author:
MEYER, Justice.
      PAGE, Justice ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Chief Justice ANDERSON, PAUL H.

text:
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Andre Francis HALL, Appellant.
    No. A05-1534.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Oct. 12, 2006.

      John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant State Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.
    Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondent.
   OPINION

MEYER, Justice.

Appellant Andre Francis Hall appeals his conviction for the October 5, 2004, shooting death of Dennis Winfield. A Hennepin County jury found Hall guilty of first-degree murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2004), second-degree murder in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2004), and being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm in violation of Minn.Stat. § 624.713, subds. 1(b), 2(b) (2004). The trial court entered judgment of conviction on first-degree murder and sentenced Hall to the mandatory term of life in prison. Hall raises four claims on appeal: (1) the trial court erred when it gave a jury instruction on transferred intent; (2) the transferred intent instruction constituted an improper constructive amendment of the indictment; (3) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied two motions relating to juror bias; and (4) he was denied the right to a public trial when the trial court imposed a blanket exclusion of children from the courtroom.

The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows. C.S. and her younger sister, P.S., were temporarily residing with their “god sister,” A.M., at A.M.’s apartment in Brooklyn Center. On the evening of October 4, 2004, C.S. rode a bus from downtown Minneapolis to Brooklyn Center. Hall, who was A.M.’s ex-boyfriend, was also on the bus. While on the bus, C.S. saw Hall drinking alcohol and overheard Hall trying to sell a gun to a group of men. C.S. and Hall exited the bus at the same bus stop and both walked to A.M.’s apartment. When Hall and C.S. arrived, A.M., P.S., and three men were present in the apartment. A.M. noticed that Hall had a gun and asked Hall to put it out of sight because she was “terrified of guns.” Hall put the gun on top of an entertainment center. Shortly thereafter, A.M. and Hall walked to a Citgo gas station, approximately one and one-half blocks from the apartment. Hall did not bring the gun to the Citgo station.

Winfield was the clerk on duty at the Citgo station. He was working in the cashier’s booth, which was protected by bulletproof glass. M.G., a regular patron at the station, was also present. While Hall and A.M. were collecting items to purchase, Hall turned to M.G. and allegedly said either, “F* * *ot, quit looking at my girlfriend,” or ‘Why are you looking at my girl?” At that point, an argument ensued between Winfield and Hall. A.M. asked . Hall to leave, but Hall refused, so A.M. returned to her apartment alone.

M.G. testified that after A.M. left, Hall said to Winfield, “This bulletproof glass isn’t [going] to save you.” Hall also asked Winfield to go outside so they could fight. At some point during the argument, Win-field left the cashier’s booth, locked the door to the gas station, and demanded that Hall return the merchandise he was holding before allowing Hall to leave. Hall returned the merchandise, and Winfield unlocked the door and allowed Hall to leave.

After leaving, Hall got into a fight with a number of unidentified men just outside the station. Winfield walked outside and told the men that if they did not break up the fight he would call the police, at which point the men stopped fighting and left the area.

Hall returned to A.M.’s apartment with a bloody face and told A.M. and C.S. that he “got jumped” by three men, and he said words to the effect that he was “going to kill them.” Hall also threw two telephones against the wall and eventually left the apartment, taking the gun with him.

Because she did not know where Hall was going, A.M. asked C.S. to go looking for him. C.S. ran to the Citgo station, but Hall was not there. She told Winfield that he should be careful because Hall had left the apartment and had a gun. Winfield called 911 to report the incident. That call was received at 2:46 a.m.

Later, M.G. helped Winfield take some garbage outside to the Citgo station’s dumpster. M.G. testified that, .while doing so, he saw Hall walk across the street to the area near the dumpster where he and Winfield were, at which point Hall pulled out a gun and shot Winfield at least four times from point blank range. According to M.G., when Hall finished shooting, Hall turned and ran from the scene, and M.G. went into the station and called 911. M.G.’s 911 call was received at 3:14 a.m. Winfield died of multiple gunshot wounds.

After the shooting, Hall returned to A.M.’s apartment, where he told P.S. and C.S., “I got that ni* * *r,” or “I capped that ni* * *r,” or “I killed that ni* * *r.” Hall asked C.S. to “get rid of’ the gun, but she was unable to do so before the police arrived and arrested Hall. Hall was able, however, to have the gun wiped off and then hidden before he was arrested. He was also able to change his clothes. During a search of the apartment after Hall’s arrest, the police found a .40 caliber gun, which forensic experts subsequently determined was the gun used to kill Winfield.

At trial, the state’s primary theory of the case was that Hall premeditated Win-field’s murder because Hall was angry about the altercation with Winfield. As an alternative argument, the state advanced a transferred intent theory, arguing that if Hall left the apartment with the intent to kill the unidentified men, then he could be found guilty of the premeditated murder of Winfield. At the end of the trial, the judge instructed the jury that the premeditation element could be found if Hall had the intent to cause the death of another. During trial, Hall conceded that he was guilty of the firearm possession and second-degree murder charges, but maintained that Winfield’s murder was not premeditated.

We are asked to determine whether the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on transferred intent. At trial, Hall elicited testimony from A.M. that when Hall returned to A.M.’s apartment from the Citgo station the first time, he was angry about the fight he had been in with the unidentified men. On cross-examination, the state elicited similar testimony that when Hall returned to A.M.’s apartment he was upset about the fight with the unidentified men, but was not angry about his verbal altercation with Winfield. Hall elicited this testimony to show that he did not premeditate Winfield’s murder. In response to this testimony, the state requested that the jury be given a transferred intent instruction. The trial court gave the following instruction on the elements of first-degree murder:

The elements of murder in the first degree are, first, the death of Dennis Lamont Winfield, Jr. must be proven. Second, the Defendant caused the death of Dennis Lamont Winfield, Jr. Third, the Defendant acted with premeditation and with the intent to kill Dennis Lamont Winfield, Jr. or another person.
Premeditation means that the Defendant considered, planned, prepared for, or determined to commit the act before the Defendant committed it. Premeditation, being a process of the mind, is wholly subjective and, hence, not susceptible to proof by direct evidence. It may be inferred from all the circumstances surrounding the event. It is not necessary that premeditation exist for any specific length of time. A premeditated decision to kill may be reached in a short period of time. However, a[n] unconsidered or rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not premeditated.
In order to have had an intent to kill, the Defendant must have acted with the purpose of causing death, or the Defendant must have believed that the act would have that result.
If the Defendant acted with premeditation and with the intent to cause the death of another, the element of premeditation and intent to kill is satisfied, even though the Defendant did not intend to kill Dennis Lamont Winfield, Jr.
Fourth, the Defendant’s act took place on or about October 5, 2004 in Hennepin County.

(Emphasis added.) Hall objected to the inclusion of that part of the instruction dealing with transferred intent, which reads, “If the Defendant acted with premeditation and with the intent to cause the death of another, the element of premeditation and intent to kill is satisfied, even though the Defendant did not intend to kill Dennis Lamont Winfield, Jr.”

On appeal, Hall argues that the transferred intent instruction was inappropriate because (1) transferred intent only applies if the perpetrator intends to commit a crime against one person and then actually commits the crime against an unintended victim; and (2) there was no evidence that Hall premeditated or intended the murder of the unidentified men with whom he had fought outside the Citgo station. The state argues that there was sufficient evidence to support a transferred intent instruction based on A.M.’s testimony, from which the inference could be drawn that Hall intended and premeditated the murder of one or more of the unidentified men.

“The decision to give a requested jury instruction lies in the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Palubicki, 700 N.W.2d 476, 487 (Minn.2005). A party is entitled to an instruction if the evidence produced at trial supports the instruction. State v. Richardson, 393 N.W.2d 657, 665 (Minn.1986). A mistaken jury instruction does not require a new trial if the error was harmless. State v. Kuhnau, 622 N.W.2d 552, 558 (Minn.2001). An erroneous jury instruction is harmless only if it can be said that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the error had no significant impact on the verdict rendered. Id. at 558-59.

Intent “means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will cause that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2004). Intent to kill may be inferred from the manner of the killing. State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn.1997). Premeditation “means to consider, plan or prepare for, or determine to commit, the act referred to prior to its commission.” Minn.Stat. § 609.18 (2004). “Premeditation is defined as ‘a state of mind generally proved circumstantially by drawing inferences from a defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances.’ ” State v. Mom, 678 N.W.2d 29, 39 (Minn.2004) (quoting State v. Brocks, 587 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Minn.1998)). Premeditation can be inferred from planning activity, motive, and the nature of the killing. Id. at 40. We have said, “In order to prove premeditation, ‘the state must always prove that, after the defendant formed the intent to kill, some appreciable time passed during which the consideration, planning, preparation or determination required * * * prior to the commission of the act took place.’ ” State v. Netland, 535 N.W.2d 328, 330 (Minn.1995) (quoting State v. Moore, 481 N.W.2d 355, 361 (Minn.1992)).

The doctrine of transferred intent is recognized in Minnesota. State v. Sutherlin, 396 N.W.2d 238, 240 (Minn.1986). That doctrine, “derived from the common law, is the principle that a defendant may be convicted if it is proved he intended to injure one person but actually harmed another.” 9 Henry W. McCarr & Jack S. Nordby, Minnesota Practice — Criminal Law and Procedure § 44.8 (3d ed.2001); see also State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 395 n. 1 (Minn.1998) (“The doctrine of transferred intent is frequently applied in cases where the accused intends to kill one person, but, because of bad aim, kills another.”). This is because the public policy goal of transferred intent is to hold the actor culpable for his intended actions. 1 Wayne R. La-Fave, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.4(d), at 475 (2d ed.2003); see McCarr & Nordby, supra, § 44.8.

Transferred intent can apply to first-degree premeditated murder. See Sutherlin, 396 N.W.2d at 240. Premeditation will transfer with intent if the perpetrator premeditated the murder of an intended victim but accidentally killed an unintended victim. See id. Transferred intent with respect to premeditated murder has been described as follows:

[I]f A without justification aims at B with a premeditated and deliberate intent to kill B (so that if he should kill B he would be guilty of first degree murder) but, missing B, he accidentally hits and kills C, A is * * * guilty of the first degree murder of C.

2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 14.7(a), at 482 (2d ed.2003). We have applied the transferred intent doctrine in accordance with that description. See State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 219, 229 (Minn.1995) (applying transferred intent doctrine when, in the course of shooting a police officer, defendant wounded a bystander); State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 323 (Minn.1990) (holding intent to kill mother is transferable to her fetus); Sutherlin, 396 N.W.2d at 239-40 (holding defendant guilty of first-degree premeditated murder through transferred intent when defendant premeditated and intended the murder of one man but accidentally shot and killed a bystander). Thus, in order for the transferred intent doctrine to apply in this case, Hall, in taking the actions that resulted in Winfield’s death, must have premeditated and intended to kill someone other than Winfield but accidentally killed Winfield instead.

The transferred intent instruction permitted the jury to find that the premeditation element was met if they believed Hall intended to kill anyone besides Winfield. Although evidence was presented at trial suggesting that Hall had premeditation toward Winfield, based on the evidence presented a reasonable juror also could have concluded that Hall had premeditation and intent to kill the three unidentified men with whom Hall had fought. Both the defense and the state elicited testimony from A.M. indicating that when Hall left her apartment with his gun he was angry and upset because he was “jumped” by the unidentified men. In fact, on cross-examination, A.M. stated that Hall said nothing about the earlier incident with Winfield. Instead, A.M. testified that after Hall arrived at her apartment, he repeatedly yelled that he had been “jumped” by three men and stated that he was “going to kill 'em.” This evidence may have been sufficient to permit a jury to infer that Hall had a premeditated intent to kill another person, one of the unidentified men, when he shot Win-field.

The facts of this case do not justify a transferred intent jury instruction. Here, there was no evidence in the record that Winfield was an unintended victim; indeed, there was no evidence showing that when Hall shot Winfield he intended to kill anyone except Winfield. M.G., the only witness to the incident, testified that Hall shot Winfield at point blank and that nothing separated Hall from Winfield at the time of the shooting. Hall also conceded at trial that he had intentionally killed Winfield. Because our rule for giving the transferred intent instruction requires that at the time of his actions the defendant intended to kill one person but instead accidentally killed another person, we conclude that the trial court erred when it gave the transferred intent instruction.

Having concluded that the transferred intent instruction was erroneous, we must determine whether the error in giving the instruction was harmless. An erroneous jury instruction is harmless only if it can be said that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the error had no significant impact on the verdict. Kuhnau, 622 N.W.2d at 558-59. We can consider the prosecutor’s closing argument to determine whether an erroneous instruction had a significant impact on the verdict. See State v. Olson, 482 N.W.2d 212, 216 (Minn. 1992).

The prosecutor’s closing argument here emphasized that the jury could conclude that Hall premeditated Winfield’s murder if the jury determined that he premeditated the murder of “those unidentified men.”

If Andre Hall acted with premeditation and with intent to cause the death of another, the element of premeditation and intent to kill is satisfied even though Andre Hall did not intend to kill Dennis Winfield. This instruction enables you to consider evidence solicited by the Defense by [A.M.]. And that was some suggestion that the Defendant retrieved his handgun and left the apartment, not with the intention to kill Dennis Win-field, but to kill those unidentified men who jumped him after leaving the gas station.
Either way, ladies and gentlemen, as the instruction reads, if he left with that intent and was thinking about it before he actually acted, even though the ultimate target was Dennis Winfield, premeditation — the element of premeditation is satisfied.

(Emphasis added.) The erroneous instruction, particularly when viewed in light of the prosecutor’s closing argument, instructed the jury that it did not have to find that Hall premeditated Winfield’s murder. The verdict could have been based on the premeditated murder “of another.” In allowing the jury to find Hall guilty of first-degree premeditated murder without finding that Hall premeditated the actual murder, the state was relieved of its burden of proving premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt.

We have consistently held that when an erroneous jury instruction eliminates a required element of the crime this type of error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In Kuhnau, we held that a jury instruction on conspiracy to commit the crime of sale of a controlled substance was error when the court did not include in the instruction the language requiring that the defendant “knew or believed that the substance was a controlled substance.” 622 N.W.2d at 558 (holding that the instruction was erroneous because it “did not require the jury to find all of the same elements of the substantive crime that were contained in the instructions on the other similar sale counts the jury had under consideration.”). Because the instruction allowed the jury to reach a verdict of guilty without finding every required element of the crime, we held that the error was not harmless. Id. at 559. In State v. Williams, we reversed a criminal conviction because an improper jury instruction constituted a mandatory presumption, thus relieving the state of its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the charged crime. 324 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Minn.1982). In Olson, we held that a trial court erroneously instructed the jury on a “permissive inference,” namely that the jury could infer knowing possession of a controlled substance based on certain facts in evidence. 482 N.W.2d at 215. In applying the harmless error analysis in that case, we said: “Although defendant probably would have been convicted in any event, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he would have been convicted in any event.” Id. at 216.

The facts of this case require the same conclusion. Hall conceded at trial that he was guilty of second-degree intentional murder; the only element the state had to prove was the element' of premeditation. Because the transferred intent instruction pertained directly to the element of premeditation and because that instruction relieved the jury of its obligation to find that the element of premeditation was satisfied, the instruction was not harmless. Moreover, although there was evidence that Hall premeditated Winfield’s murder, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Hall would have been convicted of first-degree premeditated murder without the erroneous transferred intent instruction.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

PAGE, Justice

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. In reversing Hall’s conviction, the court concludes that the trial court’s error in instructing the jury on transferred intent was not harmless because it relieved the state of its burden of proof as to the required element of premeditation. That conclusion is wrong.

Given Hall’s concession that he intended to kill Winfield and the fact that at the time of Winfield’s killing the men with whom Hall had fought earlier were not in the vicinity, the only issue for the jury to decide was whether Hall premeditated Winfield’s killing. Premeditation “means to consider, plan or prepare for, or determine to commit, the act referred to prior to its commission.” Minn.Stat. § 609.18 (2004). “Premeditation is defined as ‘a state of mind generally proved circumstantially by drawing inferences from a defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances.’ ” State v. Moua, 678 N.W.2d 29, 39 (Minn.2004) (quoting State v. Brocks, 587 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Minn.1998)). Premeditation can be inferred from planning activity, motive, and the nature of the killing. Id. at 40. We have said, “In order to prove premeditation, ‘the state must always prove that, after the defendant formed the intent to kill, some appreciable time passed during which the consideration, planning, preparation or determination required * * * prior to the commission of the act took place.’ ” State v. Netland, 535 N.W.2d 328, 330 (Minn.1995) (quoting State v. Moore, 481 N.W.2d 355, 361 (Minn.1992)). Thus, it is clear from the statutory definition of “premeditation” and our case law that premeditation has two predicates— intent and an act. Absent either intent or an act, premeditation cannot be found.

We have recognized three categories of evidence relevant to an inference of premeditation: (1) planning activity, for example, evidence regarding how or when the defendant retrieved or obtained the weapon; (2) motive evidence, that is, “ ‘facts about the defendant’s prior relationship and conduct with the victim from which motive may be inferred’ and (3) evidence regarding the nature of the killing, for example, the number of shots and whether the defendant shot within close range. Moua, 678 N.W.2d at 40-41 (quoting Moore, 481 N.W.2d at 361).

When determining whether the erroneous instruction was harmless, we must consider the instruction in its entirety. State v. Ihle, 640 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn. 2002) (explaining that to determine whether jury instructions fairly and adequately explain the law of the case, they must be viewed in their entirety). We presume that the jury followed the instructions as given. State v. Budreau, 641 N.W.2d 919, 926 (Minn.2002) (recognizing the court’s presumption that jurors follow the court’s instructions). In this case, the trial court gave the following instruction on premeditation and intent.

The elements of murder in the first degree are, first, the death of Dennis Lamont Winfield, Jr. must be proven. Second, the Defendant caused the death of Dennis Lamont Winfield, Jr. Third, the Defendant acted with premeditation and with the intent to kill Dennis Lamont Winfield, Jr. or another person.
Premeditation means that the Defendant considered, planned, prepared for, or determined to commit the act before the Defendant committed it. Premeditation, being a process of the mind, is wholly subjective and, hence, not susceptible to proof by direct evidence. It may be inferred from all the circumstances surrounding the event. It is not necessary that premeditation exist for any specific length of time. A premeditated decision to kill may be reached in a short period of time. However, a[n] unconsidered or rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not premeditated.
In order to have had an intent to kill, the Defendant must have acted with the purpose of causing death, or the Defendant must have believed that the act would have that result.
If the Defendant acted with premeditation and with the intent to cause the death of another, the element of premeditation and intent to kill is satisfied, even though the Defendant did not intend to kill Dennis Lamont Winfield, Jr.
Fourth, the Defendant’s act took place on or about October 5, 2004 in Hennepin County.

Viewing the instructions in their entirety and assuming, as we must, that the jury followed the instructions, I conclude that the error in giving the transferred intent instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The doctrine of transferred intent is recognized in Minnesota. State v. Sutherlin, 396 N.W.2d 238, 240 (Minn.1986). Transferred intent can apply to first-degree premeditated murder. See id. at 239-40. Premeditation will transfer with intent if the perpetrator premeditated the murder of an intended victim but accidentally or mistakenly killed an unintended victim. See id. at 240. Transferred intent with respect to premeditated murder has been described as follows:

[I]f A without justification aims at B with a premeditated and deliberate intent to kill B (so that if he should kill B he would be guilty of first degree murder) but, missing B, he accidentally hits and kills C, A is * * * guilty of the first degree murder of C.

2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 14.7(a), at 482 (2d ed.2003). We have applied the transferred intent doctrine in accordance with that description. See State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 219, 229 (Minn.1995) (applying transferred intent doctrine when, in the course of shooting a police officer, defendant wounded a bystander); State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 323 (Minn.1990) (holding intent to kill mother is transferable to her fetus); Sutherlin, 396 N.W.2d at 239-40 (holding defendant guilty of first-degree premeditated murder through transferred intent when defendant premeditated and intended the murder of one man but accidentally shot and killed a bystander). Thus, in order for the transferred intent doctrine to apply in this case, Hall, in shooting and killing Win-field, must have premeditated and intended to kill someone other than Winfield but accidentally or mistakenly killed Winfield instead. But that is not what happened here. As the court explained, it was error to give the instruction because “there was no evidence in the record that Winfield was an unintended victim; indeed, there was no evidence showing that when Hall shot Winfield he intended to kill anyone except Winfield.” For the same reason, the error in giving the instruction was harmless.

The court concludes that the error was not harmless because there is evidence in the record from which the jury could have inferred that between the time Hall retrieved the gun and arrived at the Citgo station he considered, planned or prepared for, or determined, that is, he premeditated, the killing of the unidentified men. The court concludes that the jury may then have used the premeditation relating to the unidentified men to convict Hall of the premeditated murder of Winfield without making a determination as to whether Hall premeditated Winfield’s killing. The court’s conclusion ignores our definition of “premeditation,” our law on transferred intent, the instructions actually given, our presumption that juries follow those instructions, and the factual circumstances of Winfield’s killing.

Here, the trial court’s instruction on premeditation and intent relating to Win-field accurately stated the law. At the same time, under the erroneously given transferred intent instruction, transferred intent would have come into play and the elements of premeditation and intent to kill would have been satisfied only “if the Defendant acted with premeditation and with the intent to cause the death of another” (emphasis added). There is no evidence from which the jury could have found both intent and an act with respect to the unidentified men. Clearly, after Hall returned to the Citgo station, no act of any kind with respect to the unidentified men took place. Therefore, the jury could not have found that Hall premeditated the killing of the unidentified men. And, to state the obvious, there being no premeditation with respect to the unidentified men, there was no premeditation that could be transferred and used to satisfy the element of premeditation with respect to Winfield. There was, however, ample evidence to support a jury finding that Hall “acted” with intent with respect to Win-field and from which it could be inferred that Hall premeditated Winfield’s killing.

The evidence demonstrating that Hall intended to kill Winfield and no one else is striking. Hall conceded at trial that at the time of the act referred to, i.e., the killing of Winfield, he intended to kill Winfield and not the unidentified men. Moreover, the record supports that conclusion even without Hall’s concession. There is nothing in the record showing that the unidentified men were anywhere in the vicinity at the time Winfield was shot, nor is there anything in the record from which it could be inferred that, at the time of the shooting, Hall intended to kill anyone other than Winfield or that he killed Winfield by accident or mistake. Indeed, after Hall returned to the Citgo station, the evidence shows that he did not act, either with or without premeditation, to carry out any intentional killing with respect to the unidentified men.

Rather, the record shows that Winfield and M.G. were taking garbage to the dumpster when Hall arrived at the Citgo station, crossed the street, walked across the station’s apron, walked up to Winfield, displayed a gun, shot Winfield multiple times from point-blank range, and then fled. In that there was nothing before the jury that the jury could have used to reach the conclusion that, at the time Hall shot and killed Winfield, Hall intended to shoot and kill any of the unidentified men, the jury could not have concluded that Hall acted with intent to kill the unidentified men when he killed Winfield. Because the jury could not have concluded that Hall acted with intent to kill the unidentified men, the jury could not have used the theory of transferred intent as the basis for finding that Hall premeditated Win-field’s murder.

In addition to evidence of Hall’s intent to kill Winfield, there is strong evidence from which the jury could infer that, after Hall formed the intent to kill Winfield, some appreciable amount of time passed during which Hall considered, planned or prepared for, or determined to kill Win-field before acting to kill him. Upon his return to the Citgo station, Hall crossed the street to the station, crossed the station’s apron, walked up to Winfield, pulled out his weapon, fired multiple shots at Winfield from a close range, and then fled. That Hall acted with premeditation as to Winfield can also be inferred from the events that occurred before he returned to the Citgo station, including the confrontation between Hall and Winfield during which Hall threatened Winfield, saying “[t]his bulletproof glass isn’t [going] to save you,” and Winfield locking Hall in the Citgo station until Hall returned the items he had originally intended to buy. Given the evidence, the jury could only have concluded that Hall premeditated Win-field’s murder and could not resort to transferring premeditation relating to someone other than Winfield as the basis for satisfying the premeditation element. Therefore, the trial court’s error in giving the transferred intent instruction was harmless.

The trial proceedings support that conclusion. The central focus of the trial, and all of the evidence produced at trial, except for A.M.’s brief testimony that Hall was angry at the unidentified men when he returned to the apartment and retrieved the gun, was directed at establishing that Hall premeditated and intended Winfield’s murder. While it is true that during closing argument the prosecutor misstated the law as well as the transferred intent instruction given by the court when he argued that the jury could find that Hall premeditated Winfield’s murder by finding that Hall premeditated the murder of the unidentified men, that argument consisted of 16 lines in the middle of the state’s 21-page closing argument. The state’s argument began with the prosecutor quoting Hall’s threat to Winfield that the bulletproof glass would not protect him. The rest of the argument consisted of the facts surrounding the shooting of Winfield, as they related to the elements of the second-degree intentional murder, premeditated first-degree murder with respect to Win-field, and the fact that Hall’s intoxication defense was not supported by the record.

Because I conclude that the trial court’s error in giving the transferred intent instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, I would affirm Hall’s convictions.

ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Chief Justice

(dissenting).

I join in the dissent of Justice Page.

ANDERSON, PAUL H.

(dissenting).

I join in the dissent of Justice Page.

      . Although he was 17 years old at the time of the offense, Hall was certified to stand trial as an adult.

      . Because we have concluded that the trial court’s erroneous jury instruction did not amount to harmless error and have remanded this case for a new trial, we do not reach Hall's remaining three arguments.

      . I also note that, for the erroneously given instruction to have harmed Hall, the jury would have had to reject or ignore all of the evidence from which it could be inferred that Hall premeditated Winfield’s murder. Given the extrinsic evidence in the record from which it could be inferred that Hall premeditated Winfield’s murder, it is highly unlikely that the jury rejected or ignored each and every piece of that evidence in finding that Hall premeditated Winfield’s murder.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Helen M. Meyer Associate Justice

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re PETITION FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST Kenneth B. HUBER, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 164355.
    No. A06-1758.
    Supreme Court of Minnesota.
    Oct. 12, 2006.
   ORDER

The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility has filed a petition for disciplinary action alleging that respondent Kenneth B. Huber committed professional misconduct warranting public discipline, namely, that during settlement negotiations in a workers’ compensation matter, respondent suggested that he may subpoena claimant’s wife and ask her to testify regarding an irrelevant videotape obtained by respondent’s client which was potentially embarrassing to the claimant, in violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 4.4 (2005) and 8.4(d).

Respondent admits his conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, waives his rights under Rule 14, Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR), and has entered into a stipulation with the Director in which they jointly recommend that the appropriate discipline is a public reprimand and payment of $900 in costs under Rule 24, RLPR.

This court has independently reviewed the file and approves the jointly recommended disposition.

Based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent Kenneth B. Huber is publicly reprimanded. Respondent shall pay the sum of $900 in costs under Rule 24, RLPR. BY THE COURT:

/s/

Helen M. Meyer Associate Justice


author: PETERSON, Judge.

text:
    In the Matter of the WELFARE OF C.T.L., Juvenile.
    No. A06-874.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Oct. 10, 2006.

      Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, and Douglas H. Johnson, Washington County Attorney, Mary M. Pieper, Assistant County Attorney, Stillwater, MN, for appellant.
    John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Lawrence Hammerling, Deputy Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, and Megan H. Schlueter, Assistant Washington County Public Defender, Stillwater, MN, for respondent.
    Considered and decided by RANDALL, Presiding Judge; KALITOWSKI, Judge; and PETERSON, Judge.
   OPINION

PETERSON, Judge.

A delinquency petition was filed alleging that respondent aided and abetted first-degree aggravated robbery and committed fifth-degree assault. Appellant moved for an order requiring respondent to provide a biological specimen for the purpose of DNA analysis pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 299C.105 (Supp.2005). Respondent challenged the constitutionality of Minn.Stat. § 299C.105 and moved for an order certifying the issue of the statute’s constitutionality to this court as an important and doubtful question. The district court held that the statute’s “compulsory DNA profiling of criminal defendants prior to conviction” is unconstitutional and certified as important and doubtful the question of whether the provisions of Minn.Stat. § 299C.105 that require charged defendants to provide a DNA sample upon a judicial finding of probable cause, but before any conviction on the charged offense, is an unconstitutional search in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution. We answer the certified question in the affirmative.

FACTS

Respondent C.T.L., a juvenile, was charged with one count each of fifth-degree assault, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1(1)(2) (2004), and aiding and abetting first-degree aggravated robbery, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2004). Appellant State of Minnesota moved for an order requiring C.T.L. to report to the sheriffs office immediately after his initial appearance in district court to provide a biological specimen for the purpose of DNA analysis pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 299C.105 (Supp. 2005). Respondent then moved for an order finding that the provisions of Minn.Stat. § 299C.105 that require law-enforcement personnel to obtain biological samples from certain defendants before any finding of guilt violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution. Respondent also moved for an order certifying the issue of the statute’s constitutionality to this court as an important or doubtful question.

Following a hearing, the district court issued an order holding unconstitutional the statute’s “compulsory DNA profiling of criminal defendants prior to conviction” and certifying the issue to this court as important and doubtful because of its “broad and far reaching implications for all defendants charged with crimes in the state of Minnesota.”

ISSUE

Do the portions of Minn.Stat. § 299C.105, subd. 1(a)(1) and (3) (Supp. 2005), that direct law-enforcement personnel to take a biological specimen from a person who has been charged with an offense, but not convicted, violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution?

ANALYSIS

“This court accepts certification of questions regarding criminal statutes as important and doubtful when the challenged statute has statewide application and the question has not previously been decided.” State v. Mireles, 619 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn.App.2000), review denied (Minn. Feb. 15, 2001). Whether Minn. Stat. § 299C.105 (Supp.2005) directs law-enforcement personnel to conduct unconstitutional searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution has not been addressed by Minnesota appellate courts, and an answer to this question will have statewide application. Therefore, the district court properly certified the question.

The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. State v. Wright, 588 N.W.2d 166, 168 (Minn.App.1998), review denied (Minn. Feb. 24, 1999). Minnesota statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and a court’s power to declare a statute unconstitutional “should be exercised with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary.” State v. Machholz, 574 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Minn.1998) (quoting In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989)). A party challenging a statute has the burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional. Id. (quotation omitted).

The statute that C.T.L. challenges directs law-enforcement personnel to take a biological specimen from C.T.L. for the purpose of DNA analysis. The statute states:

Sheriffs, peace officers, and community corrections agencies operating secure juvenile detention facilities shall take or cause to be taken biological specimens for the purpose of DNA analysis as defined in section 299C.155, of the following:
(3) juveniles who have appeared in court and have had a judicial probable cause determination on a charge of committing ...
(iv) robbery under section 609.24 or aggravated robbery under section 609.245[.]

Minn.Stat. § 299C.105, subd. l(a)(3)(iv).

Minn.Stat. § 299C.155, subd. 1 (Supp. 2005), defines “DNA analysis” as “the process through which deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) in a human biological specimen is analyzed and compared with DNA from another human biological specimen for identification purposes.” The Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) is required to “adopt uniform procedures and protocols to maintain, preserve, and analyze human biological specimens for DNA” and “establish a centralized system to cross-reference data obtained from DNA analysis.” Minn.Stat. § 299C.155, subd. 3 (Supp. 2005). The BCA is also required to “perform DNA analysis and make data obtained available to law enforcement officials in connection with criminal investigations in which human biological specimens have been recovered.” Minn.Stat. § 299C.155, subd. 4 (Supp. 2005). Biological specimens taken under Minn.Stat. § 299C.105, subd. 1(a), must be forwarded to the BCA within 72 hours. Minn.Stat. § 299C.105, subd. 1(b).

In addition to the provision that applies to C.T.L., Minn.Stat. § 299C.105, subd. 1(a), directs law-enforcement personnel to take biological specimens from (1) juveniles who have had a probable-cause determination on a charge of any one of several enumerated offenses or who have been adjudicated delinquent for committing, or attempting to commit, any of the offenses; Minn.Stat. § 299C.105, subd. 1(a)(3); (2) persons who have had a judicial probable-cause determination on a charge of committing, or have been convicted of committing or attempting to commit, any of several enumerated offenses; Minn.Stat. § 299C.105, subd. 1(a)(1); and (3) persons sentenced as patterned sex offenders under Minn.Stat. § 609.108; Minn.Stat. § 299C.105, subd. 1(a)(2).

The certified question before us involves only the portions of Minn.Stat. § 299C.105, subd. 1(a)(1) and (3) that direct law-enforcement personnel to take biological specimens from juveniles and adults who have had a probable-cause determination on a charged offense but who have not been convicted. If one of these people is later found not guilty, the BCA is required to destroy the biological specimen taken from the person who is found not guilty and to return all records to the person. Minn. Stat. § 299C.105, subd. 3(a). If the charge against one of these people is later dismissed, the BCA is required to destroy the biological specimen and return all records to the person upon the request of the person who submitted a biological specimen. Id. If the BCA destroys a person’s biological specimen under either of these circumstances, the BCA is also required to “remove the person’s information from the [BCA’s] combined DNA index system and return all related records and all copies or duplicates of them.” Minn.Stat. § 299C.105, subd. 3(b).

The state does not dispute that taking and analyzing biological specimens as required under the statute is a search under the Fourth Amendment. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 618, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1413, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (“the collection and subsequent analysis of the requisite biological samples must be deemed Fourth Amendment searches”). The Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Minn. Const, art. I, § 10. “[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ ” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)).

In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the United States Supreme Court explained the role of the Fourth Amendment when the state directs that a biological specimen be taken from a person and analyzed. Schmerber involved a defendant who was arrested at a hospital while receiving treatment for injuries that he had suffered when the automobile that he apparently had been driving was involved in an accident. Id. at 758, 86 S.Ct. at 1829. A police officer directed that a blood sample be drawn from the defendant by a physician at the hospital, and a chemical analysis of the sample indicated intoxication. Id. at 758-59, 86 S.Ct. at 1829. At the defendant’s trial for driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the report of the chemical analysis was admitted into evidence over the defendant’s objection that the blood had been drawn without his consent. Id. at 759, 86 S.Ct. at 1829. The defendant contended that in that circumstance, the withdrawal of the blood and the admission of the report denied him his right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id.

In considering whether administering the blood test violated the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court explained that

the Fourth Amendment’s proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner. In other words, the questions we must decide in this case are whether the police were justified in requiring [the defendant] to submit to the blood test, and whether the means and procedures employed in taking his blood respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness.

Id. at 768, 86 S.Ct. at 1834.

The Supreme Court acknowledged that there was plainly probable cause for the officer to arrest the defendant and charge him with driving an automobile under the influence of alcohol. Id. But the court determined that the considerations that ordinarily permit a search of a defendant incident to an arrest

have little applicability with respect to searches involving intrusions beyond the body’s surface. The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search.
Although the facts which established probable cause to arrest in this case also suggested the required relevance and likely success of a test of [the defendant’s] blood for alcohol, the question remains whether the arresting officer was permitted to draw these inferences himself, or was required instead to procure a warrant before proceeding with the test. Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned. The requirement that a warrant be obtained is a requirement that inferences to support the search “be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” The importance of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the issue whether or not to invade another’s body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great.

Id. at 769-70, 86 S.Ct. at 1835 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948) (citation omitted)).

The Supreme Court then recognized that the officer who directed the physician to draw the defendant’s blood might reasonably have believed that the delay necessary to obtain a warrant threatened the destruction of the evidence because the amount of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops. Id. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 1835. Given the fact that the evidence could disappear during the time that it would take to seek out a magistrate and obtain a search warrant, the Supreme Court held that the officer’s attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content was an appropriate incident to the defendant’s arrest. Id. at 771, 86 S.Ct. at 1836.

The significant principle to be drawn from Schmerber with respect to Minn.Stat. § 299C.105, subd. 1(a), is that establishing probable cause to arrest a person is not, by itself, sufficient to permit a biological specimen to be taken from the person without first obtaining a search warrant. In Schmerber, the facts that established probable cause to arrest the defendant were the smell of liquor on his breath, and the blood-shot, watery, and glassy appearance of his eyes. Id. at 769, 86 S.Ct. at 1835. These symptoms of drunkenness also suggested that there was alcohol in the defendant’s blood. But, by itself, the strong inference that there was alcohol in the defendant’s blood was not enough to permit the police officer to direct the physician to draw the defendant’s blood. It was only because evidence of alcohol in the defendant’s blood could disappear during the time it would take to obtain a search warrant that the Supreme Court permitted the search without a warrant. Otherwise, a search warrant was required, and the inferences to support the warrant needed to be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate, instead of the police officer.

The state acknowledges that the Fourth Amendment requires a showing of probable cause in order for a search warrant to be issued. But it argues that Minn.Stat. § 299C.105, subd. 1(a), satisfies this requirement because, under the statute, a biological specimen will not be taken until a court makes a probable-cause determination. What this argument fails to recognize, however, is that probable cause to support a criminal charge is not the same thing as probable cause to issue a search warrant.

Probable cause to support a criminal charge exists when “ ‘the evidence worthy of consideration * * * brings the ' charge against the prisoner within reasonable probability.’ ” State v. Koenig, 666 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Minn.2003) (quoting State v. Florence, 306 Minn. 442, 446, 239 N.W.2d 892, 896 (1976)). Probable cause to issue a search warrant exists when, given the totality of the circumstances, there is “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 633 (Minn.1995) (quotation omitted).

Minn.Stat. § 299C.105, subd. 1(a)(1) and (3), use a judicial determination of probable cause to support a criminal charge as a substitute for a judicial determination of probable cause to issue a search warrant. But, just as in Schmerber, where the existence of probable cause to arrest the defendant was not sufficient to permit an intrusion into his body without a warrant, a determination of probable cause to support a criminal charge, even if it is made by a judge, is not sufficient to permit a biological specimen to be taken from the person charged without a warrant. The fact that a judge has determined that the evidence in a case brings a charge against the defendant within reasonable probability does not mean that the judge has also determined that there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a biological specimen taken from the defendant.

By directing that biological specimens be taken from individuals who have been charged with certain offenses solely because there has been a judicial determination of probable cause to support a criminal charge, Minn.Stat. § 299C.105, subd. 1(a)(1) and (3), dispense with the requirement under the Fourth Amendment that before conducting a search, law-enforcement personnel must obtain a warrant based on a neutral and detached magistrate’s determination that there is a fair probability that the search will produce contraband or evidence of a crime. Under the statute, it is not necessary for anyone to even consider whether the biological specimen to be taken is related in any way to the charged crime or to any other criminal activity.

Citing federal court opinions that conclude that requiring a defendant to submit to DNA sampling does not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the state argues that this court should examine the reasonableness of Minn.Stat. § 299C.105 under a general balancing test that weighs a defendant’s right to privacy against the state’s interest in collecting and storing DNA samples. But all of the opinions that the state cites involve statutes that require specimens for DNA testing to be taken only from individuals who have been convicted of a criminal offense, and when weighing the individual’s right to privacy against the state’s interest in DNA testing, the opinions recognize that an individual who has been convicted of an offense has a reduced expectation of privacy and conclude that this reduced expectation of privacy does not outweigh the state’s interest in DNA testing. Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F.Supp. 583 (D.Minn.1995), aff'd on other grounds, 77 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir.1996); Johnson v. Quander, 370 F.Supp.2d 79 (D.D.C.2005), aff'd, 440 F.3d 489 (D.C.Cir.2006); Padgett v. Ferrero, 294 F.Supp.2d 1338 (N.D.Ga. 2003), aff'd sub nom., Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir.2005), cert. denied, — U.S. , 126 S.Ct. 352, 163 L.Ed.2d 61 (2005); United States v. Sczubelek, 255 F.Supp.2d 315 (D.Del.2003), aff'd, 402 F.3d 175 (3rd Cir.2005), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 126 S.Ct. 2930, — L.Edüd-(2006).

The question certified by the district court involves only biological specimens to be taken from individuals who have been charged with a criminal offense but who have not been convicted. Therefore, the reduced expectation of privacy that was present in the cases the state cites is not present here.

Furthermore, Minn.Stat. § 299C.105, subd. 3, requires the BCA to destroy a biological specimen and remove information about the specimen from the combined DNA index system when the person from whom the specimen was taken is found not guilty or the charge against the person is dismissed. This requirement suggests that the legislature has determined that the state’s interest in collecting and storing DNA samples is outweighed by the privacy interest of a person who has not been convicted. Consequently, unless the privacy expectation of a person who has been charged and is awaiting the disposition of the charge is different from the privacy expectation of a person who was charged but the charge was dismissed or the person was found not guilty, we see no basis for concluding that the state’s interest in taking a biological specimen from a person solely because the person has been charged outweighs the person’s right to privacy. And because a person who has been charged is presumed innocent until proved guilty, we see no basis for concluding that before being convicted, a charged person’s privacy expectation is different from the privacy expectation of a person who was charged but the charge was dismissed or the person was found not guilty. Therefore, we conclude that the privacy interest of a person who has been charged but has not been convicted is not outweighed by the state’s interest in collecting and analyzing a DNA sample.

DECISION

Because Minn.Stat. § 299C.105, subd. 1(a)(1) and (3) (Supp. 2005), direct law-enforcement personnel to conduct searches without first obtaining a search warrant based on a neutral and detached magistrate’s determination that there is a fair probability that the search will produce contraband or evidence of a crime, and because the privacy interest of a person who has been charged with a criminal offense, but who has not been convicted, is not outweighed by the state’s interest in taking a biological specimen from the person for the purpose of DNA analysis, the portions of Minn.Stat. § 299C.105, subd. 1(a)(1) and (3), that direct law-enforcement personnel to take a biological specimen from a person who has been charged but not convicted violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution.

Certified question answered in the affirmative.

      . The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
      The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
      Although there are minor differences in language and punctuation, Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution is substantively the same as the Fourth Amendment.

      . C.T.L. does not claim that the means and procedures for taking a biological specimen from him do not respect relevant Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness. The only question before us is whether the statute may require that biological specimens be taken from individuals who have been charged with an offense, but not convicted.


author: LANSING, Judge.

text:
    In re the ESTATE OF Francis E. BARG, a/k/a Francis Edward Barg.
    No. A05-2346.
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Oct. 17, 2006.

      Janice S. Kolb, Mille Lacs County Attorney, Dawn R. Nyhus, Assistant County Attorney, Milaca, MN, for appellant Mille Lacs County.
    Thomas J. Meinz, Princeton, MN, for respondent personal representative.
    Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Robin Vue-Benson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for amicus curiae Minnesota Department of Human Services.
    Considered and decided by LANSING, Presiding Judge; KLAPHAKE, Judge; and PARKER, Judge.

       Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 10.

   OPINION

LANSING, Judge.

In this appeal from an order for partial recovery of medical benefits paid to Dolores Barg, the estate of Francis Barg challenges the district court’s interpretation of Minnesota’s estate-recovery statute, Minn.Stat. § 256B.15 (2004). Because we conclude that the determination of the deceased recipient’s interest in transferred joint-tenancy property must be based on principles of real-property law as modified by specific provisions of the estate-recovery statute, we reverse and remand for recalculation of Mille Lacs County’s allowable claim against the estate.

FACTS

Dolores and Francis Barg married in 1948. In 1962 and 1967 they acquired title to real property that they held in joint tenancy. In 2001 Dolores Barg’s health declined, and she eventually required out-of-home nursing care. To pay for her medical care, she applied for long-term Medicaid benefits. After participating in an asset assessment, Dolores Barg transferred her interest in the jointly held property to Francis Barg. At the time of the transfer, the assessed value of the property was $120,800.

Dolores Barg died in 2004. Between 2001 and 2004, Dolores Barg received a total of $108,413.53 in medical-assistance benefits through the Medicaid program. Five months after Delores Barg’s death, Francis Barg died, and his will was admitted to probate. Mille Lacs County filed a claim against the estate to recover the medical-assistance payments made to Dolores Barg. The estate’s personal representative allowed $63,880 as a claim against the estate, but disallowed $44,533.53. The county thereafter filed a claim-allowance petition.

At the hearing on the petition, the county contended that it was entitled to full recovery of its claim because the value of the real property exceeded the value of the claim and, as marital property, Dolores Barg was entitled to an undivided interest in its full value. The estate contended that the court should, instead, apply a probate-law analysis that would limit Dolores Barg’s interest in the property to a life estate, with a value of $63,880.

Applying probate-law principles, the district court determined that Dolores Barg had a life-estate interest in the property and that the county could not recover the additional $44,533.53. The county appeals from this determination, and the Minnesota Department of Human Services has filed an amicus brief in support of the county’s position.

ISSUE

Did the district court err by applying, for purposes of Minnesota’s estate-recovery statute, a probate-law analysis to calculate a medical-assistance recipient’s interest in transferred joint-tenancy property that is part of the surviving spouse’s estate?

ANALYSIS

In the district court, Mille Lacs County and Francis Barg’s estate jointly submitted a stipulation of facts; on appeal, both acknowledge that the claim against the estate is governed by federal and state statutes. Application of a statute to undisputed facts involves a question of law. O’Malley v. Ulland Bros., 549 N.W.2d 889, 892 (Minn.1996). We review questions of law de novo. Morton Bldgs., Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 488 N.W.2d 254, 257 (Minn.1992).

Medicaid is a cooperative program between states and the federal government in which the federal government provides financial assistance to participating states. Martin ex rel. Hoff v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn.2002). Participating states design their own Medicaid plans and set guidelines for eligibility and participation, but these plans must comply with federal law. Id. at 11.

Under Medicaid, a person who is unable to pay the cost of long-term medical care may qualify for medical-assistance benefits. See Women of State of Minn, by Doe v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Minn.1995) (stating that Medicaid provides benefits for “medically needy”). If the person has income or assets that exceed the limits for eligibility, the person will not qualify for benefits until the available resources that exceed the eligibility level are expended. In re Estate of Atkinson v. Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 564 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Minn.1997). Because the “spend down” requirement has the potential to impose substantial hardship on the spouse of a medical-assistance recipient, Medicaid includes provisions to avoid spousal impoverishment. Id. These anti-impoverishment measures preclude certain assets from being considered for eligibility purposes. Id. Specifically, in determining eligibility for Medicaid benefits, the value of an individual’s home is not considered so long as a spouse or dependent child maintains the home as a primary residence. Minn.Stat. § 256B.056, subd. 2 (2004).

Because the spousal anti-impoverishment measures provide an exemption for a primary residence, this property is typically an asset that is subject to estate-recovery procedures. In re Estate of Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn.App.2002). To reach these assets, Congress amended the Medicaid Act to expand the government’s ability to recover from the estates of medical-assistance recipients and to require states to seek this recovery. See id. at 712. Although the Medicaid Act does not generally permit the government to recover medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual, the government may seek recovery if one of three exceptions applies. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) (2000). The exception relevant to the Bargs’ circumstances applies to individuals who were older than fifty-five when they received medical assistance. Id. § 1396p(b)(1)(B). Under this exception, the government may recover “from the individual’s estate,” but may only seek recovery after the death of the individual’s surviving spouse. Id. § 1396p(b)(1)(B), (b)(2).

For purposes of recovery, federal law defines an individual’s estate as “all real and personal property and other assets included within the individual’s estate, as defined for purposes of [sjtate probate law.” Id. § 1396p(b)(4)(A) (2000). The federal law, however, permits states to expand the definition of estate beyond the definition found within probate law. Id. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (2000). If the state chooses, it may include “any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed ... through joint tenancy ... or other arrangement.” Id.

Minnesota’s estate-recovery statute provides that the state may assert a claim against the estate of a surviving spouse to recoup medical-assistance benefits provided to the predeceased spouse. Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. la (2004). The Minnesota statute thus reflects the legislature’s exercise of the option to expand the definition of estate to allow claims against the surviving spouse’s estate. Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d at 713. But Minnesota limits a “claim against the estate of a surviving spouse ... to the value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage.” Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2 (2004). Thus, the state may not recover from portions of a surviving spouse’s estate that are not traceable to marital or jointly owned property.

In Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d at 714, this court determined that Minnesota’s statute was partially preempted by federal law. Specifically, the court concluded that Minnesota’s estate-recovery statute goes further than permitted by federal law because it permits recovery “to the value of the assets of the estate that were marital property,” while the federal law only permits recovery “to the extent of’ the individual’s interest at the time of death. Id. To harmonize federal and state law, Gull-berg concluded that Minnesota’s estate-recovery statute “allows claims against a surviving spouse’s estate only to the extent of the value of the recipient’s interest in marital or jointly owned property at the time of the recipient’s death.” Id. Recovery is thus limited to “the value of the recipient’s interest in those assets at the time of the recipient’s death.” Id.

Prior to Gullberg, the state could recover up to the full value of assets that could be traced back to marital or jointly owned property. See Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2. After Gullberg, the state’s ability to recover was limited to the recipient’s interest in marital or jointly owned property at the time of the recipient’s death. Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d at 714. Thus, the state’s recovery depends on a determination of the recipient’s interest in the specified assets at the time of death.

The county and the estate argue that Gullberg restricts the definition of the value of the recipient’s interest in the estate of the surviving spouse to either probate-law or marital-property-law principles. The county contends that marital-property-law principles should be applied because the estate-recovery statute specifically refers to marital property. The estate counters that a recipient’s interest is more appropriately determined by reference to probate law. We conclude that both the county and the estate read too much into Gullberg’s passing references to marital and probate law.

Gullberg’s holding was limited to the narrow issue of preemption. Id. at 712, 714. Rather than directly addressing the method for calculating the extent of the recipient’s interest in transferred property, the court in Gullberg remanded the issue to the district court for determination of the recipient’s interest in the assets of the surviving spouse’s estate. Id. at 714-15. Although the Gullberg decision included citations to a marital-property-law case, Searles v. Searles, 420 N.W.2d 581 (Minn.1988), and to a probate statute, Minn.Stat. § 524.2-402(a), (c) (2000), these citations were included merely as support for the precept that a medical-assistance recipient may continue to have some interest in property even after the recipient has transferred the property to a spouse. Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d at 713. Notably, Gullberg stated that the recipient’s transfer of his joint tenancy to his spouse was a conveyance by “other arrangement” and that it would therefore fall within the broader optional state definition of estate. Id. Thus the Gullberg opinion essentially applied the optional definition of estate, as allowed by federal law, and established that the medical-assistance recipient had some interest in the homestead after its conveyance, but the opinion did not address the extent of this interest. Id.

We therefore reject the parties’ competing arguments that Gullberg must be read to require either a probate-law analysis or a marital-property-law analysis when calculating a medical-assistance recipient’s interest under the estate-recovery laws. We are not persuaded that either analysis applies, particularly in this case. Analysis under marital-property law would require us to read into the estate-recovery statute a definition from Minn.Stat. § 518.54 (2004), which explicitly restricts its definitions to the context of marital dissolution, and provides that marital property “means property ... acquired by the parties, or either of them, to a dissolution, legal separation, or annulment proceeding.” Id. § 518.54, subds. 1, 5. We are unable to find a legal basis for incorporating this definition into the estate-recovery statute. See Genin v. 1996 Mercury Marquis, 622 N.W.2d 114-17 (Minn.2001) (stating that rules of statutory construction prohibit adding words or meaning to statute when legislature has not).

We are similarly unable to find a legal basis for imposing a probate-law analysis, which would require the court to apply a retrospective structuring of the medical-assistance recipient’s interest in the surviving spouse’s estate. This method, which was proposed by the estate and accepted by the district court, results in a life-estate interest that is based on an artificial assumption that the surviving spouse predeceased the recipient instead of the converse. In this case, Francis Barg did not include a provision for his deceased wife and left his interest in his homestead to his children. Under probate-law principles, the court would have to assume that Dolores Barg survived her husband and received a life-estate interest in his property as his surviving spouse.

This probate-law analysis would also conflict with the estate-recovery laws, which require courts to calculate the recipient’s interest at the time of the recipient’s death rather than on the future date of the spouse’s death. The estate-recovery statute specifically provides that a recipient’s joint-tenancy interests “shall not be merged into the remainder interest or the interests of the surviving joint tenants” and that the joint-tenancy interests shall be subject to the provisions of the statute. Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1(5) (2004); see also In re Estate of Jobe, 590 N.W.2d 162, 165 (Minn.App.1999) (stating that statutory language extends definition of estate to include nonprobate assets), review denied (Minn. May 26, 1999). Analysis under probate-law principles is also inconsistent with the federal law’s expanded definition of estate, which explicitly allows a state to broaden the definition beyond the meaning used in probate law and to include joint-tenancy interests that have been previously conveyed to a spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4).

In light of the problems with the use of either probate-law or marital-property-law principles, we conclude that the plain meaning of the estate-recovery statute requires us to apply property-law principles as specifically modified by the statute. Applying this analysis, a recipient’s interest in marital property for purposes of estate recovery is limited to that person’s legal interest in the property at the time of death. And, under federal law and Gullberg, this interest includes a conveyance of a joint tenancy to a spouse. See id. § 1396p(b)(4)(B); Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d at 713 (stating that recipient maintains joint-tenancy interest in property even after conveyance to spouse because conveyance constitutes “other arrangement”).

Applying Gullberg, the relevant statutes, and the principles of property law to the stipulated facts, we start from the elemental threshold that Dolores Barg had a joint-tenancy interest in the property that is now in Francis Barg’s estate and that her interest was acquired during their marriage. Before receiving Medicaid benefits, she conveyed her interest in the property to Francis Barg. For purposes of the estate-recovery statute, Dolores Barg’s estate retained a joint-tenancy interest in the homestead at the time of her death. See Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1(3) (providing for modification of common law principles by allowing continuation of medical-benefit recipient’s joint-tenancy interest after recipient’s death). The “extent of her interest” is defined by the joint tenancy. A joint tenant’s interest in property is an undivided one-half interest in the property’s value. Kipp v. Sweno, 683 N.W.2d 259, 260, 263 (Minn.2004). Because the stipulated facts state that the joint-tenancy property was valued at $120,800 at the time of Dolores Barg’s death, the extent of the value of Dolores Barg’s interest at the time of her death was $60,400. We therefore reverse and remand for the district court to recalculate the allowable claim against Francis Barg’s estate. Finally, the Minnesota Department of Human Services filed an amicus brief in this case, supporting the county’s position and urging reversal of the district court’s decision. The department advances two independent arguments for reversal. First it asserts that Gullberg’s discussion of the preemptive effect of the phrase “to the extent of such interest” is dictum and should not be applied. We disagree. The Gullberg court did not exceed the scope of review on the preemption issue by relying on a full-text analysis of the federal act. The language of the opinion and the stated issue in the case establish that Gullberg squarely addresses preemption and reaches a conclusion on this issue, which became the holding of the case. Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d at 712, 714.

Second, the department urges this court to reverse Gullberg based on the department’s “more complete discussion” of the preemption issue in its amicus brief. The amicus brief provides a thoughtful and comprehensive analysis of the preemption question. But that issue was decided in Gullberg, and nothing in Gullberg’s analysis suggests that the court did not consider the full spectrum of applicable law and competing policy considerations in its determination of the preemption issue. We therefore decline to reverse Gullberg.

DECISION

For purposes of obtaining reimbursement under Minnesota’s estate-recovery statute, Mille Lacs County is entitled to a claim against Francis Barg’s estate for Dolores Barg’s one-half interest in the joint-tenancy property obtained during the marriage and transferred to Francis Barg. Because the district court erred by applying a probate-law method of calculation, we reverse and remand for a recalculation of the allowance based on principles of real property as modified by specific provisions of the estate-recovery statutes.

Reversed and remanded.