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Talk:Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

Criticism and legacy --> Early reception?
Hey all,

I am considering restructuring the current "Criticism and legacy" section into a section provisionally titled "Early reception". This would have three subsections. The first would be "German reception", which would include the material currently divided between the sections on L v. R Hegelianism and Marxism. The second would be "French reception", which would probably be unchanged. The third would be American reception, which would probably also be largely unchanged from the current section entitled "American pragmatism".

This would leave four sections hanging: (i) "Racism", (ii) "Allegations of authoritarianism", (iii) "Thesis–antithesis–synthesis", and (iv) "Non-metaphysical interpretations".

To take these in reverse order:

(iv) This is an academic debate that is widely considered to be over. I wrote most of the section in order to include something that was in the article before I started overhauling it. Looking back now, however, I think just about everything currently included could be simply deleted. This debate is just not something about which non-specialists have any reason to care.

(iii) The primary reason to include this dated misrepresentation of Hegel's philosophy is to prevent editors who have not studied Hegel and do not know the literature to add it somewhere inappropriate. In the past, for instance, it has even been featured in the lead. Some of the current exposition, I believe, is useful and could be incorporated above, probably into "Dialectics, speculation, idealism", without being a section unto itself.

(ii) None of these allegations are by Hegel scholars. They are more a reflection of the intellectual climate during the Cold War than anything Hegel wrote, said, or actually inspired. Neither, to the best of my knowledge, do they any longer shadow Hegel's legacy.

(i) This section was added by someone who translated it from the German article on Hegel. Best practice is to integrate criticism into the article's presentation of the ideas being criticized, rather than as its own section. In this case, those sections are Georg_Wilhelm_Friedrich_Hegel and Georg_Wilhelm_Friedrich_Hegel.

Some of the material currently in this stand-alone section could be incorporated into those sections above in addition to what is already there. Buck-Morss, in particular, is an important addition to the bibliography; for her work on this topic is probably the most cited among scholars.

Writing from the United States as a dude on the pale side of white, however, I want to be sure other folks have a chance to chime in before I make any changes that might unduly minimize the significance of Hegel's particular brand of "scientific" racism. (Tagging the original contributor, @Anna.Bonazzi.)

The reason for these proposed changes is to help protect the page against the sort of arbitrary bloat currently found, for instance, at Immanuel_Kant or (at least until somewhat ameliorated by my recent edits) in the Aristotle article.

There is just no way to cover the legacy and criticisms of such major figures in an objectively principled way. Limiting this section of the article to the figure's initial reception helps to forestall WP:UNDO or otherwise problematic contributions by well-meaning editors. If something has no place in the Life/Biography or Philosophy/Thought section of the article, it probably does not belong at all (or else one of those sections needs to be restructured, in which case, pls. bring this to the Talk page!).

This is a long post. There is no expectation that anyone respond to anymore than one of the points I make. But if you are reading this, please share your views! I am still the primary author of most of this article (apart from the Life section, which required little by way of improvement). That is just to say that I can make these changes very easily without much time or effort. But I'm going to leave this here for a week or so in hopes others might chime in to support this proposal or else to raise qualified or categorical objections.

Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 01:15, 30 September 2023 (UTC)

 * Sorry for neglecting to follow through on any of this. I am going to now act on (i) and (ii), linking back to this thread in my edit description of the deletions. If I have removed anything of importance, I am happy to discuss and restore as appropriate.
 * Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 17:42, 8 March 2024 (UTC)
 * I've made these and a few other related edits. If no one speaks up in objection, I will come back to clean up the bibliography in a few days. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 18:06, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

Some ideas for improving the article
1. The Phenomenology of Spirit is not part of Hegel's mature system. In the preface to the Logic Hegel says the Phenomenology is only an introduction to the system, and not the system itself. So I think the section on the Phenomenology, which is good, should go outside the "Philosophical system" section.

2. "Philosophical system" should be structured in the same way as Hegel's system. So the sub-headings should be Logic, Nature, Spirit. And then within those, the subsections. So Philosophy of Art should go as a subsection within Absolute Spirit

3. The writing in the section on "philosophy of the real" is not correct regarding the structure of Hegel's system. It is not the case that Logic is in some sense finished, and Nature is an ongoing historical project. Rather it is all an ongoing project, and it's also all finished. As it is, the Realphilosophie section implies a kind of dualism which Hegel is trying to overcome.

4. The beginning of the Philosophical system section correctly states that Proclus's Neoplatonic triad of remaining-proceeding-reverting influenced Hegel. This is correct, but it is an indirect influence. The direct influence is rather Christian theosophy in general, the Rosicrucian and theosophical milieu of Swabia where Hegel went to school being suffused with the theosophy of Jakob Böhme. So I propose that the Philosophical system section begin with this influence (Christian theosophy), and then it can list a few parallel triads in other traditions which influenced both Böhme and Hegel indirectly. There are: 1. Neoplatonic triads of Being-Living-Thinking and remaining-proceeding-reverting, 2. the triadic groupings of the Sefirot in Kabbalah, 3. Plato's three gods: the One, the Demiurge, and the World Soul, 4. the triadic thought of non-Behmenist Christian mystics such as Eckhart. These influences can be grouped as Christian, Jewish, and Greek. In Böhme and Hegel the three are woven together.

Green eggs and HUM (talk) 01:05, 5 January 2024 (UTC)

 * Hi @Green eggs and HUM,
 * Thanks for weighing in! I'll respond briefly to your comments in order:
 * 1) As per the third para of that section, the PhS's place in the system is complex and controversial. I'm persuaded, in particular, by H. S. Harris's argument that we must take seriously Hegel's description of this book, not only as the introduction, but also as the first part of the system. That said, placing it above as its own section is the more neutral presentation. I'll make the change.
 * 2) The Absolute Spirit section clearly describes phi art as a mode of absolute spirit. It's its own section partly to avoid giving art an undo amount of coverage in that section, which is just devoted to explaining what Hegel means by "absolute spirit"—which is very often misunderstood. The other reason is that Hegel's views developed (just like his views on Christianity, also its own section), and at some point I plan to add a brief description of his early Romantic views (the System Fragment) and the PhS's entirely religious depiction of art (which is still how Hegel presented it in the first edition of the Enc). Since I do not think there is any danger that the current presentation might confuse readers, I'm inclined to leave as is.
 * 3) The absolute idea is never finished. Logic is eternal/non-temporal. But, according to Hegel, the philosophical project of the science of logic has been completed. The philosophy of the real, by contrast, has historical material as its content and so must remain an ongoing philosophical project. I believe this is covered fairly well in the lead to "Philosophical system". If not, suggestions always welcome! It is not easy to explain the structure of the system that Hegel himself describes as "a syllogism of syllogisms".
 * 4) Two concerns here, both of which fall under WP:UNDO:
 * The first is that the main page on Hegel cannot go into as much detail as you propose on Hegel's various influences. For instance, there are books of material on the influence of the Scottish political economists, yet this is passed over with one sentence on Smith. And this is nothing compared to how quickly this section moves past the absolutely massive influence of Aristotle and Kant.
 * The second is that these claims, and the hermetic reading they are typically adduced to advance, is mostly associated with just one scholar, and (for good reason) Wikipedia is not supposed to attempt to get out ahead of the scholarly consensus.

 * Edit: I just realized that responded to (4) with reference to the Influences section, which mentions Böhme, whereas you were referring to the lead to the Philosophical system section, which mentions Proclus. I believe, however, that my points stand equally well with respect to either.

 * I'm happy to discuss this further, however, especially if you want to suggest some specific language with supporting sources.
 * Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 02:16, 5 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Thanks for responding Patrick. And thanks for making change #1 I think this will make the whole article clearer.
 * 2) is fine, I'll let that be as is.
 * 3) Good points. However there is an important consideration you missed, which is that the structure of the logic reflects the structure of nature. If the Philosophy of Nature changes, the Logic must change in accordance. Now the logic of nature is the following: there is first a) matter, and then b) light, shining on matter, and then c) light entered into matter, which the Earth, and plants and animals. This is also the structure of the logic: first there is α) being, and then β) thinking, but external to being and thus not present, not immediate to itself; and finally there is γ) thinking entered into being, self-thinking being. So the structure of logic and nature are inseparable. I'm sure this should be presented somewhere in the article, ideally in the section on Logic and Nature.
 * 4) Good point that the section cannot go fully into detail. I think it is at least worth mentioning Jakob Bohme, no? I was really impressed by Faivre's scholarly work which is well described in the Wikipedia article on Christian theosophy. The triad Divine-Nature-Man is surely the center of a network of influence which stands at least alongside Proclus in importance for understanding Hegel's motivation for structuring his system as he has. Therefore I propose that at least the Christian theosophy article be linked in that section, since it is so revealing.
 * Cheers,
 * Green eggs and HUM Green eggs and HUM (talk) 05:54, 5 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Hi @Green eggs and HUM,
 * Glad we're good on (1) and (2)!
 * With respect to (3), I believe you are mistaken about logic being a reflection nature. Logic is the articulation in thought of the intelligibility of nature, its conceptuality—and also that of spirit, and of the identity and non-identity thereof. According to Hegel, imperfections in his presentation of the science of logic are internal to logic itself (case in point, his incompletely revised 2nd edition). I'm quite confident that this is Hegel's own self-understanding as well as the scholarly consensus. If you have evidence to the contrary, however, please do share.
 * As to (4), it occurs to me that a good way to get this into the article without violating WP:UNDO would be to place it in an endnote, for which there is ample precedent in the rest of the article. Do you want to maybe draft something up? I don't mind helping with the formatting of references, but it's on you to supply the basic info and page numbers of the sources supporting the specific claims. No objection to wikilinking out to Christian theosophy in the context of such an edit—just so long as we are careful not to suggest that its influence makes Hegel himself a theosophist.
 * Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 17:41, 6 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Hi Patrick,
 * Let us set aside 4 so we can focus on 3, which is the deeper issue and I believe deserves our undivided attention.
 * It is no doubt true that the logic is the intelligible structure of nature. And in fact that is the point I was making by saying that the logic reflects nature. The intelligible structure reflects the thing of which it is the structure. As a skeletion reflects the body which is built around it.
 * Among the most important passages for understanding the relation of logic and nature is a section in "Of the concept in general" in the forward to the subjective logic. Hegel writes:
 * "Of course, the pure determinations of being, essence, and the concept, also constitute the substrate and the inner sustaining structure [innere einfache Gerüst, framework, scaffold] of the forms of spirit; spirit, as intuiting as well as sensuous consciousness, is in the form of immediate being, just as spirit as representational and also perceptual consciousness has risen from being to the stage of essence or reflection. But these concrete shapes are of as little interest to the science of logic as are the concrete forms that logical determinations assume in nature. These last would be space and time, then space and time as assuming a content, as inorganic and then organic nature." (This is page 517 in Giovanni's translation.)
 * Here Hegel is sketching out basically what I wrote above: the triad of 1. space and time, 2. inorganic nature, and 3. organic nature, is a reflection of the triad 1. being, 2. essence, 3. concept. The Logic is thus the scaffold for nature. And therefore the comprehension of nature is the comprehension of a reflection of logic.
 * Nature is the logic expressed, gone out of itself, reflected out of itself. The ground structure of nature is the Logic. The comprehension of nature, which is natural science, is inseparable from the structure of the Logic. They are connected. We use logic, thinking, when we study nature. And nature itself is thinking gone out of itself, the outward reflection, the external projection, of the whole of logic. Mechanism is being, chemism is essence, and organics is concept.
 * My point is just that this information is really what ought to go in place of what is currently in the article under the section "Philosophy of the real." I'll now address what's written there.
 * It says, "In contrast to the first, logical part of Hegel's system, the second, real-philosophical part – the Philosophy of Nature and of Spirit – is an ongoing historical project." - This statement is misleading. Because the Logic is also an ongoing historical project. As proof of this I offer this statement from the Introduction to the Science of Logic:
 * "If logic has not undergone change since Aristotle – and in fact, judging from the latest compendiums of logic, the usual changes mostly consist only of omissions – then surely the conclusion to be drawn is that it is all the more in need of a total reworking; for the two thousand years of spirit’s continuous labor must have procured for it a higher consciousness about its thinking and the purity of its inner essence." (31 in Giovanni)
 * That is, spirit has advanced since Aristotle, and therefore the Logic needs total reworking. So you see, the Logic is also a historical project.
 * Next what appears in the Wikipedia article is a quote from the Philosophy of Right about the relation of philosophy to the structure of the state. This really don't belong in the section on the transition from Logic to Nature. Since Hegel is specifically addressing the philosopher's position vis-a-vis kings and statesmen, etc. It doesn't really obtain to the logic nature relation. The two quotes I provided above however are directly relevant.
 * The citation of Allegra de Laurentiis is just a comment on this irrelevant passage from Philosophy of Right and thus does not belong any more than does that section. The quote that follows is likewise a non-sequitur except in the context of the quote from the Philosophy of Right, which was already not appropriate for the description of the transition into Realphilosophie.
 * The last sentence is: "This is to say that what makes the philosophy of the real scientific in Hegel's technical sense is the systematically coherent logical form it uncovers in its natural-historical material – and so also displays in its presentation."
 * This sentence is the only sentence in this section which really obtains to the topic. It is quite a correct sentence. And this is really the matter which ought to be discussed here. The above scholarly citations and quotes however do not say what this sentence says, and this sentence, which is the real matter, is a non-sequitur from what is written above. What ought to go in this section, are probably the two quotes I gave above, or other citations from Hegel similar to those.
 * Thanks for reading and thanks for your careful and thoughtful consideration, Green eggs and HUM (talk) 01:12, 7 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Hi @Green eggs and HUM,
 * I'm concerned that, absent supporting sources, your proposals are (to use the language of the Talk page template) straying away from "discussing improvements" to the article into "a general discussion of the article's subject". I suspect, but am far from sure, that what you are proposing is predicated upon slippage between the "order of being" and "order of explanation"—which Aristotelian distinction is further complicated by Hegel's own syllogistic conception of the system as a whole. In any case, there's no reason to privileged any particular triadic analog to the logical being-essence-concept triad over any other of its many real-philosophic analogs.
 * The science of logic is a priori pure because its content is its own eternal form-activity, which Hegel claims to have presented in such a way as to be completely self-validating as complete. The philosophy of the real, however, can never be complete in this way because it has as its content what is contingent and historical. The treatment of nature and spirit is philosophically scientific, according to Hegel, by virtue of its logical form of organization. Changes in the natural sciences or social reality require a reworking, not of the science of logic, but of the philosophies of nature or spirit. The logic that defines the parameters of such treatment, by its very nature, cannot change in response changes in the empirical world. Hence, not "ongoing".
 * All of this, of course, is just per Hegel, who could be insanely wrong. But that is his claim, which I believe is well documented in the article. If you think you can demonstrate otherwise with reference to primary sources, I would encourage you to write that up for submission to the Hegel-Bulletin. In the meanwhile, unless you can produce scholarly secondary sources to support the changes you would like to see, this cannot be a serious debate about improving the article, and so I must bow out.
 * Finally, the paragraphs to which you object do belong in the article because their topic is not, narrowly, the relation of logic to nature, but rather of logic to the real in general. That is what the heading announces, and it is what is being discussed in the cited passages, as can be readily confirmed by an inspection of them in their contexts. The AdL citation is relevant because it specifies the relation under discussion, corrects a common misconception, and reinforces for the reader the strong connection between Aristotle's and Hegel's conceptions of actuality.
 * Over and out, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 03:14, 7 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Hi Patrick, thanks for bearing with me and please do not let up the discussion at this moment, which is so important. What is more important, more worthy of attention, than the dissemination of the truth itself?
 * The fundamental principle of Hegel's philosophy is the unity of the order of explication and the order of being. Which is why I'm so concerned about this particular section, which is completely anti-Hegelian in orientation.
 * The Logic itself is a union of order of being (being) and order of explication (reflection, essence). The whole system is likewise this union of being (nature) and explication (logic) in spirit. What you call the 'slippage' is actually the absolute truth and meaning of Hegel's entire philosophy.
 * As for scholarly sources, G.R.G. Mure's "Introduction to Hegel" and "A Study of Hegel's Logic" are perfectly suited as sources for the proper understanding of this union of being and explication in Hegel.
 * You write "The AdL citation is relevant because it specifies the relation under discussion, corrects a common misconception, and reinforces for the reader the strong connection between Aristotle's and Hegel's conceptions of actuality." - But the whole point of Hegel's Logic is that this Aristotelian standpoint is deficient. The Concept is the unity of these levels which in all prior philosophy are held apart.
 * Again, I thank you so much for your patience and bearing with me. This change is so important. What could be more important than this? Green eggs and HUM (talk) 05:35, 7 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Hi @Green eggs and HUM,
 * I'd refer you to the lead section of Georg_Wilhelm_Friedrich_Hegel for both primary and secondary sources on these issues. Inwood 2013a is the best source I know that treats the syllogistic structure of the system with any kind of concision. I'll send a copy in case you do not have access to the volume. You will find your reading confirmed in only a qualified sense. To cite further from a passage already in the article:
 * "The logical idea is non-temporal and therefore does not exist at any time apart from its manifestations. It is the deep logical structure of nature, spirit and their interrelationship. It is not, therefore, like a seed that grows on the tree that grew from that selfsame seed, or an egg laid by the chicken that emerged from that selfsame egg. The claim that the logical idea divides into nature and spirit is comparable to the claim that 12 ‘divides into’ 5 and 7, where the question ‘When does it divide?’ is inappropriate. (p. 208)"
 * If Mure supports your reading, you need to provide actual citations. I would be surprised if he made a definitive claim about this that has simply been overlooked or ignored by subsequent generations of scholars, but I'm willing to take a look an any passages you cite. Otherwise I really do need to bow out of this. The current article is supported by high-quality sources against which you are so far presenting your own interpretation of notoriously difficult texts.
 * Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 16:47, 7 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Hi Patrick, Thanks again for your patience. I think we've got our solution here.
 * I just read Inwood's 2013 article on logic-nature-spirit. This is a good article. What Inwood says here is true.
 * The problem is that this statement in Philosophy of the Real contradicts the Inwood article: "In contrast to the first, logical part of Hegel's system, the second, real-philosophical part – the Philosophy of Nature and of Spirit – is an ongoing historical project."
 * Inwood says that Logic-Nature-Spirit are related as the three terms of a syllogism. And he says the whole triad can be thought as an eternal triad. So each of the three parts speculatively united (identity in non-identity) with the other parts. So almost the whole of what is written in the "philosophy of the real" section is not true. What is currently written there suggests and introduces a fundamental dualism into the system which must be conceived rather as triune and coequal, as a syllogism. So I think the main problem with the Philosophical system section is that, instead of communicating the triunity of the system, it communicates rather the opposite: a dualism, which Hegel's syllogism and triadic system is definitely intended to overcome. Green eggs and HUM (talk) 19:48, 7 January 2024 (UTC)
 * To make a distinction is not to be a duelist. The truth necessarily unfolds in stages that are sublated but not erased in the ultimate unity, of which they are constitutive moments. What is written in the article, sourced to primary and secondary sources, is not at odds with Inwood, which, as I said, provides only qualified support for your position. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 20:29, 7 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Thanks again for your patience Patrick.
 * Let us set aside the issue of the distinction itself for a moment. The underlying problem is really the structure of the Philosophical system section. It ought to be triadic, as this form is of ultimate importance for understanding Hegel.
 * The obstacle to proper communication is this “Philosophy of the Real” section. Regardless of the content which is contained in it, its position in the article introduces a dualism into the Philosophical system section. Therefore it must be removed, or the content must be placed elsewhere. Because it disrupts the communication of the importance of the triad logic-nature-spirit. Green eggs and HUM (talk) 20:52, 7 January 2024 (UTC)
 * I have nothing further to add. Any changes you make to the article based just on your own interpretation of the system is WP:OR and will be promptly reverted. If you can produce secondary sources contrary to what is currently in the article, please start a new thread. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 20:59, 7 January 2024 (UTC)
 * It is the Realphilosophy section which is original research. Where is the source for the claim that “ In contrast to the first, logical part of Hegel's system, the second, real-philosophical part – the Philosophy of Nature and of Spirit – is an ongoing historical project.”? Where is the citation for this statement? Green eggs and HUM (talk) 21:09, 7 January 2024 (UTC)
 * I have read the whole Laurentiis article and it states the exact opposite of what is claimed in the Philosophy of the Real section. I have started a new thread for this matter here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Georg_Wilhelm_Friedrich_Hegel#Laurentiis_article_states_the_exact_opposite_of_what_is_written_in_the_Real_Philosophy_section Green eggs and HUM (talk) 00:06, 8 January 2024 (UTC)

Laurentiis article states the exact opposite of what is written in the Real Philosophy section
I have read the entire Laurentiis article that is cited in support of the claim that Hegel says the Logic is finished. Laurentiis, through the whole article, from beginning to end, on almost every single page, argued the exact opposite of what is stated in the "philosophy of the real" section which cites that article:

"The theoretical order of philosophical concepts...and the chronological order of their expression in history....do not operate independently of one another....The two orders are in principle the same." (Lauretiis 5)

"The 1820 introduction continues by highlighting....features that justify the claim of the intrinsically historical character of theoretical concepts..." (Laurentiis 13)

"Thus the historical inception of philosophic thinking coincides with the rise of the self-refexive stage of consciousness, namely self-consciousness....[Consciousness's] history is part and parcel of the natural history of knowing." (Laurentiis 17)

"Only a philosophical history of philosophy can capture the inwardization or recollective dimension of spirit's external development, namely by reconstructing the successive sublations of philosophic principles in the history of the systems." (Laurentiis 20)

"The logical concretization, that is, increasing intension and extension, of philosophic concepts is then the necessary complement of their chronological succession." (Laurentiis 20)

"The historical succession of systems in the history of philosophy parallels...the logical succession of spirit's phases in its practical and theoretical activity of knowing itself." (Laurentiis 22)

"the philosopher reconstructing the history of philosophy understands the theories succeeding each other in time to be expressions of principles of the theoretical and practical activity of self-knowing called “the Idea"." (Laurentiis 23)

"In this sense, the series of systems in the history of philosophical thinking can be interpreted as being 'the same' as the logical series of self-determinations of the idea." (Laurentiis 29)

Regarding the paragraph in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, "Translations usually disregard the reflexive form of 'sich fertig machen', a common expression that means 'to make oneself ready', and interpret this to mean that actuality is 'finished'. But the reflexive form implies both completion and preparedness. Since Hegel's prose is seldom redundant, the connotation of 'preparedness' should be stressed in the translation. Actuality has completed one of its phrases and has made itself ready for this next." i.e. history, and thus the development of the Logic, is unfinished! (Laurentiis 29)

"More importantly, since the subject of the phrase is actuality, the translation is also at odds with Hegel’s consistently Aristotelian use of “actuality” as an activity that by definition does not attain any “completed state.” Thus, translations neglect here to convey Hegel’s idea of a recollective and simultaneously anticipatory function of philosophy." (Laurentiis 29)

"Indeed, if the history of philosophic thinking follows the logic of the Idea, then philosophic principles must be as much determined by those they have sublated as by the ones they contain as yet only implicitly." (Laurentiis 29)

"Thus, while it is true that for Hegel the principles of a system, in sublating all previous ones, do express an epoch whose life cycle is concluded, it is equally true that these same principles anticipate a new epoch." (Laurentiis 30)

"Prima facie this appears to contradict the “owl of Minerva” allegory from the Preface to the Philosophy of Right. But the allegory (often quoted out of context) intends to highlight only one of the functions Hegel attributes to philosophy. It is embedded in a passage vigorously directed against the idea of a moralistic, ideological, or generically normative vocation of philosophy and philosophers." (Laurentiis 30)

" Though it attains systematic completion at the end of an epoch, it thinks beyond this end." (Laurentiis 30)

"Thus, each philosophic system grasps both an epochal closure of spirit and the new beginning for which it has “made itself ready." (Laurentiis 31)

Green eggs and HUM (talk) 00:06, 8 January 2024 (UTC)

 * Is your strategy just to overwhelm me?
 * Most saliently:
 * 1) It does not follow from the fact that history is not finished that the science of logic is not finished. That is your own contention, for which you decline to provide supporting citations. (Or if what you mean is that the absolute idea never ceases its self-activity, then that is correct, but it is not the topic of discussion in this section.)
 * 2) That "each philosophic system grasps both an epochal closure of spirit and the new beginning for which it has 'made itself ready'" is just the point at issue. The real philosophy is not, and never will be, finished or at a completed state. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 00:27, 8 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Every page of the Laurentiis article argues: the Science of Logic is the same as the History of Philosophy. It follows from this that if history is unfinished (which Laurentiis also argues in the article, in the last handful of citations I provided) then the Logic is unfinished. Since Logic is history. I did not mean to overwhelm you. I read the article and extracted the most salient points.
 * As it stands the citation supports exactly the opposite claim as the statement in the article to which it is attached. Green eggs and HUM (talk) 00:35, 8 January 2024 (UTC)
 * You are drawing a conclusion that AdL does not (and would not). With the completion of the science of logic, philosophy has attained what Hegel claims to demonstrate has been its objective all along. It would follow from Hegel's principles and AdL's essay that philosophy is now open to a new task for a new epoch. To my knowledge, however, neither discusses this directly. In any case, the essay supports the claims to which it is attached in the article and not your novel claim about the science of logic.
 * Also, please see WP:SATISFY. It is fine and good to question anything in the article that seems dubious, but you cannot demand that other editors repeatedly justify the inclusion of sourced material. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 14:45, 8 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Can you point out where in AdL’a article she says that Logic is finished once and for all? Green eggs and HUM (talk) 16:23, 8 January 2024 (UTC)
 * This is not a controversial point. I have, however, added another source to the section on the SL that makes it explicitly.
 * In more than a dozen posts now, the only passages you have adduced in support of your position are from a primary source. One is irrelevant (Hegel regards Aristotle's logic as incomplete), and the other says the opposite of what you maintain ("these concrete shapes are of as little interest to the science of logic as are the concrete forms that logical determinations assume in nature").
 * Please see criterion (2) of WP:DISRUPTSIGNS. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 16:29, 8 January 2024 (UTC)
 * In this thread I am not asking you to add any positive claim, but only to remove the erroneous one.
 * Please copy here the statement in de Laurentiis’s article which supports the claim that the Logic is finished.
 * Otherwise it would appear you are misrepresenting de Laurentiis’s work as much as Hegel’s. Green eggs and HUM (talk) 16:40, 8 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Claim is established in prior section on the SL. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 16:48, 8 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Let’s put that matter on pause while we address the thread topic. Why is the de Laurentiis article cited in support of a claim not made in the article? Green eggs and HUM (talk) 16:52, 8 January 2024 (UTC)
 * It supports the part of the sentence that some might consider contentious, namely that "the second, real-philosophical part – the philosophy of nature and of spirit – is an ongoing project with respect to its historical content, which continues to change and develop". Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 16:57, 8 January 2024 (UTC)
 * That is a misleading citation. You’re misrepresenting both Hegel and Dr. de Laurentiis. And the first part of the sentence is thus original research. Green eggs and HUM (talk) 17:03, 8 January 2024 (UTC)
 * I'm actually not—for reasons that have all been previously stated.
 * You have been warned three times now about disruptive editing. And that is setting aside warnings about the IP edits you made before the page was placed under protection.
 * Please come back when you have reliable sources to support your concerns. Otherwise, if you persist in these unsubstantiated demands, I will request administrative action. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 17:26, 8 January 2024 (UTC)
 * I am not making any edits. Criterion 2 of WP:DISRUPTSIGNS says "misrepresents reliable sources." de Lauentiis's article carefully argues the opposite of what you have written. Her argument, especially on the pages you cite (29-31), is that the Logic is unfinished. You cite it in support of the opposite claim, that the Logic is finished and nature and spirit are unfinished, which she does not mention. You are misrepresenting reliable sources with your edits. Green eggs and HUM (talk) 17:32, 8 January 2024 (UTC)
 * She does not say that the science of logic continues to develop. She says that spirit continues to develop, and therefore so too must philosophy (in particular, that of spirit).
 * Standards of conduct for talk pages are, quite rightly, much looser than those for articles. I believe, however, that you are on the wrong side of the line. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 17:44, 8 January 2024 (UTC)
 * Please read carefully on page 29: "In this sense, the series of systems in the history of philosophical thinking can be interpreted as being 'the same' as the logical series of self-determinations of the idea." Notice how she explicitly says that it is a logical series which is identified with history.
 * The entire article argues that the Logic is inseparable from history. And because history is unfinished, then the logic is unfinished. Logic is spirit. The Realphilosophie is not even mentioned. Green eggs and HUM (talk) 17:56, 8 January 2024 (UTC)
 * You are mistaken in equating philosophy (and philosophical principles) with the science of logic. The real philosophy, as you know, refers to the philosophies of nature and spirit. One need not use the term to be discussing it. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 18:16, 8 January 2024 (UTC)
 * I do not say the science of logic exhausts philosophy.
 * I say that the Realphilosophie is not explicitly mentioned in the article you cite, and what is explicitly mentioned is that the logic is historical.
 * Therefore you are misrepresenting the work of de Laurentiis and Hegel. Green eggs and HUM (talk) 18:22, 8 January 2024 (UTC)
 * You are misinterpreting a claim about philosophy in general, which is part of the philosophy of the real and so is historical, as being a claim about the science of logic, which Hegel describes as eternal. There is plenty of room to debate what he means by this and whether or not he is right. Your objections, however, are not represented by any reliable sources. So, once again, please stop. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 18:29, 8 January 2024 (UTC)
 * The issue is that your citation is misrepresenting Dr. de Laurentiis's work. With regard to Hegel, you are quite mistaken. Hegel's philosophy is the speculative identity of eternity and history. You are holding apart these two moments which, in Hegel's view, are brought together in history. Eternity enters into time, and history intersects with eternity. This is the fundamental principle of Hegel's philosophy. Green eggs and HUM (talk) 18:32, 8 January 2024 (UTC)

Can we add this summary of Hegel's Logic to the Science of Logic section?
I have written this three paragraph summary of Hegel's Logic which I think will be very helpful to wishing to understand this titanic work. Can we add this to the Science of Logic section? If you approve, I'll gather references, probably from G.R.G. Mure's "A Study of Hegel's Logic," (but I'm also willing to gather from Beiser and Inwood if you'd prefer) to point the reader to scholarship on each point of the summary. The summary is as follows:

Being is the sensible, empirical side of reality. It consists of quality and quantity (Aristotle’s ‘poion’ and ’poson’ respectively). Qualia (e.g. shiny, red, apple) constitute the content of sensible reality, but in a form which is generally recalcitrant and unreceptive to combination (shiny cannot be added to heavy). Quanta (e.g. 5, 9, etc.) constitute the combinability of sensible reality, but a formal combinability abstracted from all content (e.g. addition, subtraction, ratio, etc.). Measure is the combination of quality and quantity (e.g. 100 books in a library, 2 atoms of hydrogen), and it constitutes the general structure of the field of sensation and experience. But this field is still the external combination of qualia and quanta. Their inward union is substance, essence.

Essence is the invisible, formal side of reality. It consists of the difference between itself and its manifestation. Essence thus has two sides: on the one hand, essence is pure form, pure inner thinking without content (these are the laws of thought, e.g. A = A); and on the other hand, essence is the sensible content but in the form of abstract laws (these are the laws of nature, e.g. F = ma). As the third to pure essence and essence with content, we have actuality, which is the structure of the organic world in general. Actuality is the pure form (A = A) that has entered into reality and become a real existent (e.g. the seed = the tree; Aristotle’s dynamis and energeia). But this is only a partial unification, because it still has some reality standing outside it. When essence and existence are perfectly united so that all reality is in the essence and essence exists in reality, this is the concept.

The concept is essence fully entered into being and thus become present to itself. It is thinking, but no longer as merely formal thinking, but a thinking which has all reality in it as its own self-production. This is the ‘I’ of self-consciousness. In itself this is the content of traditional logic (Aristotle’s Prior Analytics). As externally projected, the concept is an object, an objective end apart from itself to which it relates. When this end is brought back into the concept, then we have the end in itself, the idea. The idea is the philosophical method, self-knowing truth, and eternal life. It is the creator of nature, the unity of truth and goodness, the purpose of existence, and the ideal human being. This is the Absolute Idea.

Thanks! RightHegelian (talk) 05:42, 13 January 2024 (UTC)

 * Hi @RightHegelian,
 * I have some concerns about the accuracy of parts of this description. My primary concern, however, is that Hegel's main/bio article is not the place to provide an exposition of the Logic. The section is already longer than is ideal. People seeking specifically to understand this work should find themselves instead at the Science of Logic article.
 * This article would, in general, benefit from greater use of WP:Summary style. The problem is that the existing articles on Hegel's individual works are currently in sorry shape. Otherwise, I would move even some of what is now here out to them.
 * What would you think about pursuing these edits on the SL article, to build that out instead? After the introductory section, it goes into a preposterous amount of detail without any supporting WP:RS. Anything following any published commentary would be an improvement. At such a time as it comes up to WP:B-class, the coverage of logic in this article could be cut back or moved over to enhance general readability and to send more interested readers to the dedicated SL article.
 * Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 15:26, 13 January 2024 (UTC)
 * The content of the Science of Logic article is accurate. What is presented there is very close to Hegel’s letter, and also very close to the exposition provided in G.R.G. Mure’s “A Study of Hegel’s Logic.” I would be happy to identify the pages in Hegel and Mure that correspond to the content of the current Science of Logic article, and thereby rescue this excellent exposition from possible deletion.
 * P.S. I have endeavored to improve my summary of the theory of essence:
 * Essence is the invisible, formal side of reality. This form is identity-in-difference. First, essence is formal thinking, the empty formal identity of itself with itself. These are the laws of thought (e.g. A = A). Second, essence is the difference between itself and its manifestation. This is the difference between the formal laws of nature (e.g. F = ma) and their manifestation in sensible being (e.g. the movement of planets around the sun). Third, essence is the identity-in-difference of the form, the law, and its manifestation, its being. This is actuality, the infinite rejoining of essence with itself in its existence (e.g. the seed manifests on the tree in the fruit; seed = tree = fruit). This triune circle, this infinite self-rejoining movement, is the concept. RightHegelian (talk) 20:06, 13 January 2024 (UTC)

"Probably incorrect"
Hi @Patrick Welsh, I see that you reverted my recent edit, so I'm bringing it here for discussion.

I edited the following sentence: "Dewey accepted much of Hegel's account of history and society, but rejected his (probably incorrect) conception of Hegel's account of absolute knowing."

I removed the parenthetical statement "probably incorrect".

My thought process was threefold: 1) It is redundant: if Dewey rejected Hegel's conception, then that means, by definition, that Dewey thought that Hegel's conception was probably incorrect. 2) Since I don't have access to the book cited, I could not confirm if this was a direct quote from the book, or a synthesis of what the book says. 3) Absent a direct quote from the book, the parenthetical looked like original research to me.

I've had this account since 2008, so I'm pretty familiar with Wikipedia, but I'm just getting back into it after an extended absence. I am open to learning, and would appreciate a constructive criticism of my edit. Cheers. Pecopteris (talk) 23:54, 30 May 2024 (UTC)

 * Happy to clarify—and thanks for using the talk page!
 * As I stated in my edit description, it was obviously a good-faith edit. I'll quote just the most salient paragraph from the page cited, which, as always, would be best read in its larger context:
 * "The American pragmatist and naturalist John Dewey (1859–1952) could be seen as a Hegelian who accepted Hegel’s account of society and history, while rejecting Hegel’s absolute as he interpreted it. Like Hegel, Dewey argued that individuals and society are mutually self-constituting, and so he rejected any attempt to reduce one to the other. Dewey also believed that knowledge must be understood in terms of what a given society counts as knowledge rather than transhistorical or ahistorical standards. However, he did not accept the concept of an absolute, and he denied that there is necessarily progress in history. Whether there is progress depends on what sort of society people create for themselves."
 * What is incorrect is Dewey's interpretation of Hegel's concept of the absolute. I believe this to be established in this article with multiple high-quality references and also by Fritzman's own earlier analysis. The absolute is just knowing what knowing is. History is a mess, as Hegel duly acknowledges—and proceeds to ignore in his efforts to uncover a deeper "logic" (which is not at all the same as a unified narrative of progress) beneath all the noise.
 * Even if Dewey is right to reject Hegel's concept of the absolute, he fails (at least per Fritzman) to take seriously the claims central to Hegel's philosophy regarding the ultimate orientation of spirit toward freedom and truth. (Probably he should have aligned himself with Herder instead, which Hegel deliberately declined to do.)
 * Whatever the merits of Dewey's position, this criticism of "Hegel" misses the historical Hegel as preserved for us in his writings and a great deal of secondary literature.
 * Cheers, Patrick (talk) 00:25, 31 May 2024 (UTC)
 * Thanks for your detailed reply, Patrick.
 * Although I found everything you wrote & quoted to be fascinating, I think I might be missing the point.
 * If I am understanding you correctly, the "probably incorrect" parenthetical is referring to Dewey's interpretation of Hegel's concept of the absolute. In other words, "Dewey rejected Hegel's account of absolute knowing, but Dewey's conception of that account was probably incorrect."
 * Is that right?
 * If no, then please forgive me for not keeping up. If yes, I don't see how the passage cited supports the parenthetical in question. Maybe the "high-quality references" and "Fritzman's own earlier analysis" that you mentioned could be cited to support the passage?
 * Or perhaps the sentence could be re-worked for clarity? I'm no genius, but the current sentence is confusing to me, so I suspect it may be confusing to others, as well.
 * I appreciate you taking the time to educate me on this. Pecopteris (talk) 00:43, 31 May 2024 (UTC)
 * What is incorrect (per my own understanding and Fritzman's as I understood him at the time of reading) is Dewey's understanding of Hegel's concept of the absolute. The concept that Dewey rejects is not Hegel's concept; hence, per the article, his (probably incorrect) conception of Hegel's account of absolute knowing. As the paragraph cited above states, Dewey rejected Hegel’s absolute as he [Dewey] interpreted it, which is a major qualification even just in the context of this isolated paragraph.
 * In any event, what needs to be clear is that the absolute rejected by Dewey is not Hegel's absolute. If there's a better way to communicate this without repeating too much of what has been covered above, or unduly elongating the section on American pragmatism, that's would be great. By all means implement yourself or, if you prefer, run a proposal by me and other talk-page followers here.
 * Cheers, Patrick (talk) 01:08, 31 May 2024 (UTC)
 * Thanks for the clarification.
 * Perhaps we could say something like "Dewey accepted much of Hegel's account of history and society. He rejected Hegel's account of absolute knowing, although several scholars have argued that Dewey misinterpreted it."
 * Then, the relevant works by those scholars could be cited at the end of the sentence. I would defer to you about what the proper sources are, because I am not as familiar with them as you are.
 * That would be a lot more readable, to my eye. What do you think? Pecopteris (talk) 01:19, 31 May 2024 (UTC)
 * I guess I would consider the onus to be on Dewey scholars to defend his interpretation as anything other than an obvious misunderstanding contradicted by the majority of recent Hegel scholarship (as documented in the body of the article above).
 * I might be able to turn up a second supporting source in Richard J. Bernstein's The Pragmatic Turn (just in terms of what's on my shelves about these thinkers in relation to one another), but I'm not seeing a larger problem here. It's no shame on Dewey for getting something wrong about Hegel—especially working in English more than 100 years ago.
 * Unless there's a more serious problem than I recognize, however, it's on you to provide a more properly nuanced account of James' critical reception of Hegel. While I understand your initial edit, I don't understand the ongoing issue with the section. Dewey learned from Hegel without becoming a Hegel scholar or a Hegelian. That's totally fine. Maybe the John Dewey article would benefit from a more detailed discussion, but I don't see why it is needed here. Patrick (talk) 01:51, 31 May 2024 (UTC)
 * I'm sorry for my lack of clarity. It's totally possible that I'm missing something, so if you don't see any merit to the following remarks in this comment, I'll cease and desist unless/until a 3rd editor weighs in.
 * My issues are that 1) the sentence is written in a confusing manner, and 2) the cited source does not support the parenthetical. My proposed solutions are to 1) re-write the sentence to make it clearer, and 2) cite a source that directly supports the claim (that Dewey misunderstood/probably got wrong Hegel's account of Hegel's absolute).
 * To be clear, I totally defer to you, a subject-matter expert, on the facts of the matter. If you say that Dewey got Hegel's account of absolute knowing wrong, I believe you. I just wonder if, absent a source to directly support the claim, the sentence may be WP:OR or WP:SYNTH.
 * That's all. It's obviously a minor issue, if it's an issue at all, but since I'm trying to exercise my atrophied Wikipedia-editing muscle again, I figured I'd bring it up here per WP:BRD. Pecopteris (talk) 03:15, 31 May 2024 (UTC)
 * No, I appreciate your close attention to the article. If you still think it would improve the article, go ahead and remove the parenthetical again. The "his conception of" qualifier is more strongly supported by the paragraph cited above, and it should be enough for readers here, as it is there in the source.
 * Cheers, Patrick (talk) 18:33, 31 May 2024 (UTC)

Confusing Marx/Feurbach phrasing
The article reads:

"Among the first to take a critical view of Hegel's system was the 19th-century German group known as the Young Hegelians, which included Feuerbach, Marx, Engels, and their followers. The primary thrust of their criticism is concisely expressed in the eleventh of Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach" from his 1845 German Ideology: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."

Why would Marx's Theses on Feurbach, a criticism of Feurbach, in which he says all philosophers, including Feurbach, have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it, be the primary thrust of both Marx's and Feurbach's criticism of Hegel?

My point isn't philosophical, I just think this is a very confusingly worded sentence for an encyclopedia article to have and might be a factual error.

Were this article to highlight Marx's critique of Hegel it would probably be better to quote from Marx's "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy in General" in the 1844 Manuscripts, or Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right.

Shama From MySpace (talk) 22:45, 19 June 2024 (UTC)

 * Hi @Shama From MySpace,
 * I'm pretty sure this is my work, but upon review it does arguably violate Wikipedia policies about not performing any WP:synthesis and preferring WP:reliable secondary sources over primary sources (which, yes, is the opposite of the general practice in academic contexts).
 * Do you have any specific suggestions for improvements? Just rereading it quickly now, I am inclined to further subsume the Marxism subsection under "L v. R" and try to solve the issue you raise in the process. This article is already quite long, and I think that the best course would be to wikilink folks out to the relevant pages more directly addressing the Hegelian-Marxist legacy.
 * If you have something better, please by all means just edit. Otherwise, I hope you will share further thoughts here.
 * Thanks for checking in on the talk page!
 * Cheers, Patrick (talk) 01:23, 20 June 2024 (UTC)
 * Sorry for the belated reply, and thank you for the thoughtful reply. I don't think synthesis / primary sources is the issue. I might take a crack at an edit shortly once I have reviewed the appropriate materials.
 * Cheers, Shama From MySpace (talk) 04:10, 14 July 2024 (UTC)

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Talk:Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel


text:
Grid network

A grid network is a computer network consisting of a number of computer systems connected in a grid topology.

In a regular grid topology, each node in the network is connected with two neighbors along one or more dimensions. If the network is one-dimensional, and the chain of nodes is connected to form a circular loop, the resulting topology is known as a ring. Network systems such as FDDI use two counter-rotating token-passing rings to achieve high reliability and performance. In general, when an n-dimensional grid network is connected circularly in more than one dimension, the resulting network topology is a torus, and the network is called "toroidal". When the number of nodes along each dimension of a toroidal network is 2, the resulting network is called a hypercube.

A parallel computing cluster or multi-core processor is often connected in regular interconnection network such as a de Bruijn graph, a hypercube graph, a hypertree network, a fat tree network, a torus, or cube-connected cycles.

A grid network is not the same as a grid computer or a computational grid, although the nodes in a grid network are usually computers, and grid computing requires some kind of computer network or "universal coding" to interconnect the computers.

title: Grid network