author: ANDERSON, Paul H„ Justice.

text:
    John Willard HINCE, et al., Petitioners, Appellants, v. Michael O’KEEFE, Commissioner of the Department of Human Services, et al., Respondents.
    No. C0-00-49.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Aug. 9, 2001.

      Warren J. Mass, Brooklyn Park, Thomas Wilson, Gregory Solum, Edina, Mike Biglow, James Dahlquist, Allan Poncin, Brian Southwell, Minneapolis, Kathleen Rauenhorst, Roseville and Stephen Radtke, Bloomington, for Appellants.
    Mike Hatch, Attorney General and Noah A. Cashman, for Respondents.
    Eric S. Janus, St. Paul and Teresa J. Nelson, Minneapolis, for amicus curiae MN Civil Liberties Union.
   OPINION

ANDERSON, Paul H„ Justice.

Appellants are individuals civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (Sex Offender Program). Appellants commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the Commissioner of the Department of Human Services is required to establish a review board for the Sex Offender Program treatment facilities under Minn.Stat. § 253B.22, subd. 1 (2000). In their complaint, appellants assert that they should be treated like mentally ill and dangerous patients with respect to the establishment of a review board. They also assert constitutional violations stemming from the denial of a review board. The Ramsey County District Court dismissed appellants’ action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. We reverse.

Appellants’ Status

Appellants are currently housed at the Minnesota Sexual Psychopathic Personality Treatment Center in Moose Lake and one unit of the Minnesota Security Hospital in St. Peter. All were civilly committed under Minnesota’s civil commitment statute, Minn.Stat. ch. 253B (2000). Specifically, appellants were committed as persons with sexual psychopathic personalities (SPP) or as sexually dangerous persons (SDP) as defined in MinmStat. § 253B.02, subds. 18b and 18c (2000). Unlike other civil committees, those committed as SPPs, SDPs, and mentally ill and dangerous persons (MID) are committed for an indeterminate period of time and the statute does not require that they be committed to the least restrictive setting. Compare Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subds. 1 & 5 (2000), with Minn.Stat. § 253B.18, subds. 1 & 3 (2000). The conditions of confinement at the Sex Offender Program facilities are similar to those in a prison in that patients have restricted privileges, including lockdowns, yet their commitment is not punishment for an offense. Minnesota Sex Offender Program Resident Handbook Attachments A & B (1998); Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 319-20 (Minn.1995). SPPs and SDPs may be released or transferred to a nonse-cure facility only upon approval of the commissioner and a special review board. Minn.Stat. § 253B.18, subds. 4c(a) & 6 (2000).

History of the SPP and SDP Acts

The current civil commitment statutes for SPP and SDP are the product of a delicate balancing between the “legitimate public concern over the danger posed by predatory sex offenders” and the fundamental right of those persons committed to live their lives “free of physical restraint by the state.” In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 912, 914 (Minn.1994). As early as 1939, the legislature attempted to address this problem by providing for the civil commitment of persons with psychopathic personalities. Id. at 912-13. The constitutionality of the psychopathic personality commitment provision was challenged by an individual committed under the act and upheld by our court and the United States Supreme Court. State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297 (1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 270, 60 S.Ct. 523, 84 L.Ed. 744 (1940). We upheld the psychopathic personality commitment statute by limiting its focus, concluding that in order to commit a person as a psychopathic personality, the person must evidence an “utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses ⅜ * *.” Id., 205 Minn. at 555, 287 N.W. at 302.

The Supreme Court further clarified the constitutional parameters of civil commitment in 1992. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992). In Foucha, the Court identified three circumstances under which due process is not violated by a state’s confinement of an individual: (1) convicted criminals may be imprisoned for deterrence and retribution; (2) an individual may be committed if the state has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the person is mentally ill and dangerous; and (3) in certain narrow circumstances such as pretrial detention, the state may subject persons who pose a danger to others to a limited confinement. Id. at 80-81, 112 S.Ct. 1780. Civil commitment falls in the second category. Following the Foucha decision, we considered whether Minnesota’s commitment provisions for persons with psychopathic personalities afforded due process to these persons. See Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915-16. We concluded that “[s]o long as civil commitment is programmed to provide treatment and periodic review, due process is provided.” Id. at 916 (emphasis added).

In 1994, Dennis Linehan was scheduled to be released from prison after having completely served the sentence for his criminal convictions. However, before his release, the state sought to commit him as a psychopathic personality. In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609 (Minn.1994) (Linehan I). Linehan challenged his commitment and the district court upheld the commitment. On appeal, we concluded that the state had not proved the necessary elements to commit Linehan as a psychopathic personality. Id. at 614. In response to our decision, the legislature enacted the Sexually Dangerous Person Act (SDP Act). In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 869 (Minn.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1049, 120 S.Ct. 587, 145 L.Ed.2d 488 (1999) (Linehan IV). As written, the SDP Act commitment provisions differ from the psychopathic personality commitment provisions in that commitment as an SDP does not require proof that the person has an inability to control sexual impulses. Compare Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c (2000), with Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18b (2000). After enactment of the SDP Act, the state once again sought to commit Linehan, but this time under the new statute. In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 174 (Minn.1996), vacated, 522 U.S. 1011, 118 S.Ct. 596, 139 L.Ed.2d 486 (1997) (Linehan III ). When Linehan appealed, we upheld the constitutionality of the SDP Act, concluding that it applied only to those who were “mentally disordered” and dangerous and that SDPs may be confined so long as the state provides treatment for their disorders. Id. at 182, 188-89. Linehan appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Following our decision in Linehan III, the Supreme Court decided Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). In Hendricks, the Court concluded that a Kansas law for civilly committing sexually violent predators satisfied due process because it required a finding of dangerousness coupled with a finding of mental abnormality. 521 U.S. at 358-60, 117 S.Ct. 2072. The Court explained that the mental abnormality or personality disorder language set forth criteria relating to “an individual's inability to control his dangerousness” and was sufficient legal language, even if it was not precise medical terminology. Id. at 359-60, 117 S.Ct. 2072. The Court concluded that the “lack of volitional control, coupled with a prediction of future dangerousness * * * plainly suffices for due process purposes.” Id. at 360, 117 S.Ct. 2072. Following its decision in Hendricks, the Court then granted certiorari in Linehan III, vacated our judgment, and remanded the case with instructions that it be reconsidered in light of Hendricks. Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 870-71.

On reconsideration following remand from the Supreme Court, we again concluded, with three justices dissenting, that the SDP Act satisfies due process requirements. See id. at 876, 878, 885, 887. We acknowledged that under the Supreme Court’s holding in Hendricks, a finding of dangerousness alone was not sufficient justification for indefinite commitment. Id. at 872. We then interpreted the SDP Act in light of Hendricks and concluded that “the Minnesota SDP Act ‘requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.’ ” Id. at 875 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072). Thus, implicit in appellants’ commitments as SDPs is a finding that they suffer from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that “does not allow them to adequately control their sexual impulses * * *.” Implicit in appellants’ commitments as SPPs is a finding that they suffer from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that renders them utterly unable to control their sexual impulses. Id. at 876.

Appellants’ Claims

It is in fight of this history of the SPP and SDP Acts that we consider appellants’ claim that they are entitled to a review board under the civil commitment statute. Minnesota Statutes § 253B.22, subd. 1, requires the commissioner to “establish a review board of three or more persons for each regional [treatment] center to review the admission and retention of * * * patients receiving services under this chapter.” Subdivision 2 of this section provides that “[e]ach treatment facility shall be visited by the review board at least once every six months. Upon request each patient in the treatment facility shall have the right to appear before the review board during the visit.” Minn.Stat. § 253B.22, subd. 2 (2000). The review board reviews the admission and retention of patients and may investigate conditions affecting the care and treatment of patients in the treatment facility. Minn.Stat. § 253B.22, subd. 4 (2000).

Appellants assert that the commissioner is required to establish a review board for each of the Sex Offender Program facilities because they are regional treatment centers. Appellants also assert that they are entitled to a review board because the statute mandates that (1) unless otherwise provided SPPs and SDPs should be treated like MIDs, (2) the review board provir sions of the statute do not distinguish between MIDs and SPPs and SDPs, and (3) MIDs have access to a review board. Appellants also assert constitutional violations stemming from the denial of a review board. The state made a Rule 12 motion to dismiss the action. The district court dismissed appellants’ action by reaching a legal conclusion that appellants were not entitled to a review board under the statute and that there was no basis for the constitutional claim. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellants ask us to determine whether, under the statute, SPPs and SDPs in the Sex Offender Program facilities are entitled to a review board.

I.

The answer to the question of whether review boards are required at the Sex Offender Program facilities turns on whether the Sex Offender Program facilities are “regional treatment centers” as contemplated under Minn.Stat. § 253B.22. The question presented is a legal question because it is a matter of statutory interpretation. Thus, our review is de novo. Baker v. State, 590 N.W.2d 636, 638 (Minn.1999). Basic rules of statutory construction instruct that words and phrases in the statute are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning. State by Beaulieu v. RSJ, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 695, 701 (Minn.1996). Various provisions of the same statute must be interpreted in fight of each other. Van Asperen v. Darling Olds, Inc., 254 Minn. 62, 74, 93 N.W.2d 690, 698 (1958). Courts should construe a statute to avoid absurd or unjust consequences. Erickson v. Sunset Mem’l Park Ass’n, 259 Minn. 532, 543, 108 N.W.2d 434, 441 (1961). Finally, courts should interpret statutes in a way that avoids constitutional problems. Pearson, 205 Minn. at 555, 287 N.W. at 302.

Here, the state asserts that the district court properly dismissed appellants’ action because SPP and SDP patients are not “mentally ill” and therefore Sex Offender Program facilities are not regional treatment centers. The state’s argument gives us pause because, when the state argued Blodgett, Linehan I, Linehan III, and Li-nehan IV, it argued that the parties suffered from mental disorders. We then upheld SPP and SDP commitment procedures as satisfying due process standards because the individuals committed under these procedures suffer from mental disorders. Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 878; Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 184; Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 916. Without the mental disorder component, commitment would be based on dangerousness alone, which does not satisfy due process. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072.

The state now argues that there is a difference between a mental illness and a mental disorder and this difference is the basis for the statutory distinction. However, in Hendricks the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the terms were not legally equivalent and stated, “the term ‘mental illness’ is devoid of talismanic significance. Not only do ‘psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness,’ * * * but the Court itself has used a variety of expressions to describe the mental condition of those properly subject to civil confinement.” Id. at 359, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (internal citations removed). The Court went on to explain that the key to all these definitions for purposes of civil commitment is that they reflect the individual’s inability to control his dangerousness. Id. at 360, 117 S.Ct. 2072. Thus, although the term mental illness is used in the definition of regional center, and inability to adequately control impulses is used in the SDP Act, and utter inability to control sexual impulses is used in the SPP Act, we are concerned about the constitutional implications for SPP and SDP commitment proceedings if we conclude that mental illness is not a component of civil commitment under these acts.

The state also asserts that the special review board that makes discharge decisions for SPPs, SDPs and MIDs, along with other statutory review mechanisms, fulfills the role of the review board for SPPs and SDPs. While there is some overlap in the role of the special review board and the review board, there is a difference in function, most notably in the authority of the review board to review conditions of confinement. Compare Minn.Stat. § 253B.22, subd. 4, with MinmStat. § 253B.18, subd. 4c (2000). More important, though, is that MID patients have access to both the review board and the special review board. Thus, the state’s own implementation of the statute negates its argument that the legislature did not intend any group of civilly committed individuals to have access to both boards.

With the constitutionality of the civil commitment statute in mind, together with the state’s implementation of it, we next proceed to review the language. As we stated earlier and the state admitted at oral argument, the determination of whether appellants are entitled to a review board turns on whether the Sex Offender Program facilities are “regional treatment centers.” The state asserts that the Sex Offender Program facilities are not regional treatment centers because appellants were not committed as mentally ill persons, but instead as persons with mental disorders, and the definition of regional treatment center includes the clause “for mentally ill, mentally retarded or chemically dependent persons.” The state further argues that the terms mental illness and mental disorder have different meanings and cites as an example that antisocial personality disorder is considered a mental disorder but is not considered a mental illness. The state argues that upon commitment it did not prove that appellants were mentally ill and therefore, the Sex Offender Program facilities are not facilities for mentally ill patients, although they could be classified as facilities for patients with mental disorders.

While there is some credence to the state’s argument, the state’s overall construction of the civil commitment statute as it relates to SPPs and SDPs violates one of the basic rules of statutory construction — that like language should be construed in a like manner. See Van Asperen, 254 Minn. at 74, 93 N.W.2d at 698. The exact same limiting language that the state cites in the regional treatment center definition in Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18, is also included in the definition of “treatment facility” found in subdivision 19 of the same chapter. Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 19 (2000). A treatment facility is defined as “a hospital, community mental health center, or other treatment provider qualified to' provide care and treatment for mentally ill, mentally retarded, or chemically dependent persons.” Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 19 (emphasis added).

By definition under the statute, the Sex Offender Program facilities are secure treatment facilities. See Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18a. The plain language of the term “secure treatment facility” suggests that in addition to being secure, the facility is also a “treatment facility.” In addition to the legislature’s choice in name, the commitment procedures for MID, SPP, and SDP patients also illustrate that these patients are housed in “treatment facilities.” Minn.Stat. § 253B.18. Throughout the explanation of the procedures for these patients, the legislature uses the terms “secure treatment facility” and “treatment facility” almost interchangeably, reserving its use of “secure treatment facility” for those provisions relating to the level of security that must be provided for the patients and using the term, “treatment facility” in the other places. Compare Minn.Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 1, with subd. 5 (2000). Additionally, in the section of the statute dealing with a transfer from a secure treatment facility, the statute states that “[t]ransfer may be to other regional centers under the commissioner’s control,” suggesting that secure treatment facilities are also regional centers. Minn.Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 6 (2000) (emphasis added). The inescapable conclusion of the legislature’s choice of language is that a “secure treatment facility” is a “treatment facility” regardless of the presence of the words “mentally ill, mentally retarded, or chemically dependent” in the definition.

It is difficult to understand how we can conclude that the term “mentally ill” excludes the Sex Offender Program facilities for purposes of defining a regional treatment center in section 253B.02, subd. 18, but that the term does not exclude the Sex Offender Program facilities for purposes of defining a treatment facility in subdivision 19 of the same section. To follow this reasoning would certainly produce an absurd result and would violate our basic rules of statutory construction. See Van Asperen, 254 Minn. at 74, 93 N.W.2d at 698. Instead, the fact that the Sex Offender Program facilities are treatment facilities and that the identical language is used to define regional treatment centers convinces us that the Sex Offender Program facilities are also regional treatment centers. Therefore, we hold that Minn.Stat. § 253B.22 requires the commissioner to establish a review board for the Sex Offender Program treatment facilities in Moose Lake and St. Peter. Having reached this legal conclusion, there is no need on remand for an evidentiary hearing on this claim.

II.

The state also asserts that dismissal of appellants’ declaratory judgment action was proper because appellants did not allege any harm resulting from their denial of a review board. Appellants did allege a harm. Appellants alleged that they were being denied a review board, contrary to the civil commitment statute. The legislature determined that individuals who are civilly committed in regional treatment centers should have review boards to fulfill a certain role and wrote the statute to mandate that the commissioner provide the review boards. Appellants’ allegation is sufficient for their declaratory judgment action. A declaratory judgment is a declaration of rights or a determination of “whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” Minn.Stat. § 555.01 (2000). Under the statute, any person may seek construction of a statute and may “obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.” Minn.Stat. § 555.02 (2000). As we explained in Montgomery v. Minneapolis Fire Dep’t Relief Ass’n, “[t]he main characteristic of the declaratory judgment, which distinguishes it from other judgments, is the fact that, by the act authorizing it, courts are empowered to adjudicate upon disputed legal rights whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” 218 Minn. 27, 30, 15 N.W.2d 122, 124 (1944) (internal citations removed). Thus, a declaratory judgment is proper when the court is “merely declaring the complainant’s rights so as to relieve him from a present uncertainty and insecurity.” Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 271 N.W.2d 445, 448 n. 3 (Minn.1978). In this declaratory judgment action, appellants sought and could obtain only a determination as to whether they were entitled to a review board under the statute. For this action, they are not required to allege any additional harm aside from the denial of such a statutorily mandated board.

The state argues that appellants need to allege a resulting harm in their constitutional claim and that appellants failed to do so. However, because appellants’ constitutional claim is based on the denial of a review board and we have concluded that appellants are entitled to a review board, we do not need to determine whether appellants alleged sufficient facts such that their constitutional claim should survive a motion to dismiss.

We hold that the district court improperly dismissed appellants’ claim; we reverse and remand for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

      . The commitment chapter mandates that "the provisions of this chapter pertaining to persons mentally ill and dangerous to the public apply with like force and effect to persons who are alleged or found to be sexually dangerous persons or persons with a sexual psychopathic personality” unless otherwise provided in the specific section. Minn. Stat. § 253B.185, subd. 1 (2000).

      . The commitment statute mandates that SPPs and SDPs be confined to a secure treatment facility unless "the patient establishes by clear and convincing evidence that a less restrictive treatment program is available that is consistent with the patient’s treatment needs and the requirements of public safety.’’ Minn.Stat. § 253B.185, subd. 1 (2000).

      . When the legislature added the SDP commitment proceedings, it also changed the legislative designation on the psychopathic personality commitment proceedings to "Sexual Psychopathic Personality.” Act of Aug. 31, 1994, ch. 1, §§ 1 & 6, 1995 Minn. Laws 6, 9 (1994 1st Sp. Session). When making this change, the legislature also moved these commitment proceedings into the civil commitment chapter in the statutes, ch. 253B, and codified the utter inability standard used in Blodgett. See id.

      . We reversed Linehan’s commitment as a psychopathic personality in Linehan I. After his commitment as an SDP, we upheld the district court's findings and order of indefinite commitment in In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 167 (Minn.1996) (Linehan II). At that same time, but in a separate opinion, we upheld the constitutionality of the SDP Act in Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 186-87, 189. This numbering of the Linehan cases is consistent with how we presented them in Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 869-70.

      . We do not conclude, however, that SPPs and SDPs meet the statutory definition of "mentally ill person” in Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13 (2000). The reason that SPPs and SDPs are properly housed in treatment facilities and regional treatment centers could very well be due to the fact that the statute dictates that SPPs and SDPs be treated similarly to MIDs, whose mental illness is a component of their commitment. Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17 (2000). SPPs and SDPs could, therefore, be in treatment facilities and regional treatment centers because they are statutorily mandated to receive the same treatment as MIDs unless the statute specifically says otherwise. See Call, 535 N.W.2d at 317-18.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author:
RUSSELL A. ANDERSON, Justice.
      PAUL H. ANDERSON, Justice PAGE, Justice GILBERT, Justice PAUL H. ANDERSON, Justice

license: Public Domain

text:
    In the Matter of CONDEMNATION BY THE CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS OF CERTAIN LANDS IN THE CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS for the Lyn/Lake Municipal Parking Lot Project.
    No. C5-99-1996.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Aug. 16, 2001.

      Jeffrey R. Brauchle, Sherry Davis White, Jeffrey R. Brauchle, P.A., for appellant, City of Minneapolis.
    Sherman Winthrop, Thomas H. Boyd, Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A., for respondent, Joseph E. Commers Limited, Partnership.
    Louis K Robards, Jeffrey S. Thompson, Assistant Attorneys General, for Commissioner of Transportation, amicus curiae.
   OPINION

RUSSELL A. ANDERSON, Justice.

In this eminent domain action, the City of Minneapolis (City) acquired title to and possession of property belonging to Joseph E. Commers Limited Partnership (respondent) through a statutory quick take procedure. We are asked to determine if the City owes interest at the rate set for judgments (judgment interest) to respondent on funds the City deposited with the court incidental to its quick take of respondent’s property. The district court denied respondent’s request for judgment interest because it found that the deposited funds, although not requested by respondent, were available to respondent. The court of appeals reversed the district court concluding that the deposited funds were not available to respondent until the district court issued its order for their disbursement. We reverse the court of appeals and hold that the district court need not order disbursement of funds for those funds to be considered available for purposes of the rule allowing judgment interest until the funds become available to the property owner. We also hold that the district court’s finding that the funds were available to respondent when deposited with the court is not clearly erroneous.

The City acquired respondent’s property through statutory quick take procedures, which allow a condemning authority to acquire immediate title to and possession of property even before damages for the taking are determined. Minn.Stat. § 117.042 (2000). To effect a quick take, the condemning authority must pay the owner directly or deposit in court an amount equal to the condemning authority’s approved appraisal of value for the property. Id. If payment is deposited with the court, the condemning authority may apply to the court for an order transferring title and possession of the property from the owner to the condemning authority. Id. Amounts deposited with the court are to be paid out under the direction of the court. Id. If the property owner contests the condemning authority’s approved appraisal of value for the property, court-appointed commissioners determine the damage a property owner has sustained on account of the taking, Minn.Stat. §§ 117.075 (2000), 117.042, and any party may appeal to the district court from the commissioners’ award of damages. MinmStat. § 117.145 (2000).

The eminent domain statute refers to two types of interest. One type of interest derives from the court administrator’s statutory obligation to deposit into an interest-bearing account amounts deposited with the court pursuant to the quick take procedure. Minn.Stat. § 117.042(b) (2000). The court administrator is required to pay the interest earned to the ultimate recipients) of the amount deposited. Id. The other type of interest is on an award of damages and is at the statutory rate of interest on judgments established in Minn. Stat. § 549.09 (2000). Minn.Stat. § 117.195, subd. 1 (2000). This interest is paid by the condemning authority. See id. We deal here only with a claim pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 117.195 for judgment interest pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 549.09 and not court administrator interest.

On November 3, 1998, the City deposited with the court quick take funds of $425,000 and acquired title to and possession of respondent’s property. Respondent did not seek disbursement of the funds at that time. Court-appointed commissioners subsequently appraised damages for the City’s taking of respondent’s property at $520,000, and on May 17, 1999, the City deposited with the court an additional $95,000, the difference between the commissioners’ award of $520,000 and the City’s earlier quick take deposit of $425,000. The City also deposited with the court $2,180.75, which represents judgment interest on the $95,000 from November 8, 1998, the date of the City’s quick take of the property, to May 17, 1999, the date of its deposit of $95,000 with the court. See MinmStat. § 117.195, subd. 1.

On May 27, 1999, almost 7 months after deposit of the initial $425,000, respondent petitioned the court to withdraw all of the deposited funds. The City interposed no objection, and the court ordered disbursement of the funds to respondent.

On August 11, 1999, respondent by motion requested that the court order the City to pay judgment interest to respondent on the $520,000 from November 4, 1998, the day after the City took possession of the property, to June 10, 1999, the date of hearing on respondent’s petition to withdraw the funds. The district court denied respondent’s motion because it found that the funds were available to respondent during that time.

The court of appeals reversed the district court concluding that the City owed judgment interest on the deposited funds from the date the property was taken by the City to the date the district court ordered disbursement of the funds to respondent. In re Condemnation by the City of Minneapolis, 609 N.W.2d 923, 926 (Minn.App.2000). According to the court of appeals, the funds were not available to respondent until the district court issued an order for their disbursement because (1) the City could have paid the funds directly to respondent rather than depositing them with the court; (2) to withdraw the funds, respondent had to file a motion, incur expenses, and “overcome legal obstacles”; and (3) it was speculative as to whether an earlier motion to disburse the funds would have been granted. Id.

We first address the legal issue of whether a district court must order disbursement of deposited quick take funds for those funds to be considered available for purposes of the constitutional requirement that just compensation, for the taking of private property must include judgment interest until the funds are available to the property owner. See Ford Motor Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 143 Minn. 392, 395, 173 N.W. 713, 715 (1919). We then address whether the evidence supports the district court’s finding that the funds were available to respondent.

I.

The proper interpretation of the quick take statute in conjunction with the rule set forth in Ford presents a question of law, which we review de novo. In re Estate of Janecek, 610 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Minn.2000).

The federal and state constitutions mandate that just compensation be paid before the government takes private property under the power of eminent domain. U.S. Const, amend. V; Minn. Const, art. I, § 13. More than 80 years ago we held that just compensation includes interest on a condemnation award from the time of an award, which was also when the property was deemed taken by the condemning authority, until payment becomes available to the property owner. Ford, 143 Minn. at 395, 173 N.W. at 715 (“The just compensation required by the Constitution includes not only the amount of the final award but also the interest thereon from the date of the original award until the money becomes available to the landowner.”). Ford predated the quick take statute and did not involve a deposit of funds with the court. However, it is the Ford rule requiring interest as part of just compensation that is at issue in this case, specifically whether deposited quick take funds are available to the property owner for purposes of the Ford rule.

We considered whether a condemning authority must pay judgment interest on deposited quick take funds in Fine v. City of Minneapolis, 391 N.W.2d 853 (Minn.1986). In Fine, the district court directed the transfer of title to and possession of private property to the condemning authority under quick take proceedings. Id. at 854. The property owner, who remained in possession of the property, subsequently entered into a written agreement with the condemning authority. Id. The agreement continued the condemnation proceeding, reserved to both parties the right to appeal from any subsequent commissioners’ award, allowed the property owner to continue in possession of the property upon payment of monthly rent to the condemning authority, and provided that the property owner was entitled to immediate receipt of the deposited quick take funds. Id. The district court approved the agreement and the property owner received payment of the quick take funds. Id. Later, the property owner brought an independent action seeking judgment interest from the date the district court directed the transfer of title and possession to the condemning authority to the date the funds were disbursed to the property owner. Id. at 854-55. We concluded that the award of interest was obviated by the property owner’s immediate entitlement to the deposited funds. Id. at 856.

Respondent argues that our decision in Fine was based solely upon the written agreement between the parties that provided for the property owner’s immediate entitlement to deposited funds. We disagree. We stated in Fine that, “As a practical matter, the deposit by the city of the $55,000 approved appraisal value and the owners’ immediate entitlement to those funds obviates an award of interest on the deposited monies.” Id. We did not say in Fine, nor did we imply, that the only basis for determining that deposited funds were available to the property owner was the written agreement. However, in Fine we also did not hold explicitly that the quick take funds became immediately available because they were deposited with the court. Thus, the question remains whether deposited quick take funds are available for purposes of the Ford rule. 143 Minn. at 395, 173 N.W. at 715.

Because the process for payment for a quick take is governed by chapter 117, we look there for guidance on when deposited quick take funds become available to the landowner. The quick take statute states only that funds deposited with the court are paid out under the direction of the court. Minn.Stat. § 117.042. However, chapter 117 does address entitlement to judgment interest on commissioners’ awards and amounts deposited with the court, which we construe in accord with the constitutional entitlement to judgment interest articulated in Ford. See Minn.Stat. §§ 117.155 (2000) (governing payments and partial payments pending appeal), 645.17(3) (2000) (establishing the presumption in ascertaining legislative intent that the legislature does not intend to violate the U.S. Constitution or state constitution).

Respondent argues that Minn.Stat. § 117.195 entitles him to judgment interest on the deposited quick take funds. The statute provides in part: “[a]ll damages allowed under this chapter, whether by the commissioners or upon appeal, shall bear interest from the time of the filing of the commissioners’ report or from the date of the petitioner’s possession whichever occurs first.” Minn.Stat. § 117.195, subd. 1. Respondent argues that because the City had possession on November 3, 1998, it owed judgment interest from that day forward.

We do not find the statute so clear. First, the phrase, “damages ⅞ * * whether by the commissioners or on appeal,” suggests that this provision applies only to amounts determined to be payable by the condemning authority through the com missioners’ award or district court appeal. In contrast, the legislature elsewhere in chapter 117 specifically refers to “amounts deposited,” which, although they may be encompassed within a final award of damages, are addressed separately. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. § 117.155 (providing full or partial payment on an award pending appeal shall not draw judgment interest from date of “payment or deposit” and that “damages” shall be reduced by the amount of the payment); Minn.Stat. § 117.042 (stating on quick take proceeding “amounts deposited,” with court (not damages) paid out under the direction of the court). In Fine, we stated, “The [quick take] deposit does not represent an award of damages for the taking but only the condemnor’s valuation of the property.” 391 N.W.2d at 855. When the legislature meant to refer to amounts deposited in court, it did so explicitly using the term “amounts deposited” rather than “damages.” Provisions in a statute must be interpreted in light of each other, and “the legislature must be presumed to have understood the effect of its words and intended the entire statute to be effective and certain.” Van Asperen v. Darling Olds, Inc., 254 Minn. 62, 73-74, 93 N.W.2d 690, 698 (1958). The choice to refer specifically to “damages” in Minn. Stat. § 117.195, while not determinative, suggests that provision may not apply to amounts deposited with the court.

As noted, our decision in Ford requires just compensation “from the date of the original award until the money becomes available to the landowner.” 143 Minn. at 395, 173 N.W. at 715. Respondent claims that funds are never available until the owner petitions for and obtains a court order disbursing the funds, citing a court of appeals decision, In re Condemnation by the Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency, 447 N.W.2d 891 (Minn.App.1989) (“MCDA”), rev. denied, (Minn. Jan. 12, 1990). In MCDA the condemning authority deposited quick take funds with the district court and the court ordered the court administrator to pay from the deposit any encumbrances on the property as of the transfer date. Id. at 892-93. The property owner promptly petitioned for disbursement of the funds but the district court denied the petition because of uncertainty regarding obligations associated with the property and ordered the funds transferred to a certificate of deposit. Id. at 893. Six months later, the court approved disbursement of the funds. Id.

On appeal, the court of appeals determined that the owner was entitled to judgment interest on the quick take funds from the date of the quick take deposit to the date the district court ordered disbursement of the funds to the property owner. Id. at 894. Drawing upon our analysis in Fine, the court of appeals concluded that the decisive factor in determining entitlement to judgment interest is availability of the funds, not the date of deposit. Id. at 893-94. Because the property owner’s petition for disbursement of the funds had been initially denied by the district court, the funds were not available until the court granted the property owner’s petition to disburse the funds. Id. at 893-94.

It does not follow, however, that funds are never available until a court orders disbursement. Rather, as the court of appeals stated in MCDA if the funds are available and earning only court administrator interest, it is the landowner’s responsibility to request them and then reinvest them at a higher rate. Id. at 894. In Ford we stated that just compensation includes interest until payment becomes available, not interest until the funds were received by the property owner. 143 Minn. at 395, 173 N.W. at 715. To allow judgment interest to accrue after deposit with the court allows a property owner to collect interest at public expense on deposited funds that are available to the property owner but simply not requested, as is the case here. A property owner cannot wait indefinitely, at public expense, to claim deposited funds. We hold that for purposes of determining whether the condemning authority must pay judgment interest on deposited quick take funds under Ford, those funds do not become available only when the district court orders disbursement.

II.

Finally, we consider whether the district court’s factual finding that the funds were available upon deposit was clearly erroneous. We will not set aside a district court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. Plath v. Plath, 428 N.W.2d 392, 393 (Minn.1988).

The City made quick take deposits on nine parcels in the condemnation project, including respondent’s property. Six of the property owners promptly moved the court to withdraw the funds. The City did not object to any of these motions and the court granted the motions. The City also did not object when respondent finally moved the court to disburse deposited funds for his property. A court likely would not abuse its discretion in awarding judgment interest for the period between notice of the taking and a timely motion for disbursement of the funds. Likewise, under particular circumstances a court may determine, without abusing its discretion, that funds did not truly become available after a timely petition until the court ordered the funds disbursed. However, because respondent did not timely petition the court for disbursement of the funds, those facts are not here present.

Instead respondent waited almost 7 months before seeking disbursement of the funds. There is no explanation in the record as to why respondent failed to promptly seek disbursement. In addition, respondent has presented no evidence that the court would have denied disbursement of the funds if requested earlier, as in MCDA, where judgment interest was awarded after a timely request for release of the funds was denied. 447 N.W.2d at 893-94. In fact, respondent states that at all times relevant he had “sole, exclusive, and unclouded” interest in the property, suggesting that there would have been no question as to his entitlement to the deposit. The absence of any record evidence suggesting funds would not be disbursed, coupled with respondent’s claim to “sole, exclusive and unclouded interest” leaves us unable to conclude, as the court of appeals did, that earlier disbursement was speculative. See In re Condemnation, 609 N.W.2d at 926. The prompt disbursement of deposits for six similarly situated property owners and respondent’s failure to demonstrate that the funds would not have been available if requested earlier leads us to conclude that the district court’s factual finding was not clearly erroneous.

We hold that a district court need not order disbursement of deposited quick take funds for those funds to be considered available for purposes of the Ford rule allowing judgment interest until the funds become available to the property owner. We also hold that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the funds were available to the property owner. Accordingly, the district court properly denied respondent’s motion for interest and we reverse the court of appeals.

Reversed.

PAUL H. ANDERSON, Justice

(dissenting).

I join in the dissent of Justice Gilbert and write separately to amplify my concern that the result of the majority opinion will be that property owners subject to eminent domain proceedings will be denied just compensation for the taking of their property. I have stated in a dissent to an opinion of this court that

The state’s ability to compel owners to relinquish property to the state for public purposes is a powerful intrusion upon the right to the quiet and peaceful ownership of property. * * * Both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution expressly limit the state’s exercise of the eminent domain power by requiring the payment of just compensation. See U.S. Const, amend. V; Minn. Const, art. I, § 13. These constitutional safeguards are rooted in the idea that no single individual should be forced to bear the entire burden for the good of all.
To insure that owners subject to the eminent domain power are made whole when their property is taken, legal safeguards have been established to ascertain the proper measure of damages.

County of Anoka v. Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d 331, 337 (Minn.1997) (Anderson, Paul H., J., dissenting).

Among the legal safeguards established to ensure that property owners are properly compensated is the requirement that when owners lose title and possession to property under eminent domain proceedings, they are entitled to money damages, plus interest on those damages. Ford Motor Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 143 Minn. 392, 395, 173 N.W. 713, 715 (1919). Here, the city took possession of respondent’s property under a quick-take procedure, but rather than pay damages to respondent at the time of taking, the city deposited the funds with the court. The city had the right to deposit the funds with the court and, once deposited with the court, the funds cannot be withdrawn without the permission of the court. Minn.Stat. § 117.042 (2000). There are numerous good policy reasons that underlie this deposit procedure, most of which are in place to protect the interests of the city as con-demnor.

Without a doubt, the statutory scheme subject to our analysis lacks the clarity necessary for a simple answer. Nevertheless, the majority fails to appreciate the overall scheme that the legislature has instituted to protect a condemnee’s constitutional right to just compensation while at the same time permitting a condemnor title and possession to the property subject to condemnation. The quick-take statutory scheme recognizes that for a multitude of reasons, a condemnor may need to acquire title and possession to the subject property before just compensation can be determined and before a final determination of the rights of all parties who may claim an interest in the property. However, to satisfy the constitutional just compensation requirements, a quick-take condemnor must pay the property owner directly or deposit in court an amount equal to the condemnor’s approved appraisal of value for the property at the time title and possession of the property is taken. Id.

The requirement that the condemnor make payment to the property owner under the quick-take procedure has the potential of exposing the condemnor to the risk of excessive payment. For example, if payment is made directly to the putative property owner, there is a possibility that other interests in the property, such as those of a mortgagee or a lien holder, will remain unpaid. If such an interest is not paid, the condemnor could lack clear title to the property and might be forced to pay additional funds in order to get clear title. To protect the condemnor from such a contingency, the legislature established the option of depositing the funds with the court. Once the funds have been deposited with the court, the funds can be distributed only under a court order. Payment under the supervision of the court helps to assure the condemnor that all valid interests in the property are compensated.

The legislature also understood that when funds are deposited with the court, there is the potential that no interest will be earned on the funds deposited by the condemnor pending resolution of title and other matters. Accordingly, the legislature established a procedure to protect the condemnor from the- possibility that the deposited funds would earn no interest. It required that the court deposit the funds in an interest-bearing account. Minn.Stat. § 117.042(b) (2000). Thus, the condemnor is assured that pending resolution of matters surrounding the quick take, funds deposited with the court, but subject to court order for distribution, will earn interest. This protection is important to the con-demnor because the just compensation that ultimately must be paid to the property owner includes interest.

The majority erroneously concludes that the interest rate on the funds deposited with the court is the benchmark for just compensation to be paid to the property owner. The majority takes a statutory provision that is in place to provide protection for the condemnor and uses it to establish the just compensation interest rate for the condemnee. I do not believe that this is what the legislature intended. As Justice Gilbert correctly points out in his dissent, the legislature has made specific reference to Minn.Stat. § 549.09 (2000) — the judgment rate of interest — as the benchmark for just compensation for the condemnee.

The majority attempts to use MinmStat. § 117.155 (2000) to support its position, but its rationale is undermined by its own recognition that this statute applies only to those situations when a property owner refuses to accept payment after the award is available or upon completion of condemnation proceedings. I submit that there is a very logical purpose for Minn.Stat. § 117.155 — to encourage acceptance of payment once available and to cause a recalcitrant condemnee to withdraw the funds. The situation contemplated by Minn.Stat. § 117.155 is very different from what we have before us today. Here, the funds deposited with the court were deposited to provide court-supervised protection for the interests of the condemnor. While either the condemnor or the condemnee can petition the court for release of the funds, the funds can be released only under the direction of the court. I fail to understand the majority’s position that even though the funds cannot be released without court order, they are available to the property owner in the same sense contemplated under Minn.Stat. § 117.155.

The majority cites to three cases, Ford; Warren v. First Division St. Paul and Pac. R.R. Co., 21 Minn. 424 (1875); and Fine v. City of Minneapolis, 391 N.W.2d 853 (Minn.1986), in support of its position. Ford and Warren are distinguishable because they operate under a statutory scheme different from the quick-take procedure and they deal with situations where funds clearly were available to the con-demnee. In Fine, we did not address the issue before us. Despite this, the majority attaches to language in Fine referring to the “owner’s immediate entitlement to funds.” The majority has relied on statements made in Fine that do not address the specific question before the court and has used this language to take us in a direction that is contrary to the statutory .scheme put in place by the legislature. When we go in the direction taken by the majority, we deny property owners just compensation by failing to compensate them with the interest rate as mandated by the legislature. Therefore, I dissent.

PAGE, Justice

(dissenting).

I join in the dissent of Justice PAUL H. ANDERSON.

GILBERT, Justice

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and would affirm the court of appeals. The majority has mischaracterized the issue. The issue is the rate of interest, not when interest ceases to accrue on deposited funds. The respondent in this case has merely requested its statutory interest on a judgment or award pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1 (2000), with due credit given for all interest accumulated on deposited funds, and that is what respondent should receive. The majority opinion nullifies the statutory judgment/award rate of interest provision, Minn-Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1, requiring a condemning authority to pay a property owner interest on the commissioners’ damage award from the date that petitioner takes possession of the condemned property, in favor of the statutory provision providing for interest earned on a quick-take deposit. See Minn. Stat. § 117.042(b) (2000).

The majority’s conclusion does not conform with the basic rules of statutory construction. Apparently conflicting laws are to be construed together, if possible, to give effect to both provisions. Minn.Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (2000); State ex rel. Beaulieu v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 624, 533 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn.1995). Contrary to what the majority opinion holds, interest continues to accrue even after deposit. Section 117.042(b) provides in part that “[a]ll interest credited to the amount deposited from the date of deposit shall be paid to the ultimate recipient of the amount deposited.” Thus, we must determine if the judgment or award interest rate is displaced by the deposit rate of interest rather than determine if all interest ceases to accrue upon deposit.

The majority supports its opinion with a new construction of the phrase “until the money becomes available to the landowner,” contained in Ford Motor Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 143 Minn. 392, 395, 173 N.W. 713, 715 (1919). In Ford, we decided only the narrow question of whether interest is allowed on the final award from the date of the original award. Ford did not decide the issue before us now, nor did Ford hold as the majority states that “interest ceased accruing when the funds became available.” In fact, Ford implies just the opposite. We stated in Ford that “[sjuch interest could not well be included in the final award as the full amount of interest could not be determined at that time.” Id. at 396, 173 N.W. 713, 173 N.W. at 715.

Furthermore, the offset of value for the use of the premises against the interest found to be due in Ford would be similar to the offset of the interest earned on deposit from the total statutory judgment/award interest due on the final award due in this case. However, the majority holds that because of the above language in Ford, the statutory judgment/award interest ceases to accrue on money that the condemning authority elects to deposit with the clerk of the district court in an eminent domain proceeding pursuant to the quick-take statute, Minn.Stat. § 117.042, even though the property owner cannot access the quick-take portion of the damages until the district court directs the deposited funds to be disbursed.

The majority opinion avoids addressing the controlling part of Minn.Stat. § 117.195, subd. 1 (2000), which specifies the rate of interest to be determined according to section 549.09, subd. 1, and the interplay between that rate and the interest earned on deposit as provided in Minn. Stat. § 117.042(b) of the quick-take statute. The statutory judgment/award interest section governs the interest calculation on condemnation awards and importantly, neither Minn.Stat. § 117.195, subd. 1, nor section 549.09 indicate that interest shall either be diminished or enhanced by the deposit of funds with the court administrator. When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we should follow the plain meaning of the statutes. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2000).

All damages allowed under this eminent domain proceeding were determined to be $520,000 by the commissioners, pursuant to an award dated May 19, 1999. On May 27, 1999, the respondent petitioned the court for release of these funds, and the funds were released at the hearing date on June 10, 1999. Therefore, the respondent argues that he is entitled to statutory interest on the entire award of $520,000 from November 4, 1998, the day following the condemning authority’s possession date and date of the quick-take deposit with the court of $425,000, until June 10, 1999 (with credit for amounts earned on deposit).

The majority opinion digresses into policy considerations of why money is deposited in the court on a quick-take to support its conclusion that interest then abates. The majority then concludes that “a district court need not order disbursement of deposited quick-take funds for those funds to be considered available for purposes of the Ford rule allowing judgment interest until the funds become available to the property owner.” There is no present authority cited for such a notion, and it does not make practical sense. In the practical sense, this means that even though a respondent does not have use of the funds, statutory judgment/award interest would not accrue on the quick-take deposit. I would suggest that a delayed payment without full statutory judgmenVaward interest is in violation of both our constitutional and statutory requirements of just compensation. The majority substitutes interest earned on deposit for the currently mandated statutory judgment/award interest without legislative authority to make that switch.

The majority also misconstrues Minn. Stat. § 117.155 (2000) in support of its reasoning. It interprets that statute to abate interest by stating “providing full or partial payment on an award pending appeal shall not draw judgment interest from date of ‘payment or deposit’ * * However, this abatement only occurs when a property owner “refuses to accept such payment” on appeal. Id. Here, the owner did not refuse to accept such payment but rather, the condemning authority deposited the money with the court. The majority’s reliance on Minn.Stat. § 117.155 under these facts is misplaced.

The majority opinion also cites Warren for the proposition that “interest ceased accruing when judgment was entered.” However, Warren addressed only prejudgment interest and required that interest computed from the date of filing the award to entry of judgment be added to the amount of the verdict. See 21 Minn, at 427. Warren does not support the majority’s conclusion that interest then ceases to accrue and “[t]hus, disbursing payment to the property owner was not necessary for interest to cease accruing.” Warren simply does not mention “disbursing payment” nor does it indicate when any payment was made to the landowner or whether funds were ever deposited in court.

The majority’s use of Fine v. City of Minneapolis to imply that there was some basis other than a written agreement to determine when deposited funds became available without the property owner actually receiving the funds is only another means used to rewrite Minn.Stat. § 117.195. In Fine, we specifically noted that “[n]o consideration or review was sought of the order directing the payment of [the quick-take deposit] without any added interest. Instead, * * * the Fines commenced this independent class action to recover interest on the funds originally deposited * * *.” 391 N.W.2d at 854. Our holding in Fine was limited to the issue of whether “ * * * the deposit with the court of an amount equal to the petitioner’s approved appraisal of value pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 117.042 ⅜ * * did not give rise to a separate cause of action for interest on the deposited fund.” 391 N.W.2d at 856. However, in this case, the respondent sought review of the precise issue not decided in Fine: accrued interest due on the quick-take deposit. In Fine, there was a settlement and no commissioners’ award like we have in this case. Id.

The payment, of statutory interest pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 117.195 on only the additional $95,000 awarded by the commissioners over and above the quick-take deposit does not eliminate the accrual of statutory interest on the quick-take deposit. In fact, our decision in Fine would require interest on the “final award from the date of the original award,” in this case, the date of the quick-take deposit. Ford, 143 Minn. at 396, 173 N.W. at 715. The trial court should then determine the amount earned on deposit similar to determining the value of the use of the lands in question in Ford and “offset the value of such use against the interest.” Id.

If there was a deposit, to the extent that there was interest earned on the deposit, the interest amounts paid to the ultimate recipient pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 117.042(b) would of course be an offset to the statutory interest rate mandated by Minn.Stat. § 117.195, subd. 1. That would require the court to make an equitable adjustment. If the city desired an earlier payout of the deposited funds, it also could have petitioned the court or paid them directly to respondent. Construing these statutes this way would not only eliminate the concern for the duplication of interest factor we mentioned in Fine, 391 N.W.2d at 856, but also validate both Minn.Stat. § 117.195, subd. 1, and. Minn.Stat. § 117.042(b), without having to choose one over the other. The legislature directs that when interpreting such potentially conflicting statutes, “the two shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both.” Minn.Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1.

Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals and remand this case to the district court to determine the statutory interest amount with credit for interest earned on deposit.

PAUL H. ANDERSON, Justice

(dissenting).

I join in the dissent of Justice GILBERT.

      . Thus, respondent argued that in addition to the $2,180 in judgment interest on the $95,000 that the city had already paid, he was entitled to an amount representing judgment interest on the $95,000 from the date of the deposit (May 17, 1999) to the date of the hearing on respondent’s petition to withdraw the funds (June 10, 1999).

      . The dissent dismisses the court’s statement in Ford that interest should not be required for funds available to the landowner. As authority for the statement in Ford regarding availability we referred to cases including Warren v. First Div. St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 21 Minn. 424 (1875). In that case (not a quick take), we held that interest was payable from the date of filing the original commissioners’ award “to the entry of judgment.” Id at 427. While in both Warren and Ford the narrow question presented was when interest began to accrue and not when accrual ended, in both cases we were required to instruct the district courts on remand how to compute the interest. In Ford, interest ceased accruing when the funds became available. 143 Minn. at 395, 173 N.W. at 715. In Warren, interest ceased accruing when judgment was entered. 21 Minn. at 427. Thus, disbursing payment to the property owner was not necessary for interest to cease accruing.

      . The statement in Fine relied upon by the dissent of Justice Gilbert does not support the dissent's conclusion that interest is owing on quick take deposited funds. Describing what would have happened in Fine in the absence of a settlement of all issues, the court stated, “[i]f the condemnation proceedings continued to a commissioners’ award, interest was or should have been calculated according to section 117.195 and an award of interest on the deposit would represent a duplication, in whole or in part, of the interest factor in 'just compensation.’ ” 391 N.W.2d at 856. In this case, the condemnation proceedings did continue to a commissioners' award, and the judgment interest on that $95,000 award was calculated according to section 117.195. We see no conflict with the procedures used here and our discussion in Fine.

      . We do not suggest, as the dissent claims, that section 117.155 dictates that interest not be paid on any deposited funds. We recognize that the provision above applies only to deposits or payments of funds refused by the property owner, and cite section 117.155 only to illustrate the distinction the legislature made in describing damages and deposited amounts.

      . Our conclusion encompasses the determination that the $95,000 in additional funds paid by the City after the commissioners' award was available to respondent as of the date of the deposit. See supra note 1.

      ."All damages allowed under this chapter, whether by the commissioners or upon appeal, shall bear interest from the time of the filing of the commissioner's [sic] report or from the date of the petitioner’s possession, whichever occurs first. The rate of interest shall be determined according to section 549.09.” Minn.Stat. § 117.195, subd. 1.

      . The city withheld disclosing its final appraisal value of $375,000, which was $50,000 less than the amount the city originally deposited with the court until March 2, 1999, the second day of the commissioners’ hearing.

      . See Warren v. First Div. St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 21 Minn. 424, 427 (1875) (emphasizing just compensation and delayed payment in terms of "if paid”).

      . 391 N.W.2d 853 (Minn.1986).

      . This case does not involve a situation as mentioned by the majority where a property owner has waited indefinitely, at public expense, to claim deposited funds.