author: SHUMAKER, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Umer Mohammed MASOOD, Respondent.
    No. A06-1689.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Oct. 9, 2007.

      Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Charles E. Maclean, Wino-na County Attorney, Thomas E. Gort, Assistant Winona County Attorney, Winona, MN, for appellant.
    John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.
    Considered and decided by SHUMAKER, Presiding Judge; TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge; and STONEBURNER, Judge.
   OPINION

SHUMAKER, Judge.

The respondent was convicted of witness tampering and assault. The district court sentenced only on the witness-tampering offense and departed upward durationally from the maximum presumptive sentence.

After Blakely v. Washington was decided, the respondent moved, under rule 27.03, subd. 9, to correct his sentence, seeking the imposition of the presumptive maximum sentence. The state opposed the correction and, in the alternative, asked the court to convene a jury to decide departure factors. The court granted respondent’s motion and imposed the presumptive maximum sentence without holding an evidentiary hearing. The state claims that the court erred.

Because an evidentiary hearing was not required and because the rule in State v. Osborne made a departure legally questionable, the court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm.

FACTS

On November 8, 2002, a jury found respondent Umer Mohammed Masood guilty of aggravated witness tampering and assault. The district court sentenced Ma-sood only on the witness-tampering conviction, imposing an executed sentence of 144 months. This was a departure from the presumptive maximum sentence of 115 months. The court identified the aggravating factors on which its sentencing departure was based as being the particular cruelty with which Masood committed the crime, the physical and emotional harm to the victim, and the atypical egregiousness of this crime.

Challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, Masood appealed. This court affirmed the convictions. State v. Masood, No. A03-81 (Minn. App. Feb. 28, 2004), review denied (Minn. Apr. 28, 2004).

On June 24, 2004, the United States Supreme Court filed its opinion in Blakely v. Washington, holding that a sentencing court cannot exceed the prescribed statutory maximum sentence without affording to the defendant an opportunity to have a jury decide, beyond a reasonable doubt, the facts on which the excess sentence is based. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). Blakely interpreted the prescribed statutory maximum sentence to mean the presumptive sentence. Id.

Masood then moved, under Minn. R.Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, to correct his sentence by reducing it to the presumptive maximum sentence, arguing that the judicial departure violated Blakely. The state opposed the motion, contending that the trial jury had found sufficient facts to justify the departure, and requested the court to convene a jury to determine the departure factors if the court would not let the sentence stand.

There were substantial delays before the court ruled on Masood’s motion. These were caused by the desire of the court to wait for clarification by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the retirement of the original sentencing judge, and the transfer of the case to a new judge. During the pen-dency of the motion, both parties submitted various memoranda on the issues raised in the motion and on the Blakely rule. Ultimately, the court granted Ma-sood’s motion for sentence reduction without convening a jury on the departure issue and sentenced Masood to 115 months.

On appeal, the state contends that the district court erred by failing to hold a hearing on Masood’s motion, by failing to make sufficient findings to facilitate appellate review, and by failing to convene a jury to decide the departure factors.

ISSUES

The district court departed from the sentencing guidelines in violation of Blakely v. Washington. The respondent moved, under Minn. R.Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, to correct the sentence and for the imposition of the maximum presumptive sentence. The state appealed the correction, citing departure grounds, and asked the court to convene a jury to decide departure factors. Without an evidentiary hearing, the court granted respondent’s motion, relying on the rule in State v. Osborne, which arguably precludes a departure under the circumstances of this case.

1. Did the court abuse its discretion by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing on the correction motion?

2. Did the court abuse its discretion by declining to convene a jury to determine departure factors?

ANALYSIS

This court reviews sentencing departures for an abuse of discretion. State v. Geller, 665 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Minn.2003).

Hearing and Findings

Relying on Minn.Stat. § 590.04 (2000), a part of the law on postconviction remedy, the state argues that the district court was required to hold a hearing on Masood’s motion and to make findings of fact. See Minn.Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (“[T]he court shall promptly set an early hearing on the petition and response thereto and ... make findings of fact....”). The state’s reliance on that statute is misplaced.

Masood did not petition for postconviction relief under section 590.04 but rather moved to correct his sentence under Minn. R.Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, which provides that the court “may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law.” That rule does not expressly require a hearing, nor does it require findings of fact. Although the district court may treat a rule 27 motion as the functional equivalent of a petition for postconviction relief, it is not required to do so. See State v. Scott, 529 N.W.2d 11, 12 (Minn.App.1995) (noting that an order denying a sentencing motion may be construed as a posteonvietion remedy order), review denied (Minn. Mar. 14, 1995).

When the state argues that the court should have held a hearing on Masood’s motion, presumably the state means an “evidentiary” hearing as contemplated by section 590.04. Not only is an “evidentia-ry” hearing not required by rule 27.03, subd. 9, but, also, at least in this case, such a hearing would not have been an efficient use of judicial resources, nor would it have resolved the departure question. The hearing that the state had in mind would necessarily focus on the facts the state would offer to support a sentencing departure. Those are the same facts that ultimately would be presented to a jury, if one were convened. It would serve no useful purpose to require the presentation of the same facts twice. Thus, at the preliminary stage of the correction motion having been made and opposition having been stated, the only “hearing” ordinarily useful would focus on the legal issues raised by the motion. The state would merely identify the facts to be presented to a jury, and the court could, from those identified facts, determine whether they are sufficient to convene a jury for an evidentiary hearing.

The state’s contention that the court erred by failing to hold a hearing on Ma-sood’s motion overlooks two additional facts. First, neither party requested a hearing. This is true even though the newly assigned judge wrote to both parties nearly four months before he ruled on the motion, asking, “Does either of you wish to submit any additional argument before the court rules on the matter?” Second, even though the court did not hear oral arguments for and against the relief Masood requested, both parties took advantage of being heard through extensive memoranda, submitted at various times, thoroughly addressing all issues pertinent to the motion. This includes the state’s initial response to the motion in which the state sets forth in detail, and with references to the trial transcript, the departure factors on which it relied in urging the court to deny the motion or, in the alternative, to convene a jury to decide the aggravating circumstances.

Because there was no evidentiary hearing at this stage, the court made no factual findings. But the court did disclose the basis of its ruling by indicating that it imposed the presumptive maximum sentence in “light of Blakely ... and State v. Osborne.... ” Although the court provided no analysis of those authorities, the disclosure was sufficient to allow meaningful appellate review, as we discuss below.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in not holding a hearing on Ma-sood’s sentence-correction motion and in not making findings of fact.

The Hankerson Case

The state argues that the district court erred in declining to convene a jury to decide the departure factors. The state relies on Hankerson v. State for three propositions: (1) the district court has the authority to impanel a jury on a departure issue; (2) the use of such a jury does not violate the double-jeopardy prohibition; and (3) the use of such a jury does not contravene the rule against ex post facto laws. Hankerson v. State, 723 N.W.2d 232 (Minn.2006).

But the fact that the court has the authority to impanel a jury when there has been a Blakely sentencing violation is not tantamount to a mandate to do so. Neither Hankerson nor any other caselaw authority of which we are aware requires the court to impanel a jury to determine departure factors. On the contrary, Hankerson reiterates the discretionary nature of departures: “A sentence outside the applicable range on the grid is a departure from the sentencing guidelines and is not controlled by the guidelines, but rather is an exercise of judicial discretion constrained by case law and appellate review.” Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at 235 (quoting Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D. (2005)).

Because the convening of a jury to decide departure factors is not mandated, at least for this case, we review the court’s decision not to convene such a jury for an abuse of discretion.

Exercise of Discretion

Citing the rules in Blakely and State v. Osborne, 715 N.W.2d 436 (Minn.2006), the district court declined the state’s request to impanel a jury to consider and decide departure evidence. Was this an abuse of the court’s discretion?

“Judicial discretion” has been defined as “... a legal discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law and is not to give effect to the will of the judge, but to that of the law.” It is the “... exercise of discretion where there are two alternative provisions of law applicable, under either of which [the] court could proceed.” Black’s Law Dictionary 419 (5th ed.1979). Thus, if two or more outcomes of an issue are legally permissible, the court has a choice to select any over the others.

Masood was convicted of both witness tampering and assault, but the court sentenced him only on the witness-tampering conviction. However, the court relied on the assault facts — the particularly cruel manner of committing that crime and the harm to the victim — to justify the departure. In Osborne, the supreme court noted prior caselaw prohibiting the use of the underlying facts of multiple offenses to justify a departure on one of the offenses:

We have also held that conduct underlying one conviction for which a defendant was sentenced cannot be used to support an upward sentencing departure for a separate conviction. State v. McIntosh, 641 N.W.2d 3, 9 (Minn.2002) citing State v. Spaeth, 552 N.W.2d 187, 196 (Minn.1996). The rationale ... is that a defendant should not be punished twice for the same conduct.

State v. Osborne, 715 N.W.2d at 446.

It is evident that the sentencing court sought to avoid the McIntosh proscription by not imposing a sentence for the assault. But the same conduct underlies both the witness tampering for which sentence was imposed and the assault for which no sentence was imposed. Osborne does not precisely address this sentencing approach. But arguably the rationale of the McIntosh prohibition, and the prohibitions of the other similar cases cited by the Osborne court, would apply here to preclude a departure based on the assault conduct. That was a plausibly and ostensibly legally correct view for the re-sentencing court to adopt, even though a contrary position might have been taken, and even though there existed aggravating circumstances that could justify a departure.

Because it appears that there are at least two permissible outcomes respecting the propriety of convening a jury to decide departure factors, the court did not abuse its discretion in choosing one of these permissible outcomes over the other.

The original sentencing court also cited as a departure factor the atypicality of the witness-tampering crime. We find nothing in the record, other than the state’s assertion and the court’s surmise, to support that conclusion. Without some factual support, mere argument will not suffice to establish a departure factor. Thus, the re-sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in impliedly rejecting this third reason for an aggravated departure from the maximum presumptive sentence.

DECISION

The court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on respondent’s sentence-correction motion under rule 27.03, and the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to convene a jury to decide departure factors when a departure was legally barred.

Affirmed.

      . Ostensibly, such a mandate exists in Minn.Stat. § 244.10, subd. 5(a) (Supp.2005), but the state does not invoke that statute here.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CROTHERS, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    2007 ND 160
    STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Rockwell D. SKARSGARD, Defendant and Appellant City of Burlington, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Rockwell D. Skarsgard, Defendant and Appellant.
    Nos. 20060304, 20060305.
    Supreme Court of North Dakota.
    Oct. 16, 2007.

      Mark Ashley Flagstad, Assistant State’s Attorney and City Prosecutor, Minot, N.D., for plaintiffs and appellees, State of North Dakota and City of Burlington.
    Mark Samuel Douglas, North Dakota Public Defenders’ Office, Williston, N.D., for defendant and appellant.
   CROTHERS, Justice.

[¶ 1] Rockwell D. Skarsgard appeals from criminal judgments entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and driving under suspension. We conclude the stop of Skarsgard’s vehicle was constitutionally permissible, the district court did not erroneously admit the results of Skarsgard’s blood-alcohol test into evidence or erroneously fail to grant his motion for a mistrial, Skarsgard’s excessive bail claim is moot, Skarsgard is not enti-tied to reversal of the convictions based on the conditions of his pretrial incarceration, and the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him to one year in prison. We affirm.

I

[¶ 2] At 2:39 p.m. on September 8, 2005, Burlington Police Chief Phillip K. Crabb received a call from Dodie Stevens, a United Community Bank employee, who told him a green Chrysler with no license plates had “suspiciously” driven through the bank’s parking lot twice. She also told Crabb the driver looked intoxicated and the vehicle was westbound. Crabb responded to the call, spotted the moving vehicle, and drove behind it. Crabb stated in his report of the incident that he “noticed there were no plates of any sort or any type of registration on the vehicle” and he “personally recognized the driver as a suspended driver from a past call.” After Crabb activated his emergency lights, the driver pulled the green Chrysler off the road into the parking lot of a car wash. When Crabb got out of his patrol car, the driver started to drive away. Crabb got back in his patrol car and followed the vehicle until it stopped in the parking lot. The driver started to drive off again when Crabb got out of the patrol car and he yelled to the driver to stop. The driver finally stopped the vehicle and Crabb confirmed through a concealed weapons permit that the driver was Skarsgard. Crabb detected a strong odor of alcohol on Skarsgard, informed him he was stopped for having no registration, and arrested him for driving under suspension. Skarsgard failed a field sobriety test and eventually agreed to submit to a blood-alcohol test which was administered at a Minot hospital. Skarsgard was arrested for driving under the influence.

[¶ 3] Skarsgard was incarcerated in the Ward County Jail but was released on bond pending trial. Shortly after his release, he was arrested for driving under the influence and driving under suspension. He was again released on bond, but was arrested on May 5, 2006, for driving under the influence and driving under suspension. Skarsgard posted bond, but was arrested on May 9, 2006, for actual physical control of a motor vehicle, driving under suspension, and disorderly conduct. The State’s motion to revoke bond was granted by the court. Skarsgard requested a bond hearing, and the court set bond at $25,000 cash. Skarsgard’s bond was posted by his girlfriend, and he was again released. However, on September 27, 2006, the district court revoked the bond at the request of the bond remittetur, who alleged that Skarsgard “has violated specific conditions of his release on bond, which were imposed by the Court.”

[¶ 4] While incarcerated at the Ward County Jail, Skarsgard made numerous complaints to jail personnel and the court that the facility was not sufficient to accommodate his medical needs because of his cardiovascular, orthopaedic, and mobility problems. He was taken to a hospital emergency room on three occasions during his pretrial incarceration, and on each occasion, the attending physicians indicated Skarsgard was fit to be housed at the jail. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied his pretrial motion to suppress evidence. At his jury trial, Skars-gard objected to the admission of the blood-alcohol test results and moved for a mistrial based on witness statements about his refusal to take a field sobriety test during a subsequent driving under the influence arrest. The court admitted the test results and denied the mistrial motion, giving a cautionary instruction for the jury to disregard the statements of the witness. The jury found Skarsgard guilty, and the court sentenced him to one year in prison on the driving under the influence charge and to 30 days imprisonment on the driving under suspension charge, both sentences to run concurrently.

II

[¶ 5] Skarsgard argues the district court erred in denying his suppression motion because Crabb lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle.

[¶ 6] Although an evidentiary hearing was held on the motion to suppress, Skarsgard failed to provide this Court with a transcript of that hearing. A party’s failure to provide a transcript of the proceedings in the district court may prevent the party from prevailing on appeal. State v. Roth, 2004 ND 23, ¶ 27, 674 N.W.2d 495. We will not review an issue if the record on appeal does not allow for a meaningful and intelligent review of the district court’s alleged error. State v. Hilgers, 2004 ND 160, ¶ 35, 685 N.W.2d 109. However, the record on appeal, including the exhibits and trial transcript, allow for a meaningful and intelligent review of the district court’s decision. We will affirm a district court’s decision on a suppression motion if sufficient competent evidence exists that is fairly capable of supporting the findings and the court’s decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Doohen, 2006 ND 239, ¶ 8, 724 N.W.2d 158. Questions of law are fully reviewable on appeal, and whether findings of fact meet a legal standard is a question of law. State v. Graf, 2006 ND 196, ¶ 7, 721 N.W.2d 381.

[¶ 7] Although Skarsgard argues Crabb lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle, a law enforcement officer may make an investigative stop of a vehicle on less than probable cause. In State v. Washington, 2007 ND 138, ¶ 11, 737 N.W.2d 382, we explained:

[I]nvestigative stops of automobiles and their occupants for suspected violations of law may be upheld if an officer has at least a reasonable suspicion that the motorist has violated the law or probable cause to believe the motorist has done so. State v. Westmiller, 2007 ND 52, ¶ 9, 730 N.W.2d 134. In Westmiller, at ¶ 10, we explained the minimum standard to justify a stop:
Reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch. State v. Smith, 2005 ND 21, ¶ 15, 691 N.W.2d 203. Reasonable suspicion for a stop exists when a reasonable person in the officer’s position would be justified by some objective manifestation to suspect potential unlawful activity. Johnson v. Sprynczynatyk, 2006 ND 137, ¶ 9, 717 N.W.2d 586; Smith, at ¶ 15. The reasonable suspicion standard is objective and does not hinge upon the subjective beliefs or motivations of the arresting officer. State v. Leher, 2002 ND 171, ¶ 11, 653 N.W.2d 56. In order to determine whether an investigative stop is valid, we consider the totality of the circumstances and examine the information known to the officer at the time of the stop. Gabel [v. North Dakota Dep’t of Transp.], 2006 ND 178, ¶ 11, 720 N.W.2d 433; State v. Torkelsen, 2006 ND 152, ¶ 13, 718 N.W.2d 22. The reasonable suspicion standard does not require an officer to rule out every possible innocent excuse for the behavior in question before stopping a vehicle for investigation. State v. Decoteau, 2004 ND 139, ¶ 14, 681 N.W.2d 803.

Washington, at ¶ 11.

[¶ 8] Crabb testified that he stopped the green Chrysler because it had no license plates and “no viewable registration” sticker. Crabb also testified he was able to see the driver while following him, recognized the driver as someone he had “dealt with ... approximately a month earlier,” and “knew from a prior instance that he was under suspension.” Skars-gard contends the investigative stop was unconstitutional because “it is not illegal to drive a vehicle without a registration sticker,” and in any event, he presented evidence that he had a registration sticker affixed to a vehicle window. We reject Skarsgard’s argument for several reasons. Even though N.D.C.C. § 39-04-17 does not specifically require that a registration certificate be affixed to a vehicle and be viewable, the statute does require that “possession” of a proper certificate “is pri-ma facie evidence of compliance with motor vehicle law” for 30 days from the date of application, and a violation of the statute is punishable as an infraction. “Probabilities, not hard certainties, are used in determining reasonable suspicion.” State v. Decoteau, 2004 ND 139, ¶ 13, 681 N.W.2d 803. When a law enforcement officer observes a vehicle with no license plates and no viewable registration certificate, the officer has reasonable grounds to stop the driver and check if the driver has a valid certificate in his possession. Compare State v. Oliver, 2006 ND 241, ¶ 7, 724 N.W.2d 114 (law enforcement officer’s observation of vehicle with no license plates and a “faded temporary registration certificate with no visible printing was indicative of a temporary certificate that was more than thirty days old and constituted an objective fact giving the officer a right to stop Oliver to check its validity”). Furthermore, although Skarsgard’s girlfriend presented evidence attempting to establish the vehicle had a registration sticker on its window when Skarsgard was stopped, the district court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility. Graf, 2006 ND 196, ¶ 7, 721 N.W.2d 381. Moreover, “an officer’s knowledge that a driver’s license was suspended at some relatively recent time is sufficient to create reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity and support an investigatory stop of the. vehicle.” Decoteau, at ¶ 15. Crabb’s knowledge of the prior suspension one month earlier was not too stale to support a reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. Id. at ¶ 16.

[¶ 9] On this record, we conclude Crabb had reasonable suspicion to stop Skarsgard’s vehicle, leading to his arrest for driving under suspension and driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The district court did not err in denying the suppression motion.

Ill

[¶ 10] Skarsgard argues the results of his blood-alcohol test were erroneously admitted in evidence. Skarsgard objected to admission of the test results, arguing the approved procedures were not followed in obtaining the blood-alcohol test because the box on Form 104 stating “Drew Blood Into Tube and Inverted Several Times” was left unchecked and because “Time Not on Vact Tube” was written in the “Remarks” section of the form.

[¶ 11] In State v. Friedt, 2007 ND 108, ¶¶ 9-10, 735 N.W.2d 848, we discussed the foundational requirements for evidentiary use of blood analysis results:

Under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-07(5), blood analysis results must be received in evidence when compliance with the methods approved by the state toxicologist have been shown. First, the blood sample must be properly obtained; second, the blood analysis must be fairly administered; third, the method and devices used to analyze the blood must be approved by the state toxicologist; and fourth, the blood analysis must be performed by an authorized individual or by an individual certified by the state toxicologist as qualified to perform the test. Id.
Form 104 was drafted by the state toxicologist to be used when blood is drawn for blood analysis. State v. Steier, 515 N.W.2d 195, 196 (N.D.App.1994). In [State v.] Jordheim, 508 N.W.2d [878,] 881 [(N.D.1993)], this Court reviewed the use of Form 104 to satisfy the foundational elements of N.D.C.C. § 39-20-07(5).
Form 104 has three sections that correspond to the conduct of the three people who normally participate in administering the blood test. The top half of the form includes the name of the person whose blood is drawn, and a list of directions for both the specimen collector and the recipient of the sample at the laboratory. The bottom half of the form contains a similar list for the specimen submitter. The submitter, who will usually be a police officer, is directed to retain this half of Form 104 in police records, undoubtedly for later evidentiary use.
[Jordheim,] at 881-82.

Friedt, at ¶¶ 9-10. An adequate foundation for admission of blood-alcohol test results may be established by the testimony of witnesses. See, e.g., Friedt, at ¶ 10; City of Grand Forks v. Scialdone, 2005 ND 24, ¶ 9, 691 N.W.2d 198.

[¶ 12] In this case, the State presented the testimony of Brett Fried, the blood specimen collector, and Margaret Pearson, the State Toxicologist, explaining the ambiguity on Form 104 regarding the vacu-tainer tube, which “is a sealed tube used to store and preserve a blood sample until it can be analyzed by the State Toxicologist.” Bieber v. North Dakota Dep’t of Transp. Dir., 509 N.W.2d 64, 67 (N.D.1993). Fried testified his failure to check the box on Form 104 was an “oversight” and, to his best recollection, he did invert the tube several times after taking the blood sample because “in every blood draw we invert the tubes.” Crabb testified he was present when Fried drew Skarsgard’s blood sample and saw Fried “shaking the blood tube up.” Pearson testified that although she wrote in the “Remarks” section of Form 104 the time was not noted on the vacutainer tube, the time the specimen was drawn was nevertheless written on the form. She testified the failure to include the time on the tube in addition to the form would not affect the results of the analysis. She further testified she believed the vacutainer tube had been inverted in accordance with her instructions because the blood in the tube was not coagulated.

[¶ 18] We conclude this testimony established Skarsgard’s blood was properly obtained and laid the foundation for admission of Form 104. The district court did not err in admitting the blood-alcohol test results in evidence.

IV

[¶ 14] Skarsgard argues the district court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial when Crabb mentioned one of Skarsgard’s subsequent driving under the influence offenses during his testimony.

[¶ 15] During questioning about Skars-gard’s September 8, 2005, arrest, Crabb testified:

Q. Did you ask him if he would submit to a blood test?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. Did he agree?
A. No, sir, he refused.
Q. He refused to take a blood test?
A. Sorry, that was the second DUI. This one he did — he agree [sic] to take a test, sorry.
Q. Okay.

Skarsgard’s attorney objected and moved for a mistrial alleging prejudice. After a conference out of the presence of the jury, the court denied the mistrial motion and gave the jury a curative instruction:

Members of the jury, there was just a question and answer through the state and the witness, that the — and the witness testified basically not responsive to that particular question. And the last answer is stricken. And I am going to ask Mr. Flagstad to reword his questions, and we will start over again. So, you are to disregard the previous answer — the last answer of the officer, and it is stricken from the record.

[¶ 16] Motions for mistrial are within the broad discretion of the district court, and we will not reverse the court’s decision on the motion unless there was a clear abuse of that discretion or a manifest injustice would result. State v. Paulson, 477 N.W.2d 208, 210 (N.D.1991). A district court abuses its discretion when it misinterprets or misapplies the law, or when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious manner. State v. Frohlich, 2007 ND 45, ¶ 11, 729 N.W.2d 148. “Generally, granting a mistrial is ‘an extreme remedy which should be resorted to only when there is a fundamental defect or occurrence in the proceedings of the trial which makes it evident that further proceedings would be productive of manifest injustice.’” State v. Klose, 2003 ND 39, ¶ 14, 657 N.W.2d 276 (internal citation omitted). “A jury is generally presumed to follow instructions, and a curative instruction to disregard certain evidence is generally sufficient to remove improper prejudice.” State v. Hernandez, 2005 ND 214, ¶ 24, 707 N.W.2d 449. Here, the court gave the jury a curative instruction. On this record, we cannot say the district court’s failure to grant a mistrial resulted in manifest injustice. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Skarsgard’s motion for a mistrial.

V

[¶ 17] Skarsgard argues his pretrial bail in the amount of $25,000 cash was excessive.

[¶ 18] Excessive bail is prohibited by N.D. Const. art. I, § 11, and U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. Generally, pretrial bail issues are moot after conviction. See State v. Hansen, 2006 ND 139, ¶¶ 5-11, 717 N.W.2d 541; see also Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982); United States v. Hollister, 746 F.2d 420, 426 n. 18 (8th Cir. 1984); Bostick v. United States, 400 F.2d 449, 451 (5th Cir.1968); State v. Grillette, 588 So.2d 1338, 1340 (La.Ct.App.1991); State v. Huber, 275 Minn. 475, 148 N.W.2d 137, 140 (1967); Delangel v. State, 132 S.W.3d 491, 494 (Tex.App.2004). Skarsgard does not claim the amount of bail prejudiced him in the preparation of his defense. See McMorrow v. State, 2003 ND 134, ¶ 9, 667 N.W.2d 577. We conclude this issue is moot and decline to address it.

VI

[¶ 19] Skarsgard argues the charges should be dismissed because the Ward County Jail where he was held before trial was unable to “effectively meet his physical and medical needs” in violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the state and federal constitutions.

[¶ 20] Although Skarsgard frames his argument under N.D. Const. art. I, § 11, and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, his status as a pretrial detainee while at the Ward County Jail “placed him outside the protections of the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, which applies only to convicted prisoners.” Hott v. Hennepin County, 260 F.3d 901, 905 (8th Cir.2001); see also United Hosp. v. D’Annunzio, 514 N.W.2d 681, 684 (N.D.1994); Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs County, 400 F.3d 1313, 1318 n. 13 (11th Cir.2005). Rather, pretrial detainees are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See D’Annunzio, 514 N.W.2d at 684; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Burrell v. Hampshire County, 307 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2002). “However, the distinction is academic,” White v. Crow Ghost, 456 F.Supp.2d 1096, 1101 (D.N.D.2006), because the due process rights of a pretrial detainee “are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner.” Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983); see also D’Annuzio, 514 N.W.2d at 684; Owens v. Scott County Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir.2003).

[¶ 21] Assuming for purposes of argument only that Skarsgard’s allegations of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs rose to the magnitude of a constitutional violation, reversal of his convictions and release from confinement would not be the appropriate remedy. “If an inmate established that his medical treatment amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, the appropriate remedy would be to call for proper treatment, or to award him damages; release from custody is not an option.” Glaus v. Anderson, 408 F.3d 382, 387 (7th Cir.2005); see also Gomez v. United States, 899 F.2d 1124, 1126 (11th Cir.1990) (“relief of an Eighth Amendment violation does not include release from confinement”); Cook v. Hanberry, 596 F.2d 658, 660 (5th Cir.1979) (“appropriate remedy would be to enjoin continuance of any practices or require correction of any conditions causing him cruel and unusual punishment”); United States v. Crouch, Nos. 03-20108-JWL, 06-3078-JWL, 2006 WL 1410005 *4 (D.Kan. May 22, 2006) (court could not vacate defendant’s sentence based on his medical needs); Burr v. Sherrer, No. CIV. 05-3894 DMC, 2005 WL 2007026 *1 (D.N.J. Aug.22, 2005) (“Release is not a proper remedy for unconstitutional conditions of confinement”). Skarsgard nevertheless argues dismissal of the charges is warranted as a sanction under City of Jamestown v. Erdelt, 513 N.W.2d 82, 86 (N.D.1994), for “institutional non-compliance and systematic disregard of the law.” See also Madison v. North Dakota Dep’t of Transp., 503 N.W.2d 243, 246-47 (N.D.1993). Erdelt involved a city’s illegal blanket policy of jailing for eight hours without bail all persons arrested for driving under the influence. This Court has said that “more than a ‘single miscue’ by the government is needed to evidence the institutional noncompliance that amounts to ‘systemic disregard of law.’ ” Greenwood v. Moore, 545 N.W.2d 790, 793 (N.D.1996) (internal citation omitted).

[¶ 22] Skarsgard complained about the jail’s concrete floors and its lack of handrails, shower seats, recliner, and hospital beds to accommodate his heart and arthritic conditions. He also complained about the lack of a private line to telephone the North Central Human Service Center, his physician, and his insurance company to confidentially discuss health related matters. He also requested support hose stockings and daily blood pressure checks. Many of Skarsgard’s requests were accommodated by the jail staff. He was allowed access to his support hose and blood pressure checks upon request. Plastic chairs for the shower and extra mattresses for the bed were made available. He was taken to the emergency room when he fell and physicians permitted his return to the jail. The jail commander testified that some prisoners in jail have been released for medical reasons, but Skarsgard’s condition had not reached that level. Skarsgard does not claim inmates in general had their medical needs overlooked by jail staff. On these facts, we conclude Skarsgard has not established systemic disregard of the law.

[¶ 23] Skarsgard’s argument he is entitled to dismissal of the charges because of the conditions of his pretrial confinement is without merit.

VII

[¶ 24] Skarsgard argues the district court erred in sentencing him to the maximum penalty of one year of incarceration with the Department of Corrections for the driving under the influence conviction.

[¶ 25] “A district court [] is allowed the widest range of discretion in sentencing” a convicted defendant. State v. Loughead, 2007 ND 16, ¶ 14, 726 N.W.2d 859. “[A]ppellate review of the sentence itself focuses only on whether the district court ‘acted within the limits prescribed by statute, or substantially relied on an impermissible factor.’ ” State v. Wardner, 2006 ND 256, ¶ 27, 725 N.W.2d 215 (internal citation omitted). Skarsgard was convicted of class A misdemeanor driving under the influence in violation N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01. The maximum penalty for a class A misdemeanor is “one year’s imprisonment.” N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-01(5). The district court sentenced Skarsgard within the limits prescribed by statute and the record does not reflect the court relied on an impermissible sentencing factor. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion.

VIII

[¶ 26] The judgments are affirmed.

[¶ 27] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, C.J., MARY MUEHLEN MARING, CAROL RONNING KAPSNER, and DALE V. SANDSTROM, JJ., concur.


author:
SABERS, Justice.
      KONENKAMP, Justice

text:
    2007 SD 97
    In re the Matter of J.D.M.C.
    No. 23998.
    Supreme Court of South Dakota.
    Argued Oct. 2, 2006.
    Decided Sept. 12, 2007.
    As Modified Upon Denial of Rehearing Oct. 18, 2007.

      William J. Janklow, Sioux Falls, SD and Gordon P. Nielsen of Delaney, Vander Linden, Delaney, Nielsen & Sannes, PC, Sisseton, SD, for appellant Father.
    Andrew M. Small, Jessica L. Ryan of Blue Dog, Paulson & Small, Minneapolis, MN and Karen Gangle, Tribal Prosecutor, Agency Village, SD, for appellee Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate.
    Danelle J. Daugherty of Bantz, Gosch & Cremer, LLC, Aberdeen, SD, for interve-nor appellee Mother.
   SABERS, Justice.

[¶ 1.] We determine whether the circuit court correctly granted full faith and credit or comity to a tribal court abuse and ne-gleet order when all parties, at all relevant times, lived off the reservation. Because the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate Tribe (SWO) and Mother did not meet their burden to show the tribal court had personal jurisdiction, we reverse the circuit court.

FACTS

[¶ 2.] Mother and Father were married in Sisseton, South Dakota, on December 27, 2002. Mother is an enrolled member of the SWO Tribe and Father is a non-Indian. The couple had two daughters, J.D.M.C. and T.J.C., both enrolled members of the SWO. In 2005, Mother and Father were divorced in state court in Sisseton, South Dakota, Roberts County. The parties shared joint legal and physical custody of both children, but the children resided with Father in Sisseton while Mother lived in Biloxi, Mississippi, where she was stationed as a member of the military. The parties agreed the girls would reside with Father during the school year and reside with Mother during the summer while she was stationed in Biloxi.

[¶ 3.] Despite this agreement, Mother and Father decided Father would have the girls for the summer of 2005. It was during this time that T.J.C. died when Father accidentally left her in the car while he went to work in Browns Valley, Minnesota. Father was investigated but no criminal charges were filed. Mother filed an abuse and neglect petition in tribal court, alleging J.D.M.C. was abused and neglected, based on the incident with T.J.C., and sought protective custody pending a child protection investigation. The tribal court entered an ex-parte emergency custody order making J.D.M.C. a ward of the tribal court. The state court would not grant comity to the emergency custody order.

[¶ 4.] SWO’s Child Protection Program (CPP) filed an emergency custody petition and Mother filed an abuse and neglect petition in tribal court to remove J.D.M.C. from Father’s custody. Father appeared specially to contest jurisdiction. While the tribal court found J.D.M.C. did not reside on the reservation, it found she was a ward of the tribal court. Therefore, the tribal court found it had jurisdiction and issued an order for emergency custody (order).

[¶ 5.] SWO then filed a motion to enforce the order in circuit court. Father filed a motion for a comity hearing and to invalidate the order. Mother intervened in the action. At the hearing, Father argued the tribal court had no jurisdiction to enter the order since none of the parties had ever resided or been domiciled on the reservation. SWO contended the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), since J.D.M.C. was declared a ward of the tribal court. After the hearing, the circuit court adopted the tribal court’s memorandum opinion and found the order was entitled to full faith and credit under ICWA. The circuit court also found SDCL 1-1-25, the comity statute, was preempted by ICWA. Despite firmly believing ICWA preempted SDCL 1-1-25, the circuit court went on to find the order met the requirements of SDCL 1-1-25.

[¶ 6.] Father appeals, raising the following issues:

1. Whether the circuit court erred in determining the tribal court had jurisdiction.
2. Whether the circuit court erred in determining the order was not subject to comity under SDCL 1-1-25 because ICWA preempted SDCL 1-1-25.
3. If ICWA does not preempt SDCL 1-1-25, whether the circuit court erred in determining SWO had met its burden of proving the comity factors set forth in SDCL 1-1-25 had been met by clear and convincing evidence.
4. Whether the circuit court erred in determining that SWO was not required to provide notice to the South Dakota Attorney General pursuant to SDCL 15-6-24(c), regarding its challenge to SDCL 1-1-25.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 7.] This case involves a jurisdictional question. An issue regarding jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. Grajczyk v. Tasca, 2006 SD 55, ¶ 8, 717 N.W.2d 624, 627 (additional citations omitted). “[W]e afford no deference to the conclusions reached by the trial court.” In re Adoption of H.L.C., 2005 SD 110, ¶ 18, 706 N.W.2d 90, 92 (quoting In re Yankton County Comm’n., 2003 SD 109, ¶ 9, 670 N.W.2d 34, 37).

[¶ 8.] Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. People ex rel. J.S.B., Jr., 2005 SD 3, ¶ 12, 691 N.W.2d 611, 615 (citing City of Rapid City v. Pennington County, 2003 SD 106, ¶ 5, 669 N.W.2d 120, 121).

[¶ 9.] 1. Whether the circuit court erred in concluding the SWO had jurisdiction.

[¶ 10.] The major contention of SWO is that ICWA provides the tribe with exclusive jurisdiction because J.D.M.C. was a ward of the tribal court. SWO further argues in the alternative that (a) J.D.M.C. was domiciled on the reservation; and (b) a purchase service agreement between SWO and the state conferred jurisdiction to the tribe in this type of case.

[¶ 11.] In the early seventies, Congress became concerned about the detrimental effect the removal of Indian children from their homes was having on the Indian tribes, children and families. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 1599-1600, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989). In response, Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978. Id.; see also 25 USCA §§ 1901-1963. This act was designed to limit the “wholesale removal of Indian children from their homes,” ensure Indian tribes would not be negatively harmed by the removal, and allow Indian children to remain connected to the tribe through preferential Indian family and foster home placements. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 32, 109 S.Ct. at 1600, 104 L.Ed.2d 29. The most important aspect of ICWA, especially for the purpose of this case, is its jurisdictional provisions. Id. at 36, 109 S.Ct. at 1601, 104 L.Ed.2d 29.

[¶ 12.] The starting point of ICWA is an Indian child, as there must be an Indian child who meets the statutory definition before ICWA is applicable. See People ex rel. D.T., 2003 SD 88, ¶ 16, 667 N.W.2d 694, 699. An Indian child is “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” 25 USCA § 1903(4). After this threshold is met, ICWA’s jurisdictional mandates can be separated into two different types of cases. In the first type of case, the Indian tribe would have exclusive jurisdiction. The exclusive jurisdiction cases involve “an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe” or an Indian child who “is a ward of a tribal court ... notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the child.” 25 USCA 1911(a).

[¶ 13.] In cases originating in State court, if the Indian child is not a domiciliary or resident of the reservation, or ward of the tribal court, then section 1911(b) of ICWA has been interpreted to create concurrent jurisdiction between the Indian tribe and the State court. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 36, 109 S.Ct. at 1601-02, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (“Section 1911(b) ... creates concurrent!,] but presumptively tribal jurisdiction[,] in the case of children not domiciled on the reservation[.]”); In re Interest of C.W., 239 Neb. 817, 479 N.W.2d 105, 112 (1992); see also 25 USCA § 1911(b). A parent may object to the transfer of the case to tribal court, or the tribe may decline jurisdiction. 25 USCA § 1911(b).

[¶ 14.] In this case, J.D.M.C. is an Indian child since she is an enrolled member of SWO. 25 USCA § 1903(4). It is clear from the record that J.D.M.C. did not reside on the reservation. She was living in Sisseton at the time. ICWA defines “reservation” as:

Indian country as defined in section 1151 of Title 18 and any lands, not covered under such section, title to which is either held by the United States in trust for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to a restriction by the United States against alienation.

Section 1903(10). “Indian country” is described in 18 USCA § 1151 as:

(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.

Sisseton does not meet the definition of “reservation” under ICWA. The SWO reservation was determined to be diminished. See DeCoteau v. Dist. Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427-28, 95 S.Ct. 1082, 1084-85, 43 L.Ed.2d 300 (1975). Sisseton does not rest on the “checkerboard” of Indian land that resulted from the diminishment. Id. at 464, 95 S.Ct. at 1102, 43 L.Ed.2d 300 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Nor is that portion of Sisse-ton on which they resided trust land or allotted land or a dependent Indian community. Therefore, they did not reside in Indian country.

[¶ 15.] However, SWO claims it has exclusive jurisdiction because (a) J.D.M.C. is domiciled on the reservation, since it is Mother’s domicile, and (b) J.D.M.C. was declared a ward of the tribal court. SWO also claims it has jurisdiction due to (c) a purchase service agreement with DSS. We examine each claim.

(a) Domicile

[¶ 16.] SWO claims, and the tribal court found, that Mother was domiciled on the reservation. Domicile is established for adults by physical presence in a place combined with intent to remain there. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 48, 109 S.Ct. at 1608, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (citing Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 424, 59 S.Ct. 563, 576, 83 L.Ed. 817 (1939)). A minor takes the domicile of his parents. Id.

[¶ 17.] At the comity hearing conducted in the circuit court, Father testified that Mother had lived in either Sisseton or Biloxi, Mississippi the entire time of their marriage. They were divorced in Sisseton on February 3, 2005. From the time of the divorce to the time of the abuse and neglect petition in tribal court, it is unclear where Mother was residing or domiciled. However, a person’s domicile remains the same until a person acquires a new one. Id. There was no record evidence that Mother established her presence on the reservation with intent to remain, which is required in order for her to be domiciled on the reservation.

[¶ 18.] The circuit court adopted the tribal court’s memorandum opinion, part of which concluded Mother’s domicile was the reservation. However, the record does not include any factual findings from either the tribal court or the circuit court in support of this conclusion. The circuit court’s “[f]indings of [f]act must be supported by the evidence and [c]onelusions of [l]aw must in turn be supported by the [findings of [f]act.” Adrian v. McKinnie, 2004 SD 84, ¶ 9, 684 N.W.2d 91, 95. Since the record is completely devoid of evidence or facts supporting the circuit court’s conclusion, we cannot accept the conclusion that Mother’s domicile is the reservation.

[¶ 19.] Even assuming that Mother’s domicile is the SWO reservation, it does not necessarily follow that J.D.M.C.’s domicile is the reservation. In Holyfield, the United States Supreme Court found that an illegitimate child takes the domicile of his mother. 490 U.S. at 48, 109 S.Ct. at 1608, 104 L.Ed.2d 29. In Interest of G.R.F., we followed the reasoning in the Holyfield case and found an illegitimate child took the domicile of its mother. 1997 SD 112, ¶ 16, 569 N.W.2d 29, 33. In Estate of Galada, we noted, that the “domicile of a minor child is that of the parent to whose custody it has been legally awarded.” 1999 SD 21, ¶ 11, 589 N.W.2d 221, 223 (quoting Application of Habeck, 75 S.D. 535, 541, 69 N.W.2d 353, 356 (1955)).

[¶ 20.] In this case, J.D.M.C. is not an illegitimate child, as the parents were married and the Father acknowledges her as his own and took her into his family. See SDCL 25-6-1. After the divorce, the parties shared joint legal and physical custody. However, Father had physical custody of J.D.M.C. for a greater amount of time than Mother as the children lived with Father during the school year, and Mother was to have them during the summer. Despite this agreement, the children were actually living with Father during the summer of 2005. The domicile of J.D.M.C. is Father’s domicile of Sisseton as she was living with him in Sisseton at the time the abuse and neglect petition was filed. Given this record, there is no reason Mother’s alleged domicile would control over Father’s domicile.

(b) Ward of the tribal court

[¶21.] The tribal court declared it had exclusive jurisdiction because J.D.M.C. was a ward of the SWO tribal court. Section 1911(a) provides that “the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction” where the “Indian child is a ward of a tribal court” regardless of the Indian child’s domicile or residence. 25 USCA § 1911(a) (emphasis added). Father argues the plain meaning of “retain” requires that the Indian tribal court has already declared the Indian child to be a ward of the court prior to commencement of the action. He claims the tribe cannot “retain” jurisdiction if none existed prior to commencement of the action.

[¶ 22.] The Indiana Supreme Court examined a similar issue. In Matter of Adoption of T.R.M., the Indiana Supreme Court considered whether a tribe could obtain exclusive jurisdiction by declaring the Indian child a ward of the tribal court over five months after filing their habeas petition and one day before the adoption petition was filed in state court. 525 N.E.2d 298, 301-02, 306 (Ind.1988). The court declared that “[section] 1911(a) can pertain only to such wardship orders of the tribal court which are entered while the child is residing or domiciled on the reservation” reasoning, “[t]his allows the tribal court to exercise subsequent exclusive jurisdiction ... when the domicile or residence of the child has changed after the initial tribal court order of wardship.” Id. at 306 (emphasis added). The court concluded that:

The tribal court could not be empowered to effectuate the status of a child as a “ward of the court” relying upon [section] 1911(a) where the child was never domiciled on the reservation, and was not residing on the reservation at the time the tribal court exercised jurisdiction and entered the wardship order.

Id.

[¶ 23.] SWO contends that J.D.M.C. can be declared a ward of the tribal court after commencement of the proceedings. Even the SWO’s Tribal Code supports Father’s argument,

[t]he Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe shall retain original and exclusive jurisdiction over children as wards of the Tribe notwithstanding residence or domicile, sufficient to determine all matters and disposition of the child, which it would have if the child had remained on the Reservation....

Tribal Code 38-05-02 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Bureau of Indian Affairs has promulgated guidelines on how some provisions of ICWA should be interpreted. One guideline regarding the determination of jurisdiction states: “If the Indian child has previously resided or been domiciled on the reservation, the state court shall contact the tribal court to determine whether the child is a ward of the tribal court.” Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, B.4(b) (1979) (not codified) (emphasis added). The regulation does not suggest an Indian child can be made a ward of the tribal court even if it has never been domiciled on the reservation. On the contrary, the regulation suggests the opposite conclusion — a child can only be a ward of the tribal court if it has “previously resided or been domiciled on the reservation.” Id.; see also 25 USC § 1911(a) (“Where an Indian child is a ward of the tribal court, the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the child.”) (emphasis added).

[¶ 24.] Additionally, we have held, tribal jurisdiction for purposes of “ICWA is established as of the date the action is filed.” People in re S.G.V.E., 2001 SD 105, ¶ 18, 634 N.W.2d 88, 92 (citing People in re G.R.F., 1997 SD 112, ¶ 19, 569 N.W.2d at 34) (additional citations omitted). “It is a well-established rule in both federal and state courts that jurisdiction over a case is established at the time an action is filed and cannot be voided [or altered] by later events.” People in re G.R.F., 1997 SD 112, ¶ 19, 569 N.W.2d at 34 (quoting Spear v. McDermott, 121 N.M. 609, 916 P.2d 228, 234 (N.M.Ct.App.1996)) (additional citations omitted).

[¶ 25.] In this case, Father’s arguments are correct. The plain language of section 1911(a) and the case law demonstrate the only effective way a wardship order can be used to obtain exclusive jurisdiction is to enter the order while the Indian child is domiciled or residing on the reservation and before the proceeding commenced. Therefore, SWO could not obtain exclusive jurisdiction by declaring J.D.M.C. a ward of the tribal court after the proceedings began.

(c) Jurisdiction Based on Purchase Service Agreement

[¶ 26.] In its memorandum opinion, the tribal court found it had jurisdiction due to the purchase service agreement. Despite this finding, at the comity hearing SWO stated that the purchase service agreement had “absolutely nothing to do with what we’re here for today.” It went on to state, “[w]ith regard to the agreement between the State of South Dakota and the Tribe, that’s never an assertion of — is never an argument for assertion of jurisdiction that’s been made by the Tribe.” Despite SWO’s argument at the comity hearing, in its brief to this Court, SWO claims the purchase service agreement between DSS and SWO grants SWO jurisdiction. Father argues subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by an agreement.

[¶ 27.] It is evident this argument was not raised (indeed, it was renounced) during the comity hearing. Generally, this Court will not address arguments not raised below. However, this rule is procedural and we have discretion to ignore the rule when faced with a compelling case. We will address the issue as the tribal court found jurisdiction through the agreement and the circuit court adopted the tribal court’s memorandum opinion, both sides have fully briefed the issue, it was argued during oral argument, and it presents an important question in the public interest. See Nature’s 10 Jewelers v. Gunderson, 2002 SD 80, ¶ 19, 648 N.W.2d 804, 808-09 (Konenkamp, J., dissenting) (citing Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557-58, 61 S.Ct. 719, 721-22, 85 L.Ed. 1037, 1041 (1941); Sharp v. Sharp, 422 N.W.2d 443, 445-46 (S.D.1988)).

[¶ 28.] ICWA specifically provides for such agreements. Section 1919 authorizes:

States and Indian tribes ... to enter into agreements with each other respecting care and custody of Indian children and jurisdiction over child custody proceedings, including agreements which may provide for orderly transfer of jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis and agreements which provide for concurrent jurisdiction between States and Indian tribes.

25 USCA § 1919 (emphasis added). SWO and DSS have entered into a purchase service agreement that SWO alleges is of the type contemplated by section 1919. The current agreement is the same type of agreement that has been in effect for over twenty years. This current agreement authorizes the tribe to provide “all child protective services” previously provided by DSS, “within the territory of Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate to all eligible clients.... ” [¶ 29.] The determination of jurisdiction due to this agreement hinges in part on the meaning of the word “territory” in the purchase service agreement. SWO contends the word “territory” refers to the original boundaries of the SWO reservation, including Roberts, Day and Marshall Counties. Father argues the word “territory” cannot mean the original reservation as the territory of SWO does not include Sisseton. See DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 464, 95 S.Ct. at 1102, 43 L.Ed.2d 300 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

[¶ 30.] Contract interpretation is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. Pauley v. Simonson, 2006 SD 73, ¶ 8, 720 N.W.2d 665, 667 (citing Ziegler Furniture & Funeral Home, Inc. v. Cicmanec, 2006 SD 6, ¶ 14, 709 N.W.2d 350, 354). Where the contract is not ambiguous, we look to the plain meaning of the words to establish the parties’ intentions. Id. Parol evidence is only allowed when the terms of the contract are ambiguous. Id. Ambiguity is a question of law for a court to determine. Canyon Lake Park, L.L.C. v. Loftus Dental, P.C., 2005 SD 82, ¶ 18, 700 N.W.2d 729, 734 (citing Baker v. Wilburn, 456 N.W.2d 304, 306 (S.D.1990)).

[¶ 31.] “Territory” is defined as “[a] geographical area included within a particular government’s jurisdiction; the portion of the earth’s surface that is in a state’s exclusive possession and control.” Black’s Law Dictionary 702 (8th ed. 2004). SWO’s argument fails under the plain and ordinary meaning of “territory.” “Territory” is not capable of two different meanings, and is not ambiguous. The SWO “territory” is the area “within [the tribe’s] jurisdiction” and “the portion of the earth ... that is in [the tribe’s] exclusive possession and control.” Since 1975, it has been understood that the Lake Traverse Reservation was terminated, resulting in a jurisdictional schematic resembling a checkerboard, and “giving state court jurisdiction over conduct of non-Indian lands within the 1867 reservation borders.” See DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 428, 95 S.Ct. at 1085, 43 L.Ed.2d 300. Sisseton does not fall within the territory of the SWO, nor can SWO exercise jurisdiction over Sisseton. See id. at 464, 95 S.Ct. at 1102, 43 L.Ed.2d 300 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

[¶ 32.] SWO argues that “territory” means the original boundaries of the Lake Traverse Reservation; otherwise, SWO entered into a contract for the jurisdiction they already controlled. SWO further claims the agreement was entered into specifically to clear up the confusion the DeCoteau case created with the checkerboard jurisdiction. However, this contract neither enlarges SWO’s territory nor does it confer the claimed jurisdiction. On the contrary, the contract is labeled “Agreement for Purchase of Service.” This contract “permits the state to purchase certain specified services.... ” This agreement allows SWO to provide the child protection services DSS previously provided on the reservation to all eligible clients.

[¶ 33.] By using the word “territory” in the purchase service agreement, SWO contracted to perform child protection services over the area “within [the tribe’s] jurisdiction.” This area does not include Sisseton, so the agreement cannot be said to confer any jurisdiction under section 1919 of ICWA.

[¶ 34.] Parties who are aware of certain jurisdictional problems and who want to confer jurisdiction, should specifically use language that confers jurisdiction. For example, the contract could have specified that the services will be provided within the original boundaries of the Lake Traverse Reservation. Moreover, when subject matter jurisdiction can only be conferred by the constitution or statute, Application of Koch Exploration Co., 387 N.W.2d 530, 536 (S.D.1986) (additional citations omitted), the agreement needs to be specific that jurisdiction is being conferred pursuant to a federal statute. In any event, using “territory” did not confer any more jurisdiction than SWO already possessed. The purchase service agreement cannot be used on appeal to confer jurisdiction. Given the language used in the contract, this was not within the contemplation of the parties.

[¶ 35.] The contract does not confer jurisdiction on SWO, and the requirements for exclusive jurisdiction under ICWA are not met. Father argued in his brief that section 1911(b) prevented tribal jurisdiction because, as provided for in section 1911(b), he objected to the tribe exercising authority over him. However, Father’s counsel argued at oral argument that ICWA simply does not apply because there is no exclusive jurisdiction nor is this a “state proceeding” under section 1911(b). Under the plain language of section 1911(b), it only applies “[i]n any State court proceeding” and does not apply when the proceeding was initiated in tribal court. (Emphasis supplied).

[¶ 36.] Moreover, SWO agreed that section 1911(b) was not relevant to the jurisdictional issue. From a review of the original petition filed by SWO in the circuit court, it is apparent that neither SWO, nor subsequently, Mother and Father, see this as a section 1911(b) case. In SWO’s brief it stated that “[section 1911(b)] does not apply to the case at bar, as the matter did not originate in State Court.... Clearly, the transfer of jurisdiction provision only applies to transferring cases to Tribal Court.” Additionally, the circuit court, in its bench decision and subsequent findings of facts and conclusions of law, never addressed concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, any issue regarding section 1911(b) is not before this Court.

[¶ 37.] Full Faith and Credit and Comity Analysis

[¶ 38.] While Indian tribes are not technically “states” to which the United States Constitution’s full faith and credit clause would apply, under ICWA, a judgment entered in the SWO tribal court must be given full faith and credit in our state courts. See 25 USC § 1911(d). Full faith and credit applies so long as the tribal court “had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.” See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 1188, 59 L.Ed.2d 416. “[A] judgment is entitled to full faith and credit-even as to questions of jurisdiction-when the second court’s inquiry discloses that those questions have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the court which rendered the original judgment.” Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111, 84 S.Ct. 242, 245, 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (1963). See also Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Ass’n., 283 U.S. 522, 525-27, 51 S.Ct. 517, 518, 75 L.Ed. 1244 (1931); Wells v. Wells, 2005 SD 67, ¶¶ 17-21, 698 N.W.2d 504, 509 (in the context of a party contesting personal and subject matter jurisdiction of a State court in subsequent State court proceeding, this Court noted “[a]n even stronger preclusion applies to collateral challenges to personal jurisdiction”).

[¶ 39.] The issues of personal and subject matter jurisdiction appear to have been litigated in tribal court. The tribal court’s memorandum opinion indicates, and Father concedes in his brief, that he appeared specially to contest jurisdiction. We have noted:

Where a defendant appears in an action to object that the court has no jurisdiction over him and the court overrules the objection and judgment is rendered against him, the parties are precluded from collaterally attacking the judgment on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the defendant.

Wells, 2005 SD 67, ¶ 19 n. 1, 698 N.W.2d at 509 n. 1 (quoting Restatement (First) of Judgments § 9 (1942)). Accordingly, assuming a complete record on this point, Father could not collaterally attack the tribal court judgment in state court and we could not examine whether or not there was personal jurisdiction under Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. at 111, 84 S.Ct. at 245, 11 L.Ed.2d at 191, and Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 283 U.S. at 525-27, 51 S.Ct. at 518, 75 L.Ed. 1244. Here, Father was attempting to directly prevent the enforcement of the tribal court order in circuit court by showing the tribal court did not’have personal jurisdiction.

[¶ 40.] Although the tribal court indicated Father appeared specially to contest personal and subject matter jurisdiction, the record only includes the tribal court’s memorandum opinion but no transcript of the proceedings. This prevents us from reviewing whether these questions were “fully and fairly litigated” or whether the order is a final judgment. Therefore, we examine whether SWO could assert personal jurisdiction over Father.

[IT 41.] The tribal court, circuit court and the parties referenced Montana when discussing personal jurisdiction. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 1258, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981). Both the tribal court and circuit court agreed that SWO had personal jurisdiction over Father because he entered into a consensual, relationship with the tribe by marrying Mother and allowing his children to receive services from the tribe. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66, 101 S.Ct. at 1258, 67 L.Ed.2d 493. However, marrying a tribal member, allowing children to be enrolled members of the tribe and receiving tribal services do not qualify under the consensual relationship exception in Montana. Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 655, 121 S.Ct. 1825, 1833, 149 L.Ed.2d 889 (2001); In re Application of DeFender, 435 N.W.2d 717, 718-21 (S.D.1989). In addition, Montana is really a test for subject matter jurisdiction, typically used to determine if tribal courts have legislative jurisdiction., See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 488, 445, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 1409, 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997) (“The Court of Appeals concluded that our decision in Montana v. United States ... was the controlling precedent, and that, under Montana, the Tribal Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute. We granted cer-tiorari ... and now affirm.”); see also Frank R. Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal Jurisdiction, 31 Ariz. L.Rev. 329, 334-35, 344 (noting “[tjribal legislative and judicial jurisdiction are not the same thing” and a tribal court cannot reach the question of legislative jurisdiction if there is a lack of judicial jurisdiction).

[¶42.] Moreover, analysis under Montana may not even be relevant in this case for a second reason. The Montana analysis generally applies to conduct within the reservation. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565, 101 S.Ct. at 1258, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (noting “Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on [or within] their reservations ... ”). Courts generally do not apply the Montana analysis to a situation where conduct of a non-Indian, nonmember occurs off the reservation, and instead, hold to the rule that absent a clear federal directive, tribal authority does not extend to conduct off the reservation. See Blurton, John v. Baker and the Jurisdiction of Tribal Sovereigns Without Territorial Reach, 20 Alaska L.Rev. at 18-19 (noting “tribal jurisdiction is non-existent over nonmember conduct outside of Indian country”); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 1270-71, 36 L.Ed.2d 114 (1973) (noting that “absent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to nondiseriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State”). There is no dispute that the conduct at issue in this case occurred entirely off the reservation. Therefore, the Montana analysis may not apply. See Hornell Brewing Co. v. The Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d 1087, 1091 (8thCir.1998) (“Neither Montana nor its progeny purports to allow Indian tribes to exercise civil jurisdiction over the activities or conduct of non-Indians occurring outside their reservations.”); see also Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty, 31 Ariz. L.Rev. at 336, 343 (discussing that the analysis of judicial jurisdiction determines “whether the tribal court has proper subject matter, personal, and territorial jurisdiction over the controversy” and, citing DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 427 n. 2, 95 S.Ct. at 1085 n. 2, and observing that the definition of “Indian country” applies to civil jurisdiction).

[¶ 43.] Personal jurisdiction and minimum contacts analysis

[¶ 44.] Generally, tribal law indicates the tribal court can exercise personal jurisdiction if the person has sufficient minimum contacts with the reservation in order to meet the due process requirements of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). See 25 USC § 1302; Red Fox v. Hettich, 494 N.W.2d 638, 645 (S.D.1993); In re DeFender, 435 N.W.2d 717 (S.D.1989); see also B.J. Jones, A Primer on Tribal Court Civil Practice, available at http://www.court.state.nd.us/court/ resource/tribal.htm. ICRA imposes a statutory due process clause on the tribal court. See 25 USC § 1302(8); Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, Chs. 7.02[2] & 14.04[2]. Accordingly, whether tribal courts have personal jurisdiction over a party is analyzed using the minimum contacts standard expressed in International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 265 Wis.2d 64, 665 N.W.2d 899, 910 (2003) (citing Hinshaw v. Mahler, 42 F.3d 1178 (9thCir.1994)); see also Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, at 7.02[2], We inquire whether Father “had sufficient minimum contacts with [SWO reservation] to conclude that the assertion of jurisdiction does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Daktronics, Inc. v. LBW Tech Co., Inc., 2007 SD 80, ¶ 5, 737 N.W.2d 413, 416-17 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158, 90 L.Ed. 95). “[A]n essential criterion in all cases is whether the ‘quality and nature’ of the defendant’s activity is such that it is ‘reasonable’ and ‘fair’ to require him to conduct his defense in that State.” Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 92, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1697, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978).

[¶ 45.] Recently, we reiterated the three-part test our Court uses to determine if minimum contacts exist and due process has been satisfied:

First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Second, the cause of action must arise from defendant’s activities directed at the forum state. Finally, the acts of defendant must have substantial connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over defendant a reasonable one.

Daktronics, Inc., 2007 SD 80, ¶ 6, 737 N.W.2d at 417 (quoting Frankenfeld v. Crompton Corp., 2005 SD 55, ¶ 17, 697 N.W.2d 378, 384 (citing Rothluebbers v. Obee, 2003 SD 95, ¶ 26, 668 N.W.2d 313, 322; Denver Truck & Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Design and Building Services, Inc., 2002 SD 127, ¶ 11, 653 N.W.2d 88, 91; Opp v. Nieuwsma, 458 N.W.2d 352, 355-56 (S.D.1990))). We have noted that “[m]ore in the way of ‘minimum contacts’ is required for a tribal court to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over a non-Indian ‘than would be sufficient for the citizen of one state to assert personal jurisdiction over the citizen of another state.’ ” Red Fox, 494 N.W.2d at 645 (quoting Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 519 F.Supp. 418, 431 (D.Ariz 1981) aff'd in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 710 F.2d 587 (9thCir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926, 104 S.Ct. 1707, 80 L.Ed.2d 180 (1984)).

[IT 46.] Here, Father is a nonresident, non-tribal member who never resided or domiciled on the reservation. For all times relevant to this proceeding, neither his children nor his ex-wife resided or domiciled on the reservation. Father has not purposefully availed himself to the benefits and protections of the laws of the SWO reservation. Father’s connections with SWO are too attenuated to constitute minimum contacts. The “quality and nature” of Father’s actions are not such that it would be reasonable and fair for him to require him to conduct his defense in this forum. See Kulko, 436 U.S. 84, 92, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1697, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (finding no “purposeful act” and, therefore, no personal jurisdiction over defendant where he had consented to his child living in the forum). Father has not had sufficient contacts with the reservation, so personal jurisdiction would not be met. See In re DeFender, 435 N.W.2d at 720, 721.

[¶ 47.] The tribal court also relied on the status exception to due process to explain personal jurisdiction over Father was unnecessary. The status exception allows for cases involving personal status of an individual to be adjudicated in his or her home forum even though a party to the action is outside the forum’s jurisdiction and cannot be served within the forum. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 201, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2578, 53 L.Ed.2d 683, 696 (1977) (additional citation omitted). Child custody is a typical area where the status exception is applied; however, the status exception is inapplicable in this case. A fundamental part of the status exception is the child’s presence in the forum. See id. (noting that “the personal status of the plaintiff ... [can] be adjudicated in the plaintiffs home State even though the defendant [canjnot be served within that State”) (emphasis added). J.D.M.C. was not present on the reservation and due process cannot be circumvented by utilizing the status exception.

[¶ 48.] Additionally, comity review examines the judgment for, among other things, the existence of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. SDCL 1-1-25. As indicated above, the tribe lacked personal jurisdiction over Father. Therefore, neither full faith and credit nor comity should have been granted to the tribal court order.

[¶ 49.] Moreover, a review of the circuit court’s findings and conclusions demonstrates it applied the wrong standard of review in the hearing. Under SDCL 1-1-25, the party arguing that comity should be granted has the burden to demonstrate that comity should be granted. Neither SWO nor Mother called a single witness despite repeated invitations from the circuit court to do so. They also did not present the circuit court with a transcript of the tribal court proceedings. Compare In re G.R.F., 1997 SD 112, ¶¶ 22-29, 569 N.W.2d at 34-35 (holding that affidavit evidence submitted to the circuit court was sufficient to support a finding below that the tribal court maintained jurisdiction over an abuse and neglect proceeding). Both announced to the circuit court that they rested solely on a legal argument based on the tribal court’s memorandum opinion and order. It is clear that this was not an inadvertent oversight by counsel but an intentional trial strategy. Given the fact that there is no evidence to establish SWO could exert personal jurisdiction, the order should not receive full faith and credit or comity. The circuit court erred in granting full faith and credit under section 1911(d) and comity under the dictates of SDCL 1-1-25.

[¶ 50.] This case arises from the most regrettable circumstances. However, we are not determining an abuse and neglect proceeding, but determining which court may decide the issue. The question in this case is whether a tribal court may assert jurisdiction based on off-reservation conduct over an Indian child and a non-Indian parent domiciled and residing off the reservation. As we have stated before, “absent the applicability of the ICWA, we do not believe that [sovereignty] principles may be extended so as to grant tribal courts the exclusive authority to adjudicate disputes which involve Indian children when neither the child nor the parents reside on the reservation.” In re DeFender, 435 N.W.2d at 722.

[¶ 51.] The exclusive jurisdiction provisions of ICWA do not apply to this action as J.D.M.C. was not domiciled or residing on the reservation or a ward of the tribal court when the action commenced. Furthermore, given the lack of personal jurisdiction and the lack of evidence to support the tribal court’s decision, it was error for the circuit court to grant full faith and credit or comity to the tribal court order. We reverse the circuit court.

[¶ 52.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and ZINTER and MEIERHENRY, Justices, concur.

[¶ 53.] KONENKAMP, Justice, dissents.

KONENKAMP, Justice

(dissenting).

[¶ 54.] I would give full faith and credit to the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate Tribal Court order. It was obtained after an abuse and neglect petition was personally served on the father, and the subject of the order, a Native American child, is an enrolled member of the tribe, and the father appeared through counsel in tribal court to litigate jurisdiction. Under longstanding principles, we are bound to recognize the tribal court’s determination of its own jurisdiction. Judicial proceedings in tribal courts are entitled to the same full faith and credit as any other out-of-state judicial proceeding. Under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d), Congress provided:

Pull faith and credit to public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of Indian tribes
The United States, every State, every territory or possession of the United States, and every Indian tribe shall give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any Indian tribe applicable to Indian child custody proceedings to the same extent that such entities give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any other entity.

[¶ 55.] It is true that in ordinary circumstances a judgment of a court in one jurisdiction is conclusive on the merits in another jurisdiction only if the court in the first jurisdiction had power to pass on the merits. Here, however, the issue of jurisdiction was litigated in tribal court; thus, res judicata applies, and the question of jurisdiction should not be relitigated. “[A] judgment is entitled to full faith and credit — even as to questions of jurisdiction — -when the second court’s inquiry discloses that those questions have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the court which rendered the original judgment.” Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111, 84 S.Ct. 242, 245, 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (1963).

[¶ 56.] This Court takes the position that because there is no transcript of the tribal court proceedings we are prevented from determining whether the jurisdictional questions were fully and fairly litigated. However, the father does not contend in this appeal that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the jurisdictional questions in tribal court. On the contrary, he appeared by counsel, and, after a hearing, the tribal judge entered a thoughtful written decision fairly considering whether the tribal court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Neither does the father contend that he was denied basic due process rights, including the right to a fair hearing before an impartial tribal judge.

[¶ 57.] The father’s argument before us is only that the tribal court entered an erroneous decision. But, as the United States Supreme Court has noted, “[e]rro-neous or not,” when the jurisdictional issue was fully and fairly litigated and finally determined, another jurisdiction’s judgment cannot be collaterally attacked. Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life and Accident and Health Insurance Guaranty Ass’n, 455 U.S. 691, 704-05, 102 S.Ct. 1357, 1371, 71 L.Ed.2d 558 (1982). Moreover, the father never argued that the tribal court did not enter a final judgment, as this Court seems to suggest. At this point, the case is apparently being treated as a final judgment because the father is presently appealing that judgment before the Northern Plains Intertri-bal Court of Appeals. See Bell v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 85 F.3d 1451, 1456 (10thCir.1996) (lack of opportunity to appeal may weigh against finding that a party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue).

[¶ 58.] For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

      . Comity is defined as "[a] practice among political entities (as nations, states, or courts of different jurisdictions), involving ... mutual recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial acts.” Black’s Law Dictionary, available at http://www.westlaw.com.

      . At the hearing, Mother indicated she had filed for a change of custody in the circuit court of Roberts County as well.

      . The tribal court ordered J.D.M.C. to be placed into the temporary legal care, custody and control of SWO's Child Protection Program, to be placed with an appropriate family member. The order instructed the parents to appear at a later date to answer to the abuse and neglect proceeding and declared J.D.M.C. a ward of the tribal court.

      . Section 1911(a) provides:
      Exclusive jurisdiction
      An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law. Where an Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the child.

      . Section 1911 (b) provides:
      In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian child's tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either parent, upon the petition of either parent or the Indian custodian or the Indian child's tribe: Provided, that such transfer be subject to declination by the tribal court of such tribe.

      . A tribe also has the right to intervene in a State court proceeding at any time. 25 USCA § 1911(c).

      . Living with her husband in Sisseton meets the requisite elements for a domicile as it exhibits both a presence and intent to remain. Mother was stationed in Biloxi, Mississippi for her service in the Air Force. This would not change her domicile to Biloxi as she would not have intent to remain there.

      . At oral argument, Mother conceded she had not lived on the reservation since 1997.

      . In Holyfield, the reservation was the Mother’s and the Father’s domicile. 490 U.S. at 48, 109 S.Ct. at 1608, 104 L.Ed.2d 29.

      . SDCL 25-6-1 provides:
      The father of an illegitimate child by publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such into his family, with the consent of his wife if he is married and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such, and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth. The other provisions of law relating to adoption shall not apply in such cases.

      .Several other jurisdictions have held that the child’s domicile is the same as the parent with whom he is living. See Matter of Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 306 (Ind.1988) (citing In re Marriage of Rinderknecht, 174 Ind.App. 382, 367 N.E.2d 1128, 1132 n. 3 (1977)); Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 86 A.2d 463, 467 (1952); Beckmann v. Beckmann, 358 Mo. 1029, 218 S.W.2d 566, 569 (1949) (en banc); In re Thorne, 240 N.Y. 444, 148 N.E. 630, 631 (1925); Palagi v. Palagi, 10 Neb.App. 231, 627 N.W.2d 765, 772 (2001); Somerville

        Bd. of Educ. v. Manville Bd. of Educ., 332 N.J.Super. 6, 752 A.2d 793, 796 (App.Div.2000); Geesbreght v. Geesbreght, 63 Ill.App.3d 37, 19 Ill.Dec. 866, 379 N.E.2d 738, 744 (1978) (examining Texas law); see also Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 32 (1934) (when parents have joint custody, child takes the domicile of the parent with whom he lives).

      . Available at http://www.nicwa.org/policy/ regulations/icwa/I CWA_guidelines.pdf.

      . This does not include situations where jurisdiction is established under 25 USC § 1919(a)(state/tribal agreements) or 25 USC § 1911(b) (transfers).

      .In 2004, the Governor’s Commission on the Indian Child Welfare Act conducted hearings and drafted a report relating to implementation of ICWA and areas of concern and improvement for South Dakota. This report specifically mentioned the state should work together with other tribes to implement agreements like the contract with DSS and SWO. One of the top 30 recommendations was to implement these agreements so tribes could provide "full child welfare services to its children domiciled on its reservation ...” but did not mention giving tribes more jurisdiction than they previously possessed. Nor did the commission report indicate SWO had more jurisdiction than any other tribe. Rather, the commission report said DSS provides child protection services on other reservations, but does not on SWO reservation because of this contract. Furthermore, the commission report indicates one purpose of these agreements is to provide administrative and IV-E funding to the tribes. See Indian Child Welfare Act Commission Report located at http:// www.state.sd.us/oia/files/report.pdf, pp. 6, 51, 56, 84-85.

      . Additionally, 25 USCA § 1919(b) requires "such agreement may be revoked by either party upon one hundred and eighty days’ written notice to the other party.” The purchase service agreement between DSS and SWO requires only thirty days notice.

      . As referenced above, counsel for Father argued during oral argument that section 1911(b) is irrelevant.

      . 25 USC § 1911(d) requires:
      The United States, every State, every territory or possession of the United States, and every Indian tribe shall give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any Indian tribe applicable to Indian child custody proceedings to the same extent that such entities give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any other entity.

      . Under a full faith and credit review, the judgment may also be examined for fraud. Kwongyuen Hangkee Co., Ltd. v. Starr Fireworks, Inc., 2001 SD 113, ¶ 8, 634 N.W.2d 95, 96-97 (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03, 16 S.Ct. 139, 158, 40 L.Ed. 95, 122 (1895)).

      . Father appealed the tribal court decision to the SWO appellate court, but at this time we do not know the outcome of that appeal. We have been advised as of August 21, 2007 that oral argument is set for September 7, 2007 at 11:15 a.m. in Bismarck, North Dakota before the Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals. It is unclear from research whether an appealed decision in tribal court is a final judgment.
      "It is for the local law of the state of rendition to determine whether a judgment is final even though it is subject to appeal or has been appealed. If an appeal is taken which, by the local law of the state of rendition, vacates the judgment, no action can be maintained on the judgment in another state.”
      Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 107 (1971). Therefore, we may examine whether jurisdiction exists because it is unclear that this issue has been “finally decided.” See Durfee, 375 U.S. at 111, 84 S.Ct. at 245, 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (noting “[A] judgment is entitled to full faith and credit-even as to questions of jurisdiction-when the second court’s inquiry discloses that those questions have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the court which rendered the original judgment.”) (Emphasis added).

      . While discussing that most inherent tribal authority regarding the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe has been divested, the Court noted the general rule is that the sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe. However,
      Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.

        Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66, 101 S.Ct. at 1258, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (emphasis added) (additional and internal citations omitted). The analysis encompassed in Montana and its progeny "represents the status of a tribe’s inherent sovereign powers after divestiture of all powers deemed inconsistent with the tribe's dependent status. [Montana, 450 U.S. at 563-64, 101 S.Ct. at 1257, 67 L.Ed.2d 493.] Such divestiture has been characterized as restricting tribes’ powers "to determine their external relations” (i.e., assert their powers over nonmembers).” [Id. at 564, 101 S.Ct. at 1257, 67 L.Ed.2d 493]. David M. Blurton, John v. Baker and the Jurisdiction of Tribal Sovereigns Without Territorial Reach, 20 Alaska L.Rev. 1, 15-16 (2003).

      . Even if Montana's consensual relationship exception was applied in the personal jurisdiction context, there is still no personal jurisdiction. Marrying a tribal member and allowing your children to receive tribal services does not constitute the consensual relationship contemplated by the Montana jurisdictional analysis. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 457, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 1415, 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997) (discussing "the types of activities the Court had in mind” when considering Montana’s consensual relationship exception); see also Blurton, John v. Baker and the Jurisdiction of Tribal Sovereigns Without Territorial Reach, 20 Alaska L.Rev. at 13-14 (2003) (citing Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 371-72, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 2316, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001) (noting the Supreme Court has restricted the first exception to private consensual commercial transactions occurring within Indian country between a nonmember and either the tribe or its members)).
      Furthermore, simply because a consensual relationship may exist is not enough for jurisdiction. Discussing Montana, the Eighth Circuit explained:
      The existence of a consensual relationship is not alone sufficient to support tribal jurisdiction. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 457, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 137 L.Ed.2d 661. The tribal exercise of authority must also take the form of taxation, licensing, or "other means" of regulating the activities of the nonmember, Montana, 450 U.S. at 565, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493, and this regulation must have some nexus to the consensual relationship. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 656, 121 S.Ct. 1825, 149 L.Ed.2d 889 (2001). In other words, a nonmember's consensual relationship in one area "does not trigger tribal civil authority in another.” Id.

        Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 491 F.3d 878, 886-87 (8thCir.2007).

      . Montana began as a test for determining the tribe’s regulatory authority over non-Indians’ conduct on non-Indian fee lands within the reservation. In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456-60, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 1416, 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997), the Supreme Court extended the Montana test to determine whether the tribe had adjudicatory jurisdiction for conduct by a non-Indian on non-Indian fee land within the reservation. See Cohen's Handbook on Federal Indian Law § 7.02[1][a], 599-601 (2005 ed.). In Nevada v. Hicks, the United States Supreme Court extended the Montana analysis to situations where the land was owned by a tribal member. 533 U.S. 353, 364, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 2313, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001). The land was still within the reservation. Id. at 356, 121 S.Ct. at 2309.

      . SDCL 1-1-25 provides:
      No order or judgment of a tribal court in the State of South Dakota may be recognized as a matter of comity in the state courts of South Dakota, except under the following terms and conditions:
      (1) Before a state court may consider recognizing a tribal court order or judgment the party seeking recognition shall establish by clear and convincing evidence that:
      (a) The tribal court had jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties;
      (b) The order or judgment was not fraudulently obtained;
      (c) The order or judgment was obtained by a process that assures the requisites of an impartial administration of justice including but not limited to due notice and a hearing;
      (d) The order or judgment complies with the laws, ordinances and regulations of the jurisdiction from which it was obtained; and
      (e) The order or judgment does not contravene the public policy of the State of South Dakota.
      (2) If a court is satisfied that all of the foregoing conditions exist, the court may recognize the tribal court order or judgment in any of the following circumstances:
      (a) In any child custody or domestic relations case; or
      (b) In any case in which the jurisdiction issuing the order or judgment also grants comity to orders and judgments of the South Dakota courts; or
      (c) In other cases if exceptional circumstances warrant it; or
      (d) Any order required or authorized to be recognized pursuant to 25 USC, § 1911(d) or 25 USC, § 1919.

      . See supra ¶¶ 39-40.

      . Due to our decision on these issues, we do not reach the remaining issues.

      . While a court may not have subject matter jurisdiction, still "it may have jurisdiction to determine the question whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and to bind the parties by its determination, with the result that thereafter they are precluded from successfully contending that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Restatement (First) of Judgments § 10 cmt. a (1942).

      . The judge who decided the jurisdictional questions, Chief Tribal Judge B.J. Jones, is a licensed attorney in several states and is a member of the faculty of the University of North Dakota School of Law.