text:
    No. 89-341.
    Grader v. City of Lynnwood.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 89-347.
    Williams v. Dvoskin et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-348.
    Jack L. Hargrove Builders, Inc., et al. v. Rosch.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-360.
    Land v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-406.
    Campbell v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-408.
    Joyce v. Casey, Governor of Pennsylvania, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-420.
    Musliu v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-421.
    Demos Realty v. Minneapolis Community Development Agency.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-446.
    King v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5042.
    Benzel v. Grammer, Individually and as Warden of Nebraska State Penitentiary, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5056.
    Silvaggio v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5096.
    Franks et al. v. Harwell, Sheriff, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5178.
    Mosier v. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5184.
    Rutherford v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5187.
    Cannizzaro v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5216.
    Campbell v. McCormick, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5249.
    Smith v. Butler, Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5252.
    Salamone v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5291.
    Lufkin v. Nassau County Police Department et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5309.
    Prenzler v. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5314.
    Lufkin v. Shell Oil Co. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5315.
    Haddad v. Puckett, Superintendent, Mississippi State Penitentiary, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5320.
    Edwards v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5321.
    Henderson v. Clinton, Governor of Arkansas, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5326.
    Boyd v. Village of Wheeling, Illinois, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5330.
    Veneri v. Casey, Governor of Pennsylvania, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5334.
    Haupt v. Board of Professional Responsibility, District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5335.
    Herring v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 13th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5336.
    Andrews v. Dahm, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5337.
    Gallagher v. Hall et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5344.
    Vinson v. Watkins.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5349.
    Ogunleye v. Hargett, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5350.
    Yang v. McCarthy et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5354.
    Wiggins v. District of Columbia et al.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5363.
    Davis v. Scully, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5364.
    Donati v. Jarvis et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5367.
    Bates v. Callinan.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5369.
    Bonds v. Wharton, Superintendent, Men’s Correctional Institution.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5370.
    Clifford v. Miller.
   Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5371.
    Averhart, aka Azania v. Martin et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5377.
    Vinson v. Texas Board of Corrections et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5379.
    Dempsey v. Somerville Hospital et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5381.
    Garcia v. Rowland, Director, California Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5384.
    Hurd v. Dorsey, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5387.
    Perkins v. Illinois.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5389.
    Young v. Patterson et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5390.
    Rodgers v. Russell, Superintendent, Lima Correctional Institution.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5391.
    Martin v. City of Tulsa.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5393.
    Riggins v. McMackin, Superintendent, Marion Correctional Institution.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5400.
    Lockert v. Duckworth, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5402.
    Malcolm v. Jones et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5405.
    Croy v. Department of Transportation.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5410.
    Wojtczak v. Fulcomer, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5416.
    Sanders v. Trickey, Superintendent, Missouri Eastern Correctional Center, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5417.
    Walters v. Gaither, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5418.
    Long v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5425.
    Grant v. Farnsworth et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5429.
    Dempsey v. United States Attorney et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5456.
    Salam v. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5458.
    Gallaway v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5459.
    Sims v. Sullivan, Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5462.
    Hardin v. Boyd Circuit Court et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5471.
    Wayne v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5472.
    Tano v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5480.
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5486.
    Castro v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5490.
    Tyler v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5491.
    No. 89-5494.
    Cleveland et al. v. United States; and Esmende v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 878 F. 2d 1431.


text:
    No. 89-5500.
    Branham v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5501.
    Brown v. American Express Travel Related Services Co., Inc.
   Ct. App. La., 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5507.
    Hughes v. Jabe, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5508.
    Larson v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5511.
    Casiano v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5514.
    Acosta-Cazares v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5523.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5525.
    Tanner v. Duckworth, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5530.
    Zarrilli v. Garrity et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5536.
    Leach, aka Young v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5544.
    Stewart v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5550.
    Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5556.
    Brown-Bey v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5558.
    Brooks v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5559.
    King v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 87-7191.
    No. 88-7465.
    No. 89-219.
    No. 89-5083.
    No. 89-5110.
    No. 89-5193.
    No. 89-5245.
    No. 89-5256.
    No. 89-5442.
    No. 89-5496.
    Soffar v. Texas. Underwood v. Indiana. Brown v. Alabama. Williams v. Texas. Lingar v. Missouri. Kennedy v. Alabama. Julius v. Jones, Warden. Guinan v. Missouri. DeLuna v. Lynaugh, Director, Texas Department of Corrections. Cochran v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;

Sup. Ct. Ind.;

Sup. Ct. Ala.;

Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;

Sup. Ct. Mo.;

Ct. Crim. App. Ala.;

C. A. 11th Cir.;

Sup. Ct. Mo.;

C. A. 5th Cir.; and

Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 87-7191, 742 S. W. 2d 371; No. 88-7465, 535 N. E. 2d 507; No. 89-219, 545 So. 2d 122; No. 89-5083, 773 S. W. 2d 525; No. 89-5110, 766 S. W. 2d 640; No. 89-5193, 545 So. 2d 214; No. 89-5245, 875 F. 2d 1520; No. 89-5256, 769 S. W. 2d 427; No. 89-5442, 873 F. 2d 757; No. 89-5496, 548 So. 2d 1062.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 88-1756.
    Platt v. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of Chicago Council of Lawyers for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 88-1937.
    Jones v. Celotex Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of the petition for certiorari denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 88-1981.
    DeRango et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 88-7142.
    Pino-Perez v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan and Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 88-2129.
    Kentucky v. Turner.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 88-2133.
    Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Prussin et ux.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Kennedy would grant certiorari.


author: Justice White,

text:
    No. 88-2137.
    McMonagle et al. v. Northeast Women’s Center, Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

dissenting.

A question presented in this case is whether liability under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. § 1961 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V), may be imposed where neither the “enterprise” nor the “pattern of racketeering activity” had any profit-making element. The Second and Eighth Circuits have held that it may not. United States v. Ivic, 700 F. 2d 51, 58-65 (CA2 1983) (enterprise or predicate acts must have financial purpose); United States v. Flynn, 852 F. 2d 1045, 1052 (CA8) (enterprise must be directed toward economic goal), cert. denied, 488 U. S. 974 (1988). The Third Circuit in this case upheld RICO liability despite the absence of any economic motivation on the part of the defendants. I would grant certiorari to resolve the conflict.

On the order list of October 2, 1989, the Court also denied cer-tiorari ih the following cases.

Norton v. United States, No. 88-1889, cert. denied, ante, p. 871: The Eleventh Circuit held that law enforcement officers reasonably relied on warrants calling for the search and seizure of “‘all corporate records . . . which are evidence and instrumental-ities of the offense set forth in Section 1954 of Title 18 of the United States Code,’” and that the evidence seized pursuant to that warrant was admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (1984). 867 F. 2d 1354, 1360 (1989). The decision of the Eleventh Circuit conflicts with the Tenth Circuit’s decision that a warrant ordering the seizure of all records “relating to the purchase, sale and illegal exportation of materials in violation of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U. S. C. § 2778, and the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U. S. C. App. § 2410,” was so facially overbroad that law enforcement officers could not reasonably rely on it, United States v. Leary, 846 F. 2d 592, 594 (1988), and a similar decision of the Ninth Circuit suppressing evidence seized under a warrant seeking “documents, books, ledgers, records and objects which are evidence of violations of federal criminal law,” Center Art Galleries-Hawaii, Inc. v. United States, 875 F. 2d 747, 749 (1989). The conflict should be resolved.

Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, No. 88-1960, and Kidd v. F/V St. Patrick, No. 88-1762, cert. denied, ante, p. 871: The Ninth Circuit held that where a Death on the High Seas Act claim, 41 Stat. 537, 46 U. S. C. App. §761 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. V), is joined with a Jones Act claim, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U. S. C. App. § 688 (1982 ed., Supp. V), neither statutory scheme may be supplemented by an award of punitive damages under general maritime law. 816 F. 2d 1345 (1987), modified, 866 F. 2d 318 (1989). This holding is contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F. 2d 622, 625-626 (1981), that punitive damages are available under general maritime law even when such a claim is joined with a Jones Act claim. The conflict should be resolved.

Tiller v. Fludd, No. 88-2088, cert. denied, ante, p. 872: The Eleventh Circuit held that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), prohibits the use of race-based peremptory challenges by an attorney in a civil action. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the trial court’s participation in the exercise of the peremptory strikes provided the state action necessary to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 863 F. 2d 822 (1989). The Eighth Circuit has expressed “‘strong doubts’” whether Batson applies to civil actions, see Swapshire v. Baer, 865 F. 2d 948, 953 (1989); Wilson v. Cross, 845 F. 2d 163, 164 (1988), and this important issue should be resolved.

Caraballo-Sandoval v. United States, No. 88-7438, and Cardballo-Lujan v. United States, No. 88-7480, cert. denied, ante, p. 876: Pursuant to 98 Stat. 2044, 21 U. S. C. § 853(a) (1982 ed., Supp. V), defendants convicted of serious federal narcotics offenses must forfeit to the United States any assets derived from, or used in, the commission of those crimes. 866 F. 2d 1343 (CA11 1989). The question here is whether, in this context, due process requires courts to provide a pretrial hearing to determine if some likelihood exists that the assets at issue will ultimately be subject to forfeiture. The Eleventh Circuit’s resolution of this issue in this case conflicts with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in United States v. Crozier, 777 F. 2d 1376, 1383-1384 (1985). The conflict should be resolved.

Automobile Importers of America, Inc. v. Minnesota, No. 89-72, cert. denied, ante, p. 872: The Eighth Circuit held that the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty — Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 88 Stat. 2183, 15 U. S. C. §2301 et seq., does not pre-empt state efforts to regulate private dispute resolution mechanisms established by manufacturers to settle warranty disputes with consumers. 871 F. 2d 717 (1989). The Eighth Circuit’s decision comports with that of the Fifth Circuit in Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 755 F. 2d 1192 (1985), but conflicts with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Wolf v. Ford Motor Co., 829 F. 2d 1277 (1987). The conflict should be resolved.

Rayner v. Smirl, No. 89-82, cert. denied, ante, p. 876: The Fourth Circuit held that the whistle-blower provision of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 971, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 441(a) (1982 ed. and Supp V), pre-empts a state-law action for wrongful discharge of a supervisory railroad employee who reports his employer’s railroad safety violations. 873 F. 2d 60 (1989). In Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 502, 485 N. E. 2d 372 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U. S. 1122 (1986), the Illinois Supreme Court reached a contrary result under a nearly identical statute, holding that the whistle-blower provision of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 92 Stat. 2951, as added, 42 U. S. C. § 5851 (1982 ed.), did not pre-empt a state-law action for wrongful discharge of an employee who reported nuclear safety violations. The issue should be addressed.

Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for Blind, No. 89-94, cert. denied, ante, p. 850: Petitioner was disqualified from receiving vocational aid under a state program that is primarily federally funded because he wants to study to become a minister. After the denial of aid to petitioner was upheld by the Washington Supreme Court, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 689 P. 2d 53 (1984), this Court granted certiorari. We reversed, 474 U. S. 481 (1986), concluding that the Establishment Clause presented no constitutional barrier to the vocational aid scheme, and remanded for further factual development and consideration of the program’s legitimacy under the stricter dictates of the Washington Constitution’s Establishment Clause. On remand, the Washington Supreme Court again upheld the denial of aid, this time on state constitutional grounds. 112 Wash. 2d 363, 771 P. 2d 1119 (1989). Petitioner now presses a free exercise claim under our Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), line of cases. This case presents important federal questions regarding the free exercise rights of citizens who participate in state aid programs that permit recipients a private choice in using funds received and regarding the extent to which state involvement with religion that does not violate the Establishment Clause is required by the Free Exercise Clause. The fact that 80 percent of the program’s funding is federal also may raise significant Supremacy Clause issues. These important federal questions deserve attention.

Urquhart & Hassell v. Chapman & Cole, No. 89-107, cert. denied, ante, p. 872: Petitioner asked us to consider the Fifth Circuit’s decision that an abuse-of-discretion standard applies in a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 when courts of appeals review district court determinations on questions of law and fact. 865 F. 2d 676 (1989). Other Circuits have applied a de novo standard to questions of law in this context. See, e. g., Zaldivar v. Los Angeles, 780 F. 2d 823, 829 (CA9 1986). We should resolve this conflict.

Enco Manufacturing Co. v. Clamp Manufacturing Co., No. 89-199, cert. denied, ante, p. 872: A question presented in this case is whether a district court’s finding of a likelihood of confusion in a trademark infringement matter under § 43(a) of the Lanham TradeMark Act, 60 Stat. 449, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a), is reviewable under the “clearly erroneous” standard, as a finding of fact, or de novo, as a conclusion of law. 870 F. 2d 512 (CA9 1989). I have noted before that federal courts disagree over this question. See Euroquilt, Inc. v. Scandia Down Corp., 475 U. S. 1147 (1986) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc. v. Frisch’s Restaurants, Inc., 459 U. S. 916 (1982) (same). We should resolve the conflict.

MEBA Pension Trust v. Rodriguez, No. 89-206, cert. denied, ante, p. 872: The Fourth Circuit held that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §1001 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V), applies to a denial of benefits, when the denial is based on an action by the plan prior to ERISA’s effective date. 872 F. 2d 69 (1989). Other Courts of Appeals have held to the contrary. See, e. g., Menhom v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F. 2d 1496, 1501 (CA9 1984). This conflict should be resolved.

Boyd v. Alabama, No. 89-5053, cert. denied, ante, p. 883: The Alabama Supreme Court held that a warrantless search of an automobile in police custody need only be supported by probable cause. A showing of exigent circumstances is not required. 542 So. 2d 1276 (1986). Although this Court’s decisions in cases such as United States v. Johns, 469 U. S. 478, 484 (1985); California v. Carney, 471 U. S. 386 (1985); and Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U. S. 259, 261-262 (1982) (per curiam), appear to have foreclosed a contrary position, some courts have continued to require a showing of exigent circumstances before validating a warrantless automobile search, see, e. g., United States v. Alexander, 835 F. 2d 1406, 1410 (CA11 1988); United States v. Hepperle, 810 F. 2d 836, 840 (CA8 1987). We should address this issue.

Farrell v. Illinois, No. 89-5233, cert. denied, ante, p. 872: The Illinois Appellate Court held that petitioner’s affirmative response to a judge’s question during his initial appearance regarding whether petitioner was going to hire an attorney was not enough to invoke petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 (1986), and so did not bar further police-initiated interrogation. 181 Ill. App. 3d 446, 536 N. E. 2d 476 (1989). The Illinois Supreme Court denied discretionary review. 126 Ill. 2d 562, 541 N. E. 2d 1110 (1989). This holding is directly contrary to the holdings of Fleming v. Kemp, 837 F. 2d 940, 947 (CA11 1988) (per curiam), and Wilson v. Murray, 806 F. 2d 1232, 1235 (CA4 1986), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 870 (1987). The conflict deserves our attention.


text:
    No. 88-6986.
    Oreski v. United States District Court, Western District of Pennsylvania.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 89-234.
    Crater v. Mesa Petroleum Co. et al.
   Ct. App. La., 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 89-259.
    Demosthenes, Warden v. Neuschafer.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 88-7294.
    Duncan v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White,

dissenting.

This case involves the interpretation of 18 U. S. C. § 3663(a) (1982 ed., Supp. V), which provides that a court may order a defendant convicted under that title to make restitution “to any victim of such offense.” Ibid. In this case, the Tenth Circuit read the term “offense” as used in § 3663(a) broadly: the term does not “restrict a sentencing judge to conside[r] only those acts for which conviction was had, or for which the defendant pleaded guilty.” 870 F. 2d 1532, 1536 (1989). The Sixth Circuit, by contrast, has “adopted a narrow definition of ‘offense’ holding that ‘[a] natural construction of this language would require that the defendant make restitution only to victims of the offense for which he was convicted.’” United States v. Mounts, 793 F. 2d 125, 127 (1986) (citations omitted). I would grant the petition for a writ of certio-rari in order to resolve this conflict.


text:
    No. 88-7388.
    Doe v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan, Justice White, and Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


author: Justice Stevens

text:
    No. 88-7503.
    Taylor v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Opinion of

Justice Stevens

respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari.

The question presented by this certiorari petition is whether a district court may disregard the Sentencing Guidelines after finding that a defendant’s criminal history score inadequately accounts for past conduct when the court could instead adjust for the inadequacy by increasing the criminal history category one or more levels. In United States v. Lopez, 871 F. 2d 513 (1989), a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit characterized this issue as “a significant question concerning the appropriateness of departure from the Guidelines,” id., at 514, and answered it in the negative. Two days earlier, however, in petitioner’s case a different panel of the same court had given a different answer to that question. Petitioner’s panel disposed of his case pursuant to Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, which permits the Court of Appeals to leave unpublished those “opinions that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law.” There is thus a conflict within the Fifth Circuit on both the answer and the importance of the question petitioner presents to us.

Because the petition does not identify any inter-Circuit conflict concerning the question presented, and because the answer provided by the Fifth Circuit’s published opinion is widely supported, the Court’s denial of certiorari today is entirely consistent with rules governing the management of our certiorari docket. It is unfortunate that the summary disposition of petitioner’s case by the Fifth Circuit and this Court may require petitioner to serve an 18-month prison sentence when the Guidelines would specify a range between only 9 and 15 months even if petitioner’s criminal history category were increased two full levels. That, however, is the kind of burden that the individual litigant must occasionally bear when efficient management is permitted to displace the careful administration of justice in each case. Perhaps it is not too late for the Court of Appeals to exercise additional care in the administration of justice in this case.

      Other Circuits have reached the conclusion endorsed by the Lopez panel. See United States v. Jackson, 883 F. 2d 1007, 1009 (CA11 1989); United States v. Cervantes, 878 F. 2d 50, 53 (CA2 1989); United States v. Miller, 874 F. 2d 466, 470-471 (CA7 1989). See also United States v. Joan, 883 F. 2d 491, 495 (CA6 1989) (incrementally increasing offense level to account for inadequate criminal history when the defendant’s criminal history score already placed him in the highest criminal history category).


author: Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 89-5148.
    Watkins v. Murray, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.

Justice Brennan,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 158, 227 (1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting), I would grant the petition for certiorari and vacate the death penalty in this case. Even if I did not take this view, I would grant the petition to decide whether a court’s failure either to inform a capital sentencing jury that it must consider mitigating evidence or to explain the concept of mitigation undermines a capital defendant’s right to have the jury “consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant’s background and character or the circumstances of the crime.” Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 328 (1989). The judge’s failure in this case to instruct the juries on the role of mitigating evidence created a substantial risk that the juries did not conduct their sentencing tasks properly. I therefore would vacate petitioner’s death sentences and remand for new sentencing.

Petitioner Johnny Watkins was convicted of murder in two separate proceedings and sentenced to death for both crimes. The same judge presided at both trials. At the sentencing phase of each trial, petitioner’s counsel introduced mitigating evidence concerning Watkins’ character and urged the jury to consider those factors that called for mercy. The judge’s instructions in each case stated that the prosecution had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of two aggravating circumstances:

“(1) That, after consideration of the circumstances surrounding this offense or the prior history and background of the defendant, there is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society; or
“(2) That the defendant’s conduct in committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved an aggravated battery to the victim beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish the act of murder.” App. F to Pet. for Cert.

The instructions stated that each jury could sentence Watkins to death if it found that the State had proved the existence of one of the aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; alternatively, the jury could choose the punishment of life imprisonment if it believed “from all the evidence that the death penalty is not justified.” Ibid. The instructions did not mention “mitigating evidence” or any equivalent concept. The judge also read the verdict form to the jury in each case. That form required the jury to certify that, in reaching its verdict, it had “considered evidence in mitigation of the offense.” Ibid. The form offered no explanation of “evidence in mitigation.”

Petitioner’s objections to the instructions were overruled in both cases. On direct appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court rejected his contention that the instructions had overemphasized the jury’s duty to consider aggravating circumstances and underem-phasized its duty to consider mitigating factors. The court held that the instructions and verdict form sufficiently guided the jury’s consideration and ensured that the jury had considered mitigating factors. On state habeas, the Circuit Court held, tersely, that “the jury was properly instructed as to all matters and findings that they were required to make, including but not limited to evidence in mitigation of punishment.” App. D to Pet. for Cert. The State Supreme Court, without addressing petitioner’s challenge to the instructions, refused to hear his appeal.

Two central principles pervade this Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence. First, “the sentencer may not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering ‘any relevant mitigating evidence.’” Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U. S. 1, 4 (1986) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 114 (1982)). Second, the sentencer’s discretion “must be guided appropriately by objective standards,” Mills v. Maryland, 486 U. S. 367, 374 (1988), “so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action,” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 189 (1976) (joint opinion). Although these two principles may at times come into “tension,” California v. Brown, 479 U. S. 538, 544 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring), this case presents a situation in which both principles demand the vacation of petitioner’s death sentences.

The Constitution does not require a specific set of instructions on mitigating circumstances. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 890 (1983). Nonetheless, “the jury instructions — taken as a whole — must clearly inform the jury that they are to consider any relevant mitigating evidence.” Brown, supra, at 545 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The instructions in this case — that the juries could sentence petitioner to life if they believed from “all the evidence” that the death penalty was not justified — were simply insufficient to inform the juries of their duty to consider factors in mitigation. Nor did the verdict form correct this error, as it merely stated in boilerplate language that the juries had “considered evidence in mitigation of the offense.” Although the instructions did not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating evidence, neither did they “clearly inform” the juries that they were required to consider such evidence. This situation creates an unacceptable risk that the juries did not consider “‘factors which may call for a less severe penalty.’” See Penry, supra, at 328. Petitioner’s case must accordingly be remanded for resentencing.

Even if the juries were aware of their obligation to consider mitigating evidence, the instructions provided absolutely no guidance on what constitutes relevant mitigating evidence or how the juries should have considered such evidence. “Mitigating evidence” is a term of art, with a constitutional meaning that is unlikely to be apparent to a lay jury. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U. S. 164, 188 (1988) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment) (“We have defined mitigating circumstances as facts about the defendant’s character or background, or the circumstances of the particular offense, that may call for a penalty less than death”). If it is possible for judges to misconstrue the term and exclude relevant mitigating evidence, see Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra, at 113-114, it seems probable that a jury operating without adequate guidance could do the same. The imposition of the death penalty should not be contingent on a particular jury’s unguided understanding of a legal term of art. When a trial court refuses to give content to the words on which a defendant’s life depends, the subsequent sentence is arbitrary and capricious. I therefore dissent.


author: Justice Stevens Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 89-5327.
    Schiro v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.

Opinion of

Justice Stevens

respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari.

There is a critical difference between a judgment of affirmance and an order denying a petition for a writ of certiorari. The former determines the rights of the parties; the latter expresses no opinion on the merits of the case. Partly for that reason, and partly because our certiorari docket is so crowded, the Court does not explain its reasons for entering such orders. There is, accordingly, a danger that an individual Justice’s statement of his or her views respecting the denial of certiorari may be misleading or counterproductive. Nevertheless, I am persuaded that a brief comment on this troublesome and unusual case is appropriate.

This is a capital case. It is one of 63 such cases that were considered at our conference during the week of September 25, 1989. Despite the contrary views that were once expressed, it is neither feasible nor wise for this Court to review the merits of every capital case in which the petitioner asks us to review the decision of a State’s highest court. In many of these cases review of the federal constitutional issues is more effectively administered in federal habeas corpus proceedings. The burdens associated with the delay in the date of execution are more than offset by the benefit of complete and adequate review of the decision to impose a death sentence.

In this case, despite the fact that petitioner was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to death in 1981, the Federal District Court has not yet had an opportunity to review his federal constitutional claims. The Indiana Supreme Court has, however, considered the validity of the death sentence on four different occasions. First, while the case was pending on direct review, the court unanimously granted the State’s petition to remand the case to the trial judge to enable him to make the findings of fact that the Indiana statute requires to support a death sentence. Second, in 1983, after the trial judge entered his findings nunc pro tunc, a bare majority of the court affirmed the sentence and held that the findings were adequate to support the judge’s decision to override the unanimous recommendation of the jury that the death penalty should not be imposed. Third, in 1985, a bare majority of the court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief, rejecting the claim that the trial judge violated the Due Process Clause by relying in imposing the death sentence on personal observations of petitioner’s conduct not previously disclosed to counsel. Fourth, again by a bare majority, the Indiana Supreme Court rejected the claim that is asserted in the certiorari petition the Court has denied today.

Petitioner claims that the imposition of a death sentence on the basis of the trial judge’s finding that he intended to kill his victim, made after the jury had rejected the charge of intentional murder and had unanimously refused to recommend death, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. It is undisputed that the trial judge’s finding that petitioner intended to kill his victim is an essential predicate for the death penalty. Under Indiana law, that finding had to be made beyond a reasonable doubt. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9 (Supp. 1989). Yet, the jury twice indicated that it did not believe that the murder was intentional. First, the jury apparently rejected the prosecutor’s contention, at the guilt stage, that petitioner committed the murder knowingly. Petitioner was charged with murder in the knowing killing of the victim in Count I and with felony murder in Count II; although the jury convicted him of the latter, it implicitly acquitted him of the knowing state of mind necessary to support a conviction on Count I. Second, after the prosecutor had again argued to the jury that the murder was intentional, the jury unanimously refused to recommend the death penalty. Petitioner’s claim was rejected as a matter of state law by the Indiana Supreme Court, which held that the jury’s refusal to convict on Count I was not an acquittal of the elements of the offense charged in that Count. That holding might well be sufficient reason to deny review of a case arising from a state collateral proceeding. Nonetheless, petitioner’s claim has a federal dimension that demands fresh analysis when it is first considered on its merits in a federal court.

It cannot be disputed that petitioner was placed in jeopardy within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution when the trial on Count I commenced. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U. S. 28 (1978). The fact that Indiana may not consider the jury’s silence an “acquittal” as a matter of state law surely does not determine the constitutional question whether he could again be placed in jeopardy on the same charge. Cf. Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S. 323 (1970). Nor does it determine whether the action by the jury — especially when illuminated by its unanimous decision at the penalty hearing — should be given preclusive effect either under the principles of double jeopardy in capital cases enunciated in Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430 (1981), or under more general principles of collateral estoppel, see Simpson v. Florida, 403 U. S. 384 (1971); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436 (1970). These, as well as the other federal questions that petitioner has raised in the state courts, are open to and will presumably receive careful consideration from the federal court with habeas corpus jurisdiction over the case.

The long delay that has occurred in this case is a matter of public concern and a matter that is relevant to any consideration of the efficacy of capital punishment. The State’s dubious procedural scheme that allows a judge to override a jury’s appraisal of the seriousness of a capital defendant’s crime has resulted in eight years of litigation. Those years of litigation, and the costs that they have imposed on lawyers, judges, and court administrators, have not furthered any societal interest in incapacitation: since petitioner has been incarcerated continuously from the date of his trial, he has presented no greater threat to the community than if he had been executed promptly after the trial was completed. Nor, since juries presumably represent a fair cross section of the community, has the cost served any compelling interest in satisfying an outraged community’s desire for revenge or retribution. The delay, however, is manifestly not relevant to, and should have no impact on, petitioner’s entitlement to consideration of his substantial federal claims by the federal courts.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

       “Inasmuch, therefore, as all that a denial of a petition for a writ of certio-rari means is that fewer than four members of the Court thought it should be granted, this Court has rigorously insisted that such a denial carries with it no implication whatever regarding the Court’s views on the merits of a case which it has declined to review. The Court has said this again and again; again and again the admonition has to be repeated.
      “The one thing that can be said with certainty about the Court’s denial of Maryland’s petition in this case is that it does not remotely imply approval or disapproval of what was said by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. The issues canvassed in the opinions of that court, and which the State of Maryland has asked us to review, are of a nature which very readily lend themselves to misconstruction of the denial of this petition. The present instance is peculiarly one where the redundant become the necessary.” Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U. S. 912, 919 (1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J., respecting denial of certiorari).

       See Singleton v. Commissioner, 439 U. S. 940, 945-946 (1978) (opinion of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).

       See Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U. S. 949, 956-964 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

         E. g., Watkins v. Virginia, 475 U. S. 1099, 1100 (1986) (opinion of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).

       In 1986 petitioner did file an application for a writ of habeas corpus but the parties have advised that it was “remanded” to the state court because petitioner’s state remedies had not yet been completely exhausted. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509 (1982).

       See Schiro v. State, 451 N. E. 2d 1047 (1983). Ironically, although the trial judge refused to follow the jury’s recommendation of life at the penalty phase, he apparently found its rejection of the insanity defense, at the guilt stage, dispositive on the sole aggravating factor that petitioner 'committed the murder intentionally. He explained that the sentence was supported by petitioner’s conviction of felony murder and the fact that “[t]he jury rejected the plea of insanity by its verdict,” further stating that since there was an aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances to outweigh it, “the death sentence is required by the Statutes of the State of Indiana. This Court has no choice but to follow the law.” Id., at 1066-1067. One of the dissenting justices wrote:
      “Under the evidence, Defendant could have been found guilty of the crime charged whether he killed Laura Luebbehusen intentionally or knowingly or merely accidentally while committing or attempting to commit a rape. He was subject to the death penalty, however, only if he killed her intentionally. The interposition and rejection of the defense of insanity (mental disease or defect) Ind. Code § 35-41-3-6 (Burns 1979) simply has no relevance to the issue of whether or not the killing was done intentionally; yet, it is obvious that the trial court judge regarded it as significant, if not in fact controlling.” Id., at 1068 (Prentice, J., concurring and dissenting).

       See Schiro v. State, 479 N. E. 2d 556 (1985). In dissenting from the denial of certiorari, two Members of this Court expressed the opinion that the judge’s rejection of the jury recommendation of no death sentence was inconsistent with the Court’s holding in Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447 (1984). See Schiro v. Indiana, 475 U. S. 1036 (1986) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J.).

       See 533 N. E. 2d 1201 (1989).

       “As our opinions have made clear, no higher duty exists in the judging process than to exercise meticulous care where the sentence may be, or is, death.” Address of Justice Rowell, Eleventh Circuit Conference, May 8-10, 1983. See also Judicial Conference of the United States, Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, Committee Report and Proposal 5 (Aug. 23, 1989) (“The merits.of capital cases should be reviewed carefully and deliberately, and not under time pressure. This should be true both during state and federal collateral review”).

       Cf. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S., at 437, n. 1 (applying Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), retroactively to cases on federal habeas).


text:
    No. 88-5751.
    No. 88-5957.
    No. 88-5981.
    No. 88-6341.
    No. 88-6767.
    Van Cleave v. Indiana, Grant v. California, Williams v. California, Bonin v. California, Pollack v. United States,
   488 U. S. 1019;

488 U. S. 1050;

488 U. S. 1050;

489 U. S. 1091; and

490 U. S. 1027. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    October 13, 1989
    No. 89-343.
    City of Detroit et al. v. Steward et ux.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    October 16, 1989
    No. 89-301.
    Monroe et al. v. City of Woodville, Mississippi, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. Miss. Judgment vacated and case remanded with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950).


text:
    No. A-246.
    Consumer Value Stores v. Board of Pharmacy of New Jersey.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Blackmun and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-793.
    In re Disbarment of Cartwright.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 491 U. S. 903.]


text:
    No. D-796.
    In re Disbarment of Cannon.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 492 U. S. 931.]


text:
    No. D-804.
    In re Disbarment of McManus.
   George W. McManus, Jr., of Baltimore, Md., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on August 11, 1989 [492 U. S. 932], is hereby discharged.


text:
    No. D-812.
    In re Disbarment of Mahshie.
   It is ordered that George Towfick Mahshie, of DeWitt, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-813.
    In re Disbarment of Kramer.
   It is ordered that Arthur Berlin Kramer, of Charlotte, N. C., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 111,
    Orig.
    Delaware v. New York.
   Motion of North Carolina for leave to intervene referred to the Special Master. Report of the Special Master on motions to intervene received and ordered filed. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 490 U. S. 1104.]


text:
    No. 87-1720.
    Taylor v. Peabody Coal Co. et al.,
   488 U. S. 988. Motion of counsel for approval of attorney’s fees of petitioner, Hubert Taylor, referred to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to determine whether fees are to be allowed at all and then, if so, to determine their amount for the work performed by counsel before this Court.


text:
    No. 88-192.
    McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Department of Business Regulation of Florida, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. [Certiorari granted, 488 U. S. 954.] Motion of California et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 88-1668.
    Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 490 U. S. 1097.] Motion of Service Station Dealers of America for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 89-353.
    Sanchez et al. v. Bond et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 89-5642.
    In re Sparks.
   Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 89-213.
    Pennsylvania v. Muniz.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 89-258.
    California v. American Stores Co. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 89-275.
    Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Questions 1, 3, and 6 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 88-1912.
    Little v. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 88-2107.
    Julien v. Zeringue et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 88-7348.
    Weathersby v. Chrans, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 88-7545.
    Gonzalez v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 88-7564.
    Doe v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 88-7598.
    Prows v. Spaniol et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 88-7599.
    Nyberg v. Florida Department of Corrections.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 88-7616.
    Wolford v. Armontrout, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-142.
    Rosco et al. v. County of Los Angeles et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-157.
    Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Causey, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of Causey, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-169.
    Idaho v. Fain.
   Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-180.
    City of Garfield Heights v. Asad.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-287.
    No. 89-292.
    National Right to Work Legal Defense & Education Foundation, Inc. v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, et al.; and Estate of Gilpin v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 875 F. 2d 1310.


text:
    No. 89-291.
    Ramsey v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-293.
    Postma v. District Court of Iowa, Plymouth
   County. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-294.
    Gordon et al. v. Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-297.
    Argo v. Butler, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-299.
    Kempe et al., Joint Liquidators of Mentor Insurance Ltd. v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-305.
    McGuire, Individually and as Mother and Next Friend of McGuire, a Minor v. City of Woodward, Oklahoma, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-306.
    Riley v. United Parcel Service.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-308.
    Fukoku Kogyo Co., Ltd., et al. v. C. Itoh & Co., Ltd.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-314.
    City of Norman, Oklahoma, et al. v. O’Rourke et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-316.
    City of Montclair, California v. United Artists Communications, Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-319.
    Laurence v. Anonymous et ux.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-320.
    National Democratic Policy Committee v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-321.
    Clyde Sandoz Masonry Contractors, Inc., et al. v. Joyce, Trustee of the Bricklayers & Trowel Trades International Pension Fund, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-325.
    Dzinglski v. Weirton Steel Corp. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-326.
    Young, dba Tiffany’s v. Mount Hawley Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-328.
    A. O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc., et al. v. Saylor et ux., dba Udder Nonsense Dairy.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-336.
    Krinsk v. Fund Asset Management, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-338.
    Andrews v. Indiana.
   Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-345.
    Kamecki, Administratrix of the Estate of Kamecki v. Smilevsky.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-361.
    Parrish v. Journigan et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-367.
    Capodagli, Administratrix of the Estate of Capodagli v. Wilson.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-371.
    American Steamship Co. v. Musleh.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-391.
    Dietz et ux. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, Income Tax Division of the State of Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-413.
    Jochen v. Department of Veterans Affairs et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-429.
    International Commercial Bank of China v. National Bank of Pakistan.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-432.
    Picou v. Gillum, Sheriff, Pasco County, Florida, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-436.
    Keene Corp. v. Independent School District No. 622 et al.
   Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-458.
    Badger v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-461.
    Camoscio v. Dukakis et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5069.
    Williams v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5097.
    Williams v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5134.
    Houston v. Lack, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5156.
    Fields v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5180.
    Morgan v. Jackson, Commissioner of Correctional Facility, Westchester County, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5207.
    Dawes et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5217.
    Jones v. Wisconsin.
   Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5218.
    Forester v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5359.
    Davis v. O’Leary, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5366.
    Brofford v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5392.
    Cofield v. Adams et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5422.
    Morrow v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5424.
    Vinson v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5426.
    Thomas v. Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5432.
    Telepo v. Scheidementel, Superintendent, Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5445.
    Ansari v. Lewis, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5447.
    James v. Morris, Judge, Circuit Court of South Carolina, Third Circuit, et al.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5449.
    Sanchez v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5454.
    Walker v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5455.
    Standley v. Cain, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5457.
    Telepo v. Scheidementel, Superintendent, Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5461.
    Johnson v. Heard et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5463.
    Grasty v. Foltz.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5464.
    Charboneau v. Idaho.
   Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5467.
    DeNardo v. Municipality of Anchorage et al.
   Sup. Ct. Alaska. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5468.
    Barber v. Municipality of Anchorage, Alaska.
   Sup. Ct. Alaska. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5469.
    Demos v. United States District Court for the Western District of Washington et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5474.
    Bonillas v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5483.
    Ditta v. Branch Motor Express & Freight Drivers, Helpers, Dockmen & Allied Workers, Local Union 375.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5557.
    Blanco-Torres v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5561.
    Weber v. Los Angeles County Department of Children’s Services.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5584.
    Blow v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5587.
    Leckstrom v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5590.
    Gayle et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5594.
    Farrell et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5598.
    Aubrey v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5599.
    McIntosh v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5604.
    Toole v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5606.
    Sattiewhite v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5610.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5612.
    Pickering v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 88-1956.
    Georgia v. Roper.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-151.
    Idaho v. Charboneau.
   Sup. Ct. Idaho. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-176.
    Idaho v. Leavitt.
   Sup. Ct. Idaho. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-48.
    No. 89-5068.
    No. 89-5117.
    No. 89-5397.
    No. 89-5421.
    Hulsey v. Sargent, Warden. Banda v. Texas. Clark v. New Mexico. Magwood v. Alabama. Rogers v. Kemp, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir.;

Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;

Sup. Ct. N. M.;

Sup. Ct. Ala.; and

Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 89-48, 865 F. 2d 954; No. 89-5068, 768 S. W. 2d 294; No. 89-5117, 108 N. M. 288, 772 P. 2d 322; No. 89-5397, 548 So. 2d 516.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 89-67.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White and Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 89-144.
    Local Union No. 246, Laborers’ International Union of North America, AFL-CIO v. Bickerstaff Clay Products Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion for leave to intervene in order to file a petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-335.
    Bormann et al. v. AT&T Communications, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


author: Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 89-5072.
    Wilkerson v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.

Justice Marshall,

with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting), I would grant the petition for certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case. Even if I did not hold this view, I would grant the petition to determine whether a prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges based in part on racial Considerations violates the Equal Protection Clause.

I

Richard Wilkerson, an Afro-American, was convicted of murder by an all-white jury and sentenced to death. During voir dire, the prosecution exercised 4 of its 12 peremptory challenges to remove all of the potential Afro-American jurors. After trial, while petitioner’s case was pending on direct review, this Court held that the Equal Protection Clause “forbids the States to strike black veniremen on the assumption that they will be biased in a particular case simply because the defendant is black.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, 97 (1986). Petitioner subsequently raised a Batson claim in a petition for habeas corpus filed in state court.

The trial court concluded that Wilkerson had made a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination by the prosecution in the jury selection process. At the Batson hearing, one of the prosecutors who conducted voir dire conceded that race was a factor in his peremptory strike of an Afro-American juror:

“Q. . . . When you say you felt a little uneasy about [the juror] generally, was it your considered opinion that the fact that she was black and that the Defendant was black might have some factor or might be some factor in her decision-making process?
“A. I was not completely satisfied that it would not, but that was my uneasiness.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 3.

Responding to questions concerning his'peremptory strike of a different juror, the prosecutor indicated that he “thought perhaps [the juror] might make some identification I guess, with the defendant to some extent.” Id., at 3-4. The questioning continued:

“Q. Based on [the defendant and the juror] being of the same race?
“A. Yeah, that is just a factor.” Id., at 4.

Finally, on redirect examination by the State, the same prosecutor stated that his perception that an Afro-American juror would extend sympathy to an Afro-American defendant was “[o]ne of the many considerations [for striking a particular juror] but nothing major about that.” Id., at 76.

The trial court nonetheless concluded that the prosecutors “did not exercise peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner to exclude venirepersons based upon racial considerations, nor did they, in any way, purposefully or deliberately deny jury participation to black persons because of race.” Id., at 10. The court based this legal conclusion on several pages of factual findings that relate in detail the prosecution’s race-neutral explanations for its peremptory challenges to the Afro-American venirepersons. Unaccountably, these findings do not mention, much less discuss, the prosecution’s open admissions that race played a role in its decision to prevent the Afro-American members of the venire from serving on the petit jury. This omission in the state court’s factual findings provides ample justification for this Court to dispense with the traditional deference, now codified by statute, that such findings are accorded on federal review. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d) (8) (1982 ed.) (presumption of correctness overcome if a federal court concludes that a state court’s “factual determination[s] [are] not fairly supported by the record”). Accordingly, this case is properly characterized as one involving mixed prosecutorial motives in that the decision to challenge the Afro-American jurors rested on both race-neutral considerations and race-conscious factors.

II

The state trial court’s implicit legal conclusion — that the Constitution does not prohibit a prosecutor from striking a juror even when the decision is based in part on his “intuitive judgment [that the juror] would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race,” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S., at 97 — cannot be squared with Batson’s unqualified requirement that the state offer “a neutral explanation” for its peremptory challenge, id., at 98 (emphasis added). To be “neutral,” the explanation must be based wholly on nonracial criteria.

The trial court seems to have transferred a legal standard formulated in other contexts to the Batson inquiry by requiring the defendant to show that the Afro-American venirepersons would not have been challenged “but for” the prosecution’s impermissible assumptions about race. In some instances in which a defendant’s actions were motivated by a mixture of permissible and impermissible factors, we have recognized as a defense to liability a showing that the challenged actions would have occurred even absent the improper consideration. See, e. g., Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 285-287 (1977) (decision to terminate employment). A “but for” test is inappropriate in the Batson inquiry, however, because of the special difficulties of proof that a court ■ applying that standard to a prosecutor’s peremptory-challenge decisions necessarily would encounter.

The “but for” standard requires the factfinder to address a counterfactual: whether a prosecutor would have struck the challenged Afro-American jurors if his decisions had not been clouded by impermissible racial considerations. Put another way, the question is whether the prosecutor would have struck the Afro-American jurors had they been white. To answer this question, the factfinder must decide whether the prosecutor’s intuitive, racially neutral reservations about the challenged Afro-American jurors were in each case greater than his intuitive reservations about the white jurors whom he chose not to strike. The court must determine not only whether a prosecutor’s denial of racial motivation is credible — the current Batson question — but also whether a prosecutor’s explanation for his lack of objection to white jurors is credible' so that it can undertake the difficult task of comparing prosecutorial judgments of challenged and unchallenged jurors.

But how is the factfinder to uncover the prosecutor’s intuitive reservations regarding the unchallenged white jurors? The only avenue of inquiry is to ask the prosecutor himself. If he claims not to have entertained such reservations, the questioning must end, because external corroboration of the prosecutor’s explanation of his inaction is necessarily unavailable. No record memorializes the prosecutor’s contemporaneous justifications for failing to challenge a juror. Moreover, given the purely subjective nature of peremptory challenges, such a record could not be made. Thus, the prosecutor’s claim that he harbored no reservations regarding a particular juror is insulated from meaningful review. In contrast, some external corroboration is available regarding the prosecutor’s affirmative decisions to strike; the factfinder can examine a prosecutor’s justifications in light of the characteristics of the jurors actually struck to determine generally whether the justifications were merely pretexts for racially motivated considerations.

In this respect, the Batson context differs decisively from the employment context, where the court can examine an employer’s treatment of similarly situated applicants to test an employer’s assertion that an Afro-American candidate would not have been hired absent a discriminatory motive. When an employer hires a white candidate over an Afro-American candidate, a factfinder can assess the employer’s faithfulness to its own nonracial criteria by examining whether the particular white candidate’s qualifications, as defined by the criteria, were superior to those of the Afro-American candidate. In the Batson context, though, the criteria underlying a prosecutor’s peremptory challenges are private; a factfinder therefore lacks an independent means of evaluating the prosecutor’s decisionmaking.

Thus, the “but for” test transforms a difficult credibility assessment — whether the prosecutor acted for the reasons he claims to have acted — into an impossible one — whether a prosecutor’s nonracial ground for striking an Afro-American juror, taken alone, would have outweighed the prosecutor’s possible grounds for objecting to unchallenged white jurors. The only choice, an untenable one at best, would be to accept at face value a prosecutor’s claim that he “would have struck the Afro-American jurors anyway.” A judicial inquiry designed to safeguard a criminal defendant’s basic constitutional rights should not rest on the unverifiable assertions of a prosecutor who, having admitted to racial bias, subsequently attempts to reconstruct what his thought process would have been had he not entertained such bias.

Ill

Batson’s greatest flaw is its implicit assumption that courts are capable of detecting race-based challenges to Afro-American jurors. Assuming good faith on the part of all involved, Batson’s mandate requires the parties “to confront and overcome their own racism on all levels,” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S., at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring), a most difficult challenge to meet. This flaw has rendered Batson ineffective against all but the most obvious examples of racial prejudice — the cases in which a proffered “neutral explanation” plainly betrays an underlying impermissible purpose. To excuse such prejudice when it does surface, on the ground that a prosecutor can also articulate nonracial factors for his challenges,- would be absurd. Batson would thereby become irrelevant, and racial discrimination in jury selection, perhaps the greatest embarrassment in the administration of our criminal justice system, would go undeterred. If such “smoking guns” are ignored, we have little hope of combating the more subtle forms of racial discrimination.

In sum, while I remain committed to my view that, until peremptory challenges are eliminated altogether, these challenges will inevitably be used to discriminate against racial minorities, Batson v. Kentucky, supra, at 103, 107-108 (Marshall, J., concurring), I would find that this Court’s requirement that a prosecutor provide a “neutral” explanation for challenging an Afro-American juror means just what it says — that the explanation must not be tainted by any impermissible factors. Requiring anything less undermines an already underprotective means of safeguarding the integrity of the criminal jury selection process.


text:
    October 17, 1989
    No. 89-435.
    In re Associated General Contractors of California, Inc., et al.
   Petition for writ of mandamus dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    No. 87-1294.
    Cape Publications, Inc., et al. v. Hitchner et ux.
   Appeal from Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist., dismissed under this Court’s Rule 53.


text:
    October 30, 1989
    No. 88-1601.
    No. 88-1602.
    Pullman-Standard, Inc. v. Swint et al.; and Swint et al. v. Pullman-Standard, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164 (1989), Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U. S. 642 (1989), and Owens v. Okure, 488 U. S. 235 (1989). Reported below: 854 F. 2d 1549.


text:
    No.-.
    Miller et al. v. Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance Co.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied.


text:
    No. A-269.
    Rice v. United States.
   Application for release on bond, addressed to Justice Brennan and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-276.
    Pisello v. United States.
   D. C. C. D. Cal. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Brennan and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-798.
    In re Disbarment of Zealy.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 492 U. S. 931.]


text:
    No. 65,
    Orig.
    Texas v. New Mexico.
   Motion of the Special Master for allowance of interim fees and disbursements granted, and the Special Master is awarded $55,936.76 to be paid equally by the parties. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 802.]


text:
    No. 109,
    Orig.
    Oklahoma et al. v. New Mexico.
   Interim report of the Special Master received and ordered filed. Motion of the Special Master for allowance of compensation and reimbursement of expenses granted, and the Special Master is awarded $22,200.83, one-third to be paid by each party. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 489 U. S. 1005.]


text:
    No. 111,
    Orig.
    Delaware v. New York.
   Motion of Texas for leave to file an amended complaint in intervention referred to the Special Master. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 915.]


text:
    No. 88-1125.
    Hodgson et al. v. Minnesota et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 492 U. S. 917.] Motions of Jeff White et al., Stanley John, Kenneth Fisher, and Herbert Ratner for leave to file briefs as amici curiae denied.


text:
    No. 88-1400.
    Franchise Tax Board of California et al. v. Alcan Aluminium Ltd. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 490 U. S. 1019.] Motion of respondents for reconsideration of order denying motion for divided argument [ante, p. 803] denied. Request of respondents to submit the case on the briefs denied.


text:
    No. 88-1503.
    Cruzan, by her Parents and Co-Guardians, Cruzan et ux. v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. [Certiorari granted, 492 U. S. 917.] Motions for leave to file briefs as amici curiae filed by the following are denied: Frances Ambrose, Ralph Buglioni, Jack Butler, Center for Catholic Policy of the Free Congress Foundation, Christian Action Council et al., Philip Dreisbach, James Dunlap, Lawrence J. Frieders, Mechtild Grothues, Paul Marx, J. G. Mor-riss, National Nurses for Life, Nurses for Life of Missouri, Pharmacists for Life, Right to Life League of Southern California, Inc., and Herbert Ratner.


text:
    No. 88-1725.
    Venegas v. Mitchell.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 806.] Motion of petitioner to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 88-1932.
    United States v. Munoz-Flores.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 808.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 88-1951.
    United States v. Dalm.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 807.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 88-1972.
    Illinois v. Perkins.
   App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 808.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Daniel M. Kirwin, Esq., of Mt. Vernon, Ill., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 88-6546.
    Duro v. Reina, Chief of Police, Salt River Department of Public Safety, Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 490 U. S. 1034.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 88-7146.
    Whitmore, Individually and as Next Friend of Simmons v. Arkansas et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. [Certiorari granted, 492 U. S. 917.] Motion of Washington Legal Foundation et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 89-65.
    Fort Stewart Schools v. Federal Labor Relations Authority et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 807.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 89-400.
    Lucas et al. v. Townsend, President of the Bibb County Board of Education, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. M. D. Ga. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 89-5398.
    Johnston v. Acting Commissioner of Social Security.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until November 20, 1989, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

For the reasons expressed in Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U. S. 928 (1983), we would deny the petition for writ of certiorari without reaching the merits of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.


text:
    No. 89-5700.
    Reis v. New York State Housing Finance Agency.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until November 20, 1989, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.

Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

For the reasons expressed in Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U. S. 928 (1983), we would deny the petition for writ of certiorari without reaching the merits of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.


text:
    No. 89-5374.
    No. 89-5705.
    In re Gottlieb; and In re Watters.
   Petitions for writs of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 88-2018.
    Illinois v. Rodriguez.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 89-386.
    Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney; and Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Foster.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 873 F. 2d 628 (first case); 873 F. 2d 633 (second case).


text:
    No. 89-390.
    Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of Armco et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 88-1805.
    Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation et al. v. Glover et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 88-2122.
    Ehrsam v. Pennsylvania.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 88-7409.
    Prince v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 88-7511.
    Chapman v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 88-7566.
    No. 88-7586.
    Brett, aka Wilson v. United States; and Grey, aka Gray v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 872 F. 2d 1365.


text:
    No. 89-39.
    Meros v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-59.
    Spigarolo v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-78.
    Arzola-Amaya et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-90.
    Jungen, Administratrix of the Estate of Jungen, et al. v. Oregon.
   Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-170.
    Sosebee v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-171.
    No. 89-5641.
    DiCarlantonio v. United States; and Prayso v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 870 F. 2d 1058.


text:
    No. 89-177.
    Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. McMaster.
   Ct. App. La., 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-194.
    Vance v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-200.
    Ofman v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-201.
    Deas v. Levitt, New York City Personnel Director, et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-211.
    Southern Electrical Retirement Fund v. Custer.
   Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-212.
    57,261 Items of Drug Paraphernalia et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-216.
    Lavery v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-220.
    Secrist v. Harkin, United States Senator, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-272.
    Littman, Individually and as Mayor of the Township of Millstone, New Jersey, et al. v. Gimello, Executive Director, New Jersey Hazardous Waste Siting Commission, et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-276.
    England v. King, Commissioner, Social Security Administration.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-286.
    Argubright et al. v. Beech Aircraft Corp.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-288.
    Doubletree et al. v. Hager, Commissioner of Insurance of Iowa, as Liquidator of Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-298.
    Downing et al. v. City of Urbana ex rel. Newlin, Director of Law.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-331.
    Cano v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-334.
    Ortega v. City of Kansas City, Kansas, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-339.
    Steele v. Noel et al.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-351.
    Township of Kennedy v. Kenvue Development, Inc., et al.
   Pa. Commw. Ct. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-354.
    Brown, Personal Representative of the Estate of Swan v. Laitner et al.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-355.
    Moore v. Orleans Parish School Board et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-356.
    Cicirello v. New York Telephone Co.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-357.
    Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., dba WCCO Television, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-359.
    Stewart v. Pearson Lumber Co.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-363.
    Smile v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-374.
    Ray v. Jones, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-375.
    Torcaso v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-376.
    General Dynamics Corp. v. Trevino et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-380.
    Caldwell v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-381.
    Maine v. Wing et al.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-382.
    Smith et al. v. Kentucky Democratic Party et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-384.
    Brown et al. v. 1250 Twenty-Fourth Street Associates et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-389.
    McDonnell v. Episcopal Diocese of Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-392.
    Brown et al. v. 1250 Twenty-Fourth Street Associates et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-395.
    Dow Chemical Co. v. Greenhill et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-396.
    Wiggins et al. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-398.
    Coffin v. Jackson, Chairman, Virginia Parole Board, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-399.
    Krupa v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-402.
    Guinnane v. City and County of San Francisco Planning Commission et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-404.
    Maggio, dba Patchogue Nursing Center v. Local 1199, Drug, Hospital & Health Care Employees Union, R. W. D. S. U., AFL-CIO.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-410.
    Christensen v. Minnesota.
   Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-414.
    Castella v. Long, Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service, United States Department of the Army, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-415.
    Brooks v. Town of Ashland.
   Ct. App. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-416.
    Parten v. Ford Motor Co. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-417.
    New Jersey v. Bolte.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-423.
    E. Laursens Maskinfabrik A/S v. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-425.
    Constant v. Hitachi America, Ltd., et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-426.
    McGee v. Treharne, Public Guardian.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-428.
    Mullen v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-437.
    Diefenbach et ux. v. Washington.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-439.
    Davis Oil Co. et al. v. Mills et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-445.
    Bruce v. Harlan & Harlan et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-451.
    Wrenn v. Stone et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-452.
    ICG Petroleum, Inc., et al. v. United States Department of Energy et al.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-460.
    Marathon Oil Co. et al. v. McMoRAN Offshore Exploration Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-462.
    Livera et al. v. Small Business Administration et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-467.
    Mullen v. Maxwell et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-470.
    Kayzakian v. Buck et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-493.
    Olitt v. Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the Appellate Division, Supreme Court of New York, First Judicial Department.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-498.
    Hellenic Republic et al. v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-512.
    Tearney v. Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-518.
    Pilaski v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-539.
    Ondrizek et ux., Individually and as Guardians for Ondrizek et al. v. Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-541.
    Nedza v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5062.
    Adams v. John, Sheriff of Namaha County, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5088.
    Britson v. Lewis, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5101.
    Bruner v. McMackin, Superintendent, Marion Correctional Institution.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5109.
    Mack v. Henderson, Superintendent, Auburn Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5135.
    Chambers v. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5151.
    LeCrone, Executrix of the Estate of LeCrone v. Federal National Mortgage Assn. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5183.
    Ulferts v. Wood, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5280.
    Alston v. Dubois et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5357.
    Lebbos v. State Bar of California et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5372.
    Lawrence v. United States Army (Fort Hood).
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5373.
    Lawrence v. United States Army (TACOM).
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5401.
    Benson v. Livesay, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5414.
    Stephens v. Sullivan, Secretary, Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5428.
    Spychala v. Rushen et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5439.
    Clark v. Frank, Postmaster General of the United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5473.
    Gilles v. Indiana.
   Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5475.
    Blackmon, aka Denson v. Armontrout, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5479.
    Murray v. Tansy, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5481.
    Turner v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5487.
    Manter et al. v. Town of Fayette.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5488.
    Gottlieb v. Abaris Books, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5489.
    Tucker v. Scully, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5492.
    Evans v. Scully, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5498.
    Price v. Price.
   Cir. Ct. Mercer County, W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5499.
    Prenzler v. County of Orange et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5504.
    Freiberg v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5505.
    Chaires v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5506.
    Hakim v. Department of Civil Rights et al.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5509.
    Thompson v. Collins et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5516.
    Figueroa et al. v. Charles et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5517.
    Byrd v. Zimmerman, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution (and Diagnostic and Classification Center) at Graterford, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5518.
    White v. Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the City and County of San Francisco.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5520.
    Rivers v. Turner, Superintendent, Glades Correctional Institution.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5521.
    Stubbins v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5522.
    Olim v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5524.
    Willoughby v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5526.
    Linticum v. Davis, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5528.
    Brooks v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5529.
    Franco v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5531.
    Zarrilli v. Marino.
   App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5533.
    Ossandon et al. v. Swiss Bank Corp.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5537.
    Denton v. Duckworth, Superintendent, Indiana State Prison, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5538.
    Bramlett v. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5541.
    Carpenter v. Philips et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5549.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5551.
    Bondarenko v. Binderup et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5554.
    Perea v. Mondragon, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5555.
    Manning v. Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5560.
    Coulter v. Puckett, Superintendent, Mississippi State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5563.
    Fixel v. Nevada Supreme Court et al.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5564.
    Smith v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5565.
    Smith v. Lynaugh.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5566.
    Austin v. Berryman et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5567.
    Garoux v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5570.
    May v. Challenger Communications Systems, Inc.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5572.
    Warmack v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5574.
    Pickett v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5576.
    Gala v. United States Postal Service.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5579.
    Gallardo v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5581.
    Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, Attorney General of Washington, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5585.
    Hall v. Delaware.
   Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5602.
    Williams v. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5608.
    Abdul-Akbar v. Watson et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5611.
    Jurich v. Michigan.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5613.
    Lockhart v. Rolling et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5619.
    Hedlund v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5627.
    Strickler v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5631.
    Gosho-Kim v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5640.
    Read v. Prothonotary, New Castle County, Delaware, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5645.
    Wright v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5649.
    Erlin v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5653.
    Urrego-Linares v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5660.
    Carwile v. Smith, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5664.
    Oakley v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5665.
    Thornley v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5667.
    Marquez-Rodriguez v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5678.
    Lewis v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5681.
    Santiago v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5685.
    Abdul-Akbar, aka Davis v. Redman, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5708.
    Land v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5711.
    Usan v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5714.
    Hines v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5717.
    Shah v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5719.
    Grant v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5721.
    Izquierdo v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5722.
    Fazzino v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5730.
    Porter v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 88-1449.
    No. 88-1551.
    Korean Air Lines v. MacNamara; and MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.

Reported below: 863 F. 2d 1135.


text:
    No. 89-383.
    Hanson v. Arrowsmith et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 89-45.
    Hawaii v. Roman.
   Sup. Ct. Haw. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-187.
    McCormick, Warden, et al. v. Coleman.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-247.
    Colorado v. Lacy.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-168.
    No. 89-204.
    No. 89-397.
    Rexall Drug Co. v. Tigue et al.; E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Hymowitz et al.; E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Tigue et al.; E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Dolan et al.; and Eli Lilly & Co. v. Hymowitz et al.; and Eli Lilly & Co. v. Dolan et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor and Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.

Reported below: 73 N. Y. 2d 487, 539 N. E. 2d 1069.


text:
    No. 89-365.
    Polyak v. Stack et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of the petition for writ of cer-tiorari and to consolidate with other cases denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 89-5106.
    Herrera v. Redman, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White and Justice Black-mun would grant certiorari.