author: Justice Stevens

text:
    ARKANSAS et al. v. OKLAHOMA et al.
    No. 90-1262.
    Argued December 11, 1991
    Decided February 26, 1992

      Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Edward W. Warren argued the cause for petitioners in No. 90-1262. With him on the briefs were Winston Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas, Mary B. Stallcup, Angela S. Jegley, David G. Norrell, James N. McCord, Walter R. Niblock, and Nancy L. Hamm. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for petitioner in No. 90-1266. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Stewart, Harriet S. Shapiro, Michael A. McCord, Anne S.. Almy, Gary S. Guzy, and E. Donald Elliott.

      Robert A. Butkin, Assistant Attorney General of Oklahoma, argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief for respondents State of Oklahoma et al. were Susan B. Loving, Attorney General, Brita Haugland Cantrell, Assistant Attorney General, and Julian Fite. Theodore E. Dinsmoor and Susan Hedman filed a brief for respondent Oklahoma Wildlife Federation.

      Together with No. 90-1266, Environmental Protection Agency v. Oklahoma et al., also on certiorari to the same court.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Colorado by Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Raymond T. Slaughter, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General, Martha E. Rudolph, Assistant Attorney General, and Martha Phillips Allbright; for the State of Nevada et al. by Nicholas J. Spaeth, Attorney General of North Dakota, Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, John P. Arnold, Attorney General of New Hampshire, and Mark

        Barnett, Attorney General of South Dakota; for the Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies et al. by Lee C. White, Benjamin L. Brown, Howard Holme, Don A Zimmerman, Geoff Wilson, Thomas W. Kelty, James M. Kaup, Fred G. Stickel III, Robert E. Johnson, John E. Gother-man, Mark I. Wallach, Roy D. Bates, Ogden Stokes, Thomas S. Smith, Robert J. Alfton, and John Dodge; for Champion International Corp. et al. by J. Jeffrey McNealey, Michael K. Glenn, Theodore L. Garrett, Corinne A Goldstein, Charles R. Nestrud, Richard A Flye, Jerry C. Jones, and Jess Askew III; for the Colorado Water Congress by Mark T. Pifher; and for the Mountain States Legal Foundation et al. by William Perry Pendley.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Illinois et al. by Roland W. Burris, Attorney General of Illinois, Rosalyn Kaplan, Solicitor General, and James L. Morgan, Assistant Attorney General, Charles W. Burson, Attorney General of Tennessee, John Knox Walkup, Solicitor General, and Michael D. Pearigen, Deputy Attorney General, Jimmy Evans, Attorney General of Alabama, Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, Robert A Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, Michael E. Carpenter, Attorney General of Maine, and Jon H. Edwards, Assistant Attorney General, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Mike Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi, Robert J. Del Tufo, Attorney General of New Jersey, and T. Travis Med-lock, Attorney General of South Carolina; for the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma by Jim Wilcoxen; for the Natural Resources Defense Council et al. by Jessica C. Landman and Mark Van Putten; for the Scenic Rivers Association of Oklahoma et al. by Kathy Carter-White, Joel Glenn Richardson, Harvey Chaffin, and Bill J. Ballard; for the Sierra Club by Stephan C. Volker; for the U. S. Senator from Oklahoma, Don Nickles, et al. by James George Jatras; and for Mike Synar, Member of Congress, pro se.

   Justice Stevens

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Pursuant to the Clean Water Act, 86 Stat. 816, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or Agency) issued a discharge permit to a new point source in Arkansas, about 39 miles upstream from the Oklahoma state line. The question presented in this litigation is whether the EPA’s finding that discharges from the new source would not cause a detectable violation of Oklahoma’s water quality standards satisfied the EPA’s duty to protect the interests of the downstream State. Disagreeing with the Court of Appeals, we hold that the Agency’s action was authorized by the statute.

I

In 1985, the city of Fayetteville, Arkansas, applied to the EPA, seeking a permit for the city’s new sewage treatment plant under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). After the appropriate procedures, the EPA, pursuant to § 402(a)(1) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1342(a)(1), issued a permit authorizing the plant to discharge up to half of its effluent (to a limit of 6.1 million gallons per day) into an unnamed stream in northwestern Arkansas. That flow passes through a series of three creeks for about 17 miles, and then enters the Illinois River at a point 22 miles upstream from the Arkansas-Oklahoma border.

The permit imposed specific limitations on the quantity, content, and character of the discharge and also included a number of special conditions, including a provision that if a study then underway indicated that more stringent limitations were necessary to ensure compliance with Oklahoma’s water quality standards, the permit would be modified to incorporate those limits. App. 84.

Respondents challenged this permit before the EPA, alleging, inter alia, that the discharge violated the Oklahoma water quality standards. Those standards provide that “no degradation [of water quality] shall be allowed” in the upper Illinois River, including the portion of the river immediately downstream from the state line.

Following a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the Oklahoma standards would not be implicated unless the contested discharge had “something more than a mere de minimis impact” on the State’s waters. He found that the discharge would not have an “undue impact” on Oklahoma’s waters and, accordingly, affirmed the issuance of the permit. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 90-1262, pp. 101a-103a (emphasis deleted).

On a petition for review, the EPA’s Chief Judicial Officer first ruled that § 301(b)(1)(C) of the Clean Water Act “requires an NPDES permit to impose any effluent limitations necessary to comply with applicable state water quality standards.” Id., at 116a-117a. He then held that the Act and EPA regulations offered greater protection for the downstream State than the ALJ’s “undue impact” standard suggested. He explained the proper standard as follows:

“[A] mere theoretical impairment of Oklahoma’s water quality standards — i. e., an infinitesimal impairment predicted through modeling but not expected to be actually detectable or measurable — should not by itself block the issuance of the permit. In this case, the permit should be upheld if the record shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the authorized discharges would not cause an actual detectable violation of Oklahoma’s water quality standards.” Id., at 117a (emphasis in original).

On remand, the ALJ made detailed findings of fact and concluded that the city had satisfied the standard set forth by the Chief Judicial Officer. Specifically, the ALJ found that there would be no detectable violation of any of the components of Oklahoma’s water quality standards. Id., at 127a-143a. The Chief Judicial Officer sustained the issuance of the permit. Id., at 145a-153a.

Both the petitioners in No. 90-1262 (collectively Arkansas) and the respondents in this litigation sought judicial review. Arkansas argued that the Clean Water Act did not require an Arkansas point source to comply with Oklahoma’s water quality standards. Oklahoma challenged the EPA’s determination that the Fayetteville discharge would not produce a detectable violation of the Oklahoma standards.

The Court of Appeals did not accept either of these arguments. The court agreed with the EPA that the statute required compliance with Oklahoma’s water quality standards, see 908 F. 2d 595, 602-615 (CA10 1990), and did not disagree with the Agency’s determination that the discharges from the Fayetteville plant would not produce a detectable violation of those standards. Id., at 631-633. Nevertheless, relying on a theory that neither party had advanced, the Court of Appeals reversed the Agency’s issuance of the Fayette-ville permit. The court first ruled that the statute requires that “where a proposed source would discharge effluents that would contribute to conditions currently constituting a violation of applicable water quality standards, such [a] proposed source may not be permitted.” Id., at 620. Then the court found that the Illinois River in Oklahoma was “already degraded,” that the Fayetteville effluent would reach the Illinois River in Oklahoma, and that that effluent could “be expected to contribute to the ongoing deterioration of the scenic [Illinois R]iver” in Oklahoma even though it would not detectably affect the river’s water quality. Id., at 621-629.

The importance and the novelty of the Court of Appeals’ decision persuaded us to grant certiorari. 499 U. S. 946 (1991). We now reverse.

II

Interstate waters have been a font of controversy since the founding of the Nation. E. g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824). This Court has frequently resolved disputes between States that are separated by a common river, see, e. g., Ohio v. Kentucky, 444 U. S. 335 (1980), that border the same body of water, see, e. g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296 (1921), or that are fed by the same river basin, see, e. g., New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336 (1931).

Among these cases are controversies between a State that introduces pollutants to a waterway and a downstream State that objects. See, e. g., Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496 (1906). In such cases, this Court has applied principles of common law tempered by a respect for the sovereignty of the States. Compare id., at 521, with Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, 237 (1907). In forging what “may not improperly be called interstate common law,” Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91, 105-106 (1972) (Milwaukee I), however, we remained aware “that new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance.” Id., at 107.

In Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304 (1981) (Milwaukee II), we held that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 did just that. In addressing Illinois’ claim that Milwaukee’s discharges into Lake Michigan constituted a nuisance, we held that the comprehensive regulatory regime created by the 1972 amendments pre-empted Illinois’ federal common law remedy. We observed that Congress had addressed many of the problems we had identified in Milwaukee I by providing a downstream State with an opportunity for a hearing before the source State’s permitting agency, by requiring the latter to explain its failure to accept any recommendations offered by the downstream State, and by authorizing the EPA, in its discretion, to veto a source State’s issuance of any permit if the waters of another State may be affected. Milwaukee II, 451 U. S., at 325-326.

In Milwaukee II, the Court did not address whether the 1972 amendments had supplanted state common law remedies as well as the federal common law remedy. See id., at 310, n. 4. On remand, Illinois argued that § 510 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1370, expressly preserved the State’s right to adopt and enforce rules that are more stringent than federal standards. The Court of Appeals accepted Illinois’ reading of § 510, but held that that section did “no more than to save the right and jurisdiction of a state to regulate activity occurring within the confines of its boundary waters.” Illinois v. Milwaukee, 731 F. 2d 403, 413 (CA7 1984), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1196 (1985).

This Court subsequently endorsed that analysis in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U. S. 481 (1987), in which Vermont property owners claimed that the pollution discharged into Lake Champlain by a paper company located in New York constituted a nuisance under Vermont law. The Court held the Clean Water Act taken “as a whole, its purposes and its history” pre-empted an action based on the law of the affected State and that the only state law applicable to an interstate discharge is “the law of the State in which the point source is located.” Id., at 493, 487. Moreover, in reviewing § 402(b) of the Act, the Court pointed out that when a new permit is being issued by the source State’s permit-granting agency, the downstream State

“does not have the authority to block the issuance of the permit if it is dissatisfied with the proposed standards. An affected State’s only recourse is to apply to the EPA Administrator, who then has the discretion to disapprove the permit if he concludes that the discharges will have an undue impact on interstate waters. § 1342(d)(2).... Thus the Act makes it clear that affected States occupy a subordinate position to source States in the federal regulatory program.” Id., at 490-491.

Unlike the foregoing cases, this litigation involves not a state-issued permit, but a federally issued permit. To explain the significance of this distinction, we comment further on the statutory scheme before addressing the specific issues raised by the parties.

Ill

The Clean Water Act anticipates a partnership between the States and the Federal Government, animated by a shared objective: “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U. S. C. § 1251(a). Toward this end, the Act provides for two sets of water quality measures. “Effluent limitations” are promulgated by the EPA and restrict the quantities, rates, and concentrations of specified substances which are discharged from point sources. See §§1311, 1314. “[W]ater quality standards” are, in general, promulgated by the States and establish the desired condition of a waterway. See §1313. These standards supplement effluent limitations “so that numerous point sources, despite individual compliance with effluent limitations, may be further regulated to prevent water quality from falling below acceptable levels.” EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U. S. 200, 205, n. 12 (1976).

The EPA provides States with substantial guidance in the drafting of water quality standards. See generally 40 CFR pt. 131 (1991) (setting forth model water quality standards). Moreover, §303 of the Act requires, inter alia, that state authorities periodically review water quality standards and secure the EPA’s approval of any revisions in the standards. If the EPA recommends changes to the standards and the State fails to comply with that recommendation, the Act authorizes the EPA to promulgate water quality standards for the State. 33 U. S. C. § 1313(c).

The primary means for enforcing these limitations and standards is the NPDES, enacted in 1972 as a critical part of Congress’ “complete rewriting” of federal water pollution law. Milwaukee II, 451 U. S., at 317. Section 301(a) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1311(a), generally prohibits the discharge of any effluent into a navigable body of water unless the point source has obtained an NPDES permit. Section 402 establishes the NPDES permitting regime, and describes two types of permitting systems: state permit programs that must satisfy federal requirements and be approved by the EPA, and a federal program administered by the EPA.

Section 402(b) authorizes each State to establish “its own permit program for discharges into navigable waters within its jurisdiction.” 33 U. S. C. § 1342(b). Among the requirements the state program must satisfy are the procedural protections for downstream States discussed in Ouellette and Milwaukee II. See §§ 1342(b)(3), (5). Although these provisions do not authorize the downstream State to veto the issuance of a permit for a new point source in another State, the Administrator retains authority to block the issuance of any state-issued permit that is “outside the guidelines and requirements” of the Act. § 1342(d)(2).

In the absence of an approved state program, the EPA may issue an NPDES permit under § 402(a) of the Act. (In these cases, for example, because Arkansas had not been authorized to issue NPDES permits when the Fayetteville plant was completed, the permit was issued by the EPA itself.) The EPA’s permit program is subject to the “same terms, conditions, and requirements” as a state permit program. 33 U. S. C. § 1342(a)(3). Notwithstanding this general symmetry, the EPA has construed the Act as requiring that EPA-issued NPDES permits also comply with § 401(a). That section, which predates § 402 and the NPDES, applies to a broad category of federal licenses, and sets forth requirements for “[a]ny applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity including, but not limited to, the construction or operation of facilities, which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters.” 33 U. S. C. § 1341(a). Section 401(a)(2) appears to prohibit the issuance of any federal license or permit over the objection of an affected State unless compliance with the affected State’s water quality requirements can be ensured.

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The parties have argued three analytically distinct questions concerning the interpretation of the Clean Water Act. First, does the Act require the EPA, in crafting and issuing a permit to a point source in one State, to apply the water quality standards of downstream States? Second, even if the Act does not require as much, does the Agency have the statutory authority to mandate such compliance? Third, does the Act provide, as the Court of Appeals held, that once a body of water fails to meet water quality standards no discharge that yields effluent that reach the degraded waters will be permitted?

In these cases, it is neither necessary nor prudent for us to resolve the first of these questions. In issuing the Fay-etteville permit, the EPA assumed it was obligated by both the Act and its own regulations to ensure that the Fayette-ville discharge would not violate Oklahoma’s standards. See App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 90-1262, pp. 116a-117a, and n. 14. As we discuss below, this assumption was permissible and reasonable and therefore there is no need for us to address whether the Act requires as much. Moreover, much of the analysis and argument in the briefs of the parties relies on statutory provisions that govern not only federal permits issued pursuant to §§ 401(a) and 402(a), but also state permits issued under § 402(b). It seems unwise to evaluate those arguments in a case such as these, which only involve a federal permit.

Our decision not to determine at this time the scope of the Agency’s statutory obligations does not affect our resolution of the second question, which concerns the Agency’s statutory authority. Even if the Clean Water Act itself does not require the Fayetteville discharge to comply with Oklahoma’s water quality standards, the statute clearly does not limit the EPA’s authority to mandate such compliance.

Since 1973, EPA regulations have provided that an NPDES permit shall not be issued “[w]hen the imposition of conditions cannot ensure compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected States.” 40 CFR § 122.4(d) (1991); see also 38 Fed. Reg. 13533 (1973); 40 CFR § 122.44(d) (1991). Those regulations — relied upon by the EPA in the issuance of the Fayetteville permit— constitute a reasonable exercise of the Agency’s statutory authority.

Congress has vested in the Administrator broad discretion to establish conditions for NPDES permits. Section 402(a) (2) provides that for EPA-issued permits “[t]he Administrator shall prescribe conditions ... to assure compliance with the requirements of [§ 402(a)(1)] and such other requirements as he deems appropriate.” 33 U. S. C. § 1342(a)(2) (emphasis added). Similarly, Congress preserved for the Administrator broad authority to oversee state permit programs:

“No permit shall issue ... if the Administrator . . . objects in writing to the issuance of such permit as being outside the guidelines and requirements of this chapter.” § 1342(d)(2).

The regulations relied on by the EPA were a perfectly reasonable exercise of the Agency’s statutory discretion. The application of state water quality standards in the interstate context is wholly consistent with the Act’s broad purpose “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U. S. C. § 1251(a). Moreover, as noted above, § 301(b)(1)(C) expressly identifies the achievement of state water quality standards as one of the Act’s central objectives. The Agency’s regulations conditioning NPDES permits are a well-tailored means of achieving this goal.

Notwithstanding this apparent reasonableness, Arkansas argues that our description in Ouellette of the role of affected States in the permit process and our characterization of the affected States’ position as “subordinate,” see 479 U. S., at 490-491, indicates that the EPA’s application of the Oklahoma standards was error. We disagree. Our statement in Ouellette concerned only an affected State’s input into the permit process; that input is clearly limited by the plain language of § 402(b). Limits on an affected State’s direct participation in permitting decisions, however, do not in any way constrain the EPA’s authority to require a point source to comply with downstream water quality standards.

Arkansas also argues that regulations requiring compliance with downstream standards are at odds with the legislative history of the Act and with the statutory scheme established by the Act. Although we agree with Arkansas that the Act’s legislative history indicates that Congress intended to grant the Administrator discretion in his oversight of the issuance of NPDES permits, we find nothing in that history to indicate that Congress intended to preclude the EPA from establishing a general requirement that such permits be conditioned to ensure compliance with downstream water quality standards.

Similarly, we agree with Arkansas that in the Clean Water Act Congress struck a careful balance among competing policies and interests, but do not find the EPA regulations concerning the application of downstream water quality standards at all incompatible with that balance. Congress, in crafting the Act, protected certain sovereign interests of the States; for example, §510 allows States to adopt more demanding pollution-control standards than those established under the Act. Arkansas emphasizes that §510 preserves such state authority only as it is applied to the waters of the regulating State. Even assuming Arkansas’ construction of § 510 is correct, cf. id., at 493, that section only concerns state authority and does not constrain the EPA’s authority to promulgate reasonable regulations requiring point sources in one State to comply with water quality standards in downstream States.

For these reasons, we find the EPA’s requirement that the Fayetteville discharge comply with Oklahoma’s water quality standards to be a reasonable exercise of the Agency’s substantial statutory discretion. Cf. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-845 (1984).

V

The Court of Appeals construed the Clean Water Act to prohibit any discharge of effluent that would reach waters already in violation of existing water quality standards. We find nothing in the Act to support this reading.

The interpretation of the statute adopted by the court had not been advanced by any party during the Agency or court proceedings. Moreover, the Court of Appeals candidly acknowledged that its theory “has apparently never before been addressed by a federal court.” 908 F. 2d, at 620, n. 39. The only statutory provision the court cited to support its legal analysis was § 402(h), see id., at 633, which merely authorizes the EPA (or a state permit program) to prohibit a publicly owned treatment plant that is violating a condition of its NPDES permit from accepting any additional pollutants for treatment until the ongoing violation has been corrected. See 33 U. S. C. § 1342(h).

Although the Act contains several provisions directing compliance with state water quality standards, see, e. g., § 1311(b)(1)(C), the parties have pointed to nothing that mandates a complete ban on discharges into a waterway that is in violation of those standards. The statute does, however, contain provisions designed to remedy existing water quality violations and to allocate the burden of reducing undesirable discharges between existing sources and new sources. See, e. g., § 1313(d). Thus, rather than establishing the categorical ban announced by the Court of Appeals — which might frustrate the construction of new plants that would improve existing conditions — the Clean Water Act vests in the EPA and the States broad authority to develop long-range, area-wide programs to alleviate and eliminate existing pollution. See, e. g., § 1288(b)(2).

To the extent that the Court of Appeals relied on its interpretation of the Act to reverse the EPA’s permitting decision, that reliance was misplaced.

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The Court of Appeals also concluded that the EPAs issuance of the Fayetteville permit was arbitrary and capricious because the Agency misinterpreted Oklahoma’s water quality standards. The primary difference between the court’s and the Agency’s interpretation of the standards derives from the court’s construction of the Act. Contrary to the EPA’s interpretation of the Oklahoma standards, the Court of Appeals read those standards as containing the same categorical ban on new discharges that the court had found in the Clean Water Act itself. Although we do not believe the text of the Oklahoma standards supports the court’s reading (indeed, we note that Oklahoma itself had not advanced that interpretation in its briefs in the Court of Appeals), we reject it for a more fundamental reason — namely, that the Court of Appeals exceeded the legitimate scope of judicial review of an agency adjudication. To emphasize the importance of this point, we shall first briefly assess the soundness of the EPA’s interpretation and application of the Oklahoma standards and then comment more specifically on the Court of Appeals’ approach.

As discussed above, an EPA regulation requires an NPDES permit to comply “with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected States.” 40 CFR § 122.4(d) (1991). This regulation effectively incorporates into federal law those state-law standards the Agency reasonably determines to be “applicable.” In such a situation, then, state water quality standards — promulgated by the States with substantial guidance from the EPA and approved by the Agency — are part of the federal law of water pollution control.

Two features of the body of law governing water pollution support this conclusion. First, as discussed more thoroughly above, we have long recognized that interstate water pollution is controlled by federal law. See supra, at 98-100. Recognizing that the system of federally approved state standards as applied in the interstate context constitutes federal law is wholly consistent with this principle. Second, treating state standards in interstate controversies as federal law accords with the Act’s purpose of authorizing the EPA to create and manage a uniform system of interstate water pollution regulation.

Because we recognize that, at least insofar as they affect the issuance of a permit in another State, the Oklahoma standards have a federal character, the EPA’s reasonable, consistently held interpretation of those standards is entitled to substantial deference. Cf. INS v. National Center for Immigrants’ Rights, 502 U. S. 183, 189-190 (1991); Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). In these cases, the Chief Judicial Officer ruled that the Oklahoma standards — which require that there be “no degradation” of the upper Illinois River — would only be violated if the discharge effected an “actually detectable or measurable” change in water quality. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 90-1262, p. 117a.

This interpretation of the Oklahoma standards is certainly reasonable and consistent with the purposes and principles of the Clean Water Act. As the Chief Judicial Officer noted, “unless there is some method for measuring compliance, there is no way to ensure compliance.” Id., at 118a, n. 16 (internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted). Moreover, this interpretation of the Oklahoma standards makes eminent sense in the interstate context: If every discharge that had some theoretical impact on a downstream State were interpreted as “degrading” the downstream waters, downstream States might wield an effective veto over upstream discharges.

The EPA’s application of those standards in these cases was also sound. On remand, the ALJ scrutinized the record and made explicit factual findings regarding four primary measures of water quality under the Oklahoma standards: eutrophication, esthetics, dissolved oxygen, and metals. In each case, the ALJ found that the Fayetteville discharge would not lead to a detectable change in water quality. He therefore concluded that the Fayetteville discharge would not violate the Oklahoma water quality standards. Because we agree with the Agency’s Chief Judicial Officer that these findings are supported by substantial evidence, we conclude that the Court of Appeals should have affirmed both the EPA’s construction of the regulations and the issuance of the Fayetteville permit.

In its review of the EPA’s interpretation and application of the Oklahoma standards, the Court of Appeals committed three mutually compounding errors.

First, the court failed to give due regard to the EPA’s interpretation of its own regulations, as those regulations incorporate the Oklahoma standards. Instead the court voiced its own interpretation of the governing law and concluded that “where a proposed source would discharge effluents that would contribute to conditions currently constituting a violation of applicable water quality standards, such [a] proposed source may not be permitted.” 908 F. 2d, at 620. As we have already pointed out, that reading of the law is not supported by the statute or by any EPA regulation. The Court of Appeals sat in review of an agency action and should have afforded the EPA’s interpretation of the governing law an appropriate level of deference. See generally Chevron, supra, at 842-844.

Second, the court disregarded well-established standards for reviewing the factual findings of agencies and instead made its own factual findings. The troubling nature of the court’s analysis appears on the face of the opinion itself: At least four times, the court concluded that “there was substantial evidence before the ALJ to support” particular findings which the court thought appropriate, but which were contrary to those actually made by the ALJ. 908 F. 2d, at 620, 625, 627, 629. Although we have long recognized the “substantial evidence” standard in administrative law, the court below turned that analysis on its head. A court reviewing an agency’s adjudicative action should accept the agency’s factual findings if those findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See generally Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474 (1951). The court should not supplant the agency’s findings merely by identifying alternative findings that could be supported by substantial evidence.

Third, the court incorrectly concluded that the EPA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. This error is derivative of the court’s first two errors. Having substituted its reading of the governing law for the Agency’s, and having made its own factual findings, the Court of Appeals concluded that the EPA erred in not considering an important and relevant fact — namely, that the upper Illinois River was (by the court’s assessment) already degraded.

As we have often recognized, an agency ruling is “arbitrary and capricious if the agency has . . . entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983). However, in these cases, the degraded status of the river is only an “important aspect” because of the Court of Appeals’ novel and erroneous interpretation of the controlling law. Under the EPA’s interpretation of that law, what matters is not the river’s current status, but rather whether the proposed discharge will have a “detectable effect” on that status. If the Court of Appeals had been properly respectful of the Agency’s permissible reading of the Act and the Oklahoma standards, the court would not have adjudged the Agency’s decision arbitrary and capricious for this reason.

In sum, the Court of Appeals made a policy choice that it was not authorized to make. Arguably, as that court suggested, it might be wise to prohibit any discharge into the Illinois River, even if that discharge would have no adverse impact on water quality. But it was surely not arbitrary for the EPA to conclude — given the benefits to the river from the increased flow of relatively clean water and the benefits achieved in Arkansas by allowing the new plant to operate as designed — that allowing the discharge would be even wiser. It is not our role, or that of the Court of Appeals, to decide which policy choice is the better one, for it is clear that Congress has entrusted such decisions to the Environmental Protection Agency.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

       The permit also authorized the plant to discharge the remainder of its effluent into the White River, a river that does not flow into Oklahoma; this aspect of the permit is not at issue in this litigation.

       Section 5 of the Oklahoma water quality standards provides:
      “All streams and bodies of water designated as (a) are protected by prohibition of any new point source discharge of wastes or increased load from an existing point source except under conditions described in Section 3.
      “All streams designated by the State as ‘scenic river areas,’ and such tributaries of those streams as may be appropriate will be so designated. Best management practices for control of nonpoint source discharge should be initiated when feasible.” App. 46-47.
      Oklahoma has designated the portion of the Illinois River immediately downstream from the state line as a “scenic river.” Okla. Stat., Tit. 82, § 1462(b)(1) (Supp. 1989); see also App. 54.
      Section 3 of the Oklahoma water quality standards provides, in relevant part:
      “The intent of the Anti-degradation Policy is to protect all waters of the State from quality degradation. Existing instream water uses shall be maintained and protected. No further water quality degradation which would interfere with or become injurious to existing instream water uses shall be allowed. Oklahoma’s waters constitute a valuable State resource and shall be protected, maintained and improved for the benefit of all the citizens.
      “No degradation shall be allowed in high quality waters which constitute an outstanding resource or in waters of exceptional recreational or ecological significance. These include water bodies located in national and State parks, Wildlife Refuges, and those designated ‘Scenic Rivers’ in Appendix A.” App. 27-28.

       Section 301(b)(1)(C) provides, in relevant part, that
      “there shall be achieved—

        “(C) not later than July 1,1977, any more stringent limitation, including those necessary to meet water quality standards ... established pursuant to any State law or regulations ... or required to implement any applicable water quality standard established pursuant to this chapter.” 33 U. S. C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (emphasis added).

       The Arkansas petition was filed in the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and transferred to the Tenth Circuit where it was consolidated with the petition filed by the respondents.

       Section 510 provides in relevant part:
      “Except as expressly provided in this [Act], nothing in this [Act] shall (1) preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof or interstate agency to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting discharges of pollutants, or (B) any requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution [with exceptions]; or (2) be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such States.” 33 U. S. C. § 1370 (emphasis added).

       This description of the downstream State’s role in the issuance of a new permit by a source State was apparently consistent with the EPA’s interpretation of the Act at the time. The Government’s amicus curiae brief in Ouelletie stated that “the affected neighboring state [has] only an advisory role in the formulation of applicable effluent standards or limitations. The affected state may try to persuade the federal government or the source state to increase effluent requirements, but ultimately possesses no statutory authority to compel that result, even when its waters are adversely affected by out-of-state pollution. See 33 U. S. C. § 1341(a)(2), 1342(b)(3) and (5) . . . .” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, O. T. 1986, No. 85-1233, p. 19 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).

       Section 402(b) requires state permit programs
      “(3) [t]o insure that . . . any other State the waters of which may be affected . .. receive notice of each application for a permit and to provide an opportunity for public hearing before a ruling on each such application;
      “(5) [t]o insure that any State (other than the permitting State), whose waters may be affected by the issuance of a permit may submit written recommendations to the permitting State (and the Administrator) with respect to any permit application and, if any part of such written recommendations are not accepted by the permitting State, that the permitting State will notify such affected State (and the Administrator) in writing of its failure to so accept such recommendations together with its reasons for so doing.” 33 U. S. C. § 1342(b).
      Although § 402(b) focuses on state-issued permits, § 402(a)(3) requires that, in issuing an NPDES permit, the Administrator follow the same procedures required of state permit programs. See 33 U. S. C. § 1342(a)(3); see also § 1341(a)(2).

       Section 402(d)(2) provides:
      “(2) No permit shall issue (A) if the Administrator within ninety days of the date of his notification under subsection (b)(5) of this section objects in writing to the issuance of such permit, or (B) if the Administrator within ninety days of the date of transmittal of the proposed permit by the State objects in writing to the issuance of such permit as being outside the guidelines and requirements of this chapter. Whenever the Administrator objects to the issuance of a permit under this paragraph such written objection shall contain a statement of the reasons for such objection and the effluent limitations and conditions which such permit would include if it were issued by the Administrator.” 33 U. S. C. §'1342(d)(2).

       Section 401(a)(2) provides, in relevant part:
      “Whenever such a discharge may affect, as determined by the Administrator, the quality of the waters of any other State, the Administrator . . . shall so notify such other State, the licensing or permitting agency, and the applicant. If, within sixty days after receipt of such notification, such other State determines that such discharge will affect the quality of its waters so as to violate any water quality requirements in such State, and within such sixty-day period notifies the Administrator and the licensing or permitting agency in writing of its objection to the issuance of such license or permit and requests a public hearing on such objection, the licensing or permitting agency shall hold such a hearing. The Administrator shall at such hearing submit his evaluation and recommendations with respect to any such objection to the licensing or permitting agency. Such agency, based upon the recommendations of such State, the Administrator, and upon any additional evidence, if any, presented to the agency at the hearing, shall condition such license or permit in such manner as may be necessary to insure compliance with applicable water quality requirements. If the imposition of conditions cannot insure such compliance such agency shall not issue such license or permit.” 33 U. S. C. § 1341(a)(2).

       This restriction applies whether the permit is issued by the EPA or by an approved state program. See 40 CFR § 123.25 (1991).

       See, e. g., 1 Legislative History of Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Public Works by the Library of Congress), Ser. No. 93-1, pp. 322, 388-389, 814 (1973); see also 33 U. S. C. § 1342(d)(3).

       “[W]e hold that the Clean Water Act prohibits granting an NPDES permit under the circumstances of this case (i. e., where applicable water quality standards have already been violated) and reverse EPA’s decision to permit Fayetteville to discharge any part of its effluent to the Illinois River Basin.” 908 F. 2d 595, 616 (CA10 1990).
      “Congress cannot reasonably be presumed to have intended to exclude from the CWA’s ‘all-encompassing program,’ 451 U. S., at 318, a permitting decision arising in circumstances such as those of this case. It is even more unfathomable that Congress fashioned a ‘comprehensive . . . policy for the elimination of water pollution,’ id., which sanctions continued pollution once minimum water quality standards have been transgressed. More likely, Congress simply never contemplated that EPA or a state would consider it permissible to authorize further pollution under such circumstances. We will not ascribe to the Act either the gaping loophole or the irrational purpose necessary to uphold EPA’s action in this case.” Id., at 632 (footnotes omitted).

       The court identified three errors in the EPA’s reading of the Oklahoma standards. First, the court correctly observed that the AU and the Chief Judicial Officer misinterpreted § 4.10(c) of the standards as governing only the discharge of phosphorus into lakes, rather than the discharge of phosphorus into lakes and into all “perennial and intermittent streams.” Id., at 617 (emphasis omitted). This error was harmless because the ALJ found that the discharge into Lake Francis would comply with § 4.10(c) and it is undisputed that that discharge produced a greater threat to the slow-moving water of the lake than to the rapid flow in the river.
      The second flaw identified by the court was the AU’s mistaken reliance on the 1985, rather than the 1982 version, of the Oklahoma standards. We agree with the Chief Judicial Officer, who also noted this error, that the portions of the two versions relevant to this case “do not differ materially.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 90-1262, p. 150a. Therefore, this error was also harmless.
      Because these two errors were harmless, we have focused in the text on the major difference between the court’s and the EPA’s readings of the Oklahoma standards: the “no degradation” provision.

       See supra, at 101. Oklahoma’s water quality standards closely track the EPA’s model standards in effect at that time. Compare §3 of the Oklahoma standards with 40 CFR § 35.1550(e)(1) (1981).

       Eutrophication is the “normally slow aging process by which a lake evolves into a bog or marsh.... During eutrophication the lake becomes so rich in nutritive compounds (especially nitrogen and phosphorus) that algae and other microscopic plant life become superabundant, thereby ‘choking’ the lake . . . .” App. 57-58. With regard to eutrophication, the ALJ found that the Fayetteville plant would discharge 30 pounds of phosphorus per day, only about 6 pounds of which would reach the Arkansas/Oklahoma border, and that such a small amount would not result in an increase in eutrophication. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 90-1262, p, 129a.

       With regard to esthetics, the ALJ concluded that the only discharged compound that would affect esthetics was phosphorus and that, again, the amount of that substance crossing the border would not affect the esthetic quality of Oklahoma’s waters. Id, at 135a-136a.

       With regard to dissolved oxygen, the AU found that in the 39 miles between discharge and the border the effluent would experience “complete oxygen recovery” and therefore would not affect the dissolved oxygen levels in the river. Id, at 140a. ,

       With regard to metals, the AU concluded that the concentrations of metals would be so low as not to violate the Oklahoma,standards. Id., at 143a.

       Justice Holmes recognized this potential benefit years ago:
      “There is no pretence that there is a nuisance of the simple kind that was known to the older common law. There is nothing which can be detected by the unassisted senses — no visible increase of filth, no new smell. On the contrary, it is proved that the great volume of pure water from Lake Michigan which is mixed with the sewage at the start has improved the Illinois River in these respects to a noticeable extent. Formerly it was sluggish and ill smelling. Now it is a comparatively clear stream to which edible fish have returned. Its water is drunk by the fisherman, it is said, without evil results.” Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 522 (1906).


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    COLLINS v. CITY OF HARKER HEIGHTS, TEXAS
    No. 90-1279.
    Argued November 5, 1991
    Decided February 26, 1992

      Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Sanford Jay Rosen argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Don Busby and Andrea G. Asaro.

      Lucas A. Powe, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Roy L. Barrett and Stuart Smith.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Edward Tuddenham, J. Patrick Wiseman, Steven R. Shapiro, John A. Powell, and Helen Hershkoff; for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey L. Needle; and for the National Education Association by Robert H. Chanin and Jeremiah A. Collins.

        Richard Ruda, Carter G. Phillips, and Mark D. Hopson filed a brief for the National League of Cities et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

   Justice Stevens

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is whether § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1988, provides a remedy for a municipal employee who is fatally injured in the course of his employment because the city customarily failed to train or warn its employees about known hazards in the workplace. Even though the city’s conduct may be actionable under state law, we hold that §1983 does not apply because such conduct does not violate the Due Process Clause.

On October 21, 1988, Larry Michael Collins, an employee in the sanitation department of the city of Harker Heights, Texas, died of asphyxia after entering a manhole to unstop a sewer line. Petitioner, his widow, brought this action alleging that Collins “had a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable risks of harm to his body, mind and emotions and a constitutional right to be protected from the City of Harker Heights’ custom and policy of deliberate indifference toward the safety of its employees.” App. 7. Her complaint alleged that the city violated that right by following a custom and policy of not training its employees about the dangers of working in sewer lines and manholes, not providing safety equipment at jobsites, and not providing safety warnings. The complaint also alleged that a prior incident had given the city notice of the risks of entering the sewer lines and that the city had systematically and intentionally failed to provide the equipment and training required by a Texas statute. Ibid. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that a constitutional violation had not been alleged. No. W-89-CA-168 (WD Tex., Oct. 30, 1988), App. 20. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed on a different theory. 916 F. 2d 284 (1990). It did not reach the question whether the city had violated Collins’ constitutional rights because it denied recovery on the ground that there had been no “abuse of governmental power,” which the Fifth Circuit had found to be a necessary element of a § 1983 action. Id., at 287-288, and n. 3.

The contrary decision in Ruge v. Bellevue, 892 F. 2d 738 (CA8 1989), together with our concern about the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the statute, prompted our grant of certiorari, 499 U. S. 958 (1991).

W — I

Our cases do not support the Court of Appeals reading of § 1983 as requiring proof of an abuse of governmental power separate and apart from the proof of a constitutional violation. Although the statute provides the citizen with an effective remedy against those abuses of state power that violate federal law, it does not provide a remedy for abuses that do not violate federal law, see, e. g., Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277 (1980); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U. S. 189 (1989). More importantly, the statute does not draw any distinction between abusive and nonabusive federal violations.

The Court of Appeals’ analysis rests largely on the fact that the city had, through allegedly tortious conduct, harmed one of its employees rather than an ordinary citizen over whom it exercised governmental power. The employment relationship, however, is not of controlling significance. On the one hand, if the city had pursued a policy of equally deliberate indifference to the safety of pedestrians that resulted in a fatal injury to one who inadvertently stepped into an open manhole, the Court of Appeals’ holding would not speak to this situation at all, although it would seem that a claim by such a pedestrian should be analyzed in a similar manner as the claim by this petitioner. On the other hand, a logical application of the holding might also bar potentially meritorious claims by employees if, for example, the city had given an employee a particularly dangerous assignment in retaliation for a political speech, cf. St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U. S. 112 (1988), or because of his or her gender, cf. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978). The First Amendment, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and other provisions of the Federal Constitution afford protection to employees who serve the government as well as to those who are served by them, and § 1983 provides a cause of action for all citizens injured by an abridgment of those protections. Neither the fact that petitioner’s decedent was a government employee nor the characterization of the city’s deliberate indifference to his safety as something other than an “abuse of governmental power” is a sufficient reason for refusing to entertain petitioner’s federal claim under § 1983.

Nevertheless, proper analysis requires us to separate two different issues when a § 1983 claim is asserted against a municipality: (1) whether plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the city is responsible for that violation. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U. S. 808, 817 (1985) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.); id., at 828-829 (opinion of Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Because most of our opinions discussing municipal policy have involved the latter issue, it is appropriate to discuss it before considering the question whether petitioner’s complaint has alleged a constitutional violation.

II

Section 1983 provides a remedy against “any person” who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the Constitution. In Monell, the Court held that Congress intended municipalities and other local government entities to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies. 436 U. S., at 690. At the same time, the Court made it clear that municipalities may not be held liable “unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Id., at 691. The Court emphasized that

“a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor — or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.
“[TJherefore, ... a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id., at 691, 694 (emphasis in original).

In a series of later cases, the Court has considered whether an alleged injury caused by municipal employees acting under color of state law provided a proper basis for imposing liability on a city. In each of those cases the Court assumed that a constitutional violation had been adequately alleged or proved and focused its attention on the separate issue of municipal liability. Thus, for example, in Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, supra, it was assumed that a police officer had violated the decedent’s constitutional rights, but we held that the wrongful conduct of a single officer without any policy-making authority did not establish municipal policy. And in St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U. S. 112 (1988), without reaching the question whether the adverse employment action taken against the plaintiff violated his First Amendment rights, the Court concluded that decisions by subordinate employees did not necessarily reflect official policy. On the other hand, in Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U. S. 469 (1986), the Court held that a county was responsible for unconstitutional actions taken pursuant to decisions made by the county prosecutor and the county sheriff because they were the “officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question,” id., at 483-484.

Our purpose in citing these cases is to emphasize the separate character of the inquiry into the question of municipal responsibility and the question whether a constitutional violation occurred. It was necessary to analyze whether execution of a municipal policy inflicted the injury in these cases because, unlike ordinary tort litigation, the doctrine of re-spondeat superior was inapplicable. The city is not vicariously liable under §1983 for the constitutional torts of its agents: It is only liable when it can be fairly said that the city itself is the wrongdoer. Because petitioner in this case relies so heavily on our reasoning in Canton v. Harris, 489 U. S. 378 (1989) — and in doing so, seems to assume that the case dealt with the constitutional issue — it is appropriate to comment specifically on that case.

In Canton we held that a municipality can, in some circumstances, be held liable under §1983 “for constitutional violations resulting from its failure to train municipal employees.” Id., at 380. Among the claims advanced by the plaintiff in that case was a violation of the “right, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to receive necessary medical attention while in police custody.” Id., at 381. Because we assumed, arguendo, that the plaintiff’s constitutional right to receive medical care had been denied, id., at 388-389, n. 8, our. opinion addressed only the question whether the constitutional deprivation was attributable to a municipal policy or custom.

We began our analysis by plainly indicating that we were not deciding the constitutional issue.

“In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978), we decided that a municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue. Re-spondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under §1983. Id., at 694-695. ‘It is only when the “execution of the government’s policy or custom ... inflicts the injury” that the municipality may be held liable under § 1983.’ Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U. S. 257, 267 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Monell, supra, at 694).
“Thus, our first inquiry in any case alleging municipal liability under § 1983 is the question whether there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id., at 385.

We did not suggest that all harm-causing municipal policies are actionable under § 1983 or that all such policies are unconstitutional. Moreover, we rejected the city’s argument that only unconstitutional policies can create municipal liability under the statute. Id., at 387. Instead, we concluded that if a city employee violates another’s constitutional rights, the city may be liable if it had a policy or custom of failing to train its employees and that failure to train caused the constitutional violation. In particular, we held that the inadequate training of police officers could be characterized as the cause of the constitutional tort if — and only if — the failure to train amounted to “deliberate indifference” to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact. Id., at 388.

Although the term “deliberate indifference” has been used in other contexts to define the threshold for finding a violation of the Eighth Amendment, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 104 (1976), as we have explained, that term was used in the Canton case for the quite different purpose of identifying the threshold for holding a city responsible for the constitutional torts committed by its inadequately trained agents. In this case, petitioner has used that term to characterize the city’s failure to train the employees in its sanitation department. We assume for the purpose of decision that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to provide a substitute for the doctrine of respondeat superior as a basis for imposing liability on the city for the tor-tious conduct of its agents, but that assumption does not confront the question whether the complaint has alleged a constitutional violation. To that question we now turn.

III

Petitioner’s constitutional claim rests entirely on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The most familiar office of that Clause is to provide a guarantee of fair procedure in connection with any deprivation of life, liberty, or property by a State. Petitioner, however, does not advance a procedural due process claim in this case. Instead, she relies on the substantive component of the Clause that protects individual liberty against “certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 331 (1986).

As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchar-tered area are scarce and open-ended. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U. S. 214, 225-226 (1985). The doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field. It is important, therefore, to focus on the allegations in the complaint to determine how petitioner describes the constitutional right at stake and what the city allegedly did to deprive her husband of that right.

A fair reading of petitioner’s complaint does not charge the city with a willful violation of Collins’ rights. Petitioner does not claim that the city or any of its agents deliberately harmed her husband. In fact, she does not even allege that his supervisor instructed him to go into the sewer when the supervisor knew or should have known that there was a significant risk that he would be injured. Instead, she makes the more general allegation that the city deprived him of life and liberty by failing to provide a reasonably safe work environment. Fairly analyzed, her claim advances two theories: that the Federal Constitution imposes a duty on the city to provide its employees with minimal levels of safety and security in the workplace, or that the city’s “deliberate indifference” to Collins’ safety was arbitrary government action that must “shock the conscience” of federal judges. Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 172 (1952).

Neither the text nor the history of the Due Process Clause supports petitioner’s claim that the governmental employer’s duty to provide its employees with a safe working environment is a substantive component of the Due Process Clause. “[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prevent government ‘from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression. ’ ” DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U. S., at 196 (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U. S. 344, 348 (1986)). As we recognized in DeShaney:

“The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. It forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without ‘due process of law,’ but its language cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means. Nor does history support such an expansive reading of the constitutional text.” 489 U. S., at 195.

Petitioner’s submission that the city violated a federal constitutional obligation to provide its employees with certain minimal levels of safety and security is unprecedented. It is quite different from the constitutional claim advanced by plaintiffs in several of our prior cases who argued that the State owes a duty to take care of those who have already been deprived of their liberty. We have held, for example, that apart from the protection against cruel and unusual punishment provided by the Eighth Amendment, cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978), the Due Process Clause of its own force requires that conditions of confinement satisfy certain minimal standards for pretrial detainees, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 535, n. 16, 545 (1979), for persons in mental institutions, Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307, 315-316 (1982), for convicted felons, Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 94-99 (1987), and for persons under arrest, see Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U. S. 239, 244-245 (1983). The “process” that the Constitution guarantees in connection with any deprivation of liberty thus includes a continuing obligation to satisfy certain minimal custodial standards. See DeShaney, 489 U. S., at 200. Petitioner cannot maintain, however, that the city deprived Collins of his liberty when it made, and he voluntarily accepted, an offer of employment.

We also are not persuaded that the city’s alleged failure to train its employees, or to warn them about known risks of harm, was an omission that can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense. Petitioner’s claim is analogous to a fairly typical state-law tort claim: The city breached its duty of care to her husband by failing to provide a safe work environment. Because the Due Process Clause “does not purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living together in society,” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S., at 332, we have previously rejected claims that the Due Process Clause should be interpreted to impose federal duties that are analogous to those traditionally imposed by state tort law, see, e.g., id., at 332-333; Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 146 (1979); Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 701 (1976). The reasoning in those cases applies with special force to claims asserted against public employers because state law, rather than the Federal Constitution, generally governs the substance of the employment relationship. See, e. g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 350 (1976); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577-578 (1972).

Our refusal to characterize the city’s alleged omission in this case as arbitrary in a constitutional sense rests on the presumption that the administration of government programs is based on a rational decisionmaking process that takes account of competing social, political, and economic forces. Cf. Walker v. Rowe, 791 F. 2d 507, 510 (CA7 1986). Decisions concerning the allocation of resources to individual programs, such as sewer maintenance, and to particular aspects of those programs, such as the training and compensation of employees, involve a host of policy choices that must be made by locally elected representatives, rather than by federal judges interpreting the basic charter of Government for the entire country. The Due Process Clause “is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions.” Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S., at 350. Nor does it guarantee municipal employees a workplace that is free of unreasonable risks of harm.

Finally, we reject petitioner’s suggestion that the Texas Hazard Communication Act supports her substantive due process claim. We assume that the Act imposed a duty on the city to warn its sanitation employees about the dangers of noxious gases in the sewers and to provide safety training and protective equipment to minimize those dangers. We also assume, as petitioner argues, that the Act created an entitlement that qualifies as a “liberty interest” protected by the Due Process Clause. But even with these assumptions, petitioner’s claim must fail for she has not alleged that the deprivation of this liberty interest was arbitrary in the constitutional sense. Cf. Harrah Independent School Dist. v. Martin, 440 U. S. 194, 198-199 (1979). The reasons why the city’s alleged failure to train and warn did not constitute a constitutionally arbitrary deprivation of Collins’ life, see supra, at 128-129, apply a fortiori to the less significant liberty interest created by the Texas statute.

In sum, we conclude that the Due Process Clause does not impose an independent federal obligation upon municipalities to provide certain minimal levels of safety and security in the workplace and the city’s alleged failure to train or to warn its sanitation department employees was not arbitrary in a constitutional sense. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed.

It is so ordered.

       In particular, the complaint alleged that “[pjrior to October, 1988, the City of Harker Heights was on notice of the dangers to which the employees were exposed because Larry Michael Collins’ supervisor had been rendered unconscious in a manhole several months prior to October, 1988, in fact, several months before Larry Michael Collins began work at the City of Harker Heights.” App. 7.

       The Court of Appeals explained:
      “The question presented in this case is whether a plaintiff seeking recovery under § 1983 for injury to a governmental employee must demonstrate, inter alia, that the conduct in issue was an abuse of governmental power. More particularly, does alleged wrongful conduct by government — in its capacity as employer rather than as a governing authority— that deprives its employee of an alleged constitutional right give rise to a § 1983 action? We base our holding on the abuse of government power standard, separate from the constitutional deprivation element or standard. The district court appears to have merged those two standards, which are among those necessary for bringing § 1983 into play here. In reviewing this Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we will keep them separate.
      “In this Circuit, there is a separate standard that must also be satisfied— an abuse of government power. While this element is in many ways similar to, and often blends with, other necessary elements for a § 1983 action, such as deprivation of a constitutional right, and springs from the same sources as the deprivation element, it is separate nonetheless.” 916 F. 2d, at 286-287.

       The section states, in relevant part:
      “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress_” 42 U. S. C. § 1983.

       Petitioners in Monell, a class of female employees of the New York City Department of Social Services and Board of Education, alleged that the board and department violated their due process rights by implementing an official policy that compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absences before such leaves were required for medical reasons. 436 U. S., at 660-661.

       “At the close of the evidence, the District Court submitted the case to the jury, which rejected all of Mrs. Harris’ claims except one: her § 1983 claim against the city resulting from its failure to provide her with medi

        cal treatment while in custody.” Canton v. Harris, 489 U. S., at 382 (emphasis added).

       We added:
      “Only where a municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a' city ‘policy or custom’ that is actionable under § 1983.
      “Consequently, while claims such as respondent’s — alleging that the city’s failure to provide training to municipal employees resulted in the constitutional deprivation she suffered — are cognizable under § 1983, they can only yield liability against a municipality where that city’s failure to train reflects deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of its inhabitants.” Id., at 389, 392.

       Indeed, we expressly stated: “The ‘deliberate indifference’ standard we adopt for § 1983 ‘failure to train’ claims does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation.” Id., at 388, n. 8.

       The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

       Petitioner alleges that her husband had “a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable risks of harm to his body, mind and emotions and a constitutional right to be protected from the City of Harker Heights’ custom and policy of deliberate indifference toward the safety of its employees.” App. 7. The city’s policy and custom of not training its employees and not warning them of the danger allegedly caused Collins’ death and thus deprived him of those rights. Id., at 8.

       “Historically, this guarantee of due process has been applied to deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property. E. g., Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 (1878) (assessment of real estate); Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 166 (1962) (stomach pumping); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971) (suspension of driver’s license); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977) (paddling student); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517 (1984) (intentional destruction of inmate’s property). No decision of this Court before Parratt [v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981),] supported the view that negligent conduct by a state official, even though causing injury, constitutes a deprivation under the Due Process Clause. This history reflects the traditional and common-sense notion that the Due Process Clause, like its forebear in the Magna Carta, see Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 366, 368 (1911), was ‘intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government,’ Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 527 (1884).” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 331 (1986).

       Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 5182b (Vernon 1987).

       Section 10(a) of the Act states, for example:
      “Every employer shall provide, at least annually, an education and training program for employees using or handling hazardous chemicals. . . . Additional instruction shall be provided when the potential for exposure to hazardous chemicals is altered or when new and significant information is received by the employer concerning the hazards of a chemical. New or newly assigned employees shall be provided training before working with or in a work area containing hazardous chemicals.”
      And § 15(a)states:
      “Employees who may be exposed to hazardous chemicals shall be informed of the exposure and shall have access to the workplace chemical list and [material safety data sheets] for the hazardous chemicals. ... In addition, employees shall receive training on the hazards of the chemicals and on measures they can take to protect themselves from those hazards and shall be provided with appropriate personal protective equipment. These rights are guaranteed on the effective date of this Act.”


author: Chief Justice Rehnquist

text:
    WILLY v. COASTAL CORP. et al.
    No. 90-1150.
    Argued December 3, 1991
    Decided March 3, 1992

      Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Michael A. Maness argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.

      Michael L. Beatty argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Carter G. Phillips, Mark D. Hopson, Lawrence P. Ellsworth, and Robert C. DeMoss.

   Chief Justice Rehnquist

delivered the- opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to decide whether a federal district court may impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a case in which the district court is later determined to be without subject-matter jurisdiction. 501 U. S. 1216 (1991). We conclude that in the circumstances presented here it may do so.

Petitioner Willy sued respondent Coastal Corporation (Coastal or respondent) in Texas state court, raising a variety of claims relating to Coastal’s decision to terminate his employment as “in-house” counsel. Petitioner alleged that he had been fired due to his refusal to participate in respondent’s violation of various federal and state environmental laws. Respondent removed the case- to Federal District Court, claiming original federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331,1441. Petitioner objected to the removal, claiming that his case did not “arise under” federal law, see § 1331, but the District Court disagreed and concluded that it had subject-matter jurisdiction. .The District Court subsequently granted respondent’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), and dismissed petitioner’s pendent state claims.

At the same time, the District Court granted respondent’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions, awarding attorney’s fees of $22,625 against Willy and his attorney, Young, jointly and severally. The District Court found that the filings made by plaintiff’s counsel “create[d] a blur of absolute confusion.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-7. These included a 1,200-page, unindexed, unnumbered pile of materials that the District Court determined “to be a conscious and wanton affront to the judicial process, this Court, and opposing counsel” that was “irresponsible at a minimum and at worst intentionally harassing.” Ibid. Petitioner’s sanctionable behavior also included careless pleading, such as reliance on a nonexistent Federal Rule of Evidence. Ibid. None of the sanctionable conduct was related to petitioner’s initial effort to convince the District Court that it was without subject-matter jurisdiction.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the District Court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the complaint raised no claims arising under federal law. 855 F. 2d 1160 (1988). It therefore reversed the District Court order dismissing the claims and instructed that the case be remanded to state court. The court also upheld the District Court’s decision to award Rule 11 sanctions, although it remanded the case to the District Court to determine the amount. On remand the District Court recomputed the Rule 11 sanctions and imposed sanctions in the amount of $19,307, the amount of attorney’s fees that respondent had incurred in responding to petitioner’s sanctionable conduct. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 915 F. 2d 965 (CA5 1990).

On this second appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s contention that, in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, the District Court was constitutionally without authority to impose Rule 11 sanctions. It concluded that the authority to impose Rule 11 sanctions rested in the “inherent powers” of the federal courts — those powers “ ‘necessary to the exercise of all others.’” Id., at 966 (quoting Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U. S. 752, 764 (1980)). The court concluded that the exercise of Rule 11 powers was an example of such inherent powers. It principally relied on our recent decision in Cooler & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S. 384 (1990), in which we upheld a Rule 11 sanction imposed for filing a frivolous complaint even though the sanction order was entered after the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its suit.

Before this Court, petitioner advances two claims. The first is that Congress, in- acquiescing in the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, did not “authoriz[e] recovery of fees or costs against parties who prevail on jurisdictional grounds.” Brief for Petitioner 18. Petitioner finds in both the Rules Enabling Act and the Rules the “implicit premise . . . that rules of practice and procedure are not necessary for disputes beyond the judicial power conferred by Article III.” Id., at 28. Phrased this way, the petitioner’s contention is correct, but it does not dispose of this case.

The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2072, authorizes the Court to “prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts ....” Those rules may not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” In response, we have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 1 governs their scope. It provides that “[t]hese rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature ....” Rule 81(c) specifically provides that the Rules “apply to civil actions removed to the United States district courts from the state courts and govern procedure after removal.” This expansive language contains no express exceptions and indicates a clear intent to have the Rules, including Rule 11, apply to all district court civil proceedings.

But in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1 (1941), we observed that federal courts, in adopting rules, were not free to extend or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a statute. Id., at 10. Such a caveat applies a fortiori to any effort to extend by rule the judicial power of the United States described in Article III of the Constitution. The Rules, then, must be deemed to apply only if their application will not impermissibly expand the judicial authority conferred by Article III. We must therefore examine petitioner’s second, and related contention, that the District Court action in this case lies outside the range of action constitutionally permitted to an Article III court.

Petitioner begins by pointing out that Article III limits the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts to certain “cases or controversies.” Brief for Petitioner 11. He then contends that the District Court’s exercise of judicial power to grant Rule 11 sanctions must have been an unconstitutional act because, in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court lacks “a substantive source of judicial power, beyond that conferred by Article III.” Id,, at 18. Thus, according to petitioner, even had Congress attempted to grant the courts authority to impose sanctions in a case such as this, the grant would run afoul of Article III.

In making this claim, petitioner acknowledges that there are some circumstances in which federal courts may impose attorney’s fees or costs, even where the court eventually proves to be without subject-matter jurisdiction. He contends, however, that such instances are limited to a narrowly prescribed category of cases and do not include the situation in which sanctions are imposed against a party who has successfully contested jurisdiction.

We think petitioner’s contentions flawed in several respects. Article I, § 8, cl. 9, authorizes Congress to establish the lower federal courts. From almost the founding days of this country, it has been firmly established that Congress, acting pursuant to its authority to make all laws “necessary and proper” to their establishment, also may enact laws regulating the conduct of those courts and the means by which their judgments are enforced. See Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 21-22 (1825); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U. S. 460, 473 (1965) (describing “long-recognized power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts”). Indeed, in acknowledging the many circumstances in which sanctions can be imposed, several of which have a statutory basis, petitioner effectively concedes both Congress’ general power to regulate the courts and its specific power to authorize the imposition of sanctions. See n. 2, supra.

This leaves only petitioner’s contention that Rule 11 sanctions must be aborted because at a time after the sanction-able conduct occurred, it was determined by the Court of Appeals that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. A final determination of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction of a case in a federal court, of course, precludes further adjudication of it. But such a determination does not automatically wipe out all proceedings had in the district court at a time when the district court operated under the misapprehension that it had jurisdiction. In Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940), we held that a judgment rendered in a case in which it was ultimately concluded that the District Court was without jurisdiction was nonetheless res judicata on collateral attack made by one of the parties. See also Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938). In Stoll, we observed that the practical concern with providing an end to litigation justifies a rule preventing collateral attack on subject-matter jurisdiction. Id., at 172.

In United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258 (1947), we upheld a criminal contempt citation even on the assumption that the District Court issuing the citation was without jurisdiction over the underlying action. In that case, the question was raised on direct review and not collateral attack. We think the same concern expressed in these cases— the maintenance of orderly procedure, even in the wake of a jurisdiction ruling later found to be mistaken — justifies the conclusion that the sanction ordered here need not be upset.

The District Court order which the petitioner seeks to upset is one that is collateral to the merits. We recently had occasion to examine Rule ll’s scope and purpose in great detail in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S. 384 (1990). The challenge in that case was to an order imposing Rule 11 sanctions for filing a frivolous complaint, entered after the plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed his action. In the course of our discussion we noted that “[i]t is well established that a federal court may consider collateral issues after an action is no longer pending. ... [An] imposition of a Rule 11 sanction is not a judgment on the merits of an action. Rather, it requires the determination of a collateral issue: whether the attorney has abused the judicial process, and, if so, what sanction would be appropriate.” Id., at 395-396. Such an order implicates no constitutional concern because it “does not signify a district court’s assessment of the legal merits of the complaint.” Id., at 396. It therefore does not raise the issue of a district court adjudicating the merits of a “case or controversy” over which it lacks jurisdiction.

Petitioner places great weight on our decision in United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U. S. 72 (1988), a case involving a civil contempt order entered by the District Court. The contemnors, two nonparty witnesses, refused to comply with a District Court document subpoena. The District Court found them in civil contempt and ordered them to pay a fine of $50,000 per day. The contemnors, as was their right, immediately appealed the contempt order, challenging the District Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. We held that the Court of Appeals was obligated to consider the jurisdictional challenge in full, rather than simply contenting itself with an inquiry into whether the District Court colorably had jurisdiction. We further concluded that if the District Court was found to be lacking subject-matter jurisdiction, that the contempt order would also fall. Focusing on this second part of our decision, petitioner cites Catholic Conference as establishing the proposition that a sanction must fall if imposed when jurisdiction is in fact absent.

Catholic Conference does not stand for such a broad assertion. A civil contempt order has much different purposes than a Rule 11 sanction. Civil contempt is designed to force the contemnor to comply with an order of the court, id., at 79; Rule 11 is designed to punish a party who has already violated the court’s rules. Cooter & Gell, supra, at 396. Given that civil contempt is designed to coerce compliance with the court’s decree, it is logical that the order itself should fall with a showing that the court was without authority to enter the decree. Accord, United States v. Mine Workers, supra.

The interest in having rules of procedure obeyed, by contrast, does not disappear upon a subsequent determination that the court was without subject-matter jurisdiction. Courts do make mistakes; in cases such as Catholic Conference it may be possible immediately to seek relief in an appellate tribunal. But where such an immediate appeal is not authorized, there is no constitutional infirmity under Article III in requiring those practicing before the courts to conduct themselves in compliance with the applicable procedural rules in the interim, and to allow the courts to impose Rule 11 sanctions in the event of their failure to do so.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

       ^ule 11 requires that every paper filed with the District Court be signed by an attorney or by the party. The signature constitutes a certificate by the signer that
      “to the best of the signer’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.”
      A pleading determined to be in contravention of the Rule subjects both the signer and the party he represents to "an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” Ibid. We take as given that the District Court correctly determined that petitioner’s filings were insufficiently well grounded to satisfy the Rule, the payment of attorney’s fees was a reasonable sanction in response, and the imposition of joint and several liability was appropriate.

       See Brief for Petitioner 18, n. 14, acknowledging 28 U. S. C. § 1919 (authorizing “payment of just costs” in any action or suit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction) and 28 U. S. C. § 1447(c) (authorizing attorney’s fees and costs for wrongful removal). See also Brief for Petitioner 22-27, admitting federal-court authority to exercise “inherent powers” to sanction through attorney’s fees and costs or criminal contempt those who obstruct a court’s effort to determine its jurisdiction.

       Art. I, §8, cl. 18.

       Petitioner does acknowledge certain limited exceptions, see n. 2, supra.

       Our conclusion that the District Court acted within the scope of the Federal Rules and that the sanction may constitutionally be applied even when subject-matter jurisdiction is eventually found lacking makes it unnecessary for us to consider respondent's alternative contention that the sanction may be upheld as an appropriate exercise of the District Court’s “inherent powers.”