author: SANDSTROM, Justice.

text:
    2006 ND 119
    Todd A. ROTH, Plaintiff and Appellant v. Lynette HOFFER, Defendant and Appellee.
    No. 20050328.
    Supreme Court of North Dakota.
    June 1, 2006.

      Todd A. Roth, pro se, Bismarck, N.D., plaintiff and appellant; submitted on briefs.
    Kent M. Morrow, Severin, Ringsak & Morrow, Bismarck, N.D., for defendant and appellee; submitted on briefs.
   SANDSTROM, Justice.

[¶ 1] Todd A. Roth appeals from an amended judgment in his divorce action against Lynette Hoffer and from an order denying his post-judgment motion. We affirm, concluding the district court did not err in granting Hoffer’s motion under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a) to correct a clerical mistake in the initial judgment regarding the distribution of the proceeds of Roth’s 401 (k) plan.

I

[¶ 2] In Both v. Hoffer, 2004 ND 72, ¶ 3, 688 N.W.2d 402, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 936, 125 S.Ct. 328, 160 L.Ed.2d 241 (2004), we summarily affirmed Roth’s appeal from a July 2003 divorce judgment. The judgment identified Roth’s 401(k) plan with his employer, North American Coal, and stated the plan has “a gross value of $53,620.91, but against which [Roth] took a loan of $11,233.77 leaving a net value of $42,387.14. The Court awards [Hoffer] 65% of the net value ($27,551.64).” A Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”) authorized the administrator of Roth’s 401(k) plan to hold $27,551.64 for Hoffer.

[¶ 3] In October 2004, Hoffer moved under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a) to amend the judgment, claiming there was a clerical mistake because the judgment did not accurately reflect the amount of money she was to receive from Roth’s 401(k) plan. Hoffer claimed Roth’s employer had issued Roth a check out of a total fund balance of $65,657.26, and Roth, then a prison inmate, endorsed the check to Mitch Schlaht. Hoffer claimed she was entitled to 65 percent of the total fund balance of Roth’s 401 (k) plan.

[¶ 4] After a hearing, the district court granted Hoffer’s motion “to the extent that she seeks supplementary court orders to assure that the 401(k) plan proceeds that were awarded in the divorce judgment be made available to her. If necessary, the Court will execute a new QDRO document, or issue other orders to assure that the value distributable” to Hoffer be made available for her benefit. An amended judgment was entered which awarded Hof-fer “65% of the net value of $42,027.22,” and an amended QDRO was entered which required Roth’s employer to pay Hoffer “$42,827.22 (65% of the total account balance of $65,657.26).” The amended judgment imposed a constructive trust and monetary judgment against Roth and Schlaht in the amount of $15,265.58. The court subsequently denied Roth’s post-judgment motion under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(b)(6) and 60(b)(iv), concluding the amount awarded under the amended judgment and QDRO had been satisfied and Roth’s motion was moot.

[¶ 5] The district court had jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06. The appeal is timely under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const. art. VI, §§ 2 and 6, and N.D.C.C. §§ 28-27-01 and 28-27-02.

II

[¶ 6] Roth’s arguments can be summarized in two main claims: (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a) to amend the judgment because there was not a clerical mistake, and (2) the amended judgment is void and his post-judgment motion was not moot because Roth’s payment and satisfaction of the amended judgment was not voluntary.

[¶7] Rule 60(a), N.D.R.Civ.P., authorizes a district court to correct clerical mistakes in a judgment and provides “[cjlerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversights or omission may be corrected by the court: (1) at any time on its own initiative; or (2) on the motion of any party.”

[¶ 8] In Fargo Glass and Paint Co. v. Randall, 2004 ND 4, ¶¶5-6, 673 N.W.2d 261 (quoting First Western Bank v. Wickman, 513 N.W.2d 62, 64 (N.D.1994)), we outlined our general rules for correcting clerical mistakes under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a):

This Court has clearly held that Rule 60(a) is not a substitute for an appeal on the merits.
“Generally, Rule 60(a) can only be used to make the judgment or record speak the truth and cannot be used to make it say something other than what originally was pronounced. We believe it clear that Rule 60(a) was not designed to affect substantive portions of a judgment or order, nor to act as a substitute for appeal. The rule is appropriately utilized only for ‘the correction of irregularities which becloud but do not impugn [the judgment].’ ” United States v. Stuart, 392 F.2d 60, 62 (3d Cir.1968). The problem is essentially one of characterization. Kelley v. Bank Building and Equipment Corporation of America, 453 F.2d 774, 778 (10th Cir.1972). It must be determined “whether a substantive change or amendment was made or whether the amended conclusions and judgment were in the nature of corrections.” Kelley, supra.
“A court may correct, pursuant to Rule 60(a), errors created by oversight or omission that cause the judgment to fail to reflect what was intended at the time of trial. However, Rule 60(a) is not a vehicle for relitigat-ing matters that have already been litigated and decided, nor to change what has been deliberately done.” (Citations, footnote omitted.)
Gruebele v. Gruebele, 338 N.W.2d 805, 811-12 (N.D.1983);. see also Volk v. Volk, 435 N.W.2d 690, 692 (N.D.1989).

[¶ 9] Rule 60, N.D.R.Civ.P., was adopted from F.R.Civ.P. 60, and in construing our rule, we may consider federal case law interpreting F.R.Civ.P. 60. Gruebele, 338 N.W.2d at 811 n. 5. Under the federal rule, transcription errors and mathematical errors are typical clerical mistakes, but the federal rule authorizes a district court to correct ambiguities and errors of omission or oversight to clarify and reflect the court’s intent when the initial judgment was entered. 12 J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 60.11[1] and [2] (3rd ed.2006). In Blanton v. Anzalone, 813 F.2d 1574, 1577 n. 2 (9th Cir.1987) (emphasis in original), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals aptly explained the difference between clerical mistakes and substantive mistakes:

The basic distinction between “clerical mistakes” and mistakes that cannot be corrected pursuant to Rule 60(a) is that the former consist of “blunders in execution” whereas the latter consist of instances where the court changes its mind, either because it made a legal or factual mistake in making its original determination, or because on second thought it has decided to exercise its discretion in a manner different from the way it was exercised in the original determination. See United States v. Griffin, 782 F.2d 1393, 1397 (7th Cir.1986).

[¶ 10] A district court may correct clerical errors after an appellate court has decided an appeal if the correction is the type envisioned by Rule 60(a) and the appellate court has not ruled explicitly or implicitly on the issue that is the subject of the correction. Klingman v. Levinson, 877 F.2d 1357, 1363 (7th Cir.1989); Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 789 F.2d 991, 994 (2nd Cir.1986). See 12 Moore’s Federal Practice, at § 60.12[1][b]. A correctable clerical mistake need not be made by the clerk or by the court, but may be made by a party. Matter of West Texas Mktg. Corp., 12 F.3d 497, 503-04 (5th Cir.1994). See Moore’s Federal Practice, at § 60.10[2].

[¶ 11] Here, the district court’s memorandum decision in the parties’ contested divorce action said resolution of the property issues had been “made complicated by the less than adequate record compiled at trial, partly due to [Roth’s] lack of legal assistance, and also his subsequent incarceration at the penitentiary on drug related charges. The Court’s efforts to allow for supplementing of the record following the trial and submission of additional closing arguments resulted in very little of probative value to assist in resolving the property issues.” At the divorce trial, Hoffer introduced evidence that, as of March 31, 2002, Roth’s 401(k) plan had a closing balance of $68,352.41, with an outstanding $11,233.77 loan by Roth against the account. The district court’s memorandum opinion said Roth’s 401(k) plan would “be divided between the parties, with 65 percent going to [Hoffer], and 35 percent to [Roth]. The Court is taking into account the diminishment of this account as a result of loans made against it by [Roth] prior to the divorce.” The court directed Hoffer’s counsel to prepare appropriate closing documents in the divorce action, and the findings of fact stated Roth’s 401(k) plan has “a gross value of $53,620.91, but against which [Roth] took a loan of $11,233.77 leaving a net value of $42,387.14. The Court awards [Hoffer] 65% of the net value ($27,551.64).” The original judgment repeated that language and the QDRO authorized the administrator of Roth’s 401(k) plan to hold $27,551.64 for Hoffer.

[¶ 12] The language in the district court’s memorandum opinion recognized the difficulties in resolving the parties’ property values and awarded Hoffer 65 percent of Roth’s 401 (k) plan without referring to a specific dollar amount. The memorandum decision differs from the findings of fact, judgment, and QDRO prepared by Hoffer’s counsel, which identify specific dollar amounts. The language in the memorandum opinion supports the district court’s conclusion there was a clerical mistake or “blunder in execution” in preparing the findings of fact, judgment, and QDRO. The district court was in a better position than this Court to know what it intended in making the original distribution of the 401(k) plan. The amended judgment comports with the district court’s initial memorandum decision and is not relitigation of a matter that had already been decided. Moreover, this Court did not explicitly or implicitly rule on the distribution of the 401(k) plan in Roth’s prior appeal, see Roth, 2004 ND 72, ¶ 1, 688 N.W.2d 402, and in his reply brief in this appeal, Roth admits he did not challenge the distribution of the 401(k) plan in his prior appeal. On this record, we conclude the district court did not err in granting Hoffer’s Rule 60(a) motion to reflect its original intent, as expressed in its memorandum decision, to award Hoffer 65 percent of Roth’s 401(k) plan.

[¶ 13] This record reflects that Roth endorsed the check for the proceeds of the 401 (k) plan over to Schlaht, and the district court explained it was faced with an improper distribution of the proceeds of the 401(k) plan to Roth, who was refusing to return the proceeds. The court granted Hoffer’s motion to the extent she sought supplementary orders to assure the proceeds awarded to her in the divorce judgment were made available to her. Schlaht is not a party to this appeal and has not complained about the district court’s decision. See Rott v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 2004 ND 198, ¶4, 688 N.W.2d 378. Under these circumstances and on this record, we reject Roth’s claim the district court lacked authority to issue orders to implement the court’s initial intent in distributing the 401(k) plan. See N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06(3).

[¶ 14] Roth also raises several issues involving the district court’s denial of his motion under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(b)(6) and 60(b)(iv). Roth generally claims the amended judgment is void, a satisfaction in this case was by execution and levy, and he did not voluntarily pay the judgment. Rule 59(b)(6), N.D.R.Civ.P., authorizes a district court to grant a new trial for insufficiency of the evidence, and N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(iv) authorizes relief from a judgment that is void. The district court had jurisdiction to correct the clerical mistake under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a), and Roth has not established he was entitled to relief under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(b)(6) and 60(b)(iv). We conclude the court did not err in denying Roth’s post-judgment motion.

Ill

[¶ 15] We affirm the amended judgment and order denying Roth’s motions.

[¶ 16] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, C.J., DANIEL J. CROTHERS, MARY MUEHLEN MARING, and CAROL RONNING KAPSNER, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    2006 ND 121
    UNIVERSITY HOTEL DEVELOPMENT, LLC, Plaintiff and Appellant v. DUSTERHOFT OIL, INC., Loren R. Dusterhoft, Jointly and Severally, Defendants and Appellees.
    No. 20050386.
    Supreme Court of North Dakota.
    June 1, 2006.

      Alexander F. Reichert, Reichert Law Office, Grand Forks, N.D., for plaintiff and appellant; submitted on brief.
    Thomas L. Zimney and Bradley A. Meyer, Zimney Foster P.C., Grand Forks, N.D., for defendants and appellees; submitted on brief.
   SANDSTROM, Justice.

[¶ 1] University Hotel Development (“UHD”) appeals from a summary judgment dismissing its promissory estoppel claim against Dusterhoft Oil, Inc., and Loren Dusterhoft (“Dusterhoft”). We conclude UHD failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on a required element of its promissory estoppel claim, and we affirm the summary judgment.

I

[¶ 2] UHD is a limited liability company, which owns and operates the Hilton Garden Inn in Grand Forks. Dusterhoft owns an Amoco gas station located across the street from the Hilton Garden Inn.

[¶ 3] In '2001, UHD began planning the construction of the Hilton Garden Inn, after entering into a ground lease with the State of North Dakota to construct the hotel on the western edge of the University of North Dakota campus. The Amoco station’s sewer line connected to a force main sewer line on property owned by the University of North Dakota, and under the building site for UHD’s Hilton Garden Inn. Dusterhoft had a ten-year easement from the university for the sewer line, which ended November 6, 2001. The university and the City of Grand Forks required UHD to move the sewer lines before it could acquire a building permit. In 2001, UHD’s managing partner and Dust-erhoft discussed the sewer line relocation, but the parties did not reach an agreement on who would pay the sewer line relocation expenses.

[¶ 4] In April 2002, construction on the hotel began and the sewer lines were moved. During the construction of the hotel, Dusterhoft enjoyed uninterrupted use of the sewer line. UHD paid all costs and expenses incurred in relocating Dust-erhoft’s portion of the sewer line. After construction was complete, an engineering firm UHD hired calculated Dusterhoft owed UHD $43,441.28 for the benefit Dusterhoft received from the relocation of his portion of the sewer line.

[¶ 5] In March 2008, the university began negotiations with Dusterhoft for a new easement. These negotiations included discussion of how much Dusterhoft should pay for the benefits he received from relocating his portion of the sewer line. The university requested Dusterhoft pay $43,441.28 for the benefit he received from the sewer line relocation, and upon receipt of this amount the university would pay the amount over to UHD as reimbursement for the expenses UHD incurred in relocating the sewer line. Dusterhoft rejected the university’s offer, and offered to pay $4,500 after getting an independent estimate for the cost of connecting to the sewer line. The university rejected Dust-erhoft’s counteroffer. The university and Dusterhoft failed to reach an agreement, and Dusterhoft was not granted a new easement.

[¶ 6] UHD sued Dusterhoft for $50,000 for the costs and expenses UHD incurred in relocating Dusterhoft’s portion of the sewer line, alleging claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and equitable estoppel. UHD claimed the university, Dusterhoft, and UHD agreed the university would require, as a condition of Duster-hoft’s new easement, that Dusterhoft pay for the benefit he received from the relocation of his portion of the sewer line. The district court granted Dusterhoft’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of UHD’s claims.

[¶ 7] The district court had jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06. The appeal was timely under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, §§ 2, 6, and N.D.C.C. § 28-27-01.

II

[¶ 8] “Summary judgment is a procedural device for promptly and expeditiously disposing of an action without a trial if either party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law and if no dispute exists as to either the material facts or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or resolving the factual disputes will not alter the result.” Anderson v. Meyer Broadcasting Co., 2001 ND 125, ¶ 14, 630 N.W.2d 46. The evidence presented on a motion for summary judgment is viewed “ ‘in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and that party will be given the benefit of all favorable inferences which can reasonably be drawn from the evidence.’ ” Dalan v. Paracelsus Healthcare Corp., 2002 ND 46, ¶ 7, 640 N.W.2d 726 (quoting Ellingson v. Knudson, 498 N.W.2d 814, 817 (N.D.1993)).

[¶ 9] “Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment is a question of law subject to de novo review.” Rogstad v. Dakota Gasification Co., 2001 ND 54, ¶ 10, 623 N.W.2d 382.

On appeal this Court decides if the information available to the trial court precluded the existence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitled the moving party to summary judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is appropriate against parties who fail to establish the existence of a factual dispute on an essential element of a claim on which they will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Hopfauf v. Hieb, 2006 ND 72, ¶ 6, 712 N.W.2d 333 (quoting Heart River Partners v. Goetzfried, 2005 ND 149, ¶ 8, 703 N.W.2d 330).

Ill

[¶ 10] UHD argues the district court improperly granted Dusterhoft’s motion for summary judgment on the promissory estoppel claim because there were genuine issues of material fact.

[¶ 11] Before the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be invoked, four elements must be established: “1) a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect will cause the promisee to change his position; 2) a substantial change of the promisee’s position through action, or forbearance; 3) justifiable reliance on the promise; and 4) injustice which can only be avoided by enforcing the promise.” Russell v. Bank of Kirkwood Plaza, 386 N.W.2d 892, 896 (N.D.1986). The promise must “be clear, definite, and unambiguous as to essential terms before the doctrine of promissory estoppel may be invoked to enforce an agreement or to award damages for the breach thereof.” Lohse v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 389 N.W.2d 352, 357 (N.D.1986). In the context of a promissory estoppel claim, this Court’s decision in Lohse specifically recognized “a reluctance to enforce incomplete agreements based upon preliminary negotiations and discussions or upon an agreement to negotiate the remaining terms of a contract in the future.” Id. at 357.

[¶ 12] The district court granted summary judgment on UHD’s promissory es-toppel claim because UHD failed to establish a factual dispute on the existence of a promise. The court concluded UHD failed to present any evidence demonstrating Dusterhoft had agreed to pay UHD for the benefit it received from the relocation of the sewer line. The court also concluded UHD’s promissory estoppel claim failed because it was based on an alleged promise between Dusterhoft and the university, to which UHD was only a third party beneficiary, and North Dakota law does not recognize the ability of a third party to enforce a promise.

A

[¶ 13] UHD argues it submitted sufficient evidence to raise a factual dispute on the existence of a promise by Dusterhoft to pay UHD for the benefit he received from the relocation of the sewer line. UHD claims there were numerous communications between Dusterhoft and UHD’s representatives, and it cites letters from its former attorney and from the university’s representatives to Dusterhoft as evidence.

[¶ 14] A promissory estoppel claim requires a promise with definite, clear, and unambiguous terms. Lohse, 389 N.W.2d at 357. Unsupported conclusory allegations are insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Dalan, 2002 ND 46, ¶ 7, 640 N.W.2d 726. The party resisting a summary judgment motion must present sufficient evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find for that party. Becklet v. Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist., 2006 ND 58, ¶ 7, 711 N.W.2d 172.

[¶ 15] UHD failed to establish the existence of a factual dispute about whether there was a definite, clear, and unambiguous promise by Dusterhoft to pay UHD for the benefit he received from the relocation of the sewer line. The claimed promise was not reduced to writing, and there is no written documentation of a definite, clear, and unambiguous promise. The evidence UHD presented to the district court establishes only preliminary negotiations between the university and Dusterhoft on the new easement. See Lohse, 389 N.W.2d at 357. UHD cites a May 22, 2002, letter from Daniel L. Gaustad, UHD’s former counsel, to the university’s general counsel confirming Gaustad’s understanding of the agreement between the university and Dusterhoft. The letter states, “I have asked Tom Arnot to provide me the amount of such costs and expenses and will forward the same to you for incorporation in the agreement between UND and the Amoco Station.” Gaustad’s letter fails to provide any evidence of a promise between UHD and Dusterhoft; rather, the letter shows UHD was aware that any agreement by Dusterhoft to pay for the benefit he received from the relocation of the sewer line would be between the university and Dusterhoft. UHD also claims letters from the university to Dusterhoft contain evidence of the promise between UHD and Dusterhoft. These letters, however, contain evidence only of negotiations between the university and Dusterhoft, and are insufficient to raise a factual dispute about the existence of a promise between UHD and Dusterhoft.

[¶ 16] We conclude UHD failed to provide the district court with evidence raising a factual dispute about whether Dusterhoft made a definite, clear, and unambiguous promise to UHD to pay for the benefit he received from the relocation of the sewer line, and UHD’s conclu-sory allegations are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.

B

[¶ 17] UHD argues that even if Dusterhoft did not directly promise UHD, there is evidence of a promise by Duster-hoft to pay the university for the benefit he received from the sewer line relocation, and upon receipt the university would pay this amount to UHD. UHD argues it can enforce this promise as a third-party beneficiary. UHD urges this Court to adopt the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981), and make a third party’s reliance on a promise between two other parties an available cause of action in North Dakota.

[¶ 18] This Court has not addressed the issue of whether a third party may enforce a promise under the promissory estoppel doctrine, and we conclude it is unnecessary to do so in this case because there is no evidence of a specific promise between Dusterhoft and the university regarding the payment of expenses for relocation of the sewer line. The amount Dusterhoft would have promised to pay for the relocation of the sewer line is an essential term of the agreement which must be clear and unambiguous before the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be invoked. See Lohse, 389 N.W.2d at 357.

[¶ 19] The university and Dusterhoft began negotiating the terms of a new easement, which included negotiating for payment for relocation of the sewer line, but UHD failed to provide the district court with evidence that Dusterhoft definitely, clearly, and unambiguously promised to pay a portion of the relocation expenses for the benefit he received. The letters UHD cites as evidence of a promise show preliminary negotiations between the university and Dusterhoft on the terms of the new easement. That evidence shows the university conditioned Dusterhoft’s new easement on payment of the cost of the sewer line relocation as calculated by the engineering firm UHD hired. Dusterhoft rejected that offer and submitted a counteroffer after getting an independent estimate. The university rejected Duster-hoft’s counteroffer.

[¶ 20] We conclude the evidence UHD presented establishes the university and Dusterhoft began negotiations for a new easement, but fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact about the existence of a promise by Dusterhoft, which is an essential element of UHD’s promissory estoppel claim. We therefore conclude summary judgment was appropriate on UHD’s promissory estoppel claim.

TV

[¶ 21] Dusterhoft claims UHD’s appeal is frivolous and completely devoid of merit and asks this Court to award him attorney’s fees for the appeal.

[¶ 22] Under N.D.R.App.P. 38, “If the court determines that an appeal is frivolous, or that any party has been dilatory in prosecuting the appeal, it may award just damages and single or double costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees.” “An appeal is frivolous if it is flagrantly groundless, devoid of merit, or demonstrates persistence in the course of litigation which evidences bad faith.” Healy v. Healy, 397 N.W.2d 71, 76 (N.D.1986).

[¶ 23] We conclude UHD’s appeal is not frivolous or taken in bad faith, and we deny Dusterhoft’s request for attorney’s fees.

V

[¶ 24] We affirm the summary judgment.

[¶ 25] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, C.J., DANIEL J. CROTHERS, MARY MUEHLEN MARING, and CAROL RONNING KAPSNER, JJ., concur.


author: CADY, Justice.

text:
    In re the MARRIAGE OF Donna Lee SULLINS and Raymond W. Sullins Upon the Petition of Donna Lee Sullins, Appellee, And Concerning Raymond W. Sullins, Appellant.
    No. 04-0950.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    May 12, 2006.
    Rehearing Denied June 13, 2006.

      Raymond W. Sullins, West Des Moines, pro se.
    Andrew B. Howie of Hudson, Mallaney & Shindler, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellee.
   CADY, Justice.

Ray Sullins seeks further review of a decision by the court of appeals affirming the property-distribution and attorney-fee provisions of a district court decree for dissolution of marriage. He argues: (1) the division of a retirement account was inequitable, (2) the court did not properly consider his premarital retirement savings, (3) the division of the parties’ other assets and liabilities was inequitable, (4) he should not have been ordered to pay attorney fees, and (5) the court should have ordered a postsecondary education subsidy for the parties’ daughter. We vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the decree of the district court as modified.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Ray and Donna Sullins were married on November 25, 1978. Donna was a teacher in the West Des Moines school district at the time, and Ray worked as a lawyer in the office of the Iowa Attorney General. Donna had a bachelor’s degree in music education. Ray owned a house, which he contributed to the marriage. Donna contributed a car and various household items to the marriage. She had also participated in the Iowa Public Employees Retirement System (IPERS) for eight years prior to the marriage, and had acquired a tax-sheltered annuity (TSA). Ray had a variety of personal property as well as an IPERS account from his employment with the attorney general. A year into the marriage, Ray withdrew his IPERS funds and used them as a down payment on a new home. Around the same time, Ray left the attorney general’s office and began to work as a lobbyist.

Donna and Ray had three children: Deborah, Stephen, and Matthew. Deborah was born in 1981, Stephen was born in 1984, and Matthew was born in 1986. Donna continued to work during this time on a part-time basis, and later returned as a fulltime teacher. Ray transitioned from lobbying into the private practice of law. Donna also took night and weekend classes, which enabled her to obtain her masters degree in 2000.

After that time, the marriage began to deteriorate. Sadly, Donna and Ray were confronted with more than their fair share of agony. Ray had a series of problems in his professional career that culminated in the revocation of his license to practice law in Iowa in 2002. That same year, Donna and Ray faced a parent’s worst nightmare when Stephen, their oldest son, tragically died. They also did not escape financial difficulties. Their home was put up for tax sale on two occasions.

Donna filed for divorce in February 2003. At the time of the trial in January 2004, Donna was fifty-six, and Ray was fifty-eight. Their daughter, Deborah, was twenty-two and was a fulltime student at Northwestern College in St. Paul, Minnesota. She was in her final year of school. Matthew was eighteen and was a senior at Waukee High School. Donna was teaching fulltime, making approximately $54,000 per year. Ray was working in sales, making approximately $81,000 per year.

The district court entered its decree in April 2004. The court found Donna’s annuity, which she funded entirely before the marriage, and her eight years of premarital IPERS contributions were not “part of the marital assets” and awarded both to her. The annuity was valued at $4872. The court valued the IPERS account at $57,081.47. The court awarded $35,247.81 of it to Donna, and $21,833.66 of it to Ray. Including the premarital retirement savings, which the court treated as Donna’s separate property, the court awarded Donna a total of $275,198.31 in assets (consisting mainly of the house and retirement accounts) and awarded Ray $57,236.16 in assets. The court ordered Donna to be responsible for $87,777.50 of the marital debt, and Ray to be responsible for $17,454.50 of the debt (in addition to a $750,000 malpractice judgment against him). To equalize the disparate equity awarded to Donna, the court ordered her to pay Ray $61,676.53. The court also ordered Ray to pay $7500 of Donna’s attorney fees.

Ray appealed, and we transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the decree in its entirety. Ray sought, and we granted, further review.

II. Standard of Review

We review dissolution cases de novo. In re Marriage of Schriner, 695 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Iowa 2005) (citing In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252, 253 (Iowa 1996); Iowa R.App. P. 6.4). “Although we decide the issues raised on appeal anew, we give weight to the trial court’s factual findings, especially with respect to the credibility of the witnesses.” In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Iowa 2003). We review the district court’s award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d at 258).

III. Premarital Property

Iowa is an equitable distribution state. In re Marriage of Schriner, 695 N.W.2d at 496. This “means that courts divide the property of the parties at the time of divorce, except any property excluded from the divisible estate as separate property, in an equitable manner in light of the particular circumstances of the parties.” Id. (citing In re Marriage of McNerney, 417 N.W.2d 205, 207 (Iowa1987)). All property of the marriage that exists at the time of the divorce, other than gifts and inheritances to one spouse, is divisible property. Id. (citing Iowa Code § 598.21(1) (2003)). Importantly, “the property included in the divisible estate includes not only property acquired during the marriage by one or both of the parties, but property owned prior to the marriage by a party.” Id. (citing In re Marriage of Brainard, 523 N.W.2d 611, 616 (Iowa Ct.App.1994)).

Property brought into the marriage by a party is merely a factor to consider by the court, together with all other factors, in exercising its role as an architect of an equitable distribution of property at the end of the marriage.

Id. (citing Iowa Code § 598.21(1)(5)).

In this case, the district court set aside Donna’s annuity as a “premarital asset[ ]” and found that it “should not be considered part of the marital assets.” This finding was contrary to our distribution scheme in Iowa. The property is part of the divisible estate, just as is property acquired during the marriage. Id. The trial court may place different degrees of weight on the premarital status of property, but it may not separate the asset from the divisible estate and automatically award it to the spouse that owned the property prior to the marriage.

For the same reason, we reject Ray’s argument that he should be entitled to a “credit” for the property and retirement savings he owned before the marriage and integrated into the marital coffers. While this is a factor to consider in achieving an overall equitable distribution, see Iowa Code § 598.21(1)(5), it is one factor among many, see id. (a)-(m). It does not automatically require Donna’s share of the property to be reduced as a reimbursement for Ray’s premarital contributions. We turn now to specifically consider the district court’s treatment of Donna’s IPERS pension.

IV.IPERS

Pensions are divisible marital property. See In re Marriage of Branstet- ter, 508 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Iowa 1993) (“Pensions in general are held to be marital assets, subject to division in dissolution cases, just as any other property.” (Citations omitted.)); see also Iowa Code § 598.21(1)© (stating vested and unvested pensions are circumstances to be considered in equitably dividing property). There are two accepted methods of dividing pension benefits: the present-value method and the percentage method. In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d at 255; 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation §§ 585-86, at 747-50 (1998). Additionally, there are two main types of pension plans: defined-benefit plans and defined-contribution plans. In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d at 254.

Although both methods of dividing pension benefits can be used with both types of pension plans, it is normally desirable to divide a defined-benefit plan by using the percentage method. The present-value method requires the present value of the benefits to be determined before allocating a portion of the benefits to the pensioner’s spouse. In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d at 255 (citing In re Marriage of Branstetter, 508 N.W.2d at 642). Present value derived under this method “represents the ‘restatement in “current dollars” of a payment or series of payments to a current lump sum equivalent.’” Dylan A. Wilde, Note, Obtaining an Equitable Distribution of Retirement Plans in a Divorce Proceeding, 49 S.D.L.Rev. 141, 150 (2003) [hereinafter Wilde] (quoting Gary A. Schulman & David I. Kelly, Learning from the Pension Experts Dividing Pensions in Divorce (1996)). Yet, the determination of present value of a defined-benefit plan is a complicated process that requires the use of actuarial science. In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d at 255 (citing In re Marriage of Mott, 444 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Iowa Ct.App.1989)); see also Thompson v. Thompson, 183 Conn. 96, 438 A.2d 839, 841 (1981) (“The present value of a pension benefit may be arrived at by using generally [sic] actuarial principles to discount for mortality, interest and the probability of the employee remaining with the employer until retirement age.”); see 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 586, at 748 (stating the present-value method “requires discounting to present value and further discounting to account for the probability of death before qualification for benefits and for vesting as well as consideration of the employee’s life expectancy as a retiree”).

The complicated nature of determining the present value of a defined-benefit plan and dividing the benefits, as well as the economic difficulty for a pensioner to pay a lump-sum amount representing the present value of a defined-benefit plan, normally makes the second method of division and distribution of pensions much more attractive for defined-benefit plans. Under the second method to divide and distribute a pension plan, the percentage method, the court awards a spouse a percentage of the pension payable in the future at the time the benefits mature.

IPERS is, of course, a defined-benefit plan. See Iowa Code § 97B.49A(3) (“For active or inactive vested members retiring on or after July 1, 1994, with four or more complete years of service, a monthly benefit shall be computed which is equal to one-twelfth of an amount equal to the applicable percentage of the three-year average covered wages multiplied by a fraction of years of service.”); In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d at 254 (“[I]n a defined benefit plan the future benefit is specified in advance by a formula.”). The plan uses a “percentage of earnings per year of service formula, which provides a benefit that is related to the employee’s earnings and length of service.” In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d at 254-55 (citing Steven R. Brown, An Interdisciplinary Analysis of the Division of Pension Benefits in Divorce and Post-judgment Partition Actions: Cures for the Inequities in Berry v. Berry, 39 Baylor L.Rev. 1131, 1146 (1987)). Donna is a vested member. See Iowa Code § 97B.1A(25)(a)(4) (stating a member is vested if he or she “[h]as completed at least four years of service”).

In this case, the district court divided the IPERS pension based on the current value of Donna’s personal contributions to the plan over the years of the marriage at the time of the divorce. See id. § 97B.11 (“Each employer shall deduct from the wages of each member of the system a contribution in the amount of three and seven-tenths percent of the covered wages paid by the employer, until the member’s termination from employment. The contributions of the employer shall be in the amount of five and seventy-five hundredths percent of the covered wages of the member.”). This value was not based on actuarial evidence. Instead, this value was obtained from information made available to Donna showing the amount of her personal contributions over the years and the interest earned on her personal contributions. However, the present value of her IPERS plan is more than the present value of her contributions. See In re Marriage of Scheppele, 524 N.W.2d 678, 679 (Iowa Ct.App.1994) (“We note that if we do not include Marcia’s employer’s contributions, the present value of Marcia’s contributions and accrued interest in her IPERS plan is $26,000. However, the value of Marcia’s IPERS pension is not limited to her vested contributions.”); In re Marriage of Johnston, 492 N.W.2d 206, 208 (Iowa Ct.App.1992) (“The exact value of Karin’s IPERS pension is not ascertainable. We, like the district court, will not assume the value is limited to Karin’s vested contributions. However, we disagree with Karin’s argument that a remand to take actuarial testimony to value the pension is necessary.”). In fact, the amount of Donna’s IPERS contributions has no relation to the present value of her future benefits because the contributions are not used to calculate benefits. Instead, the benefits are ultimately tied to a percentage of the employee’s average wages. See Iowa Code § 97B.49A(3) (“For active or inactive vested members retiring on or after July 1, 1994, with four or more com-píete years of service, a monthly benefit shall be computed which is equal to one-twelfth of an amount equal to the applicable percentage of the three-year average covered wages multiplied by a fraction of years of service.”)- Thus, the district court’s valuation and distribution of Donna’s IPERS plan fell far short of our accepted methods and was inequitable. Without actuarial evidence, the district court could not have divided the retirement plan based on the present value of Donna’s future benefits. See In re Marriage of Johnston, 492 N.W.2d at 208 (“The exact value of Karin’s IPERS pension is not ascertainable. We, like the district court, will not assume the value is limited to Karin’s vested contributions.”). On our de novo review, we conclude that the better way to divide and distribute the IPERS account is to use the percentage method normally applicable to cases involving IPERS. See In re Marriage of Scheppele, 524 N.W.2d at 680 (modifying decree, where present value of IPERS account was not ascertainable on the record, to order a QDRO using the percentage method to divide the future benefits when received).

Under the percentage method, the non-pensioner spouse is awarded a percentage (frequently fifty percent) of a fraction of the pensioner’s benefits (based on the duration of the marriage), by a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO), which is paid if and when the benefits mature. In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d at 255 (citing In re Marriage of Branstetter, 508 N.W.2d at 642). The fraction represents the portion of the pension attributable to the parties’ joint marital efforts. Id. The numerator in the fraction is the number of years the pensioner accrued benefits under the plan during the marriage, and the denominator is the total number of years of benefit accrual. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Mott, 444 N.W.2d at 511); accord Barker Brandt, 35 Fam. L.Q. at 472-73.

Applying this method, we modify the decree to provide for a QDRO to divide Donna’s monthly IPERS benefits when received under the following formula:

# of quarters Donna contributed to IPERS while married Ray’s Share = 50% x # of quarters Donna contributed to IPERS before retirement x Monthly Benefits

This modification will require further adjustment of the district court’s property distribution. We will address the necessary adjustment after considering the distribution of the other specific items with which Ray takes issue.

Y. Other Property

A. Trust Account

First, Ray complains the distribution scheme by the district court gave him a credit of $7687 for funds in a trust account that did not belong to him. Ray testified that the money represented client funds he obtained as a lawyer that have never been withdrawn from the trust account. Client funds in a trust account are property of the client, not the lawyer. See Iowa Sup.Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Apland, 577 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Iowa 1998). Only “property of the parties” is divisible in a dissolution. Iowa Code § 598.21(1). Thus, the district court erred in considering the trust account funds in its property distribution.

B. 2000 Saturn

Ray also contends the district court erred in considering the Saturn vehicle to be Ray’s property and giving him a credit of $6250 (minus a $3366 loan) representing the value of the vehicle. We agree. It was undisputed that Ray purchased the car for Deborah. It is owned by Deborah and titled in her name. Consequently, it should have been excluded from the divisible estate. See id. (stating “the court shall divide the property of the parties” (emphasis added)).

C. 1992 Buick

Ray argues the district court overvalued the 1992 Buick Park Avenue awarded to him. The district court valued it at $3000. Ray claims it was worth only about $2000. Donna valued it at $4000. There was no other evidence offered on the value of the ear, and we consequently defer to the judgment of the district court. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 773 (“Although we decide the issues raised on appeal anew, we give weight to the trial court’s factual findings, especially with respect to the credibility of the witnesses.”); In re Bare’s Marriage, 203 N.W.2d 551, 554 (Iowa 1973) (stating we will not disturb the district court’s valuation of assets if it was “within the permissible range of the evidence”).

D. Rowat Cut Stone Debt

We have said “that the allocation of marital debts inheres in the property division.” In re Marriage of Johnson, 299 N.W.2d 466, 467 (Iowa 1980). In this case, the district court held Ray responsible for the entire $3042 debt to Rowat Cut Stone. Ray argues the loan was used to pay family expenses and therefore should be divided between him and Donna. Even though a debt may have been incurred by a party for family expenses, it is not inequitable to order that party to be responsible for the entire amount of the debt as long as the overall property distribution is equitable. Debts of the parties normally become debts of the marriage, for which either party may be required to assume the responsibility to pay. 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 571, at 730. However, we recognize that Donna will be responsible for most of the marital debts, and that Ray’s earning capacity is greater than Donna’s. See Iowa Code § 598.21(1)00, (i), (&). These factors, as well as all other factors, including the allocation of all the debt between the parties, are considered in determining the equitable division of all property and debts.

E. Debt to Ray’s Brothers

Ray claims he borrowed money from his father before his father died, and that he was required to pay his brothers $18,000 to satisfy this debt. He claims the debt should have been divided between the parties. It was undisputed that Ray’s father loaned Ray and Donna money. The evidence included a letter from Ray’s father, dated June 27, 1988, indicating Ray and Donna owed him $26,100 at 9% interest. However, Donna testified she thought the debt had been paid, and she was unaware of Ray’s obligation to his brothers. The district court found the evidence did not support Ray’s claim, and we decline to disturb the district court’s credibility judgment. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 773 (“Although we decide the issues raised on appeal anew, we give weight to the trial court’s factual findings, especially with respect to the credibility of the witnesses.”).

F. Ray’s Income Tax Liability

Ray asserts Donna should be responsible for some of his income tax liability for 2003 and 2004. Donna filed separate tax returns in 2003 and 2004. Ray owed $14,000 in income taxes for these years because he failed to pay his quarterly self-employment taxes.

We conclude it would be inequitable for Donna to share in the responsibility for Ray’s tax obligation under the circumstances. Ray’s tax problems are self-imposed and largely the result of imprudent business practices adopted to minimize the amount of funds available to satisfy a personal judgment against him. While Ray neglected his tax obligations, Donna paid her tax obligations from her wages. Cf. Duckett v. Duckett, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 1164, 539 N.E.2d 556, 557 (1989) (holding “the judge could reasonably decide to leave each marital party to his or her debts in view of the finding that the husband had been profligate in incurring personal and business debts,” while the wife had been “fiscally responsible”); Carter v. Carter, 261 Neb. 881, 626 N.W.2d 576, 580 (2001) (“[A]n innocent spouse who has filed separate tax returns, and paid his or her taxes in a timely fashion, should not be forced to share in any statutory penalties for the late filings of a dilatory spouse.” (citing Meints v. Meints, 258 Neb. 1017, 608 N.W.2d 564 (2000)). The tax debt assigned to Ray, which ultimately inheres in the division of all the property, is only part of the overall debt distribution, and the particular circumstances of the tax obligation become a factor that benefits Donna in ultimately determining an equitable distribution of all the property.

G. Modified Property Distribution

The foregoing conclusions regarding the district court’s property distribution require us to modify the overall property distribution. We direct that Donna’s IPERS be divided under the percentage method using a qualified domestic relations order. We also remove the trust account funds and Deborah’s Saturn vehicle from the distribution scheme. In order to make the property division equitable, we find Donna should be responsible for the entire amount of the joint debt for the burial plots and the entire amount of the debt to the funeral home. In addition, taking into account that Donna has already paid Ray an equalizing payment of $61,673.54, we modify the district court’s division of the Pacific Mutual TSA to award Donna $24,391.03 and to award Ray $21,154.97. Ray shall remain solely responsible for his $750,000 malpractice judgment, as agreed by the parties.

VI. Postsecondary Education Subsidy

Under section 598.21(5A), a “court may order a postsecondary education subsidy if good cause is shown.” Iowa Code § 598.21(5A). Ray argues the district court erred by not ordering a postsecond-ary education subsidy for Deborah.

An award of a postsecondary education subsidy first requires good cause. Id. In determining good cause, the court considers:

the age of the child, the ability of the child relative to postsecondary education, the child’s financial resources, whether the child is self-sustaining, and the financial condition of each parent.

Id. § 598.21(5A)(a.). Thus, if these factors fail to support good cause, no subsidy is necessary. For example, the financial resources of the child, along with other statutory factors, could justify a finding that a subsidy is not needed.

If good cause is shown for a subsidy, the court must then determine the amount. To do this, the cost of the college education is first determined, based on the educational costs of attending an in-state public institution. Id. § 598.21(5A)(a)(l). The amount the child can reasonably expect to contribute, including contributions in the form of student loans, is subtracted from the cost figure. Id. § 598.21(5A)(a)(2). The amount that remains is apportioned to the parents, with a ceiling for each parent equal to one-third of the cost of attending an in-state public institution. Id. § 598.21(5A)(a)(3).

The district court determined that no college subsidy could be ordered because Deborah was twenty-two years old. Although the age of the child is a relevant factor in considering good cause for a subsidy, a subsidy is defined under the statute to include children “between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two.” Id. § 598.1(8). In this case, Deborah was in her senior year in college at the time of the trial in January 2004, and was scheduled to graduate in the near future. She would not turn twenty-three until September 2004. Thus, she satisfied the age requirements for a subsidy. See In re Marriage of Neff, 675 N.W.2d 573, 581 (Iowa 2004) (interpreting the statute to mean children under the age of twenty-three are eligible for a subsidy). Moreover, she had an outstanding tuition bill in the amount of $3109 at the time of trial. It is this amount that Ray claims should be the basis of a subsidy allocated between the parties.

The statutory subsidy provisions exist to help ensure that divorce between parents will not become a financial impediment to a child’s college education. See generally Johnson v. Louis, 654 N.W.2d 886, 891 (Iowa 2002) (“The educational benefit is a quid pro quo for the loss of stability resulting from divorce.”); In re Marriage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa 1980) (“[E]ven well-intentioned parents, when deprived of the custody of their children, sometimes react by refusing to support them as they would if the family unit had been preserved.” (Citation omitted.)). The model used under the statute to accomplish this goal is based solely on the costs of a college education at an instate public institution, and the statute then attempts to fairly allocate the costs among the child and the parents. See Iowa Code § 598.21(5A)(u)(l)-(3). Yet, this same cost component is also used to limit the amount of money parents can be ordered to contribute by the court. Id. § 598.21(5A)(a)(3). The subsidy, then, can fall short of providing a complete solution for all circumstances, and it is far from a perfect answer to the financial burden of attending college for most students of divorced parents.

This imperfection in the statute is especially evident for students of divorced parents who desire to attend a private in-state college or an out-of-state institution, where the costs will normally be significantly higher, or for students, like Deborah, who were already attending an out-of-state institution at the time of the divorce. The statutory subsidy may not fully assist these students because the court is not authorized to make a parent responsible to pay more than one third of the cost of an in-state public institution regardless of the cost of the institution attended. Thus, the subsidy approach recognizes that the law cannot always provide for a perfect solution to all problems, especially problems arising from family matters. At the same time, this law necessarily recognizes that former spouses remain parents of the children following divorce, and are free to fill in the inevitable gaps properly left to them by the absence of obligations imposed by the law, motivated by matters totally detached from the divorce and intimately woven into the very fabric and meaning of parenting. Cf. In re Marriage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d at 202 (recognizing that “most parents who remain married to each other support their children through college years” even though they have no legal obligation to do so). The law only imposes a minimum standard to guide conduct, and it does not foreclose a level of conduct in excess of the legal requirement.

In this case, the evidence is clear that Deborah received loans and federal work-study money to attend an out-of-state college in excess of the total costs of attending a public in-state college. Clearly, the subsidy statute does not require a parent to contribute to the college education costs when the child’s available contribution exceeds the cost of attending an in-state public institution. Moreover, there is no evidence that Deborah would not have been able to contribute similar amounts to her own college education if she had attended an in-state college. Thus, because Deborah’s contributions exceeded the cost of a public college education in Iowa, Ray and Donna cannot be made legally responsible under the statute to subsidize any additional costs of an out-of-state college education. Instead, the issue is a matter left to the parents and child.

VII. Attorney Fees

The district court ordered Ray to pay $7500 of Donna’s trial attorney fees. We review this award for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 773. “Whether attorney fees should be awarded depends on the respective abilities of the parties to pay.” In re Marriage of Guyer, 522 N.W.2d 818, 822 (Iowa 1994). Because Ray was making more money than Donna at the time of trial and did not have to pay any attorney fees of his own, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion.

The court of appeals ordered Ray to pay $1000 of Donna’s appellate attorney fees.

Appellate attorney fees are not a matter of right, but rather rest in this court’s discretion. Factors to be considered in determining whether to award attorney fees include: “the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.”

In re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 270 (Iowa 2005) (quoting In re Marriage of Geil, 509 N.W.2d 738, 743 (Iowa 1993)). We disagree with the court of appeals’ decision to award Donna appellate attorney fees. Most of Ray’s arguments on appeal were meritorious. Moreover, the errors by the district court resulted from its near-wholesale adoption of Donna’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thus, we will not order Ray to pay Donna’s attorney fees for an appeal largely based on claims by Donna that were not only unsupported by principles of equity, but were clearly detached from the governing statutory provisions. Furthermore, the parties have the ability to pay their own attorney fees.

VIII. Conclusion

This district court decree is affirmed, as modified in the following respects:

1. Ray is awarded $21,154.97 of Donna’s Pacific Mutual TSA. The balance, $24,391.03, is awarded to Donna.

2. Donna shall be responsible for the full $9185 debt for the burial plots.

3. Donna shall be responsible for the full $3500 debt to Raddatz Funeral Home.

4. A QDRO shall be entered directing IPERS to pay benefits to Ray as a marital property settlement under the following formula: 50% of the gross monthly or lump-sum benefit payable at the date of distribution to Donna, multiplied by the “service factor.” The numerator of the service factor is the number of quarters covered during the marriage period of November 25, 1978 through April 30, 2004, and the denominator is Donna’s total quarters of service covered by IPERS and used in calculating Donna’s benefit.

We remand the case for the district court to enter the QDRO consistent with this opinion.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED.

      . The court set aside eight thirty-fourths (23.5%) of the IPERS account ($13,414.14) for Donna as premarital property. Eight was the number of Donna’s premarital contribution years, and thirty-four was the number of years she had contributed up to the divorce. The court then divided the remainder of the IPERS account ($43,667.33) equally between Donna and Ray, awarding each $21,833.67.

      . When the plan at issue is a defined-contribution plan, like a 401(k), the determination of the present value of the benefits and the distribution is less complicated. In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d at 256 n. 1.
      “The value of such plans is the amount of accumulated contributions plus interest as of the valuation date. It follows that the value of the [marital] interest in defined contribution plans is the amount of contributions made during [the marriage] plus accumulated interest on these contributions.”

        Id. (quoting Phoebe Carter & John Myers, Division and Distribution of the Community Interest in Defined Benefit Pensions: Schweitzer Reconsidered, 18 N.M. L.Rev. 95, 98 (1988)); see also Elizabeth Barker Brandt, Valuation, Allocation, and Distribution of Retirement Plans at Divorce: Where Are We?, 35 Fam. L.Q. 469, 479 (2001) [hereinafter Barker Brandt] (stating a defined-contribution plan “is worth the combined value of the contributions to it and the growth and earnings on those contributions”); Wilde, 49 S.D. L.Rev. at 152 ("When the retirement plan is a defined contribution plan that is vested, there is no need to discount the contributions made by the employee to obtain the present value of the retirement plan. Instead, the amount of the employee and/or employer contributions and any accumulated earnings in the employee’s individual account reflects the actual present value.”). It appears the district court treated Donna’s IPERS as a defined-contribution plan.

      . IPERS shall use the number of quarters in each year covered during the marriage period of November 25, 1978 through April 30, 2004.

      . The modified property division is as follows:
      Marital Property Donna Ray
      Homestead $190,000
      AIG account $4872
      1998 Towncar $9000
      1994 GrandAm (Matthew) $2000
      1992 Buick Park Avenue $3000
      Truck (Ray’s Business) $1500
      Bankers Trust Checking (W) $84
      Bankers Trust Savings (W) $117
      Community Choice Account (W) $371
      Financial Plus Account (J) $44
      Wells Fargo Account (Deborah)
      Wells Fargo Checking (J) $10
      Wells Fargo Checking (W) $306

        Wells Fargo Savings (Matthew) $5
      Polk County Schools Credit Union $1200
      Furniture, Fixtures, Appliances, Personal Property $7075 $5000
      Pacific Mutual TSA $24,391.03 $21,154.97
      Pacific Mutual Life TSA $1,138.50 $1,138.50
      Mass Mutual $969
      Equalizing payment ($61,673.53) $61,673.53
      Total $179,895 $93,521
      Donna’s Share Ray’s Share
      Less Debts of Marital Debt of Marital Debt
      Burial Plots $9185
      Capital One Card $3743
      Chase Card (Ray's Business) $2530
      Citi Card (Deborah) $2871
      Mortgage $58,859
      Lien on House $10,369
      Special Assessment $398
      MBNA (Ray’s Business) $2174
      Raddatz Funeral Home $3500
      Rowat Cut Stone $3042
      1998 Town Car $5195
      Total Debts $94,120 $7746
      Total Equity $85,775 $85,775


author: STREIT, Justice.

text:
    Wayne J. TETZLAFF, Barbara A. Tetzlaff and Briana A. Tetzlaff, Appellants, v. Timothy CAMP and Glenna Camp, Defendants, Al Pangborn and Rachael Pangborn, Appellees.
    No. 04-1499.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    June 2, 2006.

      Brenda L. Myers-Maas, West Des Moines, for appellants.
    Eldon L. McAfee of Beving, Swanson & Forrest, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees.
    Paul Swinton of Morain, Burlingame & Pugh, P.L.C., West Des Moines, and Christina L. Gruenhagen, West Des Moines, for amicus curiae.
   STREIT, Justice.

With ownership of property comes responsibility. The plaintiffs, Wayne, Barbara, and Briana Tetzlaff (Tetzlaffs), rural homeowners, appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of co-defendants Al and Rachael Pangborn (Pang-borns), owners of adjacent property, on their nuisance claim. Tetzlaffs contend the district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that Pangborns could not be found liable for the other co-defendants’, Tim and Glenna Camp (Camps), decision to spread manure on the Pangborn property. Because we find a landlord may be liable if he or she renews a lease with notice that the tenant’s prior use resulted in a nuisance, we reverse the decision of the district court.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

The three parties to this litigation are neighbors. Camps operate a three-hundred head hog finishing facility on land they own across the road from Tetzlaffs’ acreage. Pangborns live on an acreage to the south of Tetzlaffs. Approximately ten acres of farmland (hereinafter the “south field”) separates the Tetzlaff and Pang-born residences. In 1999, Pangborns bought approximately sixty-seven acres of farmland directly north of Tetzlaffs’ acreage (hereinafter the “north field”).

Camps hay the south field and plant row crops on the. north field. There is no written tenancy agreement between Pang-borns and Camps. Instead, there is a verbal, yet nearly unspoken “gentlemen’s agreement.” On a year-to-year basis, Camps farm the property and pay 50% of the cash proceeds from the harvested crops to Pangborns. Pangborns maintain grass paths around the north and south fields. They also drive their ATVs and snowmobiles over the grass paths, maintain deer stands in the north field, and hunt and allow others to hunt in the north field.

Camps routinely apply manure from their hog finishing facility on Pangborns’ north and south fields and, at Pangborns’ request, spread manure on Pangborns’ personal garden. The hog manure is surface spread 90 feet from the south side of Tetzlaffs’ home and 160 feet from the north side.

In October of 1999, a month before Pangborns purchased the north field, Tet-zlaffs complained to Pangborns about Camps’ manure spreading procedures on the south field. Despite these complaints, Pangborns purchased the north field and allowed Camp to spread manure there also. After Tetzlaffs’ numerous complaints fell on deaf ears, they filed an action in 2003 against both Pangborns and Camps alleging negligence, nuisance, and nuisance under Iowa Code chapter 557 (2003).

Pangborns filed a motion for summary judgment contending they were not liable because they merely had a farm lease with Camps, the party controlling the nuisance activity. Tetzlaffs resisted the motion by arguing there was no lease, and even if there was a lease, Pangborns were still liable for allowing Camps to spread manure on the land. The district court concluded the “essential factual issue” determining Pangborns’ liability was whether Pangborns substantially controlled or participated in the nuisance activity, “regardless of whether the case is analyzed through a landlord tenant-theory or independent contractor theory.” The court concluded Pangborns did not substantially control or participate in the nuisance activity and therefore granted Pangborns’ motion for summary judgment.

On interlocutory appeal, Tetzlaffs argue the district court erred in summarily dismissing Pangborns from the case.

II. Scope of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Keokuk Junction Ry. v. IES Indus., Inc., 618 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Iowa 2000). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. Every legitimate inference reasonably deduced from the evidence should be afforded the resisting party. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Milne, 424 N.W.2d 422, 423 (Iowa 1988). Our review of a summary judgment ruling is for correction of errors of law. Keokuk Junction Ry., 618 N.W.2d at 355.

This decision is limited to the question of whether the district court’s decision to grant Pangborns’ summary judgment motion was appropriate. Whether the manure spreading activities were or were not a nuisance is not an issue before this court.

III. Error Preservation

As discussed below, we conclude the district court committed error when it concluded “[sjubstantial control or participation is the essential factual issue that determines liability for the Pangborns in this dispute.” However, before we proceed we must first address Pangborns’ argument that Tetzlaffs failed to preserve a key issue for this appeal.

Pangborns contend the district court did not address whether a landlord can be liable for a nuisance caused by a tenant in possession. More importantly, Pangborns argue Tetzlaffs did not preserve this issue for our review because they never filed a 1.904 motion asking the court to enlarge its findings. See Meier v. Senecaut III, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”); Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.904(2). Because this argument was both raised and ruled upon by the district court, we find the issue was preserved for our review.

The motion for summary judgment focused on several issues. The dominant issue was whether a farm tenancy existed between Pangborns and Camps. Another issue was whether Pangborns were liable, even if there was a farm tenancy. Pang-borns argued that Camps, as farm tenants in possession, were responsible for the farm ground and therefore Pangborns owed no duty of care to Tetzlaffs. In their memorandum of authorities supporting the motion for summary judgment, Pangborns stated:

In order to prevail under a nuisance theory, [Tetzlaffs] must establish that Pangborns would be liable if they carried on the alleged nuisance causing activity themselves, and at the time of the leasing, that the Pangborns consented to the activity and knew that the activity would necessarily result in a nuisance. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 837.... The Pangborns could not have known or anticipated that an activity such as fertilizer application on agricultural property in a rural Iowa county would, at some point in the future, necessarily result in a nuisance to neighbors living on an adjacent acreage that, at the time of leasing, did not yet exist. The law does not require a lessor to exhibit this degree of foresight. Therefore, [Tetzlaffs’] claim of nuisance against defendant Pangborns is void as a matter of law and should be dismissed.

While Tetzlaffs themselves did not specifically cite Restatement section 837 in their resistance to the summary judgment motion, they clearly addressed the issue of Pangborns’ reliance on the Restatement in their memorandum of authorities:

Iowa Courts have also found owners of land who allow others to create or maintain nuisance conditions on the owner’s land liable for the nuisance. Percival v. Yousling, 120 Iowa 451, 94 N.W. 913 (1903) (owner of land who allowed others to dump manure and other refuse on land liable for nuisance).... The court must go one step farther and determine whether, even if there is a landlord-tenant relationship between [Pangborns and Camps], the Pangborns are liable for nuisance or negligence because of their involvement in creating and/or maintaining the nuisance complained of.

The court devoted the bulk of its decision to discussing whether Pangborns substantially controlled or participated in the nuisance activity. The court found Pang-borns were not liable “regardless of whether the case is analyzed through a landlord tenant-theory or independent contractor theory” because Pangborns did not substantially control or participate in the manure spreading. A landlord’s liability for the nuisance causing activities of his or her tenants was clearly argued to the court, and the court ruled upon this issue by concluding it was not an avenue for liability.

Tetzlaffs did not need to file a rule 1.904 motion to preserve this issue for appeal. "When a district court does not rule on an issue properly raised, a party must file a motion requesting a ruling in order to preserve error for appeal. Meier, 641 N.W.2d at 539; Benavides v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 539 N.W.2d 352, 356 (Iowa 1995). We require such a motion because it is “in the best interests of the public, and especially the litigants” to give the court an opportunity to address an issue it may have missed. Estate of Grossman v. McCreary, 373 N.W.2d 113, 114 (Iowa 1985). Also, an “overlooked issue, called to the trial court’s attention, might be resolved so as to avoid an appeal” or “a ruling on [the overlooked issue] might avert a second trial and possible appeal.” Id. In this case, the court summarily resolved the issue — Pangborns were not liable under a landlord/tenant theory. Tetzlaffs correctly concluded it was not necessary to belabor the point with a rule 1.904 motion asking the court to reconsider its decision on the issue.

IV. Merits

Property law regards a lease as equivalent to a sale of the premises for the term of the lease, making the tenant both owner and occupier during the lease. Harms v. City of Sibley, 702 N.W.2d 91, 103 (Iowa 2005); accord Restatement (Second) of Torts § 356 cmt. a, at 240 (1965) (“When land is leased to a tenant, the law of property regards the lease as equivalent to a sale of the land for the term of the lease. The lessee acquires an estate in the land, and becomes for the time being the owner and occupier, subject to all of the liabilities of one in possession, both to those who enter the land and to those outside of it.”); see also Van Essen v. McCormick Enters. Co., 599 N.W.2d 716, 721 n. 5 (Iowa 1999) (quoting in part Restatement (Second) of Torts § 356 cmt. a, at 240 (1965)). Because the tenant has exclusive possession of the property, and the right of entry of the landlord is suspended during the term of the lease, the landlord’s responsibility for removing objectionable conditions is likewise suspended. Harms, 702 N.W.2d at 103. Therefore, the landowner is generally not responsible for the tenant’s acts in creating or maintaining a nuisance upon the leasehold once the landlord transfers possession to the tenant. Id.

Recently, we discussed one important exception to this general rule. In Harms v. Sibley, we were presented with a landowner who found himself on the wrong end of a nuisance action against his tenants. Id. at 96. The landowner, Sandbulte, leased property to Joe’s Ready Mix, Inc. Id. at 104. Joe’s Ready Mix constructed and operated a ready mix plant on the property. Id. A neighboring landowner sued both Joe’s Ready Mix and Sandbulte for nuisance. Id. at 94. The district court found Sandbulte liable for the nuisance. Id. at 95. On appeal, Sandbulte argued he was not personally liable because he “merely leased the property to Joe’s Ready Mix and had minimal personal involvement.” Id. at 103. Rather than analyzing whether Sandbulte was liable for participating, to a substantial extent, in carrying on the nuisance activity, we applied section 837 of the Restatement Second of Torts and affirmed the district court judgment. See id. at 103-04 (citing other jurisdictions applying same). Section 837 provides:

(1) A lessor of land is subject to liability for a nuisance caused by an activity carried on upon the land while the lease continues and the lessor continues as owner, if the lessor would be hable if he had carried on the activity himself, and
(a) at the time of the lease the lessor consents to the activity or knows or has reason to know that it will be carried on, and
([b) he then knows or should know that it will necessarily involve or is already causing the nuisance.
(2) A vendor of land is not liable for a nuisance caused solely by an activity carried on upon the land after he has transferred it.

See also 58 Am.Jur.2d Nuisances § 120, at 647 (2002) (“Under the Restatement Second of Torts, a lessor’s liability is generally based on his or her consent to or knowledge of the nuisance.”).

We found the following facts constituted “substantial evidence” to support all of the elements of section 837. Harms, 702 N.W.2d at 104. First, at the time Sand-bulte leased the property to Joe’s Ready Mix, Sandbulte knew that Joe’s Ready Mix planned to operate a ready mix plant on the property and knew the types of activities that would be performed within the plant. Id. Also, Sandbulte was aware of the plaintiffs protests about the proposed conditions before the plant was even constructed. Id. And finally, Sandbulte was, at some point, the president of Joe’s Ready Mix and oversaw all operation of the plant. Id. Section 837 does not require that the lessor work, or participate in the nuisance activity, but Sandbulte’s role as president illustrates he knew the lessee’s activities and understood the externalities that flowed therefrom.

The facts of the present case, viewed most favorably for the Tetzlaffs, similarly demonstrate Pangborns, as lessors, may be liable for the alleged nuisance caused by their tenants.

The first element of section 837(1) — “the lessor would be liable if he had carried on the activity himself’ — is not in dispute. Pangborns would be liable if they had caused a nuisance by personally spreading manure on the north and south fields. See Michael v. Michael, 461 N.W.2d 334 (Iowa 1990) (holding that spreading hog manure near neighboring residents can be a nuisance for which injunctive relief may be awarded); Valasek v. Baer, 401 N.W.2d 33 (Iowa 1987) (holding same). Likewise, if Pangborns had allowed others, without a lease, to spread manure on their property, they would also have potential liability. See Percival, 120 Iowa at 455, 94 N.W. at 914-15 (holding owner of land liable for nuisance for allowing others to dump horse manure in a ravine on his property).

The second element of section 837(1)— “at the time of the lease the lessor consents to the activity or knows or has reason to know that it will be carried on” — is also satisfied by Al Pangborn’s statement that he assumed Camps would spread manure on the north field, just as they had done on the south field.

Pangborns vigorously dispute whether the record satisfies the third element of section 837(1) — that Pangborns knew or should have known that Camps’ activities would necessarily involve a nuisance or was already causing the nuisance. Pang-borns contend they could not have known or anticipated that manure spreading on agricultural property in a rural area would, at some point in the future, necessarily result in a nuisance. They contend the law should not require a lessor to exhibit this degree of foresight. This argument ignores the stage of proceedings and the facts of this case.

Tetzlaffs complained to Pangborns about Camps’ surface spreading of manure on the south field and Pangborns’ personal garden before Pangborns even purchased the north field. Common sense would indicate that more of the same activity, in an area adjacent to Tetzlaffs’ property, would exacerbate Tetzlaffs’ complaints. Beyond this initial complaint, Tetzlaffs also complained to Camps, the Madison County Sheriff, and the Department of Natural Resources about the manure spreading activities after the “gentlemen’s agreement” was formed, but before at least one of its subsequent renewals. Pangborns were alerted to the continuing complaints in early 2000 when a third party spoke individually with Rachael Pangborn about Tetzlaffs’ complaints. In 2002, the Madison County Sheriff spoke with Al Pang-born about Tetzlaffs’ complaints. In his notes regarding the conversation, the sheriff indicated Al Pangborn agreed the manure spreading was probably very offensive to the Tetzlaff family. Tetzlaffs’ complaints to Pangborns, along with Pang-borns’ discussions with the sheriff about such complaints, create a permissible inference that Pangborns knew the manure spreading was interfering with Tetzlaffs’ property rights. Pangborns’ subjective conclusion that Tetzlaffs’ complaint had no merit does not mean he did not know of at least the potential for a nuisance action.

Comment g to section 837 also supports this conclusion. It provides:

If at the time that the lessor renews the lease he knows that activities are being carried on or that physical conditions have been created upon the leased land that are causing an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of another’s land, he is liable for the continuance of the interference after the renewal.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 837 cmt. g, at 153-54 (1979). As noted above, it is beyond dispute Pangborns were on notice that the manure spreading activity was “already causing [a] nuisance” when they renewed &eir lease with Camps. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 837(l)(b) (“A lessor of land is subject to liability for a nuisance caused by an activity carried on upon the land while the lease continues and the lessor continues as owner, if .... [the lessor] knows or should know that [the activity] will necessarily involve or is already causing the nuisance.”). Therefore, it is clear that, under section 837, Pangborns may be liable for the manure spreading activities of them tenants.

The amici curiae, a conglomeration of farming-related associations, fear that holding Pangborns liable for the actions of their farmer tenants will negatively impact Iowa’s economy because other landowners would then forbid their tenants from utilizing manure as a fertilizer. The amici hypothesize the rental price for farm land will “undoubtedly” fall, and the state’s economy will necessarily suffer because a farmer interested in renting property for crop production will be less inclined to rent a piece of land when the landlord forbids fertilization of the land with manure application.

We disagree. It is still the law of this state that a landlord is generally not responsible for the tenant’s acts in creating or maintaining a nuisance upon the leasehold. Section 837 protects the landlord so long as he or she does not know, at the time of the lease, (1) that the activity will be carried on by the tenants and (2) that the activity involved will necessarily cause a nuisance. These are formidable barriers, but Pangborns’ specific activities in this case generate enough of a factual dispute to preclude summary judgment. Pangborns knew of Camps’ manure spreading activities and Tetzlaffs’ corresponding complaints before the alleged farm tenancy was created. Pangborns also continued to renew Camps’ lease (and thereby endorsed Camps’ manure spreading procedures) despite Tetzlaffs’ repeated complaints. It is also important that the initial “gentlemen's agreement” and the ensuing renewals placed no limitation on the method of manure application. Not surprisingly, Camps chose the quickest and cheapest method of manure application — surface spreading, where a plume of manure is broadcast only on the surface of the ground. As discussed in our previous decisions in Michael v. Michael and Valasek v. Baer, surface spreading hog manure leads to nauseating odors which may result in a nuisance to others. Michael, 461 N.W.2d at 335; Valasek, 401 N.W.2d at 35-37.

We do not hold that all rural landlords who allow manure spreading on their property are liable for nuisance. We merely find that this landlord’s unique level of involvement with both the lessee and complaining neighbor generate enough factual issues to surmount the obstacles to landlord liability at this stage in the proceedings. Therefore summary judgment is not appropriate in this case.

V. Disposition

If a nuisance arises from the use of the premises during the period of the lease, the landlord likely does not have the power to abate that nuisance. However, at the expiration of the lease, the landlord, knowing that the potential nuisance exists, has the ability to stop the nuisance by not renewing the lease or by adding restrictive terms in the lease. If the landlord does not choose to do so, but renews the lease, then the landlord may be liable for the continuance of the interference after the renewal. We reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Pangborns and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . A rule 1.904 motion is the proper method to aslc the district court to enlarge or amend its findings of fact and conclusions of law when the district court failed to resolve an issue, claim, or other legal theory properly submitted for adjudication. Boyle v. Alum-Line, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 741, 751 n. 4 (Iowa 2006).

      . The Department of Natural Resources' conclusions that Camps' manure spreading procedures were not in violation of existing regulations does not terminate Tetzlaffs' nuisance complaint. A business operated within government guidelines may still, under some circumstances and in some locations, constitute a private nuisance. See, e.g., Kriener v. Turkey Valley Comm. Sch. Dist., 212 N.W.2d 526, 535 (Iowa 1973); Patz v. Farmegg Prods., Inc., 196 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Iowa 1972).

      . Although the exact date of the "gentleman's agreement” was not known, it was formed at some point between the fall of 1999 and March 1, 2000. The agreement would have therefore been renewed on approximately March 1, 2001, March 1, 2002, and March 1, 2003. This action was filed in early April. 2003.

      . While there are no Iowa cases with facts similar to this case, at least one other court has found a lessor of agricultural land liable for nuisance for allowing a lessee to spread manure near neighboring residents. In Koch v. Randall, the parties owned properties adjacent to each other. 136 N.H. 500, 618 A.2d 283, 284 (1992). Randall owned a home on a portion of his property and leased the remainder of his acreage to a co-defendant who farmed the fields and spread chicken manure thereon for fertilizer. Id. at 284-85. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held Randall, as lessor, was liable for nuisance because he knew his lessee used chicken manure to fertilize the fields and he had been, put on prior notice of the nuisance when the plaintiff complained to county health officials who in turn relayed the complaints to Randall. Id. at 285-86.

      . In addition, the amici speculate farmers will lose an important outlet for the manure created by their livestock. They hypothesize that small livestock operations will be forced to cease operations because of the high cost of otherwise treating and disposing of manure. We reject the amici’s attempt to have this case decide the hog lot debate in Iowa. To find that section 837 does not apply to farm tenancies would allow other rural landowners to rent their ground out as a manure disposal site, without any regard for the consequences to the neighbors. This is not an acceptable alternative.


text:
    Donald R. RETHAMEL, d/b/a Donald R. Rethamel Construction, Appellant, v. Stephen A. HAVEY, Appellee.
    No. 04-1830.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    June 2, 2006.

      D. Brian Scieszinski of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
    Robert S. Kinsey III and Kim R. Snit-ker of Brown, Kinsey, Funkhouser & Lander, P.L.C., Mason City, for appellee.
   STREIT, Justice.

Stephen Havey obtained an award of workers’ compensation benefits from Donald R. Rethamel based on an injury suffered by Havey during his temporary employment with Rethamel. After the award was affirmed on judicial review, the district court allowed Havey to modify the commissioner’s award through a motion for entry of judgment. Rethamel appealed; we reversed and remanded back to the district court with instructions to “enter judgment in conformity with the commissioner’s award.” On remand, the district court granted Havey’s new motion to remand the ease back to the commissioner for a limited evidentiary hearing. Because we find this is another improper attempt to modify an existing award through a motion for entry of judgment, we reverse the decision of the district court.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

Stephen Havey was injured on January 21, 1997, while working for Donald R. Re-thamel Construction. Havey filed a workers’ compensation claim, and the commissioner entered the following award:

That defendant shall pay claimant healing period benefits from January 21, 1997 to May 5, 1997, at the rate of two hundred sixty-eight and 06/100 dollars ($268.06).
That defendant shall pay claimant fifty (50) weeks of permanent partial disability benefits at the rate of two hundred sixty-eight and 06/100 dollars ($268.06) to commence on May 6, 1997.
That defendant shall pay the reasonable and necessary medical expenses as outlined in this decision.
That all accrued benefits shall be paid in a lump sum.
That defendant pay interest as provided by Iowa Code section 85.30.
That defendant pay the costs of this action, pursuant to rule 876 IAC 4.33.
That defendant shall file claim activity reports as requested by the agency.

(Emphasis added.) Rethamel appealed the decision, and the district court and court of appeals affirmed the commissioner’s decision.

After the judicial review proceedings ended, Havey sought enforcement of his award through an amended motion for judgment. See Iowa Code § 86.42 (1997) (authorizing judgment by district court on award). In this motion, Havey asked the court for three items beyond enforcement of the commissioner’s decision: (1) to enter an order whereby Rethamel would pay the medical expenses directly to Havey; (2) to award Havey a credit for attorney fees for collection of payments from third-party medical providers; and (3) payment of interest that was not included in the original award. Havey supported this motion with additional evidence purporting to prove that Havey had already paid part of the medical bills. After considering new evidence proffered by Havey, the district court ordered judgment in conformance with Havey’s requests. Rethamel appealed, requesting that the application for judgment be dismissed or recalculated to reflect only those awards made by the commissioner.

On appeal, we interpreted the district court’s role in rendering judgment on a commissioner’s award determination to be a “ministerial function.” Rethamel v. Havey, 679 N.W.2d 626, 629 (Iowa 2004). We held the court had the authority to “construe” the commissioner’s award, but found the court had no authority to review, reverse, or modify the award at this point in the proceedings. Id. at 628-29. Because the district court’s order of judgment expanded the workers’ compensation award, we vacated the judgment and remanded the case back to district court “to enter a judgment in conformity with the commissioner’s award.” Id. at 629. We ended our decision with the statement “[a ]ny remaining issues shall be resolved at the time of execution or by a separate action outside Iowa Code section 86.42, between the parties.” Id. (emphasis added).

On remand, Havey filed a new motion requesting that those issues upon which the district court previously took evidence be remanded to the workers’ compensation commissioner for an evidentiary hearing. The district court agreed and remanded a portion of the case back to the workers’ compensation commissioner for an eviden-tiary hearing to determine whether or not Havey was entitled to reimbursement of the medical expenses he had already paid.

On appeal, Rethamel claims the district court erred in remanding this case. Re-thamel argues that by ordering the commissioner to consider new issues and consider new evidence not previously raised, the court has once again effectively modified the commissioner’s original decision.

II. Standard of Review

The standard of appellate review regarding the permissible scope of a district court judgment is for errors of law. Id. at 627.

III. Merits

Iowa Code section 86.42 provides a summary method for transforming a workers’ compensation award into an enforceable judgment:

Any party in interest may present a certified copy of an order or decision of the [workers’ compensation] commissioner, ... and all papers in connection therewith, to the district court where judicial review of the agency action may be commenced. The court shall render a decree or judgment and cause the clerk to notify the parties. The decree or judgment ... has the same effect and in all proceedings in relation thereto is the same as though rendered in a suit duly heard and determined by the court.

This section does not expressly provide for enforcement by execution, but, as noted by the italicized language, it creates a judgment just like any other. See also Simonson v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 588 N.W.2d 430, 437 (Iowa 1999) (“a petitioner may seek to enforce an award pursuant to section 86.42 by obtaining a judgment in district court based on the commissioner’s award of benefits”). Judgments for money are enforced by execution. Iowa Code § 626.1. Allowing execution on a section 86.42 judgment is also consistent with the general rule as stated in Zeigler v. Fleetguard, Inc., 675 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Iowa 2004) (quoting 101 C.J.S. Workers’ Compensation § 1484, at 318 (2000)):

The court’s award of compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Act is a judgment that may be enforced by execution. The judgment must be entered before it can be enforced by execution. After an award has been filed in the proper court and given the force and effect of a judgment therein, it is enforceable by execution, and supplementary proceedings in aid of execution may be resorted to as in other cases.

Because the rights of the claimant have already been established by the time the application to enter judgment has been made, the district court is bound to enter judgment in conformance with the workers’ compensation award. Rethamel, 679 N.W.2d at 628. The court has no power to change the award, review the award, reverse the award, modify the award, remand the case to the commissioner, or construe the workers’ compensation statute. See id.; St. Louis Pressed Steel Co. v. Schorr, 303 Ill. 476, 135 N.E. 766, 767 (1922) (“[0]n application for judgment on the award the court has no jurisdiction to review the decision, construe the statute, or determine whether the decision of the board was correct or not.”).

The district court’s role at the time of entry of judgment is limited to “construing” the commissioner’s decision. Id. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “construe” means “[t]o analyze and explain the meaning of (a sentence or passage).” Black’s Law Dictionary 333 (8th ed.2004). Therefore, the district court’s role in entry of judgment is limited to analyzing and explaining the meaning of the commissioner’s written award decision.

In this case, the commissioner’s decision specifically states that Rethamel shall pay Havey healing period benefits and permanent partial disability benefits. The decision then states Rethamel is ordered to pay specific reasonable and necessary medical expenses related to this injury. The decision does not identify who shall be paid the reasonable and necessary medical expenses. Our previous decisions clearly establish that a workers’ compensation claimant is not entitled to be paid sums for medical and hospital expense unless there is a specific showing that the claimant himself paid the medical expenses. See Krohn v. State, 420 N.W.2d 463, 464-65 (Iowa 1988); accord Caylor v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 337 N.W.2d 890, 894 (Iowa Ct.App.1983) (“Claimant is not entitled to reimbursement for medical bills unless he shows that he paid them from his own funds.”). If a claimant has already paid such expenses, and anticipates difficulties in recouping those costs, the onus is on the claimant to present evidence of prior payment to the commissioner so that the commissioner, in awarding medical benefits, can order the defendant to pay such medical expenses directly to the claimant.

By remanding the case back to the commissioner, the district court implied that it had reviewed the award and was sending the case back so the commissioner could take additional evidence to reconsider or revise its original decision. This action goes far beyond the court’s power to construe the commissioner’s decision.

An appropriate way to “construe” the award would be to enter judgment stating “Rethamel is liable for Havey’s medical expenses.” Such a judgment could be enforced “at the time of execution or by a separate action” by whoever provided the medical care, or whoever already paid for the medical expenses. See generally Iowa Code ch. 626 (addressing writs of execution); Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1018-1.1020 (addressing execution and duty of officer, endorsement, and levy on personalty); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American Law, 42 Iowa L.Rev. 155 (1957) (broadly categorizing collection remedies into executability, ae-tionability, and lien creation); J.E. Heis-erman, Procedures Available for Implementation of a Judgment in Iowa, 42 Iowa L.Rev. 265 (1957) (reviewing the procedures for enforcements of judgments).

IV. Conclusion

The proper avenue to modify a decision by the commissioner is through procedures before the commissioner or a petition for judicial review. Havey’s attempt to modify the commissioner’s decision now, at the time of entry of judgment, is improper.

We vacate the district court’s judgment and remand the case back to the district court so that it can enter a judgment in conformity with the commissioner’s award.

JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED.

      . This decision does not abrogate the district court's ability to remand a case back to the commissioner at the time of judicial review.
      We only find it inappropriate when the court does so in a section 86.42 enforcement proceeding.