author: Justice Marshall Justice Blackmun,

text:
    PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE et al. v. DAVENPORT et ux.
    No. 89-156.
    Argued February 20, 1990
    Decided May 29, 1990

      Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Brennan, White, Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O’Connor, J., joined, post, p. 564.

      Walter W. Cohen, First Deputy Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General, John

      G. Knorr III, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Calvin R. Koons, Senior Deputy Attorney General, and Mary Benefield Seiverling, Deputy Attorney General.

      David A. Searles argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were Eric L. Frank and Henry J. Sommer.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorneys General Dennis and Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, and Stephen L. Nightingale; for the State of Alabama et al. by Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General of Virginia, H. Lane Kneedler, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Walter A. McFarlane, Deputy Attorney General, and Jeffrey A. Spencer, Assistant Attorney General, Don Siegelman, Attorney General of Alabama, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, Clarine Nardi Riddle, Acting Attorney General of Connecticut, and John J. Kelly, Chief States Attorney, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, James T. Jones, Attorney General of Idaho, Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, Frederic J. Cowan, Attorney General of Kentucky, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, James, E. Tierney, Attorney General of Maine, James M. Shannon, Attorney General of Massachusetts, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, William L. Webster, Attorney General of Missouri, Marc Racicot, Attorney General of Montana, John P. Arnold, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Peter N. Perretti, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, Hal Stratton, Attorney General of New Mexico, Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina, Nicholas J. Spaeth, Attorney General of North Dakota, Anthony. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General of Ohio, Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon, Jorge E. Perez-Diaz, Solicitor General of Puerto Rico, T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, Roger A. Tellinghuisen, Attorney General of South Dakota, Charles W. Burson, Attorney General of Tennessee, R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney General of Utah, Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General of Vermont, Godfrey R. de Castro, Attorney General of the Virgin Islands, and Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General of Wyoming; for the Council of State Governments et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon and Thomas D. Goldberg; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar, and Richard A. Samp.

   Justice Marshall

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U. S. 36, 50 (1986), this Court held that restitution obligations imposed as conditions of probation in state criminal actions are nondischargeable in proceedings under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. §701 et seq. The Court rested its holding on its interpretation of the Code provision that protects from discharge any debt that is “a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.” § 523(a)(7). Because the Court determined that restitution orders fall within § 523(a)(7)’s exception to discharge, it declined to reach the question whether restitution orders are “debt[s]” as defined by §101(11) of the Code. In this case, we must decide whether restitution obligations are dischargeable debts in proceedings under Chapter 13, § 1301 et seq. The exception to discharge relied on in Kelly does not extend to Chapter 13. We conclude, based on the language and structure of the Code, that restitution obligations are “debt[s]” as defined by §101(11). We therefore hold that such payments are dis-chargeable under Chapter 13.

I

In September 1986, respondents Edward and Debora Davenport pleaded guilty in a Pennsylvania court to welfare fraud and were sentenced to one year’s probation. As a condition of probation, the state court ordered the Davenports to make monthly restitution payments to the county probation department, which in turn would forward the payments to the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, the victim of the Davenports’ fraud. Pennsylvania law mandates restitution of welfare payments obtained through fraud, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 62, §481(c) (Purdon Supp. 1989), and directs the probation section to “forward to the victim the property or payments made pursuant to the restitution order,” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1106(e) (1988).

In May 1987, the Davenports filed a petition under Chapter 13 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In their Chapter 13 statement, they listed their restitution obligation as an unsecured debt payable to the Department of Public Welfare. Soon thereafter, the Adult Probation and Parole Department of Bucks County (Probation Department) commenced a probation violation proceeding, alleging that the Davenports had failed to comply with the restitution order. The Davenports informed the Probation Department of the pending bankruptcy proceedings and requested that the Department withdraw the probation violation charges until the bankruptcy issues were settled. The Probation Department refused, and the Davenports filed an adversary action in Bankruptcy Court seeking both a declaration that the restitution obligation was a dischargeable debt and an injunction preventing the Probation Department from undertaking any further efforts to collect on the obligation.

While the adversary action was pending, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed the Davenports’ Chapter 13 plan without objection from any creditor. Although notified of the proceedings, neither the Probation Department nor the Department of Public Welfare filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy action. Meanwhile, the Probation Department proceeded in state court on its motion to revoke probation. Although the court declined to revoke the Davenports’ probation and extended their payment period, it nonetheless ruled that its restitution order remained in effect.

The Bankruptcy Court subsequently held that the Davenports’ restitution obligation was an unsecured debt dis-chargeable under 11 U. S. C. § 1328(a). 83 B. R. 309 (ED Pa. 1988). On appeal, the District Court reversed, holding that state-imposed criminal restitution obligations cannot be discharged in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. 89 B. R. 428 (ED Pa. 1988). The District Court emphasized the federalism concerns that are implicated when federal courts intrude on state criminal processes, id., at 430, and relied substantially on dicta in Kelly, supra, at 50, where the Court expressed “serious doubts whether Congress intended to make criminal penalties ‘debts’ ” under the Code. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that “the plain language of the chapter” demonstrated that restitution orders are debts within the meaning of the Code and hence dis-chargeable in proceedings under Chapter 13. In re Johnson-Alien, 871 F. 2d 421, 428 (1989).

To address a conflict among Bankruptcy Courts on this issue, we granted certiorari, 493 U. S. 808 (1989).

II

Our construction of the term “debt” is guided by the fundamental canon that statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute itself. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U. S. 681, 685 (1985). Section 101(11) of the Bankruptcy Code defines “debt” as a “liability on a claim.” This definition reveals Congress’ intent that the meanings of “debt” and “claim” be coextensive. See also H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 310 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 23 (1978). Thus, the meaning of “claim” is crucial to our analysis. A “claim” is a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U. S. C. §101(4)(A) (emphasis added). As is apparent, Congress chose expansive language in both definitions relevant to this case. For example, to the extent the phrase “right to payment” is modified in the statute, the modifying language (“whether or not such right is . . .”) reflects Congress’ broad rather than restrictive view of the class of obligations that qualify as a “claim” giving rise to a “debt.” See also H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, supra, at 309 (describing definition of “claim” as “broadest possible” and noting that Code “contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor . . . will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case”); accord, S. Rep. No. 95-989, supra, at 22.

Petitioners maintain that a restitution order is not a “right to payment” because neither the Probation Department nor the victim stands in a traditional creditor-debtor relationship with the criminal offender. In support of this position, petitioners refer to Kelly’s discussion of the special purposes of punishment and rehabilitation underlying the imposition of restitution obligations. 479 U. S., at 52. Petitioners also emphasize that restitution orders are enforced differently from other obligations that are considered “rights to payment.”

In Kelly, the Court decided that restitution orders fall within 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(7)’s exception to discharge provision, which protects from discharge any debt “to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.” In reaching that conclusion, the Court necessarily found that such orders are “not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.” Rather, “[bjecause criminal proceedings focus on the State’s interests in rehabilitation and punishment,” the Court held that “restitution orders imposed in such proceedings operate ‘for the benefit of’ the State” and not “‘for . . . compensation’ of the victim.” 479 U. S., at 53.

Contrary to petitioners’ argument, however, the Court’s prior characterization of the purposes underlying restitution orders does not bear on our construction of the phrase “right to payment” in § 101(4)(A). The Court in Kelly analyzed the purposes of restitution in construing the qualifying clauses of § 523(a)(7), which explicitly tie the application of that provision to the purpose of the compensation required. But the language employed to define “claim” in § 101(4)(A) makes no reference to purpose. The plain meaning of a “right to payment” is nothing more nor less than an enforceable obligation, regardless of the objectives the State seeks to serve in imposing the obligation.

Nor does the State’s method of enforcing restitution obligations suggest that such obligations are not “claims.” Although neither the Probation Department nor the victim can enforce restitution obligations in civil proceedings, Commonwealth v. Mourar, 349 Pa. Super. 583, 603, 504 A. 2d 197, 208 (1986), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 517 Pa. 83, 534 A. 2d 1050 (1987), the obligation is enforceable by the substantial threat of revocation of probation and incarceration. That the Probation Department’s enforcement mechanism is criminal rather than civil does not alter the restitution order’s character as a “right to payment.” Indeed, the right created by such an order made as a condition of probation is in some sense greater than the right conferred by an ordinary civil obligation, because it is secured by the debtor’s freedom rather than his property. Accordingly, we do not regard the purpose or enforcement mechanism of restitution orders as placing such orders outside the scope of § 101(4)(A).

Ill

Moving beyond the language of § 101, the United States, appearing as amicus in support of petitioners, contends that other provisions in the Code, particularly the exemption to the automatic stay provision, § 362(b)(1), and Chapter 7’s distribution of claims provision, § 726, reflect Congress’ intent to exempt restitution orders from discharge under Chapter 13. We are not persuaded, however, that the language or the structure of the Code as a whole supports that conclusion.

Section 362(a) automatically stays a wide array of collection and enforcement proceedings against the debtor and his property. Section 362(b)(1) exempts from the stay “the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor.” According to the Senate Report, the exception from the automatic stay ensures that “[t]he bankruptcy laws are not a haven for criminal offenders.” S. Rep. No. 95-989, supra, at 51. Section 362(b)(1) does not, however, explicitly exempt governmental efforts to collect restitution obligations from a debtor. Cf. 11 U. S. C. § 362(b)(2) (“collection of alimony, maintenance, or support” is not barred by the stay). Nonetheless, the United States argues that it would be anomalous to construe the Code as eliminating a haven for criminal offenders under the automatic stay provision while granting them sanctuary from restitution obligations under Chapter 13.

We find no inconsistency in these provisions. Section 362(b)(1) ensures that the automatic stay provision is not construed to bar federal or state prosecution of alleged criminal offenses. It is not an irrational or inconsistent policy choice to permit prosecution of criminal offenses during the pend-ency of a bankruptcy action and at the same time to preclude probation officials from enforcing restitution orders while a debtor seeks relief under Chapter 13. Congress could well have concluded that maintaining criminal prosecutions during bankruptcy proceedings is essential to the functioning of government but that, in the context of Chapter 13, a debtor’s interest in full and complete release of his obligations outweighs society’s interest in collecting or enforcing a restitution obligation outside the agreement reached in the Chapter 13 plan.

The United States’ reliance on § 726 is likewise unavailing. That section establishes the order in which claims are settled under Chapter 7. Section 726(a)(4) assigns a low priority to “any allowed claim, whether secured or unsecured, for any fine, penalty, or forfeiture ... to the extent that such fine, penalty, forfeiture, or damages are not compensation for actual pecuniary loss suffered by the holder of such claim.” The United States argues that the phrase “fine, penalty, or forfeiture” should be construed to apply only to civil fines, penalties, and forfeitures, and not to criminal restitution obligations. Otherwise, State and Federal Governments will receive disfavored treatment relative to other creditors both in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 proceedings, see § 1325(a)(4) (a Chapter 13 plan must ensure that unsecured creditors receive no worse treatment than they would under Chapter 7), a result the United States regards as anomalous given the strength of the governmental interest in collecting restitution payments.

The central difficulty with the United States’ construction of § 726(a)(4) is that it conflicts with Kelly’s holding that § 523(a)(7), the exception to discharge provision, applies to criminal restitution obligations. 479 U. S., at 51 (§ 523(a)(7) “creates a broad exception for all penal sanctions”). The United States acknowledges that the phrase “fine, penalty, or forfeiture” as it appears in § 726(a)(4) must have the same meaning as in § 523(a)(7). We are unwilling to revisit Kelly’s determination that § 523(a)(7) “protects traditional criminal fines [by] codif[ying] the judicially created exception to discharge for fines.” Ibid, (emphasis added). Thus, we reject the view that §§ 523(a)(7) and 726(a)(4) implicitly refer only to civil fines and penalties.

The United States’ position here highlights the tension between Kelly’s, interpretation of § 523(a)(7) and its dictum suggesting that restitution obligations are not “debts.” See supra, at 557. As stated above, Kelly found explicitly that § 523(a)(7) “codifies the judicially created exception to discharge” for both civil and criminal fines. 479 U. S., at 51. Had Congress believed that restitution obligations were not “debts” giving rise to “claims,” it would have had no reason to except such obligations from discharge in § 523(a)(7). Given Kelly’s interpretation of § 523(a)(7), then, it would be anomalous to construe “debt” narrowly so as to exclude criminal restitution orders. Such a narrow construction of “debt” necessarily renders § 523(a)(7)’s codification of the judicial exception for criminal restitution orders mere surplusage. Our cases express a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment. See, e. g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 837 (1988).

Moreover, in locating Congress’ policy choice regarding the dischargeability of restitution orders in § 523(a)(7), Kelly is faithful to the language and structure of the Code: Congress defined “debt” broadly and took care to except particular debts from discharge where policy considerations so warranted. Accordingly, Congress secured a broader discharge for debtors under Chapter 13 than Chapter 7 by extending to Chapter 13 proceedings some, but not all, of § 523(a)’s exceptions to discharge. See 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1328.01 [l][c] (15th ed. 1986) (“[T]he dischargeability of debts in chapter 13 that are not dischargeable in chapter 7 represents a policy judgment that [it] is preferable for debtors to attempt to pay such debts to the best of their abilities over three years rather than for those debtors to have those debts hanging over their heads indefinitely, perhaps for the rest of their lives”) (footnote omitted). Among those exceptions that Congress chose not to extend to Chapter 13 proceedings is § 523(a)(7)’s exception for debts arising from a “fine, penalty, or forfeiture.” Thus, to construe “debt” narrowly in this context would be to override the balance Congress struck in crafting the appropriate discharge exceptions for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 debtors.

IV

Our refusal to carve out a broad judicial exception to discharge for restitution orders does not signal a retreat from the principles applied in Kelly. We will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure. Kelly, supra, at 47 (citing Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, 474 U. S. 494 (1986)). In Kelly, the Court examined pre-Code practice and identified a general reluctance “to interpret federal bankruptcy statutes to remit state criminal judgments.” 479 U. S., at 44. This pre-Code practice informed the Court’s conclusion that § 523(a)(7) broadly applies to all penal sanctions, including criminal fines. Here, on the other hand, the statutory language plainly reveals Congress’ intent not to except restitution orders from discharge in certain Chapter 13 proceedings. This intent is clear from Congress’ decision to limit the exceptions to discharge applicable to Chapter 13, § 1328(a), as well as its adoption of the “broadest possible” definition of “debt” in § 101(11). See supra, at 558.

Nor do we conclude lightly that Congress intended to interfere with States’ administration of their criminal justice systems. Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 46 (1971). As the Court stated in Kelly, permitting discharge of criminal restitution obligations may hamper the flexibility of state criminal judges in fashioning appropriate sentences and require state prosecutors to participate in federal bankruptcy proceedings to safeguard state interests. 479 U. S., at 49. Certainly the legitimate state interest in avoiding such intrusions is not lessened simply because the offender files under Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 7. Nonetheless, the concerns animating Younger cannot justify rewriting the Code to avoid federal intrusion. Where, as here, congressional intent is clear, our sole function is to enforce the statute according to its terms.

V

Restitution obligations constitute debts within the meaning of § 101(11) of the Bankruptcy Code and are therefore dis-chargeable under Chapter 13. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Blackmun,

with whom Justice O’Connor joins, dissenting.

The Court today concludes that Congress intended an obligation to pay restitution imposed as part of a state criminal sentence to be a “debt” within the meaning of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Because Congress has given no clear indication that it intended to abrogate the long “history of bankruptcy court deference to criminal judgments,” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U. S. 36, 44 (1986), and because there is no suggestion in the Bankruptcy Code that it may be used as a shield to protect a criminal from punishment for his crime, I must disagree.

This Court carefully has set forth a method for statutory analysis of the Bankruptcy Code. See Kelly, supra; see also Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, 474 U. S. 494 (1986). When analyzing a bankruptcy statute, the Court, of course, looks to its plain language. But the Court has warned against an overly literal interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code. “‘[W]e must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’” Kelly, 479 U. S., at 43, quoting, as have other opinions of this Court, United States v. Heirs of Boisdoré, 8 How. 113, 122 (1849). The strict language of the Bankruptcy Code does not control, even if the statutory language has a “plain” meaning, if the application of that language “will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters.” United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 242 (1989). To determine the drafters’ intent, the Court presumes that Congress intended to keep continuity between pre-Code judicial practice and the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. Midlantic, 474 U. S., at 501. For me, the statutory language, the consistent authority treating criminal sanctions as nondischargeable under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the absence of any legislative history suggesting that the Code was intended to change that established principle, and the strong policy of deference to state criminal judgments all compel the conclusion that a restitution order is not a dischargeable debt.

The majority appropriately begins its analysis with the language of the statute. As the majority points out, the Bankruptcy Code defines “debt” as a “liability on a claim.” 11 U. S. C. § 101 (11). The term “claim,” in turn, is defined as a “right to payment.” § 101(4)(A). The question then becomes whether it is clear from the statutory language alone that a restitution order is a “right to payment,” or whether the statutory language, “at least to some degree, [is] open to interpretation.” Ron Pair, 489 U. S., at 245-246 (emphasis added). The majority simply asserts that the plain meaning of “right to payment” is an “enforceable obligation,” which gives a restitution order the “character” of a “right to payment.” Ante, at 559. I cannot accept this easy conclusion.

Some time ago, Justice Frankfurter pointed out: “The notion that because the words of a statute are plain, its meaning is also plain, is merely pernicious oversimplification.” United States v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424, 431 (1943) (dissenting opinion). This observation rings especially true in this case. It is not at all clear to me that the words “right to payment” plainly include an obligation resulting from a criminal restitution order. While the words may be of common usage, their meaning is not at all plain in this context. Notably absent from the Code’s definition (and from the legislative history) of both “debt” and “claim” is any indication that Congress intended the discharge provisions to extend into the criminal sphere. Indeed, there are persuasive reasons for excluding criminal restitution from the category of “debts.” Petitioners argue — not without force — that a criminal restitution order is not a “right to payment” because neither the victim of the crime nor the Probation Department possesses a right to payment of a restitution order. Brief for Petitioners 22. Petitioners also argue that because the victim has no right of enforcement, the victim has no right to payment. Id., at 27; see also Commonwealth v. Mourar, 349 Pa. Super. 583, 603, 504 A. 2d 197, 208 (1986) (if criminal defendant fails to make restitution as ordered, victim has no right of enforcement), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 517 Pa. 83, 534 A. 2d 1050 (1987); cf. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U. S. 660 (1983) (state court cannot constitutionally revoke probation for failure to pay a fine and make restitution without first determining the probationer’s ability to pay). Several Bankruptcy Courts have agreed with petitioners and have decided that the definition of “debt” in the Bankruptcy Code does not include a criminal restitution order. See, e. g., In re Norman, 95 B. R. 771, 773, and n. 3 (Colo. 1989) (criminal penalties and fines are not “debt[s]” as defined under § 101(11) of the Code; because crime victim has no “right to payment,” restitution is not a “debt”); In re Pellegrino, 42 B. R. 129, 132 (Conn. 1984) (since “crime victim has no ‘right to payment,’ restitution is not a ‘debt’ under Bankruptcy Code § 101(11)”; In re Magnifico, 21 B. R. 800 (Ariz. 1982) (criminal restitution not a “debt” contemplated by Bankruptcy Code); In re Button, 8 B. R. 692, 694 (WDNY 1981) (“From these definitions [of ‘debt,’ ‘[c]laim,’ and ‘[creditor’], it does not appear that restitution could be considered a debt”); accord, In re Kohr, 82 B. R. 706, 712 (MD Pa. 1988); In re Oslager, 46 B. R. 58 (MD Pa. 1985); In re Mead, 41 B. R. 838 (Conn. 1984). Other Bankruptcy Courts, to be sure, have determined that the definition of “debt” does include restitution obligations. See, e. g., In re Vandrovec, 61 B. R. 191 (N. D. 1986). At the least, these varied interpretations of the Code by bankruptcy judges are evidence that the phrase “right to payment,” when applied to restitution orders, is “subject to interpretation.” Kelly, 479 U. S., at 50. The statute, on its face, is not self-defining and surely does not compel the result that criminal restitution orders constitute “debts.”

My conclusion that the majority errs in concluding that the words “right to payment” include restitution orders is supported by the fact that such an interpretation would produce a result “‘demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters.’” Ron Pair, 489 U. S., at 244, quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U. S. 564, 571 (1982). This Court has declared that, to effectuate Congress’ intent in enacting the Code, we must consider the language of § 101 “in light of the history of bankruptcy court deference to criminal judgments and in light of the interests of the States in unfettered administration of their criminal justice systems.” Kelly, 479 U. S., at 44. That deference was reflected in the judicial interpretation of the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544. In Kelly, the Court discussed at length the customary pre-Code practice of holding that criminal monetary sanctions were not discharge-able in bankruptcy. See 479 U. S., at 44-45. The Court explained that the new Code was enacted in 1978 to replace the 1898 Act and noted: “The treatment of criminal judgments under the Act of 1898 informs our understanding of the language of the Code.” Id., at 44.

Because Congress’ presumed intent is to preserve preCode piactice unless it specifically indicates otherwise, we must first consider the treatment of criminal restitution orders under the 1898 Act. That Act established two categories of debts, those that were “allowable” and those that were “provable.” “Only if a debt was allowable could the creditor receive a share of the bankrupt’s assets.” Ibid., citing § 65a. Only provable debts were-dischargeable. See §17. The Court in Kelly explained that penalties or forfeitures owed to governmental entities generally were not allowable, §57j; but the Act failed to state that such debts were not provable. See § 63. Given this statutory scheme, “[t]he most natural construction of the Act, therefore, would have allowed criminal penalties to be discharged in bankruptcy, even though the government was not entitled to a share of the bankrupt’s estate.” 479 U. S., at 44-45. Nonetheless, courts consistently “refused to allow a discharge in bankruptcy to affect the judgment of a state criminal court.” Id., at 45. See, e. g., In re Abramson, 210 F. 878, 880 (CA2 1914) (“[JJudgments for penalties are not debts which can be proved or allowed as such because they are not for a fixed liability”); cf. In re Alderson, 98 F. 588 (W. Va. 1899) (the only federal-court decision found by the Kelly Court that allowed a discharge to affect a sentence imposed by a state criminal court). In fact, the judicially created exception to discharge was “so widely accepted by the time Congress enacted the new Code that a leading commentator could state flatly that ‘fines and penalties are not affected by a discharge.’” Kelly, 479 U. S., at 46, quoting 1A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 17.13, pp. 1609-1610, and n. 10 (14th ed. 1978).

Those courts addressing criminal restitution orders “applied the same reasoning to prevent a discharge in bankruptcy from affecting such a condition of a criminal sentence.” 479 U. S., at 46. As a result, when Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, there existed an “established judicial exception to discharge for criminal sentences, including restitution orders.” Ibid. See also Zwick v. Freeman, 373 F. 2d 110, 116 (CA2 1967) (“[Gjovernmental sanctions are not regarded as debts even when they require monetary payments”). Because criminal sanctions were not dischargeable, they were also not “provable,” as the two terms tended to merge in pre-Code practice. See Collier, supra, at ¶ 17.05, p. 1587 (pre-Code practice held that “[f lines for violation of law, and forfeitures, are not provable [for purposes of §63], and, therefore, not dischargeable” (footnotes omitted)).

Thus, under the 1898 Act, criminal monetary sanctions were not allowable, provable, or dischargeable in bankruptcy. In functional terms, criminal monetary sanctions were not “debts” for the purpose of pre-Code bankruptcy proceedings. This judicially created pre-Code practice “reflected policy considerations of great longevity and importance,” that is, “‘a deep conviction that federal bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state criminal proceedings.’” Ron Pair, 489 U. S., at 245, quoting Kelly, 479 U. S., at 47.

In the face of such a longstanding principle, “a court must determine whether Congress has expressed an intent to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept in enacting the Code.” Ibid. The Court stated in Midiantic: “The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific.” 474 U. S., at 501. There is no indication that Congress had any intent so drastically to change the established pre-Code practice regarding criminal sanctions. Although the Bankruptcy Code definition'of “debt” is a broad one, “nothing in the legislative history [of the Bankruptcy Code provisions] compels the conclusion that Congress intended to change the state of the law with respect to criminal judgments.” Kelly, 479 U. S., at 50, n. 12; see also Midlantic (despite Code language that the dissent labeled “absolute in its terms,” 474 U. S., at 509, the Court refused to find that Congress had implicitly abrogated a judicially created pre-Code limitation on abandonment powers). Indeed, “[i]n light of the established state of the law — that bankruptcy courts could not discharge criminal judgments,” the Kelly Court expressed “serious doubts whether Congress intended to make criminal penalties ‘debts’ within the meaning of § 101(4).” 479 U. S., at 50. If Congress had intended such a radical change, surely it would have spoken more clearly. In my view, Congress’ attitude towards criminal sanctions is most clearly indicated in the statement that “[t]he bankruptcy laws are not a haven for criminal offenders.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 342 (1977) (discussing automatic stay provisions).

The majority today brushes aside the rule of statutory construction outlined by this Court — a rule the Court has stressed must be used with “particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications.” Midlantic, 474 U. S., at 501 (emphasis added). The majority insists that its holding 'does not signal a retreat from the principles applied in Kelly because there is a “clear indication” that Congress intended to depart from past bankruptcy practice. Ante, at 563 (emphasis added). The majority contends that Congress made that intent “clear” by its “adoption of the ‘broadest possible’ definition of‘debt.’” Ante, at 564. I disagree. And I am puzzled by the majority’s position because the Court previously has rejected it expressly. See Kelly, 479 U. S., at 50, n. 12 (although the definition of “debt” was broadened, “nothing in the legislative history of these sections compels the conclusion that Congress intended to change the state of the law with respect to criminal judgments”). Moreover, it seems more likely that the broader definition was enacted simply to redress the problems created by the restrictive definitions of “allowable” and “provable” claims under the Act that made it impossible for some debtors to resolve all their civil liabilities in bankruptcy. Of particular concern were contingent and unliquidated claims that were “nonprovable” under the Act:

“[U]nder the liquidation chapters of the Bankruptcy Act, certain creditors are not permitted to share in the estate because of the non-provable nature of their claims, and the debtor is not discharged from those claims. Thus, relief for the debtor is incomplete, and those creditors are not given an opportunity to collect in the case on their claims. The proposed law will permit complete settlement of the affairs of a bankrupt debtor, and a complete discharge and fresh start.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, supra, at 180 (footnote omitted).

The statutory language itself highlights this approach. The Code’s definition of “claim” includes any right to payment that is “unliquidated,” “contingent,” “unmatured,” or “disputed,” 11 U. S. C. §101(4)(A), but does not include any modifier that in any way suggests the incorporation of criminal sanctions.

The majority’s assertion that Congress’ enactment of § 523 (a)(7) evidences a “clear indication” to abrogate pre-Code rulings that criminal sanctions were neither provable nor dis-chargeable in bankruptcy is similarly unconvincing. Under § 523(a)(7), a debt is not dischargeable “to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss, other than a tax penalty.” § 523(a)(7). The majority reasons that if restitution obligations were not debts, there would be no need to except them from discharge; therefore, it says, Congress clearly intended that criminal restitution orders be considered debts. Because § 523(a)(7) does not apply to all Chapter 13 proceedings, the majority contends that criminal restitution obligations should be considered dischargeable debts under Chapter 13. Ante, at 562-563. Again, I disagree. The enactment of this single provision of the Bankruptcy Code does little to demonstrate clear congressional intent to change traditional pre-Code practice. Even if § 523(a)(7) can be interpreted as making criminal restitution orders not dischargeable, this does not mean that Congress intended to make criminal restitution orders debts. Under pre-Code practice, nondischargeability of a criminal restitution order would be evidence that it was not a debt at all. Congress gave no indication that it intended to break with this pre-Code conception of dischargeability when it enacted § 523(a)(7).

In addition, pre-Code Chapter XIII essentially adopted Chapter VII discharge policy, excepting from discharge all debts that were not dischargeable under Chapter VII when those debts were held by creditors who had not accepted the bankruptcy plan. See § 60 of the Act. Congress’ failure to include a parallel provision to § 523(a)(7) in Chapter 13, far from demonstrating a clear intent to make fines discharge-able in Chapter 13, is more likely a carryover from pre-Code practice, where Chapter XIII relied on Chapter VII’s discharge provisions. “If Congress had intended, by § 523(a)(7) or by any other provision,” to change the pre-Code practice of holding monetary sanctions not allowable, provable, or dis-chargeable in bankruptcy, “‘we can be certain that there would have been hearings, testimony, and debate concerning consequences so wasteful, so inimical to purposes previously deemed important, and so likely to arouse public outrage.’” Kelly, 479 U. S., at 51, quoting Powell, J., dissenting, in TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 209 (1978).

I do not believe that Congress so cavalierly would have disregarded the States’ overwhelmingly important interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from the interference of a federal bankruptcy judge. Every State and the District of Columbia presently authorize the use of restitution orders. See Note, Criminal Restitution as a Limited Opportunity, 13 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 243-244, n. 9 (1987). A bankruptcy court discharge of a criminal restitution order is a deep intrusion by the federal courts into the State’s sovereign power. It vacates a criminal sentence that has presumably been entered in full accord with all substantive and procedural mandates of the Constitution. I seriously doubt that “Congress lightly would limit the rehabilitative and deterrent options available to state criminal judges.” Kelly, 479 U. S., at 49.

The majority’s decision today will have an adverse effect on the sentencing process. The judgment of sentencing courts and legislators that rehabilitation is the most effective form of punishment will be tempered by the knowledge that convicted criminals easily may avoid a sentence requiring restitution merely by obtaining a Chapter 13 discharge. Sentencing courts will be faced with a dilemma. The sentencing judge must either risk that a federal bankruptcy judge will undermine a restitution order, thus absolving the convicted criminal from punishment, or impose a harsher and less appropriate term of imprisonment, a sentence that the federal bankruptcy court will be unable to undermine. Congress surely would not have enacted legislation with such an extraordinary result without at least some discussion of its consequences.

The majority’s holding turns Kelly around. The Kelly Court stressed this compelling federalism concern, terming it “one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief,” and recognized that it “must influence our interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code.” 479 U. S., at 49. The Court was concerned that “federal remission of judgments imposed by state criminal judges . . . would hamper the flexibility of state criminal judges in choosing the combination of imprisonment, fines, and restitution most likely to further the rehabilitative and deterrent goals of state criminal justice systems.” Ibid. The concerns of the Kelly Court are no less applicable in this case. Congress’ intent to invalidate the results of state criminal proceedings is far from clear. There is simply no suggestion that Congress intended to depart from pre-Code practice and encroach so deeply upon the States’ administration of their criminal justice systems. In the absence of evidence of congressional intent to the contrary, the statutory construction rule set forth in Kelly and Midlantic requires a determination that the Bankruptcy Code does not permit convicted criminals to discharge their restitution obligations in Chapter 13 proceedings. I would therefore refuse to allow the Bankruptcy Code to become a sanctuary for a criminal trying to avoid the punishment meted out by a state-court judge.

I dissent.

       The Davenports subsequently fulfilled their obligations under the plan and received a discharge pursuant to 11 U. S. C. § 1328(a), which provides: “As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under the plan, unless the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed by the debtor after the order for relief under this chapter, the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under section 502 of this title.” The section contains two exceptions that the parties agree are not applicable to this case.

       Compare, e. g., In re Kohr, 82 B. R. 706, 712 (MD Pa. 1988) (restitution obligations are not “debts” within the meaning of the Code), with In re Cullens, 77 B. R. 825, 828 (Colo. 1987) (restitution orders are “debts”).

       Although the automatic stay protects a debtor from various collection efforts over a specified period, it does not extinguish or discharge any debt. See generally 1 W. Norton, Bankruptcy Law and Practice §§20.04-20.36 (1986 and Supp. 1989).

       In any event, the Government’s contention that Congress must have intended to favor criminal, as opposed to civil, claims held by the government is unsubstantiated. The United States’ view about the wisdom of this policy choice, unsupported by any textual authority that Congress in fact adopted such a policy, is an inadequate basis for rejecting the statute’s broad definition of “debt.” See supra, at 557-558.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author:
Justice Blackmun
      Justice Scalia,

license: Public Domain

text:
    TAYLOR v. UNITED STATES
    No. 88-7194.
    Argued February 28, 1990
    Decided May 29, 1990

      Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Brennan, White, Marshall, Stevens, O’Connor, and Kennedy, JJ., joined, and in all but Part II of which Scalia, J., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 603.

      Bruce Dayton Livingston, by appointment of the Court, 493 U. S. 952, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was J. Bennett Clark.

      Michael R. Lazerwitz argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, Assistant Attorney General Dennis, and Andrew Levchuk.

         Burton H. Shostak filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging reversal.

   Justice Blackmun

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we are called upon to determine the meaning of the word “burglary” as it is used in § 1402 of Subtitle I (the Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986) of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U. S. C. § 924(e). This statute provides a sentence enhancement for a defendant who is convicted under 18 U. S. C. § 922(g) (unlawful possession of a firearm) and who has three prior convictions for specified types of offenses, including “burglary.”

H-i

Under 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for a person who has been convicted previously for a felony to possess a firearm. A defendant convicted for a violation of § 922(g)(1) is subject to the sentence-enhancement provision at issue, § 924(e):

“(1) In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions by any court . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both . . . such person shall be fined not more than $25,000 and imprisoned not less than fifteen years ....
“(2) As used in this subsection—
“(B) the term ‘violent felony’ means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that—
“(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or
“(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”

In January 1988, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, petitioner Arthur Lajuane Taylor pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of § 922(g)(1). At the time of his plea, Taylor had four prior convictions. One was for robbery, one was for assault, and the other two were for second-degree burglary under Missouri law.

The Government sought sentence enhancement under § 924(e). Taylor conceded that his robbery and assault convictions properly could be counted as two of the three prior convictions required for enhancement, because they involved the use of physical force against persons, under § 924(e)(2) (B)(i). Taylor contended, however, that his burglary convictions should not count for enhancement, because they did not involve “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). His guilty plea was conditioned on the right to appeal this issue. The District Court, pursuant to § 924(e)(1), sentenced Taylor to 15 years’ imprisonment without possibility of parole.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, by a divided vote, affirmed Taylor’s sentence. It ruled that, because the word “burglary” in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) “means ‘burglary’ however a state chooses to define it,” the District Court did not err in using Taylor’s Missouri convictions for second-degree burglary to enhance his sentence. 864 F. 2d 625, 627 (1989). The majority relied on their court’s earlier decision in United States v. Portwood, 857 F. 2d 1221 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U. S. 1069 (1989). We granted certiorari, 493 U. S. 889 (1989), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals concerning the definition of burglary for purposes of § 924(e).

The word “burglary” has not been given a single accepted meaning by the state courts; the criminal codes of the States define burglary in many different ways. See United States v. Hill, 863 F. 2d 1575, 1582, and n. 5 (CA11 1989) (surveying a number of burglary statutes). On the face of the federal enhancement provision, it is not readily apparent whether Congress intended “burglary” to mean whatever the State of the defendant’s prior conviction defines as burglary, or whether it intended that some uniform definition of burglary be applied to all cases in which the Government seeks a § 924(e) enhancement. And if Congress intended that a uniform definition of burglary be applied, was that definition to be the traditional common-law definition, or one of the broader “generic” definitions articulated in the Model Penal Code and in a predecessor statute to § 924(e), or some other definition specifically tailored to the purposes of the enhancement statute?

p-H HH

Before examining these possibilities, we think it helpful to review the background of § 924(e). Six years ago, Congress enacted the first version of the sentence-enhancement provision. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, ch. 18, 98 Stat. 2185, 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202(a) (1982 ed., Supp. Ill) (repealed in 1986 by Pub. L. 99-308, § 104(b), 100 Stat. 459), any convicted felon found guilty of possession of a firearm, who had three previous convictions “for robbery or burglary,” was to receive a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment for 15 years. Burglary was defined in the statute itself as “any felony consisting of entering or remaining surreptitiously within a building that is property of another with intent to engage in conduct constituting a Federal or State offense.” § 1202(c)(9).

The Act was intended to supplement the States’ law enforcement efforts against “career” criminals. The House Report accompanying the Act explained that a “large percentage” of crimes of theft and violence “are committed by a very small percentage of repeat offenders,” and that robbery and burglary are the crimes most frequently committed by these career criminals. H. R. Rep. No. 98-1073, pp. 1, 3 (1984) (H. Rep.); see also S. Rep. No. 98-190, p. 5 (1983) (S. Rep.). The House Report quoted the sponsor of the legislation, Senator Specter, who found burglary one of the “most damaging crimes to society” because it involves “invasion of [victims’] homes or workplaces, violation of their privacy, and loss of their most personal and valued possessions.” H. Rep., at 3. Similarly, the Senate Report stated that burglary was included because it is one of “the most common violent street crimes,” and “[wjhile burglary is sometimes viewed as a non-violent crime, its character can change rapidly, depending on the fortuitous presence of the occupants of the home when the burglar enters, or their arrival while he is still on the premises.” S. Rep., at 4-5.

The only explanation of why Congress chose the specific definition of burglary included in § 1202 appears in the Senate Report:

“Because of the wide variation among states and localities in the ways that offenses are labeled, the absence of definitions raised the possibility that culpable offenders might escape punishment on a technicality. For instance, the common law definition of burglary includes a requirement that the offense be committed during the nighttime and with respect to a dwelling. However, for purposes of this Act, such limitations are not appropriate. Furthermore, in terms of fundamental fairness, the Act should ensure, to the extent that it is consistent with the prerogatives of the States in defining their own offenses, that the same type of conduct is punishable on the Federal level in all cases.” S. Rep., at 20.

In 1986, § 1202 was recodified as 18 U. S. C. § 924(e) by the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. 99-308, § 104, 100 Stat. 458. The definition of burglary was amended slightly, by replacing the words “any felony” with “any crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year and . . . .”

Only five months later, § 924(e) again was amended, into its present form, by § 1402 of Subtitle I (the Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986) of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3207-39. This amendment effected three changes that, taken together, give rise to the problem presented in this case. It expanded the predicate offenses triggering the sentence enhancement from “robbery or burglary” to “a violent felony or a serious drug offense”; it defined the term “violent felony” to include “burglary”; and it deleted the pre-existing definition of burglary.

The legislative history is silent as to Congress’ reason for deleting the definition of burglary. It does reveal, however, the general purpose and approach of the Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986. Two bills were proposed; from these the current statutory language emerged as a compromise. The first bill, introduced in the Senate by Senator Specter and in the House by Representative Wyden, provided that any “crime of violence” would count toward the three prior convictions required for a sentence enhancement, and defined “crime of violence” as “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” or any felony “that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” S. 2312, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H. R. 4639, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). The second bill, introduced in the House by Representatives Hughes and McCollum, took a narrower approach, restricting the crimes that would count toward enhancement to “any State or Federal felony that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” H. R. 4768, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).

When Senator Specter introduced S. 2312 in the Senate, he stated that since the enhancement provision had been in effect for a year and a half, and “has been successful with the basic classification of robberies and burglaries as the definition for ‘career criminal,’ the time has come to broaden that definition so that we may have a greater sweep and more' effective use of this important statute.” 132 Cong. Rec. 7697 (1986). Similarly, during the House and Senate hearings on the bills, the witnesses reiterated the concerns that prompted the original enactment of the enhancement provision in 1984: the large proportion of crimes committed by a small number of career offenders, and the inadequacy of state prosecutorial resources to address this problem. See Armed Career Criminal Legislation: Hearing on H. R. 4639 and H. R. 4768 before the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (House Hearing); Armed Career Criminal Act Amendments: Hearing on S. 2312 before the Subcommittee on Criminal Law of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (Senate Hearing). The issue under consideration was uniformly referred to as “expanding” the range of predicate offenses. House Hearing, at 8 (“[A]ll of us want to see the legislation expanded to other violent offenders and career drug dealers”) (statement of Rep. Wyden); id., at 11 (“I think we can all agree that we should expand the predicate offenses”) (statement of Rep. Hughes); id., at 14 (statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General James Knapp); id., at 32-33 (statement of Bruce Lyons, President-elect of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers); id., at 44 (statement of Sen. Specter); Senate Hearing, at 1 (“The time seems ripe in many quarters, including the Department of Justice, to expand the armed career criminal bill to include other offenses”) (statement of Sen. Specter); id., at 15 (statement of United States Attorney Edward S. G. Dennis, Jr.); id., at 20 (statement of David Dart Queen of the Department of the Treasury); id., at 49 and 55 (statement of Ronald D. Castille, District Attorney, Philadelphia).

Witnesses criticized the narrower bill, H. R. 4768, for excluding property crimes, pointing out that some such crimes present a serious risk of harm to persons, and that the career offenders at whom the enhancement provision is aimed often specialize in property crimes, especially burglary. See House Hearing, at 9 and 12 (“I would hope . . . that at least some violent felonies against property could be included”; “people . . . make a full-time career and commit hundreds of burglaries”) (statements of Rep. Wyden); id., at 49-53 (statement of Mr. Castille). The testimony of Mr. Knapp focused specifically on whether the enhancement provision should include burglary as a predicate offense. He criticized H. R. 4768 for excluding “such serious felonies against property as most burglary offenses” and thus “inadvertently narrow[ing] the scope of the present Armed Career Criminal Act,” and went on to say:

“Now the question has been raised, well, what crimes against property should be included? We think, burglary, of course; arson; extortion; and various explosives offenses. . . .
“The one problem I see in using a specific generic term like burglary or arson — that’s fine for those statutes — but a lot of these newer explosive offenses don’t have a single generic term that covers them, and that is something that the committee may want to be very careful about in coming up with the final statutory language.
“It is these crimes against property — which are inherently dangerous —that we think should be considered as predicate offenses.” House Hearing, at 15.

In response to a question by Representative Hughes as to the justification for retaining burglary as a predicate offense, Mr. Knapp explained that “your typical career criminal is most likely to be a burglar,” and that “even though injury is not an element of the offense, it is a potentially very dangerous offense, because when you take your very typical residential burglary or even your professional commercial burglary, there is a very serious danger to people who might be inadvertently found on the premises.” Id., at 26. He qualified his remarks, however, by saying: “Obviously, we would not consider, as prior convictions, what I would call misdemeanor burglaries, or your technical burglaries, or anything like that.” Ibid.

Representative Hughes put the same question to the next witness, Mr. Lyons. The witness replied:

“When you use burglary, burglary is going back to really what the original legislative history and intent was, to get a hold of the profit motive and to the recidivist armed career criminal. The NACDL really has no problem with burglary as a predicate offense.” Id., at 38.

In his prepared statement for the Subcommittee, the witness had noted that H. R. 4768 “would not appear to encompass . . . burglary,” and that “[i]f the Subcommittee concludes that it can accept no retreat from current law, we would suggest that the preservation of burglary as a prior offense be accomplished simply by retaining ‘burglary’ . . . rather than by substituting for it the all-inclusive ‘crime of violence’ definition proposed in H. R. 4639.” House Hearing, at 34.

H. R. 4639, on the other hand, was seen as too broad. See id., at 11 (“[I]t is important to prioritize offenses”) (statement of Rep. Hughes); id., at 16 (“[T]he answer probably lies somewhere between the two bills”) (statement of Mr. Knapp). The hearing concluded with a statement by Representative Hughes, a sponsor of the narrower bill, H. R. 4768:

“Frankly, I think on the question of burglaries, I can see the arguments both ways. We have.already included burglaries.
“My leanings would be to leave it alone; it is in the existing law; it was the existing statute. We can still be specific enough. We are talking about burglaries that probably are being carried out by an armed criminal, because the triggering mechanism is that they possess a weapon .... So we are not talking about the average run-of-the-mill burglar necessarily, we are talking about somebody who also illegally possesses or has been transferred a firearm.” House Hearing, at 41.

After the House hearing, the Subcommittee drafted a compromise bill, H. R. 4885. This bill included “violent felony” as a predicate offense, and provided that

“the term ‘violent felony’ means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that —
“(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force against the person of another; or “(ii) involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”

H. R. 4885 was favorably reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary. H. R. Rep. No. 99-849 (1986). The Report explained:

“The Subcommittee on Crime held a hearing ... to consider whether it should expand the predicate offenses (robbery and burglary) in existing law in order to add to its effectiveness. At this hearing a consensus developed in support of an expansion of the predicate offenses to include serious drug trafficking offenses . . . and violent felonies, generally. This concept was encompassed in H. R. 4885 by deleting the specific predicate offenses for robbery and burglary and adding as predicate offenses [certain drug offenses] and violent felonies ....
“The other major question involved in these hearings was as to what violent felonies involving physical force against property should be included in the definition of ‘violent’ felony. The Subcommittee agreed to add the crimes punishable for a term exceeding one year that involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to others. This will add State and Federal crimes against property such as burglary, arson, extortion, use of explosives and similar crimes as predicate offenses where the conduct involved presents a serious risk of injury to a person” (emphasis in original). Id., at 3.

The provision as finally enacted, however, added to the above-quoted subsection (ii) the phrase that is critical in this case: “ ... is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).

Some useful observations may be drawn. First, throughout the history of the enhancement provision, Congress focused its efforts on career offenders — those who commit a large number of fairly serious crimes as their means of livelihood, and who, because they possess weapons, present at least a potential threat of harm to persons. This concern was not limited to offenders who had actually been convicted of crimes of violence against persons. (Only H. R. 4768, rejected by the House Subcommittee, would have restricted the predicate offenses to crimes actually involving violence against persons.)

The legislative history also indicates that Congress singled out burglary (as opposed to other frequently committed property crimes such as larceny and auto theft) for inclusion as a predicate offense, both in 1984 and in 1986, because of its inherent potential for harm to persons. The fact that an offender enters a building to commit a crime often creates the possibility of a violent confrontation between the offender and an occupant, caretaker, or some other person who comes to investigate. And the offender’s own awareness of this possibility may mean that he is prepared to use violence if necessary to carry out his plans or to escape. Congress apparently thought that all burglaries serious enough to be punishable by imprisonment for more than a year constituted a category of crimes that shared this potential for violence and that were likely to be committed by career criminals. There never was any proposal to limit the predicate offense to some special subclass of burglaries that might be especially dangerous, such as those where the offender is armed, or the building is occupied, or the crime occurs at night.

Second, the enhancement provision always has embodied a categorical approach to the designation of predicate offenses. In the 1984 statute, “robbery” and “burglary” were defined in the statute itself, not left to the vagaries of state law. See 18 U. S. C. App. §§ 1202(c)(8) and (9) (1982 ed., Supp. III). Thus, Congress intended that the enhancement provision be triggered by crimes having certain specified elements, not by crimes that happened to be labeled “robbery” or “burglary” by the laws of the State of conviction. Each of the proposed versions of the 1986 amendment carried forward this categorical approach, extending the range of predicate offenses to all crimes having certain common characteristics — the use or threatened use of force, or the risk that force would be used — regardless of how they were labeled by state law.

Third, the 1984 definition of burglary shows that Congress, at least at that time, had in mind a modern “generic” view of burglary, roughly corresponding to the definitions of burglary in a majority of the States’ criminal codes. See United States v. Hill, 863 F. 2d, at 1582, n. 5. In adopting this definition, Congress both prevented offenders from invoking the arcane technicalities of the common-law definition of burglary to evade the sentence-enhancement provision, and protected offenders from the unfairness of having enhancement depend upon the label employed by the State of conviction. See S. Rep., at 20.

Nothing in the legislative history of the 1986 amendment shows that Congress was dissatisfied with the 1984 definition. All the testimony and reports read as if the meaning of burglary was undisputed. The debate at the 1986 hearings centered upon whether any property crimes should be included as predicate offenses, and if so, which ones. At the House hearing, the Subcommittee reached a consensus that at least some property crimes, including burglary, should be included, but again there was no debate over the proper definition of burglary. The compromise bill, H. R. 4885, apparently was intended to include burglary, among other serious property offenses, by implication, as a crime that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” The language added to H. R. 4885 before its enactment seemingly was meant simply to make explicit the provision’s implied coverage of crimes such as burglary.

The legislative history as a whole suggests that the deletion of the 1984 definition of burglary may have been an inadvertent casualty of a complex drafting process. In any event, there is nothing in the history to show that Congress intended in 1986 to replace the 1984 “generic” definition of burglary with something entirely different. Although the omission of a pre-existing definition of a term often indicates Congress’ intent to reject that definition, see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 432 (1987); Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983), we draw no such inference here.

Nor is there any indication that Congress ever abandoned its general approach, in designating predicate offenses, of using uniform, categorical definitions to capture all offenses of a certain level of seriousness that involve violence or an inherent risk thereof, and that are likely to be committed by career offenders, regardless of technical definitions and labels under state law.

Ill

These observations about the purpose and general approach of the enhancement provision enable us to narrow the range of possible meanings of the term “burglary.”

A

First, we are led to reject the view of the Court of Appeals in this case. It seems to us to be implausible that Congress intended the meaning of “burglary” for purposes of § 924(e) to depend on the definition adopted by the State of conviction. That would mean that a person convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm would, or would not, receive a sentence enhancement based on exactly the same conduct, depending on whether the State of his prior conviction happened to call that conduct “burglary.”

For example, Michigan has no offense formally labeled “burglary.” It classifies burglaries into several grades of “breaking and entering.” See Mich. Comp. Laws §750.110 (1979). In contrast, California defines “burglary” so broadly as to include shoplifting and theft of goods from a “locked” but unoccupied automobile. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 459 (West Supp. 1990); United States v. Chatman, 869 F. 2d 525, 528-529, and n. 2 (CA9 1989) (entry through unsecured window of an unoccupied auto, and entry of a store open to the public with intent to commit theft, are “burglary” under California law); see also Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§30.01-30.05 (1989 and Supp. 1990) (defining burglary to include theft from coin-operated vending machine or automobile); United States v. Leonard, 868 F. 2d 1393, 1395, n. 2 (CA5 1989), cert. pending, No. 88-1885.

Thus, a person imprudent enough to shoplift or steal from an automobile in California would be found, under the Ninth Circuit’s view, to have committed a burglary constituting a “violent felony” for enhancement purposes — yet a person who did so in Michigan might not. Without a clear indication that with the 1986 amendment Congress intended to abandon its general approach of using uniform categorical definitions to identify predicate offenses, we do not interpret Congress’ omission of a definition of “burglary” in a way that leads to odd results of this kind. See Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U. S. 103, 119-120 (1983) (absent plain indication to the contrary, federal laws are not to be construed so that their application is dependent on state law, “because the application of federal legislation is nationwide and at times the federal program would be impaired if state law were to control”); United States v. Turley, 352 U. S. 407, 411 (1957) (“[I]n the absence of a plain indication of an intent to incorporate diverse state laws into a federal criminal statute, the meaning of the federal statute should not be dependent on state law”).

This Court’s response to the similar problem of interpreting the term “extortion” in the Travel Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1952, is instructive:

“Appellees argue that Congress’ decision not to define extortion combined with its decision to prohibit only extortion in violation of state law compels the conclusion that peculiar versions of state terminology are controlling .... The fallacy of this contention lies in its assumption that, by defining extortion with reference to state law, Congress also incorporated state labels for particular offenses. Congress’ intent was to aid local law enforcement officials, not to eradicate only those extortionate activities which any given State denominated extortion. . . . Giving controlling effect to state classifications would result in coverage under § 1952 if appellees’ activities were centered in Massachusetts, Michigan, or Oregon, but would deny coverage in Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, or Wisconsin although each of these States prohibits identical criminal activities.” United States v. Nardello, 393 U. S. 286, 293-294 (1969).

We think that “burglary” in § 924(e) must have some uniform definition independent of the labels employed by the various States’ criminal codes.

B

Some Courts of Appeals, see n. 2, supra, have ruled that § 924(e) incorporates the common-law definition of burglary, relying on the maxim that a statutory term is generally presumed to have its common-law meaning. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952). This view has some appeal, in that common-law burglary is the core, or common denominator, of the contemporary usage of the term. Almost all States include a breaking and entering of a dwelling at night, with intent to commit a felony, among their definitions of burglary. Whatever else the Members of Congress might have been thinking of, they presumably had in mind at least the “classic” common-law definition when they considered the inclusion of burglary as a predicate offense.

The problem with this view is that the contemporary understanding of “burglary” has diverged a long way from its common-law roots. Only a few States retain the common-law definition, or something closely resembling it. Most other States have expanded this definition to include entry without a “breaking,” structures other than dwellings, offenses committed in the daytime, entry with intent to commit a crime other than a felony, etc. See LaFave & Scott, supra, n. 3, §§ 8.13(a) through (f), pp. 464-475. This statutory development, “when viewed in totality, has resulted in a modern crime which has little in common with its common-law ancestor except for the title of burglary^ — Id., at §8.13(g), p. 476.

Also, interpreting “burglary” in § 924(e) to mean common-law burglary would not comport with the purposes of the enhancement statute. The arcane distinctions embedded in the common-law definition have little relevance to modern law enforcement concerns. It seems unlikely that the Members of Congress, immersed in the intensely practical concerns of controlling violent crime, would have decided to abandon their modern, generic 1984 definition of burglary and revert to a definition developed in the ancient English law — a definition mentioned nowhere in the legislative history. Moreover, construing “burglary” to mean common-law burglary would come close to nullifying that term’s effect in the statute, because few of the crimes now generally recognized as burglaries would fall within the common-law definition.

It could be argued, of course, that common-law burglary, by and large, involves a greater “potential risk of physical injury to another.” § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). But, even assuming that Congress intended to restrict the predicate offense to some especially dangerous subclass of burglaries, restricting it to common-law burglary would not be a rational way of doing so. The common-law definition does not require that the offender be armed or that the dwelling be occupied at the time of the crime. An armed burglary of an occupied commercial building, in the daytime, would seem to pose a far greater risk of harm to persons than an unarmed nocturnal breaking and entering of an unoccupied house. It seems unlikely that Congress would have considered the latter, but not the former, to be a “violent felony” counting towards a sentence enhancement. In the absence of any specific indication that Congress meant to incorporate the common-law meaning of burglary, we shall not read into the statute a definition of “burglary” so obviously ill suited to its purposes.

This Court has declined to follow any rule that a statutory term is to be given its common-law meaning, when that meaning is obsolete or inconsistent with the statute’s purpose. In Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37 (1979), this Court rejected the argument that the Travel Act incorporated the common-law definition of “bribery” because, by 1961 when the Act was passed,

“the common understanding and meaning of ‘bribery’ had extended beyond its early common-law definitions. In 42 States and in federal legislation, ‘bribery’ included the bribery of individuals acting in a private capacity. It was against this background that the Travel Act was passed.
"... The record of the hearings and floor debates discloses that Congress made no attempt to define the statutory term ‘bribery,’ but relied on the accepted contemporary meaning” (footnote omitted). Id., at 45.

For this reason, the Court concluded that “the generic definition of bribery, rather than a narrow common-law definition, was intended by Congress.” Id., at 49. Similarly, in United States v. Nardello, 393 U. S. 286 (1969), this Court held that the Travel Act did not incorporate the common-law definition of “extortion,” because that definition had been expanded in many States by the time the Act was passed, id., at 289, and because such an interpretation would conflict with the Act’s purpose to curb the activities of organized crime. Id., at 293. The Court therefore declined the give the term an “unnaturally narrow reading,” and concluded that the defendants’ acts fell within “the generic term extortion as used in the Travel Act.” Id., at 296. See also Bell v. United States, 462 U. S. 356, 362 (1983) (common-law limitation on meaning of “larceny” not incorporated in Bank Robbery Act because “[t]he congressional goal of protecting bank assets is entirely independent of the traditional distinction on which [the defendant] relies”); United States v. Turley, 352 U. S., at 416-417 (application of National Motor Vehicle Theft Act not limited to “situations which at common law would be considered larceny” because “[professional thieves resort to innumerable forms of theft and Congress presumably sought to meet the need for federal action effectively rather than to leave loopholes for wholesale evasion”).

Petitioner argues that the narrow common-law definition of burglary would comport with the rule of lenity — that criminal statutes, including sentencing provisions, are to be construed in favor of the accused. See Bifulco v. United States, 447 U. S. 381, 387 (1980); Simpson v. United States, 435 U. S. 6, 14-15 (1978). This maxim of statutory construction, however, cannot dictate an implausible interpretation of a statute, nor one at odds with the generally accepted contemporary meaning of a term. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S., at 49, n. 13.

C

Petitioner suggests another narrowing construction of the term “burglary,” more suited to the purpose of the enhancement statute:

“Burglary is any crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year and consisting of entering or remaining within a building that is the property of another with intent to engage in conduct constituting a Federal or State offense that has as an element necessary for conviction conduct that presents a serious risk of physical injury to another.” Brief for Petitioner 29.

As examples of burglary statutes that would fit this definition, petitioner points to first-degree or aggravated-burglary statutes having elements such as entering an occupied building; being armed with a deadly weapon; or causing or threatening physical injury to a person. See n. 4, supra. This definition has some appeal, because it avoids the arbitrariness of the state-law approach, by restricting the predicate offense in a manner congruent with the general purpose of the enhancement statute.

We do not accept petitioner’s proposal, however, for two reasons. First, it is not supported by the language of the statute or the legislative history. Petitioner essentially asserts that Congress meant to include as predicate offenses only a subclass of burglaries whose elements include “conduct that presents a serious risk of physical injury to another,” over and above the risk inherent in ordinary burglaries. But if this were Congress’ intent, there would have been no reason to add the word “burglary” to § 924(e) (2) (B) (ii), since that provision already includes any crime that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” We must assume that Congress had a purpose in adding the word “burglary” to H. R. 4885 before enacting it into law. The most likely explanation, in view of the legislative history, is that Congress thought that certain general categories of property crimes — namely burglary, arson, extortion, and the use of explosives — so often presented a risk of injury to persons, or were so often committed by career criminals, that they should be included in the enhancement statute even though, considered solely in terms of their statutory elements, they do not necessarily involve the use or threat of force against a person.

Second, if Congress had meant to include only an especially dangerous subclass of burglaries as predicate offenses, it is unlikely that.it would have used the unqualified language “is burglary ... or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk” in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). Congress presumably realized that the word “burglary” is commonly understood to include not only aggravated burglaries, but also run-of-the-mill burglaries involving an unarmed offender, an unoccupied building, and no use or threat of force. This choice of language indicates that Congress thought ordinary burglaries, as well as burglaries involving some element making them especially dangerous, presented a sufficiently “serious potential risk” to count toward enhancement.

D

We therefore reject petitioner’s view that Congress meant to include only a special subclass of burglaries, either those that would have been burglaries at common law, or those that involve especially dangerous conduct. These limiting constructions are not dictated by the rule of lenity. See supra, at 596. We believe that Congress meant by “burglary” the generic sense in which the term is now used in the criminal codes of most States. See Perrin, 444 U. S., at 45; Nardello, 393 U. S., at 289.

Although the exact formulations vary, the generic, contemporary meaning of burglary contains at least the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime. See LaFave & Scott, supra, n. 3, §8.13(a), p. 466 (modem statutes “generally require that the entry be unprivileged”); id., §8.13(c), p. 471 (modern statutes “typically describe the place as a ‘building’ or ‘structure’”); id., §8.13(e), p. 474 (“[T]he prevailing view in the modern codes is that an intent to commit any offense will do”).

This generic meaning, of course, is practically identical to the 1984 definition that, in 1986, was omitted from the enhancement provision. The 1984 definition, however, was not explicitly replaced with a different or narrower one; the legislative history discloses that no alternative definition of burglary was ever discussed. As we have seen, there simply is no plausible alternative that Congress could have had in mind. The omission of a definition of burglary in the 1986 Act therefore implies, at most, that Congress did not wish to specify an exact formulation that an offense must meet in order to count as “burglary” for enhancement purposes.

We conclude that a person has been convicted of burglary for purposes of a § 924(e) enhancement if he is convicted of any crime, regardless of its exact definition or label, having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.

IV

There remains the problem of applying this conclusion to cases in which the state statute under which a defendant is convicted varies from the generic definition of “burglary.” If the state statute is narrower than the generic view, e. g., in cases of burglary convictions in common-law States or convictions of first-degree or aggravated burglary, there is no problem, because the conviction necessarily implies that the defendant has been found guilty of all the elements of generic burglary. And if the defendant was convicted of burglary in a State where the generic definition has been adopted, with minor variations in terminology, then the trial court need find only that the state statute corresponds in substance to the generic meaning of burglary.

A few States’ burglary statutes, however, as has been noted above, define burglary more broadly, e. g., by eliminating the requirement that the entry be unlawful, or by including places, such as automobiles and vending machines, other than buildings. One of Missouri’s second-degree burglary statutes in effect at the times of petitioner Taylor’s convictions included breaking and entering “any booth or tent, or any boat or vessel, or railroad car.” Mo. Rev. Stat. §560.070 (1969) (repealed). Also, there may be offenses under some States’ laws that, while not called “burglary,” correspond in substantial part to generic burglary. We therefore must address the question whether, in the case of a defendant who has been convicted under a nongenericburglary statute, the Government may seek enhancement on the ground that he actually committed a generic burglary.

This question requires us to address a more general issue — whether the sentencing court in applying § 924(e) must look only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, or whether the court may consider other evidence concerning the defendant’s prior crimes. The Courts of Appeals uniformly have held that §924(e) mandates a.formal categorical approach, looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions. See United States v. Chatman, 869 F. 2d, at 529; United States v. Headspeth, 852 F. 2d 753, 758-759 (CA4 1988); United States v. Vidaure, 861 F. 2d 1337, 1340 (CA5 1988), cert. denied, 489 U. S. 1088 (1989); United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F. 2d 996, 1006-1010 (CA9 1988). We find the reasoning of these cases persuasive.

First, the language of § 924(e) generally supports the inference that Congress intended the sentencing court to look only to the fact that the defendant had been convicted of crimes falling within certain categories, and not to the facts underlying the prior convictions. Section 924(e)(1) refers to “a person who . . . has three previous convictions” for — not a person who has committed — three previous violent felonies or drug offenses. Section 924(e)(2)(B)(i) defines “violent felony” as any crime punishable by imprisonment for more than a year that “has as an element” — not any crime that, in a particular case, involves — the use or threat of force. Read in this context, the phrase “is burglary” in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) most likely refers to the elements of the statute of conviction, not to the facts of each defendant’s conduct.

Second, as we have said, the legislative history of the enhancement statute shows that Congress generally took a categorical approach to predicate offenses. There was considerable debate over what kinds of offenses to include and how to define them, but no one suggested that a particular crime might sometimes count towards enhancement and sometimes not, depending on the facts of the case. If Congress had meant to adopt an approach that would require the sentencing court to engage in an elaborate factfinding process regarding the defendant’s prior offenses, surely this would have been mentioned somewhere in the legislative history.

Third, the practical difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual approach are daunting. In all cases where the Government alleges that the defendant’s actual conduct would fit the generic definition of burglary, the trial court would have to determine what that conduct was. In some cases, the indictment or other charging paper might reveal the theory or theories of the case presented to the jury. In other cases, however, only the Government’s actual proof at trial would indicate whether the defendant’s conduct constituted generic burglary. Would the Government be permitted to introduce the trial transcript before the sentencing court, or if no transcript is available, present the testimony of witnesses? Could the defense present witnesses of its own and argue that the jury might have returned a guilty verdict on some theory that did not require a finding that the defendant committed generic burglary? If the sentencing court were to conclude, from its own review of the record, that the defendant actually committed a generic burglary, could the defendant challenge this conclusion as abridging his right to a jury trial? Also, in cases where the defendant pleaded guilty, there often is no record of the underlying facts. Even if the Government were able to prove those facts, if a guilty plea to a lesser, nonburglary offense was the result of a plea bargain, it would seem unfair to impose a sentence enhancement as if the defendant had pleaded guilty to burglary.

We think the only plausible interpretation of § 924(e)(2)(B) (ii) is that, like the rest of the enhancement statute, it generally requires the trial court to look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense. This categorical approach, however, may permit the sentencing court to go beyond the mere fact of conviction in a narrow range of cases where a jury was actually required to find all the elements of generic burglary. For example, in a State whose burglary statutes include entry of an automobile as well as a building, if the indictment or information and jury instructions show that the defendant was charged only with a burglary of a building, and that the jury necessarily had to find an entry of a building to convict, then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction for enhancement.

We therefore hold that an offense constitutes “burglary” for purposes of a § 924(e) sentence enhancement if either its statutory definition substantially corresponds to “generic” burglary, or the charging paper and jury instructions actually required the jury to find all the elements of generic burglary in order to convict the defendant.

In Taylor’s case, most but not all the former Missouri statutes defining second-degree burglary include all the elements of generic burglary. See n. 1, supra. Despite the Government’s argument to the contrary, it is not apparent to us from the sparse record before us which of those statutes were the bases for Taylor’s prior convictions. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join in the Court’s opinion except for Part II, which examines in great detail the statute’s legislative history. The examination does not uncover anything useful (i. e., anything that tempts us to alter the meaning we deduce from the text anyway), but that is the usual consequence of these inquiries (and a good thing, too). What is noteworthy, however, is that in this case it is hard to understand what we would have done if we had found anything useful. The Court says, correctly, that the statutory term “burglary” has a “generally accepted contemporary meaning” which must be given effect and which may not be modified by the rule of lenity. Ante, at 596, 598. But if the meaning is so clear that it cannot be constricted by that venerable canon of construction, surely it is not so ambiguous that it can be constricted by the sundry floor statements, witness testimony, and other legislative incunabula that the Court discusses. Is it conceivable that we look to the legislative history only to determine whether it displays, not a less extensive punitive intent than the plain meaning (the domain of the rule of lenity), but a more extensive one? If we found a more extensive one, I assume we would then have to apply the rule of lenity, bringing us back once again to the ordinary meaning of the statute. It seems like a lot of trouble.

I can discern no reason for devoting 10 pages of today’s opinion to legislative history, except to show that we have given this case close and careful consideration. We must find some better way of demonstrating our conscientiousness.

       Taylor’s burglary convictions were in Missouri state courts in 1963 and 1971. In those years, Missouri had seven different statutes under which one could be charged with second-degree burglary. All seven offenses required entry into a structure, but they varied as to the type of structure and the means of entry involved. See Mo. Rev. Stat. §560.045 (1969) (breaking and entering a dwelling house); §560.050 (having entered a dwelling house, breaking out of it); §§ 560.055 and 560.060 (breaking an inner door); § 560.070 (breaking and entering a building, booth, tent, boat, or railroad ear); § 560.075 (breaking and entering a bank); and § 560.080 (breaking and entering a vacant building).
      In 1979, all these statutes were replaced with Mo. Rev. Stat. §569.170 (1986)', which provides that a person commits second-degree burglary “when he knowingly enters unlawfully or knowingly remains unlawfully in a building or inhabitable structure for the purpose of committing a crime therein.”
      The formal Notice of Punishment Enhancement submitted to the District Court in this ease did not reveal which of the seven earlier Missouri statutes were the bases for Taylor’s convictions; it stated only that he was convicted of burglary in the second degree. App. 6-7.

       See, e. g., United States v. Leonard, 868 F. 2d 1393 (CA5 1989) (burglary defined according to state law); 864 F. 2d 625 (CA8 1989) (this case-same); United States v. Chatman, 869 F. 2d 525 (CA9 1989) (common-law definition of burglary); United States v. Headspeth, 852 F. 2d 753 (CA4 1988) (same); United States v. Palmer, 871 F. 2d 1202 (CA3), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 890 (1989) (burglary means any offense that would have met the definition of burglary under a predecessor statute to § 924(e)); United States v. Taylor, 882 F. 2d 1018 (CA6 1989) (same); United States v. Dombrowski, 877 F. 2d 520 (CA7 1989) (same); United States v. Hill, 863 F. 2d 1575 (CA11 1989) (same); and United States v. Patterson, 882 F. 2d 595 (CA1 1989) (case-by-case inquiry whether the crime defined by state statute involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of injury to another).

       “Burglary was defined by the common law to be the breaking and entering of the dwelling house of another in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony.” W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 8.13, p. 464 (1986) (LaFave & Scott). See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *224.

       Some States have first-degree or aggravated-burglary statutes that single out such especially dangerous forms of burglary. See LaFave & Scott §§ 8.13(f), (g), pp. 475-478.

       The Senate, on October 5, 1989, passed a bill, S. 1711, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., that would add to § 924(e)(2) a definition of burglary identical to the one deleted in 1986. See 135 Cong. Rec. 23613 (1989). In introducing the bill, Senator Biden explained that the amendment
      “corrects an error that occurred inadvertently when the definition of burglary was deleted from the Armed Career Criminal statute in 1986. The amendment reenacts the original definition which was intended to be broader than common law burglary.” Id,., at 23519.
      This bill is pending in the House.

       See, e. g., Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, §30 (1987); Mass. Gen. Laws, eh. 266, § 15 (1990); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-19 (1972); W. Va. Code § 61-3-11 (1989).

       Consider Blackstone’s exposition of one of the elements of burglary: “The time must be by night, and not by day: for in the day time there is no burglary. We have seen, in the case of justifiable homicide, how much more heinous all laws made an attack by night, rather than by day; allowing the party attacked by night to kill the assailant with impunity. , As to what is reckoned night, and what day, for this purpose: anciently the day was accounted to begin only at sun-rising, and to end immediately upon sun-set; but the better opinion seems to be, that if there be daylight or crepusculum enough, begun or left, to discern a man’s face withal, it is no burglary. But this does not extend to moonlight; for then many midnight burglaries would go unpunished: and besides, the malignity of the offence does not so properly arise from its being done in the dark, as at the dead of night; when all the creation, except beasts of prey, are at rest; when sleep has disarmed the owner, and rendered his castle defenceless.” 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *224.
      See also id., at *224-*228 (burglary must be of a “mansion-house,” must involve a breaking and entering, and must be with intent to commit a felony).

       This usage approximates that adopted by the drafters of the Model Penal Code:
      “A person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with purpose to commit a crime therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter.” American Law Institute, Model Penal Code §221.1 (1980).

       Our present concern is only to determine what offenses should count as “burglaries” for enhancement purposes. The Government remains free to argue that any offense — including offenses similar to generic burglary— should count towards enhancement as one that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).

       Even if an enhancement is not available under § 924(e), the Government may still present evidence of the defendant’s actual prior criminal conduct, to increase his sentence for the § 922(g)(1) violation under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.