author: Justice Scalia Justice Brennan, Justice Stevens,

text:
    DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY et al.
    No. 88-2123.
    Argued January 8, 1990
    Decided April 17, 1990

      Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Blackmun, O’Connor, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 934. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 937.

      Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Harriet S. Shapiro, William Ranter, and Thomas M. Bondy.

      Robert J. Englehart argued the cause for respondent Federal Labor Relations Authority. With him on the brief were William E. Persina and Arthur A. Horowitz. Gregory

      O’Duden argued the cause for respondent National Treasury Employees Union. With him on the brief were Elaine Kaplan and Clinton Wolcott

        Mark D. Roth, Stuart A. Kirsch, Walter Kamiat, and Laurence Gold filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

   Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we review the determination of the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA or Authority) that, under Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Act), 5 U. S. C. §7101 et seq., the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) must bargain with the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU or Union) over a proposed contract provision subjecting to grievance and arbitration procedures claims that the IRS had failed to comply with an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular relating to the “contracting out” of work.

I

Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act establishes a collective-bargaining system for federal agencies and their employees, under the administration of the FLRA. The Act recognizes the right of federal employees to form and join unions, 5 U. S. C. § 7102, and imposes upon management officials and employee unions the duty to “negotiate in good faith for the purposes of arriving at a collective bargaining agreement.” § 7114(a)(4). A collective-bargaining agreement must provide procedures “for the settlement of grievances,” § 7121(a)(1), which are defined as “complaint[s] . . . concerning . . . any claimed violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of any law, rule, or regulation affecting conditions of employment,” § 7103(a)(9)(C)(ii); and the agreement must “provide that any grievance not satisfactorily settled under the negotiated grievance procedure shall be subject to binding arbitration” which may be invoked by either party. § 7121(b)(3)(C). The agency’s duty to bargain is qualified, however, in one pertinent respect. The Act reserves to management officials the authority “in accordance with applicable laws ... to make determinations with respect to contracting out.” § 7106(a)(2)(B).

Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 generally directs federal agencies to “contract out” to the private sector their non-“governmental” activities (e. g., data processing) unless certain specified cost comparisons indicate that the activities can be performed more economically “in house.” Executive Office of the President, OMB Circular A-76, as revised, 48 Fed. Reg. 37110 (1983). The Circular also requires agencies to establish an administrative appeals procedure to resolve complaints by employees or private bidders relating to “determinations resulting from cost comparisons performed in compliance with [the] Circular,” or relating to decisions to contract out where no cost comparison is required. OMB Circular A-76, Supp. 1-14, 1-15 (1983).

During the course of contract negotiations with the IRS, respondent NTEU put forward a proposal that, with respect to contracting-out decisions employees wished to contest, the “grievance and arbitration” provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement would constitute the “internal appeals procedure” required by the Circular. The IRS refused to bargain over this proposal, taking the position that its subject matter was nonnegotiable under the Act. The Union then petitioned for review by the Authority, which is empowered by the Act to “resolv[e] issues relating to the duty to bargain.” § 7105(a)(2)(E); see § 7117(c).

The FLRA held that the IRS was required by §§ 7114 and 7121 to negotiate over the proposal. In its view the IRS’ failure to comply with Circular A-76 would be a “violation ... of [a] law, rule, or regulation” affecting “conditions of employment,” so that an employee complaint on the matter would qualify as a “grievance” for which procedures must be specified in the collective-bargaining agreement. 27 F. L. R. A. 976, 978-979 (1987). The FLRA found that the union’s proposal was not precluded by § 7106(a)(2)(B)’s reservation of management authority over contracting-out determinations, because it “would only contractually recognize external limitations on management’s right.” Id., at 978.

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the Authority’s decision. 274 U. S. App. D. C. 135, 862 F. 2d 880 (1988). We granted certiorari. 493 U. S. 807 (1989).

II

The management rights provision of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

“(a) [N]othing in this chapter [i. e., the Act] shall affect the authority of any management official of any agency—
“(2) in accordance with applicable laws—
“(A) to hire, assign, direct, layoff, and retain employees in the agency, or to suspend, remove, reduce in grade or pay, or take other disciplinary action against such employees;
“(B) to assign work, to make determinations with respect to contracting out, and to determine the personnel by which agency operations shall be conducted;
“(C) with respect to filling positions, to make selections for appointments from—
“(i) among properly ranked and certified candidates for promotion; or
“(ii) any other appropriate source . . . 5 U. S. C. § 7106 (emphasis added).

In the proceedings below and again before this Court, the IRS has argued that even when an agency’s decision to contract out violates OMB Circular A-76 it is still a decision “in accordance with applicable laws” and is thus immunized by the foregoing provisions from contractually imposed substantive controls — rendering the proposal here nonbargainable. According to the IRS, the Circular is not a law, but an internal Executive Branch'directive to agency officials regarding matters of office management.

The FLRA’s position is that the management rights provisions of §7106 do not trump §7121, which entitles the union to negotiate and enforce procedures for resolving any “grievance” as defined in §7103 — that is, any claimed “violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of any law, rule, or regulation affecting conditions of employment.” 5 U. S. C. § 7103(a)(9)(C)(ii) (emphasis added). Thus, according to the FLRA, it makes no difference whether OMB Circular A-76 is an “applicable law”; so long as it is a “law, rule, or regulation” within the meaning of §7103(a)(9)(C)(ii), § 7106(a) does not bar mandatory negotiation over NTEU’s proposal. This, it appears, has been the FLRA’s consistent position. See, e. g., AFSCME Local 3097 v. Department of Justice, Justice Management Div., 31 F. L. R. A. 322, 338 (1988) (§ 7106(a) reserves to management the right to make contracting-out decisions only when they are “in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations”); GSA v. American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO Nat. Council 236, 27 F. L. R. A. 3, 6 (1987) (§ 7106(a) does not preclude union from compelling agency compliance with any “applicable law, rule, or regulation”).

A

We do not lightly overturn the FLRA’s construction of the Act it is charged with administering. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U. S. 89, 97 (1983). We must accept that construction if it is a reasonable one, even though it is not the one we ourselves would arrive at. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984); NLRB v. Food and Commercial Workers, 484 U. S. 112, 123 (1987). For the reasons that follow, however, we conclude that the FLRA’s construction is not reasonable.

The FLRA’s position is flatly contradicted by the language of §7106(a)’s command that “nothing in this chapter” — i. e., nothing in the entire Act — shall affect the authority of agency officials to make contracting-out determinations in accordance with applicable laws.' Section 7121 is among the provisions covered by that italicized language.

The FLRA presents four arguments to overcome this plain text. First, it contends that reading § 7106(a) to supersede the grievance requirements of §7121 would render certain portions of §7121 superfluous. Subsection 7121(c) exempts from the grievance requirements, among other things, decisions concerning appointments and certain decisions concerning suspension and removal — decisions that are also referred to as protected management rights in § 7106(a). Compare §§ 7106(a)(2)(A) and (C)(i) with §§ 7121(c)(3) and (4). The suggestion is that these § 7121(c) exclusions would have been unnecessary if the decisions in question were already insulated from the grievance requirements by § 7106(a). We disagree. Subsection 7121(c) removes these agency decisions from the coverage of only § 7121(a)’s negotiated grievance provisions, yet does so whether or not the decisions are made in accordance with applicable laws; § 7106(a) removes the decisions from the coverage of the entire Act, but only to the extent the decisions are in accordance with applicable laws. Thus, although §§ 7106(a) and 7121(c) sometimes overlap in their treatment of these enumerated agency decisions (each removes the decisions from the coverage of § 7121(a) when they are made in accordance with applicable laws), each provision has quite a distinct effect on them as well.

Second, the FLRA argues that § 7121 is among the “applicable laws” referred to in § 7106(a)(2) — so that § 7106(a) never excuses agency management from negotiating, and submitting to, grievance procedures over the exercise of reserved management rights. This cannot be the case. If the negotiation and grievance provisions of the Act, §§ 7114 and 7121, are “applicable laws” under this section, then presumably so is all the rest of the Act, there being no basis for treating those provisions specially. Thus, under the FLRA view, § 7106(a) in effect says that “nothing in this chapter shall affect the authority of management to make contracting out decisions in accordance with this chapter” — a pointless tautology. It is clear that the term “applicable laws” refers to laws outside the Act.

Third, the FLRA argues that the NTEU proposal is not barred by § 7106(a) because, in the words of the FLRA’s opinion, its incorporation into the collective-bargaining agreement would “not itself establish any particular substantive limitation on management in the exercise of its right to make contracting-out decisions”; rather, it “would only contractually recognize and provide for the enforcement of external limitations on management’s right.” 27 F. L. R. A., at 980. Referring to one of its earlier decisions, the FLRA emphasizes that in a negotiated grievance proceeding the arbitrator would not second-guess the IRS on discretionary aspects of the contracting-out determination, but would only review claims “that the agency failed to comply with mandatory and nondiscretionary provisions” of the Circular. Headquarters, 97th Combat Support Group (SAC) Blytheville Air Force Base, Ark. v. American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2840, 22 F. L. R. A. 656, 661-662 (1986). He could, for example, order the agency to “reconstruct” the cost data it relied on in making a contracting decision, ibid., and, if the decision was not cost justified as required by the Circular, he could order the agency to reconsider it; but he would impose no “substantive limitation” on the contracting-out decision (other than those imposed by the “law, rule, or regulation” invoked by the aggrieved employee). 27 F. L. R. A., at 980. The trouble with this argument is that it is entirely disconnected from the text of the statute. The Act does not empower unions to enforce all “external limitations” on management rights, but only limitations contained in “applicable laws.” Or to put the point differently, there are no “external limitations” on management rights, insofar as union powers under § 7106(a) are concerned, other than the limitations imposed by “applicable laws.” It makes no difference that, as a remedial matter, the arbitrator would at most order the IRS to redo its cost comparisons, and would not actually order a particular contract to be awarded or set aside. Section 7106(a) says that, insofar as union rights are concerned, it is entirely up to the IRS whether it will comply at all with Circular A-76’s cost-comparison requirements, except to the extent that such compliance is required by an “applicable law” outside the Act.

Finally, the FLRA suggests that the term “applicable laws” in § 7106(a)(2) is coextensive with the phrase “any law, rule, or regulation” in § 7103(a)(9)(C)(ii), so that any agency contracting decision that gives rise to a grievance is by definition not “in accordance with applicable laws.” The FLRA did not explicitly use this reasoning in its decision here, but it seems to have done so in other cases. See, e. g., AFSCME Local 3097 v. Department of Justice, Justice Management Div., 31 F. L. R. A., at 333, 338-339. This argument is simply contrary to any reasonable interpretation of the text. A statute that in one section refers to “law, rule or regulation,” and in another section to only “laws” cannot, unless we abandon all pretense at precise communication, be deemed to mean the same thing in both places. Nor can the modifier “applicable” make the difference — not only because its meaning has nothing to do with extending the coverage in this fashion, but also because the Act in several places employs the terms “rule” and “regulation” in conjunction with the term “applicable law.” See, e. g., § 7114(c)(2) (agency head shall approve collective-bargaining agreement “if the agreement is in accordance with the provisions of this chapter and any other applicable law, rule, or regulation”) (emphasis added); § 7122(a) (“If upon review [of an arbitrator’s decision] the Authority finds that the award is deficient — (1) because it is contrary to any law, rule, or regulation . . . the authority may take such action and make such recommendations concerning the award as it considers necessary, consistent with applicable laws, rules, or regulations”) (emphasis added). There is, in short, no justification for saying that all “rules” and “regulations” are encompassed by the term “applicable laws.” It cannot be true, therefore, that all actions not in accordance with a “law, rule, or regulation” under § 7103(a) (9)(C)(ii) are, by definition, also actions not “in accordance with applicable laws” in § 7106(a)(2).

B

At oral argument, counsel for NTEU urged that we could sustain the FLRA’s decision on the ground that the term “applicable laws” includes at least those regulations that carry the “force of law,” and that OMB Circular A-76 is such a regulation. Tr. of Oral Arg. 36. We cannot, however, adopt this ground. While we think it a permissible (though not an inevitable) construction of the statute that the term “applicable laws” in § 7106(a)(2) extends to some, but not all, rules and regulations, that extension should be made, and its precise scope described, in the first instance by the FLRA — which has been proceeding until now on the mistaken assumption that § 7106(a) is irrelevant, or that “applicable laws” in § 7106(a)(2) and “any law, rule or regulation” in § 7103(a)(9)(C)(ii) are entirely synonymous. As we emphasized in Chevron, when an agency is charged with administering a statute, part of the authority it receives is the power to give reasonable content to the statute’s textual ambiguities. 467 U. S., at 843-844. That is a task infused with judgment and discretion, requiring the “‘accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care.’” Id,., at 845, quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U. S. 374, 383 (1961). It is not a task we ought to undertake on the agency’s behalf in reviewing its orders. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 88, 95 (1943); Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 169 (1962).

The IRS contends that even though the term “applicable laws” includes some rules and regulations, under no reasonable construction could it include internal directives like OMB Circular A-76. We are poorly situated to evaluate that argument, since the Court of Appeals did not consider it, neither of the respondents briefed it, and counsel for respondents addressed it in only the most cursory fashion at oral argument. It is, moreover, an argument that calls for a very difficult abstract conclusion, to wit, that no conceivable reasonable interpretation of “applicable laws” could include this Circular. The Court of Appeals, on remand, may wish to enter into that inquiry, or may prefer to await the FLRA’s specification, on remand, of the particular permissible interpretation of “applicable laws” (if any) it believes embraces the Circular. In any event, we decline to consider the point at this stage in the proceedings.

c

Finally, the IRS argues that the decision below should be reversed outright on the ground that the Union’s proposal is inconsistent with the “no arbitration” language in OMB Circular A-76, and is therefore nonnegotiable under § 7117, which provides that “the duty to bargain in good faith shall, to the extent not inconsistent with any Federal law or any Government-wide rule or regulation, extend to matters which are the subject of any rule or regulation only if the rule or regulation is not a Government-wide rule or regulation.” 5 U. S. C. § 7117(a)(1) (emphasis added). As this argument was not raised or considered in the Court of Appeals, we do not reach it. See EEOC v. FLRA, 476 U. S. 19, 24 (1986) (per curiam). Nor do we decide whether the FLRA properly held Circular A-76 to be a “rule” or “regulation” within the meaning of § 7103(a)(9); although the IRS raised this question as a separate ground for reversal in its petition for certiorari, it has relied only on the “management rights” clause of § 7106(a) in its argument before this Court.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Brennan,

with whom Justice Marshall joins, dissenting.

Because the Court remands for further proceedings I believe are unnecessary, I respectfully dissent. As I read the opinion below, the agency found OMB Circular A-76 to be an “applicable law” within the meaning of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978’s management rights provision, 5 U. S. C. § 7106(a)(2), and therefore determined that the Union’s proposal would not infringe management’s reserved rights. Since the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA or Authority) could permissibly interpret the statutory term to include regulations having the “force of law” and could permissibly find that the Circular is such a regulation, as the Court acknowledges, see ante, at 932, I would affirm the judgment below. The FLRA’s decision that the Circular is an “applicable law” is entirely reasonable. The Circular was promulgated as a formal regulation, with notice published in the Federal Register and public comment invited. See Executive Office of the President, OMB Circular A-76, 44 Fed. Reg. 20556 (1979), as amended, 48 Fed. Reg. 37110 (1983), 50 Fed. Reg. 32812 (1985). It is referenced by, and its terms generally restated in, the Federal Acquisition Regulations, codified at 48 CFR pt. 7, subpt. 7.3 (1988). By its terms, agency compliance is mandatory and enforced. OMB Circular A-76, Supp. Intro, and 1-14, 1-15 (rev. Aug. 4, 1983). Hence, I would uphold the FLRA’s conclusion that the Circular is an “applicable law” within the meaning of § 7106(a)(2).

The Court finds the FLRA’s interpretation of “applicable laws” unreasonable, not because it is an implausible reading in itself, but because it is indistinguishable from the Authority’s interpretation of the phrase “law, rule, or regulation” which is contained in a different section of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. See ante, at 931-932. I suspect the Court reads too much into the difference in language between “applicable laws” in § 7106(a)(2) and “law, rule, or regulation” in § 7103(a)(9)(C)(ii). But, in any event, I understand the Court’s decision to say only that the two phrases are not synonymous. Ibid. If the FLRA, in fact, has employed the same definition for the two phrases, which is arguable, the Authority’s error most likely was to embrace too restrictive a view of the scope of “law, rule, or regulation.” Thus on remand the FLRA is free to interpret “applicable laws” to cover not only statutes, but also regulations and rules that are binding on the agency exercising its reserved rights. See n. 2, supra. The Authority is also free to interpret “law, rule, or regulation” to cover these and more — for instance, nonbinding policy statements and unpublished internal agency guidelines.

Finally, I take issue with the Court’s expansive view of the management rights provision as abrogating any union rights vis-a-vis decisions such as contracting out, so long as agency decisions are made consistently with applicable laws. See ante, at 931. Section 7106(a) does not purport to make other provisions of the Act wholly inapplicable to the enumerated subject areas. It says only that nothing in the statute “shall affect the authority of any management official of any agency” to make certain types of decisions. (Emphasis added.) An exercise of union rights that does not affect management’s existing authority is fully consistent with this provision. Insofar as the Union proposal would require merely what is already required by OMB Circular A-76, it would not affect the Internal Revenue Service’s authority to make contracting out decisions. Therefore it would not infringe the agency’s reserved rights. Because I do not read the Authority’s decision as clearly relying on this ground, I 'do not think it necessary for the Court to have reached it.

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

If OMB Circular A-76 (rev. Aug. 4, 1983) is not an “applicable law” within the meaning of 5 U. S. C. § 7106(a)(2), the plain language of that section requires an outright reversal of the Court of Appeals’ decision. I have previously endorsed the view that the Circular is not an applicable law, and I still think that conclusion is correct. EEOC v. FLRA, 476 U. S. 19, 27 (1986) (dissenting opinion); see also U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Services v. FLRA, 844 F. 2d 1087 (CA4 1988) (en banc). But even if the Circular were an “applicable law,” it would then certainly also be “a Government-wide rule or regulation” within the meaning of § 7117(a)(1). Under the plain language of that section, the duty to bargain does not extend to matters which are the subject of such a regulation. By seeking to bargain about enforcement of the Circular, the Union seeks to bargain about matters subject to the Circular. Cf. 844 F. 2d, at 1099. I am therefore persuaded that whether or not one interprets Circular A-76 as an applicable law, either § 7106(a)(2) or § 7117(a)(1) requires-reversal. To the extent that the Court instead leaves the issue open on remand, I respectfully dissent.

      The proposed contract term read: “The Internal Appeals Procedure shall be the parties’ grievance and arbitration provisions of the Master Agreements.” 27 F. L. R. A. 976 (1987). The Court of Appeals characterized the proposal as “establishing] the ‘grievance and arbitration’ provisions of the master labor agreement between them as the internal ‘administrative appeals procedure’ mandated by the Supplement to the Circular for disputed ‘contracting-out’ cases.” 274 U. S. App. D. C. 135, 136, 862 F. 2d 880, 881 (1988). We follow the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the proposed term.

       The FLRA also held that although Circular A-76 was a “government-wide rule or regulation” within the meaning of § 7117(a), that section of the statute did not render the union’s proposal nonnegotiable because the proposal was “not inconsistent” with the Circular. 27 F. L. R. A., at 977. For reasons explained below in Part II-C, that issue is not properly before us.

       A qualification to §7106 permits contract negotiations regarding “procedures which management officials of the agency will observe in exercising” the reserved management rights. 5 U. S. C. § 7106(b)(2). Although they call our attention to this qualification, NTEU and the FLRA rightly refrain from asserting that it governs this case. The proposal at issue would enable the grievance examiner to compel the IRS to follow the cost-comparison requirements of the OMB Circular, thereby dictating the substantive criteria for the contracting-out decision. See infra, at 931.

       The relevant language of § 7121 is the following:
      “(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, any collective bargaining agreement shall provide procedures for the settlement of grievances, including questions of arbitrability. . . .
      “(2) Any collective bargaining agreement may exclude any matter from the application of the grievance procedures which are provided for in the agreement.
      “(c) The preceding subsections of this section shall not apply wdth respect to any grievance concerning—
      “(1) any claimed violation of subchapter III of chapter 73 of this title (relating to prohibited political activities);
      “(2) retirement, life insurance, or health insurance;
      “(3) a suspension or removal under section 7532 of this title;
      “(4) any examination, certification, or appointment; or “(5) the classification of any position which does not result in the reduction in grade or pay of an employee.”

       The FLRA’s position gets no support from § 7121(a)’s language providing that “Except as provided, in paragraph (2) of this subsection, any collective bargaining agreement shall provide procedures for the settlement of grievances . . . .” (Emphasis added.) If that italicized language were construed to create the Act’s only exception to the requirements of § 7121(a), then even the specific exclusions in subsection (c) of the provision would disappear.

       The IRS concedes this point. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 7; Tr. of Oral Arg. 14.

       Justice Stevens contends that § 7117(a)(1) bars negotiation over the Union’s proposal for yet another reason, namely, that the proposal covers a matter that is “the subject” of a “‘Government-wide rule or regulation.’” Post, at 938 (dissenting opinion). This argument not only was not raised or considered below, but has not even been raised by the IRS here. We decline to address it.

       See 27 F. L. R. A. 976, 979 (1987) (the Union proposal “require[s] nothing that is not required by section 7106(a)(2) of the Statute itself, namely, that determinations as to contracting-out must be made ‘in accordance with applicable laws’ ”).

       1 am inclined to agree with the position taken by the Deputy Solicitor General at oral argument, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 14, that “applicable laws” include not only statutes but also regulations having the force of law, and that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides the relevant measure. See id., at 47 (“[I]f a private party could bring an APA action, that would be very strong, if not conclusive, evidence that. . . you are dealing with an applicable law”). Under the APA, an agency action inconsistent with any valid and binding rule or regulation is actionable by anyone “aggrieved” by it. See 5 U. S. C. §§ 702, 706(2)(A); Center for Auto Safety v. Dole, 264 U. S. App. D. C. 219, 223, 235, 828 F. 2d 799, 803, 815 (1987); Padula v. Webster, 261 U. S. App. D. C. 365, 368, 822 F. 2d 97, 100 (1987).

       1 do not agree with Justice Stevens that, even if OMB Circular A-76 is an applicable law, § 7117(a)(1) precludes bargaining over the Union proposal because the Circular is also a “ ‘Government-wide rule or regulation.’” See post, at 938. Section 7117(a)(1) provides:
      “[T]he duty to bargain in good faith shall, to the extent not inconsistent with any Federal law or any Government-wide rule or regulation, extend to matters which are the subject of any rule or regulation only if the rule or regulation is not a Government-wide rule or regulation.”
      I agree with Justice Stevens that the Circular is a Government-wide rule or regulation, but I do not read the provision to bar a union proposal that asks only that an existing rule or regulation be incorporated in its entirety into the union’s collective-bargaining agreement. The function of § 7117(a)(1) appears to be to insulate from the bargaining process union efforts to change anything that has already been settled by those with authority over the agency — e. g., Congress, the President, or OMB. The two clauses in § 7117(a)(1) explain that a union proposal in direct conflict with, or covering the same ground as, a Government-wide rule or regulation is not bargainable. They establish a kind of pre-emption by which agencies may not adopt rules where those with greater authority have adopted a contrary rule or occupied the field. Thus, no purpose is served by including the rule or regulation itself within “matters which are the subject of” any Government-wide rule or regulation. Incorporating a Government-wide rule into a collective-bargaining agreement does not place the agency at odds with any greater authority.

       That the Authority found below that OMB Circular A-76 is a “law, rule, or regulation” under § 7103(a)(9)(C)(ii), see 27 F. L. R. A., at 978, does not undermine the validity of its decision even if its definition of “law, rule, or regulation” was too narrow. If the Circular fit within an overly restrictive definition of the phrase, a fortiori, it must fit within an appropriately broad definition. Moreover, the FLRA’s finding that the Union’s proposal did not interfere with reserved management rights because OMB Circular A-76 is encompassed by the term “applicable laws” is sufficient ground in itself for the decision and was relied on as such by the Authority. See 27 F. L. R. A., at 979.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 88-849.
    Action Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater Philadelphia et al. v. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Dole v. Steelworkers, ante, p. 26.


text:
    (See also No. 65, Orig., ante, p. 111.)
    No. D-801.
    In re Disbarment of Jacobson.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 492 U. S. 931.]


text:
    No. D-816.
    In re Disbarment of Chandler.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 493 U. S. 949.]


text:
    No. D-818.
    In re Disbarment of Saul.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 493 U. S. 949.]


text:
    No. D-829.
    In re Disbarment of Isis.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 493 U. S. 961.]


text:
    No. D-834.
    In re Disbarment of Raikos.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 493 U. S. 961.]


text:
    No. D-836.
    In re Disbarment of Evans.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 493 U. S. 972.]


text:
    No. D-841.
    In re Disbarment of Farley.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 493 U. S. 973.]


text:
    No. D-863.
    In re Disbarment of Morris.
   It is ordered that Jerrold L. Morris, of Chicago, Ill., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-864.
    In re Disbarment of Rocker.
   It is ordered that Jonathan Samuel Rocker, of Cleveland, Ohio, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-865.
    In re Disbarment of Boyce.
   It is ordered that Earl Rumsey Boyce, of Palm Beach, Fla., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-866.
    In re Disbarment of Silveira.
   It is ordered that Frank Diaz Silveira, of Coral Gables, Fla., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-867.
    In re Disbarment of Digges.
   It is ordered that Edward S. Digges, Jr., of Rock Hall, Md., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-868.
    In re Disbarment of Molony.
   It is ordered that Gerard E. Molony, of Upper Nyack, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-869.
    In re Disbarment of Bracken.
   It is ordered that Martin Lawrence Bracken, of Mineóla, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-870.
    In re Disbarment of Tschirhart.
   It is ordered that William Henry Tschirhart, of Clinton, Md., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-871.
    In re Disbarment of Price.
   It is ordered that William Herbert Price, of San Antonio, Tex., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 83-243.
    Brown & Root, Inc., et al. v. Thornton et al., 464 U. S. 1052.
   Motion of respondent Billy Thornton for award of attorney’s fees denied without prejudice.


text:
    No. 88-931.
    No. 88-938.
    Crandon et al. v. United States; and Boeing Co., Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 490 U. S. 1003.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 89-6605.
    In re Godwin.
   Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 89-6402.
    In re Evegelatos.
   Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 89-994.
    West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, Governor of Pennsylvania, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 89-1063.
    FirsTier Mortgage Co., aka Realbanc, Inc. v. Investors Mortgage Insurance Co.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 89-1158.
    Miles, Individually and as Administratrix of the Succession of Torregano v. Apex Marine Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 88-1075.
    Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., et al. v. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, United States Department of Labor, et al. (two cases).
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-344.
    Woodward v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-564.
    Glosemeyer et al. v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-777.
    United States Gypsum Co. v. Wesley Theological Seminary of the United Methodist Church.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-781.
    Town of Huntington et al. v. Stone, Secretary of the Army, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-835.
    Antoniu v. Securities and Exchange Commission.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-876.
    Ben-Shalom v. Stone, Secretary of the Army, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-878.
    Knight v. Central Intelligence Agency.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-898.
    Bywater Neighborhood Assn. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-997.
    Jackson et al. v. Russell.
   Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1046.
    Frates et al. v. Weinshienk, Judge, United States District Court for the District of Colorado, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1058.
    Porter et al. v. City of Atlanta.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1068.
    Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1073.
    Fant v. Bonanno, Clerk, Cleveland Municipal Court.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1086.
    Klumpner, a Minor, by Kahn, her Guardian ad Litem v. Klumpner.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1088.
    Helena Marine Service, Inc., et al. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1089.
    Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Van Vranken et al.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1090.
    Ellis v. Ringgold School District.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1091.
    Sobol, Commissioner of the New York State Education Department v. Burr, by his Parents and Next Friends, Burr et ux.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1109.
    Mason v. City of Gastonia, North Carolina, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1116.
    Bishop v. Oasis Oil Co. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1135.
    Weber et al. v. Kluge et al.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1143.
    Sung Man Kim et ux. v. Soo An Lee et ux.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1146.
    Broeckl et al. v. Chicago Park District.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1171.
    Gonzalez-Senti v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1186.
    Floca v. Homecare Health Services, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1206.
    Elkins v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6005.
    Wilkerson v. Smith, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6140.
    No. 89-6360.
    Nivica v. United States; and Wellington v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6186.
    Garcia v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6196.
    Dennis v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6292.
    Dubov v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6331.
    Woods v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6357.
    Slone v. Sowders, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6362.
    Swartz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6370.
    Bass v. Rhode, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6371.
    Scott v. Sumner et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6373.
    Keyes v. San Francisco Probation Department.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6376.
    Cole v. Reed.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6378.
    Kim v. California et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6391.
    Akmansoy v. Klevenhagen et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6392.
    Horne v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6393.
    Lee v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6395.
    McClain v. Mitchell et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6396.
    McCone v. Birge et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6397.
    Bond v. Dunn, Deputy Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6398.
    Bond v. Shams et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6401.
    Tygart v. Armontrout, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6409.
    Wesselman v. Seabold, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6411.
    Reyna v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6415.
    Brown v. Tate, Superintendent, Chillicothe Correctional Institution.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6416.
    Lepiscopo v. Reed.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6420.
    Visser v. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6424.
    Lockhart v. Nagle, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6439.
    Goodstein v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6449.
    Elkayam v. Sibert et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6463.
    Bryant v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6468.
    Vasquez v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6471.
    Dedrick v. New Hampshire.
   Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6489.
    Sherdil v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6507.
    Dupin v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6510.
    Burnette v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6514.
    Eufracio-Torres v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6515.
    Warren v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6516.
    Butler v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6517.
    Martin v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6530.
    Cruz v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6535.
    Barnhart v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6539.
    Twitty v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6545.
    Sistrunk v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6559.
    Harris v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6562.
    Molina v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6563.
    Bonga v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6577.
    Hansen v. South Carolina et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6591.
    Kennedy v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-888.
    New Hampshire v. Dedrick.
   Sup. Ct. N. H. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma patiperis granted. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 89-5295.
    Mallett v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.

Justice Blackmun dissents.

Justice Marshall,

with whom Justice Brennan joins, dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall J., dissenting), I would grant the petition for certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case. Even if I did not hold this view, I would grant the petition to consider whether a trial court’s decision to transfer a capital trial of an Afro-American defendant to a county with no residents of the defendant’s race violates the Equal Protection Clause or the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross section requirement, as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Just as state prosecutors may not use peremptory challenges to exclude members of the defendant’s race from the jury, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), state trial courts may not transfer venue of the trial to accomplish the same result by another means.

Jerome Mallett, an Afro-American, was arrested for the murder of a white police officer that occurred in Perry County, Missouri. In 1980, over 1,100 Afro-Americans lived in Perry County, out of a total population of 16,784. Mallett was originally brought to trial in that county, but he requested a change of venue because of prejudicial pretrial publicity. Both the defense and prosecution offered suggestions for an appropriate venue; defense counsel specifically expressed concern that some members of Mallett’s race reside in whatever county the court chose.

The judge ordered the case transferred to Schuyler County, a location that neither attorney had suggested. According to the 1980 census figures, Schuyler County contained 4,964 whites and 3 Afro-Americans; at the time of the trial, however, there were no Afro-Americans in the county. Mallett was convicted and sentenced to death by an all-white jury in Schuyler County. His conviction was upheld on direct appeal. In his petition for state post-conviction relief, Mallett argued that the Perry County judge’s decision to transfer venue to Schuyler County violated his rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. After a hearing, a special judge ordered a new trial on both grounds; the State Supreme Court reversed his decision and affirmed the original sentence. 769 S. W. 2d 77 (1989) (en banc).

In Batson v. Kentucky, supra, at 86, we held that “[pjurposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant’s right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure.” To make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, a defendant must establish first that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the state has acted to remove members of that race from the venire; second, that the procedure used by the state permits those “ ‘who are of a mind to discriminate’ ” to do so; and third, that the facts and circumstances of the case raise the inference that the state acted in a discriminatory manner. 476 U. S., at 96. Once the defendant has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the state to present a neutral explanation to rebut the inference. Id., at 97.

Properly applying Batson to these facts, the special judge found purposeful discrimination in the court’s transfer decision. Specifically, he found that

“ T) the case involves a cross-racial murder of a state trooper; 2) the decision of [the Perry County judge] was made without giving counsel an opportunity to object; 3) counties which were of equal convenience to witnesses; equally free of pretrial publicity; of equal, greater or less distance; and included blacks were tendered by the defense and prosecution; 4) no specific or compelling reason existed to send the case to Schuyler County; 5) there were no blacks living in Schuyler County at the time of trial; 6) movant is a black man; 7) the defense expressed concern that the county chosen include blacks.’” 769 S. W. 2d, at 81.

These facts give rise to a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. The court’s transfer decision reduced the number of Afro-Americans on Mallett’s venire; the virtually unrestricted discretion of the trial judge to make the venue determination presented an opportunity to discriminate; and the judge transferred the case to a county with no members of Mallett’s race. The trial judge failed to offer a “specific or compelling” neutral explanation for the transfer. Ibid.

In light of these circumstances, Batson requires an examination of the trial court’s justification for transferring venue in a manner that discriminated against potential Afro-American jurors. In this case, the examination was conducted by a special judge in a postconviction hearing. I do not believe that such a hearing is necessary. A reviewing court can assess the record of the trial to determine whether the judge adequately explained his decision to transfer venue to a certain county. Such review is possible in this context because a judge’s rationale is openly disclosed contemporaneously with his decision, unlike a prosecutor’s rationale for his exercise of peremptory challenges. Here the special judge’s finding that the transfer decision was racially motivated is amply supported by the record. Accordingly, Mallett’s conviction and sentence must be reversed.

Mallett also argues that the transfer of his case to Schuyler County deprived him of due process, an argument the court below characterized as a challenge under the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross section guarantee. 769 S. W. 2d, at 79-80. The fair cross section requirement has been applied to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522, 526 (1975). Although a defendant has no right to a jury of any particular racial composition, we have long held that the State cannot act so as to deprive a defendant of his right to a venire that is “truly representative of the community.” Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 130 (1940). Mallett was originally brought to trial in a community with a significant Afro-American population and asked for his case to be transferred to a county with Afro-American residents. Yet the State chose Schuyler County as the location for the trial, a venue that included no members of Mallett’s race. Although the jury pool may have been representative of Schuyler County, it was not representative of the community in which Mallett was charged, or even of the broader community comprised of the counties to which he sought transfer. In such a situation, determining which community defines the relevant universe for Sixth Amendment purposes is crucial to the adjudication of claims like Mallett’s. I would grant the petition to resolve this issue as well.

The State’s only response to both of Mallett’s contentions is that they cannot be considered because a decision adopting either argument would create “new law” that would not be applicable retroactively in a state postconviction relief proceeding. As support, it cites this Court’s recent opinion in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). The State argues further that this Court is precluded frorñ even addressing the merits of Mallett’s claims because, under Teague, retroactivity is a threshold matter. Id., at 300-301. This response is unpersuasive. Mallett’s equal protection argument is “dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Id., at 301 (emphasis omitted). The argument flows necessarily from the language in Batson stating that purposeful discrimination is impermissible in jury selection procedures. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S., at 86-87. More importantly, it is not evident to me that Teague applies to our review of state postconviction proceedings in which the state courts have addressed the merits of the petitioner’s claims. Certainly, the issue is one that merits review by this Court.

When it transferred this capital murder trial to a county with no inhabitants of Mallett’s race, the trial court violated Jerome Mallett’s fundamental equal protection rights. The transfer is particularly appalling because the defense counsel emphasized to the trial court that the venue should be one where members of Mallett’s race resided, and because the judge could have selected other counties in Missouri that satisfied this valid concern. Accordingly, I dissent.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 89-6390.
    Romero v. Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.


text:
    No. 88-1400.
    No. 89-508.
    Franchise Tax Board of California et al. v. Alcan Aluminium Ltd. et al., 493 U. S. 331; United States Can Co. et al. v. International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers et al., 493 U. S. 1019; Venus Independent School District et al. v. Shelly C., by Next Friends, Shelbie C. et ux., 493 U. S. 1024; In re Polyak, 493 U. S. 1017; Thakkar v. Martin, 493 U. S. 1027; Rawls v. United States, 493 U. S. 1013; and Ferenc v. Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al., 493 U. S. 1060.
    No. 89-788.
    No. 89-796.
    No. 89-5879.
    No. 89-6061.
    No. 89-6124.
   Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 89-741.
    No. 89-5666.
    Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., et al., 493 U. S. 1036; and Lackland v. J. C. Penney Co., 493 U. S. 1036.
   Petitions for rehearing denied.

Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.


text:
    March 5, 1990
    (See No. 89-5999, ante, p. 541.)
    No. 88-986.
    Fields v. Durham et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Zinermon v. Burch, ante, p. 113.


text:
    No. 88-6104.
    Hawkins v. Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Selvage v. Collins, ante, p. 108, and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989).


text:
    No. 88-6347.
    Bridge v. Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Selvage v. Collins, ante, p. 108, and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989).


text:
    No. 89-486.
    Hernandez v. Rice, Secretary of the Air Force.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider whether or not, in all of the circumstances of the case, receipt of the nondefective complaint by the District Court clerk’s office constituted a “filing” for the purposes of 42 U. S. C. §2000e-16(c) (1982 ed.).


text:
    No. 89-532.
    Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Holloway et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Reves v. Ernst & Young, ante, p. 56.


text:
    No. 89-599.
    Easter House v. Felder et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Zinermon v. Burch, ante, p. 113.


text:
    No.---.
    No.---.
    City of Rancho Cucamonga et al. v. Edwards Theatres Circuits, Inc.; and Manning v. United States Environmental Protection Agency.
   Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.


text:
    No.---.
    Thompson v. Covington Housing Development.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. D-847.
    In re Disbarment of Nixon.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 493 U. S. 1000.]


text:
    No. D-848.
    In re Disbarment of Williams.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 493 U. S. 1000.]


text:
    No. D-872.
    In re Disbarment of Joyce.
   It is ordered that Thomas M. Joyce, of Chicago, Ill., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring .him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-873.
    In re Disbarment of Sandborn.
   It is ordered that Michael Young Sandborn, of Lansing, Mich., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-874.
    In re Disbarment of Peiper.
   It is ordered that Jordan L. Peiper, of Philadelphia, Pa., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-875.
    In re Disbarment of Stoner.
   It is ordered that Carl B. Stoner, Jr., of Harrisburg, Pa., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 88-931.
    No. 88-938.
    Crandon et al. v. United States; and Boeing Co., Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 490 U. S. 1003.] Motion of petitioners for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 89-542.
    Perpich, Governor of Minnesota, et al. v. Department of Defense et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 493 U. S. 1017.] Motion of National Guard Association of the United States et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae, for divided argument, and for additional time for argument denied.


text:
    No. 89-700.
    Astroline Communications Company Limited Partnership v. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc., et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 493 U. S. 1018.] Motion of Committee to Promote Diversity for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 89-742.
    Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division v. Youngblood.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted sub nom. Lynaugh v. Youngblood, 493 U. S. 1001.] Motion of petitioner to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 89-6428.
    In re Madson.
   Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 89-1106.
    Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Department of Treasury.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 89-5120.
    Perry v. Louisiana.
   19th Jud. Dist. Ct., Crim. Section V, Parish of East Baton Rouge, La. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 88-6525.
    Charters v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 88-6972.
    Spencer v. Lee et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-473.
    Doody et al. v. Sinaloa Lake Owners Assn., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-746.
    Gene R. Smith Corp. v. Terry’s Tractor, Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-809.
    PaineWebber Inc. et al. v. Frye.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-829.
    DeWitt Bank & Trust Co., Conservator of the Estate of McNeely v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-922.
    Patel v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-928.
    Cementos Guadalajara, S. A., et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1087.
    Johnson v. Bank of America.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1096.
    Lawler v. Paulissen et ux.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1100.
    Robinson v. Pourciau et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1103.
    Gould Inc. et al. v. Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1119.
    Herring et al. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1120.
    Catalina v. City of Columbus, Ohio, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1121.
    Webb v. Merck & Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1122.
    Christensen v. Pettey et al.
   Ct. App. Utah. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1126.
    Suehl et al. v. Iowa.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1137.
    Rannels v. Meridian Bancorp, Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1154.
    Shell Offshore Inc. v. Gates et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1162.
    Crompton, dba Pro-Par Industries, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1165.
    Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. v. Sutton.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1234.
    Pelullo v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1250.
    Manzi v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1252.
    Basalyga et al. v. Pennsylvania et al.
   Pa. Commw. Ct. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1269.
    Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., et al. v. Frank Music Corp. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5844.
    McKinney v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6156.
    Velasquez v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6157.
    Melo v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6226.
    No. 89-6266.
    Rivera v. United States; and Burgess v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6229.
    Restrepo v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6238.
    Townsend v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6239.
    Greene v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6252.
    Frank v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir: Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6327.
    Tuttle v. Utah.
   Sup. Ct. Utah. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6338.
    Brooks v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6351.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6394.
    Harris v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6418.
    Morris v. Department of Social Services.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6432.
    Street v. Jabe, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6436.
    Arman v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6437.
    Brummell v. Trickey et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6440.
    Rodman v. Bower, Superintendent, Southeastern Correctional Institution.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6458.
    MacGuire v. Miller, Shine & Bryan et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6508.
    Cox v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6531.
    Franks v. Bauer, Police Chief, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir.- Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6536.
    Cantu v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6548.
    Harrison v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6564.
    Land v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6582.
    Curren v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6598.
    Peoples v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6603.
    Doria v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6606.
    Barnes v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6656.
    Sakovich v. Armstrong World Industries.
   App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6657.
    Sakovich v. Dodt.
   App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1075.
    A. A. Poultry Farms, Inc., et al. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 89-6219.
    Byrd v. Armontrout, Warden, et al. Townsend v. Indiana. Starr v. Arkansas.
   C. A. 8th Cir.; Sup. Ct. Ind.; and Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.

No. 89-6404.

No. 89-6405.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 89-6592.
    Stewart v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. A-259.
    No. 89-415.
    No. 89-5506.
    No. 89-5827.
    No. 89-5832.
    No. 89-6065.
    No. 89-6067.
    No. 89-6098.
    No. 89-6224.
    Fazzini v. Gluch et al., 493 U. S. 1014; Brooks v. Town of Ashland, 493 U. S. 936; Hakim v. Department of Civil Rights et al., 493 U. S. 940; MORGAN v. Turnage, 493 U. S. 1047; Perry v. Ball, Secretary of the Navy, 493 U. S. 1027; Bilal v. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, 493 U. S. 1032; Visser v. Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, 493 U. S. 1048; Martin v. United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 493 U. S. 1048; and Bond v. Raikes, Judge, Nelson Circuit Court, 493 U. S. 1062.
   Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    March 6, 1990
    No. A-606 (89-6785).
    Heishman v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice O’Connor, and by her referred to the Court, granted pending the disposition by this Court of the petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay terminates automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, this stay shall continue pending the issuance of the mandate of this Court.


text:
    March 16, 1990
    No. 89-1433.
    No. 89-1434.
    United States v. Eichman et al. United States v. Haggerty et al.
   Appeal from D. C. D. C.; and Appeal from D. C. W. D. Wash. Motion of the Solicitor General to expedite consideration of the jurisdictional statements granted to the extent that motions to dismiss or affirm shall be' received by the Clerk on or before noon, Monday, March 26, 1990.


text:
    March 19, 1990
    No. 88-6277.
    McLaughlin v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, ante, p. 433.


text:
    No. 88-6348.
    Lloyd v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, ante, p. 433.


text:
    No. 88-6450.
    Allen v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, ante, p. 433.


text:
    No. 88-6480.
    Cummings v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, ante, p. 433.


text:
    No. 88-6682.
    Barnes v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, ante, p. 433.


text:
    No. 88-6683.
    Fullwood v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, ante, p. 433.


text:
    No. 88-6684.
    Hunt v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, ante, p. 433.


text:
    No. 88-7306.
    Greene v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, ante, p. 433.


text:
    No. 89-1297.
    International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 406, et al. v. Guidry.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers, 493 U. S. 67 (1989).


text:
    No. 89-5837.
    Laws v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, ante, p. 433.


text:
    No. 89-6077.
    Quesinberry v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma paupe ris granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, ante, p. 433.


text:
    No. 89-6526.
    Artis v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, ante, p. 433.


text:
    No.---.
    No.---.
    Baker v. Gondles, Sheriff, Arlington County Jail, et al.; and Hickson v. Bowles, Sheriff.
   Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.


text:
    No. A-591.
    Neville v. Appellate Division, Supreme Court of New York, Second Judicial Department.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Application for stay of proceedings, addressed to JUSTICE Brennan and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-603 (89-6461).
    Jackson v. Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant the application for stay of execution and the petition for writ of certiorari and would vacate the death sentence in this case.


text:
    No. A-620 (89-1303).
    Reserve Life Insurance Co. v. Eichenseer.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for recall and stay of mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, presented to Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, granted, and it is ordered that the mandate is stayed pending final disposition of the petition for writ of certiorari.


text:
    No. D-843.
    In re Disbarment of Brown.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 493 U. S. 988.]


text:
    No. D-850.
    In re Disbarment of Morrison.
   James Robert Morrison III, of Alton, III, having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on January 16, 1990 [493 U. S. 1040], is hereby discharged.


text:
    No. D-853.
    In re Disbarment of Jones.
   Motion to defer further proceedings granted. [For earlier order herein, see 493 U. S. 1040.]


text:
    No. D-876.
    In re Disbarment of Tobin.
   It is ordered that Thomas P. Tobin, -of Lloyd Harbor, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-877.
    In re Disbarment of Solerwitz.
   It is ordered that Jack B. Solerwitz, of Brookville, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should -not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 88-2109.
    Kansas et al. v. Kansas Power & Light Co. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 493 U. S. 1041.] Motion of Nancy Allevato, Personal Representative of Michael J. Ferrantino, Sr., deceased, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 89-453.
    Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 493 U. S. 1017.] Motion of respondent Rainbow Broadcasting Co. for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 89-504.
    Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Finkelstein.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 493 U. S. 1055.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 89-901.
    W. R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Department of Revenue of Montana et al., 493 U. S. 1094.
   Motion of respondent Department of Revenue of Montana for damages and costs denied.


text:
    No. 89-5691.
    Hughey v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 493 U. S. 1018.] Motion of Insurance Crime Prevention Institute et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 89-5809.
    Sawyer v. Smith, Interim Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 493 U. S. 1042.] Motion of Stephen H. Sachs et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 89-5867.
    Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 493 U. S. 1069.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Jon R. Ker, Esq., of Hewitt, Tex., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case.


text:
    No. 89-6560.
    Mintz v. Supreme Court of California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until April 9, 1990, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

For the reasons expressed in Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U. S. 928 (1983), we would deny the petition for writ of certiorari without reaching the merits of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.


text:
    No. 89-6455.
    No. 89-6492.
    In re Warren; and In re Walker.
   Petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 89-927.
    In re Will, Senior Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motions of Loyola University of Chicago School of Law and Hans Zeisel for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition or certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6551.
    No. 89-6594.
    In re Martin; and In re Martin.
   Petitions for writs of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 89-964.
    Moskal v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 89-1166.
    Groves et al. v. Ring Screw Works, Ferndale Fastener Division.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    (See also No. 89-927, supra.)

    No. 89-811.
    Neiman, dba Concourse Nursing Home v. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-870.
    Kiesel Co., Inc. v. Householder, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-914.
    National Posters, Inc., et al. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-931.
    Portland Audubon Society et al. v. Lujan, Secretary of the Interior, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-973.
    Lowe et al. v. Commack Union Free School District et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-977.
    Ballard v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-985.
    Jay v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-986.
    Lucas v. Skinner, Secretary of Transportation.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-992.
    No. 89-1081.
    Certified Plaintiff Class in MDL-250 v. Folding Carton Reserve Fund et al.; Folding Carton Administration Committee et al. v. Folding Carton Reserve Fund et al.; and United States v. Folding Carton Reserve Fund et al.
    No. 89-1097.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1002.
    White v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1012.
    Fiorella et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1022.
    Pepsico, Inc. v. Sharp.
   Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1030.
    Brown v. Ledbetter, Commissioner, Georgia Department of Human Resources, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1037.
    Xemas, Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1043.
    Harris v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1044.
    Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc., et al. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1049.
    Danese, Personal Representative of the Estate of Danese, et al. v. Asman, Chief of Police of the City of Roseville, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1112.
    Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Johnson et vir.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1114.
    Donaldson et al. v. Hopkins Township, Illinois, et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1123.
    Fleischhauer et al. v. Feltner et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1130.
    Russell v. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1134.
    Yosef v. Passamaquoddy Tribe et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1136.
    McDonnell v. Board of Commissioners, Canyon County, Idaho.
   Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1138.
    Steele v. Minnesota.
   Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1139.
    Local 827, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Trad et al.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1144.
    Sargent et al. v. PaineWebber Inc. et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1145.
    McCracken v. City of College Park, Georgia, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1150.
    Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Maryland, Inc. v. Weiner et al.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1153.
    No. 89-6462.
    Florida v. Christian; and Christian v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1155.
    Thomas v. Carpenter et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1169.
    Comora et al. v. Radell et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1174.
    Hirsch, Testamentary Executor of the Succession of Godchaux, Widow of Newman, et al. v. City of New Orleans et al.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1180.
    Barrett et al. v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Company of Chicago.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1181.
    Burlington Northern Railroad Company Employees v. Montana Department of Revenue et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1183.
    Trumpold et ux. v. Besch et al.
   App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1184.
    Lacke et al. v. Gray, fka Lengyel.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1185.
    Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority et al. v. Comite Pro Rescate de la Salud et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1187.
    Banff, Ltd., fka Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd. v. Salant Corp., Successor in Interest to both Manhattan Industries, Inc., and Bayard Shirt Corp.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1188.
    Kelly v. Gill, State Attorney, Fifth Judicial Circuit of Florida, et al.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1190.
    Amazing Stores, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1196.
    Pacyna v. Greenley et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. Y., Erie County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1199.
    Stich v. United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California (Robertson et al., Real Parties in Interest).
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1200.
    Dohr, Personal Representative of the Estate of Dohr v. Provencal et al.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1202.
    Folstad et al. v. Illinois State Board of Investment et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1204.
    United States Department of Defense v. National Security Archive.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1205.
    Calvert v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1207.
    PMI Petroleum Marketers, Inc., et al. v. Getty Petroleum Corp.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1208.
    Local 530 of Operative Plasterers & Cement Masons International Assn. v. Drywall Tapers & Pointers of Greater New York, Local 1974.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1210.
    Harduvel et al. v. General Dynamics Corp.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1211.
    Cogswell v. Colorado.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1213.
    Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc., et al. v. Gilchrist, District Attorney of the 26th Prosecutorial District, North Carolina.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1214.
    Orthokinetics, Inc., et al. v. Penox Technologies, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1222.
    Ahktar, dba Circle Mobil v. Bird Oil Co.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1224.
    Youngberg, dba Maki v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1227.
    CSXT, Inc. v. Pitz, Director, Department of Transportation of Michigan, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1229.
    Jasso v. Finney.
   Sup. Ct. Alaska. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1231.
    Fan v. Minnesota.
   Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1235.
    Lander et ux. v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1236.
    Board of County Commissioners, Lawrence County, Ohio v. L. Robert Kimball & Associates.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1237.
    Gogolin & Stelter v. First City Bank, Bellaire, N. A.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1239.
    Chia v. Lujan, Secretary of the Interior, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1244.
    Sharp v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1245.
    Cohen et al. v. Reed et al.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1248.
    Rampp v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1251.
    Wrenn v. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1260.
    Baur v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1266.
    Chamberlin v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1271.
    Jupin v. Stetzer et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1278.
    Merkow v. Lawn, Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1292.
    Byers v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-1301.
    Safir v. United States Lines, Inc., et al. (two cases).
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5448.
    Groff v. Hummer et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5924.
    No. 89-5925.
    Robtoy v. Callahan, Superintendent, McNeil Island Correction Facility; and Norman v. DuCharme, Superintendent, Washington State Reformatory.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6006.
    Pilkey v. Tennessee.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6083.
    Davis v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6146.
    Blackmon v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6165.
    Lucas v. Bunnell, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6176.
    Curl v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6178.
    Grogg v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6189.
    Blige v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6279.
    Alvarez Moreno v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6285.
    Chambers v. Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6290.
    Xethakis v. Fulcomer, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6293.
    Ferrel v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6305.
    Watson v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Noble County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6316.
    Buck v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6425.
    Flanagan v. United States Parole Commission et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6447.
    Graves v. Careercom Corp.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6451.
    Wasko v. Municipal Court of San Luis Obispo.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6452.
    Burson v. Scott, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6454.
    Trammell v. Berry, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6456.
    Saunders v. Sullivan et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6457.
    Wright v. Howse, Parole Officer, Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6464.
    Burroughs v. Hertz Rent-A-Car.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6466.
    Eakins v. LeCureux et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6469.
    Bennett v. Tweedale et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6470.
    Eldridge v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6472.
    Feraci v. Smith, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6479.
    Suttles, Administratrix of the Estate of Suttles v. City of Chattanooga et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6488.
    Theophile v. Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6491.
    Esteves v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6496.
    Przybycszewski v. Bubba.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6498.
    Beas v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6501.
    Hannah v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6502.
    Fernos-Lopez v. Figarella-Lopez.
   Sup. Ct. P. R. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6504.
    Sullivan v. Alaska.
   Ct. App. Alaska. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6505.
    Whitaker v. Superior Court of California, County of Alameda (Bay Area Rapid Transit, Real Party in Interest).
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6506.
    Whitaker v. Superior Court of California, County of Alameda (Pascarella, Real Party in Interest).
   Ct. App. Cal, 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6511.
    Fields v. Steinbrenner et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6519.
    Marsh v. United States.
   C. A. -8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6521.
    McRoy v. Fogg, Superintendent, Coxsackie Correctional Facility, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6522.
    Allen v. Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6527.
    Hobbs v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6528.
    Carrion-Collazo v. Beyer, Superintendent, New Jersey State Prison, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6529.
    Easley v. McAnulty et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6533.
    Gillespie v. West Virginia.
   Cir. Ct. Pleasants County, W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6534.
    Case v. Mondragon, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6537.
    Lewis v. Russe et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6541.
    Watts v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6542.
    Phillips, aka Shabazz v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6543.
    Rivera v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. 111. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6544.
    Scott v. Heath et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6550.
    O’Halloran v. Ryan, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Dallas, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6552.
    Hummel v. Jago, Superintendent, London Correctional Institution.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6553.
    Gaunce v. Burgener et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6555.
    Hutcherson v. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6556.
    McCone v. Sagebrush Properties, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6557.
    Mindek v. Pennsylvania.
   Ct. Common Pleas, Washington County, Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6558.
    Harding v. Delaware.
   Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6566.
    Dice v. Trippett, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6567.
    Almond v. Cowley, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6568.
    Coleman v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6569.
    Dillard v. Owens, Commissioner of Corrections of Pennsylvania, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6570.
    Sutton v. Maryland et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6575.
    Barley v. Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6578.
    Smitherman v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6580.
    Weathersby v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6588.
    Motton v. Mann’s Wrecker Service.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6590.
    Harris v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6593.
    Lawrence v. Moody, Superintendent, Wildwood Correctional Center.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6599.
    Corn v. Knauf et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6601.
    Poodry v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6602.
    Kimberlin v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6610.
    Barnett v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6611.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6612.
    Gutierrez-Gonzales v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6616.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6617.
    Saeid v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6623.
    O’Neill v. Fulcomer, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6625.
    Millines v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6630.
    Jameson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6631.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6632.
    Dyer v. Evitts, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6638.
    Miller v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6639.
    Kim v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6641.
    Braggs v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6642.
    Doolan v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6643.
    Franklin v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6649.
    Martins v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6652.
    Brown v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6658.
    Edwards v. Wallace, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6666.
    Sheehan v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6668.
    Wilson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6670.
    Rodger v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6683.
    Finch v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6686.
    Kirkland v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6695.
    Coleman v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6699.
    Fant v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6710.
    Peterson v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6717.
    Medley v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6728.
    Hanson v. McCaughtry, Superintendent, Waupun Correctional Institution, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-6730.
    Hernandez de Araujo v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 88-6881.
    No. 88-7133.
    No. 88-7246.
    No. 88-7488.
    No. 88-7562.
    No. 89-5201.
    No. 89-5257.
    No. 89-5444.
    No. 89-5515.
    No. 89-5621.
    Bean v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal.; Adcox v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal.; Frey v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa.; Walker v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal.; Kimble v. Vasquez, Warden. Sup. Ct. Cal.; Coleman v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal.; Johnson v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal.; Bonin v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal.; Hicks v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio; Grant v. Vasquez, Warden. Sup. Ct. Cal.; Silva v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal.; Burton v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal.; McDowell v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal.; Hamilton v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal.; McCormick v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn.; Bloom v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal.; Lucky v. Vasquez, Warden. Sup. Ct. Cal.; Massie v. Hennessey et al. C. A. 9th Cir.; Johnson v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio; Foster v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex.; Robbins v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal.; Summerlin v. Arizona. Super. Ct. Ariz., Maricopa County; Lightbourne v. Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla.; and Roberts v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo.
    No. 89-5892.
    No. 89-5898.
    No. 89-5997.
    No. 89-5998.
    No. 89-6181.
    No. 89-6194.
    No. 89-6213.
    No. 89-6253.
    No. 89-6284.
    No. 89-6322.
    No. 89-6342.
    No. 89-6532.
    No. 89-6547.
    No. 89-6584.
   Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.