author: TERNUS, Justice. STREIT, Justice

text:
    Martin J. BAHL, Linda C. Bahl, and Terrence G. Bahl, Appellees, v. The CITY OF ASBURY, Iowa and the City Council of the City of Asbury, Iowa, Appellants.
    No. 01-1355.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Dec. 18, 2002.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 2003.

      Stephen J. Juergens of Fuerste, Carew, Coyle, Juergens & Sudmeier, P.C., Du-buque, for appellants.
    Brian J. Kane of Kane, Norby & Red-dick, P.C., Dubuque, for appellees.
   TERNUS, Justice.

The determinative issue in this case is one of statutory interpretation: does Iowa Code section 414.28A (1999) require that a city treat land-leased communities of manufactured housing the same as similar communities of site-built housing or does this statute merely require that a city allow land-leased communities of manufactured housing somewhere within the city limits? The district court held that section 414.28A requires equal treatment of manufactured housing developments and similar site-built housing projects. On the basis of this interpretation of the statute, the court ruled that the zoning ordinance of the appellee, City of Asbury, violated section 414.28A by relegating land-leased communities to R-4 zoning districts only when they contain manufactured homes. The court further held that the appellee, City Council of the City of Asbury, Iowa, acted illegally in denying a rezoning application filed by the appellants, Martin J. Bahl, Linda C. Bahl, and Terrence G. Bahl, because the Bahls planned to build a land-leased community of manufactured homes on their property.

The City and its council, sometimes hereinafter referred to jointly as the city, appealed. The City presents one issue for review: a claim that “the district court erred in concluding that, by restricting mobile home parks to R-4 districts ..., the city zoning ordinance violated section 414.28A.” We think the district court correctly ruled that the Asbury zoning ordinance violates state law. Therefore, we affirm the district court judgment in favor of the property owners.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The Bahls own property located in the city limits of Asbury, Dubuque County, Iowa. In 1997, they submitted a request to rezone their property from A-l (agricultural) to R-4 (high density residential) to allow for the construction of a manufactured housing development. Rezoning was necessary because the Asbury city zoning ordinance allowed “mobile home parks” only in R-4 districts.

The Bahls’ application proposed a phased development of manufactured homes known as Oak Meadows. The request for rezoning was supported by plans, drawings and other pertinent information. The plans submitted with the application showed the overall character of the development as well as anticipated landscaping, including evergreen screening on the perimeters of the property. Proposed development conditions for Oak Meadows, which set appearance standards and provided for methods of enforcement, were also set forth. Finally, the Bahls’ application contained detailed specifications and photographs of the types of manufactured housing and mobile homes that would be permitted in the development, with none over three years old being allowed.

The City’s planning and zoning commission held a public hearing in June 1998 on the application. See generally Iowa Code § 414.6 (providing for city council’s appointment of a zoning commission to recommend changes in zoning district boundaries to the council). Opposition to the proposed “trailer park” was nearly universal. There was concern that the development would lower property values and ruin the beauty of the area. Some members of the public who spoke at the hearing expressed stereotypical views. A retired school principal asked whether the citizens of Asbury wanted their children to go to school with kids from a “trailer court”? He said, “[Trailer court kids] come to school with a lot of baggage. I know from experience. These kids tend to be hyperactive and easily distracted. Mainly, it’s due to the confinement. They are confined in these small little houses for long periods of time. You let them out in the open spaces and they are going to run.” Another person commented that the road fronting the development would “be a drag way all of the time” if the proposed plan were allowed. The predominant sentiment appeared to be “not in my back yard.”

The commission ultimately tabled the Bahls’ request pending adoption of a new land use plan. Because the Bahls’ farm had only recently been annexed into the City, the City’s land use plan did not include their property. The commission decided to defer action until it had the recommendation of the city’s land use advisor with respect to the overall zoning plan for the area encompassing the land at issue.

In November 1998, an updated land use plan prepared by an outside consultant was presented to the commission. At that time the proposed plan showed the Bahls’ property as R-4, a designation that would permit manufactured housing developments. Again, opposition was widespread and again it was focused on the location of a manufactured housing community on the Bahls’ property. The dominant view was that the City of Asbury did not need that type of housing. Repeated references were made to a recent housing study done at the city council’s request that recommended demolishing the only trailer park in the city and creating upper-end, single-family housing. Speakers relying on the housing study emphasized that the study did not recommend the construction of trailer parks. Several residents pointed out the “upper-end” character of the city and its housing. In line with these observations was the statement of one person who cited statistics from the housing study that “Asbury has 58% higher median household income, 36% higher average household income, and 5% higher per cap-ita income than the state” and that “[t]he percent of families and people living below the poverty level in Asbury is significantly lower than that of the county and the state.”

Another citizen claimed the Asbury “blood line” was R-2 and asked why couldn’t Asbury continue just as it had? A later speaker expressed a similar feeling: “We like this community the way it is.” Assertions were also made that individuals who wanted to live in a mobile home park could live in Dubuque, but they didn’t need those things “right here in Asbury.” This sentiment was echoed by a subsequent resident who said that if people want to live in that type of housing, “then let them live in Dubuque.” Many questioned whether there was a need for any R-4 districts in the community, regardless of location. One person said, “My first feeling is I don’t believe this community needs to have that type of zoning. I understand the political structure and that if a community needs to have it, then it ought to be in a certain place.... It probably deserves to be more down ... towards the industrial area.” At the end of the hearing, a man accurately summarized the prevailing feeling: “I don’t think there is one person here that is opposed to anything but trailer parks. I don’t think anybody in this room wants trailers.” Not surprisingly, a member of the commission then moved to amend the proposed plan in one particular: to change the zoning designation of the Bahls’ farm from R-4 to R-3. After the unanimous approval of the amendment, the commission voted to recommend the new land use plan to the city council.

Two months later the city council met to consider adoption of the plan. The Bahls’ attorney spoke at that meeting and urged the council to reconsider the proposed specification of the Bahls’ property as R-3. He pointed out that the housing study had indicated a need for “housing for young families.” He observed the same study stated that 75% of the houses in Asbury were valued at $100,000 or more, and 100% of the homes currently for sale had an asking price in excess of $100,000. Noting that such homes were not within the financial reach of many young people, the Bahls’ attorney argued that the proposed manufactured housing development “would address the need for affordable housing” and “the need for housing for a variety of living environments,” such as “low-to-moderate income housing, first-time homebuy-ers, and retirement [housing].” Notwithstanding these comments, the new land use plan was unanimously approved, including the designation of the Bahls’ property as R-3.

Thereafter, in March 1999, the commission met to consider the Bahls’ 1997 application to rezone their property to R-4. Despite the recently adopted land use plan showing this property as R-3, the commission voted to recommend to the council that the Bahls’ rezoning application be granted. Notwithstanding this favorable recommendation, the city council denied the Bahls’ request, concluding that R-4 zoning was not consistent with the City’s land use plan. The Bahls thereafter filed an amended rezoning application that, among other changes, reduced the density of housing in the proposed development. This time, the planning and zoning commission recommended denial of the application, and that was the ultimate decision of the city council.

The City’s denial of the Bahls’ rezoning applications successfully shelved the Bahls’ plan to build a manufactured housing development on their land because such developments, as noted previously, are restricted to R-4 districts by the Asbury zoning ordinance. The City does not dispute the effect of the council’s decision, acknowledging in its brief that under the City’s zoning ordinance “trailer parks” are excluded from districts other than R-4.

Upon the denial of their second application for rezoning, the Bahls filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the district court, claiming the City acted illegally in several respects. See generally Iowa Rs. Civ. P. 1.1401-1412 (governing certiorari actions challenging legality of action of board). One ground of illegality was a claim that the City’s zoning ordinance required “that mobile home communities be placed only in R-4 districts,” in violation of section 414.28A. The City answered, denying any violation of state law and claiming its denial of the Bahls’ application was not “solely because the proposed structure(s) are manufactured homes.”

The district court found that the City’s exclusionary zoning ordinance lay at the heart of the council’s decision to refuse rezoning of the Bahls’ property. The court stated:

If manufactured homes were by definition given an R-3 designation, plaintiffs would have been allowed to proceed with their development because this would have been consistent with the City’s land use plan adopted on January 26, 1999. The only member of the city council who gave a reason for denying plaintiffs’ second rezoning request on March 22, 2000, was Ms. Nancy Wilson who “indicated that she believed it did not conform or fit into our ... plan. The council worked on that for a very long time and rezoning this to R-4 does not fit our land use plan and I still do believe that.”

Based on its factual findings, the district court concluded that the City violated Iowa Code section 414.28A because one reason for denying the Bahls’ rezoning request was the fact that “the [development was a land-leased community of manufactured housing.” Therefore, it granted the Bahls’ petition for writ of certiorari and annulled the City’s denial of their rezoning application. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1411 (allowing reviewing court to sustain or annul board’s action, but not to substitute a different or amended decision). This appeal followed.

II. Scope of Review.

The standard of review for district court decisions in certiorari actions is the correction of errors of law. See O’Malley v. Gundermann, 618 N.W.2d 286, 290 (Iowa 2000). Factual findings made by the district court are binding on appeal “if supported by substantial evidence.” Id.

III. Issues on Appeal.

The City states in its brief that it “appeals only from the district court’s holding that the City zoning ordinance violated section 414.28A.” In the course of addressing this issue, the City does, however, complain of two factual findings made by the district court: (1) a purported finding that “the proposed development would qualify for the R-3 zoning classification” and (2) an implicit finding that the City’s denial of the rezoning application was based upon the fact that the structures in the Bahls’ development would be manufactured homes. Assuming these matters were adequately raised for review, we address them briefly before considering the validity of the City’s ordinance.

IV. Challenged Factual Findings.

A. Conformance to R-3 requirements. In ruling on the Bahls’ petition for writ of certiorari, the court observed that “[t]he record is replete with facts which support the conclusion that plaintiffs’ proposed development would qualify for the R-3 zoning classification.” The City claims the proposed development did not meet the density requirements for R-3 districts and so would not have been permitted in that classification regardless of the restrictions imposed upon manufactured housing projects.

We find it unnecessary to consider this contention because any dispute with respect to the density of the Bahls’ project is not germane to the issue before us. As we discuss below, section 414.28A prohibits any ordinance that disallows land-leased communities if one of the reasons for disal-lowance is the fact the development contains manufactured housing. Here, as the City concedes, even if the development proposed by the Bahls met the density requirements for an R-3 district, the development would still have been disallowed because land-leased communities of manufactured homes are not permitted in an R-3 district. Consequently, whether the project otherwise met the requirements of that classification is not determinative of whether the zoning ordinance violates section 414.28A. Accordingly, even if the court’s comment could be construed as a finding that the Bahls’ project satisfied the density requirements for an R-3 district, that finding is not pertinent to the legality of the zoning ordinance challenged by the Bahls.

B. Basis for City’s denial. With respect to the second finding disputed by the City — that the City’s decision was based on the use of manufactured housing in the proposed development — we disagree with the City’s contention that “[t]here is not a shred of evidence” to support this finding. To the contrary, the record is overflowing with evidence that the City’s desire to preclude such housing in this area was at the very heart of the City’s action. Prior to the hearings reviewed above, council members had indicated approval of the Bahls’ plan to build a mobile home park as reflected by the council’s approval in 1997 of a letter of intent in which the council agreed to “support rezoning of [the Bahls’] land after it has gone through the annexation process to [R-4] for the development of a mobile home community.” Later, the City’s outside consultant who was hired to update the City’s comprehensive plan suggested that the Bahls’ property be designated as R-4, a designation that would permit a manufactured housing development. Even the planning and zoning commission initially recommended that the city council approve the Bahls’ rezoning request. Nonetheless, the City, after hearing a public outcry against “trailer parks,” specified the Bahls’ land as R-3 in the City’s land use plan and thereafter refused to rezone the property to R-4. Although several relevant considerations came up at the various hearings, the discussion was overwhelmingly focused on the use of manufactured housing in the proposed development. This scenario of events supports the district court’s finding that the City relied on its exclusionary zoning ordinance to disallow the Bahls’ project because it contained manufactured housing.

We turn now to the definitive issue.

V. Does the City’s Zoning Ordinance Violate Section 4.B1..28A?

Section 414.28A, first enacted in 1997, currently provides in pertinent part:

A city shall not adopt or enforce zoning or subdivision regulations or other ordinances which disallow or make infeasible the plans and specifications of land-leased communities because the housing within the land-leased community will be manufactured housing.

Iowa Code § 414.28A; see 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 86, § 4. This statute is very similar to a related statute adopted by the Iowa legislature nearly twenty years ago. In 1984, the General Assembly passed a bill that added the following provision to chapter 414:

A city shall not adopt or enforce zoning regulations or other ordinances which disallow the plans and specifications of a proposed residential structure solely because the proposed structure is a manufactured home....

1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1238, § 2 (codified at Iowa Code § 414.28 (1985)).

There appears to be very little difference between section 414.28 and section 414.28A with respect to the operative language. The primary distinction of course is that section 414.28 applies to “residential structured” whereas section 414.28A governs “land-leased communities.” Section 414.28A is also broader in scope, prohibiting subdivision regulations, as well as general zoning regulations. Originally section 414.28A, like section 414.28, only prohibited ordinances that “disallowed” manufactured housing developments “solely because” the homes were manufactured homes. 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 86, § 4 (codified at Iowa Code § 414.28A (1998)). Section 414.28A was soon amended, however, to enlarge the prohibition by barring regulations or ordinances that “make infeasible” manufactured housing developments, as well as those that outright disallow such developments. 1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1107, § 16 (codified at Iowa Code § 414.28A (Supp.1998)). In addition to this change, section 414.28A was also amended to strike the word “solely,” see id., again broadening the reach of the statute so as to eliminate the requirement that the disallowance or infeasibility occur only because manufactured housing is involved.

While the prohibitions of section 414.28A are even broader and stronger than those contained in section 414.28, the basic structure of the prohibitions are, nonetheless, identical, indicating similar legislative intent and, accordingly, calling for similar interpretation. See State v. Dann, 591 N.W.2d 635, 638 (Iowa 1999) (stating court should seek to harmonize later-enacted statute with existing statutes on the same subject matter); 2B Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 51.02, at 197-98 (6th ed.2000 revision) (“Unless the context indicates otherwise, words or phrases in a provision that were used in a prior act pertaining to the same subject matter will be construed in the same sense.”). Therefore, it is instructive in our search for the meaning of section 414.28A to consider what the legislature intended when it enacted section 414.28.

Although there is no legislative history explaining the legislature’s objective in adopting section 414.28, it appears this statute was enacted in response to a perceived crisis in the supply of affordable housing. See generally Brady v. City of Dubuque, 495 N.W.2d 701, 705 (Iowa 1993) (noting that contemporary circumstances may be considered as an aid to interpretation of a statute); Iowa Code § 4.6(2) (stating that “the court, in determining the intention of the legislature, may consider ... [t]he circumstances under which the statute was enacted”). In 1981, then-president Reagan established the President’s Commission on Housing to study the housing industry and make recommendations for national policy to address the housing recession caused by inflation and high interest rates. See Exec. Order No. 12,310, 46 Fed.Reg. 31,869 (June 16, 1981) (directing Commission “to develop housing ... options which strengthen the ability of the private sector to maximize opportunities for homeownership”); see also Proclamation No. 4988, 47 Fed.Reg. 46,837 (Oct. 19, 1982) (referencing the adverse impact on housing “from the twin afflictions of inflation and high interest rates” and the establishment of the Commission to study national housing policy).

One of the Commission’s fundamental concerns was “the housing problems of low-income Americans,” specifically the affordability of housing. Report of the President’s Commission on Housing 3, 10-12 (1982). The Commission concluded that “[m]anufactured housing [was] a significant source of affordable housing for American families, particularly first-time homebuyers, the elderly, and low- and moderate-income families.” Id. at 85. Nonetheless, it recognized that local action often impeded the ability of homebuyers from choosing this type of housing. Id. at 86. Therefore, the Commission recommended “removing zoning provisions that discriminate against manufactured housing.” Id.; see id. at 203 (“States and localities should remove from their zoning laws all forms of discrimination against manufactured housing ....”); see also Proclamation No. 4988, 47 Fed.Reg. 46,837 (Oct. 19, 1982) (noting Commission’s report “reaffirmed our national commitment to equal housing choice”). The following explanation was given in support of this recommendation:

Because of sharply rising housing costs, manufactured housing today offers many households their only option for homeownership. Indeed, in 1980, manufactured (“mobile”) homes amounted to 29 percent of all single-family homes sold. The marketplace demand for mobile homes has come from improvements in the product as well as from a competitive price.
Despite the increasing attractiveness of manufactured housing, local zoning laws continued to discriminate against mobile homes. In many localities, mobile homes are segregated into special areas, often in disadvantageous locations set aside as “trailer parks.
There is an increasing recognition that the quality of manufactured housing has improved. Since 1976, manufactured housing has been built under a national code, supervised by HUD, setting health and safety requirements. Vermont, California, and Indiana have enacted laws precluding discrimination against manufactured homes. The Michigan Supreme Court last year struck down a zoning law because it violated the State constitution: “The per se exclusion of mobile homes from all areas not designated as mobile home parks has no reasonable basis under the police power, and is therefore unconstitutional.”
Manufactured housing can be as safe and healthy as comparable site-built housing. Housing systems or components satisfying a nationally recognized model code similarly should not be excluded from use in a locality. Exclusionary zoning provisions based on type of manufacture are arbitrary and unrelated to legitimate zoning concerns.

Report of the President’s Commission on Housing 203-04 (emphasis added). It was within this historical context that the Iowa legislature in 1984 adopted section 414.28.

Although this court has never interpreted section 414.28, Iowa’s statute was discussed in a 1988 article appearing in Urban Lawyer. See Molly A. Sellman, Equal Treatment of Housing: A Proposed Model State Code for Manufactured Housing, 20 Urb. Law. 73, 84 (1988). Noting that one solution to the affordable housing problem is “state enabling legislation demanding comparable or equal treatment of all forms of housing,” id. at 81, the author observes, “Three states — Iowa, Minnesota, and Vermont — have enacted progressive codes encouraging the utilization of manufactured housing by mandating equal treatment of all forms of housing,” id. at 82 (emphasis added). The author makes a similar statement later in discussing Iowa’s specific statutory provisions, noting again that they “mandate equal treatment of manufactured housing with site-built housing.” Id. at 84 (emphasis added) (citing Iowa Code Ann. §§ 358A.30, 414.28 (West 1976 & Supp.1986)).

The same interpretation of Iowa’s statute was made by another author in 1996, in a discussion of state legislation “prohibiting or restraining discrimination against manufactured housing.” S. Mark White, State and Federal Planning Legislation and Manufactured Housing: New Opportunities for Affordable, Single-Family Shelter, 28 Urb. Law. 263, 269 (1996). This writer also describes Iowa’s statute as “equal treatment legislation.” Id. at 270 & n. 35. He explains such statutes prohibit “discriminatory treatment between manufactured and site-built homes, but preserve for local governments the right to impose zoning standards and procedural requirements ... on the same terms as site-built housing.” Id. at 270.

We think the commentators are correct. The historical context in which section 414.28 was enacted indicates that the statute was intended to prevent local zoning authorities from discriminating against manufactured housing. The same purpose logically must be ascribed to section 414.28A. See 2B Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 51.02, at 176-78 (6th ed.2000 revision) (stating that when a new provision is enacted that relates to the same subject matter as previous statutes, “the new provision is presumed in accord with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes”). More importantly, this interpretation of the statute is most consistent with the language of section 414.28 as well as the language of section 414.28A. Section 414.28 prohibits discrimination by providing that plans for a residential structure cannot be disallowed solely because the proposed structure is a manufactured home. Similarly, section 414.28A mandates equal treatment for manufactured housing developments by stating that plans for a land-leased community cannot be disallowed (or even made infeasible) because the proposed community contains manufactured homes. Nothing in the language of the statute supports the City’s contention that section 414.28A simply prohibits a municipality from totally excluding manufactured housing developments from the community.

The Vermont Supreme Court reached the same conclusion that we reach here when it interpreted similar legislation enacted in that state. See In re Appeal of Lunde, 166 Vt. 167, 688 A.2d 1312 (1997). In Lunde, the city’s zoning regulations restricted mobile homes to certain locations, a restriction that was not placed on site-built homes. 688 A.2d at 1313. A mobile home owner claimed the city ordinance violated a Vermont statute providing that “no zoning regulation shall have the effect of excluding mobile homes ... from the municipality, except upon the same terms and conditions as conventional housing is excluded.” Id. (quoting Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 4406(4)(A)). The Vermont Supreme Court rejected an argument that the statute “was intended to prevent municipalities from excluding mobile homes ‘from the municipality,’ but to allow restricting mobile homes to mobile home parks or to a particular zone.” Id. at 1314. Rather, the court concluded, the legislature “intended municipalities to treat mobile homes in the same manner as conventional housing.” Id.

Although the Vermont statute is not worded precisely the same as Iowa’s statute, it too is “equal treatment” legislation. See Sellman, Equal Treatment of Housing: A Proposed Model State Code for Manufactured Housing, 20 Urb. Law. at 82. The Lunde case is persuasive authority that “equal treatment” statutes prohibit ordinances that treat manufactured housing -developments differently from conventional housing developments, even though manufactured housing developments are not entirely excluded from the municipality-

In summary, the plain language of section 414.28A, particularly when considered in the statute’s historical context, reveals a legislative intent to require equal treatment of land-leased communities that are composed of manufactured homes with similar’ communities composed of site-built housing. Our interpretation of section 414.28A does not mean the City must allow mobile home parks in all zoning districts. Nor does it mean the City cannot regulate manufactured housing developments. The statute merely mandates that land-leased communities of manufactured housing be allowed in any district in which similar communities of site-built housing are allowed, under the same terms and conditions imposed on such developments containing traditional housing.

Turning to the facts of the case before us, we conclude the Asbury zoning ordinance contravenes section 414.28A by relegating “mobile home parks,” not all condominium-type communities, to R-4 zoning districts. Without a doubt, this restrictive ordinance has made the Bahls’ land-leased community infeasible because it contains manufactured housing, a clear violation of the statute. The facts of the present case present a .classic example of exclusionary and discriminatory zoning regulations and decisions of the very type the President’s Commission called on states to prevent. Moreover, the City’s zoning ordinance is exactly the type of discriminatory treatment of manufactured housing projects our legislature intended to thwart when it enacted section 414.28A.

VI. Conclusion and Disposition.

We agree with the district court’s ruling that the Asbury zoning ordinance violates section 414.28A. Accordingly, we affirm the district court judgment annulling the City’s denial of the Bahls’ second rezoning application.

AFFIRMED.

All justices concur except STREIT, J., who dissents.

STREIT, Justice

(dissenting).

I agree with the majority that the ultimate issue in this case is a matter of statutory interpretation. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s interpretation of Iowa Code section 414.28A. The majority interprets section 414.28A to mean mobile home parks must be allowed in any district in which “similar communities of site-built housing are allowed.” Given this interpretation, it concludes the Asbury ordinance is illegal under 414.28A because the ordinance assigns mobile home parks to the high-density residential district. The majority adds meaning to this statute where the .plain language shows it was not intended by the legislature.

The plain and unambiguous language of the statute is ignored under the guise of providing statutory interpretation. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, resort to extrinsic aids is unwarranted. We need only look to the plain language of the statute to determine whether the ordinance, in assigning mobile home parks to R-4 districts, violates section 414.28A. The statute provides, in part,

A city shall not adopt or enforce zoning or subdivision regulations or other ordinances which disallow or make infeasible the plans and specifications of land-leased communities because the housing within the land-leased community will be manufactured housing.

Iowa Code § 414.28A (1999). Before we examine the meaning of this section, we must look to the terms of the statute to determine its scope. Namely, we look to what is a “land-leased community” and what constitutes “manufactured housing.”

Iowa Code section 414.28 defines a manufactured home as,

a factory-built structure which ... is to be used as a place for human habitation, but which is not constructed or equipped with a permanent hitch or other device allowing it to be moved other than for the purpose of moving to a permanent site, and which does not have permanently attached to its body or frame any wheels or axles.

Iowa Code § 414.28. A land-leased community is “any site, lot, field, or tract of land under common ownership upon which ten or more occupied manufactured homes are harbored, either free of charge or for revenue purposes.... ” Iowa Code § 414.28A. Given these statutory definitions, the simple reading of section 414.28A provides: a city shall not enforce zoning or subdivision regulations or other ordinances that prevent the construction of ten or more manufactured homes upon a site simply because the site will consist of factory-built, manufactured homes. By assigning mobile home parks to R-4 districts, the ordinance does allow — and does not disallow or make infeasible — the construction of mobile home parks in the City. The statute contains no other language of limitation upon the actions of a city in regulating the development of land-leased communities.

The plain language of this section supports the conclusion that it protects land-leased communities only in so far as a municipality cannot ban mobile home parks from its districts. The statute makes it illegal for a municipality to reject or make infeasible a proposed land-leased community because it will contain manufactured housing, including mobile home parks. This statute protects manufactured homes in a limited fashion because the City still has power to regulate or place reasonable restrictions upon manufactured housing developments. See Huff v. City of Des Moines, 244 Iowa 89, 94, 56 N.W.2d 54, 57 (1952) (regulation and restriction of mobile home parks is a “legitimate exercise of police power”).

None of the language of this statute indicates that in order to comply with the section a city must allow mobile home parks in more than just the R-4 district. This section does not say the ordinance must allow mobile home parks in every zoning district. It does not say the ordinance must subject mobile home parks to the same conditions as it does all other “similar communities of site-built housing.” It does not act as an absolute prohibition on the City’s power to regulate the land under its control simply because a mobile home park is involved.

The majority avoids the simple reading of the statute and instead engages in an analysis of clear and unambiguous language. It attempts to characterize section 414.28A as a non-discriminatory or “equal treatment” statute that protects the civil rights of mobile home park developers. It does this by making a comparison between mobile home parks and “site-built houses in land-leased communities.” Such a creature does not exist under this statute. The plain meaning does not support the majority’s conclusion that the legislature intended that mobile home parks be treated in the same fashion as are site-built homes in similar communities. Rather the statute does nothing more than prevent a city from outright prohibiting mobile home parks.

The majority contends its holding does not mean the City must allow mobile home parks in all zoning districts, but only in some. Despite this declaration, it is not clear where the City can limit the placement of mobile home parks. In fact, the inescapable conclusion from the majority’s opinion is that the City of Asbury must allow mobile home parks to be constructed in any and all of its districts. Such a result is beyond both the force of section 414.28A’s prohibition and the legislative intent behind this statute.

The Asbury ordinance has not disallowed Bahls from building this mobile home park. It has not made Bahls’ plan infeasible. Rather, Bahls are free to build it in the area in which mobile home parks are permitted, i.e. R-4. To arrive at the majority’s result, section 414.28A would need to have an additional sentence reading, “A city shall not impose restrictions or conditions upon a land-leased community comprised of manufactured housing which are different than those imposed upon site-built housing in similar communities.” Because the statute does not mention site-built housing, its application is restricted to factory-built, manufactured homes.

In general, Iowa Code sections 414.28 and 414.28A are exceptions to the general zoning authority of a city.

A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that an exception in a statute, contrary to its general enacting clause, should be strictly construed and all doubts and implications should be resolved in favor of the general provision or rule rather than the exception.

Menke Hardware, Inc. v. City of Carroll, 474 N.W.2d 579, 580 (Iowa 1991). Because we must strictly construe these exemption statutes, we may not read into section 414.28A a requirement that the City must allow mobile home parks in every zoning district in which all other land-leased communities are allowed.

A municipality has authority to regulate the area of land within its control. Iowa Code § 414.1. Iowa Code section 414.1 expressly grants cities the power

to regulate and restrict the heights, number of stories and size of buildings and other structures, the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other open spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes.

Such regulation is intended to promote the public health, comfort, safety, and welfare, including the maintenance of property values. Plaza Recreational Ctr. v. Sioux City, 253 Iowa 246, 251-52, 111 N.W.2d 758, 762-63 (1961). Derived from this general zoning authority, the City has authority to regulate and restrict mobile home parks as a “legitimate exercise of police power.” Huff, 244 Iowa at 94, 56 N.W.2d at 57.

Although mobile homes may serve a residential use, they are sufficiently different from other types of housing so that there is a rational basis for placing different requirements upon them. Thus, it is within the legislative discretion of a township to place mobile homes in other than purely residential districts, although the restrictions placed on mobile homes cannot amount to exclusionary zoning.

83 Am.Jur.2d Zoning and Planning § 254, 220-21 (1992).

Given the City’s general zoning authority, it assigned mobile home parks to R-4 zoned districts. In contrast, an individual mobile home may be placed in any zoning district under the ordinance. Mobile home parks are assigned to R-4 districts because of their high density. I would find the district court erred in finding that the City, by assigning mobile home parks to R-4 districts, made them high density by definition. In sum, the ordinance permits mobile homes, including manufactured homes in all zoning districts. It restricts the parks to R^4 districts. Because the ordinance does not ban the development of mobile home parks from all zoning districts, it is not in violation of Iowa Code sections 414.28 and 414.28A.

I also disagree with the majority’s finding that the city council denied Bahls’ application for rezoning based upon the fact that the proposed development consisted of mobile homes. The majority bases its conclusion upon one factor only — the inflammatory comments of neighbors regarding the proposed mobile home park. Based only upon the neighbors’ offensive language, the majority impermissibly ascribes bad motive to the city council’s denial of Bahls’ petition for rezoning. Other than the odious and sometimes loony comments themselves, there is no evidence in the record to indicate the city council made its decision based on the neighbors’ comments.

All of the evidence considered by the city council indicates its decision to deny the application for rezoning was based on the same considerations the city council would apply to all other applications for rezoning. The ordinance states the regulations set by the ordinance shall apply uniformly to each class or kind of structure on land. There are no exceptions to this rule. The ordinance specifically provided the proposed project must comply with the City’s long-range comprehensive plan. See ordinance § 3-13.4(1)(D). The evidence shows several grounds upon which the city council could have concluded the proposed project did not comply with the comprehensive plan and ordinance. Among the evidence presented to the city council, a professional city planner, two subdivision developers, a home builder, and a professional realtor addressed this particular rezoning issue. The following are the considerations upon which the city council could have denied the Bahls’ rezoning request.

First, the city council considered the overall size and density of the proposed development. Referring to city planning texts, the city council determined five dwelling units per gross acre is considered the highest density and one dwelling unit as the lowest density. Bahls’ proposed development provided for anywhere between 3.5 and 3.7 units per gross acre. The proposed development would have created a much greater density of homes than surrounding subdivisions. The size of the proposed development is approximately 300 homes. At the time of the Bahls’ proposal there were approximately 700 homes in the City of Asbury. Bahls’ development would increase the number of total homes in the City by thirty percent. The city council also considered the relative size of the proposed lots. The proposed size was considerably smaller than that of existing lots. The area of each new lot would be 5000 square feet whereas the housing units currently in the area are required to have 7000 square foot lots. See ordinance § 3-5.6.

The council considered evidence regarding the estimated cost of the new housing units and the planned size of streets in the proposed development. Each new unit would cost on average $32,500 in a neighborhood where nearly all 700 homes were estimated to be worth at least $100,000. The record reflects most of the homes surrounding the proposed development were valued at over $200,000. The Bahls’ proposed development included streets twenty-eight feet wide in violation of the thirty-one foot minimum requirement in the ordinance.

In general, the city council had ample evidence to consider regarding the ultimate result of constructing the new housing units. The impact of putting 300 housing units on 110 acres of land would be significant. It would create substantial additional traffic and noise in the area. The size of the development would directly impact the City’s fire, police, water, and sewer services. Moreover, the city council was told of claims of the Bahls’ generally poor record of maintenance on their properties. As the Bahls proposed to complete the project in seven phases, the council could have found the project might ultimately fail and be left partially completed.

Bahls’ application was denied based upon the same factors the city council would apply to all other zoning applications. The city council concluded the proposed development violated the ordinance and comprehensive zoning plan. In doing so, the city council determined that rezoning the Bahls’ property was not in the best interests of the community. 101A C.J.S. Zoning & Land Planning § 62, at 246 (1979). Because the reasonableness of the denial of the rezoning application is fairly debatable, the city council’s discretion in this matter is controlling. See Perkins, 636 N.W.2d at 67. I would reverse the district court’s ruling that the Asbury zoning ordinance violates section 414.28A.

      . The City’s zoning ordinance defines the term "mobile home park” in part as a "tract of land upon which two (2) or more occupied mobile homes are harbored, either free of charge or for revenue purposes.” This definition tracks the statutory definition of "land-leased community,” which is defined, in part, as "a tract of land under common ownership upon which ten or more occupied manufactured homes are harbored, either free of charge or for revenue purposes.” Iowa Code § 414.28A. A "manufactured home” is defined in chapter 414, in part, as "a factory-built structure, which is manufactured or constructed under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 5403.” Id. § 414.28. Under the ordinance, a "mobile home” includes "[a] factory-built structure manufactured or constructed under the authority of 42 U.S.Code, presently Section 5403.”
      The parties do not dispute that the development proposed by the Bahls is a land-leased community of manufactured housing within the meaning of chapter 414. Nor do they dispute that the Bahls' project is subject to the restrictions imposed on mobile home parks by the City’s zoning ordinance.

      . A comparable law was enacted placing the same limitations on county zoning authority. 1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1238, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 358A.30 (1985) and now found at Iowa Code § 335.30 (1999)). Section 414.28A has a similar counterpart, prohibiting county zoning authorities from discriminating against land-leased communities containing manufactured homes. See Iowa Code § 335.30A.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CARTER, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Tina M. BOWERS, Appellant.
    No. 02-0021.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Dec. 18, 2002.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 10, 2003.

      Mark J. Neary of Neary Law Office, Muscatine, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, and Lee W. Beine, County Attorney, for appellee.
   CARTER, Justice.

Defendant, Tina Bowers, appeals from convictions on four counts of second-degree sexual abuse in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1 and 709.3 (2001). She urges that the district court erred in denying a motion to suppress her confession to police officers. She also asserts that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to (1) request a bill of particulars, (2) object to evidence of similar crimes, (3) move for a directed verdict, and (4) object to statements by the prosecutor during closing arguments. After reviewing the record and considering the arguments presented, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Defendant, Tina Bowers, is the mother of Zebidiah Holevoet, born on July 22, 1986. Defendant divorced Zebidiah’s father, Cory Holevoet, when Zebidiah was five years of age. Zebidiah lived with his father until he was nine years of age, at which time he began to reside with defendant and her second husband, Gary Bowers.

Zebidiah testified that when he was ten years of age he and defendant were drinking wine coolers and began discussing sex. He claims that he performed oral sex on defendant, she performed oral sex on him, and then they engaged in sexual intercourse. About three days later, Zebidiah stated that he performed oral sex on Gary Bowers, Gary performed oral sex on him, and he again engaged in sexual intercourse with defendant.

Zebidiah testified that this type of sexual activity continued one to three times per week for approximately one year. Sometimes the sexual activity involved Zebidiah, Gary Bowers, and defendant, while other times it only involved Zebidiah and defendant. Zebidiah testified that he and defendant engaged in sexual intercourse when Gary Bowers was not present on three or four occasions.

When Zebidiah was fourteen, he returned to his father’s care. He told his father about the sexual activity he had participated in with Gary Bowers and defendant. Mr. Holevoet advised the Illinois Department of Human Services of the allegations, and a criminal investigation ensued.

Special agent Richard Rahn of the Iowa Department of Criminal Investigation was assigned to the case on May 22, 2001. Agent Rahn interviewed Zebidiah on May 25, 2001, tape recording the interview. Agent Rahn obtained a warrant to search the home of defendant and Gary Bowers. Several other officers assisted with the search of the home.

When the search began, no one was at home. Approximately thirty minutes later, defendant returned. Agent Rahn read the search warrant to her and asked if she would be willing to talk to him. Defendant consented to do so. Agent Rahn told defendant that he believed the continuing search would be disruptive to an interview at defendant’s home. He suggested that they go to the Riverside Fire Department to conduct the interview. Agent Rahn drove defendant there in his unmarked squad car, and agent Matt George accompanied them.

Agent Rahn interviewed defendant alone, while agent George sat in an adjoining area out of defendant’s view but trying to listen. The interview was not recorded. Agent Rahn initiated the interview by reading defendant her Miranda rights and getting a family history. About thirty minutes into the interview, defendant admitted to having sexual contact with Zebi-diah. Defendant estimated that the sexual activity occurred approximately once per week, over a two- to six-month period. Other factors that are relevant to the issues on appeal will be discussed in connection with our consideration of the legal issues presented.

I. Standard of Review.

Motions to suppress evidence obtained through an allegedly illegal interrogation necessarily implicate a possible violation of constitutional rights. State v. Jackson, 542 N.W.2d 842, 844 (Iowa 1996). Therefore, the record is reviewed de novo based upon a totality of the circumstances. Id. In such a review, the court considers both the evidence presented during the suppression hearing and that introduced at trial. Id.

II. The Motion to Suppress.

Defendant asserts that she was placed under custody at the time of her interrogation. Defendant further asserts that, although agent Rahn did inform her of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706 (1966), her waiver of those rights was involuntary. The State argues that defendant was not in custody during her interrogation, and even if she was, she voluntarily and intelligently waived her Miranda rights.

For purposes of defendant’s Miranda challenge to the use of her confession, we will assume that she was in custody when she was interrogated. To be admissible the responses of an uncoun-seled accused in custody must have been voluntary in fact and must have followed a knowing and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights. State v. Donelson, 302 N.W.2d 125, 132 (Iowa 1981); State v. Washington, 257 N.W.2d 890, 895 (Iowa 1977). The standard for voluntariness in the Miranda waiver context is the same as is employed for determining voluntariness under the Fourteenth Amendment for purposes of testing the admissibility of a confession. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169—70, 107 S.Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 473, 486 (1986). Miranda warnings may be orally transmitted to a subject in custody and the waiver of rights attendant thereto may be oral or may be inferred from the facts. State v. Snethen, 245 N.W.2d 308, 314 (Iowa 1976). Agent Rahn testified at the suppression hearing that “I first started out by reading her Miranda rights off of a card which I have in my notebook, and then she indicated she understood her rights and would be willing to speak with me.” Defendant also testified at the suppression hearing and, in response to the prosecutor’s questions, stated:

Q. [H]e read you the Miranda rights? A. Yes.
Q. And you understood them? A. Yes.
Q. And you told him you understood them? A. Yes.

Defendant made no effort at the hearing to establish that she was mistaken as to her rights or that she was in any way coerced or intimidated into talking with agent Rahn.

The burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant voluntarily waived her constitutional rights is on the State. State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 559 (Iowa 1997). We are convinced that the State has sufficiently shown the interrogator’s obligation to advise defendant of her Miranda rights was fully carried out and that defendant knowingly waived those rights. We also conclude that her subsequent confession was voluntary. We have considered several different factors in determining whether a statement is voluntary. These include the intellectual abilities of the defendant, see State v. Reid, 394 N.W.2d 399, 403 (Iowa 1986); whether the interrogator acted in a deceptive manner, see State v. Jacoby, 260 N.W.2d 828, 832-33 (Iowa 1977); whether the subject appeared to understand and respond to questions, Reid, 394 N.W.2d at 404; and whether the subject was physically abused or deprived of food or sleep, see State v. Whitsel, 339 N.W.2d 149, 154 (Iowa 1983).

The ultimate test is whether, under the totality of circumstances, the statements were the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice, made by the subject at a time when that person’s will was not overborne or the capacity for self-determination critically impaired. Snethen, 245 N.W.2d at 315; State v. Cullison, 227 N.W.2d 121, 127 (Iowa 1975). Based on the considerations we have discussed, we conclude that defendant’s confession was in all respects voluntarily given.

III. Whether Defendant’s Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance.

A. Failure to request a bill of particulars. Defendant asserts that her counsel should have requested a bill of particulars, as more than four sex acts were introduced into evidence and it was necessary for defendant to know which acts were at issue. The State argues the minutes of testimony gave adequate notice to the defendant of the alleged acts. The State further argues that the four specific sex acts were clearly identified in the evidence and closing argument presented at trial.

A bill of particulars is a more specific statement of the details of the offense charged. State v. Conner, 241 N.W.2d 447, 452 (Iowa 1976). Its purpose is to provide additional information, which the indictment and minutes of testimony do not give. Id. A bill of particulars should be allowed when the charge and minutes do not inform the defendant of the specific acts of which she is accused. Id.

In reviewing the minutes of testimony, it is clearly stated that three separate witnesses would testify to sex acts between defendant and Zebidiah. The minutes specified that the acts included sexual intercourse between defendant and Zebidiah, defendant performing oral sex on Zebidi-ah, and Zebidiah performing oral sex on defendant. Additionally, defendant was notified of the name of the crime with which she was charged, the Code sections defining the offenses, the name of the victim, and the location of the acts. The trial information also alleged that the crimes took place between October 1, 1996, and July 21,1998.

In evaluating the sufficiency of the trial information, we must consider that the statements of the victim and the confession of defendant were inexact as to the number and times of the sexual encounters that took place. Given this fact, the State was not able to pinpoint specific acts on specific dates. It simply alleged a series of acts within a specified time period. Under the circumstances, we believe that this was sufficient. Based on these considerations, the denial of a bill of particulars would not have been error if defendant’s counsel had made such a motion. Consequently, defendant has failed to establish that her counsel was ineffective in not so moving.

B. Failure to object to evidence of other criminal acts. Evidence was admitted showing that defendant participated in many more acts of sexual abuse.than were charged in the information. Defendant urges that these other criminal acts would not have been admissible and that her counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the admission of this evidence. The State argues that the evidence of the additional criminal acts would not have been excluded because they were intrinsic to the case on trial.

Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(6) states:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

The other purposes listed in the rule are not exclusive. State v. Mitchell, 633 N.W.2d 295, 298 (Iowa 2001). The important question is whether the disputed evidence is “relevant and material to some legitimate issue other than a general propensity to commit wrongful acts.” Id. (quoting State v. Barrett, 401 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Iowa 1987)).

The State relies on federal cases that recognize proof of a series of similar events over time may be so blended or connected with the events on trial that proof of one necessarily requires reference to the other. United States v. LeCompte, 108 F.3d 948, 952 (8th Cir.1997); United States v. Maddix, 96 F.3d 311, 315 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. Bettelyoun, 892 F.2d 744, 746 (8th Cir.1989). In the present case, both the testimony of the victim and confession of defendant were inexact as to the number of sexual encounters that took place. Given that fact, the State, in proving its case, was properly permitted to proffer evidence of continual sexual activity in an effort to establish that, on at least four separate occasions during a specified period of time, an act of sexual abuse had occurred. Because the evidence would have properly been admitted for this purpose, defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object.

G. Failure to move for a directed verdict. Defendant asserts that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict based on insufficient evidence to prove four distinct acts of sexual abuse.. The State argues that defendant ignores her confession admitting at least four acts of sexual abuse with Zebidiah on different occasions. We agree with the State that defendant’s confession, corroborated by Zebidiah’s testimony, constituted substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdicts. Defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failure to move for a directed verdict.

D. Failure to object during closing argument. Defendant asserts that her trial counsel should have objected to prejudicial statements by the prosecutor in his closing argument. Prosecutors have a dual function. State v. Webb, 244 N.W.2d 332, 333 (Iowa 1976). They must vigorously prosecute defendants, but at the same time, they must assure the defendant a fair trial. Id. Prosecutorial misconduct only warrants a new trial when the conduct is “so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” State v. Anderson, 448 N.W.2d 32, 33 (Iowa 1989) (citing State v. Lyons, 210 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Iowa 1973)).

Defendant points to a specific portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument in asserting her claims for ineffective assistance of counsel. The prosecutor stated:

We charged four counts. They are probably undercharged. We could have charged 50 counts, but certainly the pretty much conclusive evidence would be that at a very minimum there has to be at least four counts on each.

As we have previously noted, both the testimony of the victim and the confession of defendant were inexact as to the number of and times of the sexual encounters that took place. Given this fact, the State, in proving its case, offered all of the available evidence of sexual abuse during a specified period of time in an effort to establish that at least four acts of sexual abuse had been committed on separate occasions. We have previously rejected defendant’s evidentiary challenges to that method of proof. Because we have found this evidence was properly admitted, it was not improper for the prosecutor to comment on it. Defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to challenge these statements of the prosecutor.

We have considered all issues presented and conclude that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

AFFIRMED.


author: CADY, Justice.

text:
    STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Deny Wilson BROWN, Appellant.
    No. 02-0076.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    Jan. 23, 2003.

      Kevin E. Hobbs, Des Moines, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Joe Weeg, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
   CADY, Justice.

This appeal presents three issues arising from the prosecution of a criminal case involving a murder that occurred nearly twenty-six years ago. The first issue centers on the admissibility of statements by another alleged assailant, relayed by a “jailhouse snitch,” implicating the defendant in the murder. The second focuses on whether the delayed prosecution of the defendant amounts to a violation of the defendant’s due process rights. The final issue is whether trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm the judgment and sentence of the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On February 4, 1977, the body of A.W. “Bud” Wingler was found in the front seat of his car, which was parked at the intersection of 37th and Center Streets in Des Moines. Wingler had been shot three times with a .45 caliber weapon, once in the head and twice in the shoulder. Interviews with area residents indicated the car had been parked at the location sometime during the late evening of February 3 or the early morning of February 4. There were no witnesses to the shooting and no one saw an assailant or assailants leaving the scene. Three shell casings were found in the car. Two slugs were also recovered. The keys to the vehicle were not in the car or on Wingler’s person. Wingler’s wallet and some of his jewelry were also missing. His wallet, along with a .45 caliber handgun, a .45 caliber slug, and a brown glove were found in a wooded area in Des Moines six weeks later.

Des Moines Police Department investigators were able -to establish that Wingler had spent a portion of the evening of February 3 with a close female friend, but a clear picture of the events that followed after she left his company eluded them. Moreover, despite an extensive investigation, which included numerous interviews with various individuals, no clear suspect or suspects materialized. At the end of 1977, the case remained unsolved. In fact, aside from an occasional new lead, the case languished without any real development for over ten years.

In October 1989, James Burrows, an inmate at the Anamosa State Penitentiary, contacted the Des Moines police. Burrows indicated he had information pertinent to the long-dormant Wingler investigation. An investigator was soon sent to interview Burrows, who provided the police with a detailed description of Wingler’s murder.

Burrows explained that he and two acquaintances, Gary Thrasher and the appellant, Deny Brown, had gone to Wingler’s apartment in West Des Moines on February 3, 1977, intending to rob Wingler after he returned from dinner. Brown and Burrows later confronted Wingler in his garage upon his arrival home at the apartment complex. At that point, Burrows claimed, the men planned to rob Wingler of his money and jewelry and escape to a getaway car, driven by Thrasher, which waited nearby. Brown deviated from this plan, however, by first ordering Wingler into the passenger seat of his car and then ordering Burrows to drive the car away from the apartment complex. Thrasher followed in the other vehicle. Then, as the men drove east along Interstate 235 toward downtown Des Moines, Brown shot and killed Wingler. He then ordered Burrows to exit the highway and park the car. Brown and Burrows left Wingler’s car, got in Thrasher’s car, and the three men left the scene. Later, Brown hid the murder weapon and some of Wingler’s possessions in a tree stump near Brown’s apartment. Brown and Burrows later sold a ring stolen from Wingler and combined the profit with money they had taken from his wallet. Both men took a portion of the total profit from the robbery. Burrows could not say whether Thrasher received a portion, partially because Thrasher had cut his ties with the men due to his apparent concern over Brown’s deviation from the original robbery plan. Brown and Burrows soon ended their association as well, and had little contact with each other after the robbery and murder.

Little is known about the course of events immediately after Burrows provided his story to the police. However, the new developments in the case were presented to the Polk County Attorney’s Office, which, for unknown reasons, declined to charge Brown, Burrows, or Thrasher for their alleged roles in the crime. The investigation went dormant once more.

In early 2001, the investigation into the unsolved Wingler murder was reopened, ostensibly at the behest of the victim’s daughter. The Des Moines police contacted a number of persons once again, including Burrows. The evidence in the case was reassessed. More importantly, two individuals, Kenny Bevard and Jeffrey Nall, came forward claiming Brown had made incriminating statements while incarcerated for another offense. Another inmate, Christopher Hawk, came forward claiming Thrasher also had made incriminating statements while incarcerated, including statements implicating Brown in Wingler’s murder. Bevard and Nall testified in depositions that Brown admitted to them that he shot Wingler. In particular, Bevard testified Brown told him intimate details of the crime during the period of time the men were cellmates. Hawk testified in a deposition that Thrasher told him he never would have been implicated in the crime if Brown had not confessed to a cellmate. The new information provided by Hawk, Bevard, and Nall, combined with the existing information in the case, was once again presented to the Polk County Attorney’s Office. This time, the county attorney, who was not in office in 1989, decided that a prosecution was warranted. Gary Thrasher and Deny Brown were soon arrested and charged with murder.

As Brown’s trial date approached, the parties sought a preliminary determination of the admissibility of Hawk’s testimony of Thrasher’s statement pertaining to Brown. The district court held that Hawk’s testimony was admissible. On November 5, 2001, Brown stipulated to a trial on the minutes of testimony provided in his case. The minutes included summary statements of numerous individuals interviewed between 1977 and 2001 as well as the contents of the depositions of Hawk, Bevard, and Nall. Brown was found guilty of murder in the second degree in violation of sections 690.1 and 690.3 of the 1977 Code of Iowa and was later sentenced in a manner tailored to 1977 sentencing standards. On January 7, 2002, Brown filed timely notice of appeal from the guilty verdict and sentencing. He raises three issues on appeal.

II. Hearsay Issues.

Brown’s first assertion on appeal is that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting and considering the statements of Gary Thrasher as relayed by Christopher Hawk. Brown believes Hawk’s testimony amounted to double hearsay not within an exception to the Iowa Rules of Evidence. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.805. Moreover, he argues that the admission of the testimony violated his right to confront a witness against him in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const, amend. VI. In resistance, the State first urges that Brown failed to preserve these issues for appeal. In the alternative, the State argues that Thrasher’s statement was admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule and does not violate the Confrontation Clause. The State also believes that Brown was not prejudiced by the admission of the Thrasher statements given the other inmates’ testimony conveying statements made by Brown implicating himself in Wingler’s murder.

1. Preservation of Error.

We consider first the State’s argument that Brown failed to properly preserve the hearsay and Confrontation Clause issues for appeal by stipulating to the minutes of testimony without specifically renewing his pretrial objection to Hawk’s testimony. An examination of the record reveals that Brown objected to the use of Hawk’s testimony on a number of occasions before his stipulation, but later stipulated, without objection, to minutes that included the very same statements to which he had earlier objected. Generally, a stipulation to the admission of testimony at trial constitutes a waiver of any objection to the testimony raised prior to trial. See State v. Terry, 569 N.W.2d 364, 368-69 (Iowa 1997); State v. Schmidt, 312 N.W.2d 517, 518 (Iowa 1981); see also State v. Bergmann, 633 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Iowa 2001). This appeal, however, presents a situation distinguishable from our prior considerations of this type of preservation issue.

Our prior considerations in this area arose from situations in which the defendant, through trial counsel, affirmatively consented to the admission of specific testimony or other evidence at trial that had been subject to a prior objection. Bergmann, 633 N.W.2d at 332; Terry, 569 N.W.2d at 368-69; Schmidt, 312 N.W.2d at 518. In this situation, Brown did not affirmatively and specifically consent to the admission of Hawk’s testimony at the bench trial, but generally stipulated that the district court could consider the minutes of testimony. Moreover, the record reveals the parties, as well as the trial court, understood the pretrial objections and the court’s ruling on the admissibility of Hawk’s testimony would be sufficient to preserve the issue at the stipulated trial. Although Brown did not specifically renew his objection to this testimony at the time of his stipulation and bench trial, the district court indicated during the course of the trial that it intended to consider Hawk’s testimony, yet further expressed its understanding that Brown was not waiving his “right to argue” on appeal that the objectionable statements should have been excluded. The preservation of error doctrine is grounded in the idea that a specific objection to the admission of evidence be made known, and the trial court be given an opportunity to pass upon the objection and correct any error. See Sievers v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 581 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Iowa 1998). Under the circumstances of this case, the spirit of the rule was met. We conclude Brown preserved error.

2. Hearsay and Confrontation Analy-ses.

Although the hearsay rule and Confrontation Clause are “designed to protect similar values,” they “are not to be equated with each other.” State v. Rojas, 524 N.W.2d 659, 664 (Iowa 1994.) For this reason, a number of differences between the analyses of these related issues have developed over time. For example, we review the admission of hearsay for errors at law, while Confrontation Clause issues are reviewed de novo. State v. Tangie, 616 N.W.2d 564, 568 (Iowa 2000). Despite their differences, however, both the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause operate to prevent the wrongful admission of testimony to the prejudice of a defendant. See Rojas, 524 N.W.2d at 664. Neither rule requires the reversal of a judgment if the defendant suffered no prejudice or harm from the admission of inadmissible testimony. See State v. Kite, 513 N.W.2d 720, 721 (Iowa 1994); State v. Sowder, 394 N.W.2d 368, 372 (Iowa 1986).

There are two distinct tests to apply to determine whether the admission of inadmissible testimony is non-prejudicial or harmless under the two rules. In the hearsay context, “where substantially the same evidence is in the record, erroneously admitted evidence will not be considered prejudicial.” Sowder, 394 N.W.2d at 372; see also State v. McGuire, 572 N.W.2d 545, 547-48 (Iowa 1997). For Confrontation Clause purposes, “the State must establish that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Kite, 513 N.W.2d at 721; see also State v. Coy, 433 N.W.2d 714, 715 (Iowa 1988). In making the Confrontation Clause assessment, a court must look at:

[T]he importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.

Kite, 513 N.W.2d at 722 (citation omitted).

Even assuming Thrasher’s testimony was inadmissible, we do not believe Brown was prejudiced by its admission. In this case, “substantially the same evidence” was in the record, and was provided by Brown’s own admissions to two other inmates, Kenny Bevard and Jeffrey Nall. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(d)(2). For this reason, even if Hawk’s testimony was erroneously admitted, Brown suffered no prejudice from its admission under the hearsay analysis. In addition, when considering Hawk’s testimony in light of the testimony of Bevard and Nall and the other evidence in the case, we are convinced that the admission of Hawk’s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the Confrontation Clause analysis. The admission of Hawk’s testimony does not present a ground for reversal of the judgment and sentence. .

III. Prosecutorial Delay.

Brown also believes that the State unreasonably delayed his prosecution for Wingler’s murder in violation of his due process rights. During this period of delay, he asserts, evidence was lost and witnesses that might have exonerated him died or disappeared. Because a claim of pre-accusatorial delay implicates the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, we review de novo. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; State v. Trompeter, 555 N.W.2d 468, 470 (Iowa 1996).

Although “[t]here is no constitutional right to be arrested and charged at the precise moment probable cause comes into existence,” the government cannot delay “filing charges to intentionally ‘gain [a] tactical advantage over the accused’ ” without implicating the Due Process Clause. Trompeter, 555 N.W.2d at 470 (citation omitted). To prevail on a claim that such a delay violated due process, a defendant has the heavy burden of proving both (1) the defendant’s defense suffered actual prejudice due to a delay in prosecution and (2) the delay causing such prejudice was unreasonable. See id. “To establish actual prejudice, a defendant must show loss of evidence or testimony has meaningfully impaired his ability to present a defense.” State v. Edwards, 571 N.W.2d 497, 501 (Iowa Ct.App.1997). Generalized claims of prejudice, such as “loss of memory, loss of witnesses, or loss of evidence” do not constitute actual prejudice. Id.

Brown has failed to prove actual prejudice arising from the delay in his prosecution. Instead, he merely offered generalized claims that are insufficient to establish a due process violation. See id. Brown presented an expert on robbery and robbery homicide investigations who outlined a number of concerns raised by the delay in Brown’s prosecution in his testimony in support of the motion to dismiss made by Brown prior to his stipulation. The expert indicated there were five or six people he thought “would have pertinent information” that could no longer be located or were deceased. In addition, the expert indicated that some physical evidence in the case, including the car seat in which Wingler’s body was found and the coat Wingler was wearing the night of his murder, had disappeared over time. In the course of his testimony, however, the expert was unable to state how the missing witnesses or physical evidence “meaningfully impaired [Brown’s] ability to present a defense.” Id. Instead, the expert offered only generalized claims of prejudice arising from the loss of witnesses and evidence. Id. The expert believed that further discovery of the missing witnesses and physical evidence could have produced information that might have served to impeach other evidence in the ease against Brown. He even expressed the possibility that the missing witnesses or evidence would have exonerated Brown. However, these types of claims and beliefs are insufficient to establish actual prejudice arising from the delay in the prosecution. They are too general to support a finding of actual prejudice. Accordingly, Brown has failed to establish the first requirement in proving his due process claim, and it is unnecessary to consider the second requirement. We find Brown was not deprived of his due process rights by the delay in the prosecution of his case.

IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Brown’s final assertion on appeal is that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel in two respects. First, he asserts his trial counsel failed to adequately inform him of the ramifications of waiving his right to a speedy trial, which precluded his full consideration of the issue and caused substantial and material prejudice to his case. Second, Brown believes his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to fully consider the array of witnesses available to testify on his behalf, resulting in the presentation of an inadequate defense.

A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel may be established only where it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that ineffective assistance was rendered and the ineffective assistance resulted in prejudice to the party. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be determined on direct appeal or in a postconviction proceeding. Berryhill v. State, 603 N.W.2d 243, 245-46 (Iowa 1999). However, the claim must normally be first raised and, if necessary, preserved on direct appeal. Id. To properly raise a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, a defendant must do two things: (1) actually raise the issue and, in raising the issue, (2) present it in sufficient detail so that the court can fully assess whether the issue can be decided on the available record or should be preserved for further proceedings. See id. If the record on appeal is insufficient to support the claim, counsel for defendant must reveal some specific information that could be presented at a subsequent postconviction relief hearing to support the claim.

Brown" raised his ineffective assistance of counsel issue before this court, but in so doing, failed to adequately detail the grounds on which such a claim was being asserted. In fact, Brown’s argument on this issue leaves us with little to go on in considering whether the record is sufficient to decide his claim on direct appeal or if the issues should be preserved for further proceedings. He claimed his trial counsel did not fully inform him of the consequences of waiving his right to a speedy trial. Yet, Brown did not explain what information he was denied. Similarly, he claimed his trial counsel failed to call his ex-wife as a witness. However, he did not further explain the substance of the proposed testimony or how it could have changed the outcome of the trial. For these reasons, we believe Brown failed to properly raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

V. Conclusion.

Finding no error underlying the judgment and sentence of the district court, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

All justices concur, except LAVO RATO, C. J., who takes no part.

      . Iowa Code sections 690.1 to 690.3 (1977) provided:

        690.1 Murder. Whoever kills any human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied, is guilty of murder.
      690.2 First-degree murder. All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, mayhem, or burglary, is murder in the first degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment for life at hard labor in the penitentiary and the court shall enter judgment and pass sentence accordingly.
      690.3 Second-degree murder. Whoever commits murder otherwise than as set forth in section 690.2 is guilty of murder in the second degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for life, or for a term of not less than ten years.
      Similar, albeit amended, versions of these statutes are found in Iowa Code sections 707.1 to 707.3 (2001).

      . Christopher Hawk testified, in part:
      A. ... he [Thrasher] would talk to somebody through the door about his codefend-ant which I believe is — I never meet him— met him before. I don’t know him — was—• he just said Deny.
      Q. That's the word he used was Deny to identify him? A. No. Fall partner.
      Q. Fall partner? A. Somebody he got arrested with.
      Q. Okay. So what did he say? A. His codefendant. And he’s used codefendant before too. And he said he told somebody — well, what he told me, he says, "We could have got away with it had my fall partner not said anything in his block.” He said he ran his mouth off in the block to somebody and they have turned State’s evidence against him and now they were both hung....

      . Kenny Bevard testified:
      Q. Okay. So what's Deny told you? A. Lots of things, we talked everyday all day long.
      Q. What's he told you about this case? A. He’s told me almost everything about this case. He's told me that it was a hit and that it wasn't a robbery. He told me that he was the trigger man [sic], he told me he shot Wingler three times, he said there was a 9 millimeter Lama [sic], I believe was used and he said it was Gary’s. He said it was one of Gary's family members that connected them to do this. He told me that they waited for him at his apartment or outside of his apartment area in West Des Moines, whatever it was and that they took him by gunpoint, Burrows drove the Cadillac, it was Wingler’s and Deny Brown [sat] in the back seat and Gary Thrasher followed them, I think he said in a VW or something and he said he killed him. And he said that it was supposed to look like a robbery and I asked him one time how much money was involved and he said $2,000.00 or $3,000.00 he thinks that he was supposed to have gotten off of Wingler but that wasn’t the point of it anyway.

      . Jeffrey Nall testified:
      Q. So you’re saying that Mr. Brown admitted to you that he shot A.J. [sic] Win-gler? A. Right.
      Q. Did he tell you how he did it? A. No. Well, he said — he went "roof, roof,” you know, I mean, like he pulled the trigger of a gun.
      Q. Okay. He didn’t give you any details — A. No.
      Q. —of how it went down? A. No. He said he wasn’t going to give details because of what happened with this Kenny Bevard telling on him.
      Q. So he said he didn’t want to talk about that because someone else had — A. Right.
      Q. —told on him — A. Yeah.
      Q. —basically? A. He said he wasn't going to give — you know what I mean? He wasn't going to go into detail about it.

      .There is, of course, no statute of limitations on murder in Iowa. Iowa Code § 752.1 (1977). Indeed, "[a] prosecution for murder may be commenced at any time after the death of the person killed.” Id. (emphasis added); accord Iowa Code § 802.1 (2001) ("A prosecution for murder in the first or second degree may be commenced at any time after the death of the victim.”) Thus, Brown is unable to argue his prosecution is precluded by a statutory limitation even though it was not commenced until twenty-four years after the commission of the crime for which he was accused.

      . Our prior considerations of prosecutorial delay issues have applied a test that looked first to whether a challenged delay was unreasonable and then to whether the delay prejudiced the defendant's defense. See, e.g., State v. Trompeter, 555 N.W.2d 468, 470 (Iowa 1996). Surrounding these two elements were three additional principles: (1) a defendant has the “heavy” burden of proving both elements, (2) the prejudice to the defendant must be "actual,” and (3) establishing the second element could be seen as a prerequisite in the analysis, i.e., if actual prejudice was lacking, the analysis was finished. See Trompeter, 555 N.W.2d at 470; State v. Edwards, 571 N.W.2d 497, 501 (Iowa Ct.App.1997). We utilize the factual posture of this case to adopt a new statement of the test for prosecutorial delay claims that merges these various principles into a more manageable statement.

      . Brown presented a very limited argument in asserting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. His entire claim was:

        ARGUMENT IV

      APPELLANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL TO A DEGREE THAT RESULTED IN THE APPELLANT BEING DENIED A FAIR TRIAL.
      The Appellant was not fully informed by his trial counsel as to the ramifications of waiving his right to a speedy trial. The Appellant’s uninformed waiver caused substantial and material prejudice to the Appellant's case. Had the Appellant fully understood the effect of waiving speedy trial, he would have preserved this right.
      Additionally, the Appellant’s trial counsel did not effectively explore all avenues with respect to possible defense witnesses. This lack of diligence by trial counsel also resulted in the presentation of a poor defense on the Appellant’s behalf. Specifically, the Appellant’s ex-wife would have been a very effective witness on the Appellant's behalf. The Appellant was assured by trial counsel that his ex-wife would be called as a defense witness.
      However, as can be seen from the record, the Appellant's ex-wife was not called as a witness on the Appellant's behalf. This lack of diligence by trial counsel caused substantial prejudice to the Appellant. Therefore, the [AJppellant’s murder conviction should be reversed and remanded for a new trial with the appointment of new trial counsel.