author: HANSON, Justice. PAGE, Justice

text:
    Christopher P. SCHERMER, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, et al., Respondents.
    Nos. A04-2088, A04-2054.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Sept. 14, 2006.

      Louise D. Bjorkman, Lawrence R. King, T. Joseph Snodgrass, Shawn M. Raiter, Larson King, LLP, Saint Paul, MN, Charles S. Zimmerman, J. Gordon Rudd, Zimmerman Reed, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN, Rhett A. McSweeney, McSweeney & Fay, Minneapolis, MN, Charles N. Ñauen, Robert K. Shelquist, Lockridge Grindal Ñauen P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN, for Appellants.
    Todd A. Noteboom, William L. Greene, Daniel Oberdorfer, Douglas R. Boettge, Monica L. Davies Leonard, Street and Deinard, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondent.
    Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Daniel S. Goldberg, Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General for the State of Minnesota, Saint Paul, MN, for Amicus Curiae State of MN.
    Sharon L. Van Dyck, Schwebel, Goetz & Sieben, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, Jeffrey D. Bores, Chestnut & Cambronne, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for Amicus Curiae MN Trial Lawyers Association.
   OPINION

HANSON, Justice.

Appellant Christopher P. Schermer and other homeowner’s insurance policyholders (the Class) commenced this class action against their insurer, respondent State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. (State Farm), alleging that the surcharge that was imposed by State Farm on homes whose electrical systems were more than 39 years old was racially discriminatory. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the alternative grounds that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that the filed rate doctrine prevents a court from retroactively changing a rate that has been filed with and approved by a state regulatory agency. The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment on both grounds. We affirm on the filed rate doctrine.

To place the Class’s allegations in context, we will first describe the regulatory system established by the Minnesota Legislature for the review and approval of insurance rates. Insurers operating in Minnesota are subject to investigation and regulation by the Minnesota Department of Commerce (DOC). See Minn.Stat. § 60A.031 (2004). One regulatory requirement is that all insurers must file their proposed rates with the DOC before the rates can become effective. Minn.Stat. § 70A.06, subd. 1 (2004). The DOC is authorized to review these proposed rates to ensure that they are not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. Minn. Stat. § 70A.04, subd. 1 (2004). The general standards defining discriminatory rates are contained in Minn.Stat. § 70A.04, subd. 4 (2004). More specific prohibitions against discrimination are contained in Minn.Stat. § 72A.20 (2004), the anti-redlining statute. These latter prohibitions are the basis for the Class’s complaint.

Section 72A.20 prohibits “charging differential rates for an equivalent amount of homeowner’s insurance coverage ⅜ * * solely because * * * of the age of the primary structure sought to be insured.” Minn.Stat. § 72A.20, subd. 13(b) (2004). An exception to that prohibition is made for the use of rating standards that are based on “the age of the insured structure’s plumbing, electrical, heating or cooling system or other part of the structure, the age of which affects the risk of loss.” Id. (emphasis added). The substance of the Class’s claim is that a surcharge applicable to the Class under one of State Farm’s homeowner’s insurance rating plans violated this statute because, the Class alleges, although it was purportedly based on the age of an insured’s electrical system, it was actually based on the age of the insured’s structure.

With this context in mind, we turn to the facts, which are not disputed. On May 8, 1997, State Farm filed with the DOC a rate plan known as the “Utilities Rating Plan” (URP). As eventually approved by the DOC, the URP gave homeowners a discount or a surcharge, as a percentage of their base premium, depending on the age of them electrical system. The discount ranged from 2% for an 8-year-old electrical system, to 25% for a new system. Homeowners with systems between 9 and 39 years old received no discount or surcharge. Homeowners with systems older than 39 years old were required to pay a 6% surcharge.

To support the proposed URP, State Farm submitted actuarial exhibits to demonstrate that there was a higher risk associated with older electrical systems. But the actuarial data State Farm submitted used all noncatastrophic losses (e.g., fire, water damage, theft, etc.), not just those losses directly caused by older electrical systems. The Class alleges that this lack of actuarial support for the surcharge constitutes a violation of the redlining prohibitions of section 72A.20.

Before ultimately approving the URP, the DOC rejected it three times as being in violation of section 72A.20, for reasons unrelated to the actuarial exhibits. Each time State Farm responded by making the required changes to comply with the statute and resubmitting the URP for approval. In conjunction with each rejection, the DOC indicated that State Farm’s “file would be held in suspense” until it made the required changes. After making all required changes, State Farm submitted the final URP and the DOC approved it on July 23,1997.

In 2001 a State Farm policyholder filed a complaint with the DOC after he received notice that his premium was going to increase under the URP because his electrical system was approaching 40 years of age. The DOC initiated an investigation and requested that State Farm provide actuarial data to support the URP. State Farm responded that it did not have electrical system cause-of-loss data to support its URP rates. After an 18-month investigation the DOC investigator concluded that State Farm’s URP is actually based on the age of the insured’s home, which is “illegal according to Minn.Stat. § 72A.20, subd. 13(b) (2000).” Specifically, the investigator interpreted section 72A.20, subd. 13(b), to require actuarial support of losses specifically attributable to older electrical systems.

The DOC drafted a cease and desist order that was presented to State Farm in October of 2002. The order alleged that State Farm violated several statutes, including section 72A.20, subdivision 13(b). State Farm agreed to an informal disposition. In a consent order, State Farm denied the allegations but agreed to cease the URP plan and pay investigative costs of $75,000. The consent order contained no factual or legal findings, but resolved “any and all claims by the Commissioner arising out of the activities related to [State Farm’s] URP program.” The public had no input in the resolution of this matter and nothing about the complaint, investigation, or consent order became public until after the matter was final, on December 4, 2002, when the DOC issued a press release.

Two days later the Class commenced this action. On September 12, 2003, the Class was certified to include “[a]ll insurance policyholders issued policies * * * between the dates of August 1, 1997 and February 15, 2003 that cover homes * * * the premiums for which included surcharges based on State Farm’s Utility Rating Plan.” The Class does not include all homeowner’s insurance policyholders affected by the URP because it does not include those who received a discount or those who paid the base premium.

The parties made cross-motions for summary judgment and on September 3, 2004, the district court entered a series of orders. The court denied the Class’s motion for summary judgment because it concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether the URP violated section 72A.20, subd. 13(b). But the court granted State Farm’s motion for summary judgment because it concluded, first, that section 72A.20, subd. 13(b), does not afford a private right of action and, second, that the filed rate doctrine precluded collateral judicial review of a rate filed with and approved by the DOC.

The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment on both grounds. We granted review on both issues but because we conclude that the filed rate doctrine bars the Class’s claims, we need not reach the issue of whether the Class otherwise had valid statutory or common law claims.

I.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment to determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the court erred in its application of the law. Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn.1995). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted. Id. Accordingly, we assume as true the Class’s allegation that State Farm’s rates were racially discriminatory, in violation of Section 72A.20, subd. 13(b). We consider whether the Class’s claims are nevertheless barred by the filed rate doctrine.

The origin of the filed rate doctrine can be traced back to a 1922 United States Supreme Court decision, Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 260 U.S. 156, 43 S.Ct. 47, 67 L.Ed. 183 (1922). The Court held that an award for treble damages is not available in an antitrust action by a private shipper challenging a rate that was submitted to and approved by the federal Interstate Commerce Commission. Id. at 165, 43 S.Ct. 47. The Court reasoned that a party cannot suffer injury by paying a filed rate because:

[t]he legal rights of shipper as against carrier in respect to a rate are measured by the published tariff. Unless and until suspended or set aside, this rate is made, for all purposes, the legal rate, as between carrier and shipper. The rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied or enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier.

Id. at 163, 43 S.Ct. 47. The Court also explained that any award to the plaintiff of a refund of a portion of the filed rate would discriminate against nonsuing ratepayers or ratepayers who sued but received different jury awards. Id. The Court concluded that “it is possible that no lower rate [on the goods] could have been legally maintained without reconstituting the whole rate structure for many articles moving in an important section of the country.” Id. at 164, 43 S.Ct. 47.

The Supreme Court did not explain the precise rationale for the filed rate doctrine, but hinted at separation of powers concerns, explaining that Congress had conferred on the Commerce Commission the authority to determine whether a rate is reasonable and not discriminatory. Id. The Court also identified a justiciability concern, recognizing that a court is not well-suited to determine, if the rate approved by the commission were found to be unlawful, what other rate the commission would find to be reasonable and nondiscriminatory to take its place. Id. at 164-65, 43 S.Ct. 47. In other words, in order to assess the damages that were caused by the unlawful rate, a court would need to predict what the commission would determine was a lawful rate and then compare the two.

In Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall (Arkla) the Supreme Court expanded on its separation of powers concerns in a contract dispute over the sale of natural gas between a natural gas producer and a buyer. 453 U.S. 571, 573, 101 S.Ct. 2925, 69 L.Ed.2d 856 (1981). The producer sued to retroactively enforce an increase in rates that the contract made effective if the buyer bought gas from another producer at a higher price. Id. at 573-74, 101 S.Ct. 2925. The Court recognized that the Natural Gas Act prevented the Federal Power Commission from retroactively imposing a rate increase on gas already sold. Id. at 578, 101 S.Ct. 2925. Accordingly, the Court reasoned that “[i]t would surely be inconsistent with this congressional purpose to permit a state court to do through a breach-of-contract action what the Commission itself may not do.” Id. at 578, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2925. The Court said:

It would undermine the congressional scheme of uniform rate regulation to allow a state court to award as damages a rate never filed with the Commission and thus never found to be reasonable within the meaning of the Act.

Id. at 579, 101 S.Ct. 2925. The Court concluded that any award of damages that required a court to speculate about whether the commission would have approved the proposed higher rate would constitute impermissible retroactive ratemaking. Id. at 578-79, 101 S.Ct. 2925.

In one of the most frequently cited opinions interpreting the federal filed rate doctrine, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized that regulatory agencies have special expertise, investigative capacities, and experience and familiarity with the regulated industry that enable them to “consider the whole picture regarding the reasonableness of a proposed rate,” whereas the courts are ill-suited to second-guess the decisions of regulatory agencies. Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 20-21 (2d Cir.1994).

Although these cases involved challenges to rates filed with federal agencies under federal statutes, the rationale underlying the filed rate doctrine has also been applied to rates filed with state agencies. See, e.g., Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 20; Taffet v. Southern Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1494 (11th Cir.1992); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 494 (8th Cir.1992). Of course the adoption and application of the doctrine to rates filed with state agencies is a matter of state law and is not controlled by federal precedent. Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 992 (9th Cir.2000). Nevertheless, most states have adopted the filed rate doctrine, and many apply it to insurance regulation. See, e.g., Horwitz v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 319 Ill.App.3d 390, 253 Ill.Dec. 468, 745 N.E.2d 591 (2001); Commonwealth ex rel. Chandler v. Anthem Ins. Cos., 8 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Ky.Ct.App.1999); N.C. Steel, Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., 347 N.C. 627, 496 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1998); Byan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 242 A.D.2d 456, 662 N.Y.S.2d 44 (N.Y.App.Div.1997).

As noted above, the Supreme Court has implied several possible rationales of the federal filed rate doctrine but has not committed itself to one. See Arkla, 453 U.S. at 573, 101 S.Ct. 2925 (separation of powers, legislative intent); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 459-60, 65 S.Ct. 716, 89 L.Ed. 1051 (1945) (separation of powers); Keogh, 260 U.S. at 162-63, 165, 43 S.Ct. 47 (separation of powers, legislative intent, and justiciability). Some states have been more explicit about the rationale. Kentucky views the filed rate doctrine as a specific application of separation of powers. Commonwealth ex rel. Chandler, 8 S.W.3d at 53 (explaining that rate setting is a legislative function that is outside the scope of judicial review). North Carolina also approaches the filed rate doctrine from the perspective of separation of powers, recognizing the need to effectuate legislative intent. N.C. Steel, Inc., 496 S.E.2d at 372 (stating that the legislative intent to preclude interference by the courts was evidenced by the comprehensive regulatory scheme in place for insurance companies). Many states treat the filed rate doctrine as a matter of comity, whereby the courts give deference to the agency’s expertise if the claim requires the court to determine the reasonableness of a rate. See, e.g., Amundson & Assocs. Art Studio, Ltd. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Inc., 26 Kan.App.2d 489, 988 P.2d 1208, 1214-15 (1999); Edge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 366 S.C. 511, 623 S.E.2d 387, 391-92 (2005).

This court has not directly decided whether the filed rate doctrine applies to rates established by Minnesota regulatory agencies, but we have recognized some of the separation of powers concerns that underlie the doctrine. Thus, in Northern States Power Co. v. City of St. Paul, we said that “prescribing or fixing rates for a public utility involves a legislative function which may not be usurped by the courts.” 256 Minn. 489, 493, 99 N.W.2d 207, 211 (1959). And in Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. State, we reaffirmed this principle, stating that “[rjatemaking is a legislative and not a judicial function.” 299 Minn. 1, 28, 216 N.W.2d 841, 857 (1974). We have also recognized that certain aspects of the ratemaking function, such as the allocation of rates among classes of customers, are peculiarly legislative in nature. St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Minn.Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 312 Minn. 250, 255-56, 262, 251 N.W.2d 350, 354, 358 (1977) (emphasizing that the agency has “technical expertise” and is able to balance many competing interests and holding that, unlike a court, the agency may draw on its “own internal sources of knowledge and experience” and is not limited to the evidentiary record). Finally, we have applied the doctrine indirectly where federally regulated rates produced costs that were sought to be passed on through state regulated rates. See Northern States Power Co. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 344 N.W.2d 374, 381 (Minn.1984) (holding that a federal agency’s approval of allocations of plant abandonment losses between two electric companies established a formula wholesale rate, “the reasonableness of which cannot be relitigated in a retail rate proceeding [for one of the companies] before a state utilities commission”).

We now consider whether we should adopt a filed rate doctrine for regulated rates filed with Minnesota regulatory agencies and, if so, what exceptions should be recognized. The Class suggests that the filed rate doctrine is grounded solely in justiciability concerns. They argue that the doctrine should not apply in this case because their challenge is not to the reasonableness of the URP, but to its legality, which is a matter within the peculiar expertise of courts. And the Class urges that the surcharge that class members paid under the URP is a judicially ascertainable amount. But we conclude that the Class’s argument underestimates the extent to which a court-ordered refund of State Farm’s surcharge would interfere with the regulatory scheme established by the legislature and with the ratemaking functions of the DOC. We also conclude that the filed rate doctrine should reflect separation of powers and comity considerations that the Class’s argument overlooks.

From the standpoint of separation of powers, we must start with our precedent recognizing that ratemaking is a legislative function. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 299 Minn. at 28, 216 N.W.2d at 857; N. States Power Co., 256 Minn. at 498, 99 N.W.2d at 211. Although that precedent has arisen primarily in the context of electric, gas, and telephone utilities, the principle applies equally to the rates of insurers because insurance is similarly regarded as a business that is “affected with a public interest.” George J. Couch, Couch on Insurance § 21.1 (2d ed.1984); see also Itasca Paper Co. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 175 Minn. 73, 75, 220 N.W. 425, 426 (1928). Indeed, one of the reasons that states began to regulate insurance rates was to assure the solvency of insurers so that they could be relied on to pay policyholder claims. Eric Mills Holmes & Mark S. Rhodes, Appleman on Insurance § 3.7, at 385 (2d ed.1996); see Minn.Stat. § 70A.04, subd. 3 (“Rates are inadequate only if they will endanger the solidity of an insurer that uses them or if they are insufficient to sustain projected losses and expenses within the state.”). Thus, if a court were to entertain a private claim that a regulated rate was unreasonable or unlawful, it would necessarily have to second-guess the decisions of the agency to whom the legislature has delegated the responsibility to approve rates, and a court generally would not have the technical expertise to do so nor the capacity to consider the entire rate structure or to balance all competing interests.

From the standpoint of both separation of powers and comity, we note that the statutory system for the regulation of insurance rates in Minnesota is comprehensive. See generally Minn.Stat. chs. 45, 60A, 70A, 72A (2004). That regulatory system specifically delegates to the DOC the responsibility to review all rates for reasonableness. Minn.Stat. 70A.04, subd. 1. In performing that review, the DOC is directed to protect the interest of ratepayers against excessive rates, but also to balance the interests of ratepayers against the right of the regulated entity to charge adequate rates. Minn.Stat. §§ 70A.01, subd. 2, 70A.04, subd. 1. Thus, when a regulatory agency approves rates, it seeks to achieve a balance by assuring that the rates are not excessive for ratepayers but yet are adequate to satisfy the regulated entity’s due process right to earn a reasonable return. Hibbing Taconite Co. v. Minn. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 302 N.W.2d 5, 10; see Minn.Stat. §§ 70A.04, 70A.05. And, for insurance rates specifically, “[r]ate regulation is designed to generate premium charges that are equitable for each policyholder-insured as well as yield insurers a fair return for the risks undertaken.” Holmes & Rhodes, supra, § 3.7, at 385. When a court is asked to determine whether one part of the rate structure is unlawful, as applied to a subset of ratepayers, it must necessarily interfere with the function delegated by the legislature to the DOC, and it has neither the expertise nor the mechanisms to deal with the entire rate structure or the adequacy of the return to the regulated entity.

From the standpoint of justiciability, we have recognized that courts are ill equipped to retroactively reallocate rates among ratepayers, by modifying the rates for some ratepayers but not for others. Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 369 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Minn.1985). We have said that the regulation of rates is an “intricate ongoing process” and interference by a court “may set in motion an ever-widening set of consequences and adjustments” which courts are powerless to address. Id. To illustrate this point, it is helpful to compare the power of a court with the authority of the DOC in dealing with insurance rates. Here, the court only has jurisdiction over the Class members, a subset of ratepayers who were subject to the surcharge. It does not have jurisdiction over the ratepayers who received a discount or those who paid only the base premiums. If the court were to retroactively adjust the rates of only the Class members, it would inevitably disrupt the balancing of interests achieved by the DOC when the rates were approved because the court has no jurisdiction to reallocate rates among other customer classes to assure that in total, the rates are adequate for State Farm. Thus, the Court could not increase other policyholder’s rates to protect State Farm from the shortfall in revenues that would be produced by any refund of the surcharges.

The DOC, on the other hand, does have authority to address all of State Farm’s rates on a prospective basis. If, as the Class alleges, the surcharge mechanism is unlawful, the DOC can order State Farm to discontinue the entire URP, not just the collection of the surcharge. The DOC can deal comprehensively with the rate plan and, if it eliminates a surcharge for some policyholders, it can simultaneously eliminate the discount for other ratepayers. And, if these two features are not essentially offsetting, the DOC can establish new base rates that ensure that the return to State Farm is adequate but not excessive.

This comparison makes it clear that the Class’s argument, that the filed rate doctrine is based solely on justiciability concerns, is incorrect. Even though the amount of the surcharges actually paid by Class members can be calculated, an award of that amount as damages would require the court to speculate about whether the DOC would have approved this lower, nonsurcharge rate as the reasonable and lawful rate. See Arkla, 453 U.S. at 578-79, 101 S.Ct. 2925. An award qf that amount as damages to some ratepayers would completely alter the allocation among classes of customers that the DOC had approved. And, perhaps more important, the court’s limited jurisdiction would prevent it from implementing any adjustments for other customer classes.

From the standpoint of legislative intent, the Class argues that the legislature’s intent that the filed rate doctrine not apply is expressed in Minn.Stat. § 72A.26 (2004), which allows the courts, not the DOC, to make the final determination as to whether section 72A.20 has been violated. But section 72A.26 does not apply here because it only allows direct review by the district court of a DOC-initiated investigation that results in a report of the Commissioner that fails to charge a violation of one of the unfair practices statutes. And section 72A.26 only authorizes the district court to issue injunctions and other “appropriate orders and writs,” not to grant damages to a subset of policyholders or to retroactively adjust one part of the rate structure adopted by the DOC.

We also disagree with the Class’s argument that the legislature’s intent is expressed in Minn.Stat. ch. 8 (2004), which this court has interpreted to permit the attorney general to take action against insurers for unfair insurance claims practices. See Morris v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn.1986). Again, this statute does not authorize the attorney general to secure retroactive refunds of insurance rates already paid.

We conclude that the legislative intent that the filed rate doctrine should apply to insurance rates is reflected in Minn.Stat. § 70A.11 (2004). That section addresses the refund authority of the DOC and restricts that authority to only order refunds that are calculated from “the commencement date of the contested case hearing on the rate.” In the words of the district court, this “gives the insurer notice that its accepted rates are being challenged and provides the opportunity to either discontinue them or proceed at its peril.” This statute reinforces the principles that underlie the filed rate doctrine. By restricting the authority of the DOC to order refunds to only those cases where a formal contested case proceeding has been commenced, and to only those rates that were charged after the contested case proceeding was commenced, the statute severely limits the ability of the DOC to make retroactive refunds. Here, for example, because no contested case was commenced, the DOC would have no authority to order refunds of the surcharge. Because of the separation of powers and comity concerns outlined above, courts should be reluctant to do what the regulatory agency is powerless to do. Arkla, 453 U.S. at 578, 101 S.Ct. 2925.

Finally, the Class argues that the application of the filed rate doctrine would violate the right of the Class, under the Minnesota Constitution, to have “a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs.” Minn. Const, art. I, § 8. But the Minnesota Constitution only protects “remedies for which the legislature has not provided a reasonable substitute.” Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Minn.1986). Thus, even if we were to conclude that the Class had a valid common law cause of action for rescission, the Remedies Clause is not violated because the legislature has provided a reasonable substitute. The statutes that regulate insurance companies in general and rates in particular — including the rate filing requirements, the DOC review requirements, the DOC investigative responsibilities, and the DOC and district court enforcement capabilities — -provide remedies that ensure protection of the interests of ratepayers. In fact, the collective requirements of those statutes relieve individual ratepayers of the burden of reviewing, monitoring, or challenging rates and, instead, charge the DOC with the responsibility to assure ratepayers that rates will not be excessive. This regulatory scheme is a reasonable substitute for the common law claim that the Class will be prevented from asserting.

For all of these reasons — because the regulation of insurance rates is a legislative, not a judicial function; because the Minnesota Legislature has established a comprehensive system for regulating insurance rates and has delegated the administration of that system to the DOC; because only the DOC has the capacity to determine what is a reasonable rate structure for an insurer, by balancing the interests of ratepayers and insurers and by allocating fairly among classes of ratepayers; because the legislature has severely restricted the authority of the DOC to make retroactive refunds or rebates; and because the legislature has substituted regulatory remedies to protect all policyholders in place of the private remedies that individual policyholders might possess — we conclude that the filed rate doctrine applies generally to rates filed with and approved by the DOC. And, unless there is some basis for an exception, the filed rate doctrine would bar the Class’s claims.

II.

Some courts that have adopted the filed rate doctrine have recognized exceptions to that doctrine. See, e.g., Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440 F.3d 940, 944-45 (8th Cir.2006) (holding that where a rate filed with a state regulatory agency violates a federal antidiscrimination statute, the federal statute predominates under the Supremacy Clause and the filed rate doctrine is inapplicable); Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 393-94 (9th Cir.1992) (recognizing an exception where there was minimal review by the regulatory agency); Am. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 818 So.2d 1073, 1085 (Miss.2001) (recognizing an exception where there was a claim of breach of fiduciary duty), overruled on other grounds by Capital City Ins. Co. v. G.B. “Boots” Smith Corp., 889 So.2d 505 (Miss.2004).

The Class argues that we should recognize an exception to the filed rate doctrine where the regulatory agency’s review and investigation authority is passive. The Class argues that the doctrine should not be applied here because the DOC’s authority to review a complaint and initiate an investigation is discretionary, rate filings are not subject to public input, and the DOC does not “determine” insurance rates but instead only reviews rates submitted by insurance companies.

The Class relies on Brown v. Ticor Title Insurance Co. where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the filed rate doctrine did not apply to bar federal antitrust claims challenging state insurance rates. 982 F.2d at 394. The court relied exclusively on the fact that the regulatory schemes in Arizona and Wisconsin did not require affirmative approval of the rates, only the absence of disapproval. Id. at 393. The court explained:

[I]f those rates were the product of unlawful activity prior to their being filed and were not subjected to meaningful review by the state, then the fact that they were filed does not render them immune from challenge. The absence of meaningful state review allows the insurers to file any rate they want. Therefore, the act of filing does not legitimize a rate arrived at by improper action.

Id. at 394.

We find Bromi unpersuasive. Unlike the Ninth Circuit’s description of Arizona and Wisconsin law, insurance rates in Minnesota are subject to meaningful review. Minnesota Statutes § 60A.03, subdivision 2 (2004), provides that

[t]he commissioner shall have and exercise the power to enforce all the laws of this state relating to insurance, and shall enforce all the provisions of the laws of this state relating to insurance in the manner provided by the laws defining the powers and duties of the commissioner of commerce * * *.

(Emphasis added.) Insurers “shall file with the commissioner all rates,” and “rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.” Minn.Stat. §§ 70A.06, subd. 1 (emphasis added), 70A.04, subd. 1 (emphasis added); see also Minn.Stat. §§ 72A.20, 72A.201 (2004). Consistent with this legislative mandate, the DOC did review State Farm’s URP and rejected it three times before finally approving it.

Further, the DOC has a continuing, legislatively-mandated obligation to “examine the affairs and conditions of every insurer licensed in this state not less frequently than once every five years.” Minn.Stat. § 60A.031, subd. 1 (2004). And it has broad authority to “examine the affairs and conditions” of any insurance company doing business in Minnesota “[a]t any time and for any reason related to the enforcement of the insurance laws, or to ensure that companies are being operated in a safe and sound manner and to protect the public interest.” Id.; see also Minn.Stat. § 72A.21 (2004). Consistent with this legislative authorization, the DOC initiated an 18-month investigation on State Farm’s URP in response to a complaint from a single ratepayer. Finally, the DOC has broad authority to seek injunctions, levy fines and penalties, issue cease and desist orders, and to revoke or suspend licenses to do business. Minn.Stat. §§ 45.027, subds. 5, 5a, 5b, 6, 7, 70A.06, 72A.25, 72A.201, subd. 1 (2004).

Concededly, the insurance regulatory scheme is less stringent than, for example, the scheme for electrical, gas, and telephone utilities. Compare Minn.Stat. 216.-B.16 (2004) (contemplating contested case proceedings to determine electric and gas rates, with participation of state agencies on behalf of ratepayers and intervention of ratepayer groups), with Minn.Stat. § 70A.04, subd. 2 (allowing competition to be the benchmark for excessiveness). But this difference in degree of regulation is one that the legislature has chosen and it does not materially impact the rationale for the filed rate doctrine.

In this respect, we echo the comments of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Prentice v. Title Insurance Co., 176 Wis.2d 714, 500 N.W.2d 658 (1993). There, the court examined the filed rate doctrine in the context of insurance rate regulation that is less comprehensive than in Minnesota. In fact, the Wisconsin court contrasted Wisconsin’s “use before file” regulation with the more restrictive “file before use” regulation like Minnesota’s. Id. at 725, 500 N.W.2d at 662. The court concluded that even Wisconsin’s less restrictive scheme provided an adequate regulatory remedy because the Commissioner of Insurance was empowered to establish minimum standards for loss ratios, to require that rates be filed and approved, and to disapprove of any rate that was “excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory” or which had “the effect of destroying competition or creating a monopoly.” Id. at 726, 500 N.W.2d at 662-63. The court stated:

Under the filed rate doctrine as enunciated in Keogh, the availability of such a regulatory remedy bars a private rate-related suit for damages. To hold otherwise would undermine the regulatory scheme by allowing courts to award •damages based on a rate which was never filed with the Insurance Commissioner. If courts were authorized to determine whether a hypothetical rate would have been approved by the Insurance Commissioner, we would place insurers in a procrustean bed where one rate must conform to the requirements of both the Insurance Commissioner and a trier of fact. In order to uphold the regulatory scheme enacted by the Legislature, we conclude that the Insurance Commissioner serves as the plaintiffs sole source of relief.

Id. at 726-27, 500 N.W.2d at 663.

We hold that the filed rate doctrine bars the Class’s challenge to State Farm’s URP.

Affirmed.

MEYER, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

PAGE, Justice

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the court’s characterization of the issue presented as being merely whether we should recognize a passive review exception to the filed rate doctrine. I believe that the nature of the Minnesota insurance regulatory scheme, the structure of State Farm’s URP, and the type of claim asserted by the class when viewed together undermine each rationale for adopting the filed rate doctrine in this case. The court’s expansion of the doctrine to the extreme facts of this case sets dangerous precedent that will allow quasi-regulated industries to avoid the consequences of their unlawful behavior.

I.

The court justifies applying the filed rate doctrine to bar this class action based on the principles of separation of powers and effectuating the legislature’s intent, but application of the filed rate doctrine serves neither of these goals. Nor do the other traditional rationales have any application here.

A. Justiciability

One rationale for the filed rate doctrine is justiciability. Because a rate is deemed reasonable when it has been filed and approved by the regulatory agency, in order for a court to calculate damages in an antitrust or RICO action the court would have to determine what the hypothetical alternative reasonable rate would have been without the illegal conduct. Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 21 (2d Cir.1994). Because this involves expertise unique to the administrative agency assigned to oversee those rates, it is a determination that courts are ill-equipped to make. Id. at 19, 21.

This case does not require a jury or a court to speculate on the hypothetical alternative reasonable rate that would have been set without State Farm’s allegedly illegal conduct. The class’s damages would simply be the cumulative difference between each individual homeowner’s base rate, and the rate they paid with the URP surcharge. Because the surcharge is calculated according to a percentage of the homeowner’s base rate, the class’s damages are calculable with mathematical precision. Thus, the justiciability concern has no place here.

B. Rate Discrimination

Another rationale for the filed rate doctrine is the avoidance of discriminatory rates among ratepayers. When first identifying this rationale, the Supreme Court expressed caution over recovery based on an amount less than the filed rate because it “might, like a rebate, operate to give [the plaintiff] a preference over his trade competitors.” Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 163, 43 S.Ct. 47, 67 L.Ed. 183 (1922). The Court further explained that even if all ratepayers sued, uniform treatment would not result “unless the highly improbable happened, and the several juries and courts gave to each the same measure of relief.” Id. Some courts have since expanded this rationale beyond trade competitors to include all ratepayers because it preserves the goal of uniformity of rates. See, e.g., Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 21.

Here, members of the class are not trade competitors so there is little concern for giving one a preference over others. Further, the ascertainable nature of the damages and the fact that this is a class action eliminates any concern over varying recoveries and non-uniform rates. Thus, there is no chance that awarding the class damages in this case would result in discriminatory rates.

Nonetheless, the court, without citation to authority, significantly expands this rate discrimination rationale by focusing not on the possibility of discriminatory rates among trade competitors or consumers, but on the regulated industry’s right to earn a reasonable return. Even if this were a legitimate concern for heavily regulated industries, it has no application here. For the general authority that regulated industries are constitutionally entitled to reasonable return, the court cites Hibbing Taconite Co. v. Minnesota Public Service Commission, 302 N.W.2d 5 (Minn.1980). But Hibbing Taconite was an electric utility rate case in which rates are set by the regulatory agency according to a strict set of guidelines outlined by statute and clarified by judicial decisions. See Minn.Stat. § 216B.03 (2004); Nw. Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 299 Minn. 1, 216 N.W.2d 841 (1974). In Northwestern Bell we explained that:

The process by which rates are fixed is, first, to determine the value of the company’s property represented by the equity of its stockholders; second, to establish a fair rate of return which will provide earnings to investors comparable to those realized in other businesses which are attended by similar risk, will allow the company to attract new capital as required, and will maintain the company’s financial integrity; and, third, to compute corporate taxes, depreciation reserves, and other expenses of operating the company. The rates charged subscribers are thereupon authorized in an amount which will equal the sum of the return to investors and the company’s operating expenses.

299 Minn. at 5-6, 216 N.W.2d at 846.

In contrast, insurance rates are set by the insurers themselves, not the DOC. Minn.Stat. § 70A.08, subd. 1 (2004). And more importantly, there is no limit on the amount of the rate so long as “a reasonable degree of price competition exists.” Minn.Stat. § 70A.04, subd. 2(a) (2004). The DOC’s only function in reviewing rates for excessiveness is ensuring that such competition exists. In this regard, insurance rates are little different from rates set by any other non-regulated industry. Therefore, like non-regulated industries, insurers are free to build litigation expenses into their rates. Further, even when a reasonable degree of competition does not exist, the legislature has directed that in considering rate excessiveness “[d]ue consideration shall be given to past and prospective loss and expense experience * * * and to all other relevant factors.” MinmStat. § 70A.05(1) (2004). This suggests that litigation costs associated with past rates can be built into future rates regardless of competition.

The court suggests that to allow this action would require speculation over whether the DOC would have approved of the URP without the surcharge. But, in doing so, the court elevates the importance of a rate being adequate over the importance of a rate being non-discriminatory. Given the choice between potentially saddling State Farm with an inadequate rate, or effectively punishing the class for State Farm’s allegedly illegal behavior, I would choose the former. It must be emphasized that it was State Farm who designed the URP, not the DOC.

C. No-Injury Rule

A third rationale for the filed rate doctrine is that, because the filed rate defines the legal rights between a ratepayer and the regulated industry, no economic injury can be suffered by paying the filed rate. The Supreme Court in Keogh explained that:

Section 7 of the Anti-Trust Act gives a right of action to one who has been “injured in his business or property.” Injury implies violation of a legal right. The legal rights of a shipper as against carrier in respect to a rate are measured by the published tariff. Unless and until suspended or set aside, this rate is made, for all purposes, the legal rate, as between carrier and shipper. The rights as defined by tariff cannot be varied or enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier.

260 U.S. at 163, 43 S.Ct. 47.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently distinguished Keogh in a case involving facts very similar to this case. In Saunders v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 440 F.3d 940, 942 (8th Cir.2006), homeowners brought federal anti-discrimination actions against several insurers alleging that their underwriting criteria and pricing policies reflected unlawful race discrimination. The district court applied the filed rate doctrine and issued summary judgment in favor of the insurers. The Eighth Circuit reversed, explaining first that the filed rate doctrine is simply a way to harmonize two federal statutes with competing purposes. Id. at 944. Because the insurance rate regulatory scheme involved state statutes, the court held that the “Supremacy Clause tips any legislative competition in favor of the federal anti-discrimination statutes.” Id.

While this case is slightly different in that it does not implicate the Supremacy Clause, the Saunders court went on to explain that a state regulatory scheme could still bar a federal claim, depending on the “language, remedies, and purposes of the federal statutes at issue.” Id. The court then focused on Keogh’s no-injury rationale and made an appropriate distinction that is relevant here:

RICO and the Sherman Act require a plaintiff to prove injury to “his business or property.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Thus, the no-injury principle of Keogh applies to deprive a RICO or antitrust plaintiff of standing under federal law to challenge a filed rate that must be charged under state law. But standing to sue under federal anti-discrimination statutes such as the Fair Housing Act is far broader. If a defendant’s pricing policies or practices were the product of unlawful race discrimination, plaintiffs who purchased homeowners insurance at the discriminatory rates have standing to seek relief under these federal statutes even if the defendant was required by state law to charge its filed rates. Thus, as to this limited group of plaintiffs, the no-injury principle of Keogh * * * will not support [application of the filed rate doctrine].

Saunders, 440 F.3d at 944-45 (citations omitted).

This distinction applies equally to this case. The DOC’s review of insurance rates serves four functions: to ensure that rates are not (1) excessive; (2) inadequate; (3) unfairly discriminatory; or (4) being used to engage in unfair price competition. See Minn.Stat. § 72A.04, subd. 1 (2004). Keogh’s, no-injury rule only addressed the first function. When a regulatory agency determines that a rate is not excessive— i.e., reasonable — it necessarily defines the economic rights between the consumer and the regulated entity. A consumer cannot thereafter claim that he was injured because a different reasonable rate should have been paid.

But the same cannot be said for the consumer’s right to be free from unlawful racial discrimination. This right has already been defined by statute. See Minn. Stat. §§ 70A.04, subd. 1, 72A.20, subd. 13 (2004). The DOC’s discrimination review function does nothing to further define the right and certainly does not mean that the rate cannot be discriminatory. It only means that, in the DOC’s opinion, the rate is not discriminatory. Thus, the no-injury rationale has no application in this case.

D. Separation of Powers

Related to the no-injury principle is the idea that the filed rate doctrine respects principles of separation of powers when allowing judicial involvement would infringe on the executive branch’s role of reviewing rates for reasonableness. But, as already discussed, the class’s challenge is not to the DOC’s review of the URP’s reasonableness, but to the DOC’s review of the URP for compliance with an anti-discrimination statute. The latter type of review involves the judicial function of applying facts to the law, not measuring competition, see Minn.Stat. § 70A.04, subd. 1, or calculating the insurer’s operating expenses and ascertaining a reasonable rate of return while taking into account the risk associated with insuring a particular behavior, see Minn.Stat. §§ 70A.04, subd. 2(b), 70A.05, subd. 2. Unlike measuring competition or setting rates, the DOC does not have particular expertise in interpreting statutes or identifying unlawful discrimination. Consequently, far from respecting separation of powers, the court’s decision violates separation of powers by delegating a judicial function to an executive official without the availability of judicial review.

State Farm attempts to circumvent this distinction by characterizing this action as a highly complex case centered around interpreting actuarial data. But one of the threshold disputes is over the interpretation of two apparently conflicting provisions of Minn.Stat. § 72A.20, subd. 13 (2004), which does not require interpretation of actuarial data. The main provision prohibits “charging differential rates for an equivalent amount of homeowner’s insurance coverage * * * solely because * * * of the age of the primary structure sought to be insured.” Minn.Stat. § 72A.20, subd. 18(b). This suggests that State Farm’s URP is permissible if it was in fact based on the age of utility systems within the home, and not solely on the age of the home itself. Subdivision 13, however, does “not prohibit the use of rating standards based upon the age of the insured structure’s plumbing, electrical, heating or cooling system or other part of the structure, the age of which affects the risk of loss.” Minn.Stat. § 72A.20, subd. 13. By negative implication, subdivision 13 suggests that a rating scheme based on utility systems within the home may also be prohibited if not sufficiently supported by actuarial data. But it is unclear that this is prohibited by the main provision, which is specific to charging differential rates “solely because * * * of the age of the primary structure,” instead of more broadly covering the age of the home or a proxy for it.

In other words, the first question a court would be confronted with by this case is whether the statute requires a rating scheme based on utility systems to be supported by actuarial data at all. If not, the fact question becomes whether State Farm’s URP was in fact based on the age of the utility systems, or if it was really based on the age of the primary dwelling. This requires no particular expertise or interpretation of actuarial data.

If section 72A.20, subdivision 13, were interpreted to prohibit the charging of differential rates based on the age of utility systems without actuarial support, only then would the interpretation of actuarial data be necessary. But even if this is the correct interpretation, the legislature has already recognized that courts are competent to interpret actuarial data. The DOC, insurers, and intervenors are allowed to remove a case or appeal to a district court under certain circumstances. Minn.Stat. §§ 14.63 (“Any person aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review of the decision * * 72A.25 (allowing the DOC to file for an injunction in a district court if the DOC charges a violation of, inter alia, Minn.Stat. § 72A.20, and the insurer refuses to discontinue the activity); 72A.26 (allowing any intervenor in a public hearing to seek relief from a district court if the DOC does not charge a violation of, inter alia, Minn. Stat. § 72A.20) (2004). Thus, under the right circumstances this very case could have been heard before a district court. Although this would only allow for the issuance of an injunction instead of damages, in order to support the injunction, the district court would still be required to assess actuarial data to find a violation of section 72A.20, subdivision 13(b). Therefore, any complexity in interpreting actuarial data has no relevance to the separation-of-powers rationale for the filed rate doctrine.

E. Legislative Intent

The other rationale that the court cites for the filed rate doctrine is that it carries out the intent of the legislature to assign all responsibilities associated with filed rates to the regulatory agency. In Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 106 S.Ct. 1922, 90 L.Ed.2d 413 (1986), the Supreme Court elevated this rationale over all others when declining to overrule Keogh. The Court seemed to acknowledge that certain procedural and judicial developments since Keogh may undermine the original rationales for the filed rate doctrine, including

the development of class actions, which might alleviate the expressed concern about unfair rebates; the emergence of precedents permitting treble-damages remedies even when there is a regulatory remedy available; the greater sophistication in evaluating damages, which might mitigate the expressed fears about the speculative nature of such damages; and the development of procedures in which judicial proceedings can be stayed pending regulatory proceedings.

Square D Co., 476 U.S. at 423-24, 106 S.Ct. 1922. But the Court recognized “the strong presumption of continued validity” associated with Congressional acquiesce to the judicial interpretation of a statute, which at the time had been in place for 65 years, and held that “[i]f there is to be an overruling of the Keogh rule, it must come from Congress, rather than from this Court.” Id. at 423-24, 106 S.Ct. 1922. Because this court has not yet interpreted the filed rate doctrine to apply to Minnesota’s insurance regulatory scheme, Minnesota has no such history of legislative acquiesce to the filed rate doctrine.

The court concludes that the Minnesota Legislature’s intent to apply the filed rate doctrine in this case is implied by Minn. Stat. § 70A.11, subd. 1 (2004). Section 70A.11, subdivision 1, reads:

If the commissioner finds after a contested case proceeding under chapter 14 that a rate is not in compliance with section 70A.04, the commissioner shall order that its use is to be discontinued and shall order the excess premium plus interest at the rate specified in section 549.09 to be refunded to the policyholder. The amount of the refund, plus interest, must be computed from the commencement date of the contested case hearing on the rate.

This applies only to proceedings under the Administrative Procedures Act and only to findings made by the commissioner. It does not apply to judicial proceedings. The court concludes that this “reinforces the principles that underlie the filed rate doctrine” because an insurer can rely on the DOC’s review of its rates. But the class is not challenging the DOC’s review of State Farm’s rates; they are asking the court to conduct an independent review of them for any race-based discriminatory impact. There is no expression of legislative intent anywhere that the judicial branch not review rates for their discriminatory impact.

In fact, by allowing insurers to set their own rates, the opposite may well be true, that is, by establishing a presumption of reasonableness based on the existence of competition, and by making the DOC’s review function passive only, the legislature has expressed its intent that insurance rates be treated like any other rate set by non-regulated industries. The DOC’s review function merely recognizes the unique nature of, and the potential for abuse in, the insurance industry.

The court also finds evidence of legislative approval of the filed rate doctrine in Minn.Stat. § 72A.08 (2004) because it prohibits rebates. But section 72A.08, subdivision 1, only prohibits an insurance company from giving rebates. It does not apply to a judicial award of restitution for a benefit wrongfully conferred. Further, although subdivision 2 prohibits an insured from receiving a rebate, it clearly does not contemplate prohibiting restitution from a judicial action. If it did, it would conflict with section 70A.11, subdivision 1, which allows for the DOC to order refunds of illegal premiums under certain circumstances.

Finally, even if legislative intent as suggested by the court can be implied, we have long recognized that “statutes are presumed not to alter or modify the common law unless they expressly so provide.” Agassiz & Odessa Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Magnusson, 272 Minn. 156, 166, 136 N.W.2d 861, 868 (1965) (emphasis added); see also Morris v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233, 237-38 (Minn.1986). Assuming that the class has stated a common law cause of action, the filed rate doctrine cannot be applied against them absent express legislative intent that insurance providers are immune from judicial oversight.

II.

Compounding my concern that none of the filed rate doctrine rationales apply here are the severe consequences of applying the doctrine in this case. First, as the class argues, consumers are largely left without a remedy under the regulatory scheme. In this case, the DOC and State Farm privately agreed to a $75,000 “investigation fee” that went to the state. The DOC did not seek refunds of any of the nearly 20 million dollars in URP surcharges that class members paid to State Farm. The public had no input in this remedy and no opportunity to intervene. Because the DOC agreed to charge a violation of section 72A.20, subdivision 13(b), and State Farm agreed to stop charging the URP, the class could not appeal the consent order in any way. See Minn.Stat. §§ 72A.25, 72A.26 (2004). There are no remaining statutory provisions allowing for intervention, appeal, or judicial review. The class’s only remedy — the remedy that the court now forecloses — was to file a lawsuit.

The second consequence of this decision is that the law regarding racial discrimination in insurance practices will now be determined by executive officials who are not bound by stare decisis and who, as history informs us, may well be complicit in the effort to discriminate. See generally, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) (racial segregation by school officials); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 360, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (recognizing the problem of police using minor traffic infractions to engage in racial profiling). On July 23, 1997, the DOC determined that State Farm’s URP was not racially discriminatory. In October of 2002, a different DOC official determined that the URP was racially discriminatory. On April 9, 2004, yet another DOC official determined that the URP was not racially discriminatory. The result of the court’s decision is that the legal acceptance of racially discriminatory behavior will change with the changing tides of the DOC administration, or even with the different DOC officials assigned to review the behavior on a particular day. This does not comport with the rule of law.

Third, the passive nature of the DOC’s review leaves me with serious concerns about the degree of attention that will be given to compliance with anti-discrimination statutes. There is no requirement that the DOC even review rates that are filed with it. And even if it does review all rates as a matter of course, the review serves four distinct functions and, as the court highlights, the insurance regulatory scheme is “very comprehensive.” This means that the DOC is responsible for ensuring compliance with dozens of statutes before a problem or complaint with regard to one even arises. Finally, although an investigation was initiated here based on one customer’s complaint after the URP was approved, there is nothing that requires the DOC to initiate such an investigation. While I do not endorse passive review as an exception to the filed rate doctrine, I know that passive review without judicial oversight may well result in no review of insurance rates.

For these reasons, I would reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the basis of the filed rate doctrine. While I agree in principle with the concept of the filed rate doctrine, I believe that the facts of this case undermine the rationales for adopting the filed rate doctrine here and results in severe and unfair consequences for insurance purchasers who are also persons of color. For purposes of compliance with anti-discrimination statutes, insurance companies, like all non-regulated industries, should be accountable to all three branches of government.

      . Section 72A.20 was revised by the Minnesota Legislature in 2005, but the language we cite was not affected.

      . On January 21, 2004, while this action was pending, State Farm submitted an identical URP to the DOC using the same type of actuarial support. This time the DOC rejected its investigator’s 2002 interpretation of section 72A.20, subdivision 13(b), and again approved State Farm's URP. A few months after the URP’s April 1, 2004, effective date, Governor Pawlenty ordered the DOC to suspend its approval of the URP pending the outcome of this litigation.

      . The Supreme Court later explained that the filed rate doctrine does not provide antitrust immunity. Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 422, 106 S.Ct. 1922, 90 L.Ed.2d 413 (1986). The Court said that the activities of a regulated industry are still "subject to scrutiny under the antitrust laws by the Government and to possible criminal sanctions or equitable relief.” Id. The Court concluded that these criminal and equitable safeguards and the apparent Congressional acquiescence to this "settled” area of law provided sound reasons for not overruling Keogh. Square D. Co., 476 U.S. at 422, 106 S.Ct. 1922.

      . We do not decide here that the filed rate doctrine prevents the state through the attorney general from enforcing insurance rate statutes through criminal sanctions, injunctions, equitable relief, or civil fines and penalties. See Square D Co., 476 U.S. at 422, 106 S.Ct. 1922.

      . Legislative intent for application of the filed rate doctrine is also reflected in Minn.Stat. § 72A.08, subd. 1 (2004), which provides "[n]o insurance company * * * shall make or permit any advantage or distinction in favor of any insured * * * with respect to the amount of premium named in, or to be paid on, any policy of insurance, or shall offer to pay or allow * * * as inducements to insurance, any rebate or premium payable on the policy.” Because the Class’s claim is for rescission of the URP surcharge, they are asking for a return of the payments they have already made. This is precisely what section 72A.08, and the filed rate doctrine, prohibit.

      . We do not decide whether a claim brought under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn.Stat. § 363A.33, subd. 1 (2004), would be an exception to the filed rate doctrine in Minnesota. We note that the Class moved to amend the complaint to add a MHRA claim, but that the district court denied that motion. The Class did not appeal this ruling. Accordingly, there are no issues involving the MHRA before us.

      . The court reached this conclusion even though the passivity of regulation was such that the United States Supreme Court, in FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 504 U.S. 621, 112 S.Ct. 2169, 119 L.Ed.2d 410 (1992), had found it insufficient to constitute “state action” that would shield the companies from antitrust liability, stating: "This determination, however, does not change the fact that the Wisconsin Insurance Code provides the plaintiffs with a [regulatory] remedy for the violation alleged in the present case.” 176 Wis.2d at 728, 500 N.W.2d at 663.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: GORDON W. SHUMAKER, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Lancintino Antwon FLEMINO, Appellant.
    No. A05-1384.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Sept. 5, 2006.

      Mike Hatch, Attorney General, and Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Patrick J. Swift, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.
    John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.
    Considered and decided by ROSS, Presiding Judge; GORDON W. SHUMAKER, Judge; and WRIGHT, Judge.
   OPINION

GORDON W. SHUMAKER, Judge.

Appellant challenges his first-degree aggravated-robbery conviction, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in ruling that he could be impeached with his prior convictions if he testified. He contends that the rationale that evidence of even crimes not bearing on credibility allows the jury to see the “whole person” should be abandoned. We affirm.

FACTS

The state charged appellant Lancintino Antwon Flemino with first-degree aggravated robbery and domestic assault, alleging that Flemino came to the apartment of M.R., a woman he had dated, punched her in the face, and stole several items of jewelry, including rings, belonging to M.R. and her son.

When questioned by the police, Flemino contended that he had lent money to M.R. and that she had given him her boyfriend’s ring as collateral. He stated that he went to her apartment to collect the loan but M.R. refused to pay him. He denied striking her and alleged that M.R.’s boyfriend hit her when he learned that she had given his ring to Flemino.

Flemino pleaded not guilty to the charges. During the jury trial, the state informed Flemino and the court that, if Flemino testified, the state would offer as impeachment prior felony convictions of third-degree assault, simple robbery, fifth-degree controlled-substance possession, and second-degree burglary. Flemino objected to the introduction of evidence of the convictions on the ground that none of them related to honesty or dishonesty and that the court’s ruling would affect his decision of whether to testify. The court ruled that the robbery and assault convictions were inadmissible but that the burglary and drug-possession convictions could be admitted if Flemino testified.

Flemino opted not to testify but the version of the incident that he related to the police was recorded and introduced into evidence by the state. The jury found Flemino guilty of first-degree aggravated robbery. The domestic-assault charge was not submitted to the jury.

Flemino appeals from the conviction, challenging the court’s evidentiary ruling.

ISSUE

May felony convictions of burglary and drug possession be admissible for impeachment even though they do not directly show dishonesty?

ANALYSIS

Contending that the district court erred in ruling that his prior felony convictions of burglary and drug possession were admissible for impeachment if he testified, Flemino states the essence of his argument in his brief as follows: “Here, in a he said/she said case, appellant was presented with the Hobson’s choice of: not presenting his version of what happened or presenting his version and having his character attacked by prior convictions for offenses not involving dishonesty.”

The district court enjoys broad discretion in its evidentiary rulings, and we will not reverse on appeal absent a showing of a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 654 (Minn.2006); State v. Grayson, 546 N.W.2d 731, 736 (Minn.1996).

In a criminal case, it is improper to introduce evidence of an accused’s character so as to invite an inference that the accused had a propensity to commit the crime charged. Minn. R. Evid. 404(a). But subject to certain limitations, it is permissible to introduce evidence of an accused’s prior criminal convictions to impeach his credibility if he testifies at trial. Minn. R. Evid. 609(a).

There are two categories of prior criminal convictions allowed for impeachment under rule 609(a). The first is felonies. The second is crimes of dishonesty and false statement, irrespective of the level of the crime. To be admissible under the first category, the crime need not involve dishonesty, false statement, or deceit. But to be admissible under that category the court must determine “that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.” Id. In making that determination, the court must consider (1) the impeachment value of the prior crime; (2) the conviction date and the accused’s subsequent history; (3) the similarity of the past crime and the charged crime; (4) the importance of the accused’s testimony; and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue. State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Minn.1978). The state does not contend that Flemino’s prior felony convictions of burglary and drug possession were crimes of dishonesty or false statement but rather argues that they were admissible under the felony category.

The rationale for admitting felonies that do not directly implicate honesty is that the jury should be allowed to consider a testifying witness as a “whole person.” State v. Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Minn.1993). More specifically, the rationale enables the jury to consider a witness’s “[l]ack of trustworthiness ... by his ... repeated contempt for laws which he is legally and morally bound to obey.” State v. Brouillette, 286 N.W.2d 702, 707 (Minn.1979) (quotation omitted). To say that this rationale has been criticized would be an understatement, for it has been repeatedly assailed ever since Jeremy Bentham’s famous proclamation of the absurdity of suggesting that a person is a liar because he killed another for calling him a liar. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 406 (Browning’s ed. 1827); see also To Take the Stand or Not to Take the Stand: The Dilemma of a Defendant with a Criminal Record, 4 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 215 (1968).

Flemino assails the rationale as well and, pointing to the first Jones factor, contends that his prior burglary and drug-possession convictions have little or no impeachment value. His premise is that those convictions do not implicate his credibility because they are not crimes relating to dishonesty. But the intent of rule 609(a) seems plain. There is one category for crimes of dishonesty or false statement, crimes of crimen falsi, and another that allows for a broader credibility assessment, perhaps aptly described in Bróuil-lette as general trustworthiness. Although credibility might be most directly and concretely assessed through considerations of past dishonesty that not only rose to the level of a crime but that also were established beyond a reasonable doubt, credibility in evidence law is broader than just those types of crimes. Bias, prior inconsistent statements, contradiction, and faulty perception or inaccurate recollection all implicate credibility, even though they might not involve dishonesty. See Minn. R. Evid. 616; 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 3.15 (1999). The broader credibility reflected in the felony category of impeachment prompts the question, noted in Brouillette, of whether a person who violates the law in a serious way can be trusted to tell the truth in the matter at issue.

Flemino also contends, as do many historical critics, that the jury might misuse impeachment evidence and rely on it as propensity evidence. That risk likely exists but it is diminished by the court’s careful exercise of discretion in applying the Jones factors; by cautionary instructions, which the law presumes the jury will follow; and by the court’s discretion to allow the accused to mitigate the impeachment evidence by explaining the circumstances of the prior conviction. See State v. Frisinger, 484 N.W.2d 27, 32 (Minn.1992) (holding that trial court erred in not permitting defendant to explain circumstances of prior conviction).

Viewing Flemino’s convictions of burglary and drug possession in light of the broader credibility concept reflected in the felony category of rule 609(a), the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling those convictions admissible. Furthermore, this court is without authority to alter a rule adopted by our supreme court. See Minn.Stat. § 480.059, subd. 1 (2004) (stating “supreme court shall have the power to regulate the pleadings, practice, procedure, and the forms thereof in criminal actions in all courts of this state, by rules promulgated by it from time to time”).

Flemino also addresses three other Jones factors. Although he concedes that the burglary and drug convictions are within the permissible ten-year time limit under rule 609(b), he argues that other Jones factors weigh against admissibility. He claims his prior burglary conviction was similar to the robbery charge for which he was tried because they both involved entering a residence and committing a crime therein. But burglary involves nonconsensual entries or the withdrawal of consent. The entry here was consensual and was followed by a crime not similar in name or fact to burglary.

As to the importance of Flemino’s testimony, the jury heard his version of the event through the playing of his tape-recorded statement to the police. See State v. Bettin, 295 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn.1980) (although defendant decided not to testify because the district court refused to prohibit use of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes, reviewing court refused to reverse because “defendant’s version of what happened did get before the jury” by way of defendant’s statement being admitted). Although he argues that he preferred to respond more directly to the allegations, he has not shown that this factor weighs against admissibility.

Finally, Flemino acknowledges that, when a “defendant’s credibility is crucial, the impeachment need is greater,” but he argues that the state had corroborating witnesses and thus Flemino’s credibility was not central. M.R.’s son and nephew were present in M.R.’s apartment when Flemino came in. These other people were asleep when Flemino struck M.R. and when he took the jewelry. None of the others could corroborate either event. Furthermore, none of the others could corroborate M.R.’s statement that the jewelry belonged to her, with the exception of a basketball necklace that belonged to her son. There were only two eyewitnesses to the crime of which Flemino was convicted, namely, Flemino and M.R. Flemino’s credibility was a central issue.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing into evidence for impeachment Flemino’s prior burglary and drug-possession convictions.

DECISION

The district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that prior convictions of burglary and drug possession could be used to impeach appellant if he testified.

Affirmed.


author: SHUMAKER, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. K.M.M., a/k/a K.M.H., a/k/a K.M.F., a/k/a K.M.M., Appellant.
    No. A05-1960.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Sept. 12, 2006.

      Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Cheri A. Townsend, Assistant County Attorney, Hastings, MN, for respondent.
    Lynn A. Torgerson, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.
    Considered and decided by ROSS, Presiding Judge; SHUMAKER, Judge; and WRIGHT, Judge.
   OPINION

SHUMAKER, Judge.

Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of her petition for expungement of records pertaining to criminal convictions and a dismissed homicide indictment, arguing that the district court had both statutory authority and the inherent power to expunge her records. We affirm the district court’s denial of the petition for ex-pungement of appellant’s criminal convictions on statutory grounds, but reverse and remand for appropriate findings as to expungement of the criminal convictions under the court’s inherent authority and for findings as to expungement of the indictment under statutory and inherent authority.

FACTS

In 2005, K.M.M. filed a petition with the district court under Minn.Stat. § 609A.03 (2004) to expunge all records pertaining to her 1982 forgery conviction, 1985 conviction of wrongfully obtaining public assistance, and 2000 dismissed indictment for first-degree and second-degree murder. She alleged in her petition that this “background information” caused her termination from her full-time job, prevented her from getting other jobs, and made it difficult to find suitable housing for her and her family.

The court denied the petition, ruling that it lacked authority to expunge records relating to the criminal convictions “because those proceedings were not resolved in [KM.M.’s] favor” and that K.M.M. had failed to satisfy the statutory requisites for expungement of records relating to the dismissed indictment.

Contending that the court erred in denying her petition, K.M.M. appealed.

ISSUE

A statute provides that a person may petition to seal records pertaining to criminal charges against that person if the proceedings were resolved in the person’s favor. The state dismissed a murder indictment against appellant and elected not to prosecute further. Ruling that it lacked authority to consider appellant’s petition because proceedings were not resolved in appellant’s favor, the district court denied the petition.

Did the district court err in its ruling?

ANALYSIS

Appellate courts review a district court order granting or denying the ex-pungement of criminal records for an abuse of discretion. State v. Davisson, 624 N.W.2d 292, 296 (Minn.App.2001), review denied (Minn. May 15, 2001). The district court has “both statutory and inherent powers to grant expungement relief.” Id. at 295 (citing State v. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d 256, 257-58 (Minn.2000)).

Statutory authority for expungement of criminal records is provided in Minn. Stat. §§ 609A.01-.03 (2004), which govern the grounds and procedures for ex-pungement of three categories of records: (1) comprehensive law-enforcement records, described in section 13.82, collected or created by agencies that perform a law-enforcement function; (2) records under section 152.18 relating to the deferred prosecution of first-time drug offenders; and (3) identification records, noted in section 299C.11, furnished to the bureau of criminal apprehension by sheriffs and police chiefs. Minn.Stat. § 609A.01 (2004).

Criminal records may be expunged in two ways. First, if the person who is the subject of the records has not been convicted of a felony or gross misdemeanor within ten years immediately preceding the determination of all criminal matters in that person’s favor, and either all charges were dismissed before probable cause was found or the prosecutor declined to file charges and the grand jury did not indict the person, that person may demand, without a formal petition, the return of all bureau-of-criminal-apprehension identification records. Minn.Stat. § 299C.ll(b) (2004).

The second way to obtain an expungement is through a formal petition based on the grounds provided in section 609A.02. Minn.Stat. § 609A.02 (2004). An expungement under this second method does not result in the actual return of the records but rather in “a court order sealing the records and prohibiting the disclosure of their existence or their opening except under court order or statutory authority.” Minn.Stat. § 609A.01. A person may petition for the sealing of records “if the records are not subject to section 299C.11, paragraph (b), and if all pending actions or proceedings were resolved in favor of the petitioner.” Minn.Stat. 609A.02, subd. 3.

Statutory Applicability

Criminal convictions

K.M.M.’s criminal convictions do not qualify for expungement under Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3. Even though they are not subject to section 299C.ll(b), they were not actions or proceedings resolved in K.M.M.’s favor, as required for ex-pungement under the statute.

Indictment

If K.M.M.’s indictment is not subject to section 2990.11(b), and if it can be said that the murder proceedings were resolved in her favor, she has established a ground for a 609A.03 petition.

“Whether all proceedings were resolved in petitioner’s favor is a question of law this court reviews de novo.” Davis-son, 624 N.W.2d at 295. A grand jury returned a two-count murder indictment against K.M.M. The state later dismissed the indictment and brought no further charges against K.M.M.

Whether a proceeding was resolved in the petitioner’s favor “turns on whether there has been an admission or a finding of guilt.” State v. C.P.H., 707 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Minn.App.2006). A dismissal is, in a plain sense, a determination in the defendant’s favor. If there was no valid admission or finding of guilt, the courts have held that such proceedings were resolved in favor of the petitioner. For example, in State v. C.A., the supreme court concluded that a case was resolved in favor of the petitioner because the state had dropped the charges after the petitioner’s conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered. 304 N.W.2d 353, 357 n. 3 (Minn.1981). Similarly, in State v. L.K., this court determined that because the petitioner did not plead guilty and the charge was not prosecuted, innocence was presumed and the district court’s dismissal of the charge amounted to “a determination in his favor.” 359 N.W.2d 305, 307-08 (Minn.App.1984).

It would be disingenuous and untenable to suggest that the murder proceedings were not resolved in K.M.M.’s favor. Thus, the section 299C.ll(b) requirement of resolution of proceedings in the petitioner’s favor is satisfied, as is the requirement of no felony or gross misdemeanor convictions within ten years immediately preceding the favorable resolution. But the remainder of the section is not satisfied.

The murder charges were dismissed only after the grand jury returned its indictment. “[A grand jury’s] indictment represents the grand jury’s decision that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it.” State v. Carriere, 290 N.W.2d 618, 620 n. 3 (Minn.1980); see also Minn. R.Crim. P. 18.06, subd. 2 (providing that if there is probable cause, grand jury may return indictment); State v. Eibensteiner, 690 N.W.2d 140, 150-51 (Minn.App.2004) (noting that the grand jury’s duty is to determine whether there is probable cause to indict), review denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2006). Thus, there was a determination of probable cause before the dismissal and there was an indictment. Both factors bar the application of section 2990.11(b). Minn.Stat. § 299C.ll(b)(l)(2).

Because K.M.M. has shown that the records pertaining to her indictment are not subject to section 2990.11(b), and because the murder proceedings were resolved in her favor, as required by section 609A.02, subd. 3, the district court is required to grant the petition to expunge through sealing the records “unless the agency or jurisdiction whose records would be affected establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the interests of the public and public safety outweigh the disadvantages to the petitioner of not sealing the record.” Minn.Stat. § 609A.03, subd. 5(b) (2004).

In its ruling on the indictment records, the district court relied only on section 299C.11 (2004). This was error because, as we have noted, that section is not applicable, and K.M.M. has demonstrated a proper ground for expungement under section 609A.02, subd. 3. Once a ground for expungement under that section is shown, the court must perform the balancing test of section 609A.03, subd. 5(b). See State v. L.W.J., 717 N.W.2d 451, 456 (Minn.App.2006) (holding that if petitioner establishes under section 609A.02, subd. 3, that all proceedings were resolved in her favor, she is entitled to the balancing-of-interests test in section 609A.03, subd. 5(b)).

Because the district court did not address section 609A.02, subds. 3, 5(b), this record is inadequate for meaningful review. See State v. Plant, 280 Minn. 397, 399, 159 N.W.2d 404, 405 (1968) (holding that claims without support in record are not reviewable). Furthermore, the court did not address KM.M.’s inherent-authority arguments as to either the criminal convictions or the indictment.

A district court also has inherent power to expunge as a matter of equity, which this court reviews for abuse of discretion. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d at 261. This inherent authority is exercisable (1) when petitioner’s constitutional rights may be seriously infringed by retention of the records; or (2) when constitutional rights are not involved, but the court determines that “expungement will yield a benefit to the petitioner commensurate with the disadvantages to the public from the elimination of the record and the burden on the court in issuing, enforcing, and monitoring an expungement order.” Id. at 258 (quotation omitted). To determine whether ex-pungement will yield a benefit commensurate with societal burdens, the following factors are considered: (1) the extent that the petitioner has demonstrated difficulties in securing employment or housing; (2) the seriousness and nature of the offense; (3) the potential risk that the petitioner poses and how this affects the public’s right to access the records; (4) any additional offenses or rehabilitative efforts; (5) other objective evidence of hardship under the circumstances. State v. H.A., 716 N.W.2d 360, 364 (Minn.App.2006).

K.M.M. argues that the state has not met its burden as to any of the records on the issue of inherent authority and has failed to overcome the statutory presumption as to the indictment records. Considering our standard of review, it is appropriate that the district court make appropriate findings as to both the propriety of the exercise of its inherent authority and as to the section 609A.03, subd. 5, balancing test. In making its findings, the court in its discretion may rely on the record already created or may allow additional evidence and argument as it deems appropriate.

DECISION

Thus, we affirm the district court’s determination that K.M.M. is not entitled to statutory expungement of records pertaining to her criminal convictions but reverse and remand as to the remaining statutory issues and as to the issue of inherent authority.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.


author: DIETZEN, Judge.

text:
    In re the Marriage of Kelly DANIELSON, petitioner, Appellant, v. Shane DANIELSON, Respondent.
    No. A05-2569.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Sept. 12, 2006.

      Cheryl M. Prince, Gabriel D. Johnson, Hanft Fride, P.A., Duluth, MN, for appellant.
    Timothy A. Costley, Harbors, MN, for respondent.
    Considered and decided by WILLIS, Presiding Judge; DIETZEN, Judge; and ROSS, Judge.
   OPINION

DIETZEN, Judge.

On appeal from the judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage, appellant Kelly Dan-ielson challenges the district court’s property division. Because the district court erroneously admitted and considered evidence beyond the language of an unambiguous deed to alter its terms, we reverse and remand.

FACTS

Appellant and respondent Shane Daniel-son began living together in 1993 on respondent’s family farm. In 1994, respondent and his brother, Mark Danielson, each inherited undivided one-half interests in the farmstead from their parents’ estates. In 1996, appellant and respondent decided to begin an ostrich-farming business on the farmstead but needed a loan to capitalize the venture.

The parties found a lender that would loan the money based on appellant’s good credit history. But to approve the loan, the lender required that appellant have an equity interest in the farmstead. Respondent and Mark Danielson, as grantors, then executed a quitclaim deed in the office of the attorney for the closing company that closed the loan for the lender. The quitclaim deed conveyed the farmstead to appellant and respondent as joint tenants. Mark Danielson was not a grantee on the deed. Thereafter, the parties closed on the financing loan.

Appellant and respondent married in 1998, but in 2004, appellant petitioned for dissolution. A bench trial was held in May 2005 to resolve issues arising from the dissolution. At trial, Mark Danielson testified that the parties asked him to sign a quitclaim deed so that they could obtain financing. He agreed to do so but believed that he would retain his ownership interest in the farmstead and that the conveyance was not intended as a gift to appellant. Respondent testified that the deed was executed for financing purposes and that he and his brother intended to remain owners of the property. Appellant objected to this “extraneous” testimony as prohibited by the statute of frauds. The district court overruled the objection but permitted posttrial briefing on the matter.

The district court entered its judgment in August 2005. It found that despite the quitclaim deed, Mark Danielson retained a one-half ownership interest in the farmstead, which the parties “hold and have held ... in. trust” for him- The court determined that respondent’s one-half interest in the farmstead was marital property valued at $200,000. It found that the equity in that portion was $120,000, which it divided equally between appellant and respondent. The court also awarded the farmstead to respondent. Appellant now challenges the admission of evidence of the parties’ intent regarding the quitclaim deed and, alternatively, challenges what she alleges is the district court’s imposition of a constructive trust on half of the farmstead in Mark Danielson’s favor, and the associated findings of fact and conclusions of law.

ISSUES

1. Did the district court erroneously admit and consider parol evidence to alter the terms of the deed?

2. Did the district court erroneously exercise personal jurisdiction over someone not a party to the dissolution and erroneously adjudicate the property interests of that nonparty?

ANALYSIS

I.

Appellant argues that the district court erred by admitting and considering parol evidence to vary the terms of the quitclaim deed. The parol-evidence rule is not a rule of evidence, but a substantive rule of contract interpretation. Anchor Cas. Co. v. Bird Island Produce, Inc., 249 Minn. 137, 145, 82 N.W.2d 48, 54 (1957); Karger v. Wangerin, 230 Minn. 110, 114-15, 40 N.W.2d 846, 849 (1950). It

prohibits the admission of extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements, or prior written agreements, to explain the meaning of a contract when the parties have reduced their agreement to an unambiguous integrated writing. Accordingly, when parties reduce their agreement to writing, parol evidence is ordinarily inadmissible to vary, contradict, or alter the written agreement.

Alpha Real Estate Co. of Rochester v. Delta Dental Plan of Minn., 664 N.W.2d 303, 312 (Minn.2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Despite being primarily a rule of contract interpretation, the rule’s prohibition on the use of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a document’s language applies to deeds. See La Cook Farm Land Co. v. N. Lumber Co., 159 Minn. 523, 527, 200 N.W. 801, 802 (1924) (stating that the rules for construing contracts apply to deeds); Mollico v. Mollico, 628 N.W.2d 637, 640-41 (Minn.App.2001) (applying the parol evidence rule to a deed). Thus, only if a deed is ambiguous can evidence other than its language be considered to determine its meaning. See City of St. Paul v. Dahlby (In re City of St. Paul), 266 Minn. 304, 314, 123 N.W.2d 586, 592 (1963) (stating “the terms of [an unambiguous] deed cannot be contradicted, altered, added to, or varied by parol evidence”); Mollico, 628 N.W.2d at 640-41 (stating if a deed is ambiguous, courts can consider parol evidence). A deed is ambiguous if, “judged by its language alone and without resort to extrinsic evidence, it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.” Id. at 641. And whether a deed is ambiguous is also a question of law subject to de novo review. Id.

Here, the quitclaim deed states that Mark Danielson and respondent “hereby convey(s) and quitclaim(s)” the farmstead to appellant and respondent, and notes that “total consideration for the transfer of this property is $500.00 or less.” (Emphasis added.) The quitclaim deed does not name Mark Danielson as a grantee, and its plain language does not indicate that the transfer was either limited or reserved; and on its face, it is a complete transfer of all interests of respondent and Mark Danielson as grantors to appellant and respondent as grantees. See Minn.Stat. § 507.06 (2004) (providing that a quitclaim deed is “sufficient to pass all the estate which the grantor could convey by a deed of bargain and sale”); Caughie v. Brown, 88 Minn. 469, 473, 93 N.W. 656, 657 (1903) (noting that a quitclaim deed “passes such rights and interests as the grantor possesses at the time [of the conveyance]”); Everest v. Ferris, 16 Minn. 26, 16 Gil. 14 (1870) (stating that “a quitclaim deed, in common form ..., passes only the estate which the grantor could lawfully convey”); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 424 (7th ed.1999) (describing a quitclaim deed as a “deed that conveys a grantor’s complete interest or claim in certain real property”). Because the language of the deed is unambiguous, the district court erred as a matter of law by admitting and considering evidence to determine the meaning of the deed.

II.

Appellant also argues that the district court’s “imposition” of what appellant characterizes as “a constructive trust” in favor of the nonparty Danielson “was improper.” A constructive trust is a “judicially created equitable remedy imposed to prevent unjust enrichment of a person holding property under a duty to convey it or use it for a specific purpose.” Wright v. Wright, 311 N.W.2d 484, 485 (Minn.1981). A constructive trust does not arise from an intent to create one but is imposed by a court as a remedy. Thompson v. Nesheim, 280 Minn. 407, 416, 159 N.W.2d 910, 917 (1968).

The district court found that the “parties hold and have held an undivided 1/2 interest in the property in trust for Mark Danielson” and that Danielson retained an equitable ownership interest in the farm. By ruling that Mark Danielson retained an interest in the property, the district court exercised jurisdiction over a nonparty to the dissolution (Mark Daniel-son) and functionally awarded to that non-party an interest in property that, on its face, was marital property. But in a dissolution proceeding, a district court lacks personal jurisdiction over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights. Sammons v. Sammons, 642 N.W.2d 450, 457 (Minn.App.2002); see also Fraser v. Fraser, 642 N.W.2d 34, 38 (Minn.App.2002) (noting that MinmStat. § 518.58, which provides for the division of marital property, “does not authorize the district court to adjudicate the interests of third parties”); cf. Melamed v. Melamed, 286 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Minn.1979) (holding that children may not be awarded a property interest in a dissolution action). Although Mark Danielson was a party to the quitclaim deed, he was not a party to this dissolution proceeding. Therefore, the dissolution was an improper forum for resolving disputes about the transfer of the farmstead or to otherwise adjudicate Mark Danielson’s interest in the farmstead. Because Mark Danielson’s interest, if any, in the farmstead could not be determined in a proceeding to which he was not a party, the marital interest in the farmstead was unknown, and the extent to which the farmstead is part of the parties’ marital estate will depend on the resolution of the ancillary farmstead-transfer dispute. And that dispute, if it is to be resolved by litigation, must be resolved in an action in which Mark Danielson is a party.

When the parties to a dissolution proceeding seek division of a marital asset in which a nonparty may have an interest and the existence or extent of that nonparty’s interest is disputed, the district court may initially exclude the asset from the dissolution judgment’s property division and, after resolution of any third-party disputes bearing on the various interests in the asset, later divide the marital portion of the asset as “omitted property.” See Neubauer v. Neubauer, 433 N.W.2d 456, 461 n. 1 (Minn.App.1988) (stating that pension benefits omitted from a property division in an otherwise final dissolution judgment could later be divided as “omitted property”), review denied (Minn. Mar. 17, 1989). Alternatively, the district court may award each party a percentage interest in whatever may later be determined to be the marital interest in the asset. Cf. Taylor v. Taylor, 329 N.W.2d 795, 798-99 (Minn.1983) (discussing methods of dividing pension interests, including the “fixed percentage” method of dividing pension interests, which awards each party a specific proportion of what ultimately turns out to be the marital portion of the pension being divided). A third alternative is for the district court to include the asset in the dissolution judgment’s property division, recognizing that if a nonparty is later determined to have an interest in the asset, the dissolution judgment may be reopened and adjusted under Minn.Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 (2004). But whatever method a district court selects for addressing the division of an asset in which a nonparty to the dissolution may have an interest, the district court is required to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain its decision.

DECISION

Because the quitclaim deed was unambiguous, the district court erred both by admitting and considering parol evidence to determine the meaning of the deed. The district court also erroneously exercised personal jurisdiction over a nonparty and erroneously adjudicated that nonparty’s property interest. We therefore reverse and remand for reconsideration of the marital interest in the farmstead in a manner consistent with this opinion. On remand, the district court may, in its discretion, reopen the record.

Reversed and remanded.

      . For purposes of this appeal, we assume that the question of parol evidence is properly before this court by virtue of appellant's assertion to the district court that it should not have admitted "extraneous” evidence regarding the quitclaim deed. Cf. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn.1988) (stating that appellate courts generally address only issues presented to and considered by the district court).