author: TERNUS, Justice.

text:
    Zacharia Abraham GARWICK, Appellant, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, and Darrell Rensink, Director, Iowa Department of Transportation, Appellees.
    No. 98-1947.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    June 1, 2000.

      Joel W. Bittner and Blaine B. Hudnall, Des Moines, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, David A. Ferree, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Carolyn Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
   TERNUS, Justice.

The appellant, Zacharia Garwick, claims his prior revocation under Iowa’s “zero-tolerance” law for minors should not be used to lengthen his current revocation, imposed for an operating-while-intoxicated violation. We disagree and affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In 1996, when Garwick was eighteen years old, his driver’s license was revoked for sixty days pursuant to Iowa Code section 321J.12(5) (Supp.1995). This revocation was based on Garwiek’s violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2A (Supp.1995), which prohibits a person under the age of twenty-one from driving while having ah alcohol concentration of .02 or more. Upon expiration of this revocation, Gar-wick again obtained a driver’s license.

In April of 1998, Garwick was arrested and charged with operating while intoxicated (OWI) in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (Supp.1997), which prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of .10 or more. An intoxilyzer test revealed that Garwick’s blood alcohol concentration exceeded .10. The Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) revoked Garwick’s license for one year pursuant to Iowa Code section 321J.12(1), which requires the DOT to revoke the driver’s license of any person whose chemical test indicates an alcohol concentration of .10 or more. If the person has had no prior revocation “under this chapter,” the DOT must revoke the person’s license for 180 days. See Iowa Code § 321J.12(l)(a). If “the person has had a previous revocation under this chapter,” the current revocation is extended to one year. See id. § 321J.12(l)(b).

Garwick contested his one-year revocation, claiming that his prior revocation under section 321J.2A should not be used to enhance the length of his current revocation. The administrative law judge ruled that section 321 J.12(l)(b) required such an enhancement. This ruling was affirmed on an intra-agency appeal and again on judicial review by the district court.

On his appeal to this court, Garwick continues to assert that a prior revocation under chapter 321J’s “zero-tolerance” provision, section 321J.2A, should not be treated the same as a prior revocation under the driving-while-intoxicated provision, section 321J.2, for purposes of extending the revocation imposed for a subsequent OWI violation. He also argues that revocation of his license for more than 180 days violates his constitutional right against double jeopardy. See U.S. Const, amend. V. The State alleges that the latter claim was not preserved for review. We discuss the error preservation issue first.

II. Double Jeopardy Claim — Error Preservation.

“Issues not raised before the district court, including constitutional issues, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” State v. McCright, 569 N.W.2d 605, 607 (Iowa 1997). Garwick asserts that he adequately raised the constitutional challenge to his revocation in his petition for judicial review by alleging that the DOT’S decision was “in violation of [a] statutory provision [and was] made upon unlawful procedure.” This language comes directly from Iowa Code section 17A.19(8) (1997), which enumerates general reasons that provide a basis for the district court to take corrective action on judicial review. Garwick’s allegation in his petition for judicial review is far too unspecific to preserve a double jeopardy challenge. See Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n, 465 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Iowa 1991) (holding that an issue must be raised “with sufficient precision to alert the [court] to the error being claimed”). Not only did the allegation in Garwick’s petition for judicial review fail to mention that the claimed illegality was based on the Double Jeopardy Clause, it did not even identify the violation as being constitutional in nature.

Additionally, in eases seeking review of agency action, “[c]onstitutional issues must be raised at the agency level to be preserved for judicial review.” Soo Line R.R. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 521 N.W.2d 685, 688 (Iowa 1994) (emphasis added). There is nothing in the record before us that indicates the double jeopardy issue was raised in the proceedings before the DOT. Therefore, Garwick has failed to preserve this issue for our review.

III. Extension of Revocation Period for Prior Section S21J.2A Revocation.

A. Scope of review. “When the district court exercises its powers of judicial review, it functions in an appellate capacity to correct errors of law.” Wiebenga v. lowa Dep’t of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 732, 734 (Iowa 1995). In reviewing such a decision, this court determines whether the district court correctly applied the law. See id.

B. Discussion of ’merits. Garwick challenges only the length of the revocation imposed on him pursuant-to section 321 J. 12(1). As noted earlier, a one-year revocation is required “if the person has had a previous revocation under this chapter.” Iowa Code § 321 J.12(l)(b). Therefore, we focus on the quoted language to determine whether the DOT properly imposed a one-year revocation.

As discussed above, when Garwick was eighteen years old, his license was revoked for sixty days pursuant to section 321 J.2A, which states in pertinent part:

A person who is under the age of twenty-one shall not operate a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration ... of .02 or more. The motor vehicle license ... of a person who is under the .age of twenty-one and who operates a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of .02 or more shall be revoked ... for a period of time specified under section 321J.12.

Iowa Code § 321J.2A (emphasis added). Clearly, Garwick’s prior loss of his license constituted a “revocation,” and this revocation was indisputably required by a provision of the Iowa Code found in chapter 321J, namely section 321 J.2A.

Notwithstanding the logic of this analysis, Garwick contends that the phrase “under this chapter” as it is used in section 321 J.12(l)(b) does not really mean any revocation under chapter 321J, but is instead limited to revocations under section 321 J.2. He offers several policy reasons supporting his contention that the legislature surely did not mean to include a revocation under Iowa’s “zero-tolerance” law for minors within the class of revocations that could be used to lengthen an OWI revocation.

Garwick’s argument flies in the face of the long-settled principle of statutory construction that when a statute is plain and its meaning clear, the court should not reach beyond the express terms of the statute. See Iowa Dep’t of Transp. v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Woodbury County, 488 N.W.2d 174, 175 (Iowa 1992); State v. West, 446 N.W.2d 777, 778 (Iowa 1989). Only when the terms of a statute are ambiguous do we engage in an analysis of legislative intent by applying rules of statutory construction. See State v. Guzman-Juarez, 591 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1999); Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist., 577 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Iowa 1998). Here, an examination of the express terms of the statute reveals that the term “this chapter” clearly refers to chapter 321J and we have so held under nearly identical circumstances.

In the Woodbury County case, this court considered the meaning of the words “this chapter” as used in section 321J.4(8), which allows the issuance of a temporary restricted license to persons whose license is currently revoked. 488 N.W.2d at 175. Section 321J.4(8) limits eligibility for a temporary license to those persons whose license “has either been revoked under this chapter, or revoked or suspended under chapter 321 solely for violations of this chapter.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Iowa Code section 321J.4(8) (1991)). This court held that the terms of the statute were clear and unambiguous. Id. Therefore, we looked to the express terms of the statute to ascertain the legislature’s intent. Id. In doing so, we concluded that the words “this chapter” referred to chapter 321J. Id.; accord State v. Vargason, 607 N.W.2d 691, 698-99 (Iowa 2000) (interpreting the phrase “this chapter” as used in Iowa Code section 321J.4(9) (1999) as referring to chapter 321J); cf. Searls v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 405 N.W.2d 808, 810 (Iowa 1987) (interpreting the words “this chapter” as used in Iowa Code section 321B.16 (1983) to mean chapter 321B).

Although Garwiek argues that the rationale of the Woodbury County case is limited to section 321J.4(8), we find no reasonable basis upon which to distinguish the identical language used in section 321J.12(l)(b). There is nothing in the context of section 321J.12(l)(b) that renders the words “this chapter” ambiguous. Therefore, we give these words the same meaning we gave them in section 321J.4(8); they refer to chapter 321 J.

Garwick’s argument that the interpretation placed on this statute by the DOT is “strained, impractical or absurd” also lacks merit. There is nothing strained, impractical or absurd about a legislative intent to remove repeat offenders from the highways for a longer period of time than those who have violated chapter 321J only once. Garwiek has previously violated the law with respect to drinking and driving; therefore, treating him as a repeat offender is not strained, impractical or absurd.

In summary, because Garwick’s prior revocation was pursuant to section 321J.2A, it was a revocation under “this chapter” and was properly considered by the DOT in determining the length of Gar-wick’s current revocation. The district court did not err in so ruling.

AFFIRMED.

All justices concur except CADY, J., who takes no part.

      . There are additional prerequisites set forth in section 321J.12(1) that must be met before the DOT is required to revoke a person's license, but these requirements are not relevant to the issues in this case.

      . Although Garwick’s conduct in 1998 also violated Iowa Code section 321J.2A (1997), as he was under twenty-one at the time of this offense, section 321J.2A provides that if the minor is convicted of a violation of section 321J.2, any revocation imposed as a result of that violation supercedes the revocation required by section 321J.2A.

      . It is true, as Garwiek points out in his brief, that this court discussed the legislative history of section 321J.4(8) in the Woodbury County case. The legislative history was merely used, however, to bolster the conclusion this court had already reached that the plain meaning of the express terms of the statute required the court to interpret the phrase “this chapter” to refer to chapter 321J. The court simply observed that the amendments to the statute "did not change the requirement that the underlying violations must come solely from chapter 321J.” Woodbury County, 488 N.W.2d at 176. An analysis of legislative history was not necessary to our holding in Woodbury County and is not required in the case before us.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LARSON, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Dennis BARNES, Juliann Putzier, Nancy Jo Schaffer, Ron Davidson, Sandra Dougherty, Greg Sorenson, David Lockridge, Joe Wright, Rose Simms, Karen Bollie, Richard Hibbert, Jr., Terry Riles, Julia Lucas, Bob Strad-ley, Rosella Orme, Joseph Lohman, Ramona Smith, Bonnie Eggars, and American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (Council 61 AFSCME), Appellants, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
    No. 98-1959.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    June 1, 2000.

      Marci B.H. Tooman and Gregory T. Ra-cette of Hopkins & Huebner, P.C., Des Moines, and Michael E. Hansen, Des Moines, for appellants.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Julie Burger, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
   LARSON, Justice.

The plaintiffs in this case, eighteen employees of the State of Iowa and their union, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, have appealed the district court’s dismissal of their suit for damages based on the State’s alleged failure to comply with Iowa Code section 85.27 (1995) and Iowa Code chapter 91A. We affirm.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.

The plaintiffs’ suit claimed the State violated Iowa Code section 85.27 by requiring employees to use sick leave or vacation time to attend medical appointments for treatment of workers’ compensation injuries. They seek damages and an injunction against the State to prevent future violations. The State moved to dismiss on the grounds the workers’ compensation commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction and because the State was immune from such claims. (We do not address the immunity issue because we conclude the court properly dismissed the suit on jurisdictional grounds.) Shortly before the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs requested the court to certify them as a class under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 42, but the court dismissed the suit without ruling on the request for class certification. Class certification is not an issue on appeal.

II. Standard of Review.

We review rulings on motions to dismiss for correction of errors at law, and we will affirm a dismissal only if the petition shows no right of recovery under any state of facts. Ritz v. Wapello County Bd. of Supervisors, 595 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Iowa 1999).

III. The Merits of the Claim.

The plaintiffs rely on this provision of our workers’ compensation law:

If, after the third day of incapacity to work following the date of sustaining a compensable injury which does not result in permanent partial disability, or if, at any time after sustaining a compensa-ble injury which results in permanent partial disability, an employee, who is not receiving weekly benefits under section 85.83 or section 85.34, subsection i, returns to work and is required to leave work for one full day or less to receive services pursuant to this section, the employee shall be paid an amount equivalent to the wages lost at the employee’s regular rate of pay for the time the employee is required to leave work. The employer shall make the payments under this paragraph as wages to the employee....

Iowa Code § 85.27 ¶ 7.

The plaintiffs’ petition asserts the State was “negligent” in violating this statute and demanded money.damages and an injunction to prevent future violations. The sole thrust of their pleading is that they have been denied the wages required by section 85.27 to be paid to them when they miss work for medical reasons. They claim the State’s failure to pay the wages due them under section 85.27 subjects the State to liability under Iowa Code chapter 91A, our wage collection statute. Their petition does not demand the reinstatement of lost medical leave or vacation time, although that theory is urged on appeal.

The plaintiffs are confronted at the outset by this exclusivity provision of our workers’ compensation law:

The rights and remedies provided in ... chapter [85] ... for an employee on account of injury ... for which benefits under ... chapter [85] ... are recoverable, shall be the exclusive and only rights and remedies of such employee ... at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury ... against:
1. the employee’s employer....

Iowa Code § 85.20.

The plaintiffs contend the workers’ compensation law is not exclusive in this case because it does not afford them an adequate remedy. See Portz v. Iowa Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 563 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Iowa 1997) (exhaustion rule presupposes an adequate administrative remedy). They rely on two "grounds to show the commissioner cannot provide an adequate remedy: their claims "for loss of wages are independent from their underlying personal injuries; and the number of claimants is so large they should be allowed to pursue the claim as a class action, which they hope will be available to them in district court. (The commissioner had apparently refused to recognize them as a class.)

The first argument must be rejected because Iowa Code section 85.27 applies only if an émployee takes time off to “receive [medical] services” for a “compensa-ble injury.” By the wording of the statute, a claim cannot be independent of an underlying injury. If there is no compensable injury, the worker has no claim under section 85.27. Demands for lost wages under these circumstances are clearly within the jurisdiction of the commissioner — not the courts. Iowa Code § 85.20.

The second argument to support the plaintiffs’ claim they have no adequate remedy under the workers’ compensation law must also be rejected. This argument is based solely on practicality: individual suits by the employees against the State would be less efficient, and “[m]any potential Plaintiffs may not know the State has been depriving them of this benefit [under section 85.27] or they may find it too cumbersome and expensive to file a claim for these lost wages.”

While the plaintiffs contend it would be more effective to present their claims as members of a class in a district court action rather than in individual workers’ compensation proceedings, we do not believe this means they lack an adequate remedy before the commissioner. In fact, the plaintiffs cite no authority supporting that position. In addition, there is no guarantee they would be more successful in obtaining class action certification in district court than they would be in the agency. A district court’s certification ruling is discretionary, and we will reverse it only if it is based on clearly untenable or unreasonable grounds. City of Dubuque v. Iowa, Trust, 519 N.W.2d 786, 791 (Iowa 1994).

We reject the plaintiffs’ argument that they had no adequate remedy before the commissioner; Iowa Code section 85.27 clearly gives them the right to receive wages for time lost for medical appointments. Any claim based on wages denied under this section must be brought in a workers’ compensation proceeding. The mere possibility that the plaintiffs would more efficiently do that in district court because they might be able to do it in a class action does not make the remedy before the commissioner inadequate.

IV. The “Docking” of Sick Leave and Vacation Time.

"While the plaintiffs pled their case in district court as a claim for lost tuages, they appear now to focus on a claim for lost time: lost sick leave and vacation. The district court referred to this as “docking” their accrued entitlements to time off for vacation and sick leave. The court concluded “[t]he time docked and the injuries sustained are all closely related and part of the same workers’ compensation claim,” so the commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction on the docking claim as well as the claim for wages.

Iowa Code section 85.27 provides only for lost wages, not for the reinstatement of sick leave or vacation time used for attending medical appointments. Any rights the plaintiffs have in respect to “docking” turn on the interpretation and application of their employment contracts, not on the workers’ compensation law. An action to recover lost time would properly be brought in district court, under the employment contract, not in proceedings before the commissioner.

The issue now is whether the district court erred in refusing to consider the docking claim as a part of the plaintiffs’ suit in district court. (The court dismissed the docking claim, as well as the claim for wages, on jurisdiction grounds, holding the commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction of both claims.)

We have held a district court may properly consider a contract claim, even though it had its origin in a workers’ compensation claim. See White v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 514 N.W.2d 70, 74-75 (Iowa 1994) (suit on workers’ compensation settlement agreement properly brought in district court, not in workers’ compensation proceeding, as commissioner had no jurisdiction). The problem with recognizing the plaintiffs’ docking claim in this case is their petition did not raise the issue. It raised only claims based on the State’s failure to pay wages under section 85.27; it did not seek restoration of lost sick leave or vacation. In fact, such rights were not even mentioned.

We have held that notice pleading requires a fair notice of the claim asserted to allow a party to make an adequate response. Gosha v. Woller, 288 N.W.2d 329, 331 (Iowa 1980) (petition asserting breach of express warranty not fair notice of claim based on implied warranty). Here, the plaintiffs’ petition, asserting a violation of wage-payment provisions of the workers’ compensation statute, did not give fair notice to the State that the plaintiffs were demanding reinstatement of their lost vacation and sick leave under their employment contracts.

The district court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ petition.

AFFIRMED.

All justices concur except CADY, J., who takes no part.

      . The status of the plaintiffs' attempted class action proceeding here is not clear. They sued as a class, but the court had not certified it as a class under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 42.2(a) at the time it dismissed the case. Nor is there any evidence the extensive list of criteria required by rule 42.3 have been presented to the court.


author: McGIVERIN, Chief Justice.

text:
    OSAGE CONSERVATION CLUB, Appellant, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF MITCHELL COUNTY, Iowa, Appellee.
    No. 98-484.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    June 1, 2000.

      Patrick J. Rourick, St. Ansgar, for appellant.
    Aaron R. Murphy, Assistant County Attorney, Osage, for appellee.
   McGIVERIN, Chief Justice.

The Board of supervisors of Mitchell County, Iowa seeks further review of a decision of the court of appeals which concluded that the Board’s failure to comply with public notice and hearing requirements, see Iowa Code §§ 335.6 and 335.7 (1997), deprived the Board of subject matter jurisdiction to approve a proposed zoning change. The court of appeals concluded that the Board’s decision was void and reversed a district court ruling upholding the Board’s action and remanded the case to the Board for new appropriate proceedings.

Upon our review, we conclude that the Board’s noneompliance with the statutorily required public notice and hearing requirements deprived the Board of subject matter jurisdiction concerning the proposed zoning change and that the district court therefore should have sustained plaintiffs petition for writ of certiorari challenging the zoning change. We therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

I. Background facts and proceedings.

Plaintiff Osage Conservation Club, hereinafter referred to as the Club, is a nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of the State of Iowa. The Club has its principal office located in Osage, Iowa. The Club owns a parcel of real estate located in rural Mitchell County, which is designated by the Mitchell County planning and zoning ordinance as an “A” agricultural district. For more than forty-five years, up to and including the present time, the Club has operated and maintained a rifle and pistol shooting range in the northeast portion of the Club’s parcel of land.

James A. and Rebecca J. Havig own land located directly north of the Club’s property and shooting range. Prior to November 1996, the Havigs’ property was designated or zoned “A” agricultural and was bordered on the north, south and west by land designated as “A” agricultural.

On or about October 15, 1996, the Ha-vigs submitted a proposed plat for a parcel of land known as the Sunset Acres Subdivision to the Mitchell County planning and zoning commission (commission) for approval. The plat proposed to subdivide the Havigs’ property located immediately north and adjacent to the Club’s property. The application also requested that the Havigs’ property be rezoned from “A” agricultural to “R-l” residential.

The commission published notice in the local newspaper that a public hearing would be held on November 21, 1996, concerning the Havigs’ proposal. Notice of the hearing was also mailed to the Club. Representatives of the Club appeared at the public hearing and meeting, indicating their resistance to the proposal that the Havigs’ property be rezoned from “A” agricultural to “R-l” residential. At the conclusion of the hearing and after a vote, the commission approved the final plat submitted by the Havigs, including the rezoning of the Havigs’ property from “A” agricultural to “R-l” residential. The commission’s decision and recommendation were forwarded to the Mitchell County Board of supervisors.

The Board held no special hearing concerning the proposed zoning change and did not publish notice of the proposed zoning change in the local newspaper as required by Iowa Code sections 335.6 and 335.7.

On December 17, 1996, the Club’s representatives appeared at a regular meeting of the Board of supervisors at which the proposed subdivision plat of Sunset Acres was being considered for final approval, voicing their opposition to the proposal. The Club did not raise the Board’s noncompliance with the statutory public notice and hearing requirements at the meeting/

The Board later adopted a resolution approving the proposed subdivision plat of Sunset Acres and the rezoning of the Ha-vigs’ property from “A” agricultural to “R-1” residential.

On January 16, 1997, the Club filed a petition for writ of certiorari in district court, challenging the Board’s decision in approving the subdivision plat of Sunset Acres Subdivision and the rezoning of the Havigs’ property. The Club did not challenge the jurisdiction or authority of the Board to act.

After a hearing, the court entered an order dismissing the Club’s petition for writ of certiorari. The court concluded that the Board’s decision approving the subdivision plat and subsequent change in zoning ordinances was valid as it was reasonably related to the public health, safety and welfare. The court 'also concluded that the Board’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious and that the zoning amendment complied with the county’s planning and zoning ordinance and with the county’s land subdivision regulations. Finally, the court concluded that the Board’s decision approving the plat and subdivision did not amount to illegal spot zoning.

The Club appealed, contending that the Board’s rezoning action was (1) illegal spot zoning, (2) not supported by substantial evidence, and (3) not consistent with the county’s comprehensive plan. The Club did not raise the issue of the Board’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, lack of authority to act on the rezoning application.

Upon our transfer of the case, the court of appeals discovered from the record that the Board failed to publish notice of and hold a public hearing as required by Iowa Code sections 335.6 and 335.7. The court noted that the Board’s noncompliance with the public notice and hearing requirements was not raised before the Board or in district court, but concluded, relying on Bowen v. Story County Board of Supervisors, 209 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Iowa 1973), that the issue could be raised anytime and proceeded to independently examine the issue on appeal. The court, again relying on Boiven, ultimately concluded that the Board’s failure to comply with the public notice and hearing requirements deprived the Board of subject matter jurisdiction to approve the proposed zoning change of the Havig property, and that the Board’s decision was therefore void. The court reversed the district court certiorari judgment and remanded the case to the Board for further appropriate proceedings concerning the Havigs’ application for rezoning and approval of the subdivision plat.

We granted the defendant Board’s application for further review.

II. Scope of review.

This case comes to us from the district courts ruling on plaintiffs petition for writ of certiorari. Pursuant to Iowa rule of civil procedure 318, our scope of review on appeal from a district court’s judgment in a certiorari proceeding is “governed by the rules applicable to appeals in ordinary actions.” Our review in such cases is limited to correction of errors at law and we ordinarily are bound by the findings of the trial court if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(1); accord Sergeant Bluff-Luton Sch. Dist. v. City Council of Sioux City, 605 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Iowa 2000).

III. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the Board.

Although the issue was not raised by plaintiff Club on appeal, the court of appeals sua sponte concluded that the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rezone the Havigs’ property because the Board did not comply with the notice and hearing requirements of Iowa Code sections 335.6" and 335.7. Therefore, we must consider what effect, if any, the Board’s noncompliance with the statutory public notice and hearing requirements had on the effectiveness of the Board’s zoning decision and the consequence of the Club’s failure to raise that issue before the Board or in its certiorari action in district court.

A. Applicable Iowa and other authorities.

Our legislature has given a county board of supervisors the authority over county zoning matters. See Iowa Code §§ 335.3,

335.6. This authority includes the power to designate areas of the county into districts and to regulate the use of property within those districts. See id. §§ 335.3, 335.4. Iowa Code section 335.6 provides:

The board of supervisors shall provide for the manner in which the regulations and restrictions and the boundaries of the districts shall be determined, established, and enforced, and from time to time amended, supplemented, or changed. However, the regulation, restriction, or boundary shall not become effective until after a public hearing, at which parties in interest and citizens shall have an opportunity to be heard. Notice of the time and place of the hearing shall be published as provided in section 331.305. The notice shall state the location of the district affected by naming the township and section, and the boundaries of the district shall be expressed in terms of streets or roads if possible. The regulation, restriction, or boundary shall be adopted in compliance with section 331.302.

(Emphasis added.) Pursuant to section 335.6, a county board of supervisors cannot exercise powers granted to it by the legislature over zoning matters until the specified statutory procedural requirements are satisfied. Specifically, the board must publish notice of such action at least once, not less than four and not more than twenty days before the date of the hearing, in one or more newspapers which meet the requirements of Iowa Code section 618.14. See id. § 331.305. These public notice and hearing requirements apply equally to all zoning changes or amendments. See id. § 335.7.

This case is factually similar to our decision in Bowen, 209 N.W.2d at 572. We stated the rule in Bowen that the statutory requirement of public hearing prior to a zoning change is mandatory and jurisdictional and that the failure of a county board of supervisors to provide public notice and hearing as required by Iowa Code section 358A.7 (1971) (the predecessor statute to present section 335.7), therefore deprived the board of jurisdiction to rezone certain property. We stated that the board’s (an inferior tribunal) lack of jurisdiction to act may be urged in court even though not previously raised before the board itself in order to avoid unwarranted exercise of the board’s authority. Id. In doing so, we rejected the board’s contention that plaintiffs, those persons opposing the rezoning decision, had waived the issue of the board’s noncompliance with the statutory notice and hearing requirements because they had failed to raise the issue before the board. Id. (Plaintiffs first raised the issue in their petition for writ of certiorari in district court challenging the board’s rezoning decision.)

We reached a similar decision in B. & H. Investments, Inc. v. City of Coralville, 209 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Iowa 1973), decided the same day as Bowen. Citing Bowen and other authorities, we held in B. & H. Investments that the city’s failure to give notice and hold a hearing before changing a zoning ordinance as required by Iowa Code sections 414.4 and 414.5 rendered the zoning ordinance void. Id. Quoting from one authority, we stated:

Regardless of the type of notice called for by the statute, the basic requirement that notice be given is uniformly held to impose upon the zoning authority a mandatory duty to give it, in default of which jurisdiction to pass valid zoning measures is lacking. The rule that compliance with the statute is mandatory and jurisdictional has been announced in scores of cases and appears to prevail in every jurisdiction where the question has been presented. Unless the statute provides otherwise, the rule making notice a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite to the passage of zoning measures is also applicable to ordinances amending or revising an original enactment or reclassifying property theretofore zoned.

Id. at 117-18 (quoting Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statutory Notice Requirements Prerequisite to Adoption or Amendment of Zoning Ordinance or Regulation, 96 A.L.R.2d 449, 455-56 (1964)); see also 1 Kenneth H. Young, Anderson’s American Law of Zoning § 4.08, at 247-49 (4th ed.1996) (discussing the rule that statutory procedural requirements are regarded as mandatory and failure to substantially comply with such requirements renders a zoning ordinance invalid); 88 Am.Jur.2d Zoning and Planning § 681, at 472-78 (1992) (same).

B. Application of law to facts.

Upon our review, we conclude that our decisions in Bowen and B. & H. Investments are controlling here and that the Board’s failure to comply with the public notice and hearing requirements of sections 835.6 and 335.7 rendered its zoning decision void.

We first point out that the language of section 335.6 expressly states that a zoning “regulation, restriction, or boundary shall not become effective until after a public hearing” is held. Based on a plain reading of this language, we are convinced that section 335.6 is clear and unambiguous; We will therefore simply give effect to the language of section 335.6 as written. See Drahaus v. State, 584 N.W.2d 270, 274 (Iowa 1998) (when text of statute is plain and its meaning clear, court will not search for meaning beyond express terms of statute and will give effect to statute as written). In doing so, we easily conclude, as we did in Bowen, that the Board’s compliance with section 335.6’s public notice and hearing requirements is mandatory and a condition precedent to the Board’s exercise of its power over zoning matters. Because the Board failed to comply with the notice and hearing requirements, the Board did not have subject matter jurisdiction to approve the Havigs’ proposed zoning change. Consequently, the Board’s decision approving the zoning change is illegal and void. This was our reasoning in Bowen and B. & H. Investments and we find no reason to depart from that reasoning in this case.

To conclude otherwise would mean that the purpose of the statutory notice and hearing requirements, which “is primarily to aid the Board in gathering information to discharge the legislative function,” Montgomery v. Bremer County Board of Supervisors, 299 N.W.2d 687, 693 (Iowa 1980), would not be served. How else will a board of supervisors gather the relevant “information” if a public hearing after proper notice is not held?' In any event, while personal notice to the affected property owners of proposed zoning changes may not be necessary in all cases, see Quality Refrigerated Services v. City of Spencer, 586 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Iowa 1998) (holding that notice to affected property owner by publication of proposed zoning amendments was sufficient for purposes of Due Process Clause of United States Constitution), at a minimum, a county board of supervisors must comply with the públie notice and hearing requirements set forth in section 335.6.

We also conclude that plaintiffs failure to raise the issue of the Board’s noncompliance with section 335.6 in its cer-tiorari action in district court does not preclude consideration of that issue on appeal. This is because if the Board, because of its noncompliance with chapter 335 notice and hearing requirements, did not have subject matter jurisdiction to approve the zoning change, then it would not seem logical that the district court, which .essentially sits in an appellate capacity, could acquire such jurisdiction to assess the validity of the Board’s decision in the certiorari action. See In re Adoption of Gardiner, 287 N.W.2d 555, 559 (Iowa 1980) (appellate court does not have jurisdiction of subject matter over which trial court lacks jurisdiction); Ferguson v. Union Pac. R.R., 258 Neb. 78, 601 N.W.2d 907, 912-13 (1999) (“When a lower court lacks the authority to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction so as to adjudicate the merits of a claim, issue, or question, an appellate court also lacks the power to determine the merits of the claim, issue, or question presented to the lower court.”).

Finally, in light of our above discussion, cases discussing the distinction between subject matter jurisdiction and authority to hear a particular case, see Schrier v. State, 573 N.W.2d 242, 244-15 (Iowa 1997); State v. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d 481, 482 (Iowa 1993); Christie v. Rolscreen Co., 448 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Iowa 1989), are not controlling here. Those cases dealt with the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court and not with the subject matter jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal, i.e., the Board, to make a legislative decision.

In summary, we conclude that by failing to comply with the statutorily required public notice and hearing requirements, the Board did not have subject matter jurisdiction to approve the proposed zoning change. The Board’s decision approving the Havigs’ application to have their property rezoned was therefore void. The status of the Board’s decision did not change as the case worked its way through the court system. Accordingly, we therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

IV. Disposition.

We conclude that by failing to comply with the statutorily required public notice and hearing requirements of Iowa Code sections 335.6 and 335.7, the Board did not have subject matter jurisdiction to approve the application for rezoning of Sunset Acres Subdivision.

We further conclude that the district court, sitting as an appellate court in cer-tiorari review, likewise did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the merits of the Board’s rezoning decision.

In view of the above conclusions, we do not address the issues raised in the Club’s appellate brief concerning the merits of the Board’s decision.

Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the district court judgment and remand the case to the Board for further appropriate proceedings.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED.

All justices concur except LAVORATO, J., who takes no part.


text:
    Atef S. YACOUB, Respondent, v. AMERICAN NATIONAL INSURANCE and CNA Insurance Company, Relators, and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, Intervenor.
    No. C5-00-385.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    May 30, 2000.
    Jay T. Hartman, Charlene K. Feenstra, Heacox, Hartman, Mattaini, Koshmrl, Cos-griff & Johnson, P.A., St. Paul, for appellant.
    Steven Christensen, Roseville, for respondent.
    Ted E. Sullivan, Lind, Jensen & Sullivan, Minneapolis, for intervenor.
   ORDER

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals filed February 9, 2000, be, and the same is, affirmed without opinion. See Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(b).

Employee is awarded $600 in attorney fees.

BY THE COURT: Paul H. Anderson Associate Justice


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    In re Petition for DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST Gary A. FLATTEN, an Attorney at Law of the State of Minnesota.
    No. C0-99-2182.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    June 8, 2000.

      Edward J. Cleary, Director, Craig D. Klausing, Senior Assistant Director, for appellant.
    Gary A. Flatten, Burnsville, for respondent.
   OPINION

PER CURIAM.

The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility petitions this court to suspend respondent Gary A. Flatten indefinitely from- the practice of law based on his noncooperation with a disciplinary investigation. Because respondent

failed to file an answer to the petition, the Director’s allegations are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 13(b), Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR), and we conclude that indefinite suspension from the practice of law is an appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct.

Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in Minnesota in 1964. He was previously admonished in 1991 for failing to communicate with a client and to cooperate with the ensuing disciplinary investigation in violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.4(a), 8.1(a)(3), and Rule 25, RLPR. He is currently on restricted status for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements.

On June 10, 1.999, the Director received a notice of overdraft for respondent’s client trust account,, .and wrote to him the next- day requesting an explanation and certain documents relating to the overdraft. The Director wrote to respondent at his address in the attorney registration database which matched the address on the client trust account. ' Respondent did not reply to this letter or to two subsequent letters, one of which was sent via certified mail, and he did not claim the certified letter.

The Director then opened a disciplinary file on August 19,1999, and mailed respondent a notice of investigation. The respondent again did not respond and also did not claim or reply to a follow-up letter sent via certified mail. On November 1, 1999, the Director mailed respondent charges of unprofessional conduct and notice of pre-hearing meeting but respondent did not attend the meeting or contact the Director regarding his inability to attend.

, The Director served a notice and petition for disciplinary action upon respondent on December 15, 1999, alleging violations of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.1(a)(3) 8.4(d), and Rule 25, RLPR and recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law. Because respondent failed to serve an answer within 20 days, we ordered that the allegations of the petition be deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 13(b), RLPR. Our review is thus limited to the appropriate discipline for respondent’s misconduct.

“The purpose of attorney discipline is not to punish the attorney but to protect the courts, the public and the legal profession, as well as to guard the administration of justice.” In re Madsen, 426 N.W.2d 434, 435 (Minn.1988). In determining an appropriate sanction for attorney misconduct, we consider the nature of the misconduct, the cumulative weight of the rule violations, and the harm to the public and to the legal profession. See In re Sigler, 512 N.W.2d 899, 901 (Minn.1994). We impose sanctions based on the facts of the particular case considering both aggravating and mitigating circumstances, see In re Iliff, 487 N.W.2d 234, 236 (Minn.1992), but look to similar cases for guidance in determining the appropriate discipline, see In re Sigler, 512 N.W.2d at 901.

We have stated that it is imperative that an attorney cooperate with a disciplinary authority in the investigation of a complaint against that attorney. See In re Engel, 538 N.W.2d 906, 907 (Mmn.1995). Failure to cooperate is grounds for discipline, including suspension. See id.; In re Cartwright, 282 N.W.2d 548, 552 (Minn.1979). In In re Engel we indefinitely suspended an attorney who failed to reply to repeated inquiries from the Director and who had a disciplinary history including a previous admonition for failure to cooperate. 538 N.W.2d at 906-07. We noted that the attorney’s failure to cooperate impeded investigation of the underlying allegations and showed lack of acknowledgement of the seriousness of the allegations. See id. at 907. We have also indefinitely suspended attorneys who engage in a pattern of neglecting client matters, failing to communicate with clients, and failing to cooperate with a subsequent investigation. See In re McCabe, 591 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Minn.1999); In re Orren, 590 N.W.2d 127, 129 (Minn.1999); In re Madsen, 426 N.W.2d at 436.

Respondent did not appear at oral argument before us and has not presented any evidence of mitigating circumstances that would warrant a lesser sanction. His complete lack of cooperation in the instant disciplinary investigation and his previous disciplinary history including an admonition for noncooperation lead us to the con-elusion that indefinite suspension is the appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct.

Indefinite suspension is ordered. We also order that respondent pay the Director $900 in costs and disbursements pursuant to Rules 24(a) and (b), RLPR, comply with the requirements of Rule 26, RLPR, and satisfy the conditions of Rule 18, RLPR, prior to reinstatement.

      . Rule 8.1(a)(3) provides that an attorney must cooperate with a disciplinary investigation by responding appropriately to requests for information:
      (a) [A] lawyer * * * in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:

        (3) knowingly fail to respond to * * * [a] discipline authority’s lawfully authorized demand for information by either providing the information sought or making a good faith challenge to the demand.
      Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.1(a)(3).

      . Pursuant to Rule 8.4(d), it is professional misconduct for an attorney to "engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d).

      . Rule 25, RLPR, provides that in an investigation an attorney must furnish upon request a complete explanation and requested documents as well as attend all conferences and hearings related to the disciplinary process:
      (a) Lawyer’s duty. It shall be the duty of any lawyer who is the subject of an investigation or proceeding under these Rules to cooperate with the District Committee, the Director, the Director's staff, the Board, or a Panel, by complying with reasonable requests, including requests to:
      (1) Furnish designated papers, documents or tangible objects;
      (2) Furnish in writing a full and complete explanation covering the matter under consideration;
      (3) Appear for conferences and hearings at the times and places designated. Such requests shall not be disproportionate to the gravity and complexity of the alleged ethical violations. * * *
      (b) Grounds of discipline. Violation of this Rule is unprofessional conduct and shall constitute grounds for discipline; provided, however, that a lawyer's challenge to the Director’s requests shall not constitute lack of cooperation if the challenge is promptly made, is in good faith and is asserted for a substantial purpose other than delay.
      Rule 25, RLPR.


text:
    In re Petition for DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST Kevin P. CARROLL, an Attorney at Law of the State of Minnesota.
    No. C7-00-274.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    June 8, 2000.
   ORDER

The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility has filed a petition for disciplinary action alleging that respondent Kevin P. Carroll committed professional misconduct warranting public discipline, namely, failure to account to a client for funds received on her behalf, neglect and noncommunication with clients in two divorce matters, neglect, noncom-munication, incompetence and misrepresentations to a client in a personal injury matter which resulted in the client’s claim being dismissed, failure to file state and federal withholding and corporate tax returns for respondent’s law office, failing to maintain and preserve trust account records, and failing to cooperate with the disciplinary investigations of four client complaints in violation of Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15(c)(1), (2) and (4), 1.15(h), 4.1, 8.1(a)(3) and 8.4(c) and 8.4(d), Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct.

Respondent admits his conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, waives his rights pursuant to Rule 14, Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR), and has entered into a stipulation with the Director wherein they jointly recommend that the appropriate discipline is an indefinite suspension from the practice of law for a minimum of three years and payment of $900 in costs pursuant to Rule 24, RLPR.

This court has independently reviewed the file and approves the jointly recommended disposition.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent Kevin P. Carroll is indefinitely suspended from the practice of law for a minimum period of three years, that he pay $900 in costs pursuant to Rule 24, RLPR, and that he not be permitted to petition for reinstatement until he has met the following conditions:

1. Successful completion of the professional responsibility portion of the bar examination.
2. Compliance with Rule 26, RLPR.
3. Reimbursement of $1,982 to Cynthia Henry.
4. Satisfaction of continuing legal education requirements pursuant to Rule 18(e)(4), RLPR.

BY THE COURT: Alan C. Page Associate Justice


author: Alan C. Page Associate Justice

text:
    In re Petition for DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST William P. KASZYNSKI, an Attorney at Law of the State of Minnesota.
    No. C4-99-1780.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    June 9, 2000.
   ORDER

Based upon the recommendation of the referee of this court in the above-entitled matter that respondent William P. Kaszyn-ski be disbarred, and pursuant to Rule 16(e), Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent William P. Kaszynski is temporarily suspended from the practice of law pending final disposition of this matter.

BY THE COURT:

Alan C. Page Associate Justice


text:
    In re Petition for DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST Karl Matthew RANUM, an Attorney at Law of the State of Minnesota.
    No. CX-00-351.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    June 13, 2000.
   ORDER

The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility has filed a petition for disciplinary action alleging that respondent Karl Matthew Ranum has committed professional misconduct warranting public discipline, namely, making a false statement to the court and to the Director, failing to draft a qualified domestic relations order in a timely manner, failing to file his state and federal personal income tax returns on time for the years 1993 through 1997, practicing law during a 7-month period in which he was on restricted status for failure to satisfy his Continuing Legal Education requirements, and misusing his trust account and failing to properly maintain the required trust account books and records, in violation of Rules 1.3, 1.15, 3.2, 3.3(a)(1), 4.1, 5.5(a), 8.1(a)(1), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d), Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, and Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board Opinion No. 9.

Respondent admits his conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, waives his rights pursuant to Rule 14, Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR), and has entered into a stipulation with the Director wherein they jointly recommend that the appropriate discipline is a 3-month suspension followed by 2 years’ unsupervised probation subject to the following conditions:

(1) Respondent shall pass the professional responsibility portion of the state bar examination within one year of the date of this court’s order;
(2) The reinstatement hearing provided for in Rule 18, RLPR, is waived;
(3) Respondent shall be required to file all outstanding state and federal tax returns for the calendar years 1993 through 1999 before submitting an affidavit requesting reinstatement;
(4) Respondent shall comply with Rule 26, RLPR;
(5) Respondent shall be reinstated to the practice of law following the expiration of his suspension provided that, no more than 15 days before the expiration of the suspension period, respondent files an affidavit with the Clerk of Appellate Courts and the Director’s Office establishing that respondent has filed his outstanding tax returns, is current with Continuing Legal Education requirements, has fully complied with Rules 24 and 26, RLPR, and has satisfactorily completed all other conditions imposed by the court in its decision; (6) Upon respondent’s reinstatement to the practice of law, he shall be placed on unsupervised probation for-a period of 2 years, subject to the following terms:
(a) Respondent shall cooperate fully with the Director’s Office in its efforts to monitor compliance with his probation and promptly respond to the Director’s correspondence by the due date. Respondent shall cooperate with the Director’s investigation of any allegations of professional conduct which may come to the Director’s attention. Upon the Director’s request, respondent shall provide authorizations for release of information and documentation to verify compliance with the terms of his probation.
(b) Respondent shall abide by the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct.
(c) Respondent shall maintain law office and trust account books and records in compliance with Rule 1.15, MRPC, and LPRB Opinion No. 9. These books and records include the following: client subsidiary ledger, checkbook register, monthly trial balances, monthly trust account reconciliation, bank statements, canceled checks, duplicate deposit slips and bank reports of interest, service charges and interest payments to the Lawyer Trust Account Board. Such books and records shall be made available to the Director within 30 days of the court’s order and thereafter shall be made available to the Director at such intervals as he deems necessary to determine compliance.
(d) Respondent shall timely file all required state and federal tax returns, including individual and employer withholding returns, and timely pay the taxes due thereon. Respondent shall affirmatively report to the Director, on or before the due date of the required returns, his compliance with filing and payment requirements. Such reports shall include copies of the required returns. On or before the filing deadline, respondent shall provide the Director with copies of all applications for filing extension and proof of approval of such applications. Respondent shall provide all of the documents and information required without specific reminder or request,
(e)No more than 60 days from the date of the court’s order for reinstatement and probation, respondent shall enter into agreements satisfactory to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Minnesota Department of Revenue (DOR) for the payment of all unpaid taxes. Respondent shall provide the Director with copies of the payment agreements. If after 60 days, agreement with the IRS and/or DOR has not been reached despite diligent effort by respondent, respondent shall report monthly to the Director concerning his progress in reaching agreement. Such reports shall continue until written agreements have been signed by both the IRS and DOR.

This court has independently reviewed the file and approves the jointly recommended disposition.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent Karl Matthew Ranum ' is suspended from the practice of law for 3 months and placed on 2 years’ unsupervised probation, subject to the reinstatement and probation conditions jointly agreed to and stated above. Respondent is further ordered to pay $900 in costs pursuant to Rule 24, RLPR.

BY THE COURT: Alan C. Page Associate Justice


text:
    Charles CLEVEN, Respondent, v. MARVIN WINDOWS, Relator, and Self-Insured, administered by CompCost, Inc., Insurer.
    No. C3-00-305.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    June 13, 2000.
    Arthur, Chapman Kettering, Smetak & Pikala, P.A., James S. Pikala and Christine L. Tuft, Minneapolis, for relator.
    Hazelton & Rodgers, P.C., Mark L. Rodgers, Bemidji, for respondent.
   ORDER

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals filed January 27, 2000, be, and .the same is, affirmed without opinion. See Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(b).

Employee is awarded $600 in attorney fees.

BY THE COURT: Russell A. Anderson Associate Justice


author: STRINGER, Justice.

text:
    Raymond SCOTT, Respondent, v. FOREST LAKE CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH-DODGE, petitioner, Appellant.
    No. C4-99-161.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    June 15, 2000.

      Johnson & Van Vliet, L.L.P., Gregory J. Johnson, Klay C. Ahrens, St. Paul, for appellant.
    Lommen, Nelson, Cole & Stageberg, P.A., Kay Nord Hunt, Minneapolis, Thomas J. Lyons, Jr., Consumer Justice Center, P.A., Thomas J. Lyons & Associates, P.A., Thomas J. Lyons, St. Paul, for respondent.
    Amicus curiae James Schutjer, MADA Counsel, Minnesota Automobile 'Dealers Association, St. Paul.
   OPINION

STRINGER, Justice.

Respondent Raymond Scott traded in his 1988 Dodge Caravan on the purchase of a 1991 Dodge Caravan from appellant Forest Lake Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge (Forest Lake) in a deal that required Scott to execute a vehicle purchase contract, a retail installment contract and a conditional delivery agreement. The conditional delivery agreement provided that if financing was not approved, the retail installment contract would be void. When financing was not approved by the initial lending institution,- Forest Lake arranged for financing with a second lending institution at an increased annual percentage rate. Scott signed the financing documents and later brought suit alleging that Forest Lake violated Minn.Stat. § 168.71(a)(1) (1994) because the retail installment contract did not include the conditional delivery agreement in violation of the statutory requirement that a retail installment contract “shall contain all the agreements of the parties.” The district court dismissed Scott’s claim ruling that the use of a separate conditional delivery document did not violate the statute. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the failure to identify the condition precedent of financing approval in the installment contract violated Minn.Stat. § 168.71(a)(1). See Scott v. Forest Lake Chrysler-Plym outh-Dodge, 598 N.W.2d 713, 718 (Minn.App.1999). On review, we reverse.

On August 11, 1994, Scott and his wife went to Forest Lake, a new and used automobile dealership, to trade in their 1988 Dodge Caravan on the purchase of a 1991 Dodge Caravan for $15,257.00. Forest Lake agreed to give Scott a $6,000.00 trade-in allowance on their 1988 Dodge Caravan and to pay off the outstanding loan, and Scott executed a “Vehicle Purchase Contract” setting forth the terms of the sale. Above the buyer’s signature, the purchase contract stated “THIS MAY BE A BINDING CONTRACT AND YOU MAY LOSE ANY DEPOSITS IF YOU DO NOT PERFORM ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS.” The contract also stated, “If DEALER is arranging credit for YOU, this CONTRACT is not valid until * * * you aceept[ ] the credit extended.”

Since Scott was obtaining financing the sale, Forest Lake also prepared and Scott signed a “Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement” (RIC I) which provided that credit would be extended to him in the amount of $15,177.71 in 60 monthly payments of $335.39 at an annual percentage rate of 11.5% and Comerica Bank would be the lender. RIC I also stated “IMPORTANT: THIS MAY BE A BINDING CONTRACT AND YOU MAY LOSE ANY DEPOSITS IF YOU DO NOT PERFORM ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS.”

Because of the possibility that financing might not be secured on the terms of RIC I, Scott also executed a “Conditional Delivery Agreement” which provided that if financing was not approved, RIC I would be null and void:

YOU, the undersigned Buyer and Co-Buyer, agree with ME, the Dealer, to incorporate the following terms by reference into the Motor Vehicle Purchase Contract and any Installment Sales Contract to purchase [the 1991 Dodge Caravan].
YOU understand and agree that the vehicle has been delivered to YOU conditionally subject to approval of financing. If financing is not approved, I will notify YOU and YOU agree to immediately return the vehicle to ME. * * ⅜ If financing is not approved, any Installment Sales Contract executed for purchase of the above-described vehicle shall be null and void.
$ ⅜ ⅜ ¾:
[U]pon assignment of any Installment Sales Contract to a lending institution, the terms of this Agreement set out above shall automatically lapse.
YOU have read and understand this document, intend it to be a binding part of YOUR contract to purchase a motor vehicle and acknowledge receiving a copy of it.

Scott also executed a “Credit Reporting Disclosure” agreement permitting his credit application to be submitted to other financial institutions for consideration. The 1991 vehicle was delivered to Scott subject to approval of the financing terms set forth in RIC I.

Comerica Bank declined to finance the transaction as did several other financial institutions, so Forest Lake lowered the 1991 Dodge Caravan’s price from $15,257 to $14,988 and Chrysler Credit Corporation accepted financing for a 60-month period with monthly payments of $384.27 and interest at an 18.4% annual percentage rate. The payments totaled $23,056.20. Forest Lake prepared and dated as August 11, 1994, a second installment contract (RIC II) with Chrysler Credit Corporation as the assignee which contained, in bold print, the annual percentage rate, finance charge and total sales price and, like RIC I, language stating that it may be a binding contract.

When Scott’s wife called Forest Lake several days later to check on the status of the transaction, she was told “we are close to getting the van financed, we are only about $1,000.00 away,” and was assured there were no problems. Shortly thereafter, Forest Lake called Scott and requested that he return to the dealership to sign additional papers because financing had been arranged through a different bank. On August 23, 1994, Scott returned to Forest Lake and signed RIC II identifying the new financing institution and the new credit terms. In a letter to Forest Lake he later claimed that while he was not told by the Forest Lake representative that the financing terms had changed, his wife noticed and inquired about the change in interest rate before signing the contract and was told that the purchase price had been lowered to compensate for the higher interest rate.

Scott left the dealership immediately after signing RIC II but returned later that day when he realized that the increased interest rate would raise the total contract price by $2,932.80. He attempted to undo the sale but was told that his 1988 trade-in had been sold and that he had to keep the 1991 Dodge Caravan.

Scott brought suit against Forest Lake and Chrysler Financial Corporation in U.S. District Court on July 12, 1996, alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 and violations of several Minnesota statutes including Minn. Stat. § 168.71(a)(1) (Minnesota Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act (MMVRISA)), Minn.Stat. § 325F.69 (1998) (Minnesota Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act), and Minn.Stat. § 325D.44 (1998) (Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act). On July 3, 1997, the court dismissed both the ¡federal and state claims. See Scott v. Forest Lake Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, No. 3-96-671 (D.Minn. July 3, 1997).

In July of 1997 Scott commenced these proceedings in state court against Forest Lake and Chrysler Financial Corporation and claimed, among other things, that Forest Lake’s failure to identify the condition precedent in the retail installment contract violated section 168.71(a)(1) requiring that every retail installment contract “shall contain all the agreements of the parties” and entitled him to recover statutory penalties and reasonable attorney fees under Minn.Stat. § 168.75(b) (1998).

On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court granted Forest Lake’s motion and dismissed Scott’s lawsuit in its entirety. The court ruled that the intént of the MMVRISA to protect the consumer from undisclosed terms was met by Forest Lake’s installment contract because all of the credit terms were contained in that document. The court also found that although the separate agreement" made RIC I conditional, it did not contain any additional or contradictory financing terms.

On appellate review, a majority of the court of appeals panel reversed on this issue holding that the failure to identify the condition precedent relating to financing approval within the four corners of the installment contract violated the “agreement of the parties” requirement in Minn. Stat. § 168.71(a)(1). See Scott, 598 N.W.2d at. 717-18. The court noted that although the conditional delivery agreement did not directly contradict the terms of RIC I, failure to obtain financing approval ultimately invalidated RIC I because it resulted in a $2,932.80 increase in the total contract price. See id. The court reasoned that because the failure to obtain financing approval led to an increase in the “cost of credit,” the MMVRI-SA’s purpose of informing the buyer of the cost of credit was not met and remanded the claim to the district court. See id. at 718, 721.

Forest Lake argues that the “agreement of the parties” clause in the MMVRISA is not intended to require that all agreements between the seller and buyer be literally recorded in the retail installment contract, but rather its purpose is to prohibit separate or side agreements containing credit terms contradicting those in the retail installment contract. Thus, the retail installment contract merely identifies the credit terms the parties agree to if financing is approved, and the conditional delivery agreement functions as confirmation of the parties’ understanding that the sale is contingent upon financing and is not enforceable if the condition does not occur.

Scott argues that RIC I was legally binding because it did not clarify that the purchase was contingent upon the dealer assigning the contract to a financing institution, and that allowing the seller to cancel the contract based on language in another agreement is contrary to the MMVRISA’s purpose of protecting the consumer by requiring that the retail installment contract contain “all of the agreements of the parties.” Characterizing the financing agreement as a condition precedent, Scott argues that the “all the agreements of the parties” provision requires that it be included in the retail installment contract.

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Betlach v. Wayzata Condominium, 281 N.W.2d 328, 330 (Minn.1979). We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo, see State by Beaulieu v. RSJ, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 695, 701 (Minn.1996), and our primary objective is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature’s intent. See Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 715 (Minn.1999).

In 1994 the Minnesota Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Act provided in relevant part:

Every retail installment contract shall be in writing, shall contain all the agreements of the parties, shall be signed by the retail buyer and seller, and a copy thereof shall be furnished to such retail buyer at the time of the execution of the contract.

Minn.Stat. § 168.71(a)(1) (emphasis added). The statute also listed the items that a retail installment contract must contain:

(b) The retail installment contract shall contain the following items:
(1) The cash sale price of the motor vehicle which is the subject matter of the retail installment contract;
(2) The total amount of the retail buyer’s down payment, * * *
(3) The difference between items one and two;
(4) The charge, if any, included in the transaction for any insurance and other benefits not included in clause 1, * ⅜ ⅜
(5) Principal balance, * * *
(6) The amount of the finance charge;
(7) The total payments payable by the retail buyer to the retail. seller and the number of installment payments required and the amount of each installment expressed in dollars or percentages, and date of each payment necessary finally to pay the total of payments which is the sum of item five and item six.

Minn.Stat. § 168.71(b)(l)-(7) (1994).

A year after the MMVRISA was enacted by the legislature in 1957 we held that the act “indieate[s] a legislative policy to bring both regulatory control and uniformity into the field of automobile financing” and an intent “to protect the purchasers of automobiles from the activities of a few individuals] who had been guilty of inequitable practices in particular situations.” Van Asperen v. Darling Olds, Inc., 254 Minn. 62, 70-71, 93 N.W.2d 690, 696-97 (1958). In addition, we noted that the law was adopted to address “the fact that several states had enacted some form of regulation aimed particularly at automobile installment sales because the bona fide cost of installment credit had actually exceeded the rates generally allowed under usury statutes.” Id. at 71, 93 N.W.2d at 697.

Several years later in O’Brien v. Phillips Motors Excelsior, Inc., we again emphasized the legislative objective of informing the automobile buyer qf the cost of the credit extended. 288 Minn. 183, 185, 179 N.W.2d 158, 160 (1970). Recently, in Sharlow v. Wally McCarthy Pontiac-GMC Trucks-Hyundai, Inc., a U.S. District Court, under facts virtually identical to these, held that the MMVRISA was not violated and granted the defendant retailer summary judgment, stating:

Plaintiffs' base their argument on statutory language prescribing that every retail installment contract “shall contain all the agreements of the parties.” The plain purpose of the MMVRISA is to require disclosure to consumers of the cost of credit extended to them, including sale price, amount of down payment, insurance charges, and finance charges. The “agreement of the parties” clause serves to prohibit dealers from relying on separate agreements containing additional or contradictory financing terms. The Court does not read the clause as requiring that every agreement to a condition precedent be contained in the installment contract. Here all the credit terms were contained in the installment contract itself. Moreover, the addendum did not change any contract terms-it simply made the contract itself conditional.

No. 97-20 (D.Minn. Sept. 28, 1998) (citations omitted).

Our rulings in Van Asperen and O’Brien are entirely consistent with the statutory objective of section 168.71(a)(1) as evidenced by its statutory scheme. Section 168.71(a)(1) requires that “all the agreements of the parties” be included in the retail installment contract, and immediately following is section 168.71(b)(l)-(7) which provides that the retail installment contract “must contain the following items” all relating to the terms of credit: the cash sale price, the amount of the buyer’s down payment,’ the principal balance and the amount of the finance charge, and total payments, among others. Similarly, the penalties set forth in Minn.Stat. § 168.75 for violations of Section 168.71(a)(1) are imposed in terms of enforcing the retail installment contract as modified by statutory penalties. Our conclusion in Van Asperen and O’Brien that section 168.71(a)(1) only requires that the buyer be informed of the credit terms is clearly supported by the statutory scheme.

The court of appeals agreed that section 168.71(a)(1) relates to credit terms but concluded that the failure of Scott to get approval triggered the higher financing charges in RIC II, thus the conditional delivery agreement relates to retail credit. The error in this conclusion is that it assumes that RIC I and II and the conditional delivery agreement were part of one contractual transaction, but they weren’t, as the failure to obtain RIC I financing prevented it from becoming a contract at all. RIC II was binding however, as financing was in place when Scott signed it. As these were separate transactions, Forest Lake did not fail to inform Scott of the “cost of credit” because the terms of RIC II correctly and fully disclosed the credit terms, and there were no agreements relating to credit terms not contained in RIC II.

Finally, Scott’s argument ignores the interrelationship of the three separate agreements relating to the financing transaction. The retail installment contract sets forth the details of how the financing is to work-the interest rate, the finance charge, amount financed, total payment and total sales price-and becomes effective only if financing is arranged. The conditional delivery agreement permits the buyer to take immediate possession of the vehicle, but the buyer is obligated to return it if financing is not approved, as happened here. The vehicle purchase contract sets forth the terms of the actual purchase, including trade-in allowances and identifies the amount to be financed, if any. Moreover, each agreement is dependent upon financing approval: the retail installment contract expressly states that it may not be binding, the conditional delivery agreement provides that the sale is null and void if financing is not approved, and the vehicle purchase contract provides that if the dealer is to arrange credit for respondent, the contract is not valid until the credit is accepted. We reject Scott’s argument that all of these documents are subsumed into the retail installment contract as contrary to the clear objective of the MMVRISA, its statutory scheme and to our well-considered case precedent.

Reversed.

BLATZ, C.J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

GILBERT, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

      . We refer to the two retail installment contracts at issue as RIC I and RIC II; when discussing retail installment contracts generally we do not abbreviate.

      . Chrysler Financial Corporation was dismissed from the action.

      . Scott also alleged that appellant violated the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act and that appellant's actions constituted common law fraud.

      . In 1994, the statute provided:
      Every retail installment contract shall be in writing, shall contain all the agreements of the parties, shall be signed by the retail buyer and seller, and a copy thereof shall be furnished to such retail buyer at the time of the execution of the contract.
      Minn.Stat. § 168.71(a)(1). • The statute was amended in 1996 to allow the dealer to furnish the copy of the contract signed by both parties to the purchaser within seven days of delivery of the vehicle. See Act of Apr. 2, 1996, ch. 414, art. 1, § 33, 1996 Minn. Laws 877, 894.

      . The dissent concluded that the trial court properly dismissed the MMVRISA claims as well as the other claims:
      [MMVRISA] * * * merely prohibits dealers from relying on separate agreements that contain contradictory financing terms. * * * Because the conditional delivery agreement did not alter the credit terms that were disclosed in the installment sales contracts, * * * the trial court properly dismissed [Scott’s] claims under MMVRISA.

        Id. at 721 (Short, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).

      . A “condition precedent” is "any fact or event, subsequent to the making of a contract, which must exist or occur before a duty of immediate performance arises under the contract.” National City Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 447 N.W.2d 171, 176 (Minn.1989). In 451 Corp. v. Pension System for Policemen and Firemen, we held that the requirement of loan approval is a condition precedent or subsequent to the formation of a contract and if the event required by the condition does not occur, there can be no breach. 310 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Minn.1981). We declined in 451 Corp. to decide whether the requirement of loan approval was a condition precedent or condition subsequent, but explained that "whichever way the condition is characterized, if the event required by the condition does not occur, there can be no breach of contract.” Id. Scott concedes that in this case it does not matter whether the financing contingency is labeled as a "condition precedent” or a "condition subsequent.”

      . The retail installment contracts prepared by Forest Lake contained the information required in Section 168.71(b).

      . The statute provides in relevant part:
      (b) In case of an intentional failure to comply with any provision of sections 168.66 to 168.77, the buyer shall have a right to recover from the person committing such violation ⅜ * * the whole of the contract due and payable, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees.
      (c) In case of a failure to comply with any provision of sections 168.66 to 168.77, other than an intentional failure, the buyer shall have a right to recover from the person committing such violation ⅜ ⅞ * liquidated damages equal to three times the amount of any time price differential charged in excess of the amount authorized by sections 168.66 to 168.77 or $50, whichever is greater, plus reasonable attorneys' fees.
      Minn.Stat. § 168.75 (1998) (emphasis added).


author: HARTEN, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Leslie James HAATAJA, Appellant.
    No. C1-99-1414.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    May 16, 2000.
    Review Denied July 25, 2000.
    John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant State Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN (for appellant).
    Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Joseph A. Evans, Becker County Attorney, Karen Skoyles, Assistant County Attorney, Detroit Lakes, MN (for respondent).
    Considered and decided by HARTEN, Presiding Judge, LANSING, Judge, and DAVIES, Judge.
   OPINION

HARTEN, Judge.

Appellant challenges his conviction of aggravated DWI, arguing that the officer seized him without reasonable, individualized suspicion that appellant was engaged in criminal activity, when the officer demanded that appellant stop and talk with him. Because we conclude that the officer articulated sufficient reasons for the stop, we affirm.

PACTS

On March 21, 1999, at 1:33 a.m., Detroit Lakes police officer Mike Engum observed a car driven by appellant Leslie James Haataja traveling at a very slow speed with two cars behind it. Engum followed appellant’s car for approximately a quarter of a mile and observed appellant turn into a driveway.

Engum followed appellant’s car into the driveway and parked behind it. Appellant and two passengers exited the car and began walking toward the house. Engum had to ask appellant three times to stop and talk to him before he stopped. En-gum noticed signs of intoxication in appellant and observed three half-full bottles of beer in appellant’s car. Appellant told him he had been at a bar and had just consumed a shot of tequila. Appellant failed several field sobriety tests.

Appellant was charged with aggravated DWI. At the omnibus hearing, he moved to suppress all inculpatory evidence, asserting that Engum did not have reasonable articulable suspicion to stop him. The district court denied his motion. On stipulated facts, appellant was convicted of aggravated DWI in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.129 (1998). This appeal followed.

ISSUE

Did the officer articulate sufficient reasons for the stop?

ANALYSIS

When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing— or not suppressing — the evidence.

State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999) (citation omitted). When the facts are not disputed, we must determine whether a police officer’s actions constituted a seizure and if, as a matter of law, the officer articulated an adequate basis for the seizure. Id.

A brief investigatory stop of a person is lawful if the officer is able to articulate a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” State v. Sanger, 420 N.W.2d 241, 242 (Minn.App.1988) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)).

The officer may justify his decision to seize a person based on the totality of the circumstances and may draw inferences and deductions that might elude an untrained person.

Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 99 (quoting State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn.1995)). The stop must not be based on mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity. Marben v. Dept. of Public Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn.1980) (quotation omitted).

Appellant argues that slow driving, without more, did not provide Engum with an adequate basis to investigate. “The factual basis required to support a stop is minimal, and an actual violation is not necessary.” Klotz v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 437 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Minn.App.1989), review denied (Minn. May 24, 1989). Minn.Stat. § 169.15 (1998) provides:

No person shall drive a motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede or block the normal and reasonable movement of traffic except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law or except when the vehicle is temporarily unable to maintain a greater speed due to a combination of the weight of the vehicle and the grade of the highway.

At the omnibus hearing, Engum testified that (1) he observed appellant’s vehicle traveling at a “very slow rate of speed” in the opposite direction; (2) he estimated appellant was traveling 15-20 miles per hour where the speed limit was 30 miles per hour; (3) traffic was backed up behind appellant; (4) the reduced speed was unnecessary either for the safe operation of appellant’s car or to comply with temporary restrictions or construction; (5) he observed appellant driving slowly for a quarter of a mile, which was, in his experience, longer than the usual slowdown required to make a turn.

On these facts, we conclude that En-gum’s police experience and observation of unusually slow driving that impeded traffic in a residential neighborhood in the early morning hours supported his reasonable, articulable suspicion that appellant was somehow impaired. Engum’s investigation was not based on mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.

DECISION

Because we find that the investigating officer articulated an adequate basis to stop appellant, we affirm.

Affirmed.


author: AMUNDSON, Judge

text:
    MINNESOTA TEAMSTERS PUBLIC & LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES’ UNION, LOCAL #320, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF ST. LOUIS, Respondent.
    No. C4-99-1570.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    May 23, 2000.

      Patrick J. Kelly, Stephen Kelly, Banni-gan & Kelly, P.A., St. Paul, for appellant.
    Alan L. Mitchell, St. Louis County Attorney, Vernon D. Swanum, Assistant County Attorney, Duluth, for respondent.
    Considered and decided by RANDALL, Presiding Judge, AMUNDSON, Judge, and FOLEY, Judge.

       Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 10.

   OPINION

AMUNDSON, Judge

Appellant Minnesota Teamsters Public & Law Enforcement Employees’ Union, Local # 320 (the union) challenges the district court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration based on the court’s determination that James Felty was not entitled to the grievance procedures under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The district court found that, as articulated in Article 7, § 1 of the CBA, Felty was not a “permanent” employee of the County of St. Louis (the county), the arbitrability of contract coverage was a matter for the court, and as a non-permanent employee Felty was outside the protection of the arbitration clause in question. We affirm.

FACTS

The union is the exclusive representative of those St. Louis County Highway Department Maintenance employees who are public employees within the meaning of the Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA), except for clerical, supervisory, and confidential employees. The relationship between the union and the county is governed by a collective bargaining agreement entered into on August 6, 1996.

Article 9, Part C of the CBA sets forth the agreed-upon grievance procedures and states in relevant part:

In the event an employee covered by the AGREEMENT claims that his rights or privileges under this AGREEMENT have been violated, the matter shall be resolved in accordance with the following procedure:
Step 1 [employee to submit grievance to foreman],
Step 2 [submission of grievance to department head],
Step 3 [appeal to the County Grievance Board],
Step 4: If the grievance is not settled in accordance with the foregoing procedure, the UNION may refer the grievance to arbitration within ten (10) working days after receipt of the County Grievance Board’s decision. The County and the UNION shall attempt to agree upon an arbitrator within five (5) working days after receipt of notice of referral, and in the event the parties are unable to agree upon an arbitrator within said five (5) working days, either party may request the Bureau of Mediation services to submit a panel of five (5) arbitrators.
If a grievance is not presented within the time limit set for the above, it shall be considered “waived.” If a grievance is not appealed to the next step within a specified time limit or any agreed extension thereof, it shall be considered settled on the basis of the County’s last answer.

Beginning in September 1996, James Felty was episodically employed by the St. Louis County Public Works Department. From January 21, 1997 to April 21, 1997, and from January 8 to April 11, 1998, Felty was employed as an unclassified common laborer, and from April 22 to August 22, 1997, he was employed as a provisional highway maintenance worker.

On October 9, 1997, the union petitioned the Bureau of Mediation Services (the bureau) for clarification of Felty’s appropriate unit. On December 3,1997, the county responded that Felty was covered by the parties’ CBA. On March 23, 1998, the union again petitioned the bureau requesting that Felty be designated a “public employee” as described under PELRA. See Minn.Stat. § 179A.03, subd. 14 (1998 <& Supp.1999) (defining “public employee”).

On May 22, 1998, the county had five unclassified common laborer positions in the Public Works department open for employment, but declined to hire Felty.

On June 4, 1998, the bureau held a hearing on the union’s petition. On June 30, 1998, it issued an order finding that because the parties agreed on Felty’s status as a “public employee,” and because such agreement was appropriate, Felty was included in the union’s representation.

On July 20, 1998, the union and Felty filed a grievance regarding his employment with the county, alleging that the county violated Article 4, § 2 and Article 7, § 4 of the CBA when it declined to re-hire Felty.

Article 4, § 2 of the CBA states:

In accordance with applicable law, the EMPLOYER and the UNION agree to apply the provisions of the AGREEMENT equally to all employees, without discrimination as to age, sex, marital status, religion, race, color, creed, national origin, political belief or employee organization affiliation.

Article 7, § 4 of the CBA states:.

In the event of a reduction in force, the EMPLOYER shall designate the classification(s) and .work reporting station(s) in which the reduction will be initiated. * * *
* * * ⅜
If an employee chooses not to exercise bumping rights or cannot bump any other employee, the employee shall be placed on the Civil Service re-employment list.

On October 14, 1998, the county denied the grievance in Step 2, declaring it to be outside the scope, of the CBA. On October 20, 1998, the union appealed the grievance under. Step 8 of the grievance procedure. On December 8, 1998, the County Grievance Board denied the grievance. The same day that the County Grievance Board denied the grievance, the union wrote to the bureau requesting a list of arbitrators with regard to Felty’s grievance — noting that the county’s representative was Mr. Steven C. Fecker. On December 10, 1998, the bureau forwarded a list of arbitrators to the union and to Fecker. On April 1, 1999, the county was asked to strike names of arbitrators. On April 2, 1999, the county refused. In its letter of refusal, the county first stated that the request was untimely because Fecker was not the appropriate recipient, and its timeliness inappropriate because Felty was not a “permanent” employee and therefore was not covered by the CBA’s arbitration clause.

The union filed a motion to compel arbitration, arguing that any issue of arbitra-bility was for an arbitrator to decide. The county argued that Felty and the union were not entitled to arbitrate this matter, as Felty was not covered by the CBA. On July 20, 1999, the district court denied the union’s motion, finding that Felty was not within the group of employees entitled to the CBA’s grievance procedures or arbitration. Furthermore, the district court held that the preliminary determination of arbitrability is for the court, rather than for the arbitrator. Finding the CBA’s applicability to Felty to be dispositive, the district court never reached the issue of the timeliness of the union’s actions. This appeal followed.

ISSUE

When considering a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 572.09, may the district court determine the arbitrability of a claimant’s coverage under an established arbitration agreement?

ANALYSIS

We review district court decisions concerning the arbitrability of disputes de novo. Amdahl v. Green Giant Co., 497 N.W.2d 319, 322 (Minn.App.1993). In considering a motion to compel arbitration, the court asks “(1) whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, and (2) whether the dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement.” Id.

Minnesota law clearly favors arbitration of disputes. Ehlert v. Western Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 195, 199, 207 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Minn.1973); see also Brothers Jureivicz, Inc. v. Atari, Inc., 296 N.W.2d 422, 427 (Minn.1980) (arbitration accorded “preferred status”). Doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues are resolved in favor of arbitration. Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 790, 795 (Minn.1995). But, arbitration of a dispute will not be compelled in the absence of any evidence that the parties intended to submit that dispute to arbitration. See Michael-Curry Cos. v. Knutson Shareholders Liquidating Trust, 449 N.W.2d at 139, 141 (Minn.1989) (compelling arbitration of claim only where arbitration clause specifically includes, or is broad enough to comprehend, arbitration of that claim).

I.

The union contends that the district court’s authority is limited to determining the bare existence of an arbitration agreement. Minn.Stat. § 572.09 governs motions to compel arbitration and states in pertinent part:

On application of a party showing an [arbitration] agreement * * *, and the opposing party’s refusal to arbitrate, the court shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration, but if the opposing party denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to the determination of the issue so raised and shall order arbitration if found for the moving party, otherwise, the application shall be denied.

Minn.Stat. § 572.09(a) (1998). Because the parties do not dispute the existence of an arbitration agreement, the union asserts that it was improper for the district court to decide whether Felty fell within its scope. Indeed, if the scope of the arbitration clause is at least reasonably debatable, “the issue of arbitrability is to be initially determined by the arbitrators.” Atcas v. Credit Clearing Corp. of Am., 292 Minn. 334, 341, 197 N.W.2d 448, 452 (1972). But even if the bare existence of an agreement to arbitrate clearly exists, the district court may still decide whether the particular dispute at issue was clearly outside the scope of the clause. See id. (“if no agreement to arbitrate exists * * * because the controversy sought to be arbitrated is not within the scope of the arbitration clause of the contract, the court may interfere and protect a party from being compelled to arbitrate”). Thus, we conclude that the statute governing motions to compel arbitration presumes that the district court will also determine whether the scope of the arbitration agreement is reasonably debatable as part and parcel of the required determination of the existence of an arbitration agreement.

That scope determination requires the court to divine whether the parties intended to arbitrate the particular controversy in question, Minnesota Fed’n of Teachers Local 331 v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 361, 310 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Minn.1981), gleaning that intent from the language of the parties’ agreement itself. Michael-Curry, 449 N.W.2d at 141.

Here, the county never claimed the disputed issue (re-employment) is outside the scope of the CBA; rather, it contended that the claimant was not covered by the CBA. This court has not yet addressed whether, in making an initial determination as to the scope of an arbitration agreement, it is appropriate for a district court to determine the perimeters of an arbitration clause’s coverage in a labor contract. But the Minnesota Supreme Court has addressed a similar arbitrability issue — whether contested factual preconditions of insurance policy coverage (and therefore, of an arbitration clause) need to be established first by the court. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Fruchtman, 263 N.W.2d 66, 71 (Minn.1978). The court in Fruchtman said

[w]here coverage is preconditioned on the establishment of facts, * ⅜ * such factual disputes must be tried and resolved by the trial court accompanied by findings of fact. If such factual preconditions are not established, coverage is not afforded by the policy, and the objecting party must be protected from the burden of unauthorized arbitration of both the coverage dispute and the merits of the insured’s claim.

Id. (citation omitted). Similarly, the court in Rosenberger v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 309 N.W.2d 305 (Minn.1981), approved the district court’s grant of de novo review of the issue of a party’s residency as a factual precondition to insurance coverage.

We'find the situation presented here to be analogous. In the present case, there is no question of coverage under an insurance policy arbitration clause, but rather the similar issue of whether a claimant is covered under another type of contractual agreement^-the parties’ CBA grievance procedure. There appears no good reason why courts should apply one set of rules for employment contracts and another set for insurance contracts.

The union notes that in both Fruchtman and Rosenberger, the arbitrability issues were originally decided in arbitration and subsequently appealed to the district court. Thus the union contends that the correct model is to “arbitrate first, then appeal.” This distinction is irrelevant. “[A]n objecting party must be protected from the burden of unauthorized arbitration of both the coverage dispute and the merits.” Fruchtman, 263 N.W.2d at 71 (emphasis added). In some situations, the coverage issue need not initially go to arbitration. See Myers v. State Form Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d 288, 290-91 (Minn.1983) (explaining Fruchtman). If it. is not “reasonably debatable” whether the coverage dispute is within the scope of the arbitration clause, to force a party to “arbitrate first” would directly contradict the rule that parties must be protected from unauthorized arbitration.

II.

Thus, in addition to our conclusion that the district court had jurisdiction to initially decide the issue of arbitrability, we conclude that the district court was correct in denying Felty’s motion to compel arbitration because Felty is not covered by the CBA. Under Ateas, it must be at least “reasonably debatable” whether an arbitration clause includes a particular dispute, for a court to compel arbitration of that dispute. Atcas, 292 Minn, at 341, 197 N.W.2d at 452.

Whether Felty is covered by the arbitration agreement depends on his employment classification under the CBA and the St. Louis County Civil Service law (SLCCSL), which was incorporated into the CBA. Rule 7.4(b) of the SLCCSL expressly denies civil service status and, therefore, arbitration rights to temporary employees. Article 7, § 1 of the CBA indicates that employees discharged during the six-month probationary period “shall not have rights under the grievance procedure.” Therefore, Felty only holds grievance rights if he is a permanent, non-probationary employee.

Felty’s employment with the county consisted of three periods of seasonal employment, none of which exceeded four months. Under the SLCCSL, the “period of temporary service [shall not] be counted as part of the probationary period, in case of a subsequent appointment to a permanent position.” Nothing in his employment history indicates Felty was appointed to a permanent position other than possibly the bureau’s determination that Felty was a “public employee” — a status entirely different from that of “permanent employee” — does not constitute an appointment to any permanent position. Individuals appointed to a permanent position -in the civil service acquire the status of “public employee,” pay union dues immediately, and receive union representation. However, such employees do not achieve permanent' status until they have successfully served a six-month probationary period. Since being designated a .“public employee,” Felty has not worked for the county in any capacity. Furthermore, the time Felty spent working for the county before the “public employee” designation does not count as probationary time because bureau rules provide that the effective date of a bureau order is the day following the order. Accordingly, Felty has never worked through the probationary period required for the applicability of the grievance procedure.

The plain language of the CBA indicates that Felty does not have arbitration rights. The union’s argument that Felty is covered by the clause either misapplies the significance of the bureau’s determination that he is a “public employee,” or expands his rights as a temporary employee beyond those of a probationary “permanent employee” and contravenes the SLCCSL rule that temporary employees do not have civil service status.

DECISION

The district court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to compel arbitration.

Affirmed.