author: Justice Scalia

text:
    GROWE, SECRETARY OF STATE OF MINNESOTA, et al. v. EMISON et al.
    No. 91-1420.
    Argued November 2, 1992
    Decided February 23, 1993

      Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      John R. Tunheim, Chief Deputy Attorney General of Minnesota, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, Jocelyn F Olson, Assistant Attorney General,
      John D. French, Michael L. Cheever, Peter S. Wattson, and Alan W. Weinblatt.

      Solicitor General Starr argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Dunne, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General Simon, and Jessica Dunsay Silver.

      Bruce D. Willis argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Mark B. Peterson.

        Robert B. Wallace and Jeffrey M. Wice filed a brief for Congressman Martin Frost et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

   Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case raises important issues regarding the propriety of the District Court’s pursuing reapportionment of Minnesota’s state legislative and federal congressional districts in the face of Minnesota state-court litigation seeking similar relief, and regarding the District Court’s conclusion that the state court’s legislative plan violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973.

r — l

In January 1991, a group of Minnesota voters filed a state-court action against the Minnesota Secretary of State and other officials responsible for administering elections, claiming that the State’s congressional and legislative districts were malapportioned, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article 4, §2, of the Minnesota Constitution. Cotlow v. Growe, No. C8-91-985. The plaintiffs asserted that the 1990 federal census results revealed a significant change in the distribution of the state population, and requested that the court declare the current districts unlawful and draw new districts if the legislature failed to do so. In February, the parties stipulated that, in light of the new census, the challenged districting plans were unconstitutional. The Minnesota Supreme Court appointed a Special Redistricting Panel (composed of one appellate judge and two district judges) to preside over the case.

In March, a second group of plaintiffs filed an action in federal court against essentially the same defendants, raising similar challenges to the congressional and legislative districts. Emison v. Growe, Civ. No. 4-91-202. The Emison plaintiffs (who include members of various racial minorities) in addition raised objections to the legislative districts under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973, alleging that those districts needlessly fragmented two Indian reservations and divided the minority population of Minneapolis. The suit sought declaratory relief and continuing federal jurisdiction over any legislative efforts to develop new districts. A three-judge panel was appointed pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2284(a).

While the federal and state actions were getting underway, the Minnesota Legislature was holding public hearings on, and designing, new legislative districts. In May, it adopted a new legislative districting ¡fian, Chapter 246, Minn. Stat. §§2.403-2.703 (Supp. 1991), and repealed the prior 1983 apportionment. It was soon recognized that Chapter 246 contained many technical errors — mistaken compass directions, incorrect street names, noncontiguous districts, and a few instances of double representation. By August, committees of the legislature had prepared curative legislation, Senate File 1596 and House File 1726 (collectively, Senate File 1596), but the legislature, which had adjourned in late May, was not due to reconvene until January 6, 1992.

Later in August, another group of plaintiffs filed a second action in federal court, again against the Minnesota Secretary of State. Benson v. Growe, No. 4-91-603. The Benson plaintiffs, who include the Republican minority .leaders of the Minnesota Senate and House, raised federal and state constitutional challenges to Chapter 246, but no Voting Rights Act allegations. The Benson action was consolidated with the Emison suit; the Cotlow plaintiffs, as well as the Minnesota House of Representatives and State Senate, intervened.

With the legislature out of session, the committees’ proposed curative measures for Chapter 246 pending, and the state court in Cotlow considering many of the same issues, the District Court granted the defendants’ motion to defer further proceedings pending action by the Minnesota Legislature. It denied, however, defendants’ motion to abstain in light of the Cotlow suit, or to allow the state court first to review any legislative action or, if the legislature failed to act, to allow the state court first to issue a court-ordered redistricting plan. The District Court set a January 20, 1992, deadline for the state legislature’s action on both redistricting plans, and appointed special masters to develop contingent plans in the event the legislature failed to correct Chapter 246 or to reapportion Minnesota’s eight congressional districts.

Meanwhile, the Cotlow panel concluded (in October) that Chapter 246, applied as written (i. e., with its drafting errors), violated both the State and Federal Constitutions, and invited the parties to submit alternative legislative plans based on Chapter 246. It also directed the parties to submit by mid-October written arguments on any Chapter 246 violations of the Voting Rights Act. In late November, the state court issued an order containing its preliminary legislative redistricting plan — essentially Chapter 246 with the technical corrections (though not the stylistic corrections) contained in Senate File 1596. (Since no party had responded to its order concerning Voting Rights Act violations, the court concluded that Chapter 246 did not run afoul of that Act.) It proposed putting its plan into effect on January 21, 1992, if the legislature had not acted by then. Two weeks later, after further argument, the Cotlow panel indicated it would release a revised and Anal version of its legislative redistricting plan in a few days.

In early December, before the state court issued its final plan, the District Court stayed all proceedings in the Cotlow case, and enjoined parties to that action from “attempting to enforce or implement any order of the ... Minnesota Special Redistricting Panel which has proposed adoption of a reapportionment plan relating to state redistricting or Congressional redistricting.” App. to Juris. Statement 154. The court explained its action as necessary to prevent the state court from interfering with the legislature’s efforts to redistrict and with the District Court’s jurisdiction. It mentioned the Emison Voting Rights Act allegations as grounds for issuing the injunction, which it found necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, see 28 U. S. C. § 1651. One judge dissented.

Four days later the state court issued an order containing its final legislative plan, subject to the District Court’s injunction and still conditioned on the legislature’s failure to adopt a lawful plan. The same order provided, again subject to the District Court’s injunction, that congressional redistricting plans be submitted by mid-January. The obstacle of the District Court injunction was removed on January 10, 1992, when, upon application of the Cotlow plaintiffs, we vacated the injunction. 502 U. S. 1022.

When the legislature reconvened in January, both Houses approved the corrections to Chapter 246 contained in Senate File 1596 and also adopted a congressional redistricting plan that legislative committees had drafted the previous October. The Governor, however, vetoed the legislation. On January 30, the state court issued a final order adopting its legislative plan and requiring that plan to be used for the 1992 primary and general elections. By February 6, pursuant to an order issued shortly after this Court vacated the injunction, the parties had submitted their proposals for congressional redistricting, and on February 17 the state court held hearings on the competing plans.

Two days later, the District Court issued an order adopting its own legislative and congressional districting plans and permanently enjoining interference, with state implementation of those plans. 782 F. Supp. 427, 448-449 (Minn. 1992). The Emison panel found that the state court’s modified version of Chapter 246 “fails to provide the equitable relief necessary to cure the violation of the Voting Rights Act,” id., at 440, which in its view required at least one “super-majority minority” Senate district, a district in which the minority constitutes a clear majority. The District Court rejected Chapter 246 as a basis for its plan, and instead referred to state policy as expressed in the Minnesota Constitution and in a resolution adopted by both Houses of the legislature. See Minn. Const., Art. 4, §2; H. R. Con. Res. No. 2, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1991). Judge MacLaughlin dissented in part. The District Court was unanimous, however, in its adoption of a congressional redistricting plan, after concluding that the pre-existing 1982 plan violated Art. I, § 2, of the Federal Constitution. Although it had received the same proposed plans submitted to the state court earlier that month, it used instead a congressional plan prepared by its special masters. Finally, the District Court retained jurisdiction to ensure adoption of its reapportionment plans and to enforce the permanent injunction.

In early March, the state court indicated that it was “fully prepared to release a congressional plan” but that the federal injunction prevented it from doing so. In its view, the federal plan reached population equality “without sufficient regard for the preservation of municipal and county boundaries.” App. to Juris. Statement 445-446.

Appellants sought a stay of the District Court’s February order pending this appeal. Justice Blackmun granted the stay with respect to the legislative redistricting plan. No. 91-1420 (Mar. 11, 1992) (in chambers). We noted probable jurisdiction. 503 U. S. 958 (1992).

HH H-i

In their challenge to both of the District Court s redistricting plans, appellants contend that, under the principles of Scott v. Germano, 381 U. S. 407 (1965) (per curiam), the court erred in not deferring to the Minnesota Special Redistricting Panel’s proceedings. We agree.

The parties do not dispute that both courts had jurisdiction to consider the complaints before them. Of course federal courts and state courts often find themselves exercising concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject matter, and when that happens a federal court generally need neither abstain (i. e., dismiss the case before it) nor defer to the state proceedings (i e., withhold action until the state proceedings have concluded). See McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268, 282 (1910). In rare circumstances, however, principles of federalism and comity dictate otherwise. We have found abstention necessary, for example, when the federal action raises difficult questions of state law bearing on important matters of state policy, or when federal jurisdiction has been invoked to restrain ongoing state criminal proceedings. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 814-817 (1976) (collecting examples). We have required deferral, causing a federal court to “sta[y] its hands,” when a constitutional issue in the federal action will be mooted or presented in a different posture following conclusion of the state-court case. Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 501 (1941).

In the reapportionment context, the Court has required federal judges to defer consideration of disputes involving redistricting where the State, through its legislative or judicial branch, has begun to address that highly political task itself. In Germano, a Federal District Court invalidated Illinois’ Senate districts and entered an order requiring the State to submit to the court any revised Senate districting scheme it might adopt. An action had previously been filed in state court attacking the same districting scheme. In that case the Illinois Supreme Court held (subsequent to the federal court’s order) that the Senate districting scheme was invalid, but expressed confidence that the General Assembly would enact a lawful plan during its then current session, scheduled to end in July 1965. The Illinois Supreme Court retained jurisdiction to ensure that the upcoming 1966 general elections would be conducted pursuant to a constitutionally valid plan.

This Court disapproved the District Court’s action. The District Court “should have stayed its hand,” we said, and in failing to do so overlooked this Court’s teaching that state courts have a significant role in redistricting. 381 U. S., at 409.

“The power of the judiciary of a State to require valid reapportionment or to formulate a valid redistricting plan has not only been recognized by this Court but appropriate action by the States in such cases has been specifically encouraged.
“. . . The case is remanded with directions that the District Court enter an order fixing a reasonable time within which the appropriate agencies of the State of Illinois, including its Supreme Court, may validly redistrict the Illinois State Senate; provided that the same be accomplished within ample time to permit such plan to be utilized in the 1966 election . . . .” Ibid, (citations omitted).

Today we renew our adherence to the principles expressed in Germano, which derive from the recognition that the Constitution leaves with the States primary responsibility for apportionment of their federal congressional and state legislative districts. See U. S. Const., Art. I, § 2. “We say once again what has been said on many occasions: reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or other body, rather than of a federal court.” Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 27 (1975). Absent evidence that these state branches will fail timely to perform that duty, a federal court must neither affirmatively obstruct state reapportionment nor permit federal litigation to be used to impede it.

Judged by these principles, the District Court’s December injunction of state-court proceedings, vacated by this Court in January, was clear error. It seems to have been based upon the mistaken view that federal judges need defer only to the Minnesota Legislature and not at all to the State’s courts. Thus, the January 20 deadline the District Court established was described as a deadline for the legislature, ignoring the possibility and legitimacy of state judicial redistricting. And the injunction itself treated the state court’s provisional legislative redistricting plan as “interfering” in the reapportionment process. But the doctrine of Germano prefers both state branches to federal courts as agents of apportionment. The Minnesota Special Redistricting Panel’s issuance of its plan (conditioned on the legislature’s failure to enact a constitutionally acceptable plan in January), far from being a federally enjoinable “interference,” was precisely the sort of state judicial supervision of redistricting we have encouraged. See Germano, 381 U. S., at 409 (citing cases).

Nor do the reasons offered by the District Court for its actions in December and February support departure from the Germano principles. It is true that the Emison plaintiffs alleged that the 1983 legislative districting scheme violated the Voting Rights Act, while the Cotlow complaint never invoked that statute. Germano, however, does not require that the federal and state-court complaints be identical; it instead focuses on the nature of the relief requested: reapportionment of election districts. Minnesota can have only one set of legislative districts, and the primacy of the State in designing those districts compels a federal court to defer.

The District Court also expressed concern over the lack of time for orderly appeal, prior to the State’s primaries, of any judgment that might issue from the state court, noting that Minnesota allows the losing party 90 days to appeal. See Minn. Rule Civ. App. Proc. 104.01. We fail to see the relevance of the speed of appellate review. Germano requires only that the state agencies adopt a constitutional plan “within ample time ... to be utilized in the [upcoming] election,” 381 U. S., at 409. It does not require appellate review of the plan prior to the election, and such a requirement would ignore the reality that States must often redistrict in the most exigent circumstances — during the brief interval between completion of the decennial federal census and the primary season for the general elections in the next even-numbered year. Our consideration of this appeal, long after the Minnesota primary and final elections have been held, itself reflects the improbability of completing judicial review before the necessary deadline for a new redistricting scheme.

It may be useful to describe what ought to have happened with respect to each redistricting plan. The state court entered its judgment adopting its modified version of Chapter 246 in late January (nearly three weeks before the federal court issued its opinion). That final order, by declaring the legislature’s version of Chapter 246 unconstitutional and adopting a legislative plan to replace it, altered the status quo: The state court’s plan became the law of Minnesota. At the very least, the elementary principles of federalism and comity embodied in the full faith and credit statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1738, obligated the federal court to give that judgment legal effect, rather than treating .it as simply one of several competing legislative redistricting proposals available for the District Court’s choosing. See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281, 286, 296 (1970). In other words, after January 30 the federal court was empowered to entertain the Emison plaintiffs’ claims relating to legislative redistricting only to the extent those claims challenged the state court’s plan. Cf. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U. S. 535, 540 (1978) (opinion of White, J.).

With respect to the congressional plan, the District Court did not ignore any state-court judgment, but only because it had actively prevented such a judgment from issuing. The wrongfully entered December injunction prevented the Special Redistricting Panel from developing a contingent plan for congressional redistricting, as it had for legislative redistricting prior to the injunction. The state court’s December order to the parties for mid-January submission of congressional plans was rendered a nullity by the injunction, which was not vacated until January 10. The net effect was a delay of at least a few weeks in the submissions to the state court, and in hearings on those submissions. A court may not acknowledge Germano in one breath and impede a state court’s timely development of a plan in the next. It would have been appropriate for the District Court to establish a deadline by which, if the Special Redistricting Panel had not acted, the federal court would proceed. But the January 20 deadline that the District Court established here was explicitly directed solely at the legislature. The state court was never given a time by which it should decide on reapportionment, legislative or congressional, if it wished to .avoid federal intervention.

Of course the District Court would have been justified in adopting its own plan if it had been apparent that the state court, through no fault of the District Court itself, would not develop a redistricting plan in time for the primaries. Germano requires deferral, not abstention. But in this ease, in addition to the fact that the federal court itself had been (through its injunction) a cause of the state court’s delay, it nonetheless appeared that the state court was fully prepared to adopt a congressional plan in as timely a manner as the District Court. The Special Redistricting Panel received the same plans submitted to the federal court, and held hearings on those plans two days before the federal court issued its opinion. The record simply does not support a conclusion that the state court was either unwilling or unable to adopt a congressional plan in time for the elections. What occurred here was not a last-minute federal-court rescue of the Minnesota electoral process, but a race to beat the Minnesota Special Redistricting Panel to the finish line. That would have been wrong, even if the Panel had not been tripped earlier in the course. The District Court erred in not deferring to the state court’s timely consideration of congressional reapportionment.

III

The District Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to prove minority vote dilution in a portion of the city of Minneapolis, in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973. 782 F. Supp., at 439. Choosing not to apply the preconditions for a vote-dilution violation set out by this Court for challenges to multimember districts, see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986), the court instead proceeded directly to the “totality of circumstances” test in §2(b) and found unlawful dilution. It rejected, as a basis for its redistricting plan, Chapter 246, Chapter 246 as modified by Senate File 1596, and the state court’s version of Chapter 246, and adopted instead its special masters’ legislative plan, which includes a Senate district stretching from south Minneapolis, around the downtown area, and then into the northern part of the city in order to link minority populations. This oddly shaped creation, Senate District 59, is 43 percent black and 60 percent minority, including at least three separately identifiable minority groups. In the District Court’s view, based on “[jjudicial experience, as well as the results of past elections,” a super-majority minority Senate district in Minneapolis was required in order for a districting scheme to comply with the Voting Rights Act. 782 F. Supp., at 440. We must review this analysis because, if it is correct, the District Court was right to deny effect to the state-court legislative redistricting plan.

As an initial matter, it is not clear precisely which legislative districting plan produced the vote dilution that necessitated the super-majority remedy. For almost a decade prior to the 1992 election season, the only legislative districting plan that had been in use in Minnesota was the 1983 plan, which all parties agreed was unconstitutional in light of the 1990 census. More importantly, the state court had declared the 1983 plan to be unconstitutional in its final order of January 30. Once that order issued, the Emison plaintiffs’ claims that the 1983 plan violated the Voting Rights Act became moot, unless those claims also related to the superseding plan. But no party to this litigation has ever alleged that either Chapter 246, or the modified version of Chapter 246 adopted by the state court, resulted in vote dilution. The District Court did not hold a hearing or request written argument from the parties on the § 2 validity of any particular plan; nor does the District Court’s discussion focus on any particular plan.

Although the legislative plan that in the court’s view produced the §2 “dilution” violation is unclear, the District Court did clearly conclude that the state court’s plan could not remedy that unspecified violation because it “fail[ed] to provide the affirmative relief necessary to adequately protect minority voting rights.” Id., at 448. The District Court was of the view, in other words, as the dissenting judge perceived, see id., at 452, and n. 6 (MacLaughlin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), that any legislative plan lacking a super-majority minority Senate district in Minneapolis violated §2. We turn to the merits of this position.

Our precedent requires that, to establish a vote-dilution claim with respect to a multimember districting plan (and hence to justify a super-majority districting remedy), a plaintiff must prove three threshold conditions: first, “that [the minority group] is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district”; second, “that it is politically cohesive”; and third, “that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” Gin-gles, 478 U. S., at 50-51. We have not previously considered whether these Gingles threshold factors apply to a §2 dilution challenge to a single-member districting scheme, a so-called “vote fragmentation” claim. See id., at 46-47, n. 12. We have, however, stated on many occasions that multimem-ber districting plans, as well as at-large plans, generally pose greater threats to minority-voter participation in the political process than do single-member districts, see, e. g., id., at 47, and n. 13; id., at 87 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 616-617 (1982); see also Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73, 88 (1966)—which is why we have strongly preferred single-member districts for federal-court-ordered reapportionment, see, e. g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 415 (1977). It would be peculiar to conclude that a vote-dilution challenge to the (more dangerous) multimember district requires a higher threshold showing than a vote-fragmentation challenge to a single-member district. Certainly the reasons for the three Gingles prerequisites continue to apply: The “geographically compact majority” and “minority political cohesion” showings are needed to establish that the minority has the potential to elect a representative of its own choice in some single-member district, see Gingles, supra, at 50, n. 17. And the “minority political cohesion” and “majority bloc voting” showings are needed to establish that the challenged districting thwarts a distinctive minority vote by submerging it in a larger white voting population, see Gingles, supra, at 51. Unless these points are established, there neither has been a wrong nor can be a remedy.

In the present case, even if we make the dubious assumption that the minority voters were “geographically compact,” there was quite obviously a higher-than-usual need for the second of the Gingles showings. Assuming (without deciding) that it was permissible for the District Court to combine distinct ethnic and language minority groups for purposes of assessing compliance with § 2, when dilution of the power of such an agglomerated political bloc is the basis for an alleged violation, proof of minority political cohesion is all the more essential. See Badillo v. Stockton, 956 F. 2d 884, 891 (CA9 1992); Concerned Citizens of Hardee County v. Hardee County Bd. of Comm’rs, 906 F. 2d 524 (CA11 1990); Campos v. Baytown, 840 F. 2d 1240, 1244 (CA5 1988), cert. denied, 492 U. S. 905 (1989). Since a court may not presume bloc voting within even a single minority group, see Gingles, supra, at 46, it made no sense for the District Court to (in effect) indulge that presumption as to bloc voting within an agglomeration of distinct minority groups.

We are satisfied that in the present case the Gingles preconditions were not only ignored but were unattainable. As the District Court acknowledged, the record simply “contains no statistical evidence” of minority political cohesion (whether of one or several minority groups) or of majority bloc voting in Minneapolis. 782 F. Supp., at 486, n. 30. And even anecdotal evidence is lacking. Recognizing this void, the court relied on an article identifying bloc voting as a national phenomenon that is “‘all but inevitable.’” Ibid., quoting Howard & Howard, The Dilemma of the Voting Rights Act — Recognizing the Emerging Political Equality Norm, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1615, 1625 (1983). A law review article on national voting patterns is no substitute for proof that bloc voting occurred in Minneapolis. Cf. Gingles, 478 U. S., at 58-61 (summarizing statistical and anecdotal evidence in that case). Section 2 “does not assume the existence of racial bloc voting; plaintiffs must prove it.” Id., at 46.

* * *

The District Court erred in not deferring to the state court’s efforts to redraw Minnesota’s state legislative and federal congressional districts. Its conclusion that the state court’s legislative districting plan (which it treated as merely one available option) violated §2 of the Voting Rights Act was also erroneous. Having found these defects, we need not consider the other points of error raised by appellants.

The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss.

So ordered.

       We have referred to the Pullman doctrine as a form of “abstention,” see 312 U. S., at 501-502. To bring out more clearly, however, the distinction between those circumstances that require dismissal of a suit and those that require postponing consideration of its merits, it would be preferable to speak of Pullman “deferral.” Pullman deferral recognizes that federal courts should not prematurely resolve the constitutionality of a state statute, just as Germano deferral recognizes that federal courts should not prematurely involve themselves in redistricting.

       Although under Minnesota law legislative districts must be drawn before precinct boundaries can be established, see Minn. Stat. §204B.14, subd. 3 (Supp. 1991), congressional districts were not needed in advance of the March 3 precinct caucuses. Congressional district conventions did not take place until late April and early May.

       That section provides:
      “(a) No voting qualification of prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of'this section.
      “(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown- that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.”

       These percentages refer to total population. To establish whether a §2 violation has occurred (which presumably requires application of the same standard that measures whether a §2 violation has been remedied) other courts have looked to, not the district’s total minority population, but the district’s minority population of voting age. See, e. g., Romero v. Pomona, 883 F. 2d 1418, 1425-1426, and n. 13 (CA9 1989) (citing cases). Gingles itself repeatedly refers to the voting population, see, e. g., 478 U. S., at 48, 50. We have no need to pass upon this aspect of the District Court’s opinion.

        Gingles expressly declined to resolve whether, when a plaintiff alleges that a voting practice or procedure impairs a minority’s ability to influence, rather than alter, election results, a showing of geographical compactness of a minority group not sufficiently large to constitute a majority will suffice. 478 U. S., at 46-47, n. 12. We do not reach that question in the present case either: Although the Emison plaintiffs alleged both vote dilution and minimization of vote influence (in the 1983 plan), the District Court considered only the former issue in reviewing the state court’s plan.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Scalia Justice Blackmun,

license: Public Domain

text:
    FEX v. MICHIGAN
    No. 91-7873.
    Argued December 8, 1992
    Decided February 23, 1993

      Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, O’Connob, Kennedy, SouteR, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 52.

      John B. Payne, Jr., by appointment of the Court, 505 U. S. 1202, argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.

      Jerrold Schrotenboer argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

      Richard H. Seamon argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Mueller, and Deputy Solicitor General Bryson.

   Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case arises out of a “detainer,” which is a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking that the prisoner be held for the agency, or that the agency be advised when the prisoner’s release is imminent. Indiana and Michigan, along with 46 other States, the District of Columbia, and the United States, are parties to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). See Ind. Code §35-33-10-4 (1988); Mich. Comp. Laws §780.601 (1979); Pub. L. 91-538, 84 Stat. 1397-1403, 18 U.S.C. App. §2; 11 U. L. A. 213-214 (Supp. 1992) (listing jurisdictions). Two provisions of that interstate agreement give rise to the present suit: Article III and Article V(c), which are set forth in the margin.

On February 29, 1988, petitioner was charged in Jackson County, Michigan, with armed robbery, possession of a firearm during a felony, and assault with intent to murder. At the time, he was held in connection with unrelated offenses at the Westville Correctional Center in Westville, Indiana. The Jackson County Prosecuting Attorney therefore lodged a detainer against him. On September 7, 1988, the Indiana correctional authorities informed petitioner of the detainer, and he gave them his request for final disposition of the Michigan charges. On September 22, the prison authorities mailed petitioner’s request; and on September 26, 1988, the Jackson County Prosecuting Attorney and the Jackson County Circuit Court received it. Petitioner’s trial on the Michigan charges began on March 22, 1989, 177 days after his request was delivered to the Michigan officials and 196 days after petitioner gave his request to the Indiana prison authorities. 439 Mich. 117, 118, 479 N. W. 2d 625 (1992) (per curiam).

Prior to trial, petitioner moved for dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Article V(c) of the I AD, on the ground that his trial would not begin until after the 180-day time limit set forth in Article 111(a). The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the 180-day time period did not commence until the Michigan prosecutor’s office received petitioner’s request. App. 36. Petitioner was convicted on all charges except assault with intent to murder, but his conviction was set aside by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which held that “the commencement of the 180-day statutory period was triggered by [petitioner’s] request for final disposition to the [Indiana] prison officials.” Id., at 39. The Supreme Court of Michigan summarily reversed. 439 Mich. 117, 479 N. W. 2d 625 (1992) (per curiam). We granted certiorari. 504 U. S. 908 (1992).

The outcome of the present case turns upon the meaning of the phrase, in Article 111(a), “within one hundred and eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered.” The issue, specifically, is whether, within the factual context before us, that phrase refers to (1) the time at which petitioner transmitted his notice and request (hereinafter simply “request”) to the Indiana correctional authorities; or rather (2) the time at which the Michigan prosecutor and court (hereinafter simply “prosecutor”) received that request.

Respondent argues that no one can have “caused something to be delivered” unless delivery in fact occurs. That is self-evidently true, and so we must reject petitioner’s contention that a prisoner’s transmittal of an IAD request to the prison authorities commences the 180-day period even if the request gets lost in the mail and is never delivered to the “receiving” State (i. e., the State lodging the detainer, see Article 11(c)). That still leaves open the textual possibility, however, that, once delivery has been made, the 180 days must be computed, not from the date of delivery but from the date of transmittal to the prison authorities. That is the only possibility the balance of our discussion will consider; and for convenience we shall refer to it as petitioner’s interpretation.

Respondent places great reliance upon the provision’s use of the future perfect tense {“shall have caused to be delivered”). It seems to us, however, that the future perfect would be an appropriate tense for both interpretations: The prisoner’s transmittal of his request to the warden (if that is the triggering event), or the prosecutor’s receipt of the request (if that is the triggering event), is to be completed (“perfected”) at some date in the future (viewed from the time of the IAD’s adoption) before some other date in the future that is under discussion (expiration of the 180 days). We think it must be acknowledged that the language will literally bear either interpretation — i. e., that the crucial point is the prisoner’s transmittal of his request, or that it is the prosecutor’s receipt of the request. One can almost be induced to accept one interpretation or the other on the basis of which words are emphasized: “shall have caused to be delivered” versus “shall have caused to be delivered ”

Though the text alone is indeterminate, we think resolution of the ambiguity is readily to be found in what might be called the sense of the matter, and in the import of related provisions. As to the former: Petitioner would have us believe that the choice of “triggers” for the 180-day time period lies between, on the one hand, the date the request is received by the prosecutor and, on the other hand, the date the request is delivered to the warden of the prison. In fact, however, while the former option is clearly identified by the textual term “delivered,” there is no textual identification of a clear alternative at the other end. If one seeks to determine the moment at which a prisoner “caused” the later delivery of a properly completed request, nothing in law or logic suggests that it must be when he placed the request in the hands of the warden. Perhaps it was when he gave the request to a fellow inmate to deliver to the warden — or even when he mailed it to the warden (Article II 1(b) provides that the request “shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden” (emphasis added)). It seems unlikely that a legislature would select, for the starting point of a statute of limitations, a concept so indeterminate as “caused.” It makes more sense to think that, as respondent contends, delivery is the key concept, and that paragraph (a) includes the notion of causality (rather than referring simply to “delivery” by the prisoner) merely to be more precise, anticipating the requirement of paragraph (b) that delivery be made by the warden upon the prisoner’s initiation.

Another commonsense indication pointing to the same conclusion is to be found in what might be termed (in current political jargon) the “worst-case scenarios” under the two interpretations of the IAD. Under respondent’s interpretation, it is possible that a warden, through negligence or even malice, can delay forwarding of the request and thus postpone the starting of the 180-day clock. At worst, the prisoner (if he has not checked about the matter for half a year) will not learn about the delay until several hundred days have elapsed with no trial. The result is that he will spend several hundred additional days under detainer (which entails certain disabilities, such as disqualification from certain rehabilitative programs, see United States v. Mauro, 436 U. S. 340, 359 (1978)), and will have his trial delayed several hundred days. That result is bad, given the intent of the IAD. It is, however, no worse than what regularly occurred before the IAD was adopted, and in any event cannot be entirely avoided by embracing petitioner's view that transmittal to the warden is the measuring event. As we have said, the IAD unquestionably requires delivery, and only after that has occurred can one entertain the possibility of counting the 180 days from the transmittal to the warden. Thus, the careless or malicious warden, under petitioner’s interpretation, may be unable to delay commencement of the 180-day period, but can prevent it entirely, by simply failing to forward the request. More importantly, however, the worst-case scenario under petitioner’s interpretation produces results that are significantly worse: If, through negligence of the warden, a prisoner’s IAD request is delivered to the prosecutor more than 180 days after it was transmitted to the warden, the prosecution will be precluded before the prosecutor even knows it has been requested. It is possible, though by no means certain, that this consequence could be avoided by the receiving state court’s invocation of the “good-cause continuance” clause of Article 111(a) — but it seems to us implausible that such a plainly undesirable result was meant to be avoided only by resort to the (largely discretionary) application of that provision. It is more reasonable to think that the receiving State’s prosecutors are in no risk of losing their case until they have been informed of the request for trial.

Indications in the text of Article III confirm, in our view, that the receiving State’s receipt of the request starts the clock. The most significant is the provision of Article 111(b) requiring the warden to forward the prisoner’s request and accompanying documents “by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.” The IAD thus provides for documentary evidence of the date on which the request is delivered to the officials of the receiving State, but requires no record of the date on which it is transmitted to the warden (assuming that is to be considered the act of “causing”). That would be peculiar if the latter rather than the former were the critical date. Another textual clue, we think, is the IAD’s apparent indifference as to the manner of transmittal to the warden: Article 111(b) says only that the request “shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden” (emphasis added). A strange nonchalance, if the giving or sending (either one) is to start the 180 days. Petitioner avoids .this difficulty by simply positing that it is the warden’s receipt, no matter what the manner of giving or sending, that starts the clock — but there is simply no textual basis for that; surely the “causing” which petitioner considers central occurs upon the giving or sending.

Petitioner makes the policy argument that “[fjairness requires the burden of compliance with the requirements of the IAD to be placed entirely on the law enforcement officials involved, since the prisoner has little ability to enforce compliance,” Brief for Petitioner 8, and that any other approach would “frustrate the higher purpose” of the IAD, leaving “neither a legal nor a practical limit on the length of time prison authorities could delay forwarding a [request],” id., at 20. These arguments, however, assume the availability of a reading that would give effect to a request that is never delivered at all. (Otherwise, it remains within the power of the warden to frustrate the IAD by simply not forwarding.) As we have observed, the textual requirement “shall have caused to be delivered” is simply not susceptible of such a reading. Petitioner’s “fairness” and “higher purpose” arguments are, in other words, more appropriately addressed to the legislatures of the contracting States, which adopted the IAD’s text.

Our discussion has addressed only the second question presented in the petition for writ of certiorari; we have concluded that our grant as to the first question was improvident, and do not reach the issue it presents. We hold that the 180-day time period in Article 111(a) of the IAD does not commence until the prisoner’s request for final disposition of the charges against him has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against him. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Blackmun,

with whom Justice Stevens joins,

dissenting.

I am not persuaded that the language of Article III is ambiguous. The majority suggests that a search for the literal meaning of the contested phrase comes down to an unresolvable contest between a reading that emphasizes the word “caused” and one that emphasizes the word “delivered.” But Article III contains another word that is at least as significant. That word favors petitioner’s interpretation. The word is “he.” The 180-day clock begins after he — the prisoner — “shall have caused” the request to be delivered. The focus is on the prisoner’s act, and that act is complete when he transmits his request to the warden. That is the last time at which the inmate can be said to have done anything to “have caused to be delivered” the request. Any other reading renders the words “he shall have caused” superfluous.

Even if the provision’s focus on the prisoner’s act were not so clear, the statute could not be read as Michigan suggests. The provision’s use of the future perfect tense is highly significant. Contrary to the majority’s contention that “the future perfect would be an appropriate tense for both interpretations,” ante, at 48, the logical way to express the idea that receipt must be perfected before the provision applies would be to start the clock 180 days “after he has caused the request to have been delivered” But the IAD does not say that, nor does it use the vastly more simple, “after delivery.”

That this construction was intentional is supported by the drafting history of the IAD. When the Council of State Governments proposed the agreement governing interstate detainers, it also proposed model legislation governing intrastate detainers. See Suggested State Legislation Program for 1957, pp. 77-78 (1956). Both proposals contained language virtually identical to the language in Article 111(a). See id., at 77. The Council stated that the intrastate proposal was “based substantially on statutes now operative in California and Oregon.” Id., at 76. Critically, however, neither State’s provision referred to a delivery “caused” by the prisoner. The Oregon statute required trial “within 90 days of receipt” by the district attorney of the prisoner’s notice, Act of Apr. 29, 1955, ch. 387, §2(1), 1955 Ore. Laws 435, and the California law required trial “within ninety days after [he] shall have delivered” his request to the prosecutor, Act of May 28, 1931, ch. 486, § 1, 1931 Cal. Stats. 1060-1061. If, as Michigan insists here, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 23, 26, 37, the Council’s use of “caused to be delivered” was somehow meant to convey “actual receipt,” then the drafters’ failure to follow the clear and uncomplicated model offered by the Oregon provision is puzzling in the extreme. When asked at oral argument about this failure, counsel for amicus the United States replied that “the problem with using the verb receive rather than the verb deliver in Article III is that. .. [t]hat would shift the focus away from the prisoner, and the prisoner has a vital role under article III . . . because he initiates the process.” Id., at 41. I submit that the focus on the prisoner is precisely the point, and that the reason the drafters used the language they did is because the 180-day provision is triggered by the action of the inmate.

Nevertheless, the majority finds the disputed language to be ambiguous, ante, at 47-48, and it exhibits no interest in the history of the I AD. Instead, the majority asserts that the answer to the problem is to be found in “the sense of the matter.” Ante, at 49. But petitioner’s reading prevails in the arena of “sense,” as well.

I turn first to the majority’s assumption that the 180-day provision is not triggered if the request is never delivered. Because “the IAD unquestionably requires delivery, and only after that has occurred can one entertain the possibility of counting the 180 days from the transmittal to the warden,” ante, at 50, the majority attacks as illogical a reading under which the negligent or malicious warden — who can prevent entirely the operation of the 180-day rule simply by failing to forward the prisoner’s request — could not delay the starting of the clock. Ante, at 49-50. That premise is flawed. Obviously, the rule anticipates actual delivery. .Article 111(b) requires prison officials to forward a prisoner’s request promptly, as well. The fact that the rule for marking the start of the 180-day period is written in a fashion that contemplates actual delivery, however, does not mean that it cannot apply if the request is never delivered. Although the IAD assumes that its signatories will abide by its terms, I find nothing strange in the notion that the 180-day provision might be construed to apply as well to an unanticipated act of bad faith.

Even on its own terms, the majority’s construction is not faithful to the purposes of the IAD. The IAD’s primary purpose is not to protect prosecutors’ calendars, or even to protect prosecutions, but to provide a swift and certain means for resolving the uncertainties and alleviating the disabilities created by outstanding detainers. See Article I; Carchman v. Nash, 473 U. S. 716, 720 (1985); Note, The Effect of Violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers on Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 54 Ford. L. Rev. 1209, 1210, n. 12 (1986). If the 180 days from the prisoner’s invocation of the IAD is allowed to stretch into 200 or 250 or 350 days, that purpose is defeated.

In each of this Court’s decisions construing the IAD, it properly has relied upon and emphasized the purpose of the IAD. See Carchman v. Nash, 473 U. S., at 720, 729-734; Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 448-450 (1981); United States v. Mauro, 436 U. S. 340, 361-362 (1978). The majority, however, gives that purpose short shrift, focusing instead on “worst-case scenarios,” ante, at 49, and on an assessment of the balance of harms under each interpretation. Two assumptions appear to underlie that inquiry. The first — evident in the cursory and conditional nature of the concession that to spend several hundred additional days under detainer “is bad, given the intent of the IAD,” ante, at 50—is that the burden of spending extra time under de-tainer is relatively minor. The failure to take seriously the harm suffered by a prisoner under detainer is further apparent in the majority’s offhand and insensitive description of the practical impact of such status. To say that the prisoner under detainer faces “certain disabilities, such as disqualification from certain rehabilitative programs,” ibid., is to understate the matter profoundly. This Court pointed out in Carchman v. Nash, that the prisoner under detainer bears a very heavy burden:

“ ‘[T]he inmate is (1) deprived of an opportunity to obtain a sentence to run concurrently with the sentence being served at the time the detainer is filed; (2) classified as a maximum or close custody risk; (3) ineligible for initial assignments to less than maximum security prisons (i. e., honor farms or forestry camp work); (4) ineligible for trustee [sic] status; (6) not allowed to live in preferred living quarters such as dormitories; (6) ineligible for study-release programs or work-release programs; (7) ineligible to be transferred to preferred medium or minimum custody institutions within the correctional system, which includes the removal of any possibility of transfer to an institution more appropriate for youthfiil offenders; (8) not entitled to preferred prison jobs which carry higher wages and entitle [him] to additional good time credits against [his] sentence; (9) inhibited by the denial of possibility of parole or any commutation of his sentence; (10) caused anxiety and thus hindered in the overall rehabilitation process since he cannot take maximum advantage of his institutional opportunities.’” 473 U. S., at 730, n. 8, quoting Cooper v. Lockhart, 489 F. 2d 308, 314, n. 10 (CA8 1973).

These harms are substantial and well recognized. See, e. g., Smith v. Hooey, 393 U. S. 374, 379 (1969); United States v. Ford, 550 F. 2d 732, 737-740 (CA2 1977) (citing cases), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 436 U. S. 340 (1978); L. Abramson, Criminal Detainers 29-34 (1979); Note, 54 Ford. L. Rev., at 1210, n. 12. More important for our purposes, they were the reason for the IAD’s creation in the first place. The majority’s sanguine reassurance that delays of several hundred days, while “bad,” are “no worse than what regularly occurred before the IAD was adopted,” ante, at 50, is thus perplexing. The fact that the majority’s reading leaves prisoners no worse off than if the IAD had never been adopted proves nothing at all, except perhaps that the majority’s approach nullifies the ends that the IAD was meant to achieve. Our task, however, is not to negate the IAD but to interpret it. That task is impossible without a proper understanding of the seriousness with which the IAD regards the damage done by unnecessarily long periods spent under detainer.

The majority’s misunderstanding of the stakes on the inmate's side of the scale is matched by its miscalculation of the interest of the State. It is widely acknowledged that only a fraction of all detainers ultimately result in conviction or further imprisonment. See J. Gobert & N. Cohen, Rights of Prisoners 284 (1981); Dauber, Reforming the Detainer System: A Case Study, 7 Crím. L. Bull. 669, 689-690 (1971); Note, 54 Ford. L. Rev., at 1210, n. 12. It is not uncommon for a detainer to be withdrawn just prior to the completion of the prisoner’s sentence. See Carchman v. Nash, 473 U. S., at 729-730; Note, 54 Ford. L. Rev., at 1210, n. 12; Comment, Interstate Agreement on Detainers and the Rights It Created, 18 Akron L. Rev. 691, 692 (1985). All too often, detainers are filed groundlessly or even in bad faith, see United States v. Mauro, 436 U. S., at 358, and n. 25, solely for the purpose of harassment, see Carchman v. Nash, 473 U. S., at 729, n. 6. For this reason, Article III is intended to provide the prisoner “ ‘with a procedure for bringing about a prompt test of the substantiality of detainers placed against him by other jurisdictions.’ ” Id., at 730, n. 6 (quoting House and Senate Reports).

These two observations — that detainers burden prisoners with onerous disabilities and that the paradigmatic detainer does not result in a new conviction — suggest that the majority has not properly assessed the balance of interests that underlies the lAD’s design. Particularly in light of Article IX’s command that the IAD “shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes,” I find the majority’s interpretation, which countenances lengthy and indeterminate delays in the resolution of outstanding detainers, impossible to sustain.

Finally, I must emphasize the somewhat obvious fact that a prisoner has no power of supervision over prison officials. Once he has handed over his request to the prison authorities, he has done all that he can do to set the process in motion. For that reason, this Court held in Houston v. Lack, 487 U. S. 266 (1988), that a pro se prisoner's notice of appeal is “filed” at the moment it is conveyed to prison authorities for forwarding to the district court. Because of the prisoner’s powerlessness, the IAD’s inmate-initiated 180-day period serves as a useful incentive to prison officials to forward IAD requests speedily. The Solicitor General asserts that the prisoner somehow is in a better position than are officials in the receiving State to ensure that his request is forwarded promptly, because, for example, “the prisoner can insist that he be provided with proof that his request has been mailed to the appropriate officials.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16-17. This seems to me to be severely out of touch with reality. A prisoner’s demands cannot be expected to generate the same degree of concern as do the inquiries and interests of a sister State. Because of the I AD’s reciprocal nature, the signatories, who can press for a speedy turnaround from a position of strength, are far better able to bear the risk of a failure to meet the 180-day deadline.

The IAD’s 180-day clock is intended to give the prisoner a lever with which to move forward a process that will enable him to know his fate and perhaps eliminate burdensome conditions. It makes no sense to interpret the IAD so as to remove from its intended beneficiary the power to start that clock. Accordingly, I dissent.

       Title 18 U. S. C. App. § 2 contains the full text of the IAD, and we refer to its provisions by their original article numbers, as set forth there. Article III of the IAD provides in relevant part as follows:
      “(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party State, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party State any untried indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the' indictment, information, or complaint: Provided, That, for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decision of the State parole agency relating to the prisoner.
      “(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of corrections, or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.
      “(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections, or other official having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information, or complaint on which the detainer is based.”
      Article V(c) of the IAD provides, in relevant part:
      “[I]n the event that an action on the indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in article III... hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information, or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.”

       Not, however, to the dissent: “The fact that the rule for marking the start of the 180-day period is written in a fashion that contemplates actual delivery . . . does not mean that it cannot apply if the request is never delivered.” Post, at 55. Of course it vastly understates the matter to say that the provision is “written in a fashion that contemplates actual delivery,” as one might say Hamlet was written in a fashion that contemplates 16th-century dress. Causation of delivery is the very condition of this provision’s operation — and the dissent says it does not matter whether delivery is caused.
      The dissent asserts that “the logical way to express the idea that receipt must be perfected before the provision applies would be to start the clock 180 days ‘after he has caused the request to have been delivered.”’ Post, at 53. But that reformulation changes the meaning in two respects that have nothing to do with whether receipt must be perfected: First, by using the perfect indicative (“after he has caused”) rather than the future perfect (“after he shall have caused”), it omits the notion that the “causing” is to occur not merely before the statutory deadline, but in the future; second, by using the perfect infinitive (“to have been delivered”) rather than the present (“to be delivered”), it adds the utterly fascinating notion that the receipt is to occur before the causing of receipt. The omission of futurity and the addition of a requirement of antecedence are the only differences between saying, for example, “after he shall have found the hostages to be well treated” and “after he has found the hostages to have been well treated.” In both cases good treatment must be established, just as under both the statutory text and the dissent’s reformulation delivery must be established.

       The dissent contends that the phrase “he shall have caused” puts the focus “on the prisoner’s act, and that act is complete when he transmits his request to the warden.” Ibid. It is not evident to us that the act of “causing to be delivered” is complete before delivery. Nor can we agree that, unless it has the purpose of starting the clock running upon transmittal to the warden, the phrase “he shall have caused” is “superfluous.” Ibid. It sets the stage for the succeeding paragraph, making it clear to the reader that the notice at issue is a notice which (as paragraph (b) will clarify) the prisoner is charged with providing.

       There is no substance to the dissent’s assertion that one of the “reason[s] for the IAD’s creation” was to prevent the inmate from being “deprived of an opportunity to obtain a sentence to run concurrently with the sentence being served at the time the detainer is filed.” Post, at 56, 57 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Since the IAD does not require detainers to be filed, giving a prisoner the opportunity to achieve concurrent sentencing on outstanding offenses is obviously an accidental consequence of the scheme rather than its objective. Moreover, we are unaware of any studies showing that judges willing to impose concurrent sentences are not willing (in the same circumstances) to credit out-of-state time. If they are (as they logically should be), the opportunity of obtaining a concurrent sentence would ordinarily have zero value.

       Some courts have held that a continuance must be requested and granted before the 180-day period has expired. See, e. g., Dennett v. State, 19 Md. App. 376,381, 311 A. 2d 437, 440 (1973) (citing Hoss v. State, 266 Md. 136, 143, 292 A. 2d 48, 51 (1972)); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 451 Pa. 102, 106, 301 A. 2d 605, 607 (1973); State v. Patterson, 273 S. C. 361, 363, 256 S. E. 2d 417, 418 (1979). But see, e. g., State v. Lippolis, 107 N. J. Super. 137, 147, 257 A. 2d 705, 711 (App. Div. 1969), rev’d, 55 N. J. 354, 262 A. 2d 203 (1970) (per curiam) (reversing on reasoning of dissent in Appellate Division). We express no view on this point.

       For the prisoner aggrieved by a flagrant violation of the IAD, other remedies also may be available. The Courts of Appeals have split over the question of an IAD violation’s cognizability on habeas. Compare, e. g., Kerr v. Finkbeiner, 757 F. 2d 604 (CA4) (denying habeas relief), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 929 (1985), with United States v. Williams, 615 F. 2d 585, 590 (CA3 1980) (IAD violation cognizable on habeas). See generally M. Mushlin & F. Merritt, Rights of Prisoners 324 (Supp. 1992); Note, The Effect of Violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers on Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 54 Ford. L. Rev. 1209, 1212-1215 (1986); Note, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Nonconstitutional Errors: The Cognizability of Violations of the Interstate Agreement oh Detainers, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 975 (1983). At argument, the State and the United States, respectively, suggested that a sending State’s failures can be addressed through a 42 U. S. C. § 1983 suit, Tr. of Oral Arg.. 33, or a mandamus action, id., at 44.

       Even the Solicitor General acknowledged that “a State that has been negligent in fulfilling its duty may well be subject to political pressure from other States that are parties to the IAD.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 44. The fact that nevertheless in some cases the 180-day rule may cause legitimate cases to be dismissed is no small matter, but dismissal is, after all, the result mandated by the IAD. Moreover, where a diligent prosecutor is surprised by the late arrival of a request, I would expect that, under appropriate circumstances, a good-cause continuance would be in order. See Article 111(a). (I acknowledge, however, that, as the majority points out, ante, at 51, n. 5, some courts have refused to grant a continuance after the expiration of the 180-day period.) The majority finds this obvious solution “implausible,” but to me it is far more plausible than a regime under which the inmate is expected to “insist” that recalcitrant prison authorities move more quickly.