author: LAVORATO, Justice.

text:
    ORGANIC TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, Tim Danley, and Ken Renfrow, Appellants, v. STATE of Iowa ex rel. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, Appellee.
    No. 98-1242.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    April 26, 2000.

      Mark Landa and James G. Sawtelle of Sullivan & Ward, P.C., Des Moines, for appellants.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and David R. Sheridan and David L. Dorff, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
   LAVORATO, Justice.

The Department of Natural Resources (DNR) issued an administrative order in which it alleged that Organic Technologies Corporation (OTC), a composting facility owner, had violated (1) Iowa Code chapter 455B, (2) administrative rules promulgated pursuant to this chapter, and (3) the conditions of OTC’s permit. The order imposed a fine and revoked the permit. The Environmental Protection Commission (EPC) adopted an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision finding that the violations had occurred and upholding the fine and revocation. Following OTC’s appeal, the district court upheld the EPC’s decision affirming the decision of the ALJ. On OTC’s appeal from the district court ruling, we affirm.

I. Background Facts.

OTC operates a composting facility on land it owns in Prole, Warren County, Iowa. It is in the business of composting biodegradable organic materials that, through a biological process, result in the aerobic, thermophilic, self-heating biological decomposition of these materials. During this process, microorganisms convert the raw materials to be composted into an innocuous humus. The composting process produces sufficient heat to destroy seed and pathogenic bacteria, resulting in a product that is acceptable for agricultural, commercial, and residential use.

OTC operates the facility pursuant to a sanitary disposal project permit issued on April 25, 1994. The facility composts yard waste and other source-separated organic waste materials.

OTC began operation as a yard-waste-only composting facility. On June 10, 1992, the DNR issued a developmental sanitary disposal project permit to OTC. The permit allowed OTC, on a temporary, one-year trial basis to experiment with the following composting enhancers and triggers: sawdust, particle board, and plywood scrap; all-paper feed sacks; brewing chips; reject pop cans; wheat gluten/starch; egg shells; and nonsaleable fresh fruits and vegetables. In September the permit was amended to include, on an experimental basis, mixed vegetables, soy-oil, and fiber core tubes.

In May 1993, the DNR issued to OTC a general permit for “storm water discharge associated with industrial activity.” See Iowa Code §§ 455B.103A (authorizing director of DNR to issue general permits for storm water discharge), .186 (1991) (prohibiting discharge of pollutants into waters of the state without a permit from the DNR); Iowa Admin. Code rs. 567-64.3, .4(2), .15(1) (1992). The DNR required OTC to draft a pollution prevention plan within 365 days of the permit date, which OTC eventually filed.

On June 15, the DNR issued OTC a new development project permit with Myron and Kristie Hirschman named as the responsible officials. The new permit essentially renewed the first developmental project permit and expanded the list of enhancers and triggers by adding the following: spent diatomaceous earth, meat casings, all-paper seed sacks, nonrecycla-ble cellulose fiber, and animal wastes. The new permit specifically exempted OTC from constructing a permanent impervious composting/curing pad as is normally required. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 567-105.5(8) (1989).

In August 1993, OTC submitted a Comprehensive Solid Waste Management Plan. The plan was necessary for OTC to obtain a regular — as opposed to a developmental- — waste disposal permit. See Iowa Code § 455B.305B (1993); Iowa Admin. Code rs. 567-101.5 (1992), 102.12 (1989), 102.14 (1991). The DNR approved the plan on November 15.

The plan included provisions for further expansion and development of OTC’s composting operation. These provisions identified four distinct expansion and development phases:

Phase I. This expansion will allow OTC to process upwards of 10,000 tons of yard waste and source separated com-postables on an annual basis. It will include the construction of a 60’ x 120’ impervious clay base. It will also include the construction of an additional 120’ x 120’ concrete pad for initial unloading and blending prior to movement into discrete windrows.
Phase II. This expansion will give OTC the ability to process up to 20,000 tons of yard waste and source separated materials per year. The construction of a 60’ x 80’ covered facility for screening finished material will allow OTC additional quality control over the finished product.
Phase III. ... In order to process up to 30,000 tons of yard waste and source separated compostables it will be necessary for OTC to begin processing and composting materials under cover.... During this phase OTC will construct a 60’ x 360’ covered facility....
Phase IV. OTC’s goal is to receive and process 50,000 tons of yard waste and source separated compostables at this site.... This phase therefore requires additions to the Phase III covered facility which will result in a 120’ x 360’ covered and partially enclosed composting facility.

On March 8, 1994, OTC submitted an application for a regular permit for its Prole facility. The application included an operating plan, which included a verbatim recitation of the expansion and development plans approved by the DNR in the Comprehensive Solid Waste Management Plan. The DNR issued the permit on April 25.

The permit stated that (1) the Prole project must be operated according to plans and specifications already on file with and approved by the DNR; and (2) any deviation or modification from the plan and specifications required DNR’s prior approval, accompanied by an amendment to the permit. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 567-102.5, .7 (1989). The permit also specifically listed materials that could be processed at the Prole facility. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 567-102.9 (1989) (stating that any permit may be issued subject to conditions specified in writing). The listed materials were confined to those previously described.

The permit further provided:

Prior to commencing the next phase of operation, OTC is required to have the design engineer develop and submit plans for additional Portland cement concrete or asphaltic concrete composting pad(s). It will be necessary for the [DNR] to approve and issue (an) amendment(s) prior to the construction and use of thi (e) e(s) pad(s)....

The permit also warned that failure to comply with Iowa Code chapter 455B, or any rule or order promulgated pursuant to this chapter, may result in a civil penalty and suspension or revocation of the permit.

On July 29, 1994, the DNR issued Amendment #1 to Phase I. The amendment authorized OTC to construct a 60’ x 60’ wet material handling building and an “L”-shaped 90’ x 90’ concrete slab or pad next to the building.

In the same month, the DNR began receiving complaints from residents near the OTC facility about offensive odors coming from the facility. The DNR responded by inspecting the facility. As a result of this inspection, the DNR, in July 1995, issued Administrative Order 95-SW-17 to OTC. See Iowa Code §§ 455B.175(1), .307(2) (1993).

The order required OTC to properly operate and maintain the compost facility and to comply with the operation requirements of its- permit conditions and the DNR rules. The order notified OTC of the DNR’s intent to modify OTC’s sanitary disposal project permit to restrict the composting operation to yard waste alone.

OTC appealed the order. Thereafter, OTC and the DNR began negotiating solutions that would alleviate problems at the Prole facility and thereby avoid any modification of OTC’s permit terms. Among other things, OTC agreed to complete construction of a building to house the operation, with a controlled aeration system for composting.

On September 1, 1995, OTC’s owners— Myron and Kristie Hirschman — sold the company to Tim Danley and Ken Renfrow. The DNR issued a new permit to OTC reflecting the change in ownership and listing Tim Danley and Ken Renfrow as responsible officials on the permit. The cover letter accompanying the new permit stated in relevant part:

Enclosed is your sanitary disposal project permit revised to reflect the change in responsible officials for OTC. Since the company name remains the same and only the ownership is changed, a formal title transfer involving facility compliance is technically not necessary. All of the technical and administrative requirements in the permit and Amendment #1 remain the same and the permit expiration date remains the same.
As’ you are aware, there is a pending administrative order, including a notice of intent to amend the permit further, which is under appeal.... [T]he change in ownership ... does not impact the enforcement of the administrative order in any way.

Following the change of ownership, OTC’s new owners met with the DNR’s officials who told them that the additional facilities required under the terms of OTC’s permit were necessary.

On November 21, 1995, the DNR investigated the Prole facility and prepared a report of its findings, which, along with a cover letter, was mailed to OTC. The cover letter noted that the facility was not being operated in accordance with the permit, the operating plan, and the Iowa Administrative Code. The report specifically noted that, although the facility had reached 20,-000 tons of volume per year, the 60’ x 80’ screening building required under Phase II had not been constructed. Although Amendment #1 had permitted a 60’ x 60’ blending building to be built in lieu of the screening building, the roof and upper walls of this building were destroyed by fire in September 1995 and had not been rebuilt. The report stated that the absence of such an enclosed building was a violation of the terms and conditions of the project permit.

The report also noted that the concrete pad next to the blending building was no longer being used for composting, but rather was being used to store bales of seed sacks eight-to ten-feet high. The report explained that, at the time of the inspection, OTC officials told the DNR that the sacks were being used as a bulking agent during the winter months and would continue to be stockpiled on the concrete pad throughout the winter. The report stated that the project permit did not allow “stockpiling of wastes for such periods of time,” and that the storage violated Iowa Administrative Code rule 567-105.5(8). The report also stated that because the bags were not being stored in an enclosed building, OTC was also in violation of Iowa Administrative Code rule 567-104.9(l)(b) (1990). In conjunction with this finding, because OTC was no longer conducting composting on the concrete pad, ground permeability testing of those areas where OTC was actually composting was needed to ensure compliance with Iowa Administrative Code rule 567-105.5(8).

The report went on to note that, although annual tonnage had exceeded 30,-000 tons, OTC had yet to build a covered building to handle the entire composting operation (except curing), as Phase III required. The report stated that the “[fjailure to begin construction of the covered facility early in the next construction season would be a violation of the terms of the permit.”

The report further noted that odor complaints had been received in the seven to ten days before the investigation and that the investigation revealed that ponded water at the facility was septic and responsible for generating considerable odor.

On December 22, OTC responded to the report and stated among other things that (1) the ponded area resulted from snow melting; (2) the requirement of permeability testing had not been raised before; (3) baled seed and feed bags are “salvageable material” rather than “solid waste” and were therefore only subject to the storage requirements of Iowa Administrative Code rule 567-104.9(2); and (4) although the comprehensive plan required a building when tonnage exceeded 30,000 tons per year, there was no advantage to such a building that would cost between $500,000 and $750,000 because the building could hamper operations.

Finally, OTC stated that it was aware of the concerns of the DNR and of the Prole facility’s neighbors, but claimed that additional construction and improvements would not eliminate those concerns. Instead, OTC noted that (1) it had begun to seek an additional composting site elsewhere in Iowa; and (2) once this second facility was established, OTC would phase out much of the composting at the Prole facility.

As mentioned, before the transfer in ownership, OTC and the DNR were in settlement negotiations regarding Administrative Order 95-SW-17. Renfrow and Danley continued the negotiations. Once the two explained that they wished to move much of the Prole operation to another location, the DNR became more willing to settle the pending order. The DNR began to view the negotiations as an opportunity to develop a revised operating plan to replace the existing plan. Thereafter, OTC drafted a revised operating plan.

On February 9, 1996, the DNR responded to OTC’s proposed -operating plan. In responding to the plan, the DNR addressed the need for additional efforts to control potentially contaminated runoff from the south end of the composting area. OTC and the DNR thereafter exchanged correspondence relative to the proposed operating plan. The purpose of these negotiations was to devise an operating plan that did not include a roofed building but at the same time would give protection to the environment.

On March 7, the DNR confirmed that the permeability testing of the Prole site met or exceeded the requirements of the Iowa Administrative Code.

On April 8 and May 31, the DNR inspected the Prole facility again and concluded OTC was not operating the facility in accordance with the permit, the operating plan, or the Iowa Administrative Code. Among other things, the inspection reports noted that Phase III of the original operating plan required an enclosed facility when the facility was processing 30,000 tons per year, and OTC exceeded such tonnage in the fall of 1995. The DNR provided OTC with a list of requirements and recommendations to bring the facility into compliance with the law.

On June 7, OTC submitted a second draft operating plan for the DNR to review. The plan did not include the construction of a covered facility. The plan, however, contained (1) limitations on the types of materials that would be accepted and (2) operating standards. The DNR agreed with the proposed plan as an interim plan based on the understanding that OTC would cease using the site for mixed solid waste by the end of March 1997.

On August 23, OTC informed the DNR that it intended to phase out its operations in Prole within two years by opening a compost facility in Hardin County, Iowa. In November OTC filed an application for a sanitary disposal permit in Hardin County.

The DNR conducted additional inspections of the Prole facility on September 16 and October 30. The DNR again concluded after these inspections that OTC was not operating the facility in accordance with its permit, the original operating plan, the interim operating plan, and the Iowa Administrative Code.

On November 15, 1996, the DNR issued Administrative Order Numbers 96-SW-19 and 96-WW-45 [hereinafter Administrative Order] to OTC, Tim Danley and Ken Renfrow. See Iowa Code §§ 455B.175(1), .307(2) (1995). The Administrative Order superseded the previous order — 95-SW-17 — the appeal of which had not yet been resolved. The Administrative Order stated that the DNR intended to (1) revoke OTC’s sanitary disposal project permit as of January 1, 1997; (2) restrict OTC’s composting operation to yard waste and direct OTC to move mixed compost material already on site; (3) require reduction of all yard waste by fifty percent by July 1, 1997; and (4) require complete elimination and removal of all remaining waste by January 1, 1998.

The Administrative Order also rejected OTC’s previously submitted application for a composting permit in Hardin County. Finally, the Administrative Order assessed a $10,000 civil penalty. See Iowa Code §§ 455B.109(1), .307(3) (1995); Iowa Admin. Code r. 567-10 (1992).

The DNR inspected the Prole site on several occasions after the issuance of the Administrative Order. These inspection reports were incorporated into amendments to the Administrative Order. The inspections occurred on November 18, 1996; January 1997; and April 1997. The reports resulting from these inspections indicated violations similar to those mentioned in previous inspection reports and noted that OTC was not operating the facility in accordance with OTC’s permit, the original operating plan, the interim operating plan, or the Iowa Administrative Code.

II. Proceedings.

OTC appealed the Administrative Order. Following a. contested case hearing, an ALJ entered a proposed decision. The ALJ affirmed the Administrative Order that imposed (1) a penalty against OTC, Danley, and Renfrow and (2) revoked OTC’s sanitary disposal project permit, effective three months from the date of a final administrative decision. The ALJ, however, reversed the denial of OTC’s application for a new sanitary disposal project permit at the Hardin County site.

Following a hearing before the EPC, the commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision and adopted it as the final agency decision. (Hereinafter, whenever we refer to the ALJ’s findings, we mean the ALJ’s findings as adopted by the EPC.) OTC then petitioned for judicial review in the district court.

The district court affirmed the decision of the EPC. OTC, Danley, and Renfrow thereafter appealed to this court. (Hereinafter, we refer to OTC, Danley, and Ren-frow collectively as “OTC.”) The DNR did not seek judicial review of the agency decision regarding the permit for the Hardin County site and has not appealed to this court.

III. Scope of Review.

This case involves an appeal of a district court ruling on judicial review of (1) an administrative order issued under Iowa Code sections 455B.175(1) and 455B.307(2) and (2) an assessment of civil penalties under Iowa Code section 455B.109 and Iowa Administrative Code chapter 567-10 (1992). Iowa Code chapter 17A therefore governs our review. See Iowa Code §§ 455B.178, .308 (1999).

A district court engaged in judicial review under Iowa Code section 17A.19(8) acts in an appellate capacity to correct errors of law on the part of the agency. IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d 621, 627 (Iowa 2000). The district court may affirm agency action or remand for further proceedings. Iowa Code § 17A.19(8). However, if the agency’s actions prejudice substantial rights of the petitioner, the court shall reverse, modify, or grant any other appropriate relief. Id. When we review a district court’s judicial review ruling, we apply the standards of section 17A.19(8) to the agency action to determine whether our conclusions are the same as the district court’s conclusions. IBP, 604 N.W.2d at 627.

Because the present matter is a contested case, we must determine whether substantial evidence supports the agency’s actions when we review the record made before the agency as a whole. Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(f). We may not interfere with an agency finding when there is a conflict in the evidence or when reasonable minds might disagree about the inference to be drawn from the evidence. This is so whether or not the evidence is disputed. Id. Evidence is substantial when a reasonable mind could accept it as adequate to reach the same findings. IBP, 604 N.W.2d at 632. We apply agency findings broadly and liberally to uphold, rather than to defeat, an agency’s decision. Id.

IV. The Issues.

In this appeal we consider the following issues raised by OTC: (1) whether substantial evidence supports the findings of violations alleged in the Administrative Order, (2) whether substantial evidence supports the assessment of an administrative penalty, and (3) whether substantial evidence supports the revocation of OTC’s sanitary disposal project permit.

Y. Background.

The provisions relating to solid waste disposal are found in Iowa Gode sections 455B.301 through 455B.316 (1995). Iowa Code section 455B.301A declares the state policy on solid waste disposal:

The protection of the health, safety, and welfare of Iowans and the protection of the environment require the safe and sanitary disposal of solid wastes. An effective and efficient solid waste disposal program protects the environment and the public, and provides the most practical and beneficial use of the material and energy values of solid waste. While recognizing the continuing necessity for the existence of landfills, alternative methods of managing solid waste and a reduction in the reliance upon land disposal of solid waste are encouraged.

(Emphasis added.) Composting is an alternative method of managing solid waste that reduces reliance upon land disposal of solid waste. It is therefore an activity that the legislature encourages.

Iowa Code section 455B.301(20) defines solid waste' — for our purposes here — to include “garbage, refuse, rubbish, and other similar discarded solid or semisolid materials, including but not limited to such materials resulting from industrial, commercial, agricultural, and domestic activities.”

To implement Iowa’s sanitary disposal system, the EPC has authority to establish rules to govern the general operation and maintenance of sanitary waste disposal projects including the issuance of permits for such projects. See Iowa Code § 455B.304. Pursuant to such authority, the EPC has adopted administrative rules found in Iowa Administrative Code chapters 567-100 to -121.

A “sanitary disposal project” includes
all facilities and appurtenances including all real and personal property connected with such facilities, which are acquired, purchased, constructed, reconstructed, equipped, improved, extended, maintained, or operated to facilitate the final disposition of solid waste without creating a significant hazard to health or safety, and which are approved by the executive director [of the DNR],

Iowa Code § 455B.301(18).

The administrative rules require solid waste to be stored, collected, transported, utilized, processed, reclaimed or disposed of in a manner consistent with Iowa Administrative Code chapters 567-100 to -121. Iowa Admin. Code r. 567-101.1 (1990).

Any public or private agency must obtain a permit from the director of the DNR before operating a sanitary disposal project. Iowa Admin. Code r. 567-102.1 (1989); see Iowa Code § 455B.305. Before obtaining a permit, the agency must file with the director a comprehensive plan detailing how the agency will comply with the laws regarding solid waste disposal. Iowa Code § 455B.306. The director of the DNR may suspend or revoke the permit if a sanitary disposal project is found not to meet the requirements of the statutory law regarding solid waste disposal or the administrative rules issued under section 455B.304. Iowa Code § 455B.305(1).

All sanitary disposal projects must be constructed and operated in accordance with the plans and specifications as approved by the DNR and the terms of the permit. Iowa Admin. Code r. 567-102.5 (1989). The approved plans shall constitute a term of the permit. Id.

VI. Violations.

Before addressing the alleged violations, we must first address OTC’s contention that it is not subject to the former owners’ operating plans approved by the DNR. OTC also contends that, even if it were subject to those plans, those plans were superseded by the interim operating plan submitted to the DNR on June 7, 1996.

The permit issued to OTC on April 25, 1994, stated that the Prole project would be operated according to plans and specifications already on file with and approved by the DNR. When Danley and Renfrow purchased OTC, the DNR amended and reissued the permit, listing them as the new responsible officials. However, the DNR made no other substantive changes to the permit.

As the cover letter accompanying the permit explained: “All of the technical and administrative requirements in the permit and Amendment #1 remain the same and the permit expiration date remains the same.... ” Furthermore, regulatory law specifically states that permit terms include all construction and operation plans and specifications approved by the DNR. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 567-102.5. There is no record evidence that the new owners sought to amend the permit or otherwise formally objected to being subject to all of the terms of the permit as they existed under the previous owners. The district court therefore correctly affirmed the ALJ’s conclusion that the new owners are subject to the former owners’ operating plans and Amendment # 1 to that plan.

As mentioned, OTC also contends that, even if it were subject to the previous owners’ operating plan, the June 7, 1996 interim operating plan superseded the previous owners’ operating plan. The district court also correctly affirmed the ALJ’s rejection of this argument.

The ALJ found that (1) the DNR had never approved the plan OTC had submitted and (2) at best the interim operating plan was only temporary. There is substantial record evidence to support these findings. Communications from the DNR plainly show its understanding that the interim plan was to be followed only on a temporary basis.

However, the ALJ also found that the correspondence between OTC and the DNR could reasonably have led OTC to believe that the DNR had accepted the interim operating plan (even if only on a temporary basis) as of July 23, 1996. The ALJ therefore determined that OTC should not be penalized for any perceived violations of the original owners’ operating plan (as amended) between July 23, 1996, and the issuance of the Administrative Order on November 15, 1996. Like the district court, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support these findings.

We next address whether there was substantial evidence to establish the alleged violations.

A. Water quality issues. Iowa Code section 455B.186 as well as Iowa Administrative Code rule 567-64.3 (1992) prohibits the discharge of pollutants into waters of the state without first obtaining a permit from the director of the DNR. Iowa Code section 455B.103A authorizes the issuance of general permits for storm water discharges. The DNR has adopted rules regarding permits for storm water discharge. See Iowa Admin. Code rs. 60.2, 64.3-64.16 (1992). Iowa Administrative Code rule 64.3(1) provides that no person shall operate any wastewater disposal system or part thereof without, or contrary to any condition of, an operation permit issued by the director of the DNR.

OTC’s storm water permit provided OTC must develop and implement a “pollution prevention plan” for its Prole facility that includes best management practices to prevent and reduce the amount of pollutants in storm water runoff. The permit also required OTC to modify the plan to address deficiencies noted by the DNR. In addition, OTC’s storm water permit required the company to properly maintain its facilities to provide a clean, orderly facility.

After the inspection of April 3, 1996, the DNR notified OTC that placement of curing piles less than 100 feet from the creek on the site violated a portion of its storm water pollution prevention plan by placing material outside the drainage contained by terraces and storm water ponds. In addition, OTC was directed to amend its storm water prevention plan to include an additional sampling location near the southwest portion of the site drains.

At the following inspection in May, the DNR reported that OTC had not moved the curing piles. Additionally, the DNR noted that ponded water, black and septic in appearance, was running off from the ponded area into the adjacent stream. The DNR also noted that other pools of ponded water, estimated at 500 to over 1000 gallons in size, were observed. Finally, the DNR noted that OTC had not modified its prevention plan as it had been directed to do.

In the Administrative Order, the DNR alleged that OTC violated its permit conditions, storm water discharge permit, and the Iowa Administrative Code by (1) the May 1996 runoff, (2) the ponding of water at the site, (3) the storage of the curing-piles near the stream without controls for runoff, and (4) its failure to modify the pollution prevention plan. The ALJ found that the preponderance of evidence supported the DNR’s findings of violation. The district court upheld the ALJ’s findings, and we agree with the district court.

B. Storage of seed bags. Iowa Administrative Code rule 567-104.10(5) (1990) provides that solid waste shall not be stored at the composting facility site for more than seventy-two hours. The DNR alleged in the Administrative Order that OTC violated this rule by storing seed corn bags for more than seventy-two hours. The ALJ found the preponderance of the evidence supported this allegation and rejected OTC’s contention that the bags constituted “salvageable material” and not solid waste. The district court found there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding. We agree with the district court.

Iowa Administrative Code rule 567-100.2 (1997) follows the definition of solid waste found in Iowa Code section 455B.301: “garbage, refuse, rubbish, and other similar discarded or semisolid material, including but not limited to such materials resulting from industrial, commercial, agricultural, and domestic activities.”

Iowa Administrative Code rule 567-100.2 defines salvageable material' as “discarded material no longer of value for its original purpose but which has value if reclaimed.” While there are regulations governing the storage of salvaged materials, there are no regulations governing how long such materials may be stored. See Iowa Admin. Code rs. 567-104.9(2), 104.10(5).

As the ALJ found, OTC told the DNR that it was storing the seed bags as bulking material for composting during winter months. Composting is the “controlled, biological decomposition of selected solid organic waste materials under aerobic conditions resulting in an innocuous final product.” Iowa Admin. Code r. 567-100.2. OTC’s claim that it was storing the bags as salvaged material is inconsistent with its explanation that it would use the bags for composting. By definition, any product used in composting is solid waste. The seed bags were therefore solid waste subject to the storage requirements of regulation 567-104.10(5).

C. Composting base. Iowa Administrative Code rules 567-105.5(8) through 105.5(11) (1989) relate to requirements for the base upon which composting takes place. Rule 567-105.5(8) requires that composting must take place on an impervious base that can support the load of the equipment used. The permeability coefficient of the base must be less than 1 x 10 “7 cm/sec (0.00028 ft/day).

Rule 567-105.5(9) provides that the base may be constructed of asphaltic cement concrete, Portland cement concrete, or similar materials able to support the equipment and load and meet the permeability coefficient.

Rule 567-105.5(10) requires that the low permeability, thickness, and continuity of the base material must be maintained.

Rule 567-105.5(11) requires that the area of the base must be adequate for the volume of solid waste being composted. Design calculations must be submitted supporting the proposed area of the base. These calculations should show support for equipment load and composting process used.

The DNR alleged in the Administrative Order that OTC had violated these regulations by not constructing the concrete composting pads. OTC asserts that under these regulations it was not required to compost on a concrete surface and that the ground underneath its composting area satisfies the permeability requirements.

There was testimony from the DNR that OTC was required to construct the impervious base as the rules require. Despite this testimony, the ALJ found that beginning with its first inspection of the facility under the new owners the DNR was not insisting upon the construction of a concrete base. The ALJ interpreted the regulations as permitting but not requiring that the base be constructed of concrete. The ALJ noted that the only requirement of the regulations was that the base meet the permeability requirements and that it be able to support the load. Additionally, the ALJ found that test results showed that OTC met the permeability requirements.

However, the ALJ found a violation had occurred as the DNR had alleged in the Administrative Order. The ALJ gave two reasons. First, the permit conditions clearly require construction of concrete composting pads. For this reason, OTC was in violation of this condition of its permit. Second, there was testimony from both OTC and the DNR witnesses that the base often was not able to support the equipment load. There is substantial record evidence to support the ALJ’s findings.

Like the district court, we think the ALJ was on solid ground in concluding there was a violation for the reasons it gave. The district court was therefore correct in upholding the ALJ’s decision on this issue.

D. Failure to construct facilities. As mentioned, Phase II required OTC to construct a 60’ x 80’ covered facility for screening finished material before beginning to process 20,000 tons of yard waste and source-separated compostables annually. The permit amendment (#1) modified this requirement to allow OTC to build a 60’ x 60’ wet materials handling (blending) building and an “L”-shaped 90’ x 90’ concrete slab immediately adjacent to the building.

OTC did construct the blending building, but the roof was destroyed by fire in September 1995, leaving only the walls and the floor intact. The DNR alleged in the Administrative Order that OTC’s failure to reconstruct the roof was a violation of its permit. The ALJ agreed, finding that, as of the hearing date, OTC had failed to reconstruct the roof, although it had consistently been processing in excess of 20,000 tons of yard waste and source-separated compostables. We agree with the district court that there was substantial record evidence to support the violation finding.

As mentioned, Phase III of the plan required that, when OTC was processing up to 30,000 tons of yard waste and. source-separated compostables, it had to construct a 60’ x 360’ covered facility. OTC was then to begin processing and composting materials in the covered facility. In order to process in excess of 30,000 tons per year, Phase IY required OTC to construct a 120’ x 360’ covered and partially enclosed composting facility.

The evidence shows that by November 1995 OTC was processing over 30,000 tons of waste annually, but OTC had not built the covered facility. There was therefore substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that this failure to construct the covered facility was a violation of the permit. The district court was correct in so concluding.

The evidence, however, also shows that on July 23, 1996, the DNR confirmed a new plan would be acceptable on an interim basis that would not require OTC to construct a covered facility. This was based on the understanding that OTC would cease using the facility for mixed solid waste by the end of March 1997. The ALJ found that, in these circumstances, OTC should not be penalized for perceived violations of the original operating plan between the dates of July 23, 1996, and November 15, 1996, the date of the Administrative Order. We agree with the district court that there was substantial evidence to support this finding also.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude the district court correctly affirmed the ALJ’s findings regarding OTC’s violations. We next consider whether the assessment of penalties for these violations was proper and whether the amounts assessed were appropriate.

VII. Assessment of the Civil Penalty.

Iowa Code section 455B.109(1) provides:

The commission shall establish, by rule, a schedule or range of civil penalties which may be administratively assessed. The schedule shall provide procedures and criteria for the administrative assessment of penalties of not more than ten thousand dollars for violations of this chapter or rules, permits or orders adopted or issued under this chapter.

Iowa Administrative Code chapter 567-10 (1992) implements Iowa Code section 455B.109.

When a violation has occurred, the administrator of the environmental protection division of the DNR is required to screen the case “to determine the most equitable and efficient means of redressing and abating the violation.” Iowa Admin. Code r. 567-10.2; see also Iowa Code § 455B.109(2). In determining whether a violation may be appropriate for administrative assessment of penalties and in assessing such penalties, the DNR is to consider the following factors: (1) the costs saved or likely to be saved by the violator’s noneompliance; (2) the gravity of the violation; (3) the degree of culpability of the violator; (4) the maximum penalty authorized for that particular violation under this chapter; (5) whether the assessment of administrative penalties appears to be the only or most appropriate way to deter future violations, either by the violator or by others similarly situated; and (6) other relevant factors that arise from the circumstances of the case. Iowa Code § 455B.109(l)(a)-(d); Iowa Admin. Code r. 567 — 10.2(1)—(6).

Here, the DNR assessed OTC $10,000 in civil penalties. The DNR estimated that OTC saved at least $4000 by its failure to properly handle solid wastes and runoff. The DNR also determined that OTC’s failure to comply with permit requirements saved time, operational costs, engineering costs, and construction costs easily exceeding $4000, The DNR therefore assessed OTC $4000 for the costs it saved for noncompliance. The DNR also assessed OTC $3000 for the gravity of the violation and $3000 for its degree of culpability.

The ALJ found that the DNR had sufficiently demonstrated that the violations called for the assessment of civil penalties and the amounts assessed were reasonable. The ALJ agreed with the DNR that OTC saved significant monetary and labor costs by its failure to comply with the permit conditions and the administrative rules. For example, the ALJ noted that OTC (1) had accepted large volumes of waste for which it received tipping fees without constructing improvements required by its permit and (2) failed to properly handle solid wastes and waste water runoff. By OTC’s own estimate, the covered facility to house the composting operation would have cost between $500,000 and $750,000.

The ALJ also found that the penalties were appropriate and reasonable given the large number of repeated violations from the date the current owners purchased the corporation until the hearing. Finally, the ALJ found that the violations continued even after OTC was given notice of them along with directions that the violations be corrected.

The district court found there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings, and we agree with the district court.

That brings us to the final issue.

VIII. Revocation of OTC’s Sanitary Disposal Permit.

In upholding the DNR’s revocation of OTC’s permit, the ALJ found:

The current permit was issued based on the expectation and requirement that these facility improvements would be constructed prior to certain waste loads being reached. OTC has reached those tonnage limits but has not constructed the additional facilities. When the current owners purchased the corporation from the former owners, they knew that an administrative order was pending and that they were subject to its terms. From its initial inspection reports, the DNR reiterated the requirement that additional facilities be constructed, in accordance with the terms of the permit and operating plans. The only time that the DNR has “retreated” from requiring the construction was when they thought OTC was committing to a firm schedule to phase out mixed waste composting at the Prole facility. Although OTC may have disagreed with the technical basis for this requirement, they have been unable to present an acceptable alternative. The DNR was legally entitled to require full compliance with the permit and to revoke the permit when it was clear that additional facilities would not be built.

The DNR has authority to “issue, revoke, suspend, modify, or deny permits for the construction and operation of sanitary disposal projects.” Iowa Code § 455B.305(1). The DNR may revoke a permit if a sanitary disposal project does not meet the requirements of statutory law or administrative rule. Id. Additionally, OTC’s sanitary disposal permit specifically states that failure to comply with Iowa Code chapter 455B or a rule or order promulgated pursuant thereto, or any or all provisions of the permit, may result in the revocation of the permit.

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that OTC failed to comply with the terms of (1) its original operating plan (as amended), and (2) its solid waste disposal permit, both of which required OTC to construct facilities to house its composting operation. Such failure alone was a sufficient ground to revoke the permit. However, by violating the terms of the permit, OTC also in turn violated the DNR’s administrative rules. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 567-102.5 (stating that sanitary disposal projects must be constructed and operated pursuant to terms of the permit). Under Iowa Code section 455B.305(1), this was also a sufficient ground to revoke the permit. The district court was correct in concluding that there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision upholding the revocation.

IX. Disposition.

In sum, we agree with the district court that there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that (1) OTC had committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Order, (2) the imposition of the fine was appropriate, and (3) OTC’s permit was properly revoked. We therefore affirm the district court decision.

Although we have not addressed all of the parties’ contentions, we have considered them. Those we have not addressed were either not preserved for our review, are moot, or lack merit.

AFFIRMED.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BLATZ, Chief Justice. STRINGER, Justice RUSSELL A. ANDERSON, Justice

license: Public Domain

text:
    BROOKFIELD TRADE CENTER, INC., et al., Respondents, v. COUNTY OF RAMSEY, Relator.
    No. C4-99-1164.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    April 20, 2000.
    Rehearing Denied May 23, 2000.

      Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, David F. MacMillan, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, for relator.
    Thomas R. Wilhelmy, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, for respondents.
    Clayton Robinson, City Attorney, Peter J. McCall, Assistant City Attorney, St. Paul, amici curiae.
    David F. Herr, Laura E. Walvoord, Wayne Stuart Moskowitz, Mason Edelman Borman & Brand, LLP, Minneapolis, amici curiae.
   OPINION

BLATZ, Chief Justice.

Relator Ramsey County appeals from a decision of the Minnesota Tax Court granting partial summary judgment to respondents Brookfield Trade Center, Inc., and Petula Associates, Inc. (collectively “Brookfield”), and denying summary judgment to Ramsey County. On remand from this court, the issue before the tax court was whether an assessment agreement establishing the minimum market value for a development property for tax assessment purposes was invalid because the assessor did not comply with the statutory certification requirements set forth in Minn. Stat. § 273.76, subd. 8 (1984). The tax court determined the statute required the assessor to conduct an independent valuation analysis and found that because there was no evidence to show the assessor conducted such an analysis the agreement was invalid. We reverse, concluding that the certification statute requires only an estimate of value based on the assessor’s judgment, and that Brookfield failed to rebut the presumption that the assessor complied with the statutory certification requirements.

In July 1985, the City of St. Paul (City), the St. Paul Housing and Redevelopment Authority (HRA), and Oxford Development, Inc. (Oxford) entered into a development agreement for construction of the World Trade Center in downtown St. Paul. The agreement provided that the City would issue tax increment financing (TIF) bonds in the amount of $10 million to help finance the development and that the parties would enter into an assessment agreement. The purpose of an assessment agreement is to establish minimum market values for property tax purposes as provided under Minn.Stat. § 273.76, subd. 8 (1984), for a property under development. Pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 273.76, subd. 8, the property is then valued for property tax purposes each year at the higher of its actual market value or the minimum market value established by the agreement. This ensures tax revenues will be available to repay the TIF bond debt issued for the property regardless of future adverse market conditions.

The following minimum market values were agreed to by Oxford, the City, and the HRA for the World Trade Center: $1,800,000 on January 2, 1986; $10,827,401 on January 2, 1987; and $43,309,606 on January 2, 1988 and thereafter. Under Minn.Stat. § 273.76, subd. 8, the local assessor, in this case the county assessor, was required to certify these values. According to that subdivision, the certification process required that the assessor receive the assessment agreement,

review the plans and specifications for the improvements to be constructed, review the market value previously assigned to the land upon which the improvements are to be constructed and, so long as the minimum market value contained in the assessment agreement appears, in the judgment of the assessor, to be a reasonable estimate, shall execute the following certification upon such agreement:
The undersigned assessor, being legally responsible for the assessment of the above described property upon completion of the improvements to be constructed thereon, hereby certifies that the market value assigned to such land and improvements upon completion shall not be less than $.

Id.

In the instant case, the assessment agreement between Oxford, the City, and the HRA included two certifications signed by Walter O’Malley, the Ramsey County Assessor in 1985. The first certification incorporated the statutory certification language, stating:

The undersigned, having reviewed the plans and specifications for the improvements to be constructed and the market value previously assigned to the land upon which the improvements are to be constructed, and being of the opinion that the minimum market value contained in the foregoing Agreement appears reasonable, hereby certifies as follows: The undersigned Assessor, being legally responsible for the assessment of the above described property upon completion of the improvements to be constructed thereon, hereby certifies that the market value assigned to such land and improvements upon completion shall not be less than forty-three million three hundred nine thousand Dollars ($43,309,000) until termination of this Agreement.

The second certification explained the certification process that O’Malley subscribed to:

The undersigned, being the duly qualified and acting County Assessor of Ramsey County, Minnesota, hereby certifies that:
1. he is the assessor responsible for the assessment of the property described in the foregoing Exhibit A;
2. he has read the foregoing Agreement;
3. he has received and read a duplicate original of the Development Agreement;
4. he has received and reviewed the architectural and engineering plans and specifications for the Facilities agreed to be constructed on the property described in Exhibit A by the Developer under the Development Agreement;
5. he has received and reviewed an . estimate of the cost of the property described in Exhibit A and the Facilities to be constructed thereon, prepared by the Developer; and
6. the Market Value assigned to property and the Facilities described in the foregoing Exhibits A and B upon completion shall not be less than $43,309,000.00.

Both certifications noted the $43 million minimum market value established by the assessment agreement for 1988 and thereafter when construction on the property was expected to be completed, even though minimum market values of $1.8 million and $10.8 million were also established for 1986 and 1987, respectively.

Following the signing of the development and assessment agreements, construction on the World Trade Center began in 1985 and the 37-story office tower and adjacent commercial retail area opened in September 1987. In 1987 and 1988, the property had actual market values of $48,744,200 and $59,167,600, respectively. Pursuant to the assessment agreement and Minn.Stat. § 273.76, subd. 8, Ramsey County assessed the taxes for the World Trade Center based on these actual market values rather than the lower minimum market values. In contrast, from 1989 until the termination of the assessment agreement in 1993, the market value of the World Trade Center was less than or equal to the minimum market value of $43 million set by the assessment agree-meat. Accordingly, property taxes were assessed on the basis of the $43 million minimum market value.

On January 2, 1993, Ramsey County assessed the 1993 taxes on the property (payable 1994) based on the minimum market value of $43 million. Subsequently, on February 1, 1993, the $10 million bond debt issued by St. Paul for the development of the World Trade Center was retired and the assessment agreement terminated. On May 16,1994, Brookfield filed a property tax petition in the Minnesota Tax Court seeking a reduction in the 1993 assessed value to reflect the actual market value of the World Trade Center.

During discovery, Brookfield deposed the current Ramsey County Assessor, Brian Ducklow, and served him with a subpoena duces tecum requesting all the information contained in the assessor’s files relating to the 1985 assessment agreement and the minimum market value for the World Trade Center. Ducklow found only one responsive document. It was a letter dated April 10, 1984, from Gerald Augst, Supervisor of the Commercial-Industrial Section of the Ramsey County Assessor’s Office, to Robert Simon, an employee in the Department of Planning and Economic Development for the City of St. Paul. In this 1984 letter, Augst estimated what the property taxes on the World Trade Center might be for the tax years 1985 through 1989. Attached to the letter were three pages of handwritten notes which appeared to be cost, income, and market analysis calculations of estimated market values for those years. The calculations arrived at various market values for the property. Although the last page identified the final estimates as $21.5 million and $30.2 million for 1987 and 1989, respectively, the handwritten calculations also reflected several other market values, including the values of $42.4 million, $32 million, and $35 million.

la response to Brookfield’s discovery requests, a second document related to the minimum market value was produced from the files of the City of St. Paul. It was a memorandum dated May 17, 1985, from Greg Blees of the Office of the Mayor to members of his staff (Blees Memo). This memo referred to an attached worksheet that calculated what the minimum market value for the World Trade Center property needed to be to support the issuance of TIF bonds. The memo explained that “[t]his worksheet should be the basis for determining the Minimum Assessor’s Estimated Market Value for determining Oxford’s minimum property tax after the World Trade Center is constructed, regardless of occupancy.” The memo suggested that the minimum market value must be $43,307,645 to support the bond debt, and arrived at that value by back-calculating from the proposed bond amount. It concluded by stating that “[t]his calculation results in a minimum value equal to an assessed value under the income approach if the building was 58% occupied.” Although the Blees Memo was produced by the City, the parties agreed that there was no evidence that former Ramsey County Assessor O’Malley saw it. O’Malley was never deposed because after his retirement in 1986, he moved to another state, and the parties were unable to locate him.

The parties brought cross-motions for summary judgment in the tax court. Brookfield argued that: (1) the language of the assessment agreement provided that the minimum market value had no further force or effect after the termination date of February 1, 1993, and so the 1993 taxes (payable 1994) should be assessed on the actual market value of the property; or (2) the agreement was unenforceable because the assessor’s certification did not comply with the statutory requirements of Minn. Stat. § 273.76, subd. 8. The tax court agreed with Brookfield on the first ground, concluding that the termination of the assessment agreement on February 1, 1993, meant that the 1993 taxes (payable 1994) had to be assessed on the property’s actual market value. Accordingly, the tax court granted Brookfield’s motion for partial summary judgment as to that issue without addressing the statutory certification requirements argument, and set the matter of valuation for trial. See Brookfield Trade Ctr. v. County of Ramsey, No. C1-94-5200, 1997 WL 606726, at *1 (Minn. Tax Ct. Sept. 29, 1997). Ramsey County appealed from this decision, and we reversed, holding that termination of the agreement on February 1 did not mean that the January 2 tax assessment could be changed retroactively. See Brookfield Trade Ctr. v. County of Ramsey, 584 N.W.2d 390, 394-95 (Minn.1998) (hereinafter Brookfield I). We then remanded the matter to the tax court for a determination whether the assessor’s certification complied with the requirements of Minn.Stat. § 273.76, subd. 8. See Brookfield I, 584 N.W.2d at 395.

Subsequent to our decision in Brookfield I, the parties again brought cross-motions for summary judgment, this time on the statutory certification issue. Ramsey County argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because the county assessor must be presumed to have complied with the statutory certification requirements, and there was no evidence to overcome that presumption. Brookfield moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that even if the county assessor is entitled to a presumption of compliance with the law, the evidence was sufficient to overcome that presumption and require Ramsey County to affirmatively prove the assessor properly certified the minimum market value by first conducting an independent valuation analysis.

The tax court again granted partial summary judgment to Brookfield and denied Ramsey County’s cross-motion. See Brookfield Trade Ctr. v. County of Ramsey, No. C1-94-5200, 1999 WL 305223, at *4 (Minn. Tax Ct. May 11, 1999) (hereinafter Brookfield (Tax 1999)). The tax court concluded that Minn.Stat. § 273.76, subd. 8, required the assessor to make an independent valuation that the minimum market value was a reasonable estimate of the value of the property. See Brookfield (Tax 1999), No. Cl-94-5200, at *3. Although the tax court recognized the principle that public officials are presumed to have properly performed their duties and complied with statutory procedures, it decided that the evidence submitted by Brookfield rebutted this presumption, shifting the burden of proof to Ramsey County. See id. Because Ramsey County failed to produce evidence showing the assessor conducted an independent valuation analysis, the tax court concluded that the assessment agreement was invalid. See id. at *3-4. The tax court left the matter of the valuation of the property for trial. See id. Relator Ramsey County appeals from this decision.

I.

On appeal from summary judgment, we must determine “whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the lower court erred in its application of the law.” Brookfield I, 584 N.W.2d at 392-93. This case involves the interpretation of a statute. Conclusions of law, including the interpretation of statutes, are reviewed by this court de novo. See id. at 393. This case also involves a determination of whether the evidence submitted by the parties raises an issue of material fact as to whether the assessor complied with the certification requirements of the statute. The determination of whether a genuine issue of material fact exists is also subject to de novo review. See Fairview Hosp. & Health Care Servs. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 535 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn.1995).

A genuine issue of material fact for trial must be shown by substantial evidence. See DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 70 (Minn.1997). The moving party has the burden to show the absence of an issue of material fact, and we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See W.J.L. v. Bugge, 573 N.W.2d 677, 680 (Minn.1998). The party resisting summary judgment may not simply rest on its pleadings, but must produce affirmative evidence to show an issue of material fact. See DLH, 566 N.W.2d at 71. However, there is no issue of material fact if the nonmoving party “presents evidence which merely creates a metaphysical doubt as to a factual issue and which is not sufficiently probative with respect to an essential element of the non-moving party’s case to permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions.” DLH, 566 N.W.2d at 71.

We begin with a summary of the statutory requirements for certification of an assessment agreement containing a minimum market value. Section 273.76, subd. 8, first requires that the assessment agreement be presented to the assessor, who then reviews the plans and specifications for the proposed improvements to the property and the market value previously assigned to the land. See Minn.Stat. § 273.76, subd. 8. Then, “so long as the minimum market value contained in the assessment agreement appears, in the judgment of the assessor, to be a reasonable estimate,” the assessor shall certify the minimum market value of the subject property. Id.

The controversy here centers on what is required of an assessor to make a judgment that the minimum market value is a reasonable estimate. Brookfield claims that the assessor must perform an independent valuation analysis of the subject property to determine if the proposed minimum market value is a reasonable estimate. To make that judgment, Brook-field contends that the assessor must form an opinion as to the market value of the property, utilizing the applicable professional standards. Such an opinion must be supported by a written analysis consisting of the cost, income, and market approaches to valuation. Brookfield also suggests that the purpose of requiring the assessor to certify the minimum value is to place the assessor in the role of a watchdog to prevent overzealous city officials and developers from commencing projects that have little financial merit. It is Brookfield’s position that to fulfill this role the assessor must “independently opine to the appropriate value.” We disagree with Brookfield’s contention that the statute requires the assessor to conduct a full market value appraisal to determine that the agreed minimum market value is a reasonable estimate. The tax court also disagreed, recognizing that such an appraisal would be difficult, if not impossible, given that construction on the property has not yet even begun.

In determining that a full market value appraisal is not required, our focus is on the literal requirements of the certification statute. See Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1998) (“When the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.”). Section 278.76, subd. 8, requires the assessor to certify, in his or her judgment, that the minimum market value in the agreement “appears * * * [to be] a reasonable estimate.” Brookfield focuses on the term “judgment,” arguing that it must mean a formal opinion of value. However, we conclude that the word “judgment” as used in this statute simply refers to the expertise and familiarity a county assessor has with market values of major development projects in the jurisdiction. Further, the qualifying words “reasonable estimate” mandate only a rough determination or an approximation of a value. See Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 397 (10th ed.1996).

Given that a proposed development is in its gestational stage at the time an assessor certifies the minimum market value, our literal reading of the statutory requirements does not lead to an absurd or unreasonable result. See Wegener v. Commissioner of Revenue, 505 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn.1993). Importantly, in contrast to what Brookfield suggests, this interpretation does not in any way undermine, the responsibility the assessor has to the public fisc, and still necessitates the assessor’s reliance on his or her professional expertise and standards to meet the statutory requirements for certification. However, as recognized by the tax court, the assessor need not conduct the substantial inquiry, research, and analysis used to support a contested market value. We hold that the statute simply requires the assessor to determine whether a minimum market value agreed to by the parties and presented to the assessor is a reasonable estimate.

II.

Having held that the assessor must certify a minimum market value that is a reasonable estimate, our focus turns to whether a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to whether the assessor complied with the statute. See Brookfield I, 584 N.W.2d at 392-93. Specifically, we must determine -whether the assessor received the proposed minimum market value, reviewed the plans and specifications for the proposed development, considered the previous market value for the property, and determined that the minimum market value in the agreement was a reasonable estimate. See Minn.Stat. § 273.76, subd. 8. The parties have discovered scant evidence of what the assessor did. However, neither party disputes the available evidence or opposes summary judgment on the basis of any disputed material fact issue.

The evidence largely consists of four pieces: (1) the two certifications by the acting assessor attesting that he read the agreement, reviewed the plans, and found the estimated value to be reasonable — one incorporating the statutory language and the second providing additional detail as to his actions; (2) the 1984 Augst letter from the county assessor’s office to a St. Paul employee estimating taxes for 1985 through 1989 and the attached handwritten notes reflecting these calculations; (3) the Blees Memo calculating what the minimum market value of the property needed to be to support the proposed bond debt; and (4) the current assessor’s testimony regarding standards for assessors.

This evidence is viewed in the context of a presumption that the county assessor, as a government official, properly performed his official duties and complied with statutory procedures when he certified the minimum market value. See RE. Short Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 337 (Minn.1978). Ramsey County relies primarily on this presumption and the assessor’s certifications to support its claim that the assessor complied with the statute.

The simple probative effect of the certifications should not be underestimated. Generally speaking, courts have found public documents prepared in the regular course of business, like the assessment agreement and the certifications, to be reliable. See Minn. R. Evid. 803(8). The assessor signed two documents attesting that he performed each step of the process required by the statute — reviewing the assessment agreement and the plans and specifications for the construction, considering the previous market value of the land and the estimated cost of the property, and certifying that the proposed minimum market value was reasonable. As the parties have been unable to locate the assessor at this time to confirm what the certifications indicate, the certifications themselves are the best available evidence of his having performed the statutory duties.

Brookfield claims that the other evidence conclusively shows the assessor did not perform that duty. First, Brook-field claims the Blees Memo demonstrates that Ramsey County back-calculated the minimum market value from the estimated bond debt to guarantee tax revenues would be sufficient to repay the TIF bonds, rather than estimating the actual market value. However, the Blees Memo was an internal memo circulated among city staff, and there is no evidence that the county assessor saw the memo before certifying the agreed-upon value. Further, even if we view this evidence in the light most favorable to Brookfield by assuming that the assessor saw the memo, there is still no indication that the assessor based his certification on it alone. Therefore, the memo is not probative of whether the county assessor found the agreed value to be a reasonable estimate. Although a court may not weigh evidence on a motion for summary judgment, “the court is not required to ignore its conclusion that a particular piece of evidence may have no probative value * * DLH, 566 N.W.2d at 70. Given the Blees Memo’s lack of probative value, it does not overcome the presumption and create an issue of material fact as to whether the assessor complied with the statute.

In addition to its reliance on the Blees Memo, Brookfield argues that the attachment to the Augst letter indicates that when calculating the market value of the property, Augst arrived at various market values demonstrating that the $43 million minimum market value was not a reasonable estimate. There are several problems with this argument. First, the multiple handwritten calculations are not clearly labeled and the assumptions and information used as the basis for the calculations are unknown. For example, the square footage used for the calculations is unclear and may be limited to the office tower, excluding the adjacent retail area. Further, while there are many numbers that appear to be calculated market values, one of the figures, $42,369,200, closely approximates the $43 million minimum market value certified by the assessor.

In addition to our concerns with the calculations, it is unclear what, if any, relevance the Augst letter, written in April 1984, has to the issue of whether the assessor properly performed his certification duties over a year later, in July 1985. How closely the proposed project as described in the 1984 letter comports with the project as envisioned one year later, yet still not built, is not clear. Such a gap in time reduces even the most favorable viewing of the facts as to Brookfield’s claims to a mere metaphysical doubt. This is not enough to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists so as to preclude summary judgment for Ramsey County. See DLH, 566 N.W.2d at 71.

Finally, Brookfield points to the testimony of the current Ramsey County Assessor, Ducklow, describing the duties and standards of assessors as support for its position that the former county assessor, O’Malley, did not comply with the statutory requirements when he certified the minimum value in 1985. Specifically, the current assessor testified that it was his opinion that it would constitute a violation of the standards governing appraisers to provide an opinion of value not supported by any analysis under the cost, market, or income approaches. Again, this testimony does little to illuminate whether the previous assessor actually performed the analysis specifically required under Minn.Stat. § 273.76, subd. 8, when he certified the minimum market value in 1985. Brookfield does not dispute that the current assessor was not involved in the 1985 certification and has no personal knowledge regarding the circumstances surrounding that certification. The current assessor’s testimony is simply not probative of the narrow factual issue before the court.

In summary, the evidence Brookfield submits is not probative, and at best only raises a metaphysical doubt as to whether the assessor in fact estimated the minimum market value of the property in 1985. As such, Brookfield’s evidence does not rebut the presumption that the county assessor complied with the statutory certification requirements. Thus, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact, and Ramsey County is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Reversed.

GILBERT, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

STRINGER, Justice

(concurring).

I agree with the holding of the court and its reasoning and write separately only to express my belief that the fundamental principle of equity is an additional and compelling ground for denying respondents the relief they seek.

Having accepted the $10 million financial assistance package from the City in 1985 in the form of tax increment financing bonds, a subsidy that was hardly reluctantly received by the developers, it comes with ill-grace for respondents to now complain that almost 15 years ago the assessor failed to do his job when certifying the property values as a part of the financing package. Therefore, I would add to the court’s rationale for upholding the assessment agreement that by accepting its benefits for almost ten years, respondents, through their predecessor in interest, have waived any defect in the statutory certification- process set forth in Minn.Stat. § 273.76, subd. 8 (1984), and are estopped from denying the certification’s validity by the passage of time and acceptance of benefits of the agreement. See Ostraum v. City of Minneapolis, 236 Minn. 378, 383, 53 N.W.2d 119, 121-22 (1952).

RUSSELL A. ANDERSON, Justice

(concurring).

I join in the concurrence of Justice STRINGER.

      . This section is now codified, as amended, at Minn.Stat. § 469.177, subd. 8 (1998).

      . Brookfield is the direct successor in interest to Oxford.

      . For a more detailed explanation of assessment agreements and their role in TIF plans, see this court’s decision in Brookfield Trade Center, Inc. v. County of Ramsey, 584 N.W.2d 390, 393-94 (Minn.1998).

      .These values will be referred to as $1.8 million, $10.8 million, and $43 million, respectively.

      . No tax years are specified for the calcúla-lions of these other market values.

      . Although the tax court labeled its decision a "final order," this partial summary judgment did not fully dispose of the litigation because the issue of valuation remained for trial. Cf. Liberty Mitt. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 742-43, 96 S.Ct. 1202, 47 L.Ed.2d 435 (1976) (stating that although the district court made the "recital required” under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) that "final judgment be entered,” the order was not appealable because it granted partial summary judgment on the issue of liability but left the issue of damages for trial). Partial summary judgments are interlocutory in nature, and as such are not final judgments. See id. at 744, 96 S.Ct. 1202, 47 L.Ed.2d 435; Erickson v. General United Life Ins. Co., 256 N.W.2d 255, 259 (Minn.1977). An appeal from partial summary judgment should be included within a single appeal from a final judgment that fully disposes of the litigation. See Ericlcson, 256 N.W.2d at 259. Accordingly, for a second time this case is not properly before this court pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 271.10, subd. 1 (1998) ("a review of any final order of the tax court may be had upon certiorari by the supreme court”) (emphasis added). See Brookfield I, 584 N.W.2d at 393.
      It also does not appear that this decision of the tax court satisfies any of the rules that might otherwise permit an appeal from an interlocutory ruling. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 ("When multiple claims for relief or multiple parties are involved in an action, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon express determination that there is no just reason for delay for the entry of judgment.”); Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(h) (providing that an appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion for summary judgment "if the trial court certifies that the question presented is important and doubtful”); Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 105 (providing for discretionary review of an order not otherwise appealable). Although we again exercise our discretionary authority to adjudicate this appeal in the interests of justice and judicial economy, the tax court and litigants should not assume that future nonfi-nal orders will be reviewed by this court in the absence of compliance with an appropriate rule authorizing appeal.

      . Indeed, if the Blees Memo has any probative value, it suggests that some sort of valuation was conducted, and that the income method supported the $43 million figure at a certain percentage occupancy.


author: RUSSELL A. ANDERSON, Justice.

text:
    Dana WEAVER, Wesley Hovland, Elizabeth Chorske, petitioners, Appellants, v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANIES, petitioner, Respondent.
    Nos. C9-98-1859, C3-98-2098, C1-98-2231.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    April 27, 2000.
    Rehearing Denied May 24, 2000.

      Mark C. Vandelist, Vandelist & Vandelist, P.A., Burnsville, Sharon Vandyek, Schwebel Goetz & Sieben, Minneapolis, for Dana Weaver.
    Michael B. Sokol, Sokol Law Office, Bloomington, for Wesley Hovland.
    Charles A. Beckjord, Errol Kantor & Assoc., Minneapolis, for Elizabeth Chorske.

      William M. Hart, Jenneane L. Jansen, Meagher & Greer, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, for State Farm Ins. Companies.
    Wilbur W. Fluegel, Fluegel Law Office, Minneapolis, for amicus curiae MTLA.
    Kay Nord Hunt, Lommen, Nelson, Cole & Stageberg, P.A., Minneapolis, for amicus curiae Insurance Federation of Minnesota.
   OPINION

RUSSELL A. ANDERSON, Justice.

In these three consolidated cases we examine the authority and jurisdiction of a no-fault arbitrator to award benefits when the insured has refused to attend an independent medical examination (IME) because of the insurer’s nonpayment of a disputed claim. We hold that under the Minnesota No-Fault Act, Minn.Stat. § 65B.41-.71 (1998), the arbitrator has authority, on a case by case basis, to award, suspend or deny benefits based on the arbitrator’s determination of. the reasonableness of the request for or the refusal to attend the IME.

In these three cases, the insured refused to attend an IME because claims for no-fault benefits had not been paid in full. In each case, the insurer, State Farm, suspended payment of benefits, relying on our decision in Neal v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 529 N.W.2d 330 (Minn.1995). In each case, the arbitrator awarded benefits, and State Farm moved the district court to vacate the arbitrator’s award. In Weaver v. State Fam Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. C9-98-1859, 1999 WL 293929 (Minn.App. May 11, 1999), the district court vacated the arbitrator’s award and the court of appeals reinstated it. In Hovland v. State Farm Ins. Co’s., 593 N.W.2d 271 (Minn.App.1999), the district court vacated the arbitrator’s award and the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s order. In Chorske v. State Farm Ins. Co’s., No. C1-98-2231, 1999 WL 366608 (MinmApp. June 8, 1999), the district court affirmed the arbitrator’s award and the court of appeals reversed, remanding the case for additional findings.

We recite briefly the facts from each of the cases.

Weaver

Danna Weaver sustained injuries in an automobile accident on May 9,1997. State Farm did not challenge the fact that Weaver was injured and paid her claims for medical expenses and chiropractic care. Approximately two weeks after the accident Weaver received two chiropractic treatments in one day. On two later occasions, Weaver again received two treatments in one day. State Farm sent Weaver a letter informing her that an IME had been scheduled.

Weaver’s attorney responded to State Farm’s letter and indicated that Weaver would attend the IME only if State Farm paid her claims through the date of the IME. On July 31, 1997, State Farm informed Weaver that if she refused to submit to the IME her benefits would be suspended. State Farm paid all of Weaver’s claims through August 12, 1997, the day before the scheduled IME, with the exception of the disputed double treatments, a prescription for an anti-depressant and a new mattress. State Farm suspended Weaver’s benefits from that point on and on September 24, 1997, she filed a petition for no-fault arbitration.

The arbitration hearing was held on March 10, 1998, and Weaver still had not submitted to an IME. Weaver had incurred an additional $4,000 in medical expenses since the suspension, which were included in her demand in arbitration. The arbitrator awarded Weaver all of her requested medical benefits, expenses and interest and awarded partial costs but did not award wage loss benefits. The district court granted State Farm’s motion to vacate the award, but the court of appeals reversed. The court of appeals-interpreted Neal to allow an insurer to suspend benefits but also to allow the arbitrator to make an award of benefits even if the insured had not submitted to an IME.

Hovland

Wesley Hovland was injured in an automobile accident on December 13, 1993. State Farm paid Hovland no-fault benefits through early 1994. In September 1996, Hovland began to experience flareups from the injury and he returned to his doctor for treatment. On December 9, 1996, Hovland began to submit claims to State Farm by mail. On February 20, 1997, the claims adjuster sent Hovland’s physician a request for further information. The physician submitted a letter on March 24, 1997. On April 1, 1997, State Farm informed Hovland’s attorney that the physician’s response was insufficient. On May 5, 1997, Hovland’s attorney informed State Farm that the physician had responded to the inquiry and that “[he didn’t] know what further information [State Farm] want[s] or that would be relevant to this claim.” The attorney requested payment by May 13 and informed State Farm that if payment was not made Hovland would file for arbitration. After receiving no response, Hovland filed a petition for no-fault arbitration on May 14, 1997.

On August 27, 1997, State Farm sent Hovland a letter informing him that an IME had been scheduled for September 27. Hovland refused to attend. The arbitration hearing was held on November 3, 1997. The arbitrator awarded Hovland a portion of his claimed benefits. The district court granted State Farm’s motion to vacate the arbitrator’s award. The court of appeals affirmed the district court.

Chorske

Elizabeth Chorske was injured in an automobile accident on July 27, 1995. State Farm paid Chorske’s medical expenses for approximately 11 months. On July 26, 1996, shortly after completing a second course of physical therapy, Chorske began chiropractic treatment. State Farm received Chorske’s first claim for chiropractic treatment on August 3, 1996, and on August 13, 1996, State Farm sent Chorske a letter informing her that an IME had been scheduled for September 13, 1996. Chorske informed State Farm that she had a work conflict and could not attend the IME. State Farm scheduled three subsequent IMEs. Chorske claimed that she had work conflicts for the next two IMEs and that her attorney told her not to attend the last IME because State Farm had not paid her chiropractic bills. State Farm then scheduled another IME which Chorske refused to attend. State Farm then suspended further payment of no-fault benefits. On January 29, 1997, Chorske filed for arbitration.

The arbitrator awarded Chorske benefits through November 11, 1996, which appears to be the date her benefits were suspended for refusing to attend the last IME, and denied benefits thereafter. The district court affirmed the arbitrator’s award, finding that the arbitrator could have found that Chorske’s work conflicts were legitimate and that she had reasonably missed the initial IMEs, but that her subsequent refusal to cooperate was unreasonable which justified the suspension of her benefits under Neal. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to district court.

We granted the petitions for review of State Farm, Hovland and Chorske, along with Chorske’s motion to consolidate these three cases.

I.

We turn now to the question in these cases: whether the no-fault arbitrator has jurisdiction to award, suspend or deny benefits when the insured has refused to attend an IME because of nonpayment of a disputed claim.

The claimants argue that the no-fault statute and rules give authority to arbitrators to determine whether a refusal to attend an IME is reasonable, and on the basis of that determination to thereafter determine whether benefits are to be paid or denied. Respondent State Farm argues that an arbitrator does not have jurisdiction or authority to award disputed benefits when the insured has refused to attend an IME because of the insurer’s refusal to pay a disputed claim. State Farm contends that the issue is one of law, not of fact, and that the arbitrator has no authority to decide a legal issue. Further, State Farm contends, citing our decision in Neal, that as a matter of law an insurer can suspend the payment of disputed benefits until the insured attends a reasonable IME.

We begin by acknowledging that no-fault arbitrators are limited to deciding questions of fact, leaving the interpretation of law to the courts. See Johnson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 426 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Minn.1988). Arbitration regarding automobile reparations therefore departs from the generally accepted principle that “arbitrators are the final judges of both law and fact.” Id. (citing State, by Sundquist v. Minnesota Teamsters Pub. and Law Enforcement Employees Union Local No. 820, 316 N.W.2d 542, 544 (Minn.1982)). The limitation on the final authority of arbitrators is based on the perceived need for consistency in interpretation of the No-Fault Act. See id. at 421.

Nonetheless, we have adopted rules authorizing arbitrators in no-fault cases where the claim is for less than $10,000 to “grant any remedy or relief deemed just and equitable.” Rule 32, Rules of Procedure for No-Fault Arbitration; see also Minn.Stat. § 65B.525 (1998) (mandating binding arbitration for claims under $10,-000). To grant relief, arbitrators must apply the law to the facts they have found. See, e.g., Great West Cas. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 590 N.W.2d 675, 677 n. 1 (Minn.App.1999). That is, as a general proposition, the arbitrator has jurisdiction to award, suspend or deny benefits. To achieve the consistency desired in interpreting the no-fault act, this court and the district court review de novo the arbitrator’s legal determinations necessary to granting relief. See, e.g., Neal, 529 N.W.2d at 331.

II.

We turn next to the more specific question whether the refusal to submit to an IME based on the insurer’s nonpayment presents an issue of fact or law for the arbitrator. We conclude that under the no-fault statute refusal presents an issue of reasonableness, which is a fact issue to be determined by the arbitrator.

The no-fault statute specifically provides for an IME: “Any person with respect to whose injury benefits are claimed under a plan of reparation security shall, upon re-' quest of the reparation obligor from whom recovery is sought, submit to a physical examination by a physician or physicians selected by the obligor as may reasonably be required.” Minn.Stat. § 65B.56, subd. 1 (1998). The statute explicitly requires that the IME request be reasonable. See id.

The statute also specifically requires cooperation by the claimant:

An injured person shall also do all things reasonably necessary to enable the obligor to obtain medical reports and other needed information to assist in determining the nature and extent of the injured person’s injuries and loss, and the medical treatment received. If the claimant refuses to cooperate in responding to requests for examination and information as authorized by this section, evidence of such noncooperation shall be admissible in any suit or arbitration filed for damages for such personal injuries or for the benefits provided by sections 65B.41 to 65B.71.

Minn.Stat. § 65B.56, subd. 1. Thus, in addition to requiring that an IME request be reasonable, the statute requires the insured to “do all things reasonably necessary” to assist in determining the nature of the extent of injuries and need for medical treatment. See id. The mutual obligations reflect the balancing of the entitlements of each party, which we recognized in Neal. See 529 N.W.2d at 333.

Reasonableness has traditionally been considered an issue of fact. See, e.g., Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 533 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Minn.1995). Therefore, it is entirely appropriate for an arbitrator to determine the reasonableness of both the insurer’s request for an IME and, as we recognized in Neal, the reasonableness of the insured’s refusal to attend. See 529 N.W.2d at 331-32. Based on that determination, the arbitrator may proceed to “grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable.” Rule 32, Rules of Procedure for No-Fault Arbitration.

State Farm argues that Neal established that, as a matter of law, an insurer may suspend payment of no-fault benefits until the claimant has submitted to a reasonably requested IME, and that the arbitrator therefore lacks jurisdiction to award benefits when presented with this legal issue.

In Neal, the insured refused to attend an IME, and the unreasonableness of that decision was properly determined by the arbitrator. See 529 N.W.2d at 331. The issue in Neal was the remedy: whether the insurer is authorized to suspend the payment of no-fault benefits in consequence of an insured’s unreasonable failure to attend the IME. We held that the no-fault statute contemplates that the continued receipt of benefits is conditioned on the reasonable submission to an IME, and that the suspension of benefits pending an IME unreasonably refused is “eminently reasonable.” 529 N.W.2d at 333. In Neal we rejected the argument that the arbitrator was limited to considering the prejudice to the insurer resulting from the IME refusal in the granting of benefits. See id.

State Farm’s argument that the suspension of benefits on the refusal of an IME has been determined as a matter of law in Neal overlooks the central theme of that decision: that arbitrators are to make the determination of reasonableness and the consequences thereof within the arbitration itself:

Thereafter, during the arbitration pro'cess, the parties may produce evidence of either the reasonableness of the refusal to attend the IME so as to warrant the reinstatement of benefits, in the case of the claimant, or the appropriateness of the suspension of benefits for the claimant’s lack of cooperation within the terms of the insurance contract or Minn. Stat. § 65B.56, subd. 1 and the prejudice suffered by the insurer in its efforts to gather information with regard to the claim, in the case of the insurer. '

529 N.W.2d at 333-34. Clearly the right to suspend benefits upon the refusal of an IME is not absolute. It is for the arbitrator to determine the reasonableness of the request for the IME and the refusal, and to also order an appropriate remedy, which may include suspension of payment for disputed benefits until the claimant submits to an IME. The insurer bears the risk that the arbitrator will find suspension on the basis of an IME refusal to be inappropriate, and award payment and a 15 percent penalty. See Minn.Stat. § 65B.54, subd. 2 (1998).

Arbitration is particularly appropriate where a speedy, informal and relatively inexpensive procedure for resolving controversies is needed. See Layne-Minnesota Co. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 266 Minn. 284, 287, 123 N.W.2d 371, 374 (1963). Reliance on an arbitrator for resolving disputes about an IME is therefore consistent with the goals of the No-Fault Act, which include speeding the administration of justice, requiring medical examination and disclosure, and ensuring prompt payment. See Minn.Stat. § 65B.42 (1998). The arbitrator’s determination of reasonableness of the request for and refusal of the IME and the attendant consequences also fits within the other duties of the no-fault arbitrator this court has promulgated, such as the authority to permit any discovery allowable under the Rules of Civil Procedure, and to extend time limits for the completion of physical examinations. See Rule 12, Rules of Procedure for No-Fault Arbitration.

In contrast, State Farm’s urged severance of legal and factual issues between court and arbitrator would interfere with the goal of speeding the administration of justice. As litigants dispute the obligations under the act, it makes little sense to require them to shuttle back and forth between the arbitrator making factual determinations and the court deciding legal questions. Rather, the arbitrator can determine the facts and apply the law to those facts subject to de novo review by the district court.

The court' of appeals in Hovland determined that the no-fault arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the insurer was entitled to withhold benefits pending an IME. The Hovland panel stated, “[T]he factual inquiry into the ‘reasonableness’ of an insured’s refusal to attend an examination is secondary to the threshold issue of whether the insured has a legal duty to attend even though the insurer has not paid all outstanding claims.” 593 N.W.2d at 273.

However, the legislature established that the legal duty in the No-Fault Act is one of reasonableness. See Minn. Stat. § 65B.56, subd. 1. Therefore, the reasonableness determination must be made first, and by the arbitrator. We reject the holding in Hovland that reasonableness is a secondary issue to the legal duty to attend an IME. On a disputed request for an IME, the arbitrator must first determine whether the request and refusal are reasonable before determining the consequences of the refusal. Whereas the reasonableness determination is a factual finding for which the arbitrator is the final judge (See Sundquist, 316 N.W.2d at 544), the legal consequence of the refusal is subject to de novo review by the district court. In performing de novo review, the district court must consider whether the relief ordered by the arbitrator is consistent with the purposes of the No-Fault Act. See MinmStat. § 65B.42.

State Farm argues that to allow arbitration to go forward when an insured refuses an IME gives arbitrators the authority to require insurers to either pay a claim before obtaining any independent medical information, or defend in adversarial proceedings without that information, which leaves them in a dilemma. The no-fault statute certainly requires prompt payment, indeed penalizes the failure to pay promptly. See Minn.Stat. § 65B.54, subds., 1, 2 (1998). However, the statutory scheme also recognizes that insurers will at times need more than 30 days to investigate a claim (including arranging for an IME), and may ultimately deny some claims. See Minn.Stat. §§ 65B.54, subd. 5 (1998); 72A.201, subd. 4(3) (1998).

It appears the legislature intended to allow' the insurer to withhold payment during a reasonable investigation period or pending arbitration over the disputed claim, subject to a 15 percent interest penalty after 30 days if the insured prevails. See Minn.Stat. § 65B.54, subd. 2. The penalty gives the insurer an incentive to resolve claims quickly and not to deny payment frivolously. However, because nonpayment of some claims was contemplated by the legislature, it would appear the insured has no right based on the insurer’s nonpayment to refuse a reasonably requested IME.

Accordingly, the dilemma State Farm posits is inconsistent with the role of the arbitrator under the No-Fault Act and rules. An arbitrator is not authorized to award payment for medical treatment after finding the IME request with respect to that treatment was reasonable and necessary to the determination of benefits and its refusal unreasonable. As such, insurers should not be required to defend in adversarial proceedings without necessary medical information.

Once the arbitrator makes the determination of the reasonableness of the IME request and refusal, there is a range of options for the remedy or relief available to the arbitrator. If the IME request was reasonable and its refusal unreasonable, the arbitrator may award or ratify the insurer’s suspension of disputed payments until an IME is completed. If the arbitrator finds that the insurer is so prejudiced by the unreasonable failure to attend an IME that the insurer cannot defend against the claim, the arbitrator may proceed to deny benefits for which the IME is necessary.

Where the arbitrator has determined that a request for an IME was unreasonable and the refusal reasonable, the arbitrator may or may not proceed to award benefits. For example, where the arbitrator finds that an IME is unnecessary, the arbitrator may proceed to award or deny benefits based on the record presented.

In sum, the refusal to attend an IME on the basis that the insurer has not paid outstanding claims may or may not prevent the arbitrator from ordering that benefits be paid. It is for the arbitrator to decide the reasonableness of the IME request and the reasonableness of the claimant’s response to the request. The arbitrator has authority on a case by case basis to award, suspend or deny benefits when the insured has refused to attend an independent medical examination because of nonpayment of a disputed claim. The relief awarded is subject to de novo review by the district court, however.

Having decided the legal issues presented, we must determine whether remand of these cases to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this decision is necessary.

In Weaver, the arbitrator awarded all medical costs, the district court vacated the award and on appeal the court of appeals reversed the district court, remanding for review of the award and the inclusion of accrued interest. Weaver is in this respect affirmed, with direction to the district court to consider our holding in reviewing the award.

In Hovland, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s vacation of the arbitrator’s award of a portion of Hov-land’s claim. We reverse and remand to the district court for review of the arbitration award in light of our holding today.

In Chorske, the district court concluded the arbitrator must have determined that Chorske’s initial refusals of the IME were reasonable, and affirmed the arbitrator’s partial award of benefits. The court of appeals reversed on the basis of Hovland. We reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the district court’s confirmation of the arbitrator’s decision.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and Weaver and Hovland are remanded.

      . We note a discrepancy in the record regarding the spelling of Weaver’s first name, and rely on her signature for the form adopted herein.

      . State Farm and amicus Minnesota Insurance Federation raise the specter of the practice of "front loading,” where insureds receive treatment for many months but do not submit claims until they have amassed large bills. Chorske's claims were received within eight days of her first treatment. Indeed, it does not appear that any of the appellants in this case engaged in this practice. Related to this issue, appellants filed a motion to strike the appendix to the amicus brief of the Insurance Federation as outside the record. The appendix consists of what appears to be two form letters written seven years ago by an attorney to unidentified chiropractors purporting to describe how to "front load” a claim. The motion to strike the appendix is granted.

      . Part of the reasonableness determination involves evaluating the procedural history of the dispute. For example, in Hovland, State Farm did not request that Hovland submit to an IME until several months after Hovland's demand for arbitration. Therefore, State Farm cannot claim it was justified in suspending payments based on the IME refusal when it had not even made the request for an IME when payments were suspended.

      . Arbitrators are not required to give reasons for their decisions, which may impair judicial review. See Hilltop Constr. Inc. v. Lou Park Apartments, 324 N.W.2d 236, 239-40 (Minn.1982). However, the district court has the authority to compel arbitrators to clarify their awards. See id. at 240; Minn.Stat. § 572.16 (1998); Rule 38 Rules of Procedure for No-Fault Arbitration. To achieve the purpose of the No-Fault Act in expediting resolution of claims, we urge arbitrators to indicate whether the award rests on a finding concerning reasonableness or on a legal determination.

      . State Farm argues in particular that the facts of Chorske demonstrate the unfairness of allowing an arbitrator to decide reasonableness long after the demand for an IME was made and additional medical bills incurred. Chorske refused to attend three IMEs because of claimed work conflicts. At State Farm’s fourth request for an IME, she refused on the advice of her attorney, based on State Farm’s refusal to pay the outstanding medical bills. The arbitrator awarded benefits incurred through the last refusal. The ultimate issue again goes to reasonableness: did Chorske truly have a work conflict, and did the parties try to accommodate schedules to give effect to the statutory mandate to “do all things reasonably necessary” to enable the insurer to obtain medical information? See Minn.Stat. § 65B.56, subd. 1. The arbitrator is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and make this determination.

      .In Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, the court of appeals held that the insurer’s nonpayment within 30 days after an IME was refused raised a material issue of fact whether the insurer breached the insurance contract. See 474 N.W.2d 438, 440 (Minn.App.1991). Because each no-fault auto insurance policy in Minnesota is subject to the statutory requirements of the no-fault act, and the act contemplates an insurer may withhold payment for certain reasons, a breach of contract analysis under these facts is improper. See Bobich v. Oja, 258 Minn. 287, 294, 104 N.W.2d 19, 24 (1960). Murphy is overruled to the extent inconsistent with our holding today.