text:
    No. 92-1981.
    Wiener, dba Chuck’s Bookstore, et al. v. City of National City, California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 92-1983.
    Steirer et al. v. Bethlehem Area School District et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 92-1984.
    Pennsylvania Federation of the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes et al. v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 92-1985.
    Herrera-Meras v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 92-1986.
    FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 92-1989.
    Stamps v. Collagen Corp.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 92-1990.
    Douglas v. Miller, Director, Michigan Department of Social Services, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 92-1991.
    Dean, Sheriff of Citrus County, Florida, et al. v. Redner.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 92-1992.
    Harold Washington Party et al. v. Democratic Party of Cook County, Illinois, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 92-1993.
    Beals v. City of Thatcher, Arizona, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 92-1994.
    Dunkin et al. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp.
   et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 92-1997.
    Carter v. Certified Grocers of California, Ltd.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 92-1998.
    Beyer et al. v. Cannon et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 92-1999.
    Harlow Fay, Inc. v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


author: TERNUS, Justice.

text:
    KOEHLER ELECTRIC and Continental Western Insurance, Appellants, v. Carlton WILLS, Appellee.
    No. 98-1305.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    March 22, 2000.

      E.J. Giovannetti and Anne L. Clark of Hopkins & Huebner, P.C., Des Moines, for appellants.
    Daniel D. Bernstein and William J. Bri-briesco of William J. Bribriesco & Associates, Bettendorf, for appellee.
    Considered by LARSON, P.J., and LAVORATO, SNELL, TERNUS, and CADY, JJ.
   TERNUS, Justice.

This case requires the court to decide the circumstances under which an idiopathic fall is compensable under Iowa’s workers’ compensation law. The district court affirmed the industrial commissioner’s decision that the injuries sustained by the appellee, Carlton Wills, in an idiopathic fall at his place of employment, arose out of and in the course of his employment. We affirm the district court’s decision.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Carlton Wills had worked for the appellant, Koehler Electric, for two days when he fell from a ladder while wiring a customer’s air conditioning unit. Wills sustained serious head and shoulder injuries in the fall. He subsequently filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits that was opposed by Koehler and its insurer, appellant, Continental Western Insurance. (We will refer to these parties jointly as Koehler.) Koehler asserted that Wills’ injuries did not arise out of his employment because his fall was the result of alcohol withdrawal.

The evidence introduced at the hearing showed that Wills appeared to be unconscious when he fell and that witnesses observed him convulsing as he lay on the floor. Wills experienced delirium tremens in the hospital and was diagnosed as suffering from delirium tremens and alcoholism, as well as head and shoulder injuries.

The deputy industrial commissioner awarded medical benefits for the injuries Wills sustained in the fall, finding that “the fall was greatly aggravated by the fact that it occurred five feet above the ground while working on a ladder.” Koehler appealed the deputy’s decision to the industrial commissioner, arguing that Wills had failed to show that his injuries were actually enhanced by the four to five foot fall from the ladder and that such proof was required to show that the injuries arose out of his employment. The commissioner rejected Koehler’s argument and affirmed the award of benefits, stating:

In the present case, the cause of claimant’s fall was alcohol withdrawal. The alcohol withdrawal is akin to an epileptic fit or a fainting spell. His work required that he be on a ladder four to five feet off the floor. He fell onto a cement floor. Claimant’s employment or working environment placed him in a position that increased the effects of his fall. The injury resulting from claimant’s fall arose out of his employment.

On judicial review to the district court, the commissioner’s award of benefits was affirmed. The case is now before us on Koehler’s appeal.

II. Scope of Review and Issue on Appeal.

Our review is limited to correction of errors of law. See 2800 Corp. v. Fernandez, 528 N.W.2d 124, 126 (Iowa 1995). Relief may be granted if the agency’s action is “unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.” See George A. Hormel & Co. v. Jordan, 569 N.W.2d 148, 151 (Iowa 1997). “Evidence is substantial if a reasonable mind would find it adequate to reach the same conclusion” as that reached by the commissioner. Fernandez, 528 N.W.2d at 126. Furthermore, “[a]n agency’s decision does not lack substantial evidence because inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the same evidence.” Id.

The sole issue on appeal in this case is whether there was substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s conclusion that Wills’ injuries arose out of his employment with Koehler. The resolution of that issue turns on whether Wills’ case was fatally deficient because it lacked any evidence that Wills’ injuries were in fact worse because he fell from a height. We turn now to a review of the governing legal principles.

III. Applicable Law.

A. General principles governing workers’ compensation claims. Iowa Code chapter 85 provides in pertinent part: “Every employer, not specifically excepted ..., shall provide, secure, and pay compensation according to the provisions of this chapter for any and all personal injuries sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of the employment.” Iowa Code § 85.8(1) (1995) (emphasis added). The burden is on the claimant to prove both that the injury “arose out of’ and “in the course of’ his employment. See Miedema v. Dial Corp., 551 N.W.2d 309, 311 (Iowa 1996).

An injury “arises out of’ the employment when there is a causal relationship between the employment and the injury. The injury must be a “rational consequence of the hazard connected with the employment.” “In the course of’ the employment refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the injury.

Fernandez, 528 N.W.2d at 128 (citations omitted).

In the case at hand, there is no dispute that Wills’ injuries occurred in the course of his employment. Wills was where his employer had directed him to be and was performing his required job duties at the time of his fall. See Miedema, 551 N.W.2d at 311 (holding injury occurred in the course of employment when employee was on his employer’s premises during normal working hours, and was about to perform his required duties when he unexpectedly strained his back).

Injuries that occur “in the course of’ employment do not, however, necessarily “arise out of the employment.” See id. As noted above, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the employment. “In other words, the injury must not have coincidentally occurred while at work, but must in some way be caused by or related to the working environment or the conditions of ... employment.” Id. (concluding that despite the fact that the employee’s back strain occurred in the course of employment, the fact that the employee strained his back while using the restroom was not a hazard associated with his employment and thus did not arise out of his employment). “ ‘The injury must be a natural incident of the work[;] ... it must be a rational consequence of a hazard connected with the employment.’ ” Id. (quoting Cedar Rapids Community Sch. v. Cady, 278 N.W.2d 298, 299 (Iowa 1979)).

The analysis in the present case is complicated by the fact that the commissioner found that Wills’ fall was not precipitated by any condition connected with his employment; rather it was caused by a condition purely personal to Wills — his alcohol withdrawal. Courts from other jurisdictions have held that falls resulting from alcohol withdrawal are idiopathic in nature. See Evans v. Hara’s, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 849 P.2d 934, 940 (1993); Smith v. Container Gen. Corp., 559 So.2d 1019, 1022 (Miss.1990); Sudduth v. Williams, 517 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tenn.1974). See generally 1 Arthur Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 12.11, at 3-356 (1994) [hereinafter Workmen’s Compensation Law ] (referring to falls that originate from a cause personal to the claimant as “idiopathic”). This court has not previously addressed the compensability of idiopathic falls. Consequently, we now consider that issue.

B. Compensability of idiopathic falls. Generally injuries resulting from-risks personal to the claimant are not com-pensable. See Evans, 849 P.2d at 940; Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 266 Ill.App.3d 1103, 204 Ill.Dec. 354, 641 N.E.2d 578, 581 (1994); In re Compensation of Russ, 60 Or.App. 292, 653 P.2d 274, 275 (1982); Workmen’s Compensation Law § 12.00, at 3-349. Courts have, however, recognized an exception to this rule where “the employment contributes to the risk or aggravates the injury.” Workmen’s Compensation Law § 12.00, at 3-349 (emphasis added). An example given by Larson in his treatise is an employee who is placed in a position that aggravates the effects of an idiopathic fall, such as a height. See id. § 12.11, at 3-351 to 3-355.

Koehler asserts that, in order to fall within this exception, a claimant must prove that the injuries he sustained were worse as a result of the height from which he fell, than they would have been had he fallen on level ground. Koehler argues that Wills failed to meet this burden of proof because he offered no expert testimony that his injuries were enhanced by the fall from five feet. See Bradshaw v. Iowa Methodist Hosp., 251 Iowa 375, 383, 101 N.W.2d 167, 171 (1960) (holding in negligence suit for personal injuries that “the causal connection between the [claimant’s] fall and the subsequent disability is essentially within the domain of expert testimony”).

Initially, we note that to adopt Koehler’s position would essentially require the claimant to prove what portion of his injuries was caused by the work-related condition' — the increased height — and what portion would have been sustained had he fallen at ground level. But such apportionment is not required. As Larson states in his treatise,

the relative contributions of employment and personal causes are not weighed; the employment factor need not be the greater, but it must be real, not fictitious. When a moderate exertion precipitates a heart attack or back injury, or when a secluded employment setting facilitates a privately motivated murder, who can weigh the causal factors and say that the employment contribution was ten percent and the personal contribution ninety percent? Compensation law attempts no such impossible weighing of intangibles. But it does know the difference between something and nothing, and it rightly requires that the employment contribute something to the risk, before pronouncing the injury one arising out of the employment.

Workmen’s Compensation Law § 12.14(b), at 3-371 (emphasis added). Focusing on whether the employment increases the risk of injury is consistent with our discussion in Miedema with respect to when an injury “arises out of’ the worker’s employment. In Miedema, the employee injured his back while using the restroom at his place of employment. 551 N.W.2d at 310. In holding that the injury did not arise out of his employment, we noted that it did not appear “that any condition of his employment exposed him to a risk or hazard that would not be associated with using a toilet elsewhere.” Id. at 311 (emphasis added).

In reviewing cases from other jurisdictions, we find no court that has based compensability on proof by the claimant of the precise injuries that were caused by the workplace condition, such as the elevation from which the claimant fell. Rather these courts have focused on the increased risk of injury, or have concluded summarily that a fall from a height increased the effects of the fall. See, e.g., ERC Contractor Yard & Sales v. Robertson, 335 Ark. 63, 977 S.W.2d 212, 216 (1998) (finding a compensable idiopathic fall where “the fall was caused by alcohol withdrawal, ... a condition personal to [the claimant], [because] his placement on scaffolding twelve to fifteen feet above the ground increased the dangerous effect of the fall,” with no discussion or determination of the enhanced injuries); Evans, 849 P.2d at 940-41 (holding idiopathic fall on a level surface precipitated by an alcohol withdrawal seizure was not compensable under Idaho’s workers’ compensation law without evidence that some hazard in the workplace contributed to the injury); Stapleton v. Industrial Comm’n, 282 Ill.App.3d 12, 217 Ill.Dec. 830, 668 N.E.2d 15, 16 (1996) (“If the fall is idiopathic, resultant injuries are not compensable unless the employment significantly contributed to the injury by placing claimant in a position of greater risk of injury from falling.”); Elliot v. Industrial Comm’n, 153 Ill.App.3d 238, 106 Ill.Dec. 271, 505 N.E.2d 1062, 1066-67 (1987) (holding idiopathic fall on steps when leg gave out due to numbness and previous injury was not compensable: “The act of walking down the stairs itself does not establish a risk greater than those faced outside of work.... There was no evidence that the stairs themselves were unique to his employment and increased the danger of injury.” (Emphasis added .)). Our assessment of the law from other jurisdictions finds support from Larson in his treatise on workers’ compensation law, who concludes that the general rule requires that the employment must contribute to the hazard of the fall. See Workmen’s Compensation Law § 12.14(c), at 3-373 to 3-374.

In conclusion, we hold that it is not necessary for a claimant injured in an idiopathic fall to prove that his injuries were worse because he fell from a height. It is only required that he prove that a condition of his employment increased the risk of injury. In this case, expert testimony was not essential because the fact finder could conclude based on common experience that the risk of injury is greater when one falls from a height of four to five feet onto a concrete floor than when one falls on level ground. See Howard v. Ford Motor Co., 363 S.W.2d 61, 65 (Mo.Ct.App.1962) (“Unquestionably an idiopathic fall from an inherently dangerous height would meet the requirement of a hazard in the employment conditions.”). Consequently, the lack of expert testimony in this case with respect to any enhanced injuries sustained by Wills is not fatal. We hold, therefore, that there was substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s conclusion that Wills’ injuries arose out of his employment with Koehler.

AFFIRMED.


author: SNELL, Justice.

text:
    STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Jerrot Heath CLARK, Appellee.
    No. 98-1905.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    March 22, 2000.

      Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, David A. Ferree, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Mark Hunacek, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
    Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appel-lee.
   SNELL, Justice.

The State appeals a district court ruling whereby it was determined the prosecution failed to prove the offense of driving while barred, because the Department of Transportation’s procedure for adjudicating habitual offenders did not comply with the Iowa Code. We reverse and remand.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

On October 7, 1997, defendant, Jerrot Heath Clark, was adjudicated an habitual offender by the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT). In accordance with Iowa Code section 321.560, Clark was thereafter barred from driving for a period of two years. Defendant’s adjudication was preceded by notice from the DOT in which he was informed of the pending agency action and apprised of his right to challenge the determination by requesting a hearing. Clark failed to respond, the decision of the DOT was executed and stood undisputed.

Thereafter, Clark was arrested on two subsequent occasions for driving while barred. Defendant was charged with both offenses and for possession of a controlled substance. The matters were tried on September 2, 1998, whereupon the district court held the DOT procedure for adjudicating habitual offenders did not comply with the notice requirements of Iowa Code section 321.556 (1997). The district court thus dismissed the two counts of driving while barred on the ground that the State failed to meet its burden of proof.

The State claims on appeal: (1) The DOT’s procedure for adjudicating an individual an habitual offender does not conflict with the Iowa Code; (2) Any failure by the DOT to abide by the strictures of the Code did not invalidate the proceedings; and (3) The district court exceeded its jurisdictional authority in refuting the propriety of the DOT procedures.

We agree with the State’s latter contention, and decline to address the other issues raised.

II. Scope of Review

The State challenges the authority of a district court to rule on a matter presumably beyond its jurisdiction. Questions of jurisdiction, authority, and venue of the district court are legal issues to be reviewed for correction of errors at law. Holding v. Franklin County Zoning Bd., 565 N.W.2d 318, 320 (Iowa 1997); Iowa Dep’t of Transp. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 534 N.W.2d 457, 459 (Iowa 1995) [hereinafter Bremer ].

III. Analysis

At issue in this case is whether the district court overstepped its authority when it ruled the State failed to prove the offense of driving while barred. The basis of that ruling lies in the wording of Iowa Code section 321.556 wherein it is stated:

If, upon review of the record of convictions of any person, the department determines that the person appears to be a habitual offender, the department shall immediately notify the person in writing and afford the licensee an opportunity for a hearing. The notice shall direct the person named in the notice to appear for hearing and show cause why the person should not be barred from operating a motor vehicle on the highways of this state ....

The DOT’S present means of fulfilling this statutory obligation is by sending a notice which reads: “You are ordered to surrender your driver’s license to the address below unless you request a contested hearing to show cause why you should not be barred as a habitual offender.” The district court believed this notification procedure shifted the burden of initiating a hearing to the defendant, and that this was contrary to the Code. The court thus dismissed the charges against Clark in essence holding the DOT’s habitual offender adjudication was void for failure to set and conduct a hearing.

The State contends the district court was without authority to review agency procedure in this matter because defendant failed to exhaust the administrative remedies for relief at his disposal, and because he did not file a petition with the court in accordance with the judicial review provisions of Iowa Code section 17A.19 (1997). We agree with the State’s position.

In Bremer we remarked that when a party seeks a declaratory judgment on a matter entrusted exclusively in the first instance to an administrative agency, the court must refuse to issue a ruling unless the action is indistinguishable in substance from a petition for judicial review, and all of the jurisdictional prerequisites for judicial review of agency action have been met. Bremer, 534 N.W.2d at 459. “Declaratory relief is not appropriate when there is a complete remedy otherwise provided by law that is intended to be exclusive.” Id. (quoting City of Des Moines v. Des Moines Police Bargaining Unit Ass’n, 360 N.W.2d 729, 730 (Iowa 1985)). Similarly, we find an exclusive remedy exists for the relief sought here.

Iowa Code section 321.556(4) provides:

... If the department’s findings and conclusions are that the person is a habitual offender, the department shall issue an order prohibiting the person from operating a motor vehicle on the highways of this state for the period specified in section 321.560.

Section 321.560:

A license to operate a motor vehicle in this state shall not be issued to any person declared to be a habitual offender under section 321.555, subsection 1, for a period of not less than two years nor more than six years from the date of the final decision of the department under section 17A.19 or the date on which the district court upholds the final decision of the department, whichever occurs later....

Section 17A.19 is the judicial review provision of the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act (IAPA). A person adversely affected by agency action may seek redress thereunder. Bremer, 534 N.W.2d at 459. Section 17A.19 stipulates in pertinent part:

Except as expressly provided otherwise by another statute referring to this chapter by name, the. judicial review provisions of this chapter shall be the exclusive means by which a person or party who is aggrieved or adversely affected by agency action may seek judicial review of such agency action. However, nothing in this chapter shall abridge or deny to any person or party who is aggrieved or adversely affected by any agency action the right to seek relief from such action in the courts.
1. A person or party who has exhausted all adequate administrative remedies and who is aggrieved or adversely affected by any final agency action is entitled to judicial review thereof under this chapter....
2. Proceedings for judicial review shall be instituted by filing a petition either in Polk County district court or’ in the district court for the county in which the petitioner resides or has its principal place of business....
4. The petition for review shall name the agency as respondent and shall contain a concise statement of:
a. The nature of the agency action which is the subject of the petition.
b. The particular agency action appealed from.
c. The facts on which venue is based.
d. The grounds on which relief is sought.
e. The relief sought.
8. The court may affirm the agency action or remand to the agency for further proceedings. The court shall reverse, modify, or grant any other appropriate relief from the agency action, equitable or legal and including declaratory relief, if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the action is:
a. In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
b. In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
c. In violation of any agency rule;
d. Made upon lawful procedure;
e. Affected by other error of law;
f. In a contested case, unsupported by substantial evidence in the record made before the agency when that record is viewed as a whole; or
g. Unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

Resort to further appeal may be had under Iowa Code section 17A.20:

An aggrieved or adversely affected party to the judicial review proceeding may obtain a review of any final judgment of the district court under this chapter by appeal. The appeal shall be taken as in other civil cases, although the appeal may be taken regardless of the amount involved.

The judicial review procedures delineated in chapter 17A are exclusive. Iowa Code § 17A.19 (1997); Bremer, 534 N.W.2d at 459. The review of a DOT adjudication of an habitual offender must be appealed by first exhausting all agency remedies, and then by filing a petition for relief with a district court in accordance with section 17A.19.

In the case at hand, Clark did not request a hearing when he first received notice from the DOT. Nor did he file an appeal with the agency. The validity of the DOT adjudication was never impugned prior to the criminal prosecution. For obvious reasons, institution of the criminal proceedings was by no means analogous to a petition for judicial review of the administrative ruling. Nor was it indistinguishable in substance from such a petition. Defendant’s challenge at this juncture was a collateral attack on the decision of the administrative agency. See Toomer v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 340 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Iowa 1983) (a valid and final adjudicative determination by an administrative tribunal has the same effects under the rules of res judicata as a judgment of a court, and a determination made by an administrative agency in its judicial or quasi-judicial capacity is not subject to collateral attack); see also State v. Bettenhausen, 460 N.W.2d 394, 395 (N.D.1990) (defendant, who did not request a hearing on the administrative suspension of his license, could not later challenge that suspension during a trial for driving while barred).

Because Clark did not first avail himself of the administrative or legal processes at his disposal, the district court exceeded its authority in reviewing the agency action. Cf. Jew v. University of Iowa, 398 N.W.2d 861, 864 (Iowa 1987) (when a contested case procedure has been undertaken and has run its course to conclusion, it is almost axiomatic that any further challenge may only be asserted by proper petition for judicial review under section 17A.19). We therefore reverse the ruling of the . district court and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

All justices concur except McGIVERIN, C.J., who takes no part.


author: SNELL, Justice. CARTER, Justice

text:
    STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Steven COOLEY, Appellant.
    No. 98-802.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    March 22, 2000.

      Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Arthur Adams, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha E. Boesen, Assistant Attorney General, Denver D. Dillard, County Attorney, and Jerry Vander Sanden, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
   SNELL, Justice.

Defendant, Steven Cooley, appeals his conviction following a jury trial in which he acted as his own attorney. Defendant claims the trial court’s failure to warn him of the dangers of self representation rendered his waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel unknowing and unintelligent, thereby resulting in an infringement of his rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. We transferred this case to the Iowa Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction. On further review, we now vacate the court of appeals’ decision, reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for a new trial.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Defendant, Steven Cooley, was charged with, and found guilty of, burglary in the third degree, habitual offender, in violation of Iowa Code sections 713.1, 713.6A, and 902.8 (1997). At his arraignment, defendant appeared without counsel. The following colloquy took place:

THE COURT: This is the case of State of Iowa vs. Steven Melvin Cooley. It’s number FECR 19164. Is that your true and correct name, sir?
THE DEFENDANT: That’s correct, sir.
THE COURT: Let the record show that the defendant appears personally without counsel. At the time of his initial appearance, Mr. Cooley indicated to Judge Newmeister that he did not want any attorney appointed to represent him. Is that correct, Mr. Cooley?
THE DEFENDANT: That’s absolutely correct.

At the conclusion of the proceeding, Cooley requested the court’s assistance in filing pretrial motions and obtaining subpoena forms. At no point did the court further address the defendant as to the advisability of self-representation.

On February 11, 1998, the court heard Cooley’s Motion to Proceed Pro Se, in which he stated he was “fully advised of the pitfalls claimed to be associated with one representing himself, but [that he] had found them to be without merit, while representing himself in numerous previous jurisdictions.” The following exchange was preserved for the record:

THE COURT: Now, you understand that you have a Constitutional right to have a lawyer defend you in a criminal action, such as this, and you have a right to have the State pay for the criminal attorney to defend you. You understand that you have that Constitutional right?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. And what do you desire to do in regard to that particular Constitutional right?
THE DEFENDANT: With regard to that Constitutional right, Your Honor, I would only ask that a lawyer be allowed to sit with me at trial and that otherwise I do not have no desire to have one around me.
THE COURT: Okay. You want to have a stand-by counsel; is that what you’re saying?
THE DEFENDANT: That at actual trial, in case there’s a question of law that I would want to ask him about.
THE COURT: Okay.

The discussion then focused on the appointment of a female attorney as stand-by counsel and on the defendant’s access to legal research material. Before concluding the hearing, the court again visited with the defendant concerning the appointment of counsel.

THE COURT: Well, fine. You’re exercising your right to have stand-by counsel at the trial.
THE DEFENDANT: At trial.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: But you’re waiving your right to have a lawyer in regard to trying the case. You plan on proceeding pro se and trying the case yourself?
THE DEFENDANT: That’s correct, sir.
THE COURT: But you want standby counsel.
THE DEFENDANT: At the trial.
THE COURT: At the trial.
THE DEFENDANT: In case there’s points of law that would rise up that I’d need to question.

Cooley made four subsequent appearances before the court to discuss pretrial matters. No further mention of defendant’s representation was documented until just prior to jury selection, when the court entertained a motion concerning closing arguments.

THE COURT: Well, I’m not going to order that Ms. Ableidinger give any closing argument. You have chosen to represent yourself in this matter. If you choose to have Ms. Ableidinger or any other lawyer represent you in this matter, that’s another story. But right now she is only standby counsel at the court’s request because your choice is to represent yourself.
DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I would rebut that regards to the fact that Ms. Ableidinger was appointed to assist me at trial on points of law and I think that in itself makes her a second counsel, and I think the law on 18(b) is clear that two counsel can go between a person’s last argument.
THE COURT: Well, I’m not requiring Ms. Ableidinger to do any argument for you whatsoever. What you all agree to during trial is up to you. I will cross that bridge when I come to it. But you seem to have some notion that she has to do this at your request. I don’t believe she has to. She’s there to provide you with — to answer any questions during the trial if you have any.
DEFENDANT: Uh-huh.
THE COURT: She was not, as I understand it, in this case to prepare opening argument — or opening statement or closing argument or examination of the witnesses. You have chosen to take that on yourself.
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. Well, we can deal with that at the time then.

The trial court then introduced Cooley to the jury and informed them that the defendant would represent himself. Cooley was later found guilty and sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment not to exceed fifteen years.

Defendant appealed his conviction on the grounds that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by failing to conduct an inquiry into his understanding of pro se representation and into his competency to make the decision to act as his own attorney. The State denied error was preserved as to either of these claims maintaining Cooley failed to provide a record in support of the former argument, and that he had not adequately briefed or cited authority to substantiate the latter.

While the court of appeals held the competency to stand trial issue had been waived, it also concluded the exchanges between Cooley and the trial court did not, in and of themselves, establish a knowing and intelligent waiver. Rather than reverse the defendant’s conviction, however, the court instead reasoned that Cooley’s extensive familiarity with the criminal justice system, and the emphatic nature of his pleadings in which he professed a knowledge of the pitfalls inherent in self-representation, rendered a lengthy admonishment by the trial court unnecessary. Under the circumstances, it was determined Cooley did in fact knowingly waive his right to counsel.

On further review defendant contends the court of appeals erred in holding his pleadings and prior experience in the legal system provided sufficient evidence of a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. The ruling, he argues, effectively relieved the trial court of its duty to make a meaningful inquiry and was tantamount to a harmless error analysis, which he posits is proscribed by both the Iowa and United States Supreme Courts.

II. Analysis

A. Scope of Review

We apply a de novo review standard to the constitutional issues raised by Cooley. State v. Rater, 568 N.W.2d 655, 657 (Iowa 1997); State v. Spencer, 519 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Iowa 1994).

B. Preservation of Error — Establishing Record

As a preliminary matter, the State avers Cooley failed to brief or argue his claim that the trial court posed an insufficient inquiry as to the defendant’s competence to represent himself, thereby resulting in a waiver of the issue on appeal. Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 14(a)(3) provides: “Failure in the brief to state, to argue or to cite authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.”

Cooley’s competence was not questioned during oral argument, nor was the matter referenced in the defense brief beyond a heading which reads:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONDUCTING INSUFFICIENT INQUIRY INTO THE DEFENDANT’S UNDERSTANDING OF PRO SE REPRESENTATION AND INTO WHETHER THE DEFENDANT WAS COMPETENT TO MAKE THE DECISION TO REPRESENT HIMSELF, ALL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT.

The State has interpreted this heading as a claim by Cooley that he was either incompetent to act pro se, or that the trial court owed him a duty to inquire as to his mental status. In either event, Cooley failed to articulate any arguments to that end so the point is moot.

Moreover, a defendant is generally presumed competent unless evidence appears to the contrary. Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 270 (Iowa 1991). A hearing is not necessary unless a court has reason to doubt a defendant’s competence. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 n. 13, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2688 n. 13, 125 L.Ed.2d 321, 333 n. 13 (1993); State v. Edwards, 507 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Iowa 1993); see also Iowa Code § 812.3 (1997). No such evidence arose prior to, or during, the trial to which Cooley has brought our attention to bear. The issue is waived.

With regard to Cooley’s charge that the trial court failed to conduct a colloquy to determine whether his waiver of counsel was proffered knowingly and understandingly, the State alleges the defendant failed to establish a record for appeal.

The State asserts the trial court had “off the record” conversations with Cooley regarding self-representation, and that it is incumbent upon the defendant to supply the court with a record affirmatively disclosing any error relied upon for appeal. Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(c) provides:

c. Statement of the evidence of proceedings when no report was made or when the transcript is unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, including his recollection. The statement shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and served on appellee within twenty days after the filing of the notice of appeal. Appellee may file with the clerk of the trial court and serve on appellant objections or proposed amendments to the statement within ten days after service of appellant’s statement. Thereupon the statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval and as settled and approved shall be included in the record on appeal.

The State reasons that since Cooley failed to provide a transcript of the alleged conversations, or to recreate the discourse from memory, his claim should be waived because a reviewing court cannot predicate error on speculation. State v. Douglas, 485 N.W.2d 619, 625 (Iowa 1992).

The court of appeals rejected this argument holding that when a defendant asserts a lack of inquiry, the court will presume there is no record to recreate under rule 10(c). We agree with the logic of this ruling. Here, the State requests Cooley produce a transcript of a conversation he denies ever took place. The defendant is being asked to prove a negative. If the State has reason to believe that an off the record colloquy took place, it is free to rebut the defendant’s assertions to the contrary, and to produce evidence to that end.

Thus in the case at hand, it is the responsibility of the State to uphold the validity of Cooley’s waiver of counsel.

C. Waiver

A defendant has a Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to self-representation under the United States Constitution. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2527, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 566 (1975); Rater, 568 N.W.2d at 658. ‘When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent oneself, an accused must knowingly and intelligently forgo those relinquished benefits.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d at 581; Rater, 568 N.W.2d at 658. The Supreme Court has imposed “rigorous restrictions on the information that must be conveyed to a defendant, and the procedures that must be observed, before permitting a waiver of the right to counsel at trial.” Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 2398, 101 L.Ed.2d 261, 276 (1988). A searching or formal inquiry is among the procedures required before an accused’s waiver of counsel may be accepted. Id. at 299, 108 S.Ct. at 2398, 101 L.Ed.2d at 276-77. While the extent of a trial court’s inquiry may vary depending on the nature of the offense and the background of the accused, some sort of meaningful colloquy must be accomplished. Id. at 298, 108 S.Ct. at 2398, 101 L.Ed.2d at 276-77; Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24, 68 S.Ct. 316, 323, 92 L.Ed. 309, 320-21 (1948); Rater, 568 N.W.2d at 660. In Patterson the Court remarked:

[W]e require a more searching or formal inquiry before permitting an accused to waive his right to counsel at trial than we require for a Sixth Amendment waiver during postindictment questioning— not because postindictment questioning is “less important” than a trial ... — but because the full “dangers and disadvantages of self-representation” during questioning are less substantial and more obvious to an accused than they are at trial.

Patterson, 487 U.S. at 299, 108 S.Ct. at 2398, 101 L.Ed.2d at 276-77 (citations omitted).

Thus a serious and weighty duty has been imposed upon trial courts to determine whether a waiver is competent and intelligent. Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 723, 68 S.Ct. at 323, 92 L.Ed. at 320-21; Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465, 58 S.Ct. at 1023, 82 L.Ed. at 1467. The Court described the duty thusly:

To discharge this duty properly in light of the strong presumption against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel, a judge must investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand. The fact that an accused may tell him that he is informed of his right to counsel and desires to waive this right does not automatically end the judge’s responsibility. To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. A judge can make certain that an accused’s professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a plea is tendered.
[A] mere routine inquiry — the asking of several standard questions followed by the signing of a standard written waiver of counsel — may leave a judge entirely unaware of the facts essential to an informed decision that an accused has executed a valid waiver of his right to counsel. [Tjhis case shows that such routine inquiries may be inadequate although the Constitution “does not require that under all circumstances counsel be forced upon a defendant.”

Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 724, 68 S.Ct. at 323, 92 L.Ed. at 321 (citations omitted).

A waiver is made knowingly when the accused is apprised of the factors delineated above, admonished as to the usefulness of an attorney at that particular proceeding, and made cognizant of the danger in continuing without counsel. See Patterson, 487 U.S. at 298, 108 S.Ct. at 2398, 101 L.Ed.2d at 276; Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 723-24, 68 S.Ct. at 323, 92 L.Ed. at 320-21; Rater, 568 N.W.2d at 658. A waiver that is not voluntary and intelligent cannot be accepted. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401-02, 113 S.Ct. at 2688, 125 L.Ed.2d at 334; Rater, 568 N.W.2d at 658. In other words, a waiver that does not meet these criteria is not valid. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400, 113 S.Ct. at 2687, 125 L.Ed.2d at 334; Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 724, 68 S.Ct. at 323, 92 L.Ed. at 320-21.

The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, recently addressed the question of the degree of inquiry necessary to establish adequacy of counsel when a conflict of interest arose between a defendant and his lawyer. Atley v. Ault, 191 F.3d 865 (8th Cir.1999). The defendant, Atley, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief claiming the state trial judge failed to fully investigate a conflict of interest, which required a substitution of counsel in order to safeguard defendant’s constitutional right to representation. Id. at 866. The federal court granted Atley relief because:

[T]he trial court’s dialogue improperly assumed answers to questions that were never asked and were necessary to its determination of whether the alleged conflict of interest required the substitution of new counsel.

Id. at 872.

The purpose of a colloquy is to provide fair notice of the obstacles inherent in self-representation before an accused embarks on so perilous an endeavor. The inquiry afforded Cooley was limited. He was informed of his right to counsel and told an attorney would be provided at no cost. He was not, however, warned of the dangers he would encounter as his own attorney. Nor was he advised with respect to the above mentioned criteria.

Although Cooley declared in his Motion to Proceed Pro Se that he was “fully advised of the pitfalls claimed to be associated with one representing himself,” the trial court did not attempt to ascertain which specific pitfalls defendant was aware of. Nor was any further inquiry made as to Cooley’s professed familiarity with the justice system and how that experience prepared him to represent himself. As in Atley, the trial court assumed answers to questions that were never asked.

The failure of the trial court to inquire and advise the defendant of the dangers of proceeding pro se leaves the record deficient to permit the reviewing court to properly determine whether the defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel was made knowingly and intelligently. Applying the standards and guides as established by the federal courts, we find the defendant was not afforded an adequate constitutional inquiry by the trial court.

D. Harmless Error

Irrespective of the trial court’s omission, the State asserts the goal of the colloquy rule was met and the record, as a whole, indicates defendant’s waiver was made knowingly and intelligently. This assertion is based on the fact that Cooley is an habitual felon, that he is familiar with our justice system, and that he has represented himself before. See State v. Cooley, 468 N.W.2d 833 (Iowa App.1991). The State points out that Cooley expressly indicated his desire to act pro se, that he had standby counsel, and that he was competent in the handling of his defense, as was demonstrated by his filing motions, conducting voir dire, making objections, examining witnesses, and preparing opening and closing statements.

The State is in essence arguing that the trial court’s failure to engage defendant in an appropriate dialogue amounts to harmless error. Generally, a constitutional error can be held harmless if it is proven so beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-11 (1967). The burden of providing such evidence rests squarely with the State. Id. Most constitutional errors can be held harmless. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7-8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 1833, 144 L.Ed.2d 35, 63 (1999); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1263, 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 329 (1991). However, it is well recognized that a limited class of fundamental constitutional errors defy analysis by harmless error standards. Neder, 527 U.S. at 7-8, 119 S.Ct. at 1833, 144 L.Ed.2d at 46; see also Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309, 111 S.Ct. at 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d at 331. Errors which affect substantive rights are so intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal without regard to their effect on the outcome. Neder, 527 U.S. at 7-8, 119 S.Ct. at 1833, 144 L.Ed.2d at 46. Such errors can be characterized as affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, as opposed to simple errors in the trial process. Id. at 7-8, 119 S.Ct. at 1833, 144 L.Ed.2d at 46; Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10, 111 S.Ct. at 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d at 331. These errors deprive defendants of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may then be regarded as fundamentally fair. Neder, 527 U.S. at 7-8, 119 S.Ct. at 1833, 144 L.Ed.2d at 46-47 (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3106, 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 470 (1986)).

The United States Supreme Court has declined to address the extent to which a Faretta hearing or inquiry is required to ensure a fair trial, and the federal circuit courts of appeal are split on the matter. See McDowell v. United States, 484 U.S. 980, 108 S.Ct. 478, 98 L.Ed.2d 492 (1987) (White, J. dissenting in the Court’s denial of certiorari). In Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150, 86 S.Ct. 1320, 16 L.Ed.2d 429 (1966), though, the conviction of a pro se defendant adjudged competent to stand trial was vacated, because the record failed to show the trial court fulfilled its “protecting duty” by conducting an inquiry to determine that the defendant competently and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Westbrook, 384 U.S. at 150, 86 S.Ct. at 1320, 16 L.Ed.2d at 430.

The Westbrook decision created some question as to whether the standard for competence to stand trial was the same as that required to waive the right to the assistance of counsel. The Court settled this controversy in Godinez where it was held the two standards were indeed the same, and that both would be based on the precedent set forth in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960). Godinez, 509 U.S. at 396, 113 S.Ct. at 2685, 125 L.Ed.2d at 330; see Dusky, 362 U.S. at 403, 80 S.Ct. at 789, 4 L.Ed.2d at 825 (a defendant must have the ability to consult a lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, as well as a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings).

In defining Westbrook, the Court noted that the focus of a competency hearing is on the defendant’s mental ability to understand the proceedings, whereas the purpose of a Faretta inquiry is to establish a defendant actually understands the significance and consequences of an uncoerced decision to proceed pro se. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401 n. 12, 113 S.Ct. at 2687 n. 12, 125 L.Ed.2d at 333 n. 12. The Court explained that it had a two-part inquiry in mind when it decided Westbrook, which

stands only for the unremarkable proposition that when a defendant seeks to waive his right to counsel, a determination that he is competent to stand trial is not enough; the waiver must also be intelligent and voluntary before it can be accepted.

Id. at 401, 113 S.Ct. at 2688, 125 L.Ed.2d at 333-34.

The Supreme Court’s reversal of the conviction in Westbrook was premised upon the trial court’s failure to satisfy the second prong of this test, i.e., that a voluntary and intelligent waiver had been proffered.

This court previously decided that harmless error analysis is not applicable to Sixth Amendment right to self-representation questions. Rater, 568 N.W.2d at 661. We based our decision in part on McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984), in which the Supreme Court noted that since the right to represent oneself is a right that, when exercised, usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant, its denial is not amenable to “harmless error” analysis. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. at 950 n. 8, 79 L.Ed.2d at 133 n. 8. “The right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless.” Id. at 177 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. at 950 n. 8, 79 L.Ed.2d at 133 n. 8. By corollary, just as depriving a defendant of the right to self representation fundamentally affects the process and outcome of a trial, so too does the invocation of that right. A defendant who has not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to counsel has effectively been denied representation. The denial of an attorney during the critical stages of a trial can never be construed as harmless error. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88, 109 S.Ct. 346, 354, 102 L.Ed.2d 300, 313-14 (1988). As we liken the acceptance of an invalid waiver to the deprivation of counsel, harmless error analysis cannot be utilized as a curative measure, regardless of whether prejudice results from the trial court’s error. Rater, 568 N.W.2d at 661.

Moreover, many of the criteria we might use to determine the existence of harmless error are not conducive to post-trial scrutiny. Some factors, like the nature of the charges, the education level of the defendant, and the defendant’s experience with the legal system are easily renewable at any point prior, or subsequent, to trial. Subjective factors, however, such as the defendant’s reasons for forgoing an attorney, defendant’s legitimate understanding of the charges and the consequences of a guilty verdict, as well as a knowledge of available defenses and the procedures that will be employed during trial, cannot be assessed under a harmless error analysis. Regardless of an accused’s experience, these factors are unique to every proceeding and will weigh heavily in the determination of a defendant’s ability to proceed pro se.

For these reasons a harmless error analysis cannot be utilized to cure the error incurred by an invalid acceptance of a defendant’s waiver of the constitutional right to counsel and the resultant election to proceed with self-representation.

Our analysis leads us to conclude that the proceedings by which Cooley was tried and convicted violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under the United States Constitution.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL.

All justices concur except CARTER, J., who dissents, and is joined by McGIVERIN, C.J., and LARSON, J.

CARTER, Justice

(dissenting).

The case should not turn on an extensive demonstration that Cooley was told he would run a terrible risk if he proceeded without counsel. He had counsel. To be sure, the court was told of Cooley’s intention of putting his attorney in a standby role. But judges should not be required to advise criminal defendants on trial strategy because such a requirement would arm them to manipulate the criminal justice system. See State v. Glanton, 231 N.W.2d 31, 35-36 (Iowa 1975) (judge should not contribute to advocate’s role in trial process). Defendant should not be able to obtain relief because his decision proved to be a mistake.

I would affirm.

McGIVERIN, C.J., and LARSON, J., join this dissent.

      . Prior to his arraignment, defendant filed an Application for Appointment of Counsel. Although the request was approved, a handwritten notation on the document indicates the defendant "does not want an attorney." Similarly, the Enrolled Order of defendant’s Initial Appearance, at which Cooley was present, states that the district court appointed counsel for the defendant but was aware that he did "not want an attorney.”


author: NEUMAN, Justice.

text:
    STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Kevin Gerald ANTENUCCI, Appellant.
    No. 99-0143.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    March 22, 2000.
    Curt Krull of Roehrick, Huitín, Krull & Blumberg, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha E. Boesen, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and John Heinicke, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
   NEUMAN, Justice.

This is an appeal by defendant, Kevin Antenueci, from the judgment and sentence entered on his pleas of guilty to two counts of forgery. See Iowa Code § 715A.2(l)(b), (2)(a)(3) (1997). We affirm.

Antenucci’s forgery convictions stem from his use of a stolen credit card to make two sizeable retail purchases. He urged dismissal of the charges in district court, claiming the state should have charged him with the less-serious offense of credit card fraud. See Iowa Code § 715A.6. When the court denied the motion to dismiss, Antenueci withdrew his plea of not guilty. He then entered an Alford plea to the original charges. It is the trial court’s dismissal ruling that An-tenucci seeks to challenge on appeal.

With limited exceptions, not pertinent here, a guilty plea taken in conformity with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(2)(b) waives all defenses and objections. State v. Yodprasit, 564 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Iowa 1997); State v. Worley, 297 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa 1980). “No provision is made in rule 8 for conditional pleas of guilty.” State v. Tobin, 333 N.W.2d 842, 844-45 (Iowa 1983). “[0]ur law recognizes only three pleas to a criminal charge: guilty, not guilty, or former judgment of conviction or acquittal of the offense charged.” State v. Dorr, 184 N.W.2d 673, 674 (Iowa 1971). A defendant seeking to challenge a guilty plea must do so by motion in arrest of judgment. Worley, 297 N.W.2d at 370. Failure to do so precludes the right to assert the challenge on appeal. Id.; Iowa R.Crim. P. 23(3)(a).

The record before us reveals strict adherence by the court to the plea colloquy required by rule 8(2)(b). Thereafter the court advised Antenueci of his right to file a motion in arrest of judgment, and he waived that right on the record. Antenuc-ci entered a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty to the charges for which he now stands convicted. The error he alleges on appeal was waived along the way. It has not been preserved for our review. See Dorr, 184 N.W.2d at 674 (explaining rationale for rejecting expedient, but unauthorized, “guilty plea with strings attached”). We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED.

All justices concur except CARTER, J., who takes no part.


author: McGIVERIN, Chief Justice.

text:
    CREDIT BUREAU ENTERPRISES, INC., Appellee, v. Russell N. PELO, Appellant.
    No. 98-1201.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    March 22, 2000.

      F. David Eastman of Eastman Law Office, Clear Lake, for appellant.
    John R. Cherry of Bryant & Cherry, Mason City, for appellee.
   McGIVERIN, Chief Justice.

In this appeal of a small claims decision, defendant Russell N. Pelo contends the district court erred by entering judgment against him for payment of a hospital bill.

Upon our review, we agree with the district court’s conclusion and judgment that defendant Pelo is personally liable for the hospital bill.

I. Background facts and proceedings.

On Sunday January 8,1995, at 3:00 a.m., the Hardin County Magistrate was contacted by Dr. Gude from the Ellsworth Municipal Hospital in Iowa Falls in regard to a patient, Russell N. Pelo. The record indicates that Pelo left his marital residence, after having an argument with his wife, and cheeked into a motel in Iowa Falls. Pelo later telephoned his wife “making threats of self harm” and purchased a shotgun. While the record is silent regarding the subsequent events, Pelo was apparently taken to the Ells-worth Municipal Hospital by the police, who had been advised of his threats.

Pursuant to the emergency hospitalization procedures set forth in Iowa Code section 229.22(3) and (4) (1995), the magistrate found probable cause that Pelo was seriously mentally impaired and likely to physically injure himself. The magistrate-thus entered an emergency hospitalization order on January 8, requiring that Pelo be detained in custody at the hospital’s psychiatric unit for examination and care for a period not to exceed forty-eight hours.

During admission to the hospital, Pelo was given a hospital release form to sign which would have made either Pelo or his insurance company responsible for the hospital bill. Pelo refused to sign the form. According to Pelo, at approximately five o’clock that morning, a nurse awakened him and demanded that he sign the hospital release form or the hospital could not insure the safety or return of his personal items. Pelo eventually read and signed the form. The form stated that Pelo understood he remained hable for any charges not covered by insurance.

Thereafter, Pelo’s wife filed an application for involuntary hospitalization of Pelo pursuant to Iowa Code section 229.6 and apparently an order for immediate hospitalization was entered by a hospitalization referee under Iowa Code section 229.11.

An evidentiary hearing was held before the judicial hospitalization referee on January 13, concerning Pelo’s commitment status. Medical reports and testimony were received by the referee. Pursuant to a written order, the hospitalization referee found that Pelo suffers from mental illness described as bipolar disorder, an illness from which Pelo has suffered for many years. In addition, the referee concluded “that although the Respondent [Pelo] clearly is in need of and would benefit from treatment for a serious mental illness, the required elements for involuntary hospitalization are lacking,” and that further involuntary hospitalization was not authorized. Pelo was released from the hospital and court jurisdiction as of January 13,1995.

The hospital later sought compensation from Pelo in the amount of $2,775.79 for medical services provided to him from January 8 to January 13, 1995. Pelo refused to pay the bill or authorize his health insurance carrier to do so. The hospital later assigned its claim against Pelo concerning the hospital bill to plaintiff Credit Bureau Enterprises, Inc., for collection. Plaintiff Credit Bureau filed a petition against Pelo on the small claims docket in district court, seeking judgment on the hospital bill. Credit Bureau later also named Cerro Gordo county as a defendant, based on the theory that the county, Pelo’s county of legal settlement, would be liable for mental health services provided to Pelo. See Iowa Code §§ 230.1, 230.2.

At a hearing concerning plaintiffs small claims petition, Pelo admitted that he was hospitalized from January 8 through January 13, 1995, but argued that he made no agreement to pay for services provided to him. Pelo explained that upon being admitted to the hospital, he refused to complete the hospital release form so that his health insurance carrier could be contacted for payment because he believed that he did not need evaluation or treatment. Pelo argued he later signed the release form under duress and that he did not agree to pay for medical services provided. Pelo stated he had health insurance and was not indigent at the time he was hospitalized.

The district associate judge concluded that there was no statutory requirement that Cerro Gordo county pay for medical services provided to Pelo during his hospitalization because Pelo was hospitalized at a private hospital and not a state hospital. See Iowa Code § 230.1. The court further concluded, however, that as a matter of public policy and under a reasonable interpretation of the involuntary commitment and mentally ill support statutes in Iowa Code chapters 229 and 230, Pelo could not be permitted to receive court-ordered services and then choose to ignore his responsibility to pay for those services. The court therefore entered judgment in favor of plaintiff Credit Bureau and against Pelo in the amount of $2,775.79, plus interest. The court also dismissed Credit Bureau’s claim against Cerro Gordo county.

Under Iowa Code section 631.13, Pelo appealed to a district court judge the district associate court’s decision that he was personally hable for the hospital bill. However, neither Pelo nor the plaintiff appealed that portion of the decision dismissing plaintiff’s claim against Cerro Gor-do county. The county is therefore not involved in this appeal and is out of the case.

On Pelo’s appeal, the district court judge affirmed. The court concluded that by signing the hospital form, Pelo had entered into a valid, enforceable contract to be financially responsible for the hospital bill. In doing so, the court rejected Pelo’s contention that the agreement was not enforceable because he allegedly signed the form under duress. In the alternative, the court concluded that Pelo was liable for payment of the hospital bill under a theory of contract implied in law or quasi-contract, based on the court’s conclusion that Pelo benefited from his hospitalization for which he should pay.

We granted Pelo’s application for discretionary review. See Iowa Code § 631.16.

II. Standard of review.

On discretionary review of a small claims action, see Iowa Code § 631.16, our standard of review depends on the nature of the case. Hyde v. Anania, 578 N.W.2d 647, 648 (Iowa 1998). If the action is a law case, we review the district judge’s ruling on error. Id. This small claims case began as an action to collect on account, which is a law action. In such cases, we review the judgment of the district court for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 4; Meier v. Sac & Fox Indian Tribe, 476 N.W.2d 61, 62 (Iowa 1991).

III. Defendant’s liability.

The issue we must decide is who pays for mental health medical services provided to a patient who is involuntarily committed to a private hospital. To answer this question, we first examine the applicable statutes governing involuntary hospitalization procedures for persons with mental illness.

A. Statutory provisions concerning emergency hospitalization and involuntary commitment, Iowa Code chapters 229 and 230.

Pelo was hospitalized at the Ellsworth Municipal Hospital, which has a mental health ward, pursuant to the emergency hospitalization provisions set forth in Iowa Code section 229.22.

Pursuant to the emergency hospitalization procedures outlined in section 229.22(2), a peace officer may take a person, whom the officer believes to be mentally ill and because of that illness is likely to physically injure the person’s self or others if not immediately detained, to the “nearest available facility as defined in section 229.11, subsections (2) and (3).” Possible facilities where the person may be taken include a “suitable hospital,” see Iowa Code § 229.11(2), or a facility in the community which is licensed to care for persons with mental illness, Iowa Code § 229.11(3). A “hospital” is defined as a public or private hospital. Iowa Code § 229.1(5).

Ellsworth Municipal Hospital is a private hospital, see Iowa Code section 229.1(9) (defining private hospital), as opposed to a public hospital, but would seem to be an appropriate facility for placement for purposes of emergency hospitalization proceedings. '

Iowa Code section 229.22(5) states that costs associated with the emergency hospitalization of a person at a public hospital shall be paid in the same way as if the person had been admitted to the hospital pursuant to involuntary commitment proceedings, see Iowa Code §§ 229.6-229.13. There appear to be no other relevant provisions in chapter 229 concerning payment of costs associated with emergency hospitalization or involuntary commitment of a person at a private hospital.

Pursuant to Iowa Code sections 230.1 and 230.10, a patient’s county of legal settlement is liable for costs and expenses associated with the custody, care and commitment of the patient at a state hospital. The term “state hospital” refers to the facilities in Mount Pleasant, Independence, Clarinda and Cherokee, Iowa, see Iowa Code § 226.1, and thus would not include a private hospital such as Ellsworth Municipal Hospital. A county paying such costs, however, could seek reimbursement from the patient or from persons liable for the patient’s support pursuant to Iowa Code section 230.15. Additionally, Iowa Code section 227.14 provides that where a county does not have proper facilities for caring for persons with mental illness, the county board of supervisors may provide for such care at the expense of the county in any private institution for persons with mental illness. No such provision was made by Cerro Gordo county in the present case.

Although sections 230.1 and 230.10 clearly impose a duty on a patient’s county of legal settlement to pay for costs associated with emergency hospitalization or involuntary commitment of the patient at a state hospital, there appears to be no statutory provision, other than section 227.14, which requires a county to pay for such costs incurred at a private hospital. See 1991 Op. Iowa Att’y Gen. 135, 136 (“There is no mandatory requirement or provision in chapter 230 that requires a county to pay for cost of mental health treatment at a private facility.”). Nor is there any specific statutory provision addressing a patient’s financial responsibility for such costs at a private hospital. The only discussion in chapter 230 concerning a patient’s liability for medical costs is in Iowa Code section 230.18, which states that the estates of persons legally bound for the support of persons with mental illness who are treated in any county or private hospital shall be liable to the county for the reasonable cost of such support. Thus, while it is clear that a patient’s county of legal settlement is liable for costs associated with emergency hospitalization or involuntary commitment at a state hospital, there seems to be a gap in the statutory framework concerning who must pay for such costs incurred at a private hospital.

B. Liability under implied contract theory.

The district court judge concluded that Pelo was liable for payment of the private hospital bill under a contract implied in law or quasi-contract theory.

1. Applicable law.

“A contract implied in law is an obligation imposed by the law without regard to either party’s expressions of assent either by words or acts.” Irons v. Community State Bank, 461 N.W.2d 849, 855 (Iowa App.1990) (citing Corbin on Contracts § 19 (1952)). Such contracts do not arise from the traditional bargaining process, but rather “rest on a legal fiction arising from considerations of justice and the equitable principles of unjust enrichment.” Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 177 (Iowa 1993). As such, they are not real contracts and the general rules of contracts therefore do not apply to them. Id.; accord 1 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 1:6, at 27 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed.1990) (hereinafter “Williston”). More specifically, the contracts clause of article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution does not apply to quasi-contracts. Williston, § 1:6, at 27.

“Restitution and unjust enrichment are modern designations for the older doctrine of quasi contracts or contracts implied in law, sometimes called constructive contracts.” Robert’s River Rides v. Steamboat Dev. Corp., 520 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Iowa 1994) (citations omitted). The term “ ‘unjust enrichment is an equitable principle mandating that one shall not be permitted to unjustly enrich oneself at the expense of another or to receive property or benefits without making compensation for them.’ ” Id. (quoting West Branch State Bank v. Gates, 477 N.W.2d 848, 851-52 (Iowa 1991)). Under these principles, where a person acts to confer benefits on another in a setting in which the actor is not acting officiously, the benefited party may be required to make restitution to the actor. Okoboji Camp Owners Co-op. v. Carlson, 578 N.W.2d 652, 654 (Iowa 1998) (citing Restatement of Restitution §§ 1, 2 (1936)). Thus, where a person performs services for another which are known to and accepted by the latter, the law implies a promise to pay for those services. Patterson v. Patterson’s Estate, 189 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Iowa 1971); Snyder v. Nixon, 188 Iowa 779, 781, 176 N.W. 808, 809 (1920) (“The general rule is that where one renders services of value to another with his knowledge and consent, the presumption is that the one rendering the services expects to be compensated, and that the one to whom the services are rendered intends to pay for the same, and so the law implies a promise to pay.”).

The Restatement of Restitution states that “[a] person who officiously confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution therefor.” Restatement of Restitution § 2. Under this rule, recovery is denied so that one will not have to pay for a benefit forced upon one against one’s will, see 1 E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 2.20, at 173 (2d ed.1998), or for which one did not request or knowingly accept. See Nursing Care Servs. v. Dobos, 380 So.2d 516, 518 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (referring to rule as the “officious intermeddler doctrine”).

In certain circumstances, however, restitution for services performed will be required even though the recipient did not request or voluntarily consent to receive such services. For example, section 116 of the Restatement of Restitution provides:

A person who has supplied things or services to another, although acting without the other’s knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution therefor from the other if
(a) he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor, and
(b) the things or services were necessary to prevent the other from suffering serious bodily harm or pain, and
(c) the person supplying them had no reason to know that the other would not consent to receiving them, if mentally competent; and
(d) it was impossible for the other to give consent or, because of extreme youth or mental impairment, the other’s consent would have been immaterial

(Emphasis added.) Comment b to section 116 states:

Knowledge of dissent. There can be no restitution for services or things rendered to a person who refuses to accept the services and who is of sufficient mental capacity to understand the necessity of receiving them. ... If however, the person is insane, or if he is otherwise not fully mentally competent, ... a person rendering necessaries or professional services is entitled to recover from such person under the conditions stated in this Section, although the person expresses an unwillingness to accept the things or services.

(Emphasis added.)

In addition to the principles set forth in the Restatement of Restitution discussed above, cases from other jurisdictions have concluded that a patient is liable for the reasonable value of medical services rendered by a hospital based on an implied in law contract theory. See Nursing Care Servs., 380 So.2d at 518 (concluding that provider of nursing care services was entitled to value of services provided to patient based on emergency aid quasi-contract theory); Galloway v. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 658 N.E.2d 611, 614 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (holding that equity demanded that patients pay for medical services rendered by hospital in birth of child to prevent unjust enrichment); Heartland Health Sys. v. Chamberlin, 871 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Mo.Ct.App.1993) (affirming on appeal judgment entered in favor of hospital against patient for payment of medical services under quantum meruit theory); Morehead v. Conley, 75 Ohio App.3d 409, 599 N.E.2d 786, 789 (1991) (holding defendant liable under quasi-contract theory for reasonable value of services rendered by physician); Potter v. McPherson, 198 W.Va. 158, 479 S.E.2d 668, 675 (1996) (holding that hospital had claim against patient based on implied contract for reasonable value of services rendered even though patient was not fully compensated by settlement with at-fault party; medical provider’s claim rests upon debtor-creditor relationship and cannot be extinguished by doctrine of sub-rogation).

2. Application of law to facts.

The district court concluded that Pelo benefítted by his hospitalization and that Pelo was liable for medical services rendered to him. Upon our review, we agree with the district court’s decision.

We first point out that Pelo does not challenge the factual basis for his hospitalization. Nor is it likely that such a challenge would be successful given the fact that the necessary probable cause findings concerning emergency hospitalization by the magistrate, see Iowa Code § 229.22(3), and involuntary commitment procedures by the hospitalization referee, see Iowa Code § 229.11, were made. These fact-finding requirements are in place to guarantee a patient’s liberty and due process interests when the state exercises its authority through emergency hospitalization and involuntary commitment proceedings. This authority is based on the standard for commitment, “serious mental impairment” as defined in section 229.1(14), which “melds the important elements of the police power and parens patriae doctrine.” B.A.A. v. University of Iowa Hosps., 421 N.W.2d 118, 122-23 (Iowa 1988) (discussing historical background of state’s authority in involuntary commitment proceedings).

Pelo also does not challenge the hospitalization referee’s finding that he suffers from mental illness described as bipolar disorder. Nor does Pelo challenge the district court’s finding that $2,775.79 was the reasonable cost of services provided to him during his hospitalization. Pelo contends, however, that he has no duty to pay for those services because he did not ask to be hospitalized and derived no benefit from his hospitalization. Pelo bases his argument, in part, on the hospitalization referee’s finding made after the commitment hearing that further hospitalization was not authorized (based on a finding that there was not clear and convincing evidence that Pelo was seriously mentally impaired, see Iowa Code § 229.13). Pelo apparently interprets the referee’s decision to mean that he should not have been hospitalized in the first place and that he therefore derived no benefit from his hospitalization.

We find no merit in these contentions. First, the hospitalization referee’s final decision is not relevant to Pelo’s duty to pay for services previously rendered to him by the hospital. The referee’s decision only addressed the propriety of any future hospitalization, not whether there was an adequate basis for hospitalization of Pelo in the first place or whether he medically benefited from his hospitalization.

Second, Pelo’s opinion as to whether he needed or consented to medical services provided to him during his hospitalization is essentially irrelevant. This is because the emergency hospitalization order, which was based on the magistrate’s probable cause finding that Pelo was seriously mentally impaired, see Iowa Code § 229.22(3), establishes that Pelo lacked sufficient judgment to make responsible decisions concerning hospitalization and lacked the ability to consent to treatment. See Iowa Code § 229.1(14) (defining “seriously mentally impaired”).

Additionally, like the district court, we find that Pelo’s hospitalization was indeed of medical benefit to him. The hospital provided services to Pelo from January 8 to 13, 1995, in good faith and not gratuitously. Such services were provided for Pelo’s benefit, pursuant to court orders based on probable cause findings that Pelo was seriously mentally impaired and likely to injure himself or others if not immediately detained in the hospital. Based on the later reports of the physicians who examined and evaluated Pelo during his hospitalization, the referee found that Pelo “clearly is in need of and would benefit from treatment for a serious mental illness.” This finding, we believe, would at a minimum alert Pelo to the seriousness of his mental illness and the need for further treatment, a fact that would surely be of medical benefit to him. The fact that Pelo was involuntarily hospitalized in order that this evaluation and finding could be made, and the fact that he may disagree with whether this finding is of medical benefit to him, does not eliminate the medical benefit he received from such hospitalization.

We conclude that plaintiff is entitled to recover the value of those medical services provided to Pelo. See Restatement of Restitution § 116 cmt. b (if a person is otherwise not fully mentally competent, a person rendering necessaries or professional services is entitled to recover from such person although the person expresses an unwillingness to accept the services). The district court therefore properly determined that Pelo was legally obligated to pay for those services based on an implied in law contract theory. See Heartland Health Sys., 871 S.W.2d at 11 (affirming on appeal judgment entered in favor of hospital against patient for payment of medical services under quantum meruit theory).

Because we conclude that Pelo is legally obligated to pay for medical services provided to him under an implied contract in law or quasi-contract theory, we need not consider whether an express contract was formed based on Pelo’s later signature on the hospital admission form. See Johnson v. Dodgen, 451 N.W.2d 168, 175 (Iowa 1990) (the existence of a contract generally precludes the application of the doctrine of unjust enrichment); Chariton Feed & Grain, Inc. v. Harder, 869 N.W.2d 777, 791 (Iowa 1985) (an express and an implied contract cannot be found to exist on the same subject matter).

C. Constitutional claims.

Pelo further contends that to require him to pay for medical services he did not want or ask for violates either his constitutional right to due process under article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution, or his right to contract under article I, section 21 of the Iowa Constitution. These contentions have no merit. First, quasi-contracts are not true contracts and therefore the general rules of contract, including the constitutional provisions concerning the right to contract, do not apply to them. See Williston, § 1:6, at 27.

Additionally, we point out that Pelo does not assert that the emergency hospitalization or involuntary commitment proceedings are constitutionally invalid. Based on this fact, and the preliminary factual probable cause findings of the magistrate and hospitalization referee that Pelo was seriously mentally impaired, we assume that Pelo’s involuntary hospitalization complied with the requisite procedural due process safeguards. Having established these facts, holding Pelo liable for payment of the medical services provided to him during his hospitalization does not violate his constitutional right to due process or his right to contract under the Iowa Constitution.

IV. Disposition.

We conclude that the district court properly determined that defendant Pelo was hable for payment of mental health medical services provided to him during his hospitalization at Ellsworth Municipal Hospital under a quasi-contract theory. The court therefore properly entered judgment in favor of plaintiff Credit Bureau against defendant Pelo for the amount of the hospital bill.

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED.

All justices concur except CARTER, J., who takes no part.

      . Before its repeal in 1981, Iowa Code section 444.12 imposed a duty on counties to pay for the costs of mental health treatment at private facilities:
      The board of supervisors of each county shall establish a county mental health and institutions fund, from which shall be paid:
      3. The cost of care and treatment of persons placed in the county hospital, county care facility, a health care facility as defined in section 135C.1, subsection 8, or any other public or private facility:
      a. In lieu of admission or commitment to a state mental health institute .... See 1980 Op. Iowa Att’y Gen. 425, 427 (stating that under Iowa Code § 444.12(3) a county of legal settlement is liable for costs of care in a private psychiatric facility to which a person is committed in lieu of a state mental health institute); 1980 Op. Iowa Att’y Gen. 359 (1979) (stating that county is liable for costs of care and treatment of mentally ill patients in private facilities under Iowa Code § 444.12(3)).
      Iowa Code section 444.12 was repealed in 1981 and no other code provision was enacted in its place concerning a county's duty to pay for mental health treatment in a private facility.

        . "Officiousness means interference in the affairs of others not justified by the circumstances under which the interference takes place." Restatement of Restitution § 2 cmt. a.

      . Another illustration explains:
      A is seriously hurt in an accident. Becoming hysterical with pain, he fights his rescuers and refuses to permit anyone to touch him. Over his protests, B, a surgeon, renders first aid services in stopping a hemorrhage which soon would have caused A's death. B is entitled to compensation from A.
      Restatement of Restitution § 116 cmt. b, illus. 4.


author: CARTER, Justice.

text:
    Solomon STRADT, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
    No. 98-1923.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    March 22, 2000.
    See also, 556 N.W.2d 149.

      Patrick J. Kelly, Bettendorf, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha E. Boesen, Assistant Attorney General, William E. Davis, County Attorney, and Michael J. Walton, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
   CARTER, Justice.

Postconviction applicant, Solomon Stradt, has appealed from the denial of his application for postconviction relief. In that application, he challenged his sentence following conviction of burglary in the third degree and theft in the first degree as being illegal. He also asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the sentence as illegal at the time it was imposed. Because an illegal sentence may be challenged at any time, we believe that the legality of the sentence is the only issue for review. We need not consider the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The postconviction applicant was convicted of third-degree burglary and first-degree theft growing out of the same transaction. Because he had twice previously been convicted of a felony, the court imposed, as to each of these convictions, an enhanced fifteen-year indeterminate sentence as provided in Iowa Code section 902.9(2) (1997) for an habitual offender. In addition, the court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively.

The applicant’s claim of illegal sentence appears to involve two contentions: (1) that when a person, twice before convicted of a felony, commits two additional felonies growing out of the same transaction, the habitual-offender sentencing enhancement may only be applied to one and not both of the latter two felony convictions; and (2) that if one or both of the sentences on the latter two felony convictions are enhanced under the habitual-offender statute then the sentences for the two offenses may not be made consecutive.

In support of this contention; Stradt relies on cases from other jurisdictions. In Turner v. Holland, 175 W.Va. 202, 332 S.E.2d 164, 166 (1985), the defendant was convicted of sexual abuse and Burglary and was given five-year enhancements on both counts under that state’s recidivist statute. These sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. On ¿¿peal it was held that the five-year-enhancement provisions could only be imposed as to one of the counts of the indictment on which defendant had been convicted. In Wallace v. State, 673 So.2d 910, 911 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996), the court held that “[w]hen the sentencing court enhances a sentence pursuant to the habitual offender statute, the court may not further enhance the penalty by ordering the individual sentences to be served consecutively if the violations occurred during a single criminal episode.”

We do not believe that either of the cases from other jurisdictions relied on by the applicant are reflective of Iowa law. This court has recognized that

if accused ... is convicted on several counts of an indictment, and each count is for a separate and distinct offense, a separate sentence may be pronounced on each count, and the court may pronounce separate and distinct sentences which are cumulative, and are to run consecutively. This is true, even though the several offenses were committed in the course of a single transaction.

State v. Criswell, 242 N.W.2d 259, 260 (Iowa 1976) (quoting 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1567(3), at 424). We have held that, following a conviction of two felonies, a third and fourth felony offense may both be enhanced under the habitual-offender law. State v. Gaskey, 255 Iowa 967, 972-73, 124 N.W.2d 723, 725-26 (1963). Although the offenses involved in Gaskey did not arise from the same transaction, this is not significant because the sentencing statutes on single-count indictments and multiple-count indictments are identical. A court is required to impose the proper statutory sentence for each felony count for which a defendant is convicted. The statute prescribing the sentences in the present case provides:

The maximum sentence for any person convicted of a felony ... if other than a class “A” felony shall be determined as follows:
2. An habitual offender shall be confined for no more than fifteen years.

Iowa Code § 902.9(2). This statute manifestly mandates an indeterminate fifteen-year sentence for both of the applicant’s convictions under the multicount indictment.

With respect to the issue of consecutive sentences, the applicable statute provides:

If a person is sentenced for two or more separate offenses, the sentencing judge may order the second or further sentence to begin at the expiration of the first or succeeding sentence.

Iowa Code § 901.8. In applying this statute to Stradt’s situation, the sentences to which section 901.8 refers include the enhanced sentences because they were the legal sentences provided for the crimes that were committed.

We have considered all issues presented and conclude that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

      . In State v. Aguiar-Corona, 508 N.W.2d 698, 703-04 (Iowa 1993), we approved multiple-enhancement penalties based on the use of a firearm with respect to each offense of a multiple-offense indictment. In that case, we discussed a federal habeas corpus decision on an Iowa conviction that this court had dismissed under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 104. In that case, the firearm enhancement had been applied to each conviction in a four-count indictment and the four enhanced sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. See Frink v. Iowa, 968 F.2d 734, 737 (8th Cir.1992). The federal court found that these sentences were not improper.