author: SANDSTROM, Justice. VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice,

text:
    2005 ND 204
    David B. GRAY, Plaintiff and Appellant v. NORTH DAKOTA GAME AND FISH DEPT., Defendant and Appellee.
    No. 20050103.
    Supreme Court of North Dakota.
    Nov. 29, 2005.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 20, 2005.

      David B. Gray (pro se), Bismarck, N.D.
    Dean J. Haas, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Attorney General, Bismarck, N.D., for defendant and appellee.
   SANDSTROM, Justice.

[¶ 1] David B. Gray appealed from a judgment affirming the North Dakota Game and Fish Department’s order suspending Gray’s hunting, fishing, and trapping privileges in North Dakota from September 21, 2004, through January 1, 2006. We conclude Gray has failed to establish that his statutory or constitutional rights were violated by the Department’s suspension of his hunting privileges in North Dakota on the basis of his violation of a Wyoming hunting law, and we affirm.

I

[¶ 2] On April 16, 2004, Gray, a North Dakota resident, was convicted by a Wyoming circuit court jury of trespass to hunt in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-3-305(b) (2005). While hunting in Wyoming, Gray had driven his truck across private property posted with “No Trespassing” and “No Hunting” signs to access public property for the purpose of hunting on the public property. Gray’s conviction was upheld on appeal to the Wyoming district court. As a result of the conviction, Gray’s privileges to obtain hunting, fishing, and trapping licenses in Wyoming were “suspended for the remainder of 2004 and all of 2005.”

[¶ 3] North Dakota and Wyoming are members of the Interstate Wildlife Violator Compact. See N.D.C.C. ch. 20.1-16; Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 23-6-301-23-6-304 (2005). After receiving information about Gray’s Wyoming suspension, the Department informed Gray by letter on October 12, 2004, that his North Dakota hunting, fishing, and trapping privileges were also suspended from September 21, 2004, through January 1, 2006. Gray requested a hearing. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) recommended that the Department’s suspension of Gray’s privileges be affirmed because N.D.C.C. § 20.1-16-03 authorized the Department’s actions. The Department adopted the ALJ’s recommendations. Gray appealed to the district court, which upheld the Department’s decision.

[¶ 4] The district court had jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 28-32-42. Gray’s appeal to this Court is timely under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-49 and N.D.R.App.P. 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, §§ 2 and 6, and N.D.C.C. § 28-32-49.

II

[¶ 5] Gray challenges the Department’s suspension of his hunting privileges on numerous grounds.

[¶ 6] Under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46, the district court must affirm an order of an administrative agency unless it finds any of the following are present:

1. The order is not in accordance with the law.
2. The order is in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant.
3. The provisions of this chapter have not been complied with in the proceedings before the agency.
4. The rules or procedure of the agency have not afforded the appellant a fair hearing.
5. The findings of fact made by the agency are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
6. The conclusions of law and order of the agency are not supported by its findings of fact.
7. The findings of fact made by the agency do not sufficiently address the evidence presented to the agency by the appellant.
8. The conclusions of law and order of the agency do not sufficiently explain the agency’s rationale for not adopting any contrary recommendations by a hearing officer or an administrative law judge.

[¶ 7] Our scope of review is limited in appeals from decisions of administrative agencies. We review the decision of the administrative agency in the same manner as the district court. N.D.C.C. § 28-32-49. We exercise restraint in deciding whether the agency’s findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and we do not make independent findings or substitute our judgment for that of the agency. Paul v. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2003 ND 188, ¶ 11, 671 N.W.2d 795. We decide only whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have decided the agency’s findings were proven by the weight of the evidence from the entire record. Power Fuels, Inc. v. Elkin, 283 N.W.2d 214, 220 (N.D.1979). Questions of law, including the interpretation of a statute, are fully reviewable on appeal from an administrative decision. Bjerklie v. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2005 ND 178, ¶ 9, 704 N.W.2d 818.

A

[¶ 8] Gray argues the Department erred in suspending his North Dakota hunting privileges on the basis of his Wyoming conviction for trespass to hunt. Resolution of this issue requires an examination of North Dakota’s version of the Interstate Wildlife Violator Compact.

[¶ 9] The legislature adopted a version of the Interstate Wildlife Violator Compact effective August 1, 2001. See N.D.C.C. ch. 20.1-16; 2001 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 230 § 1. In general, the Compact, which to date has been adopted by more than 20 states, is an interstate agreement promoting cooperation in enforcing laws related to managing wildlife resources whereby participating states agree to honor other participating states’ wildlife license suspensions of those who violate game and fish laws. Stapley v. State, 192 Ariz. 427, 966 P.2d 1031,1032 (App.1998). The Compact sets forth the policy of participating states to “[r]ecognize the suspension of wildlife license privileges of any person whose license privileges have been suspended by a participating state.” N.D.C.C. § 20.1-16-01, art. 1, § 2(b). Under the Compact, “[a]ll participating states may recognize the suspension of license privileges of any person by any participating state as though the violation resulting in the suspension had occurred in their state and could have been the basis for suspension of license privileges in their state,” and “shall communicate suspension information to other participating states in form and content as contained in the compact manual.” N.D.C.C. § 20.1-16-01, art. 5, §§ 1 and 2.

[¶ 10] Section 20.1-16-03 N.D.C.C., provides for reciprocal recognition of license suspensions:

1. When the department receives notice of the suspension of a person’s hunting, trapping, or fishing privileges by a participating state, the department shall determine whether the violation leading to the suspension could have led to the forfeiture of privileges under this state’s law. If the department determines that the person’s privileges could have been forfeited, the department may suspend the person’s privileges to hunt, trap, or fish in this state for the same period as imposed by the participating state not to exceed the maximum limits allowed by state law.
2. When the department receives notice of a conviction of a state resident from the licensing authority of the issuing state, the department may treat the conviction as if it had occurred in this state and shall determine whether the conviction could have led to the forfeiture of the resident’s hunting, trapping, or fishing privileges under state law. If the department determines that the resident’s privileges could have been forfeited, the department may suspend the resident’s privileges to hunt, trap, or fish in this state for the same period as the issuing state, not to exceed the limit that could have been imposed under state law.

Upon receiving notification of Gray’s Wyoming suspension, the Department was required to determine whether the violation leading to the suspension could have led to the forfeiture of privileges under North Dakota law, and if so, the Department could treat the conviction as if it had occurred in North Dakota.

[f 11] Gray was found guilty of violating Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-3-305(b) (2005), which provides that “[n]o person shall enter upon the private property of any person to hunt, fish, or trap without the permission of the owner or person in charge of the property.” In affirming Gray’s conviction on appeal, the Sixth Judicial District Court of Wyoming described the circumstances leading to Gray’s suspension:

On November 1, 2003, Appellant drove his truck across private property to access public property for the purpose of hunting there. In so doing, he drove past signs cautioning “No Trespassing,” and “No Hunting”. The property owner (“Complainant”) saw Appellant’s vehicle on the public property, which could be accessed via his property. Because the vehicle appeared to Complainant to be identical to one on which the property owner had left notes during the previous two hunting seasons, requesting the owner first obtain permission to cross his property, Complainant notified Wyoming Game and Fish authorities. Soon thereafter, a Game Warden arrived, located Appellant, who was also the registered owner of the vehicle, and following a brief investigation and discussion with Appellant, issued him a citation.

Gray v. State, No. CR-1268, at p. 2 (Wyo. Dist. Ct., Sixth Jud. Dist., Sept. 28, 2004).

[¶ 12] In North Dakota, it is unlawful for a person to trespass on posted land for the purpose of hunting under N.D.C.C. § 20.1-01-18, which provides that “[n]o person may hunt or pursue game, or enter for those purposes, upon legally posted land belonging to another without first obtaining the permission .of the person legally entitled to grant the same.” The legal requirements for posting land in North Dakota are set forth in' N.D.C.C. § 20.1-01-17:

Only the owner or tenant of any land may post it by placing signs alongside the public highway or the land giving notice that no hunting is permitted on the land. The name of the person posting the land must appear on each sign in legible characters. The signs must be readable from the outside of the land and must be placed conspicuously not more than eight hundred eighty yards [804.68 meters] apart. As to land entirely enclosed by a fence or other enclosure, posting of signs at or on all gates through the fence or enclosure constitutes a posting of all the enclosed land. No person may in any manner deface, take down, or destroy posting signs.

The major difference between the North Dakota and Wyoming hunting trespass laws is that under North Dakota law, permission to hunt is assumed absent legal posting, while under Wyoming law, refusal of permission to hunt is assumed unless permission to hunt is expressly given. Gray argues the Department erred in suspending his North Dakota hunting privileges on the basis of the Wyoming conviction because our hunting trespass law differs from Wyoming’s law.

[¶ 13] We reject Gray’s argument that the elements of hunting trespass under the North Dakota and Wyoming statutory schemes must be identical before the Department may suspend hunting privileges on the basis of the Wyoming conviction. The Interstate Wildlife Violator Compact imposes no requirement that the laws of the participating states be identical. Rather, the purpose of the Compact is for participating states to “[p]romote compliance with the statutes, laws, ordinances, regulations, and administrative rules relating to management of wildlife resources in their respective states.” N.D.C.C. § 20.1-16-01, art. 1, § 2(a) (emphasis added). The Compact places a responsibility upon every person “to comply with wildlife preservation, protection, management and restoration laws, ordinances, regulations, and administrative rules of the participating states as a condition precedent to the continuance or issuance of any license to hunt, fish, trap, or possess wildlife.” N.D.C.C. § 20.1-16-01, art. 1, § 1(d) (emphasis added). Gray’s construction of the Compact would undermine this purpose and strip the Compact of any real meaning because the wildlife laws of the participating jurisdictions are not identical.

[¶ 14] A relitigation of the factual components of the Wyoming violation in North Dakota is neither necessary nor allowed. See N.D.C.C. § 20.1-16-05(3)(a) (listing issues for consideration at administrative hearing). Section 20.1-16-03(2), N.D.C.C., directs the Department to treat the Wyoming “conviction” as if it had occurred in North Dakota and to determine whether the conviction could have led to the forfeiture of Gray’s hunting, trapping, or fishing privileges under North Dakota law. Like Wyoming, North Dakota prohibits trespassing on land for the purpose of hunting, and upon a conviction for violating N.D.C.C. § 20.1-01-18, “the court shall suspend the defendant’s hunting, fishing, and trapping privileges for a period of at least one year.” N.D.C.C. § 20.1-01-26. Because North Dakota law provides for suspension of privileges for a hunting trespass violation, the Department correctly suspended Gray’s hunting privileges on the basis of his Wyoming hunting trespass violation.

[¶ 15] Moreover, the Department found that, according to the record of the Wyoming court proceedings, the Wyoming private land Gray crossed to hunt was posted with “No Trespassing” and “No Hunting” signs and that Gray did not have permission to hunt on or cross the land. These circumstances would support a conviction under North Dakota law. Although Gray argues the signs in Wyoming did not comply with the technical requirements of N.D.C.C. § 20.1-01-17, Gray cannot use the technical requirements of North Dakota law as a defense to reciprocal enforcement of the Wyoming conviction in North Dakota.

[¶ 16] We conclude the Department did not misconstrue the law in suspending Gray’s North Dakota hunting privileges.

B

[¶ 17] Gray argues the Department should not have given full faith and credit to his Wyoming conviction because it was “wrongful[ly]” obtained.

[¶ 18] The United States Constitution requires states to give full faith and credit to “the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” U.S. Const, art. IV, § 1. See Smith v. Baumgartner, 2003 ND 120, ¶ 16, 665 N.W.2d 12. However, a judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in the rendering state and is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); 1st Summit Bank v. Samuelson, 1998 ND 113, ¶ 14, 580 N.W.2d 132.

[¶ 19] Gray’s argument is premised on the Wyoming circuit court’s allowance of an amendment to the criminal citation at his trial. The citation erroneously identified the location of the offense, and Gray claimed he was innocent on the basis of the location listed in the citation. Gray argued that, by allowing the citation to be amended at trial, the Wyoming circuit court defeated Gray’s planned defense strategy. On appeal, the Wyoming district court found Gray was not prejudiced by the amendment, because Gray’s brief “provides ample evidence that not only was he aware of the charge and the elements thereof, but that he approached the trial with a well-developed, albeit ultimately unsuccessful, strategy for the conduct of his defense.” The Wyoming district court noted Gray’s brief “demonstrates that he recognized prior to the trial that the location of the offense contained in the original citation was in error.” As in Wyoming, a North Dakota trial court has discretion to amend a criminal complaint if the amendment does not prejudice the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Higgins, 2004 ND 115, ¶ 5, 680 N.W.2d 645. There is nothing “wrongful” about Gray’s Wyoming conviction that would preclude giving it full faith and credit in North Dakota.

C

[¶ 20] Gray argues the Interstate Wildlife Violator Compact violates the compact clause of the federal constitution, which provides that “[n]o state shall, without the consent of Congress, ... enter into any ... compact with another state.” U.S. Const, art.. I, § 10.

[¶ 21] The Department argues congressional consent for the Compact has been given under 4 U.S.C. § 112(a), which provides the “consent of Congress is hereby given to any two or more States to enter into agreements or compacts for cooperative effort and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime and in the enforcement of their respective criminal laws and policies.” Assuming for purposes of argument that 4 U.S.C. § 112(a) does not provide the required consent of Congress, we note the United States Supreme Court has held that when an agreement between states is not directed to the formation of any combination tending to increase the political power in the states, which may encroach upon or interfere with the supremacy of the United States, the agreement does not fall within the scope of the compact clause and will not be invalidated for lack of congressional consent. See Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159,175-76,105 S.Ct. 2545, 86 L.Ed.2d 112 (1985); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 439, 101 S.Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981). The Interstate Wildlife Violator Compact is “based on the format of the existing Drivers License Compact and Non-Resident Violator Compact, both of these related to motor vehicle operator licensing and enforcement.” Wildlife Violator Compact Operations Manual, at p. 1 (1999). In holding the Drivers License Compact is not subject to the compact clause, the court in Koterba v. Commonwealth, 736 A.2d 761, 765-66 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 816, 121 S.Ct. 53, 148 L.Ed.2d 21 (2000), explained:

[W]e conclude without hesitation that the Driver’s License Compact is not the sort of interstate agreement for which the compact clause mandates congressional approval. Neither the sharing of information among states regarding serious motor vehicle offense convictions nor the regulation by each individual state of the driving privileges of its own citizens threatens the supremacy of the United States. Indeed, the issuance [and denial] of driver’s licenses is a function traditionally exercised by the individual state governments. Further, by joining the Compact, the member states have exercised no power that they could not exercise independently. There can be no question of the authority of any member state to decree that a driver’s license it has issued shall be suspended if the licensee is convicted of a serious motor vehicle offense either within or outside its boarders [sic]. No state has ceded any of its sovereign powers.

See also State v. Kurt, 802 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Mo.1991) (Nonresident Violator Compact regarding reciprocal enforcement of out-of-state traffic citations does not require congressional consent under the compact clause).

[¶ 22] “ ‘[Protection of the wild life of the State is peculiarly within the police power, and the State has great latitude in determining what means are appropriate for its protection.’ ” Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm’n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 391, 98 S.Ct. 1852, 56 L.Ed.2d 354 (1978) (quoting Lacoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545, 552, 44 S.Ct. 186, 68 L.Ed. 437 (1924)). The sharing of information regarding wildlife violations among Compact participants and the regulation of the hunting privileges of citizens by individual states do not encroach upon nor interfere with the supremacy of the United States. We conclude the Interstate Wildlife Violator Compact does not require congressional consent under the compact clause.

D

[¶ 23] Gray argues the suspension of his North Dakota hunting privileges on the basis of his Wyoming conviction violates double jeopardy principles.

[¶ 24] The double jeopardy-clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and N.D. Const, art. I, § 12, protect against successive prosecutions and punishments for the same criminal offense. See State v. Kelly, 2001 ND 135, ¶ 11, 631 N.W.2d 167. However, a remedial administrative sanction, as opposed to a punitive or deterrent one, does not constitute a basis for a double jeopardy claim. State v. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d 49, 55-56 (N.D.1995). In Zimmerman, at 55, this Court held the administrative suspension of a driver’s license for driving under the influence of alcohol serves the remedial, nonpunitive goal of removing potentially dangerous drivers from the roads and does not constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. We said any punitive or deterrent value -an administrative license suspension may have is merely incidental, and a suspension is not overwhelmingly disproportionate to the remedial purpose. Id. at 55-56.

[¶ 25] In the context of the Drivers License Compact, courts have likewise held that the compact-based suspension of operating privileges does not violate double jeopardy principles because the suspension is a legitimate civil remedial sanction that is not so punitive in nature as to be transformed into a criminal penalty for double jeopardy purposes. See, e.g., Marshall v. Department of Transp., 137 Idaho 337, 48 P.3d 666, 671 (App.2002) (“the Compact’s prohibition against licensing a driver whose foreign license has been revoked is a legitimate remedial measure designed to prevent unsafe drivers from operating vehicles on Idaho’s highways”); State v. Pepe, 379 N.J.Super. 411, 879 A.2d 747, 752 (App.Div.2005) (double jeopardy did not bar the imposition of two periods of suspension for driving while intoxicated in another state); Venafro v. Commonwealth, 796 A.2d 384, 387 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002) (quoting Department of Transp. v. McCafferty, 563 Pa. 146, 758 A.2d 1155, 1160 (2000)) (“Since operating privilege suspensions are collateral civil consequences of criminal convictions, the Commonwealth, as a sovereign state, ‘may impose a separate sanction beyond that imposed by the other state without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause’ ”).

[¶ 26] The Interstate Wildlife Violator Compact declares some of the policies and purposes underlying its provisions:

d. Wildlife resources are valuable without regard to political boundaries; therefore, every person should be required to comply with wildlife preservation, protection, management and restoration laws, ordinances, regulations, and administra^ tive rules of the participating states as a condition precedent to the continuance or issuance of any license to hunt, fish, trap, or possess wildlife.
e. Violation of wildlife laws interferes with the management of wildlife resources and may endanger the safety of persons and property.
f. The mobility of many wildlife law violators necessitates the maintenance of channels of communication among the various states.

N.D.C.C. § 20.1-16-01, art. 1, § l(d)(e) and (f). The suspension of hunting privileges is a legitimate civil remedial measure that serves the goal of protecting wildlife resources as well as the safety of persons and property and does not constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. We conclude Gray’s double jeopardy rights were not violated by the Department’s suspension of his North Dakota hunting privileges.

E

[¶ 27] Gray argues his due process rights have been violated because “[d]ue process is notice, hearing then suspension.”

[¶ 28] Due process is flexible and must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, balancing the competing interests and assessing whether the basic due process requirement of fairness has been satisfied. Wahl v. Morton County Soc. Servs., 1998 ND 48, ¶ 6, 574 N.W.2d 859. In determining what process is due under the Fourteenth Amendment, a court must consider the private interests at stake in a governmental decision, the governmental interests involved, and the value of the procedural requirements. Jensen v. Satran, 332 N.W.2d 222, 227 (N.D.1983).

[¶ 29] This Court has held that “[procedural due process does not require a pre-suspension hearing before the State may suspend a motor vehicle operator’s license for a violation of the statutory conditions under which it was issued.” State v. Harm, 200 N.W.2d 387, 388 Syll. ¶4 (N.D.1972); see also State v. Tininenko, 371 N.W.2d 762, 763 (N.D.1985); Kosmatka v. Safety Responsibility Div., 196 N.W.2d 402, 403 Syll. ¶ 4 (N.D.1972). The reasoning behind these decisions is that the interests of protecting the public outweigh the need for a presuspension hearing. See Tininenko, at 763; Kosmatka, at 406. In City of Maumee v. Gabriel, 35 Ohio St.3d 60, 518 N.E.2d 558, 562 (1988), the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that presus-pension notice and hearing before a license could be suspended under the Nonresident Violator Compact relating to out-of-state traffic citations was not required under the due process clause. The court reasoned the right to possess a driver’s license is not a substantial private interest, the state’s interests to insure compliance with the terms of an issued citation and to remove drivers who fail to obey the procedural laws or regulations of the respective jurisdictions were substantial, and the law’s provision for a post-license suspension hearing satisfied due process requirements. Id. at 561-62.

[¶ 30] We believe the state’s interest in insuring compliance with wildlife hunting laws outweighs the interest that hunting law violators have in their hunting privileges. Furthermore, N.D.C.C. § 20.1-16-05(1) and (2) provides for a prompt post-suspension hearing upon the violator’s request. We conclude presuspension notice and hearing were not constitutionally required to satisfy Gray’s due process rights.

F

[¶ 31] Gray complains that North Dakota’s version of the Interstate Wildlife Violator Compact differs from the original Compact because the legislature changed the term “shall” to “may” in various parts of the legislation. For example, N.D.C.C. § 20.1-16-01, art. 5, § 1 (emphasis added), provides that “[a]ll participating states may recognize the suspension of license privileges of any person by any participating state as though the violation resulting in the suspension had occurred in their state and could have been the basis for suspension of license privileges in their state.” See also N.D.C.C. §§ 20.1-16-03(1) and (2), and 20.1-16-04(1). The legislative history of the change in terms reflects that it was intended to allow the Department some discretion “to look at [a violation] more closely.” Hearing on S.B. 2178 Before the House Natural Resources Committee, 57th N.D. Legis. Sess. (March 1, 2001) (testimony of Daryl Kleyer, Game and Fish Department). Gray does not argue that this aspect of the legislation is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers to the Department. See generally Kelsh v. Jaeger, 2002 ND 53, ¶21, 641 N.W.2d 100. Rather, Gray asserts that his equal protection rights have been violated in this case because the Department has the discretion to punish some violators with suspensions and to not punish others.

[¶ 32] Gray’s equal protection challenge to the Compact appears to be based on a claim of selective prosecution. In Gale v. North Dakota Bd. of Podiatric Med., 1997 ND 83, ¶ 32, 562 N.W.2d 878, this Court explained:

Selective prosecution, if based upon improper motives, can violate equal protection. State v. Mathisen, 356 N.W.2d 129, 133 (N.D.1984); State v. Knoefler, 325 N.W.2d 192, 197 (N.D.1982). However, selective enforcement, by itself, is not a constitutional violation. Mathisen, 356 N.W.2d at 133; Knoefler, 325 N.W.2d at 197. A defendant claiming selective prosecution must establish other similarly situated individuals have not been prosecuted and the prosecution of the defendant is based upon constitutionally impermissible considerations. Mathisen, 356 N.W.2d at 133; Knoefler, 325 N.W.2d at 198.

In this case, Gray has failed to establish that other similarly situated individuals have not had their hunting privileges suspended by the Department or that his suspension is based upon any constitutionally impermissible considerations.

[¶ 33] We conclude that Gray’s equal protection rights have not been violated by the Department’s action.

G

[¶ 34] Gray argues the Interstate Wildlife Violator Compact is an unconstitutional ex post facto law.

[¶ 35] An ex post facto law is one that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal. See State v. Burr, 1999 ND 143, ¶ 10, 598 N.W.2d 147. The Interstate Wildlife Violator Compact was enacted in North Dakota in 2001. See 2001 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 230. Gray was convicted in Wyoming in 2004. There has been no ex post facto application of the Compact against Gray.

Ill

[¶ 36] We have considered Gray’s other arguments; they are without merit. The judgment is affirmed.

[¶ 37] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, C.J., DANIEL J. CROTHERS, MARY MUEHLEN MARING, and CAROL RONNING KAPSNER, JJ„ concur.

VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice,

concurring specially.

[¶ 38] I agree with and have signed the opinion written for the Court by Justice Sandstrom. I write separately only to note my discomfort with North Dakota’s statutory version of the Interstate Wildlife Violator Compact that leaves to the Game and Fish Department the decision of whether or not it will recognize a suspension of hunting privileges in another state and whether or not it will suspend the violator’s hunting privileges in North Dakota. As Justice Sandstrom notes, Gray has not argued an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Department and Gray has not shown that other similarly situated individuals have not had their hunting privileges suspended. Although the legislative change from the original Compact may have been well intended, those issues nevertheless remain open issues and the legislation remains vulnerable to attack on those grounds.

[¶ 39] Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.

      . Although the appeal is from an order for judgment, which is not appealable, we will treat this as an appeal from the subsequently entered consistent judgment. See, e.g., Hau-genoe v. Bambrick, 2003 ND 92, ¶ 1 n. 1, 663 N.W.2d 175.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: KONENKAMP, Justice. SABERS, Justice

license: Public Domain

text:
    2005 SD 112
    WALD, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Richard STANLEY and Arvidene Stanley, Defendants and Appellants.
    No. 23583.
    Supreme Court of South Dakota.
    Considered on Briefs Aug. 30, 2005.
    Decided Nov. 16, 2005.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 22, 2005.

      James E. Carlon of Carlon Law Office, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorney for plaintiff and appellee.
    George F. Johnson of Johnson, Eklund Law Offices, Gregory, South Dakota, Attorney for defendants and appellants.
   KONENKAMP, Justice.

[¶ 1.] Appellants challenge the award of attorney’s fees in this mechanic’s lien foreclosure. They contend that the award was not “warranted and necessary” under SDCL 44-9-42. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s award and affirm.

Background

[¶ 2.] Richard and Arvidene Stanley contracted with Wald, Inc. to remodel the Stanleys’ home. During the course of construction, the parties orally modified their written agreement on several occasions. These oral modifications were never reduced to writing and differing interpretations eventually followed. “Some things were assumed to be extra by Wald. Other things were assumed to be part of the contract by the Stanleys.” At some point, the disagreements could not be resolved, and the Stanleys stopped paying Wald. The Stanleys declared that “they would make no further payments unless Wald complied with certain requirements.... ” Wald walked off the job and filed a mechanic’s lien on the property. A month later, the Stanleys made a written demand under SDCL 44-9-26 that Wald foreclose on the lien. Wald then brought a foreclosure action against the Stanleys.

[¶ 3.] When the matter came to trial, the circuit court heard from litigants who each insisted that the other breached the contract. Even though the parties agreed on the original contract price, the contract provided little guidance because the parties had “numerous discussions [that] resulted in ‘extras’ which involved extra work, materials and costs [and] none of the extras were reduced to writing.” Consequently, the court had to determine which work was “extra,” and which work was part of the original contract.

[¶ 4.] In what the court described as a “twenty-six day trial,” it weighed the evidence and the credibility of the litigants, and then ruled that the Stanleys breached the contract and entered judgment in favor of Wald. Wald’s lien originally sought $46,186.30, but the actual claim was reduced to $30,000 after it was discovered that credit had not been given to the Stan-leys for a $16,000 payment. At the conclusion of the trial, the court awarded Wald $5,736.07. When Wald’s attorney sought an award of attorney’s fees, the Stanleys objected claiming that such award was not warranted and necessary. The circuit court considered the objections and issued an order awarding Wald’s attorney’s fees. In its decision, the court made detailed factual findings and legal conclusions and issued a five-page memorandum opinion. The court also outlined the facts to support its findings, including a review of the various factors required by this Court. But the court did not specifically state why it awarded the attorney’s fees. As a result, the Stanleys sought reconsideration.

[¶ 5.] The Stanleys argued to the circuit court that these circumstances warrant no award of attorney’s fees. They based their claim, in part, on their interpretation of the words “warranted and necessary” in SDCL 44-ÍM2, which authorizes the award of attorney’s fees in mechanic’s lien foreclosure actions. Specifically, the Stanleys asserted that “warranted and necessary” requires the court to issue specific findings stating why the circumstances support the allowance of an award. The Stanleys also contended that Wald inflated the amount of his lien and the attorney’s fees were not warranted as a result.

[¶ 6.] The Stanleys maintained that the ultimate award recovered by Wald in the underlying dispute in comparison to the $30,000 Wald claimed indicated that “there was no factual basis to conclude that an award of attorney’s fees was warranted and necessary.” Moreover, the Stanleys argued that because Wald rejected their offer to settle the case for $5,000 and then ultimately recovered only $5,736.07 in the trial, the court should have taken that into account and not awarded attorney’s fees.

[¶ 7.] In response to the Stanleys’ objections, the circuit court held a special hearing to consider whether the award was warranted and necessary. After the hearing, the court issued supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law stating that, “[b]y filing the demand that [Wald] foreclose on its lien, [the Stanleys] rendered the incurrence of attorney’s fees necessary and warranted by [Wald].” (emphasis added). Still believing the circuit court failed to state why the fees were warranted and necessary, the Stanleys now appeal raising the following issue: whether the trial court’s failure to specifically state why the award was “warranted and necessary” is an error under SDCL 44-9-42.

Standard of Review

[¶ 8.] When the court’s authority to award attorney’s fees “rest[s] upon a clear legislative grant of power[,]” we review the decision under the abuse of discretion standard. Hoffman v. Olsen, 2003 SD 26, ¶7, 658 N.W.2d 790, 792 (citing Estate of O’Keefe, 1998 SD 92, ¶ 17, 583 N.W.2d 138, 142). See Lakota Community Homes, Inc. v. Randall, 2004 SD 16, ¶ 9, 675 N.W.2d 437, 440. “Abuse of discretion is the most deferential standard of review available with the exception of no review at all.” In re S.D. Microsoft Antitrust Litigation, 2003 SD 19, ¶ 27, 657 N.W.2d 668, 678 (citations omitted). “We determine that an abuse of discretion occurred only if no judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances of the particular case, could reasonably have reached such a conclusion.” Lakota Community Homes, Inc., 2004 SD 16, ¶ 9, 675 N.W.2d at 440 (quoting City of Sioux Falls v. Johnson, 2003 SD 115, ¶ 6, 670 N.W.2d 360, 362 (citations omitted)). An abuse of discretion is “a fundamental error of judgment, a choice outside the reasonable range of permissible choices, a decision, which, on full consideration, is arbitrary or unreasonable.” Arneson v. Arneson, 2003 SD 125, ¶ 14, 670 N.W.2d 904, 910.

Analysis and Decision

[¶ 9.] The Stanleys contend that “this is not a ease where this Court must simply decide whether some facts exist to support the trial court’s exercise of discretion. The real question ... is whether the trial court committed legal error in not weighing all the facts both for and against the award of attorney’s fees.” In particular, the Stanleys invite this Court to interpret “warranted and necessary” in SDCL 44-9-42 as words of limitation, restricting when a court may exercise its discretion to “only when it seems ‘warranted and necessary according to the circumstances of the case.... ’ ” Under the Stanleys’ definition, for an award of attorney’s fees to be sustained, the terms “warranted and necessary” require a court to “first offer the unique factual findings which set the foundation for the decision.”

[¶ 10.] However, the Stanleys fail to cite legal authority to support their claim. The only authority they cite as support for this particular argument is Hoffman, where we stated that a circuit court is required to “enter findings of fact and conclusions of law when ruling on a request for attorney’s fees.” 2003 SD 26, ¶ 10, 658 N.W.2d at 793 (citations omitted). Aside from the fact that Hoffman supports the requirement that a court issue factual findings, it does not provide a legal basis for the Stanleys’ claim that it is error for a court to award attorney’s fees without first stating why the award is granted. See id. Because we find no other authority cited to support the Stanleys’ argument, we could rule that the matter is waived as a violation of SDCL 15-26A-60(6). We nevertheless choose to address it. See Apa v. Butler, 2001 SD 147, ¶34 n. 7, 638 N.W.2d 57, 70 n. 7 (choosing to address an issue that could have been deemed waived). See also Chem-Age Industries, Inc. v. Glover, 2002 SD 122, ¶ 22, 652 N.W.2d 756, 767 (citations omitted); First Nat’l Bank in Sioux Falls v. Drier, 1998 SD 1, ¶ 20, 574 N.W.2d 597, 601.

[¶ 11.] Under the abuse of discretion standard, we will not set aside an award of attorney’s fees unless “ ‘no judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances of the particular case, could reasonably have reached such a conclusion.’ ” Lakota Community Homes, 2004 SD 16, ¶ 9, 675 N.W.2d at 440 (quoting City of Sioux Falls, 2003 SD 115, ¶6, 670 N.W.2d at 362); Osgood v. Osgood, 2004 SD 22, ¶ 16, 676 N.W.2d 145, 150. More importantly, when reviewing a court’s exercise of discretion, we have never specifically held that “warranted and necessary” in an attorney’s fees statute limits the instances where a court may award fees. Instead, we have set forth several factors a court should consider when making an award. See Duffy v. Seventh Judicial Cir., 2004 SD 19, ¶¶ 15-16, 676 N.W.2d 126, 138-34; Atchison v. Seventh Judicial Cir., 2004 SD 20, ¶¶2-3, 676 N.W.2d 814, 816; Crisman v. Determan Chiropractic, Inc., 2004 SD 103, ¶¶ 26-29, 687 N.W.2d 507, 513-14; City of Sioux Falls v. Kelley, 513 N.W.2d 97, 111 (S.D.1994).

[¶ 12.] Those same requirements have been applied to mechanic’s lien cases under SDCL 44-9-42. See Duffield Constr., Inc. v. Baldwin, 2004 SD 51, ¶ 19, 679 N.W.2d 477, 483; Hoffman, 2003 SD 26, ¶ 10, 658 N.W.2d at 792-93; Larson Concrete Co., Inc. v. Stroschein, 353 N.W.2d 354, 357 (S.D.1984). A review of these cases does not indicate that the terms “warranted and necessary” limit the court’s discretion to allow an award.

[¶ 13.] We addressed a challenge to the court’s discretion under SDCL 44-9-42 in Duffield Construction, Inc., 2004 SD 51, 679 N.W.2d 477. In Duffield, Baldwin claimed that the circuit court’s award of attorney’s fees to the lienor was an error “because [the lienees] presented a meritorious defense.” Id. ¶ 17. But Baldwin did not cite any authority to support this argument, and the failure to cite authority waived the issue. Id. Nonetheless, we said that “[e]ven if they had not waived this issue, they have nevertheless failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion. SDCL 44-9-42 specifically authorizes an award of attorney’s fees in this situation.” Id. ¶ 18. Here, we are similarly presented with circumstances where SDCL 44-9-42 authorizes an award of attorney’s fees. And, as in Duffield, the Stanleys also assert a legally unsupported argument. However, the Stanleys contend that in this case we should hold that the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees.

[¶ 14.] Specifically, the Stan-leys claim they are being punished for exercising their right, under SDCL 44-9-26, to demand that Wald foreclose on the lien. Yet, “nothing in SDCL 44-9-42 suggests that an award of attorney’s fees is punitive or must be based on a conclusion that punishment is warranted.” Duffield, 2004 SD 51, ¶ 19, 679 N.W.2d at 483. In fact, South Dakota enacted the mechanic’s lien laws to allow “persons who provide labor and materials to file mechanic’s liens to ensure that they get paid.” Action Mech., Inc. v. Deadwood Historic Preservation Comm’n, 2002 SD 121, ¶ 17, 652 N.W.2d 742, 749 (citing SDCL ch. 44-9). See also Lytle v. Morgan, 270 N.W.2d 359, 361 (S.D.1978). SDCL 44-9-6 required Wald to fix his lien at “reasonable value of the work done, and of the skill, material, and machinery furnished.” Thus, we turn to the Stanleys’ allegation that Wald inflated the claim and attorney’s fees should not he awarded as a result. We note that the Stanleys do not allege that Wald violated SDCL 44-9-6 or acted in bad faith. Instead, the Stanleys argue that because Wald recovered significantly less than originally claimed, attorney’s fees are not warranted.

[¶ 15.] The amount of the ultimate award is not the only determining factor in an award of attorney’s fees. Circuit courts have statutory authority to exercise discretion in these matters. See SDCL 44-9-42. There is no suggestion that such awards are designed to punish. Instead, the circuit court, when exercising its discretion under statutory authority, need only follow the requirements set by this Court in awarding the attorney’s fees. See Crisman, 2004 SD 103, ¶¶ 26-29, 687 N.W.2d at 513-14. We find no support for the Stanleys’ contention that because Wald only recovered a fraction of the original claim, the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding fees. The circuit court addressed this point and concluded that “[t]he amount of fees and costs is reasonably related to the amount recovered, and the amount in dispute.”

[¶ 16.] Because the Stanleys opposed the court’s decision to award Wald attorney’s fees, the circuit court held a hearing to consider the Stanleys’ arguments against the award, which included: Wald’s exorbitant billing was the reason the case existed in the first place; Wald failed to meet its burden to prove the amount in its lien because the lien was exaggerated; and the testimony presented for Wald was “evasive and false.” But, in the underlying action the court did not find that Wald breached the contract with the Stanleys. On the contrary, the court held that “the Stanleys’ refusal to make further payments and demand for additional consideration constitutes a breach of the contract between the Stanleys and Wald.” Thus, in making the final decision to award Wald attorney’s fees, the circuit court explained that “because the Stanleys filed a demand requiring Wald to foreclose its mechanics lien” the fees were warranted and necessary under SDCL 44-9-42.

[¶ 17.] While the Stanleys contest the circuit court’s decision to award fees, they do not object to the findings that determined that the fees were reasonably warranted and necessary. Because we decline the Stanleys’ invitation to interpret the words “warranted and necessary” in SDCL 44-9-42 as a limitation on when the court may exercise its discretion, we are only left to decide whether the circuit court abused its discretion. After a review of the record, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion and affirm the award of attorney’s fees to Wald, Inc. Wald’s request for appellate attorney’s fees is denied.

[¶ 18.] Affirmed.

[¶ 19.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and ZINTER and MEIERHENRY, Justices, concur.

[¶ 20.] SABERS, Justice, dissents.

SABERS, Justice

(dissenting).

[¶ 21.] I respectfully dissent because the majority opinion rewards Wald for greatly inflating the amount of its mechanic’s lien.

[¶ 22.] Mechanic’s liens are devices that allow “persons who provide labor and materials ... to ensure that they get paid.” Action Mechanical v. Deadwood Historic, 2002 SD 121, ¶17, 652 N.W.2d 742, 749. However, mechanic’s liens are easily abused. In an effort to curtail abuse, the Legislature requires that lien claimants file itemized statements upon which the lien is claimed. SDCL 44-9-16. “Substantial compliance with the statute ... is required to protect others with an interest in the property from fraud and imposition.” Ringgenberg v. Wilmsmeyer, 253 N.W.2d 197, 200 (S.D.1977).

[¶ 23.] We refuse to enforce a mechanic’s lien where the claimant has willfully and intentionally exaggerated the claim. Id. at 201. A claim is not intentionally or willfully false if the mistakes were honestly made. Id. However, “if the lien grossly misrepresents the amount, the burden is on the person asserting the lien to prove the mistake was made in good faith.” Id.

[¶ 24.] Wald’s mechanic’s lien claim was for $46,186.30. The Stanleys offered to settle for $5,000. The circuit court found that Wald was only entitled to $5,351. Thus, Wald insisted on litigating its claim and was awarded only $351 more than offered by the Stanleys. The amount the circuit court determined Wald was entitled to, was only one-eighth of the amount claimed. Despite that, the circuit court awarded Wald the full amount of attorney’s fees claimed ($5,726.07) because Stanleys exercised their statutory option that the lien be enforced or forfeited as provided in SDCL 44-9-26.

[¶ 25.] Under the circuit court’s logic, a claimant who recovers even a small fraction of its original claim is entitled to attorney’s fees even though not warranted or necessary. Creditors are free to be careless, negligent, or excessive in filing their claims so long as they recover some portion of the claim at trial.

[¶ 26.] Wald filed a mechanic’s lien that encumbered the Stanley homestead by over eight times the amount determined. The Stanleys appropriately demanded that Wald enforce or forfeit the inflated lien as provided by statute. As a result, the circuit court abused its discretion when it awarded attorney’s fees neither warranted nor necessary. In fact, the action to enforce the excessive mechanic’s lien was not warranted or necessary and the case should have been settled without a lawsuit.

      . While it is true that Wald did not recover the entire $30,000 claimed in the lien, the court noted that this dispute existed because neither party could agree on what was included in the original contract and what was extra work. Both parties had made different assumptions on what work was extra and what was part of the contract. In the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, paragraphs thirteen through fifty were devoted to addressing each item of work to determine whether it was extra or part of the original contract. Thereafter, the court summarized its calculations in a chart.

      . SDCL 44-9-42 states:
      The court shall have authority in its discretion to allow such attorney's fees and receiver's fees and other expenses as to it may seem warranted and necessary according to the circumstances of each case, and except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter.

      . The circuit court entered specific findings under the required factors, both in its memorandum decision and in its findings of fact and conclusions of law.

      . SDCL 44-9-26 states:
      Upon written demand of the owner, his agent, or contractor, served on any person holding a lien, requiring him to commence suit to enforce such lien, such suit shall be commenced within thirty days after such service, or the lien shall be forfeited.

      .Because the original contract between Wald and the Stanleys was orally modified, we apply the "reasonable value" criterion under SDCL 44-9-6, as opposed to the "value of the contract” criterion. See Hoffman, 2003 SD 26, ¶ 14, 658 N.W.2d at 793.

      . "Courts will not lend their aid to parties in the commission of fraud, and, if the plaintiff knowingly and intentionally filed claim for a lien for a larger amount than is due it for material furnished, it forfeits its right to such lien.” Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Keenan, 15 S.D. 377, 89 N.W. 1009, 1010 (1902). In this case, the Stanleys do not allege that Wald filed a fraudulent lien against them. Nor, do they contend that the difference in the amount Wald ultimately recovered as compared to the amount originally claimed requires the court to dismiss Wald's lien.

      . As a further indication that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in the award of attorney's fees, we note that the final judgment was for an amount exceeding what the Stanleys offered to settle the case. Thus, despite the fact that the judgment was for much less than what Wald demanded, Wald would not have received this amount without a trial.


author: WIGGINS, Justice.

text:
    In the Interest of R.S.N. and R.M.N., Minor Children, J.S. and T.S., Appellants.
    No. 05-0016.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Dec. 9, 2005.

      Sally B. Prank, Drake University Legal Clinic, and Elizabeth Kellner-Nelson, Student Legal Intern, Des Moines, for appellants.
    Jeffrey T. Mains of Mains Law Office, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellee-mother.
    Catherine Levine, Des Moines, for minor children.
   WIGGINS, Justice.

The juvenile court taxed reasonable attorney fees and costs against the petitioners, the prevailing parties, in a private involuntary termination of parental rights action. Because there was no statutory authority or controlling appellate decision allowing for the juvenile court to assess reasonable attorney fees and costs against the petitioners, we reverse the judgment of the juvenile court. We, however, remand this case to the juvenile court to reconsider its decision in light of Iowa Code section 600A.6B (Supp. 2005), enacted during the pendency of this appeal.

I. Background Facts, and Proceedings.

T.S. and J.S. are the maternal grandparents and legal guardians of the minor children R.S.N. and R.M.N. The grandparents raised the children since infancy. In May 2004, the grandparents filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of. the children’s biological parents after they decided to adopt the children.

The biological mother, J.N.C., contested the termination and submitted an application for court-appointed counsel in June 2004. The juvenile court determined the mother was indigent and appointed an attorney to represent her in the proceeding. The juvenile court held the termination hearing in August 2004. The court found the mother never provided financial support for the children and made little effort to contact them. The court also found while R.S.N.’s biological father is unknown and R.M.N.’s biological father is known, both fathers abandoned the children. Even with these findings, the court denied the application to terminate the parental rights of the biological mother and the fathers, citing the failure of the grandparents to give the requisite notice to the fathers.

The mother filed a motion for enlarged findings and conclusions requesting the juvenile court to direct the state department of inspections and appeals to pay the attorney fees and costs the mother incurred and to tax the fees and costs to the grandparents as court costs. The grandparents responded by filing their own motion to amend the findings and rulings of the juvenile court contending they gave proper notice to the fathers. In their motion, the grandparents noted the court did not explain why it did not terminate the parental rights of the mother.

The mother submitted a partial resistance to the grandparents’ motion. In her resistance, the mother stated she presumed the basis for not terminating her parental rights rested not on the court’s inability to terminate the fathers’ parental rights, but rather on a best interests inquiry. In October 2004, the juvenile court denied the mother’s motion for attorney fees and costs because of the absence of a mechanism allowing the court to direct the state department of inspections and appeals to pay the mother’s court-appointed attorney fees.

On October 28, 2004, the mother submitted a second motion for reasonable attorney fees and costs on the grounds she was the prevailing party. On November 3, 2004, the juvenile court issued an amended and substituted ruling and order reversing its prior decision by terminating the parental rights of the mother and fathers.

In the amended order, the court noted the children’s fathers did receive notice of the termination proceeding and had abandoned the children, and the termination of the mother’s parental rights was proper due to her continuing failure to provide parental support to the children.

On November 10, 2004, the grandparents filed a resistance to the mother’s second motion asking for attorney fees and costs. In their resistance, the grandparents agreed some state agency should pay the mother’s attorney fees, but argued the court does not have authority to require a petitioner in a private involuntary termination proceeding to pay a terminated parent’s attorney fees. The grandparents also pointed out the mother was no longer the prevailing party after the juvenile court issued its amended and substituted ruling and order terminating the mother’s parental rights.

On December 6, 2004, the juvenile court ordered the costs of the action, as well as reasonable attorney fees, taxed to the grandparents. The grandparents appealed the judgment taxing the costs of the action and reasonable attorney fees to them.

II. Scope of Review.

The issue presented is whether the prevailing petitioners in a private involuntary termination of parental rights action may be required to pay the costs of the action and reasonable court-appointed attorney fees for an indigent respondent. The scope of review in termination of parental rights cases is ordinarily de novo. In re R.E.K.F., 698 N.W.2d 147, 149 (Iowa 2005). However, to the extent the claim of error rests upon an interpretation of law, our review is for correction of errors at law. Id.; see also In re Marriage of Seyler, 559 N.W.2d 7, 8 (Iowa 1997) (stating

“[questions of the court’s authority are reviewed for correction of errors at law”).

III. Analysis.

Iowa law provides for private termination of parental rights proceedings pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 600A (2003). On May 12, 2004, six days before the grandparents filed their termination petition, this court held “an indigent parent has a right to have an attorney appointed, at public expense, to help defend against an involuntary termination of parental rights brought under Iowa Code chapter 600A.” In re S.A.J.B., 679 N.W.2d 645, 646 (Iowa 2004). In so holding, we found the Iowa Constitution requires this result in cases where a private party brings a termination action because “the state is an integral part of the process in a 600A termination.” Id. at 646, 650. The basis of the right to court-appointed counsel in such proceedings is to prevent discrimination by the state against indigent parents in private termination actions. See id. at 647-48, 650-51 (noting similarly situated parents in termination cases brought by the state under Iowa Code chapter 232 receive an attorney at public expense); Iowa Code § 232.113(1) (stating on the filing of a termination petition the parent has the right to counsel, and “[i]f the parent desires but is financially unable to employ counsel, the court shall appoint counsel”).

The juvenile court acknowledged our In re S.AJ.B. decision in its denial of the mother’s first motion for enlarged findings and conclusions when it stated:

[A]lthough the Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that a person has a right to counsel in private termination proceedings at state expense, if necessary, there is no mechanism by statute or otherwise which allows the court the authority to direct the Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals to pay the attorney fees of a person who is appointed counsel in these matters.

On appeal, the grandparents argue Iowa law does not permit a juvenile court to assess attorney fees against a party when there is no controlling appellate decision or statute allowing the court to assess attorney fees. “[I]t is well settled in this and other jurisdictions that neither a court of law nor equity has inherent power to tax costs [including attorney fees] to the losing party in any action.” Harris v. Short, 253 Iowa 1206, 1210, 115 N.W.2d 865, 867 (1962).

We agree with the grandparents In re S.A.J.B. stands for the simple proposition that indigent parents facing termination proceedings enjoy a right to court-appointed counsel at public expense, just as their counterparts in termination cases brought by the state do. 679 N.W.2d at 646-47. In re S.A.J.B. is silent as to who is responsible for assuming the financial obligation of providing counsel to an indigent parent in a private termination action. Accordingly, In re S.A.J.B. did not authorize the juvenile court to order the grandparents to pay for the mother’s court-appointed counsel.

We also agree with the grandparents that on December 6, 2004, when the juvenile court assessed the mother’s attorney fees against the grandparents, there was no statutory authority permitting the court to do so. Only those costs or attorney fees authorized by statute are taxable. Harris, 253 Iowa at 1210, 115 N.W.2d at 867. Consequently, the juvenile court did not have authority to tax the attorney fees against the grandparents at the time it entered its order.

The grandparents also argue the court was without authority to assess the court costs against them because the juvenile court’s subsequent ruling and order granted the grandparents their application to terminate the parental rights of the biological mother and fathers. Our statutes provide “[c]osts shall be recovered by the successful [party] against the losing party.” Iowa Code § 625.1. Therefore, the juvenile court did not have the authority to assess the costs of this action against the grandparents, the prevailing parties.

Normally, our analysis would cause us to reverse the judgment of the ■ juvenile court and remand the case to enter judgment without assessing reasonable attorney fees and costs against the grandparents. In this case, however, we must consider the effect of Iowa Code section 600A.6B enacted May 4, 2005, forty-four days after the grandparents filed their final proof brief.

Section 600A.6B provides:

1. A person filing a petition for termination of parental rights under this chapter or the person on whose behalf the petition is filed shall be responsible for the payment of reasonable attorney fees for counsel appointed pursuant to section 600A.6A unless the court determines that the person filing the petition or the person on whose behalf the petition is filed is indigent.
2. If the person filing the petition or the person on whose behalf the petition is filed is indigent, the appointed attorney shall be paid reasonable attorney fees as determined by the state public defender.
3. The state public defender shall review all the claims submitted under this section and shall have the same authority with regard to the payment of these claims as the state public defender has with regard to claims submitted under chapters 13B and 815, including the authority to adopt rules concerning the review and payment of claims submitted.

Iowa Code § 600A.6B. The legislature provided this section with retroactive application back to May 12, 2004, the date we filed In re S.A.J.B. Id. 2005 Iowa Acts ch. 107, § 14. Neither the parties nor the juvenile court considered the effect of this amendment because the governor signed the bill enacting section 600A.6B during the pendency of this appeal, almost five months after the court entered the order assessing reasonable attorney fees and costs against the grandparents.

We have said:

“Trial courts must be afforded the opportunity to avoid or correct error in judicial proceedings. Similarly, appellate courts must be provided with an adequate record in reviewing errors purportedly committed during trial. This perforce requires that counsel make timely and sufficient motions or objections upon which trial judges may rule. Absent such actions, an appellate court has nothing to review.”

DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Iowa 2002) (citation omitted). We will not speculate as to the arguments the parties may have made to the juvenile court concerning the constitutionality or applicability of section 600A.6B to the present case. For this reason, we remand the case to the juvenile court to allow the parties to make their motions and arguments concerning section 600A.6B’s applicability to the assessment of costs and attorney fees.

IV. Disposition.

Because there was no statutory authority or controlling appellate decision allowing the juvenile court to assess reasonable attorney fees and costs against the petitioners, we reverse the judgment of the juvenile court. It was, however, impossible for the juvenile court to consider the relevance of section 600A.6B to its award of reasonable attorney fees and costs. Accordingly, we remand this case to the juvenile court to consider section 600A.6B’s applicability to this case. The juvenile court shall allow the parties to raise any issues they deem necessary in order for the court to determine if section 600A.6B has any effect on the award of reasonable attorney fees or costs in this action. We do not retain jurisdiction.

REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.


author: CADY, Justice.

text:
    TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 421 and John Gotto, Appellants, v. CITY OF DUBUQUE, Appellee.
    No. 04-0736.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Dec. 9, 2005.

      Scott D. Soldon and Andrea F. Hoes-chen of Previant, Goldberg, Uelmen, Gratz, Miller & Brueggeman, S.C., Milwaukee, WI, for appellants.
    Barry A. Lindahl, Dubuque, for appel-lee.
    William F. Sueppel of Meardon, Sueppel & Downer, P.L.C., Iowa City, for amicus curiae Iowa League of Cities.
    Donald C. Hoskins, Marion, for amicus curiae City of Marion.
   CADY, Justice.

This appeal from a declaratory judgment requires us to decide whether a city snowplow operator is a “critical municipal employee” under a statute allowing cities to impose reasonable residency restrictions on such employees. The district court determined that the city snowplow operator was a critical employee and was subject to the municipal residency restriction. The court of appeals reversed. Upon our review, we agree with the district court. We vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the district court judgment.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In 1980, the City of Dubuque issued an administrative policy that imposed a residency requirement for its employees. The policy required that

persons hired after August 31, 1980, shall be, within six (6) months of the date of hire, residents of the State of Iowa and shall have their principal place of residence either within the corporate limits of the City of Dubuque or within 6.5 miles of the corporate limits of the City of Dubuque by the most direct street, road, or highway.

City of Dubuque, Administrative Policy No. 4.05 (Sept. 1, 1980), http://www.eityof dubuque.org/index. cfm?pageid=412. The policy was adopted after the Iowa legislature enacted a law that allowed cities in Iowa to “set reasonable maximum distances outside of the corporate limits of the city that police officers, fire fighters and other critical municipal employees may live.” Iowa Code § 400.17 (2001).

John Gotto was hired by the City of Dubuque after the policy was instituted. He resides in Epworth, Iowa, 7.2 miles outside the Dubuque corporate limits. It takes Gotto twenty-five minutes to drive from his home to work in normal driving conditions. He holds the position of Equipment Operator II in the Operations and Maintenance Department of the City. His job duties include operating a snowplow to remove snow and ice from city streets.

In April 2002, the Operations and Maintenance manager for the City sent a letter to Gotto informing him that he was in violation of the residency restriction. Got-to was told he would lose his job if he failed to comply with the requirement within a certain period of time.

In response to the notice, Gotto and his local union unsuccessfully pursued a grievance against the City. They then filed a declaratory judgment petition seeking a declaration that Gotto was not a “critical municipal employee” under Iowa Code section 400.17. Gotto also asked for a declaration that the residency requirement was facially invalid because it was not restricted to “critical municipal employees,” but rather applied to all city employees.

Gotto and the City filed cross-motions for summary judgment. As a part of the summary judgment record, the Operations and Maintenance Department manager and the City Manager expressed their belief that Gotto was a critical employee. Gotto’s supervisor explained that Gotto is one of eight back-up employees whose function is to fill in for the twenty-eight regular department employees in case of illness, injury, or other similar events. Moreover, Gotto is one of only six employees in the entire department who operates heavy snowplow equipment. There was evidence that Gotto had been called in to work on numerous occasions to clear snow and ice from the roads. In addition, both the police chief and the fire chief for the City of Dubuque stated that their personnel would be unable to timely respond to emergencies during snowstorms if the city streets were not cleared of ice and snow.

The district court denied Gotto’s motion for summary judgment and granted the City’s motion. The court determined that Gotto was a “critical municipal employee,” but did not address the additional issue whether the City’s policy was facially invalid. Gotto filed a notice of appeal without first filing a motion asking the trial court to specifically rule on the issue whether the City’s policy was invalid on its face.

We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals concluded Gotto was not a critical municipal employee. It reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Gotto. We granted the City’s application for further review.

II. Standard of Review

“ ‘A declaratory judgment action tried at law limits our review to correction of errors at law. We are bound by well-supported findings of fact, but are not bound by the legal conclusions of the district court.’ ” In re Estate of Tolson, 690 N.W.2d 680, 682 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Petersen, 679 N.W.2d 571, 575 (Iowa 2004)). Likewise, we review rulings granting summary judgment for correction of errors at law. Otterberg v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 696 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Iowa 2005) (citing In re Estate of Graham, 690 N.W.2d 66, 69-70 (Iowa 2004)).

III. Preservation of Error

We first address the claim by Gotto that the City policy is facially invalid because it applies to all city employees, rather than only “critical municipal employees.” See Iowa Const, art. Ill, § 38A (“Municipal corporations are granted home rule power and authority, not inconsistent with the laws of the general assembly, to determine their local affairs in government....”); Iowa Code § 364.2(2) (“A City may exercise its general powers subject only to limitations expressly imposed by a state or city law.”). Although Gotto presented this issue to the district court, the district court did not address it in its written decision, and Gotto did not file a motion to enlarge under rule 1.904(2). Generally, error is not preserved for appeal on an issue submitted but not decided by the district court when the party seeking the appeal failed to file a posttrial motion asking the district court to rule on the issue. See In re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 266 (Iowa 2005); Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 538 (Iowa 2002).

Gotto argues the district court impliedly decided the municipal restriction was facially valid when it ruled that the policy applied to him. However, our preservation-of-error rule does not draw any such assumptions. Although we assume, for purposes of appellate review, that the district court considered and rejected all defenses to a claim on its merits when not specifically addressed in its ruling, this rule is inapplicable to our rule requiring error to be preserved. Id. at 539-40. Gotto was required to preserve error by filing a rule 1.904(2) motion when the district court failed to address the facial invalidity issue. Accordingly, error has not been preserved.

For the purposes of this appeal, we consider the City’s residency policy to be limited by the “critical municipal employee” limitation under section 400.17. We therefore proceed to consider whether Gotto can be subject to the residency restriction as a “critical municipal employee.”

IV. “Critical Municipal Employee”

Disputes over the interpretation of a statute can arise even with the most carefully drafted laws. 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 45:02, at 15 (6th ed. 2000) [hereinafter Singer]. Disputes arise because it is nearly impossible, even for the most thoughtful lawmakers, to anticipate all future circumstances and neatly corral them into communicative words. Id. Thus, it is a fundamental role, and duty, of courts to interpret statutes enacted by our legislature when particular disputes arise. See Slockett v. Iowa Valley Cmty. Sch. Dist., 359 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Iowa 1984) (“[I]t is the fundamental prerogative of the legislature to declare what the law shall be, but of the courts to declare what it is.” (Citation omitted.)); accord Lynch v. Saddler, 656 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 2003) (“In general, it is the legislature’s duty to declare the law and the court’s responsibility to interpret the law.” (Citation omitted.)).

Courts have, over time, carefully crafted and refined rules of construction to help ascertain the legislative intent of a statute. See State v. DeCamp, 622 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Iowa 2001) (“In the absence of clear legislative intent, we turn to the rules of statutory construction.” (citing State v. Perez, 563 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Iowa 1997))); Singer § 45:02, at 13 .(“Accepted rules of statutory construction can provide helpful guidance in uncovering the most likely legislative intent.”)- We apply these rules in resolving statutory disputes to attain our goal of interpreting statutes according to the intent of the legislature. See Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 606 N.W.2d 359, 363 (Iowa 2000) (“In interpreting the statute, our ultimate goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” (citing Iowa Fed’n of Labor AFL-CIO v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 427 N.W.2d 443, 445 (Iowa 1988))). We begin in this case, as we do in all cases, with the language of the statute. See Singer § 47:01, at 208 (“The starting point in statutory construction is to read and examine the text of the act....”).

Iowa Code section 400.17 provides, in relevant part:

Cities may set reasonable maximum distances outside of the corporate limits of the city that police officers, fire fighters and other critical municipal employees may live.

Iowa Code § 400.17. Gotto claims the legislature intended the phrase “critical municipal employees” to cover only employees who regularly respond to emergency situations that threaten life or property, such as police and firefighters. The City claims the legislature intended the phrase to be broad enough to cover employees who operate snow-removal equipment. These claims illustrate the ambiguity in the statute presented by the circumstances of this case, and require us to interpret the statute.

Neither the phrase “critical municipal employees,” nor the term “critical,” was defined by our legislature in the civil service statute or any other section of the Code. Additionally, we have not established the meaning of the phrase in our prior decisions. Absent a definition by the legislature or an established meaning in the law, we have repeatedly said that “words in the statute are given their ordinary and common meaning by considering the context within which they are used.” Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., Iowa Dep’t of Commerce, 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004) (citing Midwest Auto. III, L.L.C. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 417, 426 (Iowa 2002)); accord Gen. Elec. Co. v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review, 702 N.W.2d 485, 489 (Iowa 2005) (“ ‘Ordinarily, the usual and ordinary meaning is to be given the language used but the manifest intent of the legislature will prevail over the literal import of the words used.’ ” (quoting Welp v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 333 N.W.2d 481, 483-84 (Iowa 1983); citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review, 492 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa 1992))); see also Worth County Friends of Agric. v. Worth County, 688 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Iowa 2004) (stating when a term is not defined in the statute, “ ‘we look to prior decisions of this court, similar statutes, dictionary definitions, and common usage’ ” (quoting Bob Zimmerman Ford, Inc. v. Midwest Auto. I, L.L.C., 679 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Iowa 2004))). We begin down the path of legislative intent with this rule of construction in mind.

In the context of describing a person, the dictionary definition of “critical” means essential, or “indispensable for the weathering, solution, or the overcoming of a crisis.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 538 (2002); accord Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 275 (10th ed. 2002) (“vital, indispensable”). This meaning reveals that the phrase “critical municipal employee” is not limited to traditional emergency responders, but rather would encompass any employee who performs work that is essential or indispensable in responding to or dealing with any municipal crisis or potential crisis.

Notwithstanding, the court of appeals identified another interpretive aid to support its conclusion that our legislature did intend to limit the phrase “critical municipal employee” to employees who regularly work as emergency responders. This aid of statutory interpretation is known as ejusdem generis. It provides that when general words follow specific words in a statute, the general words are read to embrace only objects similar to those objects of the specific words. Messerschmidt v. City of Sioux City, 654 N.W.2d 879, 884 (Iowa 2002) (citing Shatzer v. Globe Am. Cas. Co., 639 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2001)); accord Maxim Techs., Inc. v. City of Dubuque, 690 N.W.2d 896, 902 (Iowa 2005); Black’s Law Dictionary 535; Singer § 47:17, at 272-81. The rule recognizes and gives effect to both the specific and general words by using the class indicated by the specific words to extend the scope of the statute with the general words to include additional terms or objects within the class. Id. at 285.

In using the doctrine as an interpretative aid, it is important to keep in mind that it is not applied in a vacuum, and disputes cannot be resolved by merely tying the issue “to the procrustean bed of ejusdem generis.” United States v. Weadon, 145 F.3d 158, 162 (3d Cir.1998). In fact, there are several conditions that have been identified for the doctrine to apply, but none more important than the identification of the class. Classes can be defined in a vast number of ways, but the key to unlocking the true value of the doctrine is to ensure that the identified class has some objective relationship to the aim of the statute. Singer § 47:18, at 289. In other words, the “basis for determining which among various semantically correct definitions of the class should be given effect” is found in the purpose and subject of the statute as revealed in the legislative intent. Id.

In this case, the court of appeals found the specific enumerations — police and firefighters — identified a class of emergency responders, or employees who respond quickly to emergencies that threaten life or property. While it is undeniably true that police and firefighters are both emergency responders, this classification lacks a connection to the residency of the employees. Consequently, the classification has a tenuous relationship to the purpose and intent of the statute. We think the germane feature of the class under the statute is not that the included employees respond to emergencies in the performance of their regular duties for the municipality, but that the employees in the class perform a critical function, for the municipality that may require them to reliably and quickly respond from their residence to a community crisis or potential crisis. As a public safety measure, the statute ensures that critical employees will be able to promptly get to work in the event of an emergency or crisis.

In this light, not only is it important for employees who regularly respond to emergencies in their work to be able to quickly respond to a community crisis or potential crisis from their residence, but it is also important for employees who may not regularly respond to emergencies in their work but who nevertheless perform critical duties for the municipality in the event of a crisis or potential crisis. This feature is the essential element of the class in the context of the residency requirement imposed under the statute. An interpretation that restricts critical employees to emergency responders would not give full effect to the purpose and intent of the statute.

Once the class is properly tied to the subject and purpose of section 400.17, the doctrine of ejusdem generis reveals, as does the common meaning of the language of the statute, that critical employees áre not limited to employees who regularly respond to emergencies, but includes all employees who must report to work from their homes at times to perform critical functions for a municipality in the event of a community crisis. We conclude our legislature did not intend to limit the class of critical municipal employees to emergency responders.

Notwithstanding, Gotto further argues that a snowplow operator is not a critical employee even if the statute includes employees other than emergency responders. He maintains, as the court of appeals found, that snowplow operators must no longer respond quickly to snow and ice storms in light of the advanced warning of storms provided by modern forecasting technology, as well as the modern anti-icing and snow-removal technology. We disagree that Gotto is not a critical employee for three reasons.

First, we reject the underlying premise relied upon by the court of appeals. While it may be possible for a court to take judicial notice of improved weather forecasting and the improved predictability of impending storms, the nature and severity of storms, and the precise location of storms in particular, remain very uncertain. A regional forecast of a few inches of snow can quickly turn into a substantial amount of snow or ice in a particular location within the forecast region.

Second, the undisputed evidence in the case was that Gotto has been called into work from his home to perform his snow-removal duties in the past. This evidence reveals Gotto is an indispensable component of a team of city employees that responds to crises and emergencies faced by the community. It is hard to imagine that a snowplow operator would not be a “critical municipal employee” in Iowa, in light of our dependence on travel and the need for our government to keep roads and streets open to facilitate travel during inclement winter weather at all times of the day and night. A snowplow is' often the lifeline to winter travel. Indeed, it would be ironic to include regular emergency responders as critical employees but exclude those employees charged with the responsibility of keeping streets and roads open during snow and ice storms for emergency responders to perform their duties. We will not interpret a statute to reach an absurd result. See State v. Petithory, 702 N.W.2d 854, 859 (Iowa 2005) (stating we interpret statutes in a commonsense manner and avoid absurd results (citing State v. Anderson, 636 N.W.2d 26, 35 (Iowa 2001)); Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 520 (Iowa 2003)). That too is an interpretive aid that supports our conclusion that snowplow operators are “critical municipal employees” under section 400.17. As a public safety measure, we will not interpret section 400.17 too narrowly so as to undermine or jeopardize its purpose. Instead, we interpret statutes consistent with their purpose. See IBP, Inc. v. Harker, 633 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Iowa 2001) (stating we give statutes “ ‘a reasonable construction that will effectuate the statute’s purpose rather than one that will defeat it’ ” (quoting Voss v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 621 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Iowa 2001))).

Y. Conclusion

The court of appeals interpreted “critical” too narrowly when it equated “critical municipal employees” with emergency responders. The concept of “critical” is broader and includes employees that are indispensable to the weathering of a crisis, such as John Gotto. We conclude John Gotto is a critical municipal employee under Iowa Code section 400.17. The decision of the court of appeals is therefore vacated, and the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

      . We also do not consider whether the 6.5-mile residency restriction under the City's policy is reasonable under section 400.17.

      . We have frequently said that we do not resort to the rules of construction when the terms of the statute are unambiguous. Bankers Standard Ins. Co. v. Stanley, 661 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Iowa 2003). "We do not search for meaning beyond the express terms of a statute when a statute is plain and its meaning is clear.” Cubit v. Mahaska County, 677 N.W.2d 111, 781-82 (Iowa 2004). See generally Singer § 45:02.

      . Gotto asserts we implied that "critical” employees meant emergency responders in Clinton Police Department Bargaining Unit v. City of Clinton, 464 N.W.2d 875 (Iowa 1991). In that case, we rejected an equal protection challenge to a city’s residency requirement for police officers by pointing out that the need to respond quickly to emergencies helps support a rational relationship to the residency requirement. Clinton Police Dep’t Bargaining Unit, 464 N.W.2d at 878. Gotto also relies on cases from other jurisdictions that have upheld residency requirements for police based in part on their unique role as emergency responders. See Wadsworth v. State, 275 Mont. 287, 911 P.2d 1165, 1176 (1996) ("It is true that cities may place police officers in a separate category and impose residence requirements on the officers because the duties and interests protected by police are of a sufficiently distinct character from those of other governmental employees.”); Seabrook Police Ass'n v. Town of Seabrook, 138 N.H. 177, 635 A.2d 1371, 1374 (1993) (”[C]ourts cite various reasons for upholding the residency requirements for police officers, including quicker emergency response time which enhances community safety.... ”). Yet, these cases do not establish a definition of a "critical” employee or support the position that a “critical” employee must be an emergency responder.

      . Ejusdem generis is Latin for "of the same kind or class." Black's Law Dictionary 535 (7th ed. 1999). It is an ancient doctrine, commonly called Lord Tenterden's Rule, dating back to Archbishop of Canterbury’s Case in 1596. Singer § 47:17, at 272-73 (citation omitted).

      . There are five conditions that have been identified:
      (1) the statute contains an enumeration by specific words; (2) the members of the enumeration suggest a class; (3) the class is not exhausted by the enumeration; (4) a general reference supplementing the enumeration, usually following it; and (5) there is not clearly manifested an intent that the general term be given a broader meaning than the doctrine requires.
        Id. at 287; see Metier v. Cooper Transp. Co., 378 N.W.2d 907, 912-13 (Iowa 1985) (doctrine inapplicable when there is no inconsis-
      tency between the general and specific language).