author: TERNUS, Justice.

text:
    Stacy L. OPAT, Appellee, v. Cheryl LUDEKING, Appellant. Cheryl Ludeking, Plaintiff, v. Iowa District Court for Winneshiek County, Defendant.
    No. 02-0657.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    July 16, 2003.

      Richard D. Zahasky, Decorah, for appellant.
    Dale L. Putnam, Decorah, for appellee.
   TERNUS, Justice.

In this action for injunctive relief, the trial court found that the defendant, Cheryl Ludeking, has gone “out of her way to have contact with [the plaintiff, Stacy Opat,] to induce a state of anxiety,” all in retaliation for Opat’s high school rejection of Ludeking’s friendship nearly twenty years ago. The court issued a permanent injunction restricting Ludeking’s physical proximity to and interaction with Opat and members of her family. The court also held Ludeking in contempt for violating a prior temporary injunction issued by the court.

Ludeking appeals the court’s order granting a permanent injunction and also challenges the court’s contempt finding through a petition for writ of certiorari. Based on our de novo review, we affirm the court’s grant of injunctive relief. In addition, we think the court’s contempt finding is supported by substantial evidence and so we annul the writ of certiora-ri.

I. Background Facts.

Because we concur in the trial court’s factual findings after having undertaken a de novo review of the record, we borrow heavily from the trial court’s order in setting forth the pertinent facts underlying the present appeal. In 1984-1985, Opat and Ludeking were friends for a few months during their freshman year in high school. Their friendship broke up, however, after Opat refused to write a nasty letter to a classmate with whom Ludeking had a dispute. Ludeking resented Opat’s rejection and throughout the remainder of their time in high school harassed Opat, spreading rumors about her and calling her a bitch, slut, whore, and liar in the presence of others. Ludeking’s actions caused Opat immense distress. Ludeking, in turn, derived great pleasure from her success in causing Opat emotional anguish.

In the fall of 1990, Ludeking persuaded another girl to follow Opat while Opat was shopping. Opat noticed that she was being followed and later that day saw the girl talking to Ludeking. Several months later Opat talked to the girl at a party and found out that Ludeking had asked the girl to follow Opat and report Opat’s activities to Ludeking. When asked why, the girl explained that Ludeking hated Opat. In the same general time period, Ludeking or others acting at her request, rearranged letters on a sign at a business owned by Opat’s parents to read “Stacy is a slut.”

Ludeking, who has a bold and assertive personality, could see that she was having a detrimental effect on Opat, who is quiet and reserved. Nonetheless, Ludeking continued to ridicule Opat when the opportunity presented itself.

Over the years Opat had sought help from her parents and school officials who told her she needed to toughen up and things would eventually get better. But by July 1991, Opat felt she had no way of stopping Ludeking. Opat required treatment for depression and attempted suicidé by carbon monoxide poisoning.

Ludeking took advantage of this unfortunate occurrence to further torment Opat. About a month after Opat’s suicide attempt Ludeking saw Opat on the street. In the presence of several other .people, Ludeking yelled, “Did you hear Stacy Eljel-stul [Opat’s maiden name] tried to kill herself? Too bad she didn’t succeed.” Opat made no response.

Later in September 1991, Ludeking arranged for the delivery of a “gift” to Opat around the time of Opat’s twenty-first birthday. One of Ludeking’s cohorts put a package prepared by Ludeking under Opat’s car, which was parked at Opat’s place of employment. When Opat and a co-worker observed the package during a break, Opat asked her friend to open it. Although the package appeared to be a flower box with pretty wrapping on it, Opat was concerned Ludeking might be involved due to the odd method of delivery. Opat’s friend was shocked upon opening the package. Ludeking’s “gift” consisted of a Barbie doll with its head cut off, a razor blade stuck in its chest, and ketchup smeared around to represent blood. A note in the package said, “Try again.”

Opat pursued criminal charges against Ludeking. While a charge of harassment was pending, Ludeking contacted a local priest to convey to Opat that Ludeking was seeking Opat’s forgiveness. Ludeking did so in the hope that Opat would have the criminal charge dropped. Opat rejected Ludeking’s request for forgiveness after she learned that Ludeking had not been forthright with the priest as to the acts for which Ludeking wanted to be forgiven. Later, Ludeking entered an Alford plea to a' charge of aiding and abetting harassment.

In 1993, Ludeking and Opat sought the same . secretarial position with . the Win-neshiek County office 'of the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS). Opat got the job. In 1997 a similar position opened in the NRCS office in Alla-makee County. Opat received a call from Ludeking, posing as “Pam Bolson,” inquiring about the position. Opat was not able to answer all of “Pam’s” questions and so Opat referred her to.the Allamakee County office. “Pam” was persistent, however, in trying to get answers to her questions, to the point of being offensive. This contact, by Ludeking was aimed at provoking Opat so Ludeking could report Opat’s rudeness to Opat’s supervisor. (In fact; Ludeking later called the Allamakee County office to complain that she had received rude treatment from Opat.)

Concerned that Ludeking was trying to interfere with Opat’s employment, Opat called ,her supervisor in Des Moines. Although Opat had not previously informed her boss of her difficulties with Ludeking, she began to describe the situation to him. He interrupted her to ask if the other person involved was Cheryl . Ludeking. Her supervisor, was aware of Ludeking because Ludeking had applied for the Alla-makee County position, but had not received an interview. Ludeking' attributed her lack of success to Opat and had complained about Opat to Opat’s supervisor and others in the Des Moines office. In reality, Opat had had no input in the decision whether to interview Ludeking.

In the summer of 2000, Opat and her husband decided to send their children to a parochial school associated with St. Benedict’s Catholic Church in Decorah. After verifying that Ludeking and her family were not members, the Opats joined the parish. Within a few months, Ludeking and her husband joined St. Benedict’s even though they had had no strong ties to the church previously. When the Opats saw the Ludekings at the 11:00 a.m. mass on several Sundays in a row, the Opats began to go to the 9:00 a.m. mass in order to avoid the Ludekings. After the Opats changed the service they attended, however, the Ludekings also began to attend the 9:00 a.m. mass.

In May 2001 Ludeking came to Opat’s office under the pretext of asking for directions to the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) office in the same building. Opat gave Ludeking the directions Ludek-ing requested, but Opat was visibly upset by the encounter. Because Opat had seen Ludeking in the DNR office a week earlier, Opat doubted that a need for directions was Ludeking’s true purpose in approaching Opat. Opat took Ludeking’s actions as a threat. Shaken, she retreated to the break room for twenty minutes to wait for Ludeking to leave the building. When Opat returned to her desk, Ludeking was standing at the counter. Ludeking then walked through a swinging gate toward Opat’s desk behind the counter, asking several questions about pictures of Opat’s children that were on Opat’s desk. Lu-deking asked Opat to hand her the pictures, but Opat refused and returned to the break room. At this point, Opat was crying, shaking, and sobbing because she interpreted Ludeking’s actions as a threat against her children.

Although Ludeking later claimed that she and her husband were conducting business in the NRCS office that day, the technician with whom the Ludekings worked refuted her testimony. He recalled waiting on another customer while Ludeking was in the office and testified that Ludeking did not ask for any service that day.

In addition to these specific events, Lu-deking had the practice of following Opat around whenever they happened to be in-the same store. This conduct occurred several times over the years.

Following Ludeking’s visit to Opat’s workplace, Opat again required mental health counseling. Her counselor, Charles Dopke, testified at trial that Opat was suffering from severe depression when he first saw her in May 2001. He explained her reaction to the office encounter with Ludeking as similar to a posttraumatic stress disorder arising from the doll incident years earlier. According to Dopke, Opat sees the beheaded doll incident as symbolic of Ludeking’s intentions toward her.' Opat views Ludeking as a clear threat and danger. When Ludeking asked to see the picture of Opat’s children, Opat attributed the same intentions toward her children. Dopke testified that Opat’s response to Ludeking’s actions was not abnormal considering the traumatic event involving the beheaded doll.

At trial Ludeking denied any vendetta against Opat. Ludeking’s response to Opat’s testimony and that of Opat’s witnesses was twofold: (1) Opat and the witnesses were lying; and (2) the contact between Opat and Ludeking that did occur was minimal and coincidental.

II. Issuance of Temporary Injunction.

On May 29, 2001, Opat filed the present action seeking temporary and permanent injunctions against Ludeking. Her attorney obtained an ex parte temporary injunction prohibiting Ludeking from coming within 500 feet of Opat or Opat’s family members. In obtaining this injunction, Opat’s attorney failed to certify “either the efforts which [had] been made to give notice to the adverse party or that party’s attorney or the reason supporting the claim that notice should not be required,” as mandated by Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1507. Ludeking filed a motion to dissolve the temporary injunction, but this motion was not heard until the trial on Opat’s petition in March 2002.

In the interim, Opat filed two applications for rule to show cause, claiming that Ludeking violated the restrictions of the temporary injunction on two occasions. In finding that Ludeking had violated the injunction on the first occasion, the trial court made the following findings of fact, which are supported by substantial evidence. (Since the court made no finding of contempt on the second application, we give it no further attention.)

On August 8, 2001, Opat encountered Ludeking when Opat took her children to Wal-Mart to have their pictures taken. Ludeking stood within several feet of Opat and her children for more than eight minutes while the children were photographed. Although Ludeking had also signed up to have her children’s pictures taken, there was no reason for her to remain in the vicinity, as there was a long wait and the custom was for those waiting to shop until their names were called over the store’s public address system. In fact, it was not until Opat’s name had been publicly called that Ludeking came to the photography area to put her name on the list to have pictures taken.

III. Trial and Judgment.

Opat’s petition for an injunction and the two allegations of contempt were tried simultaneously to the court. After trial the court concluded Opat was entitled to permanent injunctive relief. An order was entered enjoining Ludeking (1) from coming within 100 feet of Opat’s residence or place of employment, (2) from coming within twenty feet of Opat anywhere except St. Benedict’s Catholic Church, and (3) from engaging in any conduct toward Opat or her family intended to provoke fear or anxiety in Opat. The temporary injunction was cancelled and the permanent injunction was ordered to remain in effect until April 1, 2012, unless extended for good cause.

As for the contempt charges, the district court found that Ludeking had willfully violated the temporary injunction at Wal-Mart. The court ruled that any procedural defect in the issuance of that injunction did not excuse Ludeking’s violation. Nonetheless, the court withheld sentencing until such time, if ever, that Ludeking violated the permanent injunction. If no such violation occurred, ruled the court, Ludeking would be deemed to have purged herself of the contempt.

Ludeking was ordered to pay $300 towards Opat’s attorney’s fees, as well as the costs of the action.

IV. Permanent Injunction.

A. Principles governing our review. Our review of the trial court’s order issuing a permanent injunction is de novo. Matlock v. Weets, 531 N.W.2d 118, 121 (Iowa 1995). Although the trial court’s factual findings are not binding, we give weight to the court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. Id.

An injunction is warranted when necessary to prevent irreparable injury and when the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. Hockenberg Equip. Co. v. Hockenberg’s Equip. & Supply Co., 510 N.W.2d 153, 158 (Iowa 1993); Myers v. Caple, 258 N.W.2d 301, 304 (Iowa 1977). Thus, a party requesting injunctive relief must establish “(1) an invasion or threatened invasion of a right, (2) substantial injury or damages will result unless an injunction is granted, and (3) no adequate legal remedy is available.” Show v. Goforth, 618 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Iowa 2000). In deciding whether an injunction should be issued, the court must weigh the relative hardships on the parties by the grant or denial of injunctive relief. Myers, 258 N.W.2d at 305.

A plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law when the threat of repeated misconduct would require a multiplicity of suits. Hockenberg Equip. Co., 510 N.W.2d at 158; Planned Parenthood of Mid-Iowa v. Maki 478 N.W.2d 637, 640 (Iowa 1991). The mere existence of criminal penalties does not preclude a party from obtaining injunctive relief. Planned Parenthood of Mid-Iowa, 478 N.W.2d at 640; Hughes A. Bagley, Inc. v. Bagley, 463 N.W.2d 423, 425 (Iowa Ct.App.1990).

B. Evidentiary support for permanent injunction. In carefully reviewing Ludek-ing’s brief we find no argument that the facts as found by the trial court would not support the required elements for issuance of an injunction. Rather, Ludeking challenges the correctness of the court’s factual findings, complaining in particular about the court’s reliance on hearsay and opinion testimony. Of the various instances of such testimony discussed in Ludeking’s brief, objection was made at trial to only two: (1) Opat’s testimony that the girl who followed Opat in 1990 said Ludeking hated Opat; and (2) the testimony of Rita Fjel-stul, Opat’s mother, that she thought Lu-deking asked the priest to intervene in order to get the criminal charges dismissed. In addition to Ludeking’s challenge to the admissibility of this evidence, Ludeking also discounts any testimony of Opat that was not corroborated by another witness.

In our de novo review of the record, we have not considered the two items of evidence to which Ludeking objected at trial and now challenges on appeal. Nevertheless, based on the remaining evidence, we conclude Ludeking harbored great resentment toward Opat, if not outright hatred, a conclusion supported by the testimony of nearly every witness that testified. As for Ludeking’s motivation in asking the priest’s assistance in seeking Opat’s forgiveness, we observe that the only time in the many years preceding this action that Ludeking expressed any remorse was when criminal charges were pending against her. But whether Ludeking contacted the priest in a last-ditch effort to avoid conviction on the harassment charge is really not as important as the fact that Ludeking orchestrated the entire Barbie doll incident. Although Ludeking denied any involvement, a woman who helped Lu-deking put the package together testified to Ludeking’s active participation. The trial court made a specific finding that this witness was more credible than Ludeking.

Upon our review of the record, we also think Ludeking’s testimony on this point and in general did not have the ring of truth. Our view of Ludeking’s credibility is supported by the assessment of Ludek-ing made by the trial judge, who had the opportunity to hear Ludeking testify and to observe her during the trial. The judge stated in his order:

Cheryl [Ludeking] is aware that Stacy [Opat] perceives her as a threat. Although Cheryl’s conduct does not appear obtrusive to uninformed bystanders, her acts are intentional subtle reminders to Stacy of Cheryl’s attitude, if not intended actions, toward her. Cheryl is aware that her contacts with subtle veiled threats re-traunaatize Stacy. Sadly, Cheryl derives pleasure from Stacy’s distress. Her pleasure was apparent to the court during trial at times when Stacy was most upset.

(Emphasis added.) Ludeking’s claim that her contacts with Opat over the years were mere coincidences and not intended to cause harm ring hollow in view of the trial court’s observations.

In summary, we have no reason to believe Ludeking’s characterization of the past interaction between her and Opat. We also find no basis to ignore Opat’s testimony, as Ludeking urges us to do. Much of Opat’s testimony was supported by other witnesses at trial — witnesses who would have had little, if any, motivation to lie. Consequently, we make the same factual findings that the trial court did.

Although Ludeking does not claim on appeal that these facts would not warrant injunctive relief, we nonetheless conclude that any such claim would have no merit had it been made. Opat has proven the invasion of a right; she has established that substantial emotional injury will result unless an injunction is granted; and she has demonstrated that no adequate legal remedy is available. See Matlock, 531 N.W.2d at 123 (affirming injunction against plaintiffs former boyfriend based on the “negative psychological impact” of the defendant’s actions on the plaintiff despite absence of “actual assault or verbal physical threat”). Ludeking’s continued conduct toward Opat even after being convicted of aiding and abetting criminal harassment demonstrates that court intervention is warranted. We conclude injunc-tive relief was properly granted.

C. Scope of injunction. Ludek-ing also attacks the scope of the injunctive relief granted by the court. In particular, she complains that enjoining her from any conduct toward Opat or Opat’s family “intended to provoke fear or anxiety” in Opat is too uncertain and unclear. She relies on this court’s pronouncement that the conduct enjoined “‘should be set forth with certainty and clearness so that persons bound by the decree may readily know what they must refrain from doing without speculation or conjecture.’ ” 205 Corp. v. Brandow, 517 N.W.2d 548, 552 (Iowa 1994) (quoting 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions § 296, at 1095 (1969)).

We considered challenges to an injunction similar to the one at issue here in the Matlock case. There, the injunction imposed physical restrictions. on the defendant’s proximity to the plaintiff, her residence, and her place of employment. Matlock, 531 N.W.2d at 122. In addition, the defendant was enjoined from “taking any other action to harass the Petitioner.” Id. The defendant claimed the injunction was vague and overbroad. Id. at 123. We concluded the language of the injunction was not vague and clearly conveyed to the defendant what he could not do. Id. We also held that it was “narrowly drawn to address the harm sought to be redressed.” Id. We noted, “It prohibits only intentional acts by [the defendant] such as approaching, following, and harassing [the petitioner], Also, it does not prevent [the defendant] from going about his daily business.” Id.

We think the same can be said of the injunction issued here. The court’s prohibition of “conduct towards [Opat] or members of her family intended to provoke fear or anxiety in [Opat]” is not “open to speculation or conjecture” as argued by Ludek-ing. As in Matlock, the injunction ’prohibits only intentional acts by Ludeking. Thus, while the injunction does not identify the specific activities subject to the injunction, only activities “intended to provoke fear or anxiety” violate the court’s order. When this aspect of the injunction is considered together with the restrictions on Ludeking’s physical proximity to Opat, the message to Ludeking is clear: she is to stay away from any purposeful contact, direct or indirect, with Opat or her family. This ban does not unduly burden Ludek-ing, as she testified she wanted nothing to do with Opat. Therefore, we find no infirmity in the scope of the injunctive relief granted in this case.

V. Contempt.

A. Principles governing our review. “Although there is no statutory right to appeal from a contempt order, the proceeding may, in a proper case, be reviewed by certiorari.” In re Inspection of Titan Tire, 637 N.W.2d 135, 140 (Iowa 2001). “In a certiorari action, we may examine only the jurisdiction of the district court and the legality of its actions.” Christensen v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 578 N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa 1998). “Illegality exists when the court’s factual findings lack substantial evidentiary support, or when the court has not properly applied the law.” Id. Because certiorari is a law action, our review is for the correction of errors at law. In re Inspection of Titan Tire, 637 N.W.2d at 140.

B. Validity of temporary injunction. Ludeking first contends that the temporary injunction she was found to have violated was void from its inception because Opat did not make the certification concerning notice required by rule 1.1507. Ludeking argues she cannot be held in contempt for violating a void order. See Burtch v. Zeuch, 200 Iowa 49, 53, 202 N.W. 542, 543 (1925) (“There can be no contempt based on a process which is wholly void.”).

“A void judgment is one that, from its inception, is a complete nullity and without legal effect.” 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 31, at 392 (1994). “A judgment is void when the court lacks jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject matter, lacks the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved, or acts in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.” Id. at 394, accord Davis v. Rudolph, 242 Iowa 589, 597, 45 N.W.2d 886, 890 (1951).

In contrast, a voidable judgment is not a nullity, but rather “has all the ordinary attributes and consequences of a valid judgment.” 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 30, at 392. Therefore a judgment that is merely voidable is enforceable until reversed or vacated. Davis, 242 Iowa at 595, 45 N.W.2d at 889-90; 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 30, at 392. Procedural irregularities or errors of law render a judgment voidable, not void. Holmes v. Polk City Sav. Bank, 278 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Iowa 1979); Davis, 242 Iowa at 595, 45 N.W.2d at 889-90.

Normally a judgment entered against a party without notice is void, as the court has no personal jurisdiction over the defendant. E.g., Dimmitt v. Campbell, 260 Iowa 884, 888, 151 N.W.2d 562, 565 (1967); Davis, 242 Iowa at 599, 45 N.W.2d at 892. In the case of a temporary injunction, however, the court may, under certain circumstances, enter a temporary order pending notice and hearing. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1507; 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions § 243, at 826 (2000) (“Under certain conditions, temporary restraining orders and temporary injunctions may be issued without notice.”); id. § 249, at 831 (“[A] temporary injunction issued by a competent court in the exercise of judicial discretion does not deprive a person of liberty or property without due process simply because it is issued ex parte.”); cf. Rouse v. Rouse, 174 N.W.2d 660, 665 (Iowa 1970) (holding failure to give notice to adverse parties prior to appointment of a receiver did “not defeat the inherent discretionary authority of a court to act, absent notice, when reasonably satisfied such is necessary to prevent damage to or loss of property”). In Iowa, rule 1.1507 sets out the procedure to use when a party seeks a temporary injunction without notice to the adverse party. That procedure was not followed here, however, because Opat did not make the required certification.

This court has held that the issuance of a temporary injunction without the required notice is an irregularity that may be waived. See Bowman v. City of Waverly, 155 Iowa 745, 751, 128 N.W. 950, 952 (1910); accord R & V, Ltd. v. Iowa Dep’t of Commerce, 470 N.W.2d 59, 62 (Iowa Ct.App.1991); 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions § 243, at 826 (stating “[t]he requirement of notice may be waived”). Even if the deficiency in the present case is viewed as a substantive failure to make the required factual showing to support the necessity of issuing a temporary injunction without notice, that failure of proof simply renders the judgment erroneous and vulnerable to a motion to dissolve; it does not render the temporary injunction void. See Davis, 242 Iowa at 596, 45 N.W.2d at 890 (holding judgment “rendered without proof to sustain the allegations of the petition” was not void).

We conclude the temporary injunction issued here, even if not supported by the required -certification, was at the most voidable, not void. Therefore, it was valid and binding until dissolved or vacated. Consequently, even though Ludeking believed the court’s order imposing a temporary injunction was subject to challenge, she was obliged to obey it. See Sound Storm Enters., Inc. v. Keefe, 209 N.W.2d 560, 567-68 (Iowa 1973) (“[I]f merely erroneous, improvidently granted or irregularly obtained, the enjoined parties could still be punished for any attendant contemptuous behavior.”); Burtch, 200 Iowa at 56, 202 N.W. at 544 (“It is elementary that disobedience of an order or process made by a court within its jurisdiction and power is a contempt, although the order or process may be irregular or irregularly issued.”). Thus, any procedural irregularity in the proceedings leading to the temporary injunction is not a defense to a charge of contempt.

C. Evidence of willful violation. “In order to find a person guilty of contempt, a court must find beyond a reasonable . doubt that the individual willfully violated a court order or decree.” In re Marriage of Jacobo, 526 N.W.2d 859, 866 (Iowa 1995). Ludeking claims the evidence in this case will not support a finding of willfulness.

Willfulness is established by proof of “intentional and deliberate” conduct undertaken with a bad purpose, in disregard for the rights of another, or contrary to a known duty. Id. We are convinced there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding of willfulness.

The credible testimony in the record shows Ludeking, being well aware of the prohibitions of the temporary injunction, knowingly stood within several feet of Opat and her children for at least eight minutes. Even if Ludeking’s initial encounter with Opat at Wal-Mart was coincidental, the sustained nature of the contact was intentional and deliberate. Thus, we think there is substantial evidence that Ludeking deliberately acted contrary to a known duty. Consequently, the trial court did not err in concluding Ludeking willfully disobeyed the court’s temporary injunction order.

VI. Summary.

Upon our de novo review, we conclude the plaintiff has established the prerequisites for issuance of a permanent injunction. We also find no infirmity in the terms, scope or duration of the injunction crafted by the court. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s order enjoining Ludek-ing’s contact with Opat in the particulars set forth in the trial court’s judgment.

Any irregularity in the proceedings leading to issuance of the temporary injunction does not excuse Ludeking’s violation of the court’s order. Moreover, there is abundant evidence that Ludeking’s prohibited contact with Opat on August 8, 2001, was willful. Finding no illegality in the court’s judgment of contempt, we annul the writ.

AFFIRMED ON APPEAL; WRIT ANNULLED.

      . The remaining challenges made on appeal to hearsay or opinion evidence were waived by Ludeking’s failure to object at trial. See In re C.T., 521 N.W.2d 754, 757 (Iowa 1994).

      . Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1507 provides:
      Before granting a temporary injunction, the court may require reasonable notice of the time and place of hearing therefor to be given the party to be enjoined. When the applicant is requesting that a temporary injunction be issued without notice, applicant's attorney must certify to the court in writing either the efforts which have been made to give notice to the adverse party or that party's attorney or the reason supporting the claim that notice should not be required. Such notice and hearing must be had for a temporary injunction or stay of agency action pursuant to Iowa Code section 17A.19(5), to stop the general or ordinary business of a corporation, or action of an agency of the state of Iowa, or the operations of a railway or of a municipal corporation, or the erection of a building or other work, or the board of supervisors of a county, or to restrain a nuisance.
      Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1507 (emphasis added).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LAVORATO, Chief Justice. CARTER, Justice

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Matthew Dale RANKIN, Appellee.
    No. 02-1577.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    July 16, 2003.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

      R. William Petersen and William L. Shelton, Chariton, for appellee.
   LAVORATO, Chief Justice.

The State appeals from the district court’s ruling on the defendant Matthew Dale Rankin’s motion to dismiss. The State contends the district court erred by interpreting Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2001) and ruling that Rankin should have been charged with a serious rather than an aggravated misdemeanor. We agree and reverse and remand.

I.Background Facts and Proceedings.

On June 28, 2002, Rankin was convicted of possession with intent to deliver marijuana in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(l)(d) and 124.410 (2001). His conviction was determined to be an accommodation offense under section 124.410.

Two days later, a police officer stopped the car in which Rankin was a passenger for a traffic violation. According to the officer, as he approached the car he was “hit with a large amount of burnt marijuana smoke coming from inside the vehicle.” Rankin was trying to brush smoking ashes off his lap. The officer found a marijuana cigarette in the car and residue all over the passenger seat where Rankin was sitting.

The State charged Rankin with possession of marijuana in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5). The State also alleged that Rankin had previously been convicted of possession with intent to deliver on Juné 28, 2002, making the current offense an aggravated misdemeanor.

Rankin moved to dismiss. In his motion, Rankin asserted that no basis existed to charge him with the enhanced offense under section 124.401(5).

. Following a hearing,on-the motion, the district court, determined that the punishment would be that provided for a serious misdemeanor.

The State appealed, contending that the district court erred by interpreting section 124.401(5) and ruling that Rankin should have been' charged with a serious rather than an aggravated misdemeanor. For reasons that follow, we agree.

II. Scope of Review.

We review issues of statutory interpretation for errors at law. State v. Snyder, 634 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Iowa 2001).

III. Analysis.

We first begin our analysis wjth the fundamental rules of statutory interpretation that guide our resolution of the issue before us:

[In .interpreting statutes] [o]ur goal ... is to discover the true intention of the legislature. In searching for legislative intent, we consider not only the language of the statute, but also its. subject matter, the object sought to be aceom-plished, the purpose to be served, underlying. policies,, remedies provided, and the consequences of various interpretations. Additionally, we construe a statute in a way that would avoid impractical or absurd results. And'we look at the whole statute, not just separate parts. '

State v. Albrecht, 657 N.W.2d 474, 479 (Iowa 2003) (citations omitted);

Rankin contends the district court was' correct. In support of the district court’s ruling, Rankin argues, as he did in the district court, that at the time of the first conviction he'was sentenced pursuant to section 124.410, as though he had been convicted of possession of marijuana. Therefore, according to Rankin, the second paragraph of section 124.401(5) applied and the charge for a second offense should have been a serious misdemeanor rather than an aggravated misdemeanor under section 124.401(5). (An aggravated misdemeanor carries a sentence not to exceed two years (Iowa Code section 903.1(2)) and a serious misdemeanor under section 124.401(5) carries a sentence not to exceed six months for the first offense and not to exceed one year for a second offense under Iowa Code section 903.1(1)(6).)

To understand Rankin’s argument, we first set out Iowa Code section 124.410, the provision under which he was sentenced for his first conviction:

In a prosecution for unlawful delivery or possession with intent to deliver marijuana, if the prosecution proves that the defendant violated the provisions of section 124.401, subsection 1, by proving that the defendant delivered or possessed with intent to deliver one-half ounce or less of marijuana which was not offered for sale, the defendant is guilty of an accommodation offense and rather than being sentenced as if convicted for a violation of section 124.401, subsection 1, paragraph “d”, shall be sentenced as if convicted of a violation of section 12J/.401, subsection 5....

Iowa Code § 124.410 (emphasis added).

The second paragraph of section 124.401(5) — that part of the statute that Rankin claims applies — provides:

If the controlled substance is marijuana and the person has been previously convicted of a violation of this subsection in which the controlled substance was marijuana, the punishment shall be as provided in section 903.1, subsection 1, paragraph “b” [serious misdemeanor].

Iowa Code § 124.401(5) (emphasis added).

Reading these two provisions together as we must, we conclude, contrary to Rankin’s contention, that he was not “convicted of’ a violation of section 124.401(5) when he was sentenced under section 124.410 for his first offense. By the language “shall be sentenced as if convicted of a violation of’ section 124.401(5), the legislature simply intended that section 124.401(5) should only serve to supply the sentencing court with the proper sentence for a defendant found guilty of accommodation. A defendant found guilty of accommodation is not “convicted of’ a violation of section 124.401(5). Rather such a defendant is convicted of accommodation'— a delivery offense under section 124.410. See State v. Metcalf, 260 N.W.2d 857, 860 (Iowa 1977) (holding that accommodation is a lesser included offense of possession with intent to deliver); Iowa Code § 124.410 (“An accommodation offense may be proved as an included offense under a charge of delivering or possessing with the intent to deliver marijuana in violation of section 124.401, subsection 1.”).

We agree with the State that the second paragraph of section 124.401(5) does not apply to Rankin for two reasons. First, as we just explained, Rankin was not “convicted of’ a violation of section 124.401(5) when he was found guilty of an accommodation offense under section 124.410. Second, as the State correctly points out, the second paragraph of section 124.401(5) applies only to those persons convicted of possession of marijuana. Accommodation is a delivery offense; it is not a possession-of-marijuana offense. All of this is borne out by the following language in the second paragraph of section 124.401(5): “If the controlled substance is marijuana and the person has been previously convicted of a violation of this subsection in which the controlled substance was marijuana. ...” Iowa Code § 124.401(5) (emphasis added). Because Rankin was convicted of an accommodation offense in violation of section 124.410 and not a possession-of-marijuana offense, his previous conviction does not fall within the “this subsection” language of paragraph two of section 124.401(5).

As the State suggests, Rankin’s case falls within the following language of section 124.401(5) found in the first paragraph of that provision:

It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance.... Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a serious misdemeanor for a first offense. A person who commits a violation of this subsection and who has previously been convicted of violating this chapter ... is guilty of an aggravated misdemeanor.

Rankin was previously convicted of violating sections 124.401(d) and 124.410 (“this chapter”). By using the language “this subsection,” rather than “this chapter,” in the second paragraph of section 124.401(5), the legislature clearly intended to grant leniency only to those charged with possession of marijuana.

We therefore conclude the State properly charged Rankin with an aggravated misdemeanor pursuant to the first paragraph of section 124.401(5). The district court erred in concluding otherwise. We therefore reverse the district court’s ruling on Rankin’s motion to dismiss and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

All justices concur except CARTER, J., who dissents and STREIT, J., who takes no part.

CARTER, Justice

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent.

The sentencing enhancement provided in the first paragraph of section 124.401(5), although purporting to apply to “any person who violates this subsection,” clearly does not apply to a conviction for possession of marijuana. The penalties for that offense, including first-offense and subsequent-offense convictions, are contained in the second paragraph of section 124.401(5). In applying that paragraph, the issue that must be decided is whether a person charged with possession with intent to deliver marijuana under Iowa Code section 124.401(l)(d), but sentenced “as if convicted under Iowa Code section 124.401(5),” because found to be an accommodation offender as provided in section 124.410, should be considered a person previously convicted of a violation of section 124.401(5). I am satisfied that the answer to this question is yes.

The statutory scheme for enhancing sentences imposed under section 124.401(5) is designed to increase the degree of offense by one classification for each prior conviction. Thus, for violations found under the first paragraph of section 124.401(5), involving possession of controlled substances other than marijuana, one prior conviction enhances a sentence from a serious misdemeanor to an aggravated misdemeanor. Two or more prior convictions enhances the sentence from a serious misdemeanor to a felony.

Similarly in the second paragraph of section 124.401(5), governing possession of marijuana, one prior conviction will enhance an offense calling for a prison term of six months to a serious misdemeanor (providing a maximum sentence of twelve months). Two or more prior convictions enhance an offense calling for six months imprisonment to an aggravated misdemeanor.

This defendant’s prior sentence was “as if convicted of section 124.401(5).” That sentence was limited to a maximum of six months, the same as provided for defendant’s present offense but for the enhancement to be applied as the result of the prior conviction. Yet, the enhancement that the majority endorses, although based on a single prior conviction, increases the penalty by two sentencing classifications rather than one. That is inconsistent with the statutory scheme. I would affirm the judgment of the district court.


author: NEUMAN, Justice.

text:
    Alan BARKEMA, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Appellant, v. WILLIAMS PIPELINE COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, and WorldCom Network Services, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Appellees.
    No. 01-1845.
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    July 16, 2003.

      Raymond P. Drew of Raymond P. Drew, P.C., Hampton, and Daniel J. Millea, John B. Massopust, and Terrance C. Newby of Zelle, Hofmann, Voelbel, Mason & Gette, L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.
    Paul E. Horvath of Dickinson, Macka-man, Tyler & Hagen, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee Williams Pipeline Company.
    Paul E. Horvath of Dickinson, Macka-man, Tyler & Hagen, P.C., Des Moines, Thomas F. O’Neil III and V. Nicole By-num; and David A. Handzo and J. Alex Ward of Jenner & Block, L.L.C., Washington, DC, for appellee WorldCom Network Services, Inc.
   NEUMAN, Justice.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff, Alan Barkema, who was an unnamed plaintiff in previous class action litigation involving the defendants in this case, WorldCom and Williams Pipeline Company. That litigation ended with a settlement which Barke-ma now challenges, arguing the notices sent to plaintiffs in the previous litigation did not comport with the requirements of due process. Finding no due process violation, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The facts are undisputed. In the 1930s and 1950s, a large number of Iowa landowners granted easements allowing defendant Williams Pipeline Company (WPL) and its predecessors in interest to install and maintain underground pipelines for the purpose of carrying gas and oil. In the 1980s WPL granted defendant World-Com the right to place fiber optic cable in one of the pipelines no longer being used to transport petroleum products.

When property owners realized that fiber optic cable had been installed under their property, they instituted a class action suit alleging WPL and WorldCom trespassed on their land and breached their easements. A Notice of Pendency of Class Action was sent to each affected landowner of record. The parties to the original action negotiated a settlement. ' Notices regarding both the settlement and what is known as a “fairness hearing” were sent to all members of the class, including Barkema. After the hearing, the district court approved the settlement. Members of the class were paid $0.76 per linear foot of pipeline running under their land. Class members also had the option of receiving an additional $250 payment for voluntarily amending their easements to allow fiber optic cable to be placed in the pipelines. Class members who did not execute an amended easement did not receive the $250 and judgments were entered against them amending the easement. Barkema executed an amended easement and received payment for it in addition to the $0.76 per linear foot.

In 1999, Barkema and other landowners involved in the class action learned that fiber optic cable had been installed in the second pipeline running under their land. Barkema filed this class action suit to have the previous judgment set aside on the basis of fraud or due process violations. WPL moved for summary judgment and WorldCom moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted both motions, reasoning the fraud claim was time barred and the requirements of due process had been met. Barkema appeals only the court’s ruling on the due process issue.

II. Scope of Review.

We review the grant of summary judgment for correction of errors at law. Keokuk Junction Ry. v. IES Indus., Inc., 618 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Iowa 2000). Summary judgment is only proper when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the mov-ant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Knapp v. Simmons, 345 N.W.2d 118, 121 (Iowa 1984).

We likewise review motions to dismiss for errors at law. Bauman v. Maple Valley Cmty. Sch. Dist., 649 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Iowa 2002). Such a motion is properly sustained only when there exists no conceivable set of facts entitling the non-moving party to relief. Orud v. Groth, 652 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Iowa 2002).

III. Issue on Appeal.

The only question on appeal is whether the notices sent to class members in the first class action fulfilled the requirements of due process. Two notices are at issue— the Notice of Litigation and the Notice of Settlement. Barkema contends both notices were insufficient because they failed to notify class members that the litigation and settlement involved both pipelines running under the plaintiffs’ properties.

A. Litigation notices. Barkema concedes, as he must, that class members received notice of the litigation. He merely argues the notice was constitutionally insufficient to apprise them that both pipelines were at issue.

The Description of the Lawsuit contained in the Notice of Pendency of Class Action included the following information.

In the mid-1980’s, Defendant, Williams Pipe Line Company (“WPL”), which in the 1960’s had taken an assignment of Great Lakes Pipe Line Company’s easement rights, installed fiber optic cables in a pipeline located under your property that was previously used to, but does not currently, transport petroleum products. The other Defendant in this case, [WorldCom], operates a fiber optic communications network using those fiber optic cables. For most landowners along this route, there is another pipeline owned by WPL running under the land. That pipeline is still being used to transport petroleum products.
This class action lawsuit challenges the Defendants’ rights to install and maintain the fiber optic cables under your land and under other Iowa land subject to similar easements originally granted to Great Lakes Pipe Line Company. The claims in the case are that the Defendants are in breach of the easement agreement and are trespassing on your property by using this petroleum pipe to house fiber optic cables.

(Emphasis added.)

It is axiomatic that due process requires notice “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 389 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865, 873 (1950). In the class action context, the notice must (1) reach the parties affected, and (2) “convey the required information.” In re Nissan Motor Corp., 552 F.2d 1088, 1103 (5th Cir.1977).

There is no dispute here that affected parties received notice. Barkema merely maintains that due process was violated because the notice contained “incomplete” and “false” information, i.e., that the second pipeline was not at issue. The problem with this argument is that the notice did not say the second pipeline was not at issue. It merely stated the second pipeline was still used to transport petroleum, and there is no evidence that was not true at the time of the litigation.

Plainly the notice of litigation alerted the landowners that the easement on their land for petroleum pipelines was at issue. The notice also explained that the defendants were accused of trespassing and breaching their easements. Finally, the notice supplied an address and telephone number to call to receive additional information. Thus the parties knew that a class action was pending, the nature of it, and that they were given the opportunity to exclude themselves from the proceedings. Due process requires no more.

B. Settlement notice. Barkema also challenges the Notice of Proposed Settlement. The settlement notice gave essentially the same description of the lawsuit as the Notice of Pendency of Class Action. Barkema takes issue with the following additional language contained in the document:

For most landowners along the pipeline route, another pipeline owned by WPL runs under the land. That pipeline is still being used to transport petroleum products and it is not involved in this lawsuit.

(Emphasis added.) Barkema argues this description violated due process because it, too, was “false” and “incomplete.” His argument rests on the fact that the easement for both pipelines was amended in the settlement, and therefore both pipelines were involved in the lawsuit.

The district court rightly rejected Barkema’s argument. To meet the requirements of due process, notice of settlement in a class action lawsuit merely must provide enough information to allow “class members rationally to decide whether they should intervene in the settlement proceedings or otherwise make their views known, and if they choose to become actively involved, to have sufficient opportunity to prepare their position.” Reynolds v. Nat’l Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 285 (8th Cir.1978). Stated another way, “the notice of settlement must be sufficiently detailed to permit class mémbers to determine the potential costs and benefits involved, or at least whether additional investigation into the matter would be an efficient use of their time.” Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140, 1153 (8th Cir.1999).

It is significant that, in addition to the language quoted above, the settlement notice contained a description of the monetary compensation each plaintiff would receive. Pertinent to Barkema’s claim, the notice explained that plaintiffs could voluntarily amend their easements in exchange for $250. If that option was not exercised, class members were further advised the court would enter judgment amending the easement and the plaintiff would not receive $250. It is true that copies of the amended easements were not included with the notice. But the notice also gave the date, time and place of the fairness hearing and directed plaintiffs to inspect the settlement agreement or other litigation filings if they had any questions.

We are convinced, as was the district court, that the notice of settlement gave the class members ample information to decide whether additional research would be wise or useful. It “unquestionably alerted the recipients that they were members of a pending class action, that a settlement had been proposed, and that they had the right to state their objections at a fairness hearing.” Petrovic, 200 F.3d at 1153. Given the notice’s reference to monetary compensation for easements related to the pipeline, any possible inconsistency in another portion of the notice regarding whether one or both of the pipelines was involved should have alerted recipients to investigate the matter further. Barkema and the other plaintiffs evidently failed to do so. See id. (specific formula used to figure individual awards not required in settlement notice where class members “could easily acquire more detailed information” through telephone number provided). In any event the challenged statement, standing alone, is far from sufficient to warrant upsetting the judgment on due process grounds.

Because the notices in the original litigation met the requirements of due process, the district committed no error in dismissing the plaintiffs suit.

AFFIRMED.

      . In its ruling, the court characterized World-Corn’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as a motion to dismiss. When a motion for judgment on the pleadings is made prior to an answer denying the allegations in the petition, the court should view the motion for judgment on the pleadings as a motion to dismiss. Orud v. Groth, 652 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Iowa 2002). Because WorldCom filed its motion for judgment on the pleadings before answering Barkema’s petition, the district court properly considered it a motion to dismiss. Id.


author: HECHT, J.

text:
    In re the MARRIAGE OF Deeann Marie THOMPSON and Eli Allen Thompson. Upon the Petition of Deeann Marie Thompson, Petitioner-Appellee, And Concerning Eli Allen Thompson, Respondent-Appellant.
    No. 02-0979.
    Court of Appeals of Iowa.
    April 30, 2003.

      Michael Holzworth, Des Moines, and Jeanne Johnson, Des Moines, for appellant.
    Dedra Schroeder of the Schroeder Law Office, Charles City, for appellee.
    Heard by HUITINK, P.J., and MAHAN and HECHT, JJ.
   HECHT, J.

Eli Thompson appeals from an order denying his motion to set aside the default decree dissolving his marriage to DeeAnn Thompson. Our review of dissolution-of-marriage cases generally is de novo. In re Marriage of Geil, 509 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Iowa 1993). However, to the extent this appeal involves a question of statutory interpretation, our review is for correction of errors at law. BHC Co. v. Board of Review, 351 N.W.2d 523, 524 (Iowa 1984).

It is undisputed that Eli was in the military service and not represented by counsel at the time the default decree was entered on August 6, 2001. Although Eli was in the military at that time, no attorney was appointed to represent him or his interests. He subsequently filed a motion asserting the default was entered despite noncompliance with the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Relief Act and requesting the decree be set aside. The district court overruled Eli’s motion notwithstanding Eli’s assertion that at all material times he was stationed outside the United States in the military service of the United States, and was thus unable to defend himself in the dissolution action. The court concluded Eli’s failure to comply with the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically his failure to move to set aside the decree within sixty days after it was entered and his failure to introduce any evidence supporting the existence of good cause, precluded relief under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.977.

On appeal, Eli maintains the court erred in denying him relief under the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940. 50 U.S.C. app. § 501-591. We agree. The district court erred in rejecting Eli’s motion for noncompliance with the time constraints within rule 1.977. In Winship v. Gargiulo, 761 S.W.2d 301, 301 (Tex.1989), the Texas Supreme Court noted the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Relief Act created a “distinct right for which relief may be sought,” and determined “[t]here is no reason that this federally created procedure should be required to fit within one of our state’s existing procedures for vacating a default judgment.” Our supreme court has likewise stated under the Act “the right to have the judgment vacated upon proper showing ... is absolute.” Kirby v. Holman, 238 Iowa 355, 379, 25 N.W.2d 664, 677 (1947).

Here, the district court concluded Eli failed to move to vacate the decree within sixty days of its issuance, as rule 1.977 requires. The Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Relief Act permits a party to move to reopen within ninety days after he or she leaves the military service. It is not disputed Eli complied with this time limitation.

The district court determined “Eli failed to meet his burden to introduce evidence to establish good cause of the existence of at least one ground found in Rule 1.977.” Because Eli’s motion sought relief under the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Relief Act, he was not required to establish grounds for setting aside a default judgment under rule 1.977. As previously noted, the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Relief Act provides a distinct right for which relief may be sought regardless of the strictures of the Iowa rules of procedure. See Winship, 761 S.W.2d at 301. We conclude the district court’s error of law requires reversal. On remand, a hearing shall be held and the parties will be permitted to present evidence upon the issues of whether Eli (1) was prejudiced by reason of his military service in making his defense, and (2) has a meritorious or legal defense to the action or some part thereof. 50 U.S.C. app. § 520(4).

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

      . Section 520(1) provides in relevant part:
      If an affidavit is not filed showing that the defendant is not in the military service, no judgment shall be entered without first securing an order of court directing such . entry, and no such order shall be made if the defendant is in such service until after the court shall have appointed an attorney to represent defendant and protect his interest, and the court shall on application make such appointment.
      Section 520(4) provides in relevant part as follows:
      If any judgment shall be rendered in any action or proceeding governed by this section against any person in military service during the period of such service or within thirty days thereafter, and it appears that such person was prejudiced by reason of his military service in making his defense thereto, such judgment may, upon application, made by such person or his legal representative, not later than ninety days after the termination of such service, be opened by the court rendering the same and such defendant or his legal representative let in to defend; provided it is made to appear that the defendant has a meritorious or legal defense to the action of some part thereof.

      . The rule authorizes the district court to set aside a default or the judgment thereon for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or unavoidable casualty.


author: PAGE, Justice.

text:
    Debora K. HAUGLAND, as trustee for the heirs and next of kin of Robert John DONOVAN, Sr., Appellant, v. MAPLEVIEW LOUNGE & BOTTLESHOP, INC., Respondent, and Armadillo Willy’s, d/b/a Julio’s Bar, Respondent.
    No. CX-01-1395.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Aug. 7, 2003.

      Peter D. Plunkett, Warren F. Plunkett & Associates, Austin, MN, for Appellant.
    Peter M. Waldeck, Peter E. Lind, Wal-deck & Lind, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for Respondent Mapleview Lounge .& Bott-leshop.
    Steven E. Tomsche, Chandelle L. Heyer, Tomsche, Sonnesyn <& Tomsche, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for Respondent Armadillo Willy’s, d/b/a Julio’s Bar.
   OPINION

PAGE, Justice.

This pretrial appeal arises out of a single-vehicle drunk-driving accident in which the vehicle’s driver, Robert John Donovan Sr., was killed. Donovan Sr. died after allegedly having been served alcohol by respondent Mapleview Lounge & Bottlesh-op, Inc. (Mapleview), and respondent Armadillo Willy’s, d/b/a Julio’s Bar (Julio’s), in violation of Minnesota’s Civil Damages Act (the Act). See Minn.Stat. § 340A.801 (2002). Donovan Sr. is survived by a minor son, Robert John Donovan Jr. After first having been appointed Donovan Jr.’s conservator and wrongful death trustee for Donovan Sr.’s estate, Debora Haugland, Donovan Jr.’s maternal aunt, filed a lawsuit against Mapleview and Julio’s. The action was commenced eight days before the statute of limitations for claims under the Act expired. The complaint, captioned “Debra [sic] K. Haugland, as trustee for the next of kin of Robert John Donovan, Sr.,” sets out claims for wrongful death and for violations of the Act. See Minn. Stat. §§ 340A.801-.802; 573.02(3). After the limitations period expired, Mapleview and Julio’s moved to dismiss the action on the ground that Haugland was not a proper party to bring a claim under the Act. In response, Haugland moved to amend the complaint to change the caption to identify Donovan Jr. as the plaintiff and to clarify that the action was brought pursuant to the Act. Mapleview and Julio’s argued there was no valid complaint to amend because the original complaint did not name a party who could bring a civil damages claim. The district court granted Maple-view's and Julio’s motions to dismiss and denied Haugland’s motion to amend the complaint. The court of appeals affirmed. We granted review on the following two issues: (1) whether a complaint in a civil damages action can be amended after the statute of limitations period has expired to name the real party in interest; and (2) whether a conservator for the decedent’s surviving minor child may bring a civil damages action on behalf of the minor child. We reverse and remand.

On February 20, 1999, Donovan Sr. died in a motor-vehicle accident. On February 10, 2000, Haugland was appointed conservator for Donovan Jr. On February 8, 2001, she was appointed trustee for Donovan Sr.’s estate for the purpose of pursuing a wrongful death action. On February 12, 2001, Haugland initiated an action in Mower County District Court against Ma-pleview and Julio’s. Paragraph I of the complaint alleges: .

That the plaintiff herein, who is the conservator for Robert John Donovan, Jr., the only son of decedent Robert John Donovan, Sr., was duly appointed Trustee by order of the District Court of Mower County on the 8th day of February,. 2001, to prosecute an action for the wrongful death of Robert John Donovan, Sr. for the benefit of the next of kin, for whose benefit this action is brought, pursuant to the provisions of Minnesota Statute section 573.02(3).

Paragraphs II, III, and IV identify Ma-pleview and Julio’s as the defendants. Paragraph V alleges that the defendants “unlawfully sold, bartered, or gave intoxicating liquors to [Donovan Sr.] in violation” of Minnesota law. Paragraph VI alleges that those illegal sales caused or contributed to Donovan Sr.’s intoxication. Paragraph VII alleges that-Donovan Sr. operated his motor vehicle while under the influence of the illegally sold intoxicating liquor. Paragraph VIII alleges that, as a result of Donovan Sr.’s driving under -the influence of the illegally sold intoxicating liquor, he was involved in an accident that resulted in his death. Paragraph IX alleges that Donovan Sr.’s death was caused by the defendants’ illegal sale of the intoxicating liquor. ' Paragraph X states that the defendants received written notice of the civil damages claim as required by the Act. A copy of that notice was attached to the complaint as Exhibit A. Paragraph XI alleges that the defendants are liable for damages pursuant to the Act. Finally, paragraph XII of the complaint alleges that, as a result of the negligence of the defendants, Donovan Sr.’s survivors have suffered “permanent and substantial personal and pecuniary loss and have been deprived of the advice, counsel, comfort, protection, support and companionship” of Donovan Sr.

The complaint was filed eight days before the expiration of the Act’s two-year statute of limitations. After the expiration of the limitations period, Mapleview and Julio’s moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that Haugland, as trustee for the next of kin of Robert John Donovan Sr., could not bring a cause of action for civil damages. Haugland then sought to amend the complaint, specifically the caption heading naming the plaintiff to read “Robert John Donovan, Jr., a minor, by his Conservator and Guardian; ad Litem, Debra [sic] K. Haugland.” Haugland also sought to amend paragraph I of the complaint to state that the action was being brought under the Act. Finally, the proposed amended complaint deleted all references to a wrongful death claim.

Mapleview and Julio’s opposed allowing the complaint to be amended, arguing that there was no valid complaint to amend because the original complaint was brought by a party who did not have capacity to bring a claim under the Act. Therefore, they reasoned, the statute of limitations expired on Donovan Jr.’s civil damages claim before a valid lawsuit was commenced. Mapleview further argued that under the clear language of the Act a conservator does not have the authority to bring an action in the conservator’s own name.

Haugland argued that the complaint, although improperly captioned, set forth a valid civil damages claim on behalf of Donovan Jr. who, as a minor, could not bring the claim on his own. She claimed that the proposed amendment did not allege a different cause of action, but merely corrected the pleadings in the original cause of action and therefore she should be allowed to amend the complaint under Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.01, 15.08, and 17.01 to change the caption to reflect that the action was being brought by Donovan Jr. by and through Haugland and to clarify that the action was being brought under the Act.

The district court agreed with Maple-view and Julio’s and found that: (1) Haug-land, as trustee for the next of kin of Donovan Sr., did not have the capacity to bring a claim in her own name under the Act; (2) there was no valid complaint to which the proposed amended pleadings could relate back; and (3) the complaint, therefore, had to be dismissed. In affirming, the court of appeals concluded as did the, district court that Haugland did not, as either trustee or conservator, have a right of action in her own name under the Act and that, as a result, the original complaint was a legal nullity and could not be amended to assert a claim in the name of Donovan Jr. after the statute of limitations for a civil damages claim had expired.

I.

This case requires us to determine whether the original complaint filed by Haugland set out a legally sufficient civil damages action on behalf of Donovan Jr., such that the claim was not time barred and therefore the complaint could be amended and relate back to the original. We must also determine whether Haug-land, as conservator, may commence a civil damages action against Mapleview and Julio’s on Donovan Jr.’s behalf. We review questions of statutory construction de novo. K.R. v. Sanford, 605 N.W.2d 387, 389 (Minn.2000).

The Act provides in relevant part: A spouse, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person injured in person, property, or means of support, or who incurs other pecuniary loss by an intoxicated person or by the intoxication of another person, has a right of action in the person’s mm name for all damages sustained against a person who caused the intoxication of that person by illegally selling alcoholic beverages. All damages recovered by a minor under this section must be paid either to the minor or to the minor’s parent, guardian, or next friend as the court directs.

Minn.Stat. § 340A.801, subd. 1 (emphasis added). The Act is to be strictly construed. See Whitener v. Dahl, 625 N.W.2d 827, 833 (Minn.2001); see also Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 33, 70 N.W.2d 886, 891 (1955).

The court of appeals concluded that Haugland did not, either as trustee for Donovan Sr.’s next of kin or as conservator for Donovan Jr., have a right of action in her own name for personal injury or pecuniary loss. The court of appeals is correct in that conclusion. To bring an action against a liquor establishment under the Act a party must be a “spouse, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person injured * * * by an intoxicated person or by the intoxication of another person.” Minn.Stat. § 340A.801, subd. 1 (emphasis added). Because Haugland does not claim that she was injured in person or that she fits within the class of people identified under the Act who have a right of action, she has no right to bring a claim in her own name. Therefore, the complaint as originally captioned does not identify a proper party plaintiff under the Act.

This conclusion, however, does not end the inquiry. If the original complaint set out a legally sufficient civil damages action on behalf of Donovan Jr. before the statute of limitations expired, thus allowing the proposed amended complaint to relate back, and if Haugland, as conservator, has the capacity to bring the action' on Donovan Jr.’s behalf, dismissal of the complaint was improper.

As we understand Haugland’s argument, she does not seek to bring a claim in her own name as a person injured under the Act, but rather in Donovan Jr.’s name in her capacity as conservator. Haugland contends that the original complaint, even if improperly captioned, set out a legally sufficient civil damages action on behalf of Donovan Jr. who, as Donovan Sr.’s child, comes within the class of people identified in the Act and who suffered a permanent and substantial personal and pecuniary loss as a result of Mapleview and Julio’s allegedly illegal sale of intoxicating liquor to Donovan Sr. Noting that Donovan Jr. did not have the capacity to bring the action on his own behalf, Haugland argues that she should be permitted to amend the improperly captioned complaint to name Donovan Jr. as the real party in interest because the defect is technical, not substantive.

Mapleview and Julio’s argue that Haug-land, as conservator, cannot bring an action under the Act in her own name on Donovan Jr.’s behalf because conservators do not come within the class of people who can bring a claim under the Act. Therefore, they argue that the original complaint was a legal nullity and cannot be amended to set out a proper civil damages action because the statute of limitations on Donovan Jr.’s action has expired. In support of their arguments, Maplewood and Julio’s rely on Whitener v. Dahl, 625 N.W.2d 827 (Minn.2001), Ortiz v. Gavenda, 590 N.W.2d 119 (Minn.1999), and Regie de l’assurance Auto. du Quebec v. Jensen, 399 N.W.2d 85 (Minn.1987).

Minnesota is a notice pleading state. See Barton v. Moore, 558 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn.1997). “The primary function of notice pleading is to give the adverse party fair notice of the theory on which the claim for relief is based.” Id. Further, Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 provides that “whenever' the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.” See also Grothe v. Shaffer, 305 Minn. 17, 21-23, 232 N.W.2d 227, 231-32 (1975) (applying Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 to permit an amendment of the complaint to add a plaintiff after the statute of limitations had expired because the defendants had -notice of the new plaintiffs claim, were not unfairly prejudiced, and there was an identity of interest between the original and new pleading). Thus, if the original complaint put Mapleview and Julio’s on notice of a civil damages action by Donovan Jr., if amendment of the original complaint would not be unfairly prejudicial, and if the claim in the proposed amended complaint arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original complaint, then its amendment is permissible.

Our review of the original complaint satisfies us that it set out a valid claim under the Act on behalf of Donovan Jr. and gave Mapleview and Julio’s ample notice of that claim. Paragraphs V through XII of the original complaint allege all the necessary elements of a claim under the Act. They allege that Mapleview and Julio’s unlawfully sold intoxicating liquor to Donovan Sr., those sales caused or contributed to Donovan Sr.’s intoxication, Donovan Sr. operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of the illegally sold intoxicating liquor, Donovan Sr. was involved in a motor-vehicle accident while under the influence of the intoxicating liquor, the motor-vehicle accident resulted in Donovan Sr.’s death, Mapleview and Julio’s received the notice required for bringing a claim under the Civil Damages Act, Mapleview and Julio’s are liable for damages under the Civil Damages Act, and, finally, Donovan Sr.’s survivor. sustained personal and pecuniary loss as a result of-Donovan ⅜⅛ death. The notice referred to in paragraph X of the complaint identifies Donovan Jr. as Donovan Sr.’s only child.

Review of Haugland’s proposed amended complaint satisfies us that the amended complaint relies on the same factual allegations set forth in the original complaint. The amended complaint also clarifies that the action is brought under the Act, deletes all allegations referring to a wrongful death action, and changes the caption to clarify that the action is brought in Donovan Jr.’s name. Specifically, paragraphs V through XI of the proposed amended complaint are identical to those set forth in the original complaint. Paragraph XII clarifies that Donovan Jr. has been injured in person, property, and means of support. Because the proposed amended complaint relies on the same factual allegations that were alleged in the original complaint, we conclude that the claim set out in the proposed amended complaint “arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth * * * in the original pleading” and, therefore, consistent with Minn. R. Civ. P, 15.03, relates back to the original complaint. Because we conclude that the original complaint put Mapleview and Julio’s on notice of a valid civil damages claim on' behalf of Donovan Jr., the amended pleading was not prejudicial to the two defendants, and because the allegations set forth in the proposed amendment to that complaint arose out of the same conduct, transaction, and occurrences set forth in the complaint, we hold that it was error for the district court and court of appeals not to allow its amendment.

This holding is supported by our- decision in Richardson v. Kotek, 123 Minn. 360, 361-62, 143 N.W. 973, 974 (1913), in which we held that the failure to caption the action in the name of an incompetent person by her guardian was a technical error and that the plaintiff should have been allowed to amend her complaint when it was clear that the action was brought on behalf of the incompetent person. Here, as in Richardson, the original complaint set out a valid claim on behalf of a party who was not competent to bring the claim on his own, but with an improper caption. As in Richardson, the error was technical. Therefore, consistent with Richardson, the original complaint may be amended.

As for Mapleview and Julio’s reliance on Ortiz, Regie, and Whitener, review of those decisions leads us to conclude that they are either distinguishable or not helpful in the resolution of this case. Ortiz involved a wrongful death lawsuit. 590 N.W.2d at 120. As a condition precedent to bringing such a lawsuit, a trustee must be appointed to bring the action and the action must be commenced by the trustee within the statutory limitations period. Minn.Stat. § 573.02, subds. 1, 3 (2002). In Ortiz, the decedent’s wife signed a petition to be appointed trustee, but through inadvertence the petition was not filed. 590 N.W.2d at 121. We held that the filing of the action without a trustee having been appointed within the statute of limitations was a legal nullity because the appointment of a trustee to commence a wrongful death action was a condition precedent to bringing such an action. Id. at 122-24. In so holding, we relied on Regie, 399 N.W.2d 85, where we held that, since appointment of a trustee is a prerequisite to filing a wrongful death claim, a claim filed without such appointment is legally null. Id. at 122-23. That is not the case here. Unlike the Wrongful . Death Act, Minn.Stat. § 573.01-.02, this Act does not require the appointment of a trustee or other person in order to bring the action. See Minn. Stat. § 340A.801. Thus, neither Ortiz nor Regie precludes the result we reach today.

The third case relied on by respondents, Whitener, involved a claim under the Act brought, by the guardian ad litem of four minor children whose mother was killed in a motor-vehicle accident as a result of the defendants allegedly selling her intoxicating beverages beyond the legal limit. 625 N.W.2d 827, 828. The plaintiff filed suit after the two-year statute of limitations had expired, but. argued that the suit was nonetheless timely because of the minority tolling statute. Id. The. defendant liquor establishment moved for summary judgment, contending that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. We held that in the absence of clear legislative intent the minority tolling statute could not toll the Act’s statute of limitations. Id. at 833-34. The case before us is distinguishable in that a legally valid, albeit improperly captioned, civil damages complaint was filed before the Act’s limitations period expired.

II.

To the extent that Mapleview and Julio’s argument is that even if the proposed amended complaint does relate back, Haugland, as conservator, does not have the capacity generally to bring the claim on Donovan Jr.’s behalf in Donovan Sr.’s name, we find that argument unpersuasive. Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 17.02 authorizes a “representative duly appointed under the laws of this state” to sue on behalf of a minor. In the order appointing Haugland conservator of Donovan Jr., she was granted all of the powers and duties given to a guardian of the estate as set out in the relevant statute, including:

(3) The duty to possess and manage the estate, collect all debts and claims in favor of the ward or conservatee, or, with the approval of the court, compromise them, institute suit on behalf of the ward or conservatee and represent the ward or conservatee in any court proceedings * * *.

Minn.Stat. § 525.56, subd. 4(3) (2002) (emphasis added). Thus, Haugland, as the representative of Donovan Jr. appointed under the state’s laws, has the authority to bring a civil damages action in Donovan Jr.’s name on his behalf as a person injured under the Act. Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

      . Minnesota Statutes § 573.02(3) sets out a cause of action under the Wrongful Death Act.

      . Haugland also petitioned the court to be appointed Donovan Jr.'s guardian. The status of the petition at the time she requested permission to amend the complaint is not clear from the record. However, her status as guardian is not at issue here.

      . The defendants acknowledge in their briefs to this court that the Act permits a minor child to bring an action in his own name by and through another person, but argue that an otherwise-qualified person cannot bring an action on behalf of the minor child.