author: Justice Thomas Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg,

text:
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE et al. v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY et al.
    No. 92-1223.
    Argued November 8, 1993
    Decided February 23, 1994

      Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 504. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 504.

      Christopher J. Wright argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Leonard Schaitman, and Sandra Wien Simon.

      David M. Smith argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Federal Labor Relations Authority were William R. Tobey, William E. Persina, and Pamela P. Johnson. Mark D. Roth, Charles A. Hobbie, Stuart A. Kirsch, Walter Kamiat, and Laurence Gold filed a brief for respondent American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO.

        Rossie D. Alston, Jr., filed a brief for the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal.

        Gregory O’Duden and Elaine Kaplan filed a brief for the National Treasury Employees- Union as amiciis curiae urging affirmance.

   Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us to consider whether disclosure of the home addresses of federal civil service employees by their employing agency pursuant to a request made by the employees’ collective-bargaining representative under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U. S. C. §§7101-7135 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV), would constitute a “clearly unwarranted invasion” of the employees’ personal privacy within the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552. Concluding that it would, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I

The controversy underlying this case arose when two local unions requested the petitioner federal agencies to provide them with the names and home addresses of the agency employees in the bargaining units represented by the unions. The agencies supplied the unions with the employees’ names and work stations, but refused to release home addresses.

In response, the unions filed unfair labor practice charges with respondent Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority), in which they contended that the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (Labor Statute), 5 U. S. C. §§7101-7135 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV), required the agencies to divulge the addresses. The Labor Statute generally provides that agencies must, “to the extent not prohibited by law,” furnish unions with data that are necessary for collective-bargaining purposes. § 7114(b)(4). The agencies argued that disclosure of the home addresses was prohibited by the Privacy Act of 1974 (Privacy Act), 5 U. S. C. § 552a (1988 ed. and Supp. IV). Relying on its earlier decision in Department of Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, N H., 37 F. L. R. A. 515 (1990) (Portsmouth), application for enforcement denied and cross-petition for review granted sub nom. FLRA v. Department of Navy, Naval Communications Unit Cutler, 941 F. 2d 49 (CA1 1991), the Authority rejected that argument and ordered the agencies to divulge the addresses. Department of Defense, Army and Air Force Exchange Serv., Dallas, Tex., 37 F. L. R. A. 930 (1990); Department of Navy, 37 F. L. R. A. 652 (1990).

A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted enforcement of the Authority’s orders. 975 F. 2d 1105 (1992). The panel majority agreed with the Authority that the unions’ requests for home addresses fell within a statutory exception to the Privacy Act. That Act does not bar disclosure of personal information if disclosure would be “required under section 552 of this title [the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)].” 5 U. S. C. §552a(b)(2). The court below observed that FOIA, with certain enumerated exceptions, generally mandates full disclosure of information held by agencies. In the view of the Court of Appeals, only one of the enumerated exceptions— the provision exempting from FOIA’s coverage personnel files “the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(6) (Exemption 6) — potentially applied to this case. 975 F. 2d, at 1109.

In determining whether Exemption 6 applied, the Fifth •Circuit balanced the public interest in effective collective bargaining embodied in the Labor Statute against the interest of employees in keeping their home addresses private. The court recognized that, in light of our decision in Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm, for Freedom of Press, 489 U. S. 749 (1989), other Courts of Appeals had concluded that the only public interest to be weighed in the Exemption 6 balancing analysis is the extent to which FOIA’s central purpose of opening agency action to public scrutiny would be served by disclosure. Rejecting that view, however, the panel majority reasoned that Reporters Committee “has absolutely nothing to say about . . . the situation that arises when disclosure is initially required by some statute other than the FOIA, and the FOIA is employed only secondarily.” 975 F. 2d, at 1113. In such cases, the court ruled that “it is proper for the federal court to consider the public interests embodied in the statute which generates the disclosure request.” Id., at 1115.

Applying this approach, the court concluded that, because the weighty interest in public sector collective bargaining identified by Congress in the Labor Statute would be advanced by the release of the home addresses, disclosure “would not constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Id., at 1116. In the panel majority’s view, because Exemption 6 would not apply, FOIA would require disclosure of the addresses; in turn, therefore, the Privacy Act did not forbid the agencies to divulge the addresses, and the Authority’s orders were binding. Ibid. The dissenting judge argued that Reporters Committee controlled the case and barred the agencies from disclosing their employees’ addresses to the unions. Id., at 1116-1119 (Garza, J., dissenting).

We granted certiorari, 507 U. S. 1003 (1993), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals concerning whether the Privacy Act forbids the disclosure of employee addresses to collective-bargaining representatives pursuant to information requests made under the Labor Statute.

II

Like the Court of Appeals, we begin our analysis with the terms of the Labor Statute, which governs labor-management relations in the federal civil service. Consistent with the congressional finding that “labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public interest,” 5 U. S. C. § 7101(a), the Labor Statute requires an agency to accord exclusive recognition to a labor union that is elected by employees to serve as the representative of a bargaining unit. § 7111(a). An exclusive representative must represent fairly all employees in the unit, regardless of whether they choose to become union members. § 7114(a)(1). The Labor Statute also imposes a duty on the agency and the exclusive representative to negotiate in good faith for the purpose of arriving at a collective-bargaining agreement. § 7114(a)(4).

To fulfill its good-faith bargaining obligation, an agency must, inter alia, “furnish to the exclusive representative involved, or its authorized representative, upon request and, to the extent not prohibited by law, data . . . (B) which is reasonably available and necessary for full and proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation of subjects within the scope of collective bargaining.” § 7114(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The Authority has determined that the home addresses of bargaining unit employees constitute information that is “necessary” to the collective-bargaining process because through them, unions may communicate with employees more effectively than would otherwise be possible. See Portsmouth, 37 F. L. R. A., at 532 (“In the home environment, the employee has the leisure and the privacy to give the full and thoughtful attention to the union’s message that the workplace generally does not permit”); Farmers Home Admin. Finance Office, 23 F. L. R. A. 788, 796-797 (1986). This determination, which has been upheld by several Courts of Appeals, is not before us. Nor is there any dispute that the addresses are “reasonably available.” Therefore, unless disclosure is “prohibited by law,” agencies such as petitioners must release home addresses to exclusive representatives upon request.

Petitioners contend that the Privacy Act prohibits disclosure. This statute provides in part:

“No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains, unless disclosure of the record would be ... (2) required under section 552 of this title [FOIA].” 5 U. S. C. § 552a(b)(2) (1988 ed. and Supp. IV).

The employee addresses sought by the unions are “records” covered by the broad terms of the Privacy Act. Therefore, unless FOIA would require release of the addresses, their disclosure is “prohibited by law,” and the agencies may not reveal them to the unions.

We turn, then, to FOIA. As we have recognized previously, FOIA reflects “a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language.” Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U. S. 352, 360-361 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also ERA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73, 79-80 (1973). Thus, while “disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of [FOIA],” there are a number of exemptions from the statute’s broad reach. Rose, supra, at 361. The exemption potentially applicable to employee addresses is Exemption 6, which provides that FOIA’s disclosure requirements do not apply to “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(6).

Thus, although this case requires us to follow a somewhat convoluted path of statutory cross-references, its proper resolution depends upon a discrete inquiry: whether disclosure of the home addresses “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of [the] personal privacy” of bargaining unit employees within the meaning of FOIA. For guidance in answering this question, we need look no further than to our decision in Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U. S. 749 (1989).

Reporters Committee involved FOIA requests addressed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation that sought the “rap sheets” of several individuals. In the process of deciding that the FBI was prohibited from disclosing the contents of the rap sheets, we reaffirmed several basic principles that have informed our interpretation of FOIA. First, in evaluating whether a request for information lies within the scope of a FOIA exemption, such as Exemption 6, that bars disclosure when it would amount to an invasion of privacy that is to some degree “unwarranted,” “a court must balance the public interest in disclosure against the interest Congress intended the [exemption to protect.” Id., at 776. See also Rose, supra, at 372.

Second, the only relevant “public interest in disclosure” to be weighed in this balance is the extent to which disclosure would serve the “core purpose of the FOIA,” which is “contribut[ing] significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government.” Reporters Comm., supra, at 775 (internal quotation marks omitted). We elaborated on this point at some length:

“[FOIA’s] basic policy of ‘full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language’ indeed focuses on the citizens’ right to be informed about what their government is up to. Official information that sheds light on an agency’s performance of its statutory duties falls squarely within that statutory purpose. That purpose, however, is not fostered by disclosure of information about private citizens that is accumulated in various governmental files but that reveals little or nothing about an agency’s own conduct.” 489 U. S., at 773 (quoting Rose, supra, at 360-361) (other internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

See also Rose, supra, at 372 (Exemption 6 cases “require a balancing of the individual’s right of privacy against the preservation of the basic purpose of [FOIA] to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Third, “whether an invasion of privacy is warranted cannot turn on the purposes for which the request for information is made.” Reporters Comm., 489 U. S., at 771. Because “Congress ‘clearly intended’ the FOIA ‘to give any member of the public as much right to disclosure as one with a special interest [in a particular document],’ ” ibid, (quoting NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S. 132, 149 (1975)), except in certain cases involving claims of privilege, “the identity of the requesting party has no bearing on the merits of his or her FOIA request,” 489 U. S., at 771.

III

The principles that we followed in Reporters Committee can be applied easily to this case. We must weigh the privacy interest of bargaining unit employees in nondisclosure of their addresses against the only relevant public interest in the FOIA balancing analysis — the extent to which disclosure of the information sought would “she[d] light on an agency’s performance of its statutory duties” or otherwise let citizens know “what their government is up to.” Reporters Comm., supra, at 773 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis deleted).

The relevant public interest supporting disclosure in this case is negligible, at best. Disclosure of the addresses might allow the unions to communicate more effectively with employees, but it would not appreciably further “the citizens’ right to be informed about what their government is up to.” 489 U. S., at 773 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, such disclosure would reveal little or nothing about the employing agencies or their activities. Even the Fifth Circuit recognized that “[r]elease of the employees’ . . . addresses would not in any meaningful way open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.” 975 F. 2d, at 1113.

Apparently realizing that this conclusion follows ineluctably from an application of the FOIA tenets we embraced in Reporters Committee, respondents argue that Reporters Committee is largely inapposite here because it dealt with an information request made directly under FOIA, whereas the unions’ requests for home addresses initially were made under the Labor Statute, and implicated FOIA only incidentally through a chain of statutory cross-references. In such a circumstance, contend respondents, to give full effect to the three statutes involved and to allow unions to perform their statutory representational duties, we should import the policy considerations that are made explicit in the Labor Statute into the FOIA Exemption 6 balancing analysis. If we were to do so, respondents are confident we would conclude that the Labor Statute’s policy favoring collective bargaining easily outweighs any privacy interest that employees might have in nondisclosure.

We decline to accept respondents’ ambitious invitation to rewrite the statutes before us and to disregard the FOIA principles reaffirmed in Reporters Committee. The Labor Statute does not, as the Fifth Circuit suggested, merely “borro[w] the FOIA’s disclosure calculus for another purpose.” 975 F. 2d, at 1115. Rather, it allows the disclosure of information necessary for effective collective bargaining only “to the extent not prohibited by law.” 5 U. S. C. § 7114(b)(4). Disclosure of the home addresses is prohibited by the Privacy Act unless an exception to that Act applies. The terms of the Labor Statute in no way suggest that the Privacy Act should be read in light of the purposes of the Labor Statute. If there is an exception, therefore, it must be found within the Privacy Act itself. Congress could have enacted an exception to the Privacy Act’s coverage for information “necessary” for collective-bargaining purposes, but it did not do so. In the absence of such a provision, respondents rely on the exception for information the disclosure of which would be “required under [FOIA].” §552a(b)(2). Nowhere, however, does the Labor Statute amend FOIA’s disclosure requirements or grant information requesters under the Labor Statute special status under FOIA. Therefore, because all FOIA requesters have an equal, and equally qualified, right to information, the fact that respondents are seeking to vindicate the policies behind the Labor Statute is irrelevant to the FOIA analysis. Cf. Reporters Comm., 489 U. S., at 771-772.

In her concurring opinion in FLRA v. Department of Treasury, Financial Management Serv., 884 F. 2d 1446 (CADC 1989), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 1055 (1990), then-judge Ginsburg cogently explained why we must reject respondents’ central argument:

“The broad cross-reference in 5 U. S. C. § 7114(b)(4) — ‘to the extent not prohibited by law’ — picks up the Privacy Act unmodified; that Act, in turn, shelters personal records absent the consent of the person to whom the record pertains, unless disclosure would be required under the [FOIA].
“Once placed wholly within the FOIA’s domain, the union requesting information relevant to collective bargaining stands in no better position than members of the general public. True, unions have a special interest in identifying and communicating with persons in the bargaining unit, an interest initially accommodated by [the Labor Statute]. The bargaining process facilitation interest is ultimately unavailing, however, because it ‘falls outside the ambit of the public interest that the FOIA was enacted to serve,’ i. e., the interest in advancing ‘public understanding of the operation or activities of the government.’” 884 F. 2d, at 1457 (quoting Reporters Comm., supra, at 775).

Against the virtually nonexistent FOIA-related public interest in disclosure, we weigh the interest of bargaining unit employees in nondisclosure of their home addresses. Cf. Department of State v. Ray, 502 U. S. 164, 173-177 (1991); Rose, 425 U. S., at 372. Because a very slight privacy interest would suffice to outweigh the relevant public interest, we need not be exact in our quantification of the privacy interest. It is enough for present purposes to observe that the employees’ interest in nondisclosure is not insubstantial.

It is true that home addresses often are publicly available through sources such as telephone directories and voter registration lists, but “[i]n an organized society, there are few facts that are not at one time or another divulged to another.” Reporters Comm., supra, at 763. The privacy interest protected by Exemption 6 “encompass[es] the individual’s control of information concerning his- or her person.” 489 U. S., at 763. An individual’s interest in controlling the dissemination of information regarding personal matters does not dissolve simply because that information may be available to the public in some form. Here, for the most part, the unions seek to obtain the addresses of nonunion employees who have decided not to reveal their addresses to their exclusive representative. See n. 5, supra. Perhaps some of these individuals have failed to join the union that represents them due to lack of familiarity with the union or its services. Others may be opposed to their union or to unionism in general on practical or ideological grounds. Whatever the reason that these employees have chosen not to become members of the union or to provide the union with their addresses, however, it is clear that they have some nontrivial privacy interest in nondisclosure, and in avoiding the influx of union-related mail, and, perhaps, union-related telephone calls or visits, that would follow disclosure.

Many people simply do not want to be disturbed at home by work-related matters. Employees can lessen the chance of such unwanted contacts by not revealing their addresses to their exclusive representative. Even if the direct union/ employee communication facilitated by the disclosure of home addresses were limited to mailings, this does not lessen the interest that individuals have in preventing at least some unsolicited, unwanted mail from reaching them at their homes. We are reluctant to disparage the privacy of the home, which is accorded special consideration in our Constitution, laws, and traditions. Cf. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728, 737 (1970); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandéis, J., dissenting). Moreover, when we consider that other parties, such as commercial advertisers and solicitors, must have the same access under FOIA as the unions to the employee address lists sought in this case, see supra, at 496, 499, it is clear that the individual privacy interest that would be protected by nondisclosure is far from insignificant.

Because the privacy interest of bargaining unit employees in nondisclosure of their home addresses substantially outweighs the negligible FOIA-related public interest in disclosure, we conclude that disclosure would constitute a “clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(6). FOIA, thus, does not require the agencies to divulge the addresses, and the Privacy Act, therefore, prohibits their release to the unions.

IV

Respondents argue that our decision will have a number of untoward effects. First, they contend that without access to home addresses, public sector unions will be unable to communicate with, and represent effectively, all bargaining unit employees. Such a result, they believe, thwarts the collective-bargaining policies explicitly embodied in the Labor Statute. See, e. g., 5 U. S. C. § 7101(a) (congressional finding that “labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public interest”). According to respondents, it is illogical to believe that Congress intended the Privacy Act and FOIA to be interpreted in a manner that hinders the effectuation of the purposes motivating the Labor Statute.

Respondents, however, place undue emphasis on what they perceive to be the impulses of the Congress that enacted the Labor Statute, and neglect to consider the language in that statute that calls into play the limitations of the Privacy Act. Speculation about the ultimate goals of the Labor Statute is inappropriate here; the statute plainly states that an agency need furnish an exclusive representative with information that is necessary for collective-bargaining purposes only “to the extent not prohibited by law.” 5 U. S. C. § 7114(b)(4). Disclosure of the addresses in this case is prohibited “by law,” the Privacy Act. By disallowing disclosure, we do no more than give effect to the clear words of the provisions we construe, including the Labor Statute. Cf. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992) (“We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there”).

Second, respondents fear that our ruling will allow agencies, acting pursuant to the Privacy Act, to refuse to provide unions with other employee records, such as disciplinary reports and performance appraisals, that the unions need in order to perform their duties as exclusive bargaining representatives. This concern is not presented in this case, however, and we do not address it.

Finally, respondents contend that our decision creates an unnecessary and unintended disparity between public and private sector unions. While private sector unions assertedly are entitled to receive employee home address lists from employers under the National Labor Relations Act, as interpreted by the National Labor Relations Board, respondents claim that federal sector unions now will be needlessly barred from obtaining this information, despite the lack of any indication that Congress intended such a result. See Department of Treasury, 884 F. 2d, at 1457-1461 (R. Ginsburg, J., concurring). We do not question that, as a general matter, private sector labor law may provide guidance in parallel public sector matters. This fact has little relevance here, however, for unlike private sector employees, federal employees enjoy the protection of the Privacy Act, and that statute prohibits the disclosure of the address lists sought in this case. To the extent that this prohibition leaves public sector unions in a position different from that of their private sector counterparts, Congress may correct the disparity. Cf. Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 499 (1985).

V

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

So ordered.

Justice Souter,

concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion with the understanding that it does not ultimately resolve the relationship between the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (Labor Statute) and all of the Privacy Act of 1974 exceptions potentially available to respondents, and that any more general language in the opinion is limited, as the Court notes, to the relationship between the Labor Statute and the Freedom of Information Act exception to the Privacy Act at issue here. See ante, at 494, n. 5.

Justice Ginsburg,

concurring in the judgment.

Before this Court’s decision in Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U. S. 749 (1989), every court to consider the issue presented in this case reached a conclusion opposing the one the Court announces today: The courts uniformly enforced, against Privacy Act challenges, Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority) orders directing agencies to disclose the names and addresses of bargaining unit employees to the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative. In these judgments, the Courts of Appeals deferred to the Authority’s expert determination that disclosure was necessary to vindicate the public interest in promoting federal-sector collective bargaining — the interest Congress identified when it enacted the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (Labor Statute).

The Privacy Act interposed no bar to disclosure under the Labor Statute, these courts reasoned, because the Privacy Act allows disclosure when the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) so requires, see 5 U. S. C. § 552a(b)(2), and the FOIA balancing of public interest in disclosure against the asserted privacy interest, see ante, at 495, tipped decisively in favor of disclosure. The public interest the Courts of Appeals balanced was the promotion of collective bargaining; the privacy interest, keeping employees’ names and addresses from their bargaining representative.

Reporters Committee, however, changed the FOIA calculus that underlies these prodisclosure decisions. In Reporters Committee, the Court adopted a restrictive definition of the “public interest in disclosure,” holding that interest to be circumscribed by FOIA’s “core purpose”: the purpose of “opening] agency action to the light of public scrutiny” and advancing “public understanding of the operations or activities of the government.” 489 U. S., at 774-776 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). As the Court observes today, disclosure of employees’ home addresses to their bargaining representatives would not advance this purpose. See ante, at 497. With Reporters Committee as its guide, the Court traverses the “convoluted path of statutory cross-references,” ante, at 495, from the Labor Statute to the Privacy Act to FOIA, and the Court’s journey ends in a judgment that disclosure is impermissible.

The Court convincingly demonstrates that Reporters Committee, unmodified, requires this result. I came to the same conclusion as a judge instructed by the Court’s precedent. See FLRA v. Department of Treasury, Financial Mgmt. Service, 884 F. 2d 1446, 1457 (CADC 1989) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 1055 (1990), quoted ante, at 499-500. It seemed to me then and seems to me now, however, that Congress did not chart our journey’s end. See 884 F. 2d, at 1457-1461.

As this Court has recognized, in enacting the Labor Statute “Congress unquestionably intended to strengthen the position of federal unions.” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U. S. 89, 107 (1983). It is surely doubtful that, in the very statute bolstering federal-sector unions, Congress aimed to deny those unions information their private-sector counterparts routinely receive. See, e. g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. NLRB, 412 F. 2d 77 (CA2), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 928 (1969); see also NLRB v. WymanGordon Co., 394 U. S. 759 (1969) (upholding National Labor Relations Board order requiring employer to disclose names and addresses before election). It is similarly doubtful that Congress intended a privacy interest, appraised by most courts as relatively modest, to trump the Legislature’s firmly declared interest in promoting federal-sector collective bargaining. I do not agree with the Court, see ante, at 498-499, that the Reporters Committee rule yielding these anomalies is indubitably commanded by FOIA.

The Reporters Committee “core purpose” limitation is not found in FOIA’s language. A FOIA requester need not show in the first instance that disclosure would serve any public purpose, let alone a “core purpose” of “open[ing] agency action to the light of public scrutiny” or advancing “public understanding of the operations or activities of the government.” Instead, “[a]n agency must disclose agency records to any person ... 'unless [the records] may be withheld pursuant to one of the nine enumerated exemptions listed in § 552(b).’ ” Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U. S. 136, 150-151 (1989), quoting Department of Justice v. Julian, 486 U. S. 1, 8 (1988). In Tax Analysts, for example, the Court required disclosure of Department of Justice compilations of district court tax decisions to the publishers of Tax Notes, a weekly magazine. That disclosure did not notably “ad[d]... to public knowledge of Government operations.” ■ 492 U. S., at 156-157 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (required disclosure “adds nothing whatsoever to public knowledge of Government operations”).

Just as the FOIA requester confronts no “core purpose” obstacle at the outset, no such limitation appears in the text of any FOIA exemption. The exemption asserted in this case, for example, provides that an agency may withhold information if disclosure “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(6). It is fully consistent with this statutory language to judge an invasion of personal privacy “warranted,” courts held pre-Reporters Committee, even if the disclosure sought is unrelated to informing citizens about Government operations. Courts, on the issue before us, found disclosure in order because the information was deemed necessary by the expert Authority to vindicate an interest specifically identified by Congress in the Labor Statute — the interest in promoting federal-sector collective bargaining.

Such an interpretation is reconcilable with a main rule that the identity and particular purpose of the requester is irrelevant under FOIA. See ante, at 496. This main rule serves as a check against selection among requesters, by agencies and reviewing courts, according to idiosyncratic estimations of the request’s or requester’s worthiness. In the matter at hand, however, it is Congress that has declared the importance of the request’s purpose, and Congress that has selected a single entity — the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative — as entitled to assert that purpose. Allowing consideration of the public interest Congress has recognized would distinguish among potential requesters on the basis of the interest they assert, not simply their identity or particular purpose. See FLRA v. Department of Navy, Navy Resale and Services Support Office, 958 F. 2d 1490, 1495 (CA9 1992) (cautioning against “confusing] the identity of the requester with the interest asserted by the requester”).

I am mindful, however, that the preservation of Reporters Committee, unmodified, is the position solidly approved by my colleagues, and I am also mindful that the pull of precedent is strongest in statutory cases. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandéis, J., dissenting); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34, 42 (1927) (Brandéis, J., dissenting). I therefore concur in the Court’s judgment, recognizing that, although today’s decision denies federal-sector unions information accessible to their private-sector counterparts, “Congress may correct the disparity.” Ante, at 503.

       Local 1657 of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union represents a bargaining unit composed of employees of the Navy CBC Exchange in Gulfport, Mississippi. Local 1345 of respondent American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, represents a worldwide bargaining unit composed of employees of the Army and Air Force Exchange, which is headquartered in Dallas, Texas.

       Petitioners are the U. S. Department of Defense, U. S. Department of the Navy, Navy CBC Exchange, Construction Battalion Center, Gulfport, Mississippi, and the U. S. Department of Defense, Army and Air Force Exchange, Dallas, Texas.

       See, e. g., Department of Navy, Navy Exchange v. FLRA, 975 F. 2d 348 (CA7 1992); FLRA v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 958 F. 2d 503 (CA2 1992); FLRA v. Department of Navy, Naval Communications Unit Cutler, 941 F. 2d 49 (CA11991); FLRA v. Department of Treasury, Financial Management Serv., 884 F. 2d 1446 (CADC 1989), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 1055 (1990).

       See, e. g., FLRA v. Department of Defense, Army and Air Force Exchange Serv., 984 F. 2d 370, 373 (CA10 1993); Department of Veterans Affairs, supra, at 507-508.

       The written-consent provision of the Privacy Act is not implicated in this case. The unions already have access to the addresses of their members and to those of nonmembers who have divulged this information to them. It is not disputed that the unions are able to contact bargaining unit employees at work and ask them for their home addresses. In practical effect, the unions seek only those addresses that they do not currently possess: the addresses of nonunion employees who have not revealed this information to their exclusive representative.
      We also note that we are not asked in this case to consider the potential applicability of any other Privacy Act exceptions, such as the “routine use” exception. See 5 U. S. C. § 552a(b)(3). Respondents rely solely on the argument that the unions’ requests for home addresses fall within the Privacy Act’s FOIA exception.

       Our decision in Reporters Committee turned on the applicability of FOIA Exemption 7(C) to the requests for “rap sheets.” In pertinent part, Exemption 7(C) provides that “[FOIA] does not apply to matters that are ... (7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information .. . (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(7)(C). When we applied the FOIA principles discussed in the text, we concluded that “[t]he privacy interest in maintaining the practical obscurity of rap-sheet information will always be high,” and that “the FOIA-based public interest in disclosure is at its nadir” when third parties seek law enforcement records concerning private citizens, given that those records would shed no light on the activities of government agencies or officials. Reporters Comm., 489 U. S., at 780. Because the privacy interest outweighed the relevant public interest, we held as a categorical matter that such records are excepted from FOIA’s broad disclosure requirements by Exemption 7(C). Ibid.

      Exemption 7(C) is more protective of privacy than Exemption 6: The former provision applies to any disclosure that “could reasonably be expected to constitute” an invasion of privacy that is “unwarranted,” while the latter bars any disclosure that “would constitute” an invasion of privacy that is “clearly unwarranted.” Contrary to the view of the court below, see 975 F. 2d, at 1113, however, the fact that Reporters Committee dealt with a different FOIA exemption than the one we focus on today is of little import. Exemptions 7(C) and 6 differ in the magnitude of the public interest that is required to override the respective privacy interests protected by the exemptions. As we shall see in Part III, infra, however, the dispositive issue here is the identification of the relevant public interest to be weighed in the balance, not the magnitude of that interest. Reporters Committee provides the same guidance in making this identification in Exemption 7(C) and Exemption 6 cases. See, e. g., Department of State v. Ray, 502 U. S. 164 (1991) (Exemption 6 case applying Reporters Committee).

       In this regard, see Department of Veterans Affairs, 958 F. 2d, at 512 (“Nowhere in the [Labor Statute] does its language indicate that the disclosure calculus required by FOIA should be modified. Nowhere do we find a qualification that the policies of collective bargaining should be integrated into FOIA”); Department of Treasury, 884 F. 2d, at 1453 (“Privacy Act exception b(2) speaks only of FOIA. We do not believe we are entitled to engage in the sort of imaginative reconstruction that would be necessary to introduce collective bargaining values into the [FOIA] balancing process”).

       Even the Authority'has recognized that “employees have some privacy interest in their home addresses.” Brief for Federal Respondent 41 (citing Department of Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, N. H., 37 F. L. R. A. 515, 532 (1990)). The Courts of Appeals that have considered the question have reached the same conclusion, although they have differed in their characterization of the magnitude of the interest implicated. See, e. g., FLRA v. Department of Defense, 977 F. 2d 545, 549 (CA11 1992) (“important” privacy interest); FLRA v. Department of Navy, 966 F. 2d 747, 759 (CA3 1992) (en banc) (“minimal” interest); Department of Veterans Affairs, supra, at 510 (“general privacy interest” in preventing dissemination of home address); Department of Treasury, supra, at 1453 (“significant” interest).

       See, e. g., NLRB v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 633 F. 2d 766, 773 (CA9 1980), cert. denied, 452 U. S. 915 (1981); NLRB v. Pearl Bookbinding Co., 517 F. 2d 1108, 1113 (CA1 1975).

       See Department of Navy v. FLRA, 840 F. 2d 1131 (CA3), cert. dism’d, 488 U. S. 881 (1988); Department of Air Force, Scott Air Force Base v. FLRA, 838 F. 2d 229 (CA7), cert. dism’d, 488 U. S. 880 (1988); Department of Agriculture v. FLRA, 836 F. 2d 1139 (CA8 1988), vacated and remanded, 488 U. S. 1025 (1989); Department of Health and Human Services v. FLRA, 833 F. 2d 1129 (CA4 1987), cert. dism’d, 488 U. S. 880 (1988). See also American Federation of Govt. Employees, Local 1760 v. FLRA, 786 F. 2d 554 (CA2 1986) (requiring FLRA to order disclosure).

       See 5 U. S. C. § 7101(a) (“labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public interest”); § 7114(b)(4)(B) (agency must disclose information “necessary for full and proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation of subjects within the scope of collective bargaining,” unless disclosure is “prohibited by law”).

       The Court does not reach the issue whether the “routine use” exception to the Privacy Act, see 5 U. S. C. § 552a(b)(3), might justify disclosure. See ante, at 494, n. 5. The “routine use” exception is not a secure one for the unions, however, because it empowers agencies, in the first instance, to determine which uses warrant the classification “routine,” and because courts ordinarily defer to agency assessments of this order. But cf. United States Postal Service v. National Assn. of Letter Carriers, 9 F. 3d 138, 143 (CADC 1993) (opinion of Silberman, J.) (suggesting that National Labor Relations Act disclosure obligations might compel the Postal Service “to publish a routine use notice that would accommodate its duties under that Act”).

       Compare FLRA v. Department of Navy, Navy Ships Parts Control Center, 966 F. 2d 747, 759 (CA3 1992) (en banc) (“minimal” privacy interest); FLRA v. Department of Navy, Navy Resale and Services Support Office, 958 F. 2d 1490, 1496 (CA9 1992) (“minimal”); FLRA v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 958 F. 2d 503, 511 (CA2 1992) (“more than de minimis”); FLRA v. Department of Navy, Naval Communications Unit Cutler, 941 F. 2d 49, 56 (CA11991) (“modest”); Department of Air Force, Scott Air Force Base v. FLRA 838 F. 2d 229, 232 (CA7) (“minuscule”), cert. dism’d, 488 U. S. 880 (1988); Department of Agriculture v. FLRA 836 F. 2d 1139, 1143 (CA8 1988) (“modest”), vacated and remanded, 488 U. S. 1025 (1989); American Federation of Govt. Employees, Local 1760 v. FLRA 786 F. 2d 554, 556 (CA2 1986) (“not particularly compelling”), with FLRA v. Department of Defense, Department of Navy, Pensacola Navy Exchange, 977. F. 2d 545, 549 (CA11 1992) (“important”).

       I do not question the result in Reporters Committee, shielding under FOIA exemption 7(C), 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(7)(C), scattered bits of information relevant to criminal matters compiled in FBI “rap sheets.” See FLRA v. Department of Treasury, Financial Mgmt. Service, 884 F. 2d 1446, 1460 (R. B. Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“privacy invasion threatened by release [to the union] of the bare names and addresses [of bargaining unit employees] pales in comparison to the privacy invasion threatened by [public] release of the rap sheet”).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Ginsburg

license: Public Domain

text:
    ELDER v. HOLLOWAY et al.
    No. 92-8579.
    Argued January 10,1994
    Decided February 23, 1994

      Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Michael E. Tankersley argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Brian Wolfinan, Alan B. Morrison, and John C. Lynn, appointed by this Court, 510 U. S. 806.

      James J. Davis argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.

         Andrew J. Pincus and Steven R. Shapiro filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging reversal.
      A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed for the State of Hawaii et al. by Robert A Marks, Attorney General of Hawaii, and Steven S. Michaels, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Charles M. Oberly III of Delaware, Larry EchoHawk of Idaho, Roland W. Burris of Illinois, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Jefferey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, Joseph B. Meyer of Wyoming, and Malaetasi Togafau of American Samoa.

   Justice Ginsburg

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether an appellate court, reviewing a judgment according public officials qualified immunity from a damages suit charging violation of a federal right, must disregard relevant legal authority not presented to, or considered by, the court of first instance. We hold that appellate review of qualified immunity dispositions is to be conducted in light of all relevant precedents, not simply those cited to, or discovered by, the district court.

I

In April 1987, police officers in Idaho learned that Charles Elder was wanted by Florida authorities. They set out to arrest Elder, but did not obtain an Idaho arrest warrant. The officers planned to apprehend Elder at his workplace, in a public area where a warrant is not required. See United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 418, n. 6 (1976). Finding that Elder had already left his jobsite, the officers surrounded the house in which he resided and ordered him to come out. Elder suffered epileptic seizures during the episode, and an officer instructed him to crawl out of the house to avoid injury from falling. Elder, instead, walked through the doorway, immediately suffered another seizure, and fell on the concrete walk in front of the house. He sustained serious brain trauma and remains partially paralyzed.

II

Alleging that the warrantless arrest violated his Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable seizure, Elder sued the arresting officers for damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials like respondents from damages actions unless their conduct was unreasonable in light of clearly established law. The District Court analyzed Elder’s case in three steps. Had the arrest occurred inside the house, that court recognized, clear law would come into play: absent exigent circumstances, an arrest warrant would have been required. See 751 F. Supp. 858, 860 (Idaho 1990) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980)). If the same clear law governed Elder’s arrest as it in fact transpired, the District Court said, then the matter of exigent circumstances would present a triable issue. 751 F. Supp., at 865. But, the District Court concluded, it was not clear that the warrant requirement applied when officers surrounded a house and requested an individual inside to come out and surrender. For that scenario, the one presented here, the District Court “found no controlling Idaho or Ninth Circuit case law.” Id., at 866. The District Court accordingly granted summary judgment for the officers on qualified immunity grounds. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982) (officials “are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known”).

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noticed precedent in point missed in the District Court: United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F. 2d 890 (CA9 1985), cert. denied, 476 U. S. 1144 (1986). Al-Azzawy, the Court of Appeals observed, involved a suspect seized outside his surrounded home. The Al-Azzawy decision, published over a year before Elder’s arrest, “might have alerted a reasonable officer to the constitutional implications of putting a suspect under arrest after he had come outside his house pursuant to an order to exit.” 975 F. 2d 1388, 1391-1392 (1991). Indeed, Al-Azzawy explicitly “reaffirmed the rule that ‘it is the location of the arrested person, and not the arresting agents, that determines whether an arrest occurs within a home.’ [Al-Azzawy, 784 F. 2d, at 893] (quoting United States v. Johnson, 626 F. 2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 457 U. S. 537 .. . (1982)).” 975 F. 2d, at 1391.

Elder could not benefit from the rule reaffirmed in AlAzzawy, the Court of Appeals believed, because that precedent had been unearthed too late. For the conclusion that cases unmentioned in the District Court could not control on appeal, the Court of Appeals relied on Davis v. Scherer, 468 U. S. 183 (1984), in particular, on this statement from Davis: “A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official’s qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.” Id., at 197 (emphasis added).

Although typing the qualified immunity inquiry “a ‘pure questiofn] of law,’” 975 F. 2d, at 1392 (quoting Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F. 2d 624, 627-628 (CA9 1991)), the Court of Appeals read Davis to require plaintiffs to put into the district court record, as “legal facts,” the cases showing that the right asserted was “clearly established.” 975 F. 2d, at 1394. Just as appellants forfeit facts not presented to the court of first instance, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, so, in the peculiar context of civil rights qualified immunity litigation, a plaintiff may not benefit on appeal from precedent neither he nor the district court itself mentioned in the first instance: “[T]he plaintiff’s burden in responding to a request for judgment based on qualified immunity is to identify the universe of statutory or decisional law from which the [district] court can determine whether the right allegedly violated was clearly established.” Id., at 1392. We granted certiorari, 509 U. S. 921 (1993).

Ill

The central purpose of affording public officials qualified immunity from suit is to protect them “from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 806. The rule announced by the Ninth Circuit does not aid this objective because its operation is unpredictable in advance of the district court’s adjudication. Nor does the rule further the interests on the other side of the balance: deterring public officials’ unlawful actions and compensating victims of such conduct. Instead, it simply releases defendants because of shortages in counsel’s or the court’s legal research or briefing.

In thinking its rule compelled by this Court’s instruction, the Ninth Circuit misconstrued Davis v. Scherer. The Court held in Davis that an official’s clear violation of a state administrative regulation does not allow a § 1983 plaintiff to overcome the official’s qualified immunity. Only in this context is the Court’s statement comprehensible: “A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official’s qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established____” Davis v. Scherer, 468 U. S., at 197 (emphasis added). Davis, in short, concerned not the authorities a court may consider in determining qualified immunity, but this entirely discrete question: Is qualified immunity defeated where a defendant violates any clearly established duty, including one under state law, or must the clearly established right be the federal right on which the claim for relief is based? The Court held the latter. Id., at 193-196, and n. 14; see 984 F. 2d 991, 995 (CA9 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc).

Whether an asserted federal right was clearly established at a particular time, so that a public official who allegedly violated the right has no qualified immunity from suit, presents a question of law, not one of “legal facts.” See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 528 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 818. That question of law, like the generality of such questions, must be resolved de novo on appeal. See, e. g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 558 (1988). A court engaging in review of a qualified immunity judgment should therefore use its “full knowledge of its own [and other relevant] precedents.” See Davis, 468 U. S., at 192, n. 9.

We leave it to the Court of Appeals to consider, in light of all relevant authority, including Al-Azzawy, whether the respondent officers are entitled to prevail on their qualified immunity defense. We express no opinion on that ultimate issue, nor do we consider whether the officers’ alternate plea of exigent circumstances is tenable.

* * *

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

       According to depositions before the District Court, Elder had access to guns in the house, a consideration that might support an exigent circumstances plea. On the other hand, the police started to plan for the arrest five days before it occurred, a factor that might tug against a finding of exigency.

       Elder’s brief in the Court of Appeals did cite Al-Azzawy, albeit without elaboration. Brief for Appellant in No. 91-35146 (CA9), p. 9. There was cause for Elder’s caution: The ultimate holding of Al-Azzawy was that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. Cf. n. 1, supra.

       The Ninth Circuit’s rule could have a number of untoward effects. It could occasion appellate affirmation of incorrect legal results, see 984 F. 2d 991, 998-999 (CA9 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc), and it could place defense counsel in a trying situation. See ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a) (1989 ed.) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly: ... (3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.”).


author: Chief Justice Rehnquist Justice Thomas,

text:
    FOGERTY v. FANTASY, INC.
    No. 92-1750.
    Argued December 8, 1993
    Decided March 1, 1994

      Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Black-mun, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 535.

      Kenneth I. Sidle argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Vincent H. Chieffo and Julia L. Ross.

      Lawrence S. Robbins argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Carlos T. Angulo, Malcolm Burnstein, and Norman G. Rudman.

         Jonathan A Marshall, William. G. Pecan, Jon R. Stark, Stephen P. Fox, and Roland I. Griffin filed a brief for Hewlett-Packard Co. as amicus curiae urging reversal.

        Jack E. Brown, Chris R. Ottenweller, and Charles A Blanchard filed a brief for Apple Computer, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

   Chief Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U. S. C. § 505, provides in relevant part that in any copyright infringement action “the court may . .. award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” The question presented in this case is what standards should inform a court’s decision to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a copyright infringement action — a question that has produced conflicting views in the Courts of Appeals.

Petitioner John Fogerty is a successful musician, who, in the late 1960’s, was the. lead singer and songwriter of a popular music group known as “Creedence Clearwater Revival.” In 1970, he wrote a song entitled “Run Through the Jungle” and sold the exclusive publishing rights to predeeessors-ininterest of respondent Fantasy, Inc., who later obtained the copyright by assignment. The music group disbanded in 1972 and Fogerty subsequently published under another recording label. In 1985, he published and registered a copyright to a song entitled “The Old Man Down the Road,” which was released on an album distributed by Warner Brothers Records, Inc. Respondent Fantasy, Inc., sued Fogerty, Warner Brothers, and affiliated companies in District Court, alleging that “The Old Man Down the Road” was merely “Run Through the Jungle” with new words. The copyright infringement claim went to trial and a jury returned a verdict in favor of Fogerty.

After his successful defense of the action, Fogerty moved for reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to 17 U. S. C. § 505. The District Court denied the motion, finding that Fantasy’s infringement suit was not brought frivolously or in bad faith as required by Circuit precedent for an award of attorney’s fees to a successful defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 984 F. 2d 1524 (CA9 1993), and declined to abandon the existing Ninth Circuit standard for awarding attorney’s fees which treats successful plaintiffs and successful defendants differently. Under'that standard, commonly termed the “dual” standard, prevailing plaintiffs are generally awarded attorney’s fees as a matter of course, while prevailing defendants must show that the original suit was frivolous or brought in bad faith. In contrast, some Courts of Appeals follow the so-called “evenhanded” approach in which no distinction is made between prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, for example, has ruled that “we do not require bad faith, nor do we mandate an allowance of fees as a concomitant of prevailing in every case, but we do favor an evenhanded approach.” Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F. 2d 151, 156 (1986).

We granted certiorari, 509 U. S. 903 (1993), to address an important area of federal law and to resolve the conflict between the Ninth Circuit’s “dual” standard for awarding attorney’s fees under §505, and the so-called “evenhanded” approach exemplified by the Third Circuit. We reverse.

Respondent advances three arguments in support of the dual standard followed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case. First, it contends that the language of § 505, when read in the light of our decisions construing similar fee-shifting language, supports the rule. Second, it asserts that treating prevailing plaintiffs and defendants differently comports with the “objectives” and “equitable considerations” underlying the Copyright Act as a whole. Finally, respondent contends that the legislative history of §505 indicates that Congress ratified the dual standard which it claims was “uniformly” followed by the lower courts under identical language in the 1909 Copyright Act. We address each of these arguments in turn.

The statutory language — “the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs” — gives no hint that successful plaintiffs are to be treated differently from successful defendants. But respondent contends that our decision in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412 (1978), in which we construed virtually identical language, supports a differentiation in treatment between plaintiffs and defendants.

Christiansburg construed the language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which in relevant part provided that the court, “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs____” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(k). We had earlier held, interpreting the cognate provision of Title II of that Act, 42 U. S. C. §2000a-3(b), that a prevailing plaintiff “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless some special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400, 402 (1968). This decision was based on what we found to be the important policy objectives of the Civil Rights statutes, and the intent of Congress to achieve such objectives through the use of plaintiffs as “‘private attorney[s] general.’” Ibid. In Christians-burg, supra, we determined that the same policy considerations were not at work in the case of a prevailing civil rights defendant. We noted that a Title VII plaintiff, like a Title II plaintiff in Piggie Park, is “the chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate ‘a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.’ ” 434 U. S., at 418. We also relied on the admittedly sparse legislative history to indicate that different standards were to be applied to successful plaintiffs than to successful defendants.

Respondent points to our language in Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U. S. 754, 758, n. 2 (1989), that “fee-shifting statutes’ similar language is a ‘strong indication’ that they are to be interpreted alike.” But here we think this normal indication is overborne by the factors relied upon in our Christiansburg opinion that are absent in the case of the Copyright Act. The legislative history of §505 provides no support for treating prevailing plaintiffs and defendants differently with respect to the recovery of attorney’s fees. The attorney’s fees provision of § 505 of the 1976 Act was carried forward verbatim from the 1909 Act with very little discussion. The relevant House Report provides simply:

“Under section 505 the awarding of costs and attorney’s fees are left to the court’s discretion, and the section also makes clear that neither costs nor attorney’s fees can be awarded to or against ‘the United States or an officer thereof.’” H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 163 (1976).

See also S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 145 (1975) (same). Other courts and commentators have noted the paucity of legislative history of § 505. See, e. g., Cohen v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 617 F. Supp. 619, 621 (ED Va. 1985), aff’d on other grounds, 788 F. 2d 247 (CA4 1986). See also Jaszi, 505 And All That — The Defendant’s Dilemma, 55 Law & Contemp. Prob. 107, 107-108, and nn. 1, 2 (1992).

The goals and objectives of the two Acts are likewise not completely similar. Oftentimes, in the civil rights context, impecunious “private attorney general” plaintiffs can ill afford to litigate their claims against defendants with more resources. Congress sought to redress this balance in part, and to provide incentives for the bringing of meritorious lawsuits, by treating successful plaintiffs more favorably than successful defendants in terms of the award of attorney’s fees. The primary objective of the Copyright Act is to encourage the production of original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the good of the public. See infra, at 527. In the copyright context, it has been noted that “[entities which sue for copyright infringement as plaintiffs can run the gamut from corporate behemoths to starving artists; the same is true of prospective copyright infringement defendants.” Cohen, supra, at 622-623.

We thus conclude that respondent’s argument based on our fee-shifting decisions under the Civil Rights Act must fail.

Respondent next argues that the policies and objectives of § 505 and of the Copyright Act in general are best served by the “dual approach” to the award of attorney’s fees. The most common reason advanced in support of the dual approach is that, by awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs as a matter of course, it encourages litigation of meritorious claims of copyright infringement. See, e. g., McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F. 2d 316, 323 (CA9 1987) (“Because section 505 is intended in part to encourage the assertion of colorable copyright claims, to deter infringement, and to make the plaintiff whole, fees are generally awarded to a prevailing plaintiff”) (citations omitted); Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp., 745 F. 2d 142, 148 (CA2 1984) (same). Indeed, respondent relies heavily on this argument. We think the argument is flawed because it expresses a one-sided view of the purposes of the Copyright Act. While it is true that one of the goals of the Copyright Act is to discourage infringement, it is by no means the only goal of that Act. In the first place, it is by no means always the case that the plaintiff in an infringement action is the only holder of a copyright; often times, defendants hold copyrights too, as exemplified in the case at hand. See Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F. 2d, at 155 (noting that “in many cases the defendants are the [copyright] holders”).

More importantly, the policies served by the Copyright Act are more complex, more measured, than simply maximizing the number of meritorious suits for copyright infringement. The Constitution grants to Congress the power “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 8. We have often recognized the monopoly privileges that Congress has authorized, while “intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward,” are limited in nature and must ultimately serve the public good. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417, 429 (1984). For example, in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1975), we discussed the policies underlying the 1909 Copyright Act as follows:

“The limited scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly... reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.” (Footnotes omitted.)

We reiterated this theme in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U. S. 340, 349-350 (1991), where we said:

“The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.” (Citations omitted.)

Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as clearly as possible. To that end, defendants who seek to advance a variety of meritorious copyright defenses should be encouraged to litigate them to the same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of infringement. In the case before us, the successful defense of “The Old Man Down the Road” increased public exposure to a musical work that could, as a result, lead to further creative pieces. Thus a successful defense of a copyright infringement action may further the policies of the Copyright Act every bit as much as a successful prosecution of an infringement claim by the holder of a copyright.

Respondent finally urges that the legislative history supports the dual standard, relying on the principle of ratification. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580 (1978) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute-and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change . . .”). Respondent surveys the great number of lower court cases interpreting the identical provision in the 1909 Act, 17 U. S. C. § 116 (1976 ed.), and asserts that “it was firmly established” that prevailing defendants should be awarded attorney’s fees only where the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous or brought with a vexatious purpose. Brief for Respondent 40-45. Furthermore, respondent claims that Congress was aware of this construction of former §116 because of two copyright studies submitted to Congress when it was studying revisions to the Act. W. Strauss, Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law, Study No. 22 (hereinafter Strauss Study), and R. Brown, Operation of the Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law: An Exploratory Study, Study No. 23 (hereinafter Brown Study), Studies Prepared for Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 1960).

Before turning to the import of the two studies and the cases decided under the 1909 Act, we summarize briefly the factual background of Lorillard, whence comes the statement upon which respondent relies. There the question was whether there was a right to jury trial in an action for lost wages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). In enacting that statute, Congress provided, inter alia, that the provisions of the ADEA were to be “enforced in accordance with the ‘powers, remedies and procedures’ ” of specified sections of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 81 Stat. 604, 29 U. S. C. § 626(b). Lorillard, 434 U. S., at 580. In the three decided cases which had treated the right to jury trial under the FLSA, each court had decided that there was such a right. In enacting the ADEA, “Congress exhibited both a detailed knowledge of the FLSA provisions and their judicial interpretation and a willingness to depart from those provisions regarded as undesirable or inappropriate for incorporation.” Id., at 581.

Here, by contrast, the Strauss and Brown Studies deal only briefly with the provision for the award of attorney’s fees. In the Strauss Study, the limited discussion begins with a quote to A. Weil, American Copyright Law 530-531 (1917), for an explanation of the “discretionary awarding of attorney’s fees”:

“ ‘The amount of money frequently involved in copyright letigation [sic], especially on the part of the defendant is trifling. The expense of any letigation [sic] is considerable. Unless, therefore, some provision is made for financial protection to a litigant, if successful, it may not pay a party to defend rights, even if valid, a situation opposed to justice .... It is increasingly recognized that the person who forces another to engage counsel to vindicate, or defend, a right should bear the expense of such engagement and not his successful opponent....’” Strauss Study 31.

The study then notes that the pending bills contemplate no change in the attorney’s fees provision and concludes with the simple statement “[t]he cases indicate that this discretion has been judiciously exercised by the courts.” Ibid. This limited discussion of attorney’s fees surely does not constitute an endorsement of a dual standard.

The Brown Study was intended as a supplement to the Strauss Study and, inter alia, provides information from a survey distributed to practitioners about the practical workings of the 1909 Copyright Act. It also does not endorse a standard of treating prevailing plaintiffs and defendants differently. At one point, the study notes that “courts do not usually make an allowance- at all if an unsuccessful plaintiff’s claim was not ‘synthetic, capricious or otherwise unreasonable,’ or if the losing defendant raised real issues of fact or law.” Brown Study 85.

Our review of the prior case law itself leads us to conclude that there was no settled “dual standard” interpretation of former § 116 about which Congress could have been aware. We note initially that at least one reported case stated no reason in awarding attorney’s fees to successful defendants. See, e.g., Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 8 F. 2d 460, 461 (CA2 1925) (noting that the Copyright Act gave courts “absolute discretion,” the court awarded attorney’s fees to prevailing defendant after plaintiff voluntarily dismissed suit). More importantly, while it appears that the majority of lower courts exercised their discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing defendants based on a finding of frivolousness or bad faith, not all courts expressly described the test in those terms. In fact, only one pre-1976 case expressly endorsed a dual standard. Breffort v. I Had a Ball Co., 271 F. Supp. 623 (SDNY 1967). This is hardly the sort of uniform construction that Congress might have endorsed.

In summary, neither of the two studies presented to Congress, nor the cases referred to by the studies, support respondent’s view that there was a settled construction in favor of the “dual standard” under § 116 of the 1909 Copyright Act.

We thus reject each of respondent’s three arguments in support of the dual standard. We now turn to petitioner’s argument that §505 was intended to adopt the “British Rule.” Petitioner argues that, consistent with the neutral language of §505, both prevailing plaintiffs and defendants should be awarded attorney’s fees as a matter of course, absent exceptional circumstances. For two reasons we reject this argument for the British Rule.

First, just as the plain language of § 505 supports petitioner’s claim for disapproving the dual standard, it cuts against him in arguing for the British Rule. The statute says that “the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” The word “may” clearly connotes discretion. The automatic awarding of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party would pretermit the exercise of that discretion.

Second, we are mindful that Congress legislates against the strong background of the American Rule. Unlike Britain where counsel fees are regularly awarded to the prevailing party, it is the general rule in this country that unless Congress provides otherwise, parties are to bear their own attorney’s fees. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 247-262 (1975) (tracing the origins and development of the American Rule); Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U. S., at 758. While § 505 is one situation in which Congress has modified the American Rule to allow an award of attorney’s fees in the court’s discretion, we find it impossible to believe that Congress, without more, intended to adopt the British Rule. Such a bold departure from traditional practice would have surely drawn more explicit statutory language and legislative comment. Cf. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U. S. 779, 783 (1952) (“Statutes which invade the common law... are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident”). Not surprisingly, no court has held that § 505 (or its predecessor statute) adopted the British Rule.

Thus we reject both the “dual standard” adopted by several of the Courts of Appeals and petitioner’s claim that § 505 enacted the British Rule for automatic recovery of attorney’s fees by the prevailing party. Prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants are to be treated alike, but attorney’s fees are to be awarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the court’s discretion. “There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations,” but instead equitable discretion should be exercised “in light of the considerations we have identified.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 436-437 (1983). Because the Court of Appeals erroneously held petitioner, the prevailing defendant, to a more stringent standard than that applicable to a prevailing plaintiff, its judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Thomas,

concurring in the judgment.

In my view, the Court’s opinion is flatly inconsistent with our statutory analysis in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412 (1978). Because I disagree with that analysis, however, and because I believe the Court adopts the correct interpretation of the statutory language at issue in this case, I concur in the judgment.

In Christiansburg, the Court interpreted the attorney’s fee provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which states that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . as part of the costs . . . .” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(k) (1988 ed., Supp. III). In this case, the Court construes the attorney’s fee provision of the Copyright Act of 1976, which states that “the court may . . . award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” 17 U. S. C. § 505. As the Court observes, the two provisions contain “virtually identical language.” Ante, at 522. After today’s decision, however, they will have vastly different meanings.

Under the Title VII provision, a prevailing plaintiff “ordinarily is to be awarded attorney’s fees in all but special circumstances,” Christiansburg, 434 U. S., at 417, whereas a prevailing defendant is to be awarded fees only “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation,” id., at 421. By contrast, under the Court’s decision today, prevailing plaintiffs and defendants in the copyright context “are to be treated alike,” and “attorney’s fees are to be awarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the court’s discretion.” Ante, at 534.

Interestingly, the Court does not mention, let alone discuss, Christiansburg’s statutory analysis. We began that analysis by considering the Christiansburg petitioner’s argument:

“Relying on what it terms ‘the plain meaning of the statute,’ [petitioner] argues that the language of [the attorney’s fee provision] admits of only one interpretation: ‘A prevailing defendant is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees on the same basis as a prevailing plaintiff.’” 434 U. S., at 418.

We summarily rejected this contention, stating that “the permissive and discretionary language of the statute does not even invite, let-alone require, such a mechanical construction.” Ibid. We opined that the language “provide[s] no indication whatever of the circumstances under which either a plaintiff or a defendant should be entitled to attorney’s fees.” Ibid, (emphasis deleted). Turning to the “equitable considerations” embodied in the statute’s policy objectives and legislative history, id., at 418-420, we stated that those considerations counseled against petitioner’s position — a position we concluded was “untenable,” id., at 419.

Today, confronting a provision “virtually identical” to that at issue in Christiansburg, the Court adopts precisely the interpretation that Christiansburg rejected as “mechanical” and “untenable.” The Court states that “the plain language of § 505 supports petitioner’s claim for disapproving the dual standard,” ante, at 533, and that the language “gives no hint that successful plaintiffs are to be treated differently from successful defendants,” ante, at 522. Thus, the Court replaces the “dual” standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit with an “evenhanded” approach, under which district courts will apply the same standard to prevailing plaintiffs and defendants when deciding whether to award fees. Ante, at 534-535, and n. 19.

It is difficult to see how the Court, when faced with “virtually identical” language in two provisions, can hold that a given interpretation is required by the “plain language” in one instance, but reject that same interpretation as “mechanical” and “untenable” in the other. After today’s decision, Congress could employ the same terminology in two different attorney’s fee statutes, but be quite uncertain as to whether the Court would adopt a “dual” standard (that is, reject the “mechanical” construction) or apply an “evenhanded” rule (that is, adopt the “plain meaning”).

Such an inconsistent approach to statutory interpretation robs the law of “the clarity of its command and the certainty of its application.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647, 669 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Indeed, we repeatedly have sought to avoid this sort of inconsistency in our fee award decisions. See, e. g., Burlington v. Dague, 505 U. S. 557, 562 (1992) (“case law construing what is a ‘reasonable’ fee applies uniformly to all” fee-shifting statutes using the term); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U. S. 680, 691 (1983) (“similar attorney’s fee provisions should be interpreted pari passu”); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 433, n. 7 (1983) (the standards “set forth in this opinion are generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a ‘prevailing party’ ”). See also Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U. S. 754, 758, n. 2 (1989) (“fee-shifting statutes’ similar language is ‘a strong indication’ that they are to be interpreted alike”); Northcross v. Board of Ed. of Memphis City Schools, 412 U. S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam) (“[Similarity of language ... is, of course, a strong indication that . . . two [attorney’s fee] statutes should be interpreted pari passu”).

The Court recognizes the general principle that similar fee provisions are to be interpreted alike, ante, at 523, but states that the principle does not govern this case because the factors that guided our interpretation in Christiansburg — the policy objectives and legislative history of the statute — do not support the adoption of a “dual” standard in this context. See ante, at 522-525. The Court’s analysis, however, rests on the mistaken premise — a premise implicit in Christians- burg — that whether we construe a statute in accordance with its plain meaning depends upon the statute’s policy objectives and legislative history. Although attorney’s fee provisions may be interpreted “in light of the competing equities that Congress normally takes into account,” Zipes, supra, at 761, those “equities” cannot dictate a result that is contrary to the statutory language. “Our task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it.” Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, Div. of Cadence Industries Corp., 493 U. S. 120, 126 (1989). When the text of the statute is clear, our interpretive inquiry ends. See Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 254 (1992). The Court goes astray, in my view, by attempting to reconcile this case with Christiansburg. Rather, it should acknowledge that Christiansburg mistakenly cast aside the statutory language to give effect to equitable considerations.

I concur in the judgment, however, because I believe the Court adopts the correct interpretation of the statutory language in this case. As the Court observes, the language of 17 U. S. C. § 505 gives no indication that prevailing plaintiffs and defendants are to be treated differently. See ante, at 522, 533. In addition, as the Court states, the use of the word “may” suggests that the determination of whether an attorney’s fee award is appropriate is to be left to the discretion of the district courts. Ante, at 533. This conclusion finds further support in the full text of § 505, which provides that “the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs .... [T]he court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” (Emphasis added.)

Because considerations of stare decisis have “special force” in the area of statutory interpretation, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172 (1989), I might be hesitant to overrule Christiansburg and other cases in which we have construed similar attorney’s fee provisions to impose a “dual” standard of recovery. See, e. g., Hensley, supra, at 429, and n. 2 (42 U. S. C. § 1988 (1988 ed., Supp. III)); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U. S. 711, 713, n. 1 (1987) (42 U. S. C. § 7604(d)). But while stare decisis may call for hesitation in overruling a dubious precedent, “it does not demand that such a precedent be expanded to its outer limits.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U. S. 25, 42 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting). I would therefore decline to extend Christiansburg’s analysis to other contexts. Because the Court — at least in result, if not in rationale — refuses to make such an extension, I concur in the judgment.

       The section provides in full: “In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States or an officer thereof Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” 17 U. S. C. §505.

       Creedence Clearwater Revival (CCR), recently inducted into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, has been recognized as one of the greatest American rock and roll groups of all time. With Fogerty as its leader, CCR developed a distinctive style of music, dubbed “swamp rock” by the media due to its southern country and blues feel. Brief for Petitioner 4-5; see also Questions and Answers with John Fogerty, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 12, 1993, section F, p. 1, col. 2.

       Pursuant to an agreement between Fogerty and the Warner defendants, Fogerty indemnified and reimbursed the Warner defendants for their attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending the copyright infringement action. Brief for Petitioner 4, n. 3'.

       In addition to the copyright infringement claim, Fantasy asserted state law and Lanham Act claims. These claims were voluntarily dismissed before trial. Petitioner also asserted various counterclaims against Fantasy, which were ultimately dismissed on Fantasy’s motion for summary judgment. These related claims and counterclaims are not before this Court. ;

       In making its findings, the District Court stated: “Although the facts of this case did not present the textbook scenario of copyright infringement, the Court has held that Fogerty could indeed be held liable for copyright infringement even where he also wrote the song allegedly infringed.... Nor does Fantasy’s ‘knowledge of Fogerty’s creativity’ mean that this suit was brought in bad faith, where a finding of subconscious copying would have supported Fantasy’s infringement claim.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-31 (citation omitted).

       By predicating an award of attorney’s fees to prevailing defendants on a showing of bad faith or frivolousness on the part of plaintiffs, the “dual” standard makes it more difficult for prevailing defendants to secure awards of attorney’s fees than prevailing plaintiffs. The Ninth Circuit has explained that prevailing plaintiffs, on the other hand, should generally receive such awards absent special circumstances such as “the presence of a complex or novel issue of law that the defendant litigates vigorously and in good faith . . . .” McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F. 2d 316, 323 (1987). In the instant case, the Court of Appeals explained: “The purpose of [the dual standard] rule is to avoid chilling a copyright holder’s incentive to sue on colorable claims, and thereby to give full effect to the broad protection for copyrights intended by the Copyright Act.” 984 F. 2d, at 1532.

       At oral argument, counsel for respondent voiced his dissatisfaction with the terms “dual” and “evenhanded” used to describe the differing rules in the Circuits. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. Counsel objected to the implication from the terms — that the Ninth Circuit’s dual standard was somehow not evenhanded or fair. While this point may be well taken in a rhetorical sense, we will continue to use the terms as commonly used by the lower courts for the sake of convenience.

       In addition to the Ninth Circuit, the Second, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits have adopted a “dual” standard of awarding attorney’s fees whereby a greater burden is placed upon prevailing defendants than prevailing plaintiffs. See, e. g., Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp.,
        745 F. 2d 142, 148-149 (CA2 1984); Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F. 2d 1010, 1022 (CA7), cert. denied, 502 U. S. 861 (1991); Reader’s Digest Assn., Inc. v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F 2d 800, 809 (CADC 1987). On the other hand, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have been identified as following an “evenhanded” approach similar to that of the Third Circuit. See, e. g., Sherry Manufacturing Co. v. Towel King of Florida, Inc., 822 F. 2d 1031, 1034-1035, n. 3 (CA11 1987); Cohen v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 617 F. Supp. 619, 620-623 (ED Va. 1985), aff’d on other grounds, 788 F. 2d 247 (CA4 1986).

       Additionally, we note that Congress, in enacting §505 of the 1976 Copyright Act, could not have been aware of the Christiansburg dual standard as Christiansburg was not decided until 1978.

       For the former provision under the Copyright Act of 1909, see 17 U.S. C. §116 (1976 ed.).

       The 1976 Copyright Act did change, however, the standard for awarding costs to the prevailing party. The 1909 Act provided.a mandatory rule that “full costs shall be allowed.” 17 U. S. C. § 116 (1976 ed.) (emphasis added). The 1976 Act changed the rule from a mandatory one to one of discretion. As the 1909 Act indicates, Congress clearly knows how to use mandatory language when it so desires. That Congress did not amend the neutral language of the 1909 rule respecting attorney’s fees lends further support to the plain language of § 505 — district courts are to use their discretion in awarding attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party.

       We note that the federal fee-shifting statutes in the patent and trademark fields, which are more closely related to that of copyright, support a party-neutral approach. Those statutes contain language similar to that of § 505, with the added proviso that fees are only to be awarded in “exceptional cases.” 35 U. S. C. § 285 (patent) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party”); 15 U. S. C. § 1117 (trademark) (same). Consistent with the party-neutral language, courts have generally awarded attorney’s fees in an evenhanded manner based on the same criteria. For patent, see, e. g., Eltech Systems Corp. v. PPG Industries, Inc., 903 F. 2d 805, 811 (CA Fed. 1990) (“[T]here is and should be no difference in the standards applicable to patentees and . infringers who engage in bad faith litigation”). For trademark, see, e. g., Motown Productions, Inc. v. Cacomm, Inc., 849 F. 2d 781, 786 (CA2 1988) (exceptional circumstances include cases in which losing party prosecuted or defended action in bad faith); but see Scotch Whisky Assn. v. Majestic Distilling Co., 958 F. 2d 594, 599 (CA4) (finding in the legislative history that prevailing defendants are to be treated more favorably than prevailing plaintiffs), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 862 (1992).

       Respondent points to four important interests allegedly advanced by the dual standard: (1) it promotes the vigorous enforcement of the Copyright Act; (2) it distinguishes between the wrongdoers and the blameless; (3) it enhances the predictability and certainty in copyrights by providing a relatively certain benchmark for the award of attorney’s fees; and (4) it affords copyright defendants sufficient incentives to litigate their defenses.

       In a footnote, the Strauss Study lists several cases exemplifying the courts’ use of discretion. None of these cases explicitly require a dual standard of awarding attorney’s fees, but instead offer various reasons for awarding or not awarding attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. Cases cited by the study involving prevailing defendants: Overman v. Loesser, 205 F. 2d 521, 524 (CA9 1953) (denying counsel fees because there was “no indication that the appeal was pursued in bad faith” and “the principal question [was] a complex question of law”); Official Aviation Guide Co. v. American Aviation Associates, 162 F. 2d 541, 543 (CA7 1947) (denying attorney’s fee where “[t]he instant case was hard fought and prosecuted in good faith, and . . . presented a complex problem in law”); Rosen v. Lowe’s Inc., 162 F. 2d 785 (CA2 1947) (defendant prevailed; no discussion of attorney’s fees); Advertisers Exchange, Inc. v. Anderson, 144 F. 2d 907 (CA8 1944) (denying attorney’s fee without comment in case involving defective copyright notice); Lewys v. O’Neill, 49 F. 2d 603, 618 (SDNY 1931) (awarding fees where plaintiff’s case was “wholly synthetic”); Metro Associated Services, Inc. v. Webster City Graphic, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 224 (ND Iowa 1953) (denying attorney’s fee without explanation where plaintiff filed defective copyright); Lowenfels v. Nathan, 2 F. Supp. 73, 80 (SDNY 1932) (awarding fees where “[t]he most earnest advocate of the plaintiff’s side . . . could not . . . possibly find” any plagiarism by the defendant);
        Jerome v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 71F. Supp. 914, 915 (SDNY 1946) (denying fee where court “[could] very well understand how plaintiff was driven to some litigation, although the theory of [the] action ... was not supported by the proof”), 7 F. R. D. 190 (SDNY 1947), aff’d, 165 F. 2d 784 (CA2 1948).
      Cases cited by the study involving prevailing plaintiffs: Advertisers Exchange, Inc. v. Hinkley, 199 F. 2d 313, 316 (CA8 1952) (denying an attorney’s fee where plaintiff’s counsel attempted to inflate and exaggerate plaintiff’s claim), cert. denied, 344 U. S. 921 (1953); Ziegelheim v. Flohr, 119 F Supp. 324, 329 (EDNY 1954) (court denied attorney’s fee “since it appears to have ... been a fairly common practice for publishers of [prayer books] to copy rather freely from each other, and since much of plaintiff’s book was in the public domain, and defendant honestly, but mistakenly, believed that plaintiff was illegally attempting to copyright and monopolize the printing of ancient prayers”); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Borst Music Pub. Co., 110 F. Supp. 913 (NJ 1953) (court noted only that it would not award attorney’s fee because such award is discretionary); Stein v. Rosenthal, 103 F. Supp. 227, 232 (SD Cal. 1952) (awarding attorney’s fees of $3,500 as an amount “reasonably necessary to redress the infringement of plaintiffs’ copyright”); Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distributing Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 401 (SDNY 1952) (noting that prevailing plaintiff entitled to receive a reasonable attorney’s fee to be assessed by the court); White v. Kimmell, 94 F. Supp. 502, 511 (SD Cal. 1950) (copyright holder, who was a successful defendant in a declaratory judgment action, was awarded costs but denied attorney’s fee award without elaboration); M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470, 482-483 (EDSC 1924) (court awarded a moderate attorney’s fee after noting that foil allowance “would bear too heavily upon the defendant, in view of the character of the infringement and the circumstances surrounding it; but, if no fee should be allowed at all in such cases, it would probably result in many cases in a practical denial of the rights of copyright owners”).
      The study also cited to Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. v. Buck, 283 U. S. 202 (1931), a case that did not involve attorney’s fees, but instead addressed the damages provision of § 25 of the 1909 Act, 35 Stat. 1081.

       To this extent, the Brown Study focuses more on the effect that the prospect of an award of attorney’s fees has on decisions to litigate or to settle cases. Based on its interview sources, the study concluded that the likelihood of getting a fee award is so problematic that “it is not a factor” that goes into the decision to settle or litigate. Brown Study 85. The report also noted that its observations about attorney’s fees “are not intended as an exhaustive treatment of the subject” and that “[attorney’s fees’] deterrent effect on ill-founded litigation, whether by plaintiffs or defendants, is outside the scope of this inquiry.” Id., at 85-86.

       Citing to Cloth v. Hyman, 146 F. Supp. 185, 193 (SDNY 1956) (it is proper to award fees to prevailing defendant when copyright action is brought in bad faith, with a motive to “vex and harass the defendant,” or where plaintiff’s claim utterly lacks merit). The Brown Study also included cites to Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 246 F. 2d 598, 604 (CA7) (reversing attorney’s fee award to prevailing defendant as an abuse of discretion where plaintiff’s claim was not entirely without merit and involved a close question of law), cert. denied, 355 U. S. 907 (1957); Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 8 F. 2d 460, 461 (CA2 1925) (awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing defendant after plaintiff voluntarily dismissed suit).

       See, e. g., Shroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 421 F. Supp. 372, 378 (ND Ill. 1976) (refusing to award prevailing defendant an attorney’s fee because plaintiff’s action was “prosecuted in good faith and with a reasonable likelihood of success”), rev’d on other grounds, 566 F. 2d 3 (CA7 1977); Kinelow Publishing Co. v. Photography In Business, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 851, 855 (SDNY 1967) (denying fee award to prevailing defendant because plaintiff’s claims, while “lacking in merit,” were not “unreasonable or capricious”); Burnett v. Lambino, 206 F. Supp. 517, 518-519 (SDNY 1962) (granting fee award to prevailing defendant where “asserted claim of infringement was so demonstrably lacking in merit that bringing it was clearly unreasonable”); Cloth v. Hyman, supra, at 193 (noting that it is proper to award fees when a copyright action is brought in bad faith, with a motive to “vex and harass the defendant,” or where plaintiff’s claim utterly lacks merit); Loews, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 186 (SD Cal. 1955) (denying prevailing defendant fee award where question presented in the case “was a nice one,” and there are “no authorities squarely in point to guide the litigants or their counsel”), aff’d, 239 F. 2d 532 (CA9 1956), aff’d, 356 U. S. 43 (1958); Krafft v. Cohen, 38 F. Supp. 1022, 1023 (ED Pa. 1941) (denying fee award to prevailing defendant where claim brought “in good faith,” and evidence demonstrated appropriation); Lewys v. O’Neill, 49 F. 2d, at 618 (awarding fees to prevailing defendant because plaintiff’s case was “wholly synthetic”).

       That court concluded that “the considerations prompting an award of fees to a successful plaintiff must of necessity differ from those determining whether a prevailing defendant is entitled to such an award.” Breffort, 271 F. Supp., at 627. As support, the court stated: “The purpose of an award of counsel fees to a plaintiff is to deter copyright infringement.... In the case of a prevailing defendant, however, prevention of infringement is obviously not a factor; and if an award is to be made at all, it represents a penalty imposed upon the plaintiff for institution of a baseless, frivolous, or unreasonable suit, or one instituted in bad faith.” Ibid. As we have already explained, supra, at 527, such is too narrow a view of the purposes of the Copyright Act because it fails to adequately consider the important role played by copyright defendants. See also
        Cohen v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 617 F. Supp., at 621-622 (tracing the evolution of the Second Circuit’s dual standard rule and concluding that earlier cases upon which it supposedly rests do not require bad faith or frivolousness — “[the dual standard rule] is the culmination of a long line of bootstrapping from nothing to something”).

       Some courts following the evenhanded standard have suggested several nonexclusive factors to guide courts’ discretion. For example, the Third Circuit has listed several nonexclusive factors that courts should consider in making awards of attorney’s fees to any prevailing party. These factors include “frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and in the legal components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.” Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F. 2d 151, 166 (1986). We agree that such factors may be used to guide courts’ discretion, so long as such factors are faithful to the purposes of the Copyright Act and are applied to prevailing plaintiffs and defendants in an evenhanded manner.