author: HUSPENI, Judge.

text:
    Raymond L. SEMLER, Appellant, v. Erick KLANG, Crow Wing County Sheriff, Respondent, Rick Koop, Chief Investigator for Crosby Police Department, et al., Respondents.
    No. A06-1852.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Dec. 18, 2007.
    Review Denied Feb. 19, 2008.

      Raymond L. Semler, Moose Lake, MN, pro se.
    Kristy A. Saum, James R. Andreen, Er-stad & Riemer, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for respondent Erick Klang.
    Jon K. Iverson, Jason M. Hiveley, Iver-son Reuvers, LLC, Bloomington, MN, for respondents Rick Koop, John A. Bolduc, and Kyle Huber.
    Considered and decided by TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge; LANSING, Judge; and HUSPENI, Judge.
   OPINION

HUSPENI, Judge.

Respondents Kyle Huber (the Staples police chief), Rick Koop (the Crosby police department chief investigator), John Bol-duc (the Brainerd police chief), and Erick Klang (the Crow Wing county sheriff), acting under Minn.Stat. § 244.052 (2000) and MinmStat. § 244.052 (2002), notified communities about the presence of appellant Raymond Semler, a risk level II sex offender. Appellant brought this action against them, alleging that the community notifications violated his rights and constituted slander and defamation. The claims against Huber, Koop, and Bolduc were dismissed on the ground of official immunity, and the claims against Klang were dismissed on the grounds of improper service and expiration of the statute of limitations. Appellant challenges the dismissals.

FACTS

Appellant Raymond Semler was born in January 1976. In 1989, he assaulted a 14-year-old girl, but no conviction resulted. In 1993, he assaulted and raped a 17-year-old girl, but again, no conviction resulted. In 1997, he was convicted of criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree and of kidnapping after assaulting an adult woman. He was placed on probation. In July 2000, his probation was revoked and he was confined to the correctional facility at Moose Lake.

Prior to appellant’s release, the end-of-confinement review committee (ECRC) categorized him as a risk level II sex offender. Appellant’s risk assessment report said he “has a definite pattern of harassing females” and that “the juvenile investigations occurred but there were no charges or convictions.”

Appellant was released on December 31, 2001. In January 2002, the Deerwood Police Department notified the public of appellant’s release. The notice stated that appellant “has a history of forced sexual contact with females (ranging in age from 14 to adult). The contact includes fondling and penetration. The offender uses physical force to gain compliance. The offender was unknown to the victims.” The Deer-wood police department again provided this notice to the public in December 2002, when appellant was released after having been incarcerated following the August 2002 revocation of his probation. The Crow Wing county sheriffs department provided the same notice to the public in June 2003, when appellant was released after having been incarcerated in February 2003, following another probation revocation. The Brainerd police department provided the notice to the public when appellant changed his address in July 2003, and the Staples police department provided it when he again changed his address in August 2003.

In November 2005, acting pro se, appellant brought this action against respondents, alleging that the community notification violated his rights and constituted slander and defamation.

The district court dismissed appellant’s claims against Huber, Koop, and Bolduc after determining that they “erred in disclosing information ‘inconsistent with offender’s conviction history’” under Minn. Stat. § 244.052 subd. 7(c) (2006), but that they were entitled to official immunity because they “did not engage in willful or malicious disclosures to injure [appellant’s] reputation,” and “disclosed that information, which in their discretion, allowed them to protect the public.” The district court subsequently dismissed appellant’s claims against Klang after determining that appellant had failed to serve Klang, and that the statute of limitations had run on all claims made by appellant against Klang. Appellant now challenges dismissal of all claims.

ISSUES

1. Does Minn.Stat. § 244.052, subd. 7(c) (2006), preclude official immunity for officers who disclose information about a sex offender that is not “consistent with the offender’s conviction history?”

2. Does Minn.Stat. § 541.06 (2006) apply to police officers?

3. Does unacknowledged service by mail confer jurisdiction?

4. Does Minn.Stat. § 541.06 preclude an action against a sheriff if more than three years have passed since the act complained of?

ANALYSIS

1. Official immunity of respondents Huber, Koop, and Bolduc

The application of official immunity is a question of law, which we review de novo. Thompson v. City of Minneapolis, 707 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Minn.2006).

Appellant was a risk level II sex offender. He alleges that Koop’s offense occurred prior to December 31, 2001, and that Bolduc’s and Huber’s offenses occurred in July 2003 and August 2003, respectively. At these times, disclosure to the public of information on sex offenders of various risk levels was governed by Minn.Stat. § 244.052 (2000) and Minn.Stat. § 244.052 (2002). Understanding the relevant subdivisions in their context requires a comprehensive review of the statute.

Subdivision 1(2) defines “law enforcement agency” as “the law enforcement agency having primary jurisdiction over the location where the offender expects to reside upon release.” Subdivision 2 directs the commissioner of corrections to “develop a risk assessment scale” that “specifies the risk level to which offenders with various risk assessment scores shall be assigned.”

Subdivision 3(a) provides for the establishment of an “end-of-confinement review committee” at each state correctional facility. Subdivision 3(c) provides that the committee shall have access to an offender’s private medical data, private and confidential court services data, private and confidential corrections data, and private criminal history data, and also that data collected and maintained by the committee may not be disclosed outside the committee. Subdivision 3(e) provides that a sex offenders whose risk assessment score indicates a low risk of reoffense shall be assigned to level I; those whose score indicates a moderate risk shall be assigned to level II, and those whose score indicates a high risk shall be assigned to level III. Subdivision 3(f) provides that, before an offender’s release, the committee “shall prepare a risk assessment report which specifies the risk level to which the offender has been assigned and the reasons underlying the committee’s risk assessment decision” and “shall give the report to the offender and to the law enforcement agency at least 60 days before an offender is released from confinement.”

Subdivision 4 provides in relevant part:

(a) The law enforcement agency in the area where the sex offender resides, expects to reside, is employed, or is regularly found, shall disclose to the public any information regarding the offender contained in [the risk assessment] report ... that is relevant and necessary to protect the public and to counteract the offender’s dangerousness, consistent with the guidelines in paragraph (b). The extent of the information disclosed and the community to whom disclosure is made must relate to the level of danger posed by the offender, to the offender’s pattern of offending behavior, and to the need of community members for information to enhance their individual and collective safety.
(b) The law enforcement agency shall employ the following guidelines in determining the scope of disclosure made under this subdivision:
(1) if the offender is assigned to risk level I, the agency may maintain information regarding the offender within the agency and may disclose it to other law enforcement agencies....;
(2) if the offender is assigned to risk level II, the agency also may disclose the information to agencies and groups that the offender is likely to encounter for the purpose of securing those institutions and protecting individuals in their care while they are on or near the premises of the institution.... The agency also may disclose the information to individuals the agency believes are likely to be victimized by the offender. The agency’s belief shall be based on the offender’s pattern of offending or victim preference as documented in the information provided by the department of corrections or human services;
(3) if the offender is assigned to risk level III, the agency shall disclose the information to the persons and entities described in clauses (1) and (2) and to other members of the community whom the offender is likely to encounter, unless the law enforcement agency determines that public safety would be compromised by the disclosure or that a more limited disclosure is necessary to protect the identity of the victim.

Subdivision 4(c) defines those an offender is “likely to encounter” as those in, or in close proximity to, a location where the offender lives or is employed or which the offender is likely to visit on a regular basis. Subdivision 4(d) provides that a law enforcement agency or official who discloses information “shall make a good faith effort to make the notification within 14 days of receipt of a confirmed address.” Subdivision 5 provides that the law enforcement agency where an offender plans to reside is to be given all relevant information concerning the offender, including information on risk factors in the offender’s history and the risk level to which the offender was assigned, by the appropriate department (corrections or human services) within five days of the department’s receipt of the offender’s approved release plan.

Finally, subdivision 7 provides that no criminal liability will attach for either disclosing or failing to disclose information as permitted by this section, that no civil liability will attach for failing to disclose such information, and that no civil liability will attach for disclosing “information that is consistent with the offender’s conviction history.” Subdivision 7 also provides that this immunity does not extend to disclosure of information relating to conduct for which the offender was not convicted.

The district court found that Huber, Koop, and Bolduc had disclosed information relating to conduct for which appellant was not convicted, and we agree that the statutory immunity provided by subdivision 7 is not available to these respondents. But we also agree with the district court that official immunity is available to them.

“A public official is not protected by [official] immunity in the performance of his duties when he fails to perform a ministerial act, or when his performance of a discretionary act is willful or malicious.” Thompson, 707 N.W.2d at 673. Thus, the first question before us is whether the conduct of Huber, Koop, and Bolduc was ministerial or discretionary. If it was discretionary, the second question becomes whether they acted willfully or maliciously.

A discretionary act requires the exercise of individual judgment in carrying out duties, while a ministerial act involves merely the execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts. Id. The language of Minn.Stat. § 244.052 both presupposes and requires that law enforcement officials use their individual judgment. Subdivision 4(b) provides “guidelines” to assist law enforcement officials “in determining the scope of disclosure.” Subdivision 4(b)(1) and (2) provide that an agency “may” disclose information about risk level I and risk level II offenders, while subdivision 4(b)(3) provides that the agency “shall” disclose information “unless [it] determines that public safety would be compromised” by the disclosure. In construing statutes, “may” is permissive and “shall” is mandatory. Minn.Stat. § 645.44, subds. 15, 16 (2006). At no point does MinmStat. § 244.052 either mandate or forbid disclosure without reference to the diselosers’ judgment as to what to disclose and to whom to disclose it. Thus, disclosure of information under Minn.Stat. § 244.052 is a discretionary act.

The subdivision 7 provision of immunity from civil liability for all failures to disclose but only for disclosures of information consistent with an offender’s conviction history is consistent with the requirement that even discretionary acts must be performed without malice for official immunity to attach. See Thompson, 707 N.W.2d at 673 (public official not protected by official immunity when performance of discretionary act is willful or malicious). While a public official’s decision to disclose information other than what is consistent with an offender’s conviction history could be willful or malicious, and would therefore not be entitled to official immunity, clearly such is not demonstrated here.

Mere allegations of malice are not sufficient to support a finding of malice, as such a finding must be based on “specific facts evidencing bad faith.” Reuter v. City of New Hope, 449 N.W.2d 745, 751 (Minn.App.1990), review denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 1990). Nothing in the record indicates that the motive of Huber, Koop, and Bol-duc were the bad-faith deprecation of appellant rather than their attempt to follow statutory mandates and guidelines and to protect individuals in the areas where appellant was residing. The notice about appellant referred to forced sexual conduct with females “ranging in age from 14 to adult” and appellant’s only conviction resulted from an incident with an adult. But appellant’s risk-assessment report said he “has a definite pattern of harassing females” and that “the juvenile investigations occurred but there were no charges or convictions.” Minn.Stat. § 244.052, subd 4(a), provides for disclosure of information in the risk-assessment report. Minn.Stat. § 244.052, subd. 4(b)(2), provides that, for risk level II offenders, “[t]he agency also may disclose the information to individuals the agency believes are likely to be victimized by the offender. The agency’s belief shall be based on the offender’s pattern of offending or victim preference as documented in the information provided by the department of corrections or human services.”

Although the disclosures of Huber, Koop, and Bolduc may have deprived them of the protections of subdivision 7, the district court properly continued its analysis by considering the application of official immunity to the challenged actions. We conclude, as did the district court, that Huber, Koop, and Bolduc acted in a manner intended to comply with the statute, and that they were entitled to official immunity.

2. Statute of limitations for Huber, Koop, and Bolduc

In November 2005, appellant filed his complaint alleging that Koop committed slander and defamation prior to December 31, 2001, that Bolduc did so in July 2003, and that Huber did so in August 2003. Minn.Stat. § 541.07(1) (2004) provides that actions for these torts shall be commenced within two years. Appellant relies on Minn.Stat. § 541.06 (2004), which provides that actions against “a sheriff, coroner, or constable for any act done in an official capacity” shall be commenced within three years. But Minn.Stat. § 541.06 does not mention “police officer,” and “this court cannot add language that is not present in the statute or supply what the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks.” Roer v. Dunham, 682 N.W.2d 179, 181 (Minn.App.2004).

Appellant argues that “constable” means “police officer” but offers no support for this argument. Moreover, the legislature’s practice has been to use both terms. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 18 (2004) (defining “peace officer” to include both “a constable” and a “police officer of any municipality”); Minn.Stat. § 631.04 (2004) (“A police officer, constable, sheriff, or other officer in charge of a court....”). Thus, the terms are not synonymous. The three-year limitation of Minn.Stat. § 541.06 (2004) does not apply to police officers and appellant’s claims are barred by the two-year limitation of Minn.Stat. § 541.07(1).

3. Service on Klang

This court reviews de novo whether service of process was proper. Amdahl v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 484 N.W.2d 811, 814 (Minn.App.1992), review denied (Minn. July 16, 1992). Appellant chose to serve Klang by mail, which is governed by Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05:

In any action service may be made by mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint (by first-class mail, postage prepaid) to the person to be served, together with two copies of a notice and acknowledgement conforming substantially to Form 22 and a return envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to the sender. If acknowledgment of service under this rule is not received by the sender within the time defendant is required by these rules to serve an answer, service shall be ineffectual.

It is undisputed that appellant mailed Klang a copy of the complaint and other documents twice — once on October 13, 2005 and once on June 15, 2006 — -and that Klang never acknowledged service. Service, therefore, was ineffective, and the district court properly dismissed the claims against Klang because it had no jurisdiction over him. See Mercer v. Andersen, 715 N.W.2d 114, 118 (Minn.App.2006) (“Ineffective service of a defendant results in a lack of personal jurisdiction.”).

4. Statute of limitations for Klang

The construction and application of a statute of limitations are questions of law, which this court reviews de novo. Benigni v. County of St. Louis, 585 N.W.2d 51, 54 (Minn.1998).

Minn.Stat. § 541.06 provides that an action against a sheriff for an act performed in an official capacity must be brought within three years. Appellant claimed that the sheriffs actions of which he complained occurred on January 7, 2002, and June 23, 2003. The district court determined on September 22, 2006, that neither of appellant’s attempts to serve Klang had been effective. Because more than three years had elapsed since the acts complained of occurred, the district court did not err in dismissing with prejudice the claims against Klang on the ground that the statute of limitations had run.

DECISION

Because Huber, Koop, and Bolduc were entitled to official immunity for their good-faith notification of communities about appellant, and because the relevant statute of limitations had run when appellant brought his claims against them, we affirm the dismissal of those claims. Because Klang was never properly served and the relevant statute of limitations had run, we affirm the dismissal of the claims against him.

Affirmed.

       Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 10.

      . Appellant has since been indeterminately committed as a sexually dangerous person (SDP). See In re Civil Commitment of Semler, No. A06-2213, 2007 WL 969081, at *3 (Minn.App. Apr.3, 2007) (concluding that appellant "engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct” and upholding his commitment as SDP), review denied (Minn. May 30, 2007). We note that appellant's motion to strike references to Semler from the record was denied in this court's order dated June 8, 2007.

      . These statutes are identical in all parts relevant to this matter.

      . After describing the offense for which appellant was found guilty, the risk assessment report also describes several incidents that did not result in conviction, including one in which appellant "was investigated for grabbing a 14-year old female and dragging her across a road toward a house.” Appellant does not claim that the committee included any improper data in the risk assessment report.

      . Because we conclude that Huber, Koop, and Bolduc were entitled to official immunity, we do not address their argument that they are entitled to absolute immunity.

      . This issue was presented to, but not addressed by the district court, which dismissed the claims against Huber, Koop, and Bolduc on the ground of official immunity. We address it in the interest of completeness. See Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 103.04.

      . Minn.Stat. § 541.06 (2006) has been revised to impose the three-year limitation on actions “against a sheriff or coroner.” References to constables have been deleted from Minnesota statutes. See 2005 Minn. Laws ch. 10, art. 2, § 4, subd. 2, at 137 (directing revisor to eliminate references to the term “constable”).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WRIGHT, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Lillian Virginia SIMMONS, Appellant, v. Joan FABIAN, Commissioner of Corrections, in her Official and Individual Capacities, Respondent.
    No. A06-2308.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Dec. 31, 2007.

      Bradford Colbert, Legal Assistance to Minnesota Prisoners, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.
    Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Kelly S. Kemp, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.
    Considered and decided by PETERSON, Presiding Judge; WILLIS, Judge; and WRIGHT, Judge.
   OPINION

WRIGHT, Judge.

Appellant challenges an order dismissing her complaint, arguing that the district court erred by ruling that respondent was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim seeking injunctive relief. We reverse and remand.

FACTS

Appellant Lillian Simmons is currently serving an indeterminate life sentence based on a 1989 conviction of first-degree felony murder, a violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.185(3) (1988). Under the law in effect when she was convicted, Simmons was eligible for parole after serving 17 years of her sentence. See Minn.Stat. § 244.05, subd. 4 (1988). Respondent Joan Fabian is the Minnesota Commissioner of Corrections, the executive-branch official ultimately responsible for parole decisions in the state.

In March 2003, the commissioner met with an advisory panel to review Simmons’s file and establish a projected release date. Although Simmons was eligible for parole in October 2006, the commissioner continued review of her file until 2010. She explained her decision in a letter to Simmons:

As you may know, no life-sentenced inmate now gets out at their minimum parole eligibility date, since the purposeful taking-of-a-life requires more than minimum accountability time. Even if an inmate’s prison discipline record is perfectly clean, which yours is not, and they have done everything they can to prepare themselves for release, which you have been striving to do, there will still be [a] number of years beyond their minimum to serve before release is considered.

Simmons brought an action against the commissioner in both her official and individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that this decision effectively denied Simmons a formal parole hearing in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was based on an indiscriminate, blanket policy rather than a complete review of her file. Simmons sought injunctive relief compelling the commissioner to hold a new hearing in which the commissioner would be required to “[ejxercise her discretion in a fair manner ... including reviewing] and considering] [Simmons’s] entire case file and all expert reports contained therein.” Simmons also sought a declaratory judgment that the commissioner violated Simmons’s constitutional rights, along with attorney fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

The commissioner moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that, as the commissioner of corrections, she is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity in her parole decision-making capacity. The district court granted the commissioner’s motion, and this appeal followed.

ISSUE

Is the commissioner of corrections entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from lawsuits for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as amended by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, based on allegedly unconstitutional decision-making in that capacity?

ANALYSIS

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action against a state official who, acting under color of law, deprives a person of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 163-64, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-32, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992). We note at the outset that whether an official is entitled to immunity in a state court proceeding alleging a violation of section 1983 is governed by federal, not state, immunity doctrine. Finch v. Wemlinger, 310 N.W.2d 66, 70 (Minn.1981). And whether a public official is entitled to absolute immunity under federal law presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Johnson v. State, 553 N.W.2d 40, 45 (Minn.1996); Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 675 (Minn.1988). In doing so, we analyze this question independent of the merits of the underlying action. Johnson, 553 N.W.2d at 45; Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 675. An official claiming immunity bears the burden of establishing entitlement to it. Finch, 310 N.W.2d at 70.

The commissioner asserts that she is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity because her official decision-making functions in the parole process are essentially adjudicatory in nature and are integral to the judicial sentencing function. Had this lawsuit been an action for damages, we would agree. See Figg v. Russell, 433 F.3d 593, 598 (8th Cir.2006) (holding that parole-board members are absolutely immune from damages based on quasi-judicial function). But Simmons is seeking an injunction, and “immunity from damages does not ordinarily bar equitable relief as well.” Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314 n. 6, 95 S.Ct. 992, 997 n. 6, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975).

Whether the commissioner of corrections is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity in an action for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as amended by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 (FCIA) is an issue of first impression in Minnesota. Before 1996, it was clear that even sitting judges were not immune from lawsuits for injunctive relief under section 1983. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 540, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 1980, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984) (holding that judicial immunity from damages did not extend to equitable relief). The FCIA, however, substantially restricted the availability of injunctive relief against a “judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity.” Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-317, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3847 (1996) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)). Because section 1983 does not define the term “judicial officer,” it is disputable whether this “new restriction on the granting of injunctive relief against ‘judicial officers’ was meant to extend to other officials whose entitlement to absolute immunity from damages had been recognized in light of their roles in judicial proceedings.” Hili v. Sciarrotta, 140 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir.1998). In light of the plain language, legislative history, and purpose of section 1983, including the FCIA, we conclude that section 1983 does not protect the commissioner from lawsuits seeking injunctive relief.

I.

When Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, it intended “to provide a remedy, to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights.” Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 660, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2020, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). To this end, section 1 of the act, which is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, created an action designed to “deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.” Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 161, 112 S.Ct. at 1830. And although the language of this section permits a plaintiff to sue “every person” who deprives the plaintiff of a federal right “under color of law,” section 1983 also must be construed in light of the common-law background against which it was enacted. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 709, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 1638, 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999). This includes common-law immunity defenses. Id. at 728, 119 S.Ct. at 1648.

The various common-law doctrines of official immunity embody a recognition that “[sjpecial problems arise ... when government officials are exposed to liability for damages.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223, 108 S.Ct. 538, 542, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988). For example, the threat of liability “can create perverse incentives that operate to inhibit officials in the proper performance of their duties.” Id. If those who may be adversely affected by a government official’s decisions can sue that official, the threat of personal financial loss may induce government officials “to act with an excess of caution or otherwise to skew their decisions in ways that result in less than full fidelity to the objective and independent criteria that ought to guide their conduct.” Id.

Yet there is an “undeniable tension” between ensuring that an official is free to fearlessly serve the public and granting a license to disregard the consequences of the official’s actions. Id. at 223-24, 108 S.Ct. at 542. After all, a governing principle of our constitutional democracy is that “[a]ll the officers of the government from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.” Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2910, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (quotation omitted). Although the primary purpose of immunity is to protect the public’s interest in fearless decision-making by its officials, the fear of personal liability for wrongful conduct encourages officials “to carry out their duties in a lawful and appropriate manner[.]” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 223, 108 S.Ct. at 542. Therefore, the law “has been cautious in recognizing claims that government officials should be free of the obligation to answer for their actions in court.” Id. at 223-24, 108 S.Ct. at 542.

This tension factors not only into our analysis of whether to extend immunity, but also into the nature of the immunity the law is willing to extend. The United States Supreme Court has recognized two levels of immunity in section 1983 claims. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 2613, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). Qualified immunity, the most common variety, protects officials so long as “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. By focusing on “the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law,” the test for qualified immunity is intended both to avoid excessively disrupting government functioning and to deter unlawful conduct. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738-39, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). And in most cases, qualified immunity “provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494-95, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 1944, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) (quotation omitted).

In contrast, absolute immunity always protects an official’s acts from personal liability from damages, even if the official should have known that the acts clearly violated the plaintiffs rights. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n. 13, 96 S.Ct. 984, 989 n. 13, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (noting that absolute immunity automatically “defeats a suit at the outset, so long as the official’s actions were within the scope of the immunity”). Unlike qualified immunity, which focuses on the reasonableness of the act that allegedly violated the plaintiffs rights, absolute immunity focuses on the nature of the governmental function that the official was performing. Burns, 500 U.S. at 486, 111 S.Ct. at 1939. Absolute immunity reflects a recognition that the particularly sensitive nature of performing certain duties makes it “better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.” Id. (quotation omitted).

The Supreme Court has been “quite sparing” in recognizing entitlement to absolute immunity and typically refuses “to extend it any further than its justification would warrant.” Id. at 487, 111 S.Ct. at 1939 (quotations omitted). Therefore, qualified, not absolute, immunity is presumed to be sufficient protection for most government officials; the “strong medicine” of absolute immunity is justified only when the mere possibility of liability poses a “very great” danger to officials performing their duties effectively. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 230, 108 S.Ct. at 545 (quoting Forrester v. White, 792 F.2d 647, 660 (7th Cir.1986) (Posner, J., dissenting)).

Absolute judicial immunity from damages is one of the most “solidly established” immunities in the common law. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); see also Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 530-36, 104 S.Ct. at 1974-78 (discussing historical development of doctrine). The judicial function is particularly vulnerable to the threat of litigation. A judge’s “errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation.” Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S.Ct. at 1218. To promote the public interest in an impartial judiciary free to engage in “principled and fearless decisionmaking,” the federal common law developed a rule that protects judges from liability for damages resulting from their judicial acts. Id.

However, because the threat of injunctive relief raises different concerns from those justifying immunity from damages awards, “there is little support in the common law for a rule of judicial immunity that prevents injunctive relief against a judge.” Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 540, 104 S.Ct. at 1980. Whereas liability for damages would require a judge to pay, an injunction forces a judge to act. The threat of injunctive relief does not create “perverse incentives” for a judge to decide a case in a way that will avoid risking pecuniary consequences. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 223, 108 S.Ct. at 542 (noting fear of monetary damages as primary threat to officials’ discretion justifying immunity). Moreover, the built-in limitations on the availability of equitable relief already “severely curtail the risk that judges will be harassed and their independence compromised by the threat of having to defend themselves against suits by disgruntled litigants.” Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 537-38, 104 S.Ct. at 1978-79. Indeed, before obtaining equitable relief against any defendant, a litigant must establish both the absence of an adequate remedy at law and a serious risk of irreparable harm. Id. at 537, 104 S.Ct. at 1978. For these reasons, the Pulliam Court held that common-law absolute judicial immunity did not preclude injunctive relief or attorney fees awards under section 1983. Id. at 541-42, 104 S.Ct. at 1981.

The above analysis is equally applicable to “quasi-judicial” immunity, which is derived from common-law judicial immunity and applies to government officials who “perform functions closely associated with the judicial process.” Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200, 106 S.Ct. 496, 500, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985); see Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423, 96 S.Ct. at 991 (noting same concerns underlying common-law basis for immunity). Because absolute immunity should not be extended “any further than its justification would warrant,” the law takes a “functional approach” to determine whether “the nature of the responsibilities of the individual official” creates one of “those exceptional situations where ... absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of the public business[.]” Burns, 500 U.S. at 486-87, 111 S.Ct. at 1939 (quotation omitted); Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 201, 106 S.Ct. at 500-01 (quotations omitted). The Supreme Court has recognized that absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages awards is warranted for federal hearing examiners, administrative law judges, witnesses, grand jurors, and prosecutors. Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 200, 202, 106 S.Ct. at 500, 501.

Just as the federal common law did not immunize judges against injunctive relief, it also did not immunize quasi-judicial officials against such relief. For example, although prosecutors are entitled to absolute “quasi-judicial” immunity against damages claims, they are not immune from, and in fact have historically been subject to, actions for injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement of unconstitutional criminal laws. See Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 736-37, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 1977, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980) (observing that prosecutors are “natural targets” for lawsuits enjoining them from bringing criminal charges on constitutional grounds). Such an injunction does not interfere with a prosecutor’s general discretion because the prosecutor “is simply prohibited from doing an act which [the prosecutor] had no legal right to do.” Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159, 28 S.Ct. 441, 453, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).

Prior to 1996, federal common law is clear as to the lack of absolute judicial or “quasi-judicial” immunity from claims for injunctive relief under section 1983. Thus, even assuming, without deciding, that the commissioner is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages claims, see Figg, 433 F.3d at 598, she nevertheless is subject to claims for injunctive relief unless she falls within the class of “judicial officers” granted absolute immunity by the FCIA. Without addressing the scope of the FCIA, the district court held that the commissioner was entitled to absolute immunity from both damages, which were not sought, and injunctive relief. To the extent that the district court’s decision reflects a conclusion that absolute quasi-judicial immunity from injunctive relief under section 1983 is available without the benefit of the FCIA, that decision is without legal support.

II.

In 1996, Congress responded to the Pul-liam Court’s holding that federal common-law judicial immunity did not bar awarding injunctive relief or attorney fees against “a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity” by enacting the FCIA. S. Rep. 104-366, at 36-37 (1996). The FCIA placed a substantial restriction on the availability of equitable relief under section 1983 claims against a “judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity.” Pub.L. No. 104-317, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3847. We now must decide whether the restriction enacted in the FCIA protects the commissioner by granting immunity from claims seeking injunc-tive relief. Although section 1983 continues to permit a “suit in equity” against “[ejvery person” who deprives another of a federal right under color of law, after the enactment of the FCIA, section 1983 now also provides:

[I]n any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

According to the Senate Judiciary Committee Report, this new language was intended to “restore[ ] the doctrine of judicial immunity to the status it occupied prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in [Pulliam ],” which the committee concluded “broke with 400 years of common-law tradition and weakened judicial immunity protections.” S. Rep. 104-366, at 36.

There is very little caselaw addressing the issue before us — whether the new restriction on granting injunctive relief against “judicial officers” extends to other officials who are entitled to absolute immunity from damages because of their role in judicial proceedings. See Hili, 140 F.3d at 215 (noting uncertainty on issue). And we acknowledge that the scant caselaw that exists reaches a conclusion contrary to ours. In Montero v. Travis, for example, the Second Circuit applied the FCIA to protect the New York parole-board commissioner from injunctive relief. 171 F.3d 757, 761 (1999). The plaintiff in Montero was arrested for allegedly violating a condition of his parole four days after his release. Id. at 759. As a result of the parole violation, the commissioner resen-tenced the plaintiff to six years in prison. Id. The plaintiff brought a section 1983 action alleging that the commissioner violated his due-process rights by presiding over the parole-revocation hearing despite preexisting bias. Id. The relief sought by the plaintiff included both damages and an injunction prohibiting the commissioner from retaliating against him for filing suit. Id. The Montero court summarily concluded that “[ajbsolute immunity bars not only [the plaintiffs section] 1983 claim for damages but also his claim for injunctive relief’ against parole officials “when they serve a quasi-adjudicative function in deciding whether to grant, deny or revoke parole.” Id. at 761 (citing Pub.L. No. 104-317, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3847).

In Roth v. King, the District of Columbia Circuit applied the FCIA and found public-defender administrators immune from injunctive relief when selecting court-appointed attorneys in juvenile-delinquency cases. 449 F.3d 1272, 1286-87 (D.C.Cir.2006). The administrators were statutorily required to both “assist the court in determining the financial eligibility for appointed representation” and “establish and coordinate the operation of an adequate system of private attorneys to represent [indigent] persons.” Id. at 1287 (quotation omitted). A group of lawyers brought a section 1983 action against, among others, administrators in a family-law division of the District of Columbia public defender’s office. Id. at 1276. The plaintiffs alleged that changes in the system for appointing attorneys in delinquency cases deprived them of their property right “to receive paid Family Court appointments” without due process and sought to enjoin the administrators from enforcing the new system of appointment. Id. at 1278. The Roth court held that the administrators were entitled to absolute immunity from injunctive relief based on their statutory role in the appointment process. Id. at 1287. The court reasoned that section 1983 as amended by the FCIA “explicitly immunizes judicial officers against suits for injunctive relief,” and that “[i]t is well established that judicial immunity extends to other officers of government whose duties are related to the judicial process.” Id. at 1286-87 (quotation omitted). The Roth court concluded that “[tjhere is also no reason to believe that the [FCIA] is restricted to ‘judges.’” Id. at 1287. We respectfully disagree. Indeed, our application of United States Supreme Court precedent construing section 1983 and our analysis of the legislative history of the FCIA provide ample reasons to conclude that immunity from injunctive relief enacted in the FCIA is indeed restricted to “judges.”

The interpretive approach taken by Montero and Roth is inconsistent with the applicable Supreme Court precedent construing section 1983. It is axiomatic that we must construe section 1983 “generously to further its primary purpose” of “providing] a remedy ... against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 700-01, 98 S.Ct. at 2041 (noting primary purpose to provide remedy against state officials); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980) (noting that section 1983 should be broadly construed as remedial statute). Even when the plaintiff is seeking monetary damages, immunity for state officers is the exception, not the rule. See Gomez, 446 U.S. at 639, 100 S.Ct. at 1923 (describing willingness to extend immunity under “certain limited circumstances”). We must presume that, by using the broad language of section 1983 to reach “every” state official, Congress affirmatively intended to abrogate “every” state official’s immunity unless a particular immunity is so well-settled and compatible with Congress’s goals in enacting section 1983 that Congress can be presumed to have thought otherwise. Cf id. (unwilling to infer congressional intention to abrogate immunities that were both well established at common law and compatible with purposes of Civil Rights Act); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635-36, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1408, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (noting that “expansive sweep of the statutory language” was intentional); Gomez, 446 U.S. at 639, 100 S.Ct. at 1923.

There is no indication that Congress intended the FCIA to undermine its original goal for the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Congress did not purport to change the fact that section 1983 is a remedial statute specifically designed to provide plaintiffs with a broad remedy against state officials who violate their federal rights. The language of the FCIA restricting the availability of this remedy “in any action [for injunctive relief] brought against a judicial officer,” therefore, must be interpreted narrowly. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 432-33, 93 S.Ct. 602, 610, 34 L.Ed.2d 613 (1973) (quotation omitted) (discussing construction of section 1983). “We are not at liberty to seek ingenious analytical instruments to avoid giving a congressional enactment the broad scope its language and origins may require.” Id. Without a reason to conclude that the FCIA affirmatively intended the term “judicial officer” to restrict the availability of injunctive relief beyond official members of the judiciary, we decline to “recast this [amended] statute to expand its application beyond the limited reach Congress gave it.” See id. (quotation omitted).

Furthermore, our review of the legislative history establishes that Congress did not even consider the possibility that it would be amending section 1983 to restrict the availability of injunctive relief against quasi-judicial officers. Section 309 of the FCIA followed a number of virtually identical bills that never reached a final vote. See S. Rep. 104-366, at 36 (listing previous versions). Congress first addressed the subject matter in 1985, when it conducted hearings on “the immunity issues raised by Pulliam.” Judicial Immunity Restoration Act, S. Rep. 102-224, at 2 (1991). The Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution produced a bill that would have given judges personal immunity from attorney-fee awards under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, but it was never considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee. Id. at 2-3. It was not until three years later that the Senate Judiciary Committee actually considered a bill that prohibited damages or injunctive relief against a “judicial officer for action taken in a judicial capacity.” Id. at 3. This bill, however, was never considered by the full Senate. Id. The 1989 and later versions contained substantially the same text as the one finally enacted in 1996. Id. at 3^1 Whether in the language of these bills, the accompanying committee reports, or the introductory remarks on the floor, the history of the legislation that ultimately was enacted in 1996 is entirely consistent in at least three important respects.

First, it is clear that Congress was specifically addressing the Supreme Court’s decision in Pulliam when it amended section 1983. S. Rep. 104-366, at 37 (referring to language in FCIA as designed “specifically [to] address the statutes at issue in Pulliam”). And language substantially identical to “this legislation is to restore judicial immunity to its pre-Pul-liam status” can be found in nearly every iteration of the bill. See, e.g., S. Rep. 104-366, at 36 (FCIA); 141 Cong. Rec. S11324-01 (1995) (Judicial Immunity Restoration Act); S. Rep. 102-224, at 1-2 (1991) (Judicial Immunity Restoration Act); S. Rep. 101-465, at 1 (1990) (Judicial Immunity . Restoration Act); 135 Cong. Rec. S2630-01, at S2705 (1989) (judicial immunity bill); 134 Cong. Rec. S3802-01 (1988) (Joint Resolution of Virginia Legislature to Senate Committee on the Judiciary); 131 Cong. Rec. E304-02 (extended remarks of sponsor).

Furthermore, this legislation was originally introduced because Congress was concerned that Pulliam’s holding that judicial immunity did not bar attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 would have the same impact on traditional judicial independence as awarding damages. See, e.g., 134 Cong. Rec. S3802-01 (1988) (Joint Resolution of Virginia Legislature to Senate Committee on the Judiciary) (supporting legislation prohibiting “award of attorney’s fees against judges arising out of actions for injunctive relief’ because “the consequences of such liability on the independence of state judicial decisions cannot but exert an intimidating influence on the free and unbiased functioning of even the most courageous judge”). Indeed, the earliest proposed legislation traceable to section 309 of the FCIA specifically avoided any restrictions on injunctive relief; and Congress did not address injunctive relief until three years later. 131 Cong. Rec. E304-02 (1985); S. Rep. 102-224, at 3. According to the report accompanying the 1991 version, Pulliam created a “critical” problem “for the independence of the judiciary” if a plaintiff can collect section 1988 attorney fees after successfully getting in-junctive relief under section 1983, “mak[ing] judges personally liable for court costs and large attorney fee awards that are tantamount to direct money damages and thereby encouraging] harassing litigation.” S. Rep. 102-224, at 7. Likewise, the FCIA specifically refers to the effect Pulliam has on individual judges:

Even when [frivolous suits for injunctive relief] are routinely dismissed, the very process of defending against those actions is vexatious and subjects judges to undue expense. More importantly, the risk to judges of burdensome litigation creates a chilling effect that threatens judicial independence and may impair the day-to-day decisions of the judiciary in close or controversial cases.

5. Rep. 104-366, at 37.

Second, Congress restricted injunctive relief against “judicial officers” because it was concerned that dissatisfied state-court litigants would erode traditional principles of comity by using section 1983 to collaterally attack unfavorable judgments in federal court. By introducing the first bill equivalent to the FCIA, the sponsors specifically referred to the problem the legislation was addressing by restricting in-junctive relief against “judicial officers” in section 1983 actions. Senator Hefflin, who introduced the 1989 bill, explained:

In addition to the chilling effect of [attorney-fee awards] on judicial independence, my colleagues in the judicial branch are concerned that this decision will create a new class of Federal litigation against State decisions. State court plaintiffs are placed, in effect, in a position of appealing to the Federal courts to enjoin State court action when they should be in State courts appealing through the State judicial system. This encroachment on the doctrine of federalism destroys comity between the two separate but equal judicial systems. State judges cannot act effectively if their decisions, no matter how closely they are made in keeping with State law, are subject to immediate challenge in the Federal courts.

135 Cong. Rec. S2630-01, at S2705. Similarly, Senator Gorton described the amendment as “essential to fulfill the historic function of judicial immunity to protect the independence of State and Federal courts, and preserve judicial Federalism.” Id.

Third, there is absolutely no reference to “quasi-judicial” officers anywhere in the legislative history. Rather, “judicial officer” is used interchangeably with “judge,” “justice,” and “magistrate.” See, e.g., S. Rep. 104-366, at 37 (parenthetically describing “judicial officers” as “justices, judges and magistrates”); 134 Cong. Rec. S3802-01 (disapproving of “principle that state judicial officers, from magistrate to supreme court justice, even when clearly acting within their jurisdiction, may be subjected to liability for costs and attorney’s fees as a result of what is perceived to be their failure to interpret the law ‘correctly’ ”). Indeed, the 1991 report specifically discusses the legislation’s focus as being unique to those who preside over litigation:

It is redundant to say that judges are in the business of judging. But it helps to emphasize that judges are required, more so than most other public officials, to make on a daily basis judgments that directly affect our most precious rights as individuals. Virtually every case, whether a civil dispute or a criminal prosecution, results in judgments favoring one party over another. These judgments often affect large groups or classes of people other than the litigants directly involved.
It follows that judges are at the center of controversy and high emotions in their daily work, but must make dispassionate and objective evaluations of the facts plus reasoned applications of the law if there is to be a just and fair result. A typical judge makes thousands of controversial decisions over the course of even a brief career on the bench. Many of these decisions involve difficult factual and legal determinations, often involving unsettled questions of law or settled questions that can change on appeal. Judicial immunity, therefore, is not for the protection of the judge but for the protection and integrity of the judicial process. It is essential to the rule of law.

S. Rep. 102-224, at 8 (emphasis added). Even the opponents of amending section 1983 did not contemplate that the new language would restrict injunctive relief against anyone other than judges:

Th[e] proposed limitation would operate to deprive the Federal courts of a vital tool for protecting constitutional rights. Perhaps this intrusion upon the capacity of Federal courts to remedy constitutional violations might be justified if it could be shown that Federal courts were continually overstepping their bounds and fashioning broad, injunctions that interfered with the operation of the State judiciary. Yet no such showing has been made. In the absence of any evidence of widespread abuse in the granting of declaratory and injunc-tive relief by Federal courts in civil rights actions against State judges, there is no justification for [this] drastic restriction.

Id. at 14 (emphasis added). And finally, the report accompanying the FCIA describes Congress’s specific intent in amending section 1983 “to bar a Federal judge from granting injunctive relief against a State judge, unless declaratory relief is unavailable or the State judge violated a declaratory decree.” S. Rep. 104-366, at 37.

In sum, the legislative history demonstrates that Congress did not even consider the issue of quasi-judicial officers when it amended section 1983, much less affirmatively intend to restrict the availability of injunctive relief against them. And we are unwilling to infer from this legislative silence that Congress intended to abrogate the availability of injunctive relief against a state official when entitlement to such protection is neither “well established at common law” nor “compatible with the purposes of the Civil Rights Act.” See Gomez, 446 U.S. at 639, 100 S.Ct. at 1923 (quotation omitted).

The commissioner’s immunity from in-junctive relief is not well established at common law. Rather, the well established rule is that “immunity from damages does not ordinarily bar equitable relief as well.” Wood, 420 U.S. at 314 n. 6, 95 S.Ct. at 997 n. 6. Indeed, although prosecutors have enjoyed absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages since the early 20th century, they also have been subject to injunc-tive relief since that time period. Compare Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421-22, 96 S.Ct. at 990-91 (citing Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir.1926) (granting federal prosecutor absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages), aff'd, 275 U.S. 503, 48 S.Ct. 155, 72 L.Ed. 395 (1927) (per curiam)), with Young, 209 U.S. at 159, 28 S.Ct. at 453 (enjoining state attorney general). “Certain immunities were so well established in 1871, when [section] 1983 was enacted, that we presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish them.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268, 113 S.Ct. at 2613 (quotation omitted). Conversely, the availability of injunctive relief against quasi-judicial officials, despite absolute immunity from damages, is so well established that we presume Congress would have expressly abrogated the availability of injunctive relief against quasi-judicial officials had it intended to do so.

DECISION

Because extending to the commissioner quasi-judicial immunity from injunctive relief in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as amended by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 (FCIA), would be inconsistent with (1) the plain language of the statute and the United States Supreme Court’s broad construction of section 1983, (2) the legislative history of the FCIA, and (3) the purpose of section 1983, the district court erred by dismissing Simmons’s complaint on this ground.

Reversed and remanded.

        . The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and remanded on another issue in Dunn v. State, 486 N.W.2d 428 (Minn.1992). See also Dunn v. State, 499 N.W.2d 37 (Minn.1993) (affirming appeal following remand); Dunn v. State, 578 N.W.2d 351 (Minn.1998) (affirming summary denial of third petition for postconviction relief). Since that time, appellant has legally changed her surname to Simmons.

      . Simmons also claimed that the commissioner’s decision violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The district court dismissed this claim for failure to establish an ex post facto violation. Simmons does not challenge this ruling on appeal.

      . Some factors to consider in determining whether absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages awards is warranted include (1) the severity of the threat of liability on the official’s ability to perform the functions without harassment or intimidation; (2) whether there are already safeguards that reduce the need for private damages actions as a method of controlling unconstitutional conduct; (3) the degree to which the official is insulated from political influence; (4) the importance of precedent to the official’s decision-making; (5) the adversary nature of the process; and (6) the correctability of the official’s error on appeal. Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 202, 106 S.Ct. at 501 (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 512, 98 S.Ct at 2913).

      . Minnesota law may provide a basis for quasi-judicial immunity from injunctive relief on state-law claims. See, e.g., Tindell v. Rogosheske, 428 N.W.2d 386, 387 (Minn.1988) (guardians ad litem). But section 1983 immunity doctrine does not govern state immunity doctrine nor does state immunity law govern section 1983 immunity doctrine. Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 677.

      . Although the opinions of these federal courts "are persuasive and should be afforded due deference,” we are bound only by decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court, even when interpreting federal statutes. Citizens for a Balanced City v. Plymouth Congregational Church, 672 N.W.2d 13, 20 (Minn.App.2003).

      . As the sponsor explains:
      My proposed legislation ... does not prohibit the seeking of injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. [§ ] 1983 against judges, even though Justice Powell argued [in his dissent in Pulliam ] that the doctrine of judicial immunity should extend to such actions. Nor on the other hand does it codify that portion of the majority opinion, preferring rather to permit subsequent Court construction on the extent of judicial immunity.
      My bill simply prohibits the award of attorney's fees against judges growing out of actions for injunctive relief. As Justice Powell noted in Pulliam, there is no difference between monetary damages against a judge and making him personally liable for a plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. The latter is the same as the former in its effect and would make even the most conscientious judge reticent about making the difficult decisions necessary to discharge his responsibilities.
      131 Cong. Rec. E304-02 (1988) (remarks of Sen. Gekas).

      . The closest reference to "quasi-judicial” officers comes in the report accompanying the 1991 version in discussing the financial hardships that attorney-fee awards place on state judicial officers:
      Even where the State has ultimately paid the fees imposed by these cases, the fact remains that each case that joins a judge places an open-ended financial threat against the judge for making an honest judicial decision for which a governmental unit may not be liable. While such a case is pending, the judge might be unable to buy a house or gain credit for purchase of a car. Such circumstances have a direct impact on the lives of judges. Moreover, only 20 States protect judges against fee awards by some kind of indemnification or tort claims statute and some of these statutes are limited in their coverage. Only 10 States cover all State employees including court administrators. Therefore, judicial officials in at least 30 States could be found personally liable for fee awards unless their legislatures acted to protect them.
      S. Rep. 102-224, at 9 (emphasis added). At most, this shows that Congress considered the financial impact that amending section 1988 might have on court administrators — judicial-branch employees, even if not actual judges.


author: PETERSON, Judge.

text:
    James John RUD, petitioner, Respondent, v. Joan FABIAN, Commissioner of Corrections, Appellant.
    No. A06-2381.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Dec. 31, 2007.

      Bradford Colbert, Legal Assistance to Minnesota Prisoners, Vadim Trifel, Student Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.
    Brent D. Wartner, Director, Policy & Legal Services, Krista J. Guinn, Associate Legal Counsel, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.
    Considered and decided by PETERSON, Presiding Judge; WILLIS, Judge; and WRIGHT, Judge.
   OPINION

PETERSON, Judge.

This appeal is from a judgment that grants an inmate’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and orders that good time that the inmate lost as a sanction for violating a prison disciplinary rule be reinstated. The judgment also orders the commissioner of corrections to create an administrative procedure for restoring good time lost as a result of a disciplinary violation. Because the statute that authorized the prison disciplinary rule that the inmate violated, as applied to the inmate, is an ex post facto law, we affirm the granting of the inmate’s petition and the reinstatement of the good time lost as a result of the violation. But because, in a habeas corpus proceeding, the district court does not have authority to order the commissioner of corrections to create an administrative procedure to be used by inmates in future administrative proceedings, we reverse the order that directs the commissioner of corrections to create an administrative procedure for restoring lost good time.

FACTS

In 1983, respondent James John Rud was charged with more than 75 counts of criminal sexual conduct. On August 15, 1984, Rud pleaded guilty to ten counts of criminal sexual conduct, and, in accordance with a plea agreement, all other charges were dismissed. In January 1985, Rud was sentenced to 480 months in prison. In February 1985, the district court issued an amended sentencing order that imposed a 463-month sentence. Rud filed a direct appeal challenging his sentence, and this court affirmed. State v. Rud, 372 N.W.2d 434 (Minn.App.1985), review denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 1985).

In January 2003, appellant commissioner of corrections required Rud to enter sex-offender treatment, but Rud refused. Rud was served with a notice of violation of offender discipline regulation (ODR) 510, which prohibits an offender from refusing an order to participate in treatment. Following a disciplinary hearing, a hearing officer found Rud guilty of the violation and imposed a penalty of 270 days during which good time is not earned, which results in 90 days of lost good time and, as a result, 90 days of additional time that Rud must serve in prison. Rud appealed to the warden, and the warden affirmed the hearing officer’s decision.

Rud filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court, arguing that taking away 90 days of good time as a disciplinary sanction for his refusal to participate in sex-offender treatment violated his constitutional rights. The district court determined that no evidentiary hearing was required because the issues could be determined as a matter of law. The district court concluded that because sex-offender treatment was voluntary and refusing to participate in treatment could not result in a disciplinary violation when Rud was sentenced in 1985, a later-enacted statute that permitted a disciplinary sanction for refusing to participate in treatment is an ex post facto law. The district court also concluded that Rud was denied due process because there is no procedure that he can use to restore good time lost as a result of a disciplinary violation. The district court granted Rud’s petition and ordered that Rud’s 90 days of good time be reinstated. The district court also ordered the commissioner to create a procedure for restoring good time that was lost as a result of a disciplinary violation. This appeal followed.

ISSUES

1. In 1985, did the commissioner of corrections have authority to require an inmate to participate in a mental-health program if the inmate did not desire to voluntarily participate in the program?

2. Is the amendment to Minn.Stat. § 244.03 (1998) enacted by 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 126, § 8, an ex post facto law when applied to require an inmate sentenced in 1985 to participate in a mental-health program that the inmate does not desire to voluntarily participate in?

3. In a habeas corpus proceeding, does the district court have authority to order the commissioner of corrections to create an administrative procedure to be used by inmates in future administrative proceedings?

ANALYSIS

A writ of habeas corpus is a statutory civil remedy available to obtain relief from unlawful imprisonment or restraint. MinmStat. § 589.01 (2006); see also Loyd v. Fabian, 682 N.W.2d 688, 690 (Minn.App. 2004) (construing Minn.Stat. § 589.01 (2000)), review denied (Minn. Oct. 19, 2004). “A writ of habeas corpus may also be used to raise claims involving fundamental constitutional rights and significant restraints on a defendant’s liberty or to challenge the conditions of confinement.” State ex rel. Guth v. Fabian, 716 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn.App.2006), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2006).

The district court’s findings in ruling on a petition for habeas corpus are entitled to great weight and will be upheld if reasonably supported by the evidence. Northwest v. LaFleur, 583 N.W.2d 589, 591 (Minn.App.1998), review denied (Minn. Nov. 17,1998). Questions of law, however, are subject to de novo review. Guth, 716 N.W.2d at 26. Whether a statute has been properly construed is a question of law subject to de novo review. State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 909, 914 (Minn.1996).

I.

Under the statutes in effect when Rud was sentenced in 1985, the commissioner of corrections had the general authority “[t]o determine the place of confinement of committed persons in a correctional facility ... and to prescribe reasonable conditions and rules for their employment, conduct, instruction, and discipline within or outside the facility.” Minn.Stat. § 241.01, subd. 3a(b) (1984). Rud does not dispute that when he was sentenced, the commissioner had general authority to promulgate disciplinary rules.

But another statute in effect when Rud was sentenced stated that “[t]he commissioner shall provide appropriate mental health programs and vocational and educational programs with employment-related goals for inmates who desire to voluntarily participate in such programs.” Minn.Stat. § 244.03 (1984) (emphasis added). Rud contends that the emphasized language in section 244.03 indicates that when he was sentenced, the legislature intended to grant the commissioner authority to provide mental-health programs only for inmates who desired to voluntarily participate in the programs and that this specific statute regarding mental-health programs controls over the general statute regarding reasonable conditions and rules for the employment, conduct, instruction, and discipline of committed persons in a correctional facility. See Minn.Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (2006) (stating, “[i]f the conflict between [a general provision in a law and a special provision in the same or another law] be irreconcilable, the special provision shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the general provision”). Therefore, Rud argues, the commissioner’s general authority to prescribe reasonable conditions for instruction and discipline under Minn.Stat. § 241.01, subd. 3a(b), was limited by Minn.Stat. § 244.03 with respect to participation in mental-health programs, and the commissioner’s general authority did not include authority to require an inmate to participate in a mental-health program when the inmate did not desire to voluntarily participate or to discipline an inmate for refusing to participate in a mental-health program.

The commissioner argues that the statutory requirement to provide mental-health programs for inmates who desire to voluntarily participate in the programs did not limit her general authority to prescribe rules that require an inmate to participate in sex-offender treatment even when the inmate does not desire to voluntarily participate and to promulgate disciplinary rules that permit sanctions to be imposed when an inmate fails to participate in required treatment. The commissioner contends that the requirement in Minn.Stat. § 244.03 that she provide programs for certain inmates did not remove her discretionary authority to also provide programs for other inmates and to require those inmates to participate in those programs.

“The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Every law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2006). Our examination of sentencing statutes enacted before and after Rud was sentenced persuades us that when Rud was sentenced, the legislature intended Minn.Stat. § 244.03 to be a limitation on the commissioner’s general authority to require inmates to participate in mental-health programs. See Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (stating “[w]hen the words of a law are not explicit, the intention of the legislature may be ascertained by considering, among other matters ... the former law, if any, including other laws upon the same or similar subjects”).

Minn.Stat. § 244.03 was originally enacted in 1978 as a part of legislation that created the sentencing-guidelines system. 1978 Minn. Laws ch. 723, art. 1, § 3 at 763. That legislation also created the “good time” system, which reduces an inmate’s term of imprisonment by one day for each two days that the inmate does not violate a disciplinary-offense rule and, following the inmate’s term of imprisonment, requires the inmate to serve a supervised-release term equal to the period of good time that the inmate has earned. 1978 Minn. Laws ch. 723, art. 1, §§ 4 and 5 at 763-64. When Rud was sentenced in 1985, Minn. Stat. § 244.03 had never been amended, and as we have already noted, the statute stated that “[t]he commissioner shall provide appropriate mental health programs ... for inmates who desire to voluntarily participate in such programs.”

The first substantive amendment to Minn.Stat. § 244.03 was enacted in 1992 as a part of legislation that, among other things, replaced the “good time” system for reducing prison sentences with a system that allows an inmate’s prison term to be extended when the inmate violates a disciplinary-offense rule. 1992 Minn. Laws ch. 571, art. 2, § 6 at 2005. As part of this system, the legislature directed the commissioner to

modify the commissioner’s existing disciplinary rules to specify disciplinary offenses which may result in imposition of a disciplinary confinement period and the length of the disciplinary confinement period for each disciplinary offense. These disciplinary offense rules may cover violation of institution rules, refusal to work, refusal to participate in treatment or other rehabilitative programs, and other matters determined by the commissioner.

Id. at 2005-06 (emphasis added).

This legislative directive was codified as Minn.Stat. § 244.05, subd. lb(b), and consistent with granting the commissioner authority to impose a disciplinary confinement period for refusal to participate in treatment or other rehabilitative programs, the legislature also amended Minn. Stat. § 244.03 to require the commissioner to provide these programs for inmates who are required to participate. 1992 Minn. Laws ch. 571, art. 2, § 2 at 2004. Following this amendment, which added the following underlined language, Minn.Stat. § 244.03 stated:

The commissioner shall provide appropriate mental health programs and vocational and educational programs with employment-related goals for inmates who desire to voluntarily participate in such programs and for inmates who are required to participate in the programs under the disciplinary offense rules adopted by the commissioner under section 24-4-05, subdivision lb.

But when the legislature replaced the “good time” system and amended section 244.03 to require the commissioner to provide programs for inmates who are required to participate in the programs under the disciplinary offense rules adopted by the commissioner under section 244.05, subd. lb, it specifically stated that these statutory changes apply to crimes committed on or after August 1, 1993. 1992 Minn. Laws ch. 571, art. 2, § 14 at 2009. This demonstrates that the legislature did not intend that the new sentencing system should apply to inmates who were convicted of crimes committed before August 1, 1993. Consequently, Minn.Stat. § 244.05, subd. lb(b), did not grant the commissioner authority to discipline Rud for refusing to participate in treatment.

However, in 1999, the legislature further amended Minn.Stat. § 244.03 by deleting the language that referred to inmates who desire to voluntarily participate in programs and inmates who are required to participate in programs. 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 126, § 8 at 521-22. Following this amendment, the statute simply stated, “[t]he commissioner shall provide appropriate mental health programs and vocational and educational programs with employment-related goals for inmates.”

If this were the only change made by the 1999 amendment, the legislative history of Minn.Stat. § 244.03 would be consistent with the commissioner’s argument that when Rud was sentenced in 1985, she had discretionary authority under Minn.Stat. § 241.01, subd. 3a(b), to require any inmate to participate in sex-offender treatment and to discipline any inmate who refused to participate, and rather than limiting this authority, Minn. Stat. § 244.03 required the commissioner to provide appropriate mental-health programs for inmates who desired to voluntarily participate. Under the commissioner’s interpretation of the statutes, we would interpret the 1999 amendment to have simply removed the specific requirement that the commissioner provide mental-health programs for inmates who desired to voluntarily participate and replaced it with a general requirement that she provide appropriate programs for inmates.

But in addition to deleting the language that referred to inmates who desire to voluntarily participate in mental-health programs and inmates who are required to participate in programs, the 1999 amendment also added a sentence to Minn.Stat. § 244.03, which states, “[t]he commissioner may impose disciplinary sanctions upon any inmate who refuses to participate in rehabilitative programs.” 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 126, § 8 at 522. We presume that this amendment was “passed by the legislature ‘with deliberation and full knowledge of all existing legislation on the subject and regarded by the lawmakers as being part of a connected whole.’ ” State v. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d 466, 480 (Minn.1999) (quoting Kaljuste v. Hennepin County Sanatorium Comm’n, 240 Minn. 407, 414, 61 N.W.2d 757, 762 (1953)). If the legislature intended before 1999 that the commissioner had discretionary authority under Minn.Stat. § 241.01, subd. 3a(b), to require any inmate to participate in sex-offender treatment and to discipline any inmate who refused to participate, there would have been no need to add this sentence to Minn.Stat. § 244.03 because the sentence would have only granted the commissioner authority that had already been granted under Minn.Stat. § 241.01, subd. 3a(b). Therefore, we conclude that before 1999, Minn.Stat. § 244.03 limited the commissioner’s general disciplinary authority under Minn.Stat. § 241.01, subd. 3a(b), and when Rud was sentenced in 1985, the commissioner did not have authority under Minn.Stat. § 241.01, subd. 3a(b), to require Rud to participate in a mental-health program if Rud did not desire to voluntarily participate in the program and to discipline Rud if he refused to participate.

II.

The district court concluded that because Rud could not be punished for refusing to participate in treatment at the time he was sentenced, applying Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. lb, to Rud violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. But the district court also correctly concluded that Minn.Stat. § 244.05, subd. lb, does not apply to Rud because his offense was committed before August 1, 1993. It is not clear why, after concluding that Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. lb, does not apply to Rud, the district court went on to conclude that applying the statute to Rud violated his constitutional rights. It appears that in the district court, Rud cited Minn.Stat. § 244.05, subd. lb, as the statute that provided the commissioner with authority to punish inmates for refusing treatment, and the district court then cited the statute in its order.

As we have already explained, the statutory change that purportedly allowed the commissioner to require Rud to participate in a mental-health program if Rud did not desire to voluntarily participate was the 1999 amendment to Minn.Stat. § 244.03. However, the incorrect citation of the applicable statutory source of the commissioner’s authority did not affect the district court’s substantive analysis of Rud’s claim under the ex post facto clauses. Rud claimed in the district court that when he was sentenced, he could not be subjected to the loss of good time for refusing to participate in treatment, and after he was sentenced, the sentencing statutes were amended in a manner that permitted him to be subjected to the loss of good time for refusing to participate in treatment. As we have explained, this was the effect of the 1999 amendment to Minn.Stat. § 244.03, and, therefore, the issue before us is whether applying this legislative enactment to Rud violated his rights under the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.

Appellate courts review de novo 'a district court’s conclusions as to the application of a constitutional provision. State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418 (Minn.2003). Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit the enactment of ex post facto laws. Starkweather v. Blair, 245 Minn. 371, 389, 71 N.W.2d 869, 881 (1955). “The ex post facto prohibition forbids the Congress and the States to enact any law ‘which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.’ ” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall). 277, 325-326, 18 L.Ed. 356 (1866)). See also Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810) (“An ex post facto law is one which renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed”).

In Weaver, an inmate was sentenced under a Florida statute that provided a formula for deducting time from an inmate’s sentence using gain-time credits, which benefited “every prisoner who had committed no infraction of the rules or regulations of the division, or of the laws of the state, and who has performed in a faithful, diligent, industrious, orderly and peaceful manner, the work, duties and tasks assigned to him.” 450 U.S. at 26, 101 S.Ct. at 962-63 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 944.27(1) (1975)). The Florida statute was similar to the good-time statute in effect in Minnesota when Rud was sentenced in that both statutes allowed an inmate to reduce the amount of time spent in prison by obeying disciplinary rules while in prison. The Florida statute included a more complicated formula for calculating a sentence reduction than the Minnesota statute, but the statutes operated in basically the same manner. After the inmate in Weaver was sentenced, Florida repealed its statute and enacted a new statute that significantly decreased the number of days of gain time that an inmate could accrue for each month of good conduct. Id. at 26, 101 S.Ct at 963. The Supreme Court held that applying the later statute to an inmate who was convicted of a crime that occurred before the statute’s effective date violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution because “the new provision constricts the inmate’s opportunity to earn early release, and thereby makes more onerous the punishment for crimes committed before its enactment.” Id. at 35-36, 101 S.Ct. at 968.

The commissioner argues that the amendment to Minn.Stat. § 244.03 that allows the commissioner to impose a loss of good time for refusing to participate in treatment does not constitute a constitutionally significant change in penalty for purposes of ex post facto analysis. The commissioner contends that at sentencing, Rud was ordered to serve a 463-month sentence in the custody of the commissioner, and the change in disciplinary rules permitting Rud to lose good time for refusing to participate in treatment did not change this penalty because Rud can continue to earn the same amount of good time if he adheres to prison rules and regulations.

But the commissioner’s argument ignores the actual effect of the 1999 amendment to Minn.Stat. § 244.03. When he was sentenced, Rud could refuse to participate in treatment without losing any good time because, at that time, under Minn.Stat. § 244.03, the commissioner was not permitted to require participation in treatment. The 1999 amendment changed this by allowing the commissioner to require participation and to impose a loss of good time for refusing to participate. In fact, Rud lost 90 days of good time for refusing to participate in treatment. Thus, although the amendment to Minn.Stat. § 244.03 did not act to increase the length of Rud’s executed sentence, it constricted his opportunity to earn good time and made the punishment for his crime more onerous by increasing the amount of time that he must spend in prison.

The commissioner’s argument is similar to an argument made by the respondent in Weaver in defense of the Florida statute. In addition to decreasing the amount of gain time that an inmate could accrue, the new Florida statute included other provisions that permitted “discretionary grants of additional gain time for inmates who not only satisfy the good-conduct requirement, but who also deserve extra rewards under designated categories.” 450 U.S. at 34, n. 18, 101 S.Ct. at 967. The respondent argued that in determining whether the new statute substantially changed the quantum of punishment, the loss of gain time under one provision of the statute must be examined in conjunction with other provisions that allowed inmates to acquire extra gain time. Id. at 34, 101 S.Ct. at 967. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and explained that

none of these provisions for extra gain time compensates for the reduction of gain time available solely for good conduct. The fact remains that an inmate who performs satisfactory work and avoids disciplinary violations could obtain more gain time per month under the repealed [statute] than he could for the same conduct under the new [statute]. To make up the difference, the inmate has to satisfy the extra conditions specified by the discretionary gain-time provisions.

Id. at 35, 101 S.Ct. at 967.

We recognize that the commissioner is correct when she argues that under the new statute, Rud can earn the same amount of good time if he adheres to prison rules and regulations. But to adhere to prison rules and regulations under the new statute, Rud must change his conduct from what was required under the old statute. As in Weaver, the fact remains that for exactly the same conduct, Rud could obtain more good time under the old statute than he can under the new statute. This fact cannot be avoided by changing prison rules and regulations and simply saying that all that is required under both statutes is that Rud adhere to the rules and regulations.

The commissioner argues that disciplinary sanctions imposed on inmates for failing to obey prison rules do not constitute an increased penalty because disciplinary sanctions are remedial, rather than penal, in nature. We do not disagree that, generally, prison disciplinary sanctions are considered to be remedial because their purpose is to maintain order and protect inmates and prison staff. See State v. McKenzie, 542 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn.1996) (loss of good-time credit and placing inmate in segregation are designed to achieve remedial goals of establishing institutional order and protecting prison staff and fellow inmates from violent or uncooperative prisoners). But in this case, there is no indication that the disciplinary sanction was imposed on Rud to maintain order or to protect other inmates or prison staff. The record indicates that the only conduct that prompted imposition of the penalty was Rud’s refusal to participate in treatment. Also, the memorandum submitted to the warden in Rud’s discipline-hearing appeal indicates that Department of Corrections policy permits offenders with sex-related convictions to be referred to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program “as a means to reduce their risk to the general public.” This demonstrates that Rud was referred to treatment because he had sex-related convictions, rather than because he was causing any problem in prison.

The commissioner also argues that the amendment to Minn.Stat. § 244.03 is not a retrospective law as applied to Rud because Rud was sanctioned for refusing to participate in treatment, and his refusal occurred after the amendment to Minn. Stat. § 244.03 became effective. But this argument ignores the fact that when Rud was sentenced, the punishment prescribed by the legislature for his offenses did not include a disciplinary sanction if he refused to participate in treatment while in prison.

The Supreme Court explained in Weaver that “it is the effect, not the form, of the law that determines whether it is ex post facto. The critical question is whether the law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.” 450 U.S. at 31, 101 S.Ct. at 965. The effect of the amendment to Minn.Stat. § 244.03 was to permit the commissioner to impose a disciplinary sanction on Rud that could not have been imposed when he was sentenced. This newly permitted sanction is a change in the legal consequences of Rud’s offenses.

We conclude that, as applied to Rud, the 1999 amendment to Minn.Stat. § 244.03, which removed the limitation on the commissioner of correction’s general disciplinary authority under Minn.Stat. § 241.01, subd. 3a(b), and purportedly authorized the commissioner to require Rud to participate in a mental-health program and to increase the amount of time that Rud must spend in prison if he refuses to participate, is an ex post facto law. Therefore, the 90 days of good time that Rud was denied for refusing to participate in sex-offender treatment must be reinstated.

III.

In 1978, when the legislature created the “good time” system as part of the sentencing-guidelines system, it directed that “[b]y May 1, 1980, the commissioner [of corrections] shall promulgate rules specifying disciplinary offenses which may result in the loss of good time and the amount of good time which may be lost as a result of each disciplinary offense.” 1978 Minn. Laws ch. 723, art. I, § 4, subd. 2 at 763. In 1980, the legislature added to this directive the requirement that the rules promulgated by the commissioner include “provision for restoration of good time.” 1980 Minn. Laws ch. 417, § 14 at 156-67. These directives were codified at Minn. Stat. § 244.04, subd. 2.

The district court determined that Rud is being denied due process because there is no process that he can use to restore the good time that he lost as a result of his violation of ODR 510. The district court also ordered the commissioner to create a procedure for restoring good time lost as a result of a disciplinary violation.

Because we have already concluded that as applied to Rud, the 1999 amendment to Minn.Stat. § 244.03 is an ex post facto law, and, therefore, the 90 days of good time that Rud was improperly denied must be reinstated, it is not necessary for us to also determine whether Rud is being denied due process because there is no procedure for restoring good time lost as a result of a disciplinary violation. But the district court’s order directing the commissioner to create a procedure for restoring lost good time does not apply only to the 90 days of good time that Rud lost; it directs the commissioner to create a procedure for any inmate to use for restoring good time lost as a result of a disciplinary violation.

We have not found any authority that permits a district court to grant general declaratory or injunctive relief in a habeas proceeding.

A person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of liberty, except persons committed or detained by virtue of the final judgment of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction, or by virtue of an execution issued upon the judgment, may apply for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from imprisonment or restraint.

Minn.Stat. § 589.01 (2006); see also Kelsey v. State, 283 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn.1979) (stating that supreme court has inherent judicial power to create exception to general rule that habeas is unavailable to prisoner confined pursuant to final judgment). “The scope of inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings is limited to constitutional issues, jurisdictional challenges, claims that confinement constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and claims that confinement violates applicable statutes.” Loyd, 682 N.W.2d at 690 (citing Kelsey, 288 N.W.2d at 894-95 (stating that habeas corpus may be used to test whether denial of parole violates applicable statutes or constitutional provisions and to test allegations that confinement conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment); State of Minn., ex rel. Griep v. Skon, 568 N.W.2d 453, 454-55 (Minn.App.1997) (reviewing district court denial of habeas petition where petitioner claimed hearing officer lacked jurisdiction and disciplinary proceeding allegedly violated due process)). “Habeas is also an appropriate remedy if the relief to which a petitioner may be entitled is immediate release.” Id. (citing Kelsey v. State ex rel. McManus, 809 Minn. 560, 561, 244 N.W.2d 53, 54 (1976)).

The district court’s order directing the commissioner to create a procedure for restoration of good time does not directly address any of the items listed above. Instead, the order addresses the creation of an administrative process for restoring lost good time in future cases, an issue that case law indicates is beyond the scope of a habeas proceeding. Cf. State ex rel. Butler v. Swenson, 243 Minn. 24, 28-29, 66 N.W.2d 1, 4 (1954) (stating that assertions of impropriety and incompetence by counsel did not constitute deprivation of fundamental right and, therefore, could not be addressed in habeas proceeding); Loyd, 682 N.W.2d at 690-91 (concluding that request for relief under contract theory was outside permissible scope of habeas proceeding); Sanders v. State, 400 N.W.2d 175, 177 (Minn.App.1987) (upholding denial of habeas corpus, when inmate sought temporary release to pursue discovery to pursue new trial based on newly discovered evidence, because any relief to which inmate might be entitled must be secured by administrative procedures), review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 1987). Because we have found no authority that permits the district court in a habeas corpus proceeding to order the commissioner to create an administrative procedure to be used in future cases, we reverse the district court’s order directing the commissioner to create a procedure for restoration of good time.

DECISION

Because the 1999 amendment to Minn. Stat. § 244.03, as applied to Rud, is an ex post facto law, we affirm the granting of Rud’s petition and the reinstatement of the 90 days of good time that Rud lost as a sanction for violating ODR 510. Because, in a habeas corpus proceeding, the district court does not have authority to order the commissioner of corrections to create an administrative procedure to be used by inmates in future administrative proceedings, we reverse the order that directs the commissioner of corrections to create an administrative procedure for restoring lost good time.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

      . The requirement that the commissioner provide programs for inmates who are required to participate in the programs reflects an apparent legislative recognition that if an inmate is required to participate in a program and will be subject to disciplinary confinement for refusing to participate, the program must be made available to the inmate.

      . In 1992, the legislature also amended Minn. Stat. § 244.04, subd. 1, which provides for the reduction of an inmate's sentence under the "good time” system. 1992 Minn. Laws ch. 571, art. 2, § 3 at 2004-005. Following the amendment, which added the following underlined language, Minn.Stat. § 244.04, subd. 1, stated that
      the term of imprisonment of any inmate sentenced to a presumptive fixed sentence after May 1, 1980, and whose crime was committed before August 1, 1993, shall be reduced in duration by one day for each two days during which the inmate violates none of the disciplinary offense rules promulgated by the commissioner.
      This amendment is a further indication that the legislature intended that the new system should not apply to inmates whose crimes were committed before August 1, 1993, and that the “good time” system should continue to apply to these inmates.

      . The commissioner argued in the district court that Minn.Stat. § 244.03 provides statutory authority for her to discipline any offender, and she expressly argues on appeal that Minn.Stat. § 244.03 is not an ex post facto law.