author: ROBERT H. SCHUMACHER, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Saye Lawrence WHITTLE, Appellant.
    No. A03-1111.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Aug. 17, 2004.

      Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, David C. Brown, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.
    John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Marie L. Wolf, Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.
    Considered and decided by SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge; SHUMAKER, Judge; and PARKER, Judge.

       Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 10.

   OPINION

ROBERT H. SCHUMACHER, Judge.

This appeal is from a conviction of one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, MinmStat. § 609.344, subd. 1(d) (2002) (prohibiting sexual intercourse when complainant physically helpless). Appellant Saye Lawrence Whittle argues that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting his cross-examination of the victim and in allowing the state to impeach him with a prior statement that was not truly inconsistent with his trial testimony. We affirm.

FACTS

Whittle was charged with third- and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct for allegedly having sexual penetration and sexual contact with two women, K.K. and N.M., while the women were asleep following a party at their house. Whittle, who was a guest at the party, claimed the women were not asleep and that the sexual conduct, in each case, was consensual.

Before trial, the state brought a motion to exclude any reference to K.K.’s belief that she was on probation at the time of the party. The defense sought to cross-examine K.K. on the subject to support a theory that K.K. was motivated to claim the sexual conduct was criminal in order to shift the focus from her own use of cocaine, which she could have believed was a violation of her probation. As an offer of proof, the defense presented a computer printout showing that K.K. had been arrested on November 23, 2001, in North Dakota, charged with “hindering law enforcement,” a Class A misdemeanor, and may have been placed on unsupervised probation, and that she would not have been discharged from probation until after the charged offense occurred.

The trial court ruled that the defense could not impeach K.K. with her North Dakota probationary status because the evidence was “too remote,” and the potential prejudice to the state’s case outweighed its probative value.

K.K. testified that she was living in a south Minneapolis house with four other women in March 2002. One Friday night, after working all day as a waitress, she got a call from Don Coquillette, a friend of the women at the residence, and agreed to meet him at a Minneapolis bar. One of KK.’s roommates accompanied her. At the bar, they met Coquillette and Whittle, whom they had never met before.

At some point it was agreed that they would try to buy some cocaine that night. After Coquillette could not locate any cocaine, the four of them drove to the women’s home to make more calls. They eventually located N.M., another roommate, at a party where, she told them, she had obtained cocaine. After driving to the party and picking up N.M., they returned to the women’s home, intending to use the cocaine. K.K. testified that all five of them used the cocaine, while partying mostly in N.M.’s large master bedroom.

KK testified that at about 5:00 a.m. she closed the door to her bedroom, which was next to N.M.’s, changed into her pajamas, and went to sleep. She testified that she woke later to find Whittle on top of her, having vaginal intercourse with her. She tried to push him off of her, eventually succeeding, got dressed and left for work. But after realizing she was too upset to work, she drove to her family’s home in North Dakota, where after taking a nap she described the sexual assault to her older sister. She did not, however, tell her sister that she had used cocaine during the party. K.K. also failed to tell police about the cocaine use until after Minneapolis police learned this from others present and asked her about it.

N.M. testified that she had gone to a party on March 29, 2002, at a friend’s house and reported to K.K. and the others over the telephone that she had access to some cocaine. When the other four drove her back to the women’s home, they drank beer and “hung out” in N.M.’s bedroom listening to music.

N.M. testified that after K.K. went to her own bedroom, Coquillette went into the living room, and she went to the kitchen to finish her beer, with Whittle accompanying her. She returned to her bedroom alone and lay on her bed in her clothes and fell asleep. N.M. testified that she awoke to find her pants unzipped, her panties rolled down, and Whittle performing oral sex on her. Whittle was performing oral sex on her. She told him to get off, which he eventually did. N.M. testified that she was “shocked” and denied that she had been flirting with Whittle that evening.

Coquillette testified for the state, indicating, contrary to Whittle’s later testimony, that the four of them drove from the bar to Coquillette’s house. Coquillette testified that there was no flirting between Whittle and either K.K. or N.M.

After the state completed its case-in-chief, the prosecutor gave notice that, if Whittle chose to testify, he intended to impeach him with his statement to police. Defense counsel argued that police had misstated the Miranda warning before obtaining the statement and that one officer had pressured Whittle into talking while driving him to jail following his arrest.

After viewing the videotape of Whittle’s statement, the court ruled that the state could use it to impeach him. The court noted that the statement was given voluntarily and was exculpatory.

Whittle testified that he went to the bar about midnight and met K.K., her roommate, and Coquillette. Whittle testified that, instead of all four driving to Coquil-lette’s house, as K.K. had testified, he and Coquillette walked while K.K. and her roommate drove together. He testified that Coquillette wanted to talk to him and assured him that K.K. and her roommate were “cool” and that they liked going out with black guys. Whittle testified that during the evening K.K. was flirting with him and “showing her butt.” He testified that when they drove back from N.M.’s friends’ party, he sat in the front seat of the car with N.M. in his lap. •

Whittle testified that when they arrived at the women’s home, he put his coat in K.K.’s bedroom, at her suggestion, that he spent time in the bedroom with her and thought she was interested in him. He testified that he engaged in mutual kissing with N.M. in her bedroom until N.M. told him to stop and that he asked K.Z. if he could sleep with her. Whittle testified that K.K. agreed and that she changed into her pajamas and they had consensual sex. He testified that Coquillette entered K.K.’s bedroom after he and K.K. had stopped having sex. Coquillette, however, did not corroborate this, testifying that he saw no signs of physical affection involving Whittle and that he encountered Whittle in the hallway early in the morning, not in K.K.’s bedroom. Whittle denied that he saw either K.K. or N.M. asleep that night. He admitted that he had been convicted in 1996 of giving a false name to a police officer.

On cross-examination, Whittle admitted that he had not told Sergeant Hogquist, in his taped statement, that K.K. had any tequila the night of the party. Whittle also admitted that he had not said anything about smoking marijuana in his statement. On re-direct, Whittle testified that Hogquist said he was not interested in the cocaine use or what people were drinking that night.

The jury found Whittle guilty of the first count, charging sexual penetration committed against K.K., and acquitted Whittle of the counts charging him with sexual penetration and sexual contact committed against N.M. The trial court sentenced Whittle to 44 months in prison.

ISSUES

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ruling the defense could not question K.K. about her probationary status?

2. Did the court abuse its discretion in ruling the state could impeach Whittle with omissions from his statement to police?

ANALYSIS

Whittle argues that the trial court erred in two of its evidentiary rulings, entitling him to a new trial. Appellate courts review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for a clear abuse of discretion, recognizing that evidentiary matters rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn.2003). Whittle has the burden of showing not only that the trial court abused its discretion, but also that he was thereby prejudiced. Id.

1. Whittle argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling the defense could not cross-examine K.K. about her alleged unsupervised probationary status in North Dakota at the time of the offense. Whittle argues that this evidence was admissible to show K.K.’s bias and her motivation in accusing him of criminal sexual conduct.

The supreme court has noted: “In criminal cases, the Confrontation Clause contemplates a cross-examination of the witness in which the defendant has the opportunity to reveal a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness.” State v. Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Minn.1995). “Bias” generally refers to “the relationship between a party and a witness” that might cause the witness to “slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party.” United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52, 105 S.Ct. 465, 469, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984). K.K.’s probationary status had no relationship to Whittle, but Whittle argues that it created a form of self-interest motivating K.K. to accuse him. “Self-interest” is generally recognized as a source of partiality that may be used, along with bias directed at a party, to impeach the witness. I Charles T. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence, § 39, at 146-47 (John W. Strong, et al. eds., 5th ed.1999); see Abel, 469 U.S. at 52, 105 S.Ct. at 469 (stating bias may be induced “by the witness’ self-interest”).

The problem with Whittle’s argument is that it was obviously in K.K.’s self-interest, regardless of her probationary status, to omit any reference to cocaine use from her statement to police simply because using cocaine is a criminal offense. K.K.’s alleged probationary status, therefore, had little probative value as impeachment evidence. The use of cocaine was also something that K.K. apparently knew would offend her family because she did not disclose it to her sister or mother either. That provided a secondary reason to conceal the cocaine use from police. K.K.’s alleged probationary status was merely an additional possible reason for nondisclosure, and one that posed the risk of unfairly prejudicing the state’s case.

Thus, this is not a case in which the proposed method of impeachment was the only way of eliciting a particular form of bias or self-interest. See generally State v. Greer, 635 N.W.2d 82, 89 (Minn.2001) (noting that evidence that is only marginally useful to show bias may be excluded); cf. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232, 109 S.Ct. 480, 483, 102 L.Ed.2d 513 (1988) (holding that proposed line of cross-examination of complainant to show her extramarital relationship, which might have been jeopardized if sex with defendant was consensual, should have been permitted).

As the state points out, another flaw in Whittle’s argument is that KK.’s allegation of a sexual assault was the means by which the cocaine use was revealed, not a way for K.K. to conceal it. If the order of events were reversed, and KK’s use of cocaine had been disclosed first, she might have had an interest in minimizing or diverting attention from that offense by fabricating a rape allegation. But that is not what occurred.

Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. Minn. R. Evid. 403. When balanced against its cumulative, and rather minimal, probative value, the potential of K.K.’s alleged North Dakota probation for unfair prejudice, for distracting the jury by injecting the issue of K.K.’s past criminal conduct, and for wasting time on a peripheral issue was simply too great to support its admission. We conclude that the trial court was well within its discretion in excluding this evidence.

2. WThittle also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling the prosecution could impeach him with his statement to police, which Whittle argues was not inconsistent with his trial testimony. The trial court, after reviewing the tape of Whittle’s statement to police, concluded that the statement was voluntary and exculpatory and could be used by the prosecutor for impeachment. On appeal, Whittle concedes that even if there were a Miranda violation in the course of the interrogation, Whittle’s statement would be admissible for impeachment purposes. See State v. Slowinski, 450 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn.1990). He argues, however, that the statement was not truly impeaching because there was nothing in it that was inconsistent with Whittle’s trial testimony.

The prosecutor impeached Whittle with his failure to tell police in his statement that K.K. drank tequila at the house the night of the apartment, or that the partygoers had smoked marijuana, or that the partygoers were “real tired” by the time they went to bed. Whittle does not refute the state’s argument that witnesses may be impeached by their prior failure to state a fact. A witness’s failure to state a fact in a previous account of the incident in question may, under the circumstances, be considered impeaching. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 281, 239, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 2129, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980). This court has held, for example, that a defendant could be impeached with his failure, after his arrest, to tell police that a companion had planted the gun on him. State v. Houston, 654 N.W.2d 727, 735-36 (Minn.App.2003), review denied (Minn. Mar. 26, 2003).

The scope of cross-examination is largely left to the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Dille, 258 N.W.2d 565, 569 (Minn.1977). Whittle cites no authority requiring closer scrutiny of the impeachment value of a prior statement when the defendant’s Miranda rights have been violated. Whittle is not raising a hearsay challenge to the use of the statement. See Minn. R. Evid. 801(c) (defining hearsay as out-of-court statement offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted”), (d)(2)(A) (providing that party’s own statement is not hearsay).

The state did not present Whittle’s statement to police as a prior inconsistent statement admissible for substantive purposes. Thus, we are presented only with the question whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion in determining that Whittle’s failure to mention certain facts in his statement to police had sufficient impeachment value to warrant the use of that statement in cross-examination.

K.K.’s drinking tequila, or the par-tygoers’ use of marijuana, or the fact that they were “real tired” by the time they went to bed, are not essential exculpatory details, as the “planting” of the gun was in Houston. But it was in Whittle’s interest to bring out any facts casting doubt on the complainants’ ability to accurately perceive or relate what occurred at the women’s home. Certainly, their degree of fatigue and their consumption of alcohol and drugs could have affected the credibility of complainants’ allegations. It was within the trial court’s broad discretion to conclude that Whittle’s omission of these details had sufficient impeachment value to warrant their use in cross-examination.

We note that Whittle’s argument that these details were not sufficiently impeaching necessarily implies their admission was not significantly damaging to the defense case. Thus, even if the trial court abused its discretion, we would conclude, based on the limited impeachment value of the details omitted and on the strength of the state’s evidence, that there is no reasonable possibility that this evidence significantly affected the jury’s verdict. See generally State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 n. 2 (Minn.1994).

The impeaching omissions went to the peripheral details of the evening — what people were drinking or what drugs they were using. The other witnesses’ testimony went to more critical facts — whether there was flirting, or a sexually-charged atmosphere, and particularly whether Co-quillette witnessed consensual sexual activity involving Whittle and K.K. Even with respect to the accuracy of K.K.’s perceptions, her use of tequila and marijuana and her degree of fatigue would be merely cumulative to evidence that she used cocaine, consumed other alcoholic drinks, and was partying into the early morning after getting off from work.

DECISION

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling K.K. could not be impeached with her probationary status in North Dakota or in ruling that the state could impeach Whittle with his omission of several details from his statement to police.

Affirmed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    COUNCIL OF INDEPENDENT TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, et al., Appellants, v. The STATE of Minnesota, et al., Respondents.
    No. A03-2020.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Aug. 24, 2004.

      Thomas H. Boyd, Karl E. Robinson, Winthrop Weinstine, P.A., Suite Minneapolis, MN and Anthony F. Troy, Trout-man Sanders, LLP, 1122, Richmond, VA, for appellants.
    Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Hilary Lindell Caligiuri, Deputy Attorney General, Bradford S. Delapena, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for respondents.
    Walter A. Pickhardt, Faegre Benson, LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for amicus curiae Brown Williamson Tobacco Corporation.
    Considered and decided by STONEBURNER, Presiding Judge; SCHUMACHER, Judge; and FORSBERG, Judge.

       Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 10.

   OPINION

ROBERT H. SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Appellants Council of Independent Tobacco Manufacturers of America, Carolina Tobacco Company, and Winner Tobacco Wholesale, Inc. brought this action to prohibit enforcement of Minn.Stat. § 297F.24 (Supp.2003), alleging that the statute violates the First Amendment, Equal Protection and state uniformity clauses. Appellants further contend that the statute is a bill of attainder and unconstitutional special legislation.

MinmStat. § 297F.24 is not a direct attempt to regulate speech but has a legitimate legislative purpose and therefore is not an infringement of appellants’ rights to free speech. The statute creates classifications based on genuine and substantial distinctions, does not violate the Equal Protection or state uniformity clauses, and is not special legislation. Finally, because the statute seeks to regulate prospective rather than past conduct, it is not a bill of attainder. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellants are manufacturers and distributors of cigarettes who were not parties to State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (Minn.Dist.Ct. May 8, 1998), which ended in settlement in May 1998. In that matter, the state sued Philip Morris, Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, and Lorillard Tobacco Co., the so-called “major manufacturers,” as well as Liggett Group, Inc., asserting claims for costs associated with the tobacco companies’ conduct in denying the deadly and addictive nature of their products and attempting to conceal this information.

The state settled with Liggett on March 20, 1997. Liggett agreed to make annual payments of $100,000, publicly acknowledge the dangers of nicotine, restrict its advertising, and cooperate with the state in its action against the major manufacturers. After trial, but before a verdict was returned, the state entered into a settlement agreement with the major manufacturers (“Minnesota settlement”).

Broadly stated, the major manufacturers agreed to make six one-time payments, as well as annual payments in perpetuity, amounting to approximately $6.1 billion over 25 years. The annual payment amount is based on the national market share of each of the major manufacturers. In addition, the major manufacturers agreed not to oppose legislative proposals designed to reduce tobacco use by children, to challenge certain existing laws or rules governing tobacco, or to support national legislation designed to override the settlement agreement. The major manufacturers further agreed to discontinue advertising on billboards and in transit facilities, refrain from paying for product placement in movies, and cease sales of products bearing logos of their products. In return for these agreements, the state agreed to release the major manufacturers from all past and future tobacco-related claims.

Six months after the Minnesota settlement, 46 states and 6 United States territories settled with the major manufacturers in the “Master Settlement Agreement.” Like the Minnesota settlement, the Master Settlement Agreement involved settlement payments, annual payments in perpetuity, and restrictions on lobbying and advertising activities in exchange for releases from claims. The Master Settlement Agreement also permits manufacturers other than the majors to join in the settlement by making annual payments. The Master Settlement Agreement encouraged all participating states to draft a “qualifying statute” which would neutralize the cost advantages a non-participating manufacturer would otherwise enjoy.

Within four years after the Minnesota settlement, the market share of the major manufacturers had fallen from about 98% to about 88% of the state market. Smaller manufacturers not party to the settlement agreement had apparently been able to capture a much larger share of the market based on lower prices. In 2003, the state legislature enacted Minn.Stat. § 297F.24 (Supp.2003) to counteract this trend. This statute imposes a 1.75<t per cigarette or 35$ per pack fee on cigarettes, payable by distributors of tobacco products that are manufactured by companies not subject to the Minnesota settlement. The stated purposes of the statute are to make “non-settlement” cigarette manufacturers pay fees comparable to the costs attributable to the use of their cigarettes, prevent non-settlement manufacturers from undermining the state’s policy of discouraging youthful smokers by supplying low-priced cigarettes, and fund other appropriate purposes. Minn.Stat. § 297F.24, subd. l(b)(l)(2)(3).

The statute permits a manufacturer not a party to the Minnesota settlement to voluntarily enter into an agreement with the state on similar terms. MinmStat. § 297F.24, subd. 2(2). Respondent Dan Salomone, in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Revenue, has interpreted this to mean that the nonparty manufacturer must make annual payments equal to at least 75% of the payments required from parties to the original agreement and must also agree to the lobbying and advertising restrictions. As of September 2003, the 75% payment would be equal to 48$ per pack, but the manufacturer would not have to pay the 35$ fee otherwise imposed by the act. Respondent State of Minnesota would be obligated to release the manufacturer from all past and future tobacco-related claims.

The model act proposed by the Master Settlement Agreement provides that monies collected under the qualifying statute from non-participating manufacturers would be escrowed for 25 years to provide a fund for payment if a state successfully sues a non-participating member for health-care costs. If no costs accrue over the 25-year period, the money is returned to the non-participating manufacturer. The Minnesota law, on the other hand, acts like an excise tax; the money collected through the 35<f fee belongs to the state and can be used for general purposes. Further, the fee is collected from distributors, not manufacturers, and will not be returned to the distributor. In theory, although the tax is on distributors, a non-settling manufacturer will be forced to raise the price of its cigarettes to cover the fee, thus decreasing the economic advantage of the non-settling manufacturers.

Appellants sought a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction to prohibit enforcement of the statute. The district court denied appellants’ motions. Both appellants and respondents made cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court denied appellants’ motion and granted summary judgment to respondents.

ISSUES

1. Is Minn.Stat. § 297F.24 (Supp.2003), an unconstitutional abridgement of appellants’ First Amendment rights?

2. Does Minn.Stat. § 297F.24 violate principles of equal protection or the state’s uniformity clause?

3. Is MinmStat. § 297F.24 unlawful under the United States Constitution or the Minnesota Constitution as a bill of attainder?

4. Is Minn.Stat. § 297F.24 a violation of the Minnesota Constitution’s prohibition against special legislation?

ANALYSIS

1. We evaluate a statute’s constitutionality as a matter of law. Granville v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 668 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn.App.2003), review denied (Minn. Nov. 18, 2003). Statutes are presumed to be constitutional. Kismet Investors, Inc. v. County of Benton, 617 N.W.2d 85, 93 (Minn.App.2000), review denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 2000). If the constitutional challenge involves a fundamental right, the reviewing court applies a strict scrutiny analysis. State ex rel. Morrow v. LaFleur, 590 N.W.2d 787, 796 (Minn.1999). If no fundamental right is involved, an appellate court reviews the statute under a rational basis standard. Kolton v. County of Anoka, 645 N.W.2d 403, 411 (Minn.2002).

The first question is whether MinmStat. § 297F.24 (Supp.2003), abridges appellants’ First Amendment right of free speech, a fundamental right. A government entity “may not condition a tax exemption on the renunciation of an individual’s right to free speech.” PTI, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 100 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1206 (C.D.Cal.2000) (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1338, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958)). But the usual case where an unconstitutional tax exemption is found involves a direct attack on speech, rather than limitation as a collateral consequence. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383-84, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 3119, 82 L.Ed.2d 278 (1984) (requiring ban on editorial speech on pub-lie broadcasting stations in order to maintain tax-exempt status); Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518, 78 S.Ct. at 1338 (requiring oath from veterans that they have not advocated overthrow of government before grant of tax exemption).

The United States Supreme Court stated that although lobbying is speech, a government entity need not provide a tax exemption, which the Court described as a subsidy, in order to permit an individual to more fully exercise the protected right. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 2001, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983). The Court noted: “We have held in several contexts that a legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny.” Id. at 549, 103 S.Ct. at 2003. The Court stated: “Where governmental [denial of a tax exemption] is not aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas, its power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.” Id. at 550, 103 S.Ct. at 2003 (citation and quotation omitted). The Court went on to examine the organization’s claims using a rational basis standard, concluding that Congress had a rational reason to limit tax-free status. Id. at 549-50,103 S.Ct. at 2003.

Thus, where a statute has a legitimate purpose that is not a direct attempt to stifle speech, the court applies a rational basis review standard. Applying that standard, the purpose of Minn.Stat. § 297F.24, as set forth in subdivision 1(b), is to require non-settlement manufacturers to pay fees comparable to the costs incurred by the state that are attributable to the use of cigarettes and to prevent non-settlement manufacturers from flooding the state with cheap cigarettes, thereby undermining the state’s policy of discouraging youth smokers. This is a legitimate purpose within the state’s power and, because it is not a direct attempt to regulate speech, does not offend the First Amendment.

2. This court reviews claims under the Equal Protection and state uniformity clauses to decide whether the classification is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const, art. I, § 7, art. X, § 1; Star Scientific, Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 348 (4th Cir.2002). Under Minnesota decisions, the rational basis test requires:

(1) The distinctions which separate those included within the classification from those excluded must not be manifestly arbitrary or fanciful but must be genuine and substantial, thereby providing a natural and reasonable basis to justify legislation adapted to peculiar conditions and needs; (2) the classification must be genuine or relevant to the purpose of the law; that is, there must be an evident connection between the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and the prescribed remedy; (3) the purpose of the statute must be one that the state can legitimately attempt to achieve.

Westling v. County of Mille Lacs, 581 N.W.2d 815, 820 (Minn.1998) (quoting Miller Brewing Co. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Minn.1979)).

“[CJourts are especially deferential in the context of classifications made by complex tax laws.” John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 497 N.W.2d 250, 253 (Minn.1993) (quotation omitted); see also Regan, 461 U.S. at 547, 103 S.Ct. at 2002 (“Legislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes.”). Even where the effect on particular groups within a class is uneven, there is no constitutional violation so long as the basic classification is reasonable. John Hancock, 497 N.W.2d at 253.

Here, the two classifications are settling and non-settling manufacturers. Using the rational-basis test, we first address whether the distinctions between the two are reasonable. Settling manufacturers are making annual payments in perpetuity, while the non-settling manufacturers are not. This provides a reasonable basis for the distinction that is not manifestly arbitrary or fanciful.

As to the second factor, whether the classification is relevant to the purpose of the law, the stated purpose of the law is to discourage the sale of cigarettes at prices attractive to youthful smokers and to compel the non-settling manufacturers to pay fees comparable to the costs incurred by the state from the sale and use of cigarettes. As the state points out, the settling manufacturers are providing annual payments that provide a source of revenue to the state to use for preventative purposes and recovery of health costs and that also force the price of their cigarettes to remain higher and thus less attractive to youthful smokers. Without the cigarette fee, the non-settling manufacturers avoid assuming responsibility for the hidden costs of smoking and can maintain their prices at a lower level. Thus, the classification is relevant to the purposes of the law.

The third prong of the analysis, whether the purpose is something the state can legitimately hope to achieve, is subject to extremely deferential review. Westling, 581 N.W.2d at 822. Unless the purpose is “invidious or arbitrary,” it will be sustained. Id. The purpose of Minn.Stat. § 297F.24 is related to the health and well-being of its citizens, particularly youth, which is a legitimate interest of the state.

The state’s classifications are rationally related to a legitimate state purpose and do not offend either the Equal Protection Clause or the state uniformity clause.

3. Both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution prohibit passage of any bill of attainder. U.S. Const, art. I, § 11; Minn. Const, art. I, § 11. A bill of attainder is defined as “a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial.” Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2803, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977). The prohibition against bills of attainder is grounded in the separation of powers doctrine; it is designed to prevent a legislative body from usurping the role of the judiciary by legislatively determining issues of guilt and punishment. Id. at 469, 97 S.Ct. at 2803.

Generally, a bill of attainder requires proof of three things: (1) singling out or specification of an identifiable individual or group; (2) punishment; and (3) lack of a judicial trial. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 847, 104 S.Ct. 3348, 3352, 82 L.Ed.2d 632 (1984). Although it is not unlawful per se to single out a group for a legislative purpose, it is unlawful to single out a group for punishment based on past conduct. Id. Thus, if a law is intended to legislatively punish an individual or group solely because of past conduct, it is a bill of attainder. Id. But if an affected group can escape the regulation by altering their conduct, the proscription is not a bill of attainder, because it addresses future, not past, conduct. WMX Techs., Inc. v. Gasconade County, 105 F.3d 1195, 1202 (8th Cir.1997).

To determine if a law has a punitive purpose, a court makes three inquiries: (1) whether the law imposes punishment such as death, imprisonment, banishment, confiscation of property, or barring participation in certain employment or occupations; (2) whether the law furthers a non-punitive legislative purpose; and (3) whether the legislative body had a punitive motive in passing the law. Id. at 1202-03.

First, appellants here are not barred from engaging in their chosen occupations. They may sell cigarettes and pay a tax, refrain from selling in the state, or join in the settlement agreement. A legislative prohibition is not a bill of attainder if it can be avoided by simply not engaging in the affected conduct. See Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 856-57, 104 S.Ct. at 3357.

Next, the statute sets forth two primary legislative purposes: to discourage youthful smokers by preventing cigarettes from being too attractively priced and to recover some of the state’s costs resulting from cigarette smoking. Minn.Stat. § 297F.24, subd. 1(b). Neither of these purposes have a punitive intent.

Finally, a legislative body’s punitive motivation can be inferred if the law suggests intent to punish an affected party for past conduct. WMX, 105 F.3d at 1203. Once again, this law applies to future sales of cigarettes and is not based on appellants’ past conduct. Although the law requires appellants to pay taxes not previously imposed on them, “[fjorbidden legislative punishment is not involved merely because [an act] imposes burdensome consequences.” Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472, 97 S.Ct. at 2805.

Because the statute is not punitive in nature and seeks to regulate future rather than past conduct, we conclude that it is not a bill of attainder.

4. Appellants also argue that Minn.Stat. § 297F.24 is unlawful because it violates the prohibition against special legislation. Article 12, section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution states:

In all cases when a general law can be made applicable, a special law shall not be enacted.... Whether a general law could have been made applicable in any case shall be judicially determined without regard to any legislative assertion on that subject. The legislature shall pass no local or special law ... granting to any private corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever.

Although the legislature is prohibited from enacting special legislation, it is nevertheless lawful to create different classes and apply different rules to them, so long as the classification is based on substantial distinctions. In re Tveten, 402 N.W.2d 551, 558 (Minn.1987). In order to determine whether an appropriate classification has been made, the reviewing court applies a three-part rational basis test:

(a) the classification applies to and embraces all who are similarly situated with respect to conditions or wants justifying appropriate legislation; (b) the distinctions are not manifestly arbitrary or fanciful but are genuine and substantial so as to provide a natural and reasonable basis justifying the distinction; and (c) there is an evident connection between the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and the remedy or regulations therefor which the law purports to provide.

Id. at 558-59 (quotation omitted).

This review is similar to the standard applied above on the equal protection/uniformity question. We have already concluded that the classifications in the statute between settling manufacturers, who pay annual fees that subsidize the costs to the state of smoking and act to raise cigarette prices to discourage youthful smokers, and non-settling manufacturers, who do not, create a genuine and substantial distinction tied to a legitimate state interest. As such, Minn.Stat. § 297F.24 is not special legislation prohibited by the Minnesota Constitution.

DECISION

Minn.Stat. § 297F.24 (Supp.2003) does not abridge appellants’ First Amendment rights or violate the Equal Protection and state uniformity clauses and is neither a bill of attainder nor special legislation in violation of the Minnesota Constitution.

Affirmed.

      . Appellants argue that the district court erred by placing the burden of proof on them rather than respondents. When a statute infringes on First Amendment rights, the government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of the statute. Kismet, 617 N.W.2d at 93. This is true even where the restriction impinges on commercial speech, which is generally accorded a lesser standard of protection. State by Humphrey v. Casino Mktg., 491 N.W.2d 882, 885 (Minn.1992). Even assuming, however, that the district court erred in placing the burden of proof on appellants, this court can still evaluate the merits of this appeal, applying the appropriate standard. See id. at 885-86.


author: NEUMANN, Justice.

text:
    2004 ND 163
    STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant v. Krystal HAIBECK, Defendant and Appellee.
    No. 20040060.
    Supreme Court of North Dakota.
    Aug. 9, 2004.

      Brandi Sasse Russell, Assistant State’s Attorney, Bismarck, N.D., for plaintiff and appellant.
    Michael R. Hoffman, Bismarck, N.D., for defendant and appellee. ■
   NEUMANN, Justice.

[¶ 1] The State appeals from the trial court’s order granting Krystal Haibeck’s motion to suppress evidence related to four counts against her, and the trial court’s subsequent order dismissing those four counts. We reverse with regard to the suppression of physical evidence and the order of dismissal, and we remand for determination of which statements, if any, should remain suppressed.

I

[¶ 2] On July 5, 2003, eighteen-year-old Krystal Haibeck was a passenger in a vehicle driven by nineteen-year-old Angelique Waliser. Highway Patrol Trooper Robert Arman stopped the vehicle for exceeding the speed limit and detected the odor of alcohol after he approached the vehicle. Once he approached the vehicle, Officer Arman also recognized Haibeck from an arrest for an underage alcohol violation several days earlier. Officer Ar-man questioned Waliser in his patrol car, where he confirmed Haibeck’s identity. Officer Arman also conducted a field sobriety breath test of Waliser, which showed she had consumed alcohol, At that point, Officer Arman cited Waliser for minor in consumption or possession of an alcoholic beverage and speeding. He also informed Waliser that he would be searching her vehicle incident to the arrest.

[¶ 3] Officer Arman then approached Haibeck and removed her from the vehicle. He placed Haibeck in the patrol car for questioning after returning Waliser to her vehicle. Officer Arman later testified he continued to detect the odor of alcohol while speaking with Haibeck. Upon questioning, Haibeck admitted to drinking. During this time, another officer searched Waliser’s vehicle, but failed to discover any contraband.

[¶ 4] While questioning Haibeck, after the officer searched Waliser’s vehicle, Officer Arman noticed a necklace around Haibeck’s neck that appeared to be a marijuana pipe; he questioned her about it. Haibeck confirmed it was used for marijuana. Officer Arman detected the odor of marijuana emanating from the necklace and also noticed that it contained fresh residue.

[¶ 5] After speaking with Haibeck further, Officer Arman conducted a second search of the vehicle and found a razor and a plastic vial with methamphetamine residue inside Haibeck’s purse. When confronted with the contraband, Haibeck confirmed the residue was, in fact, methamphetamine. Officer Arman also found marijuana among Hai-beck’s belongings. Haibeck and Waliser were then driven into Bismarck, where Waliser was released. While driving, Officer Arman mentioned to Haibeck that he “should Mirandize her” and then asked, “do you know your rights, Krystal?” Haibeck stated, “yes.” Haibeck was taken to Burleigh County Detention Center, where Officer Arman arranged for her to be released after booking. Haibeck was charged with minor in consumption or possession of an alcoholic beverage, possession of marijuana paraphernalia, possession of marijuana, possession of methamphetamine, and possession of methamphetamine paraphernalia.

[¶ 6] Haibeck moved to suppress the physical evidence of the contraband and her statements, contending Officer Arman had failed to issue a Miranda warning before questioning her and searching the vehicle. The trial court granted the suppression motion and dismissed all four drug-related counts after holding Haibeck had not been properly advised of her Miranda rights during a police investigation.

[¶ 7] The State appeals, contending the trial court erred when it granted the motion to suppress. The State argues the search of Waliser’s vehicle was reasonable under either the automobile exception to the warrant requirement or a$ a search incident to arrest. In addition, the State appeals from suppression of Haibeck’s statements.

II

[¶ 8] We have previously set forth our standard when reviewing a trial court’s motion to suppress:

When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to the district court’s findings of fact and resolve conflicts in testimony in favor of affirmance. We affirm the district court’s decision unless we conclude there is insufficient competent evidence to support the decision, or unless the decision goes against the manifest weight of the evidence.

State v. Gregg, 2000 ND 154, ¶ 19, 615 N.W.2d 515 (citations omitted). “The question of whether the facts found by the trial court meet a legal standard ... is a question of law which is fully reviewable.” State v. Steinmetz, 552 N.W.2d 358, 360 (N.D.1996). In the context of a warrant-less search of an automobile, “determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 698, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996).

[¶ 9] All searches and seizures must be reasonable, under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution. State v. Utvick, 2004 ND 36, ¶ 15, 675 N.W.2d 387. Under the warrant requirement, generally, “[w]hen an individual reasonably expects privacy in an area, the government must obtain a search warrant.” State v. Dunn, 2002 ND 189, ¶ 4, 653 N.W.2d 688. “A warrant cannot issue except upon probable cause. Absent an exception to the warrant requirement, the exclusionary rule mandates suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the protection against searches conducted without a warrant because they are per se unreasonable.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Winkler, 552 N.W.2d 347, 351-52 (N.D.1996). In the context of a warrant-less search, “the lawfulness of the search depends upon whether it falls within one of the well-recognized and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Lange, 255 N.W.2d 59, 62 (N.D.1977); see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991) (holding, “[sjearches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”). If no such exception applies, “evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches must be suppressed as inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.” Dunn, 2002 ND 189, ¶ 4, 653 N.W.2d 688.

A

[¶ 10] One such exception is known as the “automobile exception.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 155, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). Under the automobile exception, “ ‘contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched for without a warrant’ where probable cause exists.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999) (quoting, Carroll v. United States, at 153, 45 S.Ct. 280). Specifically, under Carroll, “[t]he measure of legality of such a seizure is ... that the seizing officer shall have ... probable cause for believing that the automobile ... has contraband.... ” Carroll, 267 U.S. at 155-56, 45 S.Ct. 280. See also State v. Gregg, 2000 ND 154, ¶ 33, 615 N.W.2d 515 (holding, “if the search of an automobile without warrant is made upon probable cause, based upon a reasonable belief arising out of the circumstances known to the officer — that the automobile contains articles which are subject to seizure — the search is valid”); State v. Meadows, 260 N.W.2d 328, 330 (N.D.1977) (holding, “[t]he search of an automobile, with or without a warrant, must be made upon probable cause, based upon a reasonable belief arising out of the circumstances known to the officer, that the automobile contains articles which are subject to seizure”).

[¶ 11] The automobile exception allows officers to search the belongings of passengers and driver alike:

If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search. [This applies] broadly to all containers within a car, without qualification as to ownership.

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 301, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999) (emphasis omitted).

[¶ 12] When searching a vehicle, the warrant requirement is excused “primarily because vehicles are inherently ‘mobile’ and can be ‘quickly moved’ out of the jurisdiction.” State v. Garrett, 1998 ND 173, ¶ 19, 584 N.W.2d 502 (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50-51, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970)). We also stated in Garrett, “searches of vehicles may be made under circumstances where searches of buildings would not be allowed because of the ambulatory character of automobiles, the lesser expectation of privacy as to automobiles, and the fact that automobiles are often within the plain view of officers.” Id. at ¶ 14.

[¶ 13] Generally, before an officer may stop a moving vehicle for investigative purposes, the officer must have “an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a law has been or is being violated.” City of Fargo v. Sivertson, 1997 ND 204, ¶ 9, 571 N.W.2d 137. However, “traffic violations, even if considered common or minor, constitute prohibited conduct and, therefore, provide officers with requisite suspicion for conducting investigatory stops.” State v. Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 7, 662 N.W.2d 242. Indeed, “[a]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).

[¶ 14] In this case, Officer Arman observed Waliser’s vehicle traveling 52 miles per hour in a 40-mile-per-hour-construction zone. The violation of the speed limit supports Officer Arman’s stop of Waliser’s vehicle. Once he approached Waliser’s vehicle, Officer Arman detected the odor of alcohol and learned both Waliser and Haibeck were under the legal drinking age. Officer Arman also recognized Haibeck from an arrest for an underage alcohol violation several days earlier. “[A] police officer may draw inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). Officer Arman removed Waliser from the vehicle and administered a field Breathalyzer test, which revealed Waliser had consumed alcohol, a fact she later admitted. Officer Arman also removed Haibeck from the vehicle, where he testified he continued to smell alcohol. Officer Arman administered a field Breathalyzer test, which showed Haibeck had been drinking alcohol that day. Haibeck also admitted the same to Officer Arman.

[¶ 15] Based on all of these circumstances, the officer had probable cause to believe the car contained additional contraband and properly searched the vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Therefore, both the search of the vehicle and subsequent seizure of contraband were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution. The trial court improperly suppressed the contraband seized from the vehicle during the search, which includes methamphetamine, methamphetamine paraphernalia, and marijuana.

B

[¶ 16] Haibeck asserts that all contraband in the vehicle was illegally seized because it was not found until the second search of the vehicle, which she contends occurred after Officer Arman failed to issue her a Miranda warning. The initial search, performed by another officer, revealed no contraband. However, we conclude this is inconsequential. Both searches are supported by the existence of probable cause and valid under the automobile exception. We do not necessarily believe the officer needed separate findings of probable cause to support each search of the vehicle, considering the searches were virtually contemporaneous. Officer Arman’s initial observations regarding the odor of alcohol and age of the passengers likely supports each of the searches and subsequent seizure of the drug evidence. However, even if a separate finding of probable cause was required for the second search, this was surely satisfied by the discovery of Hai-beck’s necklace, which was a marijuana pipe emanating a marijuana smell.

Ill

[¶ 17] Haibeck’s necklace, later confirmed to be a marijuana pipe, was not found within the vehicle and, therefore, is not subject to the automobile exception. However, we conclude the trial court improperly suppressed this evidence.

[¶ 18] After Haibeck was taken back to Officer Arman’s patrol car for questioning, they had the following exchange:

Officer: What’s that on the necklace?
Is that a pipe?
Krystal: Yes.
Officer: A marijuana pipe?
Krystal: Yes.

[¶ 19] Haibeck argues her response to Officer Arman’s question, affirming the nature of the necklace as a marijuana pipe, requires suppression of that statement evidence, including the necklace and subsequent discovery of drug contraband, because she was not given a proper Miranda warning.

[¶ 20] Whether Haibeck was entitled to a Miranda warning depends on whether she was considered to be in police custody at the time of questioning,

The constitutional triggers requiring Miranda warnings are custody and interrogation. State v. Helmenstein, 2000 ND 223, ¶ 13, 620 N.W.2d 581 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). When a person is in custody and being interrogated by law enforcement, the individual must be apprised, or warned, of his or her rights.

Red Paint v. State, 2002 ND 27, ¶ 10, 639 N.W.2d 503 (citation and quotations omitted); State v. Fields, 294 N.W.2d 404, 407 (N.D.1980) (holding, “custody is the determinative factor in deciding if the.Miranda warnings are required.”). However, this analysis is unnecessary for our purposes. Even if we were to assume that Haibeck was in custody for Miranda purposes, and there was no timely Miranda warning, suppression is inappropriate.

[¶ 21] The United States Supreme Court has recently stated that a Miranda violation does not require “suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect’s unwarned but voluntary statements.” U.S. v. Patane, — U.S. -, -, 124 S.Ct. 2620, 2624, 159 L.Ed.2d 667, - (2004). In Patane, the Court reasoned that:

[T]he Miranda rule is a prophylactic employed to protect against violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause. The Self-Incrimination Clause, however, is not implicated by the admission into evidence of the physical fruit of a voluntary statement. Accordingly, there is no justification for extending the Miranda rule to this context....

Patane, at 2626. There is no indication Haibeck’s statements were involuntary, as examined under the standard for determining voluntariness:

The totality of the circumstances must be examined to determine voluntariness. The inquiry focuses on two non-determinative elements: (1) the characteristics and conditions of the accused at the time of the confession, including the age, sex, race, education level, physical or mental condition, and prior experience with police; and (2) the details of the setting in which the confession was obtained, including the duration and conditions of . detention, police attitude toward the defendant, and the diverse pressures that sap the accused’s powers of resistance or self-control.

See State v. Syvertson, 1999 ND 134, ¶ 20, 597 N.W.2d 652. Therefore, the trial court improperly suppressed evidence of the necklace.

IV

[¶ 22] Because we have determined the automobile exception applies in this case, it is unnecessary to consider the State’s argument related to search incident to arrest, another exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

V

[¶ 23] On appeal, the State argues Hai-beck’s statements were improperly suppressed, despite the trial court’s finding that they were taken in violation of her Miranda rights. We remand this issue to the trial court for determination of when Haibeck was in police custody, for Miranda purposes, and further determination of which statements, if any, should be suppressed.

[¶ 24] Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, “[n]o person ... shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself....” This privilege against “compelled self-incrimination,” requires that:

The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or incul-patory, stemming from custodial interrogation of [a] defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.

State v. Fasching, 453 N.W.2d 761, 762-63 (N.D.1990) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)).

[¶ 25] As we stated above, whether such a warning is legally required depends on whether a suspect is considered to be within police custody and subject to interrogation. Red Paint, 2002 ND 27, ¶ 10, 639 N.W.2d 503.

The test of custody is formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. The custody test is objective and does not depend on the arresting officer’s subjective motive or thoughts.
... When evaluating whether a person was in custody, the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation.

State v. Helmenstein, 2000 ND 223, ¶¶ 13-14, 620 N.W.2d 581 (quotations and citations omitted). “If the police take someone into custody and question that person without warning about this basic constitutional right, the responses cannot be used as evidence to establish guilt.” Fasching, 453 N.W.2d at 763. Again, however, physical fruits of the statements are admissible. U.S. v. Patane, — U.S. —, —, 124 S.Ct. 2620, 2624, 159 L.Ed.2d 667, — (2004). Officer Arman did not mention a Miranda warning until after all of the drug evidence had been seized, while driving Haibeck to the Burleigh County Detention Center:

Officer: How long you been doing meth? I should Mirandize you. You know your rights, Krystal?
Haibeck: Yes.
Officer: You have the right to remain silent. You have the right to an attorney. How long have you been using meth?

[¶ 26] The trial court found that Hai-beck was under custodial interrogation almost immediately after he placed her in his patrol car, before either search of the vehicle. According to the trial court, Hai-beck was under custodial interrogation when Officer Arman “verified the odor of alcohol coming from her, [because] she simply wasn’t free to go as she was subject to arrest.” The fact that Officer Arman may have had authority to arrest Haibeck does not mean that she was in custody for purposes of Miranda. State v. Murray, 510 N.W.2d 107, 110 (N.D.1994) (holding, “the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation”).

[¶ 27] A person is not in custody for Miranda purposes merely because her freedom of movement is restrained by a police officer during a traffic stop. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); see also Fasching, 453 N.W.2d at 763. In Berkemer, the United States Supreme Court stated the “noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not ‘in custody’ for the purposes of Miranda.” Id. at 440,104 S.Ct. 3138. Traffic stops are brief compared to lengthy station house interrogations, and occur in the “public view,” an atmosphere far “less police dominated” than custodial interrogations at issue in Miranda. Id. at 437-39, 104 S.Ct. 3138.

[¶ 28] The temporary detention of an individual in a traffic stop is more analogous to a Terry stop than to a formal arrest and custody. Id. at 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138. During this temporary detention, a person is not in custody for Miranda purposes. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439-40, 104 S.Ct. 3138; see also Fasching, 453 N.W.2d at 763.

[¶29] During the second search of Waliser’s vehicle, Officer Arman informed Waliser and Haibeck, “[d]o me a favor. Let’s not be talking on that [cellular phone] cuz you’re both under arrest right now.” At this point, there is no doubt Haibeck was in custody for Miranda purposes, under the reasonable person standard. Therefore, we conclude any statements Haibeck made after that point should be suppressed. Specifically, Hai-beck’s exchange with Officer Arman with regard to the methamphetamine, marijuana, and paraphernalia found in the vehicle should be suppressed:

Officer: [While searching the passenger side of Waliser’s vehicle] Say, Krystal, mind telling me about your white powder and your razor blade?
Haibeck: Yeah.
* * * *
Officer: And what would it be? We got meth or is it going to be coke?
Haibeck: Meth.
Officer: Which bag is yours back there [in Waliser’s trunk], Krystal?
* * * *
Officer: Wanna go back? We’re going to take a look at that [Krystal’s bag],
Haibeck: Yup.
Officer: OK, nothing else back here, ma’am?
Haibeck: No.
Officer: This is the only thing that’s yours?
Haibeck: And I forgot about that weed, otherwise I would have told you.
Officer: What about the meth?
Haibeck: That, too. I know I have a problem.

[¶ 30] However, we remand for the trial court to determine the specific moment Haibeck was in custody for Miranda purposes, so as to determine which other statements should properly be suppressed. After Officer Arman verified the odor of alcohol emanating from Krystal, but before he informed her she was under arrest, a lengthy exchange took place between Officer Arman and Haibeck.

Officer: What’s that on the necklace? Is that a pipe?
Haibeck: Yes.
Officer: A marijuana pipe?
Haibeck: Yes.
Officer: And were you smoking today?
Haibeck: [Inaudible]
Officer: Wanna stick your tongue out, Krystal? Yeah, you were smoking today.
Haibeck: I said I was.
Officer: What are we gonna do with you? How many times do I need to have to arrest you, Krystal?
Haibeck: This will be the last time.
* * * *
Officer: We are definitely going to be giving you guys rides. The question is, do I need to take you and have you bond out, Krystal?
Haibeck: I can’t bond out.
Officer: You can’t bond out; that means you’re sitting till Monday. So, are you gonna maybe learn from this little, oh, ah, debacle we’ve had again, tonight?
Haibeck: Yeah, actually I have an appointment on Monday.
Officer: For?
Haibeck: The Freedom Center.
Officer: For the alcohol or the marijuana?
Haibeck: Both.
Officer: Krystal, I’m finding it hard to believe there is no marijuana in the car. So I’m gonna, I’m gonna search the stuff. Is there anything else I have to worry about?
Haibeck: No.

[¶ 31] The trial court, as fact-finder, should determine the point at which Hai-beck was under custodial interrogation, under the standard set forth above. Based on that finding, the trial court should determine which statements made by Haibeck to Officer Arman should be suppressed.

VI

[¶ 32] The trial court’s order granting suppression of evidence and its order dismissing the case are reversed, and this case is remanded for determination of which statements, if any, should remain suppressed.

[¶ 33] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, C.J., WILLIAM A. NEUMANN, DALE V. SANDSTROM, MARY MUEHLEN MARING, and CAROL RONNING KAPSNER, JJ., concur.


author: LAVORATO, Chief Justice.

text:
    P.D.S.I. (3M Midwest Drivers) and Travelers Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Carolyn PETERSON, Surviving Spouse of Wayne Peterson, Appellee.
    No. 03-0260.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Aug. 11, 2004.

      William D. Scherle and Aaron T. Oliver of Hansen, McClintock & Riley, Des Moines, for appellants.
    Thomas J. Reilly of Thomas J. Reilly Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, and E.J. Kelly and Erin Q. Pals of Hopkins and Huebner, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
   LAVORATO, Chief Justice.

The interim workers’ compensation commissioner (commissioner) found that claimant’s husband died from a work-related heart attack. The commissioner granted claimant death benefits but denied her claim for penalty benefits. The employer and its insurer sought judicial review in the district court and the claimant cross-appealed. The district court affirmed on both appeals. The employer and its insurer appeal from that decision, and the claimant cross-appeals. We affirm.

I. Background Facts.

Wayne Peterson was an over-the-road truck driver for P.D.S.I., which leased drivers to 3M Companies to haul 3M’s freight. Peterson spent five to six days per week on the road with a driving partner.

Peterson and Russell Mersman were driving partners and had been such for two years. The drivers were paid by the hour and by the mile, so Peterson and Mersman tried to keep the truck running twenty-four hours per day because that is how they and the company made the most money.

The pair followed a regular routine when they were on the road together. The drivers changed at 4 a.m., 12 noon, and 8 p.m., and each driver would drive for an eight-hour shift with time off for sleeping and eating meals.

On October 12, 1997, Peterson and Mersman started their final road trip together. They met in Ames to pick up the first trailer to deliver. According to Mers-man, it was an average week, and they were not under any particular scheduling or delivery pressure. Early in the week, Peterson had complained to Mersman that he was experiencing cold symptoms, including chest congestion, and that he did not feel well. Despite these symptoms, Peterson maintained the normal driving routine he and Mersman had established for themselves for the prior two years.

The evidence shows that on October 16, Peterson was off duty 5.5 hours, he was in the sleeper berth for 11 hours, he drove 6.5 hours, and he was on duty but not driving for 1 hour. On that day he drove 377 miles, which was within the normal range expected of a professional over-the-road truck driver.

Some time before 2:30 p.m. on the 16th, Peterson telephoned the company dispatcher, Lee Olson. Olson’s telephone log noted the following:

Wayne Peterson at Greenville said he wasn’t feeling good yesterday and not much better today. Has lung congestion and coughing a lot. Thought it might have been something to do last week with a drop and hooking of trailer, or it might be from when they were broke down on the road and were in a wet, cold type of weather and maybe it’s cold from that. He didn’t ask to get switched through to Jan to report it. When I asked him if he wanted to report it, he said he’ll see how he feels later on, or might have to get off in Des Moines en route to Hutch.

According to Olson, he said to Peterson during that call:

“If you’re feeling sick in any way, I need you to go right now, get to any medical facility you want to, the soonest one and get checked out and call and give us an update of what is going on with you.”

As a dispatcher, Olson had company authorization to give drivers permission to seek necessary medical treatment.

At approximately 2:30 p.m. on the same day, Peterson again telephoned the company dispatcher. Olson’s log noted the following:

Wayne Peterson en route from Decatur to Hutch on Route 155 at Cornersville, TN complaining of shortness of breathing and breath problems. Said same occurrence at Greenville yesterday but not as bad as today. Will get off in Des Moines on Friday and get to the doctor for observation and call us with update of his condition. Mersman will single tail end of route.

During this second call, Olson said, “Wayne, you have the right[,] right now[,] to go to any medical facility and get checked out. You should do that.” Peterson said he would ride it out until he reached Des Moines.

Following this conversation, Peterson drove from 3:30 p.m. until 8 p.m., when they reached Marion, Illinois. From 8 p.m. until 9 p.m., Peterson and Mersman were off duty and ate dinner together at a truck stop in Marion. At 9 p.m., Peterson went to the sleeper berth.

Sometime during the early morning hours of the 17th, Peterson emerged from the sleeper. According to Mersman, Peterson was sweating profusely and having trouble breathing. Peterson said, “I’m sick. I got to get to the hospital.” Mers-man drove five miles to a truck stop in Kingdom City, Missouri, where an attendant called 911 and requested an ambulance. After the ambulance arrived, paramedics transported Peterson to Callaway Community Hospital in Fulton, Missouri. Later, Peterson was flown to the University Hospital at Columbia, Missouri for cardiac care.

At the latter hospital, Peterson was diagnosed as having suffered a myocardial infarction (heart attack). Despite efforts to treat Peterson, he died five days later on the 22nd. The cause of death was listed as septic shock, extensive bilateral pneumonia, and secondary cause as acute myocardial infarction with cardiogenic shock.

II. Proceedings.

Peterson’s widow, Carolyn Peterson (claimant), filed a workers’ compensation petition on September 9, 1999, against P.D.S.I. and its insurer, Travelers Insur-anee Company (collectively “employer”). The petition alleged the claimant was entitled to death benefits as a result of “her husband’s work-related death.” Later, the claimant filed an amended petition seeking penalty benefits for benefits unreasonably delayed or denied. She alleged she had not received any payments in the two years and ten months since her husband’s death.

The deputy commissioner who heard the matter awarded the claimant the following benefits: .714 weeks of temporary total disability benefits ($599.88 per week) for the time the decedent was hospitalized pri- or to his death, death benefits ($599.88 per week for life or until remarriage), medical expenses ($2309.00), and burial expenses ($2845.75). See Iowa Code §§ 85.27, .28, .31, .33 (2001). The deputy also ordered the employer to pay $12,000 to the Second Injury Fund of Iowa. See id. § 85.65. Accrued benefits were to be paid in a lump sum with interest. See id. § 85.30. The deputy denied the claimant’s request for penalty benefits. See id. § 86.13.

The employer appealed the deputy’s decision to the Iowa workers’ compensation commissioner. The claimant cross-appealed, contesting the award of medical expenses based on a scrivener’s error. She further contested the denial of penalty benefits.

The commissioner corrected the amount of medical expenses, increasing it to $65,594.25, but otherwise affirmed the deputy’s decision.

The employer filed a petition for judicial review, challenging the commissioner’s decision awarding death benefits, and the claimant cross-appealed the decision denying penalty benefits. The district court affirmed the commissioner’s decision on the appeal and cross-appeal.

The employer appealed and the claimant cross-appealed. We set out additional facts in connection with the issues we discuss.

III. Issues.

An employee with a pre-existing heart condition or defect may recover for a heart attack occurring on the job upon a showing of legal and medical causation. Riley v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., 532 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa Ct.App.1995). Proving both prongs establishes that the injury arose out of the employment. A claimant establishes legal causation under any one of the following circumstances:

(1) [when] heavy exertions ordinarily required by the job are superimposed on a defective heart, aggravating or accelerating the previous condition; (2) unusually strenuous employment exertion is superimposed on a preexisting diseased condition; or (3) damage results from continued exertion required by the employment after the onset of the heart attack symptoms.

Wilson v. Good Will Publishers, 671 N.W.2d 479, 480-81 (Iowa 2003). We have found medical causation when the employee’s continued driving after the onset of his symptoms materially aggravated and accelerated the impact of the myocardial infarction. Varied Enters., Inc. v. Sumner, 353 N.W.2d 407, 410 (Iowa 1984).

Although the claimant must establish both legal and medical causation, we limit our discussion to the legal causation issue because the employer concedes medical causation exists. There was evidence from two medical experts that Peterson suffered his myocardial infarction while on the road on October 16. Additionally, these experts opined that Peterson’s continued driving after the onset of heart attack symptoms materially and substantially aggravated his myocardial infarction and thus was a significant causal factor in his death.

At issue in this appeal is the third test for legal causation: damage results from continued exertion required by the employment after the onset of heart attack symptoms. Concerning this test for legal causation, the commissioner relied on Varied Enterprises, Inc. v. Sumner, 358 N.W.2d 407 (Iowa 1984). In Varied Enterprises, the claimant — an over-the-road truck driver — suffered a myocardial infarction while driving a truck pursuant to his employment.

The issues in Varied Enterprises were whether there was substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s findings that (1) the claimant felt impelled to continue driving despite his physical discomfort because of his concern about the effect of lost time on his probationary status with his employer, and (2) the claimant’s actions in continuing to drive after the onset of the myocardial infarction materially aggravated the effect of the myocardial infarction. The court noted that the “impelled-to-continue” challenge appeared to be tied to the court’s reference in Sondag v. Ferris Hardware, 220 N.W.2d 903 (Iowa 1974), to the following observation:

The most obvious relevance of this element [continuing exertion after symptoms] is in showing causal connection between the obligations of the employment and the final injury; for if the workman, for some reason, feels impelled to continue with his duties when, but for these duties, he could and would have gone somewhere to lie down at once, the causal contribution of the employment to the aggravation of the condition is clear.

Varied Enters., 353 N.W.2d at 409 (alteration in original) (quoting 1A A. Larson, The Lato of Workmen’s Compensation § 38.64(c), at 7-145 (1972)).

The commissioner in the case before us noted that in Varied Enterprises the court held (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that claimant felt impelled to continue driving because of the rather shaky nature of his probationary status with his employer, (2) contrary to the employer’s and insurer’s contention, the claimant was not absolutely required to have known there was a health deprivation in order to make a heart attack claim compensable, and (3) the claimant’s actions in continuing to work after he sustained a myocardial infarction materially aggravated the effect of his underlying heart attack.

Following the Varied Enterprises analysis, the commissioner here found that Peterson continued to work after he sustained a myocardial infarction and that he was impelled to continue working. The commissioner therefore concluded the claimant had established that Peterson engaged in continued exertion once he sustained the heart attack and for that reason proved the third test for legal causation. Finally, the commissioner found that the claimant had established medical causation based upon testimony that Peterson’s continued driving after the onset of his myocardial infarction materially and substantially aggravated the infarction.

On the issue whether Peterson felt impelled to continue driving, the district court noted that both the deputy and the commissioner found that Peterson was impelled to continue working. That finding, the district court noted, appeared to be based on a subjective evaluation of Peterson’s state of mind. Thus, the district court injected the issue of whether a subjective or objective feeling of the employee is contemplated by the impelled-to continue language, concluded that the subjective feeling of the employee controlled, found there was substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s finding that Peterson subjectively felt impelled to continue working, and affirmed the commissioner’s ruling.

The issue here on legal causation has now morphed into whether a subjective or objective standard is to be applied in determining whether the employee was impelled to continue working. The district court contrasted the two standards by adopting the following definitions:

objective standard. A legal standard that is based on conduct and perceptions external to a particular person. In tort law, for example, the reasonable-person standard is considered an objective standard because it does not require a determination of what the defendant was thinking.
subjective standard. A legal standard that is peculiar to a particular person and based on the person’s individual views and experiences. In criminal law, for example, premeditation is determined by a subjective standard because it depends on the defendant’s mental state.

Black’s Law Dictionary 1413 (7th ed.1999).

Following up on the district court’s characterization of the issue, the employer contends here that the district court should have applied an objective standard to determine whether a reasonable person in Peterson’s situation would have believed he was required to continue working. In that regard, the employer argues Peterson was told to get medical care and not to proceed if he did not want to. Therefore, the employer concludes, Peterson could not have been impelled to continue working. But, if Peterson was impelled to continue, it was for personal gain or a mistaken belief, in which case, the injury was not compensable.

Also at issue here is whether there was substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s conclusion that Peterson felt impelled to continue driving following the onset of heart attack symptoms.

The cross-appeal presents the issue of whether there was substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s decision to deny penalty benefits.

IV. Scope and Standards of Review.

Iowa Code chapter 17A governs judicial review of the workers’ compensation commissioner’s decisions. Iowa Code § 86.26. In this case the commissioner rendered his decision on June 11, 2002. Therefore the 1998 amendments to Iowa Code chapter 17A apply. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Caselman, 657 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Iowa 2003).

When it exercises its judicial review power, the district court acts in an appellate capacity. Mycogen Seeds v. Sands, 686 N.W.2d 457, 463 (Iowa 2004). Our review of the district court’s decision requires us to apply the standards of Iowa Code section 17A.19(10) to determine whether the conclusions we reach are the same as those of the district court. Id. at 464. If they are the same, we affirm; otherwise we reverse. Id. at 464.

In this case, the issues involve the agency’s application of case law, its factual determinations, and its application of the law to the facts. Here, as mentioned, the first issue centers on legal causation-damage resulting from continued exertion required by the employment after the onset of heart attack symptoms. The second issue concerns the claimant’s entitlement to penalty benefits.

The proof required to establish both legal causation and entitlement to penalty benefits requires a legal interpretation. The legal causation test has resulted from case law development and does not appear in statutes covering workers’ compensation. The entitlement to penalty benefits flows from statute and our interpretation of the statute.

We see nothing in the workers’ compensation statutes that convinces us that the legislature has delegated any special powers to the agency regarding its interpretation of case law or statutes. So the agency’s interpretation has not “clearly been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(c). We therefore need not give the agency any deference regarding its interpretation, and we are free to substitute our judgment de novo for the agency’s interpretation. See id. § 17A.19(10)(c), (11)(6); see also Mycogen, 686 N.W.2d at 464.

As to the agency’s factual determinations regarding legal causation and whether the claimant is entitled to penalty benefits, such determinations are “clearly vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(/'); see also Mycogen, 686 N.W.2d at 464. We are therefore bound by the agency findings of fact if “supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole.” Id.

Substantial evidence is
the quantity and quality of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact are understood to be serious and of great importance.

Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(l).

“When that record is viewed as a whole” simply means

that the adequacy of the evidence in the record before the court to support a particular finding of fact must be judged in light of all the relevant evidence in the record cited by any party that detracts from the finding as well as all of the relevant evidence in the record cited by any party that supports it....

Id. § 17A.19(10)(f)(3).

Finally, the application of the law to the factual determinations in workers’ compensation cases is “vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency.” Id. § 17A.19(10)(f); see also Mycogen, 686 N.W.2d at 464. We can therefore only reverse the agency’s application of the law to the facts if we determine such an application was “irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(to ); see also Mycogen, 686 N.W.2d at 464.

With these principles in mind, we now turn to the issues in this case.

V. Analysis.

A. Background. To understand how the concept of “impelled to continue” has crept into our workers’ compensation law as an independent test for legal causation, we need to revisit Sondag v. Ferris Hardware, 220 N.W.2d 903 (Iowa 1974).

In Sondag, this court discussed two concepts of work-related causation under which a claimant with a pre-existing heart condition was permitted to recover. The first concept involved a situation where the work ordinarily requires heavy exertions which, superimposed on an already-defee-tive heart, aggravates or accelerates the condition, resulting in a compensable injury. 220 N.W.2d at 905 (citing Littell v. Lagomarcino Grupe Co., 235 Iowa 523, 17 N.W.2d 120 (1945)). To prove this, the claimant has to show the employment contributed an exertion greater than that of non-employment life. Id.

Under the second concept, compensation is allowed when the medical evidence shows an instance of unusually strenuous employment exertion, imposed upon a preexisting diseased condition, resulting in a heart injury. Id. (citing Guyon v. Swift & Co., 229 Iowa 625, 295 N.W. 185 (1940)).

The claimant in Sondag had experienced chest pains in the past, particularly on the heavy exertion frequently required by his employment. Id. at 904. Eventually, he was diagnosed as having angina pectoris and nitroglycerin was prescribed. Id. Almost a year following this diagnosis, the claimant started having chest pains on the job while unloading washing machines weighing 300 to 400 pounds. Id. He continued this strenuous activity for about an hour following the onset of his pain. Id. He finally told his employer he could not continue working and was taken to the hospital where he was diagnosed as suffering from a myocardial infarction. Id.

The claimant in Sondag never tried to medically prove a compensable injury under the first concept. Id. at 906. Rather he tried to prove his activity on the date in question causally contributed to his injury. Id. However, his medical experts would not make that connection, resulting in the commissioner concluding the claimant had failed to prove he had sustained a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. Id. In response to this finding, the court said:

Apparently the devastating dearth of the evidence in this regard caused the commissioner to virtually overlook the un-controverted medical evidence [medical opinion in response to hypothetical question] that claimant’s continuing to work after the coronary onslaught would have aggravated the effect of the obstruction in the heart artery.

Id. at 906.

The court then made the following pronouncement:

It has long been legally recognized that damage caused by continued exertions required by the employment after the onset of a heart attack is compensa-ble. The industrial commissioner so held under facts strikingly similar to those in this case ... [citing a commissioner decision and a commissioner’s biennial report]. This concept has found application in the following representative cases from other jurisdictions ... [citing state and federal cases].

Id.

In further support of this pronouncement the court cited the following:

The most obvious relevance of this element [continuing exertion after symptoms] is in showing causal connection between the obligations of the employment and the final injury; for if the workman, for some reason, feels impelled to continue with his duties when, but for these duties, he could and would have gone somewhere to lie down at once, the causal contribution of the employment to the aggravation of the condition is clear.

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 1A Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law § 38.64(c), at 7-145).

Unfortunately, the italicized language in the above quote from this treatise became the impelled-to-continue test in future cases and overshadowed the simple rule that damage caused by continued exertion required by the employment after the onset of a heart attack is compensable. Varied Enterprises, Inc. v. Sumner, 353 N.W.2d 407 (Iowa 1984), was the first case to apply the impelled-to-continue test. This court stated, however, that the impelled-to-continue “example” was not “an absolute requirement that a claimant be motivated to continue working in the face of a known health deprivation in order to produce a compensable situation.” Varied Enters., 353 N.W.2d at 409.

Wilson v. Good Will Publishers, 671 N.W.2d 479 (Iowa 2003),- is our latest ease employing the impelled-to-continue test. In that case, we affirmed the commissioner’s finding that the claimant failed to establish legal causation for his workers’ compensation claim, although he asserted that he felt impelled to keep working while traveling for his employer after he suffered a heart attack. Wilson, 671 N.W.2d at 481-82. We held evidence that the claimant (1) did not feel he would lose his job if he stopped for medical attention, (2) was free to seek medical attention whenever he felt ill, and (3) was not under orders to continue working after his symptoms began supported the commissioner’s finding that the claimant did not meet the impelled-to-continue test. Id. at 482.

In Wilson, we expressly left open the question whether the impelled-to-continue test is judged by a subjective or objective standard. Id. As mentioned, this objective versus subjective standard is the fighting issue on this appeal, an issue the district court injected into this case. The issue demonstrates how far off the mark we are from a workers’ compensation standpoint and the simple rule this court announced in Sondag.

Based on our review of Sondag, we conclude this court did not intend the impelled-to-continue language to be an independent test for establishing legal causation. Rather, as clearly demonstrated in Sondag, the impelled-to-continue language was intended as an explanation of the third test for establishing legal causation: damage, results from continued exertion required by the employment after the onset of heart attack symptoms.

We think the language “exertion required by the employment” was meant to mean exertion required by the job duties— in this case, driving — and not exertion required because the employer is requiring or demanding such exertion. The latter interpretation — exertion required because the employer is requiring or demanding such exertion — puts the onus on the employee to prove his or her continuing to work was required by the employer despite the employee’s symptoms. Such an interpretation underlies our decisions in Varied Enterprises and Wilson and is one the employer is suggesting here. This interpretation is fault-based, which has no place in workers’ compensation law. Finally, we note that none of the cases cited in Sondag for. the third test of legal causation even mention the impelled-to-continue language. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Johnson, 278 F.2d 200 (6th Cir.1960); S. Stevedoring Co. v. Henderson, 175 F.2d 863 (5th Cir.1949).

• For all these reasons, in this and future cases, we abandon any analysis based on the notion that the impelled-to-continue language is a requirement for establishing legal causation under the third test in heart attack cases arising out of the workers’ compensation law. Where, as here, liability is based on the third test of legal causation, we simply focus on the language “damage results from continued exertion required by the employment after the onset of heart attack symptoms.” “Required by the employment” simply means exertion required by the job duties and not exertion specifically required or demanded by the employer in the face of the employee’s illness or symptoms. Thus, if the evidence shows that the employee for some reason — whatever that reason might be— continues with his or her job duties, then any aggravation of a heart attack suffered by the employee while performing those duties, which is attributable to that exertion, is compensable.

As mentioned, the commissioner found that despite the symptoms Peterson was experiencing, he continued driving. The commissioner also found that Peterson suffered a myocardial infarction while on the road, and that his continued driving after the onset of heart attack symptoms materially and substantially aggravated his myocardial infarction and thus was a significant causal factor in his death, a finding the employer does not dispute. We conclude there was substantial evidence to support these findings. The commissioner was therefore correct in determining that the claimant established both legal and medical causation, entitling the claimant to benefits. The district court was likewise correct in affirming the commissioner’s decision on this issue.

That brings us to the final issue in the case.

B. Penalty benefits. In her cross-appeal, the claimant contends she is entitled to penalty benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 86.13 because of the employer’s failure to pay death benefits. That provision pertinently provides:

If a delay in commencement or termination of benefits occurs without reasonable or probable cause or excuse, the workers’ compensation commissioner shall award benefits in addition to those benefits payable under this chapter ... up to fifty percent of the amount of benefits that were unreasonably delayed or denied.

Iowa Code § 86.13.

Under this provision, an injured employee is entitled to penalty benefits unless the employer proves a reasonable cause or excuse for the delay or denial. Christensen v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 554 N.W.2d 254, 260 (Iowa 1996).

A reasonable cause or excuse exists if either (1) the delay was necessary for the insurer to investigate the claim or (2) the employer had a reasonable basis to contest the employee’s entitlement to benefits. A “reasonable basis” for denial of the claim exists if the claim is “fairly debatable.”

Id.

The claimant contends the employer never filed a First Report of Injury until two years after Peterson’s death even though it had knowledge of his death and the spouse’s claim several weeks after Peterson’s death. (Peterson died on October 22, 1997; the employer prepared the First Report of Injury on October 23, 1997 and filed it on September 30, 1999.) Pursuant to Iowa Code section 86.11, the employer is required to file the report within four days after having notice of the employee’s death. The claimant also contends that the employer had a duty to investigate the circumstances of Peterson’s death but never conducted one. Because the employer failed to file a timely First Report of Injury and never investigated, the claimant argues the employer had no reasonable basis to deny the claimant’s claim.

The commissioner denied the penalty benefits claim, finding:

In the present case, penalty benefits are not warranted. There is a fairly debatable claim involved. Work place injuries involving heart attacks are always complicated questions of fact and law. These types of cases require both legal and medical causation. It was not unreasonable for [the employer] to deny payments for benefits, given claimant’s family history, lifestyle, and personal problems. [The employer is] not liable for penalty benefits.

We agree. There is substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s findings. Because the employer might not have investigated or filed the First Report of Injury in a timely manner does not change the fact that there was a fairly debatable question. Finally, we cannot say that the commissioner’s application of the law to the facts here was irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. The commissioner was therefore correct in denying the claimant’s claim for penalty benefits, and the district court was correct in affirming the commissioner’s decision on this issue.

VI. Disposition.

In sum, we hold that there was substantial evidence in the record when the record is viewed as a whole to support the conclusion, that the claimant established both legal and medical causation regarding the aggravation of the myocardial infarction that Peterson suffered, thereby entitling the claimant to benefits. We therefore affirm the district court judgment affirming the commissioner’s decision on this issue.

There was also substantial evidence in the record before the court when the record is viewed as a whole to support the commissioner’s finding that the claimant was not entitled to penalty benefits. We therefore affirm the district court judgment affirming the commissioner’s decision on this issue as well.

AFFIRMED ON APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL.