author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    2007 SD 29
    STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Raymond A. ANDREWS, Defendant and Appellant.
    No. 24100.
    Supreme Court of South Dakota.
    Considered on Briefs Nov. 27, 2006.
    Decided March 14, 2007.

      Lawrence E. Long, Attorney General, Craig M. Eichstadt, Deputy Attorney General, Pierre, for plaintiff and appellee.
    Robin M. Eich, Eich Law Office, Parker, for defendant and appellant.
   PER CURIAM.

[¶ 1.] Raymond Andrews appeals his conviction for operating a boat with 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in his blood. He challenges the constitutionality of the statute making this conduct a criminal offense. We affirm because he has failed to preserve this issue for appellate review.

FACTS

[¶2.] In September 2005 Andrews was charged with alternative counts of operating a boat while under the influence of alcohol or with 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in his blood. Andrews initially pled not guilty and requested a jury trial. Jury selection began on January 18, 2006. During voir dire, a question apparently arose over how the trial court intended to instruct the jury on the issue of the “operation” of a boat. After an in-chambers discussion of the issue between the court and counsel, Andrews elected to enter a guilty plea to the charge of operating a boat with 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in his blood. He was sentenced to 90 days in the county jail and a $500 fine. Both the fine and jail time were suspended on various terms and conditions including payment of costs and court appointed attorney’s fees.

[¶ 3.] Andrews was convicted under SDCL 42-8-45(1), which provides:

No person may operate a boat while underway on the public waters of the state while:
(1) There is 0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in that person’s blood as shown by chemical analysis of that person’s breath, blood, or other bodily substance;
Any violation of this section is a Class 1 misdemeanor.

(Emphasis added.) The operation of a boat under this statute is defined as “to navigate or otherwise use a boat[.]” SDCL 42-8-2(4)(emphasis added). Andrews argues that these statutes are unconstitutionally overbroad and vague because the emphasized language could be construed to apply to a passenger’s use of, a boat, and no reasonable person would expect such conduct to constitute a crime.

[¶4.] Before we may address Andrews’ argument, we must first determine the effect of his plea of guilty. It is “ ‘the general rule that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty waives a defendant’s right to appeal all nonjurisdictional defects in the prior proceedings.’ ” State v. Hoeft, 1999 SD 24, ¶ 12, 594 N.W.2d 323, 326 (quoting State v. Cowley, 408 N.W.2d 758, 759 (S.D.1987)). In State v. Grosh, 387 N.W.2d 503, 507 (S.D.1986), this Court, quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L.Ed.2d 235, 243 (1973), explained:

[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea ...

[¶ 5.] There is, however, an exception to this general rule of waiver. As explained in Weisberg v. State of Minnesota, 29 F.3d 1271, 1279-1280 (8th Cir.1994):

[a]s a general rule, “[a] defendant’s knowing and intelligent guilty plea forecloses ‘independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred before the entry of the guilty plea.’ ” United States v. Vaughan, 13 F.3d 1186, 1187 (8th Cir.[1994]) (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973)), cert. denied, Vaughan v. U.S., 511 U.S. 1094, 114 S.Ct. 1858, 128 L.Ed.2d 481 (U.S. 1994). There are exceptions to this rule, however; a person may, despite a valid guilty plea, pursue a certain type of claim that has been variously defined as a claim that attacks “the State’s power to bring any indictment at all,” United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 575, 109 S.Ct. 757, 765, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989), that protects a defendant’s “right not to be haled into court,” Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 2104, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974), and that “the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute,” Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 241, 242 n. 2, 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975) (per curiam).

This exception was further explained in U.S. v. Morgan, 230 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir.2000):

A claim that a statute is facially unconstitutional falls within the exception. See Sodders v. Parratt, 693 F.2d 811, 812 (8th Cir.1982) (holding guilty plea does not foreclose attack on constitutionality of criminal statute under which defendant was charged-defendant claimed statute was vague on its face); United States v. Johnston, 199 F.3d 1015, 1019 n. 3 (9th Cir.1999). [However, n]o court has applied the exception to a claim, like [appellant’s], that a statute is unconstitutional as applied. See Johnston, 199 F.3d at 1019 n. 3.

Therefore, under this exception, while a guilty plea waives a claim that a statute is unconstitutional as applied, it does not waive a claim that a statute is facially unconstitutional.

[¶ 6.] “A ‘facial’ challenge, in this context, means a claim that the law is ‘invalid in toto — and therefore incapable of any valid application.’ ” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)(quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1223, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974)).

In examining a facial challenge, [a] court must first “determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.” Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362. Where the enactment does not reach constitutionally protected conduct, “the overbreadth challenge must fail[,]” id., and the complainant may succeed in a vagueness challenge “only if the enactment is im-permissibly vague in all of its applications.” Id. at 495, 455 U.S. 489, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362. Pursuing this line of analysis, the Supreme Court cautioned courts to “examine the complainant’s conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law[,]” id, because “[a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to ... others.” Id. Therefore, “vagueness challenges that do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute’s facial validity.” United States v. Nadi 996 F.2d 548, 550 (2d Cir.1993) (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991)).

Woodis v. Westark Community College, 160 F.3d 435, 438-39 (8th Cir.1998).

[¶ 7.] SDCL 42-8-45(1) does not reach constitutionally protected activities such as speech. Moreover, because the statute not only prohibits the use, but also the navigation of a boat, it cannot be said that it is impermissibly vague in all applications. After all, no citation of authority is necessary to sustain the proposition that the State may validly prohibit the navigation or operation of boats and motor vehicles in public places while impaired. Therefore, Andrews has no viable claim of facial unconstitutionality. This leaves him with the sole claim that the statutes are unconstitutional as applied. However, as noted above, “as applied” claims are waived by the entry of a guilty plea.

[¶ 8.] We also observe that even if Andrews’ “as applied” challenge had not been waived by his plea, he waived it by failing to present an adequate factual record of the conduct at issue. In analyzing as applied challenges, a court must examine the complainant’s conduct and the specific facts of the case at hand. See Woodis, supra. That is not possible here. Because Andrews entered a guilty plea, the record of his conduct and the specific facts of the case would generally be confined to the factual basis entered for his plea. See McCarthy v. U.S., 394 U.S. 459, 467, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969)(cited in State v. Lashwood, 384 N.W.2d 319, 322 (S.D.1986))(factual basis rule requires judge to determine that conduct which defendant admits constitutes the offense charged). However, the factual basis for Andrews’ plea has not been included as a part of the settled record, for appeal. Other than Andrews’ counsel’s statements in voir dire, the only thing the record indicates is that Andrews was initially arrested as the “driver” of the boat.

[¶ 9.] This Court has repeatedly instructed that the party claiming error carries the responsibility of ensuring an adequate record for review. State v. Cates, 2001 SD 99, ¶ 18, 632 N.W.2d 28, 36. When confronted with an incomplete record, this Court presumes that the trial court acted properly. Id. “Without an adequate record, any claim of alleged error fails.” MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Credit, 281 Kan. 655, 132 P.3d 898, 900 (2006).

[¶ 10.] Based upon the foregoing, Andrews’ “as applied” challenge was waived by his guilty plea, and even if it was not, his challenge fails for lack of an adequate record for review.

[¶ 11.] Affirmed.

[¶ 12.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, SABERS, KONENKAMP, ZINTER and MEIERHENRY, Justices, participating.

      . The trial court offered Andrews the following alternatives to preserve his legal argument: "I would reject [Andrews' proposed] instruction and you could protect the record on a plea so that would be appealable. Or we could do a trial before the Court, if you want to do it that way, and stipulated facts.” Andrews apparently declined these opportunities and simply pleaded guilty.

      . See also Balk v. Martin, 136 Idaho 652, 39 P.3d 592, 600 (2001)(absent adequate record on appeal to support appellant's claims, court will not presume error); Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Ill.2d 389, 76 Ill.Dec. 823, 459 N.E.2d 958, 959 (1984)(absent complete record to support claim of error it will be presumed that order entered by trial court was in conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual basis); Stallings v. State, 508 N.E.2d 550, 552 (Ind. 1987)(it is appellant's duty to present adequate record showing alleged error and, where he fails to do so, the issue is deemed waived); Your Home, Inc. v. City of Portland, 432 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Me.1981)(appeal must be denied if appellant has not presented an adequate record for review); Barak v. Quisenberry Law Firm, 135 Cal.App.4th 654, 37 Cal. Rptr.3d 688, 692 (2006)(failure to provide adequate record on issue requires that issue be resolved against appellant); Nelson v. Schubert, 98 Wash.App. 754, 994 P.2d 225, 231 (2000)(appellant has burden of presenting adequate record, and bears consequence of court's inability to conduct full review, which is rejection of his challenge).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: /s/Helen M. Meyer Associate Justice

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Petition for DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST Seth Patrick HARTIGAN, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 29889X.
    No. A05-1308.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    April 25, 2007.
   ORDER

The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility has filed a petition for disciplinary action seeking reciprocal discipline under Rule 12(d), Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR), based on an order of the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspending respondent Seth Patrick Hartigan from the practice of law for a period of six months. On August 11, 2005, we suspended respondent under Rule 12(c), RLPR, because he could not be found in the state to respond to the allegations of the petition. On October 25, 2006, we ordered respondent to show cause why we should not impose appropriate discipline based on the allegations of the petition. On January 12, 2007, we ordered the Director to provide respondent with copies of the petition and our orders at an address furnished by respondent in the People’s Republic of China and allowed respondent 45 days in which to respond to our order to show cause. Respondent did not respond to the order to show cause or otherwise respond to the petition; the petition’s allegations are therefore deemed admitted under Rule 13(b), RLPR.

The petition alleges, and we find, that respondent: (1) accepted a laptop computer as payment for legal fees and retained it for his personal benefit without notifying his employer; (2) made misrepresentations to the Wisconsin Office of Lawyers Responsibility; (3) failed to appear in court on behalf of two clients; (4) failed to provide notice of withdrawal from representation; (5) failed to communicate with and pursue client matters; (6) failed to protect client interests; (7) made false representations to a tribunal; and (8) failed to return client property. This misconduct violated Rules 1.4(a) and (b), 1.16(d), 3.3(a)(1), 8.1(a), and 8.4(c), Minn. R. Prof. Conduct.

Respondent was suspended by the Wisconsin Supreme Court for six months. Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Hartigan, 277 Wis.2d 341, 690 N.W.2d 831, 835 (2005). We conclude that the same discipline is appropriate here. See In re Heinemann, 606 N.W.2d 62, 64 (Minn.2000) (reciprocal discipline prevents attorneys sanctioned in one jurisdiction from avoiding the consequences of their misconduct by moving to another jurisdiction).

Based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent is suspended from the practice of law for six months. The petition and hearing process provided by Rule 18, RLPR, is not waived. Respondent shall pay the sum of $900 in costs pursuant to Rule 24(a), RLPR.

BY THE COURT:

/s/Helen M. Meyer Associate Justice


author: WRIGHT, Judge.

text:
    In the Matter of the CLAIM FOR BENEFITS BY Thomas John HAGERT.
    No. A06-1141.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    April 17, 2007.

      Minnesota Public Safety Officers Benefit Eligibility Panel James R. Bettenburg, Bettenburg Law Firm, St. Paul, MN for appellant.
    Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Bernard E. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN for respondent Minnesota Public Safety Officers Benefit Eligibility Panel.
    Considered and decided by STONEBURNER, Presiding Judge; WILLIS, Judge; and WRIGHT, Judge.
   OPINION

WRIGHT, Judge.

This case involves a retired peace officer’s eligibility to receive continued health-insurance benefits until age 65 under MinmStat. § 299A.465 (2004 <& Supp.2005) when the retirement was caused by injuries sustained while performing his or her occupational duties. Appellant challenges the decision of the Public Safety Officers Benefit Eligibility Panel denying him continued health-insurance benefits under section 299A.465 because the injuries appellant sustained in a traffic accident while responding to a theft report did not result from an occupational duty “unique to the job of a peace officer.” Appellant argues that the panel (1) erred in its interpretation of MinmStat. § 299A.465, and (2) unfairly denied appellant a rehearing. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS

Appellant Thomas Hagert, a veteran of the Forest Lake Police Department, was injured on July 3, 2004, while traveling on his assigned police motorcycle to a retail store in response to a theft report. While enroute, a pickup truck traveling in oncoming traffic failed to yield and turned left in front of Hagert. To avoid a collision, Ha-gert lay the motorcycle on its side. As a result of doing so, he suffered injuries to his left leg, including a torn anterior cruciate ligament (ACL), a torn meniscus, and a fractured tibia. These injuries prevented Hagert from returning to work as a police officer without restrictions.

In March 2006, Hagert retired from his employment with the City of Forest Lake, and the Public Employees Retirement Association approved Hagert’s application for a duty-related disability pension. Hagert also applied to the Public Safety Officers Benefit Eligibility Panel (the panel) for a determination that he was entitled to receive continued health-insurance benefits under Minn.Stat. § 299A.465 (2004 & Supp.2005). On March 24, Hagert received a letter from the panel notifying him that his application would be reviewed at a hearing on April 13 and that Hagert could appear and present information to the panel at that time. Hagert did not attend the hearing. The panel voted unanimously to deny Hagert’s application for continued health-insurance benefits. Ha-gert requested a rehearing, and the panel advised Hagert that his case would be placed on the June 8 agenda for possible reconsideration. On June 8, the panel denied Hagert’s request for reconsideration. This certiorari appeal followed.

ISSUES

I. Does Minn.Stat. § 299A.465 (2004 & Supp.2005), which authorizes a retired peace officer receiving a duty-related disability pension to receive continued health-insurance benefits if the peace officer’s occupational duties or professional responsibilities put the officer at risk for the type of injury actually sustained, also require those occupational duties or professional responsibilities to be unique to those of a peace officer?

II. Did the Public Safety Officers Benefit Eligibility Panel abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s request for a rehearing?

ANALYSIS

We review an administrative agency’s decision to determine whether the agency committed an error of law, made arbitrary and capricious findings or conclusions, or otherwise ruled in a manner unsupported by the record. Minn.Stat. § 14.69 (2006); In re Excess Surplus Status of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., 624 N.W.2d 264, 277 (Minn.2001); Health-Partners, Inc. v. Bernstein, 655 N.W.2d 357, 360 (Minn.App.2003), review denied (Minn. Mar. 26, 2003). We exercise de novo review of alleged “errors of law which arise when an agency decision is based upon the meaning of words in a statute.” In re Denial of Eller Media Co.'s Applications for Outdoor Adver. Device Permits, 664 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn.2003).

When interpreting a statute, we must “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2006). In doing so, we first determine whether the statute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous. Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn.2001). A statute’s language is ambiguous only when its language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn.1999). We construe words and phrases according to their plain and ordinary meaning. Frank’s Nursery Sales, Inc. v. City of Roseville, 295 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn.1980); see also Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1) (2006) (providing that words are construed according to their common usage). When the legislature’s intent is clearly discernible from a statute’s plain and unambiguous language, we interpret the language according to its plain meaning without resorting to other principles of statutory construction. Am. Tower, 636 N.W.2d at 312. Because Hagert challenges the panel’s interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 299A.465 (2004 & Supp.2005), we examine the statutory language to determine how it applies in this case.

Under Minnesota law, an employer of a peace officer disabled in the line of duty shall provide continued health-insurance benefits to the peace officer and the officer’s dependents until the officer reaches the age of 65 when the officer suffers an injury that “(1) results in the officer’s ... retirement or separation from service; (2) occurs while the officer ... is acting in the course and scope of duties as a peace officer ...; and (3) the officer ... has been approved to receive the officer’s ... duty-related disability pension.” Minn. Stat. § 299A.465, subd. l(a)-(e) (2004). To obtain this benefit, once the peace officer has been approved to receive a duty-related disability pension, the officer may apply to the panel for a determination of whether the officer was injured while acting within the course and scope of his or her duties. Minn.Stat. § 299A.465, subd. 6(a) (Supp.2005). The panel then determines, based on the facts, “whether or not the officer’s ... occupational duties or professional responsibilities put the officer ... at risk for the type of ... injury actually sustained.” Id.

The plain language of section 299A.465 creates a two-part test for determining whether a retired peace officer is entitled to receive continued health-insurance benefits: (1) the officer must be approved to receive a duty-related disability pension; and (2) the officer’s occupational duties or professional responsibilities must have put the officer at risk for the type of injury actually sustained. Id., subds. 1(a), 6(a); In re Claim for Benefits by Meuleners, 725 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Minn.App.2006). These inquiries are not coextensive. A duty-related disability pension is awarded to a peace officer injured during “any act of duty.” Minn.Stat. § 353.656, subd. 1 (Supp.2005); see In re Application for PERA Police & Fire Plan Line of Duty Disability Benefits of Brittain, 724 N.W.2d 512, 519 (Minn.2006) (holding that “any act of duty” includes all tasks and functions of an officer, not just those involving hazards or heightened risks). But continued health-insurance benefits are limited to those retired peace officers who sustain an injury or illness for which the officer’s occupational duties or professional responsibilities put the officer at risk. Minn.Stat. § 299A.465, subd. 6(a). The legislature created the panel solely to determine whether an officer satisfies the second part of the test for eligibility, namely, whether the officer’s occupational duties or professional responsibilities put the officer at risk for the injury or illness sustained. See Minn.Stat. § 299A.465, subd. 7 (Supp.2005) (establishing course and scope of panel’s duties).

Although Hagert was on duty and responding to a theft call using a police motorcycle, the panel concluded that Ha-gert’s “injury was not an occupational duty unique to the job of a peace officer” and that “injuries from a motor vehicle accident [are] not the intended use of benefits under Minn.Stat. § 299A.465, subd. 6.” During the panel’s deliberations, members considered that Hagert was not responding in an emergency' mode at the time of the accident.

Hagert, who was approved to receive a duty-related disability pension, argues that the panel applied a standard different from that authorized by Minn. Stat. § 299A.465, subd. 6(a), by considering whether Hagert’s injuries resulted from occupational duties or professional responsibilities that were “unique to the job of a peace officer.” We agree. The statute’s language is unambiguous. There is no statutory requirement that the officer’s occupational duties or professional responsibilities be “unique to the job of a peace officer.” Rather, the statute requires that the officer’s occupational duties or professional responsibilities put the officer at risk for the type of injury sustained. Id. The additional requirement applied by the panel does not effectuate the plain language of section 299A.465.

It was Hagert’s occupational duty to respond on his assigned police motorcycle to a retail store to investigate a theft. Because a turning vehicle did not see Ha-gert’s motorcycle, Hagert was forced to use an avoidance tactic with his motorcycle to prevent a collision. In doing so, he injured his left leg but sustained far less-serious injuries than if the collision had not been successfully avoided. Hagert’s occupational duty- — responding to a police call on his assigned police motorcycle — put him at risk for the leg injury he sustained in the accident. Unlike a negligence standard, under the statutory standard at issue here, Hagert’s occupational duties need not be the proximate cause of his injury. Rather, the applicable legal standard requires that his duties “put [him] at risk for the type of ... injury actually sustained.” Minn.Stat. § 299.465, subd. 6(a). Although the proximate cause of Hagert’s injuries was the other driver’s failure to see the motorcycle and yield, Hagert’s duty to travel on a motorcycle put him at risk for the injuries he sustained. The panel erred by denying Hagert continued health-insurance benefits because such a duty was not “unique to the job of a peace officer.” See In re Claim for Benefits by Sloan, 729 N.W.2d 626, 630, 2007 WL 968756 at *3 (Minn.App. Apr.3, 2007) (noting that panel’s unique-to-the-job analysis improperly excluded conduct that, although mundane and ordinary, is incidental to proper discharge of officer’s duties).

II.

Hagert also maintains that the panel abused its discretion and denied him due process of law when it denied his request for a rehearing. Section 299A.465 does not afford Hagert a rehearing as a matter of right. But administrative agencies have the inherent or implied power to correct erroneous decisions. Nieszner v. State, Dep’t of Jobs & Training, 499 N.W.2d 832, 838 (Minn.App.1993). We accord deference to an administrative agency’s decision to deny a request for rehearing and will reverse that decision only for an abuse of discretion. See Goodwin v. BPS Guard Servs., Inc., 524 N.W.2d 28, 30 (Minn.App.1994) (deferring to commissioner’s discretion not to remand for new hearing when party failed to submit testimony at first hearing).

The United States Constitution guarantees the right to due process of law. U.S. Const, amends. V, XIV, § 1. “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (quotation omitted). When considering a procedural-due-process challenge, we apply a balancing test to determine whether the process adequately balances the private interest at stake, the risk that the process utilized will result in an erroneous deprivation of the private interest, the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, and the state’s interest in the procedures provided, including the administrative burden and expense additional procedures would require. In re Conservatorship of Foster, 547 N.W.2d 81, 85 (Minn.1996).

In March 2006, Hagert received the panel’s letter notifying him of the date that his application would be considered and of the right to present information to the panel. Although Hagert received ample notice and an opportunity to be heard, neither Hagert nor his counsel attended the hearing. And Hagert did not request a different date prior to the hearing or notify the panel that he was unable to attend on the date scheduled. Our review of the record establishes that Hagert’s submission gave the panel sufficient factual information to render a decision. Hagert cites no additional facts that he would have submitted for rehearing. Because Hagert was given adequate notice and opportunity to be heard at the first hearing, he was not denied due process, and the panel’s decision to deny his request for rehearing was not an abuse of discretion.

DECISION

We affirm the Public Safety Officers Benefit Eligibility Panel’s decision to deny Hagert’s request for rehearing. But because the panel did not apply the correct legal standard when it denied continued health-insurance benefits under Minn.Stat. § 299A.465 (Supp.2005), we reverse.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

      . Based on the date of the panel's decision, we analyze the 2004 version of the statute, as amended in 2005.

      . A "peace officer” is defined as "an employee or an elected or appointed official of a political subdivision or law enforcement agency who is licensed by the board, charged with the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of the general criminal laws of the state and who has the full power of arrest.” Minn.Stat. § 626.84, subd. 1(c)(1) (2006).

      . The Public Officers Benefit Eligibility Panel was established with 2005 legislation. Minn. Stat. § 299A.465, subds. 6, 7 (Supp.2005) (noting that subdivisions 6 and 7 expire on July 1, 2008).


author: KLAPHAKE, Judge.

text:
    CITY OF MORRIS, Respondent, v. SAX INVESTMENTS, INC., Appellant, Michael Sax, Appellant.
    No. A06-1188.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    May 1, 2007.

      Charles C. Glasrud, Morris City Attorney, Morris, MN, for respondent.
    J. Richard Stermer, Prindle, Maland, Sellner, Stennes, Knutsen & Stermer, Chartered, Montevideo, MN, for appellants.
    Considered and decided by SHUMAKER, Presiding Judge; KLAPHAKE, Judge; and WILLIS, Judge.
   OPINION

KLAPHAKE, Judge.

In this temporary injunction action, appellant Michael Sax challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to respondent City of Morris, arguing that the court erred by concluding that the Minnesota State Building Code, Minn.Stat. §§ 16B.59-.76 (2004) did not preempt the city’s rental housing code, found at Morris City Code, Section 4.32 (1997).

Because we conclude that the state building code preempts matters of construction, remodeling, restoration, or alteration in residential housing, but does not preempt local authorities from creating and enforcing standards of habitability as they relate to the business of rental housing, we affirm.

FACTS

Appellant Michael Sax owns property located at 608 Eighth Street East in the City of Morris. This property is rental housing and thus subject to periodic inspections pursuant to Morris City Code, Section 4.32 (1997). This ordinance provides for registration and licensure of rental property in the city, with a stated purpose of “establish[ing] and enforce[ing] minimum standards for rental units to meet City and State safety, health, fire, and zoning codes within the City and to provide a more efficient system to ensure that rental property is properly maintained.” To accomplish this purpose, the ordinance sets out a procedure for registering and licensing rental property, provides for periodic inspections, and details a number of rental property standards.

The city inspected the property on January 18, 2005, and noted eight deficiencies, which it ordered appellant to correct. The city conducted a re-inspection on March 25, 2005, and found that four of the deficiencies had been corrected, but four remained: (1) ground fault interruption receptacles were not installed for outlets within six feet of a water source; (2) the bathroom lacked a window or fan; (3) the basement bedrooms did not have smoke detectors; and (4) the egress windows in the basement lacked proper covers. In addition to setting a new deadline for correction of these problems, the city assessed a $50 inspection fee. Appellant argued that the four deficiencies are covered by the state building code and that he was not in violation of the state building code because the property was “grandfathered in” under the state rules.

Appellant refused to correct the cited problems or to pay the inspection fee. The city brought this action, seeking a temporary injunction preventing appellant from renting the property as residential housing until the problems were corrected and appellant paid the inspection fee. Appellant answered, asking the court to declare that (1) the property was deemed to have passed the inspection because the building was in compliance with the state building code; and (2) the state building code preempted the city’s ordinance. Appellant also counterclaimed, asking that the court enjoin the city from enforcing any portion of the ordinance that conflicts with the state building code and to relieve appellant from an unrelated special assessment.

The district court denied appellant’s motions and dismissed his counterclaim but granted summary judgment in favor of the city and issued a temporary injunction. The court noted that the parties “are in agreement that there are no disputed facts and that resolution of the issues would rest upon the Court’s interpretation of the ordinance and its relationship to the State Building Code.” The district court concluded that the state building code preempted local ordinances to the extent that they addressed the design or construction of buildings, but that the city retained control of other issues not directly tied to building design or construction, including regulation of health and safety as it pertains to residential rental housing. The court limited its opinion to the four specific violations alleged by the city and refused to rule on the broader issue of whether any provisions of the ordinance might be preempted by the state building code.

ISSUE

Did the district court err by concluding that the state building code did not preempt certain provisions of the city’s rental housing ordinance?

ANALYSIS

This court reviews de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment on undisputed facts as a question of law. Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enters., Inc., 581 N.W.2d 855, 856 (Minn.1998). The narrow legal question here is whether the state building code preempts certain sections of the city’s rental housing ordinance. Ordinances are presumed to be valid. Press v. City of Minneapolis, 558 N.W.2d 80, 84 (Minn.App.1996). The party challenging the ordinance bears the burden of proof. Id.

In Minnesota, a state statute preempts a local ordinance when the statute completely occupies a field of legislation so that there is no room for local regulation. Minn. Agrie. Aircraft Ass’n v. Twp. of Mantrap, 498 N.W.2d 40, 42 (Minn.App.1993). In order to determine if a state statute has preempted a local ordinance, the court examines four questions:

(1) What is the subject matter being regulated?
(2) Has the subject matter been so fully covered by state law as to have become solely a matter of state concern?
(3) Has the legislature in partially regulating the subject matter indicated that it is a matter solely of state concern?
(4) Is the subject matter itself of such a nature that local regulation would have unreasonably adverse effects upon the general populace?

Canadian Connection v. New Prairie Twp., 581 N.W.2d 391, 394 (Minn.App. 1998) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Sept. 30, 1998). “The extent of the state’s preemption is determined by the language of the statute.” Minn. Agrie. Aircraft Ass’n, 498 N.W.2d at 42.

The state building code, Minn.Stat. §§ 16B.59-76 (2004), contains specific preemptive language:

The State Building Code applies statewide and supersedes the building code of any municipality. A municipality must not by ordinance or through development agreement require building code provisions regulating components or systems of any residential structure that are different from any provision of the State Building Code_All municipalities shall adopt and enforce the State Building Code with respect to new construction within their respective jurisdictions.

Minn.Stat. § 16B.62, subd. 1 (2004). The actual code provisions are contained in Minn. R. 1300.0010-.0250 (2005). Minn. R. 1300.0030, subp. 2, reiterates that the code supersedes the building code of any municipality; subpart 1 states:

The purpose of the code is to provide minimum standards to safeguard life and limb, health, property, and public welfare by regulating and controlling the design, construction, quality of materials, use and occupancy, location and maintenance of all structures and equipment specifically covered by the code in a jurisdiction that adopts and enforces the code.

In an opinion issued shortly after adoption of the state building code, the supreme court stated, “We hold that insofar as local ordinances purport to adopt fire prevention measures which affect the design and construction of buildings, they are in conflict with the State Building Code, which has preempted the field.” City of Minnetonka v. Mark Z. Jones Assoc., Inc., 306 Minn. 217, 219, 236 N.W.2d 163, 165 (1975). In City of Minnetonka, the city sought to enforce a fire code that was more restrictive than the provisions of the state building code. The supreme court rebuffed the city’s argument that firefighting was a function of local government that justified the more restrictive requirements.

We are of the opinion ... that the State Building Code has dealt with fire prevention in a comprehensive manner insofar as it affects the design and construction of buildings, and that it was the legislature’s intent that the state code preempt the requirements for fire prevention except as they dealt with matters other than construction. It would, undoubtedly, be within the province of local government to provide, by ordinance, fire prevention measures dealing with the use and storage of combustible materials, the number and location of portable fire extinguishers, limitations on occupancy of dwellings or commercial buildings, and similar regulations not directly related to the design or construction.

Id. at 320, 236 N.W.2d at 165. The supreme court noted that one of the purposes of the statute was to control construction costs in a manner consistent with standards of health and safety. Id. From the language of the statute and its interpretation in City of Minnetonka, it is clear that the answer to the first preemption factor is that the state building code seeks to regulate construction standards.

As to the second preemption factor, the state building code makes construction, alteration, and remodeling standards a matter solely of state concern, but does not regulate the use of a structure; in contrast, rental housing codes seek to regulate the use of a building as a business venture, by creating standards of habitability that must be met. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1734-35, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (opining that routine inspections of such structures are reasonable in order to enforce housing standards); see also City of Minneapolis v. Ellis, 441 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Minn.App. 1989) (affirming city’s ordinance making landlords responsible for maintenance of rental property), review denied (Minn. July 12, 1989). The state also enacted Minn.Stat. §§ 504B.001-.471 (2004), which deals with the landlord/tenant relationship and imposes a duty on the landlord to maintain the premises in compliance with health and safety laws and with conditions imposed by statute and ordinance. Minn.Stat. § 504B.161, subds. 1, 4. This suggests that although the state intended to occupy the field of building codes as applied to construction, it did not intend to occupy the field of housing codes dealing with occupancy.

As to the third preemption factor, the state has not indicated that by regulating construction standards, it regards regulation of rental housing standards as a matter solely of state concern, except to the extent that the state building code applies to construction of rental housing.

Lastly, the local regulation of rental housing habitability would not adversely affect the general population. At most, the ordinance affects a narrow class of people, including renters or landlords, not the general population.

The language of the state building code and supporting rules, as well as the supreme court’s interpretation in City of Minnetonka, make it clear that local building ordinances are preempted because the state intends to fully occupy the field of building and construction regulations. But this language applies to construction, remodeling, alteration, or restoration, that is, to the act of building, and not to the subsequent use of the building as a business. The supreme court noted that “limitations on occupancy of dwellings or commercial buildings” are fit subjects for local control. City of Minnetonka, 806 Minn, at 219, 236 N.W.2d at 165. Local authorities retain the right to regulate the business of rental housing by enacting standards of habitability. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err by determining that the state building code did not preempt those parts of the city’s rental housing ordinance at issue here.

DECISION

The state building code preempts local attempts to regulate construction, alteration, remodeling, and restoration of residential housing but does not preempt local authorities from creating and enforcing habitability standards in rental housing.

Affirmed.

      . Appellant Sax Investments, Inc. transferred title to the subject property to appellant Michael Sax on January 3, 2005, before the city of Morris commenced this action. Michael Sax is now the sole owner of the property and shall be referred to as “appellant.”

      . Appellant argues that the district court erred by addressing only the four deficiencies for which he was cited, rather than all provision of the city’s ordinance. As a general rule, courts decide only actual controversies and avoid giving advisory opinions. N. States Power Co. v. City of Sunfish Lake, 659 N.W.2d 271, 274 (Minn.App.2003). We decline to address the remaining 71 provisions of the city’s ordinance.


author: CRIPPEN, Judge.

text:
    Steven SCHOSSOW, as trustee for the heirs and next of kin of Ann Elizabeth Schossow, deceased, Respondent, v. FIRST NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Appellant.
    No. A06-1003.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    May 1, 2007.

      Robert G. Manly, Vogel Law Firm, Moorhead, MN, for respondent.
    Chris A. Edison, Storslee Law Firm, Bismarck, ND, for appellant.
    Considered and decided by PETERSON, Presiding Judge, WORKE, Judge, and CRIPPEN, Judge.
   OPINION

CRIPPEN, Judge.

Appealing the district court’s summary judgment, appellant First National Insur-anee Company of America disputes the district court’s determination that appellant is liable to respondent Steven Schos-sow for underinsured motorist benefits in accordance with Minnesota law. Appellant issued a policy to respondent in North Dakota, which defines underinsured motorist coverage more restrictively than Minnesota. Because the district court’s decision comports with the evidence and with Minnesota’s no-fault statutes, we affirm.

FACTS

This dispute arose out of respondent’s claim for underinsured motorist benefits from his automobile insurer. In November 2002, Ann Schossow died from injuries that she sustained in an accident in which she was struck by a vehicle while she was walking to work from her apartment in St. Louis Park, Minnesota.

Respondent and his wife Ann had lived in Fargo, North Dakota, where she had worked for Qwest Communications. In 2000, when her Fargo job was eliminated, Ann Schossow accepted Qwest’s offer for employment in Minnesota. She intended to live and work in Minnesota until 2005, when her Qwest pension would vest. In January 2001, she rented an apartment in the Twin Cities and began work in her new position. She returned to Fargo an average of one weekend a month.

In May 2002, the Schossows obtained automobile insurance from appellant for a vehicle that they purchased for Ann Schos-sow. The agent who issued the policy became aware in December 2001 that Ann, who had an accident with her prior vehicle at that time, was living and working in Minnesota and planned to stay in Minnesota until her retirement with Qwest. Appellant is licensed to write insurance policies in both North Dakota and Minnesota.

The Schossows had other policies with appellant for vehicles that respondent drove. Appellant issued all policies to the couple at their Fargo address, including the policy in question covering Ann’s vehicle. The couple registered this vehicle in North Dakota and obtained a certificate of title using their Fargo address. Ann had also renewed her North Dakota driver’s license while she lived in Minnesota.

After Ann Sehossow’s death, respondent settled with the driver’s insurance company for the driver’s liability coverage limit of $100,000 and then sought underinsured motorist benefits under his policy with appellant for his excess damages. Appellant denied the claim based on North Dakota law, which provided for “difference-in-limits” coverage — with no benefits in this case because respondent’s underinsured motorist policy limit was also $100,000.

In respondent’s subsequent suit, the district court denied appellant’s summary judgment motion and entered judgment for respondent, concluding that Ann Schossow was a Minnesota resident at the time of her fatal accident, and, therefore, Minn.Stat. § 65B.50, subd. 1 (2006), requires appellant, an insurer licensed to write policies in Minnesota, to provide respondent with “add-on” underinsured benefits, allowing for recovery of respondent’s uncompensated loss up to the amount of his underinsured motorist limit, $100,000. Appellant argues that Ann Schossow was not a Minnesota resident because her domicile was in North Dakota and that in any case the policy was never renewed, delivered or issued for delivery, or executed in Minnesota.

ISSUES

1. Did the district court err by concluding that Ann Schossow was a Minnesota resident at the time of her fatal accident?

2. Did the district court err by applying Minnesota law regarding underinsured motorist coverage to a Minnesota resident when the policy, which included underin-sured motorist benefits, was never renewed, delivered or issued for delivery, or executed in Minnesota?

ANALYSIS

On appeal from summary judgment, we determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of the law. Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 672 (Minn.2001). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn.1993).

Respondent’s policy conforms to North Dakota law for underinsured motorist coverage, in which a tortfeasor driver is considered underinsured when the driver’s liability coverage does not at least equal the amount of underinsured motorist coverage carried by the injured insured. N.D. Cent.Code § 26.1-40-15.1(2) (2005); DeCoteau v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 603 N.W.2d 906, 909-12 (N.D.2000). By contrast, under Minnesota law, a tortfeasor driver is considered underinsured when the driver’s liability coverage does not at least equal the amount needed to compensate the injured insured for actual damages. Minn. Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 17 (2006).

The parties do not dispute that respondent’s actual damages exceed the $100,000 maximum benefit paid by the tortfeasor’s insurer. Minnesota’s “add-on” approach allows respondent to recover from appellant the amount of actual damages, less the settlement amount of $100,000, up to the amount of respondent’s underinsured coverage, $100,000. See Minn.Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 4a (2006) (stating that “[wjith respect to underinsured motorist coverage, the maximum liability of an insurer is the amount of damages sustained but not recovered from the insurance policy of the driver or owner of any underinsured at fault vehicle.”).

I.

Minnesota requires that every insurer licensed to write automobile insurance in the state provide at least the minimum security required by Minn.Stat. § 65B.49 (2006) to all policyholders, except that in the case of “nonresident” policyholders it need only provide security with respect to accidents occurring in Minnesota. Minn.Stat. § 65B.50, subd. 1 (2006); see also Minn.Stat. § 65B.49, subds. 3a-4a (defining Minnesota’s under-insured motorist coverage requirements). The “security” required for all insurance policies covering nonresidents includes only basic-economic loss and residual-liability coverages. Ziegelmann v. Nat’l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Cos., 686 N.W.2d 563, 567 (Minn.App.2004), review denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2004). If nonresidents purchase underinsured motorist coverage, it does not need to comply with Minnesota law. Warthan v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 592 N.W.2d 136, 138-39 (Minn.App.1999) (concluding that under Minn.Stat. § 65B.50, subd. 1, even insurers licensed to write insurance in Minnesota are not required to furnish uninsured motorist coverage to nonresidents), review denied (Minn. July 28, 1999). To resolve the additional issue in this case, we must first address whether Ann Schossow is considered a “resident” of Minnesota.

The terms “resident” and “nonresident” are not defined anywhere in Minn. Stat. ch. 65B, which deals with automobile insurance. Appellant argues that the undisputed facts of this case support the conclusion that Ann Schossow was a North Dakota resident because she represented herself as one. Appellant points out that Ann renewed her North Dakota driver’s license, registered and titled her car in North Dakota, and declared her intention to return permanently to North Dakota after becoming vested in her Qwest pension. Her 2002 W-2 form contained only her North Dakota address, and the Schos-sows’ 2002 tax returns indicated that they were both full-year residents of North Dakota.

The district court concluded, under a “plain and simple analysis,” that Ann Schossow was a Minnesota resident because she lived here continuously and worked here full time, with only one weekend visit per month to North Dakota. This analysis conforms to governing precedents.

The district court cited Jacobson v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Group, in which we affirmed the district court’s determination as a matter of law that Minnesota law should apply to an underinsured motorist claim on behalf of a student who was killed in an automobile accident in Minnesota while he was going to school here. 645 N.W.2d 741, 746-47 (Minn.App.2002).

It was determinative in Jacobson that “[djecedent lived in Minnesota at the time of the accident, and the accident occurred here.” Id. at 746. Our opinion stated Minnesota’s “important governmental interest” in seeing that all tort victims are fully compensated. Id. We discounted the importance of facts that the student maintained an Iowa driver’s license and would be returning to live in his parents’ home in one month when he graduated from school. Id. at 743-45.

Our decision in Schoer v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. also supports the district court’s determination, although the facts in Schoer contrast with those of the present case. Schoer v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 473 N.W.2d 73, 74 (Minn.App.1991). Schoer was involved in a Minnesota automobile accident and sought underinsured benefits under his mother’s Wisconsin policy. Id. We upheld a jury’s finding that Schoer was a resident of his mother’s home in Wisconsin at the time of the accident because, while attending school here, Schoer did not establish a single residence separate from his mother’s household. Id. 76-77. He lived out of a suitcase in many different places for short periods, and he returned to his Wisconsin home as often as possible, including stays of a few months at a time. Id. at 74, 76-77. Unlike Shoer’s transient status, Ann Schossow had established a residence in Minnesota, went back to North Dakota infrequently, and planned to stay in Minnesota for a few more years.

Appellant relies on our decision in Hoes-chen v. South Carolina Ins. Co. for the proposition that “residency” for the purpose of Minn.Stat. § 65B.50, subd. 1, should be interpreted to mean “domicile.” See Hoeschen v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 349 N.W.2d 833, 834-35 (Minn.App.1984) (discussing domicile), aff'd on other grounds, 378 N.W.2d 796 (Minn.1985).

“Domicile” is a person’s permanent home, to which that person intends to return and remain even though currently residing elsewhere. Black’s Law Dictionary . 523 (8th ed.2004). Appellant cites Hoeschen for more than it says.

Hoeschen was a military serviceman living and working in North Carolina and domiciled in Minnesota when he was injured in an automobile accident in this state. Hoeschen, 349 N.W.2d at 834-35. We determined that a person must be a Minnesota resident, as Hoeschen was, to obtain Minnesota underinsured motorist benefits. Id. at 837. One’s Minnesota domicile may be a residence for an accident here, but Hoeschen does not preclude the person domiciled elsewhere from also having a residence in Minnesota. See also Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thiem, 503 N.W.2d 789, 790-91 (Minn.1993) (stating that deceased child was resident of divorced father’s household and mother’s household within definition of “insured” under coverage of father’s automobile insurance policy).

As a general rule, “while a person can have only one domicile, [the person] can have more than one residence.” Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Olson, 402 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn.App.1987), review denied (Minn. May 20, 1987); see Krause by Krause v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Co., 399 N.W.2d 597, 601-02 (Minn.App.1987) (holding that child was a resident of both parents’ households under the Minnesota No-Fault Act). Nothing in Minn.Stat. § 65B.50 suggests that a person can be a resident of only one state.

The remaining cases that appellant cites to support its argument that residence means domicile are inapplicable to the present case. See Dreyling v. Comm’r of Revenue, 711 N.W.2d 491, 494-96 (Minn. 2006) (applying income tax statute that defines resident as any individual domiciled in Minnesota); In re Smith’s Estate, 242 Minn. 85, 88, 64 N.W.2d 129, 131 (1954) (interpreting residence as used in probate statutory provision to mean decedent’s domicile at time of death). That Ann Schossow’s legal domicile was the family home in North Dakota does not determine the meaning of residency in Minn.Stat. § 65B.50, subd. 1.

II.

Appellant asserts, alternatively, that even if Ann Schossow was a Minnesota resident at the time of her accident, the district court erred by requiring appellant to provide respondent with Minnesota un-derinsured motorist benefits, because appellant issued the policy to the Schossows’ North Dakota address and never renewed the policy while Ann Schossow was living in Minnesota.

Any automobile insurance policy that is “renewed, delivered or issued for delivery, or executed in [Minnesota] with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in [Minnesota]” must provide un-derinsured motorist coverage under Minnesota law. MinmStat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(l) (2006) (defining Minnesota’s underinsured motorist coverage requirements). But under Minn.Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 1, every insurer licensed to write automobile insurance must “afford at least the minimum security provided by section 65B.49 to all policyholders,” with the exception for nonresidents as already discussed.

Because Minn.Stat. § 65B.49, subds. 3a and 4a, define required underinsurance coverage, we address whether a Minnesota licensed insurer who issues a policy in North Dakota, including underinsurance benefits as required by North Dakota law, to a resident of Minnesota is required to provide underinsurance coverage under Minnesota law.

Appellant relies on Cantu v. Atlanta Cas. Cos., 535 N.W.2d 291 (Minn.1995), to support its argument. The supreme court reversed our decision that Cantu’s policy issued out of state automatically provided uninsured motorist coverage when he became a Minnesota resident. Id. at 291-92. But Cantu arose in markedly different circumstances: Cantu rejected uninsured motorist coverage from his Florida insurer. Cantu v. Atlanta Cas. Cos., 532 N.W.2d 261, 262 (Minn.App.1995), rev’d, 535 N.W.2d 291 (Minn.1995).

The Schossows, in contrast, purchased underinsured motorist benefits from appellant, their North Dakota insurer. Unquestionably, a policy specifically incorporating Minnesota underinsured coverage is required only when issued in this state. But it does not follow that an insurer who writes a policy with an underin-sured motorist provision in another state, does not certify for Minnesota residents, under Minn.Stat. 65B.50, subd. 1, that they will be afforded the full benefits as provided by Minnesota law. See Warthan, 592 N.W.2d at 139 (stating that under Hoeschen, “when a Minnesota resident is injured in an accident in Minnesota, the resident’s [underinsured motorist] policy will be reformed to comply with Minnesota law.”). The language of Minn.Stat. § 65B.50, subd. 1, which states that “[e]very insurer licensed [in Minnesota] shall ... afford at least the minimum security provided by section 65B.49 to all [resident] policyholders,” is a compelling matter of law, whereby we uphold the district court’s .determination of benefits coverage.

Our deference to the dictates of Minn. Stat. § 65B.50, subd. 1, is enlarged by Minnesota’s strong governmental interest in providing for coverage to alleviate severe economic distress on uncompensated persons injured in automobile accidents in Minnesota. The no-fault law exists to deal with the “detrimental impact of automobile accidents on uncompensated injured persons,” and to promote the “orderly and efficient administration of justice in this state.” Minn.Stat. § 65B.42 (2006). Minnesota has a strong policy of extending coverage rather than allowing coverage to be restricted. Maher v. All Nation Ins. Co., 340 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Minn.App.1983), review denied (Minn. Apr. 25, 1984). Appellant is required to extend underinsured motorist coverage to respondent.

DECISION

The district court did not err by concluding that Ann Sehossow was a Minnesota resident at the time of her accident and that respondent is entitled to underinsured motorist benefits in accordance with Minnesota law.

Affirmed.

       Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 10.

      . We find no merit to appellant's argument that the district court erred by deciding the residency question as a matter of law. The parties agreed that the underlying facts were undisputed, in which case a district court may properly determine residency as a matter of law. French v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 372 N.W.2d 839, 841 (Minn.App.1985) (affirming district court’s determination of residency when parties had stipulated to relevant facts and district court concluded that ultimate interpretation of “reside” involved merely a "characterization” of those facts).

      . Under Cantu, a federal court states, "the Court will not read [UIM] into the policies.” Ray v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., CIV. 06-277, 2007 WL 172559, at *5 (D.Minn. Jan. 19, 2007). Ray, noted in argument by appellant, similarly declines to recognize UIM coverage when none was purchased by the insured when they last purchased their policy in Michigan.

      . Respondent also contends that the requirements of Minn.Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(l), were satisfied because, unlike Cantu, in which the insurer did not become aware that Cantu had become a Minnesota resident until after his wife was killed in a Minnesota automobile accident, appellant knew or should have known several months before Ann Schossow’s fatal accident that she was living and working in Minnesota. We need not reach this issue because we hold that benefits in this case are determined by section 65B.50, not section 65B.49.