author: STREIT, Justice.

text:
    Doris N. PASSEHL ESTATE, David Passehl and Karen Zander, Co-Executors, Appellee, v. Jerry W. PASSEHL and Volnetta Passehl, Appellants.
    No. 04-0874.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    April 14, 2006.

      G.A. Cady III of Cady & Cady, Hampton, for appellants.
    John J. Haney of Hinshaw, Danielson, Kloberdanz & Haney, P.C., Marshalltown, for appellee.
   STREIT, Justice.

As the cynic Ambrose Bierce once said, “Death is not the end. There remains the litigation oyer the estate.” Jerry and Volnetta Passehl claim the district court erred by enforcing a penalty provision in their settlement agreement with the Doris N. Passehl Estate (hereinafter “the Estate”). They now seek further review of the court of appeals’ decision affirming the district court’s ruling. Because we find the terms of the penalty provision were not met, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and reverse and remand to the district court with instructions. ■

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

Jerry, Karen, and David are the children of Doris N. Passehl. Doris died in 1997. At the time of her death, Doris owned approximately 160 acres of farmland in Franklin County. Jerry Passehl and his wife, Volnetta (hereinafter “Pas-sehls”), have, for the past fifteen years, occupied a five-acre portion of this land and operated an auto salvage business thereon. The portion of land occupied by Passehls was covered with vehicles and, for the most part, surrounded by a fence. The fence was erected in 1990 after the Franklin County Zoning Board of Adjustment approved the use of the land as a dismantling and recycling center on the condition that a six-foot-high enclosure fence surround the premises. Two grain bins were also located within the fenced area. The other 155 tillable acres were, and still are, leased to a third party. The lease provides that the third party can use the two grain bins located on the land occupied by Passehls.

Karen and David serve as co-executors of the Estate. After Doris’s death, family disputes over Passehls’ operation of the salvage business resulted in two separate lawsuits. In one lawsuit, the Estate filed suit against Passehls for breach of contract, conversion, and nonpayment of rent. In another lawsuit, the Estate filed an ejectment action to remove Passehls from the land. In an effort to resolve their differences, the parties agreed to settle these lawsuits through a written settlement agreement. The settlement agreement, signed October 17, 2002, provides:

2. [Passehls] agree to return to Karen Zander and David Passehl the motorized Shriner’s car and the cornsheller.
4. [The Estate] agrees to sell to [Pas-sehls] and [Passehls] agree to buy from [the Estate] ... [a]n approximate five acre tract ... [t]he legal description [of such land] shall be established by survey which shall coincide with existing fence boundaries required by Franklin County Zoning Ordinances.
[Passehls] agree to deposit into the Brian D. Miller Trust Account[] Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) on or before October 18, 2002. The purchase price for the above described real estate shall be Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,-000.00). Closing shall be held on or before March 1, 2003. The parties agree that the $20,000.00 deposited into the Brian D. Miller Trust Account shall be applied toward the purchase price at time of closing.
In the event that [the Estate] provides marketable title to the subject real estate, but closing does not occur on or before March 1, 2003, as a result of nonperformance by [Passehls], then the parties agree that the $20,000.00 deposited into the Brian D. Miller Trust Account shall be forfeited to (the Estate].
The parties agree that Karen Zander and David Passehl shall have an easement for access to the grain bins located on the Passehl property but owned by Karen Zander and David Passehl for the purpose of loading and unloading grain. The parties acknowledge that Karen Zander and David Passehl shall be entitled to any and all income from said bins. The [Estate] shall have the right to make repairs to the bins as necessary.

(Emphasis added.) The district court approved the settlement agreement. Both lawsuits, along with an unrelated pending appeal by Passehls, were dismissed with prejudice. On the same day, the parties signed an Iowa State Bar Association real estate contract form for the land described in the settlement agreement. At the time the agreement and contract were drafted, neither party had a precise legal description of this land. In both the settlement agreement and the real estate contract, the land was described as the following:

The acreage locally known as 513 160th St., Latimer, Iowa and described as: An approximate five acre tract located in the Northwest Quarter (NW1/4) of section 26, Township 92 North, Range 22 West of the 5th P.M., Franklin County, Iowa. The legal description shall be determined by survey, which shall coincede [sic] with existing fence boundaries required by Franklin County Zoning.

The real estate contract also stated the purchase price for the real estate:

1.PRICE. The total purchase price for the Real Estate is ... ($50,000.00) of which ... ($20,000) has been paid. Buyers shall pay the balance to Sellers at Hampton, Iowa or as directed by Sellers, as follows: Said down payment of $20,000.00 shall be deposited in the Brian D. Miller Trust account before October, 18, 2002. Closing shall be on or before March 1, 2003. In the event the [Estate] provide[s] marketable title to the subject real estate, but as a result of nonperformance by [Passehls], the sale does not close then the parties agree that the $20,000.00 deposited in the Brian D. Miller Trust Account shall be forfeited to the [Estate].

The real estate contract set March 1, 2003, as the closing date.

A subsequent survey determined the fence did not “line-up” with the boundaries set forth by the zoning ordinance. The land zoned for the salvage business was approximately 22,457 square feet less than the land demarcated by the fence. The boundary line described in the zoning ordinance cut through an existing garage, horse barn, and driveway, while the fence boundary did not. After the survey, a disagreement developed between Passehls and the Estate as to whether the fence or the zoning ordinance boundary controlled the property to be conveyed.

On March 19, 2003, the Estate’s attorney sent Passehls a letter with the following requirements for the real estate closing:

1. The motorized Shriner’s car and corn sheller needs to be delivered by Jerry and Volnetta to Karen’s residence, prior to the real estate closing.
2. Karen reports that the east bin cannot be accessed because of junk and junk vehicles stored around it. The junk and junk vehicles need to be cleared from the bins.
3. The horse pasture fence needs to be removed. Karen and David would like to know if Jerry and Volnetta plan to remove the fence and if so, the date by which they can expect the fence to be removed.
4. The junk vehicles located outside the fence and on the tillable farm ground need to be removed. Karen and David would like to know if Jerry and Volnetta plan to move these junk vehicles and if so, the date by which they can expect them to be moved.
5. As we have already mentioned by letter, the junkyard fence is not properly located per the Franklin County Zoning Variance. Karen and David want to know if Jerry and Volnetta plan to move the fence to the legal description consistent with the County Zoning Variances and if so, when that work will be completed by.

On March 24, 2003, the parties met to close the sale. Passehls brought a check for $30,000, but the Shriner’s car and cornsheller had not yet been delivered to Karen and David. The attorney for the Estate brought a deed, but the deed only conveyed the lesser amount of land defined by the zoning ordinance. An argument erupted between the parties. Karen, as co-executor of the Estate, stated Passehls had not performed because the Shriner’s car and cornsheller had not been delivered, there were still vehicles surrounding one of the grain bins, and there were still vehicles outside of the fenced area. Jerry also objected because the property described in the deed did not match the property the parties had agreed upon. The discussions deteriorated, and the parties did not close the transaction.

On March 26, the Estate sent a letter to Passehls assigning April 1 as the new closing date. The letter declared “this will be the last time this real estate closing will be rescheduled ... Karen and David are not willing to extend this matter further.”

The letter also reiterated the “five specific items that Jerry and Volnetta needed to take care of prior to the closing.” The letter also stated the following:

if the real estate closing cannot take place on April 1st, at the scheduled time, as a result of their non-compliance with the settlement agreement, my letter dated March 19, 2003, and this letter, the $20,000.00 currently being held in my Trust Account [will be] forfeited by Jerry and Volnetta.

On April 1, Passehls’ attorney came to the closing with a check for $30,000. The Shriner’s car and cornsheller had already been delivered to Karen and David; however, vehicles still surrounded one of the grain bins, and some junk vehicles still remained outside of the fenced-in area. The Estate came to the closing with a deed that did not conform to the existing fence boundaries. As before, Karen contended the terms of the contract were not fulfilled, and Jerry disputed the correct legal description of the property. Once again, the closing did not occur.

Days later, the Estate’s attorney took the $20,000 out of his client trust account and paid it to Karen and David.

Passehls filed a motion to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. The Estate filed a cross motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The Estate’s requested relief included all of the following:

A. That the $20,000.00 placed in the Brian D. Miller Trust Account on or before October 18, 2002, is forfeited based upon [Passehls] failing to close the real estate transaction on or before March 1, 2003;
B. That the Court declare the survey conducted on December 6, 2002, establishing the fence boundary required by Franklin County Zoning Ordinance to be the legal description of the property subject to the Settlement Agreement and transaction with [Passehls];
C. That [Passehls] be forced to comply with the Settlement Agreement, consistent with the previous two Declaratory Judgment requests, by paying $50,000.00 to [the Estate] for the purchase of the real estate;
D. That pursuant to Rule 1.1501 of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure, an injunction issue prohibiting [Passehls] from placing anything within 20 yards of the bins, thereby preventing [Passehls] from interfering with [the Estate’s] access easement.
E. That [Passehls] be enjoined from placing property of any kind outside of the boundary required by Franklin County Zoning Ordinances;
F. That [Passehls] be required to indemnify and hold harmless the [Estate] from any civil or criminal proceeding relating to [Passehls] operation of a junkyard.

After a bench trial, the trial court concluded the parties’ intent was clear at the time the settlement agreement and real estate contract were signed — the fence was to remain, and the survey and conveyance would coincide with the fence. The court then concluded the $20,000 down payment was forfeited because Passehls “failed to perform by not only providing access to the grain bins but also by failing to remove junk cars from outside the fence boundary, an agreed upon contingency required prior to closing.” The court then ordered the Estate to execute a deed and convey the property within the fenced boundary once Passehls: paid an additional $50,000 to the Estate, moved all junk vehicles away from the grain bins, removed an unrelated horse fence, and removed the junk vehicles that were still outside the fenced-in area. The court also enjoined Passehls from placing anything within twenty yards of the grain bins and from placing anything else outside the existing fence boundary. Passehls appealed.

The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, and we granted Passehls’ application for further review.

II. Scope of Review

The parties dispute the scope of review. The Estate claims our review is for correction of errors at law because the case was filed at law. See Iowa R.App. P. 6.4. Passehls contend our review is de novo because the original motion to enforce judgment and the Estate’s corresponding motion were both tried in equity. See id.

The original basis of this action, the settlement agreement, pertained to two cases, both of which were filed at law, and both of which were filed by the Estate. The settlement agreement ultimately led to the dismissal of the two underlying cases. Rather than file the present agreement under a new case number, Passehls filed the present motion under the case numbers of the dismissed cases. The fact that these two underlying actions were brought by the Estate as actions at law does not control our review of the present case. Passehls’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement is separate from the causes of action in the eases underlying the settlement agreement. We therefore focus our attention on the nature of Pas-sehls’ motion and the Estate’s subsequent motion.

Passehls’ motion did not seek monetary damages; instead, Passehls asked the court to order the Estate to execute a court officer’s deed. Similarly, the Estate’s motion did not seek monetary damages; the Estate asked the court to force Passehls to comply with the settlement agreement, to declare the land conveyed in the settlement agreement to be that which coincided with the zoning ordinance, and to declare that Passehls’ $20,000 down payment was forfeited due to nonperformance. The Estate’s motion also asked the court to enjoin Passehls from placing anything within twenty yards of the grain bins, to enjoin Passehls from placing any property of any kind outside of the zoning boundary, and to indemnify and hold harmless the Estate from any civil or criminal proceeding relating to the operation of the junkyard.

Both parties have asked the court to force the other party to fulfill its obligations according to the precise terms in the settlement agreement. This is a form of specific performance. Specific performance is a form of equitable relief. See Levis v. Hammond, 251 Iowa 567, 576, 100 N.W.2d 638, 644 (1960). Similarly, the Estate’s request for an injunction is a request for equitable relief. Myers v. Caple, 258 N.W.2d 301, 304-05 (Iowa 1977).

It is less clear whether the Estate’s numerous requests for declaratory judgment were actions at law or in equity. Our review of actions for declaratory judgment depends upon how the action was tried to the district court. Owens v. Brownlie, 610 N.W.2d 860, 865 (Iowa 2000). To determine the proper standard of review, we consider the “pleadings, relief sought, and nature of the case [to] determine whether a declaratory judgment action is legal or equitable.” Nelson v. Agro Globe Eng’g, Inc., 578 N.W.2d 659, 661 (Iowa 1998). We also consider “whether the court ruled on evidentiary objections” as an important, although not dispositive, test of whether the case was tried in law or equity. See Sille v. Shaffer, 297 N.W.2d 379, 380-81 (Iowa 1980)

Both parties’ motions impliedly ask the court to use its equitable powers. Although the district court ruled on some evidentiary objections in the course of trial, the objections were minor and did not have a significant effect on the proceedings. The district court ultimately used its equitable powers to order specific performance and to issue an injunction. The nature of the pleadings and the court’s decision leads to the conclusion that this case was fully tried in equity.

Because this matter was tried by the district court wholly in equity, we review this appeal de novo. Iowa R.App. P. 6.4; Owens, 610 N.W.2d at 865.

III. Merits

Bad blood, demands outside the four corners of the settlement agreement and corresponding real estate contract, and real estate contract forfeiture law have unnecessarily clouded the facts of this case. The parties disagree on the size of the property; both parties claim the other failed to perform their obligations under the contract, and neither party can agree on the meaning of the penalty provision. Because this case can be resolved under basic contract principles, we will not obfuscate the matter with irrelevant Iowa Code provisions concerning real estate contract forfeitures.

A. Size of the Property

Both parties dispute the meaning of the terms describing the property to be conveyed.

The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides rules to aid our interpretation of contract terms. See Fausel v. JRJ Enters., Inc., 603 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Iowa 1999) (applying sections 202 and 212 to the interpretation of contract terms). Section 202 provides:

(1) Words and other conduct are interpreted in the light of all the circumstances, and if the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great weight.
(2) A writing is interpreted as a whole, and all writings that are part of the same transaction are interpreted together.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202 (1981). These rules “do not depend upon any determination that there is an ambiguity, but are used in determining what meanings are reasonably possible as well as in choosing among possible meanings.” Id. § 202 cmt. a. In addition, section 212 provides:

Any determination of meaning or ambiguity should only be made in the light of the relevant evidence of the situation and relations of the parties, the subject matter of the transaction, preliminary negotiations and statements made therein, usages of trade, and the course of dealing between the parties. But after the transaction has been shown in all its length and breadth, the words of an integrated agreement remain the most important evidence of intention.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212 cmt. b (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also id. § 209(1) (“An integrated agreement is a writing or writings constituting a final expression of one or more terms of an agreement.”). With these rules in mind, we turn to the language of the agreement and the circumstances surrounding the signing of the agreement.

The settlement agreement and the real estate contract both recite the following description of the property to be conveyed:

The acreage locally known as 513 160th St., Latimer, Iowa and described as: An approximate five acre tract located in the Northwest Quarter (NW1/4) of section 26, Township 92 North, Range 22 West of the 5th P.M., Franklin County, Iowa. The legal description shall be determined by survey, which shall coin-cede [sic] with existing fence boundaries required by Franklin County Zoning.

(Emphasis added.) At trial, Passehls argued the parties wrote the contract so that Passehls could keep the junkyard as defined by the boundary fence. The Estate argued the fence was immaterial because the land to be conveyed was the land described by the zoning ordinance.

The record belies the Estate’s argument. To conclude the intent of the parties was to convey only the property set forth in the zoning ordinance would require us to excise any reference to the fence in the property description as follows:

The legal description shall be established by survey which shall coincide with existing fence boundaries required by Franklin County Zoning Ordinances.

(Strikethrough added.) We value each word in a written contract, and we are not persuaded to eliminate the phrase “existing fence” when a more suitable explanation is apparent. See id. § 212 cmt. b (“the words of an integrated agreement remain the most important evidence of intention”).

A more sensible interpretation of the contract is that the phrase “required by Franklin County Zoning Ordinances” described the “fence” that was to be the subject of the survey. There were at least two fences in the area — a “horse pasture fence” and the boundary fence surrounding the junkyard. The boundary fence was erected in 1990 after the Franklin County Zoning Board of Adjustment approved the use of the site as a dismantling and recycling center on the condition that a six-foot-high enclosure fence surround the premises. The reference in the contract to the zoning ordinance was meant to describe the fence that controlled the size of the property; the zoning ordinance itself was not meant to control the size of the property.

The circumstances surrounding the signing of the contract also do not support the Estate’s proposed description. Such a description would result in a property line that divided an existing garage, horse barn, and driveway. Such a description would also require that the existing fence be moved. Karen and David, the co-executors of the Estate, both testified they did not contemplate the boundary fence or any building or driveway would have to be moved for the conveyance. Their testimony indicates their primary concerns were to keep the junkyard from growing onto the land rented to a third party and to shield themselves from any liability relating to possible environmental contamination.

We therefore agree with the finding of the trial court; the intent of the parties was clear at the time the agreements were signed — Passehls contracted to purchase the land contained within the fenced boundary.

Presenting a deed conveying property that is 22,457 square feet less than the property bargained for does not constitute substantial performance of the terms of the settlement agreement or the real estate contract. Therefore, the Estate effectively refused to perform its obligations under the contract.

B. Penalty Provision

The settlement agreement and contract contain a penalty provision which provides the following:

In the event that [the Estate] provides marketable title to the subject real estate, but closing does not occur on or before March 1, 2003, as a result of nonperformance by [Passehls], then the parties agree that the $20,000.00 deposited into the Brian D. Miller [the Estate’s attorney’s] Trust Account shall be forfeited to [the Estate],

A plain reading of this provision indicates the Estate must provide a marketable title to the subject real estate before the penalty provision can be enforced. Because the penalty provision sets forth a specific order of performance, the Estate’s obligation to provide title to the appropriate real estate is a precondition to the enforcement of the penalty provision. As mentioned above, the Estate never proffered a deed to the real estate described in the settlement agreement or the real estate contract. Therefore, the penalty provisions contained within the written settlement agreement and real estate contract were not triggered.

C. Breach

Despite the clear language of the penalty provision, the trial court still concluded the Estate was entitled to the $20,000 penalty because Passehls failed to perform “an agreed upon contingency pri- or to closing.” The trial court found Pas-sehls failed to perform this contingency by not providing access to the grain bins and not moving all junk vehicles into the fenced-in area. However, neither the settlement agreement nor the real estate contract expressly states this contingency. In order to find that this additional contingency existed, the trial court apparently accepted the Estate’s argument that there was a subsequent oral modification to the contract.

The Estate contends a new oral agreement was formed on March 24 after Pas-sehls “failed” to close. At that time Karen, the co-executor of the Estate, stated she would not enforce the $20,000 penalty so long as Passehls agreed to complete five specific items by April 1. These items included returning the Shriner’s car and eornsheller, removing the junk vehicles from around the grain bins, removing the horse pasture fence, removing the junk vehicles from outside of the fenced areas, and moving the fence to comply with the zoning requirements. Although Passehls contends there was no such agreement, the Estate claims the agreement was memorialized through a letter prepared by the Estate’s attorney and sent to Passehls on March 26.

A written contract may be modified by a subsequent oral contract that has the essential elements of a binding contract. Berg v. Kucharo Constr. Co., 237 Iowa 478, 489, 21 N.W.2d 561, 567 (1946). Consent to the modification may be either express or implied from acts and conduct. Davenport Osteopathic Hosp. Ass’n v. Hosp. Serv., Inc., 261 Iowa 247, 253, 154 N.W.2d 153, 157 (1967). However, proof of a claimed oral contract must come from more than “loose and random conversations.” Ehlinger v. Ehlinger, 253 Iowa 187, 192, 111 N.W.2d 656, 659 (1961) (citations omitted).

Our de novo review of the record leads us to the conclusion that Passehls did not agree to any oral modification. First, the letter that purportedly contains the terms of the contract does not reference any new oral agreement; instead, it threatens forfeiture if Passehls did not perform five tasks by April 1. Second, we find it unlikely Passehls abruptly abandoned the argument that the land conveyed was the land within the fence and then agreed to remove and erect a new fence to comply with the Estate’s deed. Third, in order to accept that the parties agreed to this new contract, we must find the parties agreed to change not only what was due at closing, but also agreed to alter the specific order of performance set forth in the forfeiture provision. Given the fact that Jerry, Karen, and David had been feuding about their mother’s estate for more than five years and the fact that this feud had sparked at least three separate lawsuits, we find it incredible that all would agree to a major modification of an existing settlement agreement and real estate contract without reducing the agreement to writing.

We therefore find there was no oral agreement modifying the existing contract.

D. Current Status of Contract

In a real estate transaction, the law contemplates that each party will only relinquish their tight grip on their money or deed once they have their other hand firmly planted on the other party’s money or deed; therefore, the law generally requires simultaneous performance. Braig v. Frye, 199 Iowa 184, 189, 199 N.W. 977, 979 (1924); see also 13 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 38:8, at 407 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter Williston on Contracts.] (stating, the obligation of each party in a real estate contract “is subject to the condition precedent that the other party either perform, or make an absolute or conditional tender of performance”). The penalty provision is the only language in either the settlement agreement or real estate contract which could possibly change the presumption of simultaneous performance. As discussed above, the penalty provision required the Estate to first tender a marketable title to the subject property before the penalty provision became applicable. At best, this means the Estate had to perform first by tendering marketable title to the subject property-

Even if we assume, arguendo, Passehls failed to tender proper performance on March 24 and April 1, we would still conclude neither party tendered proper performance on either date. If both parties fail to perform their mutual and simultaneous obligations under a contract, then neither is in default. Braig, 199 Iowa at 189, 199 N.W. at 979; Wright v. Swigart, 172 Iowa 743, 746, 154 N.W. 938, 939 (1915); Waters v. Pearson, 163 Iowa 391, 403, 144 N.W. 1026, 1031 (1914); see also 13 Williston on Contracts § 38:8, at 407 (“[b]efore either party can sue on a [real estate] contract, that party must first put the other party in default by tendering or offering to tender performance”). Without a default or breach by either party, the penalty provision becomes inapplicable and the contract continues as binding on both parties. See Braig, 199 Iowa at 189, 199 N.W. at 979.

IV. Disposition

Because the Estate never proffered a deed to the appropriate property, the trial court erred when it decided the Estate was entitled to the $20,000 “forfeiture.” We therefore reverse the decision of the district court.

At present, all of the obligations explicitly set forth in the settlement agreement and real estate contract have been performed by Passehls. The pending appeal was dropped; the Estate received the $20,000 down payment; the remaining $30,000 rests in Passehls’ attorney’s trust account; the Shriner’s car and cornsheller have been delivered; and Passehls acknowledged the easement for access to the grain bins.

Upon remand, the district court shall direct the Estate to tender performance by executing a court officer’s deed to the property described herein. The remaining $30,000 shall be simultaneously transferred to the Estate.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

      . Ambrose Bierce, The Collected Worlcs of Am-brose Bierce 865 (Neale Publ'g Co. 1911).

      . Brian D. Miller is the attorney for the Estate. The trust account is his client trust account.

      . Both parties later agreed to postpone the scheduled March 1 closing due to a family emergency with one of the attorneys.

      . The land zoned for heavy industry, rather than for agricultural use, is described as the following:
      a tract of land beginning at the Northwest corner of Section 26, Township 92 North, Range 22 West of the 5th P.M., thence 370.0 feet to the point of beginning; thence S 500 feet; thence East 500 feet; thence West 500 feet to the point of beginning.

      . The Shriner’s car and cornsheller were delivered later that day or the next day.

      .During trial, the judge ruled on objections. Normally, this is the “hallmark of a law trial,” but the fact that the trial judge did so does not automatically make this an at-law proceeding. See Sille, 297 N.W.2d at 381. Where, as here, no one claims the trial court improperly excluded evidence, the trial court's ruling on objections does not prevent a de novo review. Id.

      . Neither party argues there was a mutual mistake at the time of the formation of the contract.

      . The Iowa State Bar Association real estate contract form contains a boilerplate forfeiture provision; however, this provision is inapplicable because the arguments in this case do not center upon this provision and do not call for a forfeiture of the subject property.

      . One might argue the clause in the settlement agreement that stated Passehls would grant an easement for access to the grain bins "for the purposes of loading and unloading grain" required the vehicles be moved prior to closing, but the Estate provides no evidence or case law supporting such an argument. Instead, the Estate made numerous contentions that the language in the settlement agreement was "clear and concise” and there was no ambiguity in the contract and therefore "the allowance of extrinsic evidence to explain the contract [was] irrelevant, immaterial and improper."


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: HANSON, Justice. GILDEA, Justice

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Randy Leroy SCHMIDT, Respondent.
    No. A05-218.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    April 13, 2006.

      Mike Hatch, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Brian D. Roverud, Faribault County Atty., Blue Earth, for appellant.
    Mark D. Nyvold, St. Paul, for respondent.
   OPINION

HANSON, Justice.

Respondent Randy Leroy Schmidt was arrested for driving while intoxicated and was charged with an enhanced felony DWI and an enhanced felony chemical test refusal based on his three prior South Dakota impaired driving convictions and one prior Minnesota impaired driving conviction. The district court dismissed the enhanced charges because the South Dakota convictions were based on chemical test decisions that were made without the benefit of counsel. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the South Dakota convictions violated Schmidt’s right to counsel as defined by the Minnesota Constitution. State v. Schmidt, 701 N.W.2d 313, 319 (Minn.App.2005). We granted review on the question of “whether the limited right to counsel under the Minnesota Constitution prohibits the use of qualified prior impaired driving incidents from other states based on uncounseled chemical tests to enhance a DWI offense in Minnesota.” We reverse.

On March 1, 2004, a Blue Earth police officer investigated a report of a possibly intoxicated motorist and eventually arrested Schmidt for driving while intoxicated. The officer discovered that Schmidt had a revoked driver’s license status in both Minnesota and South Dakota, and had an open container of alcohol in his vehicle. The officer took Schmidt to the police station and read him the implied consent advisory. Schmidt refused to take a chemical test. Within the ten years preceding Schmidt’s arrest, he had three prior impaired driving convictions in South Dakota and one prior impaired driving conviction in Minnesota.

Schmidt was charged with, among other things, first-degree felony DWI, Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(1), 169A.24, subd. 1(1) (2004) (fourth DWI incident within 10 years of three prior qualified DWI incidents), and first-degree felony chemical test refusal, Minn.Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 2, 169A.24, subd. 1(1) (2004) (refusal to submit to a chemical test within 10 years of three prior qualified DWI incidents). It is not clear from the record whether Schmidt’s South Dakota convictions were the product of chemical test refusals or of his agreement to take chemical tests that indicated he was in excess of the legal alcohol concentration limit. Despite this gap in the record, the parties have agreed that the South Dakota convictions constitute qualified prior impaired driving convictions for purposes of enhancement.

After initially pleading guilty but then withdrawing his plea, Schmidt made a motion to dismiss the felony DWI and test refusal counts. He argued that the South Dakota convictions could not be used to enhance his Minnesota offenses because, in each case, he was not given the opportunity to consult with an attorney prior to deciding whether to take a chemical test. Schmidt relied on the court of appeals’ decision in State v. Bergh, 679 N.W.2d 734, 735 (Minn.App.2004), which held that a “Colorado driver’s license revocation resulting from an uncounseled blood-alcohol test violates the Minnesota Constitution and cannot be used to enhance Minnesota impaired driving charges.” Bergh was based on our decision in Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Minn.1991), which held that under the Minnesota Constitution, “an individual has the right, upon request, to a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal advice before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing.” The district court agreed that Bergh was controlling and granted Schmidt’s motion to dismiss. The court of appeals affirmed. Schmidt, 701 N.W.2d at 319.

The state concedes that Schmidt was not allowed to consult with an attorney before any of the test decisions that underlie his three South Dakota convictions. Schmidt concedes that the South Dakota convictions were valid under the South Dakota and United States Constitutions. Thus, the only issue before us is whether the public policy considerations underlying the limited right to counsel for test decisions under the Minnesota Constitution are sufficient to warrant rejection for enhancement purposes of out-of-state convictions that are otherwise valid under the United States Constitution and under the laws of the state rendering the conviction.

I.

In Minnesota, an impaired driving offense can be enhanced based on “qualified prior impaired driving incidents.” Minn.Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(1). An “incident” can include either a prior impaired driving conviction or an impaired driving-related loss of license. Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 22 (2004). In order for an out-of-state conviction or license revocation to be “qualified,” the statute or ordinance that the conviction was based on must be “in conformity with” one of the enumerated Minnesota impaired driving-related statutes. Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subds. 20(5) & 21(4) (2004). Schmidt concedes that the South Dakota statutes he was convicted under are in conformity with Minnesota’s impaired driving statutes. Thus, we begin with the recognition that Schmidt’s convictions qualify for enhancement under the express terms of the statute.

Schmidt seeks to have his South Dakota convictions disqualified by collaterally attacking them, arguing that they are defective because they violated Schmidt’s right to counsel as defined in the Minnesota Constitution. This procedure of collaterally attacking the underlying conviction is one that we have authorized on a narrow basis for uncounseled plea agreements. See State v. Warren, 419 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn.1988); State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 905 (Minn.1983). In Nord-strom, the defendant argued that the enhancement was impermissible because his prior Minnesota DWI conviction was based on a guilty plea that was entered without any record of a waiver of his right to counsel. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d at 903. We held that “[ajbsent that valid waiver on the record of defendant’s right to counsel, the [Minnesota] misdemeanor DWI conviction based on an uncounseled plea of guilty cannot be used as the basis of a gross misdemeanor charge.” Id. at 905. In Warren, the defendant argued that a prior Minnesota misdemeanor conviction could not be used to increase his criminal history score because, although he had waived the right to counsel and pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor offense, the district court had failed to inquire at the plea hearing about the factual basis for his plea. Warren, 419 N.W.2d at 797. We held that “when the state, in computing a defendant’s criminal history score, proposes to use a prior [Minnesota] misdemeanor conviction where the defendant had waived counsel, the defendant may collaterally challenge the conviction for lack of a factual basis determination.” Id. at 798.

Schmidt essentially argues that the collateral attack procedure permitted in Nordstrom and Warren should be available for a prior conviction that was obtained in violation of our decision in Friedman that the Minnesota Constitution provides a right to counsel for a DWI test decision. Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 835. But Nordstrom and Warren do not support collateral attack in this case for several reasons. First, each involved the effects of a prior Minnesota conviction. Second, each involved the more fundamental decision to plead guilty to a charge and, thus, waive the whole array of trial rights. In contrast, the Friedman right to counsel is described as a “limited right” applicable to the decision to participate in a chemical test during a police traffic investigation. Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 837. Thus, the precise issue is whether Nordstrom and Warren should be extended to include the limited right to counsel that exists in Minnesota for test decisions and to apply to convictions rendered in another state where no equivalent right to counsel exists.

We first address the question of whether a defendant in Minnesota may collaterally challenge the validity of a prior conviction rendered in another state when that prior conviction is offered to enhance the defendant’s Minnesota crime or sentence. The United States Supreme Court has decided this question for the federal courts and has only permitted a very narrow collateral challenge for those few (or perhaps singular) constitutional violations that rise to the level of a jurisdictional defect. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 496-97, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994). The Court in Custis stressed that the “failure to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant was a unique constitutional defect” that presents a jurisdictional issue that can always be raised by collateral challenge. Id. at 493-96, 114 S.Ct. 1732. The Court concluded that, outside of the right to appointed counsel as recognized in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), lesser violations of the federal Constitution (specifically, ineffective assistance of counsel, entry of a plea that was not knowing and intelligent, or agreement to a stipulated facts trial without being adequately advised of trial rights) did not rise to the level of a jurisdictional defect that could be raised by collateral challenge when the conviction was used to enhance the defendant’s sentence. Custis, 511 U.S. at 496, 114 S.Ct. 1732. For this reason, Schmidt does not claim that he has a right to collaterally challenge the South Dakota convictions for any violation of the United States Constitution.

Schmidt’s argument that the validity of the South Dakota convictions should be tested by the Minnesota Constitution raises conflict of laws questions that we have not previously addressed. Clearly, the legislature did not expressly authorize such a collateral challenge when it included convictions from other states as “qualified prior impaired driving incidents” that could be used to enhance a Minnesota DWI. See MinmStat. §§ 169A.03, subds. 20(5), 21(4), & 22,169A.24, subd. 1(1). The only legislative restriction was that the foreign conviction be for a crime that is in conformity with the Minnesota impaired driving statutes. See MinmStat. § 169A.03, subds. 20(5) and 21(4). Thus, in Pilger v. State, we concluded that a defendant could not collaterally challenge a North Dakota prior conviction that was offered to increase his criminal history score on grounds that the conviction was based on a guilty plea that violated North Dakota’s rules. 337 N.W.2d 695, 698 (Minn.1983). We said:

There may be cases in which the sentencing court, in determining the defendant’s criminal history score, should look at the procedure that led to the prior conviction. Generally, however, the trial court should only have to determine if the defendant was convicted and if the conviction was for an offense that corresponds to an offense in Minnesota.

Id.

The only other context in which we have addressed analogous conflict of laws issues is in determining the admissibility in a Minnesota prosecution of evidence that was obtained in another state. Thus, in State v. Lucas, we held that tape recordings of phone conversations made in Wisconsin were admissible in Minnesota because, although they would have been inadmissible under a Wisconsin rule, they were not illegally obtained under either Minnesota or Wisconsin law. 372 N.W.2d 731, 736-37 (Minn.1985). We considered the several conflict of laws approaches that are used by other states in deciding such evidentiary issues: (1) the “mechanical” approach, that determines admissibility by the law of the forum state; (2) the “significant relationship” or “group of contacts” approach that looks to which state has the greater interest in the process by which the evidence was obtained; (3) the “governmental interest” approach that weighs the interests of the forum state against those of the state in which the evidence was obtained; and (4) the “exclusionary rule” approach that incorporates the policies underlying each state’s exclusionary rules of evidence. Id.; 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.5(c), at 175-86 (4th ed.2004). We opted for the exclusionary rule approach and held that suppression in Minnesota was not necessary to deter police misconduct or to assure judicial integrity in Minnesota. Lucas, 372 N.W.2d at 737.

Recently, in State v. Heaney, we again examined the various conflict of laws approaches in deciding whether Minnesota medical privilege objections could be made to the admissibility of blood-alcohol evidence that was lawfully obtained in Wisconsin and would have been admissible under Wisconsin law. 689 N.W.2d 168, 171, 173-74 (Minn.2004). We concluded that, because the evidence was lawfully obtained and the law of the search state did not make it inadmissible, the exclusionary rule approach was not appropriate. Id. at 172. Instead, we considered a “traditional conflict of laws analysis” and then rejected both the mechanical law of the forum and the better rule of law approaches in favor of the most significant relationship approach. Id. at 174-77. We held that Wisconsin had the most significant relationship to the blood test and that there was no strong public policy reason in Minnesota for excluding the evidence. Id. at 177.

Of course, Lucas and Heaney are not directly applicable because they dealt with the admissibility of evidence obtained in another state, whereas the present case deals with the effect of a judgment rendered in another state. But the guidance that we take from those cases is that we need to consider various conflict of laws approaches and select the one that is most relevant to the issue presented.

We now turn to the question of whether the validity of the South Dakota convictions should be determined under South Dakota or Minnesota law. For some of the same reasons mentioned in Heaney, we conclude that the significant relationship approach is most relevant to this question because it best enables the weighing of the policy interests of both states.

The Oregon Court of Appeals addressed a similar issue in a related context. In State v. Graves the district court used the defendant’s prior military conviction to compute his criminal history score. 150 Or.App. 437, 947 P.2d 209, 210 (1997). The defendant argued that the military conviction could not be used for this purpose because he was not afforded the right to a trial by jury, which would have been required by the Oregon Constitution. Id. at 210. The court held that the validity of the conviction should be tested by the laws of the jurisdiction rendering it and thus, the military convictions could be used to compute the defendant’s criminal history score. Id. at 211-12. In rejecting the defendant’s argument that “the constitutional validity of an out-of-state conviction is to be measured by Oregon constitutional standards,” the court reasoned:

Article I, section 11, [of the Oregon Constitution] provides that “in all criminal prosecutions,” the accused has “the right to public trial by an impartial jury.” The provision governs prosecutions in Oregon. It does not speak to the validity of convictions based on prosecutions conducted in other jurisdictions. * * * [T]he prosecution in Oregon is the constitutionally significant fact that renders Oregon’s constitutional protections applicable. * ⅜ * Those protections do not bear on the validity of defendant’s out-of-state convictions; rather, the validity of an out-of-state convictions [sic] should be tested under the constitutional requirements of that jurisdiction or of the federal constitution.

947 P.2d at 211 (citations and quotations omitted).

We find this reasoning persuasive on the question of which state has the greatest interest in the police conduct of the traffic stop, arrest, and ultimate test decision. Like the right to a jury trial in Oregon, the right to counsel for a test decision under the Minnesota Constitution is only triggered by a prosecution in Minnesota. Article I, Section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution provides, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to have the assistance of counsel in his defense.” Because Schmidt’s convictions were based on prosecutions that occurred in South Dakota, the protections of the Minnesota Constitution do not directly apply.

The fact that South Dakota has the greater interest in these convictions, and the test decisions that underlie them, is reinforced by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, art. IV, § 1. As interpreted, that clause generally requires that a valid judgment rendered in one state be “given the same conclusive effect that it has in the state of rendition with respect to the persons, the subject matter of the action and the issues involved.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 93 cmt. b (1971); see 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000) (“[¿[judicial proceedings of any court of any * * * State * * * shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States * * * as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State ⅜ ⅜ * from which they are taken.”); Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 270, 100 S.Ct. 2647, 65 L.Ed.2d 757 (1980) (“It has long been the law that ‘the judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity, and effect, in every other court in the United States, which it had in the state where it was pronounced.’ ”) (quotations omitted). Thus, the traditional conflict of laws analysis leads us to the preliminary conclusion that the validity of Schmidt’s South Dakota convictions should be tested by the laws of South Dakota.

II.

The rule that convictions of another state should generally be recognized in the forum state is subject to an exception where strong public policy interests of the forum state provide sufficient reason to override the general rule of recognition. The Restatement describes this public policy exception:

A judgment rendered in one State of the United States need not be recognized or enforced in a sister State if such recognition * * * would involve an improper interference with important interests of the sister State.

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 103 (1971). The Restatement acknowledges that this is a very narrow exception. Id. cmt. a; see, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Rule, 155 Minn. 302, 305, 193 N.W. 161, 162 (1923) (refusing to give effect to an Iowa judgment enjoining an injured railroad employee from suing his employer in Minnesota, reasoning “the courts of the several states are without authority or jurisdiction to curtail or prohibit in any form the exercise of rights and privileges conferred by” Article TV, Section 2 of the United States Constitution); Thompson v. Thompson, 645 S.W.2d 79, 88 (Mo.Ct.App.1982) (holding that the “interests of Missouri in the maintenance and support of minor children domiciled in Missouri” outweigh the “interests of Kansas under the policy reasons for full faith and credit”); Delehant v. Bd. on Police Standards & Training, 115 Or.App. 598, 839 P.2d 737, 739-40 (1992) (holding that Oregon’s interest in denying certification as police officers to those with criminal convictions outweighed the full faith and credit command of recognizing another state’s expungement order), aff'd, 317 Or. 273, 855 P.2d 1088 (1993).

Schmidt relies on State v. Friedrich, a court of appeals decision holding that a Minnesota offense could not be enhanced by a Wisconsin conviction that was based on an uncounseled plea. 436 N.W.2d 475, 478 (Minn.App.1989). The Wisconsin conviction was valid in Wisconsin because a first impaired driving offense leads only to the civil forfeiture of money, and there is no right to counsel in the proceedings. See Friedrich, 436 N.W.2d at 477; State v. Novak, 107 Wis.2d 31, 318 N.W.2d 364, 366 (1982). Thus, the Wisconsin conviction could have been used as a basis to enhance a subsequent Wisconsin DWI. Novak, 318 N.W.2d at 370. But, the Friedrich court observed that Minnesota law does afford the right to counsel at a plea hearing on a misdemeanor charge which may lead to incarceration, citing State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967). Friedrich, 436 N.W.2d at 477. The court of appeals interpreted Nordstrom to “not permit incarceration for an uncounseled guilty plea to a DWI whether taken in Minnesota or Wisconsin.” Friedrich, 436 N.W.2d at 478.

We find it unnecessary to determine whether the public policy exception would apply to a foreign conviction that is based on an uncounseled plea and that would violate Borst if it had been taken in Minnesota. We need only consider the right to counsel at issue here, the right to counsel for a test decision, which is more limited in nature than the right to counsel at a plea hearing or at trial. In Friedman we recognized that “the evanescent nature of the evidence in DWI cases requires that the accused be given a limited amount of time in which to contact counsel.” 473 N.W.2d at 835. The right is deemed forfeited if counsel is not contacted within a reasonable period of time, even if by no fault of the accused. State v. White, 504 N.W.2d 211, 213 (Minn.1993) (“[T]he right to an attorney is a limited right, with no guarantee of actual consultation.”); Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 835. There is no analogous durational limitation or forfeiture consequence associated with the right to counsel at a plea hearing or at trial.

Also, the right to counsel at a plea hearing or at trial has been interpreted to impose certain obligations on the government to ensure meaningful vindication. See, e.g., Borst, 278 Minn. at 397, 154 N.W.2d at 894 (providing appointed counsel for indigents). We have declined to impose similar obligations on the government to ensure the right to counsel for test decisions. Thus, in State v. White we held that police are not obligated to provide pretest counsel to indigents at the state’s expense. 504 N.W.2d at 214. And in Commissioner of Public Safety v. Campbell we held the Friedman right does not include the right to a private consultation with counsel. 494 N.W.2d 268, 269-70 (Minn.1992). Both of these obligations would be fundamental to ensure the meaningful vindication of the right to counsel at a plea hearing or at trial.

In each of these cases defining the limited right to counsel, we recognized a need to balance the competing interests of the accused in obtaining the advice of counsel before making a chemical test decision and those of the government in efficiently and accurately obtaining chemical test results. White, 504 N.W.2d at 214 (recognizing that administrative burdens and the associated delay would render appointment of pretest counsel to indigents unworkable); Campbell, 494 N.W.2d at 270 (recognizing that the need for police to ensure that an arres-tee does not ingest something that may affect the accuracy of the chemical test outweighs the arrestee’s interest in uninhibited legal consultation); Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 835 (“[T]he evanescent nature of the evidence in DWI cases requires that the accused be given a limited amount of time in which to contact counsel.”). Such a balancing of interests would not be appropriate with respect to a defendant’s right to counsel at a plea hearing or at trial.

We have recognized the fundamental importance of the right to counsel at trial because when a “defendant has counsel, it may be assumed that other important trial rights * * * are being protected, at least for the purposes of a collateral attack.” Warren, 419 N.W.2d at 798. But the absence of counsel when making a decision about taking a chemical test does not carry with it the same risk of jeopardizing all other constitutional rights, especially where, as here, Schmidt was subsequently represented by counsel at trial.

The primary reason why a conviction based on an uncounseled plea can be collaterally attacked and disregarded for enhancement purposes is because it is “inherently prejudicial” and unreliable. Burgett v. Texas, 889 U.S. 109, 115, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967). The denial of the right to counsel before making a decision about taking a chemical test does not automatically render the subsequent conviction unreliable and prejudicial. Cf. McDonnell v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 848, 853 (Minn.1991) (refusing to give Friedman retroactive application). A Friedman violation has evidentiary impact, rendering the test results or evidence of a test refusal inadmissible. While this would preclude certain prosecutions, for example driving with an alcohol concentration of .08 or more, Minn.Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (2004), prosecution could still proceed for the general offense of driving while under the influence, based on other evidence of impairment, see Minn.Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1).

For all of these reasons we conclude that Minnesota’s interest in preserving the Friedman right is not sufficient to prohibit the use of the South Dakota convictions to enhance Schmidt’s DWI offenses in Minnesota even though the South Dakota convictions were based on uncoun-seled test decisions. Accordingly, unless Schmidt has some other basis to challenge the validity or applicability of the South Dakota convictions, those convictions can be used to enhance the DWI and DWI test refusal charges to felonies.

Reversed.

GILDEA, Justice

(concurring).'

I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the South Dakota convictions can be used to enhance the charges to felonies. I write separately to express my view that we do not need to invoke conflict of law principles to resolve this case. In State v. Warren, we recognized that collateral attacks of criminal convictions undermine finality of judgments and therefore are allowed only in “unique cases.” 419 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn.1988); see also Pilger v. State, 337 N.W.2d 695, 698 (Minn.1983) (“Generally, however, the trial court should only have to determine if the defendant was convicted and if the conviction was for an offense that corresponds to an offense in Minnesota.”). The facts presented here do not constitute the “unique case” where our jurisprudence permits collateral attack.

      . It is also unclear whether Schmidt was afforded the right to counsel in each case at the plea or trial stage. Nevertheless, we presume that his trial right to counsel was vindicated because of his failure to present evidence to the contrary. See State v. Fussy, 467 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Minn.1991).

      . The treatment of out-of-state convictions for the purpose of computing criminal history under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines is analogous to the legislature's treatment of out-of-state DWI convictions for DWI enhancement under chapter 169A. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.B.5 ("The designation of out-of-state convictions as felonies, gross misdemeanors, or misdemeanors shall be governed by the offense definitions and sentences provided in Minnesota law.”); see also Hill v. State, 483 N.W.2d 57, 61 (Minn.1992).

      . It is true that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require one state to enforce the penal judgments of another state. Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229, 90 S.Ct. 1963, 26 L.Ed.2d 578 (1970); Midland Co. v. Broat, 50 Minn. 562, 567, 52 N.W. 972, 973 (1892). But, the clause also addresses recognition of a foreign judgment even where enforcement is not sought or available. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 93-98 (1971).

      . Although it may be undesirable to distinguish between the importance of constitutional rights, we note that there is a substantial basis to do so where, as here, the issue is raised by a collateral challenge. In emphasizing the importance of the finality of judgments, we have distinguished between constitutional rights and have allowed collateral attacks only in “unique cases." See, e.g., Warren, 419 N.W.2d at 797-98 (noting that collateral attack is available for a prior conviction where counsel was waived but no factual basis for the plea was placed on the record); State v. Simon, 339 N.W.2d 907, 907-08 (Minn.1983) (rejecting a collateral challenge to North Dakota convictions where the defendant's attorney had entered the defendant’s plea for him, allegedly without securing a waiver of the defendant’s right to be present); Pilger, 337 N.W.2d at 698 (not allowing a collateral challenge to a conviction where the trial court failed to secure a waiver of constitutional trial rights but the defendant was represented by counsel); accord Custis, 511 U.S. at 496-97, 114 S.Ct 1732 (limiting the authority to collaterally attack prior convictions to situations in which there was a complete denial of counsel, distinguishing this defect from other constitutional infirmities such as ineffective assistance of counsel and the failure to assure that a guilty plea was voluntary).


author: ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice.

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Thanh Quan TRAN, Appellant.
    No. A05-26.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    April 20, 2006.

      Office of the State Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Ass’t State Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.
    Mike Hatch, Minnesota Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, James Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Scott A. Hersey, Assistant Dakota County Attorney, Hastings, MN, for Respondent.
   OPINION

ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice.

A Dakota County jury found appellant Thanh Tran guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree intentional murder for the shooting death of Dao Xiong. The district court convicted Tran of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced him to life in prison. On appeal, Tran alleges that the court erred when it admitted evidence of the existence of a large insurance policy on the victim’s life and of the financial difficulties and gambling habits of the victim’s wife. Tran asserts that the court erred in admitting this evidence because there was no evidence that he knew the life insurance policy existed or had a reasonable expectation of benefiting from it. Additionally, Tran claims the court erred when it prevented defense counsel from eliciting testimony that a possible alternative suspect was a gang member. We affirm.

On December 18, 2003, at approximately 5:30 p.m., Dao Xiong was entering his Inver Grove Heights home when he was shot three times. The first shot went through Dao Xiong’s hand; the second shot was to his head. Following the second shot, the perpetrator placed a pillow over Dao Xiong’s head as he lay on the floor, and fired a third shot to the back of the head through the pillow. Dao Xiong died immediately after the second shot to the head.

Dao Xiong’s wife, Laura Xiong, arrived home at approximately 6:30 p.m. with the couple’s three children, who were approximately 2, 8, and 10 years old, and three of Laura Xiong’s nieces, T.L., M.L., age 16, and C.L., age 18. Laura Xiong and the children discovered Dao Xiong’s body about ten feet inside the door from the attached garage. M.L. checked to see if Dao Xiong had a pulse and found none. Laura Xiong told M.L. and C.L. to go upstairs to see if anything was taken from the home. M.L. and C.L. obeyed, but could see little because it was dark; nevertheless, M.L. was able to observe that the bookshelves appeared to be “shoved down.” When the two nieces returned to the scene of the homicide, Laura Xiong called 911 at M.L.’s request.

When the police arrived, they noted that, while M.L. and C.L. were quite upset, Laura Xiong appeared to be “very controlled” and generally emotionless. On walking through the home, the police saw that some things appeared to be stolen; there were, for example, conspicuous spaces where items appeared to have been removed, and a gun safe was open and empty. But the police also noted that there was little evidence that the intruder(s) had rummaged around the home, and the police observed that several things that normally would have been taken during a burglary were not. In addition to the attached garage door, the Xiongs’ home had an exterior basement entrance, which had both a regular wooden door and a storm door. The police noted that the window on the exterior basement entry wooden door was broken, and that broken glass lay on the floor on the inside of the house. The police also found blood on the storm door, and they took a sample of the blood for DNA testing.

Upon inquiry, Laura Xiong indicated that several things were missing from the home, including two PlayStations, a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a Samsung VCR/DVD player, a JVC video camera, a Kodak digital camera, two Game Boys, some jewelry, a quantity of cash, and a number of firearms. The firearms included a Taurus PT-111 9mm, a Ruger 10/22, a Browning, a youth Lever .22, and a Benelli shotgun. A gun scope was also reported stolen. Laura Xiong provided serial numbers for the video camera, the DVD/VCR, the stolen firearms, and one of the PlayStations. Laura and Dao Xiong’s children helped in compiling an additional list of stolen PlayStation games and DVDs, some of which had been rented from a video store.

During the course of their investigation, the police learned several facts which caused them to suspect that the thefts were staged and the murder was planned. Upon subpoenaing Laura and Dao Xiong’s cell phone records, the police noticed that a certain number appeared frequently, sometimes as often as 10 and 25 times per day, on Laura Xiong’s cell phone records. This number was assigned to a cell phone owned by Tran. The police contacted Tran and brought him to the police station for questioning on January 14, 2004. During this interview, Tran indicated that he and Laura Xiong were platonic friends who knew each other through a gambling establishment at Canterbury Park. At this police interview, Tran gave the police a DNA sample. Upon conducting a DNA analysis, the police concluded that the blood found on the storm door of Dao and Laura Xiong’s home was Tran’s. On January 22, 2004, a week after being questioned by the police, Tran had his Ford Explorer detailed. Soon after being questioned by the police, Tran began driving the car that Dao Xiong drove before his death.

Laura Xiong also initially claimed that she and Tran were only friends. But in addition to the numerous telephone calls between Laura Xiong and Tran, the police discovered that Laura Xiong and Tran had spent several nights together at hotels. Also, some of Laura Xiong’s and Tran’s Mends and acquaintances informed the police that the two were in a romantic relationship. Laura Xiong eventually admitted that she and Tran were involved in an ongoing sexual relationship and that Tran had told her several times that he loved her.

Telephone records and witness testimony revealed that around December 1, 2008, Tran had given Laura Xiong a cell phone, which police believed was used to carry on their affair and possibly to arrange Dao’s murder. Laura Xiong denied having received such a phone from Tran. However, the large volume of calls between the cell phone registered to Laura Xiong and Tran’s cell phone ceased abruptly after December 1, 2003. Instead, a similarly large volume of calls began between Tran’s first cell phone and a second cell phone which was registered to Tran. Cell phone records also indicated that someone using this second cell phone frequently called from the area of Laura Xiong’s workplace, and that calls from that phone and location were made to Laura Xiong’s relatives and friends in addition to Tran, indicating that Laura Xiong was using this second cell phone. After the murder, Tran gave the second cell phone to an acquaintance. Police determined by the nature of the incoming and outgoing calls that Tran’s first cell phone was in his possession at the time of the murder.

The police also discovered that Laura Xiong had financial difficulties. Laura and Dao Xiong had declared bankruptcy in 1998. At the time of the murder, Dao earned over $100,000 per year as a trucker and Laura Xiong earned an additional $40,000 per year as an office manager for a local painting company, but, despite their substantial combined income, they owed over $72,000 in federal taxes, another $60,000 in credit card debt, and had assorted smaller debts of under $10,000 each. The mortgage payment on the couple’s home was $2,700 per month, and they had the expense of raising three children. Laura and Dao Xiong were each covered for $850,000 in life insurance. and paid approximately $500 per month for life insurance premiums. In addition, the police learned that Laura Xiong was a habitual gambler who lost approximately $5,000 per month at gambling establishments — particularly Canterbury Park.

The police also discovered that Tran had severe financial difficulties. At the time of the murder, Tran was unemployed, the title to the car he was driving was in his ex-girlfriend’s name, he was living with friends — generally for free — and he had persuaded two ex-girlfriends to give him a total of $19,000. Tran also owed $13,500 to his ex-wife, and he gambled heavily.

Upon further investigation, the police discovered that Tran had had possession of nearly all of the items taken from the Xiong home and had distributed those items to various friends. First, the police searched the apartment of a friend of Tran’s where Tran had been living. The friend told the police that sometime between the 15th and 20th of December 2003, she noticed that Tran had moved a “pile of stuff’ into the apartment and had placed a blanket over it. Tran told the friend that he had bought the objects from “some Hmong people.” One day when Tran was absent, the friend looked under the blanket, opened a zippered bag underneath it, and saw three guns inside the bag, one of which was a “long gun” with a gun scope on it. She then told Tran to remove the guns from the apartment. Later, Tran told the friend that he had thrown the guns into the river.

Tran’s friend also saw him moving a desktop computer into the apartment. The friend also noted that Tran had moved a PlayStation and possibly a laptop computer into the apartment. Tran subsequently gave the desktop computer to another friend. Upon examination of this desktop computer, the police discovered that it was the one that Laura Xiong had reported stolen.

Following up on several leads, the police recovered the Xiongs’ camcorder, laptop, VCR/DVD player, digital camera, one of the missing PlayStations, and a number of the missing DYDs from another of Tran’s acquaintances, who told the police that Tran had given him the items. He said Tran had told him the items were “old” and that Tran wanted to “get rid of’ them. The serial numbers on all the items recovered matched those provided by Laura Xiong, pictures of the Xiong children and family outings were found on the cameras, and the police found the remote control for the VCR/DVD player at the friend’s apartment where Tran had been staying. An assistant manager from a movie rental store confirmed that several of the DVDs were those that had been rented by the Xiongs and that Laura Xiong had reported stolen. Additionally, Tran’s ex-wife reported that Tran had given his children a PlayStation; while this PlayStation did not have a serial number, it was of the type that Laura Xiong had reported stolen. The record does not indicate that any of the items were insured or that any insurance was claimed for any of the items.

Using the cell phone records and admissions made by Laura Xiong at a subsequent interview, the police ascertained that Tran was present at the Xiong home on the day of Dao Xiong’s murder and was in the neighborhood all that afternoon. At trial, Laura Xiong admitted that she and Tran had met at the Xiong home to have sex on the afternoon of December 18, 2003. Laura Xiong testified that she left the home at approximately 1:10 p.m. and arrived back at work at about 1:45 p.m. While Laura Xiong claimed that Tran left the home before she did, cell phone records indicate that Tran made and received several calls via his first cell phone between 3:00 and 5:00 p.m., accessing the cell phone tower closest to the Xiongs’ home. At about 5:15-5:20 that evening, Laura Xiong called her husband. She testified that he told her he was on his way home to switch his semi-truck for his car and then would go immediately to pick up their son and take him to karate class. Immediately after that call ended, at 5:25 p.m., cell phone records indicate that someone using the second cell phone, which evidence showed was in Laura Xiong’s possession, placed a call to Tran which lasted only one minute.

Based on the collected evidence, the police arrested Tran and charged him with second-degree murder. Tran subsequently was indicted for first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree murder committed during a burglary. The state argued at trial that Tran had moved the “stolen” objects into his Ford Explorer during the afternoon of the murder, shot Dao Xiong when he returned home, and only after the murder did Tran break the window on the exterior basement entry wooden door to make it appear that the murderer had broken into the home. The state asserted that because no glass was found in Dao Xiong’s shoes, it was likely that the window had been broken after he was murdered. The police speculated that if Dao Xiong had walked over the broken glass when entering the home, his shoes probably would have contained broken glass residue. The state further argued that Tran probably cut himself while breaking the window, and that this cut was the likely reason his blood was on the door.

The state’s primary theory of the murder was that it was a planned conspiracy between Tran and Laura Xiong. The state’s secondary theory was that Tran had broken into the Xiongs’ home without Laura’s permission and murdered Dao when he returned home. Under this secondary theory, the state suggested that Tran was obsessed with Laura Xiong and that this obsession could have led him to commit murder without her complicity.

At trial, Tran attempted to show that the police “rushed to judge” when they failed to follow up on other important leads. Specifically, Tran elicited testimony regarding a “deer party” that Dao Xiong had given in November 2003. A nephew of Dao Xiong’s, C.S.X., had shown up at the deer party uninvited with two friends, which uninvited appearance Laura Xiong told the police had angered Dao Xiong. When interrogated by the police, C.S.X. refused to provide DNA to aid the investigation, but the police obtained DNA samples from his parents instead and were able to use their DNA to determine that none of the blood at the homicide scene belonged to C.S.X. Tran additionally attempted to elicit testimony on cross-examination of police officers to the effect that C.S.X. was regarded by the police as a gang member, but the district court excluded this evidence. Tran did not call C.S.X. to testify and offered no evidence directly connecting C.S.X. to the murder.

Tran also elicited testimony on cross-examination regarding N.V., another relative, who had been dating Laura Xiong’s niece, C.L., at some point before the murder. N.V. was allegedly angry at Laura Xiong for causing C.L. to- break up with him, and Tran elicited testimony at trial to the effect that N.V. possibly admitted having pushed Dao on one occasion.

The jury found Tran guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree intentional murder, but not guilty of first-degree murder committed in the course of a burglary. The district court entered judgment of conviction on the count of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced Tran to life in prison without parole. This appeal followed.

I.

Tran argues that, because there was no “independent evidence” offered that Tran knew of Dao Xiong’s life insurance policy, evidence of the policy and Laura Xiong’s financial problems was irrelevant and therefore the district court abused its discretion when it admitted that evidence. To be admissible, evidence must be relevant. Minn. R. Evid. 402. Evidence of motive is relevant to show premeditation or intent. State v. Moua, 678 N.W.2d 29, 40 (Minn.2004); State v. Nunn, 561 N.W.2d 902, 908 (Minn.1997). Rulings on evidentiary matters rest within the sound discretion of the district court, and we will not reverse a court’s evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion. Moua, 678 N.W.2d at 37.

When making his argument that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the life insurance policy evidence and the evidence of Laura Xiong’s financial difficulties, Tran urges our court to adopt a rule that Tran claims has been adopted by several other states. The rule that Tran urges us to adopt is that before evidence of the insurance policy on Dao Xiong’s life could be admitted, “independent evidence” must have been submitted that Tran knew of the existence of the life insurance policy and, possibly, that he knew he would benefit from the policy. Tran claims that without such independent evidence, the life insurance policy evidence and evidence of Laura Xiong’s financial difficulties were irrelevant and substantially more prejudicial than probative, violating both Minn. R. Evid. 402 and 403.

The state responds by arguing that there was evidence presented from which the jury could have concluded that Tran knew of the life insurance policy. Specifically, Laura Xiong admitted to a police officer that she had told Tran of the insurance. But this evidence is not conclusive on this issue. The statement made by Laura Xiong is not clear, because shortly after volunteering the information indicating that she may have told Tran about the insurance, she said she did so after her husband’s death. Nevertheless, the state points out that the jury was free to believe Laura Xiong’s first statement and to disbelieve her second statement. The state also claims that evidence at trial indicated that Laura Xiong was an accomplice to the murder, and therefore her knowledge of the life insurance policy and her financial difficulty are relevant because her motives could be considered the motives of her accomplice as well. The state asserts that it is entitled to prove its theory or theories of the case, and one of its two theories was that Laura Xiong and Tran were involved in a romantic relationship, that they talked constantly, that they were both in dire financial straits, that Laura Xiong knew of the life insurance policies, and that the two planned Dao Xiong’s death for both love and money. The state argues that under such circumstances it is permissible to draw an inference of knowledge on Tran’s part.

In support of his argument that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the life insurance policy, Tran cites various cases from other states which have held that before evidence of an insurance policy may be introduced, the state must produce evidence that indicates the defendant knew of the insurance policies. As mentioned above, the requirement that evidence of a defendant’s knowledge of an insurance policy be introduced is based on relevancy considerations. If the defendant did not know of the insurance, then the evidence of the insurance policy is generally irrelevant to the case, as it could not have been a motivating factor. In addition, Tran argues that without the insurance evidence, evidence of Laura Xiong’s financial condition would also be irrelevant.

While the cases Tran cites from other jurisdictions all purport to require some evidence that a defendant knew of a given insurance policy before evidence of that policy may be admitted, the cases vary in how much and what type of evidence is required. Some of the cases, such as People v. Gougas, 410 Ill. 235, 102 N.E.2d 152, 154 (1951), State v. Felker, 27 Mont. 451, 71 P. 668, 670-71 (1903), and State v. Beckham, 334 S.C. 302, 513 S.E.2d 606, 610 (1999), appear to require explicit evidence that the defendant knew of the insurance policies. But other cases, such as Stoudemire v. State, 261 Ga. 49, 401 S.E.2d 482 (1991), and Smallwood v. Commonwealth, 36 Va.App. 483, 553 S.E.2d 140 (2001), appear to be less restrictive regarding allowing insurance evidence. The Stoude-mire court required “independent evidence at a nexus” between the crime and the insurance policy, and found none when, after the evidence of the existence of the insurance was announced to the jury, “the State neither made reference to the insurance policies nor made any attempt to connect the commission of the crime to the existence of the insurance policies.” 401 S.E.2d at 483-84. In Smallwood, the Virginia Court of Appeals required some evidence or knowledge that the defendant was the beneficiary and that, despite the fact that the defendant and the victim were married, knowledge of the insurance policy could not be imputed to the defendant. 553 S.E.2d at 146. But the Virginia court also distinguished a case wherein a defendant took the stand and denied having knowledge of an insurance policy, saying that in that case the jury could hear evidence of the policy because it was relevant to the witness’s credibility. Id.

Importantly, the cases cited by Tran also differ in how much circumstantial evidence is sufficient to allow admission of insurance evidence. In Smallwood, the Virginia court concluded that where a wife had attempted to make her husband the beneficiary of her life insurance policy the week before her murder, the marital connection alone was not sufficient evidence to show that the husband had knowledge of the policy so that it could be introduced into evidence. Id. The court held that other evidence was required. Id. But in State v. White, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that evidence that the defendant had become the beneficiary of her stepson’s life insurance policy days before the stepson’s death was admissible because “[d]efendant’s husband was a life insurance agent, and the jury could reasonably infer that defendant, as his spouse, knew that the lives of the family members were insured and that defendant’s husband would have discussed with defendant the decision to name defendant as a co-beneficiary of the victim’s life insurance policy in place of the child’s natural mother.” 340 N.C. 264, 457 S.E.2d 841, 857-58 (1995).

In a recent case not cited by Tran, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the rule that the state must produce evidence of a nexus between the crime charged and the life insurance policy before evidence of the policy may be introduced. Brooks v. State, 918 So.2d 181, 189 (Fla.2005). But when it adopted this rule, the Florida court also indicated that inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence can satisfy the nexus requirement. Id. at 191. The Florida court stated that “evidence establishing the substantial sum of money Davis [defendant’s cousin] promised to pay [the defendant] to complete the conspiracy to commit murder coupled with evidence of the modest financial means of Davis — a condition that would not have escaped his cousin’s notice under these circumstances- — more than satisfies this nexus requirement.” Id. at 190.

We obviously are not bound to follow the case law of other states. However, we agree that, under our rules of evidence, without some evidence that the defendant probably knew of the existence of an insurance policy, evidence of the insurance policy would be irrelevant and should not be admitted. But evidence introduced at trial may be direct or circumstantial. Circumstantial evidence is defined as “[e]vidence based on inference and not on personal knowledge or observation.” Black’s Law Dictionary 595 (8th ed.2004). Tran appears to read the cases he cites from other jurisdictions to require direct evidence on one certain point — knowledge of insurance — and he requests that we articulate and uphold such a rule.

We do not believe that the cases from other jurisdictions uniformly support Tran’s proposed rule that a defendant’s knowledge of an insurance policy must be proven by direct evidence, and we decline Tran’s invitation to adopt a special rule that requires direct evidence before insurance policies may be admitted. As mentioned above, evidence of an insurance policy is admissible under Minnesota law to show motive. See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 841 (Minn.2008) (concluding that evidence of life insurance and of the defendant’s household debt was admissible to show motive). Many other types of evidence are also admissible to show motive — for example, evidence of an affair, or other evidence of a victim’s interference with a defendant’s life. It is not apparent to us why insurance policies should be treated differently from any other evidence used to show motive. While Tran is probably correct that evidence of an insurance policy may be prejudicial, it can be relevant and probative and therefore admissible. See Minn. R. Evid. 402, 403. Moreover, such evidence does not appear likely to be more prejudicial than other relevant evidence, for example, evidence of an affair.

While we conclude that there must be some evidence that a defendant knew of an insurance policy before such a policy may be introduced as evidence of the defendant’s motive, we agree with the courts in Brooks and White that circumstantial evidence that the defendant probably knew of the existence of the insurance policy is sufficient. In Brooks, a conspirator, Davis, hired Brooks to kill an insured child and her mother. 918 So.2d at 186. The court found sufficient inferential evidence of knowledge of the insurance based on the fact that Davis was in difficult financial circumstances and Brooks knew of Davis’s financial difficulties, but still apparently believed that Davis would be able to pay him $10,000 for committing the murder. Id. at 191. The circumstances in the case before us today are similarly suggestive.

The state introduced evidence that Laura Xiong and Tran had an intense romantic relationship that involved sexual relations. They met frequently and often called each other up to 25 times per day. It is a reasonable inference that Laura Xiong and Tran would have discussed their relative financial situations. Additionally, Laura Xiong owed $60,000 in credit card debt and $74,000 in unpaid income taxes, and was being pursued by creditors on several other significant debts. Tran had no independent source of income and lived off the generosity of friends and, in particular, girlfriends. If, as the state argued, Tran planned to murder Dao Xiong, it is a reasonable inference that Tran would have given some thought to the financial problems Dao Xiong’s murder could potentially resolve, and could have depended on the insurance money to provide financial support for Laura Xiong and him. Indeed, had there been no insurance in the case, there would arguably have been less motive for Tran to kill Dao Xiong, as Dao Xiong was the primary wage earner for his family. Such reasoning is similar to that addressed by the Florida court in Brooks. See id. Finally, Laura Xiong stated that she told Tran about the insurance policy, though she later qualified her statement, adding that she had told Tran about the policy after Dao’s death. While this arguably “direct” evidence does not control our decision here, it does support the inference that Tran knew of the insurance policies.

Additionally, though there is no evidence that Tran expected “payment” as such from Laura Xiong, there is evidence that he would reasonably have expected to benefit from the insurance proceeds Laura Xiong received. Tran appears at the time of the murder to have lived for some time off the generosity of others, in particular the women in his life, including his ex-wife, two ex-girlfriends, and a female friend. More generally, Tran and Laura Xiong were in an intimate relationship, and such relationships often involve helping out the other when he or she is financially disadvantaged. It appears reasonable to expect that one partner’s sudden acquisition of wealth would result in benefits for the other partner. Additionally, if, as the state intimated in closing, Tran and Laura Xiong hoped to live together or marry, Tran would receive the benefits of the insurance through payment of his living expenses.

We decline to endorse the new rule proposed by Tran,- which would require more evidence for the admission of evidence of an insurance policy than is required of any other type of motive evidence. We conclude that, as there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that Tran knew of the insurance policy, the evidence of the insurance policy was relevant. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of the life insurance policy on Dao Xiong and the evidence of Laura Xiong’s financial difficulties.

II.

Tran also claims that the district court abused its discretion in prohibiting him from eliciting evidence from police investigators about the alleged gang affiliation of a third party. At trial, the court allowed Tran to cross-examine the police investigators regarding certain suspects who Tran claimed should have been investigated more thoroughly. But the court refused to allow Tran to elicit testimony on cross-examination regarding the alleged gang affiliation of one of the suspects, C.S.X. The court stated that the gang affiliation testimony was barred under Minn. R. Evid. 403 because the testimony was substantially more prejudicial than probative. Tran alleges that the court’s refusal to allow the gang affiliation testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Tran argues that this refusal was not harmless error because the alleged gang affiliation was an important part of Tran’s argument that C.S.X. was a serious suspect who should have been investigated further.

The state contends that admission of the gang affiliation testimony would have been improper because C.S.X. was not being put forward by Tran as an alternative perpetrator and did not meet the criteria for alternative perpetrator status. Furthermore, the state argues that evidence of C.S.X.’s alleged gang affiliation would be inadmissible character evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). Additionally, the state claims that the gang affiliation evidence, even if relevant and otherwise admissible, would be barred from admission under Minn. R. Evid. 403 because its probative value would be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Furthermore, the state argues that even if the exclusion of the gang affiliation testimony was error, it was harmless, as Tran was able to elicit information about several suspects, including C.S.X., and to vigorously argue that the police failed to follow up on those suspects.

Rulings on evidentiary matters rest within the sound discretion of the district court. Moua, 678 N.W.2d at 37. We will not reverse a court’s evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id. “Based on concerns about such things as harassment, decision making on an improper basis, con fusion of the issues, and cross-examination that is repetitive or only marginally relevant, the [district] court possesses wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination of a prosecution witness.” State v. Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Minn.1995). “[T]he discretionary authority of the [court] to control the scope of cross-examination is limited by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 640. However, we have said that “[t]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only ‘an opportunity for cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’ ” State v. DeVerney, 592 N.W.2d 837, 845 (Minn.1999) (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987)).

In DeVemey, we held that it was not a violation of DeVerney’s Sixth Amendment rights for the district court to allow DeV-erney to closely question a witness regarding how the witness’s sentence could be reduced in exchange for the witness’s testimony, but to forbid DeVerney from inquiring about the precise number of months by which the sentence could be reduced. Id. In general, we have stated that the main purpose of cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause is to allow the defendant an opportunity to reveal bias, and “thereby ‘to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors * * * could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’ ” Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d at 640 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)).

Here, the purpose of the Confrontation Clause is not directly implicated because, in attempting to elicit testimony from police investigators regarding the alleged gang affiliation of a third party, Tran’s goal was not to show bias on the part of the police investigators. The Confrontation Clause would have been more appropriately implicated if Tran had called C.S.X. himself to the stand to question him about his alleged gang activity. As it is, the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit the district court’s exclusion of the alleged gang affiliation evidence because, like the defendant in DeVemey, Tran was still able to effectively cross-examine the police investigator witnesses for bias.

The district court allowed Tran to elicit information regarding the November “deer party” incident, C.S.X.’s refusal to submit to DNA testing, and the investigator’s initial suspicions regarding C.S.X. But the court concluded that testimony regarding C.S.X.’s alleged gang affiliation was barred by Minn. R. Evid. 403 because the gang affiliation evidence was substantially more prejudicial than probative. The record indicates that the court closely considered both the concerns of the state and the defense on the matter of introduction of evidence regarding C.S.X. We conclude that Tran was able to introduce sufficient relevant evidence regarding C.S.X. to make clear to the jury Tran’s argument that the police had not properly investigated. Here, the court correctly concluded that the gang affiliation evidence was only minimally probative and would have caused significant prejudice. We conclude that the court’s decision to allow most of the evidence regarding C.S.X., but to prevent Tran from eliciting testimony regarding C.S.X’s gang affiliation, was not an abuse of discretion.

Finally, we note that Tran’s attempt to introduce the gang affiliation evidence under the guise of criticizing the police investigation is problematic because it appears that Tran may be attempting to circumvent the rule we have recently articulated regarding alternative perpetrator evidence. We have held that alternative perpetrator evidence is not relevant and therefore inadmissible absent some evidence having an inherent tendency to connect the alternative perpetrator with the crime. State v. Jones, 678 N.W.2d 1, 16 (Minn.2004). Here, C.S.X. was not being put forward as an alternative perpetrator; defense counsel admitted that Tran did not have sufficient evidence to tie C.S.X. to the crime and satisfy the alternative perpetrator standard. While the district court was correct that Tran was entitled to some latitude when questioning investigators regarding their lack of interest in other potential suspects, the court was also correct in its conclusion that delving too deeply into the prejudicial history of some of these suspects via cross-examination of the investigators is in essence bringing alternative perpetrator evidence in through the back door. Here, we want to emphasize that the alternative perpetrator rule cannot be circumvented in this manner.

Affirmed.

      . "Detailing” is a technical term which refers to a thorough, expert cleaning of both the inside and outside of a car. It is generally significantly more expensive and extensive than a typical car cleaning.

      . The ex-girlfriend testified that the car was purchased in her name because Tran had bad credit, but Tran was supposed to make the car payments. For a time, he did make the payments, but he stopped around January 2004 and returned the car to his ex-girlfriend.

      . Cell phones operate by bouncing signals off "cell towers.” The closest cell tower within a cell phone network, and only the closest tower, takes the phone call. Cell towers are usually between two and five miles apart. The records here indicated that the calls placed from Tran’s first cell phone were processed through the tower nearest the Xiongs' home, implying that Tran was in the neighborhood of the Xiongs’ home when the calls were made. The first cell phone also received several calls from friends of Tran and Tran's ex-wife during the afternoon of December 18, indicating that it was indeed Tran's general use phone. The records also indicate that the second cell phone, which Tran allegedly gave to Laura Xiong, was in the area of Laura Xiong’s work place (where Laura Xiong un-disputedly was) during the afternoon of December 18, 2003.

      . The transcript of an interview with N.V. indicated that N.V. said “I pushed him [Dao] around.” However, the interviewing police officer said the statement was mistranscribed, and that N.V. actually said "I pushed them around.” N.V.’s DNA was found in the Xiongs’ home, but that was expected because N.V. babysat for the Xiongs.

      . Some of these states have additional requirements; for example, (1) evidence that the defendant would benefit from the policies and (2) evidence that the policies were valid or that the defendant believed that the poli-cíes were valid. Gougas, 102 N.E.2d at 154 (requiring both); Felker, 71 P. at 670-71 (requiring that defendant believed policies were valid); Beckham, 513 S.E.2d at at 610 (requiring both).

      . Because we have concluded that the circumstantial evidence that Tran knew of the insurance policy is sufficient to support admission of the insurance policy to prove motive, we need not address the state’s alternative argument that Laura Xiong’s knowledge of the insurance policy could be imputed to Tran as a co-conspirator.

      . Tran points out that the police initially thought the killing might be gang-related because of the "execution-style” nature of the shooting. Additionally, Tran claimed at trial that the jury would not be able to understand why the deer party incident might have driven C.S.X. to commit murder unless they knew that C.S.X. was a member of an Asian gang. Tran alleged that within Asian gangs, respect is very important, and C.S.X. might have perceived Dao's displeasure at C.S.X.'s uninvited appearance at the party as disrespect. Tran produced no evidence that C.S.X. did in fact feel insulted by or angry with Dao.