author: WRIGHT, Judge. LANSING, Judge

text:
    George M. ROEHRDANZ, Respondent, v. Toby BRILL, Appellant.
    No. CX-03-137.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Aug. 26, 2003.
    Review Granted Oct. 29, 2003.
    Andrew D. Parker, Ryan P. Winkler, Smith Parker, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.
    George M. Roebrdanz, Minneapolis, MN, attorney pro se.

      Considered and decided by PETERSON, Presiding Judge, LANSING, Judge, and WRIGHT, Judge.
   OPINION

WRIGHT, Judge.

After respondent sued appellant in conciliation court for unpaid legal fees, respondent removed the matter to district court, where a default judgment was eventually entered. The district court denied appellant’s motion to vacate the default judgment, finding that appellant was properly served. Appellant contends that service was • ineffectual because respondent did not comply with Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05, which requires an acknowledgment of service by mail. We reverse.

FACTS

On May 7, 2002, respondent George Roehrdanz brought a conciliation court action against appellant Toby Brill for unpaid legal fees. The complainant listed Brill’s address as 1212 Yale Place in Minneapolis, and it was personally served on her by a Hennepin County deputy sheriff. Brill filed a counterclaim, on which she listed her address as “5115 Excelsior Blvd.” Brill alleged that she did not reside at 1212 Yale Place and that 5115 Excelsior Boulevard was her proper mailing address. A hearing was held on June 17, 2002, and the conciliation court issued a judgment that awarded no damages to either party.

On July 2, 2002, Roehrdanz filed a demand for removal to district court and mailed a copy to Brill, using the 1212 Yale Place address. The demand did not contain an acknowledgment of service, and Brill did not send an acknowledgment of service to Roehrdanz. Brill did not appear for the October 18, 2002, post-removal hearing. On October 29, 2002, the district court entered a default judgment, awarding Roehrdanz $7,500. On November 7, 2002, after opening mail sent to the 1212 Yale Place address, Brill learned of the removal action and the default judgment. She moved to vacate the default judgment, and the district court denied her motion. Brill now appeals.

ISSUE

Where respondent did not send or receive an acknowledgment of service in accordance with Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05, was service of process effectuated by mail?

ANALYSIS

Whether service of process is proper and effectual is a question of law, which we review de novo. Turek v. A.S.P. of Moorhead, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn.App.2000), review denied (Minn. Jan. 26, 2001); Leek v. Am. Express Prop. Cas., 591 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Minn.App.1999), review denied (Minn. July 7, 1999). Citing Rule 4.05 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that service by mail is ineffectual if an acknowl-edgement is not received by the sender, Brill argues that Roehrdanz’s service of the demand for removal was ineffectual because he did not send or receive an acknowledgment of service. Although Brill raised this issue at the hearing on the motion to vacate the default judgment, the district court did not expressly address Brill’s argument when it found that service was proper.

Rule 4.05 provides, in pertinent part:

In any action service may be made by mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint (by first-class mail, postage prepaid) to the person to be served, together with two copies of a notice and acknowledgment conforming substantially to Form 22 and a return envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to the sender. If acknowledgment of service under this rule is not received by the sender within the time defendant is required by these rules to serve an answer, service shall be ineffectual

Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05 (emphasis added). “Rule 4.05 requires strict compliance to procedure in order to perfect service.” Coons v. St. Paul Cos., 486 N.W.2d 771, 776 (Minn.App.1992), review denied (Minn. July 16, 1992). “Service of process in a manner not authorized by the rule is ineffective service.” Turek, 618 N.W.2d at 611 (quotations omitted). When service of process is invalid, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider the case, and the case is properly dismissed. Lewis v. Contracting Northwest, Inc., 413 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Minn.App.1987).

Roehrdanz counters that service of the demand was proper because it complied with the General Rules of Practice for the District Courts governing conciliation court actions. See Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 501-525 (conciliation court rules). Regarding removal of an action from conciliation court to district court, Rule 521 provides:

To effect removal, the aggrieved party must perform all the following * * *: (1) Serve on the opposing party or the opposing party’s lawyer a demand for removal of the cause to district court for trial de novo. Service shall be by first class mail. Service may also be by personal service in accordance with the provisions for personal service of a summons in district court.

Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 521(b). The rules of general practice regarding conciliation court do not address sending or receiving an acknowledgment of service. Resolution of the parties’ dispute, thus, requires us to determine which set of rules — the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure or the General Rules of Practice governing conciliation court — governs the service of a demand for removal to district court.

The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure list the actions to which they apply. The rules “govern the procedure in the district courts of the State of Minnesota in all suits of a civil nature, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 1. Rule 81.01(a) exempts proceedings listed in Appendix A from the scope of the rules of civil procedure when they are inconsistent with the statutory provisions governing the proceedings listed in Appendix A. Appendix A does not list conciliation court proceedings as exempt; and under Rule 81.01(c), except for the proceedings listed in Appendix A, the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure supercede any statutes that are inconsistent with them.

In addition, we have previously addressed the applicability of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure to the removal of a case from conciliation court to district court. In Wilkins v. City of Glencoe, which required us to determine the time limits for removal, we held that “[t]he Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure apply to conciliation court proceedings which are removed to district court.” 479 N.W.2d 430, 431 (Minn.App.1992) (citation omitted). In Wilkins, the demand of a party seeking removal was received by the district court 21 days after notice of judgment was mailed to the party. Id. The applicable conciliation court rule provided a 20-day deadline for removal, but Rule 6.05 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure permitted an additional three days because the demand for removal was served by mail. Id. Compare Minn. R. Civ. P. 6.05 (providing that, when notice is served by mail, three days shall be added to the period allowed for service) with Minn. Stat § 487.30, subd. 9 (1990) (providing that procedures for removal irom conciliation court must be performed within 20 days of mailing of notice of judgment order), repealed 1993 Minn. Laws ch. 321, § 7. Thus, in resolving the conflict, we concluded that Rule 6.05 controlled, in light of Minn. R. Civ. P. 81 and the precedent established in Reichel v. Hefner, 472 N.W.2d 346 (Minn.App.1991).

In Reichel, we were required to determine whether the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure applied to the removal of a case from conciliation court to district court or whether the Minnesota Rules of Conciliation Court controlled. Id. at 347-48. Compare Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.02 (prohibiting a party to an action from making service) with Minn. R. Conciliation Cts. 1.21 (1990) (requiring that aggrieved party serve opposing party by personal service). The parties disputed whether service of process was effective when a party in a conciliation court action removed the case to district court. Id. at 347. Specifically at issue was whether a party was prohibited from personally serving the opposing party. Id. We concluded that the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure governed. Id. at 348. We are mindful that Reichel and the instant case are distinguishable in that the conciliation court action in Reichel resulted in a default judgment, not a judgment pursuant to a contested hearing, as in the case here. Id. But this distinction does not render inapposite our conclusion in Reichel that, “since the parties are entitled to a trial de novo, the removal from conciliation court to district court constitutes commencement of a civil action” governed by the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Here, where the parties were likewise entitled to a trial de novo pursuant to Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 521(b), we conclude that a civil action was commenced upon removal, thereby requiring service in conformity with Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05.

Roehrdanz argues that, because Rule 521(b) specifically covers the method of service in removal actions from conciliation court, there is no reason to refer to the civil procedure rules. We acknowledge that this conciliation court rule does not inform a litigant that the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure apply upon removal. But this argument is unavailing in light of Rule 81, which does not exempt conciliation court from the application of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure and explicitly provides that these rules super-cede any conflicting statutes, along with the precedent established in Wilkins and Reichel. Both cases explain that removal of a conciliation court action constitutes the commencement of a civil action. Wilkins, 479 N.W.2d at 432; Reichel, 472 N.W.2d at 348. Although Wilkins and Reichel addressed other requirements of the service rules, we conclude that their holdings apply with equal force here, where effectuating proper service by mail with the requisite acknowledgement of service is at issue.

Because Rule 4.05 applies to Roehrd-anz’s removal to district court, service was ineffectual, and the district court lacked jurisdiction over this case. Without jurisdiction to enter the default judgment, the district court was required to grant Brill’s motion to vacate the default judgment as void and dismiss Roehrdanz’s claim in district court. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 (providing for relief from judgment when judgment is void); Turek, 618 N.W.2d at 613 (stating that default judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction when service was improper); Lewis, 413 N.W.2d at 157 (stating that it is proper to dismiss case when service of process is invalid).

DECISION

The district court erred when it denied Brill’s motion to vacate the default judgment. Because Roehrdanz failed to effectuate proper service by mail, the default judgment against Brill is void for lack of jurisdiction.

Reversed; judgment vacated.

LANSING, Judge

(dissenting).

The dispositive question in this case is how to serve an appeal from a conciliation court decision. George Roehrdanz served Toby Brill by first class mail with a demand for removal to district court. The majority concludes that the notice of removal or appeal is ineffective because Roehrdanz was required to serve Brill under Rule 4.05 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. I respectfully disagree. The conciliation court rules allow the notice for removal to be served by first class mail. Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 521(b)(1). Roehrdanz could have effectively served Brill under the rules of civil procedure, but service by first class mail is equally effective.

The conciliation court rules are included in the General Rules of Practice for the District Courts. Rule 521 provides that a person who is “aggrieved by an order for judgment entered in conciliation court” may “remove the cause” or appeal to the district court for trial de novo. Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 521(a). Under the rules, the demand for removal may be served on the opposing party in either of two ways. Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 521(b)(1). The rules provide: “[sjervice shall be by first class mail,” or “[sjervice may also be by personal service in accordance with the provisions for personal service of a summons in district court.” Id.

I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure supersede the General Rules of Practice for the District Courts on the method of service for an appeal from conciliation court to the district court. The rules of civil procedure specifically provide that “[tjhese rules do not supersede the provisions of statutes relating to appeals to the district courts.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 81.02. Appeal by removal to the district court is addressed in Minn.Stat. § 491A.02. The statute provides that the right of appeal from the decision of the conciliation court by removal to the district court will be governed by the rules promulgated by the supreme court. Minn. Stat. § 491A.02, subd. 6 (2002). The conciliation court rules promulgated by the supreme court are set forth in the General Rules of Practice for the District Courts, which contain the alternative provision for service by first class mail or in accordance with the rules of civil procedure.

The two previous Minnesota Court of Appeals decisions that the majority relies on to confirm the application of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure do not directly address whether the notice to remove may be served by first class mail. The cases instead address service issues that are not directly covered by the General Rules of Practice for the District Courts. See Wilkins v. City of Glencoe, 479 N.W.2d 430, 431 (Minn.App.1992) (permitting an additional three days when demand for removal is served by mail); Reichel v. Hefner, 472 N.W.2d 346 (Minn.App.1991) (determining whether party to action is disqualified from personally serving opposing party). I read these cases to stand for the proposition that the rules of civil procedure apply once the case has been removed to district court, and, before removal, they are a source of instructive information on questions not resolved by the General Rules of Practice for the District Courts.

I agree that after the case has been removed to district court the rules of civil procedure apply. Reichel, 472 N.W.2d at 348 (holding that rules of civil procedure apply upon removal to district court). But the method of serving the notice of removal or appeal to the district court is governed by the conciliation court rules, and the district court correctly determined that service by mail is effective to appeal from conciliation court by removing the case to the district court.

      . When Wilkins was decided (prior to the conciliation court rules merging into the General Rules of Practice for the District Courts), the predecessor to the current conciliation court rules were the Minnesota Rules for Conciliation Courts. Minn. R. Conciliation Cts. 1.21. The conciliation court rule at issue in Wilkins, however, was amended by Minn. Stat § 487.30, subd. 9 (1990), 1987 Minn. Laws ch. 221, § 5, and repealed in 1993. 1993 Minn. Laws ch. 321, § 7.

      . Accordingly, we concur with the Reichel court's observation that "[i]t would be a considerable public service for conciliation court rules to specify that, upon removal, the Rules of Civil Procedure apply.” Reichel, 472 N.W.2d at 348.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: STONEBURNER, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Richard Edward WINTER, Appellant.
    No. CX-02-1911.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Sept. 2, 2003.

      Mike Hatch, Attorney General, John B. Galus, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, and Doug Johnson, Washington County Attorney, Stillwater, for respondent.
    John M. Stuart, Minnesota Public Defender, Lawrence W. Pry, Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.
    Considered and decided by MINGE, Judge, HARTEN, Judge, and STONEBURNER, Judge.
   OPINION

STONEBURNER, Judge.

Appellant Richard Edward Winter challenges his conviction of second-degree criminal sexual conduct and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct. Appellant argues that the district court’s admission into evidence of a taped police interview without redacting repeated references to polygraph testing constitutes plain error entitling him to a new trial. Because admission of repeated references to polygraph testing is plain error, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

FACTS

Appellant Richard Edward Winter was charged with second-degree and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct for the sexual assault of a 14-year-old girl, T.M., for whom he was caring while her mother was out of town. Appellant denied guilt. Appellant did not testify at trial. The state’s case depended primarily on the credibility of the victim.

At trial, the district court, without objection, admitted into evidence a tape and transcript of appellant’s police interview in which appellant described one incident during which he said he may have accidentally touched the victim when she fell as she came out of the shower while appellant was in the bathroom to urinate. During the interview, the interviewing officer discussed polygraph testing with appellant four times, making numerous references to polygraph testing on each occasion. References to polygraph testing were not redacted from the interview or transcript. The first discussion occurred early in the interview when the interviewing officer asked:

Q. Do you know — do you know what a polygraph test is?
A. Yeah. Something you hook up.
Q. It’s a lie detector.
A. They see if you’re lying or not.
Q. Right. What would it say if you were hooked up on it right now as to whether — if the question was asked—
A. If I did anything?
Q. Right. If you did anything, if you touched her or anything like that.
A. Nope, never touched her.
Q. Is that what it would say?
A. Well, yeah.
Q. Ever? It would — the question would say have you ever touched her—
A. Inappropriately.
Q. Inappropriately, like have you ever touched her in any of her private parts or anything like that?
A. No. Nope. Nothing.
Q. Nothing like that. Okay, would it say that you were—
A. No, I’m telling the truth. I’m telling the truth right now. Like I said, I’m an honest person—

Later in the interview, after the officer had stopped the tape to call his office, he initiated the following discussion:

Q. Turn that back on. Its 25 after 4:00. What do you think you would do on a lie detector test—
A. You asked me that already.
Q. I know, but you want to let me finish my question buddy?
A. Yep, sure.
Q. All right. I let you finish your answers.
A. Yes you do, man. All right, I just didn’t want to go over the same thing again.
Q. If the question was asked of you that you got into the shower with her today, what do you think your answer would be?
A. No.
Q. No, you didn’t?
A. No, I didn’t?
Q. How do you think the answer would come out on the polygraph?
A. No, I didn’t.

The officer raised the issue of a polygraph test again later:

Q. Okay. Now, do you think you’d take that polygraph, Rick, to see if you were telling the truth as to what—
A. I am telling the truth.
Q. Nope. No, now do you think you’d take the polygraph about being truthful about whether your touch was inadvertent or on purpose, ‘cause she’s saying that her private part was touched.
A. Nope.
Q. She’s saying that you touched her in her vaginal area, mm-hmm, and she’s also saying that you penetrated her digitally, with your finger.
A. No, never did that.
Q. What do you think a polygraph would say if you were asked those questions now?
A. It would say I’m telling the truth. I did not, I did not penetrate her or put my finger there, or do whatever.

And the fourth exchange is as follows:

Q. Well, your stories are a little bit different, you know what I mean, that your stories are different?
Q. You know, that’s why it would be interesting for you to take a polygraph for me, to find out who’s being truthful, you or her.
A. Well, I don’t — why? I never, ever — I never put my hand down there and touched her.
Q. I didn’t say that, I said it would be real interesting to—
A. I know. I know what you’re saying.
Q. As to who you — if you took a polygraph for me as to who would be — who’s story is the truth, you or hers? Don’t you think it would be interesting?
A. If I — if I take it to get this done with, yeah. I mean, I can understand if she says, you know, I’m sorry I was miss — misunderstanding of it, ‘cause, you know, it happened to her before, you know.

Winter was convicted of second- and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct. This appeal followed.

ISSUE

Does the admission of a police interview with appellant that contained multiple references to polygraph testing constitute plain error entitling appellant to a new trial?

ANALYSIS

In general, a defendant is deemed to have forfeited his right to have an alleged error reviewed on appeal if he fails to object to the error at trial. State v. Quick, 659 N.W.2d 701, 717 (Minn.2003). But this court, has discretion to review a previously unraised issue if it is plain error. Id. The elements of plain error are (1) that there has been error; (2) that this error is plain; and (3) that the error affected substantial rights of the appellant. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.1998); see also Minn. R.Crim. P. 31.02. Winter argues that the admission of the polygraph-related portions of the interview into evidence constitutes plain error. We agree.

Rulings on evidentiary matters rest within the sound discretion of the district court. State v. Riley, 568 N.W.2d 518, 527 (Minn.1997). This court will not reverse a district court’s evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id. But it has long been the rule in Minnesota that, with one exception,, results of polygraph tests as well as any direct or indirect references to the taking of or refusal to take such a test are inadmissible.. State v. Fenney, 448 N.W.2d 54, 61 (Minn.1989); See also State v. Schaeffer, 457 N.W.2d 194, 197 (Minn.1990) (establishing as exception to rule that defendant has a right to present polygraph information as part of circumstances surrounding a confession).

In Anderson, we noted that polygraph tests had been almost universally held to be inadmissible and concluded: “[inasmuch as the results of such tests are . inadmissible, it must follow that the refusal or willingness of a defendant to take the test is also inadmissible.”

Riley, 568 N.W.2d at 527 (citing State v. Anderson, 261 Minn. 431, 437, 113 N.W.2d 4, 8 (1962)). Even when the parties have stipulated to the admission of polygraph testing evidence, we have held that the district court erred in admitting such evidence. State v. Litzau, 377 N.W.2d 53, 55 (Minn.App.1985).

The state argues that admission of the references to the polygraph in this case is not error because the discussion with appellant about the polygraph test did not involve either polygraph test results or evidence that appellant agreed to or refused to take such a test. We disagree. The questioning clearly is a request or strong suggestion that appellant should submit to a polygraph test to establish his innocence. The inference of the questioning is that if appellant is not guilty, he would submit to the test and that failure to submit to the test is evidence of his guilt. We hold that admission of appellant’s police interview without redacting all references to polygraph testing constitutes error.

“An error is ‘plain’ if it was ‘clear’ or ‘obvious.’ ” State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 688 (Minn.2002) (citations omitted).

[W]e have held that the state cannot “be permitted to deprive a defendant of a fair trial by means of insinuations and innuendoes which plant in the minds of the jury a prejudicial belief in the existence of evidence which is otherwise inadmissible.”

Id. (citation omitted). Because the references to polygraph testing in this case do not fit within the narrow exception to the court’s consistent ban on the introduction of such evidence, we conclude that admission of such references constitutes plain error.

Even if there is plain error, this court will not reverse unless the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights. Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740. An appellant’s substantial rights have been affected if the error was prejudicial and affected the outcome of the case. State v. Lindsey, 654 N.W.2d 718, 724 (Minn.App.2002). Error is prejudicial if there exists a reasonable likelihood that it had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict. Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 741. The defendant bears the burden of persuasion on this prong of establishing the right to appellate review of un-objected-to error. Id.

In some cases involving admission of polygraph-related testimony, the reviewing court has determined that although admission of the evidence was error, it was not reversible error because a mass of other more concrete physical and testimonial evidence negated any effect of the error on the verdict. See, e.g., Fenney, 448 N.W.2d at 61-62 (holding, in homicide case, that although admission of polygraph testimony to lay foundation for opinion testimony is inadmissible, there was no reversible error where state presented evidence of bloody footprints at the crime scene matching defendant’s shoes and of blood stains consistent with the victim’s blood found on defendant’s clothes, as well as other evidence). In this case, however, appellant was convicted primarily on the basis of the victim’s testimony and the credibility of appellant’s admission during his police interview of an incident in which he may have “accidentally” touched the victim as she came out of the shower. There is a reasonable likelihood that the repeated references to polygraph testing contained in appellant’s police interview had a significant effect on the jury’s decision. The jury may have concluded that appellant refused to take the test because he was guilty or that he took the test and failed it. We hold that admission of evidence related to polygraph testing in this case affected defendant’s substantial rights. And we conclude that the erroneous admission of references to polygraph testing deprived appellant of a fair trial. It is therefore necessary to reverse appellant’s conviction and remand for a new trial. See Quick, 659 N.W.2d at 717 (stating that when plain error is established, reviewing court may correct the error if the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding is seriously affected).

DECISION

The district court committed plain error by admitting into evidence a police interview that included numerous references to polygraph testing. The error deprived appellant of a fair trial, making it necessary to reverse appellant’s conviction and remand for a new trial to ensure the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceeding.

Reversed and remanded.


author: WRIGHT, Judge.

text:
    David GRANVILLE and Marlyss Granville as parents and natural guardians of Kailynn Granville, a minor, Appellants, Jacqueline Johnson, as parent and natural guardian of Shanel Andrews, a minor, Appellant, v. MINNEAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, Respondent.
    Nos. C6-03-135, C8-03-136.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Sept. 2, 2003.

      Paula M. Jossart, Michael L. Weiner, Christopher J. Moreland, Yaeger, Jung-bauer, Barczak & Vucinovich, P.L.C., Minneapolis, for appellants.
    Eric J. Magnuson, Nell E. Mathews, Kimberly T. Ross, Rider, Bennett, Egan & Arundel, LLP, Minneapolis, for respondent.
    Considered and decided by WRIGHT, Judge, LANSING, Judge, and PARKER, Judge.

       Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 10.

   OPINION

WRIGHT, Judge.

Appellants David and Marlyss Granville and Jacqueline Johnson (appellants collectively) are parents of African-American students who were injured in a physical education class at Loring Elementary School in Minneapolis. Appellants filed a lawsuit against respondent Minneapolis Public Schools, Special School District No. 1 (the school district), which moved to dismiss all claims pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) based on immunity granted by operation of Minn.Stat. § 466.12, subd. 3a (2002). After appellants challenged the constitutionality of the provision, the district court dismissed the claims, ruling that section 466.12, subdivision 3a, is constitutional and protects the school district from tort liability. Appellants contend that the district court erred when it dismissed appellants’ claims because the statute violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

FACTS

On November 1, 2001, Loring Elementary School students Shanel Andrews and Kailynn Granville, who are African-American, were injured while participating in a game of “flashlight tag” during physical education class. The parents of both children sued the school district to recover for personal injuries. The school district moved to dismiss the suit pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e), asserting that it is immune from tort liability under Minn. Stat. § 466.12, subd. 3a (2002), which provides immunity for school districts that are unable to obtain insurance for an average rate of $1.50 or less per pupil. Appellants countered that Minn.Stat. § 466.12, subd. 3a, violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. The district court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss. These consolidated appeals followed.

ISSUE

Did the district court err when it ruled that, as applied to appellants, Minn.Stat. § 466.12, subd. 3a (2002), is constitutional?

ANALYSIS

When reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12.02(e), we determine whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief. Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 558 (Minn.2003); Elzie v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 298 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Minn.1980). We, therefore, apply a de novo standard of review. Bodah, 663 N.W.2d at 553. “[I]t is immaterial whether or not the plaintiff can prove the facts alleged, and [an appellate court] will not uphold a Rule 12.02(e) dismissal if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded[.]” Martens v. Minn. Min. & Mfg. Co., 616 N.W.2d 732, 739-40 (Minn.2000) (quotation and citations omitted). We consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, accept those facts as true, and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Bodah, 663 N.W.2d at 553.

We must determine whether the district court erred when it ruled that, as applied to appellants, Minn.Stat. § 466.12, subd. 3a (2002), does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of either the United States Constitution or the Minnesota Constitution. “Evaluating a statute’s constitutionality is a question of law.” Hamilton v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 600 N.W.2d 720, 722 (Minn.1999). Accordingly, we are not bound by the district court’s conclusions. In re Blilie, 494 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Minn.1993) (quoting Sherek v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 699, Gilbert, 449 N.W.2d 434, 436 (Minn.1990)). Minnesota statutes enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, and we exercise our power to declare a statute unconstitutional “with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary.” In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn.1989).

The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution guarantees that “[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. The Minnesota Constitution guarantees that “[n]o member of this state shall be disenfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.” Minn. Const, art. 1, § 2. The Minnesota Supreme Court has explained that “[b]oth clauses have been analyzed under the same principles and ... mandate that all similarly situated individuals shall be treated alike, but only ‘invidious discrimination’ is deemed constitutionally offensive.” Scott v. Minneapolis Police Relief Ass’n, 615 N.W.2d 66, 74 (Minn.2000).

We begin every analysis of an equal-protection challenge by determining “whether the challenged classification must satisfy strict scrutiny or merely the rational basis standard.” Erlandson v. Kiffmeyer, 659 N.W.2d 724, 733 (Minn.2003). We apply strict scrutiny to legislatively created classifications in two situations: (1) when they impermissibly limit a fundamental right and (2) when they involve a suspect classification. Krueth v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 28, 496 N.W.2d 829, 835 (Minn.App.1993) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985)), review denied (Minn. Apr. 20, 1993). “If a constitutional challenge involves neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right, we review the challenge under a rational basis standard....” Holton v. County of Anoka, 645 N.W.2d 403, 411 (Minn.2002).

The statute at issue in this case requires school districts to obtain liability insurance but provides immunity from tort liability if the commissioner of insurance certifies that a school district is unable to obtain insurance for an average cost of $1.50 or less per pupil per year.

A school district shall procure insurance as provided in section 466.06, meeting the requirements of section 466.04, if it is able to obtain insurance and the cost thereof does not exceed $1.50 per pupil per year for the average number of pupils. If, after a good faith attempt to procure such insurance, a school district is unable to do so, and the commissioner of insurance certifies that such insurance is unobtainable, it shall be subject to the provisions of subdivisions 1 and 2. If the school district fails to make a good faith attempt to procure such insurance and the commissioner of insurance does not certify that such insurance is unobtainable, then in that event section 466.12 shall not apply to such a school district and it shall be subject to all of the other applicable provisions of chapter 466.

Minn.Stat. § 466.12, subd. 3a.

The school district attempted to obtain insurance 'within the cost limits but was certified by the commissioner of insurance as unable to do so in accordance with Minn.Stat. § 466.12, subd 3a, and, therefore, was immune from tort liability. Appellants assert that the school district, whose student population is 45 percent African-American, is the only one in the state to request or receive certification. They argue that, consequently, this immunity creates a class of African-American students who are prevented from suing the school district and whose rights, therefore, are violated under the Equal Protection Clause of the state and federal constitutions.

The district court applied a rational-basis test to the statute and concluded that it was constitutional. Appellants contend that the district court erred when it failed to apply the strict scrutiny standard to the statute at issue for two reasons. First, they allege that the operation of the statute creates an unconstitutional racial classification, disparately impacting African-American students, and second, they assert that the fundamental right to sue the school district is impinged by the operation of the challenged statute.

A. Racial Classification

A classification based on race is a suspect classification. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 65 S.Ct. 193, 194, 89 L.Ed. 194 (1944). We, therefore, apply strict scrutiny to a challenged statute if it burdens one racial group. Krueth, 496 N.W.2d at 835. Strict scrutiny provides that racial classifications “are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2113, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995).

There are two alternative ways of demonstrating the existence of a race or national origin classification. One is where the classification exists on the face of the law * * ⅜. Alternatively, if a law is facially neutral, a race or national origin classification might be proven by demonstrating discriminatory administration or discriminatory impact.

Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies § 9.3.3 (1997). While appellants concede that “Minn.Stat. § 466.12, subd. 3a, does not present a racial classification per se” they assert that application of the statute creates a disparate impact on African-American students who attend Minneapolis public schools. Because of their divergent treatment of this issue, it is necessary to analyze separately the federal and state constitutions.

1. Federal Constitutional Law

Under the federal constitution, disparate impact alone, without proof of discriminatory purpose, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2048, 48 L.Ed.2d 597, (1976) (acknowledging “the basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose”). Here, appellants do not allege any discriminatory purpose associated with the statute. Rather, appellants assert that an inference of invidious discrimination can be drawn from the statute’s disparate impact on African-American students. As an initial matter, we conclude that appellants’ argument does not accurately characterize the class of individuals created by the statute’s operation. Appellants allege the statute creates a class of African-American students who are prevented from suing the school district. This argument is unpersuasive. Clearly, the operation of the statute prevents any person injured by the school district under any circumstances, regardless of race, from bringing suit. Further, the alleged disparate impact itself is the only proof of discriminatory purpose offered by appellants, which falls short of federal constitutional requirements. See Washington, 426 U.S. at 238-39, 96 S.Ct. at 2047 (declining to embrace the proposition that a law is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact). We conclude that appellants have not shown a racial classification warranting application of strict scrutiny under federal constitutional law.

2. Minnesota Constitutional Law

Citing State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn.1991), appellants contend that the Minnesota Supreme Court has implied that strict scrutiny is warranted in cases where a statute’s application results in disparate impact. In Russell, individuals charged with possession of crack cocaine moved to dismiss the charges, alleging a violation of the equal protection guarantees in both the federal and state constitutions. Id. at 887. They asserted that a statute requiring possession of three grams of crack cocaine for a third-degree offense as opposed to ten grams of cocaine powder was violative of equal protection. Id. Although the Russell defendants argued that the statute had a disparate racial impact because crack cocaine is used predominantly by African Americans and cocaine powder is used predominantly by whites, the supreme court did not apply strict scrutiny. Id. at 888-89. Instead, the Russell court examined the classification between users of the two substances under “an independent Minnesota constitutional standard of rational basis review,” which is more stringent than the federal rational-basis test. Id. at 889. Although appellants argue that the Russell decision supports the application of strict scrutiny when only disparate racial impact, and not intentional discrimination, can be shown, Russell only expressly held that the more stringent Minnesota rational-basis test should be applied in such cases.

It is particularly appropriate that we apply our stricter standard of rational basis review in a case such as this where the challenged classification appears to impose a substantially disproportionate burden on the very class of persons whose history inspired the principles of equal protection.

Id.; see also State v. Frazier, 649 N.W.2d 828, 841 (Minn.2002) (Page, J., dissenting) (stating that, in Russell, “this court utilized a more protective approach under the Minnesota Constitution to strike down a facially neutral criminal statute that had a discriminatory impact on blacks”); Ann L. Iijima, Minnesota Equal Protection in the Third Millennium: “Old Formulations” Or “New Articulations”?, 20 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 337, 356 (1994) (stating that the Russell court “indicate[d] that the disparate impact on African Americans imposed by the crack/cocaine distinction was one of the persuasive factors encouraging use of the less deferential analysis”). Further, because the Russell court held that the challenged statute did not pass the Minnesota rational-basis test, it expressly deferred the decision of whether strict scrutiny should be applied in eases involving disparate racial impact. See Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888 n. 2 (stating that whether strict scrutiny should be applied “need not be decided today, however, because we find the statute unconstitutional under the Minnesota rational basis test”). Under both the federal and state constitutions, we decline to apply strict scrutiny. Based on Russell, assuming appellants’ allegations of disparate impact to be true, we apply Minnesota’s “stricter standard of rational basis review.” Id. at 889.

B. Fundamental Right

In addition to their argument that the statute creates an unconstitutional racial classification, appellants contend that strict scrutiny should apply because a fundamental right is implicated by the operation of Minn.Stat. § 466.12, subd. 3a.

1. Federal Constitutional Law

Appellants do not explicitly argue that the right to sue a governmental entity is a fundamental right under the federal constitution, and our review of the caselaw demonstrates that it is not. Fundamental rights are those “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1938, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977); see, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (right to familial relations fundamental); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-84, 98 S.Ct. 673, 679-80, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978) (right to marry fundamental); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559-60, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1380, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964) (voting rights fundamental). The right to sue a governmental entity is not discussed in caselaw, and we conclude that it is not analogous to any of the rights that the United States Supreme Court has declared to be fundamental. Under the federal constitution, appellants have not demonstrated such impingement of a fundamental right as to justify application of strict scrutiny.

2. Minnesota Constitutional Law

Appellants argue that, by being prevented from suing the school district, a fundamental right to “[r]edress of injuries or wrongs” is affected, and strict scrutiny should be applied. This argument is unavailing. “Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive to his person, property or character, and to obtain justice freely and without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformable to the laws.” Minn. Const, art. I, § 8. Minnesota courts have never stated that the right to sue a governmental entity is “fundamental” for the purpose of invoking strict scrutiny. Further, when reviewing constitutional challenges to other governmental immunity statutes, courts have applied a rational-basis test rather than strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Bernthal v. City of St. Paul, 376 N.W.2d 422, 424 & n. 5 (Minn.1985) (noting that all constitutional challenges of the municipal tort liability statute have required application of the rational-basis test); Green-Glo Turf Farms, Inc. v. State, 347 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn.1984) (holding that state outdoor recreational immunity statute did not violate Equal Protection Clause of United States Constitution under rational-basis test); Lloyd v. City of St. Paul, 538 N.W.2d 921, 924-25 (Minn.App.1995) (applying rational-basis test to state outdoor recreational immunity statute), review denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 1995).

Further, “the purpose of article I, section 8 of the Minnesota Constitution is to preserve remedies under common law.” Johnson v. State, 478 N.W.2d 769, 773 (Minn.App.1991), review denied (Minn. Feb. 27,1992); see also Hickman v. Growp Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Minn.1986). In 1962, the Minnesota Supreme Court expressed “its intention to overrule the doctrine of sovereign tort immunity as a defense with respect to tort claims against school districts[J” Spanel v. Mounds View Sch. Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 292, 118 N.W.2d 795, 803 (1962). In response to Spanel, “the legislature enacted Minn.Stat. ch. 466, the Municipal Tort Liability Act, which imposes liability — subject to the limitations set out in the other sections of the Act — on every municipality for its torts[.]” Doyle v. City of Roseville, 524 N.W.2d 461, 462 (Minn.1994). The provisions of chapter 466 include school districts. See Minn.Stat. § 466.01, subd. 1 (including a school district in the definition of “municipality”). We conclude that, because liability is imposed on the school district by statutory law and not common law, no right protected by article I, section 8, of the Minnesota Constitution is implicated. Because a fundamental right is not implicated by the operation of Minn.Stat. § 466.12, subd. 3a, we do not apply strict scrutiny. Accordingly, the appropriate standard to apply is the rational-basis test.

Minnesota courts apply two formulations of the rational-basis test to determine whether a challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.

One formulation is the standard articulated by federal courts for the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, where it must be determined whether the challenged classification has a legitimate purpose and whether it was reasonable to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose.

Kolton v. County of Anoka, 645 N.W.2d 403, 411 (Minn.2002) (citing W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 668, 101 S.Ct. 2070, 2083, 68 L.Ed.2d 514 (1981) and Imlay v. City of Lake Crystal, 453 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn.1990)). A second formulation, often referred to as the Minnesota rational-basis test, requires:

(1) The distinctions which separate those included within the classification from those excluded must not be manifestly arbitrary or fanciful but must be genuine and substantial, thereby providing a natural and reasonable basis to justify legislation adapted to peculiar conditions and needs; (2) the classification must be genuine or relevant to the purpose of the law; that is there must be an evident connection between the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and the prescribed remedy; and (3) the purpose of the statute must be one that the state can legitimately attempt to achieve.

Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888 (quoting Vegan v. Vill. of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273, 280 (Minn.1981)). For purposes of federal constitutional analysis, “[t]he general rule is that [the] legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. at 3254.

Here, in the context of a Rule 12.02(e) motion to dismiss, we conclude that the record, in its current state, does not permit the determination of whether Minn. Stat. § 466.12, subd. 3a, passes the rational-basis test in either of its formulations. At this early stage of the proceedings, there is insufficient evidence from which the district court can determine whether the legislature’s choice of a rate of $1.50 per student is arbitrary under current market conditions, as appellants assert, or, on the contrary, creates a constitutional classification that is relevant to the statute’s purpose. The rate of $1.50 per pupil has not changed since subdivision 3a was enacted in 1969. See Minn.Stat. § 466.12, subd. 3a (1969). In order to decide whether the statute meets the federal and state rational-basis tests, evidence demonstrating whether immunity triggered by the $1.50 per pupil rate permits constitutional operation of the statute is required. Without such analysis, the district court’s conclusion that the school district is entitled to immunity is erroneous. Appellants’ claims are legally sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted pursuant to Rule 12.02(e). We, therefore, conclude that the district court erred when it granted the school district’s motion to dismiss.

DECISION

The district court properly ruled that, in examining appellants’ challenge to Minn. Stat. § 466.12, subd. 3a (2002), the appropriate constitutional test is the rational-basis test. But because the district court erred in dismissing appellants’ claims, we reverse the district court’s dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.


author: HALBROOKS, Judge.

text:
    In re Kris Lynn EISENSCHENK, n/k/a Kris Lynn Gruenes, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Timothy James EISENSCHENK, Respondent.
    No. C2-03-343.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Sept. 9, 2003.

      Paul A. Jeddeloh, Jeddeloh & Snyder, P.A., St. Cloud, MN, for appellant.
    Greg Engel, St. Cloud, MN, for respondent.
    Considered and decided by HALBROOKS, Presiding Judge, TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge, and SHUMAKER, Judge.
   OPINION

HALBROOKS, Judge.

On appeal from the district court’s review of a child support magistrate’s ruling, appellant challenges the district court’s refusal to rule that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction over respondent’s motion for support from appellant. Appellant also challenges the propriety of attributing income to her, the amount of income attributed to her, and the district court’s decision to make her support obligation effective as of the date of a prior stipulated order giving respondent custody of the parties’ children. Because the magistrate had jurisdiction and because the district court did not make findings unsupported by the record or otherwise abuse its discretion in addressing the amount of appellant’s support obligation, we affirm those determinations by the district court. Because the district court did not adequately explain why it made appellant’s support obligation effective as of the date of the stipulated order, we reverse and remand that aspect of the district court’s decision.

FACTS

The May 1997 judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage awarded appellant Kris Gruenes sole physical custody of the parties’ four children and set respondent Timothy Eisenschenk’s monthly support obligation at $585 per month. After the dissolution, appellant remarried and lived on her new husband’s farm with their two children, and the parties’ four children. A stipulated January 80, 2002 order temporarily awarded respondent physical custody of the parties’ four children and suspended his support obligation while he had custody. The stipulated order also stated that if respondent wanted support from appellant, he could seek support in the expedited child-support process.

When respondent later sought support from appellant, a IV-D child-support file was open in appellant’s name but not in respondent’s name. Although the record is not fully developed on the point, respondent initially sought support in the expedited child-support process, apparently assuming that the magistrate had jurisdiction to address his request for support either because of the existence of appellant’s IV-D file or the existence of the provision in the January 30, 2002 stipulated order stating that respondent could seek support in the expedited child-support process (or both). While a hearing on respondent’s motion was set for August 9, 2002, the magistrate continued that hearing.

At the rescheduled hearing on September 12, 2002, respondent’s attorney stated that respondent had applied for IV-D services. The magistrate heard testimony from appellant regarding her income and addressed the merits of the parties’ support dispute. Appellant sought review of the magistrate’s decision in the district court. She argued, among other things, that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The district court rejected this argument, noting that the case had been referred to the expedited child-support process by the stipulated order. The district court denied appellant’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and upheld the magistrate’s determination of appellant’s support obligation. The court also concluded that the matter should be considered an establishment of support rather than a modification of support and ordered the support obligation to begin on January 30, 2002, the date that respondent gained physical custody of the children.

ISSUES

1. Did the district court err in ruling that the child support magistrate had jurisdiction to address support?

2. Did the district court abuse its discretion in attributing income to appellant?

3. Did the district court err in making appellant’s support obligation effective as of the date of the stipulated order?

ANALYSIS

I.

After the legislature directed the supreme court to create an expedited process for addressing certain types of child-support matters, the supreme court promulgated the Expedited Child Support Process Rules. See Minn.Stat. § 484.702 (2002) (providing legislative authority for supreme court to create expedited child-support process); Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 351-79 (rules for expedited child-support process). Here, respondent’s motion was heard in the expedited child-support process. On appeal, appellant argues that the expedited process lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear respondent’s motion.

The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a legal question, which appellate courts review de novo. Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426, 434 (Minn.2002); see Ludwigson v. Ludwigson, 642 N.W.2d 441, 448 (Minn.App.2002) (reciting this rule in context of expedited child-support process). Child-support matters that are not “IV-D cases” “may not be conducted in the expedited [child support] process.” MinmStat. § 484.702, subd. 1(b); see Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 353.01, subd. 3 (stating certain types of cases “shall not be conducted or decided in the expedited process[,]” including “non-IV-D cases”). A “IV-D case” is

a case where a party has assigned to the state rights to child support because of the receipt of public assistance as defined in section 256.741 or has applied for child support services under title IVD of the Social Security Act, United States Code, title 42, section 654(4).

MinmStat. § 518.54, subd. 14 (2002) (emphasis added); see also Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 352.01(f) (stating “IV-D case” is “any proceeding where a party has either (1) assigned to the State rights to child support because of the receipt of public assistance as defined in Minn.Stat. § '256.741 (2000), or (2) applied for child support services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 654(4) (1994). ‘IV-D case’ doés not include proceedings where income withholding is the only service applied for or received under MinmStat. § 518.6111 (2000).” (emphasis added)). Thus, under the statute, for a “IV-D case” to exist, “a party” must have “assigned” his or her right to receive support to the state or “applied for” the requisite child-support services. Because the statute refers to “a party” (i.e., either party), the fact that the party who assigned rights or applied for support services is the party from whom support is sought, is not fatal to the existence of a IV-D case. See Glen Paul Court Neighborhood, Ass’n v. Paster, 437 N.W.2d 52, 56 (Minn.1989) (stating “[w]here on its face or in application a statute’s meaning is clear, there is no room for construction”).

In determining whether a “IV-D case” exists here, we note that this case involves two avoidable flaws that are commonly found in cases arising out of the expedited child-support process. First, the magistrate generically, without further explanation and in what is apparently a form order, stated that jurisdiction in the expedited child-support process was appropriate “pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 484.702, subds. 1 and 3.” While Minn.Stat. § 484.702, subd. 1(f), adopts the definition of “IV-D case” in Minn.Stat. § 518.54, subd. 14, neither the documents the parties submitted to the magistrate nor the magistrate’s order address whether chapter 518’s definition of “IV-D case” was satisfied (or address whether there was some other basis for jurisdiction in the expedited child-support process). We note that a fuller treatment of the jurisdictional question by the parties or the magistrate at this stage of the proceeding might have avoided a significant part of the subsequent litigation.

Second, when the parties did focus on the jurisdictional issue during review of the magistrate’s decision in district court, the parties simply submitted letters to the court, trading nonspecific, undocumented assertions regarding the sequence of events leading up to the magistrate’s ruling rather than submitting documents showing the existence of jurisdiction in the expedited child-support process (e.g., an assignment to the state by one of the parties of that party’s right to receive support). Because the appellate courts do not get the IV-D file, the parties’ failures to put the relevant IV-D documents into the district court file means that those documents are not part of the record on appeal. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 110.01 (defining record on appeal as documents filed in district court). We note that not including the relevant documents in the district court file renders review of jurisdictional issues (and possibly other issues as well) unnecessarily complicated, and risks otherwise avoidable reversals and remands.

Here, the only things that the parties’ letters allege with any particularity are that (a) appellant opened a IV-D case on an unspecified date and that it stayed open until (at least) August 9, 2002; (b) respondent initially served his motion in June 2002; (c) on August 9, 2002, the magistrate continued the hearing set to address respondent’s motion; (d) after the continuance, the county told respondent it would (at some future point not specified in the relevant letter) close appellant’s IVD file; (e) respondent procured the forms necessary to open a ‘TV-D case” in his own name, filled them out, and provided them to his attorney on August 11, 2002; (f) the continued hearing occurred on September 12, 2002, at which time respondent’s attorney told the magistrate that respondent had applied for IV-D services; (g) respondent’s IV-D papers were filed on September 26, 2002; and (h) a IV-D file was opened in respondent’s name on October 1, 2002. The record shows that the magistrate’s order was signed and filed on October 4, 2002, and October 9, 2002, respectively. For the reasons set out below, we conclude that, on the unique facts presented by this peculiar case (and the less than fully developed record), the magistrate had jurisdiction to address respondent’s motion.

First, the record shows that at least one party to this support dispute had a IV-D file open, and hence that the expedited child-support process had jurisdiction to address respondent’s motion, when (a) respondent’s motion was made; (b) the case was originally heard (and continued); (c) the decision was issued; and (d) the decision was filed. Second, but for the continuance requested by appellant, respondent’s motion would have been heard at a time when the record undisputedly shows that appellant’s IV-D case was still open. Third, although the county’s reasons for its stated intent to close appellant’s IV-D file are not explicitly identified, it appears that the reason appellant’s IV-D file was to be closed was because she no longer received support from respondent. To rule that the fact that a party no longer is entitled to receive support requires an automatic closing of that party’s IV-D file could result in temporary “gaps” in the jurisdiction of the expedited child-support process where custody is modified and one party’s right to support ends before the other party completes the requisite IV-D documentation. Lastly, because the record does not show whether or when the county actually closed appellant’s IV-D file, that file may have been open until (or even after) the county opened respondent’s IV-D file.

II.

The child support magistrate found appellant’s monthly income to be equal to the amount it found to be respondent’s monthly income and set appellant’s support obligation at the guideline amount for that income. The district court affirmed these rulings, and appellant now challenges them. We review a district court’s affir-mance of a magistrate’s order for an abuse of discretion. Davis v. Davis, 631 N.W.2d 822, 826 (Minn.App.2001).

A. Propriety of Attributing Income to Appellant

Income may be imputed to or estimated for a child-support obligor either because the obligor is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, or because it is impracticable to determine the obligor’s actual income. See Minn.Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5b(d) (2002) (addressing imputed income where obligor is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed); Gorz v. Gorz, 552 N.W.2d 566, 569 (Minn.App.1996) (noting that, in addition to imputing income to voluntarily unemployed or underemployed support obligor, income may be imputed to obligor when obligor’s income is otherwise “impracticable to determine” (quotation omitted)). Here, appellant testified that she and her second husband signed a premarital agreement (PMA) stating that appellant had no interest in her second husband’s business or in the income generated by that business. The district court, however, noted that the PMA was not entered into evidence and that there might be a problem with the enforceability of a PMA with the terms described by appellant. Cf. Minn.Stat. § 519.11 (2002) (addressing premarital agreements); McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 265 (Minn. 1989) (same). Appellant also testified that she is ignorant of her current family’s financial situation, that she is a full-time homemaker and performs no work for her current husband’s business, that her current family has no income and no budget, that she does not know how much money she spends out of the joint checking account she shares with her current husband, and that she receives no income from the family business. The district court specifically found each of these assertions to be not credible. The district court further stated that appellant’s alleged “poverty and total financial ignorance is completely disingenuous” in light of $588,000 in revenue “available to [appellant] and her current [husband]” from her current husband’s business, that appellant’s “lack of cooperation with the Court in its attempt to make'a reasonable determination of her financial circumstances reflected bad faith on her part[,]” and that “[i]t was reasonable and equitable to impute a portion of the marital income to [appellant] in an amount equal to [respondent’s net monthly income.]”

Questions of witness credibility and whether a party acts in good faith are questions on which appellate courts defer to the district court. See Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn.1988) (stating appellate courts defer to district court credibility determinations); Tonka Tours, Inc. v. Chadima, 372 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Minn.1985) (stating whether party acts in good faith is, essentially, a credibility question). Here, the district court determined that appellant was not credible when she testified that she did not work for and receive remuneration from her current husband’s business and that she acted in bad faith by attempting to preclude an accurate estimate of the amount of the income that should be attributable to her. This determination shows that the district court attributed income to appellant because it was impracticable to determine her actual income, rather than because she was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. See Gorz, 552 N.W.2d at 569.

In estimating appellant’s income, the district court (a) contemplated the possibility of imputing an income to appellant of 150% of the federal minimum wage (apparently under Minn.Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5b(e)), but rejected the idea, stating “it is apparent to the Court that [appellant] enjoys substantially greater financial resources than 150% of minimum wage”; (b) noted that the business of appellant’s current husband showed a loss for tax purposes; (e) added back to the tax-loss figure amounts for depreciation, mortgage-interest expense, and capital gains, and arrived at a positive “income” figure for the business; (d) determined that it was “reasonable and equitable” to impute to appellant a portion of the business’s income equal to respondent’s gross monthly income; (e) noted that this amount was less than 24% of the estimated “income” figure calculated for the business of appellant’s current husband; and (f) set appellant’s support obligation at the guideline amount for a monthly net income figure derived from the gross income attributed to appellant.

When addressing child support, the income of an obligor’s spouse is not to be included in the obligor’s net monthly income and the financial circumstances of the obligor’s spouse are not to be considered. Minn.Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5(b)(1) (2002) (spouse’s income); Minn.Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2(c)(1) (2002) (spouse’s financial circumstances); cf. Sherburne County Soc. Servs. v. Riedle, 481 N.W.2d 111, 112 (Minn.App.1992) (stating “[w]hether a source of funds is income for purposes of determining a person’s child support obligation is a question of law”). Arguing that determination of her income by referring to the revenue of her current husband’s business violates these concepts, appellant challenges the finding of her net monthly income. This argument, however, assumes that the PMA is enforceable. Moreover, regardless of whether the PMA is enforceable, because the district court rejected as not credible appellant’s assertions that she does not perform services for, and is not paid by, the business, at least some of the business’s revenue is attributable to appellant.

The fact that appellant may not receive a regular paycheck from the business is not fatal to this conclusion. Appellant testified that her current family’s entire household living expenses are written off as business expenses by her current husband’s business. While “income” is generally defined in terms of a periodic payment to a person, for child-support purposes it also includes “in-kind payments received by the obligor in the course of employment, self-employment, or operation of a business if the payments reduce the obli-gor’s living expenses.” MinmStat. § 518.551, subd. 5(b)(1) (requiring inclusion of in-kind payments in support obli-gor’s income); Minn.Stat. § 518.54, subd. 6 (2002) (defining income as “periodic payment”). Thus, on this record, we cannot say that appellant has shown that the district court abused its discretion by attributing income to her.

B. Propriety of Amount of Income Attributed to Appellant

Appellant challenges the amount of income attributed to her, noting that it was determined based, in part, on consideration of respondent’s monthly income. The record shows, however, that respondent’s income was neither the only, nor the dispositive, consideration in finding appellant’s net monthly income. The record shows that (a) appellant submitted no credible financial information; (b) the district court functionally found that appellant provided services for her current husband’s business; (c) appellant admitted that the business paid her living expenses; (d) the district court found that appellant acted in bad faith by attempting to preclude the court from estimating the amount of income attributable to her; (e) the district court noted the possibility of attributing income to appellant at 150% of the minimum wage but rejected that possibility because “it is apparent” that she enjoyed “substantially greater financial resources”; (f) the district court examined the financial information provided regarding the business of appellant’s current husband; and (g) the court attributed an income to appellant that it noted was less than 24% of what the district court deems the business’s gross income to be. While the record support for the income figure attributed to appellant is not conclusive, a major reason for the limited support was appellant’s failure to provide any credible evidence regarding her financial status. Cf Doering v. Doering, 629 N.W.2d 124, 132 (Minn.App.2001) (discussing affirmative duty to disclose information that is present for parties to dissolution), review denied (Minn. Sept. 11, 2001). On appeal, a party cannot complain about a district court’s failure to rule in her favor when one of the reasons it did not do so is because that party failed to provide the district court with the evidence that would allow the district court to fully address the question. See Tuthill v. Tuthill, 399 N.W.2d 230, 232 (Minn.App.1987) (reciting this rule in maintenance-modification context); Taflin v. Taflin, 366 N.W.2d 315, 319 (Minn.App.1985) (reciting this rule in support-modification context).

Appellant also argues that the district court violated Minn.Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5f (2002), by setting her support obligation without considering the children she has with her current husband. That statute presumes that the appropriate child-support obligation for a support obli-gor who has children in multiple families is the guideline amount. See id. (stating “[t]he needs of subsequent children shall not be factored into a support guidelines calculation” and listing considerations for determining whether to deviate from the guideline-support obligation). Thus, the crux of appellant’s complaint is that her support obligation was not set in an amount that deviated from the guideline amount. To set a support obligation in an amount deviating from the guideline amount, the district court must consider the various financial and other factors listed at Minn.Stat. § 518.551, subd 5f(l)-(4). Because appellant failed to produce any credible evidence of her financial circumstances, however, even if the statute did apply here (which, for purposes of this appeal we assume, but do not concede), appellant was not entitled to a deviation from the guideline support amount. See Tuthill, 399 N.W.2d at 232; Taflin, 366 N.W.2d at 319.

On this record, given the lack of credible financial information produced by appellant, her attempts to stonewall any meaningful investigation of her actual financial status, and the fact that the amount imputed to her is less than 24% of the business’s gross income, we cannot say that appellant showed that the amount of income found attributable to her is clearly erroneous. See Ludwigson, 642 N.W.2d at 446 (stating findings of net monthly income for support purposes are not altered on appeal unless clearly erroneous).

III.

Appellant argues that the district court should not have made her support obligation retroactive to the January 30, 2002 stipulated order. Where support was reserved, this court observed that “[generally, where no prior order to pay child support exists, it is improper to give a support order retroactive effect.” Davis v. Davis, 631 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Minn.App.2001). Here, regarding support, the stipulated January 30, 2002 order stated that if respondent “[s]hould ... desire to seek child support[,]” he could seek it in the expedited child-support process. Because the stipulated order did not contemplate immediate support payments from appellant and made any payment of support by appellant contingent on respondent seeking support from her, the stipulated order functionally reserved appellant’s support obligation. Thus, the general rule articulated in Davis is applicable. The district court’s reason for not applying the general rule was that respondent had had custody of the children since the stipulated order without receiving any support. This reasoning, however, merely recites the facts that will exist in most, if not all, cases where support is reserved. Therefore, it is an insufficient reason to not apply the general rule. We reverse the district court’s determination that appellant’s support obligation is effective as of the date of the stipulated order and remand for the relevant provisions of the order to be adjusted accordingly.

DECISION

Because the district court correctly determined that the expedited child-support process had jurisdiction in this case, we affirm the district court’s determination on that point. Because appellant did not show that the district court abused its discretion in attributing income to her or that it clearly erred in determining the amount of income to be attributed to her, we affirm those aspects of the district court’s ruling as well. Because the district court erred in making appellant’s support obligation effective as of the date the stipulated order, however, we reverse that portion of the district court’s decision and remand for the district court to make the necessary alterations in its order.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

      . At the time of the hearing, appellant was pregnant and due to have a third child with her second husband in April 2003.

      . We note that such a gap in the jurisdiction of the expedited child-support process would be likely to occur if the parties stipulated to one or more issues (e.g., change of custody from child support "recipient” to support "obligor" and termination of "obligor’s” existing support obligation) but had to litigate another issue (e.g., amount of support to be paid by the former support "recipient”).

      . Because we resolve the jurisdictional issue based on the existence of a IV-D file, we need not address the parties' disputes regarding whether their January 2002 stipulation conferred jurisdiction on the expedited support process or whether the district court's January 2002 order adopting that stipulation validly referred the support question to the expedited child-support process. We have doubts about both asserted bases for jurisdiction, however. See Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 353.02, subds. 1, 2 (addressing referral of questions to expedited support process); Hemmesch v. Molitor, 328 N.W.2d 445, 447 (Minn.1983) (addressing ability to confer subject-matter jurisdiction by stipulation).

      . Minn.Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5b(e) (2002), creates a presumption that a party is not voluntarily unemployed or underemployed for periods that a party is "physically ... incapacitated.” Citing this provision, appellant argues that, in attributing income to her, the district court ignored her “physical disability” due to her pregnancy. Because the district court's attribution of income to appellant was not based on appellant being voluntarily unemployed or underemployed (indeed, the district court made no finding that appellant was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed), we need not address whether appellant’s pregnancy constitutes "physical incapacitation” under the statute.

      . To the extent appellant argues that any income imputed to her should have been at a rate of 150% of the minimum wage under Minn.Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5b(e), we reject that argument. The statute states that, in certain circumstances, the court "may” impute income at 150% of the minimum wage. "May” is permissive. Compare Minn.Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15 (2002) (stating " '|m]ay' ⅛ permissive”) with Minn.Stat. § 645.44, subd. 16 (2002) (stating " '[s]hall’ is mandatory”).


author: NEUMANN, Justice. MARY MUEHLEN MARING. RONALD L. HILDEN, District Judge,

text:
    2003 ND 141
    Celeste BARNES, Claimant and Appellant, v. WORKFORCE SAFETY AND INSURANCE, Appellee, and North Dakota Parks and Rec., Respondent.
    No. 20030012.
    Supreme Court of North Dakota.
    Sept. 2, 2003.
    Rehearing Denied Sept. 26, 2008.

      Stephen D. Little, Dietz & Little Lawyers, Bismarck, N.D., for claimant and appellant.
    Lawrence E. King, Special Assistant Attorney General, Bismarck, N.D., for appel-lee.
   NEUMANN, Justice.

[¶ 1] Celeste Barnes appeals from a district court judgment affirming an order of Workforce Safety and Insurance denying benefits for Barnes’s cervical spine condition. We affirm, concluding that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) did not err in admitting expert testimony, that the ALJ and the organization did not apply an erroneous legal standard, and that the organization’s finding that Barnes’s cervical spine condition was- not a compensable injury is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

I

[¶ 2] Barnes had a lengthy history of non-work-related low back problems, culminating in surgery to fuse the L5-S1 vertebrae in February 1998. She returned to her employment as an administrative assistant at Cross Ranch State Park in May 1998.

[¶ 3] On September 2, 1998, as Barnes was getting out of her chair at work, the back of the chair broke off and she fell backwards onto her tailbone. Barnes was taken by ambulance to a Bismarck hospital, where she complained of extreme back pain and some tightening in her neck. The emergency room doctor diagnosed a contused sacrum. Barnes thereafter saw her regular doctor, who released her to return to work on September 21, 1998.

[¶ 4] Barnes filed a claim for her injuries with the organization on September 11, 1998. The organization accepted the claim and began paying Barnes’s medical expenses. Barnes experienced continuing low back problems after the work injury, and in April 1999 had surgery to remove screws from her prior back surgery.

[¶ 5] At some point after the work injury Barnes began experiencing numbness in her fingers and some neck pain. An MRI performed in November 1999 showed some bulging of the cervical discs. Barnes was referred to Dr. Francis Denis, who diagnosed Barnes with herniated cervical discs with congenital spinal, stenosis. On May 23, 2000, Dr. Denis performed fusion surgery on Barnes’s cervical spine at C4-5, C5-6, and C6-7.

[¶ 6] In March 2000, the organization informed Barnes that it was denying liability for her neck and upper extremity problems. Barnes’s attorney provided additional information to the organization, including a letter from her treating physician, Dr. Martire, stating the cervical problems were causally related to her work injury. Barnes requested that the organization issue an appealable order if it was not going to pay medical expenses for her cervical spine problems. The organization requested an opinion from its medical consultant, Dr. Kilzer, and also requested an independent record review by Dr. Simonet, an orthopedic surgeon. Both Dr. Kilzer and Dr. Simonet concluded Barnes’s cervical problems were not causally related to her work injury. On November 2, 2000, the organization issued an order denying specific benefits, concluding Barnes’s cervical spine problems were not related to the work injury.

[¶ 7] Barnes requested a hearing, which was scheduled for May 3, 2001. Shortly after the hearing began, the ALJ determined a continuance was necessary to allow further discovery and to, allow the organization to amend its order to address disability benefits. After the organization issued an amended order denying disability benefits, the hearing was continued on November 7, 2001. The ALJ issued her recommended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order, finding Barnes’s cervical problems were not causally related to her work injury and affirming the organization’s order denying benefits. The organization adopted the- ALJ’s recommended findings, conclusion, and order. The organization denied Barnes’s request for reconsideration, and she appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed the organization’s order, and Barnes appealed to this Court.

II

[¶ 8] Under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46, the district court must affirm an order of an administrative agency unless it finds any of the following are present:

1. The order is not in accordance with the law. •
2. The order is in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant.
. 3. The provisions of this chapter have not been complied with in the proceedings before the agency.
4. The rules or procedure of the agency have not afforded the appellant a fair hearing.
5. The findings of fact made by the agency are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
6. The conclusions of law and order of the agency are not supported by its findings of fact.
7. The findings of fact made by the agency do not sufficiently address the evidence presented to the agency by the appellant.
8. ■ The conclusions of law and order of the agency do not sufficiently explain the agency’s rationale for not adopting any contrary recommendations by a hearing officer or an administrative law judge.

On an appeal from the district court’s judgment, this Court' reviews the agency order in the same manner. N.D.C.C. § 28-32-49; Grand Forks Prof'l Baseball, Inc. v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 2002 ND 204, ¶ 8, 654 N.W.2d 426.

[¶ 9] We review the decision of the administrative agency, rather than that of the district court, although the district court’s analysis is entitled to respect. Paul v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 2002 ND 96, ¶6, 644 N.W.2d 884. We exercise restraint in deciding whether the agency’s findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and we do not make independent findings or substitute our judgment for that of the agency. Id. We decide only whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have decided the agency’s findings were proven by the weight of the evidence from the entire record. Id. Questions of law, including the interpretation of a statute, are fully reviewable on appeal from an administrative decision. Grand Forks Prof'l Baseball, 2002 ND 204, ¶ 8, 654 N.W.2d 426.

Ill

[¶ 10] The sole issue raised by Barnes on appeal is whether the organization’s finding that Barnes’s cervical spine problem was not a compensable injury is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. In support of her argument, Barnes contends that the organization should not have relied upon the expert opinions of Dr. Simonet and Dr. Kilzer, and that the organization and the ALJ applied an incorrect legal standard in determining Barnes’s cervical condition was not causally related to her work injury.

A

[¶ 11] Barnes argues the organization should not be allowed to rely upon the expert opinion of Dr. Kilzer, an orthopedic surgeon who was employed by the organization as a medical consultant. Barnes claims there is no statutory authority for the organization to rely upon the opinion of one of its own employees as substantive evidence in a formal administrative proceeding.

[¶ 12] Admissibility of evidence in adjudicative proceedings before an administrative agency is governed by the North Dakota Rules of Evidence. N.D.C.C. § 28-32-24(1); Aalund v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 2001 ND 32, ¶ 7, 622 N.W.2d 210. Under N.D.R.Ev. 702, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of opinion if his scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact. See Myer v. Rygg, 2001 ND 123, ¶ 10, 630 N.W.2d 62.

[¶ 13] We find nothing in the Rules of Evidence or the statutes governing administrative procedure which precludes an agency employee from testifying as an expert in an administrative proceeding. While Dr. Kilzer’s employment by the organization may be relevant to show bias and provide a basis to attack his credibility, it does not affect admissibility.

[¶ 14] Barnes also suggests the organization should not have relied upon the expert opinion of Dr. Simonet, who conducted an independent review of Barnes’s medical records at the organization’s request. Dr. Simonet concluded that there was no physiological basis for Barnes’s cervical spine complaints and that Barnes suffered from somatoform pain disorder. Barnes claims that Dr. Simonet, an orthopedic surgeon, was not qualified to diagnose somatoform pain disorder, a psychiatric diagnosis.

[¶ 15] If Barnes is challenging the admissibility of Dr. Simonet’s opinion, she did not preserve the issue in the administrative proceedings below. The record demonstrates that, although Barnes initially objected to Dr. Simonet’s opinion, she subsequently withdrew her objection and waived this issue. Accordingly, any argument on appeal about Dr. Simonet’s opinion may go only to its weight and credibility, not to its admissibility.

B

[¶ 16] Barnes contends the ALJ and the organization may have mistakenly concluded that Barnes’s fall at work had to be the sole cause of her cervical condition for the injury to be compensable. Bárnes cites findings of fact which note that several of the doctors indicated Barnes had prior cervical problems which may have contributed to her neck pain. At various points in the findings, the ALJ and the organization stated:

Dr. Denis also stated, however, that “[t]here is no question that a part of her problems in the cervical spine were related to ... a component of degenerative disc disease prior to the accident” as well as to “a very likely sudden onset of herniations at C4-5 and C6-7 related to the accident.”
Dr. Martire agreed Dr. Denis indicated the May 23, 2000, cervical spine surgery was needed at least in part to correct the congenital narrowed spinal canal as indicated in Barnes’s radio-graphic studies. Dr. Martire further agreed that the congenital narrowed spinal canal was a condition that had nothing whatsoever to do with the fall at work and the condition might or might not cause neck pain.
Dr. Simonet, Dr. Kilzer and even Dr. Denis attributed at least part of the cause of the neck pain to be the degenerative spine condition.

[¶ 17] We view these findings as merely statements summarizing the evidence, not as an indication that the ALJ misunderstood the legal standard for determining whether an injury is compensable. In the conclusions of law, the ALJ and the organization outlined the appropriate standard under N.D.C.C. § 65-01-02(11), the statute which defines compensable injury:

1. Under the provisions of N.D.C.C. § 65-01-02(11) (1997), in order for an injury to be compensable under the North Dakota Workers Compensation Act, it must arise “out of and in the course of employment” and “must be established by medical evidence supported by objective medical findings.” 2. Under the provisions of N.D.C.C. § 65 — 01—02(ll)(b)(7) (1997), a compensa-ble injury does not include injuries that are attributable to preexisting conditions, even if the employment acts as a trigger to produce symptoms in the condition, unless the employment substantially accelerates the progression, or substantially worsens the severity, of the preexisting condition.

[¶ 18] We conclude the ALJ and the organization did not apply an erroneous legal standard.

C

[¶ 19] The crux of this case is essentially a battle of the experts. The ALJ was presented with a variety of conflicting medical opinions on whether Barnes’s cervical spine condition was causally related to her work injury. The ALJ determined that Dr. Simonet’s and Dr. Kilzer’s opinions, which concluded Barnes’s cervical spine problems were not causally related to her work injury, were the most credible.

[¶ 20] A claimant seeking workers compensation benefits generally has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she has suffered a com-pensable injury. N.D.C.C. § 65-01-11; Elter v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 1999 ND 179, ¶ 15, 599 N.W.2d 315. It is the organization’s responsibility to weigh the credibility of conflicting medical evidence. Negaard-Cooley v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 2000 ND 122, ¶ 18, 611 N.W.2d 898; Boger v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 1999 ND 192, ¶ 11, 600 N.W.2d 877. In so doing, the organization must consider the entire record, clarify inconsistencies, and adequately explain its reasons for disregarding medical evidence favorable to the claimant. Negaard-Cooley, at ¶ 18; Boger, at ¶ 11.

[¶ 21] The ALJ in this case issued lengthy findings of fact setting out the various conflicting medical opinions and explained in detail her reasons for accepting Dr. Simonet’s and Dr. Kilzer’s opinions over the opinions supporting Barnes’s claim. While we may not have reached the same result had we been the initial finder of fact, we exercise restraint in reviewing the organization’s findings of fact and resolution of conflicting evidence, and we do not make independent findings or substitute our judgment for that of the organization. See Paul v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 2002 ND 96, ¶ 6, 644 N.W.2d 884.

[¶ 22] We conclude that the ALJ and the organization adequately clarified inconsistencies in the medical evidence and explained their reasons for disregarding the medical evidence favorable to Barnes, and that a reasoning mind reasonably could have found that Barnes’s cervical spine condition was not a compensable injury.

IV

[¶ 23] We have considered the remaining issues and arguments raised by Barnes and find them to be without merit. The judgment of the district court affirming the organization’s order is affirmed.

[¶ 24] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, C.J., DALE V. SANDSTROM, and WILLIAM A. NEUMANN, JJ., concur.

MARY MUEHLEN MARING.

I concur in the result.

[¶ 25] The Honorable RONALD L. HILDEN, District Judge, sitting in place of KAPSNER, J., disqualified.

RONALD L. HILDEN, District Judge,

dissenting.

[¶ 26] I respectfully dissent.

[¶ 27] Under all of the rules, regulations and procedures promulgated and followed by the agency, I should be joining the majority. Under the agency appeal procedure, there can be scant quarrel that rules were obeyed. Under the judicial appeal procedure of the administrative practices act, the district judge scrupulously followed the statute governing such review. And now, under the rules of appellate construction and a sea of precedent, this court affirms. Everyone was right, everyone followed the law and precedent but the injured worker loses.

[¶ 28] The reason this claimant loses is because a doctor employed by the agency as a reviewer of medical records formed and then convincingly expressed his opinion that claimant’s condition was not work-injury related. The record reviewer had never met, examined or even seen the claimant. Yet his record-studied opinion was sufficient to trump the opinions of her treating physicians. This kind of evidence signals a dilution in the integrity of the doctor/patient relationship and, in my view, should not be tolerated. I would therefore defy precedent and remand to the agency with instructions to reconsider without regard for or any deference to agency-generated adverse medical opinions.

[¶ 29] Perhaps this lament might be more apt as a letter to the editor or to the deliberative members of our state legislative body. However, I write only to express my belief that this injured worker and others are being denied rightful redress by this flawed agency protocol.

      . The 2003 Legislature changed the title of the North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau to Workforce Safety and Insurance. See 2003 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 561; N.D.C.C. § 65-02-01.1. Section 65-02-01.1 indicates Workforce Safety and Insurance should be referred to as an "organization.”