author: WIGGINS, Justice.

text:
    Richard MEYER, Appellant, v. Redmond JONES II and City of Davenport, Iowa, Appellees.
    No. 04-0364.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    May 20, 2005.

      Michael J. Meloy of Koos & Meloy, Bet-tendorf, for appellant.
    Brian Heyer, Assistant City Attorney, Davenport, for appellee.
   WIGGINS, Justice.

A property owner filed a petition requesting a writ of certiorari on the ground a municipality failed to give the owner adequate notice of an alleged nuisance and the city’s intent to abate the nuisance. The owner further claims the city cannot charge him with the expense of abating the nuisance because he did not receive adequate notice. The district court annulled the writ of certiorari. We disagree with the district court because the city failed to follow its code provisions and afford the owner his right to procedural due process. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case for entry of an order sustaining the writ of certiorari.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Paul Reid owned land located in the City of Davenport. Reid purchased the land in three separate transactions. The county auditor assigned a separate parcel number to the real property conveyed in each transaction. Iowa Code § 441.29 (2001). The combined acreage for the three parcels totaled 7.7 acres. Over the years, numerous individuals and entities dumped trash and debris on Reid’s property with his consent. This debris included broken concrete, rubble, vehicles, and trailers. The trash and debris spilled onto the adjoining property owned by Zenith Gorp. The auditor assigned the Zenith property a fourth parcel number. The trash and debris spanned an area of around twenty acres.

On August 21, 2001, the -city declared the property a nuisance and served Reid a written notice to abate the nuisance. Rather than identifying the entire twenty acres in the notice by legal description, the city identified the property as the “property located at 2400 West River Drive” and listed only one of the parcel numbers assigned to Reid’s property. Reid challenged the city’s abatement order. The city held a hearing on September 24. The plaintiff, Richard Meyer, was present' at the hearing as an observer. The hearing officer filed his decision on October 9. The hearing officer described the affected property as having twenty plus acres, upheld the abatement order, but gave Reid an opportunity to obtain a special-use permit from the zoning board of adjustment to use the property as a salvage yard. The hearing officer did not serve Meyer with a copy of the order.

Reid was unable to obtain the special-use permit. The city held a second hearing on March 6, 2002. Meyer was not given notice of this hearing and was not present. The hearing officer gave Reid until April 15 to remove all non-vehicle debris and June 30 to' remove the vehicles on the property. The hearing officer did not serve Meyer with a copy of this order. Reid did not appeal this order.

When Reid failed to abate the nuisance by removing the non-vehicle debris as ordered, the city sent invitations for bids to thirty-four vendors to remove the debris and grade the area. On June 27, the city received and opened four bids. The city did not act upon the bids at that time.

Sometime before July 31, Richard Meyer purchased the 7.7 acres from Reid. The city was aware of the change in ownership but never served Meyer with a written notice to abate the nuisance.

In October, the city accepted a bid to remove the debris and grade the area. Meyer provided the contractor who cleaned up the property with a temporary access agreement. When the cleanup was complete, the city sent Meyer four separate bills for the abatement of the property. The city tied each bill to each separate parcel number. Meyer owned three of the parcels. Zenith owned the fourth parcel.

Meyer objected to the billing and requested a hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer issued an oral decision on the record. The hearing officer upheld the billing finding the cleanup costs were reasonable.

' Meyer brought a, petition for writ of certiorari requesting the district court to overturn the decision, of the hearing officer. The district court annulled the writ of certiorari. Applicable to this appeal, the district court concluded the city gave Meyer adequate notice of the alleged nuisance and the city’s intent to abate the nuisance. Meyer appeals.

II. Issue.

Meyer raised many procedural issues in this appeal. We find it only necessary to determine whether Meyer received adequate notice of the alleged nuisance arid the city’s intent to abate the nuisance to dispose of this appeal.

III. Scope of Review.

A court shall grant a writ of certio-rari when an inferior officer acted illegally. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1401. Our review of a certiorari proceeding is for correction of errors at law. Waddell v. Brooke, 684 N.W.2d 185, 190 (Iowa 2004). Meyer has the burden of “showing the inferior tribunal, board, or official exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally.” Id. at 189.

IY. Analysis.

A. Procedural Due Process. When a state action threatens to deprive a person of a protected liberty or property interest, a person is entitled to procedural due process. Bowers v. Polk County Bd. of Supervisors, 638 N.W.2d 682, 690 (Iowa 2002). The due process clause of the Fourteenth - Amendment to the United States Constitution requires the city to provide a property owner with adequate notice and hearing before it exercises its police power to declare and abate a nuisance in a non-emergency situation. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Walker v. Johnson County, 209 N.W.2d 137, 140 (Iowa 1973). “Notice must be reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” In re Estate of Borrego, 490 N.W.2d 833, 837 (Iowa 1992). Before a city can declare a property a nuisance and order its abatement in a non-emergency situation, the city should inform the property owner of the city’s declaration that a property is a nuisance, inform the owner of what the owner must do to prevent the city from abating the nuisance at the owner’s expense, and provide the owner with a hearing to contest the declaration and abatement order. Hancock v. City Council, 392 N.W.2d 472, 475-76 (Iowa 1986).

B.The City’s Code Provisions. Pursuant to its home rule power, the city adopted as part of its health, safety, and neighborhood enhancement ordinance a chapter concerning nuisances. Davenport Mun.Code ch. 8.12 (2000). The city incorporated the required procedural due process requirements in its ordinance. Chapter 8.12 permits the city administrator to cause a written notice to be served on the property owner to abate a nuisance. Id. §§ 8.12.040, 8.12.060. “ ‘Property owner’ means the record holder of legal title.” Id. § 8.12.010(H). The notice shall contain:

A. A description of what constitutes the nuisance;
B. The location of the nuisance;
C. An order to abate the nuisance and a statement of the act or acts to be taken to abate it. The order may also include a statement giving the recipient an opportunity to submit an alternative abatement plan satisfactory to the city.
D. A reasonable time within which to complete the abatement;
E. A statement of the terms of Section 8.12.070 regarding hearings;
F. A statement that if the nuisance is not abated as ordered and no request for hearing is made within the designated abatement period, the city will abate the nuisance and assess the costs against such person.

Id. § 8.12.050.

A person receiving a written notice to abate a nuisance is entitled to a hearing if timely requested. Id. § 8.12.070(A). The hearing officer is required to

render a written decision as to whether, by clear and convincing evidence, a nuisance exists, and shall notify the parties of the decision by certified mail. If the committee or its designee finds that a nuisance exists, it shall include in the notification and order that the nuisance shall be abated within such additional time as it determines is reasonable under the circumstances.

Id. § 8.12.070(B). “If the person notified to abate a nuisance neglects or fails to abate as ordered, the city may perform the required action to abate.” Id. § 8.12.090. If the city performs the abatement, the city is required to mail a statement of the total expense incurred to the person who has failed to abide by the notice to abate, demanding payment of the expense. Id. § 8.12.100.

Any person receiving the statement can request a hearing, which “shall be limited to the question of the reasonability of the amount of expense demanded.” Id. § 8.12.110. The determination made by the hearing officer “shall be communicated in writing to the objector.” Id. After the hearing officer makes a decision, the city can rebill the person who has failed to abide by the notice to abate. Id. If the person fails to pay within thirty days of billing, the city can collect the amount it is due in the same manner, as special taxes. Id. § 8.12.100.

C. Procedures Followed by the City. In dealing with the alleged nuisance on Reid’s property, the city relied on chapter 8.12 of its health, safety, and neighborhood enhancement ordinance to move toward abating the alleged nuisance. The ordinance provided and the city gave Reid adequate notice and a hearing before ordering him to abate the nuisance. Reid sold the property to Meyer before Reid abated the nuisance and before the city accepted any bids from vendors to abate the nuisance. The city knew Meyer owned the property for at least two months prior to accepting the bid -to abate the nuisance from an outside vendor. Under its own statutes in accordance ■ with the requirements of due process, the city should have given Meyer, as record titleholder, notice under its code to abate the nuisance.

Instead of billing the record titleholder who received a notice to abate the nuisance, the city attempted to bill Meyer for the cost of the cleanup. The ordinance only allows the city to bill the person who has failed to abide by the notice to abate for the expenses incurred by the city in abating the nuisance. Davenport Mun. Code § 8.12.100. Meyer never received a notice to abate the nuisance from the city, so he never failed to abide by the notice to abate the nuisance; .consequently, the city could not charge him with the expense to abate the nuisance under its ordinance.

The city advances various arguments why Meyer should be responsible for the expenses the city incurred in abating the nuisance. First, it argues Meyer’s attendance as an observer at the initial hearing and a memo exchanged between' Meyer’s attorney and the mayor gave Meyer adequate knowledge to satisfy due process requirements. In the context of a collateral action against a municipality for damages caused to property when the municipality abated a nuisance, we held a party’s presence at a council meeting and general knowledge of the factual issues might satisfy due process notice requirements. Lacy v. City of Des Moines, 253 Iowa 621, 628-29, 113 N.W.2d 279, 283-84 (1962). However, in - the context of a direct chal-lepge to the due process requirements of notice and hearing prior to declaring and ordering the abatement of a nuisance, we disapproved Lacy and held notice obtained by a person’s presence at a council meeting together with a general knowledge of the factual issues is inconsistent with the notice requirements of due process. Hancock, 392 N.W.2d at 478. In the context of Meyer’s due process challenge, we once again disapprove Lacy and overrule its application to a direct challenge to the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The city also argues that the disclosure statement Reid was required to give Meyer prior to the transfer of the property under chapter 558A would have given Meyer adequate notice of the fact the city declared the property a nuisance and ordered it abated. See Iowa Code § 558A.4 (requiring the disclosure statement contain “information relating to the condition and important characteristics of the property ... ”). The record is devoid of any evidence regarding a disclosure statement given by Reid to Meyer in connection with the transfer of the property. Without the benefit of the disclosure statement or testimony as to what disclosures Reid may have given Meyer in connection with the property transaction, we are unable to make any determination if the disclosure statement could have substituted for the notice and hearing as required by the ordinance and due process.

The city lastly argues that if we do not hold Meyer responsible for the expenses, a person who created a nuisance could defeat the city’s order requiring a party to abate the nuisance by transferring the property to a person who has no notice of the proceedings. To support this argument, the city cites Silvers v. Traverse, 82 Iowa 52, 47 N.W. 888 (1891). In Silvers, this court stated a court decree enjoining a person from using a property for the unlawful keeping and sale of intoxicating liquors is a restriction on the use of the property. 82 Iowa at 56, 47 N.W. at 889. Accordingly, any person who purchases or leases the property is subject to this restriction and the court can find a person in contempt for violating the restriction.

Silvers is distinguishable from the present case. In Silvers, this court relied on a Code provision providing:

When a petition has been filed affecting real estate, the action is pending so as to charge third persons with notice of its péndency, and while pending no interest can be acquired by third persons in the subject matter thereof as against the plaintiffs title, if the real property affected be situated in the county where the petition is filed.

Iowa ' Code § 2628 (1873). This statute codifies the doctrine of lis pendens. The purpose of section 2628 was to give subsequent purchasers of a property subject to litigation constructive knowledge of the court proceedings. Olson v. Leibpke, 110 Iowa 594, 597, 81 N.W. 801, 802 (1900). Consequently, when the court entered its injunction in Silvers, section 2628 gave notice to the subsequent purchaser that the property was subject to the injunction, and the injunction operated in rem by attaching to the property in whosever hands it may be transferred. Silvers, 82 Iowa at 56, 47 N.W. at 889.

Our legislature has continued to incorporate the doctrine of lis pendens in the Code. Iowa Code §§ 617.10-15. However, the doctrine only applies when a party files a petition in district court affecting real estate. Id. § 617.10. Therefore, the city cannot rely on the theory that the hearing officer’s finding that Reid’s property was a nuisance gave Meyer constructive notice of the finding and created an encumbrance on the property running with the land.

Y. Disposition.

The district court should have sustained the writ of certiorari because the city failed to follow its code provisions and afford Meyer his right to procedural due process. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case for entry of an order sustaining the writ of certiorari.

REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.

      . If the city determines an emergency exists because of the continuing presence of a nuisance, the city may perform any action, which may be required under its nuisance ordinance without prior notice or hearing. Davenport Mun.Code § 8.12.080 (2000). The city has not claimed an emergency existed in the present case to relieve it of the obligation to provide notice or hearing under its ordinance.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: HECHT, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In the Interest of L.E.H., Minor Child, B.S., Father, Appellant.
    No. 04-1746.
    Court of Appeals of Iowa.
    March 16, 2005.

      Patrick E. Ingram of the Mears Law' Office, Iowa City, for appellant.
    Thomas Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, J. Patrick White, County Attorney, and Deborah. Minot, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
    Shelly Mott, Coralville, guardian ad li-tem for minor child.
    Considered by SACKETT, C. J., and ZIMMER and HECHT, JJ. \
   HECHT, J.

A father appeals the order terminating his parental rights to his daughter. We conclude clear and convincing evidence does not support the termination, and therefore reverse the termination order.

Background Facts and Proceedings.

Melinda H. and Bryan S. are the parents of Lily H., who was born on July 20, 2003. Lily was conceived after a short relationship between Melinda and Bryan,- and Bryan was not aware of the pregnancy until approximately six weeks before Lily’s birth. Just prior to the birth, Melinda, who had significant mental health and substance abuse problems, moved from a substance abuse treatment program to an apartment. In August of 2003, the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) received a report that Melinda had been drinking and driving while caring for Lily. In October of the same year, Melinda was found lying in a drunken stupor with Lily next to her. After Lily was removed from Melinda’s care, Bryan expressed to DHS an interest in gaining custody of Lily. On. October 29, 2003, Melinda stipulated that Lily was a child in need of assistance (CINA).

The State filed a petition to terminate both Melinda’s and Bryan’s parental rights on May 28, 2004. At the hearing on the petition, Melinda’s counsel advised the court that, although she did not consent to termination, she was waiving her right to be present and participate in the proceedings. Following the hearing, the court terminated both Melinda’s and Bryan’s parental rights. It terminated Bryan’s rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(l)(h) (2003) (child three or younger, CINA, removed for last six months, cannot be returned to parent). Bryan appeals.

Scope and Standards of Review.

We review termination orders de novo. In re R.F., 471 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Iowa 1991). Our primary concern is the best interests of the children. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). The grounds for termination must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 661 (Iowa 2000). Our primary concern is the best interest of the child; we look to both the child’s long-range and immediate interests. In re M.T., 613 N.W.2d 690, 691 (Iowa Ct.App. 2000).

Bryan’s Contentions.

On appeal, Bryan maintains clear and convincing evidence does not support the juvenile court’s determination that Lily could not be returned to him at the present time without being subjected to some harm which would justify her adjudication as a child in need of assistance under section 232.116(l)(h)(4). He further maintains the court improperly based the termination, in part, on its conclusion the foster parents would provide a better home for Lily. Finally, he argues the State imposed conditions evidencing a sexual bias against men and failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite him with Lily. Iowa Code section 232.116(l)(h).

We first address whether clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of Bryan’s parental rights under section 232.116(l)(h). As part of its burden of proof, the State was required to prove that if returned' to Bryan’s custody at the time of the termination hearing Lily would be exposed to harm which would justify her adjudication as CINA. See Iowa Code § 232.102(5)(b) (“Preserving the safety of the child is the paramount consideration.”). In its termination order, the district court determined Lily “cannot be placed in her father’s custody without risk to her health and safety....” The order briefly listed three incidents which were deemed by social workers and the foster mother to be “safety concerns.” First, the court found Bryan had used a knife in a “careless manner” around Lily. Second, it noted an occasion where Bryan ran Lily’s bath water too warm. Third, it recounted an incident in which Bryan held Lily on his hip while cooking.

After a careful review of the record, we find these three incidents did not pose such a risk to Lily’s health and safety as to preclude her placement with Bryan. We acknowledge that Lily’s foster parent reported Bryan used a serrated knife to scrape food onto the tray of Lily’s high chair while the child was sitting in the chair. However, we do not believe that Bryan’s conduct on that occasion or the risk of harm to which Lily was then exposed would justify a CINA adjudication. We have also considered the evidence that Bryan held Lily on his hip while standing near the stove and cooking. Again, there is no evidence that Lily was injured, nor do we have reason to believe that Bryan would repeat the behavior after being cautioned against cooking while holding his daughter. Finally, we consider the evidence that Bryan once ran bath water that was believed to be too hot for Lily’s comfort. Even the supervising social worker who reported this incident conceded the bath water “was not dangerously hot,” and noted that Bryan recognized the water may have been too hot and added cold water to alleviate any danger to Lily. We find these three incidents, while perhaps indicating Bryan’s need to learn and grow as a parent, are fully understandable for a first-time, young parent, and do not reach a level constituting an adjudicatory' concern.

Certain of the district court’s findings support our conclusion that Bryan has the potential to be a successful parent. In particular, the court found “Bryan is a likeable young man living a lifestyle common to similarly situated college students in Iowa City.” The district court further observed: “Indeed Bryan is a fine young man. Under future circumstances when his life becomes more settled and has prepared for parenthood, there is no reason to believe he will not be capable of being an effective parent.” After a careful review of the record, we agree with these findings and believe Bryan possesses the desire, mental capacity, and intellectual ability to become a successful custodial parent.

' Bryan did not miss any scheduled visits with Lily. He cooperated fully with requested psychological and substance abuse evaluations. The psychological evaluator concluded Bryan “is intellectually capable of parenting” and found “no evidence of a psychological disorder that would preclude Bryan from parenting his daughter should he be granted custody.” At the time of the hearing, Bryan had child-proofed his apartment and had procured appropriate children’s toys, a play mat, a high chair, various baby books, a crib, and other necessities. He. provided clothing, diapers, wipes, food, formula, bottles, and other supplies at his visits. Thus, it appears Bryan is taking advantage of services and has undertaken reasonable steps required of him by his case plan and by service providers.

We note that Bryan was not permitted more than supervised visitation prior to the termination hearingi but this circumstance was not solely due to Bryan’s shortcomings or inexperience. We believe DHS’s decision to withhold semi-supervised and unsupervised visitation was unjustified, because none of the criticisms of Bryan’s parenting posed the types of risks that would justify such restriction of his contacts with Lily. Moreover, we conclude the parenting deficits perceived by DHS did not justify its failure to move intentionally and promptly toward unification of Bryan and Lily in a parent-child custodial relationship.

Conclusion.

We conclude clear and convincing evidence was not presented to prove Lily could not be placed with Bryan at the time of the termination hearing. The clear and convincing evidence simply does not establish that Lily would have been subjected to adjudicatory harm if her custody had been transferred to Bryan at the time of the termination hearing. While the record amply supports a finding that Bryan still has much to learn, he is a well-intentioned, caring, young parent. Like other new parents, he is inexperienced in the art of child rearing. And like most other new parents, he will learn “on the job.” We do not find clear and convincing evidence in this record to prove that Lily will be exposed to adjudicatory harm as Bryan becomes a more experienced parent.

We acknowledge that a parent’s protected interest in the integrity of the family unit is not absolute. It may be forfeited by certain conduct. In re Dameron, 306 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Iowa 1981). We also recognize the State has a duty to intercede when parents abdicate their responsibility to provide proper care for children. See In re I.L.G.R., 433 N.W.2d 681, 689 (Iowa 1988). This duty often causes the State’s representatives to adopt an adversarial posture to protect children from parents who would endanger them. While acting in furtherance .of that duty, however, the State has a concomitant statutory duty to provide reasonable services to achieve reunification of parents and children.

We recognize these duties sometimes appear quite inconsistent and at times irreconcilable. To be sure, they demand a delicate balance on the part of those who represent the State’s interests. For if not properly balanced, the State’s adversarial posture adopted in furtherance of the protection of children can seriously compromise and undermine the goal of reunification. After carefully reviewing the record in this case, we conclude the delicate balance of the State’s duties was not achieved in this case. We find the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that, at the time of the hearing, a transfer of Lily’s custody to Bryan would expose Lily to adjudicatory harm. We therefore reverse the order terminating his parental rights.

REVERSED.

      . One of the perceived parenting deficits related to Bryan's failure to submit to DHS an assigned term paper on parenting. Bryan was a college student who held a part-time job. He admitted he procrastinated and ultimately did not provide the assigned paper to DHS because writing is difficult for him. Although we believe the DHS representative who assigned the writing task had sincere intentions and was motivated by a good faith desire to provoke Bryan to undertake auxiliary education to supplement the services provided to him by the State, we are not inclined to view a parent’s failure to produce a term paper assignment as an important factor in our assessment of his ability to safely supervise his child.


text:
    In re PETITION FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST Robert J. MILLER, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 73428.
    No. A04-1622.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    May 23, 2005.
   ORDER

The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility has filed a petition for disciplinary action alleging that respondent Robert J. Miller has committed professional misconduct warranting public discipline, namely, failing to provide timely and diligent representation to his clients in two different matters, failing to adequately communicate with the client in one of those matters, and failing to cooperate in the disciplinary proceedings, in violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 3.2 and 8.1(a)(3) and Rule 25, Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR).

Respondent admits his conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, waives his rights under Rule 14, Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR), and has entered into a stipulation with the Director in which they jointly recommend that the appropriate discipline is a public reprimand, immediate transfer to permanent retired status, and payment of $900 in costs and disbursements pursuant to Rule 24, RLPR. , ..

This court has independently reviewed the file and approves the jointly recommended disposition.

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent Robert J. Miller is publicly reprimanded and is placed on permanent retired status effective immediately. Respondent shall pay $900 in costs and disbursements under Rule 24, RLPR.

BY THE COURT:

/s/Russell A. Anderson Associate Justice


author: /s/Kathleen A. Blatz Chief Justice

text:
    In re PETITION FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST Richard A. OHLSEN, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 81176.
    No. A04-2432.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    May 24, 2005.
   ORDER

On December 21, 2004, the Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility filed a petition for disciplinary action alleging that respondent Richard A. Ohlsen committed professional misconduct warranting public discipline. The Director alleged that respondent abandoned a client matter, failed to respond to client communications, failed to inform a client about court-ordered sanctions, and failed to comply with discovery requests, resulting in dismissal of the client’s case with prejudice in violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, 1.3,1.4, 3.2, 3.4(c), and 8.4(d).

Subsequent to the filing of the petition, respondent entered into a stipulation with the Director in which respondent admitted his conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and waived his rights under Rule 14, Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR). The stipulation also set forth the respondent’s and Director’s joint recommendation to our court that the appropriate discipline is a public reprimand and two years of supervised probation along with payment of $900 in costs pursuant to Rule 24, RLPR. The recommended supervised probation included the following conditions:

(1) Respondent shall cooperate fully with the Director’s Office in its efforts to monitor compliance with this probation and promptly respond to the Director’s correspondence by the due date. Respondent shall cooperate with the Director’s investigation of any allegations of unprofessional conduct which may come to the Director’s attention. Upon the Director’s request, respondent shall provide authorization for release of information and documentation to verify compliance with the terms of this probation.
(2) Respondent shall abide by the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct.
(3) Respondent shall be supervised by a licensed Minnesota attorney, appointed by the Director to monitor compliance with the terms of this probation. Respondent shall provide to the Director the names of four attorneys who have agreed to be nominated as respondent’s supervisor within two weeks from the date the stipulation between the parties is executed. If, after diligent effort, respondent is unable to locate a supervisor acceptable to the Director, the Director will seek to appoint a supervisor. Until a supervisor has signed a consent to supervise agreement, the respondent shall on the first day of each month provide the Director with an inventory of active client files described in paragraph 4 below. Respondent shall make active client files available to the Director upon request.
(4) Respondent shall cooperate fully with the supervisor in his/her efforts to monitor compliance with this probation. Respondent shall contact the supervisor and schedule a minimum of one in-person meeting per calendar quarter. Respondent shall submit to the supervisor an inventory of all active client files by the first day of each month during the probation. With respect to each active file, the inventory shall disclose the client name, type of representation, date opened, most recent activity, next anticipated action, and anticipated closing date. Respondent’s supervisor shall file written reports with the Director at least quarterly, • or at such more frequent intervals as may be reasonably requested by the Director.
(5) Respondent shall initiate and maintain office procedures which ensure that there are prompt responses to correspondence, telephone calls, and other important communications from clients, courts and other persons interested in matters which respondent is handling, and which will ensure that respondent regularly reviews each and every file and completes legal matters on a timely basis.

On February 18, 2005, we issued an order directing the parties to file briefs addressing why more severe discipline was not warranted and setting the matter on for oral argument. Having heard the matter on May 9, 2005, and upon reviewing the record submitted, we now conclude that the recommended discipline is appropriate.

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: that respondent Richard A. Ohlsen is publicly reprimanded and placed on two years of supervised probation subject to the agreed-upon conditions set forth above. Respondent shall pay $900 in costs pursuant to Rule 24, RLPR.

BY THE COURT:

/s/Kathleen A. Blatz Chief Justice


text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Roger BENNETT, Petitioner.
    No. A04-1450.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    May 25, 2005.
   ORDER

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that (1) the petition of Roger Bennett for further review of the decision of the court of appeals be, and the same is, granted on the issue of the adequacy of the district court’s findings for revocation of probation; (2) the decision of the court of appeals filed March 15, 2005 be, and the same is, reversed as to that issue; and (3) the case is remanded to the district court for a new decision on probation revocation in light of State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602 (Minn. 2005).

BY THE COURT:

/s/Kathleen A. Blatz Chief Justice


text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Adam Michael WINTZ, Petitioner.
    No. A04-1514.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    May 25, 2005.
   ORDER

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that (1) the petition of Adam Michael Wintz for further review of the decision of the court of appeals be, and the same is, granted; (2) the decision of the court of appeals filed March 15, 2005 be, and the same is, reversed; and (3) the case is remanded to the district court for a new decision on probation revocation in light of State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602 (Minn.2005). BY THE COURT:

/s/Kathleen A. Blatz Chief Justice


text:
    In re PETITION FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST Craig Victor KITCHEN, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 216100.
    No. A05-841.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    May 25, 2005.
   ORDER

Based upon the application of the Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility, pursuant to Rule 12(c)(1), Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility, and upon evidence that respondent Craig Victor Kitchen cannot be found in the state or served personally with the petition for disciplinary action,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent Craig Victor Kitchen is suspended from the practice of law in Minnesota. Within one year from the date of this order, respondent may move for vacation of the order for suspension and for leave to answer the disciplinary petition. Respondent is advised that if he fails to appear in this matter within one year from the date this order is filed, the allegations in the petition for disciplinary action shall be deemed admitted.

BY THE COURT:

/s/Russell A. Anderson Associate Justice


text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Anthony CARMAN, Petitioner.
    No. A04-966.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    May 25, 2005.
   ORDER

By order dated March 29, 2005, the petition for further review in the above-entitled case was granted and all proceedings were stayed pending final disposition in State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602 (2005). The Modtland opinion was filed May 12, 2005.

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the court of appeals filed January 11, 2005, be, and the same is, reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for a new decision on probation revocation in light of State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602 (Minn.2005).

BY THE COURT:

/s/Kathleen A. Blatz Chief Justice


text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Angel CARRERA-VALDEZ, Petitioner.
    No. A04-630.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    May 25, 2005.
   ORDER

By order dated February 15, 2005, the petition for further review in the above-entitled case was granted and all proceedings were stayed pending final disposition in State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602. The Modtland opinion was filed May 12, 2005.

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that (1) the decision of the court of appeals filed November 23, 2004, be, and the same is, reversed on the issue of probation revocation; and (2) the case is remanded to the district court for a new decision on probation revocation in light of State v. Modt-land, 695 N.W.2d 602 (Minn.2005).

BY THE COURT:

/s/Kathleen A. Blatz Chief Justice


author: /s/Sam Hanson Associate Justice

text:
    Charles H. SCHULENBURG, Respondent, v. CORN PLUS and Self-Insured/ASU Risk Management Services, Relators, and Fortis Benefits Insurance Co., Intervenor.
    No. A05-453.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    May 25, 2005.
    Matthew T. Nielsen, Scott, Nielsen & Bentz, P.A., Fairmont, MN, for Charles H. Schulenburg, Respondent.
    Charles E. Gillin, Thomas J. Misurek, Jardine, Logan & O’Brien, P.L.L.P., Lake Elmo, MN, for Corn Plus, Relator/ASU Risk Management Services, Relator.
    Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Rory H. Foley, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry, Amicus.
    Timothy J. Schumann, Lindner & Mar-sack, S.C., Milwaukee WI, for Intervenor.
   ORDER

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals filed February 8, 2005, be, and the same is, affirmed without opinion. See Hoff v. Kempton, 317 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Minn.1982) (summary dispositions have no precedential value because they do not commit the court to any particular point of view, doing no more than establishing the law of the case). We conclude that the treatment parameters provided in Minn. R. 5221.6020, subp. 2, do not apply to treatment provided while the employer is contesting liability, including all appeals. But our affirmance of the compensation judge’s order that the employer pay for IDET procedures is limited to such procedures provided prior to the date of this order. Our order does not preclude the employer from objecting to IDET procedures provided after the date of this order.

Employee is awarded $1,200 in attorney fees.

BY THE COURT:

/s/Sam Hanson Associate Justice


author: ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Justice.

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Robert S. ZEIMET, Appellant.
    No. A03-273.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    May 26, 2005.

      John Stuart, State Public Defender, James ;R. Peterson, Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.
    Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Mark Nathan Lystig, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for Respondent.
   OPINION

ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Justice.

This is a sentencing appeal. Appellant Robert S. Ziemet disputes the computation of his criminal history score in sentencing for first-degree driving while impaired. Concluding that the computation of the criminal history score was inconsistent with Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines goals and policies, we reduce the sentence to 66 months, the presumptive sentence available under the guidelines when properly computed, and affirm as modified.

On August 6, 2002, appellant Robert S. Zeimet (Zeimet) was arrested and ultimately charged with two counts of first-degree driving while impaired, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2004) (driving when under the influence of alcohol) and Minn.Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (2004) (driving while having an alcohol concentration of .10 or more), felony-level offenses when the driving violation is committed “within ten years of the first of three or more qualified prior impaired driving incidents.” Minn.Stat. § 169A.24 (2004). Qualified prior impaired driving incidents include both criminal impaired driving convictions and civil impaired driving-related losses of license. Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 22 (2004). The probable cause portion of the complaint in this case identified six qualified prior impaired driving incidents within ten years of the August 6 violation, two civil and four criminal. Zeimet entered a guilty plea to the second count of the complaint in exchange for the dismissal of the first count and a guidelines sentence.

The Ramsey County Corrections Department conducted a presentence investigation and prepared a sentencing worksheet recommending a presumptive sentence of 72 months based on a criminal history score of six, using the most recent three impaired driving incidents which were criminal convictions to enhance the offense to a felony and the remaining civil and criminal impaired driving incidents in the computation of the criminal history score. The worksheet also noted the statutorily mandated five-year conditional release period.

By memorandum filed on December 2, 2002, Zeimet challenged the inclusion of the civil incidents in the computation of the criminal history score, asserting that his criminal history score, as properly calculated, was five. On December 12, 2002, county corrections submitted an amended sentencing worksheet, using the two civil impaired driving incidents and one criminal impaired driving incident to enhance the offense to a felony level and the remaining three criminal incidents in the computation of the criminal history score, arriving at the same score of six and presumptive sentence of 72 months. Following a hearing, the district court sentenced Zeimet to 72 months in prison along with the statutorily-mandated five-year conditional release period.

Zeimet appealed, challenging the computation of the criminal history score. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that under the guidelines and governing statutes, a prosecutor may elect to use qualified prior civil impaired driving incidents for enhancement purposes and preserve qualified prior criminal impaired driving incidents for use in the criminal history score computation. State v. Zeimet, 673 N.W.2d 191 (Minn.App.2004). We granted further review. ■. .

Whether a statute or a provision of the sentencing guidelines has been properly construed is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 909, 914 (Minn.1996) (applying de novo review to terroristic threats statute); State v. Garcia, 302 N.W.2d- 643, 646-47 (Minn.1981) (applying de novo review to district court’s interpretation of sentencing guidelines). The object of statutory interpretation is to determine and effectuate legislative intent. In re Welfare of C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802, 805 (Minn. 2000). The ambit of an ambiguous criminal law should be construed narrowly according to the rule of lenity. State v. Lubitz, 472 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Minn.1991) (applying rule of lenity to ambiguous minimum sentencing provision).

In 2001, the legislature amended the impaired driving crimes statutes to include a felony-level offense. Act of June 30, 2001, ch. 8, art. 11, § 3, 2001 Minn. Laws, 1st Spec. Sess.1943, 2112 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 169A.24 (2004)). The provision applied to offenses committed on or after August 1, 2002, but violations occurring before that date may be considered as qualified prior impaired driving incidents. Id., § 17, 2001 Minn. Laws, 1st Spec. Sess. at 2120.

As previously indicated, the first-degree impaired driving statute makes a driving-while-impaired offense a felony when the person commits the current “violation within ten years of the first of three or more qualified prior impaired driving incidents.” Minn.Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(1). Qualified prior impaired driving incidents include both “prior impaired driving convictions” and “prior impaired driving-related losses of license.” Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 22. The term “prior impaired driving conviction” includes criminal convictions for alcohol-related driving offenses. Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 20. The term “prior impaired driving-related loss of license” includes alcohol-related driver’s license suspensions, revocations, cancellations, denials and disqualifications. Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 21 (2004). When a person has both a qualified prior impaired driving conviction and a qualified prior impaired driving-related loss of license based on the same course of conduct, either the conviction or the loss of license may be considered a qualified prior impaired driving incident, but not both. MinmStat. § 169A.09 (2004).

Under the sentencing guidelines, civil prior impaired driving-related losses of license may not be considered in the computation of the criminal history score. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines II.B. (describing the criminal history index axis of sentencing guidelines grid as comprised of criminal records, custody status at time of offense, and prior juvenile record for young adult felons). Prior nonfelony criminal convictions upon which a current offense is enhanced to a felony cannot be used in computing the criminal history score, except for use in determining custody status. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines II.B.6. In the context of first-degree driving while impaired, the qualified prior impaired driving incidents used to enhance the current offense to a felony, or “predicate offenses,” should be excluded from the computation of the criminal history score. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines cmt. II.B.601. The guidelines indicate that when not used for enhancement of a current offense to a felony, prior driving-while-impaired convictions are .to be used in computing the misdemeanor/gross misdemeanor points. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines cmts. II.B.301, II.B.302.

Zeimet argues that the felony driving-while-impaired statute and the sentencing guidelines provisions create an ambiguity in the computation of the, components of an offender’s criminal history score. He asserts that the- phrase “three or more” qualified prior impaired driving incidents in Minn.Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(1) is susceptible to more than one interpretation, suggesting that the phrase could be read as permitting the use of only three qualified prior incidents for enhancement or as including all prior qualified incidents for enhancement. He suggests that by application of the rule of lenity, all qualified prior impaired driving incidents should be deemed enhancement offenses and therefore excluded in the computation of the criminal history score. In the alternative, Zeimet suggests that prior impaired driving convictions first be counted for felony enhancement purposes. The state counters that there was no error in the allocation of the prior impaired driving incidents for enhancement purposes and that the rulings below should be affirmed.

To answer Zeimet’s argument that no prior convictions arising from qualified prior impaired driving incidents should be used in the computation of a felony driving-while-impaired defendant’s criminal history score, the statutory phrase “three or more qualified prior impaired driving incidents” essentially refers to those whose impaired driving behavior will subject them to felony liability. As a corollary, the statute does not operate as authority for prosecutorial allocation of qualified pri- or impaired driving incidents for sentencing purposes. “The power to fix the limits of punishment for criminal acts lies with the legislature. However, the imposition of a sentence in a particular case within those limits is a judicial function.” State v. Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65, 68 (Minn. 2002) (internal citations omitted).

In Minnesota we have a commission-based sentencing guidelines system, the goals of which are “to assure public safety, promote uniformity and proportionality in sentencing, provide greater honesty or ‘truth in sentencing,’ and coordinate sentencing practices with correctional resources.” Taylor v. State, 670 N.W.2d 584, 586 (Minn.2003) (citations omitted). The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, section I, states:

The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to establish rational and consistent sentencing standards which reduce sentencing disparity and ensure that sanctions following conviction of a felony are proportional to the severity of the offense of conviction and the extent of the offender’s criminal history. Equity in sentencing requires (a) that convicted felons similar with respect to relevant sentencing criteria ought to receive similar sanctions, and (b) that convicted felons substantially different from a typical case with respect to relevant criteria ought to receive different sanctions.

See also Minn.Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2004). Accordingly, it is up to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission to determine how an offender’s prior record will be used in assessing the number of criminal history points and, in that regard, the use for criminal point computation of prior alcohol-related driving incidents beyond the minimum. number of alcohol-related incidents already used to enhance the current driving offense to a felony-level offense.

Furthermore, the sentencing guidelines were created to assure equity in sentencing. MinmStat. § 244.09, subd. 5(2). In achieving this goal, substantial efforts have been made to avoid systematic manipulation. See, e.g., Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines cmt. II.B.102 (explaining that the commission decided to limit criminal history points for multiple convictions arising out of a single course of conduct that can result in multiple sentences in order to limit the impact of variability in charging and sentencing practices and to “prevent systematic manipulation.”). This court has also issued decisions aimed at avoiding potential for manipulation in the sentencing context. See, e.g., State v. Folley, 438 N.W.2d 372, 374 (Minn.1989) (stating that jail credit should not turn on matters that are subject to manipulation such as the timing of the filing of a criminal complaint); State v. Hernandez, 311 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn.1981) (approving a method for sentencing multiple current convictions under circumstances of the case which showed no indication of manipulation).

We believe that to advance the interests of consistency and avoidance of manipulation, qualified prior impaired driving incidents, whether evidenced by criminal conviction or civil losses of license, may be ordered by a bright-line rule. This could be accomplished by the date of the underlying impaired driving behavior. Cfi Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines II.B.l, II.B.101 (“When multiple current offenses are sentenced on the same day before the same judge, sentencing shall occur in the order in which the offenses occurred.”). Then the first three incidents, whether established by criminal conviction or license revocation, would be applied as enhancers unavailable to be double counted thereafter in the computation of the criminal history score. If there are subsequent qualified impaired driving incidents that resulted in convictions, those convictions would be available in the computation of the criminal history score.

Of concern with this method, however, is that it is evident from the guidelines that a prior alcohol-related driving incident, evidenced only by a civil proceeding, cannot be used in the computation of the criminal history score to enhance the presumptive punishment available under the sentencing guidelines system. In choosing the architecture of the sentencing guidelines, the commission decided to arrange the guidelines on a two-dimensional grid. The vertical axis of the grid represents the seriousness of the offender’s current offense and the horizontal axis represents the extent of the offender’s prior criminal record. Andrew von Hirsch, Constructing Guidelines for Sentencing: the Critical Choices for the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, 5 Hamline L.Rev. 164, 180 (1982). While there have been changes to the guidelines over the years, including the implementation of a criminal history weighting scheme in the computation of the criminal history score, criminal history for purposes of sentencing is still predicated on the offender’s criminal record. Richard S. Frase, The Role of the Legislature, The Sentencing Commission and Other Officials under the Minnesota Sentencing■ Guidelines, 28 Wake Forest L.Rev. 345, 360 (1993).

The allocation of civil losses of license for enhancement of the current driving-while-impaired offense to the felony level, however, effectively increases de facto the presumptive sentence available under the guidelines in a manner not contemplated by the guidelines grid. Accordingly, where there are multiple qualified criminal and civil prior impaired driving incidents available for calculating the sentence, for purposes of enhancing the current offense to the felony level, prior criminal convictions should be used before qualified civil incidents are allocated for that purpose'; and, consistent with established policies under the guidelines, if a prior driving-while-impaired conviction has been used as a predicate offense for enhancement to create a felony level offense, that same conviction cannot be used a second time in the determination of the offender’s criminal history score.

In summary, the court of appeals’ decision that at sentencing a prosecutor can select from the qualified impaired driving incidents those that will be used to enhance the current offense level and those that remain for criminal history computation is fraught with potential for inconsistent application and manipulation which is contrary to the guidelines’ goals in setting up the determination of the presumptive sentence in an individual case. Therefore, we hold that in sentencing a felony driving-while-impaired offender, qualified criminal predicate convictions must first be allocated for the purpose of enhancement of the current driving-while-impaired offense to a felony, and the same predicate convictions cannot be used a second time in the determination of the offender’s criminal history score. Qualified criminal predicate convictions in excess of those used for enhancement will be available in the computation of the offender’s criminal history score on the current offense.

Thus, in Zeimet’s case, counting three qualifying prior driving-while-impaired convictions as the required enhancers, we reduce the sentence to 66 months, the presumptive sentence under the rule we have announced in this case. Zeimet’s sentence is in all other respects affirmed.

Affirmed as modified.

ANDERSON, G. BARRY, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

      . Zeimet's qualified prior impaired driving incidents consisted of the following: (1) October 18, 1995, Implied Consent-Test, Revocation (Civil); (2) April 18, 1996, Implied Consent-Test, Revocation (Civil); (3) January 22, 1998, Gross Misdemeanor Test Refusal Conviction (Criminal); (4) November 9, 1998, Implied Consent-Test, Conviction (Criminal); (5) January 9, 2001, Gross Misdemeanor DWI Conviction (Criminal); and (6) September 10, 2002, Gross Misdemeanor DWI Conviction (Criminal).

      . The amended sentencing worksheet computed Zeimet's criminal history score as six, consisting of four felony points, one misdemeanor/gross misdemeanor point and one custody status point. Under the guidelines, four misdemeanor/gross misdemeanor "units” constitute a criminal history point, and ordinarily only one misdemeanor/gross misdemeanor point is permitted in computing a defendant’s criminal history score. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines II.B.3. But when the current conviction is for first-degree driving while impaired, prior driving while impaired violations are assigned two units each and there is no limit on the total number of misdemeanor/gross misdemeanor points included in the criminal history score. Id. If only one of Zeimet's prior gross misdemeanors were included in the computation, his criminal history score would be five and his presumptive sentence would be 66 months. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines IV.

      . Minnesota Statutes § 169A.24 provides:
      Subdivision 1. A person who violates section 169A.20 (driving while impaired) is guilty of first-degree driving while impaired if the person:
      (1) commits the violation within ten years of the first of three or more qualified prior impaired driving incidents; or
      (2) has previously been convicted of a felony under this section.
      Subd. 2. A person who commits first-degree driving while impaired is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than seven years, or to payment of a fine of not more than $14,000, or both. The person is subject to the mandatory penalties described in section 169A.276 (mandatory penalties; felony violations).

      . Minnesota Statutes § 169A.03, subdivision 21 provides:
      Prior impaired driving-related loss of license. (a) "Prior impaired driving-related loss of license” includes a driver’s license suspension, revocation, cancellation, denial, or disqualification under:
      (1) section 169A.31 (alcohol-related school bus or Head Start bus driving); 169A.50 to 169A.53 (implied consent law); 169A.54 (impaired driving convictions and adjudications; administrative penalties); 171.04 (persons not eligible for drivers' licenses); 171.14 (cancellation); 171.16 (court may recommend suspension); 171.165 (commercial driver's license, disqualification); 171.17 (revocation); or 171.18 (suspension); because of an alcohol-related incident;
      (2) section 609.21 (criminal vehicular homicide and injury, substance-related offenses), subdivision 1, clauses (2) to (6); subdivision 2, clauses (2) to (6); subdivision 2a, clauses (2) to (6); subdivision 2b, clauses (2) to (6); subdivision 3, clauses (2) to (6); or subdivision 4, clauses (2) to (6);
      (3) Minnesota Statutes 1998, section 169.121 (driver under influence of alcohol or controlled substance); 169.1211 (alcohol-related driving by commercial vehicle drivers); or 169.123 (chemical tests for intoxication); or
      (4) an ordinance from this state, or a statute or ordinance from another state, in conformity with any provision listed in clause (1), (2), or (3).
      (b) "Prior impaired driving-related loss of license” also includes the revocation of snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle operating privileges under section 84.911 (chemical testing), or motorboat operating privileges under section 86B.335 (testing for alcohol and controlled substances), for violations that occurred on or after August 1, 1994; the revocation of snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle operating privileges under section 84.91 (operation of snowmobiles and all-terrain vehicles by persons under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances); or the revocation of motorboat operating privileges under section 86B.331 (operation while using alcohol or drugs or with a physical or mental disability).
      (c) "Prior impaired driving-related loss of license” does not include any license action stemming solely from a violation of section 169A.33 (underage drinking and driving), 171.09 (conditions of a restricted license), or 340A.503 (persons under the age of 21, illegal acts).

      . Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines II.B.6 provides:
      When determining the criminal history score for a current offense that is a felony solely because the offender has previous convictions for similar or related misde.-meanor and gross misdemeanor offenses, the prior gross misdemeanor conviction(s) upon which the enhancement is based may be used in determining custody status, but the prior misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor convictions(s). cannot be used in calculáting the remaining components of the offender’s criminal history score.

      . Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines cmt. II. B.601 provides that a "first-time first degree (felony) driving while impaired (DWI) offense involves a DWI violation within ten years of the first of three or more prior impaired driving incidents. Because the DWI priors elevated this offense to the felony level, they should be excluded from the criminal history score.” (Parentheses in original.)

      . The state points out that in State v. Coleman, 661 N.W.2d 296, 300 (Minn.App.2003), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2003), the court of appeals rejected application of the rule of lenity to a claim that a prior impaired driving-related loss of license could not be used as an "aggravating factor.” In Coleman, the court of appeals held that the use of a civil license revocation as an "aggravating factor” did not violate due process rights. Id. at 301. We note that we have neither ruled on the constitutional issues raised in Coleman nor on any other constitutional challenges to the collateral use of civil losses of license for felony liability.


author: /s/Helen M. Meyer Associate Justice

text:
    Gregory McLAUGHLIN, Respondent, v. CHILD CARE RESOURCE AND REFERRAL, and Self-Insured/Administered by Berkley Risk Admin.Co., Relators.
    No. A05-237.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    May 26, 2005.
    Timothy P. Jung, Cronan Pearson Quin-livan, PA, Minneapolis, for Relators.
    Mary M. Morin, Morin Law Office, Minneapolis, for Respondent.
   ORDER

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals filed January 7, 2005, be, and the same is, affirmed without opinion. See Hoff v. Kempton, 317 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Minn.1982) (summary dispositions have no precedential value because they do not commit the court to any particular point of view, doing no more than establishing the law of the case).

Employee is awarded $1,200 in attorney fees.

BY THE COURT:

/s/Helen M. Meyer Associate Justice


author: MINGE, Judge.

text:
    Judy A. JOHNSON, Relator, v. WALCH & WALCH, INC., Respondent, Commissioner of Employment and Economic Development, Respondent.
    No. A04-1451.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    May 24, 2005.
    Petition for Review Denied July 19, 2005.
    Peter B. Knapp, Eric P. Hockman (certified student attorney), William Mitchell Law Clinic, St. Paul, MN, for relator. .
    Lee B. Nelson, Linda A. Holmes, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul, MN, for respondent commissioner.
    Considered and decided by RANDALL, Presiding Judge; WILLIS, Judge; and MINGE, Judge.
   OPINION

MINGE, Judge.

Relator challenges the decision by the commissioner’s representative that she is not entitled to unemployment benefits. Because there was substantial evidence to support the representative’s decision and because relator’s claim that she would suffer a substantial loss of income was speculative, we affirm.

FACTS

Relator Judy Johnson worked as a hair stylist for respondent Walch & Walch, Inc. (Walch) at its shop in Apache Plaza. She had worked in the same location since 1966. Although she was paid entirely on a commission basis and set her own hours, she was considered an employee, not an independent contractor. Johnson worked approximately 25 hours a week and her earnings averaged approximately $16 per hour.

Apache Plaza closed. As a result, Walch lost its lease and that business location. In anticipation of closing, the president of Walch visited the Apache Plaza shop and told Johnson that she could work at Walch’s Brooklyn Center location. The Brooklyn Center location is about an eight-minute drive by freeway from Apache Plaza. Walch’s president testified that Johnson stated she would retire after the Apache Plaza shop closed. Neither party discussed her work situation again.

Johnson testified that her customer base at Apache Plaza consisted of about 75 elderly women, that she had developed this base over 38 years, and that most of her clients lived within one mile of Apache Plaza. Based on her informal poll of a small number of these customers, Johnson concluded that most of her clientele would not travel to the Brooklyn Center location and that she would suffer a dramatic drop in income if she accepted the offer to relocate. Walch’s president testified that in his experience approximately 70% of a hairstylist’s clients will travel a few minutes to a new location and that there were extra customers and other duties at the Brooklyn Center shop that Johnson could pick up to offset the loss.

After Apache Plaza closed, Johnson ceased working and sought unemployment benefits. A hearing was held before an unemployment law judge (ULJ) who found that Johnson qualified for benefits because she quit her employment for good reason caused by the employer. The decision of the ULJ was appealed to the commissioner’s representative. The commissioner’s representative found that the evidence presented by Walch was more credible than Johnson’s evidence, that in the fall of 2003 Johnson told Walch’s president that she planned to retire after the Apache Mall store closed, that continuing employment was available at the Brooklyn Center location, that her claim of dramatic loss of income was speculative, and that Johnson declined the new opportunity without adequately checking the prospects. Based on these findings, the commissioner’s representative concluded that Johnson quit without good cause attributable to her employer and denied unemployment benefits.

ISSUE

Does Johnson qualify for unemployment benefits?

ANALYSIS

Johnson contends that she had good reason to quit caused by her employer because she would have suffered a substantial loss of income if she moved to the Brooklyn Center location and that the commissioner’s representative erred in denying unemployment benefits.

When reviewing a determination of the commissioner’s representative, this court considers only whether the record reasonably supports the commissioner’s determination. Tuff v. Knitcraft Corp., 526 N.W.2d 50, 51 (Minn.1995). This court views the commissioner’s representative’s findings in the light most favorable to the decision. Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., 644 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn.2002). The court defers to the representative’s ability to weigh conflicting evidence. Whitehead v. Moonlight Nursing Care, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn.App.1995). We defer to the representative’s findings of fact if the record reasonably supports them. Ress v. Abbott Northwestern Hosp., Inc., 448 N.W.2d 519, 523 (Minn.1989). Whether an employee had good cause to quit is a question of law, which we review de novo. Peppi v. Phyllis Wheatley Crnty. Ctr., 614 N.W.2d 750, 752 (Minn.App.2000).

If an employee quits employment because of a good reason caused by the employer, the employee is not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Minn.Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1(1) (Supp. 2003). A good reason caused by the employer is defined as a reason “(1) that is directly related to the employment and for which the employer is responsible; and (2) that is significant and would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than remaining in the employment.” Id., subd. 3(a) (Supp. 2003). Additionally, “[a] substantial adverse change in the wages, hours, or other terms of employment by the employer shall be considered a good reason caused by the employer for quitting[.]” Id., subd. 3(c).

In determining what constitutes a substantial adverse change, Minnesota courts have held that a reduction in wages of between 19 and 25% constitutes a good reason caused by the employer for quitting, but that a reduction of 15% alone does not constitute a good reason. See Sunstar Foods, Inc. v. Uhlendorf, 310 N.W.2d 80, 84-85 (Minn.1981); Danielson Mobil, Inc. v. Johnson, 394 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn.App.1986). In Rootes v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., we held that a 15% pay reduction, a demotion and less favorable hours constituted a good reason to quit. 669 N.W.2d 416, 418 (Minn.App.2003). The Rootes court held that even though the employee did not know the exact terms of the new employment being offered her, the combination of factors was substantial. Id. at 419.

Johnson contends that because she expected to lose a significant number of clients if she moved to the Brooklyn Center location, she would have suffered a substantial adverse change in the terms of her employment, including hours and wages. Johnson bases this conclusion on her belief that her elderly customers would not drive eight minutes to the Brooklyn Center location, that as a commissioned employee, this loss in her customer base would leave her without a steady source of income, and that the employer admitted 30% of her clients would be lost. However, unlike the Sunstar Foods, Danielson Mobil, and Rootes cases, the evidence of income loss is unclear. Although the president of Walch testified that in his experience, 70% of Johnson’s customers would follow her to the Brooklyn Center location, this was not an admission of a 30% income loss. Rather, he testified that there were extra customers at the Brooklyn Center location that Johnson could pick up to replace customers she might lose and that these new customers would allow Johnson to continue to work a similar number of hours and earn a comparable income. He also testified that she told him that she planned to retire.

This appeal presents the following questions: Did Johnson have adequate prospect of continued employment without a substantial adverse change in the terras of her employment and was the situation that Johnson faced one that would cause a reasonable person to quit rather than further investigate the opportunity of continued employment? The commissioner’s representative accepted the employer’s testimony and rejected Johnson’s testimony as speculative and unpersuasive. The commissioner’s representative also found that Johnson never told Walch of her concerns about loss of income, that this deprived the employer of an opportunity to find a solution, and that quitting entirely and applying for unemployment benefits did not “make sense.” We conclude that the employer’s evidence of continued employment and earnings at a nearby location constitutes an adequate factual basis to support the decision of the commissioner’s representative.

Johnson also argues that her situation is like Rootes where the employee did not have to inquire into the terms of her new employment. See 669 N.W.2d at 419. In Rootes, the employee did not have to inquire because she knew she was being demoted, her pay reduced and her hours changed and because her employer acknowledged these changes. Id. While the decision in Rootes supports the proposition that good reason to quit employment may exist even if an employee does not inquire as to the exact nature of the adverse change in employment, in that case there was uncontroverted evidence of a substantial, adverse change in the terms of employment, not just an apprehension of such a change. See id. Unlike Rootes, where the change in income was clear, here it was not. Although Johnson was not given any assurance of her new income level, her conclusion was speculative.

We conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for the commissioner’s representative to determine that Johnson’s concern about loss of income was based on speculation and that the commissioner’s representative did not err in determining that Johnson should have sought more information from Walch or tried working at the alternative location rather than quitting.

DECISION

Because there is adequate evidence that the replacement employment available to Johnson was on terms substantially equivalent to those under which she had previously worked, the commissioner’s representative did not abuse its discretion in determining that Johnson’s decision to quit disqualified her from receiving benefits. Johnson’s apprehension about loss of income does not constitute a good reason to quit caused by the employer which would allow an employee to receive unemployment benefits under Minn.Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1, 3 (Supp.2003). In the circumstances of this case, before quitting, Johnson should have sought more information from the employer about the replacement position or tried working at the alternative location.

Affirmed.

      . A question was raised whether Johnson should be disqualified from receiving benefits because the Apache Plaza shopping center was demolished and Walch, as a lessee, lost its business involuntarily. If Walch had closed the store and discharged Johnson, she would presumably have been eligible for unemployment benefits. See Minn.Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4 (Supp.2003). However, Walch did not discharge Johnson or passively wait for the demolition crew to destroy the shop. Instead, Walch offered Johnson a job as a hair stylist in another shop eight minutes away. Similarly, the parties did not argue and we do not address the question of whether Johnson's claim for benefits should be rejected because she was not paid a wage, but rather paid on commission, and Walch did not cut her wages.


author: DIETZEN, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Richard Robert WEMYSS, a/k/a Richard Robert Weyness, Appellant.
    No. A04-1001.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    May 24, 2005.

      Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Mark N. Lystig, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.
    John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN; and Timothy T. Mulroo-ney, Rochelle Hauser (certified student attorney), Henson & Efron, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.
    Considered and decided by DIETZEN, Presiding Judge; TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge; and SHUMAKER, Judge.
   OPINION

DIETZEN, Judge.

Appellant challenges his conviction for failure to register as a predatory offender, arguing that the district court erred by admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the charge. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting some of the challenged evidence, but the error was harmless, and the evidence as a whole was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTS

On February 27,1996, appellant Richard Robert Wemyss was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. ' As part of his sentence, Wemyss was required to register as a predatory sex offender with the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) for ten years. Wemyss initially registered on March 15, 1996. Since that time, Wemyss periodically updated the BCA and local law enforcement authorities with changes in address, place of employment, and ownership of vehicles. The BCA annually attempted to contact Wem-yss by mail for verification of his data, but the letters were either unanswered or undeliverable to the address on file. As of August 2002, Wemyss’s most recent address on file with the BCA was 435 University Avenue in Saint Paul.

On July 10, 2003, a state patrol officer conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle and noticed Wemyss among the passengers. Wemyss told the officer that he was “staying” at 1003 Montclair, in Mounds View, but his identification card listed his address as 1260 Oakcrest, in Roseville. Wemyss indicated that he was on his way to 1003 Montclair to baby-sit his significant other’s children and was, therefore, released at the scene. The patrol officer informed police in Mounds View that Wemyss was headed to 1003 Montclair.

Later that evening, two Mounds View police officers contacted Wemyss at the front door of the 1003 Montclair residence. The officers asked Wemyss to produce identification and accompanied him as he retrieved a driver’s license from a bedroom dresser. The driver’s license listed Wem-yss’s address as 2466 County Road I in Mounds View. The officers ran a computer check for Wemyss’s registered addiess, which was 435 University Avenue in Saint Paul. Wemyss first told the officers that he had been “living” at 1003 Montclair “for weeks,” and when pressed by the officers about his 435 University Avenue address, Wemyss became belligerent and claimed that he did not have to register his residence. Wemyss finally claimed that he lived at 435 University Avenue and only stayed at 1003 Montclair “on and off.” After verifying that Wemyss had not registered the 1003 Montclair address, the officers arrested Wemyss for failure to register as a predatory offender on July 10, 2003, under Minn.Stat. § 243.166 (2002 & Supp.2003). A police investigator later confirmed that Wemyss had not registered the 1003 Montclair address with the Mounds View Police Department.

At a pretrial hearing, Wemyss stipulated to the following two of the four elements of the offense: (1) he was a person required to register as a predatory offender; and (2) the time period during which he was required to register had not lapsed. Wemyss did not stipulate to the element that he knowingly violated any of the statutory predatory-offender registration requirements. Wemyss testified that he understood that he was stipulating to the first element so he could “remove any mention of the prior criminal sexual conduct charge from the jury.”

After accepting the stipulation, the prosecutor advised Wemyss that the state would be introducing exhibits of Wemyss’s prior predatory-offender registrations and that some of the registrations would mention his underlying conviction. Wemyss objected to the exhibits, arguing that his past registrations were not relevant to the current offense and that the exhibits were contrary to the intent of Wemyss’s stipulation, namely, removing any mention of his underlying conviction from the purview of the jury. The state argued that the exhibits were important for the jury to understand Wemyss’s compliance history with the predatory-registration statute. The district court found that the exhibits were relevant and probative and overruled the objection. The district court also denied Wemyss’s requests to redact terms such as “sex offender” and “predatory offender” from the exhibits.

At trial, the state called the program administrator in the BCA’s predatory-registration unit to introduce 29 exhibits regarding Wemyss’s history of compliance with applicable predatory-registration requirements. The exhibits were generally in three categories. First, 19 exhibits were predatory offender information forms (predatory information forms). These exhibits were completed by Wemyss and signed by a probation officer whenever Wemyss changed his address, employment, or vehicle. Second, one exhibit was entitled “Sex Offender Notification and Registration Form” (SO Registration Form), which stated that Wemyss was notified of his duty to register as a “sex offender” because he was “convicted of engaging in sexual penetration with a 14 [year] old neighbor girl.” Third, there were nine exhibits which consisted of five annual requests (annual request forms) for Wemyss to provide updated information to the BCA. Four out of the nine exhibits superimposed a mailing envelope with the notation “Returned to Sender” over the BCA requests.

The state introduced testimony from the state patrol officer, the Mounds View police officer, the police investigator, the BCA administrator, and Wemyss’s supervised-release agent. The supervised-release agent testified that, in his opinion, Wemyss had knowledge of the predatory offender registration procedures. The only evidence introduced by Wemyss consisted of testimony from a Roseville police lieutenant, who testified that he shredded a BCA “Change of Information Form” after Wemyss went to the police department to change his address on file but failed to provide the lieutenant with a complete updated address.

After completion of the trial, the jury found Wemyss guilty of failure to register as a predatory offender. The district court sentenced Wemyss to two years in prison, imposed a $50 fíne, and extended the period that Wemyss must register as a predatory offender by five years. This appeal follows.

ISSUES

1. Did the district court err when it admitted all of the state’s exhibits into evidence?

2. Were the district court’s erroneous evidentiary rulings harmless?

3. Was the state’s evidence subject to Spreigl procedures?

4. Was the state’s evidence sufficient to support the jury’s verdict?

ANALYSIS

Wemyss was convicted under a statute that makes it a felony for a predatory offender to “knowingly violate[ ]” the statute’s registration requirements. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a) (2002). A person is required to register under the predatory-offender statute if the person was convicted of, among other crimes, third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Id., subd. l(a)(l)(iii) (2002). Under the statute’s registration procedures, at least five days before a move to a new address, a predatory offender must give written notice to the “assigned corrections agent or to the law enforcement authority with which the [offender] currently is registered.” Id., subd. 3(b) (Supp.2003). The offender must also give written notice to the corrections agent or law enforcement jurisdiction that has authority over the offender’s prior place of residence. Id. When registering with a corrections agent or law enforcement entity, an offender must provide addresses for primary and secondary residences. Id., subd. 4a(b)(l)-(2) (S.upp.2003). The statute also requires the BCA to “mail a verification form to the last reported address of the [offender’s] residence.” Id., subd. 4(e)(1) (2002). If the offender fails to complete and mail the verification form within ten days, the offender is in violation of the statute. Id., subd. 4(e)(3). We now turn to an analysis of the admissibility of exhibits presented at trial.

I.

Evidentiary Rulings

Wemyss argues that his conviction must be reversed because the state’s registration exhibits were erroneously admitted. Wemyss argues that the admission of the exhibits, which included the labels “sex offender” and “predatory offender,” undermined the stipulation he made to his prior conviction. The state contends that the exhibits were relevant because they tended to prove that Wemyss was familiar with the registration requirements under the predatory-offender statute, and the probative value of the exhibits was not substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice.

“The district court has discretion in the admissibility of evidence and its ruling will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Matelski, 622 N.W.2d 826, 831 (Minn.App.2001), review denied (Minn.-May 15, 2001). A defendant has the burden to show that evidence was wrongly admitted and resulted in prejudice. Id. Relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ... or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 403. Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible as character evidence in a subsequent proceeding, unless the evidence is used for another purpose, such as proof that the defendant had knowledge of an issue relevant to the proceeding. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). The issue, then, is whether the value of the exhibits was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

A criminal defendant has a right to keep “potentially prejudicial evidence of [a] prior conviction from the jury,” even when that conviction is an element of the offense, by stipulating to the prior conviction and removing the issue from the case. State v. Berkelman, 355 N.W.2d 394, 396-97 (Minn.1984); see also State v. Davidson, 351 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Minn.1984). Although the parties have not cited any cases extending this right to a prosecution for failure to register as a predatory offender, the state does not contest Wemyss’s exercise of that right in this case. The supreme court has stated, with regard to evidence of a prior felony conviction, of any nature, “In the vast majority of such cases the potential of the evidence for unfair prejudice clearly outweighs its probative value.” Davidson, 351 N.W.2d at 11. The same may be said with even greater force of evidence of a prior conviction for a sex offense or “predatory offense.”

Because of the stipulation made by the defense, the state was required to prove only that Wemyss knowingly failed to register his new address as of July 10, 2003. The state argues that the exhibits admitted were relevant to. prove this element of the offense. Wemyss, however, argues that any evidence of past registrations and failures to register was irrelevant to that element and were rendered inadmissible by his stipulation. We disagree. “A defendant may not be allowed to unilaterally control the need for relevant evidence by offering to stipulate, especially where the evidence bears upon other issues not covered by the stipulation.” Matelski, 622 N.W.2d at 832.

The predatory offender information forms contained responses that set forth the changes in Wemyss’s addresses, places of employment, and vehicles. As the state argues, they are relevant to Wemyss’s knowledge of his duty to register as a predatory offender and the manner in which he notified the BCA of changes in his address. See Minn. R. Evid. 401 1977 comm. cmt. (“The fact to be established need not be an ultimate fact or a vital fact. It need only be a fact that is of some consequence to the disposition of the litigation.”). The state had the right to use all relevant evidence available to prove that Wemyss knowingly violated his responsibility to register as a predatory offender so long as that evidence did not undermine the stipulation. See Davidson, 351 N.W.2d at 11 (recognizing facts of prior conviction may be admissible if relevant to a disputed issue); MinmStat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a) (making it a crime to “knowingly violate” registration statute). Because the predatory offender information forms tended to prove Wemyss’s knowledge of his duty to register, and, except for the captions discussed below, did not undermine the stipulation to Wemyss’s prior conviction, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits.

Wemyss next argues that the court’s failure to redact the terms “predatory offender” and “sex offender” on the admitted exhibits was error, and along with the utterance of the same terms on several occasions by the prosecutor, denied Wemyss’s right to a fair trial. The district court denied Wemyss’s request to redact the allegedly prejudicial terms in the exhibits and prohibit the state from using the terms because the issue at trial was whether Wemyss knowingly violated any of the statutory predatory offender registration requirements. Minn.Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a).

The term “predatory offender” is the term used in the statute to refer to those required to register. But Wemyss stipulated that he was required to register as a predatory offender to avoid the potential prejudice of the repeated references to him as a “predatory offender” or “sex offender” before the jury. Although the jury needed to be informed of this stipulation, use of the terminology “predatory offender” or “sex offender” tended to undermine the stipulation. In Davidson, the supreme court held that a defendant charged with possession of a handgun had a right to stipulate to his prior felony conviction, and that the court “should have instructed the jury to the effect that defendant had stipulated that under Minnesota law he was not entitled to possess a pistol.... ” 351 N.W.2d at 12. Similarly, in this case, the purpose of the stipulation was to keep from the jury Wemyss’s prior conviction. Consequently, to label him a “predatory offender” or “sex offender” undermined that stipulation.

The state argues that the stipulation did not explicitly preclude it from referring to Wemyss as a predatory offender. But the issue is not the scope of the stipulation as agreed on by the parties, but rather the benefit of the stipulation to which Wemyss was entitled under Davidson and Berkel-man. As we read the supreme court’s holdings in Davidson and Berkelman, Wemyss was entitled to the benefit of the stipulation to avoid the potential prejudice of those references of him before the jury. Because the references to Wemyss as a predatory offender were prejudicial and undermined the stipulation, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the exhibits without redacting those references, and in allowing the prosecutor to refer to Wemyss as a “predatory offender” and a “sex offender.”

Next, Wemyss argues that one of the responses on the SO Registration Form signed by him on March 15, 1996, violated the pretrial stipulation because it states the details of Wemyss’s underlying conviction, sexual penetration with a 14-year-old neighborhood girl. Wemyss argues that he entered the stipulation to avoid testimony detailing the nature of his underlying conviction. We agree. The exhibit violated the stipulation by going into the details of his conviction and was not relevant to the element of the offense that Wemyss did not stipulate to — that he knowingly violated any of the statutory predatory-offender-registration requirements. And, Wemyss properly requested that the offending language be redacted. Consequently, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the SO Registration Form without redacting the offending language.

Finally, based on our review of the record, we conclude that the district court also abused its discretion when it admitted the nine annual request forms for Wemyss to keep his registrations updated — which included five instances of annual request forms returned to the BCA undelivered or unanswered. The exhibits were not relevant to whether Wemyss knowingly failed to comply with all of the predatory registration requirements. Because these requests were returned to the BCA undelivered, it is unclear whether Wemyss even saw the requests. The requests also could have been returned to the BCA if Wemyss unknowingly did not provide the BCA with an updated address ón a timely basis, or if the mail was not delivered through no fault of Wemyss. None of these scenarios are relevant to the “knowledge” element the state was charged with proving at trial. Therefore, we conclude that these nine exhibits were irrelevant under Minn. R. Evid. 401 and should not have been admitted at trial by the district court.

II.

Harmless Error

Wemyss argues that because the district court erred when it admitted the unredaeted exhibits and other references to “predatory offender” and “sex offender,” he is entitled to a new trial. But Wemyss’s conviction need not be vacated if the district court’s errors were harmless. “[A]ppellate courts must look to the basis on which the jury rested its verdict and determine what effect the error had on the actual verdict.” State v. Jones, 556 N.W.2d 903, 910 (Minn.1996). “If the verdict actually rendered was surely unattributable to the error, the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. The inquiry is not whether the jury could have convicted the defendant without the error, but rather, what effect the error had on the jury’s verdict, “and more specifically, whether the jury’s verdict is ‘surely unattributable’ to [the error].” State v. King, 622 N.W.2d 800, 811 (Minn.2001) (quoting State v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Minn.1997)).

In addition to the exhibits improperly admitted without redaction, the state presented testimony from the patrol officer, the Mounds View police officer, the police investigator, and the supervised-release agent. This testimony revealed that (1) Wemyss was registered at 435 University Avenue in Saint Paul but said that he had been staying at 1003 Montclair “for weeks”; (2) Wemyss was found at 1003 Montclair; (3) Wemyss became belligerent once officers challenged him on his address; (4) Wemyss did not register the 1003 Montclair address with the police department before July 10, 2003; and (5) Wemyss appeared knowledgeable about the predatory offender registration requirements. Wemyss also presented evidence that he had attempted to orally report a new address in 2002 or 2003, strongly indicating that he knew of the registration requirement. Based on this record, we conclude that the jury had ample evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Wemyss knowingly failed to register, and thus its verdict was surely unattributable to the error. Therefore, although the district court erroneously admitted evidence that undermined the stipulation, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

III.

Spreigl Evidence

Wemyss also argues that the state’s exhibits were Spreigl evidence and improperly admitted by the district court. A district court may not receive evidence of other crimes and misconduct unless the state provides notice to the defendant. State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 496-97,139 N.W.2d 167, 172-73 (1965). We will not reverse the district court’s admission of Spreigl evidence unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown. State v. Spaeth, 552 N.W.2d 187,193 (Minn.1996).

We disagree with Wemyss’s argument that the exhibits were improper Spreigl evidence. First, we have already concluded that ten of the 29 exhibits were erroneously admitted into evidence, which makes a Spreigl analysis unnecessary as to those exhibits. Second, the procedural Spreigl requirements only apply to other crimes and misconduct by the defendant. Spreigl, 272 Minn, at 496-97, 139 N.W.2d at 172-73. Here, the 19 exhibits that detail Wemyss’s changes in address, employment, and vehicle ownership are not evidence of other crimes or misconduct. Instead, the exhibits are proof that Wem-yss had knowledge of his legal obligation to register because he updated the BCA and local law enforcement agencies on his status. They do not show other failures to fulfill that obligation. Third, even if the 19 exhibits were instances of other crimes and misconduct, Spreigl would not apply because the other acts were inextricably intertwined with the charged offense. See generally State v. Nunn, 561 N.W.2d 902, 907-08 (Minn.1997). Fourth, Wemyss was given adequate notice of the exhibits, either through their written inclusion in the state’s criminal complaint or at the pretrial hearing. Therefore, we conclude that Wemyss’s Spreigl argument is without merit.

IY.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Wemyss finally argues that the state’s evidence is insufficient to convict him of failure to register as a predatory offender. After examining the record, appellate courts must determine if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, “was sufficient for the jurors to reach their verdict.” Matelski, 622 N.W.2d at 830. We “must assume the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” Id. at 831.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction, we conclude that there was ample evidence for the jury to find Wemyss guilty of failure to register as a predatory offender. At the time of the offense, the predatory-offender statute required Wemyss to report the addresses of his primary and secondary residences. Minn.Stat. § 243.166, subd. 4a(b). Testimony at trial revealed that on July 10, 2003, a state patrol officer stopped a vehicle in which Wemyss was a passenger, and Wemyss told the officer that he was “living” or “staying” at 1003 Montclair, in Mounds View. A Mounds View police officer testified that he found Wemyss at 1003 Montclair and that Wemyss produced identification from a dresser drawer in the bedroom. After Wemyss produced the identification, he told the officers that he had been staying at 1003 Montclair “for weeks.” A Mounds View police investigator testified, after reviewing department records, that Wemyss had not registered the 1003 Montclair address with the police department prior to July 10, 2003. Wem-yss’s supervised-release agent testified that, in his belief, Wemyss understood the predatory offender registration procedures. Finally, the state introduced a multitude of exhibits showing that Wemyss had timely registered as a predatory offender in the past. Given our deferential standard of review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction.

DECISION

Because we conclude that the district court’s improper admission of evidence was harmless error, that Wemyss’s Spreigl argument is without merit, and that the remaining evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, we affirm Wem-yss’s conviction of failure to register as a predatory offender under Minn.Stat. § 243.166 (2002 <& Supp.2003).

Affirmed.

      . One of the five BCA memoranda did not feature a superimposed "Returned to Sender” envelope, but instead contained a notation on the memorandum that no reply had been received.