author: GILBERTSON, Chief Justice. [¶ 66.] SABERS, Justice

text:
    2007 SD 15
    STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Ralph BUCHHOLD, Defendant and Appellant.
    No. 23839.
    Supreme Court of South Dakota.
    Argued Aug. 30, 2006.
    Decided Jan. 31, 2007.

      Lawrence E. Long, Attorney General, Steven R. Blair, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.
    Brian L. Utzman, Alan L. Smoot, Smoot & Utzman, Rapid City, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendant and appellant.
   GILBERTSON, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1.] Ralph Buchhold (Buchhold) was convicted by a jury of one count of second degree rape, six counts of third degree rape, and four counts of sexual contact with a child under the age of sixteen. He was sentenced to 25 years in the state penitentiary on the second degree rape count and 15 years .on each of the third degree rape and sexual contact counts. The sentences are to be served consecutively. We affirm.

PACTS AND PROCEDURE

[¶ 2.] A child, (hereinafter referred to as A.B.), was born to Ralph and Kathleen Buchhold on August 22, 1988. During the initial years of AB.’s life, Buchhold was largely absent from the home. He served overseas as an active duty member of the United States Air Force.

[¶ 3.] Buchhold was discharged from the Air Force on January 1, 1995. At that time he joined his family in Rapid City, South Dakota. During the next few years, A.B., who was seven when her father returned from the Air Force, enjoyed a fairly normal upbringing. The Buchholds welcomed a second daughter into their family in 1998.

[¶ 4.] AB.’s life began to change in 1999, after her eleventh birthday. During this time, A.B.’s father, Buchhold, began to make sexual advances towards her. This started when Buchhold came into A.B.’s room one day and began touching her in the breast area on the outside of her clothes. Athough A.B. did not understand the inappropriateness of the act at this time, it made her uncomfortable. She attempted to slide away from Buchhold. Buchhold persisted and once again made inappropriate contact with A.B. on the outside of her clothes. This initial episode ended when Buchhold left A.B.’s room after she yelled at him and shoved him away.

[¶ 5.] The first encounter was followed by another in AB.’s bedroom where Buch-hold placed his hands inside AB.’s pants. Buchhold told A.B. at this time that she was made for his pleasure. This episode again ended when A.B. shoved Buchhold away.

[¶ 6.] Following these initial episodes, A.B. told her mother, Kathleen, about what her father had been doing to her. Kathleen confronted Buchhold about the allegations, but came away from the meeting distrusting A.B. After this meeting, Buchhold told A.B. that if she would keep her mouth shut the sexual advances would not happen again. However, within a short period of time Buchhold’s behavior resumed and his sexual advances became more extreme.

[¶ 7.] A.B. was still eleven years old the first time she was raped by her father. Buchhold ordered A.B. into his room where he removed AB.’s clothes and forced her, kicking and crying, to have vaginal sex with him. A.B. continued to cry complaining about the pain that the penetration was causing her. Buchhold dismissed A.B.’s pleas and finally subdued her struggling by squeezing his hand around her throat until she ceased.

[¶ 8.] Thus, began an ordeal for A.B. that lasted four years. During this period, Buchhold’s rape and sexual abuse of his daughter escalated to an almost daily occurrence. It was not until A.B. was 15 that she was able to overcome her fear and humiliation in order to report the abuse from Buchhold. On December 13, 2003, a Rapid City police officer was dispatched to the Buchhold residence in response to a reported rape.

[¶ 9.] On February 12, 2004, Buchhold was indicted by a Pennington County Grand Jury on one count of second degree rape, six counts of third degree rape and four counts of sexual contact with a minor. A warrant was immediately issued for Buchhold’s arrest. Aware that he was about to be arrested, Buchhold left South Dakota to do a “photo shoot.” He traveled to various places under an assumed name. A Canadian by birth, he tried to arrange the purchase of a home in Canada under the name Thomas Keyes. Before he reached Canada, however, he was apprehended in New Jersey on May 14, 2004. Buchhold made his initial appearance on all charges before a Pennington County Magistrate on June 24, 2004. His trial commenced on July 13, 2005.

[¶ 10.] During the trial, A.B. testified to at least ten separate instances of rape or sexual contact perpetrated upon her by her father. In addition A.B. testified that from 1999 through 2003, like instances of rape and sexual contact escalated from a once or twice weekly occurrence to as frequent as every other day or almost daily. Dr. Lori Strong, a pediatrician specializing in the treatment of children who suffer sexual and other physical abuse, testified on direct examination by the State that a vaginal examination of A.B. revealed a hymenal irregularity. The doctor asserted that this irregularity could not have existed from birth and was not attributable to any sort of natural infirmity such as a urinary tract infection. In Dr. Strong’s opinion A.B.’s hymenal irregularity was due to a penetration injury. She stated that this kind of injury was consistent with someone experiencing a history of sexual abuse like that relayed by A.B.

[¶ 11.] Prior to trial, the State gave notice of its intent to elicit testimony about statements of a sexual nature allegedly made to other young women by Buchhold. The circuit court ruled that the statements would not be admissible since they were not similar to the charges Buchhold faced; thus, being unduly prejudicial and not evidence of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, or absence of mistake or accident in relation to the charges. See SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule 404(b)).

[¶ 12.] During the trial, the State played a videotape of an interview of Buch-hold conducted by Pennington County Sheriffs Deputy, Misti Walker. Due to a redaction error the jury was allowed to hear a portion of the videotape that included the statement from Walker to Buch-hold, “Her friends say that you make these sexual com — ....” Defense counsel moved for a mistrial contending that the intent of the court’s ruling at the Rule 404(b) hearing had been violated. The circuit court denied the motion on the ground that the fragmentary statement did not violate the intent of the Rule 404(b) ruling and thus was not unduly prejudicial to Buchhold’s ability to have a fair trial.

[¶ 13.] Following the conclusion of the first day of the trial, Buchhold was escorted from the courtroom by a uniformed deputy sheriff. He was apparently placed in restraints in preparation for transport back to the Pennington County jail after leaving the courtroom. He was then taken by the deputy to await an elevator. Before Buchhold could board the elevator, four jurors, who had inadvertently been excused, saw him shackled under the supervision of the deputy. Though defense counsel did not ask for a mistrial, he did discuss the incident with the circuit court. The circuit court, aware of the incident, noted that the jurors had immediately returned to the courtroom without any resulting effect. Considering there to be no prejudicial consequence to Buchhold, the judge dismissed the incident.

[¶ 14.] Finally, during closing arguments, the state’s attorney recalled for the jury the testimony of Dr. Strong. He specifically recounted the doctor’s discussion about the hymenal irregularity. The state’s attorney reiterated Dr. Strong’s contention that the irregularity was consistent with what one might find in a child who had been the victim of prolonged sexual abuse. He concluded this discussion by stating that it was another piece of the puzzle and convincing evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that rape had occurred. Defense counsel had no objection to the state’s attorney’s statement.

[¶ 15.] Buchhold was found guilty on all eleven counts on July 14, 2005. On September 6, 2005, he was given the maximum sentence on all counts to be served consecutively; thus, totaling 175 years.

[¶ 16.] On appeal, Buchhold raises six issues:

1. Whether Buchhold was properly convicted of and sentenced on the mutually exclusive crimes of third degree rape and sexual contact with a minor under the age of sixteen.
2. Whether sentencing Buchhold to the maximum allowable on each count, to be served consecutively, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
3. Whether the statutory 180-day rule was violated.
4. Whether the circuit court erred when it failed to grant Buchhold’s motion for a mistrial when the State failed to redact portions of a videotape that was shown to the jury.
5. Whether Buchhold’s ability to have a fair trial was unduly prejudiced when members of the jury saw him in restraints while in the custody of a sheriffs deputy.
6. Whether the state’s attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct when referencing expert testimony during closing arguments.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 17.] “In determining the sufficiency of the evidence on review, the question presented is whether there is evidence in the record which, if believed by the fact finder, is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Lewandowski, 463 N.W.2d 341, 343-44 (S.D.1990). This Court reviews sentencing within statutory limits under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. McKinney, 2005 SD 73, ¶ 10, 699 N.W.2d 471, 476 (citing State v. Goodroad, 1997 SD 46, ¶ 40, 563 N.W.2d 126, 135 (citing State v. Anderson, 1996 SD 46, ¶ 30, 546 N.W.2d 395, 402)). “We give ‘great deference to sentencing decisions made by trial courts.’ ” State v. Garber, 2004 SD 2, ¶ 13, 674 N.W.2d 320, 323 (quoting State v. Milk, 2000 SD 28, ¶ 10, 607 N.W.2d 14, 17 (citing State v. Gehrke, 491 N.W.2d 421, 422 (S.D.1992))). However, when a defendant challenges a sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds, our review is conducted using the gross dispro-portionality standard set out in State v. Bonner, 1998 SD 30, ¶ 17, 577 N.W.2d 575, 580. “[T]his Court reviews ‘the determination of whether the 180-day period has expired as well as what constitutes good cause for delay under a de novo standard.’ ” State v. Cottrill, 2003 SD 38, ¶ 6, 660 N.W.2d 624, 628 (quoting State v. Sparks, 1999 SD 115, ¶ 5, 600 N.W.2d 550, 553). “The denial of a motion for mistrial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Janklow, 2005 SD 25, ¶ 42, 693 N.W.2d 685, 699 (citing State v. Ball, 2004 SD 9, ¶ 16, 675 N.W.2d 192, 197). Where an issue has not been preserved by objection at trial, this Court’s review is limited to consideration of whether the circuit court committed plain error. State v. Nelson, 1998 SD 124, ¶ 7, 587 N.W.2d 439, 443 (citing State v. Satter, 1996 SD 9, ¶ 11, 543 N.W.2d 249, 251).

ANALYSIS AND DECISION

[¶ 18.] 1. Whether Buchhold was properly convicted of and sentenced on the mutually exclusive crimes of third degree rape and sexual contact with a minor under the age of sixteen.

[¶ 19.] Buchhold argues that there is not sufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt on the eleven separate counts for which he was convicted. Specifically, Buchhold contends the only evidence supporting the multiple counts was “the very general” and “uncorroborated” testimony of A.B. Buchhold was convicted of four counts of sexual contact with a minor. He asserts that AB.’s testimony only supports two counts of sexual contact. He then concludes the only basis under which more counts could be rationalized would be to assume sexual contact occurred coincident with incidences of rape. Buchhold asserts that our legislature did not intend for sexual contact and rape crimes to be cumulative.

[¶ 20.] Buchhold reasons that under SDCL 22-22-7, sexual contact with a child under the age of sixteen is a mutually exclusive offense from that of rape under SDCL 22-22-1. Buchhold points to the usage of the term “sexual contact” in SDCL 22-22-7 and its definition under SDCL 22-22-7.1, as the basis for the mutual exclusivity of “rape” and “sexual contact” crimes as intended by our legislature.

[¶ 21.] Buchhold cites a litany of cases decided by this Court that resulted in the reversal of convictions for mutually exclusive offenses based on the same set of facts. See State v. Perovich, 2001 SD 96, 632 N.W.2d 12; State v. Dillon, 2001 SD 97, 632 N.W.2d 37 (holding that convictions for rape and pedophilia based on one act violated the prohibition against double jeopardy where the legislature did not specifically intend for multiple punishments for the same conduct); Interest of C.H., 2001 SD 119, 634 N.W.2d 309 (vacating two convictions for sexual contact incidental to rape because the legislature did not intend for cumulative punishments for one act of sexual penetration); State v. Brammer, 304 N.W.2d 111 (S.D.1981) (holding that convictions for the mutually exclusive crimes of rape and sexual contact were substantially prejudicial to the defendant under the plain error rule).

[¶ 22.] Buchhold failed to seek dismissal at trial of any of the counts under that he now claims to have been improperly charged. We must therefore consider this issue from the perspective of whether the circuit court committed plain error in entering convictions on all charges. See Satter, 1996 SD 9, ¶ 11, 543 N.W.2d at 251. “Plain error requires (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights; and only then may this Court exercise its discretion to notice the error if (4) it ‘seriously affectfs] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” Nelson, 1998 SD 124, ¶ 8, 587 N.W.2d at 443 (citation omitted).

[¶ 23.] A.B. testified that the first time Buchhold came to her room and touched her in a sexual manner, she pushed him away. A.B. then stated that her father initiated a second sexual contact during this incident. A.B. later testified that the next time A.B. made sexual advances, he placed his hands inside her pants. This constitutes three acts of sexual contact rather than the two that Buchhold claims.

[¶ 24.] Buchhold also fails to address the sheer magnitude of the number of sexual acts he committed against A.B. A.B. testified that when her father started sexually abusing her it was with a frequency of once or twice a week, “not that often.” Later it progressed to two or three times a week and by the time she was in the eighth grade it was occurring somewhere between every other day and every day. A.B. asserts that the total number of times she was sexually abused by her father were too numerous for her to count.

[¶ 25.]This Court must accept the evidence, and the most favorable inferences that can be drawn from it, which will sustain a verdict. State v. Buchholz, 1999 SD 110, ¶ 33, 598 N.W.2d 899, 905 (citation omitted). This Court will not pass on the credibility of witnesses or weigh the evidence in determining its sufficiency. Id. (citation omitted).

[¶ 26.] Clearly, the jury considered A.B.’s testimony to be credible. It is entirely possible that given the hundreds of acts of sexual abuse perpetrated upon A.B. by her father, the jury may have inferred that at least one additional count of sexual contact existed. Thus, the circuit court could not be held to be in error for accepting the jury’s finding of fact as to the sufficiency of evidence supporting eleven separate counts.

[¶ 27.] 2. Whether sentencing Buch-hold to the maximum allowable on each count, to be served consecutively, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

[¶ 28.] Buchhold received the maximum available sentence on all eleven counts for which he was convicted; thus, totaling 175 years. He will not be eligible for parole until he has served half of his sentence or 87½ years. Buchhold was 50 years old when sentenced. He therefore argues that he has received a de facto life sentence and otherwise cruel and unusual punishment given the circumstances in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

[¶ 29.] In Bonner, we set out the proportionality test used by this Court to review a defendant’s challenge to a sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds.

To assess a challenge to proportionality we first determine whether the sentence appears grossly disproportionate. To accomplish this, we consider the conduct involved, and any relevant past conduct, with utmost deference to the Legislature and the sentencing court. If these circumstances fail to suggest gross dispro-portionality, our review ends.

Bonner, 1998 SD 30, ¶ 17, 577 N.W.2d at 580 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2704, 115 L.Ed.2d 836, 868 (1991)). Only when a sentence appears grossly disproportional will this Court conduct an inter/intra-juris-dictional sentencing analysis or assess other factors. Id. ¶ 21 (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1000, 111 S.Ct. at 2704, 115 L.Ed.2d at 868).

[¶ 30.] In order to apply the test set out in Bonner to this case, we must first determine if the issue of gross dispropor-tionality is confined to the sentences imposed for each individual conviction or whether it extends to the consecutive sentencing scheme. The United States Supreme Court has not provided a clear answer to this question. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003). However, we take note of the statement pertaining to this issue from the early case of O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 12 S.Ct. 693, 36 L.Ed. 450 (1892). Though not central to the holding in that case, the Court recognized that the length of a defendant’s sentence may be attributable to the number of crimes committed which of itself does not raise proportionality concerns:

The punishment imposed by statute for the offence with which the respondent, O’Neil, is charged, cannot be said to be excessive or oppressive. If he has subjected himself to a severe penalty, it is simply because he has committed a great many such offences. It would be scarcely competent for a person to assail the constitutionality of the statute prescribing a punishment for burglary, on the ground that he had committed so many burglaries that, if punishment for each were inflicting on him, he might be kept in prison for life. The mere fact that cumulative punishments may be imposed for distinct offences in the same prosecution is not material upon this question.

Id. at 331, 12 S.Ct. at 696-97, 36 L.Ed. 450.

[¶ 31.] Several lower courts have dealt with this issue and concluded that the gross disproportionality review applies to the sentence imposed for the individual crimes rather than the consecutive aggregate. In United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 265 (2dCir.1988), the court also took notice of the reasoning from O’Neil, holding that a proportionality analysis did not apply to a defendant’s life sentence without parole plus 140 consecutive years because the analysis properly focuses on the sentence applied for each specific crime and not cumulative sentencing. In supporting the same proposition, the court in United States v. Schell, 692 F.2d 672, 675 (10thCir.1982) reasoned that concluding otherwise would mean that any sentence regardless of length could be deemed cruel and unusual punishment when imposed on a defendant already serving lengthy sentences for prior convictions. Similarly, the court in Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 886 (7thCir.2001) predicted the absurd result of prisoners that would generate col-orable Eighth Amendment claims by simply committing more crimes.

[¶ 32.] Other jurisdictions have also considered the issue of proportionality where consecutive sentencing is involved. The Arizona Supreme Court has concluded that defendant’s have no constitutional right to concurrent sentencing for multiple separate crimes. State v. Jonas, 164 Ariz. 242, 792 P.2d 705, 712 (1990) (citations omitted). Recently, the Arizona court concluded that even when consecutive sentences exceed life expectancy, it cannot be argued that a sentence that is not alone grossly disproportional becomes so because it is lengthy in aggregate with other sentences. State v. Berger, 212 Ariz. 473, 134 P.3d 378, 384 (2006) (citation omitted). In Close v. People, 48 P.3d 528, 540 (Colo.2002), the Colorado Supreme Court held that cumulative sentences are not reviewable in aggregate. In State v. August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 744 (Iowa 1999), the Iowa Supreme Court noted that an Eighth Amendment claim does not arise where a defendant who commits multiple crimes is punished more severely than a defendant who commits one.

[¶ 33.] We conclude that the imposition of consecutive sentencing is a discretionary matter for the sentencing court in line with SDCL 22-6-6.1. In State v. Blair, we justified in part the circuit court’s imposition of five consecutive eight year terms against the defendant by reasoning that each of the five counts was individual and specific to one of his five victims. 2006 SD 75, ¶ 66, 721 N.W.2d 55, 72. The same rationale applies to this case because even though A.B. was the only victim of Buchhold’s crimes, each instance of sexual abuse was a separate offense committed at different times.

[¶ 34.] Defense counsel argues that in imposing sentence the circuit court “disregarded” the psychosexual evaluator’s conclusions that Buchhold does not have “a chronic objectively sexual interest in young children” or an “objectively measured interest in sexual violence.” According to the evaluator, Buchhold’s test scores suggested that he is a “low risk for recidivism.” Nonetheless, it must be noted that the evaluator’s entire assessment was prefaced with the comment that Buchhold’s “continued denial is viewed as an indicator of his failure to take responsibility for his sexual behavior problems and a lack of forthrightness on this assessment.” Thus, the test scores showing Buchhold to be a low risk are of dubious worth.

[¶ 35.] During the sentencing hearing, the circuit court stated that in addition to the evidence presented at trial, it considered the pre-sentence investigation and psychosexual evaluation. This evaluation revealed that Buchhold is in “deep denial” of the molestation he perpetrated against A.B. Instead of accepting responsibility for his acts, Buchhold depicted his daughter as mentally unstable and a habitual liar. As the trial court noted, his continued denial left him unamenable to treatment or the possibility of rehabilitation: “It would appear to me, sir, based on the entire record before me, that there is no prospect of rehabilitation in the foreseeable future in your particular instance and that the only way to protect society is to remove you from society.” Thus, in total we conclude the circuit court acted within its discretion by sentencing Buchhold to eleven consecutive sentences.

[¶ 36.] The next step in our analysis is to determine whether the individual sentences are grossly disproportionate. The first step in establishing whether a threshold showing of gross disproportion-ality in sentencing exists is to determine whether the legislature had a rational basis to conclude the statutory sentencing guidelines would further the objectives of the State’s criminal justice system. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1189, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003). We then decide whether a defendant’s sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime by determining whether that sentence furthers those objectives the legislature sought to advance. Id. at 29-30, 123 S.Ct. at 1190, 155 L.Ed.2d 108.

[¶ 37.] The legislature has determined that sex crimes against children are a serious public concern and should be punished severely. State v. Guthmiller, 2003 SD 83, ¶ 48, 667 N.W.2d 295, 311. At the time Buchhold was charged, second degree rape carried a maximum 25-year sentence while the crimes of third degree rape and sexual contact each carried a maximum sentence of 15 years. The statutory sentencing structure established for these crimes can reasonably be construed to further the State’s public policy of deterrence through correction and retribution. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28, 123 S.Ct. at 1189, 155 L.Ed.2d 108; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1003, 111 S.Ct. at 2706, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).

[¶ 38.] The legislature’s establishment of this sentencing structure, providing a range of punishment up to the statutory maximum, reveals its intent to invest sentencing courts with the discretion to hand down harsher sentences for those committing the most egregious examples of the crimes. See Guthmiller, 2003 SD 83, ¶ 44, 667 N.W.2d at 309; Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S.Ct. 544, 549, 54 L.Ed. 793, 798. This case illustrates an example of the kind of egregious violation justifying imposition of the maximum sentence available under the statutes.

[¶ 39.] Buchhold sexually violated his daughter through force and coercion constituting second degree rape, third degree rape, and sexual contact with a child. AB.’s extended exposure to Buchhold’s sexual abuse has all but destroyed her family life. She no longer has any apparent emotional feeling for either of her parents. She has been separated from two younger sisters for whom she still feels great emotional attachment.

[¶ 40.] Buchhold’s intentional conduct occurred repeatedly over a period of approximately four years and likely has resulted in irreparable emotional harm to AJB. We can reasonably conclude that imposition of the maximum sentence in this case for convictions on the individual counts advances, through correction and retribution, the State’s interest in deterring such crimes. We therefore conclude in this case that imposition of the maximum sentence for the individual charges is not grossly disproportional and our review of this issue is complete.

[¶ 41.] 3. Whether the statutory 180-day rule was violated.

[¶ 42.] Buchhold argues that he is entitled to a dismissal with prejudice on all counts because the time between his initial appearance and trial exceeded the statutory 180-day period provided under SDCL 23A-44-5.1. The following is a chronology of the period between Buch-hold’s initial appearance and trial:

1. June 24, 2004: Buchhold makes his initial appearance.
2. June 30, 2004: Arraignment.
3. July 7, 2004: Buchhold files a request with circuit court for recusal of the Honorable Mertin B. Tice (including removal affidavit attached).
4. July 19, 2004: Status hearing (rescheduled due to change of presiding judge).
5. July 26, 2004: Motions hearing.
6. August 2, 2004: Status hearing.
7. September 13, 2004: Motions hearing. Buchhold makes oral motion to release seized property.
8. September 14, 2004: Motion by original trial counsel to withdraw because Buchhold retained new counsel.
9. September 17, 2004: Order granting September 14, 2004 motion.
10. October 5, 2004: Order granting September 13, 2004 motion.
11. December 15, 2004: Original trial date. Cancelled. New trial date scheduled for April 20, 2005.
12. January 10, 2005: Status hearing.
13. January 21, 2005: Buchhold files 19 pretrial motions. These motions include a request for order permitting Buchhold to be transported for a medical examination. In addition, motions include request for production of records, medical reports, disclosure of State’s Rule 404(b) evidence, State’s witness list and pretrial discovery.
14. January 31, 2005: Motions hearing.
15. February 18, 2005: State files Rule 404(b) notice.
16. February 28, 2005: Motions hearing.
17. March 7, 2005: Status hearing.
18. March 7, 2005: Circuit court order that all Department of Social Services records, pertaining to A.B. requested by Buchhold, be sent to the circuit court for in-camera review.
19. March 21, 2005: Status hearing.
20. April 6, 2005: Circuit court releases memorandum stating that in-camera records have been reviewed and will be released to the parties.
21. April 6, 2005: Hearing is held to consider State’s Rule 404(b) notice.
22. April 20, 2005: Buchhold’s second trial date. Trial is continued due to significant health problems of defense counsel.
28. May 11, 2005: State asks for continuance of June 8, 2005 trial date due to unavailability of State’s expert, Dr. Strong.
24. May 13, 2005: Circuit court grants continuance and reschedules trial for July 13, 2005.
25. July 7, 2005: Circuit court orders that Buchhold be transported for medical examination.
26. July 13, 2005: Buchhold’s trial commences.

[¶ 43.] Three hundred and eighty-five days passed between Buchhold’s June 24, 2004 initial appearance and commencement of trial on July 13, 2005. However, SDCL 23A-44-5.1(4) provides for conditions under which the 180-day clock shall be tolled. Included in these conditions are continuances granted at the request or with the consent of the defendant or defense counsel so long as there is a written order filed by the court. SDCL 23A-44-5.1(4)(b).

[¶ 44.] Buchhold argues that defense counsel’s request for continuance of the April 20, 2005 trial date should not be excluded from the 180-day computation because there was no written order filed by the circuit court. However, when the trial opened, defense counsel addressed the 180-day issue. He specifically made reference to his request for continuance of the April 20 trial date due to his serious health problems that required hospitalization. Defense counsel also made reference to the many motions and status hearings he had requested. In total, defense counsel did not believe that given the number of defense initiated delays there was any justification for dismissal under the 180-day rule. The circuit court concurred with defense counsel’s assessment of the merits of a motion for dismissal based on a 180-day rule violation stating on the record that the proceedings are within the requirements of the statute.

[¶ 45.] Additionally, this Court has held, “ ‘[W]here a defendant assents to a period of delay and later attempts to take advantage of it, courts should be loathe to find a violation of an accused’s speedy trial rights.’ ” Cottrill, 2003 SD 38, ¶ 11, 660 N.W.2d at 630 (quoting Hays v. Weber, 2002 SD 59, ¶ 23, 645 N.W.2d 591, 599 (quoting State v. Beynon, 484 N.W.2d 898, 903 (S.D.1992))). There is nothing in the record indicating that Buchhold objected or failed to consent to the April 20 continuance. Thus, the 84-day period between the second trial date on April 20, 2005, and the actual trial, commenced on July 13, 2005, should be excluded.

[¶ 46.] Further, all but six days of this period are excluded within a 167-day period between a pretrial motion and its final disposition. Periods between a pretrial motion and its final disposition are excluded from the 180-day computation. SDCL 23A-44-5.1(4)(a). The excluded 167-day period began on January 21, 2005, when Buchhold filed his motion for an order permitting transportation for a medical examination. The excluded period ends when the circuit court entered an order on July 7, 2005, granting Buchhold’s motion. When added to the remaining six days resulting from the excluded period between trial dates, there is a total of 173 days of excluded time between January 21, 2005, and the trial date on July 13, 2005.

[¶ 47.] Buehhold also made a pretrial motion on September 13, 2004, for the release of confiscated property. The circuit court granted this motion on October 5, 2004. The excluded time between these dates is 22 days. In addition, on July 7, 2004, original defense counsel filed for re-cusal of the first judge assigned to preside over the case. The motion was granted and resulted in delay of a status hearing to July 19, 2004, for an additional 12 days excluded. Finally, there were two status hearings in 2004 that would result in at least one day of excluded time for each hearing.

[¶ 48.] The sum of excluded days comes to 209. The time between Buch-hold’s initial appearance and trial less excluded days is 176. Since this falls within the statutory provisions, there is no basis for dismissal on this issue.

[¶ 49.] 4. Whether the circuit court erred when it failed to grant Buch-hold’s motion for a mistrial when the State failed to redact portions of a videotape that was shown to the jury.

[¶ 50.] Buehhold argues that the a fragmentary statement left unredact-ed in a videotape interview of him by Deputy Walker violated the intent of the circuit court’s April 6, 2005 ruling on the State’s Rule 404(b) notice. He contends that he was unduly prejudiced since the jury heard this fragmentary statement, which was related to other sexual comments that he allegedly made to friends of A.B.

Trial courts have considerable discretion not only in granting or denying a mistrial, but also in determining the prejudicial effect of a witness’ statements. Only when this discretion is clearly abused will this court overturn the trial court’s decision.

State v. Anderson, 1996 SD 46, ¶ 21, 546 N.W.2d 395, 401 (citations omitted).

[¶ 51.] The circuit court did acknowledge the State’s redaction error. However, it went on to point out that the kind of statements it intended to bar could be found in a transcript of the unedited videotape and that these statements were not heard on the edited version. The circuit court denied the motion because the intent of the prior Rule 404(b) ruling barring such statements had not been compromised. The record does not indicate the circuit court clearly abused its discretion. Therefore, we will not overturn the circuit court’s decision on Buchhold’s motion.

[¶ 52.] 5. Whether Buchhold’s ability to have a fair trial was unduly prejudiced when members of the jury saw him in restraints while in the custody of a sheriffs deputy.

[¶ 53.] Buehhold argues that when four jurors saw him in restraints, under the supervision of a deputy sheriff while waiting for an elevator, his presumption of innocence was compromised. Buehhold did not move for mistrial at the time. However, he now contends that a mistrial is required due to plain error.

[¶ 54.] Buehhold cites State v. Mollman, 2003 SD 150, ¶ 24, 674 N.W.2d 22, 29 for the proposition that courts must guard against prejudice arising when a defendant is seen before a jury under restraint or in prison garb. However, this Court in Moll-man noted: “brief, inadvertent meetings between jurors and a shackled defendant are insufficient to show prejudice.” Id. ¶ 27 (citing Harrell v. Israel, 672 F.2d 632, 637 (7thCir.1982) (citing United States v. Figueroar-Espinoza, 454 F.2d 590 (9thCir.1972); United States v. Leach, 429 F.2d 956 (8thCir.1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 986, 91 S.Ct. 1675, 29 L.Ed.2d 151 (1971); Hardin v. United States, 324 F.2d 553 (5thCir.1963))).

[¶ 55.] For Buchhold to now show that there was reversible error on this issue, he must show that there exists (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights such that this Court may exercise its discretion to notice the error if (4) it seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Nelson, 1998 SD 124, ¶ 8, 587 N.W.2d at 443 (citation omitted).

[¶ 56.] The record shows that the inadvertent incident occurred following the first day’s trial proceedings when Buch-hold was awaiting transport back to the Pennington County jail. When defense counsel brought the matter to the attention of the circuit court, he apparently doubted the existence of undue prejudice since he elected not to file a motion for mistrial. Nevertheless, the circuit court was aware of the incident and noted that the four jurors who had seen Buchhold promptly returned to the courtroom. The circuit court stated that it did not appear that the incident caused any concern for the jurors. Buchhold cannot show that there was any resultant prejudice and therefore cannot establish there was plain error.

[¶ 57.] 6. Whether the state’s attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct when referencing expert testimony during closing arguments.

[¶ 58.] Buchhold argues that the state’s attorney made improper statements during closing arguments that substantially prejudiced his ability to have a fair trail. Buchhold did not object to the statements at the time. However, he contends that this Court adopted a new standard in State v. Ball, 2004 SD 9, 675 N.W.2d 192 under which this Court can review prosecutorial misconduct de novo notwithstanding the absence of objection at trial.

[¶ 59.] Buchhold misinterprets Ball. Like the instant case, the defendant in Ball alleged that the prosecutor made improper statements during closing arguments amounting to prosecutorial misconduct. Id. ¶ 12. However, unlike the instant case where nothing that could be construed as an objection was offered, in Ball this Court concluded that the defendant preserved an objection during an off-the-record discussion because both the State and the defendant considered it as such in their briefs. Id. ¶ 14 n3. We therefore must consider this issue from the perspective whether the prosecutor’s statements constituted plain error.

[¶ 60.] The state’s attorney essentially restated the findings of Dr. Strong. He stated that A.B. had a penetrating injury that could not have occurred naturally nor existed from birth. He also stated that there was “no report of any other incident that happened to [A.B.].”

[¶ 61.] Buchhold contends that the state’s attorney’s statements were improper because the nature of A.B.’s injury was categorized as inconclusive and that a friend of A.B.’s had testified that A.B. told her she had had sex with two boys in 2003. During Dr. Strong’s testimony, she stated that although the injury was not diagnostic of sexual abuse on its own, it was indicative of what could be found in a child relaying a history like that of A.B.

[¶ 62.] Whether the jury did or did not conclude that A.B. had sex with boys prior to the time the rape allegations were made against her father, it is possible it concluded that such acts were not “incidents that happened to A.B.” The state’s attorney merely concluded the penetrating injury was a piece of the puzzle that showed convincingly beyond a reasonable doubt that there was rape. These statements do not rise to the level where they become unduly prejudicial. We therefore find no plain error related to this issue that would justifying reversal.

[¶ 63.] Since we find no basis for reversal on any of the issues raised by Buch-hold, we affirm.

[¶ 64.] KONENKAMP, ZINTER, and MEIERHENRY, Justices, concur.

[¶ 65.] SABERS, Justice, dissents.

[¶ 66.] SABERS, Justice

(dissenting).

[¶ 67.] This fifty-year-old man received a sentence of 175 years. This sentence constitutes six life sentences when considering Buchhold’s age and statistical life expectancy. Even if we consider Buchhold will be eligible for parole in half time served, this sentence effectively amounts to three life sentences. Sentencing him to “de facto” life sentences “eliminates forever any opportunity for hope, self-improvement, and rehabilitation.” State v. Pasek, 2004 SD 132, ¶ 43, 691 N.W.2d 301, 313 (Sabers, J., dissenting). This sentence is harsh, excessive, grossly disproportionate and wasteful. All this sentence guarantees is that Buchhold will be housed, fed, medically treated and buried at the State’s expense when he dies in the South Dakota State Penitentiary. I dissent because we should remand this case to impose a “meaningful less than life sentence.” Id. ¶ 49.

[¶ 68.] 1. De facto life sentences

[¶ 69.] There must be some hope of rehabilitation. While I do not condone Buchhold’s actions, nor minimize their magnitude, some hope should exist in sentencing.

A life sentence should only be imposed when a trial court “can determine from the facts of the principal offense and the previous convictions that rehabilitation is so unlikely as to be removed from consideration in sentencing; that the interests of society demand that the convict be kept off the streets for the rest of his life.... ”

Id. ¶ 44 (quoting State v. Pulfrey, 1996 SD 54, ¶ 18, 548 N.W.2d 34, 38). Ultimately, we must keep the goals of sentencing in mind and hold firmly to the ideal that a sentence cannot “constitute excessive retribution.” Id. Buchhold has received three life sentences based on his present age and his average life expectancy. He will not be eligible for parole for 87 and ½ years.

[¶ 70.] Even the majority opinion points out the “statutory sentencing structure established for these crimes can reasonably be construed to further the State’s public policy of deterrence through correction and retribution.” Supra ¶ 37 (emphasis added) (citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1189, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1003, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2706, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). Giving a fifty-year-old man a 175-year sentence cannot further the State’s policy of deterrence through correction. Leaving Buchhold in the penitentiary without the possibility of parole will never provide correction. It constitutes excessive retribution.

[¶ 71.] Buchhold’s criminal record reveals no prior instances or allegations of sexual misconduct. “[T]he lack of a prior felony conviction or other serious offense aids our decision and ‘certainly bears on the question of gross disproportionality.’ ” State v. Blair, 2006 SD 75, ¶ 96, 721 N.W.2d 55, 79 (Sabers, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Bonner, 1998 SD 30, ¶ 23, 577 N.W.2d 575, 581-82). His presentence report indicated he still maintains his innocence and recommends he be sentenced “for a substantial period of time.” However, his sentence of 175 years is much longer than “a substantial period of time.” It is effectively three life sentences without the possibility of parole and constitutes excessive retribution. This is the type of excessive punishment that “generate[s] disrespect for the law.” Id. ¶ 82, (Konen-kamp, J., concurring in result).

[¶ 72.] In sentencing, the court should “examine a defendant’s ‘general moral character, mentality, habits, social environment, tendencies, age, aversion or inclination to commit crime, life, family, occupation, and previous criminal record.’ The sentencing court should also consider rehabilitation prospects.” State v. Lemley, 1996 SD 91, ¶ 12, 552 N.W.2d 409, 412 (internal citations omitted). What rehabilitation prospects can a man have when there is no incentive to rehabilitate? “There should generally be a light at the end of the tunnel for any human no matter how bad he appears or how bad his past conduct reflects he is.” Ganrude v. Weber, 2000 SD 96, ¶ 29, 614 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Amundson, J., dissenting). We should impose a meaningful sentence of less than life to keep that light on and the hope going.

[¶ 73.] As Justice Amundson stated,

It seems as though the result of this sentence is to cast this individual into the human waste dump and let him languish there until he finally totally decomposes and has gasped his last breath. I cannot agree that this should be the severity of the sentence and would hold that a light should remain on at the end of the tunnel for this individual.

Id. Again, I do not condone Buchhold’s actions, but I cannot condemn him to a life without hope. For this reason, we should vacate these “de facto” life sentences and remand to require the judge to impose a sentence that does not last long beyond the time Buchhold has “gasped his last breath.”

[¶ 74.] 2. Gross Disproportionality

[¶ 75.] I also disagree with the majority opinion’s gross disproportionality analysis. When conducting gross disproportion-ality review, the review should entail the aggregate sentence, not the individual sentence on each count. The majority opinion appears to adopt the position advanced in the Blair concurrence as the method to conduct a gross disproportionality review when the defendant received consecutive sentences. 2006 SD 75, ¶ 73, 721 N.W.2d at 73 (Konenkamp, J., concurring in result). Utilization of this method creates a situation where no sentence could really ever appear to be grossly disproportionate. I reiterate the position advanced in the Blair dissent, “[w]hether we measure one grain of sand or one tree at a time, a desert remains a desert and a forest remains a forest.” Id. ¶ 109 n. 33 (Sabers, J., dissenting). Even the Blair concurrence concedes there may be a time when the sentences should be reviewed in the aggregate, as opposed to individually. Id. ¶ 78 n. 22 (Konenkamp, J., concurring in result). Specifically, the Blair concurrence provided it may be appropriate to view the sentences in the aggregate when the “consecutive sentences amount[] to life in prison.” Id. This is the type of sentence that should be reviewed in the aggregate. Buchhold received ten fifteen-year sentences and one twenty-five year sentence, all to be served consecutively. This amounts to a 175-year sentence, which is effectively three life sentences without the possibility of parole.

[¶ 76.] Looking at each individual count shows Buchhold received sentences each within the statutory maximum. While this might be initially reassuring, it demonstrates a concern when reviewing the counts in isolation. The problem is that the statutes do not allow a life sentence for Buchhold’s charged crimes. The most severe crime he was charged and convicted of is second degree rape, which is a Class 2 felony punishable by twenty-five years in the state penitentiary. Examining the counts in isolation, rather in the aggregate, results in Buchhold receiving a sentence that the statute did not initially allow. Conducting proportionality review in this manner encourages prosecutors to charge as many counts as possible to ensure a higher sentence that will not appear grossly disproportionate. That violates the spirit of Bonner and the law of the State of South Dakota. See Blair, 2006 SD 75, ¶ 109, 721 N.W.2d at 82 n. 33 (noting “the words ‘Equal Justice Under Law’ call for more than just a lofty inscription”) (Sabers, J., dissenting) (citing Bonner, 1998 SD 30, ¶ 12, 577 N.W.2d at 578). All this sentence guarantees is that Buchhold will be housed, fed, medically treated and buried at the State’s expense when he dies in the South Dakota State Penitentiary.

      . His jury was given the pattern "flight” instruction.

      . SDCL 22-22-7 provides in part: “Any person, sixteen years of age or older, who knowingly engages in sexual contact with another person, other than that person’s spouse if the other person is under the age of sixteen years is guilty of a Class 3 felony....”

      . At the time of Buchhold's offenses, SDCL 22-22-1(2004) provided in part: "Rape is an act of sexual penetration accomplished with any person under any of the following circumstances:”

      (2) Through the use of force, coercion, or threats of immediate and great bodily harm against the victim or other persons within the victim's presence, accompanied by apparent power of execution; or

      (6) If persons who are not "legally married and who are within degrees of consanguinity within which marriages are by the laws of this state declared void pursuant to § 25-1-6, which is also defined as incest; ...”

      . At the time of Buchhold’s offenses, SDCL 22-22-7.1 (2004) provided in part: "As used in this chapter, the term, sexual contact, means any touching, not amounting to rape, ... of the breasts of a female or the genitalia or anus of any person with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of either party....”

      . At the time of Buchhold's conviction SDCL 22-6-6.1 (2004) provided:
      If a defendant has been convicted of two or more offenses, regardless of when the offenses were committed or when the judgment or sentence was entered, the judgment or sentence may be that the imprisonment on any of the offenses or convictions may run concurrently or consecutively at the discretion of the court.

      . SDCL 23A-44-5.1 provides in part:
      (1) Every person indicted, ... for any offense shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days, and such time shall be computed as provided in this section.
      (2) Such one-hundred-eighty-day period shall commence to run from the date the defendant has first appeared before a judicial officer on an indictment, ...

      (5) If a defendant is not brought to trial before the running of the time for trial, as extended by excluded periods, the defendant shall be entitled to a dismissal with prejudice of the offense charged and any other offense required by law to be joined with the offense charged.

      . See supra ¶ 28.

      . When reading the sentencing transcript, it appears that Buchhold’s maintained innocence weighed heavily in the court's conclusion that Buchhold was not a candidate for rehabilitation and its decision to sentence him to 175 years. The trial judge specifically quoted Dr. Gans who explained he had specific recommendations to treat Buchhold, "[i]f and when Ralph becomes amenable to treatment through the relinquishment of denial.” The majority opinion points out Buchhold is in "deep denial” and not amenable “to treatment or the possibility of rehabilitation.” Supra ¶ 34-35. Buchhold may never relinquish denial. However, that should be the basis of denying parole. It should not be the basis to deny him even the opportunity for parole. Buchhold at some point may atone for his crimes and may be rehabilitated. Without even a chance of parole, it leaves Buchhold without a chance of ever having hope of rehabilitating.

      . Buchhold was fifty-years old when he was sentenced. He will not be eligible for parole for 87 and ½ years. Whether we view the 175-year sentence as six or three life sentences is irrelevant. By the time Buchhold is eligible for parole, he will be dead or 137 and ½ years old.

      . SDCL 22-6-1 provides, in relevant part:
      Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are divided into the following nine classes which are distinguished from each other by the following maximum penalties which are authorized upon conviction:
      (1)Class A felony: death or life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. A lesser sentence than death or life imprisonment may not be given for a Class A felony. In addition, a fine of fifty thousand dollars may be imposed; (2) Class B felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. A lesser sentence may not be given for a Class B felony. In addition, a fine of fifty thousand dollars may be imposed;
      (3) Class C felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of fifty thousand dollars may be imposed;
      (4) Class 1 felony: fifty years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of fifty thousand dollars may be imposed;
      (5) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of fifty thousand dollars may be imposed;
      (6) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of thirty thousand dollars may be imposed[J


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re PETITION FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST Q.F.C.
    No. A06-345.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    March 1, 2007.
   OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Following multiple admitted violations of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, respondent lawyer Q.F.C. entered into a stipulated probation agreement with the Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility. A complainant who reported one of the violations appealed the stipulated probation disposition. The Director assigned a Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board member to review the appeal, and after reviewing Q.F.C.’s file, the board member instructed the Director to issue charges of professional misconduct for submission to a board panel. The panel in turn instructed the Director to file a petition for public discipline. We then referred the matter to a referee.

The referee recommended a public reprimand and two years of probation, stayed for two years, and a private reprimand and a reinstatement of the previously stipulated probation. The Director challenges the referee’s recommendation as to the stay, arguing that a public reprimand and two years’ probation is the appropriate sanction. Q.F.C. argues that the recommended sanction is appropriate in light of an alleged procedural error that the reviewing board member committed in referring his matter to the board panel. We decline to adopt the referee’s recommendation and instead order that effective immediately, Q.F.C. is subject to the terms of the stipulated probation agreement that he and the Director originally reached.

The relevant facts divide naturally into three topics — probation violations, client matter, and lawyer discipline procedure— and are set forth accordingly.

Probation Violations

On September 26, 2002, the Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility placed respondent lawyer Q.F.C. on private probation for two years for failing to deposit client funds in his client trust account. As a condition of probation, Q.F.C. was required to submit trust account books and records to the Director on a quarterly basis. Beginning in January 2004, Q.F.C. failed to meet this requirement in a timely and diligent manner. For example, Q.F.C. submitted incomplete books and records for the third quarter of 2003. According to a letter the Director sent to Q.F.C., Q.F.C. had, among other things, failed to maintain subsidiary ledgers for interest and personal funds as required, improperly credited trust account interest to one client’s ledger, and failed to reconcile the trust account with bank statements. The Director enclosed a sample reconciliation report for Q.F.C. to use in preparing future reports.

Despite the Director’s guidance, Q.F.C. continued to submit incomplete books and records. As a result, the Director sent another letter notifying Q.F.C. that he had failed to provide his check ledger for a certain period, his reconciliation report, and copies of his checks and deposit slips for the client trust account. The Director enclosed some educational materials regarding the proper maintenance of a client trust account and instructed Q.F.C. to provide the missing documents within one week. Q.F.C. apparently submitted the documents within the one-week deadline.

Two months later, the Director sent a letter notifying Q.F.C. that his books and records for the most recent quarter appeared to be complete and properly reconciled, but that a subsidiary ledger for one of his clients carried a negative balance. The Director noted that such negative balances were improper and directed Q.F.C. to deposit an appropriate amount into the account and to record future bank charges in a subsidiary ledger. The Director also noted that Q.F.C.’s subsidiary ledgers lacked running balances, and told Q.F.C. to utilize Q.F.C.’s computer software to create a more functional ledger.

In the same letter, the Director asked Q.F.C. to submit complete and properly reconciled books and records within one week. Q.F.C. did not comply until five weeks later, after the Director sent another letter instructing Q.F.C. to immediately submit the required documents. Q.F.C. then submitted the trust account books and records. After reviewing these documents, the Director again wrote to Q.F.C. to notify him that the documents appeared to be complete, but were not properly reconciled. The Director enclosed some educational materials on the proper use of spreadsheet software and instructed Q.F.C. to review the materials and to set up his subsidiary ledgers properly.

Q.F.C. missed the submission deadline for the next quarter’s reports by six weeks, and the Director sent a letter requesting that Q.F.C. immediately provide the reports. When Q.F.C. failed to respond within three weeks, the Director sent a follow-up letter, again requesting that Q.F.C. provide the required reports “immediately.” In this second letter, the Director informed Q.F.C. that his probation could not end on September 26, 2004 as scheduled, unless the Director received the required documents. On September 27 — nearly three months after the Director’s first request — Q.F.C. submitted the reports.

Shortly thereafter, the Director sent a letter to Q.F.C. stating that the last quarter’s books and records were again incomplete and did not reconcile. The Director noted that Q.F.C. had, among other things, failed to provide a subsidiary ledger for interest, failed to provide running balances on subsidiary ledgers as the Director had twice requested, and failed to properly reconcile his books and records. In the letter, the Director asked Q.F.C. to attend a meeting with the Director and to bring with him certain documents related to his client trust account. Q.F.C. did not appear at that meeting.

Client Matter

After Q.F.C. was placed on private probation but before his compliance with the probation terms began to falter, he accepted a nonrefundable retainer of $738 from C.E. to represent an incarcerated criminal defendant, hereinafter identified as Jones. C.E. retained Q.F.C. to research postcon-viction relief that might be available to Jones. Several weeks passed without any contact between Q.F.C. and C.E., and C.E. telephoned Q.F.C. to inquire about the status of the case. Q.F.C. did not answer this call. C.E. made several subsequent attempts to reach Q.F.C. by telephone, but he did not answer any of these calls. Q.F.C. never contacted Jones to discuss his case. Approximately 11 weeks after C.E. retained Q.F.C., Jones sent Q.F.C. a certified letter asking him for a progress report. Q.F.C. did not respond.

At some point during the following 15 months, Jones filed a complaint with the Director. The Director sent Q.F.C. a notice of investigation regarding the complaint. The notice required Q.F.C. to respond within 14 days. Q.F.C. did not respond, and approximately one month later, the Director again wrote to Q.F.C. demanding an immediate reply. Again, Q.F.C. did not reply. Approximately one week after sending the second letter, the Director telephoned Q.F.C. and left a voicemail message. Q.F.C. did not reply to the message. Q.F.C. then failed to appear at the meeting the Director called to discuss Q.F.C.’s trust account books and records as well as Jones’s complaint.

Lawyer Discipline Procedure

Q.F.C. ultimately attended a prepanel hearing, at which he admitted the violations described above. The Director asked whether Q.F.C. had ever considered seeing a counselor or therapist, and Q.F.C. responded that he had been seeing a psychiatrist for a number of years. At the end of the prepanel hearing, the Director asked Q.F.C. to send a letter to Jones within one week and to sign a release authorizing the transfer of certain documents from Q.F.C.’s psychiatrist to the Director. Shortly after the prepanel hearing, Q.F.C. completed his research on the Jones matter and sent Jones a letter summarizing his conclusion that Jones had no “colorable” postconviction claims. Q.F.C. also requested that his psychiatrist send a letter to the Director, providing the information the Director requested.

Q.F.C. subsequently entered into an agreement with the Director for two years of private probation, apparently as a result of his completing the foregoing tasks. As required by Rule 8(d)(3)(i), Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR), this agreement was approved by the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board chair. The agreement terms called for quarterly meetings with a supervising lawyer and for the private probation to end in September 2006.

In keeping with Rule 8(d)(3)(ii), RLPR, the Director notified Jones of the disposition of his complaint. Jones appealed the disposition. The Director assigned a Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board member to review Jones’s appeal. Rule 8(e), RLPR. After reading Q.F.C.’s file, the board member apparently concluded that public discipline, rather than private probation, was warranted. Rule 8(e)(4), RLPR, provides that

in any case that has been investigated, if the Board member concludes that public discipline is warranted, the Board member may instruct the Director to issue charges of unprofessional conduct for submission to a Panel other than the Board member’s own.

The board member sent a letter to Jones and C.E., stating, “Based upon my review of [Q.F.C.’s file], I direct that this matter be submitted to a Lawyer’s Board Panel to determine whether public discipline is warranted.” The board member’s letter contained no information as to why she decided to submit the disposition of Q.F.C.’s matter to a panel rather than taking one of the other actions allowed under the RLPR.

A panel hearing was held, and the panel instructed the Director to issue a petition for public discipline. Accordingly, the Director issued a petition seeking a public reprimand with probation, and we assigned a referee to hear the matter. At the referee hearing, Q.F.C. acknowledged the existence of probable cause for public discipline, but argued that Jones’s appeal of private probation was not “properly perfected” and the resulting petition was “fundamentally unfair” because the reviewing board member submitted the disposition to a board panel without setting forth an explanation for her decision as required under Rule 8(e), RLPR. The Director essentially responded that the procedural error, if any, was not relevant to the referee’s determination as to whether the petition for public reprimand and probation should be granted.

The referee found that Q.F.C. violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.1(a)(3) by failing to comply with the terms of his probation and failing to cooperate with the Director’s investigation and Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.3 and 1.4 respectively by failing to pursue the Jones representation diligently and failing to respond to Jones’s inquiries. The referee also found that Q.F.C.’s argument regarding the board member’s procedural error “ha[d] merit” and that “[r]ules are made to be followed, even though not doing so may be a mere oversight.” Accordingly, the referee recommended

that [Q.F.C.] be publicly reprimanded and that he be placed on probation for a period of two years. It is further recommended that the public reprimand and two years probation be stayed for two years and [Q.F.C.] receive a private reprimand and be re-instated on probation for two years on those terms previously agreed to by the parties. Any failure to comply with those terms by [Q.F.C.] shall result in the stayed discipline taking effect.

The Director appeals the referee’s recommendation, arguing that a public reprimand and two years’ probation is the appropriate sanction for Q.F.C.’s misconduct and that the recommended two-year stay of this sanction is improper.

I.

The Director timely requested a transcript of the referee’s hearing and consequently, the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions are not conclusive. Rule 14(e), RLPR. But we will not set aside the referee’s findings or conclusions unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Peterson, 718 N.W.2d 849, 853 (Minn.2006). In this case, neither party disputes the referee’s conclusions that Q.F.C. violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.1(a)(3), 1.3, and 1.4, and the record supports these conclusions. Accordingly, we turn to the issue of whether the sanction the referee recommended is appropriate in the context of this case.

We give great weight to the referee’s recommendation, but we retain final responsibility for determining the appropriate sanction. In re Ruffenach, 486 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn.1992) (citing In re Simonson, 420 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Minn.1988)). Our goals are not to punish the lawyer, but rather to guard the administration of justice and to protect the courts, the legal profession, and the public. Id. While consistency is a goal, we examine each case individually and impose the discipline we believe appropriate based on the unique circumstances of each case. Id. (citing In re Gubbins, 380 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Minn.1986)). To determine appropriate sanctions, we consider our prior disciplinary decisions, any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and the following four factors: (1) the nature of the misconduct; (2) the cumulative weight of the disciplinary violations; (3) the harm to the public; and (4) the harm to the legal profession. In re Edinger, 700 N.W.2d 462, 468 (Minn.2005) (citing In re Moore, 692 N.W.2d 446, 450 (Minn.2005)).

In this case, the referee recommended a public reprimand and two years of probation, stayed for two years, and a private reprimand and reinstatement of the previously stipulated probation. The Director agrees with the recommendation that Q.F.C. receive a public reprimand and two years of probation. But he argues that a stay is “inconsistent with the referee’s own findings and inconsistent with the attorney discipline system,” and moreover, that “private discipline is not now possible.” Q.F.C. argues in response that although public discipline would not be “unjustifiable” in light of existing ease law, it would be “unjust” given the circumstances of his case, which include a number of mitigating factors and the fact that his matter was improperly referred to a board panel. Q.F.C. also disputes the Director’s contention that private discipline is no longer possible and urges us to use our inherent authority to “fashion just results.”

A review of our case law reveals that it is not unusual for lawyers who commit violations similar to those Q.F.C. committed to receive public discipline, including two years of probation. See In re Schumack, 655 N.W.2d 637 (Minn.2003); In re McCann, 652 N.W.2d 700 (Minn.2002); In re Johnson, 652 N.W.2d 703 (Minn.2002). Like Q.F.C., the lawyer in each of the foregoing cases failed to comply with the terms of a probation agreement. Also like Q.F.C., the lawyers in McCann and Johnson, respectively, failed to promptly respond to correspondence from the Director and failed to cooperate with the Director’s investigation of a complaint. 652 N.W.2d at 700-01, 652 N.W.2d at 703. Further, in both Schumack and Johnson, the lawyers, like Q.F.C., neglected client matters. 655 N.W.2d at 638, 652 N.W.2d at 703. Only one of these cases — Johnson—appears to involve dishonesty; the other two cases involve the same basic type of misconduct Q.F.C. committed — namely, failure to meet probation requirements, client neglect, and failure to cooperate with the Director.

Q.F.C. does not dispute the fact that in light of our case law, public discipline is a justifiable sanction. He nonetheless argues that public discipline would be unjust based on (1) several facts that correspond with the four factors we articulated in Edinger; and (2) the board member’s procedural error.

With regard to the first Edinger factor — the nature of the misconduct' — it is apparently true that as Q.F.C. asserts, he has never “been dishonest or misleading about ⅝ ⅜ * any client matter.” But this assertion is not particularly helpful to Q.F.C. in light of Schumack and McCann. In each of these cases, a lawyer was subject to public reprimand and two years’ probation despite the fact that the lawyer apparently never denied or was dishonest or misleading about his misconduct or any client matter. 655 N.W.2d at 638, 652 N.W.2d at 700-01. Q.F.C. also asserts that the matters now before us comprise “the entirety of [his] disciplinary history,” and that although the misconduct at issue was not isolated, most of the violations happened during a single three-month period. These assertions correspond to the second Edinger factor — the cumulative weight of the disciplinary violations. But the fact that Q.F.C. committed numerous offenses while already on probation for a prior act of professional misconduct tends to undermine his argument. Moreover, after the Director clarified what was expected and provided Q.F.C. with relevant resources, Q.F.C. repeatedly committed certain violations with regard to his trust account books and records.

Finally, Q.F.C. sets forth a number of facts that pertain to the third and fourth Edinger factors, which respectively concern the harm caused to the public and to the legal profession by the lawyer’s misconduct. For example, Q.F.C. argues that although Jones did not receive legal services in a timely manner, Jones was not prejudiced — apparently in light of Q.F.C.’s conclusion that Jones had no viable post-conviction claims. Q.F.C. also emphasizes that he has no client contact in his current position, maintains no private practice but for the occasional client, and has no intention of maintaining a client trust account in the future. The implication of the foregoing facts is that a public reprimand is unnecessary to prevent harm to the public and the legal profession. To the extent that supervised probation with or without a public reprimand would protect any clients Q.F.C. might represent, it is arguable that a public reprimand is not required to prevent harm to the public in this case.

Yet, we are nonetheless aware of the importance of emphasizing to the practicing bar and the public that failing to (1) comply with the terms of a stipulated probation agreement; (2) properly maintain client trust account books and records after repeated instructions from the Director as to how to maintain those documents; and (3) cooperate with a disciplinary investigation seriously undermine the integrity of our self-governing profession. As we explained in In re Franke,

[s]ince lawyers are granted a monopoly to perform legal services for hire, they, like all monopolies, must be subject to strict regulation with respect to admission to practice and to the performance of professional services, as well as to public accountability for adherence to * * * standards of professional responsibility.

345 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Minn.1984) (internal quotation omitted).

In light of our case law and, specifically, the four factors we articulated in Edinger, we conclude that under ordinary circumstances, a public reprimand and two years of probation are an appropriate sanction for Q.F.C.’s misconduct. Accordingly, the referee’s recommendation for a stay of this sanction would be inappropriate but for the board member’s alleged procedural error and Q.F.C.’s related arguments on fairness. Therefore, we must address whether a procedural error was committed in the referral of Q.F.C.’s matter to a board panel and, if so, what impact the error has on the sanction Q.F.C. should receive.

II.

The referee apparently concluded that the reviewing board member committed a procedural error in referring Q.F.C.’s matter to a board panel. We review this conclusion de novo because it rests on an interpretation of Rule 8(e), RLPR. Cf. Lennartson v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 662 N.W.2d 125, 129 (Minn.2003) (stating that the “scope and application” of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, as court rules, present a question of law that we review de novo).

Rule 8(e), RLPR, provides:

If the complainant is not satisfied with the Director’s disposition[,] * ⅜ * the complainant may appeal the matter by notifying the Director in writing within fourteen days. The Director shall notify the lawyer of the appeal and assign the matter by rotation to a board member * * *. The reviewing Board member may:
(1) approve the Director’s disposition; or
(2) direct that further investigation be undertaken; or
(3) if a district ethics committee recommended discipline, but the Director determined that discipline is not warranted, the Board member may instruct the Director to issue an admonition; or
(4) in any case that has been investigated, if the Board member concludes that public discipline is warranted, the Board member may instruct the Director to issue charges of unprofessional conduct for submission to a Panel other than the Board member’s own.
The reviewing Board member shall set forth an explanation of the Board member’s action. A summary dismissal by the Director under Rule 8(b) shall be final and may not be appealed to a Board member for review under this section.

(Emphasis added.) In this case, the “explanation” the reviewing board member provided for her decision to submit Q.F.C.’s matter to a panel under Rule 8(e)(4) consisted of a single sentence: “Based upon my review of [Q.F.C.’s file], I direct that this matter be submitted to a Lawyer’s Board Panel to determine whether public discipline is warranted.”

The Director argues that the foregoing sentence constituted a sufficient explanation because under Rule 8(e), RLPR, the necessary explanation depends on which of the options the board member chooses, and when she determines that it is appropriate to submit the matter to a panel, “the determination itself contains all the ‘explanation’ necessary.” Q.F.C. argues that the plain language of Rule 8(e), RLPR, requires a reviewing board member to provide an explanation for her action, regardless of which of the numbered alternatives she selects from Rule 8(e)(l)-(4), RLPR. He asserts that the single sentence the reviewing board member provided in this case was not an explanation because it shed no light on the board member’s reasoning. Accordingly, Q.F.C. contends, Rule 8(e) was not followed, and his matter was improperly referred to a board panel.

Given the plain meaning of Rule 8(e), RLPR, we agree with Q.F.C.’s contention. An explanation is “[s]omething that explains,” and to explain is “to offer reasons for or a cause of; justify.” American Heritage Dictionary 645 (3d ed.1992). Here, the board member’s single sentence communicated what action she decided to take — that is, to instruct the Director to issue charges for submission to a panel— but the sentence did not offer reasons for or a cause of her action. The language the board member used essentially repeats the directive she is authorized to issue under Rule 8(e)(4), RLPR. As the Director conceded at oral argument, a board member’s “basis for referring [a] matter to a panel is that a board member has reached a conclusion that ⅜ * * public discipline [is warranted].” If a board member’s statement of the requisite basis for her action under Rule 8(e)(4), RLPR, constituted an “explanation,” the unnumbered paragraph following part (e)(4) would serve no purpose. We decline to interpret Rule 8(e), RLPR, in a way that renders any part of it a nullity. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the board member failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 8(e), RLPR.

We now turn to the more difficult question of what effect the board member’s procedural error has on the sanction Q.F.C. should receive. The Director argues that to the extent an error was committed, it should have no effect on the disposition of this matter because Q.F.C. was not prejudiced by the error. More specifically, the Director argues that because the disciplinary process would not have unfolded any differently in the absence of the error, due process was provided. Q.F.C. conceded at oral argument that the disciplinary process may not have taken a different course if the board member had provided an explanation for referring his matter to a panel. But he asserts that (1) a board member assigned to review a complainant’s appeal has significant power in that she can, without consulting the lawyer, unilaterally place an agreement reached by a lawyer and the Director in jeopardy; (2) the Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility demand few responsibilities of the board member in return for this power; and (3) in this case, the board member’s failure to meet her responsibility to provide an explanation left him without any understanding of why she decided to place in jeopardy the agreement he relied on for 11 months.

In In re N.P., we stated that although there was no question that the Director committed a technical violation of a Rule on Lawyers Professional Responsibility, “[njothing in that rule mandate[d] * * * that the sanction for a violation be dismissal of the charges under investigation.” 361 N.W.2d 386, 393 (Minn.1985). We also stated, in regard to an alleged delay by the Director in investigating possible misconduct, that

[a] fundamental goal of every disciplinary action is protection of the public. Requiring prejudice to an attorney before dismissing an action for unreasonable delay is consistent with that goal. Unless the attorney has been unfairly prejudiced, it would not be in the public interest to dismiss a disciplinary proceeding simply because of a failure to prosecute promptly.

Id. (internal citations omitted). Broadly read, N.P. stresses the importance of prejudice when deciding whether a procedural error in a particular lawyer discipline case should affect the disposition of that case.

But N.P. is factually distinguishable from the present matter. In N.P., the lawyer refused to cooperate with the Director over a protracted period and raised legal obstacles to the Director’s investigation at every opportunity. Id. at 389-90. He then sought to have various disciplinary charges dismissed on the grounds that (1) the Director allegedly unduly delayed the investigation; and (2) the Director designated the lawyer by name, rather than initials, in a subpoena — a violation of Rule 9(d), RLPR, as it existed at the time. Id. at 392-93. Here, a dismissal of disciplinary charges is not contemplated by either party, and a ruling in Q.F.C.’s favor would simply reinstate the discipline previously agreed to by the Director in lieu of the public reprimand and probation the Director currently seeks. Further, unlike the relief sought in N.P., we conclude that here, the relief granted will adequately protect the public.

We conclude that when a Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board member initiates a process that may ultimately invalidate a disposition previously agreed upon by the Director, the board chair, and the lawyer to be disciplined, that board member exercises considerable authority and must comply with the process set forth in Rule 8(e), RLPR. Because that process was not followed here, we believe that under the circumstances of this case, basic fairness favors reinstating the agreement Q.F.C. and the Director reached for two years of private probation. Here, reinstating the original agreement comports with the referee’s apparent intention not to subject Q.F.C. to public discipline in light of the procedural error. At the same time, reinstating the original agreement avoids the administrative complications that the referee’s recommended disposition — specifically, a public reprimand stayed for two years — would generate.

We order that effective immediately, Q.F.C. is subject to the terms of the stipulated probation agreement he and the Director originally reached.

      . Because we ultimately approve the private disciplinary sanctions contained in the stipulated probation agreement, in this opinion we designate the respondent attorney by randomly selected initials, Q.F.C. Cf. Rule 9(m), Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility. The Clerk of Appellate Courts is directed to amend the title of this case by substituting the designated initials for respondent's name and attorney registration number and to redact respondent’s name and attorney registration number from any briefs and appendix materials filed with this court that are made available to the public, substituting the designated initials.

      . Because the board member provided no explanation for her action, we need not decide today how thorough an explanation must be— or, stated another way, what constitutes a sufficient explanation under Rule 8(e), RLPR.

      . To the extent that the probation Q.F.C. and the Director originally agreed to was partially completed by the time that probation was suspended on August 19, 2005 — the date the reviewing board member referred Q.F.C.’s matter to a panel — Q.F.C. is to be credited for the number of probation days completed.


author: /s/Paul H. Anderson Associate Justice

text:
    Inocencio Zamorano HERNANDEZ, Employee, v. FANTOM WIRE, INC. and State Fund Mutual Insurance Company, Respondents, and Specialty Staff, Inc., Self-Insured, claims administered by Meadowbrook Insurance Group, Relators.
    No. A06-2260.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    March 1, 2007.
    Hon. Debra Wilson.
    Scott A. Teplinsky, Katz, Manka, Teplin-sky, Due & Sobol, Ltd., Minneapolis, MN, for Respondent Hernandez.

      Steven T. Scharfenberg, Lynn, Schar-fenberg & Associates, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents.
    John H. Guthmann, Trisha A. Vicario, Hansen, Dordell, Bradt, Odlaug & Bradt, PLLP, St. Paul, MN, for Relators.
   ORDER

Based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals filed October 31, 2006, be, and the same is, affirmed without opinion. See Hoff v. Kempton, 317 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Minn.1982) (explaining that, [s]ummary affirmances have no prece-dential value because they do not commit the court to any particular point of view, doing no more than establishing the law of the case).

BY THE COURT:

/s/Paul H. Anderson Associate Justice