author: TERNUS, Justice.

text:
    AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Jeffrey CORRIGAN and Kirsten Corrigan, as Next Friends of Ryan Corrigan, Appellees, and Mark Francke and Harold Francke, Defendants.
    No. 04-0723.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    May 6, 2005.
    Rehearing Denied June 10, 2005.

      Ted J. Wallace, Davenport, for appellant.
    Thad J. Collins and Matthew G. Novak of Pickens, Barnes & Abernathy, Cedar Rapids, for appellees.
   TERNUS, Justice.

This lawsuit arises from injuries sustained by Ryan Corrigan, son of the appel-lees, Jeff and Kirsten Corrigan, when Ryan was in the care of Mark Francke, who was providing childcare services to the Corrigans. Mark Francke was later convicted of child endangerment as a re-suit of this incident. The district court ruled in a summary judgment decision that the appellant, American Family Mutual Insurance Company, had no coverage for claims made by the Corrigans against Mark Francke. The court did, however, find coverage for the Corrigans’ claims against Mark’s father, Harold Francke, which were based generally on Harold’s allegedly negligent supervision of Mark and on Harold’s ownership of the premises where the injuries occurred. On appeal, American Family claims that several -exclusions in its homeowners policy preclude coverage for these claims.

We agree that based on the undisputed facts, coverage is excluded by the policy exclusion for “bodily injury ...’ arising out of ... violation of any criminal law for which any insured is convicted.” Therefore, we reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of American Family.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

The record establishes the following facts. Mark Francke operated a daycare business in the home of his father, Harold Francke. On January 16, 2002, eight-month-old Ryan Corrigan was left in Mark’s care. Ryan did not seem normal when his father, Jeff Corrigan, took him home that afternoon, so later that evening Jeff took Ryan to a local hospital. Ryan was soon airlifted to the University of Iowa Hospitals where it was determined he suffered injuries resulting from shakén-baby syndrome. Emergency surgery saved the child’s life, but Ryan suffered permanent brain damage. During the course of treating Ryan, the doctors discovered that he had suffered other injuries, including four fractured ribs, consistent with prior abuse. Although Mark Francke initially denied he had done anything that could have resulted in Ryan’s injuries, Mark eventually pled guilty to child endangerment, in violation of Iowa Code section 726.6 (2001).

The Corrigans filed suit against Mark and Harold seeking damages for the injuries to their son. Their claim against Mark was based on his allegedly negligent, reckless and/or intentional conduct resulting in serious harm to Ryan. The Corri-gans’ claim against Harold was based on three theories: (1) failure to warn of the danger Mark presented; (2) failure to supervise, monitor, or otherwise take action to discover Mark was a danger; and (3) knowingly allowing dangers to exist at the daycare that created a substantial risk of harm to children on the premises. The Franckes did not file an appearance in this lawsuit, so the court entered a default judgment against them for money damages.

While the tort action was pending, American.Family filed the present declaratory judgment action against the Corri-gans and the Franckes to-establish that a homeowners policy it had issued to Harold, which was in effect on January 16, 2002, did not provide coverage for the injuries suffered by Ryan. Again, the Franckes did not defend, and the district court entered a default judgment against Mark and Harold.

Subsequently, American Family filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming several exclusions in the liability coverage of its policy precluded coverage for the Corrigans’ claims against the Franckes. The Corrigans resisted, essentially filing a cross-motion for summary judgment. At the summary judgment hearing, the parties agreed there were no genuine issues of material fact and the case could be decided as a matter of law.

In a subsequent ruling, the district court held there was no coverage for Mark based on the business pursuits and criminal acts exclusions in the American Family policy. The court concluded these exclusions did not apply to Harold, however, because the Corrigans “[did] not seek to hold Harold vicariously liable for Mark’s actions, but assert[ed] separate claims against Harold for negligence.” Therefore, the court held, American Family’s policy provided coverage for the claims made against Harold.

The Corrigans did not appeal the district court’s decision that American Family had no liability under its policy for the judgment the Corrigans obtained against Mark. On the other hand, American Family appealed, reasserting its claim that several policy exclusions preclude coverage for the judgment against Harold. ■ Because we think the criminal acts exclusion applies, we limit our opinion to an analysis of that policy provision. In addition, we consider the Corrigans’ contention that the reasonable expectations doctrine requires that coverage be extended to Harold.

II. Standard of Review.

On appeal from a summary judgment ruling, this court reviews the district court’s decision for correction of errors at law. Lee v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 646 N.W.2d 403, 406 (Iowa 2002). We will affirm if the record shows “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to -a judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3).

III. General Principles of Insurance Policy Construction and Interpretation.

In resolving the dispute before us, we must first interpret the insurance policy by ascertaining the meaning of the words used in the parties’ contract, and then construe the policy by determining its legal effect. See LeMars Mut. Ins. Co. v. Joffer, 574 N.W.2d 303, 306-07 (Iowa 1998). “Construction of an insurance policy and the interpretation of its language are matters of law for the court to decide, when as here, neither party offers extrinsic evidence about the meaning of the policy’s language.” Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 494 N.W.2d 690, 692 (Iowa 1993). Neither the district court’s interpretation of the policy nor its construction of the policy is binding on this court. Id.

The principles governing our interpretation and construction of insurance policies are well established:

The cardinal principle in the construction and interpretation of insurance poli- . cies is that the intent of the parties at the time the policy was sold must control. Except in cases of. ambiguity, the intent of the parties is determined by the language of the policy. “An ambiguity exists if, after the application of pertinent rules of interpretation to the policy, a genuine uncertainty results as to which one of two or more meanings is the proper one.”

LeMars Mut. Ins. Co., 574 N.W.2d at 307 (citations omitted). “However, a mere disagreement between the parties regarding the meaning of undefined terms does not automatically establish an ambiguity.” Id.

Due to the adhesive nature of insurance contracts,. ambiguous policy provisions are interpreted in the- light most favorable to the insured. See Cairns v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 398 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Iowa 1987). In addition, “exclusions will be strictly construed against the insurer.” Kalell v. Mut. Fire & Auto. Ins. Co., 471 N.W.2d 865, 867 (Iowa 1991).

IV.Criminal Acts Exclusion.

The liability coverage pi the American Family policy states the-insurer “will pay, up to our limit, compensatory damages for which any insured is legally liable because of bodily injury or property damages caused by an occurrence covered by this policy.” (Emphasis omitted.) The policy also contains a severability-of-interests clause that states the insurance “applies separately to each insured.” (Emphasis omitted.)

The liability coverage contains several exclusions. The one pertinent to this case provides: “Violation of Law. We will not cover bodily injury or property damages arising out of ... violation of any criminal law for which any insured is convicted.” (Emphasis omitted.) The district court relied on this exclusion in ruling there was “plainly” no coverage for the judgment against Mark. The court’s conclusion rested on two undisputed facts: (1) Mark caused Ryan’s bodily injuries; and (2) Mark’s conduct constituted a violation of criminal law for which he was convicted.

The Corrigans contend the same conclusion is not warranted with respect to coverage for Harold. They argue there were two causes of Ryan’s injuries — Mark’s conduct and Harold’s negligence. Relying on this court’s decision in Kalell, they assert the mere fact that the injury arising from Mark’s intentional acts is excluded does not mean the same injury also caused by Harold’s negligent acts is excluded, particularly in view of the policy provision that coverage is applied separately to each insured. ■ ■

In Kalell, an insured sought coverage under his homeowners policy for claims made against him when he áttached a rope to his car to remove a dead limb from a tree, resulting in injuries to a third person. 471 N.W.2d at 866. Two causes of the injury were alleged: nonvehicle-related negligence in using a rope to remove the limb and vehicle-related negligence in using a vehicle to pull on the rope. Id. at 868. The policy contained an exclusion for bodily injury “arising out of the ... use ... of ... a motor vehicle owned or operated by . .•. any insured.” Id. at 866. We concluded the phrase “arising out of’ should be interpreted narrowly to exclude “ ‘only those injuries which are proximately caused by the automobile.’ ” Id. at 868 (citation omitted).

This court then considered how the exclusion should be applied when there are two proximate causes, of the third party’s injuries, one cause falling within the exclusion and one cause not encompassed in the exclusion. Id. We stated the following test for determining when bodily injury arises out of the excluded act: “[W]hen two independent acts of negligence are alleged, one vehicle-related and one not vehicle-related, coverage is still provided under the homeowners policy unless the vehicle-related negligence is the sole proximate cause of the injury.” Id. (emphasis added). Applying this test to .the facts presented in Kalell, this court observed that “[rjemoval of a limb with a rope could be negligence without regard to whether a motor vehicle was used to pull the rope.” Id. We concluded, therefore, that “[t]his [act of negli-,genee] could be found to be an independent act of negligence and one which is covered by the policy.” Id.

The present'case is clearly distinguishable because the acts of negligence alleged against Harold are not independent of the excluded acts of Mark. All three theories of liability asserted against Harold require as an element proof of Mark’s conduct in inflicting the injuries. Starting first with the negligent supervision claim, we note that this theory includes “ ‘as an element an underlying tort or wrongful act committed by the [person who was not properly supervised].’ ” Schoff v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 604 N.W.2d 43, 53 (Iowa 1999) (citation omitted); accord Cubit v. Mahaska County, 677 N.W.2d 777, 784-85 (Iowa 2004). The failure-to-monitor specification of negligence alleged by the Corrigans is indistinguishable in this respect. Thus, the success of these claims is dependent upon proof that Mark caused Ryan’s injuries.

The remaining claims of negligence— failure to warn of the danger posed by Mark, failure to discover this danger, and allowing this danger to exist — are really just different alternatives of the liability imposed on the possessor of land under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 (1965). See generally Continental Ins. Co. v. Bones, 596 N.W.2d 552, 559 (Iowa 1999) (stating “coverage is controlled by the actual claim asserted against the insured, not the label the claimant chooses to put on his or her claim”). That section provides:

A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for such a purpose, for -physical harm caused, by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third persons or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect them against it.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344, at 223-24 (emphasis added). This rule makes a landowner liable for “the acts of independent contractors ... who are permitted to carry on activities upon the land.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 cmt. c, at 224. Although the liability imposed on a landowner under section 344 requires proof of the landowner’s own negligence in failing to discover the harmful acts, warn visitors of the harmful acts, or protect visitors against the harmful acts, there must also be proof that the physical harm was “caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of [a] third person[].” Restatement- (Second) of Torts § 344, at 224. Consequently, these specifications of negligence, just like the failure-to-supervise and failure-to-monitor claims, are dependent upon proof that the person constituting the danger caused the physical harm.

Because Mark’s acts must be established to prove that Harold’s negligence was a proximate cause of Ryan’s injuries, none of the claims of negligence alleged against Harold are independent of the wrongful conduct of Mark so as to be subject to the sole-proximate-cause requirement announced in the Kalell case. See Pike v. Am. States Preferred Ins. Co., 55 P.3d 212, 216 (Colo.Ct.App.2002) (holding claims of negligent entrustment and supervision were excluded by vehicle exclusion in homeowners policy because these claims were not independent of use of automobile); Calvin v. Janbar Enters., Inc., 856 So.2d 88, 91 (La.Ct.App.2003) (holding vehicle exclusion applied because use of motor vehicle was an essential element of negligent hiring, supervision and retention claims); Austin Mut. Ins. Co. v. Klande, 563 N.W.2d 282, 285 (Minn.Ct.App.1997) (holding claim of negligence in failing to keep child away from motorcycle fell within vehicle exclusion because “claim of negligent supervision is not divisible from the ownership and use of the motorcycle itself’); Taylor v. Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 925 P.2d 1279, 1283 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (holding motor vehicle exclusion applied to claims of negligent supervision and control where insured parents’ negligence was “firmly grounded” in a failure to supervise use of automobile; use of automobile was essential to improper supervision claim). For the same reason, the bodily injury for which the Corrigans seek compensation from Harold inescapably arises out of Mark’s violation of criminal law for which Mark was convicted. See Muzzio v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 799 So.2d 272, 274-75 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (holding claims that insured negligently hired, supervised and retained truck driver were “inextricably linked with the use of the vehicle” and therefore, “necessarily deemed to arise out of the use of the vehicle”). Therefore, liability coverage for the claims made against Harold is excluded by the criminal acts exclusion. See Taylor, 925 P.2d at 1282-83 (noting majority of jurisdictions “reason that where the negligent supervision is so inextricably intertwined with the motor vehicle, there is no independent non-auto-related act which would take the claim outside the scope of the motor vehicle exclusionary clause”).

We have considered the Corrigans’ claim that the exclusion is ambiguous and accordingly should be interpreted in their favor, but we find no merit in this argument. The Corrigans point to a discrepancy between the liability and property coverages of American Family’s policy to support their claim of ambiguity. The property coverage of the policy, unlike the liability coverage, specifically prefaces the list of exclusions applicable to that coverage with the statement that “[sjuch loss is excluded regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.” This statement is apparently meant to avoid the sole-proximate-cause requirement courts have adopted in cases of multiple causation. The Corrigans argue American Family could have included such a statement in the liability coverage if it had intended to preclude coverage in multiple causation situations where one cause is excluded and another cause is not. The company’s failure to do so, they contend, evidences an intent to extend coverage in multiple-cause situations so long as any one cause is not excluded.

It is true a statement in the liability coverage like the one in the property coverage would have made resolution of the issue in the present case clearer because this court would not have even had to consider the Kalell test. But “Ambiguity is not present merely because the provision ‘could have been worded more clearly or precisely than it in fact was.’ ” Cairns, 398 N.W.2d at 824. In the absence of a statement in the liability coverage expressly addressing the multiple-cause situation, we are obligated to interpret the criminal acts exclusion using the principles set forth in Kalell. As we have already discussed, those principles do not require that Mark’s negligence be the sole proximate cause of Ryan’s bodily injury in order for the exclusion to apply. That is so because the negligent acts of Harold were not independent of Mark’s criminal acts. Therefore, even though the liability coverage does not expressly address multiple-cause situations, the language of the exclusion, interpreted in accordance with our multiple-cause test, precludes coverage for the claims asserted against Harold.

The Corrigans also contend the policy’s severability-of-interests clause creates an ambiguity. They rely on this court’s decision in United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Shelly Funeral Home, Inc., 642 N.W.2d 648 (Iowa 2002), wherein we held a liability insurer had coverage for a claim of negligent supervision. In that case, an insured employee of a funeral home committed intentional acts of sexual misconduct for which there was no coverage. United Fire, 642 N.W.2d at 653. At issue on appeal was whether there was coverage for a claim of negligent supervision made against the insured funeral home. Id. The insurance company relied on an exclusion that stated the policy did not apply to bodily injury “expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.” Id. (emphasis added). Noting the policy contained a severability clause, we held whether an injury was intended must be determined from the viewpoint of the insured seeking coverage. Id. at 654. Because the. funeral home did not intend or expect the injuries inflicted by its employee, we held the exclusion did not apply to the claim made against the funeral home. Id.

The Corrigans contend the same result is required here because American Family’s policy also contains a severability-of-interests clause. They assert this clause requires that we interpret the policy as if Harold were the only insured. Because Harold did not commit a criminal act for which he was convicted, they argue, coverage for the claim made against him is not excluded by the criminal acts exclusion. This argument is not sound, however, when one examines the language of American Family’s exclusion, which is significantly different from the exclusion at issue in United Fire.

In order to appreciate the significance of differences in policy language, it is helpful first to understand this court’s interpretation of the severability-of-interests clause. This court first addressed the meaning of such a provision in Zenti v. Home Insurance Co., 262 N.W.2d 588 (Iowa 1978). At issue in that case was an exclusion for “bodily injury to any employee of the Insured .... ” Zenti, 262 N.W.2d at 589 (emphasis added). We held “the severability-of-interests clause was inserted into insurance contracts to make clear that the employee exclusion is applicable only when the person claiming coverage as insured is the employer.” Id. at 592. We apparently adopted the rationale of the Maryland Court of Appeals, which stated in a case quoted in our opinion, that the severability-of-interests clause was included in the policy to clarify “ ‘that the term “insured” does not always mean any insured who could claim coverage under the policy but only the insured claiming coverage.’ ” Id. at 591 (citation omitted); see also Michael Carbone, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 937 F.Supp. 413, 418 (E.D.Pa.1996) (stating “the vast majority of jurisdictions ... hold that ... a separation of insureds clause modifies the meaning of an exclusion phrased in terms of ‘the insured’ ”). Thus, the severability clause was pertinent in United-Fire because the policy at issue in that case excluded coverage for bodily injury “expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.” 642 N.W.2d at 663 (emphasis added).

In contrast to the exclusions at issue in Zenti and United Fire, the American 'Family policy excludes coverage for bodily injury “arising out of ... violation of any criminal law for which any insured is convicted.” (Emphasis added.) This court has held that the term “any insured” as used in an exclusionary provision of the property coverage of a homeowners policy means that coverage is voided as to all insureds if any insured committed a prohibited act. Webb v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 493 N.W.2d 808, 812 (Iowa 1992); see Chacon v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d 748, 751 (Colo.1990) (noting “[t]he majority of courts ... have held that ‘unlike the phrase “the insured,” the phrase “any insured” unambiguously expresses a contractual intent ... to prohibit recovery by an innocent co-insured’ ”). Although the Corrigans argue the holding of the Webb case is not appropriately applied to the interpretation of American Family’s liability coverage, we disagree. Our decision in Webb rested on “contract analysis of the insurance policy provisions.” Webb, 493 N.W.2d at 812; accord Vance v. Pekin Ins. Co., 457 N.W.2d 589, 592 (Iowa 1990) (adopting contract analysis to determine meaning of term “an insured”). We have the same focus in the case before us. Thus, we are not persuaded that the term “any insured” means something different in one part of the homeowners policy than it means in another part of the same policy in the absence of a policy provision requiring divergent interpretations.

American Family’s use of the term “any insured” in its criminal acts exclusion unambiguously conveys an intent to exclude coverage when recovery is sought for bodily injury proximately caused by the criminal act of any insured. See Webb, 493 N.W.2d at 812 (holding use of word “any” unambiguously conveys intention to preclude coverage for all insureds if any insured commits a prohibited act); Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 593 (same). Because the language of the exclusion clearly contemplates its applicability to multiple insureds under the policy, it would be unreasonable to interpret the severability-of-interests clause as the Corrigans suggest: that the clause calls for application of the policy as if Harold were the sole insured.- To interpret the policy in this manner would require this court to conclude the term “the insured” means the same as “any insured,” a conclusion we have rejected in the past. See Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 593. Because the Corrigans’ suggested interpretation of the severability-of-interests clause is not reasonable when that clause is considered in the context of the entire policy, the severability clause does not create an ambiguity in the criminal acts exclusion. See Taryn E.F. v. Joshua M.C., 178 Wis.2d 719, 505 N.W.2d 418, 420 (Ct.App.1993) (holding severability clause did not render exclusion of “any damages ... attributable to ... any outrageous conduct on the part of any ‘insured’ ” ambiguous); see also Nat’l Ins. Underwriters v. Lexington Flying Club, Inc.,. 603 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Ky.Ct.App.1979) (“The purpose of sever-ability clauses is to spread protection, to the limits of coverage, among all of the named insureds. The purpose is not to negate bargained-for exclusions which are plainly worded.”); N.W. G.F. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Norgard, 518 N.W.2d 179, 183-84 (N.D.1994) (holding exclusion of bodily injury arising out of sexual molestation by any person involved in day care operation clearly placed such risks outside the policy and consequently there was no coverage for claim of negligent supervision despite existence of severability-of-interests clause: “To construe the severability clause to provide coverage in these circumstances is repugnant to the plainly-worded exclusion.”). See generally Grinnell Mut., 494 N.W.2d at 692 (“An insurance policy is construed as a whole, not by its separate provisions.”).

In summary, we conclude that even though the severability-of-interests clause requires that we apply the criminal acts exclusion from the viewpoint of Harold, the plain language of the exclusion mandates that we consider whether the claims made against Harold include as an element conduct by any insured that is a violation of the criminal law. See Chacon, 788 P.2d at 752 (holding exclusion for damage “ ‘expected or intended by any insured’ clearly and unambiguously expresses an intention to deny coverage to all insureds when damage is intended or expected as a result of the actions of any insured,” notwithstanding severability clause). As we have already discussed, the facts clearly establish that the negligence claims made against Harold are casually connected to Mark’s criminal act; these claims are not distinct and severable from that act. Accordingly, under our cases, the bodily injury underlying the Corrigans’ claims against Harold arises out of Mark’s violation of the criminal law, and therefore coverage is excluded.

As a final matter, we acknowledge the Corrigans’ assertions that the insurance policy should be interpreted to protect the insured’s interests and provide compensation to victims of wrongdoing. They argue considerations of public policy dictate that we find coverage for their claims. Although insurance policies are interpreted favorably toward the insured, this rule applies only when there is an ambiguity in the policy, and we have found. none here. See Continental Ins. Co., 596 N.W.2d at, 558. Thus, this court is constrained by the unambiguous language of the policy in determining whether there is coverage for the judgment obtained by the Corrigans. See LeMars Mut. Ins. Co., 574 N.W.2d at 307 (“Except in cases of, ambiguity, the intent of the parties is determined by the language of the policy.”); Moncivais v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 430 N.W.2d 438, 442.(Iowa 1988) (stating court may not “ignore the plain meaning of the policy in order to find ambiguity”); Indianola Country Club v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 250 Iowa 1, 6, 92 N.W.2d 402, 405 (1958) (stating “ ‘a court is in duty bound to give effect to exceptions and limitations in a policy as they are written’ ” citation omitted)). We cannot add to or subtract from the parties’ contract based on what this court might think is a preferable public policy in the absence of a legislative, regulatory, or prior judicial statement of that public policy. See Claude v. Guaranty Nat’l Ins. Co., 679 N.W.2d 659, 663 (Iowa 2004) (stating public policy is determined by reference to the constitution, statutes, and the court’s prior decisions, not by the -court’s generalized view of what is fair or just in a particular case); Principal Cas. Ins. Co. v. Blair, 500 N.W.2d 67, 69 (Iowa 1993) (holding family exclusion in homeowners policy did not violate public policy, noting the insureds had not identified any statute or court case that required coverage under the circumstances presented in that case). No statute, rule, or prior decision of this court has been identified that would make the insurance policy provisions at issue here against public policy. Cf. Sager v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 680 N.W.2d 8, 13-14 (Iowa 2004) (refusing to enforce fire policy exclusion for losses arising out of act of “an insured” with the intent or expectation of causing a loss because statute required that exclusions be limited to “the insured” engaging in excluded act): Therefore, we must conclude there is no coverage for the claims made by the Corrigans against Harold and Mark Francke.

V. Reasonable Expectations.

The defendants assert that even if American Family’s interpretation of the policy is correct, the doctrine of reasonable expectations mandates coverage. As we have stated on a prior occasion, “The doctrine [of reasonable expectations] is carefully circumscribed and does not contemplate the expansion of coverage on a general equitable basis.” Johnson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 203, 206 (Iowa 1995). The doctrine “ ‘can only be invoked [when] an exclusion (1) is bizarre or oppressive, (2) eviscerates terms explicitly agreed to, or (3) eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction.’ ” Essex Ins. Co. v. The Fieldhouse, Inc., 506 N.W.2d 772, 777 (Iowa 1993) (citation omitted). Moreover, as a precondition to reliance on this doctrine, an insured must establish that an ordinary layperson would misunderstand the policy coverage or that there are circumstances attributable to the insurer that led the insured to expect coverage. Johnson, 533 N.W.2d at 206.

We conclude neither of these prerequisites has been satisfied. In Vance, this court held a reasonable person in the insured’s position would understand that an exclusion for “any loss arising out of any act committed ... by or at the direction of an insured” would preclude coverage for all insureds. Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 593 (finding exclusion clear and unequivocal in barring coverage for all insureds). The same conclusion is warranted here because, as we have already discussed, the criminal acts exclusion is unambiguous. See LeMars Mut. Ins. Co., 574 N.W.2d at 311 (holding layperson would not misunderstand exclusion that was “clear and unambiguous”); Johnson, 533 N.W.2d at 206 (same). In addition, there is no evidence of any conduct on the part of American Family that fostered expectations by the Franckes that they would be covered for claims such as those asserted by the Corrigans. See LeMars Mut. Ins. Co., 574 N.W.2d at 311 (rejecting reasonable expectations doctrine in part due to lack of any evidence that the parties discussed the exclusion at issue so as to create a misunderstanding on the part of the insureds as to their coverage). Therefore, the reasonable expectations doctrine is not applicable.

VI. Summary and Disposition.

The district court erred when it ruled American Family’s homeowners policy provides coverage for the negligence claims asserted against Harold Francke. The undisputed facts show the bodily injury resulting from Harold’s negligence was proximately caused by Mark Francke’s violation of criminal law. This violation was not independent of the negligence claims against Harold as Mark’s conduct was a required element in establishing Harold’s liability. Therefore, even though the policy is applied separately to Harold, it does not provide coverage. In addition, the reasonable expectations doctrine is not implicated by the criminal acts exclusion. For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of the Corrigans and remand for entry of judgment in favor of American Family.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . The Corrigans claim this conclusion is inconsistent with our decisions in Gabe's Construction Co. v. United Capitol Insurance Co., 539 N.W.2d 144 (Iowa 1995), and Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co. v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 494 N.W.2d 690 (Iowa 1993). Both cases involved vehicle exclusions in commercial liability policies and in both cases the injured parties alleged multiple causes of their injuries. Gabe’s Constr., 539 N.W.2d at 145; Grinnell Mut., 494 N.W.2d at 691-92. This court held the policies provided coverage for nonvehicle-related negligence claims, some of which were based on allegations of failure to supervise. Gabe's Constr., 539 N.W.2d at 147; Grinnell Mut., 494 N.W.2d at 694. Unfortunately, there- is no discussion in those cases of whether the nonvehicle-related allegations of negligence were independent of the vehicle-related negligence. It appears this aspect of the multiple-cause test was not challenged. See Gabe’s Constr., 539 N.W.2d at 145 (stating primary issue was whether Iowa or Minnesota law governed); Grinnell Mut., 494 N.W.2d at 693 (noting insurer argued vehicle exclusion should apply whenever instrumentality that caused the bodily injury is a vehicle). Therefore, these decisions lack a discussion of the nature of the negligent supervision claims so as to permit a comparison of the holdings in those cases with the decision we reach today. To the extent the
        Gabes Construction and Grinnell Mutual opinions can be interpreted as a retreat from the test set forth in Kalell, our decision today should reaffirm our adherence to the principles set forth in Kalell.

      . Other courts have also concluded that "the term 'any insured' unambiguously precludes coverage to all persons covered by the policy if any one of them engages in excludable conduct,” notwithstanding a severability clause. See Taryn E.F. v. Joshua M.C., 178 Wis.2d 719, 505 N.W.2d 418, 420, 422 (Ct.App.1993); accord Michael Carbone, 937 F.Supp. at 420; Cal. Cas. Ins. Co. v. North-land Ins. Co., 48 Cal.App.4th 1682, 56 Cal. Rptr.2d 434, 442 (1996); Chacon, 788 P.2d at 752; Oaks v. Dupuy, 653 So.2d 165, 168-69 (La.Ct.App.1995); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Copeland-Williams, 941 S.W.2d 625, 627, 629 (Mo.Ct.App.1997); Great Cent. Ins. Co. v. Roemmich, 291 N.W.2d 772, 774 (S.D.1980); cf. Gorzen v. Westfield Ins. Co., 207 Mich. App. 575, 526 N.W.2d.43, 45 (1994) (reaching same conclusion wheh interpreting policy exclusion that referred to "an insured”).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LAVORATO, Chief Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Bruce L. RATCLIFF, Appellant, v. John M. GRAETHER and Wolfe Clinic, P.C., Appellees.
    No. 03-1816.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    May 13, 2005.
    Rehearing Denied June 10, 2005.

      John W. Holmes of Holmes & Holmes, Waterloo, for appellant.
    Robert C. Rouwenhorst of Rouwenhorst & Brown, P.C., West Des Moines, for ap-pellees.
   LAVORATO, Chief Justice.

In this medical malpractice action, the plaintiff, Bruce L. Ratcliff, appeals from a district court ruling sustaining a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, John M. Graether, M.D. and Wolfe Clinic, P.C. At issue is whether the continuous treatment doctrine tolled the statute of limitations. Because we conclude the doctrine did not toll the statute, we affirm.

I. Background Facts.

Wolfe Clinic, P.C. sponsored an orientation seminar, which Ratcliff attended, that provided information on elective surgery designed to reduce or eliminate the need to wear eyeglasses or contact lenses. At that seminar, Norman F. Woodlief, M.D. of the clinic talked about various surgical techniques that were available, which involved removing tissue from the cornea.

On April 30, 1996, Ratcliff pursued this treatment at which time Graether of the Wolfe Clinic performed surgery on Rat-cliffs right eye. That eye had a negative twelve diopters myopia reading prior to surgery.

On April 9,1997, Graether performed an “enhancement” surgery on the eye. Enhancement surgeries remove additional tissue and further flatten the cornea. Such surgeries are often performed becausé surgeons choose to err on the side of tm-dercorrection with the first surgery.

Ratcliff described how the enhancement surgery improved his vision:

[F]rom the moment it was uncovered the day following the surgery, the vision was clear and much improved over what I’d had prior to any surgery, and I felt that if I could get vision in my left eye - as good as what I was now seeing in the right eye that this would be a benefit.

On April 30 Graether performed LASIK surgery on Ratcliffs left eye, which had a negative ten diopters myopia reading. After this surgery, Ratcliff said his vision was “very clouded” and “terrible” compared to what had happened just less than a month before on the right eye.

On May 13 Graether told Ratcliff he might have overcorrected the left eye. A week later, Graether told Ratcliff that a cataract was forming on that eye, which was not present prior to the surgery. The cataract formation, according to Graether, was just a coincidence.

At some point in 1997, Graether stopped seeing patients in the Wolfe Clinic’s Cedar Falls office, where Graether had seen Rat-cliff. Graether chose to see patients only in the clime’s Marshalltown office. From that time forward, Todd W. Gothard, M.D. treated Graether’s Cedar Falls patients and kept Graether informed of their progress.

On December 23 Ratcliff saw Richard C. Mauer, M.D., an ophthalmologist and ophthalmic surgeon, because of the cataract formation. In his deposition, Ratcliff explained more fully why he saw Mauer and what Mauer told him:

I was still having a great deal of problem with my eye. I, frankly, had doubted their explanation of the cataract as being the cause, and so in the interim I had gone to Dr. Mauer for a second opinion as to the effect of the cataract. And I was told by Dr. Mauer that¡ yes, there was a very small, tiny cataract forming, but that it would not be perceptible to me at that stage, and he didn’t believe that the cataract would account for my visual problems.
Q. What did you tell Dr. Mauer? A. Well, to the best of my recollection, the general theme of it was that I had serious visual problems with the left eye and that both Dr. Graether and Dr. Gothard told me it was due to a cataract, and I didn’t think the timing made much sense, and I wanted his opinion.
Q. What did Dr. Mauer tell you he thought was wrong with your left eye when you saw him. in December of 1997? A. He told me that he thought that the surface, of my cornea was irregular., .
Q. And did he offer an opinion to you that that was probably related to the , LASIK surgery that you had had on your left eye? A. I think he was careful not to accuse anybody of anything. But that was clearly the message that I got.
Q. All right. So he made it clear to you that — or at least the impression that you had when you left his office in December of 1997 was that the LASIK procedure that you had had on April 30 of 1997 had caused some irregularity in your cornea; correct? A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. So in the December visit of 1997 with Dr. Mauer, you believe that your problem was vision in your left eye related to an irregularity of your cornea; correct? A. That’s correct.
Q. But in December of 1997, you left Dr. Mauer’s office with the impression that the April 30, 1997 LASIK procedure was the cause of your visual problems? A. Yes.

Mauer examined Ratcliff on several occasions from December 23, 1997 through February 14, 2002.

Ratcliff saw Gothard on November 18, 1998, and Gothard’s medical notes of that visit state:

[Ratcliff] apparently had gotten a second opinion sometime since the last visit when I saw him, with Dr. Mauer who told him he had no effect or very little effect from the cataract and that it was mainly a problem with the LASIK surgery that was causing his vision to be blurry....
He is absolutely convinced that the LASIK surgery on the OS has made the cataract and also made his vision blurry. I have told him that there is absolutely no known association between LÁSIK and cataract formation. He was extremely confrontational and said that there is no way that we can know for sure that this did not cause the cataract, or cause his vision to be blurry.... [H]e really has his mind made up already regarding the cause of his problem. He is very reluctant to get glasses. He says the surgery was an entire waste, and now he has poor vision. I’ve told him that he may have had a mild amount of myopic regression from the surgery, but I would be a little reluctant to perform any additional laser surgery at this juncture due to the fact that there is a cataract forming and the refraction has been changing.

On November 20, 1998, Graether wrote Ratcliff telling him that the cataract was “merely coincidence” and had nothing to do with the surgery to the eye. Graether also wrote that because of the developing cataract no further refractive surgery should be done to improve Ratcliffs vision., “[A]ny improvement,” wrote Graether, “would only be transient.”

In a letter dated February 22, 2002, Mauer opined that Ratcliffs poor vision was due to an irregular astigmatism. He attributed the condition to several factors, including the surgical procedures employed to treat Ratcliffs left eye.

II. Proceedings.

On November 16, 2000, Ratcliff sued Graether and Wolfe Clinic. Ratcliff alleged that the defendants combined different procedures in a two-step process in their attempt to correct the myopia of negative ten diopters in his left eye. He further alleged that such process had not been studied or approved by the FDA. Ratcliff also alleged that he would not have consented to such a procedure if he had known these facts, and the defendants suppressed the information to get him to consent.

The defendants asserted a number of affirmative defenses, one of which is the subject of this appeal: Ratcliffs claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations found in Iowa Code section 614.1(9).

Later, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the action was time-barred by section 614.1(9). Ratcliff resisted, contending that the continuous treatment doctrine tolled the statute of limitations. The district court denied the motion, ruling that genuine issues of material fact existed. The ruling discussed the possible application of the continuous treatment doctrine.

Following the district court’s ruling, the defendants filed their second motion for summary judgment. In it the defendants asked the court to assume, for the purposes of the motion only, that the continuous treatment doctrine would be adopted and would be applied in this case. Even assuming adoption of the continuous treatment doctrine, the defendants contended the single act exception applied to the case and the action was therefore barred by the statute of limitations. '

The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case. The district court noted that Ratcliff saw Mauer in December 1997 and left his office with the impression that the April 30, 1997 LASIK procedure was the cause of his visual problems. Under these circumstances, the district court reasoned, it was inappropriate to apply the continuous treatment doctrine after December 1997. The court concluded that because the statute of limitations expired in 1999 and Ratcliff did not file his petition until November 2000, the action was barred.

Ratcliff filed a motion to enlarge or amend findings pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure, 1.904(2). In its ruling on this motion, the district court concluded that the single act exception applied because Ratcliff was on. immediate notice of his injury when, following the surgery, his left eye vision was impaired. The court reasoned that, under the single act exception, if there is a single act of malpractice, subsequent time and effort to remedy or cure the act does not toll the statute of limitations. Additionally, the court ruled, even if the continuous treatment doctrine were to be applied in this case, it could not be applied- later than the December 1997 consultation with Mauer.

Following this latter ruling, Ratcliff appealed.

III. Issues.

On appeal, Ratcliff raises three issues, only one of which we need to address: whether the continuous treatment doctrine applies to toll the statute of limitations.

IV. Scope of Review.

tl, 2] We recently summarized rules governing motions for summary judgment in Berte v. Bode:

“Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a , matter of law. ■ There is no fact issue if the only dispute concerns the legal consequences flowing from the undisputed facts. Our review is therefore limited to whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the district court correctly applied the law.”

692 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa 2005) (citation omitted).

V. Analysis.

The statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims provides in relevant part:

Actions may be brought within the times herein limited, respectively, after their causes accrue, and not afterwards, except when otherwise specifically declared:
9. Malpractice.
a. Except as provided in paragraph “b ”, those founded on injuries to the person ... against any physician and surgeon ... arising out of patient care, within two years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known ... of the existence of, the injury ... for which damages are sought in the action, whichever of the dates occurs first....

Iowa Code § 614.1(9)(a) (2003) (emphasis added).

The italicized language is the legislature’s discovery rule and means the statute of limitations “begins to run when the patient knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, of the injury for which damages are sought.” Langner v. Simpson, 533 N.W.2d 511, 517 (Iowa 1995). “Injury” for the purposes of this discovery rule means physical harm rather than the wrongful act that caused the injury. Schlote v. Dawson, 676 N.W.2d 187, 193 (Iowa 2004), disavowed on other grounds by Christy v. Miulli, 692 N.W.2d 694, 701 n. 1 (Iowa 2005). In Schlote, we held the removal of plaintiffs voice box was the injury and not the alleged unnecessary and excessive treatment in removing it. Id. at 194. Because the plaintiff knew that the surgery would result in removal of his voice box, we held the statute of limitations began to run on the date of the surgery. This was more than two years before the plaintiff filed suit, resulting in the action being time-barred. Id.

Underlying the discovery rule is inquiry notice. We explained inquiry notice in Langner:

[T]he statute [of limitations] begins to run when a person gains knowledge sufficient to put the person on inquiry. On that date, the person is charged with knowledge of facts that would have been disclosed by a reasonably diligent investigation. Moreover, once a person is aware that a problem exists, the person has a duty to investigate even though the person may not have knowledge of the nature of the problem that caused the injury.

533 N.W.2d at 518.

Here, by Ratcliffs own admission, he was aware of an eye problem on May 1, 1997, the day following surgery on his left eye. He was on inquiry notice at that point which charged him with knowledge of facts that would have been disclosed by a reasonably diligent investigation. And by his own admission, he knew on May 13, 1997 that there might have been an over-correction when Graether told him so. Finally, by his own admission, when he left Mauer’s office in December 1997, he knew that Mauer believed the April 30, 1997 procedure was the cause of his visual problems in his left eye. Graether’s and Mauer’s comments amounted to actual notice on the part of Ratcliff of his left eye injury. Ratcliff did not file suit until November 16, 2000, more than two years later. His action was therefore time-barred, unless, as he urges, we adopt the continuous treatment doctrine to toll the statute of limitations. Although we have been urged to adopt the doctrine in two cases, see McClendon v. Beck, 569 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Iowa 1997) and Langner, 533 N.W.2d at 519, we have yet to adopt it.

The so-called “continuous treatment” doctrine as generally formulated at common law provides that

if the treatment by the doctor is a continuing course and the patient’s disease or condition is of such a nature as to impose on the doctor a duty of continuing treatment and care, the statute does not commence running until treatment by the [doctor] for the particular disease or condition involved has terminated, unless during the course of treatment the patient learns or should reasonably have learned of the harm, in which case the statute runs from the time of knoiul-edge, actual or constructive.

Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825, 827-28 (1966) (emphasis added). The doctrine was adopted as a “judicial effort to soften the harshness of the statutory accrual rule existing in the particular jurisdiction at the time.” Ewing v. Beck, 520 A.2d 653, 660 (Del.1987). The statutory accrual rule provided that the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run from the time of the negligent act. Waldman, 215 A.2d at 827. Consequently, in many cases, the victim was not aware of the initial wrong until after the limitations period had run. Id.

The defendants contend, as they did in the district court, that the doctrine does not apply here. For reasons that follow, we agree.

As one court explained concerning a medical malpractice statute of limitations:

Considering the formulation of the doctrine, and the rationale upon which it is based, it is clear that the continuing medical treatment doctrine is merely a particularized application of the discovery rule. The rule presumes, for policy reasons, that a patient has not discovered an injury during the time medical treatment continues. If there is actual proof that the patient knows or reasonably should know of the injury or harm before termination of medical treatment, the statute of limitations is not tolled. The rule has outlived its necessity in light of the comprehensive medical malpractice statute of limitations which requires that suit be brought within one year of the negligent act or within one year of discovery.

Stanbury v. Bacardi, 953 S.W.2d 671, 676 (Tenn.1997).

The court in Stanbury noted that it had adopted the discovery rule for determining when the statute of limitations begins to run in medical malpractice actions in Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn.1974) but had not addressed the relationship between the newly adopted discovery rule and the continuous medical treatment doctrine. Id. at 675. Six months later, the Tennessee legislature included the discovery rule as part of its Medical Malpractice Claims Act of 1975. Id. at 675-76. In view of the court’s adoption of the discovery rule in Teeters and inclusion of the discovery rule in this statute, the court in Stanbury held that “the common law continuing medical treatment doctrine has been abrogated by judicial and legislative adoption of the discovery rule in this State.” Id. at 676. The court noted that “[ajlthough the common law doctrine still is recognized in some jurisdictions, it has been judicially or legislatively abrogated in many states following adoption of the discovery rule.” Id. at 676-77 (footnote omitted) (citing jurisdictions).

We need not decide whether we should reject the continuous treatment doctrine outright in all circumstances. However, we do think the doctrine does not apply when the plaintiff, as here, is on inquiry notice, a concept that underlies the discovery rule that is now part of Iowa Code section 614.1(9)(a).

VI. Disposition.

Because Ratcliff has generated no genuine issue of material fact regarding the tolling of the statute of limitations, we conclude the district court correctly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Finding no error, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

All justices concur except CARTER, J., who takes no part.


text:
    In re Petition for DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST James P. MULVAHILL, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 151932.
    No. A04-955.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    June 6, 2005.
   ORDER

The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility filed an amended petition for disciplinary action and a supplementary petition for disciplinary action alleging that respondent James P. Mulvahill has committed professional misconduct warranting public discipline, namely, misappropriation of client funds, making representations to conceal the misappropriation, failure to deposit a non-refundable retainer into a trust account, and engaging in a pattern of knowing issuance of non-sufficient fund checks to take advantage of bank check clearing practices in violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.4, 4.1, 8.4(c) and (d), and 1.15.

Respondent admits his conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, waives his rights under Rule 14, Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR), and has entered into a stipulation with the Director in which they jointly recommend that the appropriate discipline is disbarment, and payment of $900 in costs and $1,306.30 in disbursements under Rule 24, RLPR.

This court has independently reviewed the file and approves the jointly recommended disposition.

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent James P. Mulvahill is disbarred, effective immediately. Respondent shall pay $900 in costs and $1,306.30 in disbursements under Rule 24, RLPR.

BY THE COURT:

/s/Russell A. Anderson Associate Justice


author: MEYER, Justice.

text:
    Richard Robert JOHNSON, petitioner, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.
    No. A04-1822.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    June 9, 2005.
    Rehearing Denied July 12, 2005.

      Richard R. Johnson, MCF-Stillwater, Bayport, MN, (pro se appellant).
    Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, Amy Klobuehar, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Asst. County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondent.
   OPINION

MEYER, Justice.

Appellant Richard Robert Johnson appeals from the postconviction court’s denial of his second petition for relief. We affirm.

Johnson was convicted of first-degree murder for the November 11, 1989, rape and murder by strangulation of Dorothy Jean Harrison and was sentenced to life in prison. The facts of the underlying crime in this case are set out in detail in State v. Johnson, 498 N.W.2d 10 (Minn.1993). At trial, the state presented DNA evidence taken from Johnson’s blood and a sample of semen taken from the victim’s clothing. Id. at 11-12. In his direct appeal, Johnson challenged his conviction on two grounds: (1) the DNA evidence was improperly admitted; and (2) his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. Id. at 11. With respect to the DNA evidence, Johnson, who is Native American, challenged the validity of the DNA typing methods used by the FBI and the statistical frequency evidence based on the FBI’s Caucasian DNA database. Id. at 14-15. We affirmed his conviction, holding that both the DNA evidence and statistical evidence were properly admitted and that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. Id. at 10.

In his first postconviction appeal, Johnson raised a number of grand jury and trial errors and alleged bias by the post-conviction court. Johnson v. State, 528 N.W.2d 238, 238-39 (Minn.1995). We affirmed the denial of relief, holding that all issues raised in the petition were known at the time of his direct appeal and were procedurally barred. Id. at 239. We also held that his claim of alleged bias lacked support. Id.

In this second postconviction appeal, Johnson claims that an investigation report by the Department of Justice regarding alleged irregularities in the FBI crime laboratories was newly discovered evidence that would entitle him to a new trial. Johnson also claims that the post-conviction court improperly granted the state continuances of the postconviction ev-identiary hearing and violated his constitutional right to a fair and impartial hearing.

I.

We review a postconviction court’s denial of relief for abuse of discretion. Perry v. State, 595 N.W.2d 197, 200 (Minn.1999). Appellate review of postcon-viction proceedings is limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the findings of the postconviction court. State v. Rainer, 502 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Minn.1993).

To reopen a case based on newly discovered evidence, the defendant must prove: (1) that the evidence was not known to him or his counsel at the time of the trial; (2) that the evidence could not have been discovered through due diligence before the trial; (3) that the evidence is not cumulative, impeaching, or doubtful; and (4) that the evidence would probably produce an acquittal or a more favorable result. Wieland v. State, 457 N.W.2d 712, 714 (Minn.1990). We have decided that properly tested DNA evidence is scientifically reliable and trustworthy. State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn.1989). We have also decided that DNA testing conducted by the FBI under the TWGDAM guidelines is admissible. State v. Jobe, 486 N.W.2d 407, 420 (Minn.1992).

Further, “where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976). Any claim that should have been known, but was not raised, at the time of direct appeal is also barred by Knaffla. King v. State, 649 N.W.2d 149, 156 (Minn.2002).

Johnson argues that the investigation report issued by the Department of Justice was newly discovered evidence because neither the report nor the alleged irregularities at the FBI crime laboratories were known to him at the time of his trial or direct appeal. He further argues that the investigation report showed the unreliability and untrustworthiness of the DNA evidence in his case. He alleges that the FBI failed to comply with the TWGDAM guidelines in his case and that the guidelines themselves are not reliable. He also alleges inconsistent testimony by Dr. Dwight Adams, an FBI expert, at the Frye eviden-tiary hearing.

The postconviction court reviewed the investigation report and specifically found that “[t]he content of the report * * * fails to address the analysis performed on the evidence in this case, the analyst who performed it (Dr. Adams), or any actions by the DNA analysis unit that would jeopardize the accuracy of their testing results either generally or specifically to this case.” The court noted that the Inspector General concluded that most of the whis-tleblower’s allegations, including those relied on by Johnson, were unsubstantiated. The court further found that, although the report was not known to Johnson at the time of his direct appeal, the report was unlikely to produce an acquittal or a more favorable result. Having reviewed the record and the report, we conclude that there is'sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the findings of the postconviction court.

Further, any issue related to the TWGDAM guidelines and their application in Johnson’s case was raised and decided in the direct appeal and -therefore is barred by Knaffla. Any issue relating to the testimony of Dr. Adams should have been known,- but was not raised, at the time of direct appeal and therefore is also barred by Knaffla. Therefore, .we hold that the postconviction court did not abuse, its discretion in denying Johnson’s petition for relief.

II.

Johnson also claims that the post-conviction court improperly granted con-, tinuances to the state.

The decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance lies within the sound discretion of the district court and will only be reversed upon a showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Turnipseed, 297 N.W.2d 308, 311 (Minn.1980). A defendant must show prejudice to justify a reversal. State v. Rainer, 411 N.W.2d 490, 495 (Minn.1987).

Johnson argues that he did not receive a copy of the state’s February 11, 2004, memorandum and that the- postconviction court had no just cause to grant the state a 60-day continuance. Johnson further alleges that the postconviction court improperly allowed the state to respond to his supplemental reply.

The record reveals that the postconviction court granted Johnson a 45-day continuance because he claimed that he • did not receive a copy of the state’s February 11, 2004, memorandum opposing his petition. After Johnson filed his supplemental reply, the court granted the state a 60-day continuance to respond because the assistant county attorney was out of town. Both continuances were granted for proper reasons. Johnson was not denied an opportunity- to respond to each of the state’s filings and was not prejudiced. We, therefore, hold that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in granting continuances to both Johnson and the state.

III.

Johnson further claims that the postconviction court denied his constitutional right to a fair and impartial eviden-tiary hearing under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.

An evidentiary hearing is required only when the postconviction pleading places material facts in dispute. State ex rel. Roy v. Tahash, 277 Minn. 238, 243-44, 152 N.W.2d 301, 305 (1967). An evi-dentiary hearing is not required unless facts are alleged which, if proven, would entitle a petitioner to the requested relief. Fratzke v. State, 450 N.W.2d 101, 102 (Minn.1990).

Johnson argues that his constitutional rights were violated because the postcon-viction court held a hearing that was not fair and impartial. Johnson also alleges that the court failed to file a writ of habeas corpus on the original hearing date of February 23, 2004, resulting in his nonappearance.

The record indicates that Johnson’s initial request for postconviction relief, relying only on a news report of alleged FBI misconduct, was denied. After Johnson moved the postconviction court for an order of relief from the financial hardship of copying costs, the court ordered the state to make a copy of the Justice Department’s investigation report available for copying and separately ordered Johnson to submit a copy of the report to the court for review. Although Johnson did not appear in court on February 23, 2004, he did appear in person on April 20, 2004, when the evidentiary hearing was eventually held. At the hearing, Johnson did not present any facts pertinent to his case. He stated: “[The investigation report] found that there’s misconduct by different technicians * * * [m]aybe not relating to this case[.]”

Because Johnson’s petition did not allege any facts which, if proven, would entitle him to a new trial, an evidentiary hearing was not required. Nonetheless, the posteonviction court did hold a hearing. Johnson personally appeared at the hearing, was given the opportunity to argue his case, and was granted a 45-day continuance to respond to the state’s memorandum that he claimed he did not receive. The record reflects that the postconviction court conducted the hearing in a fair and impartial manner. Therefore, we hold that Johnson’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial postconviction evidentiary hearing was not violated.

Affirmed.

      . The DNA evidence was tested by the FBI in compliance with the guidelines recommended by the Technical Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (TWGDAM). Id. at 12.

      . The full title of the report is United States Department of Justice/Office of Inspector General Special Report — The FBI Laboratory: An Investigation into Laboratory Practices and Alleged Misconduct in Explosives-Related and Other Cases (April 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/9704a/in-dex.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).