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Bohdan Khmelnytsky

Bohdan Zynoviy Mykhailovych Khmelnytsky (Ruthenian: Ѕѣнові Богданъ Хмелнiцкiи; modern Богдан Зиновій Михайлович Хмельницький, Polish: Bohdan Chmielnicki; 1595 – 6 August 1657) was a Ruthenian nobleman and military commander of Ukrainian Cossacks     as Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, which was then under the suzerainty of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. He led an uprising against the Commonwealth and its magnates (1648–1654) that resulted in the creation of an independent Cossack state in Ukraine. In 1654, he concluded the Treaty of Pereiaslav with the Russian Tsar and allied the Cossack Hetmanate with Tsardom of Russia, thus placing central Ukraine under Russian protection. During the uprising the Cossacks led a massacre of thousands of Poles and Jews during 1648–1649 as one of the most traumatic events in the history of the Jews in Ukraine and Ukrainian nationalism.

Early life
Although there is no definite proof of the date of Khmelnytsky's birth, Ukrainian-born historian Mykhailo Maksymovych suggests that it is likely 27 December 1595 Julian (St. Theodore's day). As was the custom in the Orthodox Church, he was baptized with one of his middle names, Theodore, translated into Ukrainian as Bohdan. A biography of Khmelnytsky by Smoliy and Stepankov, however, suggests that it is more likely he was born on 9 November (feast day of St Zenoby, 30 October in Julian calendar) and was baptized on 11 November (feast day of St. Theodore in the Catholic Church). In the work of Paul of Aleppo, "the Travels of Macarius: Patriarch of Antioch", Khmelnytsky is called as the Khatman Zenobius Akhmil.

Khmelnytsky was probably born in the village of Subotiv, near Chyhyryn in the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland at the estate of his father Mykhailo Khmelnytsky. He was born into Ukrainian lesser nobility. His father was a courtier of Great Crown Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski, but later joined the court of his son-in-law Jan Daniłowicz, who in 1597 became starosta of Korsuń and Chyhyryn and appointed Mykhailo as his deputy in Chyhyryn (pidstarosta). For his service, he was granted a strip of land near the town, where Mykhailo set up a khutor Subotiv.

There has been controversy as to whether Bohdan and his father belonged to the Szlachta (Polish term for noblemen). Some sources state that in 1590 his father Mykhailo was appointed as a sotnyk for the Korsun-Chyhyryn starosta Jan Daniłowicz, who continued to colonize the new Ukrainian lands near the Dnieper river. Khmelnytsky identified as a noble, and his father's status as a pidstarosta of Chyhyryn helped him to be considered as such by others. During the Uprising, however, Khmelnytsky would stress his mother's Cossack roots and his father's exploits with the Cossacks of the Sich.

Khmelnytsky attended a Jesuit college, possibly in Jarosław, but more likely in Lviv in the school founded by hetman Żółkiewski. He completed his schooling by 1617, acquiring a broad knowledge of world history and learning Polish and Latin. Later he learned Turkish, Tatar, and French. Unlike many of the other Jesuit students, he did not embrace Roman Catholicism but remained Orthodox.

Marriage and family
Khmelnytsky married Hanna Somkivna, a sister of a rich Pereyaslav Cossack; the couple settled in Subotiv. By the second half of the 1620s, they had three daughters: Stepanyda, Olena, and Kateryna. His first son Tymish (Tymofiy) was born in 1632, and another son Yuriy was born in 1640.

Registered Cossack
Upon completion of his studies in 1617, Khmelnytsky entered into service with the Cossacks. As early as 1619, he was sent together with his father to Moldavia, when the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth entered into war against the Ottoman Empire. During the battle of Cecora (Țuțora) on 17 September 1620, his father was killed, and young Khmelnytsky, among many others including future hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski, was captured by the Turks. He spent the next two years in captivity in Constantinople as a prisoner of an Ottoman Kapudan Pasha (presumably Parlak Mustafa Pasha). Other sources claim that he spent his slavery in Ottoman Navy on galleys as an oarsman, where he picked up a knowledge of Turkic languages.

While there is no concrete evidence as to his return to Ukraine, most historians believe Khmelnytsky either escaped or was ransomed. Sources vary as to his benefactor – his mother, friends, the Polish king – but perhaps by Krzysztof Zbaraski, ambassador of the Commonwealth to the Ottomans. In 1622 he paid 30,000 thalers in ransom for all prisoners of war captured at the Battle of Cecora. Upon return to Subotiv, Khmelnytsky took over operating his father's estate and became a registered Cossack in the Chyhyryn Regiment.

He most likely did not take part in any of the Cossack uprisings that broke out in Ukraine at that time. His loyal service achieved him the rank of military clerk (pisarz wojskowy) of the registered Cossacks in 1637. It happened after the capitulation of the Pavlyuk uprising in the town Borowica on 24 December 1637, when field hetman Mikołaj Potocki appointed new Cossack eldership. He had to do it because some of the elders either joined Pavlyuk or were killed by him (like former military clerk, Teodor Onuszkowicz). Because of his new position Khmelnytsky was the one who prepared and signed an act of capitulation. Fighting didn't stop in Borowica, rebel Cossacks rose up again under the new command of Ostryanyn and Hunia in the spring next year. Mikołaj Potocki was successful again and after a six week long siege, the rebel Cossacks were forced to capitulate on 3 August 1638. Like the year before, some registered Cossacks joined the rebels, while some of them remained loyal. Unlike the last time, Potocki decided not to punish the rebel Cossacks, but forced all of them to swear loyalty to the king and the state and swear not to seek revenge against each other. The Hetman also agreed to their request to send emissaries to the king to seek royal grace and preserve Cossack rights. They were elected on a council on 9 September 1638 in Kiev. Bohdan Khmelnytsky was one of them; the other three were Iwan Bojaryn, colonel of Kaniów, Roman Połowiec and Jan Wołczenko. The emissaries didn't achieve much, mostly because all decisions were already made by the Sejm earlier this year, when deputies accepted the project presented by the grand Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski. Cossacks were forced to accept harsh new terms at the next council in Masłowy Staw, at the Ros river. According to one of the articles of the Ordynacya Woyska Zaporowskiego ("Ordinance of the Zaporozhian Army") registered Cossacks lost the right to elect their own officers and a commander, called elder (starszy) or commissar. From now on, the elder was to be nominated by the Sejm, from the Grand Hetman's recommendation. The Grand Hetman also got the right to appoint all officers. Commissars, colonels and osauls had to be a noblemen, while sotniks and atamans had to be Cossacks, who were "distinguished in a service for Us and the Commonwealth". Khmelnytsky became one of the sotniks of Chyhryn regiment.

In 1663 in Paris Pierre Chevalier published a book about Cossack uprising called Histoire de la guerre des Cosaques contre la Pologne, which he dedicated to Nicolas Léonor de Flesselles, count de Brégy, who was an ambassador to Poland in 1645. In the dedication he described the meeting de Brégy had with Khmelnytsky in France, and group of Cossacks he brought to France to fight against Spain in Flanders. Chevalier also claimed that he himself commanded Cossacks in Flanders. Although in distant parts of the book Chevalier doesn't mention either Cossacks or Khmelnytsky even once. In his other writing, Relation des Cosaques (avec la vie de Kmielniski, tirée d'un Manuscrit), published the same year, which also contains a biography of Khmelnytsky, there is no mention about his or any other Cossacks stay in France or Flanders. Moreover first Chevalier book is the only source that mention such an event, there is not trace of it even in correspondence of count de Brègy. Although it is true that he was conducting a recruitment of soldiers in Poland for French army in years 1646–1648. In fact he succeeded and about 3000 of them travelled via Gdańsk to Flanders and took part in fights around Dunkirk. French sources describes them as infanterie tout Poulonnois qu'Allemand. They were commanded by colonels Krzysztof Przyjemski, Andrzej Przyjemski and Georges Cabray. Second recruitment that shipped off in 1647 were commanded by Jan Pleitner, Dutch military engineer in service of Władysław IV and Jan Denhoff, colonel of Royal Guard. 17th century French historian Jean-François Sarasіn in his Histoire de siège de Dunkerque when describing participation of Polish mercenaries in fights over Dunkirk, notes that they were commanded by some "Sirot". Some historians identify him as Ivan Sirko, Cossack ataman.

Claims that Khmelnytsky and Cossacks were actually in France are supported by some Ukrainian historians, while other and most Polish scholarship finds it unlikely.

Czapliński Affair
Upon the death of magnate Stanisław Koniecpolski (March 1646) his successor, Aleksander, redrew the maps of his possessions. He laid claim to Khmelnytsky's estate, claiming it as his. Trying to find protection from this grab by the powerful magnate, Khmelnytsky wrote numerous appeals and letters to different representatives of the Polish crown but to no avail. At the end of 1645 the Chyhyryn starosta Daniel Czapliński officially received authority from Koniecpolski to seize Khmelnytsky's Subotiv estate.

In the summer of 1646, Khmelnytsky arranged an audience with King Władysław IV to plead his case, as he had favourable standing at the court. Władysław, who wanted Cossacks on his side in the wars he planned, gave Khmelnytsky a royal charter, protecting his rights to the Subotiv estate. But, because of the structure of the Commonwealth at that time and the lawlessness of Ukraine, even the King was not able to prevent a confrontation with local magnates. In the beginning of 1647, Daniel Czapliński started to harass Khmelnytsky in order to force him off the land. On two occasions the magnate had Subotiv raided: considerable property damage was done and Khmelnytsky's son Yuriy was badly beaten. Finally, in April 1647, Czapliński succeeded in evicting Khmelnytsky from the land, and he was forced to move with his large family to a relative's house in Chyhyryn.

In May 1647, Khmelnytsky arranged a second audience with the king to plead his case but found him unwilling to confront a powerful magnate. In addition to losing the estate, Khmelnytsky suffered the loss of his wife Hanna, and he was left alone with their children. He promptly remarried, to Motrona (Helena Czaplińska), by that time wife of Daniel Czapliński, the so-called "Helen of the steppe". He was less successful in real estate, and was unable to regain the land and property of his estate or financial compensation for it. During this time, he met several higher Polish officials to discuss the Cossacks' war with the Tatars, and used this occasion again to plead his case with Czapliński, still unsuccessfully.

While Khmelnytsky found no support from the Polish officials, he found it in his Cossack friends and subordinates. His Chyhyryn regiment and others were on his side. All through the autumn of 1647 Khmelnytsky travelled from one regiment to another, and had numerous consultations with Cossack leaders throughout Ukraine. His activity raised suspicion among the local Polish authorities already used to Cossack revolts; he was promptly arrested. Koniecpolski issued an order for his execution, but the Chyhyryn Cossack polkovnyk, who held Khmelnytsky, was persuaded to release him. Not willing to tempt fate any further, Khmelnytsky headed for the Zaporozhian Sich with a group of his supporters.

Uprising
While the Czapliński Affair is generally regarded as the immediate cause of the uprising, it was primarily a catalyst for actions representing rising popular discontent. Religion, ethnicity, and economics factored into this discontent. While the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth remained a union of nations, a sizable population of Orthodox Ruthenians were ignored. Oppressed by the Polish magnates, they took their wrath out on Poles, as well as the Jews, who often managed the estates of Polish nobles. The advent of the Counter-Reformation worsened relations between the Orthodox and Catholic Churches. Many Orthodox Ukrainians considered the Union of Brest as a threat to their Orthodox faith.

Initial successes
At the end of 1647 Khmelnytsky reached the estuary of the Dnieper river. On 7 December, his small detachment (300–500 men), with the help of registered Cossacks who went over to his side, disarmed the small Polish detachment guarding the area and took over the Zaporozhian Sich. The Poles attempted to retake the Sich but were decisively defeated as more registered Cossacks joined the forces. At the end of January 1648, a Cossack Rada was called and Khmelnytsky was unanimously elected a hetman. A period of feverish activity followed. Cossacks were sent with hetman's letters to many regions of Ukraine calling on Cossacks and Orthodox peasants to join the rebellion, Khortytsia was fortified, efforts were made to acquire and make weapons and ammunition, and emissaries were sent to the Khan of Crimea, İslâm III Giray.

Initially, Polish authorities took the news of Khmelnytsky's arrival at the Sich and reports about the rebellion lightly. The two sides exchanged lists of demands: the Poles asked the Cossacks to surrender the mutinous leader and disband, while Khmelnytsky and the Rada demanded that the Commonwealth restore the Cossacks' ancient rights, stop the advance of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, yield the right to appoint Orthodox leaders of the Sich and of the Registered Cossack regiments, and to remove Commonwealth troops from Ukraine. The Polish magnates considered the demands an affront, and an army headed by Stefan Potocki moved in the direction of the Sich.

Had the Cossacks stayed at Khortytsia, they might have been defeated, as in many other rebellions. However, Khmelnytsky marched against the Poles. The two armies met on 16 May 1648 at Zhovti Vody, where, aided by the Tatars of Tugay Bey, the Cossacks inflicted their first crushing defeat on the Commonwealth. It was repeated soon afterwards, with the same success, at the Battle of Korsuń on 26 May 1648. Khmelnytsky used his diplomatic and military skills: under his leadership, the Cossack army moved to battle positions following his plans, Cossacks were proactive and decisive in their manoeuvrers and attacks, and most importantly, he gained the support of both large contingents of registered Cossacks and the Crimean Khan, his crucial ally for the many battles to come.

Establishment of Cossack Hetmanate
The Patriarch of Jerusalem Paiseus, who was visiting Kiev at this time, referred to Khmelnytsky as the Prince of Rus. In February 1649, during negotiations in Pereiaslav with a Polish delegation headed by Senator Adam Kysil, Khmelnytsky declared that he was "the sole autocrat of Rus" and that he had "enough power in Ukraine, Podilia, and Volhynia... in his land and principality stretching as far as Lviv, Kholm (modern Chełm), and Halych."

"I already did more than was thinking before, now I will obtain what I revised recently. I will liberate out of the Polish woe all of the Ruthenian people! Before I was fighting for the insults and injustice caused to me, now I will fight for our Orthodox faith. And all people will help me in that all the way to Lublin and Krakow, and I won't back off from the people as they are our right hand. And for the purpose lest you won't attack cossacks by conquering peasants, I will have two, three hundred thousands of them."

After the period of initial military successes, the state-building process began. His leadership was demonstrated in all areas of state-building: military, administration, finance, economics and culture. Khmelnytsky made the Zaporozhian Host the supreme power in the new Ukrainian state and unified all the spheres of Ukrainian society under his authority. Khmelnytsky built a new government system and developed military and civilian administration.

A new generation of statesmen and military leaders came to the forefront: Ivan Vyhovsky, Pavlo Teteria, Danylo Nechai and Ivan Nechai, Ivan Bohun, Hryhoriy Hulyanytsky. From Cossack polkovnyks, officers, and military commanders, a new elite within the Cossack Hetman state was born. Throughout the years, the elite preserved and maintained the autonomy of the Cossack Hetmanate in the face of Russia's attempt to curb it. It was also instrumental in the onset of the period of Ruin that followed, eventually destroying most of the achievements of the Khmelnytsky era.

Complications
Khmelnytsky's initial successes were followed by a series of setbacks as neither Khmelnytsky nor the Commonwealth had enough strength to stabilise the situation or to inflict a defeat on the enemy. What followed was a period of intermittent warfare and several peace treaties, which were seldom upheld. From spring 1649 onward, the situation turned for the worse for the Cossacks; as Polish attacks increased in frequency, they became more successful. The resulting Treaty of Zboriv on 18 August 1649 was unfavourable for the Cossacks. It was followed by another defeat at the battle of Berestechko on 18 June 1651 in which the Tatars betrayed Khmelnytsky and held the hetman captive. The Cossacks suffered a crushing defeat, with an estimated 30,000 casualties. They were forced to sign the Treaty of Bila Tserkva, which favoured the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Warfare broke open again and, in the years that followed, the two sides were almost perpetually at war. Now, the Crimean Tatars played a decisive role and did not allow either side to prevail. It was in their interests to keep both Ukraine and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth from getting too strong and becoming an effective power in the region.

Khmelnytsky started looking for another foreign ally. Although the Cossacks had established their de facto independence from Poland, the new state needed legitimacy, which could be provided by a foreign monarch. In search of a protectorate, Khmelnytsky approached the Ottoman sultan in 1651, and formal embassies were exchanged. The Turks offered vassalship, like their other arrangements with contemporary Crimea, Moldavia and Wallachia. However, the idea of a union with the Muslim monarch was not acceptable to the general populace and most Cossacks.

The other possible ally was the Tsardom of Russia. However, despite appeals for help from Khmelnytsky in the name of the shared Orthodox faith, the tsar preferred to wait, until the threat of a Cossack-Ottoman union in 1653 finally forced him to action. The idea that the tsar might be favourable to taking Ukraine under his hand was communicated to the hetman and so diplomatic activity intensified.

Treaty with the tsar
After a series of negotiations, it was agreed that the Cossacks would accept overlordship by the Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. To finalize the treaty, a Russian embassy led by boyar Vasily Buturlin came to Pereiaslav, where, on 18 January 1654, the Cossack Rada was called and the treaty concluded. Historians have not come to consensus in interpreting the intentions of the tsar and Khmelnytsky in signing this agreement. The treaty legitimized Russian claims to the capital of Kievan Rus' and strengthened the tsar's influence in the region. Khmelnytsky needed the treaty to gain a legitimate monarch's protection and support from a friendly Orthodox power.

Historians have differed in their reading of Khmelnytsky's goal with the union: whether it was to be a military union, a suzerainty, or a complete incorporation of Ukraine into the Tsardom of Russia.

The differences were expressed during the ceremony of the oath of allegiance to the tsar: the Russian envoy refused to reciprocate with an oath from the ruler to his subjects, as the Cossacks and Ruthenians expected since it was the custom of the Polish king.

Khmelnytsky stormed out of the church and threatened to cancel the entire treaty. The Cossacks decided to rescind the demand and abide by the treaty.

Final years
As a result of the 1654 Treaty of Pereiaslav, the geopolitical map of the region changed. Russia entered the scene, and the Cossacks' former allies, the Tatars, had switched sides and gone over to the Polish side, initiating warfare against Khmelnytsky and his forces. Tatar raids depopulated whole areas of Sich. Cossacks, aided by the Tsar's army, took revenge on Polish possessions in Belarus, and in the spring of 1654, the Cossacks drove the Poles from much of the country. Sweden entered the mêlée. Old adversaries of both Poland and Russia, they occupied a share of Lithuania before the Russians could get there.

The occupation displeased Russia because the tsar sought to take over the Swedish Baltic provinces. In 1656, with the Commonwealth increasingly war-torn but also increasingly hostile and successful against the Swedes, the ruler of Transylvania, George II Rákóczi, also joined in. Charles X of Sweden had solicited his help because of the massive Polish popular opposition and resistance against the Swedes. Under blows from all sides, the Commonwealth barely survived.

Russia attacked Sweden in July 1656, while its forces were deeply involved in Poland. That war ended in status quo two years later, but it complicated matters for Khmelnytsky, as his ally was now fighting his overlord. In addition to diplomatic tensions between the tsar and Khmelnytsky, a number of other disagreements between the two surfaced. In particular, they concerned Russian officials' interference in the finances of the Cossack Hetmanate and in the newly captured Belarus. The tsar concluded a separate treaty with the Poles in Vilnius in 1656. The Hetman's emissaries were not even allowed to attend the negotiations.

Khmelnytsky wrote an irate letter to the tsar accusing him of breaking the Pereiaslav agreement. He compared the Swedes to the tsar and said that the former were more honourable and trustworthy than the Russians.

In Poland, the Cossack army and Transylvanian allies suffered a number of setbacks. As a result, Khmelnytsky had to deal with a Cossack rebellion on the home front. Troubling news also came from Crimea, as Tatars, in alliance with Poland, were preparing for a new invasion of Ukraine. Though already ill, Khmelnytsky continued to conduct diplomatic activity, at one point even receiving the tsar's envoys from his bed. On 22 July, he suffered a cerebral hemorrhage and became paralysed after his audience with the Kiev Colonel Zhdanovich. His expedition to Halychyna had failed because of mutiny within his army. Less than a week later, Bohdan Khmelnytsky died at 5 a.m. on 27 July 1657. His funeral was held on 23 August, and his body was taken from his capital, Chyhyryn, to his estate, at Subotiv, for burial in his ancestral church. In 1664 a Polish hetman Stefan Czarniecki recaptured Subotiv, which according to some Ukrainian historians, ordered the bodies of the hetman and his son, Tymish, to be exhumed and desecrated, while others claim that is not the case.

Influences
Khmelnytsky had a crucial influence on the history of Ukraine. He not only shaped the future of Ukraine but affected the balance of power in Europe, as the weakening of Poland-Lithuania was exploited by Austria, Saxony, Prussia, and Russia. His actions and role in events were viewed differently by different contemporaries, and even now there are greatly differing perspectives on his legacy.

Ukrainian assessment
In Ukraine, Khmelnytsky is generally regarded as a national hero. A city and a region of the country bear his name. His image is prominently displayed on Ukrainian banknotes and his monument in the centre of Kyiv is a focal point of the Ukrainian capital. There have also been several issues of the Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky – one of the highest decorations in Ukraine and in the former Soviet Union.

However, with all this positive appreciation of his legacy, even in Ukraine it is far from being unanimous. He is criticised for his union with Russia, which in the view of some, proved to be disastrous for the future of the country. Prominent Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko, was one of Khmelnytsky's very vocal and harsh critics. Others criticize him for his alliance with the Crimean Tatars, which permitted the latter to take a large number of Ukrainian peasants as slaves, as the Cossacks as a military caste did not protect the kholopy, the lowest stratum of the Ukrainian people. Folk songs capture this. On the balance, the view of his legacy in present-day Ukraine is more positive than negative, with some critics acknowledging that the union with Russia was dictated by necessity and an attempt to survive in those difficult times.

In a 2018 Ukraine's Rating Sociological Group poll, 73% of Ukrainian respondents had a positive attitude to Khmelnytsky.

Polish assessment
Khmelnytsky's role in the history of the Polish State has been viewed mostly in a negative light. The rebellion of 1648 proved to be the end of the Golden Age of the Commonwealth and the beginning of its demise. Although it survived the rebellion and the following war, within a hundred years it was divided amongst Russia, Prussia, and Austria in the partitions of Poland. Many Poles blamed Khmelnytsky for the decline of the Commonwealth.

Khmelnytsky has been a subject to several works of fiction in the 19th century Polish literature, but the most notable treatment of him in Polish literature is found in Henryk Sienkiewicz's With Fire and Sword. The rather critical portrayal of him by Sienkiewicz has been moderated in the 1999 movie adaptation by Jerzy Hoffman.

Russian and Soviet history
The official Russian historiography stressed the fact that Khmelnytsky entered into union with Moscow's Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich with an expressed desire to "re-unify" Ukraine with Russia. This view corresponded with the official theory of Moscow as an heir of the Kievan Rus', which appropriately gathered its former territories.

Khmelnytsky was viewed as a national hero of Russia for bringing Ukraine into the "eternal union" of all the Russias – Great (Russia), Little (Ukraine) and White (Belarus) Russia. As such, he was much respected and venerated during the existence of the Russian Empire. His role was presented as a model for all Ukrainians to follow: to aspire for closer ties with Great Russia. This view was expressed in a monument commissioned by the Russian nationalist Mikhail Yuzefovich, which was installed in the centre of Kiev in 1888.

Russian authorities decided the original version of the monument (created by Russian sculptor Mikhail Mikeshin) was too xenophobic; it was to depict a vanquished Pole, Jew, and a Catholic priest under the hooves of the horse. The inscription on the monument reads "To Bohdan Khmelnytsky from one and indivisible Russia." Mikeshin also created the Monument to the Millennium of Russia in Novgorod, which has Khmelnytsky shown as one of Russia's prominent figures.

Soviet historiography followed in many ways the Imperial Russian theory of re-unification while adding the class struggle dimension to the story. Khmelnytsky was praised not only for re-unifying Ukraine with Russia, but also for organizing the class struggle of oppressed Ukrainian peasants against Polish exploiters.

Jewish history
The assessment of Khmelnytsky in Jewish history is overwhelmingly negative because he used Jews as scapegoats and sought to eradicate Jews from Ukraine. The Khmelnytsky Uprising led to the deaths of an estimated 18,000–100,000 Jews. Sources estimating 100,000 Jews killed: "Between 1648 and 1656, tens of thousands of Jews—given the lack of reliable data, it is impossible to establish more accurate figures—were killed by the rebels, and to this day the Khmelnytsky uprising is considered by Jews to be one of the most traumatic events in their history."
 * "Bogdan Chmelnitzki leads Cossack uprising against Polish rule; 100,000 Jews are killed and hundreds of Jewish communities are destroyed." Judaism Timeline 1618–1770, CBS News. Accessed 13 May 2007.
 * "The peasants of Ukraine rose up in 1648 under a petty aristocrat Bogdan Chmielnicki. ... It is estimated that 100,000 Jews were massacred and 300 of their communities destroyed". Oscar Reiss. The Jews in Colonial America, McFarland & Company, 2004, ISBN 0-7864-1730-7, pp. 98–99.
 * "Moreover, Poles must have been keenly aware of the massacre of Jews in 1768 and even more so as the result of the much more widespread massacres (approximately 100,000 dead) of the earlier Chmielnicki pogroms during the preceding century." Manus I. Midlarsky. The Killing Trap: genocide in the twentieth century, Cambridge University Press, 2005,ISBN 0-521-81545-2, p. 352.
 * "... as many as 100,000 Jews were murdered throughout the Ukraine by Bogdan Chmielnicki's Cossack soldiers on the rampage." Martin Gilbert. Holocaust Journey: Traveling in Search of the Past, Columbia University Press, 1999, ISBN 0-231-10965-2, p. 219.
 * "A series of massacres perpetrated by the Ukrainian Cossacks under the leadership of Bogdan Chmielnicki saw the death of up to 100,000 Jews and the destruction of perhaps 700 communities between 1648 and 1654 ..." Samuel Totten. Teaching About Genocide: Issues, Approaches, and Resources, Information Age Publishing, 2004, ISBN 1-59311-074-X, p. 25.
 * "In response to Poland having taken control of much of the Ukraine in the early seventeenth century, Ukrainian peasants mobilized as groups of cavalry, and these "cossacks" in the Chmielnicki uprising of 1648 killed an estimated 100,000 Jews." Cara Camcastle. The More Moderate Side of Joseph De Maistre: Views on Political Liberty And Political Economy, McGill-Queen's Press, 2005, ISBN 0-7735-2976-4, p. 26
 * "Is there not a difference in nature between Hitler's extermination of three million Polish Jews between 1939 and 1945 because he wanted every Jew dead and the mass murder [in] 1648–49 of 100,000 Polish Jews by General Bogdan Chmielnicki because he wanted to end Polish rule in the Ukraine and was prepared to use Cossack terrorism to kill Jews in the process?" Colin Martin Tatz. With Intent to Destroy: Reflections on Genocide, Verso, 2003, ISBN 1-85984-550-9, p. 146.
 * "... massacring an estimated one hundred thousand Jews as the Ukrainian Bogdan Chmielnicki had done nearly three centuries earlier." Mosheh Weiss. A Brief History of the Jewish People, Rowman & Littlefield, 2004, ISBN 0-7425-4402-8, p. 193. Atrocity stories about massacre victims who had been buried alive, cut to pieces or forced to kill one another spread throughout Europe and beyond. The pogroms contributed to a revival of the ideas of Isaac Luria, who revered the Kabbalah, and the identification of Sabbatai Zevi as the Messiah. Orest Subtelny writes:

Commemoration

 * The Ukrainian city of Khmelnytskyi is named after Khmelnytsky.
 * In most Ukrainian cities there are streets named after Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. There is also Bohdan Khmelnytskyi Avenue in the city of Dnipro.
 * There are monuments to Khmelnytsky in Kyiv, Chyhyryn, Chernihiv, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Nikopol, Kropyvnytskyi, Zaporizhzhia, and Subotiv.
 * The Separate Presidential Brigade "Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi", a unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine tasked with protecting the president of Ukraine, is named in honor of Khmelnytsky.
 * The National Academy of the State Border Service of Ukraine is named after Khmelnytsky.
 * The Bohdan Khmelnytsky Battalion, a pro-Russian battalion allegedly formed from Ukrainian POWs is named in honor of Khmelnytsky.

title: Bohdan Khmelnytsky


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Ben Bova

Benjamin William Bova (November 8, 1932 –November 29, 2020) was an American writer and editor. During a writing career of 60 years, he was the author of more than 120 works of science fact and fiction, an editor of Analog Science Fiction and Fact, for which he won a Hugo Award six times, and an editorial director of Omni; he was also president of both the National Space Society and the Science Fiction Writers of America.

Personal life and education
Ben Bova was born on November 8, 1932, in Philadelphia. He graduated from South Philadelphia High School in 1949. In 1953, while attending Temple University in Philadelphia, he married Rosa Cucinotta; they had a son and a daughter. The couple divorced in 1974. That year he married Barbara Berson Rose. Barbara Bova died on September 23, 2009. Bova dedicated his 2011 novel Power Play to Barbara. In March 2013, he announced on his website that he had remarried, to Rashida Loya.

Bova was an atheist and was critical of what he saw as the unquestioning nature of religion. He wrote an op-ed piece in 2012, in which he argued that atheists can be just as moral as religious believers.

He went back to school in the 1980s, earning a Master of Arts degree in communications in 1987 from the State University of New York at Albany and a Doctor of Education degree from California Coast University in 1996.

Bova died from COVID-19-related pneumonia and a stroke on November 29, 2020, at the age of 88.

Career

Bova worked as a technical writer for Project Vanguard in the 1950s and later for the Avco Everett Research Laboratory

In 1972, Bova became editor of Analog Science Fact & Fiction, after John W. Campbell's death in 1971. At Analog, Bova won six Hugo Awards for Best Professional Editor.

Bova served as the science advisor for the television series The Starlost (1973), resigning as he lacked the "contractual right to remove his name from the credits." His novel The Starcrossed, loosely based on his experiences, featured a characterization of his friend and colleague Harlan Ellison as "Ron Gabriel". In 1974, he co-wrote the screenplay for an episode of the children's science-fiction television series Land of the Lost, titled "The Search". After leaving Analog in 1978, Bova went on to edit Omni, from 1978 to 1982.

Bova held the position of President Emeritus of the National Space Society and served as President of Science Fiction and Fantasy Writers of America (SFWA).

In 2000, he attended the 58th World Science Fiction Convention (Chicon 2000) as the Author Guest of Honor. In 2007, Stuber/Parent Productions hired him as a consultant to provide insight into what the world may look like in the near future, for their film Repo Men (2010) starring Jude Law and Forest Whitaker. Also in 2007 he provided consulting services to Silver Pictures on the film adaptation of Richard K. Morgan's hardboiled cyberpunk science-fiction novel Altered Carbon (2002). He was awarded the Robert A. Heinlein Award in 2008 for his work in science fiction.

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title: Ben Bova


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Battle of Okinawa

The Battle of Okinawa (沖縄戦), codenamed Operation Iceberg, was a major battle of the Pacific War fought on the island of Okinawa by United States Army and United States Marine Corps forces against the Imperial Japanese Army. The initial invasion of Okinawa on 1 April 1945 was the largest amphibious assault in the Pacific Theater of World War II. The Kerama Islands surrounding Okinawa were preemptively captured on 26 March by the 77th Infantry Division. The 82-day battle lasted from 1 April until 22 June 1945. After a long campaign of island hopping, the Allies were planning to use Kadena Air Base on the large island of Okinawa as a base for Operation Downfall, the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands, 340 mi away.

The United States created the Tenth Army, a cross-branch force consisting of the U.S. Army 7th, 27th, 77th and 96th Infantry Divisions with the 1st, 2nd, and 6th Marine Divisions, to fight on the island. The Tenth Army was unique in that it had its own Tactical Air Force (joint Army-Marine command) and was supported by combined naval and amphibious forces. Opposing the Allied forces on the ground was the Japanese Thirty-Second Army. The Battle of Okinawa was the single longest sustained carrier campaign of the Second World War.

The battle has been referred to as the "typhoon of steel" in English, known in Japanese as "tetsu no bōfū". The nicknames refer to the ferocity of the fighting, the intensity of Japanese kamikaze attacks and the sheer numbers of Allied ships and armored vehicles that assaulted the island. The battle was the bloodiest and fiercest of the Pacific War, with some 50,000 Allied and around 100,000 Japanese casualties, also including local Okinawans conscripted into the Japanese Army. According to local authorities, at least 149,425 Okinawan people were killed, died by coerced suicide or went missing.

In the naval operations surrounding the battle, both sides lost considerable numbers of ships and aircraft, including the Japanese battleship JAPANESE BATTLESHIP Yamato. After the battle, Okinawa provided a fleet anchorage, troop staging areas, and airfields in proximity to Japan for US forces in preparation for a planned invasion of the Japanese home islands.

Allied
In all, the US Army had over 103,000 soldiers (of these, 38,000+ were non-divisional artillery, combat support and HQ troops, with another 9,000 service troops), over 88,000 Marines and 18,000 Navy personnel (mostly Seabees and medical personnel). At the start of the Battle of Okinawa, the US Tenth Army had 182,821 personnel under its command. It was planned that Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. would report to Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner until the amphibious phase was completed, after which he would report directly to Admiral Raymond A. Spruance. Total aircraft in the US Navy, Marine and Army Air Force exceeded 3,000 over the course of the battle, including fighters, attack aircraft, scout planes, bombers and dive-bombers. The invasion was supported by a fleet consisting of 18 battleships, 27 cruisers, 177 destroyers/destroyer escorts, 39 aircraft carriers (11 fleet carriers, 6 light carriers and 22 escort carriers) and various support and troop transport ships.

The British naval contingent accompanied 251 British naval aircraft and included a British Commonwealth fleet with Australian, New Zealand and Canadian ships and personnel.

Japanese
The Japanese land campaign (mainly defensive) was conducted by the 67,000-strong (77,000 according to some sources) regular 32nd Army and some 9,000 Imperial Japanese Navy troops at Oroku Naval Base (only a few hundred of whom had been trained and equipped for ground combat), supported by 39,000 drafted local Ryukyuan people (including 24,000 hastily drafted rear militia called Boeitai and 15,000 non-uniformed laborers). The Japanese had used kamikaze tactics since the Battle of Leyte Gulf, but for the first time they became a major part of the defense. Between the American landing on 1 April and 25 May, seven major kamikaze attacks were attempted, involving more than 1,500 planes.

The 32nd Army initially consisted of the 9th, 24th and 62nd Divisions and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade. The 9th Division was moved to Taiwan before the invasion, resulting in shuffling of Japanese defensive plans. Primary resistance was to be led in the south by Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima, his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Isamu Chō and his chief of operations, Colonel Hiromichi Yahara. Yahara advocated a defensive strategy, whilst Chō advocated an offensive one.

In the north, Colonel Takehido Udo was in command. The naval troops were led by Rear Admiral Minoru Ōta. They expected the Americans to land 6–10 divisions against the Japanese garrison of two and a half divisions. The staff calculated that superior quality and numbers of weapons gave each US division five or six times the firepower of a Japanese division. To this, would be added the Americans' abundant naval and air firepower.

Japanese use of children
On Okinawa, the Imperial Japanese Army mobilized 1,780 schoolboys aged 14–17 years into front line service as an Iron and Blood Imperial Corps (鉄血勤皇隊), while female Himeyuri students were organized into a nursing unit. This mobilization was conducted by an ordinance of the Ministry of the Army, not by law. The ordinances mobilized the students as volunteer soldiers for form's sake; in reality, the military authorities ordered schools to force almost all students to "volunteer" as soldiers; sometimes they counterfeited the necessary documents. About half of the Tekketsu Kinnōtai were killed, including in suicide bomb attacks against tanks and in guerrilla operations.

Among the 21 male and female secondary schools that made up these student corps, 2,000 students died on the battlefield. Even with the female students acting mainly as nurses to Japanese soldiers, they were still exposed to the harsh conditions of war.

Naval battle
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The US Navy's Task Force 58, deployed to the east of Okinawa with a picket group of 6 to 8 destroyers, kept 13 carriers (7 fleet carriers and 6 light carriers) on duty from 23 March to 27 April and a smaller number thereafter. Until 27 April, a minimum of 14 and up to 18 escort carriers were in the area at all times. Until 20 April, British Task Force 57, with 4 large and 6 escort carriers, remained off the Sakishima Islands to protect the southern flank.

The protracted length of the campaign under stressful conditions forced Admiral Chester W. Nimitz to take the unprecedented step of relieving the principal naval commanders to rest and recuperate. Following the practice of changing the fleet designation with the change of commanders, US naval forces began the campaign as the US 5th Fleet under Admiral Spruance, but ended it as the 3rd Fleet under Admiral Halsey.

Japanese air opposition had been relatively light during the first few days after the landings. However, on 6 April the expected air reaction began with an attack by 400 planes from Kyushu. Periodic heavy air attacks continued through April. During the period of 26 March to 30 April, 20 American ships were sunk and 157 damaged by enemy action. By 30 April the Japanese had lost more than 1,100 planes to Allied naval forces alone.

Between 6 April and 22 June, the Japanese flew 1,465 kamikaze aircraft in large-scale attacks from Kyushu, 185 individual kamikaze sorties from Kyushu, and 250 individual kamikaze sorties from Taiwan, then called Formosa. While US intelligence estimated there were 89 planes on Formosa, the Japanese actually had about 700, dismantled or well camouflaged and dispersed into scattered villages and towns; the US Fifth Air Force disputed Navy claims of kamikaze coming from Formosa.

The ships lost were smaller vessels, particularly the destroyers of the radar pickets, as well as destroyer escorts and landing ships. While no major Allied warships were lost, several fleet carriers were severely damaged. Land-based Shin'yō-class suicide motorboats were also used in the Japanese suicide attacks, although Ushijima had disbanded the majority of the suicide boat battalions before the battle because of expected low effectiveness against a superior enemy. The boat crews were re-formed into three additional infantry battalions.

Operation Ten-Go
Operation Ten-Go (Ten-gō sakusen) was the attempted attack by a strike force of 10 Japanese surface vessels, led by Yamato and commanded by Admiral Seiichi Itō. This small task force had been ordered to fight through enemy naval forces, then beach Yamato and fight from shore, using her guns as coastal artillery and her crew as naval infantry. The Ten-Go force was spotted by submarines shortly after it left the Japanese home waters and was intercepted by US carrier aircraft.

Under attack from more than 300 aircraft over a two-hour span, the world's largest battleship sank on 7 April 1945 after a one-sided battle, long before she could reach Okinawa. (US torpedo bombers were instructed to aim for only one side to prevent effective counter flooding by the battleship's crew, and to aim for the bow or the stern where armor was believed to be the thinnest.) Of Yamato's screening force, the light cruiser JAPANESE CRUISER Yahagi and 4 of the 8 destroyers were also sunk. The Imperial Japanese Navy lost some 3,700 sailors, including Admiral Itō, at the cost of 10 US aircraft and 12 airmen.

British Pacific Fleet
The British Pacific Fleet, taking part as Task Force 57, was assigned the task of neutralizing the Japanese airfields in the Sakishima Islands, which it did successfully from March 26 to April 10. On April 10, its attention was shifted to airfields in northern Formosa. The force withdrew to San Pedro Bay on April 23. On May 1, the British Pacific Fleet returned to action, subduing the airfields as before, this time with naval bombardment as well as aircraft. Several kamikaze attacks caused significant damage, but as the Royal Navy carriers had armored flight decks, they experienced only a brief interruption to their force's operations.

Land battle
The land battle took place over about 81 days beginning on 1 April 1945. The first Americans ashore were soldiers of the 77th Infantry Division who landed in the Kerama Islands, 15 mi west of Okinawa on 26 March. Subsidiary landings followed, and the Kerama group was secured over the next five days. In these preliminary operations, the 77th Infantry Division suffered 27 dead and 81 wounded, while the Japanese dead and captured numbered over 650. The operation provided a protected anchorage for the fleet and eliminated the threat from suicide boats.

On 31 March, Marines of the Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion landed without opposition on Keise Shima, four islets just 8 mi west of the Okinawan capital of Naha. A group of 155 mm "Long Tom" artillery pieces went ashore on the islets to cover operations on Okinawa.

Northern Okinawa

The main landing was made by the XXIV Corps and the III Amphibious Corps on the Hagushi beaches on the western coast of Okinawa on 1 April. The 2nd Marine Division conducted a demonstration off the Minatoga beaches on the southeastern coast to deceive the Japanese about American intentions and delay movement of reserves from there.

Tenth Army swept across the south-central part of the island with relative ease, capturing the Kadena and the Yomitan airbases within hours of the landing. In light of the weak opposition, General Buckner decided to proceed immediately with Phase II of his plan, the seizure of northern Okinawa. The 6th Marine Division headed up the Ishikawa Isthmus and by 7 April had sealed off the Motobu Peninsula.

Six days later on 13 April, the 2nd Battalion, 22nd Marine Regiment, reached Hedo Point at the northernmost tip of the island. By this point, the bulk of the Japanese forces in the north (codenamed Udo Force) were cornered on the Motobu Peninsula. The terrain was mountainous and wooded, with the Japanese defenses concentrated on Mount Yaedake, a twisted mass of rocky ridges and ravines on the center of the peninsula. There was heavy fighting before the Marines finally cleared Yaedake on 18 April. However, this was not the end of ground combat in northern Okinawa. On 24 May, the Japanese mounted Operation Gi-gou: a company of Giretsu Kuteitai commandos were airlifted in a suicide attack on Yomitan. They destroyed 70000 USgal of fuel and nine planes before being killed by the defenders, who lost two men.

Meanwhile, the 77th Infantry Division assaulted Ie Shima, a small island off the western end of the peninsula, on 16 April. In addition to conventional hazards, the 77th Infantry Division encountered kamikaze attacks and even local women armed with spears. There was heavy fighting before the area was declared secured on 21 April and became another airbase for operations against Japan.

Southern Okinawa
While the 6th Marine Division cleared northern Okinawa, the US Army 96th and 7th Infantry Divisions wheeled south across the narrow isthmus of Okinawa. The 96th Infantry Division began to encounter fierce resistance in west-central Okinawa from Japanese troops holding fortified positions east of Highway No. 1 and about 5 mi northwest of Shuri, from what came to be known as Cactus Ridge. The 7th Infantry Division encountered similarly fierce Japanese opposition from a rocky pinnacle located about 1000 yd southwest of Arakachi (later dubbed "The Pinnacle"). By the night of 8 April, American troops had cleared these and several other strongly fortified positions. They suffered over 1,500 battle casualties in the process while killing or capturing about 4,500 Japanese. Yet the battle had only begun, for it was realized that "these were merely outposts," guarding the Shuri Line.

The next American objective was Kakazu Ridge (26.259°N, 127.737°W), two hills with a connecting saddle that formed part of Shuri's outer defenses. The Japanese had prepared their positions well and fought tenaciously. The Japanese soldiers hid in fortified caves. American forces often lost personnel before clearing the Japanese out from each cave or other hiding place. The Japanese sent Okinawans at gunpoint out to obtain water and supplies for them, which led to civilian casualties. The American advance was inexorable but resulted in a high number of casualties on both sides.

As the American assault against Kakazu Ridge stalled, Lieutenant General Ushijima—influenced by General Chō—decided to take the offensive. On the evening of 12 April, the 32nd Army attacked American positions across the entire front. The Japanese attack was heavy, sustained, and well organized. After fierce close combat, the attackers retreated, only to repeat their offensive the following night. A final assault on 14 April was again repulsed. The effort led the 32nd Army's staff to conclude that the Americans were vulnerable to night infiltration tactics but that their superior firepower made any offensive Japanese troop concentrations extremely dangerous, and they reverted to their defensive strategy.

The 27th Infantry Division, which had landed on 9 April, took over on the right, along the west coast of Okinawa. General John R. Hodge now had three divisions in the line, with the 96th in the middle and the 7th to the east, with each division holding a front of only about 1.5 mi. Hodge launched a new offensive on 19 April with a barrage of 324 guns, the largest ever in the Pacific Ocean Theater. Battleships, cruisers, and destroyers joined the bombardment, which was followed by 650 Navy and Marine planes attacking the Japanese positions with napalm, rockets, bombs, and machine guns. The Japanese defenses were sited on reverse slopes, where the defenders waited out the artillery barrage and aerial attack in relative safety, emerging from the caves to rain mortar rounds and grenades upon the Americans advancing up the forward slope.

A tank assault to achieve breakthrough by outflanking Kakazu Ridge failed to link up with its infantry support attempting to cross the ridge and therefore failed with the loss of 22 tanks. Although flame tanks cleared many cave defenses, there was no breakthrough, and the XXIV Corps suffered 720 casualties. The losses might have been greater except for the fact that the Japanese had practically all of their infantry reserves tied up farther south, held there by another feint off the Minatoga beaches by the 2nd Marine Division that coincided with the attack.

At the end of April, after Army forces had pushed through the Machinato defensive line, the 1st Marine Division relieved the 27th Infantry Division and the 77th Infantry Division relieved the 96th. When the 6th Marine Division arrived, the III Amphibious Corps took over the right flank and Tenth Army assumed control of the battle.

On 4 May, the 32nd Army launched another counter-offensive. This time, Ushijima attempted to make amphibious assaults on the coasts behind American lines. To support his offensive, the Japanese artillery moved into the open. By doing so, they were able to fire 13,000 rounds in support, but effective American counter-battery fire destroyed dozens of Japanese artillery pieces. The attack failed.

Buckner launched another American attack on 11 May. Ten days of fierce fighting followed. On 13 May, troops of the 96th Infantry Division and 763rd Tank Battalion captured Conical Hill (26.21°N, 127.75°W). Rising 476 ft above the Yonabaru coastal plain, this feature was the eastern anchor of the main Japanese defenses and was defended by about 1,000 Japanese. Meanwhile, on the opposite coast, the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions fought for "Sugar Loaf Hill" (26.222°N, 127.696°W). The capture of these two key positions exposed the Japanese around Shuri on both sides. Buckner hoped to envelop Shuri and trap the main Japanese defending force.

By the end of May, monsoon rains which had turned contested hills and roads into a morass exacerbated both the tactical and medical situations. The ground advance began to resemble a World War I battlefield, as troops became mired in mud, and flooded roads greatly inhibited evacuation of wounded to the rear. Troops lived on a field sodden by rain, part garbage dump and part graveyard. Unburied Japanese and American bodies decayed, sank in the mud and became part of a noxious stew. Anyone sliding down the greasy slopes could easily find their pockets full of maggots at the end of the journey.

From 24 to 27 May the 6th Marine Division cautiously occupied the ruins of Naha, the largest city on the island, finding it largely deserted.

On 26 May aerial observers saw large troop movements just below Shuri. On 28 May Marine patrols found recently abandoned positions west of Shuri. By 30 May the consensus among Army and Marine intelligence was that the majority of Japanese forces had withdrawn from the Shuri Line. On 29 May the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (1/5 Marines) occupied high ground 700 yd east of Shuri Castle and reported that the castle appeared undefended. At 10:15 Company A, 1/5 Marines occupied the castle.

Shuri Castle had been shelled by the battleship USS Mississippi (BB-41) for three days before this advance. The 32nd Army withdrew to the south and thus the Marines had an easy task of securing Shuri Castle. The castle, however, was outside the 1st Marine Division's assigned zone, and only frantic efforts by the commander and staff of the 77th Infantry Division prevented an American airstrike and artillery bombardment which would have resulted in many friendly fire casualties.

On 29 May a Confederate flag was raised over Shuri Castle, before being removed and replaced by a US flag three days later on orders of General Buckner.

The Japanese retreat, although harassed by artillery fire, was conducted with great skill at night and aided by the monsoon storms. The 32nd Army was able to move nearly 30,000 personnel into its last defense line on the Kiyan Peninsula, which ultimately led to the greatest slaughter on Okinawa in the latter stages of the battle, including the deaths of thousands of civilians. In addition, there were 9,000 IJN troops supported by 1,100 militia, with approximately 4,000 holed up at the underground headquarters on the hillside overlooking the Okinawa Naval Base in the Oroku Peninsula, east of the airfield.

On 4 June, elements of the 6th Marine Division launched an amphibious assault on the peninsula. The 4,000 Japanese sailors, including Admiral Ōta, all committed suicide within the hand-built tunnels of the underground naval headquarters on 13 June. By 17 June, the remnants of Ushijima's shattered 32nd Army were pushed into a small pocket in the far south of the island to the southeast of Itoman.

On 18 June, General Buckner was killed by Japanese artillery fire while monitoring the progress of his troops from a forward observation post. Buckner was replaced by Major General Roy Geiger. Upon assuming command, Geiger became the only US Marine to command a numbered army of the US Army in combat; he was relieved five days later by General Joseph Stilwell. On 19 June, Brigadier General Claudius Miller Easley, the commander of the 96th Infantry Division, was killed by Japanese machine-gun fire, also while checking on the progress of his troops at the front.

The last remnants of Japanese resistance ended on 21 June, although some Japanese continued hiding, including the future governor of Okinawa Prefecture, Masahide Ōta. Ushijima and Chō committed suicide by seppuku in their command headquarters on Hill 89 in the closing hours of the battle. Colonel Yahara had asked Ushijima for permission to commit suicide, but the general refused his request, saying: "If you die there will be no one left who knows the truth about the battle of Okinawa. Bear the temporary shame but endure it. This is an order from your army commander." Yahara was the most senior officer to have survived the battle on the island, and he later authored a book titled The Battle for Okinawa. On 22 June Tenth Army held a flag-raising ceremony to mark the end of organized resistance on Okinawa. On 23 June a mopping-up operation commenced, which concluded on 30 June.

On 15 August 1945, Admiral Matome Ugaki was killed while part of a kamikaze raid on Iheyajima island. The official surrender ceremony was held on 7 September, near the Kadena Airfield.

Casualties

The Battle of Okinawa was the bloodiest battle of the Pacific War. The most complete tally of deaths during the battle is at the Cornerstone of Peace monument at the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, which identifies the names of each individual who died at Okinawa in World War II. As of 2023, the monument lists 242,046 names, including 149,634 Okinawans, 77,823 Imperial Japanese soldiers, 14,010 Americans, and smaller numbers of people from South Korea (381), the United Kingdom (82), North Korea (82) and Taiwan (34).

The numbers correspond to recorded deaths during the Battle of Okinawa from the time of the American landings in the Kerama Islands on 26 March 1945 to the signing of the Japanese surrender on 2 September 1945, in addition to all Okinawan casualties in the Pacific War in the 15 years from the Manchurian Incident, along with those who died in Okinawa from war-related events in the year before the battle and the year after the surrender. 234,183 names were inscribed by the time of unveiling, and new names are added as necessary. 40,000 of the Okinawan civilians killed had been drafted or impressed by the Japanese army and are often counted as combat deaths.

American

The Americans suffered some 48,000 casualties, not including some 33,000 non-battle casualties (psychiatric, injuries, illnesses), of whom over 12,000 were killed or missing. Killed in action were 4,907 Navy, 4,675 Army, and 2,938 Marine Corps personnel; when excluding naval losses at sea and losses on the surrounding islands (such as Ie Shima), 6,316 killed and over 30,000 wounded occurred on Okinawa proper. Other authors such as John Keegan have come up with higher numbers. The battle caused more than twice the number of American casualties than both the Guadalcanal Campaign and Battle of Iwo Jima combined, with the Japanese kamikaze effort causing the American Navy to suffer more casualties than any previous engagement in the Atlantic or Pacific.

The most famous American casualty was Lieutenant General Buckner, whose decision to attack the Japanese defenses head-on, although extremely costly in American lives, was ultimately successful. Four days from the closing of the campaign, Buckner was killed by Japanese artillery fire, which blew lethal slivers of coral into his body, while inspecting his troops at the front line. He was the highest-ranking US officer to be killed by enemy fire during the Second World War. The day after Buckner was killed, Brigadier General Easley was killed by Japanese machine-gun fire. War correspondent Ernie Pyle was also killed by Japanese machine-gun fire on Ie Shima, a small island just off of northwestern Okinawa.

Aircraft losses over the three-month period were 768 US planes, including those bombing the Kyushu airfields launching kamikazes. Combat losses were 458, and the other 310 were operational accidents. At sea, 368 Allied ships—including 120 amphibious craft—were damaged while another 36—including 15 amphibious ships and 12 destroyers—were sunk during the Okinawa campaign. The US Navy's dead exceeded its wounded, with 4,907 killed and 4,874 wounded, primarily from kamikaze attacks.

American personnel casualties included thousands of cases of mental breakdown. According to the account of the battle presented in Marine Corps Gazette:

"More mental health issues arose from the Battle of Okinawa than any other battle in the Pacific during World War II. The constant bombardment from artillery and mortars coupled with the high casualty rates led to a great deal of personnel coming down with combat fatigue. Additionally, the rains caused mud that prevented tanks from moving and tracks from pulling out the dead, forcing Marines (who pride themselves on burying their dead in a proper and honorable manner) to leave their comrades where they lay. This, coupled with thousands of bodies both friend and foe littering the entire island, created a scent you could nearly taste. Morale was dangerously low by May and the state of discipline on a moral basis had a new low barometer for acceptable behavior. The ruthless atrocities by the Japanese throughout the war had already brought on an altered behavior (deemed so by traditional standards) by many Americans resulting in the desecration of Japanese remains, but the Japanese tactic of using the Okinawan people as human shields brought about a new aspect of terror and torment to the psychological capacity of the Americans."

Medal of Honor recipients from Okinawa are: Marine Corps Army Navy
 * Richard E. Bush – 16 April
 * Henry A. Courtney Jr. – 14–15 May (posth.)
 * John P. Fardy – 7 May (posth.)
 * William A. Foster – 2 May (posth.)
 * Harold Gonsalves – 15 April (posth.)
 * Dale M. Hansen – 7 May (posth.)
 * Louis J. Hauge Jr. – 14 May (posth.)
 * Elbert L. Kinser – 4 May (posth.)
 * Robert M. McTureous Jr. – 7 June (posth.)
 * Albert E. Schwab – 7 May (posth.)
 * Beauford T. Anderson – 13 April
 * Clarence B. Craft – 31 May
 * James L. Day – 14–17 May
 * Desmond Doss – 29 April – 21 May
 * Martin O. May – 19–21 April (posth.)
 * Seymour W. Terry – 11 May
 * John W. Meagher – 19 June
 * Edward J. Moskala – 9 April (posth.)
 * Joseph E. Muller – 15–16 May (posth.)
 * Alejandro R. Ruiz – 28 April
 * Robert Eugene Bush – 2 May
 * William D. Halyburton Jr. – 10 May (posth.)
 * Fred F. Lester – 8 June (posth.)
 * Richard M. McCool Jr. – 10–11 June

Allied naval vessels sunk or damaged at Okinawa
The following table lists the Allied naval vessels that received damage or were sunk in the Battle of Okinawa between 19 March – 30 July 1945. The table lists a total of 147 damaged ships, five of which were damaged by enemy suicide boats and another five by mines. During the naval battle, which started before the amphibious landings on Okinawa on 1 April, USS Franklin (CV-13) suffered over 800 killed and missing and USS Bunker Hill (CV-17) suffered 396 killed and missing. These were the first and third largest loss of life on damaged or sunken American aircraft carriers during World War II. USS Franklin (hit by two bombs in a level bombing attack by a D4Y Suisei (Judy) on 19 March 1945) and USS Bunker Hill were the only two aircraft carriers that sustained very severe damage from Japanese attacks and as a result were the only aircraft carriers in the Essex-class aircraft carrier that did not experience any active service after the end of World War II. One source estimated that total Japanese sorties during the entire Okinawa campaign exceeded 3,700, with a large percentage being kamikaze attacks, and that the attackers damaged slightly more than 200 Allied vessels, with 4,900 naval officers and seamen killed and roughly 4,824 wounded or missing. USS Thorton was damaged as the result of a collision with another US ship.

The Japanese air attacks were so intense that Fifth Fleet commander Admiral Spruance's flagships were struck two separate times (USS Indianapolis (CA-35) was hit in March and had to retire for repairs which forced him to transfer to USS New Mexico (BB-40) which was also hit in May). Fast Carrier Task Force commander Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher and his chief of staff Commodore Arleigh Burke were yards away from getting killed or wounded by kamikazes on his flagship USS Bunker Hill, which killed three of Mitscher's staff officers and eleven of his enlisted staff members and also destroyed his flag cabin along with all of his uniforms, personal papers, and possessions. Just three days later Mitscher's new flagship USS Enterprise (CV-6) was also struck by a kamikaze forcing him to have to change his flagship yet again. Both fleet carriers were knocked out for the rest of the war.

sunk or had to be scuttled due to irreparable damage. Of those sunk, the majority were relatively smaller ships; these included destroyers of around 300–450 feet. A few small cargo ships were also sunk, several containing munitions which caught fire.

scrapped or decommissioned as a result of damage.

Japanese losses
The US military estimates that 110,071 Japanese soldiers were killed during the battle. This total includes conscripted Okinawan civilians.

A total of 7,401 Japanese regulars and 3,400 Okinawan conscripts surrendered or were captured during the battle of Okinawa. Additional Japanese and renegade Okinawans were captured or surrendered over the next few months, bringing the total to 16,346. This was the first battle in the Pacific War in which thousands of Japanese soldiers surrendered or were captured. Many of the prisoners were native Okinawans who had been pressed into service shortly before the battle and were less imbued with the Imperial Japanese Army's no-surrender doctrine. When the American forces occupied the island, many Japanese soldiers put on Okinawan clothing to avoid capture, and some Okinawans would come to the Americans' aid by offering to identify these mainland Japanese.

The Japanese lost 16 combat vessels, including the super battleship Yamato. Early claims of Japanese aircraft losses put the total at 7,800, however later examination of Japanese records revealed that Japanese aircraft losses at Okinawa were far below often-repeated US estimates for the campaign. The number of conventional and kamikaze aircraft actually lost or expended by the 3rd, 5th, and 10th Air Fleets, combined with about 500 lost or expended by the Imperial Army at Okinawa, was roughly 1,430. The Allies destroyed 27 Japanese tanks and 743 artillery pieces (including mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns), some of them eliminated by the naval and air bombardments but most knocked out by American counter-battery fire.

Civilian losses, suicides, and atrocities

Some of the other islands that saw major battles in World War II, such as Iwo Jima, were uninhabited or had been evacuated. Okinawa, by contrast, had a large indigenous civilian population; US Army records from the planning phase of the operation made the assumption that Okinawa was home to about 300,000 civilians. The official US Tenth Army count for the 82-day campaign is a total of 142,058 recovered enemy bodies (including those civilians pressed into service by the Imperial Japanese Army), with the deduction made that about 42,000 were non-uniformed civilians who had been killed in the crossfire. Okinawa Prefecture's estimate is over 100,000 losses.

During the battle, American forces found it difficult to distinguish civilians from soldiers. It became common for them to shoot at Okinawan houses, as one infantryman wrote: There was some return fire from a few of the houses, but the others were probably occupied by civilians—and we didn't care. It was a terrible thing not to distinguish between the enemy and women and children. Americans always had great compassion, especially for children. Now we fired indiscriminately.

In its history of the war, the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum presents Okinawa as being caught between Japan and the United States. During the battle, the Imperial Japanese Army showed indifference to Okinawans' safety, and its soldiers used civilians as human shields or outright killed them. The Japanese military also confiscated food from the Okinawans and executed those who hid it, leading to mass starvation, and forced civilians out of their shelters. Japanese soldiers also killed about 1,000 people who spoke in the Okinawan language to suppress spying. The museum writes that "some were blown apart by [artillery] shells, some finding themselves in a hopeless situation were driven to suicide, some died of starvation, some succumbed to malaria, while others fell victim to the retreating Japanese troops."

With the impending Japanese defeat, civilians often committed mass suicide, urged on by the Japanese soldiers who told locals that victorious American soldiers would go on a rampage of killing and raping. Ryūkyū Shimpō, one of the two major Okinawan newspapers, wrote in 2007: "There are many Okinawans who have testified that the Japanese Army directed them to commit suicide. There are also people who have testified that they were handed grenades by Japanese soldiers" to blow themselves up. Thousands of civilians, having been induced by Japanese propaganda to believe that American soldiers were barbarians who committed horrible atrocities, killed their families and themselves to avoid capture at the hands of the Americans. Some of them threw themselves and their family members from the southern cliffs where the Peace Museum now resides.

Okinawans "were often surprised at the comparatively humane treatment they received from the American enemy". Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power by Mark Selden states that the Americans "did not pursue a policy of torture, rape, and murder of civilians as Japanese military officials had warned". American Military Intelligence Corps combat translators such as Teruto Tsubota managed to convince many civilians not to kill themselves. Survivors of the mass suicides blamed also the indoctrination of their education system of the time, in which the Okinawans were taught to become "more Japanese than the Japanese" and were expected to prove it.

Witnesses and historians claim that soldiers, mainly Japanese troops, raped Okinawan women during the battle. Rape by Japanese troops reportedly "became common" in June, after it became clear that the Imperial Japanese Army had been defeated. Marine Corps officials in Okinawa and Washington have said that they knew of no rapes by American personnel in Okinawa at the end of the war. There are, however, numerous credible testimony accounts which note that a large number of rapes were committed by American forces during the battle. This includes stories of rape after trading sexual favors or even marrying Americans, such as the alleged incident in the village of Katsuyama, where civilians said they had formed a vigilante group to ambush and kill three black American soldiers who they claimed would frequently rape the local girls there.

MEXT textbook controversy
There is ongoing disagreement between Okinawa's local government and Japan's national government over the role of the Japanese military in civilian mass suicides during the battle. In March 2007, the national Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) advised textbook publishers to reword descriptions that the embattled Imperial Japanese Army forced civilians to kill themselves in the war to avoid being taken prisoner. MEXT preferred descriptions that just say that civilians received hand grenades from the Japanese military. This move sparked widespread protests among Okinawans. In June 2007, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly adopted a resolution stating, "We strongly call on the (national) government to retract the instruction and to immediately restore the description in the textbooks so the truth of the Battle of Okinawa will be handed down correctly and a tragic war will never happen again."

On 29 September 2007, about 110,000 people held the biggest political rally in the history of Okinawa to demand that MEXT retract its order to textbook publishers regarding revising the account of the civilian suicides. The resolution states, "It is an undeniable fact that the 'multiple suicides' would not have occurred without the involvement of the Japanese military and any deletion of or revision to (the descriptions) is a denial and distortion of the many testimonies by those people who survived the incidents." In December 2007, MEXT partially admitted the role of the Japanese military in civilian mass suicides. The ministry's Textbook Authorization Council allowed the publishers to reinstate the reference that civilians "were forced into mass suicides by the Japanese military", on condition it is placed in sufficient context. The council report states, "It can be said that from the viewpoint of the Okinawa residents, they were forced into the mass suicides." That was not enough for the survivors who said it is important for children today to know what really happened.

The Nobel Prize-winning author Kenzaburō Ōe wrote a booklet that states that the mass suicide order was given by the military during the battle. He was sued by revisionists, including a wartime commander during the battle, who disputed this and wanted to stop publication of the booklet. At a court hearing, Ōe testified "Mass suicides were forced on Okinawa islanders under Japan's hierarchical social structure that ran through the state of Japan, the Japanese armed forces and local garrisons." In March 2008, the Osaka Prefecture Court ruled in favor of Ōe, stating, "It can be said the military was deeply involved in the mass suicides." The court recognized the military's involvement in the mass suicides and murder-suicides, citing the testimony about the distribution of grenades for suicide by soldiers and the fact that mass suicides were not recorded on islands where the military was not stationed.

In 2012, Korean-Japanese director Pak Su-nam announced her work on the documentary Nuchigafu (Okinawan for "only if one is alive") collecting living survivors' accounts to show "the truth of history to many people", alleging that "there were two types of orders for 'honorable deaths'—one for residents to kill each other and the other for the military to kill all residents". In March 2013, Japanese textbook publisher Shimizu Shoin was permitted by MEXT to publish the statements that "Orders from Japanese soldiers led to Okinawans committing group suicide" and "The [Japanese] army caused many tragedies in Okinawa, killing local civilians and forcing them to commit mass suicide."

Aftermath

Military historian and journalist Hanson W. Baldwin stated about scale and ferocity of the battle, especially for American forces, that: "The battle for Okinawa can be described only in the grim superlatives of war. In size, scope and ferocity, it dwarfed the Battle of Britain. Never before had there been, probably never again will there be, such a vicious sprawling struggle of planes against planes, of ships against planes. Never before, in so short a space, had the Navy lost so many ships; never before in land fighting had so much American blood been shed in so short a time in so small an area: probably never before in any three months of the war had the enemy suffered so hugely, and the final toll of American casualties was the highest experienced in any campaign against the Japanese. There have been larger land battles, more protracted air campaigns, but Okinawa was the largest combined operation, a “no quarter” struggle fought on, under and over the sea and land."According to historian George Feifer, Okinawa was the "site of the largest land-sea-air battle in history" and that the battle was the "last major one before the start of the atomic age". At least 90% of the buildings on the island were destroyed, along with countless historical documents, artifacts, and cultural treasures, and the tropical landscape was turned into "a vast field of mud, lead, decay and maggots". The military value of Okinawa was significant, as Okinawa provided a fleet anchorage, troop staging areas, and airfields in proximity to Japan. The US cleared the surrounding waters of mines in Operation Zebra, occupied Okinawa, and set up the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, a form of military government, after the battle. In 2011, one official of the prefectural government told David Hearst of The Guardian:

"You have the Battle of Britain, in which your airmen protected the British people. We had the Battle of Okinawa, in which the exact opposite happened. The Japanese army not only starved the Okinawans but used them as human shields. That dark history is still present today – and Japan and the US should study it before they decide what to do with next."

Effect on the wider war
Because the next major event following the Battle of Okinawa was the total surrender of Japan, the effect of this battle is more difficult to consider. Because Japan surrendered when it did, the anticipated series of battles and the invasion of the Japanese homeland never occurred, and all military strategies on both sides which presupposed this apparently-inevitable next development were immediately rendered moot.

Some military historians believe that the Okinawa campaign led directly to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as a means of avoiding the planned ground invasion of the Japanese mainland. This view is explained by Victor Davis Hanson in his book Ripples of Battle:

"... because the Japanese on Okinawa ... were so fierce in their defense (even when cut off and without supplies), and because casualties were so appalling, many American strategists looked for an alternative means to subdue mainland Japan, other than a direct invasion. This means presented itself, with the advent of atomic bombs, which worked admirably in convincing the Japanese to sue for peace [unconditionally], without American casualties."

Meanwhile, many parties continue to debate the broader question of "why Japan surrendered", attributing the surrender to a number of possible reasons including: the atomic bombings, the Soviet invasion of Manchuria,  and Japan's depleted resources.

Memorial
In 1995, the Okinawa government erected a memorial monument named the Cornerstone of Peace in Mabuni, the site of the last fighting in southeastern Okinawa. The memorial lists all the known names of those who died in the battle, civilian and military, Japanese and foreign. As of 2024, the monument lists 242,225 names.

Modern US base
Significant US forces remain garrisoned on Okinawa as the United States Forces Japan, which the Japanese government sees as an important guarantee of regional stability, and Kadena remains the largest US air base in Asia. Local residents have long protested against the size and presence of the base.

title: Battle of Okinawa


text:
Battle of El Alamein

There were two battles of El Alamein in World War II, both fought in 1942. The Battles occurred during the North African campaign, in Egypt, in and around an area named after a railway stop called El Alamein.

 * First Battle of El Alamein: 1–27 July 1942
 * Second Battle of El Alamein: 23 October – 4 November 1942

In addition, the Battle of Alam el Halfa (30 August – 5 September 1942) was fought during the same period and in the same location.

エル・アラメインの戦い

title: Battle of El Alamein


text:
Brezhnev Doctrine

The Brezhnev Doctrine was a Soviet foreign policy that proclaimed that any threat to "socialist rule" in any state of the Soviet Bloc in Central and Eastern Europe was a threat to all of them, and therefore, it justified the intervention of fellow socialist states. It was proclaimed in order to justify the Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia earlier in 1968, with the overthrow of the reformist government there. The references to "socialism" meant control by the communist parties which were loyal to the Kremlin. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev repudiated the doctrine in the late 1980s, as the Kremlin accepted the peaceful overthrow of Soviet rule in all its satellite countries in Eastern Europe.

The policy was first and most clearly outlined by Sergei Kovalev in a September 26, 1968 Pravda article entitled "Sovereignty and the International Obligations of Socialist Countries". Leonid Brezhnev reiterated it in a speech at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party on November 13, 1968, which stated: "When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries."

This doctrine was announced to retroactively justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 that ended the Prague Spring, along with earlier Soviet military interventions, such as the invasion of Hungary in 1956. These interventions were meant to put an end to liberalization efforts and uprisings that had the potential to compromise Soviet hegemony inside the Soviet Bloc, which was considered by the Soviet Union to be an essential and defensive and strategic buffer in case hostilities with NATO were to break out.

In practice, the policy meant that only limited independence of the satellite states' communist parties was allowed and that none would be allowed to compromise the cohesiveness of the Eastern Bloc in any way. That is, no country could leave the Warsaw Pact or disturb a ruling communist party's monopoly on power. Implicit in this doctrine was that the leadership of the Soviet Union reserved, for itself, the power to define "socialism" and "capitalism". Following the announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine, numerous treaties were signed between the Soviet Union and its satellite states to reassert these points and to further ensure inter-state cooperation. The principles of the doctrine were so broad that the Soviets even used it to justify their military intervention in the communist (but non-Warsaw Pact) nation of Afghanistan in 1979. The Brezhnev Doctrine stayed in effect until it was ended with the Soviet reaction to the Polish crisis of 1980–1981.

Mikhail Gorbachev refused to use military force when Poland held free elections in 1989 and Solidarity defeated the Polish United Workers' Party. It was superseded by the facetiously named Sinatra Doctrine in 1989, alluding to the Frank Sinatra song "My Way". The refusal to intervene in the emancipation of the Eastern European satellite states and the Pan-European Picnic then led to the fall of the Iron Curtain and the largely peaceful collapse of the Eastern Bloc.

1956 Hungarian Revolution and Soviet invasion
The period between 1953 and 1968 was saturated with dissidence and reformation within the Soviet satellite states. 1953 saw the death of Soviet Leader Joseph Stalin, followed closely by Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 "Secret Speech" denouncing Stalin. This denouncement of the former leader led to a period of the Soviet Era known commonly as "De-Stalinization." Under the blanket reforms of this process, Imre Nagy came to power in Hungary as the new Prime Minister, taking over for Mátyás Rákosi. Almost immediately Nagy set out on a path of reform. Police power was reduced, collectivized farms were split up and being returned to individual peasants, industry and food production shifted and religious tolerance was becoming more prominent. These reforms shocked the Hungarian Communist Party. Nagy was quickly overthrown by Rákosi in 1955, and stripped of his political livelihood. Shortly after this coup, Khrushchev signed the Belgrade Declaration which stated "separate paths to socialism were permissible within the Soviet Bloc." With hopes for serious reform just having been extinguished in Hungary, this declaration was not received well by the Hungarians. Tensions quickly mounted in Hungary with demonstrations and calls for not only the withdrawal of Soviet troops, but for a Hungarian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact as well. By October 23 Soviet forces landed in Budapest. A chaotic and bloody suppression of revolutionary forces lasted from October 24 until November 7, ending with thousands of Hungarians murdered and many more fleeing the country. Although order was restored, tensions remained on both sides of the conflict. Hungarians resented the end of the reformation, and the Soviets wanted to avoid a similar crisis from occurring again anywhere in the Soviet Bloc.

A peaceful Brezhnev Doctrine
When the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was suppressed, the Soviets adopted the mindset that governments supporting both communism and capitalism must coexist, and more importantly, build relations. This idea stressed that all people are equal, and own the right to solve the problems of their own countries themselves, and that in order for both states to peacefully coexist, neither country can exercise the right to get involved in each other's internal affairs. While this idea was brought up following the events of Hungary, they were not put into effect for a great deal of time. This is further explained in the Renunciation section.

1968 Prague Spring
Notions of reform had been slowly growing in Czechoslovakia since the early-mid 1960s. However, once the Stalinist President Antonín Novotný resigned as head of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in January 1968, the Prague Spring began to take shape. Alexander Dubček replaced Novotný as head of the party, initially thought a friend to the Soviet Union. It was not long before Dubček began making serious liberal reforms. In an effort to establish what Dubček called "developed socialism", he instituted changes in Czechoslovakia to create a much more free and liberal version of the socialist state. Aspects of a market economy were implemented, travel restrictions were eased for citizens, state censorship loosened, the power of the secret police was limited, and steps were taken to improve relations with the west. As the reforms piled up, the Kremlin quickly grew uneasy as they hoped to not only preserve their power within Czechoslovakia, but to avoid another Hungarian-style revolution as well. Soviet panic compounded in March 1968 when student protests erupted in Poland and Antonín Novotný resigned as the Czechoslovak President. On March 21, Yuri Andropov, the KGB Chairman, issued a grave statement concerning the reforms taking place under Dubček. "The methods and forms by which the work is progressing in Czechoslovakia remind one very much of Hungary. In this outward appearance of chaos…there is a certain order. It all began like this in Hungary also, but then came the first and second echelons, and then, finally the social democrats."

Leonid Brezhnev sought clarification from Dubček on March 21, with the Politburo convened, on the situation in Czechoslovakia. Eager to avoid a similar fate as Imre Nagy, Dubček reassured Brezhnev that the reforms were totally under control and not on a similar path to those seen in 1956 in Hungary. Despite Dubček's assurances, other Soviet allies grew uneasy by the reforms taking place in an Eastern European neighbor. The First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party (banned after the restoration of Ukrainian independence in 1991) called on Moscow for an immediate invasion of Czechoslovakia in order to stop Dubček's "socialism with a human face" from spreading into the Ukrainian SSR and sparking unrest. By May 6, Brezhnev condemned Dubček's system, declaring it a step toward "the complete collapse of the Warsaw Pact." After three months of negotiations, agreements, and rising tensions between Moscow and Czechoslovakia, the Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion began on the night of August 20, 1968, which was to be met with great Czechoslovak discontent and resistance for many months into 1970.

Formation of the Doctrine
Brezhnev realized the need for a shift from Nikita Khrushchev's idea of "different paths to socialism" towards one that fostered a more unified vision throughout the socialist camp. "Economic integration, political consolidation, a return to ideological orthodoxy, and inter-Party cooperation became the new watchwords of Soviet bloc relations." On November 12, 1968, Brezhnev stated that "[w]hen external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a given socialist country in the direction of … the capitalist system ... this is no longer merely a problem for that country's people, but a common problem, the concern of all socialist countries." Brezhnev's statement at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers Party effectively classified the issue of sovereignty as less important than the preservation of Soviet-style socialism. While no new doctrine had been officially announced, it was clear that Soviet intervention was imminent if Moscow perceived any satellite to be at risk of jeopardizing the Soviet hegemony.

Brezhnev Doctrine in practice
The vague, broad nature of the Brezhnev Doctrine allowed application to any international situation the USSR saw fit. This is clearly evident not only through the Prague Spring in 1968, and the indirect pressure on Poland from 1980 to 1981, but also in the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan starting in the 1970s. Any instance which caused the USSR to question whether or not a country was becoming a "risk to international socialism", the use of military intervention was, in Soviet eyes, not only justified, but necessary.

Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979
The Soviet government's desire to link its foreign policy to the Brezhnev Doctrine was evoked again when it ordered a military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. This was perhaps the last chapter of this doctrine's saga.

In April 1978, a coup in Kabul brought the Afghan Communist Party to power with Nur Muhammad Taraki being installed as the second president of Afghanistan. The previous president, Mohammed Daoud Khan was killed during the coup. The Saur Revolution (as the coup was known) took Moscow by surprise, who preferred that the pro-Soviet Daoud Khan stay in power. The previous regime had maintained a pro-Soviet foreign policy as Daoud Khan was a Pashtun who rejected the Durand Line as the frontier with Pakistan. The Afghan Communist Party was divided into a factional struggle between factions known as the Khalq and Parcham. The Parcham was the more moderate of the two factions, arguing that Afghanistan was not ready for socialism, requiring more gradual process while the ultra-Communist Khalq favored a more radical approach. The Khalq faction was victorious and the leader of the Pacham faction Babrak Karmal fled to Moscow in fear of his life, to take up the position as Afghan ambassador in Moscow.

Islamic fundamentalists took issue with the Communist party in power. As a result, a jihad was proclaimed against the Communist government. Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders falsely portrayed the United States as the one behind the jihad in Afghanistan, and the rebellion in Afghanistan was seen in Moscow not so much in the context of Afghan politics with an unpopular government pursuing policies that much of the population rejected (such as the collectivisation of agriculture), but rather in the context of the Cold War, being seen as the first stage of an alleged American plot to instigate a jihad in Soviet Central Asia where the majority of the population was Muslim. To assist the government, the Soviet Union drastically increased its military aid to Afghanistan while sending Soviet advisers to train the Afghan military.

Following a split in the Communist Party, the leader of the Khalq faction, Hafizullah Amin, overthrew President Nur Muhammad Taraki and had him murdered on 8 October 1979. Soviet diplomats in Kabul had a low opinion of Taraki's ability to handle the rebellion, and an even lower one of Amin, who was regarded as a fanatic, but incompetent leader who lost control of the situation. In the fall of 1979, the leaders who pressed the most strongly for an invasion of Afghanistan to replace the incompetent Amin with Karmal, who was the man better able to preserve the communist regime's existence, were the Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, the Chairman of KGB, Yuri Andropov and the Defense Minister Marshal Dmitry Ustinov. The intervention was envisioned in Moscow was merely a short conflict to stabilize the situation and allow the Communist regime to regain power. Brezhnev was indecisive, fearing that an occupation of Afghanistan might not be the short war that Gromyko, Ustinov and Andropov kept insisting it would be, but was fearful of the possibility of an Islamic fundamentalist regime being established that would export Islam into Soviet Central Asia. As it was, the inability and unwillingness of much of the Soviet-controlled Afghan Army to fight led the Soviets to involve themselves in Afghanistan for almost 10 years. Ironically, despite what was being feared in Moscow, the United States was not supporting the Islamic fundamentalist rebellion in Afghanistan, and only started to support the mujahideen ("warriors of Allah") with weapons after the Soviet invasion, concentrating foreign policy matters in the form of linkage towards preventing Soviet expansion.

During his talks with the Soviets during his time as Ambassador, Karmal coordinated with the Soviet government to replace Amin. It was this coordination that led to both Soviet soldiers and airborne units organizing a coup against the Amin-led Afghanistan government, during which Amin was assassinated. In his place, the Soviets installed their ally, former-Ambassador Babrak Karmal, as the new lead of the government in Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union, once again, fell back to the Brezhnev Doctrine for rationale, claiming that it was both morally and politically justified. It was also explained by the Soviets that they owed help to their friend and ally Babrak Karmal.

Renunciation
The long lasting struggle of the war in Afghanistan made the Soviets realize that their reach and influence was in fact limited. "[The war in Afghanistan] had shown that socialist internationalism and Soviet national interests were not always compatible." Tensions between the USSR and Czechoslovakia since 1968, as well as Poland in 1980, proved the inefficiencies inherent in the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Solidarity trade union protests in Poland were suppressed without outside intervention, leaving the Brezhnev doctrine effectively dead. Although the Kremlin wanted to preserve communism in its satellites, the decision was not to intervene. Gorbachev's Glasnost and Perestroika finally opened the door for Soviet Bloc countries and republics to make reforms without fear of Soviet intervention. When East Germany desperately asked for Soviet troops to put down growing unrest in 1989, Gorbachev flatly refused.

Post-Brezhnev Doctrine
With the agreement to terminate the Brezhnev Doctrine, later came on a new leader for the Soviets—Mikhail Gorbachev. His views were much more relaxed. This is most likely due to the fact that Brezhnev Doctrine was no longer at the disposal of the Soviet Union. This had a major effect on the way that the Soviets carried out their new mentality when dealing with countries they once tried to control. This was best captured by Gorbachev's involvement with a group by the name of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). This organization lessens the control that the Soviets had on all other partners of the agreement. This notion provided other countries that were once oppressed under communist intervention, to go about their own political reform. This actually carried over internally as well. In fact, the Soviet Union's biggest problem after the removal of the Brezhnev Doctrine, was the Khrushchev Dilemma. This did not address how to stop internal political reform, but how to tame the physical violence that comes along with it. It had become clear that the Soviet Union was beginning to loosen up.

It is possible to pinpoint the renouncement of the Brezhnev Doctrine as to what started the end for the Soviet Union. Countries that were once micromanaged now could do what they wanted to politically, because the Soviets could no longer try to conquer where they saw fit. With that, the Soviet Union began to collapse. While the communist agenda had caused infinite problems for other countries, it was the driving force behind the Soviet Union staying together. After all, it seems that the removal of the incentive to conquer, and forcing of communism upon other nations, defeated the one thing Soviet Russia had always been about, the expansion of Communism.

With the fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine, came the fall of the man, Brezhnev himself, the share of power in the Warsaw Pact, and perhaps the final moment for the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall that had prevented the migration of East Germans to West Germany. The Brezhnev Doctrine coming to a close, was perhaps the beginning of the end for one of the strongest empires in the world's history, the Soviet Union.

In other Communist countries
The Soviet Union was not the only Communist country to intervene militarily in fellow countries. Vietnam deposed the Khmer Rouge in the Cambodian–Vietnamese War of 1978, which was followed by a revenge Chinese invasion of Vietnam in the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979.

title: Brezhnev Doctrine