author: ■ Mr. Chief Justice TANEY

text:
    The United States, Appellants, v. The Heirs of Boisdoré. Same, Appellants, v. The Heirs of Powers. Same, Appellants, v. The Heirs of Turner.
    In 1824, Congress passed an act (4 Stat. at Large, 52), entitled “ An act enabling the claimants to lands within the limits of the State of Missouri and Territory of Arkansas to institute proceedings to try the validity of their claims.”
    The second section provided that, in “ all cases, the party against whom the judgment or decree of the said District Court may be finally given, shall be entitled to an appeal, within one year from the time of its rendition, to the Supreme Court of the United States ”; and the fifth section enacted that any claim which shall not be brought by petition before the said courts within two years from the passing of the act, or which, after being brought before the said courts, shall, on account of the neglect or delay of the claimant, not be prosecuted to a final decision within three years, shall be for ever barred.
    In 1844, Congress passed another act (5 Stat. at Large, 676), entitled “ An act to provide for the adjustment of land claims within the States of Missouri, Arkansas, and Louisiana, and in those parts of the States of Mississippi and Alabama, south of the thirty-first degree of north latitude, and between the Mississippi and Perdido Rivers.”
    It enacted, “that so much of the expired act of 1824 as related to the State of Missouri be, and is hereby, revived and reiinacted, and continued in force for the term of five years, and no longer; and the provisions of that part of the aforesaid act hereby revived and reenacted shall be, and hereby are, extended to the States of Louisiana and Arkansas, and to so much of the States of Mississippi and Alabama as is included in the district of country south of the thirty-first degree of north latitude, and between the Mississippi and Perdido Rivers.”
    The act of 1824, revived and reenacted by the act of 1844, did not expire in five years from the passage of the act of 1844, so far as regards appeals from the District Court to this court. It will continue in force until all the appeals regularly brought up from the, District Courts shall be finally disposed of.
    The first two of these cases were appeals from the District Court of Mississippi. One of them, viz., The United States v. The Heirs of Boisdoré, was the same case in which a motion to dismiss was made at the preceding term, as reported in 7 Howard, 658.

      The third was an appeal from the District Court of Louisiana.
    A motion was now made to dismiss the whole three, upon a ground which was common to them all, viz., that the act of 1844, reviving and reenacting the act of 1824, continued it in force for the term of five years, and no longer; and that, as the act was passed on the 17th of June, 1,844, it expired upon the 17th of June, 1849. By reason of which expiration, it was alleged, this court had no longer any jurisdiction over the case.
    By an act of June 17th, 1844, (5 Statutes at Large, 676,) entitled “An act to provide for the adjustment of land claims within the States of Missouri, Arkansas, and Louisiana, and ih those parts of the States of Mississippi and Alabama south of the thirty-first degree of north latitude, and between the Mississippi and Perdido Rivers,” it is enacted, “That so much of the expired act of the 26th of May, 1824, entitled ‘ An act to enable claimants to land within the State of Missouri and Territory of Arkansas to institute proceedings to try the validity of their claims,’ as related to the State of Missouri,.....be and is hereby revived and reenacted, and continued in force for the term of five years, and no longer; and the provisions of that part of the aforesaid act, hereby revived and reenacted, shall be and hereby are extended,” to the States of Louisiana, Mississippi, <fcc., “ in the same way, and with the same rights, powers, and jurisdictions, to every extent they can be rendered applicable, as if these States had been enumerated in the original act hereby revived, and the enactments expressly applied to them, as to the State of Missouri; and the District Court and the judges thereof, in each of these States, shall have and exercise the like jurisdiction over the land claims in their respective States and districts, originating with either the- Spanish, French, or British authorities, as by said act was given to the court and the judge thereof in the State of Missouri.”
    The act of the 26th of May, 1824, thus revived and reenacted, (4 Statutes at Large, 52,) after describing the classes of cases embraced within its provisions, prescribes, that the claimants shall present a petition to the District Court, setting forth their claims; that proper parties, including the district attorney, shall be made; that the proceedings shall be conducted according to the rules of a cou -t of equity; and that the said court shall have power to hear and determine the questions arising in the cause, and to make a decree. It then, in the latter part of the second section, enacts : — “ And in all cases, the party against whom the judgment or decree of the said District Court may be finally given shall be entitled to an appeal, within one year from the time of its rendition, to the Supreme Court of the United States, the-decision of which court shall be final and conclusive between the parties; and should no appeal be taken, the judgment or decree of the said District Court shall, in like manner, be final and conclusive.”
    By the fifth section it is enacted “ that any claim to lands} tenements, or hereditaments, within the purview of this act, which shall not be brought by petition before the said courts within two years from the passing of this act, or which, after being brought before the said courts, shall, on account of the neglect or delay of the claimant, not be prosecuted to a final decision within three years, shall be for ever barred, both at law and-in equity; and no other action at common law, or proceeding in equity, shall ever thereafter be sustained, in any court whatever, in relation to said claims.”
    In the three cases/above mentioned, petitions had been filed in the respective courts, and the district judge confirmed the claims to the several petitioners. The United States appealed to this court.
    The motion to dismiss was sustained by Mr, Volney Howard and Mr. Henderson, and opposed by Áfr. Gillet and Mr. Johnson (Attorney-General). ■ i
    The motion and brief, as filed by Mr. Henderson, were as follows.
    The appellees have presented their respective motions tb dismiss these cases, in form as follows: -—

      “ And now at this term come the appellees, by attorney, and move the court to dismiss this case, because the court has no jurisdiction thereof, in this, to wit:: — That the court from which this case is brought here by appeal had but a limited and special jurisdiction of the cáse in virtue of two acts of Congress, the one of date 17th June', '1844, entitled ‘ An act to provide for the adjustment of land claittis- within the States of Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, and'those'párts of the States of Mississippi and Alabama south of the 3'lst degree of' north latitude, and between the Mississippi arid Perdido Rivers,’ and which said act revived á certain other expired act therein recited of date 26th May, 1824, for five years arid no longer, and during the operative existence of which two acts, the decree in this case was pronounced.: ! And bbcausé by virtue of which said act of 1824, so revived as aforésáíd, and by no other law or authority whatever, this court was “assigned to have a like special jurisdiction of this case by' appeal; but which act, so revived as aforesaid, ceased and expired On the 17th of June, 1849, by express legislative limitation, without any saving clause for the adjudication of cases then pending.”
    Assuming the facts to be as set forth in this motion, we contend that there is now no law in force giving to this court jurisdiction of these cases, or of supplying any rule by which it can review them ; and the same must therefore be dismissed.
    It is well settled, that this court has no general jurisdiction in matters of appeal. That unless Congress authorize an appeal by statute, none can be entertained. 11 Pet. 165, 166 ; 3 How. 104; 6 Pet. 495 ; 1 Cranch, 212; 3 Cranch, 159; 6 Cranch, 307; 3 Dali. 321, 327; 1 How. 268; 3 How. 317; 7 Wheat. 38; 3 Pet. 193 ; 7 Pet. 568.
    It is equally well settled, that the United States have no greater claim to assert the right of appeal, or any other legal right as a litigant, than a citizen has; and have no right of appeal unless expressly accorded to them by act of Congress. 6 Pet. 494; 11 Pet. 165, 166.
    If, therefore, it be shown that the appeal given by the statute of 1824 was special, and had its origin with that statute, and that the statute conferred a special and peculiar jurisdiction, appellate as well as original, and ■ that said statute has expired or is repealed, we suppose the legal conclusion of such showing to b.e demonstrative in favor of our motion to dismiss, unless some other law be shown to sustain the appeal.
    A mere glance at the records and decrees in these cases, show them to have been adjudicated in pursuance of the authority conferred by these two statutes. And the reading of the statute of 1824 will certify the speciality of the jurisdiction it confers in every section.
    It is special as to the States to which it applies, being but five in number. Special as to the classes .of cases it submits for trial; and even excepts one case of the classes submitted.
    It is special in designating the court to have cognizance of the cases, and directing the mode of procedure. Selecting the District Courts of the United States, which have no general chancery jurisdiction, and directing them to adjudicate the cases in accordance with equity practice.
    It is peculiarly special, also, in enlarging the field of equity power in the latitude given for the.decision of these cases. Submitting thern tó/be adjudged in “conformity with the principles of justice,” and “according to the law of nations; the stipulations of any treaty, and proceedings under the same; the several acts of Congress in relation thereto; the laws and ordinances of the government from which it (the title) is alleged to have been derived'; and all other questions properly arising between the claimant and the United States.”

      .It is strikingly special in, permitting the citizen to implead and litigate with the government.
    The rules of evidence are special; the common law. rales being relaxed in these cases.
    The statute submitted, also, legal and complete titles to be tried under equitable rules.
    The decree to be pronounced was special in its recitals and requirements.
    The powers of the court were peculiarly special, also, in being permitted to decree the survey of the claims adjudged, though affecting the public domain.
    And the operation and effect of the decree are also singularly special, when, after adjudging the title of the petitioner in his favor, it deprived him of so much of the claim as the United States had previously disposed of, and turned him over for reclamation upon the public lands: the decree, to this extent, thus operating as land scrip.
    The time allowed for an appeal from decrees pronounced under this statute is special, being limited to one year.
    Such are a portion of the peculiar and special rules under which proceedings in these cases have been carried on, and the decrees pronounced, pursuant to the act of 26th May, 1824, and while it was in force. And such only must be the rules by which this court can review and revise these cases, if it ■ assumes to review them at all. It must be certainly requisite, then, if this court is to review these cases by these rules, (being the rules by which the court below adjudged them,) the rules themselves must have vitality, and be in force. Because, from no other laws and from no other source of authority, can these rules be invoked, but from the act of 1824. But this act, by the special limitation of the act of 1844, which revived it, was prescribed in the precise measure and duration of its operative existence; and the act again became functus on the 17th of June, 1849.
    This act, therefore, which conferred specially all the jurisdiction this court could ever entertain of these cases, is now as if it had never been, except as to the rights it conferred, consummated, or established, while in force.
    This court, then, can have no right to retain these cases upon its docket, because it has no rule, law, or authority in existence by which it can try and adjudge them. In other words, the jurisdiction by which it was contemplated this court should have cognizance of these cases was wholly special, and the law which conferred it is extinct, and has ceased to be a rule. And this conclusion we think clearly sustained by the following authorities. Miller’s case, 3 Burr. 1456; 1 Hill, 328-336; 2 Pet. 523, 524; 5 Mart. (La.) 463; 4 Wend. 211; 6 Wend. 526; 1 Watts, 258; 4 Yeates, 392; 17 Louis. R. 478; Dwarris on Statutes, 676 ; 4 Maun. <fc Ryl. 586 - 588; 9 Barn. & Ores. 750; 12 Moore, 357-359; 4 Moore & Payne, 341, 351; 4 Bingh. 212.
    We consider the court has already construed this statute of 1824 as conferring a special jurisdiction, as well as special remedy. United States v. Curry, 6 How. 113. And see 6 Pet. 493 and 11 Pet. 165, 166.
    Congress, too, in extending this act of 1824, by the act of 24th May, 1828, (4 Stat. at Large, 298,) obviously discovers its opinion, that, with the expiration of the law, the jurisdiction also terminated.
    And so, too, in repealing the bankrupt laws of 1800 and of 1841. In both instances, Congress inserted a saving clause, to save jurisdiction in cases pending at the time of the repeal; and without which, doubtless, those cases would have fallen with the repeal.

      Mr. Gillet

    said it was not his purpose to controvert the correctness of the positions laid down in the cases cited for the motion. If there was no statute in force conferring jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court, he should not contend that these appeals could be heard. Nor should he insist that the Judiciary Act conferred any such power. It was found in the act of 1824, or did not exist at all. It has been contended, that this act expired in five years from its approval, and was revived June 17,1844, for five years only, and is not now in force. He denied the correctness of this assumption, and took issue upon it. The second and fifth sections of the act of 1824 contain limitations upon the claimant, as to the time within which the petition shall be presented, and the cause heard and an appeal taken. The residue of the act is without limitation. As a whole, it is as permanent as any other statute. An examination of its provisions, and especially sections 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 11, will prove this. The fifth section contains an important limitation, while the seventh contains an important provision applicable to all bonds not determined to belong to claimants. There is no limitation upon the jurisdiction of this court, when <a cause is lawfully brought here. The act of 1844 revived and continued in operation provisions relating to proceedings in the court below only.
    But if we are in error in this view of the statute, then these appeals, having removed the causes from the court below, cannot be sent back to that court. If there is no law empowering this court to hear and determine them, then it has no power to act upon them at all, and it can perform no act which will entitle either party to any advantage which they did not possess, and could not enforce, on the day when'the revival act of 1S44 expired. To dismiss the appeal, and thereby furnish evidence that the causes had not been lawfully-brought here under the act, would lay the foundation for the claimants to contend that it was never properly made, and that they were therefore entitled to patents under the décision- -of the district judge.

      Mr. Johnson (Attorney-Géneral)
    -said,'-that, if the construction given to these laws upon-’ the other sidé was correct, the result would be that they could stand upon the decree below as a final decree. But all these land -law's did not contemplate that the decree of the court beloAV was to be final, in case either party chose to appeal; and we had obtained an appeal when it was properly taken even upon the showing of the other side, and when this court had undoubted jurisdiction over the case. Let us look into the act of 1824, and then examine what part of it was revived. The dispute is, Avhether the jurisdiction of this court, when once attached, stopped when five years expired after the passage of the act of 1844. • If we had now a case before us arising under the act of 1824 alone, Avithout any other act having been passed, this court could decide it and settle the controversy, provided the appeal had been taken in proper time.

      (Mr. Henderson said he conceded that.)
    Then if the opposite counsel concedes that, I think that the other consequences for which I contend must follow. What Avas the character of the act of 1824 ? It describes the claims which are to be presented, the notice to be given, the proceedings to be had, the principles by Avhich the decision is to be governed, and states the reasons for granting an appeal to this court. The claimant had a year to decide whether he would appeal or not. The District Attorney was directed to consult the Attorney-General whether or not an appeal should be taken in case the decision was adverse to the United .States. If no appeal Avas taken, the decree below was final. If the claimant succeeded, a copy of the decree was to be presented to the land office, and he would receive his patent. If he succeeded by the judgment of this .court, he was to present the certificate of the clerk of this court to the land office, before he could receive a patent. But how was this to be done, if the jurisdiction of this court Avas to cease after the expiration of five years from the passage of the act of 1844? It is admitted, that, under the act of 1824, the jurisdiction of this court would not have ceased. Therefore, the opposite counsel must contend that the two acts are not alike ; and yet the act of 1844 extends the act of 1824 “ in the same way, and with the same rights, powers, and jurisdictions to every extent they can he rendered applicable.” Suppose a party were to put off the trial of his cause in the court below until a late period, or the court was so pressed with business that the case could not be taken up^ or that, the District. Attorney could not immediately report to the Attorney-General, a decree .might be passed for millions which, would be irrevocably lost to the government; and yet it is admitted that this would not have been so under the act of 1824. These laws have always looked to a supervision, by this court, of. the .decree of the District Court ; and if the opposite counsel are right, this act of 1844 is an exception to all the laws, and Congress have committed a. palpable blunder. . •
    But reliance is placed by the opposite counsel upon the phraseology of the act of 1844, namely; that the act of 1824 is continued in force for the term of five years and no longer. What has this court said about the samé expression in another law? The act of 24th May, 1828, (4 Stat. at Large, 298,) was to continue in force until the 26th of May, 1830, and no longer;. and yet cases were decided here long after that day. This very question was involved and decided in those cases. If the court had no jurisdiction and the appellate power had éxpired, all these judgments are void. The titles will be lost to thousands of acres, which are now held under these judgments.
   ■ Mr. Chief Justice TANEY

delivered the opinion of the court.

• A motion has been made to dismiss this case, for want of jurisdiction in this court to hear' and decide it.

It appears that a petition was filed by the appellees in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi, pursuant to the acts of Congress of May 26, 1824, and of June 17, 1844, praying to have confirmed to them a large tract of land, which they claimed under a concession or grant which they alleged .had been made to their ancestors, by the Spanish authorities.

The petition was filed on February 1, 1845, and on the 12th of November, 1847, the district judge passed his decree confirming the concession; and on the same day the United States appealed to this court. The motion is made to dismiss, upon the ground that the act of 1844, which extended to the State of Mississippi the act of 1824, and reenacted it as to claims in that State, limited the duration of both acts to five years and no longer, and that both of these acts, so far as concerns such claims, expired on the 17th of June, 1849; and this court having no appellate jurisdiction, unless conferred on it by act of Congress, and having derived the jurisdiction it heretofore exercised in cases of this description altogether from the laws above mentioned, its power in this respect ceased when the laws expired ; and there being no act of Congress now in force authorizing it to review the decree of the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, the appeal of the United States ought to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

It is true that this court can exercise no appellate power over this case, unless it is conferred upon it by . act of Congress. And if the laws which gave it jurisdiction in such cases have expired, so far as regards claims in the State of Mississippi, its jurisdiction over them has ceased, although this appeal was actually pending in this court when they expired.

But the court is of opinion that the act of 1824, reenacted by the act of 1844 for the State of Mississippi and the other States mentioned in that law, has not expired so far as regards appeals from the District Courts to this court; that it is still in full force, and unless repealed by Congress will continue in force, until all the appeals regularly brought up from the District Courts shall be finally disposed of.

The act of 1824 originally extended only to the Spanish and French grants in the State of Missouri, and the then Territory of Arkansas. It contains no clause limiting- generally the duration of the law. The fifth section limits the time within which the claimant's may file their petitions to two years, and gives the petitioner three years from the time his petition is brought before the District Court, to prosecute it to a final decision in that court; but by the second section either party may appeal to this court, within twelve months from the time of the final decree in the District Court. And as many of the cases might and most probably would be decided in the latter period of the five years within which the party is required to present his claim and- prosecute it to a final decision, it is evident that the jurisdiction of this court to hear and determine the appeal was not intended to be limited to the same period. And as there is (no clause of limitation applying to the whole act, nor as to the time within which this court shall exercise the appellate power conferred on it, the act of 1824, in this respect, is a perpetual one ; and if any appeal were at this day depending, which had been regularly brought up from the State of Missouri or the Territory of Arkansas, the court would' have jurisdiction to hear and decide it.

This construction of the original act of 1824 is, indeéd, not disputed. But it is insisted that it is otherwise when taken in connection with the act of 1844, which reenacted it for the States therein mentioned, in one of which this case has arisen. And it is contended that the duration of the whole act of 1824, as thus reenacted, including the appellate jurisdiction of this court, is restricted to five years from the enactment of the law.

This construction cannot be maintained. In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy. And it was evidently the intention of the act of 1844 to place the claims under Spanish and French grants in the States therein mentioned upon precisely the same footing with the claims in Missouri and the Territory of Arkansas, and to give the claimants the same rights and remedies, including the right to appeal to this court. For it declares in express terms, that the act of 1824 shall be extended to them, “ in the same way,-and with the same rights, and powers, and jurisdictions to every extent they can be rendered applicable, as if these States had been enumerated in the original act thereby revived; find the enactments expressly applied to them, as to the State of Missouri.” Now, if they had been in-eluded in- the original act, and the enactments applied to them as-to the State of Missouri, it is admitted that the appellate jurisdiction of this court would not be limited to five years. And if it would not, it necessarily follows that it is not limited by the act when reenacted and extended by the law of 1844. For if it .were to be so limited, and the jurisdiction of this court ceased in five years, the rights and powers and jurisdictions in relation to the claimants in these States would be different from what they would have been if they had been included in the original law. Such a construction would in effect take away the jurisdiction of this court, and deprive each party of the right to appeal within twelve months in the cases decided in the last year of the five, and would make the appeal in almost every case inefficient and nugatory. Certainly, there could be no reason-of policy or justice for making such a difference in the jurisdiction of this court indifferent classes of similar eases; nor could such have been intended. The error of the appellees appears to have arisen from what is evidently an inaccuracy of language in the act of 1844, when it speaks, in the beginning of the enacting clause, of “so much of the-expired act of 1824” as related to the State of Missouri. Now the act of 1824, as we have already said, had not expired, and is still in force. But the fifth section of the act, which gave the claimant two years from the date of the law to file his petition, and three more to bring it to a final decision, had expired. And the whole context and provisions of the act of 1844 show that it was the intention of the legislature to revive this portion of the act of 1824, and to give to the claimants in the States there mentioned, as it had given to those in the State of Missouri, five years to establish their claims, and to subject them in other respects also to the same regulations and jurisdictions in prosecuting them in the courts of the United States- And the expression, “ so much of the expired act of 1824,” should/have been, “ so much of the act of 1824 as had then expired,” in order to make this clause consistent with the residue of the act. This evident inaccuracy ought not, however, to embarrass the court in expounding the act, which, taken altogether, is sufficiently plain in its objects and intention, as well as in its language.

The motion to dismiss this appeal must therefore be overruled.

The cases of The United States v. The Heirs of Powers, and The United States v. The Heirs of Turner, stand upon the same grounds, and the motions to dismiss them must therefore be disposed of in like manner.

Order.

On consideration of the motion made by Mr. Henderson, of counsel for the appellees, on a prior day of the. present term of this court, to wit, on Friday the 14th instant, to dismiss this cause for the want of jurisdiction, and of the arguments of counsel thereupon had, as well against as in support of the said motion, it is now here ordered by this court, that the said motion be, and the same is hereby, overruled.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Chief Justice TANEY Mr. Justice DANIEL.

license: Public Domain

text:
    John H. Bennett, Plaintiff in error, v. Samuel F. Butterworth.
    Where a plaintiff in the court below filed a petition for the recovery from the defendant of four slaves, whose value he alleged to be $2,700, and the jury found a verdict for.the plaintiff '• for $ 1,200, the value of the negro slaves in suit,” and the plaintiff thereupon released the judgment for $ 1,200, and the court adjudged that he recover of the said defendant the said slaves, the case is within the appellate jurisdiction of this court.
    The plaintiff averred in' his petition, that the slaves were worth $-2,700, and by his releasing the judgment for $ 1,200. the only question before this court is the right to the property. And as the defendant below prosecuted the appeal, the plaintiff’ cannot be allowed to deny here the truth of his own averment of the value of the property in dispute.
    This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the District Court of the United States for the District of Texas. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
    A motion was made to dismiss it for want of jurisdiction, because the sum or matter in- controversy was not of the value of two thousand dollars.
    The motion to dismiss was sustained by Mr. Hughes and Mr. Howard, and opposed by Mr. Harris.

    •The reasons in support of the motion were the following.
    The counsel for Butterworth move to dismiss the writ of error, because the sum or matter in controversy is not of the value of two thousand dollars. Bennett’s counsel, on this motion, have taken affidavits to show the negroes to be worth two thousand dollars and upwards.
    We contend, for the .defendant in error, that the affidavits cannot be read: —
    1. Because they contradict the verdict of the jury, which is a part of the record. The error complained of is, that the court erred in giving judgment for the negroes, instead of for the value assessed by the jury; while, on the other side, it is insisted that the judgment was right, and properly for the negroes. The matter then in controversy is the negroes and their value. If the court should be of the opinion, that judgment in the court below could only have been rendered for the value assessed, -then the judgment will be reversed, and judgment rendered on the verdict below for that value ; and thereby the plaintiff in error, by proving by affidavits what is insisted upon to be the true value, will get off with paying the twelve hundred dollars, though, by his own shoAving, the value is more than two thousand dollars. Such a result as this will certainly not be tolerated. Could the matter be so arranged that, in'the event the judgment is reversed, a judgment could be rendered for the true value, it might be otherwise; for then in truth the matter in controversy in the Supreme Court would be of the value of two thousand dollars; but, as it stands, the plaintiff may be enabled to get clear of a delivery of the negroes, but in no event can be compelled to pay what he says is the true value.
    2. Because the judgment in the court below was for the plaintiff; and theft judgment it is which, by the writ of error, is in controversy in the Supreme Court; and upon an affirmance of the judgment below, if the affirmed judgment would be for the value of $ 2,000 or more, then the court would have jurisdiction ; but in the case, in any event, there cannot be a judgment for more than twelve hundred dollars, or for the negroes, which the record proves to be of the value of $ 1,200, and the court cannot take jurisdiction. Gordon v. Ogden, 3 Peters, 33; Smith v. Honey, 3 Peters, 469; Knapp v. Banks, 2 How. 73.
    3. Mr. Justice Story says, —“ To support the jurisdiction, it is necessary- that it appear upon the face of the record, or upon affidavits to be filed by the parties, that the sum or value in controversy exceeds f> 2,000, exclusive of costs.” Hagan v. Foison, 10 Peters, 160.
    When the value appears upon the face' of the record, that record must be the only evidence; but when it is silent, evidence aliunde may be looked to. When the plaintiff' in his declaration or petition claims more than two thousand dollars, and the judgment is for the defendant below, the. court has jurisdiction; because, as 'the court say in Gordon v. Ogden, the whole sum claimed “ may be still recovered; and, consequently, the whole sum claimed is still in dispute.” But the same court say, in the same case, “ If the writ of error- be brought by the defendant in the original action, the judgment of this court can only affirm that of the Circuit Court; and consequently, the matter in dispute cannot exceed the amount of the judgment.”
    From these rules it would seem that the record, when containing on its face evidence of the value, is conclusive.
    The rule as to affidavits was adopted of necessity, and applies only in cases where the record does not furnish evidence of the value. This is shown by the case in which the rule was first laid down. See Williamson v. Kincaid, 4 Dallas, 20.

      Mr. Harris against the motion.
    The counsel for the defendant in error have moved.to dismiss the writ of error, because the sum or matter in controversy is not of the value of two thousand dollars. But the same counsel admits in court, that, when the judgment was rendered, the slaves in controversy were worth more than said sum.
    He contends, however, that affidavits to that effect cannot be read: —
    1. Because they would contradict the verdict of the jury.
    2. Because the judgment of the court below was for the plaintiff for property which the record proves to be only of the value of twelve hundred dollars.
    And, in support of these positions, he cites the cases of Gordon v. Ogden, 3 Peters, 33; Smith v. Honey, Ibid. 460 ; Knapp v. Banks, 2 Howard, 73; Hagan v. Foison, 10 Peters, 160; and Williamson v. Kincaid, 4 Dallas, 20.
    Now, for the plaintiff in error it is contended, that these authorities do not sustain the position taken in the brief of the counsel for the defendant in error. In the first three cases, it was impossible to prove that the sum in controversy amounted to more than two thousand dollars, for judgments were rendered for money; in the first instance, for the sum of four hundred dollars; in the second, for only one hundred dollars; and in the thircl, for $ 1,720. In the fourth and fifth cases', the amount did not appear upon the face of the record, and the court held that the plaintiffs in error might prove by affidavits that the-value of the property in controversy, in these respective causes, amounted to more than the sum of $2,000. And it maybe remarked, that, in the three cases cited first above, the only’ question was whether the sum claimed in the count,- or that which was recovered, ought to be regarded as the amount in controversy ; and to which sum the court should look in order to determine the question of jurisdiction. And the onus of proving that the value of the property amounted to more than two thousand dollars rested upon the plaintiff, (who had alleged that its value, was $2,700,) and not upon the defendant in the court below. Now, for the first time, the burden of making that proof rests upon the defendant in that court, and he is prepared to make it.
    It is respectfully suggested, that there can be produced no decision of this court refusing to permit the plaintiff in error to make such proof. And to deny the privilege, under the imposing circumstances of this case, would, we contend, be to deny to the plaintiff and the defendant a mutuality of rights under the statute, the benefits of which we are seeking to obtain.
    The case of The United States v. The Brig Union, 4 Cranch, 216, bears a resemblance to this, and in that the court permitted affidavits to be read to prove the value of the property in controversy; see, also, Wilson v. Daniel, 3 Dallas, 401.
    It is further contended, that the éffect claimed for this verdict ought not to be conceded to it, for that it is illegal, and that it ought to have been set aside in the court below. It, will be seen, by reference to the plaintiff’s petition, — particularly to the prayer thereof, — that this suit was brought for the recovery of the slaves “ in specie” (not for the recovery of their value,) and for damages for their unlawful detention. The important issue, viz. whether the right of property was in the plaintiff or the defendant, was, in the verdict of the jury, entirely omitted. See Coffin v. Jones, 11 Pick. 45.
    2. It did not embrace all the issues which it should have done. See Crouch v. Martin, 3 Blackford, 256; Patterson v. United States, 2 Wheat. 221: Jewett v. Davis, 6 N. Hamp. 518.
    3. It should have found the value of each of the slaves separately.
    II. We further contend, that the judgment is illegal, because it is not responsive to the verdict.
    And it is contended, on the part of the plaintiff in error, that he ought not to be estopped from proving the value of the property in controversy by a verdict which is Illegal, and is not responsive to the issues : nor by a judgment which is entirely foreign to the verdict. Estoppels are not favored in law, because they tend to exclude the truth. That such would be the case here cannot be questioned. Again, estoppels, like contracts, must bind both parties, or they will bind neither.
    Each court is the guardian of its own jurisdiction. Kendrick v. McQuary, Cooke, 480. And this proposition may be said to be universally correct in regard to appellate courts, established for the purpose of reexamining causes tried in inferior tribunals, and to correct the errors which may be there committed.
   Mr. Chief Justice TANEY

delivered the opinion of the court.

The court have considered the motion made in this case to dismiss the writ of error for want of jurisdiction. From the mode of judicial proceeding adopted in Texas, the motion presents a new question, and one that is not free from difficulty.

The suit is not brought in any of the forms of action known to the common law. It is instituted by petition; and the plaintiff in the court below seeks to recover four slaves,-which he alleges are his property, and are detained from him by the defendant. The value of each slave is averred separately in the petition, the whole amounting to two thousand seven hundred dollars. The verdict of the jury is as follows: —

“We the jury find for the plaintiff twelve hundred dollars, the Value of the negro slaves in suit, with six and a quarter cents damages.”

And the record states, that thereupon the plaintiff released the judgment for twelve hundred dollars in open court; and the court adjudged that he recover of the defendant the said slaves and the damages assessed by the jury, and his costs.

This proceeding appears to be a substitute for the common law action of detinue, and resembles it in many respects. In that action, if the jury find that the property belongs to • the plaintiff, and is detained from him by the defendant, they ought to find at the same time the value of each separate article in dispute, and the judgment of the court is that the plaintiff recover the property, or the value thereof as • found by the jury, provided he cannot obtain possession-of the property, together with his damages and costs. Upon such a judgment a writ of error certainly would not lie, when the value assessed by the jury was less than two' thousand dollars. For the value of the property in dispute would be fixed'by the verdict and the judgment of the court, and both parties would be bound by it.

But in the case' before us, the finding of the - jury and the judgment of the court differ from the proceedings in an action of detinue. The gross value of the four slaves is found by the jury, and not the separate value of each of them. 'And the value as found forms no part of the judgment of the court. The plaintiff was permitted to release it, -— and although it is said in the record that he released the judgment for this sum, yet it appears that no judgment was rendered for it, and that it was released before any was given.

The judgment of the District Court therefore décides nothing more than the right to the property specified in the petition; and whether- that judgment is erroneous or not is all that this court can examine into upon the writ of error. The sum which the plaintiff below (who is the defendant in error here) is entitled to recover, if the property is placed beyond his reach and he fails to. obtain possession of it, can form no part of the judgment of this court. The only matter in controversy is the four slaves ; and their actual value, whatever it may be, is the value of the matter in dispute.

Now if the. judgment of the District Court had been for. the defendant, the plaintiff would evidently have been entitled to 'maintain a writ of error. And as he sues for the specific property, and avers the value to be $2,700, he would have been entitled to the writ, even if he had laid his damages for the detention below $ 2,000. For the averment of value when he sues for property shows the value of the thing in controversy, as much as the averment of debt or damage, when he sues for money. And when he has rejected the value found by the jury, and refused .a judgment for it, and is not bound by that finding, can he bind the defendant to it, and thereby deprive him of his' writ of error, upon the ground that the property in dispute is .not worth $ 2,000?

This is-the question upon the motion before us.

In cases where the plaintiff sues for- money, and claims in his pleadings a larger sum than $ 2,000, and obtains a judgment for a smaller amount, the sum for which the judgment is rendered is the only matter in controversy,- when the defendant brings the writ of error. Because, if the plaintiff rests satisfied with it, and takes no step to reverse it, he is bound by it as well as the defendant-. Both parties, therefore, stand upon an equal footing in that respect. But if the plaintiff brings the writ of error upon the ground that he is entitled to more than the judgment was rendered for, then his averment in his declaration shows the amount he claimed; and as that claim is the matter for which he brings suit, he is entitled to the writ of error if that claim appears to be large enough to give jurisdiction to this court. These principles have been settled in this court by the cases referred to in the argument.

In the case before us, the plaintiff avers in his petition that the slaves for which the suit is brought are worth $2,700. The right to these slaves must be the only matter in controversy here, whether the writ of error is .sued out by the plaintiff or the defendant. If by the plaintiff, he would undoubtedly be entitled to it, upon the ground that the property in dispute, and which he is seeking to recover in this suit, is claimed to be worth more than $ 2,000 ; and he would be entitled, under the decisions of this court, to rely on the averment in his petition, to show that the amount in value of the slaves he claimed is sufficient to give jurisdiction to this court. Can he, then, be permitted to deny here the truth of his own averment, when precisely the same thing — the same property — is the matter in controversy upon the writ of error brought by the defendant? We think not. And as by his release he prevented a judgment from being entered, fixing the value, as between these parties in this suit, at $ 1,200, the averment in his petition must be regarded .as determining the amount in controversy upon a writ of error brought by either plaintiff or defendant. Consequently, this court has jurisdiction upon this writ, and the motion to dismiss it must be overruled. '

Mr. Justice DANIEL.

In the opinion of the court pronounced in this cause I am unable to concur, regarding that opinion as reconcilable vfith neither the act of Congress (Judiciary Act, § 22) regulating the jurisdiction of this court, nor with the fundamental rules of pleading and evidence, but as in contravention of both. ' This cause is in effect, and in form except with regard to the frame of the petition, corresponding with the declaration at common law, in all its details and proceedings, an action of detinue for the recovery of four slaves. In every such action, the authorities tell us that it is requisite to describe the property demanded with so much certainty, that it may be delivered up in specie; and it was ruled by the older cases, that, where the property consisted of several articles, the plaintiff must show the value of each particular article, and not state the aggregate value. Subsequently, however, it has been ruled that the declaration may mention the separate value of each article, or it may state the value in gross; and this appears to be the established doctrine in England at this day. See Com. Dig., tit. Pleader (2 X 2). So in 1 Chitty on Pleading, p. 377, it is said, that, “ in actions for injuring or taking away goods or chattels, it is in general necessary that their quality, quantity, or number, and value or price, should be stated ; the assigned reason is, that a former recovery could not else be pleaded in bar to a second action for the same goods; neither could the defendant properly defend himself.” Then with respect to the verdict and judgment, to be rendered in the action of detinue, the law is thus given in Com. Dig., tit. Pleader (2 X 12): —“ The judgment against the defendant shall be for the recovery of the thing detained vel valorem inde and costs ; and if judgment be upon confession non sum informatus, demurrer, &c., a writ of inquiry shall be awarded to inquire of the values. And after judgment, if a distringas goes ad deliberandum bona, and the defendant does not, the plaintiff shall have damages taxed by the inquest, so that it lies in the defendant’s election to deliver the goods or the value.”

Sir William Blackstone in treating of the action of detinue, Vol. IV. p. 413, thus states the law: — “In detinue, after judgment, the plaintiff shall have a distringas to compel the defendant to deliver the goods by repeated distresses of his chattels; and if the defendant still continues obstinate, then (if judgment hath been by default or demurrer) the sheriff shall summon an inqugst to ascertain the value of the goods, and the plaintiff’s damages (which being so assessed, or by the verdict in case of an issue) shall be levied on the person or goods of the defendant. So that after all, in replevin and detinue, (the only actions for recovering the specific possession of personal chattels,) if the wrong-doer be very perverse, he cannot be compelled to a restitution of the thing taken or detained.” So, too, in Chitty on Pleading, Vol. I. p. 124, it is said, — “The nature of this action requires, that the verdict and judgment be such that a specific remedy may be had for the recovery of the goods detained, or a satisfaction in valué, for each parcel, in case they or either of them cannot be obtained. The judgment is on the alternative, that the plaintiff do recover the goods or the value thereof, if he cannot have the goods themselves.”

The citation of these seemingly trite and familiar principles of law will not be deemed useless, when an application of them, and of the reasons on which they are founded, shall be made to the case under consideration. In the authorities above quoted,, we have disclosed to us the propriety and necessity (resulting from the peculiar character of the remedy) for averring in tfie declaration, and of ascertaining by the verdict and judgment, the value of the property sought; because that value is to become the measure of redress to the plaintiff, in one branch of the alternative, in the evént that the other shall prove fruitless. It is indispensable, therefore, that this measure be ascertained upon legal testimony and solemn investigation before the court, and under its supervising authority, — as indispensable, fully, as that'the title to the property should be so ascertained ; for both enter alike into the redress of the plaintiff, and flow from the same source. His right to the one rests upon the same foundation with his right to the other, and if he had no right to one, he had a right to neither. Nor can' it be said that the measure of the plaintiff’s redress rests mainly in the breast or in the action of the court; on the contrary, it rests rather in the opinion and action of the jury. The court cannot, even with the parties and witnesses before it, determine the value of the property, or the parties’ right thereto. The court, by awarding a new trial, may correct an excess or irregularity of any kind on the part of the jury; but it could have no power to find for either party upon the issue before the jury, nor augment or diminish by one cent the measure of redress established by the jury. If, then, such a power belonged not to the court when in a course of regular judicial inquiry, with the parties and witnesses fully before it, does it not seem strange to contend, that such a power can be exercised collaterally by a different tribunal, neither trying the issue, nor weighing the evidence which the jury had before them, and in the absence of all or any of the circumstances, exercised upon ex parte affidavits before the jury, thereby overturning what twelve men upon their oaths, and in regular discharge of their functions, have done, and what the law through them has declared shall be the standard of value ? And for what purpose, it may be asked, is this collateral inquiry to be allowed?- Not, strange as it may seem, to settle any other alternate value of the property, nor to put any estimate upon it at all; but to let in other questions connected with the title, or with some proceedings in the court below, wholly disconnected with the value of the property. But it is said that the plaintiff below has released his right to the damages assessed by the jury, and therefore can no longer enforce them. What of that ? What possible connection can exist between the power of the plaintiff to enforce his judgment, as affected by any act or indiscretion of his own, and the value of the property as assessed by the jury ? Does the release of the estimated value render that value either greater or smaller than it was before ? Possibly this act of the plaintiff may render his power to enforce the verdict and judgment less efficient; but to reason from that consequence to the value of the property as found by the jury, appears to me to be an argument as illogical as any that can be conceived. The estimated value, the true measure settled by the jury, remains unchanged, although it may have been released. The verdict has never been reversed or annulled. Moreover, it may not follow necessarily, that the release of the damages by the plaintiff below vitiates the judgment, or deprives the plaintiff of the power to enforce it; for we find by the authorities that a judgment may be by confession, or non sum informatus, or on demurrer, in either of which cases judgment may be entered, and that afterwards, if the defendant will not deliver the property, damages for the value and for the detention may be assessed; and such value, when assessed in the proper,' regular, legal mode, is all for which execution can be had against the person or property of the defendant. But the inquiry is not properly instituted here whether the plaintiff, by error or indiscretion, has lost the power of enforcing his verdict and judgment: the question is purely one of jurisdiction, dependent upon the value of the subjéct, and that value ascertained by all the solemnities, and in the only mode known to the law, — solemnities, as I contend, nowhere to be properly gainsaid. Let it be supposed that.there had been no release of damages or value by the plaintiff below. The principles applicable to the action of this court would be precisely those involved in the case as it now stands. Then let it be supposed that, after taking jurisdiction upon this collateral inquiry, this court should come to the conclusion. that there was no error'in the proceedings and judgment in the court below. What manner of mandate would be sent to that court ? Would this court, upon its own estimate of the value of the subject founded upon affidavits, and because it had claimed jurisdiction upon such an estimate, order the Circuit Court to augment the damages assessed to the plaintiff below? Could they by so doing open again that which had become res judicata 1 If they should not do this, they would confessedly have effected a wrong to the plaintiff; and if they should attempt to do so, I desire to know their authority for such a proceeding, and what standard or measure for their mandate they would adopt; they would have repudiated the verdict of a jury and a judgment of the court, and what higher or other standard they would adopt I am at a loss to conceive. In defence of the proceeding permitted in this case, it has been contended that, by the practice of this court, in cases sounding in damages purely, a plaintiff is permitted to confer jurisdiction .on this tribunal by laying his damages at an amount ad libitum, sufficient for that purpose. If the practice of this court is to be understood in the latitude in which it is just expressed, that practice must be deemed to be in consonance with neither the letter nor the spirit of the statute. In cases arising ex contractu or quasi ex contractu, which in their original form and magnitude might fall within the rule laid down by Congress, but which, in the progress of investigation by the application of payments or set-offs, should be brought below the minimum established by law, or in cases of tort, which, from their peculiar character, might also come within the reason of the same rule, (though the latter must be regarded as liable to strong doubt,) jurisdiction may be claimed. But if either the practice, or any express annunciation from this court, is to be apprehended as placing it at the option of parties, plaintiffs or defendants, to refer all their contests to this tribunal, however their character may be stamped and ascertained by the decision of the inferior courts, and in contravention of such solemn decisions, given upon full investigation by courts and juries, why then, by the rules or the practice of this court, the act of Congress-is substantially repealed, and the proceedings of the courts below are a mere mockery. The value of the subject of the controversy, as ascertained in the court below, supplies the only safe and uniform rule as to jurisdiction, in cases wherein jurisdiction is dependent on value. My opinion, therefore, is, that it is incompetent to either of the parties, or to this court, in the indirect and collateral mode, here attempted, and upon evidence entirely dehors and unconnected'■with the record, to impeach or inquire into the verdict and judgment rendered in the District Court of Texas; that such a proceeding is utterly subversive of the act of Congress limiting the right to appeals and writs of error, and equally subversive of the fundamental rule of pleading and of evidence, which establishes undeniable verity in the solemn proceedings of courts acting within the sphere of their jurisdic-; tion, and establishes every fact and every conclusion embraced within the scope of those proceedings.

Order.

On consideration of the motion made by Messrs. Hughes and Howard, on a prior day of the present term of this court, to wit, on Friday, the 25th day of January last past, to dismiss this writ of error for the want of jurisdiction, and of the arguments of counsel thereupon had, as well in support of as against the same, it is now here ordered by this court, that the said motion be, and the same is hereby, overruled.