author: STREIT, Justice.

text:
    IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD, Appellant, v. Mark A. NEWMAN, Appellee.
    No. 07-1692.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    May 2, 2008.
    Charles L. Harrington and Elizabeth E. Quinlan, Des Moines, for appellant.
    Mark McCormick of Belin Lamson McCormick Zumbach Flynn, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
   STREIT, Justice.

An attorney presented a judge with two orders to approve. The judge agreed to both orders but overlooked signing one of them. The attorney realized what had happened when he returned to his office. He forged the judge’s signature on the unsigned-but-approved order and filed it with the clerk of court. When confronted, the attorney admitted the forgery and apologized. The Grievance Commission privately admonished the attorney for this ethical violation. The Board appealed arguing forgery is a serious violation and warrants public discipline. We agree and publicly reprimand the attorney.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.

In 1994, Mark A. Newman graduated from law school and was admitted to the Iowa bar at the age of forty. He and his family moved to Forest City where he has been a solo practitioner since that time. His practice involves real estate, criminal defense, probate, and corporate work.

In October 2006, Newman agreed to assist a Davenport attorney with a conser-vatorship in Winnebago County. The Davenport attorney sent Newman certain documents to be filed as well as two proposed orders to be presented for a judge’s signature. One day in January 2007, Newman drove to Garner, Iowa for court service day. Newman presented the two proposed orders to Judge James M. Drew. One order approved Newman’s appointment as guardian ad litem. The second order approved a wrongful death settlement. Judge Drew and Newman discussed the case, and Judge Drew agreed to sign the orders. Judge Drew dated and signed the order appointing Newman as guardian ad litem. He dated but did not sign the order approving the wrongful death settlement. He returned the orders to Newman for filing.

Newman returned to his office, forged the judge’s signature, and filed the order. Two days later, Judge Drew telephoned Newman and told him he had an order in his hand with a signature he did not recognize. Newman admitted signing the judge’s name. Thereafter, both Judge Drew and Newman reported the incident to the Board. Judge Drew stated his failure to sign the order was an oversight. He also noted Newman was remorseful and apologetic.

The Board filed a complaint against Newman as a result of this incident. Newman’s answer admitted the facts and ethical violations alleged in the complaint. The Commission held a hearing to determine the appropriate sanction. The Commission found Newman to have a “record of a life of service and integrity” before this incident. It found Newman’s forgery of Judge Drew’s signature to be “an isolated instance of unethical conduct.” The Commission privately admonished Newman and requested he accept 120 hours of court-appointed criminal cases with pay by the end of 2008.

The Board subsequently applied for permission to appeal the Commission’s decision. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.11(2). It argued due to the serious nature of Newman’s misconduct, a suspension of his law license would be the more appropriate sanction. We sustained the Board’s application and now publicly reprimand Newman for his actions.

II. Scope of Review.

We review the findings of the Commission de novo. Iowa Ct. R. 35.10(1). We give weight to the Commission’s findings, but we are not bound by those findings. Iowa Supreme Ct. Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. McGrath, 713 N.W.2d 682, 695 (Iowa 2006). The Board has the burden to prove disciplinary violations by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. Iowa Supreme Ct. Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. D’Angelo, 710 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Iowa 2006). This burden is “ ‘less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but more than the preponderance standard required in the usual civil case.’ ” Id. (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Lett, 674 N.W.2d 139, 142 (Iowa 2004)).

III. Sanction.

We find the Board proved by a convincing preponderance of the evidence Newman violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(c), which prohibits an attorney from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Thompson, 732 N.W.2d 865, 867 (Iowa 2007) (stating forging a signature on a court document is conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation). We now must determine the appropriate sanction. We consider “the nature of the violations, protection of the public, deterrence of similar misconduct by others, the lawyer’s fitness to practice, and our duty to uphold the integrity of the profession in the eyes of the public.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Fleming, 602 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 1999) (citing Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Havercamp, 442 N.W.2d 67, 69 (Iowa 1989)). We also consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Ruth, 656 N.W.2d 93, 99 (Iowa 2002) (citing Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Sherman, 637 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Iowa 2001)). Ultimately, the form and extent of a disciplinary sanction “must be tailored to the specific facts and circumstances of each individual case.” Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Rogers, 313 N.W.2d 535, 537 (Iowa 1981).

Based on the record, Newman appears to be a person of good moral character who committed a serious lapse in judgment. He has never been subjected to attorney discipline before this occasion. Several people either testified or provided affidavits attesting to his good character. He accepted responsibility for his actions and is very remorseful. Nevertheless, forgery is a serious ethical violation. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Rickabaugh, 728 N.W.2d 375, 382 (Iowa 2007) (revoking the license of an attorney who, among other things, forged his clients’ signatures and was previously disciplined for fabricating documents and forging a judge’s signature); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Rylaarsdam, 636 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Iowa 2001) (suspending an attorney’s license for six months for forging clients’ signatures and falsifying a court document); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Clauss, 530 N.W.2d 453, 455 (Iowa 1995) (suspending an attorney’s license for three years because he, among other things, forged and notarized a signature on a return of service).

The Board notes Newman’s conduct was similar to the conduct in Thompson. There, we suspended an attorney’s license for nine months for forging a judge’s signature on an order “without the knowledge or authorization of the judge.” Thompson, 732 N.W.2d at 866. However, unlike Newman, Thompson had a history of prior discipline which included a sanction for altering a court document. Id. Thompson also forged the judge’s signature and filed the order without ever presenting it to a judge. We find the totality of the circumstances in this case less egregious than those in Thompson. Nevertheless, we believe a public reprimand is necessary to signal Iowa lawyers and the citizens of Iowa that forging a judge’s signature is a serious ethical violation under any circumstances.

IV. Conclusion.

Newman is hereby publicly reprimanded for forging Judge Drew’s signature on an approved-but-unsigned order. Costs are taxed to Newman pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.25(1).

ATTORNEY REPRIMANDED.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: HECHT, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Allen Robert ALLENSWORTH, Appellee.
    No. 06-1507.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    May 9, 2008.

      Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Elisabeth S. Reynoldson and Mary E. Tabor, Assistant Attorneys General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Stephanie Cox, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
    Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellee.
   HECHT, Justice.

We granted the State’s application for discretionary review of the district court’s order suppressing methamphetamine seized by law enforcement officers from a motor vehicle. We conclude the warrant-less search of the steering column of the vehicle was supported by probable cause, and was therefore permissible under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order.

I. Factual and Procedural Background.

A Polk County sheriffs deputy stopped a vehicle for speeding on Euclid Avenue in Des Moines. As the deputy approached the vehicle, Allen Allensworth rolled down the driver’s window, stated his name, and disclosed that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. The deputy noticed Allensworth had a large snake draped around his neck. A warrant check confirmed Allensworth had an outstanding warrant for a parole violation. The deputy arrested Allensworth, contacted Allens-worth’s friend to come to the scene and retrieve the snake, and called a towing company to transport the vehicle from the scene of the arrest. Due to the presence of the snake and the amount of traffic at the intersection where the stop occurred, the deputy decided to defer an inventory of the contents of the vehicle until after it was moved to the location where it was to be impounded.

After transporting Allensworth to the jail for booking, but before he went to the impound lot to complete an inventory search of the vehicle, the deputy received an anonymous phone call reporting there were drugs in Allensworth’s car. Approximately two hours after the vehicle was towed and impounded, the deputy and another officer began an inventory of the vehicle’s contents. The deputy located a small bag of marijuana in the center console. Knowing the steering column was “a known place where people hide drugs,” an officer removed the horn button on the steering column and discovered a small plastic bag containing approximately twenty-five grams of methamphetamine.

Allensworth was charged with possession with intent to deliver more than five grams of methamphetamine, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1) (b) (7) (2005), and failure to possess a drug tax stamp, in violation of Iowa Code section 453B.12. He filed a pro se motion to suppress the marijuana and methamphetamine, claiming they were seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Following a hearing, the district court concluded the seizure of the vehicle, the inventory search of the console, and the resulting seizure of the marijuana did not violate Allensworth’s Fourth Amendment rights. The court suppressed the methamphetamine, however, on the ground that the search of the steering column exceeded the proper scope of an inventory search.

The State filed a motion requesting the district court reconsider its ruling, advancing the automobile exception to the warrant requirement as an alternative ground for upholding the search of the vehicle and seizure of the methamphetamine. The district court denied the motion, concluding the automobile exception applies only if probable cause for the search and exigent circumstances exist at the scene of the stop. The district court reasoned that the automobile exception did not apply under the circumstances of this case because probable cause for a warrantless search extending beyond an inventory search did not exist at the scene of the stop in this case, but arose only later after the vehicle was impounded when marijuana was discovered in the course of the inventory search. We granted discretionary review of the district court’s suppression order.

II. Scope of Review.

We review Fourth Amendment claims de novo. State v. Lam, 391 N.W.2d 245, 248 (Iowa 1986).

III. Discussion.

The State confines its argument on appeal to the validity of the search of the steering column under the so-called “automobile exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The State contends the district court erred in holding the automobile exception requires special exigency at the time the probable cause arises. Allensworth asserts the district court correctly suppressed the methamphetamine because the officers who conducted the search of the vehicle exceeded the limits of an inventory search when they invaded the steering column.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ensures “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures .... ” U.S. Const, amend. IV. “Searches and seizures conducted by governmental officials without prior court approval are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the few exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” State v. Jackson, 542 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Iowa 1996) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967); State v. Cook, 530 N.W.2d 728, 731 (Iowa 1995)). The Supreme Court has recognized a “specifically established and well-delineated” exception to the warrant requirement for searches of automobiles and their contents. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1991, 114 L.Ed.2d 619, 634 (1991).

A review of the evolution of the automobile exception is useful in the analysis of the issue presented in this case. The United States Supreme Court first applied the exception in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). In Carroll, the Court held a search warrant is unnecessary for the search of an automobile when officers have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband. 267 U.S. at 153-56, 45 S.Ct. at 285-86, 69 L.Ed. at 551-53. The Court concluded warrantless searches of vehicles based on probable cause are constitutionally permissible as it would be impracticable to require officers to secure a warrant “because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.” Id. at 153, 45 S.Ct. at 285, 69 L.Ed. at 551. Thus, the original impetus for allowing warrantless searches of automobiles based upon probable cause was the exigency inherent in dealing with movable vehicles.

Forty-five years after Carroll was decided, the Court again addressed the scope of the automobile exception in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). In Chambers, the police stopped a vehicle matching a description of the vehicle used an hour earlier by armed gunmen who robbed a gas station. 399 U.S. at 44, 90 S.Ct. at 1977, 26 L.Ed.2d at 424. The officers arrested the passengers on suspicion of armed robbery, and impounded the vehicle at the police station. The officers conducted a search of the vehicle at the police station and found a gun concealed under the dashboard. Id.

Rejecting Chambers’ claim that the search by the officers at the police station was unreasonable because no exigency existed to justify a warrantless search of the impounded vehicle, the Court noted:

Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate’s judgment, only the immobilization of the car should be permitted until a search warrant is obtained; arguably, only the “lesser” intrusion is permissible until the magistrate authorizes the “greater.” But which is the “greater” and which the “lesser” intrusion is itself a debatable question and the answer may depend on a variety of circumstances. For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
On the facts before us, the [vehicle] could have been searched on the spot when it was stopped since there was probable cause to search and it was a fleeting target for a search. The probable-cause factor still obtained at the station house and so did the mobility of the car unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the car and the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured. In that event there is little to choose in terms of practical consequences between an immediate search without a warrant and the car’s immobilization until a warrant is obtained.

Id. at 51-52, 90 S.Ct. at 1981, 26 L.Ed.2d at 428 (emphasis added). The Court concluded law enforcement officers’ encounters with vehicles that are readily capable of movement are sufficiently “exigent” to allow for warrantless searches based on probable cause. Id. The exigencies faced by law enforcement officers dealing with motor vehicles do not evaporate when the vehicle is removed from the scene of the stop to a police station or other place of impoundment. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2163 n. 9, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, 583 n. 9 (1982) (“[I]f an immediate search on the scene could be conducted, but not one at the station if the vehicle is impounded, police often simply would search the vehicle on the street — at no advantage to the occupants, yet possibly at certain costs to the police.”); see United States v. Watts, 329 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.2003) (“[T]he requirement of exigent circumstances is satisfied by the ‘ready mobility’ inherent in all automobiles that reasonably appear to be capable of functioning.” (Emphasis in original.)).

In a more recent phase of the evolution of the automobile exception, the Court disavowed a “special exigency” requirement for searches of readily mobile vehicles, and provided additional rationales for allowing warrantless searches of automobiles based on probable cause. In California v. Car ney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985), a case involving a search of a mobile home, the Court acknowledged the “ready mobility” rationale for the automobile exception, but noted the exception is also justified based on the reduced expectation of privacy, as compared to the home or office, that individuals have in their automobiles. Carney, 471 U.S. at 391, 105 S.Ct. at 2069, 85 L.Ed.2d at 413 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3096, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000, 1004-05 (1976)). This decreased expectation of privacy results from the “pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways.” Id. at 392, 105 S.Ct. at 2069, 85 L.Ed.2d at 413.

In Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 304, 46 L.Ed.2d 209 (1975) (per curiam), officers stopped the defendant at a bank drive-through window on suspicion of attempting to pass fraudulent checks. 423 U.S. at 67, 96 S.Ct. at 305, 46 L.Ed.2d at 211. A bank employee had observed the defendant try to put something between the seats of the vehicle he was driving. Id. The officers arrested White and transported him and his car to the police station, where they questioned White and searched the vehicle. Id. at 67-68, 96 S.Ct. at 305, 46 L.Ed.2d at 211. Although the trial court found the officers had probable cause to believe contraband was in the vehicle, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held four checks found during the search of the vehicle were obtained in violation of White’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 68, 96 S.Ct. at 305, 46 L.Ed.2d at 211. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the search at the station house was valid because probable cause to believe the car contained contraband did not evaporate when the car was removed from the scene of the seizure. Id. Probable cause persisted at the station house, and therefore no showing of exigency beyond the vehicle’s inherent mobility was required to sustain the warrantless search of the vehicle. Id. (“[Pjolice officers with probable cause to search an automobile at the scene where it was stopped could constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant.”).

In Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 102 S.Ct. 3079, 73 L.Ed.2d 750 (1982) (per curiam), law enforcement officers stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation and observed an open bottle of liquor on the passenger seat floorboard. 458 U.S. at 259, 102 S.Ct. at 3080, 73 L.Ed.2d at 752. The officers placed the driver, Thomas, under arrest for possession of open intoxicants in a motor vehicle. Id. During an inventory search conducted before the vehicle was towed from the scene of the arrest, an officer located two bags of marijuana in the unlocked glove compartment. Id. at 260, 102 S.Ct. at 3080, 73 L.Ed.2d at 752. A second officer then conducted a more thorough search, which included checking under the dashboard and inside the locked trunk. The officer located a loaded revolver inside the air vents under the dashboard. The Michigan Court of Appeals held the search did not fit within the automobile exception “because both the car and its occupants were already in police custody [thus] there were no ‘exigent circumstances’ justifying a warrant-less search for contraband.” Id. at 261, 102 S.Ct. at 3080, 73 L.Ed.2d at 752-53. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that “when police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrant-less search of the vehicle, even after it has been impounded and is in police custody.” Id. The Court further clarified,

the justification to conduct such a war-rantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon a reviewing court’s assessment of the likelihood in each particular case that the car would have been driven away, or that its contents would have been tampered with, during the period required for the police to obtain a warrant.

Id. at 261, 102 S.Ct. at 3081, 73 L.Ed.2d at 753.

In Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 2014, 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999) (per curiam), the Court expressly rejected the argument that the automobile exception does not apply in the absence of a separate showing of exigency. The defendant’s vehicle was stopped and searched on the street based on a tip from a reliable informant that the vehicle the defendant was driving would be carrying a large quantity of cocaine. Id., at 466, 119 S.Ct. at 2013, 144 L.Ed.2d at 444. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction for possession of crack cocaine, holding that “in order for the automobile exception to the warrant requirement to apply, there must not only be probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime is contained in the automobile, but also a separate finding of exigency precluding the police from obtaining a warrant.” Id. The Supreme Court reversed, stating “under our established precedent, the ‘automobile exception’ has no separate exigency requirement.” Id. at 467, 119 S.Ct. at 2014, 144 L.Ed.2d at 445. The Maryland court’s finding of “abundant probable cause” to believe the readily mobile vehicle contained contraband “alone satisfied] the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” Id.

We have previously applied the “inherent exigency” rationale for warrantless probable-cause searches and seizures of readily mobile vehicles undertaken prior to the vehicle’s impoundment. State v. Cain, 400 N.W.2d 582, 585 (Iowa 1987) (noting “recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court and this court ... have made it clear that the exigency requirement is always satisfied by a vehicle’s inherent mobility”); Lam, 391 N.W.2d at 248 (“The Court’s decision [in Carney ] makes it clear that under the automobile exception which was created in recognition of the decreased expectation of privacy accorded to a vehicle and the exigencies associated •with it, a warrantless search of a vehicle may be made if the authorities have probable cause.”). We have also upheld against both federal and Iowa constitutional challenges a vehicle search that was undertaken with probable cause at a police station after the defendant’s arrest. State v. Holderness, 301 N.W.2d 733, 737 (Iowa 1981) (upholding against federal and Iowa constitutional challenges a warrantless vehicle search based on probable cause at a police station). In each of these cases, probable cause supporting a warrantless search existed at the scene of the arrest or stop. This case requires us to decide whether probable cause to conduct a war-rantless automobile-exception search can arise during an inventory search of a vehicle after it has been removed from the scene of the stop and seizure. We conclude that it can.

In State v. Edgington, 487 N.W.2d 675 (Iowa 1992), the defendant was stopped for speeding. He was arrested after he admitted he was driving with a suspended license. Before having the vehicle towed, the arresting officer commenced an inventory search and discovered a loaded handgun under the seat and a jewelry box and jewelry on the back seat. 487 N.W.2d at 677. The inventory search was interrupted when the tow track arrived and took the vehicle away. When the search was completed at another location, numerous stolen items were found in the trunk. We concluded the search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle at the scene of the stop was incident to the arrest and therefore valid. Id. at 678 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d 768, 775 (1981)). The discovery of the handgun and jewelry supplied the officers with probable cause to believe the vehicle contained additional contraband. Finding exigent circumstances and probable cause, we upheld under the automobile exception the search of the trunk conducted after the vehicle was towed from the scene of the arrest. Id. Having concluded the search was valid under the automobile exception, we did not address Edgington’s claim that the im-poundment and the inventory search of his car violated the police department’s regulations which required the arresting officers to provide the defendant with an alternative to impoundment. Id. at 679.

Allensworth does not dispute that the marijuana discovered in the console during the inventory search and the anonymous tip received before the inventory began gave the officer probable cause to suspect the vehicle contained additional contraband. He contends, however, the officers conducting the inventory search were required, after they discovered the marijuana, to stop the inventory and request a search warrant before they could legally extend the search beyond the scope of the inventory. We disagree. Allens-worth’s Fourth Amendment challenge based on the claimed failure of the officers to comply with their departmental rules governing inventory searches is, like Edg-ington’s, without merit. The State correctly posits that whether or not the search subsequent to the discovery of the marijuana was completed in compliance with the sheriffs inventory search rules, the search of the vehicle driven by Allens-worth at the time of the stop was reasonable under the automobile exception. Probable cause for an automobile exception search “may evolve from a proper investigatory stop of a vehicle.” Id. at 678. We conclude it may also evolve from the discovery of contraband in the course of a proper inventory search as it did in Edgington. Id. at 678-79. An automobile exception search may be “as thorough as a magistrate could authorize in a warrant particularly describing the place to be searched.” Ross, 456 U.S. at 800, 102 S.Ct. at 2159, 72 L.Ed.2d at 578; accord Carroll, 267 U.S. at 172-73, 45 S.Ct. at 292, 69 L.Ed. at 559-60 (scope of automobile-exception search included tearing open vehicle’s seat cushion to find suspected contraband). Thus, what began as an inventory search expanded to a broader automobile-exception search that properly included the opening of the horn cap on the steering column.

In finding the automobile exception inapplicable in this case, the district court relied upon language in Edgington and Holdemess suggesting probable cause and exigent circumstances must arise at the scene of the stop to justify a later search at the station house under the automobile exception. See Edgington, 487 N.W.2d at 677-78 (“Previously, we have stated that the automobile exception to the fourth amendment requirement of a search warrant is applicable if probable cause and exigent circumstances exist at the time the automobile is stopped by police.”); Holderness, 301 N.W.2d at 736-37 (“[EJxigent circumstances are necessary only initially; the absence of exigent circumstances at the time of the actual search is irrelevant.”); see also State v. Olsen, 293 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa 1980) (“It is now clear that the absence of exigent circumstances for the later search is wholly irrelevant. Exigent circumstances are necessary only initially”). As detailed above, under prevailing Fourth Amendment law, the only exigency required to justify a warrantless search of a vehicle is the vehicle’s ready mobility. Cain, 400 N.W.2d at 585 (noting “[m]ore recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court and this court ... have made it clear that the exigency requirement is always satisfied by a vehicle’s inherent mobility”). The essential teaching of Edgington, Holderness, and Olsen is that sufficient exigency exists to justify a warrantless search of a readily mobile vehicle even after the vehicle has been impounded and removed to another location. Our decisions in those eases should not be understood to stand for the proposition that if probable cause for an automobile-exception search does not arise at the scene of a stop or seizure, it cannot arise later in the course of an inventory search conducted after the vehicle has been impounded and removed to another location.

The fact that the vehicle had been impounded and removed from the scene of the seizure before an inventory search was commenced and probable cause arose for the broader automobile exception search is of no constitutional moment. Under the substantial body of case law establishing the automobile exception, the reasonableness of the search simply cannot turn on the fortuity of whether the inventory search was commenced and contraband was discovered before or after the car was removed from the scene of the stop or seizure. When probable cause arose at the police station, the vehicle was still sufficiently mobile to render the situation exigent and the warrantless search supported by probable cause reasonable. Allens-worth’s motion to suppress is without merit and the district court erred in suppressing the methamphetamine.

IV. Conclusion.

The search of the steering column of Allensworth’s vehicle was based on probable cause that arose during a lawful inventory search. • A warrantless search of the vehicle’s steering column was therefore reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. We reverse the district court’s suppression of the methamphetamine found in the steering column and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

All justices concur except Streit, J., who takes no part.

      . The Polk County Sheriff has a motor vehicle impoundment and inventory policy. With exceptions not relevant here, the policy directs that if the driver of a vehicle is arrested, officers are to impound the vehicle and perform an inventory of its contents. The policy states the inventory is not to be used as a pretext to search for evidence, but is designed to protect the citizen’s property and the county. If illegal substances are encountered during the inventoiy, the policy directs the officer to (1) stop the inventoiy; (2) contact a supervisor; (3) complete the inventory; and (4) consider obtaining a search warrant authorizing "a more thorough search of the motor vehicle.”

      . Allensworth claims on appeal the search also violated his rights under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, and that if we find the issue was not preserved below, we should address it on ineffective-assistance-of-counsel grounds. Allensworth did not raise below, and the district court did not rule on, a state constitutional claim. Moreover, he does not suggest on appeal that the analytical framework under the state constitution should differ from the Fourth Amendment analysis in this case. Cf. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2004) (declining to adopt a different equal protection analysis under the analogous provision of the Iowa Constitution where no such analytical framework was urged by either party). Accordingly, Allensworth has failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from his counsel’s failure to raise a state constitutional claim. See State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 136 (Iowa 2006) (stating that in order to obtain relief on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim one must prove "(1) the attorney failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted”). Because the claim of trial counsel's ineffectiveness is without merit, we shall not further discuss it.

      . An inventory of the contents of an impounded vehicle pursuant to standard police procedures is reasonable if the process is aimed at securing or protecting the vehicle and its contents. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3098-99, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000, 1007 (1976). “The policy or practice governing inventory searches should be designed to produce an inventory," and not simply be a ruse for "general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.” Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 1635, 109 L.Ed.2d 1, 6 (1990). One factor considered by the court in its assessment of the reasonableness of an inventory search is whether the officer "acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation.” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 373, 107 S.Ct. 738, 741, 93 L.Ed.2d 739, 746 (1987).

      . We use the term "special exigency” to refer to some circumstance beyond the inherent mobility of the vehicle that makes it impossible or impractical for the police to obtain a search warrant prior to the vehicle being moved away. United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 509-10 (6th Cir.2001) (noting the Supreme Court "has emphasized that no special exigency is required to conduct a war-rantless search of an automobile when the car is mobile and the searching officer has probable cause to believe that fruits of a crime may be present in the automobile"). The Supreme Court has alternatively used the phrase "separate exigency” to refer to the same concept. See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 2014, 144 L.Ed.2d 442, 445 (1999) (“[T]he 'automobile exception’ has no separate exigency requirement.”).

      . Although neither Cain nor Lam posed a challenge to a warrantless probable cause search of a vehicle after impoundment, we have upheld searches that were undertaken, at least in part, after impoundment as well. See State v. Edgington, 487 N.W.2d 675, 677-78 (Iowa 1992) (upholding later warrantless search of an impounded vehicle after a gun was discovered under the seat during an inventory search at the scene of the stop).

      . Our conclusion is guided by the overriding concern in Fourth Amendment cases that the reasonableness of the search or seizure be determined by balancing the need for the search against the individual’s privacy interest. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19, 122 S.Ct. 587, 591, 151 L.Ed.2d 497, 505 (2001) (“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”). As demonstrated by the cases permitting searches of impounded vehicles under the automobile exception, the State's need to conduct an immediate search remains static once probable cause arises, regardless of whether the vehicle remains at the scene of the stop or has already been impounded. Similarly, the individual’s privacy interest in the contents of the vehicle remains static from the scene of the arrest throughout the duration of the impoundment — the individual does not gain a greater interest in keeping the contents of the vehicle secret simply because officers choose to impound the vehicle. See Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 Harv. L.Rev. 835, 840 (1974) (noting the privacy interest implicated in a vehicle search is the defendant's interest in “attempts at secrecy” of the automobile’s contents). The spatial and temporal limitation on the emergence of probable cause urged by Allensworth and applied by the district court would not provide any greater protection to the privacy interest at stake in an automobile search. Requiring, as a precondition to a finding of reasonableness, that probable cause to support an automobile exception search arise before impoundment would therefore afford "no advantage to the occupants,” and we decline to impose such a limitation. Ross, 456 U.S. at 807 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. at 2163 n. 9, 72 L.Ed.2d at 583 n. 9.


author: /s/Alan C. Page Associate Justice

text:
    In re Petition for DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST Dale W. SHELDON, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 100080.
    No. A08-810.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    May 22, 2008.
   ORDER

The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility has filed a petition for disciplinary action alleging that respondent Dale W. Sheldon committed professional misconduct warranting public discipline, namely, failing to maintain the trust account books and records required by Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(a) and (h), resulting in the unintentional misappropriation of client funds.

Respondent admits the allegations of the petition and waives his procedural rights under Rule 14, Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR). The parties jointly recommend that the appropriate discipline is a public reprimand and two years’ probation.

The court has independently reviewed the file and approves the jointly recommended disposition.

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent Dale W. Sheldon is publicly reprimanded and placed on probation for a period of two years from the date of filing of this order, subject to the following terms and conditions:

(a)Respondent shall cooperate fully with the Director’s office in its efforts to monitor compliance with this probation and shall promptly respond to the Director’s correspondence by the due date. Respondent shall provide to the Director a current mailing address and shall immediately notify the Director of any change of address. Respondent shall cooperate with the Director’s investigation of any allegations of unprofessional conduct that may come to the Director’s attention. Upon the Director’s request, respondent shall provide authorization for the release of information and documentation to verify compliance with the terms of this probation.
(b) Respondent shall abide by the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct.
(c) Respondent shall be supervised by an attorney with the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility, who will monitor respondent’s compliance with the terms of this probation.
(d) Respondent shall maintain law office and trust account books and records in compliance with Rule 1.15, Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC), and Appendix 1 to the MRPC. These books and records include the following: client subsidiary ledger, checkbook register, monthly trial balances, monthly trust account reconciliation, bank statements, canceled checks, duplicate deposit slips, and bank reports of interest, service charges, and interest payments made to the Lawyer Trust Account Board. Such books and records shall be made available to the Director within 30 days of the date of entry of this order, and thereafter shall be made available to the Director at such intervals as he deems necessary to determine compliance.

Respondent shall pay $900 in costs pursuant to Rule 24, RLPR.

BY THE COURT:

/s/Alan C. Page Associate Justice


author: ROSS, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent v. Vern Lewis MUDGETT, Appellant.
    No. A06-2440.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    May 20, 2008.
    Lori Swanson, Attorney General, and Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Mark Nathan Lystig, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.
    Lawrence Hammerling, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael W. Kunkel, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.
    Considered and decided by ROSS, Presiding Judge; LANSING, Judge; and JOHNSON, Judge.
   OPINION

ROSS, Judge.

This appeal arises from Vern Mudgett’s challenge to his conviction after he pleaded guilty to two counts of third-degree burglary. Mudgett argues that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to consider his request to withdraw his plea. Before his sentencing hearing, Mudgett moved the district court to depart downward from the presumptive sentence. At the hearing, he informed the court through counsel that he “would seek to withdraw” his guilty plea “if the court is not inclined” to grant his motion for a downward departure. The district court did not consider Mudgett’s statements to constitute a proper motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and it sentenced him according to the terms of his plea agreement. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion when it treated Mudgett’s comments as something less than a pre-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea, we affirm.

FACTS

The facts underlying this dispute are simple. After Vern Mudgett entered two garages in St. Paul, stealing tools from one, the state charged him with two counts of third-degree burglary, and he agreed to plead guilty to both. His plea agreement contemplated two concurrent 45-month terms in prison, which he acknowledged was an appropriate sentence based on the sentencing guidelines. He admitted that factors warrant the lengthy sentence based on his criminal history and the nature of his previous convictions. He acknowledged that of his fourteen previous criminal convictions, five were felony burglaries, qualifying him as a career offender.

Despite the plea agreement, Mudgett moved the district court to impose a sentence that included a downward disposi-tional or durational departure from the presumptive sentence. While arguing at his sentencing hearing in support of a downward departure, Mudgett’s attorney conditionally offered to make a plea-withdrawal motion, the contingency being whether the district court was leaning toward denying his departure motion: “Today [Mudgett] indicated to me that if the court is not inclined to depart in this matter either dispositionally or durationally, he would seek to withdraw his plea. I just ask to be heard on that in the event the court is not inclined to depart.” The district court did not deem that statement to present a valid pre-sentencing motion to withdraw the plea. It responded that because the sentencing hearing had been continued several times, the court would sentence Mudgett and address an actual motion for plea withdrawal after one was filed.

The court then sentenced Mudgett to the presumptive sentence according to the terms of the plea agreement. Mudgett filed no post-sentencing motion to withdraw his plea, and he appeals.

ISSUE

Did the district court abuse its discretion by failing to treat appellant’s statements at his sentencing hearing as a pre-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

ANALYSIS

Mudgett’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by failing to entertain arguments or otherwise consider his motion to withdraw his guilty plea fails for the basic reason that he made no motion to withdraw his plea.

Mudgett accurately frames the primary question: “As a threshold inquiry, this court must first determine whether appellant did indeed move the district court prior to sentencing for withdrawal of his plea such that the court would then have been obligated to exercise its discretion in accord with Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2.” Our answer to the question is, no. Mudgett asserts that he made a proper pre-sentencing motion to withdraw his plea, contending that the district court was bound to address his request to withdraw once the court “determined that it was going to” deny his motion for a downward sentencing departure. The state ignores the substantive issue and focuses only on whether the rules allow a defendant to make an oral motion to withdraw a guilty plea, and it contends that Mudgett was required to submit a written motion. See Minn. R.Crim. P. 32 (“A motion other than one made during a ... hearing shall be in writing unless the court or these rules permit it to be made orally.”). We need not decide whether a motion must be written because Mudgett’s contingent request, written or not, did not require treatment as a pre-sentencing plea-withdrawal motion.

The rules do not specify any particular language required for a request to be a “motion,” and ordinary definitions of the terms do not give much guidance. The rules provide only that “[a]n application to the court for an order shall be by motion.” Minn. R.Crim. P. 32. A “motion” is simply a “written or oral application requesting a court to make a specified ruling or order.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1036 (8th ed. 2004). And an “application” is “a request or petition.”. Id. at 108. So in circular fashion, a motion is an application requesting court action, and an application is simply a request; then, a motion is a request that requests action. This clearly is not helpful.

At least in civil litigation, it has been said that an informal reference, such as a party’s objection to a court order that is not accompanied by a specific application for relief, is not a motion. Raughley v. Penn. R. Co., 230 F.2d 387, 391 (3rd Cir. 1956). But Mudgett’s informal comments included a clear application for relief. Mudgett vaguely — but clearly enough to be understood — requested the district court to entertain argument on a pre-sen-tencing request to withdraw his guilty plea “if’ the district court “is not inclined” to sentence Mudgett according to his formalized motion for a downward sentencing departure. So our decision as to whether Mudgett’s request is the kind that must be treated as a motion under the rules depends on what the meaning of the word, “if,” is.

We conclude that Mudgett’s “if’ justified the district court’s decision not to entertain his conditional plea-withdrawal request. The “if’ rendered his statement to be a contingent request asking the district court to consider the validity of his guilty plea on the condition that the district court was itself inclined to rule against Mud-gett’s pending sentencing motion. The triggering event for Mudgett’s motion was the district court’s own deliberations: If the district court was disinclined to grant, or was leaning away from granting, or was thinking disfavorably about, Mudgett’s sentencing motion, then the district court was to avoid making any sentencing ruling based on that disinclination and to replace the pending motion with one that might invalidate Mudgett’s underlying guilty plea altogether. He asked the district court to consider the replacement motion depending on the court’s assessment of the likely outcome of the yet-undecided sentencing motion. So understood, Mudgett’s request was not a motion that required district-court action.

Mudgett is correct that he has a right to a judicial ruling on an actual motion, see Minn.Stat. § 546.27, subd. 1(a) (2006) (providing that all motions submitted for decision shall be decided), but he fails to support the implied proposition that he also has the right to be informed of the court’s extant analytical considerations, or of its inclination, before that ruling is made. The rales require the district court to inform the parties that it is considering departing from the presumptive sentence so that they may argue the appropriateness of the potential sentencing departure. Minn. R.Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 1(C). But after the parties have been heard regarding what sentence the court should impose, there is no rule requiring the district court to divulge its sentencing contemplations or inclination before it imposes the sentence. This is not to say that the rules prohibit a district court from disclosing its inclination regarding sentencing alternatives before imposing the sentence to allow a defendant to consider his options, including perhaps whether to make a pre-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea. But the rules do not require this disclosure. It stands to reason, therefore, that a defendant does not have the right to make the fashioning of a plea-withdrawal motion contingent on the district court’s inclination to impose any particular sentence in response to a sentencing motion pending before the court.

Mudgett argues that the district court should have treated his statement at sentencing as a motion to “either grant a downward sentencing departure or, in the alternative, allow him to withdraw his plea.” Taken out of context from the balance of his argument and from the actual procedural setting, this assertion might have been persuasive. If Mudgett had requested the district court to decide the sentencing motion first, for example, and then, assuming the court denied that motion by imposing the presumptive sentence, to entertain an alternative motion to withdraw his guilty plea, he would be in a position that is consistent with this argument. In that situation, the district court could treat the issues in their reasonable order: Once it imposed Mudgett’s sentence, the court could then hear argument on his posi-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea. But his appellate brief consistently urges that the district court should have considered his plea-withdrawal motion as a pre-sentencing motion. It would seem that Mudgett seeks the benefit of a pre-sentencing motion framed in a post-sentencing setting, and the difference between the two is material.

The order of events is significant because, as we recently explained, the standard of proof to withdraw a guilty plea is lower for motions brought before sentencing than for those brought after sentencing. Anderson v. State, 746 N.W.2d 901 (Minn.App.2008). A defendant moving to withdraw his plea before sentencing may prevail merely on a showing that it would be “fair and just” to allow him to do so, but a defendant seeking to withdraw after sentencing must show a “manifest injustice.” Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.05, subds. 1, 2. Mudgett’s argument mistakenly implies that he was entitled to the benefit of the lower, pre-sentencing standard of proof for a plea-withdrawal motion depending essentially on the length or nature of his sentence. If this argument were persuasive, defendants could hedge their bets in their decisions to plead guilty, avoiding the risk of the higher standard of proof associated with post-sentencing plea-withdrawal motions. A perceptive defendant could then circumvent the more strenuous post-sentencing standard by entering a plea agreement that purports to accept a presumptive sentence but then bringing a contingent “motion” to withdraw the plea before sentencing predicated on a judicial forecast of the pending sentencing decision. Although defendants in plea negotiations might appreciate that extra protection against the risk of unfavorable sentencing, this approach is not contemplated by the applicable rules.

Mudgett contends that this court must follow the logic of State v. Curtiss, 353 N.W.2d 262 (Minn.App.1984), and remand so that he may argue for plea withdrawal under the pre-sentencing, fair-and-just standard. The analogy is not persuasive. In Curtiss, we determined that the district court abused its discretion because it failed to consider reasons offered for departing downward from the presumptive sentence. Id. at 263-64. Mudgett argues that the district court here similarly failed to apply any discretion by refusing to consider his motion to withdraw his plea. But the question in Curtiss was not whether the defendant presented an actual motion. And Curtiss offers no analysis concerning any of the issues that bear on our decision.

DECISION

We hold that Mudgett’s conditional request to withdraw his guilty plea, which was made contingent on the district court’s inclination to rule a certain way on Mud-gett’s pending sentencing motion, was not a proper pre-sentencing plea-withdrawal motion that the district court was required to entertain. We therefore affirm Mud-gett’s conviction.

Affirmed.


author: GILDEA, Justice. ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice

text:
    CITY OF MORRIS, Respondent, v. SAX INVESTMENTS, INC., Appellant.
    No. A06-1188.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    May 15, 2008.

      J. Richard Stermer, Montevideo, MN, for Appellant.
    Charles C. Glasrud, Morris, MN, George C. Hoff, Hoff, Barry & Kuderer, PA, Eden Prairie, MN, for Respondent.
    Susan Lynn Naughton, St. Paul, MN, for League of Minnesota Cities Amicus.

      Terry Lee Adkins, Patricia Kay Alfred-son, Rochester, MN, for City if Rochester Amicus.
    Gerald T. Hendrickson, St. Paul, MN, for City of St. Paul Amicus.
   OPINION

GILDEA, Justice.

In this case, we must determine whether the Minnesota State Building Code, Minn.Stat. §§ 16B.59-.75 (2006), permits the enforcement of four inspection standards contained in the Rental Licensing Ordinance of the City of Morris (Rental Licensing Ordinance), Morris, Minn., Rental Licensing Ordinance § 4.32 (2002). The district court concluded that the ordinance provisions regulate the business of rental housing, not the design or construction of buildings, and are therefore permitted under state law. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the ordinance provisions do not regulate “the act of building,” but instead impose “standards of habitability” on “the subsequent use of the building as a business.” City of Morns v. Sax Invs., Inc., 730 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn.App.2007). We conclude that the ordinance provisions regulating ground fault interrupter receptacles, bathroom ventilation, and egress window covers are building code provisions that regulate a component or system of a residential structure and differ impermissibly from the State Building Code, and that these provisions are therefore prohibited by state law. But we conclude that the factual record is insufficient for us to determine whether the ordinance provision regulating smoke detectors in sleeping rooms is prohibited by state law. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the district court.

The Rental Licensing Ordinance prohibits the use of residential property as rental property unless the property has been licensed by the City for such use. Morris, Minn., Rental Licensing Ordinance § 4.32, subd. 3. Before a license is issued, the property must be inspected and found to “fully comply with all the provisions of the applicable rules, standards, statutes and ordinances which pertain to such dwelling units.” Id., subd. 6. Among the provisions that the property must satisfy before licensure are extensive inspection standards contained in the ordinance. Id., subd. 21.

Appellant Michael Sax owns property in the City of Morris. On January 3, 2005, Sax registered the property as residential rental property. The record does not reveal whether the building on the property is a single-family or multi-family building. The parties agree, however, that no known improvements or alterations (other than replacement of shingles, siding, and exteri- or trim) have been made to the building since the State Building Code went into effect in 1972.

On January 18, 2005, an enforcement officer for the City of Morris inspected the property and identified eight violations of the inspection standards contained in the Rental Licensing Ordinance. The City ordered Sax to correct these violations. When the property was re-inspected two months later, four of the eight violations still had not been corrected: (1) ground fault interrupter receptacles were not installed on outlets within 6 feet of water sources in the kitchen, bathroom, and basement; (2) the bathroom did not contain either a window or a ventilation fan; (3) the egress windows in the basement lacked covers; and (4) the basement bedroom did not have a smoke detector. The City assessed a $50 fee due to the failed re-inspection.

After Sax refused to correct the remaining violations and pay the re-inspection fee, the City of Morris initiated the present action seeking temporary and permanent injunctions prohibiting Sax from leasing his property to residential tenants until the four remaining violations were corrected and the re-inspection fee was paid. In his answer to the City’s complaint, Sax asserted that the remaining violations were not subject to a correction order because the property complies with the requirements of the Minnesota State Building Code. Sax also filed a counterclaim seeking an order directing the City to issue a residential rental license for the property and an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the ordinance provisions.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court ordered summary judgment in favor of the City on both the City’s claim for a temporary injunction and Sax’s counterclaims. The court concluded that the State Building Code does not prohibit local regulations that are “not directly tied to building design or construction,” even if the subject of the local regulation “is also addressed in the State Building Code.” Because it found that the ordinance provisions at issue in this case “are not structural, do not involve the ‘design or construction’ of the property, and do not involve complex ‘components or systems’ within [Sax’s] rental property,” the court concluded that the ordinance “regulates certain safety and health provisions that are part and parcel of the business of renting residential property in the City of Morris” and is therefore “a valid exercise of the City’s police powers.”

The court of appeals held that the State Building Code supersedes only local regulations pertaining “to construction, remodeling, alteration, or restoration, that is, to the act of building, and not to the subsequent use of the building as a business.” Sax Invs., 730 N.W.2d at 556. Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that “[l]ocal authorities retain the right to regulate the business of rental housing by enacting standards of habitability.” Id. Without defining “standards of habitability,” and without analyzing whether the ordinance provisions at issue constitute “local building ordinances” or “standards of habitability,” the court of appeals affirmed the district court. Id. We granted Sax’s petition for further review.

On review of a “grant [of] summary judgment, we determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of the law.” In re Estate of Kinney, 733 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Minn.2007); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. The application of statutes, administrative regulations, and local ordinances to undisputed facts is a legal conclusion and is reviewed de novo. See Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enters., Inc., 581 N.W.2d 855, 856 (Minn.1998); Wallin v. Letourneau, 534 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Minn.1995); St. Otto’s Home v. Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 437 N.W.2d 35, 39 (Minn.1989).

I.

The questions presented in this case concern the scope of the Minnesota State Building Code. The State Building Code “governs the construction, reconstruction, alteration, and repair of buildings.” Minn. Stat. § 16B.59. The purpose of the code is to “provide basic and uniform performance standards, establish reasonable safeguards for health, safety, welfare, comfort, and security of the residents of this state and provide for the use of modern methods, devices, materials, and techniques which will in part tend to lower construction costs.” Id. To effectuate this legislative purpose, the statute instructs the Commissioner of Administration to establish by administrative rule “a code of standards for the construction, reconstruction, alteration, and repair of buildings, governing matters of structural materials, design and construction, fire protection, health, sanitation, and safety.” Minn.Stat. § 16B.61, subd. 1. Most of the substantive standards are addressed in these administrative rules, which encompass several separate chapters of Minnesota Rules. See Minn. R. 1300.0050 (2007) (listing the Minnesota State Building Code as including chapters 1300-70, 4715, and 7670-78).

Shortly after the State Building Code became effective in 1972, Act of May 26, 1971, ch. 561, § 4, 1971 Minn. Laws 1018, 1020, we considered the interaction between the State Building Code and municipal regulation in City of Minnetonka v. Mark Z. Jones Assocs., Inc., 306 Minn. 217, 218-19, 236 N.W.2d 163, 165 (1975). In that case, a municipality sought to enforce a fire prevention ordinance that required the developer of an apartment complex to install an emergency lighting system in hallways and exits, and a sprinkler system in the basement garage. Id. at 218, 236 N.W.2d at 164-65. Although we recognized that municipalities were “undoubtedly” authorized to adopt some fire prevention ordinances, we held that the State Building Code preempts local ordinances that “affect [ ] the construction and design of buildings.” Id. at 219-20, 236 N.W.2d at 165. In holding that the Minnetonka fire prevention ordinance provisions were preempted by state law, we concluded that “we are influenced, if not governed, by the fact that the State Building Code itself deals extensively with fire prevention and fire-related safety measures.” Id. at 222, 236 N.W.2d at 167.

Since our decision in Mark Z. Jones, the legislature has added language to the State Building Code that specifically addresses municipal regulation of residential structures. Act of May 29, 2001, ch. 207, § 3, 2001 Minn. Laws 849, 850 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 16B.62, subd. 1). The specific issue here is whether the State Building Code, as currently written, leaves room for the enforcement of four inspection standards contained in the Rental Licensing Ordinance.

Generally, “municipalities have no inherent powers and possess only such powers as are expressly conferred by statute or implied as necessary in aid of those powers which have been expressly conferred.” Mangold Midwest Co. v. Village of Richfield, 274 Minn. 347, 357, 143 N.W.2d 813, 820 (1966). Among other powers, statutory cities have the power to enact and enforce ordinances to promote “health, safety, order, convenience, and the general welfare.” Minn.Stat. § 412.221, subd. 32 (2006).

Notwithstanding a city’s broad “power to legislate in regard to municipal affairs,” state law may limit the power of a city to act in a particular area. Mangold, 274 Minn. at 357, 143 N.W.2d at 819-20 (internal quotation omitted). For example, a city cannot enact a local regulation that conflicts with state law, and state law may “fully occupy a particular field of legislation so that there is no room for local regulation.” Id. at 356, 143 N.W.2d at 819 (internal quotation omitted). In Mangold, we set forth four questions that are relevant in determining whether the area is one the legislature has “impliedly declared” to be an “area solely of state concern”:

(1) What is the ‘subject matter’ which is to be regulated? (2) Has the subject matter been so fully covered by state law as to have become solely a matter of state concern? (3) Has the legislature in partially regulating the subject matter indicated that it is a matter solely of state concern? (4) Is the subject matter itself of such a nature that local regulation would have unreasonably adverse effects upon the general populace of the state?

Id. at 358, 143 N.W.2d at 820. This analysis does not apply, however, when the legislature’s intent to limit municipal regulation in a particular area is expressly stated in the language of the statute. See id. at 359, 143 N.W.2d at 821. When a statute contains specific language as to the extent of permissible municipal regulation, our focus is on the language of the statute. See State v. Kuhlman, 729 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Minn.2007) (applying the specific language of a state statute imposing a uniformity requirement on traffic regulations to determine the validity of a municipal ordinance authorizing photo enforcement of traffic control signals).

In this case, the relevant language of the State Building Code expresses the legislature’s specific intent to supersede municipal building codes. In enacting a statewide building code, the legislature recognized that a single, uniform set of building standards was necessary to lower costs and make housing more affordable. See Act of May 26, 1971, ch. 561, § 1, 1971 Minn. Laws 1018, 1019 (noting that multiple laws, ordinances, and rules regulating the construction of buildings “serve to increase costs without providing correlative benefits of safety to owners, builders, tenants, and users of buildings”). The statute therefore provides:

The State Building Code applies statewide and supersedes the building code of any municipality. A municipality must not by ordinance or through development agreement require building code provisions regulating components or systems of any residential structure that are different from any provision of the State Building Code.

Minn.Stat. § 16B.62, subd. 1. The parties agree that this language controls the resolution of this case. We turn next to the application of the plain wording of the statute.

II.

As noted above, the State Building Code currently provides that “[a] municipality must not by ordinance or through development agreement require building code provisions regulating components or systems of any residential structure that are different from any provision of the State Building Code.” Minn.Stat. § 16B.62, subd. 1. By its express terms, this language prohibits a municipal ordinance if (1) the ordinance is a building code provision; (2) it regulates a component or system of a residential structure; and (3) it is different from a provision of the State Building Code.

A. Building Code Provision

With respect to the first element of the express prohibition on municipal regulations of residential structures, the City asserts that the provisions of the Rental Licensing Ordinance are not “building code provisions.” Based on Mark Z. Jones, the City argues that the term “building code provisions” means that the regulation must affect “the design and construction” of the building, and the inspection standards at issue here do not relate to the design or the construction of Sax’s building. See Mark Z. Jones, 306 Minn. at 220, 236 N.W.2d at 165. According to the City, the ordinance merely regulates the business of rental housing, and the inspection standards relate to the use of the residence as rental property and its habitability — not its design and construction. The district court and court of appeals appear to have accepted this argument. The court of appeals concluded that the Rental Licensing Ordinance is not prohibited by the State Building Code because the ordinance regulates “the business of rental housing by enacting standards of habitability.” Sax Invs., 730 N.W.2d at 556.

We agree that the Rental Licensing Ordinance regulates the business of rental housing, but that conclusion does not resolve the issue presented in this case. Although we implicitly construed the term “building code” in Mark Z. Jones to include a regulation that “affects the construction and design of buildings,” 306 Minn. at 219, 236 N.W.2d at 165, we did not purport to exclude from that definition subjects that are plainly covered by the State Building Code. Indeed, we said that our decision in that case was “influenced, if not governed,” by the fact that the subject matter of the local ordinance was regulated by the State Building Code. See id. at 222, 236 N.W.2d at 167. In other words, if the subject of the regulation is included within the State Building Code, it is a “building code” regulation. We adopt the same reasoning in this case and conclude that the term “building code provision” means at least those subjects specifically regulated by the State Building Code.

The City also argues that the term “building code provisions” is limited to regulations on the new construction of buildings and does not include regulations on the subsequent use of buildings. But the plain text of the State Building Code refutes this interpretation. The statutory statement of policy and purpose provides that “[t]he State Building Code governs the construction, reconstruction, alteration, and repair of buildings and other structures.” Minn.Stat. § 16B.59 (emphasis added); see also Minn. Rule 1300.0040 (2005) (explaining that “[t]he code applies to the construction, alteration, moving, demolition, repair and use of any building * * * in a municipality”). Moreover, the State Building Code directly regulates the post-construction use of buildings through its use of occupancy classifications. The Code utilizes a system of occupancy classifications to tailor construction standards to different building types, and prohibits the use of a new building and changes in the occupancy classifications of an existing building unless the building complies with the code requirements that apply based on the intended use of the building. See Minn. R. 1300.0220 (2005). With respect to residential structures, the primary factors that distinguish between occupancy classes are (1) the transient or permanent nature of the typical occupants, and (2) the number of dwelling units in the structure. Minn. R. 1305.0310 (2005). Significant to our analysis in this case is the fact that in defining the building standards applicable to residential buildings, the State Building Code does not distinguish between buildings that are owner-occupied and those that are used as rental property.

Finally, the State Building Code regulates the post-construction use of buddings by specifically allowing the occupancy of an existing building to continue without complying with current code requirements (nonconforming use) unless a code provision is “specifically applicable to existing buildings.” 2000 Guidelines for the Rehabilitation of Existing Buildings § 104 (incorporated by reference into the State Building Code by Minn. R. 1311.0010 (2007)); see also Minn. R. 1300.0220, subp. 2 (stating that “[t]he legal occupancy of any structure existing on the date of adoption of the code shall be permitted to continue without change except as specifically required in chapter 1311”). In addition, the code does not permit existing conditions to continue if they are “unsafe” or “dangerous to human life.” See Minn. R. 1300.0180 (2007); Minn. R. 1311.0206 (2007). We therefore conclude that the term “building code provisions” is not limited to regulation of the new construction of buildings but may also include regulation on the subsequent use of a building.

B. Components or Systems

With respect to the second element of the express prohibition on municipal ordinances, we are asked to determine the meanings of “components” and “systems” in Minn.Stat. § 16B.62, subd. 1. When interpreting a statute, we “construe words and phrases according to their plain and ordinary meaning.” Am. Family Ins. Group v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn.2000); see also Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1) (2006). Although the statute itself does not define the terms “components” and “systems,” the administrative rules incorporate the Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, available at www.m-w.com, as the source of “ordinarily accepted meanings” for undefined terms in the State Building Code. Minn. R. 1300.0070, subp. 1 (2007); see also Minn. R. 1309.0201 (2007) (providing that the Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary “shall be considered as providing ordinarily accepted meanings” for terms in the International Residential Code). According to the Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, a “component” is “a constituent part.” “System,” meanwhile, is defined as “a regularly interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified whole,” or more specifically, “a group of devices or artificial objects or an organization forming a network especially for distributing something or serving a common purpose.” Because the administrative rules incorporate the definitions from this source, we apply these definitions in determining the scope of the municipal regulations that are prohibited under the State Building Code.

C. Different from

Finally, we consider the third element of the express prohibition on municipal ordinances: whether the municipal building code provision is “different from” any provision of the State Building Code. Minn.Stat. § 16B.62, subd. 1. Although the meaning of “different from” does not require extensive discussion, we do note that “different from” does not mean “in conflict with.” For example, in State v. Kuhlman, 729 N.W.2d 577 (Minn.2007), we interpreted the uniformity requirement of the Minnesota Traffic Regulations, which provides that the provisions of Minn.Stat. ch. 169 (2006) “shall be applicable and uniform throughout this state” and that “no local authority shall enact or enforce any rule or regulation in conflict with the provisions of this chapter unless expressly authorized herein.” Minn.Stat. § 169.022 (emphasis added). In Kuhlman, we concluded that “no conflict exists when an ordinance is merely additional and complementary to a state law and covers specifically what the statute covers generally.” 729 N.W.2d at 581. In contrast, under Minn.Stat. § 16B.62, subd. 1, any difference from the State Building Code is prohibited. Thus, even a provision that is merely additional and complementary to a provision in the State Building Code is prohibited.

III.

With these definitions in mind, we proceed to analyze whether the four inspection standards at issue here fall within the State Building Code’s express prohibition on municipal ordinances. The Rental Licensing Ordinance requires that residential buildings comply with several inspection standards before they may be used as rental property. The inspection standards at issue here require that (1) ground fault interrupter receptacles be installed on certain electrical outlets; (2) bathrooms receive ventilation from either an exterior window or a mechanical ventilation system; (3) rigid covers be installed over all egress windows; and (4) smoke detectors be installed in every sleeping room.

A. Ground Fault Interrupter Receptacles

We look first at the ordinance provision requiring ground fault interrupter receptacles. The Rental Licensing Ordinance provides that “[r]eceptacles in bathrooms, kitchens, and laundry rooms must be [ground fault interrupters] where receptacles are within 6 feet of a water supply.” Morris, Minn., Rental Licensing Oi'-dinance § 4.32, subd. 21(b) (Section 2.02). A ground fault interrupter receptacle is a safety device that replaces a standard outlet and protects against electrical shocks by switching off the power to a circuit if it senses any loss in current. See U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, GFCIs Fact Sheet, http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/ pubs/99.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2008). Because they replace standard electrical outlets, ground fault interrupter receptacles work with the other devices that comprise a building’s electrical system (i.e., wires, fuses or circuit breakers, and switches) to safely distribute electrical power for use throughout the building.

The Minnesota State Building Code requires that ground fault interrupter receptacles be used for outlets in several specific areas throughout dwelling units, including outlets in bathrooms, outlets installed to serve kitchen countertop surfaces, and outlets in laundry rooms near sinks. See 2002 National Electrical Code § 210.8; Minn. R. 1315.0200 (2005) (providing that “[a]ll new electrical wiring, apparatus, and equipment for electric light, heat, power, technology circuits and systems, and alarm and communication systems must comply with” the 2002 edition of the National Electrical Code, as approved by the American National Standards Institute, Minn.Stat. § 326.243, and the Minnesota State Building Code). Because this provision is not specifically applicable to existing buildings, the nonconforming use provisions of the State Building Code, Minn. R. 1300.0220, subp. 2, allow the continued use of an existing building without the installation of ground fault interrupter receptacles. See Minn. R. 1315.0200; 2002 National Electrical Code § 210.8.

We conclude that the provision of the Rental Licensing Ordinance requiring the use of ground fault interrupter receptacles meets all three elements of the prohibition on municipal ordinances in the State Building Code, Minn.Stat. § 16B.62, subd. 1. First, because ground fault interrupter receptacles are regulated by the State Building Code, this provision of the ordinance is a building code provision. Second, the ordinance also regulates a component or system of a residential structure by mandating the inclusion of a specific device in the electrical system of a residential structure. Finally, although the State Building Code permits the continued use of an existing residential structure without the installation of these devices, the ordinance requires these devices. We therefore conclude that this provision is invalid under the State Building Code.

B. Bathroom Ventilation

We look next at the ordinance provision pertaining to bathroom ventilation. The Rental Licensing Ordinance requires ventilation in a bathroom from either “openable exterior openings” — i.e., windows — or “a mechanical ventilation system connected directly to the outside.” Morris, Minn., Rental Licensing Ordinance § 4.32, subd. 21(f) (Section 4.02). This provision thus requires the incorporation of either a window or a mechanical ventilation system into the structure itself.

The State Building Code requires that bathrooms contain either a window that opens or “artificial light and a mechanical ventilation system” that exhausts air directly to the outside. 2000 International Residential Code § R303.3; see Minn. R. 1309.0010, subp. 1 (2005) (generally incorporating the 2000 edition of the International Residential Code into the Minnesota State Building Code by reference, with certain exceptions). A bathroom ventilation system, however, is not a requirement for existing residential buildings. See Minn. R. 1300.0220, subp. 2.

We conclude that the Rental Licensing Ordinance provision requiring ventilation in bathrooms meets all three elements of the prohibition on municipal ordinances in the State Building Code, Minn.Stat. § 16B.62, subd. 1. Because bathroom ventilation is covered by the State Budding Code, this provision of the ordinance is a building code provision. Moreover, by requiring the creation of an opening in the exterior shell of a building and the installation of a window or mechanical ventilation system in a bathroom, the provision regulates the components of a residential structure. And finally, like the ordinance’s regulation of ground fault interrupter receptacles, this provision differs from the State Building Code because the Code allows the continued nonconforming use of a residential building without a bathroom ventilation system. Therefore, this provision of the municipal ordinance is invalid under the State Building Code.

C. Egress Window Covers

Next, we consider the provision of the Rental Licensing Ordinance regarding egress windows. The ordinance requires rigid covers over basement egress windows. Morris, Minn., Rental Licensing Ordinance § 4.32, subd. 21(c) (Section 6.02). The State Building Code, however, expressly makes egress window covers optional:

Bars, grills, covers, screens or similar devices are permitted to be placed over emergency escape and rescue openings, bulkhead enclosures, or window wells that serve such openings, provided ⅜ * * such devices shall be releasable or removable from the inside without the use of a key, tool or force greater than that which is required for normal operation of the escape and rescue opening.

2000 International Residential Code § R310.4 (emphasis added); see Minn. R. 1309.0010, subp. 1.

We conclude that the Rental Licensing Ordinance provision requiring the installation of covers over egress windows meets all three elements of the prohibition on municipal ordinances in the State Building Code, Minn.Stat. § 16B.62, subd. 1. Because egress window covers are regulated by the State Building Code, this provision is a building code provision. Moreover, windows are incorporated into the structure of a building and therefore are components of that structure. The ordinance requires the installation of an additional device on some of these components and therefore constitutes a regulation of that component. It also directly requires that which the State Building Code leaves to the discretion of the building owner, and is therefore different from the State Building Code. Thus, this provision of the ordinance is invalid under the State Building Code.

D. Smoke Detectors

Finally, we address the smoke detector provision of the Rental Licensing Ordinance. The ordinance provides that “[a]ny room used for sleeping purposes shall be provided with smoke detectors.” Morris, Minn., Rental Licensing Ordinance § 4.32, subd. 21(c) (Section 2.01). The State Building Code also requires the installation of smoke detectors “[i]n each sleeping room” and in other locations throughout the structure. 2000 International Residential Code § R317.1; see Minn. R. 1309.0010, subp. 3 (2005) (incorporating by reference the 2000 International Residential Code “Section R317 Smoke Alarms” into the State Building Code). Like the provisions discussed above, however, the State Building Code’s smoke detector requirements are not specifically applicable to existing residential structures. See Minn. R. 1300.0220, subp. 2.

But the State Building Code also requires that all dwellings must comply with Minn.Stat. § 299F.362 (2006), which addresses smoke detector requirements. MinmStat. § 16B.61, subd. 3(b) (2006). Section 299F.362 requires that all dwellings be outfitted with smoke detectors as required by the State Fire Code, id., subds. 3-3a, and generally prohibits a municipality from adopting smoke detector requirements that are different from the State Fire Code, id., subd. 7. See also Minn. R. ch. 7511 (2007) (the Minnesota State Fire Code). Local governing bodies, however, are specifically authorized to adopt more restrictive smoke detector requirements for single-family homes: “Notwithstanding subdivision 7, or other law, a local governing body may adopt, by ordinance, rules for the installation of a smoke detector in single-family homes in the city that are more restrictive than the standards provided by this section.” Minn. Stat. § 299F.362, subd. 9 (emphasis added). If the building at issue in this case is a single-family home, the smoke detector provision of the Rental Licensing Ordinance would be expressly permitted by section 299F.362, subdivision 9, and would therefore not be different than the State Building Code. But because the record in this case does not reveal whether the building owned by Sax is a single-family home, we cannot determine whether the ordinance provision requiring the installation of smoke detectors in each sleeping room is invalid under state law. Accordingly, we remand this issue to the district court for further proceedings.

IV.

The City of Morris and the amici curiae City of Saint Paul, City of Rochester, and League of Minnesota Cities argue that municipalities must, as a matter of public policy, have the authority to enforce habitability standards to protect the health and safety of tenants from substandard housing. The cities assert that property owners do not have the same incentives to maintain rental property as they do their own residences, and tenants generally have little leverage to require landlords to address habitability problems. We recognize that substandard housing raises health and safety issues for municipalities, and that disposition of this case raises considerations about the ability of municipalities to address these issues. But regardless of our view on the merits of these policy arguments, we are bound to apply the policy decisions adopted by the legislature and embodied in the State Building Code. In this case, the plain statutory text clearly indicates that the City’s building code provisions regulating ground fault interrupter receptacles, bathroom ventilation, and egress window covers are invalid because they are “different from” the State Building Code. Minn.Stat. § 16B.62, subd. I.

V.

Finally, the City of Morris argues that the four ordinance violations at issue in this case involve unsafe conditions that should be considered “dangerous to human life,” which allows the City to take action against the property. See Minn. R. 1311.0206 (requiring a building official to order a building vacated “if its continued use is dangerous to life, health, or safety” and requiring all unsafe buildings to be “abated by repair, rehabilitation, demolition, or removal”). But Sax’s property was not cited as being “dangerous to life, health, or safety,” and this issue was not raised in the City’s complaint. In addition, this issue was not argued to either the district court or the court of appeals, and was not raised in connection with Sax’s petition for further review. We therefore conclude that this issue is not properly before us. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn.1988).

Because we conclude that the City’s regulations requiring ground fault interrupter receptacles, ventilation in bathrooms, and egress window covers are building code provisions that regulate a component or system of a residential structure and are different from the State Building Code, these regulations are invalid under Minn. Stat. § 16B.62, subd. 1. But because the factual record is insufficient to determine whether the regulation requiring smoke detectors in every sleeping room is permitted under state law, we remand this issue to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

DIETZEN, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

DISSENT

ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice

(concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that the provisions of the municipal ordinance regulating ground fault interrupter receptacles and bathroom ventilation are prohibited by the State Building Code. But I conclude that egress window coverings are not “components or systems” of a “residential structure” and therefore may be regulated under the municipal ordinance. Minn.Stat. § 16B.62, subd. 1 (2006).

The majority correctly concludes that “ground fault interrupter receptacles work with the other devices that comprise a building’s electrical system.” I therefore agree that such receptacles are part of the system of a residential structure, and thus the State Building Code prohibits municipalities from regulating them in a way that differs from the Code. Similarly, a bathroom ventilation provision that requires “the incorporation of either a window or a mechanical ventilation system into the structure itself, see Morris, Minn., Rental Licensing Ordinance § 4.32, subd. 21(f), § 4.02 (2002),” regulates a component of a residential structure because it affects a “constituent part” of that structure. Thus the State Building code also prohibits municipalities from regulating bathroom ventilation differently.

Unlike ground fault interrupter receptacles and bathroom ventilation, I conclude that coverings on egress windows are neither “systems” nor “components” of a residential structure. The majority reasons that because egress windows are components of a residential structure,' and because an ordinance requiring window covers requires the installation of an additional device on these components, the ordinance regulates the components themselves. While I agree that an egress window itself may be a component of a residential structure, extending the definition of “component” to include the window cover goes too far.

An egress window cover is an external add-on that is neither a part of the structure itself, nor a part of any systems that are part of the structure. Because egress window covers easily attach to the outside surface of a window on a residential structure (if they are attached at all), regulation of such covers would not require an owner to rewire anything within the structure, as would the installation of ground fault interrupter receptacles, or to cut into walls or any other part of the structure, as would bathroom ventilation regulations. Because the State Building Code explicitly states that only “building code provisions regulating components or systems of any residential structure” are prohibited, Minn.Stat. § 16B.62, subd. 1, and because I conclude that egress window coverings are not “components or systems,” I further conclude that the State Building Code does not prohibit the regulation of egress window covers. Thus, I would hold that the district court did not err when it concluded that the municipality’s ordinance provision requiring the installation of rigid covers over basement egress windows is valid under the State Building Code.

      . Additionally, the City argues that our decision in Mark Z. Jones held that the State Building Code only prohibits municipal regulations that affect something that is ‘'integral” to the design and construction of a building. See 306 Minn. at 218, 236 N.W.2d at 165. At one point in Mark Z. Jones, we did describe the specific fire prevention devices at issue as "an integral part of the construction of the building.” Id. at 218, 236 N.W.2d at 165. But throughout our analysis and in our actual holding, we did not limit preemption to only those regulations that were an "integral part” of the design or construction of buildings. See id. at 219, 236 N.W.2d at 165 (holding that "insofar as local ordinances purport to adopt fire prevention measures which affect the design and construction of buildings, they are in conflict with the State Building Code which has preempted that field”). We likewise decline to engraft this limitation onto the statute in this case.

      . We apply the standards in effect at the time of the complaint, but we note that some of the applicable standards have changed since then. See, e.g., Minn. R. 1309.0010 (2007) (generally adopting the 2006 edition of the International Residential Code by reference); Minn. R. 1309.0313 (2007) (addressing smoke alarm requirements for alterations, repairs or additions).

      . The State Building Code also provides for a separate residential building classification consisting of residential care and assisted living facilities serving between 6 and 16 occupants. See Minn. R. 1305.0310 (2005).

      . Section 4.02 states in full:
      Bathrooms, water closets, laundry rooms and similar rooms shall be provided with natural ventilation by means of openable exterior openings with an area not less than one twentieth of the floor area of such rooms with a minimum of 1 ½ square feet.
      In lieu of required exterior openings for natural ventilation in bathrooms containing a bathtub or shower or combination thereof, laundry rooms, and similar rooms, a mechanical ventilation system connected directly to the outside capable of providing five air changes per hour shall be provided. The point of discharge of exhaust air shall be at least 3 feet from any opening into the building. Bathrooms which contain only a water closet and lavatory, and similar rooms, may be ventilated with an approved mechanical system and shall not be recirculated.
      Morris, Minn., Rental Licensing Ordinance § 4.32, subd. 21(f) (Section 4.02).

      . Section 6.02 states in full:
      Window Coverings-Egress window wells must be covered and free of any obstruction. Window well covers are required for each egress window. Covers shall be of rigid and transparent or translucent material with framework of decay resistant material or manufactured covers designed to fit a window well.
      Morris, Minn., Rental Licensing Ordinance § 4.32, subd. 21(c) (Section 6.02) (emphasis added).

      . Section 2.01 states in full:
      Smoke Detectors/Alarms — Any room used for sleeping purposes shall be provided with smoke detectors. Detectors shall be installed in accordance with the approved manufacturer's instructions. When a dwelling unit has more than one story and in dwellings with basements, a detector shall also be installed on each story including the basement. Detectors shall sound an alarm audible in all sleeping areas of the dwelling unit in which they are located. All smoke detectors shall be maintained operational at all times.
      Morris, Minn., Rental Licensing Ordinance § 4.32, subd. 21(c) (Section 2.01).

      . Our decision should not be misconstrued as precluding all municipal regulation of rental housing. For example, municipalities are permitted to require that a residential structure be inspected and found to comply with valid state and local regulations — including the "dangerous to human life" provisions of the State Building Code — before a rental license is issued for the property. See Minn. Stat. § 16B.62, subd. 1 (discussing the adoption and enforcement of State Building Code by municipalities); see also Minn.Stat. § 504B.161, subd. 1(3) (2006) (requiring that landlords comply with "health and safety laws of the state * * ⅞ and of the local units of government where the premises are located”). In addition, municipal rental housing regulations are not prohibited by the State Building Code if they do not regulate components or systems of a residential structure covered by the Slate Building Code and are not different from any provisions in the State Building Code. This leaves many permissible areas of regulation.