author: NEUMAN, Justice.

text:
    STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. David James ROE, Appellant.
    No. 00-0297.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Feb. 27, 2002.

      Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary E. Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, J. Patrick White, County Attorney, and Michael D. Brennan, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
   NEUMAN, Justice.

David Roe stands convicted of domestic assault, a violation of Iowa Code sections 236.2, 708.1 and 708.2A(2) (1999). The judgment against him, however, rests on a jury verdict finding him guilty only of simple assault. On appeal, Roe contends he cannot be convicted of an offense at variance with the jury’s verdict. We agree, thereby vacating a contrary decision by our court of appeals. The case must be reversed and remanded for a corrected judgment and sentence.

The facts are largely undisputed. Police responded to a 9-1-1 call placed from a home shared by Roe and Heather Wood-ford. Woodford was noticeably upset and Roe angrily resisted police intervention. Woodford claimed Roe had slapped or punched her several times while she was holding their infant. Based on these facts, the State charged Roe with domestic assault causing bodily injury and child en~ dangerment. See Iowa Code §§ 708.1(1), 708.2A(2)(b) and 236.2 (domestic assault with injury); 726.6(l)(a) and (3) (child endangerment).

The case proceeded to trial. Following the submission of evidence, the court instructed the jury regarding a stipulation reached by the State and Roe that his relationship with Woodford was a “domestic relationship as defined by Section 236 of the Iowa Code.” Thereafter the court’s marshalling instruction listed the essential elements for the crimes of assault causing bodily injury and the lesser-included offense of simple assault, but made no mention of the term “domestic” in connection with either assault crime.

The jury acquitted Roe of the crimes of child endangerment and assault causing bodily injury but returned a verdict finding him “guilty of Assault.” The court’s order scheduling sentencing likewise recited that Roe had been found “guilty of the lesser, included offense of Assault.” At the time of sentencing, however, the State moved to correct the order’s “scrivener’s error” that suggested Roe would be sentenced for simple assault, rather than domestic assault. The court granted the State’s motion and proceeded to sentence Roe for domestic assault. A thirty-day jail term was imposed, along with a $250 fine and the requirement that Roe complete a batterer’s education program.

Roe sought, and was granted, discretionary review. See Iowa Code § 814.6(2)(d) (permitting defendant discretionary review from simple misdemeanor conviction). We transferred the case to the court of appeals. It held that because Roe had stipulated to his domestic relationship with Woodford, it was unnecessary for the jury to specifically find that fact as part of its guilty verdict. The court of appeals further found that the parties’ stipulation, combined with the jury’s guilty verdict on the crime of assault, supported the district court’s entry of judgment and conviction for domestic abuse assault.

I. We granted Roe’s petition for further review to address, in this slightly different context, an issue this court recently examined in State v. Owens, 685 N.W.2d 478 (Iowa 2001). Owens involved a defendant charged with several offenses, including the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Owens stipulated that he had previously been convicted of a felony, thereby seeking to keep prejudicial details about his criminal history from the jury. Owens, 635 N.W.2d at 481. Over Owens’ objection, however, the trial court included the stipulation in its marshalling instruction. It believed the jury was required to find Owens guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on each essential element of the crimes charged. Id.

On appeal following conviction, Owens claimed his trial counsel was ineffective because he should have urged the court to submit an interrogatory concerning his firearm possession and then, based on his stipulated felony status, the court could have rendered a verdict based on the. jury’s interrogatory answer. Id. We rejected Owens’ contention and affirmed the district court. In doing so we overruled a contrary court of appeals decision, State v. Smith, 576 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). Id. at 484. We held, contrary to Smith, that

[w]hen a prior conviction forms an essential element of the current charge, rather than merely furnishing the basis for an enhanced sentence, the jury must determine guilt on that element beyond a reasonable doubt; answering an interrogatory will not suffice. Even if the defendant stipulates to guilt on an element of an offense, the court must still instruct the jury as to the stipulation. It is from this stipulation that the jury determines a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at 483-84 (citations omitted).

Although the case before us does not, like Owens, involve a stipulation concerning a prior conviction, it does involve a stipulation to an essential element of the domestic assault crimes with which Roe was charged. The record reveals that Roe’s counsel proposed instructions that included as an essential element of both domestic assault crimes a finding that the “act occurred between family or household members.” The record further reveals that defense counsel specifically objected to the submission of an instruction on simple assault, claiming this was an “all or nothing” defense. The trial court overruled that objection. For some inexplicable reason, however, it then submitted instructions and verdict forms to the jury that omitted any reference to the domestic nature of the alleged assault. As already mentioned, the jury unanimously answered a verdict form finding Roe “guilty of Assault.”

Given this procedural scenario, we are convinced Owens controls the outcome here. A defendant’s stipulation regarding evidence may eliminate the State’s need to marshal proof on an essential element of a crime, but the stipulation does not thereby eliminate the jury’s duty to make a finding beyond a reasonable doubt on each essential element. Owens, 635 N.W.2d at 484. Just as we found an interrogatory answer would have been insufficient to satisfy the jury’s determination of guilt in Owens, the defendant’s stipulation here (without a corresponding interrogatory) is equally insufficient.

II. In answer to the State’s argument that Roe is too late in complaining about the court’s erroneous instructions, our answer is simple: He had no reason to do so. The instructions, submitted over defense counsel’s objection on a different ground, eliminated an elevating element which would have potentially hurt Roe, not helped him. Any fault for the supposed “scrivener’s error” leading to the court’s ultimate error in amending the judgment rests squarely with the State.

Roe is entitled to be sentenced consistent with the jury’s verdict of guilt. We therefore vacate the decision of the court of appeals, vacate the trial court’s amendment to the jury’s verdict and its sentence thereon, and remand for resentencing on the crime of assault.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

All justices concur except STREIT, J., who takes no part.

      . Domestic assault differs from simple assault in the penalties that may be imposed upon conviction. For assault in violation of Iowa Code § 708.2(5), a simple misdemeanor, the maximum penalty includes a $100 fine or thirty days in jail. See Iowa Code § 903.1(a). The authorized penalty upon conviction for first offense domestic abuse assault, also a simple misdemeanor, includes a minimum 2-day jail sentence that may not be suspended, possible fine and required participation in a batterer’s treatment program. See id. § 708.2A(2)(a), (6), (9). Conviction of domestic abuse assault may also impact on a person's eligibility for a permit to carry weapons. See id. § 724.8(6).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LAVORATO, Chief Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Mark KLOUDA and Michael Wayne Mayberry, Appellants, v. SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES and Iowa Board of Parole, Appellees.
    No. 99-1560.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Feb. 27, 2002.

      Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender and David Arthur Adams and John P. Messina, Assistant State Appellate Defenders, for appellants.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General and Jeffrey D. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
   LAVORATO, Chief Justice.

Mark Klouda and Michael Mayberry, the plaintiffs in this case, appeal from the district court’s denial of declaratory and injunctive relief. They argue that Iowa Code sections 907.8A and 908.11 (1999) violate the separation-of-powers doctrine of the Iowa Constitution. The challenged statutes create a pilot project in the sixth judicial district. They transfer jurisdiction over probation revocation cases from judges to administrative law judges employed by the Iowa Board of Parole. Because we agree the statutes violate the separation-of-powers doctrine, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. Statutory Scheme.

The plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Iowa Code sections 907.8A and 908.11 (Supp.1997), as amended by 1998 Iowa Acts chapter 1197, sections 1-3 (effective May 18, 1998) (codified at Iowa Code §§ 907.8A and 908.11 (1999)). They contend these provisions violate the separation-of-powers clause of article III, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution. The challenged statutes create a pilot project in the sixth judicial district whereby judges in that district transfer jurisdiction over probation revocation cases to an administrative parole and probation judge (ALJ). The transfer is made “upon entry of the sentencing order for each person who is sentenced to the custody of the director of the department of corrections and whose sentence is suspended.” Iowa Code § 907.8A(1).

The district court retains jurisdiction over restitution, reconsideration of the original sentence, arrest warrants, initial appearances, preliminary probation violation informations, bond proceedings, and appointment of counsel. Iowa Code § 907.8A(1). The court also retains jurisdiction over matters relating to cases in which the person is not sentenced to the custody of the director of the department of corrections. Id.

The ALJ determines “[a]ll issues relating to whether the probationer has violated or fulfilled the terms and conditions of probation, including but not limited to express violations of a specific term of probation, new violations of the law, and changes of the terms of probation.... ” Iowa Code § 907.8A(2). The ALJ is to conduct probation hearings “in the same manner as hearings regarding revocations or modifications of or discharge from parole.” Id.

Section 908.11 provides procedures for ALJs, magistrates, and judges to follow in probation revocation cases. For example, the provision permits the ALJ to perform the functions of the liaison officer and the board of parole if the alleged probation violator was sentenced and placed on probation in the sixth judicial district. Iowa Code § 908.11(4). The ALJ may conduct the probable cause and probation revocation hearings, and may reconsider a person’s sentence “if reconsideration is deemed appropriate and the person’s probation was revoked by an [ALJ] in the sixth judicial district.” Iowa Code § 908.11(5).

If a violation is established, the ALJ may (1) continue the probation with or without altering the conditions of probation, (2) sentence the defendant to a jail term while continuing the probation, (3) order the defendant to be placed in a violator facility while continuing probation, or (4) revoke the probation and require the defendant to serve the, sentence imposed or any lesser sentence. Iowa Code § 908.11(6).

The ALJ’s order becomes a final decision, unless the defendant appeals the decision to the board of parole within the time provided in rules adopted by the board. Id. The appeal is to be conducted pursuant to rules adopted by the board. Id. The record made at the hearing before the ALJ becomes the record on appeal. Id. The provisions of Iowa Code chapter 17A (Iowa Administrative Procedure Act) apply to the hearing before the ALJ and to the appeal. See Iowa Code § 908.11(6) (appeal from ALJ’s decision “shall be conducted pursuant to rules adopted by the board”); Iowa Admin. Code r. 205 — 15.1 et seq. (Appeal of Decisions) (“These rules are intended to implement Iowa Code chapter 17A ...”); see also,: Frazee v. Iowa Bd. of Parole, 248 N.W.2d 80, 82-83 (Iowa 1976) (holding that the provisions of chapter 17A apply to parole revocation proceedings).

II. Probation Revocation Proceedings Regarding Mayberry.

In September 1998, the district court in Johnson County sentenced Mayberry to an indeterminate ten-year term on a felony charge of prohibited acts. The court suspended the sentence and placed Mayberry on three years’ probation on condition that he reside at a halfway house for a period of time not to exceed one year.

On October 14, 1998, a probation violation report and an application for revocation of probation were filed in Johnson County district court. The next day, the district court entered an order setting the probable cause and final hearing before an ALJ. The court did this pursuant to section 907.8A.

At the probation revocation hearing on December 16, 1998, Mayberry raised the separation-of-powers issue. The ALJ found that Mayberry had violated two rules of his probation agreement. The ALJ ordered that Mayberry reside in a halfway house and that he have an evaluation for psychiatric treatment and substance abuse. Mayberry appealed, and on February 4, 1999, the Board of Parole affirmed the ALJ’s findings of fact but remanded the case for an additional hearing.

Before the Board rendered its appeal decision, a second report of violation was filed in January 1999. On February 24, 1999, the ALJ held a consolidated hearing on the remand of the first application and the second application to revoke probation. In addressing the remand of the December 1998 decision, the ALJ ordered May-berry to complete a competency evaluation at the Forensic Unit at the Iowa Men’s Classification Center at Oakdale. At the time of trial on Mayberry’s declaratory judgment action — the case at issue here— the ALJ had continued his probation violation case pending the results of the competency evaluation.

III. Probation Revocation Proceedings Regarding Klouda.

In January 1999, the district court in Linn County sentenced Klouda to an indeterminate term of five years on a felony charge of third-degree burglary, suspended his sentence, and placed him on probation under terms including residency in a halfway house. In February 1999, probation revocation proceedings were initiated. The district court transferred jurisdiction of the proceedings to an ALJ.

The ALJ found that Klouda had violated the terms of his probation. The ALJ originally ordered Klouda to attend a violator’s program for sixty days. However, the ALJ revised his order, revoked probation, and sentenced Klouda to the term originally imposed when Klouda refused to participate in the violator’s program.

IY. The Declaratory Judgment Actions.

On October 29, 1998, Mayberry filed a petition for declaratory judgment in Johnson County, naming as defendants the Sixth Judicial District Department of Correctional Services and the Iowa Board of Parole. He alleged that sections 907.8A and 908.11 violated the separation-of-powers clause of the Iowa Constitution, as well as several other Iowa constitutional provisions not relevant here. He asked that the statutes be declared unconstitutional and that the court, issue a temporary and permanent injunction against enforcement of those provisions against him and those similarly situated.

On November 17, 1998, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider the action because Mayberry had not exhausted his administrative remedies as required by the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act. Later, the district court denied the request for a temporary injunction and overruled the motion to dismiss. The defendants did not appeal from the ruling on the motion to dismiss.

On April 29, 1999, Klouda filed a petition for' declaratory judgment in Linn County, naming the Sixth Judicial District Department of Correctional Services and the Iowa Board of Parole as defendants. Like Mayberry, Klouda alleged that the statutes in question violated the separation-of-powers clause under the Iowa Constitution, as well as several other Iowa constitutional provisions not relevant here. And like Mayberry, Klouda requested a temporary and permanent injunction. The court denied Klouda’s request for a temporary injunction on June 2, 1999. In the same ruling, the court consolidated Klouda’s and Mayberry’s petitions upon the defendants’ motion.

By agreement of the parties, the district court heard the consolidated petitions 'for declaratory judgment in Johnson County. Following the trial, the district court rejected all of the various constitutional challenges to sections 907.8A and 908.11.

Mayberry and Klouda appealed, raising only the separation-of-powers issue. We questioned whether we had jurisdiction to hear this appeal and directed the parties to file statements regarding this issue. Following receipt of those statements, we are convinced we have jurisdiction. See Keokuk County v. H.B., 593 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Iowa 1999) (holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a subject matter jurisdiction issue; rather, it is an authority to hear the case issue, which can be waived).

V. Scope of Review.

We review constitutional issues de novo. State v. Simpson, 587 N.W.2d 770, 771 (Iowa 1998). Because statutes are cloaked with a strong presumption of constitutionality, a party challenging a statute carries a heavy burden of rebutting this presumption. Channon v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 852 (Iowa 2001). A party who challenges a statute must negate every reasonable basis upon which we could hold the statute constitutional. Id. In addition, the party must show beyond a reasonable doubt that a statute violates the constitution. Johnston v. Veterans’ Plaza Auth., 535 N.W.2d 131, 132 (Iowa 1995).

VI. Separation of Powers.

A. Applicable law.

The separation-of-powers clause of the Iowa Constitution provides:

The powers of the government of Iowa shall be divided into three separate departments — the legislative, the executive, and the judicial: and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any function appertaining to either of the others, except in cases hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.

Iowa Const, art. Ill, § 1.

The constitution further provides regarding judicial power:

The judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts, and such other courts, inferior to the supreme court, as the general assembly may, from time to time, establish.

Iowa Const, art. V, § 1.

Finally, the constitution prescribes the jurisdiction of the district court:

The district court shall be a court of law and equity, which shall be distinct and separate jurisdictions, and have jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters arising in their respective districts, in such manner as shall be prescribed by law.

Iowa Const, art. V, § 6 (emphasis added).

All three provisions are implicated by the challenge to the statutes in question.

The separation-of-powers doctrine is violated “if one branch of government purports to use powers that are clearly forbidden, or attempts to use powers granted by the constitution to another branch.” State v. Phillips, 610 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Iowa 2000). The doctrine requires that a branch of government not impair another in the performance of its constitutional duties. Id. (citation omitted).

The separation oFpowers doctrine, however, has no rigid boundaries. State v. Hoegh, 632 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 2001). “Instead, some acts can be properly entrusted to more than one branch of government, and some functions inevitably intersect.” Id. When this happens, “harmonious cooperation among the three branches of government [becomes] fundamental to our system of government.” Id. (quoting Webster County Bd. of Supervi sors v. Flattery, 268 N.W.2d 869, 874 (Iowa 1978)). As one treatise explains:

[a]lthough a state constitution may define three separate branches of power, there is generally no attempt to compartmentalize them, and perhaps, in truth, there can be no absolute and complete separation of all the powers of a practical government. The powers of one department of government have always depended on or have been aided in some way by those of another. Moreover, there is sometimes an overlapping or blending of powers of separate departments.

16A Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 249, at 152 (1998).

Judicial power vested in the courts by the Iowa Constitution is the power to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect. Cedar Rapids Human Rights Comm’n v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 222 N.W.2d 391, 396 (Iowa 1974); accord State ex rel. Allee v. Gocha, 555 N.W.2d 683, 685 (Iowa 1996). Any encroachment upon that power is a violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine. Gocha, 555 N.W.2d at 685; Richardson v. Fitzgerald, 132 Iowa 253, 255, 109 N.W. 866, 867 (1906) (“any direction by the Legislature that the judicial function shall be performed in a particular way is a plain violation of the Constitution”). And we alone have the authority to check any legislative action resulting in such an encroachment. Gocha, 555 N.W.2d at 685.

With these principles in mind, we turn to the challenged statutes to determine if they encroach upon judicial power and thereby violate the separation-of-powers clause of the Iowa Constitution.

B. Analysis.

Our case law recognizes that the legislature has the sole power to prescribe certain acts as crimes and to provide penalties for the commission of such acts. State v. Ronek, 176 N.W.2d 153, 155 (Iowa 1970). It also has the sole power to statutorily authorize or withhold probation. State v. Holmes, 276 N.W.2d 823, 830 (Iowa 1979); State v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Shelby County, 308 N.W.2d 27, 29 (Iowa 1981) (“A court has no power to suspend a sentence unless that power is conferred by statute.”). So there is no encroachment on judicial power when the legislature prescribes certain acts as . crimes, provides penalties for their violation, and authorizes or withholds probation.

The executive branch has a very limited role in criminal cases. Under the Iowa Constitution the governor has the “power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment. ...” Iowa Const. art. IV, § 16; Phillips, 610 N.W.2d at 842. Given this constitutional authority, there is therefore no encroachment on judicial power when the governor acts in these areas.

A sentence is “[t] he judgment formally pronounced by the court or judge upon the defendant after his conviction in a criminal prosecution, imposing the punishment to be inflicted.... ” Black’s Law Dictionary 1362 (6th ed.1990). This is consistent with the definition of judicial power: the power to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect. Sentencing therefore falls within the realm of judicial power. State v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Black Hawk County, 616 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 2000) (“Although the legislature prescribes the punishment for crimes, the actual sentencing of a defendant is an independent function that is the sole province, of the judiciary.”); State v. Longo, 608 N.W.2d 471, 475 (Iowa 2000) (“sentencing is the sole prerogative of the judge”). Because sentencing falls within the realm of judicial power, any encroachment on this power is a violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine.

The powers transferred under the challenged statutes that clearly encroach upon judicial power include those enabling the ALJ to (1) reconsider the defendant’s sentence “in the manner provided in sections 902.4 and 903.2,” (2) sentence the defendant to a jail term while continuing probation, (3) revoke probation and require the defendant to serve a lesser sentence than that imposed by the district court; and (4) revoke probation and place the defendant on work release. See Iowa Code § 908.11; Iowa Admin. Code r. 205 — 12.7(10)(e)(2). To the extent that these provisions relate to sentencing, they involve sentencing functions — functions that are clearly reserved to the judiciary. This is because sentencing involves the power to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect — the quintessential element of judicial power. Therefore, to the extent the challenged statutes transfer sentencing functions to the ALJ, they constitute a violation of the separation-of-powers clause of the Iowa Constitution.

That leaves for our consideration the ability of the ALJ under the challenged statutes to revoke or continue probation. See Iowa Code §§ 908.11(6)(d) (authority to revoke probation if a violation of probation is established); 908.11(6)(a) (authority to continue probation even if a violation of probation is established). We think for reasons that follow this too encroaches on judicial power and therefore violates the separation-of-powers clause of the Iowa Constitution.

Probation “relates to judicial action taken before the prison door is closed.” State v. Wright, 202 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Iowa 1972) (emphasis added). In contrast, parole “relates to executive or administrative action taken after the door has been closed on the convict.” Wright, 202 N.W.2d at 76.

We have recognized that “[a] court has no power to suspend a sentence unless that power is conferred by statute.” Iowa Dist. Ct. for Shelby County, 308 N.W.2d at 29. That power is found in Iowa Code chapter 907.

Iowa Code section 907.1(3) defines a “suspended sentence” as

a sentencing option whereby the court pronounces judgment and imposes a sentence and then suspends execution of the sentence subject to the defendant’s compliance with conditions set by the court as a requirement of the suspended sentence. Revocation of the suspended sentence results in the execution of sentence already pronounced.

Iowa Code § 907.1(3).

Iowa Code section 907.1(4) defines “probation” as

the procedure under which a defendant, against whom a judgment of conviction of a public offense has been or may be entered, is released by the court subject to supervision by a resident of this state or by the judicial district department of correctional services.

Iowa Code § 907.1(4).

Iowa Code 907.3(3) gives the court power to suspend a sentence and place the defendant on probation:

By record entry at the time of or after sentencing, the court may suspend the sentence and place the defendant on probation upon such terms and conditions as it may require including commitment to an alternate jail facility or a community correctional residential treatment facility for a specific number of days to be followed by a term of- probation ....

Iowa Code § 907.3(3).

The legislature has also given the court the power to revoke or continue probation. See Iowa Code § 908.11(6)(d) (providing that if a violation of probation is established, the court may “[rjevoke the probation and require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed or any lesser sentence”); Iowa Code § 908.11(6)(a) (providing that if a violation of probation is established, the court may “[c]ontinue the probation with or without an alteration of the conditions of probation”). Although suspending a sentence and granting probation do not constitute imposing a sentence, see Wright, 202 N.W.2d at 76, they are akin to sentencing in that they represent a sentencing alternative. The legislature has chosen language confirming this characterization. See Iowa Code § 907.1(3) (defining a “suspended sentence” as “a sentencing option”).

In any event, suspending a sentence, granting probation, revoking probation, or continuing probation fall within the realm of judicial powers. They are judicial functions which result in a court deciding and pronouncing a judgment and carrying it into effect. Because the challenged statutes vest such powers in the ALJs in the sixth judicial district, they encroach upon judicial power and therefore violate the separation-of-powers doctrine of the Iowa Constitution.

The defendants’ fallback position is that the aggrieved probationer may still seek judicial review of an ALJ’s decision through Iowa Code chapter 17A. Such a review, however, does not change the fact that the challenged statutes violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. Moreover, the defendants overlook the fact that a court in the first instance may have reached a result different from the ALJ’s, but given the limited nature of judicial review, the ALJ’s decision would nevertheless stand. See Dubuque Casino Belle, Inc. v. Bair, 562 N.W.2d 605, 606 (Iowa 1997) (agency’s decision must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence).

VII. Disposition.

In sum, we conclude, contrary to the district court’s ruling, that the challenged statutes violate the separation-of-powers clause of the Iowa Constitution. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings on the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief. Our decision shall not apply retroactively to cases in which a final decision has been rendered unless the case is pending on appeal and the issue was preserved.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.


text:
    Stephen A. RUBES, Appellee, v. MEGA LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Appellant.
    No. 01-0433.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Feb. 27, 2002.
    Rehearing Denied April 22, 2002.

      Jaki K. Samuelson and Jason M. Casini of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
    Joseph J. Hrvol of Joseph J. Hrvol, P.C., Council Bluffs, and Joseph B. Reedy, Council Bluffs, for appellee.
   NEUMAN, Justice.

This declaratory judgment action concerns plaintiff Stephen Rubes’ coverage for health and medical expenses under a policy of insurance issued by defendant MEGA Life and Health Insurance Company, Inc. (MEGA). Resolution of the controversy hinges on the application of competing equitable theories to a disputed factual record: Whether Rubes materially misrepresented his health history so as to justify rescission by MEGA and, if so, whether MEGA should be equitably estopped from rescinding because its decision was not conveyed until Rubes’ costly — but lifesaving — liver transplant operation was complete.

The parties agree the case sounds in equity and thus our review is de novo. See Ralfs v. Mowry, 586 N.W.2d 369, 371 (Iowa 1998) (standard of review rests on predominantly equitable nature of theories at issue). Under that review standard, we are not bound by the district court’s factual findings but we may give them weight, especially with regard to the credibility of witnesses. Perkins v. Madison County Livestock & Fair Ass’n, 613 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Iowa 2000).

As in many cases, credibility determinations are crucial here. Yet our ability to apply the usual deferential standard is undermined by the court’s verbatim adoption of Rubes’ proposed factual findings and legal conclusions on this point. We have in the past cautioned trial courts about the perils of such practice. Kroblin v. RDR Motels, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 430, 435 (Iowa 1984). We do so again because the customary deference accorded trial courts cannot fairly be applied when the decision on review reflects the findings of the prevailing litigant rather than the court’s own scrutiny of the evidence and articulation of controlling legal principles. See id.; see also Phoenix Eng’g & Supply Inc. v. Universal Elec. Co., 104 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir.1997) (close scrutiny of record required where trial court adopts one party’s proposed findings); In re Las Colinas, Inc., 426 F.2d 1005, 1009, 1010 (1st Cir.1970) (practice of adopting proposed findings should be limited to “extraordinary cases” of a “highly technical nature requiring expertise” not possessed by trial court; to extent decision does not reflect independent work, “the more careful we are obliged to be in our review”).

We are convinced from our independent review of the trial testimony and exhibits that MEGA lawfully rescinded Rubes’ contract of insurance. We further conclude that the company’s decision to do so, although regrettably late, was not without fair warning to Rubes well in advance of surgery. We therefore reverse the contrary judgment of the district court and remand for entry of a judgment rescinding the contract.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

This case centers on information conveyed by Rubes to his health insurer, MEGA, on an application for insurance dated July 15, 1998. For over a year before submitting this application, Rubes had been uninsured. Before that time, Rubes — who practices law as a sole practitioner — had been covered under a policy furnished by his wife’s employer. Rubes’ marriage was dissolved in April 1997. He put off securing his own policy until the illness and hospitalization that started this controversy.

On May 31, 1998, Rubes visited a physician in Council Bluffs complaining of fever, chills and shortness of breath. The physician suspected pneumonia. Rubes was then admitted to St. Joseph’s hospital in Omaha for intravenous antibiotics and further tests. The hospital’s admitting notes indicate that Rubes reported “a history of alcohol abuse” including outpatient treatment for alcoholism but no other serious health history. Lab work performed at the hospital revealed extremely low white blood cell and platelet counts. These results prompted screening for HIV and hepatitis. Liver function tests were ordered based on Rubes’ enlarged liver and spleen. These tests revealed elevated liver enzymes.

The administration of antibiotics resolved Rubes’ acute symptoms shortly after admission to the hospital. He was eager to be discharged because he had no insurance to cover the expense and, moreover, his hospitalization conflicted with plans to attend his sister’s wedding m California. Rubes’ sister happens to be a physician, so Rubes prevailed upon his doctor to release him to her care. The physician’s discharge notes reveal that he spoke to Rubes’ sister, Dr. Susan Rubes-Heller, who assured him that she would draw “a CBC and set of liver, function tests there as well.”

Upon his arrival in California, Rubes was examined by his sister. She did not observe the liver or spleen enlargement noted in the St. Joseph’s hospital records, nor did she observe any other symptoms of liver disease. Blood tests she performed revealed a low white cell count but the liver function results showed improvement when compared to the tests administered at St. Joseph’s. She also learned, either from Rubes or from hospital personnel, that his HIV test was negative, as was the hepatitis screen. This was good news and minimized her concerns about liver disease. She evidently advised Rubes accordingly. What Dr. Rubes-Heller did not learn until mid-August was that not all the hepatitis results were reported before Rubes’ discharge from the hospital. The full results disclosed the presence of the hepatitis B antibody (indicating a previous infection) and active hepatitis C.

Meanwhile, upon his return to Iowa, Rubes began shopping around for insurance. He called William Steiner, an agent for MEGA. Steiner testified that when responding to such calls he routinely inquires about medical history and treatment for drug and alcohol abuse because such matters may automatically disqualify the applicant, making further contacts futile. Evidently Steiner’s preliminary inquiry revealed no such concerns because he arranged to meet with Rubes to fill out an application. What transpired at their meeting, and the answers contained on Rubes’ application form, are at the heart of this controversy.

At this point additional facts about Rubes’ personal history become important. Rubes candidly testified at trial that he is a recovering alcoholic. In 1991 he was convicted for drunk driving and completed a thirty-day outpatient treatment program for alcoholism. That treatment followed a long history of substance abuse, including IV drug use (heroin) during the 1970s and marijuana and cocaine use (as well as alcohol abuse) throughout the 1980s. He had an additional arrest for driving under the influence in the 1970s. He has reportedly maintained his sobriety since 1991 and actively participates in Alcoholics Anonymous (AA).

The MEGA application completed by Rubes on July 15, 1998 revealed none of this drug or alcohol history. In response to the question “Have you ... EVER had symptoms or been treated for ... alcoholism or drug addiction,” Rubes answered “no.” He likewise answered “no” to the question “Have you ... ever had your driver’s license suspended ... or received any citations for driving while under the influence (i.e. DWI or DUI)?” Despite his recent hospitalization for pneumonia, Rubes answered “no” to a question regarding symptoms of “[rjespiratory disorder ... or breathing problems.” Rubes, however, gave a positive response to an inquiry concerning “medical ... advice, hospitalizations, treatment or operations in the last 5 years.” He described his May-June hospitalization this way: “bacterial infection, 100% full recovery, [n]o follow up medication or treatment.” He also listed the names, addresses and phone numbers of the hospital and physician.

Rubes admitted at trial that the application contained false responses concerning his arrest record for drank driving, substance abuse treatment and hospitalizations. He ascribed any misrepresentation, however, to MEGA’s agent, Steiner. It is undisputed that Steiner asked the questions and filled out the form. Rubes maintains that he answered all inquiries about his alcoholism and drank driving arrests truthfully, consistent with his customary AA routine. He insists that Steiner told him matters predating the application by five years were irrelevant and need not be reported. He acknowledged that he personally signed the application, attesting to its truthfulness, but asserts he' did not read it before doing so.

Steiner, an insurance agent for over thirty years, adamantly denied editing either the questions or Rubes’ answers. But he admitted on cross-examination that he had no personal recollection of meeting Rubes or completing his application; he based his testimony on decades of customary practice, reading the questions as written and recording the applicants’ answers precisely as given.

Rubes’ application was approved and MEGA issued a policy of insurance effective August 1, 1998. In November 1998 Rubes was hospitalized for severe gastrointestinal bleeding. In his words, he “about bled to death” at home. He was diagnosed with “cirrhosis probably secondary to hepatitis C infection” and referred to the University of Nebraska Medical Center for consultation about a liver transplant. University staff advised that his. policy with MEGA contained a one-year exclusion for pre-existing medical conditions so that a transplant would not be covered until August 1, 1999, at the earliest. Given the waiting list for organ transplants, the delay in payment was the least of Rubes’ concerns.

Rubes’ November 1998 hospitalization claims triggered MEGA’s review of Rubes’ insurance application. It was during this investigation that MEGA examined the medical records relating to his May 1998 hospitalization. That record, of course, revealed Rubes’ history of alcoholism as well as the extent to which liver disease was suspected at that time.

MEGA paid none of Rubes’ pending hospital bills. In a letter dated August 12, 1999, MEGA advised Rubes that material misrepresentations regarding his health history were found in his application. Had Rubes revealed the full extent of his medical history, the company advised, it would have declined coverage. Before taking action to rescind the policy, however, MEGA gave Rubes fifteen days to furnish additional information concerning his previous illness and medical treatment. Rubes did not respond to the letter. On August 13, 1999, he filed this declaratory judgment action concerning his coverage under the policy. MEGA counterclaimed for rescission of the insurance contract.

While the declaratory judgment action was pending, Rubes’ plans for a liver transplant proceeded. He was assigned to a patient transplant financial coordinator, Michael Chaney, who communicated with MEGA concerning Rubes’ insurance coverage. Chaney testified that he received both written and oral confirmation that Rubes’ transplant was deemed by the company to be “medically necessary and approved.” He admitted, however, that MEGA’s correspondence also carried customary language disclaiming any “guarantee” to benefit payment “prior to services actually being rendered.” From August 3, 1998 to May 8, 1999, Chaney periodically confirmed Rubes’ active status as a policyholder. At no time did Rubes or MEGA advise Chaney that the parties were engaged in litigation over his coverage.

On May 10, 1999, MEGA took action to rescind Rubes’ policy by issuing him a refund check for all premiums paid less claims paid for prescription drugs. The notice did not reach Rnbes until after his successful transplant operation on May 15, 1999.

Trial over the coverage question took place in January 2001. The district court entered judgment in Rubes’ favor, concluding that his application for insurance disclosed the full extent of his knowledge concerning the May 1998 hospitalization, that Rubes answered truthfully all questions posed to him by Steiner, and that any errors in making the application were the agent’s, not Rubes’. This appeal by MEGA followed.

II. Issues on Appeal.

MEGA argues that the district court’s judgment for Rubes cannot withstand scrutiny, factually or legally. It contends the court ignored crucial admissions and objectively false disclosures entitling it to rescission under the standard announced in Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864 (Iowa 1996). Rubes counters that MEGA was required to prove intent to deceive, or scienter, in order to prevail on a rescission claim based on misrepresentation. He insists that any misstatements on the application were attributable to MEGA’s agent, Steiner.

The parties likewise disagree on the court’s alternative ruling on equitable es-toppel. MEGA insists the doctrine has no application where, as here, its intention to rescind was made clear and thus dispels Rubes’ claim he acted in reliance on the insurer’s promise of benefits. We shall consider the arguments in turn.

A. Equitable Rescission. In general, “fraudulent misrepresentations leading to the creation of a contract give rise to a right of rescission.” Robinson v. Perpetual Servs. Corp., 412 N.W.2d 562, 568 (Iowa 1987); accord Hyler, 548 N.W.2d at 870. When a party relies on the doctrine of equitable rescission to avoid a contract, five elements must be proven: “(1) a representation, (2) falsity, (3) materiality, (4) an intent to induce the other to act or refrain from acting, and (5) justifiable reliance.” Hyler, 548 N.W.2d at 872; accord Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stockdale Agency, 892 F.Supp. 1179, 1193 (N.D.Iowa 1995).

At issue here is a dispute over the requisite “intent” needed to fulfill the equitable rescission doctrine’s fourth element. Consistent with the rule recited above, MEGA argues that the intent required is only that Rubes intended to induce MEGA into acting favorably on his application. Rubes contends, and the district court ruled, that an intent to deceive the defendant must be shown. MEGA’s position is plainly the correct one.

This court’s recent discussion in Hyler, and the federal court’s exhaustive treatment of the topic in Utica, clarified the historical distinction drawn between the proof required to sustain an equitable action to rescind a contract and the proof required to recover at law based on fraudulent representation. An action to rescind a contract is regarded as less severe, and hence less demanding in its proof requirements, than an action at law for damages based on fraud. Hyler, 548 N.W.2d at 871. In an equitable rescission action, it is not the knowledge of falsity that is at issue, but “whether misrepresentations induced the complaining party to contract.” Utica, 892 F.Supp. at 1195. As this court stated in Hyler, injecting an “intent to deceive” element in a rescission case would reintroduce the concept of scienter, “making the elimination of this requirement in equity cases illusory.” Hyler, 548 N.W.2d at 872.

Applying the correct formulation of the law to the record before us, we are convinced MEGA proved all five elements entitling it to rescind Rubes’ contract of insurance. Rubes made several representations to MEGA’s agent concerning his health history, drunk driving arrests and alcoholism. In this context, a representation includes not only an affirmative statement but the omission or nondisclosure of a pertinent fact. Utica, 892 F.Supp. at 1194.

The alleged falsity of Rubes’ representations was hotly contested at trial. Given Rubes’ long history of alcohol and drug abuse, including two arrests for drunk driving, it is inconceivable to us that he could be found to have truthfully answered “no” to a question asking whether he had “EVER had symptoms or been treated for ... alcoholism or drug addiction.” A reasonable fact finder might find that Rubes was ignorant of, or in denial over, the extent of his liver disease. After all, his sister minimized, the symptoms and she testified that she did not carefully examine the hepatitis test results until two weeks after the policy was issued. But having just been diagnosed and treated for pneumonia two weeks before applying for coverage, it strains credulity that Rubes would answer “no” to an inquiry concerning “EVER” having symptoms of a respiratory disorder. Rubes’ bald allegation that the agent filled out the form and edited his answers cannot save him. Having been given an opportunity to review the document before signing it, but failing to do so, Rubes is now in no position to question the answers he certified. See Bryant v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 595 N.W.2d 482, 486-87 (Iowa 1999); Gouge v. McNamara, 586 N.W.2d 710, 713 (Iowa Ct.App.1998); Advance Elevator Co. v. Four State Supply Co., 572 N.W.2d 186, 188 (Iowa Ct.App.1997).

The district court’s decision, relying heavily on findings prepared by Rubes’ counsel, drew the credibility line in Rubes’ favor. We believe compelling proof in the record points in the opposite direction. Applications submitted contemporaneously by Rubes to other potential insurers revealed similar departures from the truth, even including a denial that other applications were pending. And a psychologist’s evaluation submitted in connection with Rubes’ transplant surgery described Rubes, as “somewhat manipulative and untruthful at times,” a telling observation.

There is no dispute that each of Rubes’ representations was material to MEGA’s determination regarding his eligibility for coverage. Factors bearing on materiality include whether a representation “influences a person to enter into a transaction, ... induces that person to act, or where the transaction would not have occurred without it.” Utica, 892 F.Supp. at 1194. MEGA’s underwriter, Doug Kor-negay, testified that had the company been made aware of Rubes ever having received treatment for alcoholism, the answer would have raised a “red flag” prompting MEGA to examine Rubes’ driving records and health history further. For a conviction for driving while intoxicated or treatment of alcoholism within the prior ten years, coverage would have been declined. Similarly, had the application listed “elevated liver enzymes” or “enlarged liver”— as reported.on Rubes’ hospital discharge— instead of “bacterial infection” as Rubes reported, further inquiry would have been triggered and coverage declined.

The fourth element — intent to induce the other to act — goes to the purpose for which the representations are made. Id. at 1205 n. 17. Clearly the application for insurance, including the answers it contained, was submitted by Rubes for the sole purpose of securing health insurance from MEGA. As already noted, proof of this element does not require proof of intent to deceive. See Hyler, 548 N.W.2d at 871-72. The questions asked by MEGA called for objectively factual answers, a matter bringing us to the fifth and final element, justifiable reliance. Unlike the factual scenarios underlying the older insurance cases upon which Rubes relies, MEGA’s application did not ask Rubes to speculate about the general state of his health. Cf. Dezsi v. Mut. Ben. Health & Accident Ass’n, 255 Iowa 1027, 1034-35, 125 N.W.2d 219, 223 (1963) (insured’s affirmative answer regarding good health and freedom from disease not a warranty but a representation that may, in good faith, be truthful); Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. McCullough, 234 Iowa 817, 828, 13 N.W.2d 440, 444-45 (1944) (same). Instead MEGA’s application sought straightforward answers to known past information. MEGA was justified in relying on the answers given by Rubes and plainly relied on them to its detriment in extending health insurance coverage to him.

In summary, we are convinced that application of the correct legal standard to the record before us justifies equitable rescission of the insurance contract based on Rubes’ material misrepresentation of his health and criminal history. We therefore turn to the remaining question: Is MEGA equitably estopped from avoiding the contract on a theory of rescission because of its delay or waiver?

B. Equitable Estoppel. The district court, reciting verbatim from Rubes’ proposed findings, ruled on his claim of estop-pel this way:

Defendant is estopped from denying coverage because it has retained premiums until after Plaintiff had already been placed on a transplant list and continued to take the premiums until after the Plaintiff had finally obtained a transplant. It also processed other claims of Plaintiff despite the knowledge of the allegedly false statements made by him ... and, most importantly, informed the organ transplant unit at the University of Nebraska Medical Center on continuing occasions and through the transplant procedure itself, that Plaintiffs procedure was covered under the policy.

MEGA argues on appeal that these conclusions have neither factual nor legal support in this record. We agree.

A party relying on equitable estoppel must prove four things: (1) the opposing party misrepresented or concealed material facts, (2) the party relying on estoppel lacked knowledge of the true facts, (3) the party misrepresenting or concealing the true facts intended the deceived party to act on those representations, and (4) detrimental reliance by the party to whom the representations were made. Folkers v. Britt, 457 N.W.2d 578, 582 (Iowa 1990). Absence of any one of the elements prevents the doctrine’s application. Id. The essence of the doctrine is that “one who has made certain representations should not thereafter be permitted to change his position to the prejudice of one who has relied thereon.” Ahrendsen ex rel. Ahrendsen v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 613 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Iowa 2000) (citation omitted).

Here the court’s estoppel ruling rested heavily on representations allegedly made by MEGA to the transplant unit. This is a legally unsound application of the doctrine, given the fact that it is Rubes who is asserting estoppel based on MEGA’s representations, not the transplant unit. See Wendt v. White Pigeon Mut. Ins. Ass’n, 418 N.W.2d 374, 376 (Iowa Ct.App.1987) (representation made by insurer to insured sufficient to equitably estop insurer from asserting statute of limitation defense). If it were the transplant unit seeking payment under the policy MEGA seeks to rescind, MEGA’s representations to it might be relevant. But that is not the case before us.

The fact is that MEGA never altered its course with regard to Rubes. It refused to pay the claim for Rubes’ November 1998 hospitalization and advised that his policy would be rescinded if the misrepresentations it suspected were founded. This was not a false representation on MEGA’s part. The company fully intended for Rubes to rely on this representation and respond accordingly. At no time was Rubes without the true facts. In short, Rubes’ claim of equitable estoppel based on misrepresentation rests on inadequate proof to defeat MEGA’s right to rescission.

That brings us to Rubes’ claim of estoppel by acquiescence, or waiver. The theory applies where a party, knowing of an enforceable right, neglects enforcement for such a length of time that the law implies its waiver or abandonment. Westfield Ins. Cos. v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 623 N.W.2d 871, 880 (Iowa 2001). Rubes essentially claimed, and the court agreed, that MEGA’s retention of his premiums “until after the Plaintiff had finally obtained a transplant” estopped it from rescinding its obligations under the contract.

We agree with MEGA that the record does not factually support the court’s finding that MEGA retained Rubes’ premiums until after his transplant was completed. MEGA, as uncertain as Rubes about when the needed organ might become available, issued a refund check to Rubes five days in advance of the transplant surgery. It is true, however, that the check did not reach Rubes before the surgery was performed.

The only case relied upon by the court to legally support its waiver theory, Venz v. State Automobile Insurance Association, 217 Iowa 662, 251 N.W. 27 (1933), is factually distinguishable from this case. In Venz, an insurer knowingly retained an additional premium for an underage driver and then, when the driver was involved in an accident, refused to honor coverage or return the insured’s premiums. Venz, 217 Iowa at 668, 251 N.W. at 29. This court held under such facts the company waived the underage condition of the driver and could not, having retained the premiums, repudiate its liability under the contract. Id. at 669, 251 N.W. at 30.

Here the parties were engaged in unresolved litigation over what the insurer knew about Rubes’ history based on his application. That litigation extended for nearly nine months in advance of surgery, and MEGA had refused payment of benefits for more than a year before that. It was in Rubes’ interest to keep making monthly premium payments so as not to give the company an independent ground to cancel the policy. Company officials testified that judgments about rescission are never made hastily, given their potential impact on the insured and company alike. And so although it appears in retrospect that MEGA could have made its decision more swiftly, we do not believe the equities of the situation warrant the extraordinary remedy of requiring coverage in the face of Rubes’ demonstrated fraud.

We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for entry of a judgment rescinding MEGA’s contract of insurance on Stephen Rubes.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.


author: STREIT, Justice.

text:
    Michael P. McMURRAY, Bobbye J. McMurray, Valley West DM, an Iowa Limited Partnership, and Merle Hay Mall, an Iowa Limited Partnership, Appellants, v. The CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF WEST DES MOINES, Iowa, and the City of West Des Moines, Iowa, Appellees.
    No. 01-0701.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Feb. 27, 2002.
    Rehearing Denied March 26, 2002.

      William J. Koehn, Sharon K. Malheiro and Deborah M. Tharnish of Davis, Brown, Koehn, Shors & Roberts, P.C., Des Moines, for appellants.
    Edward W. Remsburg, Ivan T. Webber and Nathan J. Overberg of Ahlers, Coo-ney, Dorweiler, Haynie, Smith & Allbee, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees.
   STREIT, Justice.

A group of taxpayers argue the City of West Des Moines incorrectly used its powers under the urban renewal statute to create an urban renewal plan including projects to facilitate various public infrastructure improvements. Opponents argue the designation of an urban renewal area in this case is for the sole purpose of allowing a private developer to construct a $150,000,000 shopping mall. They challenged the urban renewal development plan arguing it is inconsistent with the purposes of the Iowa urban renewal statute, inconsistent with the City’s comprehensive plan, and in violation of the Iowa Constitution. On a joint motion for summary judgment, the district court disagreed with Opponents’ arguments and found in favor of the City. Opponents appeal. We conclude this urban renewal plan is consistent with both Iowa Code chapter 403 and the comprehensive plan. We also conclude the urban renewal plan does not violate the Iowa Constitution. We affirm.

I. Background and Facts

A group of people joined to challenge the actions of the West Des Moines City Council in designating a particular region an urban renewal area. Michael and Bob-bye McMurray are residents and taxpayers of Dallas County, Iowa. Valley West Mall is an Iowa limited partnership that owns and operates Valley West Mall in West Des Moines, Iowa. It is a taxpayer in the City of West Des Moines. Merle Hay Mall is an Iowa limited partnership that owns and operates Merle Hay Mall in the cities of Des Moines and Urbandale, Iowa.

GGP Jordan Creek L.L.C. proposed to build a regional shopping mall and adjoining retail facilities (the “Project”) on approximately 200 acres of land one mile south of interstate 80 in the City of West Des Moines in Dallas County. The surrounding property is primarily agricultural land with some residential development. The property is over one mile from the interstate highway.

The West Des Moines City Council approved a Development Agreement (“Agreement”) between the City and GGP for the Project. The Agreement also provided the City would pay GGP $2,500,000 to offset a portion of the costs for construction of several recreational public use components on the private property of the mall. The City agreed to pay for all of the road, sewer, and water main infrastructure necessary for the development of the Project. The Agreement provided the City would finance these improvements through tax increment financing (TIF) by adopting an urban renewal plan pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 403 (1999) for the area of. proposed development. GGP agreed to build a shopping center valued at approximately $150,000,000.

The City Council approved the agreement by resolution. On May 30, 2000, the City Council held a public hearing. The Council ultimately adopted the Jordan Creek Urban Renewal Plan (the “Plan”) under Iowa Code chapter 403. The Plan designated a 1075 acre tract including the Project property as an urban renewal area for economic development and proposed to undertake public improvements within the area. In adopting the Plan, the City found,

The Plan is in conformance with the existing West Des Moines Comprehensive Plan and that a feasible method exists for the relocation of any families who would be displaced from the urban renewal area into decent, safe and sanitary dwelling accommodations within their means and without undue hardship to said families.
The City Council finds the project area to be suitable for designation as an economic development area, to encourage the location and expansion of certain commercial enterprises to more conveniently provide needed employment services and facilities to the residents of the City, to alleviate and prevent conditions of unemployment by assisting and retaining local industries and commercial enterprises and to strengthen and revitalize the economy of the State and the City.

The City did not reference the proposed shopping mall. The Plan did not include the development of the shopping mall as one of its proposed projects. Instead, the Plan merely provided for the development and improvement of public infrastructures. On June 12, 2000, the City Council approved a TIF district covering the Plan to provide financing for the municipal projects proposed by it.

Opponents filed a petition for writ of certiorari and declaratory judgment seeking to declare the City’s adoption of the urban renewal plan and related TIF district illegal. Opponents claim the City failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Iowa Code chapter 403 in adopting the Plan. Opponents also argue the Plan violates article III, section 31 of the Iowa Constitution.

Both Opponents and the City filed motions for summary judgment. On April 4, 2001, the district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded the following:

1) Chapter 403 did not require the City to make specific findings regarding the need to reduce unemployment or shortage of housing to establish an economic development area;
2) Chapter 403 did not require the City to establish the existence of unemployment or shortage of housing;
3) The City did not act in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner in - designating the urban renewal area despite the fact the City did not investigate what effect, if any, the proposed shopping center would have on existing businesses;
■ 4) The Plan was not inconsistent with the City’s comprehensive plan;
5) The City was not required to designate a percentage of the project revenue for low-income' family housing because the economic area was designated for commercial, rather than residential development; and
6) The urban renewal plan did not violate article III, section 31 of the Iowa Constitution.

The district court noted the City proposed to build an infrastructure that would benefit both the private developer and the area residents. The court further found the proposed development in the urban renewal area would stimulate commercial growth and prevent unemployment. Opponents appeal.

On appeal, Opponents argue the district court erred in granting summary judgment. Specifically, Opponents contend the court erred as a matter of law in determining the City complied with the procedural requirements of Iowa Code chapter 403. Further, Opponents argue the court erred in concluding the urban renewal plan does not violate the City’s comprehensive plan or the Iowa Constitution.

II. Standard of Review

We review a grant of a motion for summary judgment for correction of errors at law. Kolbe v. State, 625 N.W.2d 721, 725 (Iowa 2001) (citing Knudson v. City of Decorah, 622 N.W.2d 42, 48 (Iowa 2000)). Summary judgment shall be granted when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c). We must review the entire record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Kelly v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 620 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Iowa 2000). With respect to Opponents’ constitutional challenge, our review is de novo. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001). We will make an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances shown by the entire record. Id.

III. The Merits

On appeal, Opponents challenge the City’s actions based on three grounds. Opponents first argue the City did not comply with the procedural requirements of Iowa Code chapter 403. They also contend the urban renewal plan violates the City’s comprehensive plan. Finally, Opponents assert the City’s actions violate the Iowa Constitution. Before we address the issues before us, we briefly examine the nature of action taken by the City Council.

The nature of the City Council’s actions in this case is critical to determine whether the City Council acted in accordance with chapter 403. In general, the City Council acts in a legislative capacity. Chapter 403 grants city councils authority to carry out urban redevelopment, rehabilitation, and renewal projects. As such, the City Council’s action in designating this economic development area involved determination of legislative, not judicial, facts. Legislative facts are “generalized propositions of fact or policy guiding the exercise of legislative judgment.” Montgomery v. Bremer County Bd. of Supervisors, 299 N.W.2d 687, 693 (Iowa 1980) (quoting Arthur E. Bonfleld, The Definition of Formal Agency Adjudication Under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, 63 Iowa L.Rev. 285, 288 (1977)). Moreover, legislative facts are not concerned with particular problems of individuals, but involve a determination of what is in the best interests of the public generally. Trager v. Peabody Redevelopment Auth., 367 F.Supp. 1000, 1002 (D.C.Mass.1973).

It is appropriate for a city council, when determining whether an area may be designated as an economic development area, to be concerned with the area itself, as well as with considerations of public policy. Such decisions by the city ' council involving legislative facts necessarily involve the exercise of considerable discretion. Legislative declarations, such as the one before us, are entitled to great weight. See, e.g., Miller v. City of Tacoma, 61 Wash.2d 374, 384, 378 P.2d 464, 470 (1963) (“the legislative declaration that blighted areas constitute a serious and growing menace injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare is entitled to great weight”). Consequently, we have no power to interfere with the City Council’s legislatively given discretion to carry out the purposes of the urban renewal law. See, e.g., Dilley v. City of Des Moines, 247 N.W.2d 187, 192 (Iowa 1976) (the court may invalidate the findings of a legislative body only if they are arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable). Rather, we presume the City Council, as a governing body of elected officials, acted in the overall best interests of the public.

Also important to our analysis is the language of the statute and the powers the legislature has conferred on municipalities. In general, under the powers provided in this chapter, a municipality may designate and develop an economic development area in an urban renewal area. Iowa Code § 403.17(25). Municipalities are vested with “all the powers necessary or convenient to carry out and effectuate the purposes and provisions of this chapter....” Id. § 403.6 (emphasis added). To aid in the planning, undertaking or carrying out of an urban renewal project, municipalities may:

1) incur the entire expense of any public improvements made by such public body in exercising the powers granted in this section;
2) cause' public buildings and public facilities, including parks, playgrounds, and recreational, community, educational, water, sewer or drainage facilities, or any other works which it is otherwise empowered to undertake to be furnished; and
.3) furnish, dedicate, close, vacate, pave, install, grade, regrade, plan or replan streets, roads, sidewalks, ways or other places.

Id. § 403.12(l)(b), (f), (g). City councils are clearly vested with broad authority to carry out the goals of the urban renewal law. Bearing in mind the wide discretion and authority the legislature has given to municipalities in this respect, we now turn to the issues before us.

A. Iowa Code Chapter 403

Iowa Code chapter 403 contains the state urban renewal law. Id. § 403.1 (1999). Although one purpose of the urban renewal law is the prevention and elimination of slums and blighted areas within the state, it is also designed to provide general economic development for a community. Bowers v. Polk County Bd. of Supervisors, 638 N.W.2d 682, 697 (Iowa 2002) (citing Iowa Code § 403.2(3)). In order to advance these purposes, a municipality may assist and retain industries and commercial enterprises to strengthen and revitalize the economy and prevent unemployment. Id. The legislature authorized local governing bodies to designate areas of a municipality as “economic development areas for commercial and industrial enterprises, public improvements related to housing and residential development, or construction of housing for low and moderate-income families.” Id. Chapter 403 outlines the process which a municipality must follow in adopting an urban renewal plan. According to the procedural requirements within this chapter, the municipality must adopt a “resolution of necessity” finding:

1) one or more slum, blighted, or economic development areas exist in the municipality; and
2) the rehabilitation, conservation, redevelopment, development, or a combination thereof, of the area is necessary in the interest of the public health, safety, or welfare of the residents of the municipality.

Iowa Code § 403.4. The urban renewal law further provides the governing body must determine the area to be an economic development area and designate it as appropriate for an urban renewal project. Id. § 403.5(1). Then, the governing body must hold a public hearing on the plan after appropriate notice. Id. § 403.5(3). Finally, after consulting with other taxing entities, the governing body must submit the plan to the municipality’s planning commission for review and recommendations. Id. § 403.5(2).

1. ⅜ Designation of the Economic Development Area

Opponents argue the City failed to make specific, detailed, and comprehensive findings that the area could be properly designated an “economic development area” under the urban renewal law. Iowa Code section 403.17 defines “economic development area” in part as

an area of a municipality designated by the local governing body as appropriate for commercial and industrial enterprises, public improvements related to housing and residential development, or construction of housing and residential development for low and moderate income families, including single or multifamily housing....

Id. § 408.17. In the City Council’s May 80, 2000 resolution, the Council determined the Jordan Creek urban renewal plan area as defined in the Plan is an economic development area within the meaning of Iowa Code chapter 403. The Council declared the area eligible for designation as an urban renewal area and otherwise meets all of. the requirements under chapter 403. Finally, the Council found the development of the area is necessary in the interest of public health, safety, and welfare of the residents of the City of West Des Moines.

In arguing the City Council improperly designated the area an economic development area, Opponents concede an urban renewal plan may be established based exclusively on the existence of an economic development area without any finding of slum or blighted areas. However, Opponents argue because the Plan contains only an economic development area, the City was required, as a prerequisite to designating the urban renewal area, to find the existence of unemployment or a shortage of housing. This argument is without merit.

Iowa Code section 403.2 contains the declaration of policy for Iowa’s urban renewal statute. Nothing in this section suggests the City must find all of the conditions discussed in the declaration of policy as a prerequisite to designating a region an urban renewal area. The declaration of policy states that vesting municipalities with urban renewal powers is warranted in part to alleviate and prevent unemployment and a shortage of housing. The phrase “prevent unemployment and a shortage of housing” suggests the City was not required to find unemployment or a housing shortage presently exist before it declared the area an urban renewal area. Furthermore, this section provides the City may prevent unemployment and shortage of housing by encouraging “the location and expansion of commercial enterprises to more conveniently provide needed services and facilities of the commercial enterprises to municipalities and the residents of the municipalities-.” Id. § 403.2(3). To accomplish these goals, the legislature gave municipalities the power to engage in urban renewal activities.

The statutory provisions simply provide “a municipality shall not approve an urban renewal project for an urban renewal area unless the governing body has, by resolution, determined the area to be a[n] ... economic development area ... and designated the area as appropriate for an urban renewal project.” Id. § 403.5(1). There are no other provisions in the code regulating the establishment of an economic development area. The statute does not impose a burden upon the City Council to make specific findings, and we decline to read such a requirement into the statute. Rather, the statute merely requires a declaration by the City Council in the resolution of necessity the area is suitable for economic development to support and stimulate commercial and industrial growth.

The City Council complied with all of the statutory requirements of chapter 403. The City Council designated the economic development area and found its development necessary in the interest of public health, safety, and welfare of the residents of the City.- The City complied with the various procedural requirements including holding a public hearing, consulting’ with taxing entities, and submitting the Plan to the City’s planning commission. The statute required nothing more of the City in designating this urban renewal area. The undisputed record shows much evidence to support the conclusion the City Council has long considered the area at issue as a prime economic development area. Additionally, the record supports the determination the City Council considered whether the urban renewal project would promote the public health, safety, and welfare. Among the factors discussed by the City Council were tourism, quality of life, tax base, employment, culture and entertainment, property values, general economic growth, and encouraging people to move to and stay in Iowa.

It is not within our province to decide whether the City made a good or bad decision in designating this economic development area. Rather, the City’s decision was a matter of public policy and we will not second guess their legislatively-given discretion. We conclude the district court correctly found the City validly exercised its authority pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 403 in designating the region an “economic development area” to support the creation of the urban renewal plan.

2. Low and Moderate-income Family Housing

Opponents also argue the Plan violates the requirement that the City must provide or aid in the provision of public improvements related to housing and residential development. Id. § 403.22. Opponents contend this statutory provision requires the City to dedicate a percentage of the project revenue for low and moderate-income family housing. Iowa Code section 403.22(1) provides, in part:

With respect to any urban renewal area established upon the determination that the area is an economic development area, a division of revenue as provided in section 403.19 shall not be allowed for the purpose of providing or aiding in the provision of public improvements related to housing and residential development, unless the municipality assures that the project will include assistance for low and moderate income family housing.

Id. § 403.22(1) (emphasis added). This section clearly shows the City must provide assistance for low and moderate-income family housing only when an area is designated an economic development area “for the purpose of providing or aiding in the provision of public improvements related to housing and residential development.” Id.

Opponents argue the public improvements are related to housing and residential development because they will affect both the existing and future residential areas. We have determined the phrase “related to” means “a reasonable nexus or logical connection with the development.” Knudson, 622 N.W.2d at 51. Most public improvements primarily intended to facilitate industrial or commercial development will also incidentally affect the area residential and housing development. Application of Opponents’ argument would lead to the result that all public improvement projects must include aid for low and moderate-income family housing because all such projects would appear, no matter how remote, to be “related to” housing and residential development. Whether the Plan is “related to” housing and residential development depends on the purpose for which the City designated the urban renewal area. Given the facts below, we find the link is insufficient to conclude the Plan is related to housing and residential development.

The City designated the Jordan Creek Urban Renewal Area as an economic development area for the purpose of developing commercial or industrial enterprises. The City did not designate the area as an economic development area to aid in the provision of public improvements related to housing and residential development. See, e.g., Knudson, 622 N.W.2d at 46 (the city stated the area at issue was appropriate for public improvements related to housing and residential development and therefore was required to assure improvements would be included in calculating assistance for low and moderate-income families). A municipality is only required to provide assistance for low and moderate-income families when the economic area has been designated appropriate for public improvements related to housing and residential development. Because the City did not do this, it is not required to provide assistance for low and moderate-income family housing.

3. Purposes of the Urban Renewal Law

Opponents also contend the Plan does not further the purposes of the urban renewal law. Prior to 1985, the urban renewal law was aimed at the elimination of slum and blighted areas. In 1985, the legislature amended chapter 403 to provide a municipality with authority to adopt an urban renewal plan based solely on the existence of an economic development area. 1985 Iowa Acts ch. 66, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 403.2(3) (1987)). The purpose of extending the urban renewal powers of chapter 403 in this way was to stem economic decline and promote economic growth. Brady v. City of Dubuque, 495 N.W.2d 701, 707 (Iowa 1993). In amending chapter 403, the legislature explained,

This bill provides that the city council can designate an area of the city as an economic development area and provide for its development for commercial or industrial enterprises in the same manner that blighted or slum areas of a city can be redeveloped under an urban renewal plan. An economic development area may include open land, blighted areas, slum areas, or any combination of those areas of land. The bill also authorizes a city to expedite the approval of an urban renewal plan and a subsequent project involving an economic development area.

Leg. Servs. Bureau H.F. 494 (1985). The legislature further explained such an extension of coverage for urban renewal plans was warranted because “there exists in this state the continuing need for programs to alleviate and prevent conditions of unemployment and a shortage of housing.” 1985 Iowa Acts ch. 66, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 403.2(3) (1987)). To address these conditions, a municipality has express powers to finance and pay for urban renewal projects to encourage and assist industrial and commercial enterprises in locating in the State and its municipalities. Iowa Code § 403.2(3). Among the type of activities an urban renewal project may include are the very activities provided for in the Plan — construction and improvement of infrastructure. See id. §§ 403.6, 403.12(l)(b), (f), (g).

In furthering the purposes of the urban renewal law, Opponents contend chapter 403 does not authorize public improvements related to retail development. This contention is not supported by the language of the statute. Iowa Code section 403.6 expressly vests municipalities with all of the necessary powers to carry out the purposes of the urban renewal law. Id. § 403.6. A .municipality has authority to: undertake and carry out urban renewal projects within the urban renewal area; arrange and contract for the construction, reconstruction, furnishing, or repair of infrastructure; close, vacate, plan, or replan streets and roads; and plan or replan any part of the city. Id. A municipality may also plan and reconstruct buildings, parks, and water, sewer or drainage facilities. Id. § 403.12.

The City is promoting one of the main goals of the urban renewal law by the Plan. The intended effect of the Plan is to encourage and assist various industrial and commercial enterprises in locating in the State of Iowa. Under the legislature’s grant of power to municipalities and in accord with the purposes of the urban renewal law, the City is authorized to carry out all of the activities included in the Plan.

B. Comprehensive Plan

Opponents also argue the Plan violates the provision in chapter 403 requiring urban renewal plans to conform to the “general plan” of the city as a whole. Though “general plan” is not defined, the parties have assumed “general plan” refers to the City’s comprehensive plan. We have held urban renewal projects must be consistent with the comprehensive plan. Knudson, 622 N.W.2d at 55. Opponents argue both the Plan and urban renewal project, as outlined in the Agreement, must conform to the comprehensive plan. In so arguing, Opponents contend the potential activities of private developers in the renewal area must conform to the comprehensive plan. The district court disagreed and concluded “urban renewal project,” as the term is defined in Iowa Code section 403.17(25), includes only the activities and undertakings of the City in the urban renewal area.

Here, the urban renewal project consists of the undertakings listed in the Jordan Creek Urban Renewal Plan. The Plan’s proposed activities include the construction of public improvements within the urban renewal area, including a fire and EMS station, a police substation, public streets, water mains, sanitary sewers, storm water facilities, and bike and pedestrian trails, features, and parks. None of these activities violates the comprehensive plan. Because the shopping mall project is not an undertaking of the City, we do not consider whether GGP’s proposed shopping center cdnforms to the comprehensive plan.

Opponents quite correctly point out the Plan does not state what type of private commercial development, if any, will arise out of the City’s infrastructure improvements. However, the Plan also does not condition the infrastructure improvements on the completion of the GGP shopping mall or any other private commercial development. There is undisputed evidence in the record the infrastructure improvements provided for in the Plan have been a part of the City’s capital improvement plan for years, even as far back as 1991. As the record shows, the GGP proposal merely served to accelerate what the City had already anticipated and planned for in terms of infrastructure development. Moreover, on appeal we, like the district court before us, are not reviewing the Agreement, including the proposed shopping mall, between the City and GGP. In fact, the proposed site plan for the development of the shopping mall has not yet been presented to the City Council for approval. At that time, the shopping mall will be compared to the comprehensive plan. Because the urban renewal project at issue does not include the proposed shopping mall, we do not address whether the Project conforms to the comprehensive plan.

C. Iowa Constitution

Finally, Opponents argue the Plan and the urban renewal project violate the prohibition against the use of public funds to pay for private enterprise. Iowa Const, art. Ill, § 31. Article III, section 31 of the Iowa Constitution provides “no public money or property shall be appropriated for local or private purposes unless authorized by the State General Assembly.” Id. We must determine whether public funds are being used to support private purposes. Opponents have the burden to show “there is an absence of all public interest in the purposes for which the appropriation” is made. Richards, 237 N.W.2d at 61.

Upon examination of the Plan, we find public money is being used to build or improve public infrastructures. The projects included in the Plan include constructing a municipal fire and EMS station, a municipal substation, various street improvements, water mains, sanitary sewers, storm water facilities, and public recreational facilities. None of the .above projects could be characterized as private purposes. Rather, the Plan’s objectives require an appropriation of public money to improve public infrastructures. This does not violate article III, section 31 of the Iowa Constitution.

The public infrastructure projects contemplated in the Plan will benefit not only the proposed GGP mall project, but more generally will benefit the City’s citizens. Ultimately, the Plan will “more conveniently provide needed services and facilities of the commercial enterprises to municipalities and the residents of the municipalities.” Iowa Code § 403.2(3). The Plan advances a public purpose and will not be invalidated because it benefits not only the public, but also potentially benefits a private developer. See Knudson, 622 N.W.2d at 53 (citing John R. Grubb, Inc. v. Iowa Hous. Fin. Auth., 255 N.W.2d 89, 95 (Iowa 1977)); Richards, 237 N.W.2d at 60. In great part, the Plan is aimed at preventing economic decline and promoting economic growth. These purposes have been identified by the legislature as valid public purposes. Iowa Code § 403.2(3). We conclude the Plan does not violate article III, section 31 of the Iowa Constitution as it does not appropriate money for private purposes and it promotes valid public purposes.

IV. Conclusion

On appeal, Opponents have repeatedly structured their arguments around the Agreement between the City and GGP. We emphasize we are not reviewing the legality of this Agreement, including the proposed shopping mall. We reviewed only the Plan and included public infrastructure improvement projects. The Plan violates neither the comprehensive plan nor the Iowa Constitution. The Plan is in conformity with Iowa Code chapter 403. Finding there were no genuine issues as to any material fact, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City.

AFFIRMED.

      . Plaintiffs Michael and Bobbye McMurray, Valley West Mall, and Merle Hay Mall shall be referred to as “Opponents.”

      .It is not clear why Merle Hay Mall is an appropriate party to this lawsuit. Merle Hay Mall, unlike Valley West Mall and the McMur-rays, is not a taxpayer of the City of West Des Moines or Dallas County. Opponents appear to contend Merle Hay Mall has standing by virtue of its distance from the proposed shopping mall. It is located approximately seven miles from the urban renewal area. Opponents refer to the City’s comprehensive plan which describes the service area for a regional commercial area is generally at least eight miles from another regional commercial area. However, the site plan of the mall is not an issue in this appeal. Therefore, Merle Hay Mall’s mere location with respect to the proposed mall does not appear sufficient to confer on it standing to challenge the actions of the City Council in this case. Though the City argued Merle Hall Mall does not have standing in its memorandum of law in support of its motion for summary judgment, neither party has argued the issue on appeal.

      . Opponents do not contest this expenditure on appeal.

      . ‘ Iowa Code section 403.19(2) permits municipalities to use TIF bonds to finance an urban renewal project within the urban renewal area. Iowa Code § 403.19(2); see also Iowa Code §§ 403.9, 403.19(1); Richards v. City of Muscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48, 58 (Iowa 1975) (discussing TIF under Iowa Code section 403.19).