws are implied into private contracts regardless of the assent of the parties only when those laws affect the validity, construction, and enforcement of contracts. See United States Trust Co. of N. Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U. S. 1, 19, n. 17 (1977).

While it is somewhat misleading to characterize laws affecting the enforceability of contracts as “incorporated terms” of a contract, see 3 A. Corbin, Contracts §551, pp. 199-200 (1960), these laws are subject to Contract Clause analysis because without them, contracts are reduced to simple, unenforceable promises. “The obligation of a contract consists in its binding force on the party who makes it. This depends on the laws in existence when it is made; these are necessarily referred to in all contracts, and forming a part of them as the measure of the obligation to perform them by the one party, and the right acquired by the other.... If any subsequent law affect to diminish the duty, or to impair the right, it necessarily bears on the obligation of the contract.” McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608, 612 (1844). See also Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, supra. A change in the remedies available under a contract, for example, may convert an agreement enforceable at law into a mere promise, thereby impairing the contract’s obligatory force. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 197-198 (1819); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 601 (1878). For this reason, changes in the laws that make a contract legally enforceable may trigger Contract Clause scrutiny if they impair the obligation of pre-existing contracts, even if they do not alter any of the contracts’ bargained-for terms. See, e. g., Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, supra (repeal of tax designed to repay bond issue); Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, 316 (1843) (law limiting foreclosure rights); McCracken, supra, at 611-614 (same).

The 1987 statute did not change the legal enforceability of the employment contracts here. The parties still have the same ability to enforce the bargained-for terms of the employment contracts that they did before the 1987 statute was enacted. Moreover, petitioners’ suggestion that we should read every workplace regulation into the private contractual arrangements of employers and employees would expand the definition of contract so far that the constitutional provision would lose its anchoring purpose, i. e., “enabling] individuals to order their personal and business affairs according to their particular needs and interests.” Allied Structural Steel, 438 U. S., at 245. Instead, the Clause would protect against all changes in legislation, regardless of the effect of those changes on bargained-for agreements. The employment contract, in petitioners’ view, could incorporate workplace safety regulations, employment tax obligations, and laws prohibiting workplace discrimination, even if these laws are not intended to affect private contracts and are not subject to bargaining between the employer and employees. Moreover, petitioners’ construction would severely limit the ability of state legislatures to amend their regulatory legislation. Amendments could not take effect until all existing contracts expired, and parties could evade regulation by entering into long-term contracts. The ultimate irony of petitioners’ proposed principle is that, taken to an extreme, it would render the Contract Clause itself entirely dependent on state law. As Justice Story pointed out:

“It has been contended, by some learned minds, that the municipal law of a place where a contract is made forms a part of it, and travels with it, wherever the parties to it may be found. If this were admitted to be true, the consequence would be, that all the existing laws of a State, being incorporated into the contract, would constitute a part of its stipulations .... If, therefore, the legislature should provide, by a law, that all contracts thereafter made should be subject to the entire control of the legislature, as to their obligation, validity, and execution, whatever might be their terms, they would be 'completely within the legislative power, and might be impaired or extinguished by future laws; thus having a complete ex post facto operation.” 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1383, pp. 252-253 (5th ed. 1891).

I — Í hH HH

Petitioners also contend that the 1987 statute violated due process because its retroactive provisions unreasonably interfered with closed transactions. Retroactive legislation presents problems of unfairness that are more serious than those posed by prospective legislation, because it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions. For this reason, “[t]he retroactive aspects of [economic] legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due process”: a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U. S. 717, 730 (1984).

The statute in this case meets that standard. The purpose of the 1987 statute was to correct the unexpected results of the Michigan Supreme Court’s Chambers opinion. The retroactive repayment provision of the 1987 statute was a rational means of meeting this legitimate objective: It preserved the delicate legislative compromise that had been struck by the 1980 and 1981 laws — giving workers injured before 1982 their full benefits without coordination, but not the greater increases given to subsequently injured workers. Also, it equalized the payments made by employers who had gambled on the Chambers decision with those made by employers who had not. Cf. United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U. S. 52, 64-65 (1989) (legitimate to legislate retrospectively in order to ensure that similarly situated persons bear similar financial burdens of program).

In sum, petitioners knew they were taking a risk in reducing benefits to their workers, but they took their chances with their interpretation of the 1981 law. Having now lost the battle in the Michigan Legislature, petitioners wished to continue the war in court. Losing a political skirmish, however, in itself creates no ground for constitutional relief.

Affirmed.