text:
    STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Randy Lee CORSI, Appellant.
    No. 03-0978.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Sept. 1, 2004.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 28, 2004.

      Herbert Rogers, Sr. of Rogers Law Offices, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Brad Walz, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
   TERNUS, Justice.

The defendant, Randy Corsi, appeals his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. He claims (1) the evidence does not support his conviction, (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and (3) a sentencing enhancement was improperly applied to his term of imprisonment. We find no merit in these claims with the exception of the propriety of the sentencing enhancement. Therefore, we affirm the defendant’s conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand this case for resentenc-ing without the enhancement.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Shortly after midnight on December 5, 2002, police officers investigating the reported smell of ammonia at a city residence observed through a basement window of the residence what appeared to be an active methamphetamine lab. The officers saw a man sitting on a stool with drug apparatus at his feet, apparently boiling ingredients for methamphetamine. This man was described by some officers as balding and by others as wearing a flannel shirt. Due to the overwhelming fumes, the police decided it was necessary to intervene immediately, so they forced their way into the basement apartment.

The officers removed six persons from the apartment, including the defendant. Corsi was the only occupant who matched the description of a balding man wearing a long-sleeved flannel shirt. After obtaining consent for a search, the police found multiple items throughout the apartment consistent with methamphetamine manufacturing. A search of the defendant revealed lithium batteries, coffee filters, a needle, and two marijuana pipes with marijuana residue. The coffee filters “had an odor about them” and the officer confiscating them thought they were “probably chemically soaked.”

Corsi was charged with manufacturing or conspiracy to manufacture more than five grams of methamphetamine in the presence of a minor, in violation of Iowa Code sections 124.401(l)(e )(6) and 124.401C (2001); multiple counts of possession of precursors of methamphetamine, in violation of section 124.401(4); and possession of marijuana, in violation of section 124.401(5). He was also alleged to be a habitual offender under section 902.8. In a subsequent jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of the conspiracy offense, but was acquitted of all other charges. After Corsi’s motion for new trial and motion in arrest of judgment were overruled, he was sentenced to an indeterminate term of thirty years in prison with a ten-year minimum, in addition to a $5000 fine and license revocation.

On appeal, the defendant claims there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, specifically with respect to his personal agreement to participate in the manufacturing operation. He also asserts he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel in two ways: (1) failure to object to erroneous jury instructions; and (2) failure to conduct a reasonable investigation. Finally, Corsi contends the application of the sentencing enhancement for manufacturing methamphetamine in the presence of a minor under section 124.401C(1) was improper and resulted in an illegal sentence. We will separately address each issue.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

A. Scope of review. If the jury’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence, it is binding on the court. State v. Speicher, 625 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Iowa 2001). Therefore, our review is for correction of errors at law. Id.

“Evidence is substantial if it could convince a rational jury of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 741. If it only raises suspicion or speculation, it is not substantial. Id. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the evidence in the record, but we view the record in the light most favorable to the State. Id.

B. Elements of conspiracy offense. Section 124.401(1) makes it a crime “for any person to ... conspire with one or more other persons to manufacture, deliver, or possess with the intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance.” Iowa Code section 706.1 defines conspiracy as follows:

1. A person commits conspiracy with another if, with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a crime which is an aggravated misdemeanor or felony, the person does either of the following:
a. Agrees with another that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct constituting the crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit the crime.
b. Agrees to aid another in the planning or commission of the crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit the crime.
2. It is not necessary for the conspirator to know the identity of each and every conspirator.
3. . A person shall not be convicted of conspiracy unless it is alleged and proven that at least one conspirator committed an overt act evidencing a design to accomplish the purpose of the conspiracy by criminal means.
4. A person shall not be convicted of conspiracy if the only other person or persons involved in the conspiracy were acting at the behest of or as agents of a law enforcement agency in an investigation of the criminal activity alleged at the time of the formation of the conspiracy.

Based on these statutes, the State was obligated to prove thát (1) Corsi agfeed with one or more persons to manufacture or attempt to manufacture methamphetamine or assist another in planning or committing this crime; (2) Corsi entered into the agreement with the intent to manufacture or promote the manufacture of methamphetamine; (3) one or more of the conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the manufacturing of methamphetamine; and (4) at least one of the co-conspirators was not a law enforcement agent or working with law enforcement when the conspiracy began. See Speicher, 625 N.W.2d at 741. The defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to establish the first element — that Corsi agreed with another to manufacture or attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, or agreed to assist another in planning or committing this offense. He asserts the evidence merely showed he “walked in on the manufacturing activities” of others.

C. Discussion. Since a conspiracy is by nature clandestine, it will often rest -upon circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence. See State v. Ross, 573 N.W.2d 906, 914 (Iowa 1998) (holding evidence of an agreement may be direct or circumstantial). Thus,

“[a]n agreement that, because of its purpose or the means contemplated, amounts to a conspiracy need not be formal or express, but may be a tacit understanding; the agreement may be inherent in and inferred from the circumstances, especially declarations, acts, and conduct of the alleged conspirators.” '

State v. Casady, 597 N.W.2d 801, 805 (Iowa 1999) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). On the other hand, circumstantial evidence that proves mere presence at the scene of the crime or association with those involved in the crime is not sufficient to show an agreement. Speicher, 625 N.W.2d at 742. We will indulge in “ ‘[a]ll legitimate inferences arising reasonably and fairly from the evidence’ ” to support a verdict of conspiracy. Casady, 597 N.W.2d at 804-05 (citation omitted).

Turning to the record, we find the testimony of multiple police officers that they observed a balding man or a man in a long-sleeved flannel shirt cooking methamphetamine. Although each officer observed different aspects of this individual’s appearance, the officers all agreed that the only person removed from the apartment minutes after these observations who matched their combined description was the defendant. In addition, two officers testified that when the occupants were removed from the apartment they recognized Corsi as the individual they had seen actively engaged in the cooking process. The fact that the officers only saw the individual in the apartment for a short period of time or that they did not identify in their individual written reports that the defendant was the man they saw through the window were circumstances the jury was free to consider in determining what weight to give to the officers’ testimony. See State v. Grimme, 338 N.W.2d 142, 146 (Iowa 1983) (stating “the credibility of the witnesses and weight of the evidence were for the jury to determine”).

In addition to the officers’ testimony was the uneontroverted fact the apartment was not Corsi’s residence. His presence in the apartment, cooking methamphetamine, supports an inference that he had permission from — an agreement with — the apartment’s residents to engage in this illegal activity. The existence of an agreement can also be inferred from the testimony of Douglas Fintel, who lived in the apartment and stated to the police that “he knew it was wrong that he let them cook in the apartment, but [due to] his addiction ... he let it happen.” Furthermore, the defendant’s possession of lithium batteries and coffee filters, both items essential to the manufacturing process, is an additional fact indicating the defendant had agreed to participate in the manufacturing operation. See State v. Weatherly, 679 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Iowa 2004) (rejecting challenge to sufficiency of evidence to prove agreement where the bottom half of a plastic pop bottle containing a coffee filter was found in the defendant’s pocket).

The defendant points to the testimony of Bruce Fuller who said he went to the apartment that night after having called and received permission from an unidentified person to make methamphetamine there. Prior to Fuller’s arrival, Corsi and Cheryl Refshauge, the other resident of the apartment, had gone to a convenience store to buy beer. When they returned, Fuller had already started the manufacturing process. According to Fuller, he acted alone and no one else, including Corsi, assisted him. Fuller also denied that the defendant provided any of the ingredients, asserting that when the police broke in the door Corsi picked up the lithium batteries from the table where Fuller had put them. The defendant argues this evidence proves he simply walked in on the illegal activity and was not involved in any agreement to manufacture methamphetamine.

Although the jury could have concluded the defendant was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time, they were not required to do so in the face of evidence that Corsi was seen cooking methamphetamine and that he possessed items needed for this process. Moreover, the jury was free to disbelieve Fuller’s testimony. See id. (stating jury could have found defendant’s exculpatory statement was untrue). Fuller had already pled guilty to conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and was repeatedly evasive when questioned about the identity of others involved in the conspiracy. The jury could have concluded Fuller’s exonerating testimony was motivated by his reluctance to name names.

We also reject Corsi’s argument that the jury’s verdict of guilty on the conspiracy charge was inconsistent with its acquittal on the manufacturing charge. It is possible the jury found a conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, yet concluded no product had been prepared or produced before the process was interrupted by law enforcement. See State v. Royer, 632 N.W.2d 905, 908 (Iowa 2001) (holding in order to be guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine, defendant must produce the proscribed amount of the illegal substance). Moreover, the fact that Corsi may not have been present when the manufacturing process was started does not negate the possibility that he joined in the enterprise upon his return. See 16 Am. Jur.2d Conspiracy § 10, at 206 (1998) (“The agreement need not be entered into by all the parties to it at the same time, but may be reached by successive actions evidencing their joining of the conspiracy.”)-

We conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction on the conspiracy charge. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Corsi’s post-trial motions.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

A. General principles. To succeed on this claim, the defendant must show his trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty and this failure resulted in prejudice to the defendant. State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 869 (Iowa 2003). Although ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims should generally be preserved for a postconviction relief action where a more complete factual record can be developed, such claims will be resolved on direct appeal where it appears the outcome will not be altered by taking additional evidence. Id. We think that is the case here.

B. Instructional error. The defendant claims his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the court’s instructions on the manufacturing and conspiracy offenses. The challenged instructions were intended to inform the jury of the proof required of the State to show the defendant violated section 124.401(1). That statute makes it “unlawful for any person to manufacture, ... or to act with, enter into a common scheme or design with, or conspire with one or more other persons to manufacture ... a controlled substance.” See Iowa Code § 124.401(1).

In instruction no. 17, the court told the jury that the defendant could be guilty of manufacturing a controlled substance upon proof that he (1) “manufactured methamphetamine”; (2) “aided and abetted another who manufactured methamphetamine”; or (3) “acted together with another who manufactured methamphetamine.” Instruction no. 18 purported to define the alternative ways in which the State might prove the defendant guilty of conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance. This instruction included three alternatives, but as the parties agree, only the third alternative actually defined a conspiracy offense. The first alternative was akin to an aiding and abetting instruction and required proof that

1. On or about the 5th day of December, 2002, the defendant knowingly acted with one or more persons to manufacture or attempt to manufacture methamphetamine.
2. The defendant:
a. had the specific intent to promote or facilitate the manufacture of methamphetamine, or
b. knew that the person or persons with whom he acted had the specific intent to promote or facilitate the manufacture of methamphetamine.

The second alternative of the conspiracy instruction defined the elements of the “common scheme and design” alternative of section 124.401(1) and required the State to prove that

1. On or about the 5th day of December, 2002, the defendant entered into a common scheme or design with one or more persons to manufacture or attempt to manufacture methamphetamine.
2. The defendant:
a. had the specific intent to promote or facilitate the manufacture of methamphetamine, or
b. knew that the person or persons with whom he entered into a common scheme or design had the specific intent to promote or facilitate the manufacture of methamphetamine.

Another instruction defined “common scheme” as “a series of separate transactions or acts which are the product of a single or continuing motive.”

Corsi claims his trial counsel should have objected to these instructions because (1) they incorrectly set forth multiple alternatives for the conspiracy crime; and (2) the first two alternatives in the conspiracy instruction did not require an overt act, an essential element of conspiracy. As the defendant’s arguments with respect to each claim are interrelated, we discuss them together.

The defendant argues the jury could have convicted him under the conspiracy count by some jurors finding him guilty of conspiracy, others finding him guilty under the “aiding and abetting” alternative of the conspiracy instruction, and other jurors finding him guilty of the “common scheme” alternative of that instruction. The defendant argues this route to conviction is improper because the first two alternatives of the conspiracy instruction were not even true conspiracy alternatives.

This court has held, however, that a jury need not “ ‘concur in a single view of the transaction disclosed by the evidence.’ ” State v. Duncan, 312 N.W.2d 519, 523 (Iowa 1981) (citation omitted). As we said in Duncan, “ ‘[I]f substantial evidence is presented to support each alternative method of committing a single crime, and the alternatives are not repugnant to each other, then unanimity of the jury as to the mode of commission of the crime is not required.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). In the present case, regardless of any error by the trial court in labeling the three alternatives in instruction no. 18 “conspiracy,” they were each appropriate bases for finding a violation of section 124.401(1). See State v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 1997) (holding conspiracy is not a separate crime, but is simply one way of violating section 204.401(1), now section 124.401(1), Iowa’s drug trafficking statute); State v. Williams, 305 N.W.2d 428, 431 (Iowa 1981) (holding section 204.401(1) “is a [drug] trafficking statute providing for several means of its violation”). Therefore, we do not think the defendant was prejudiced by the court’s decision to put different methods of violating section 124.401(1) in one instruction and calling them all “conspiracy.”

Similarly, we find no error in the court’s failure to expressly include an overt act as an element in the first two alternatives of the conspiracy instruction. As both parties agree, these alternatives were not really conspiracy theories. Furthermore, the defendant does not contend they were not proper instructions on the “aiding and abetting” and “common scheme and design” theories. In any event, both alternatives did require an overt act. The first alternative required the jury to find “the defendant knowingly acted with one or more persons to manufacture or attempt to manufacture methamphetamine” and the second alternative required proof of a common scheme or design, defined as “a series of separate transactions or acts.” (Emphases added.)

Finally, we consider Corsi’s claim that instruction no. 18 was improper because one may not be convicted of aiding and abetting a conspiracy. The weakness in this argument is that the jury was not instructed that it could convict the defendant if it found he aided and abetted a conspiracy. The first alternative of the conspiracy instruction required proof that the defendant “acted with one or more persons to manufacture or attempt to manufacture methamphetamine.” Although this alternative was incorrectly labeled a conspiracy theory, it did not incorporate conspiracy elements and stood on its own as a separate basis upon which the jury validly could find the defendant violated section 124.401(1).

In summary, Corsi’s trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance when he failed to object to the marshalling instruction on conspiracy. Although the instruction may have been subject to a valid criticism that it inappropriately classified two alternative ways of violating section 124.401(1) as conspiracy, the error was one of labeling and not one of substance. Consequently, there was no prejudice to the defendant that would have required competent counsel to lodge an objection. We hold, therefore, that Corsi cannot succeed on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on alleged instructional errors as a matter of law. See State v. Aldape, 307 N.W.2d 32, 44 (Iowa 1981) (rejecting ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim made on direct appeal where instruction, even though erroneous, caused no prejudice).

C. Inadequate investigation. Corsi claims his counsel should have obtained a videotape from the convenience store that would have corroborated his contention that he was not at the apartment when Fuller arrived to set up the manufacturing operation and that he did not go to the store to purchase lithium batteries. We do not think there is a reasonable probability that the videotape, even if it confirmed the defendant had left the apartment to purchase beer, not batteries, would have changed the outcome of the trial. See Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 143 (Iowa 2001) (defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel “must demonstrate ‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different’ ” (citation omitted)).

Whether or not the defendant was absent from the apartment at the time the conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine began is not determinative of his guilt. There is no requirement that a participant in a conspiracy must be present when the illegal activity starts. It is sufficient that Corsi joined in the conspiracy once he returned from his trip to the convenience store.

We also reject the defendant’s argument that the State’s case was “tenuous” at best if the videotape had shown that Corsi did not buy batteries that night. Proof of Corsi’s participation in the manufacturing of methamphetamine did not turn on whether he purchased the lithium batteries needed for the process. Several police officers identified him as one of the “cookers” and he was found to have not only batteries on his person, but also coffee filters, another item used in the production of methamphetamine. We do not think there is a reasonable probability that proof the defendant did not purchase the batteries would have' changed the outcome of this trial. Therefore, we find no merit in Cor-si’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on his attorney’s failure to subpoena the videotape.

III. Sentencing Enhancement.

The defendant’s sentence was increased five years pursuant to Iowa Code section 124.401C(1), which provides:

In addition to any other penalties provided in this chapter, a person who is eighteen years of age or older and who either directly or by extraction from natural substances, or independently by means of chemical processes, or both, unlawfully manufactures methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers in the presence of a minor shall be sentenced up to an additional term of confinement of five years.

(Emphasis added.) Corsi claims this statute by its terms applies only to manufacturing methamphetamine, not conspiracy to do so. Since he was acquitted of the manufacturing charge, he argues the court improperly enhanced his sentence. The State contends the enhancement statute does not require that a particular amount of methamphetamine be manufactured and, therefore, it encompasses a conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine that is established by an overt act just short of production. We review the trial court’s interpretation and application of section 124.401C(1) for correction of errors at law. See State v. Morris, 416 N.W.2d 688, 689 (Iowa 1987).

Iowa Code section 124.101(16) defines “manufacturing” in pertinent part as “the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion, or processing of a controlled substance.” We have interpreted this definition to require production of the illegal material. See Royer, 632 N.W.2d at 908; Casady, 597 N.W.2d at 807. In Casady, this court contrasted the manufacturing alternative of section 124.401(1) with the conspiracy alternative:

The first alternative means of violating the statute is the actual manufacture of drugs, but the second alternative includes a conspiracy to manufacture it. Contrary to Casady’s argument, it is not necessary for the State to prove the second alternative by also proving the first. While the State must show an overt act toward the accomplishment of the conspiracy, it did not have to prove the completed act.

597 N.W.2d at 807 (citations omitted). We reject the State’s argument that “manufacturing” means something short of the “actual manufacture of drugs” when used in the enhancement statute.

Because the enhancement statute applies only to the manufacturing of methamphetamine, and because Corsi was acquitted of that charge, his sentence is not subject to enhancement under section 124.401C(1). Corsi’s conviction of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine does not trigger the enhancement because under our prior cases a conspiracy conviction does not require proof of manufacturing. Therefore, the trial court imposed an illegal sentence when it added five years to the defendant’s term of imprisonment. Accordingly, we vacate Corsi’s sentence and remand this case to the district court for resentencing.

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED, AND CASE REMANDED FOR RESEN-TENCING.

      . Corsi also argued in his brief that the district court had improperly enhanced his sentence because the jury had not made a finding of the factual prerequisite for the enhancement. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2362-63, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, 455 (2000) (holding that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt"). Although there was initially some confusion on appeal concerning what had happened in the district court, it now appears certain that the jury was instructed that if it found the defendant guilty of the manufacturing or conspiracy charge, it was to answer a question "whether the defendant manufactured or conspired to manufacture methamphetamine in the presence of minors.” This question was answered affirmatively by the jury and consequently there was no Apprendi violation.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: STREIT, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Nicholas J. LLOYD, Appellant, v. DRAKE UNIVERSITY, the Institution in all Capacities, and David Maxwell, in His Official and Individual Capacity, Appellees.
    No. 03-1105.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Sept. 1, 2004.

      Donna M. Schauer, Des Moines, for appellant.
    Michael R. Reck, James R. Swanger, and Margaret C. Callahan of Belin Lam-son McCormick Zumbach Flynn, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees.
   STREIT, Justice.

A Drake University security guard tried to forcibly subdue a black football player at a university-sponsored street-painting event. The security guard thought the football player was assaulting a female student. The security guard’s actions, which were caught on videotape, ignited a media firestorm and inflamed racial passions. He was eventually fired.

The security guard sued for wrongful discharge, defamation, and fraudulent misrepresentation. His wrongful-discharge claim was premised upon the theory that, notwithstanding our long tradition of at-will employment, it is wrong as a matter of public policy for an employer to fire a security guard simply for upholding the criminal laws of the state. Because we find the security guard’s claims lack merit, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of his lawsuit in its entirety.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

Viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, Nicholas Lloyd, the facts are as follows:

Nicholas Lloyd was a Drake University security guard on duty at the annual Drake Relays street-painting event on April 20, 2002. A student told Lloyd about an apparent altercation between Phillipe Joseph, a Drake football player, and Erin Kane. Lloyd and Kane were white; Joseph was black. Joseph was holding Kane in the air with her feet kicking. Lloyd and another security guard, Steven Smith, thought Joseph was holding Kane in a headlock. Although Kane later claimed she and Joseph were just friends engaged in horseplay, Lloyd alleges Joseph’s girlfriend called Lloyd and said Joseph had admitted to her that he and Kane were fighting.

Lloyd ordered Joseph to release" Kane. After Lloyd’s second command, Joseph did so. Joseph suddenly made a 180-degree turn and lunged toward Lloyd with his fists raised to his chest and “an angry look on his face.”' Lloyd feared for his own safety and pepper sprayed Joseph. Smith reached for his pepper spray at the same time and would have sprayed Joseph if Lloyd had not done so first.

Another Drake security guard, Sergeant Risvold, attempted to handcuff Joseph, but was unable to do so — Joseph was still writhing from the pepper spray. Lloyd hit Joseph on the thigh with his baton, forcing him to the ground.

Des Moines police officers took Joseph to the police station, where he was charged with disorderly conduct. Meanwhile, 'witnesses began screaming “racist, racist” at Lloyd. Students immediately discussed the incident with Drake’s president, David Maxwell. Maxwell obtained Joseph’s release and took him for medical treatment, even though he had not previously complained about any injuries resulting from the arrest. Joseph later pled guilty to disturbing the peace. He also received a settlement from Drake.

As local media reported on the street-painting episode, Lloyd’s actions became the subject of a heated controversy. After the NAACP and Black Student Coalition demanded an investigation, Drake organized a panel to study the incident and related topics.

The panel concluded Lloyd had overreacted and .used unnecessary force. Although the panel determined Llqyd’s actions at the street-painting event were not overtly racially motivated, the panel discovered some prior complaints against Lloyd involving minority students. (Lloyd, however, points out he was never reprimanded on any of those occasions.) The panel also criticized Drake for insufficiently training its security guards and its “ambiguous philosophy for security.”

During the investigation, Drake assigned Lloyd to a desk job. Maxwell assured Lloyd he would not lose his job. One of Lloyd’s supervisors told Lloyd he was still in line for a promotion.

Nonetheless, Drake fired Lloyd from his security position on June 16, 2002. It offered him a transfer to openings elsewhere, but the only one he qualified for was a custodial position. Drake kept Lloyd on the payroll for three months, but Lloyd refused to accept a transfer.

Lloyd sued Drake and Maxwell for wrongful discharge, defamation, and fraudulent misrepresentation. Lloyd’s wrongful-discharge claim was premised upon the theory he was fired in violation of public policy: Lloyd argues he was fired simply for enforcing the criminal laws of the state. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all three claims. Lloyd appealed.

Additional facts will be set forth below as needed.

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is improper unless the record shows no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3); see, e.g., Coralville Hotel Assocs., L.C. v. City of Coralville, 684 N.W.2d 245, 247 (Iowa 2004). When examining the record, the court views it in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Coralville Hotel As-socs., 684 N.W.2d at 247. We will “indulge in every legitimate inference that the evidence will bear in an effort to ascertain the existence of a fact question.” Id. at 247-48 (quoting Crippen v. City of Cedar Rapids, 618 N.W.2d 562, 565 (Iowa 2000)). Whether a public policy against discharge exists is a question of law appropriately decided on a motion for summary judgment. See Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 282 (Iowa 2000).

III. Merits

A. Wrongful Discharge

Lloyd does not dispute he was an at-will employee. As a consequence, Drake could fire him for any lawful reason or for no reason at all. Theisen v. Covenant Med. Ctr., Inc., 636 N.W.2d 74, 82 (Iowa 2001); cf. Harrod v. Wineman, 146 Iowa 718, 720, 125 N.W. 812, 813 (1910) (stating traditional rule that “indefinite employment may be abandoned at will by either party without incurring any liability”). A discharge is not lawful, however, when it violates public policy. See Fitzgerald, 613 N.W.2d at 281. Lloyd claims Drake violated public policy and thereby committed the tort of wrongful discharge when it fired him simply for upholding the criminal laws, i.e., attempting to arrest Joseph, a man he thought was assaulting a student.

Having alleged a violation of public policy, to succeed in his wrongful-discharge claim Lloyd must thus prove:

(1) The existence of a clearly defined public policy that protects an activity.
(2) This policy would be undermined by a discharge from employment.
(3) The challenged discharge was the result of participating in the protected activity.
(4) There was lack of other justification for the termination.

Davis v. Horton, 661 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Iowa 2003) (citing Fitzgerald, 613 N.W.2d at 282 n. 2); accord Teachout v. Forest City Cmty. Sch, Dist., 584 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Iowa 1998) (identifying the elements of a wrongful-discharge claim rooted in a violation of public policy as (1) engagement in a protected activity; (2) discharge; and (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the discharge). The district court dismissed Lloyd’s wrongful-discharge claim on causation grounds, ruling Drake had fired Lloyd for a variety of other lawful reasons, including (1) a desire to capitulate to outside pressures in the hope of forestalling a lack of public confidence in Drake’s security system and (2) a determination — based upon newly rediscovered prior complaints and the panel’s conclusion Lloyd used premature and excessive force in subduing Joseph — that Lloyd lacked the appropriate demeanor of a security guard. (On appeal, Drake also points out Lloyd’s conduct affected its relationships with a variety of constituencies, and his retention could have cost it essential financial support.) The district court did not expressly decide whether public policy prevented an employer from firing a private security guard simply for upholding the criminal law.

We take a different route than the district court, but reach the same conclusion. We decline to decide whether Lloyd has generated a genuine issue of material fact on the causation element of his claim. The record made on this issue is murky and conflicted, and in the wrongful discharge context “the elements of causation and motive are factual in fiature and generally more suitable for resolution by the finder of fact.” Fitzgerald, 613 N.W.2d at 282. On the other hand, whether a public policy exists against discharge presents a question of law for the court to resolve. Id. Because our rules of error preservation permit us to affirm the district court ruling on any ground urged in the trial court, in this opinion we only address the question of whether there is a public policy against discharge for upholding the criminal laws of the state. See DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 62 (Iowa 2002) (setting forth basic error preservation principles). Even assuming Lloyd was fired simply for upholding the law, we think his claim still fails because the public policy against discharge that Lloyd asserts is neither clearly defined nor well recognized.

As indicated, in order to prevail on his wrongful-discharge claim Lloyd must first identify a clearly defined and well recognized public policy that would be undermined by his dismissal. See Fitzgerald, 613 N.W.2d at 282. To determine whether such a public policy exists, on prior occasions we have generally looked only to our statutes and state constitution. See id. at 283. We have also recognized that other states have looked to other sources, such as judicial decisions and administrative rules. See id. Regardless of the source, however, “we proceed cautiously and will only extend such recognition to those policies that are well recognized and clearly defined.” Davis, 661 N.W.2d at 536 (emphasis added). Only such policies are weighty enough “to overcome the employer’s interest in operating its business in the manner it sees fit,” which we have long and vigorously protected. Fitzgerald, 613 N.W.2d at 282.

Over the years we have recognized a number of clearly defined public policies. See, e.g., id. at 285-89 (public policy in favor of providing truthful testimony); Teachout, 584 N.W.2d at 300-01 (public policy in favor of reporting suspected child abuse); Tullis v. Merrill, 584 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Iowa 1998) (public policy in favor of permitting employees to make demand for wages); Lara v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Iowa 1994) (public policy in .favor of permitting employees to seek partial unemployment benefits); Springer, 429 N.W.2d at 560-61 (public policy in favor of permitting employees to seek workers’ compensation for work-related injuries). To date, however, we have not held that a private security guard’s actions in “enforcing the criminal laws of the state” to be a well recognized , and clearly defined public policy.

Not surprisingly, Lloyd cites little authority, and his argument mostly consists of vague generalizations about the social desirability of upholding the criminal laws of the state. He draws upon our language in BorsChel v. City of Perry, 512 N.W.2d 565 (1994), in which we remarked that other

[cjourts have recognized a cause of action for discharge in violation of public policy when the termination of the employee “is in retaliation for performing an important and socially desirable a'ct, exercising a statutory right, or refusing to commit an unlawful act.”

512 N.W.2d 565, 567 (Iowa 1994) (quoting 82 Am.Jur.2d Wrongful Discharge § 14, at 687 (1992) (emphasis added)). Lloyd also points out that there need not be an express statutory prohibition against discharge to underpin the public policy. See id. at 568. In a number of cases, we have “found an implied prohibition against retaliatory discharge based on an employee’s exercise of a right conferred by a clearly articulated legislative enactment.” Id. The gist of Lloyd’s argument is that because upholding the criminal laws is important and socially desirable conduct, this court should find a public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine for a private security guard who tried to effectuate an arrest of a suspected criminal.

Lloyd’s argument is not well taken. We have little quarrel, however, with one of the basic premises of Lloyd’s argument: namely, that the criminal laws of the state reflect a general public policy against crime and in favor of the protection of the public. That said, the public policy asserted here is far too generalized to support an argument for an exception to the at-will doctrine. In short, the public policy is not clearly defined. Apart from a vague reference to the whole of the criminal law, Lloyd cites no statutory or constitutional provision to buttress his claim. Divorced from any such provision or equivalent expression of public policy, we cannot find a well recognized and clearly defined public policy in such vague generalizations. “Any effort to evaluate the public policy exception with generalized concepts of fairness and justice will result in an elimination of the at-will doctrine itself.” Fitzgerald, 613 N.W.2d at 283 (citation omitted). “[I]t could unwittingly transform the public policy exception into a ‘good faith and fair dealing’ exception, a standard we have repeatedly rejected.” Id.

Lloyd’s best attempt at grounding his claim in a specific legal principle involves citation to a recent federal district court ruling, which references the fact that we have on prior occasions recognized a “special relationship” between peace officers and the members of the public they protect. Cf. Freeman v. Busch, 150 F.Supp.2d 995, 1000 (S.D.Iowa 2001). The line of cases Lloyd refers to, however, is clearly distinguishable; these cases do not create an all-encompassing duty that would require private security guards to investigate crime and make arrests whenever they have probable cause to do so. We have only recognized that peace officers owe a special duty to aid and protect those who are in their custody. See, e.g., Hildenbrand v. Cox, 369 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Iowa 1985) (“The Restatement and case law also recognize that persons who take others into their custody, for example peace officers who arrest persons suspected of crime, owe a special duty to aid and protect them.”) (citing, in part, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(4) (1965)); Smith v. Miller, 241 Iowa 625, 628-31, 40 N.W.2d 597, 598-600 (1950); see also Tini-us v. Carroll County Sheriff Dep’t, 321 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1085 (N.D.Iowa 2004) (“Iowa courts have determined that law enforcement officers have a duty of care to protect detainees from personal harm.”).

In sum, we find no cited authority to suggest a clearly defined public policy. See Fitzgerald, 613 N.W.2d at 283 (“The need for clarity in public policy is similarly recognized in our reluctance to search too far beyond our legislative pronouncements and constitution to find public policy to support an action.”). Nor is it well recognized. Having found no support in our own precedents or other legal authority in this jurisdiction, we note that two other courts have rejected similar arguments. For example, the Oregon Supreme Court wrote:

[S]uch expressions of a public desire for law and order are far too general.... We are concerned here with a duty to perform a specific act (the arrest of lawbreakers by private citizens or private security personnel), and the statutes cited have nothing to say about that kind of act.... [The statutes] are neutral on the essential issue, which is whether the law encourages law enforcement action by private individuals or security personnel or otherwise demonstrates that such acts enjoy high social value.

Babick v. Oregon Arena Corp., 333 Or. 401, 40 P.3d 1059, 1063 (2002). Likewise, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, in ruling against a store security guard who was fired for investigating whether his store manager was a thief, ruled the criminal statute the employee was upholding “makes theft a crime, but does not impose on citizens a duty to investigate or report theft.” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wholey, 139 Md.App. 642, 779 A.2d 408, 417 (2001), aff'd, 370 Md. 38, 803 A.2d 482 (2002). Unlike Fitzgerald, in which we held the law against perjury necessarily implies an inverse corresponding public policy to provide truthful testimony, here the inverse of the policy that the criminal laws ought not be broken is clearly not that everyone who sees a crime committed must actively try to stop it. 613 N.W.2d at 286. In the absence of any statutory, constitutional, or other expression imposing a duty upon private security personnel to do so, we can find no origin for the well recognized and clearly defined public policy essential to carve out an exception to the at-will employment doctrine. There is nothing, thén, to sustain the tort of wrongful discharge on these facts — however encouraged or frequently beneficial it may be to have private citizens take it upon themselves to enforce the criminal laws. Cf. Davis, 661 N.W.2d at 536 (“[W]e are satisfied that the mediation of disputes, although encouraged and frequently beneficial, is not an activity so imbued with public purpose as to satisfy the clarity element that our cases require.”). The point is simply this: while we might be persuaded that society would be better off if private security personnel investigated and attempted to stop crimes in progress, we are not convinced it is a clear and well recognized public policy of this state “that we all become citizen crime fighters.” See Wholey, 779 A.2d at 416 (internal quotation omitted).

B. Defamation

In both the district court and now on appeal, Lloyd has primarily focused his energies upon his wrongful-discharge claim. In the district court, however, Lloyd also claimed Drake and Maxwell defamed him, and as a consequence he has been unable to find employment in security and related law-enforcement fields. The district court dismissed Lloyd’s claim on procedural grounds, but also held that Lloyd had failed to show how the statements he attributed to Drake and Maxwell were capable of a defamatory understanding.

As a matter of procedure, the district court dismissed Lloyd’s claim because he failed to state in his petition with sufficient specificity which particular statements of the defendants were defamatory. The district court relied, in part, upon the common-law pleading rule as adopted in Nelson v. Melvin, which required that a plaintiffs petition in a defamation action set forth the defamatory words relied upon with particularity. 236 Iowa 604, 609-11, 19 N.W.2d 685, 688-89 (1945); cf. Vantassell-Matin v. Nelson, 741 F.Supp. 698, 707-08 (N.D.I11.1990). Notwithstand-mg the fact that we have long since adopted notice pleading in this state, on appeal Lloyd does not challenge the continuing validity of the common-law rule. Lloyd simply claims the entire panel report was defamatory, insofar as it (1) suggested he was immoral and a racist and (2) contained false and “disparaging psycho-social remarks” about him. For the latter argument Lloyd seizes upon statements in the panel’s report that allege Lloyd “overreacted,” had a “confrontational mindset,” and “was too quick to use force” at the street-painting event. Lloyd vigorously denies he is a racist, and the record contains affidavits from a number of Des Moines police officers who contradict Drake’s “damaging psycho-social remarks” about him.

We decline the defendants’ invitation to likewise affirm dismissal of this case upon the old common-law pleading rule stated in Nelson. Rather, we simply hold that nothing in the panel report can reasonably be interpreted as suggesting Lloyd was a racist, and that Lloyd has failed to preserve error on much of the complaints asserted on appeal.

We begin our analysis with the observation that “[i]t is for the court, in the first instance to determine whether the words are capable of a defamatory meaning, and for the jury to determine whether they were so understood.” Brown v. First Nat’l Bank of Mason City, 193 N.W.2d 547, 553 (Iowa 1972) (citations omitted); accord Restatement (Second) of Torts § 614 (1977). The only two statements in the panel’s report that the district court specifically addressed were:

(1) “The panel found no evidence of overt racial motivation in any aspect of the actions that led to the arrest of Phillipe Joseph.”
and
(2) “The [p]anel concluded that, even assuming arguendo that Lloyd’s actions may have been influenced in part by Phil Joseph’s race, the predominant motive was Lloyd’s confrontational-control mindset....”

Neither of these two statements can reasonably be interpreted as defamatory. In the first statement the panel denied Lloyd was racist; in the second, it explicitly assumed he was racist for the sake of argument. As for any other alleged defamatory remarks in the panel report concerning Lloyd’s alleged racism, or even the “disparaging psycho-social remarks,” the district court did not rule on their merits and Lloyd did not file a motion asking the district court to do so. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.904(2). We therefore will not consider these claims for the first time on appeal. Meier v. Senecaut III, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“When [the] district court fails to rule on an issue properly raised by a party, the party who raised the issue must file a motion requesting a ruling in order to preserve error for appeal.”); accord Sorci v. Iowa Dist. Ct, 671 N.W.2d 482, 490-91 (Iowa 2003).

C. Fraudulent Misrepresentation

Lloyd claims Maxwell committed fraudulent misrepresentation when he assured him Drake would “take care of him” and that Lloyd “did not have to worry about anything.” Maxwell admits he made the statements, but maintains he only intended to allay Lloyd’s concerns about his potential civil liability to Joseph and not to make any representations about Lloyd’s job security.

To succeed in his fraudulent-misrepresentation claim, Lloyd

must establish the following elements by a preponderance of clear, satisfactory, and convincing proof: (1) representation, (2) falsity, (8) materiality, (4) scien-ter, (5) intent to deceive, (6) reliance, (7) resulting injury and damage.

City of McGregor v. Janett, 546 N.W.2d 616, 619 (Iowa 1996) (citing Cornell v. Wunschel, 408 N.W.2d 369, 374 (Iowa 1987)). We have recognized the applicability of this doctrine in the employment context. Lara, 512 N.W.2d at 782-83. The district court ruled Lloyd could not prove representation, scienter, intent to deceive, or reliance, and dismissed his claim.

We agree with the district court that there is no evidence Maxwell intended to deceive, and thus his fraudulent-misrepresentation claim must fail. There is no evidence in the record from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude by a preponderance of clear, satisfactory, and convincing proof that Maxwell had any existing intent to deceive when he made the representations in question. Even if Maxwell had promised Lloyd he would keep his job, by the time Drake decided to terminate Lloyd much had transpired. Time passed, and the inquiry panel’s investigation discovered, among other things, four other possible confrontations with minority students. As the defendants point out, there is insufficient evidence to prove, with clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence, that Maxwell had already decided to discharge Lloyd when he made the representations in question. Rather, the only evidence in the record tends to show Maxwell changed his mind due to changed circumstances, which hardly manifests the requisite intent to deceive. Cfi Robinson v. Perpetual Sews. Corp., 412 N.W.2d 562, 566 (Iowa 1987) (“The mere breach of a promise is never enough in itself to establish the fraudulent intent. It may ... be inferred from the circumstances, such as the defendant’s ... repudiation of the promise soon after it was made, with no intewening change in the situation ....”) (emphasis in original, citation omitted); Hagarty v. Dysart-Geneseo Cmty. Sch. Dist., 282 N.W.2d 92, 95-96 (Iowa 1979) (“Subsequent events changed the facts so that if the representation had been made later it would not then have been true. But this does not give viability to a claim based upon an earlier representation which was true when made and when relied on.”).

IV. Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the district court. First, while it may be beneficial to have private citizens take it upon themselves to enforce the criminal laws, we cannot find a well recognized and clearly defined public policy essential to carve out an exception to the at-will employment doctrine and sustain the tort of wrongful discharge for simply “upholding the criminal laws.” Second, Lloyd has waived much of his defamation claim, and those statements upon which he has preserved error cannot reasonably be understood as defamatory. Lastly, a reasonable fact finder could not conclude by a preponderance of clear, satisfactory, and convincing proof that Maxwell had any existing intent to deceive when he made the representations in question.

AFFIRMED.

      . For example, Lloyd’s counsel only sought to address the wrongful-discharge claim at oral argument.

      . On appeal, it appears Lloyd also claims Drake is liable for fraudulent misrepresentation because President Maxwell's wife brought him cookies and told him "everything's going to be all right,” as well as because a supervisor told him he would be promoted once matters "blew over.” Once again, however, the district court did not rule on these claims for this purpose, and Lloyd did not file a motion urging the court to consider them. As a consequence, we will not entertain them for the first time on appeal. Meier, 641 N.W.2d at 537 ("When [the] district court fails to rule on an issue properly raised by a party, the party who raised the issue must file a motion requesting a ruling in order to preserve error for appeal.”); accord Sorci, 671 N.W.2d at 490-91.