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Backward compatibility

In telecommunications and computing, backward compatibility (or backwards compatibility) is a property of an operating system, software, real-world product, or technology that allows for interoperability with an older legacy system, or with input designed for such a system.

Modifying a system in a way that does not allow backward compatibility is sometimes called "breaking" backward compatibility. Such breaking usually incurs various types of costs, such as switching cost.

A complementary concept is forward compatibility; a design that is forward-compatible usually has a roadmap for compatibility with future standards and products.

In hardware
A simple example of both backward and forward compatibility is the introduction of FM radio in stereo. FM radio was initially mono, with only one audio channel represented by one signal. With the introduction of two-channel stereo FM radio, many listeners had only mono FM receivers. Forward compatibility for mono receivers with stereo signals was achieved by sending the sum of both left and right audio channels in one signal and the difference in another signal. That allows mono FM receivers to receive and decode the sum signal while ignoring the difference signal, which is necessary only for separating the audio channels. Stereo FM receivers can receive a mono signal and decode it without the need for a second signal, and they can separate a sum signal to left and right channels if both sum and difference signals are received. Without the requirement for backward compatibility, a simpler method could have been chosen.

Full backward compatibility is particularly important in computer instruction set architectures, two of the most successful being the IBM 360/370/390/Zseries families of mainframes, and the Intel x86 family of microprocessors.

IBM announced the first 360 models in 1964 and has continued to update the series ever since, with migration over the decades from 32-bit register/24-bit addresses to 64-bit registers and addresses.

Intel announced the first Intel 8086/8088 processors in 1978, again with migrations over the decades from 16-bit to 64-bit. (The 8086/8088, in turn, were designed with easy machine-translatability of programs written for its predecessor in mind, although they were not instruction-set compatible with the 8-bit Intel 8080 processor of 1974. The Zilog Z80, however, was fully backward compatible with the Intel 8080.)

Fully backward compatible processors can process the same binary executable software instructions as their predecessors, allowing the use of a newer processor without having to acquire new applications or operating systems. Similarly, the success of the Wi-Fi digital communication standard is attributed to its broad forward and backward compatibility; it became more popular than other standards that were not backward compatible.

In software
In software development, backward compatibility is a general notion of interoperation between software pieces that will not produce any errors when its functionality is invoked via API. The software is considered stable when its API that is used to invoke functions is stable across different versions.

In operating systems, upgrades to newer versions are said to be backward compatible if executables and other files from the previous versions will work as usual.

In compilers, backward compatibility may refer to the ability of a compiler for a newer version of the language to accept source code of programs or data that worked under the previous version.

A data format is said to be backward compatible when a newer version of the program can open it without errors just like its predecessor.

Benefits
There are several incentives for a company to implement backward compatibility. Backward compatibility can be used to preserve older software that would have otherwise been lost when a manufacturer decides to stop supporting older hardware. Classic video games are a common example used when discussing the value of supporting older software. The cultural impact of video games is a large part of their continued success, and some believe ignoring backward compatibility would cause these titles to disappear. Backward compatibility also acts as a selling point for new hardware, as an existing player base can more affordably upgrade to subsequent generations of a console. This also helps to make up for lack of content at the launch of new systems, as users can pull from the previous console's library of games while developers transition to the new hardware. Moreover, studies in the mid-1990s found that even consumers who never play older games after purchasing a new system consider backward compatibility a highly desirable feature, valuing the mere ability to continue to play an existing collection of games even if they choose never to do so. Backward compatibility with the original PlayStation (PS) software discs and peripherals is considered to have been a key selling point for the PlayStation 2 (PS2) during its early months on the market.

Despite not being included at launch, Microsoft slowly incorporated backward compatibility for select titles on the Xbox One several years into its product life cycle. Players have racked up over a billion hours with backward-compatible games on Xbox, and the newest generation of consoles such as PlayStation 5 and Xbox Series X/S also support this feature. A large part of the success and implementation of this feature is that the hardware within newer generation consoles is both powerful and similar enough to legacy systems that older titles can be broken down and re-configured to run on the Xbox One. This program has proven incredibly popular with Xbox players and goes against the recent trend of studio made remasters of classic titles, creating what some believe to be an important shift in console makers' strategies.

Costs
The monetary costs of supporting old software is considered a large drawback to the usage of backward compatibility. The associated costs of backward compatibility are a larger bill of materials if hardware is required to support the legacy systems; increased complexity of the product that may lead to longer time to market, technological hindrances, and slowing innovation; and increased expectations from users in terms of compatibility. Because of this, several console manufacturers phased out backward compatibility toward the end of the console generation in order to reduce cost and briefly reinvigorate sales before the arrival of newer hardware.

It is possible to bypass some of the hardware costs. In earlier versions of the PS2, a CPU core identical to that of the PS serves a dual purpose, either as the main CPU in PS mode, or upclocking itself to offload I/O in PS2 mode. Such an approach can backfire, however, as in the case of the Super Nintendo Entertainment System (Super NES), which opted for the peculiar 65C816 over more popular 16-bit microprocessors on the basis that it would allow easy compatibility with the original NES, but NES compatibility ultimately did not prove workable once the rest of the Super NES's architecture was designed.

Backward compatibility introduces the risk that developers will favor developing games that are compatible with both the old and new systems, since this gives them a larger base of potential buyers, resulting in a dearth of software which uses the advanced features of the new system.

Alternatives
With the decline in physical game sales and the rise of digital storefronts and downloads, some believe backward compatibility will soon be obsolete. Many game studios are re-mastering and re-releasing their most popular titles by improving the quality of graphics and adding new content. These remasters have found success by appealing both to nostalgic players who remember enjoying the original versions, and to newcomers who may not have had the original system it was released on. For most consumers, digital remasters are more appealing than hanging on to obsolete hardware.

For the manufacturers of consoles, digital re-releases of classic titles are a large benefit. It not only removes the financial drawbacks of supporting older hardware, but also shifts all of the costs of updating software to the developers. The manufacturer gets a new addition to their system with name recognition, and the studio does not have to develop a new game.

title: Backward compatibility


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Bacterial conjugation

Bacterial conjugation is the transfer of genetic material between bacterial cells by direct cell-to-cell contact or by a bridge-like connection between two cells. This takes place through a pilus. It is a parasexual mode of reproduction in bacteria.

It is a mechanism of horizontal gene transfer as are transformation and transduction although these two other mechanisms do not involve cell-to-cell contact.

Classical E. coli bacterial conjugation is often regarded as the bacterial equivalent of sexual reproduction or mating since it involves the exchange of genetic material. However, it is not sexual reproduction, since no exchange of gamete occurs, and indeed no generation of a new organism: instead an existing organism is transformed. During classical E. coli conjugation the donor cell provides a conjugative or mobilizable genetic element that is most often a plasmid or transposon. Most conjugative plasmids have systems ensuring that the recipient cell does not already contain a similar element.

The genetic information transferred is often beneficial to the recipient. Benefits may include antibiotic resistance, xenobiotic tolerance or the ability to use new metabolites. Other elements can be detrimental and may be viewed as bacterial parasites.

Conjugation in Escherichia coli by spontaneous zygogenesis and in Mycobacterium smegmatis by distributive conjugal transfer differ from the better studied classical E. coli conjugation in that these cases involve substantial blending of the parental genomes.

History
The process was discovered by Joshua Lederberg and Edward Tatum in 1946.

Mechanism

Conjugation diagram

 * 1) Donor cell produces pilus.
 * 2) Pilus attaches to recipient cell and brings the two cells together.
 * 3) The mobile plasmid is nicked and a single strand of DNA is then transferred to the recipient cell.
 * 4) Both cells synthesize a complementary strand to produce a double stranded circular plasmid and also reproduce pili; both cells are now viable donor for the F-factor.

The F-factor is an episome (a plasmid that can integrate itself into the bacterial chromosome by homologous recombination) with a length of about 100 kb. It carries its own origin of replication, the oriV, and an origin of transfer, or oriT. There can only be one copy of the F-plasmid in a given bacterium, either free or integrated, and bacteria that possess a copy are called F-positive or F-plus (denoted F+). Cells that lack F plasmids are called F-negative or F-minus (F−) and as such can function as recipient cells.

Among other genetic information, the F-plasmid carries a tra and trb locus, which together are about 33 kb long and consist of about 40 genes. The tra locus includes the pilin gene and regulatory genes, which together form pili on the cell surface. The locus also includes the genes for the proteins that attach themselves to the surface of F− bacteria and initiate conjugation. Though there is some debate on the exact mechanism of conjugation it seems that the pili are the structures through which DNA exchange occurs. The F-pili are extremely resistant to mechanical and thermochemical stress, which guarantees successful conjugation in a variety of environments. Several proteins coded for in the tra or trb locus seem to open a channel between the bacteria and it is thought that the traD enzyme, located at the base of the pilus, initiates membrane fusion.

When conjugation is initiated by a signal the relaxase enzyme creates a nick in one of the strands of the conjugative plasmid at the oriT. Relaxase may work alone or in a complex of over a dozen proteins known collectively as a relaxosome. In the F-plasmid system the relaxase enzyme is called TraI and the relaxosome consists of TraI, TraY, TraM and the integrated host factor IHF. The nicked strand, or T-strand, is then unwound from the unbroken strand and transferred to the recipient cell in a 5'-terminus to 3'-terminus direction. The remaining strand is replicated either independent of conjugative action (vegetative replication beginning at the oriV) or in concert with conjugation (conjugative replication similar to the rolling circle replication of lambda phage). Conjugative replication may require a second nick before successful transfer can occur. A recent report claims to have inhibited conjugation with chemicals that mimic an intermediate step of this second nicking event. Hfr Recombination.png (yellow) on both the F factor plasmid and the chromosome have similar sequences, allowing the F factor to insert itself into the genome of the cell. This is called homologous recombination and creates an Hfr (high frequency of recombination) cell.

2.The Hfr cell forms a pilus and attaches to a recipient F- cell.

3.A nick in one strand of the Hfr cell's chromosome is created.

4.DNA begins to be transferred from the Hfr cell to the recipient cell while the second strand of its chromosome is being replicated.

5.The pilus detaches from the recipient cell and retracts. The Hfr cell ideally wants to transfer its entire genome to the recipient cell. However, due to its large size and inability to keep in contact with the recipient cell, it is not able to do so.

6.a. The F- cell remains F- because the entire F factor sequence was not received. Since no homologous recombination occurred, the DNA that was transferred is degraded by enzymes.

b. In very rare cases, the F factor will be completely transferred and the F- cell will become an Hfr cell. ]] If the F-plasmid that is transferred has previously been integrated into the donor's genome (producing an Hfr strain ["High Frequency of Recombination"]) some of the donor's chromosomal DNA may also be transferred with the plasmid DNA. The amount of chromosomal DNA that is transferred depends on how long the two conjugating bacteria remain in contact. In common laboratory strains of E. coli the transfer of the entire bacterial chromosome takes about 100 minutes. The transferred DNA can then be integrated into the recipient genome via homologous recombination.

A cell culture that contains in its population cells with non-integrated F-plasmids usually also contains a few cells that have accidentally integrated their plasmids. It is these cells that are responsible for the low-frequency chromosomal gene transfers that occur in such cultures. Some strains of bacteria with an integrated F-plasmid can be isolated and grown in pure culture. Because such strains transfer chromosomal genes very efficiently they are called Hfr (high frequency of recombination). The E. coli genome was originally mapped by interrupted mating experiments in which various Hfr cells in the process of conjugation were sheared from recipients after less than 100 minutes (initially using a Waring blender). The genes that were transferred were then investigated.

Since integration of the F-plasmid into the E. coli chromosome is a rare spontaneous occurrence, and since the numerous genes promoting DNA transfer are in the plasmid genome rather than in the bacterial genome, it has been argued that conjugative bacterial gene transfer, as it occurs in the E. coli Hfr system, is not an evolutionary adaptation of the bacterial host, nor is it likely ancestral to eukaryotic sex.

Spontaneous zygogenesis in E. coli

In addition to classical bacterial conjugation described above for E. coli, a form of conjugation referred to as spontaneous zygogenesis (Z-mating for short) is observed in certain strains of E. coli. In Z-mating there is complete genetic mixing, and unstable diploids are formed that throw off phenotypically haploid cells, of which some show a parental phenotype and some are true recombinants.

Conjugal transfer in mycobacteria
Conjugation in Mycobacteria smegmatis, like conjugation in E. coli, requires stable and extended contact between a donor and a recipient strain, is DNase resistant, and the transferred DNA is incorporated into the recipient chromosome by homologous recombination. However, unlike E. coli Hfr conjugation, mycobacterial conjugation is chromosome rather than plasmid based. Furthermore, in contrast to E. coli Hfr conjugation, in M. smegmatis all regions of the chromosome are transferred with comparable efficiencies. The lengths of the donor segments vary widely, but have an average length of 44.2kb. Since a mean of 13 tracts are transferred, the average total of transferred DNA per genome is 575kb. This process is referred to as "Distributive conjugal transfer." Gray et al. found substantial blending of the parental genomes as a result of conjugation and regarded this blending as reminiscent of that seen in the meiotic products of sexual reproduction.

Conjugation-like DNA transfer in hyperthermophilic archaea
Hyperthermophilic archaea encode pili structurally similar to the bacterial conjugative pili. However, unlike in bacteria, where conjugation apparatus typically mediates the transfer of mobile genetic elements, such as plasmids or transposons, the conjugative machinery of hyperthermophilic archaea, called Ced (Crenarchaeal system for exchange of DNA) and Ted (Thermoproteales system for exchange of DNA), appears to be responsible for the transfer of cellular DNA between members of the same species. It has been suggested that in these archaea the conjugation machinery has been fully domesticated for promoting DNA repair through homologous recombination rather than spread of mobile genetic elements. In addition to the VirB2-like conjugative pilus, the Ced and Ted systems include components for the VirB6-like transmembrane mating pore and the VirB4-like ATPase.

Inter-kingdom transfer
Bacteria related to the nitrogen fixing Rhizobia are an interesting case of inter-kingdom conjugation. For example, the tumor-inducing (Ti) plasmid of Agrobacterium and the root-tumor inducing (Ri) plasmid of A. rhizogenes contain genes that are capable of transferring to plant cells. The expression of these genes effectively transforms the plant cells into opine-producing factories. Opines are used by the bacteria as sources of nitrogen and energy. Infected cells form crown gall or root tumors. The Ti and Ri plasmids are thus endosymbionts of the bacteria, which are in turn endosymbionts (or parasites) of the infected plant.

The Ti and Ri plasmids can also be transferred between bacteria using a system (the tra, or transfer, operon) that is different and independent of the system used for inter-kingdom transfer (the vir, or virulence, operon). Such transfers create virulent strains from previously avirulent strains.

Genetic engineering applications
Conjugation is a convenient means for transferring genetic material to a variety of targets. In laboratories, successful transfers have been reported from bacteria to yeast, plants, mammalian cells, diatoms and isolated mammalian mitochondria. Conjugation has advantages over other forms of genetic transfer including minimal disruption of the target's cellular envelope and the ability to transfer relatively large amounts of genetic material (see the above discussion of E. coli chromosome transfer). In plant engineering, Agrobacterium-like conjugation complements other standard vehicles such as tobacco mosaic virus (TMV). While TMV is capable of infecting many plant families these are primarily herbaceous dicots. Agrobacterium-like conjugation is also primarily used for dicots, but monocot recipients are not uncommon.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Bacterial conjugation


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Galjoen

The galjoen, black bream, or blackfish (Dichistius capensis) is a species of marine fish found only along the coast of South Africa. Galjoen is the national fish of South Africa.

Distribution and habitat
The galjoen is indigenous to the coasts of southern Africa from Angola to South Africa, and is generally found around reefs at shallow depths around 10 m, often near the shore.

Description
This species can reach 80 cm in total length and a weight of 6.5 kg. The body is compressed, and the fins are well developed, with prominent spines, 10 of them, with between 18 and 23 rays. The anal fin has three spines, and usually 13 or 14 rays, the pelvic fins have 1 spine and 5 rays, and the pectoral fins are typically shorter than the head. The body, fins, and head, with the except of the front of the snout, are covered in scales. The lips are thick, with strong curved incisors at the front of the mouth, with smaller teeth behind the front incisors.

Diet
The species usually feeds on red and coraline seaweed and red bait, small mussels and barnacles found off rocky shores, and appear in particular to be a partial to the white mussels residing in the sandy beaches and inlets of the rocky outcrops along the southern coast.

Home area
In 2005, the movements of the species were extensively studied. Some 25,000 galjoen were tagged at four sites in reserves in South Africa and their overall movement was found to remain localised, with some 95% of fish studied seeming to indicate a particular area.

Fishing
It is important to local commercial fisheries and is also popular as a game fish.

As food
Due to their abundance in the shores off South Africa, galjoen is common in South African cuisine. A notable dish is the fish sprinkled with pepper and lemon — or alternatively with lemon, mayonnaise, and melted garlic butter — and served with fresh bread and apricot jam.

As the national fish of South Africa
Galjoen is the national fish of South Africa. The suggestion to make it the national fish came from Margaret Smith, the wife of ichthyologist J. L. B. Smith, to find a marine equivalent to the springbok.

Etymology
The scientific name of Coracinus capensis is a reference to its black colour when found in rocky areas, Coracinus meaning "raven" or "black coloured"; in sandy areas it gives off a silver-bronze colour.

title: Galjoen


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Blue crane

The blue crane (Grus paradisea), also known as the Stanley crane and the paradise crane, is the national bird of South Africa. The species is listed as Vulnerable by the IUCN.

Description
The blue crane is a tall, ground-dwelling bird, but is fairly small by the standards of the crane family. It is 100 - 120 cm tall, with a wingspan of 180 - 200 cm and weighs 3.6 - 6.2 kg. Among standard measurements, the wing chord measures 51.4 - 59 cm, the exposed culmen measures 8 - 10 cm and the tarsus measures 20.5 - 25.2 cm. This crane is pale blue-gray in color becoming darker on the upper head, neck and nape. From the crown to the lores, the plumage is distinctly lighter, sometimes whitish. The bill is ochre to greyish, with a pink tinge. The long wingtip feathers which trail to the ground. The primaries are black to slate grey, with dark coverts and blackish on the secondaries. Unlike most cranes, it has a relatively large head and a proportionately thin neck. Juveniles are similar but slightly lighter, with tawny coloration on the head, and no long wing plumes.

Habitat
Blue cranes are birds of the dry grassy uplands, usually the pastured grasses of hills, valleys, and plains with a few scattered trees. They prefer areas in the nesting season that have access to both upland and wetland areas, though they feed almost entirely in dry areas. They are altitudinal migrants, generally nesting in the lower grasslands of an elevation of around 1,300 to 2,000 m and moving down to lower altitudes for winter.

Movements and behaviour
Of the 15 species of crane, the blue crane has the most restricted distribution of all. Even species with lower population numbers now (such as Siberian or whooping cranes) are found over a considerable range in their migratory movements. The blue crane is migratory, primarily altitudinal, but details are little known.

The blue crane is partially social, less so during the breeding season. There is a strict hierarchy in groups, with the larger adult males being dominant. They overlap in range with three other crane species but interactions with these species and other "large wader" type birds are not known. They are aggressively protective of their nesting sites during the nesting season, even attacking innocent, non-predatory animals such as antelope, cattle, tortoises, plovers and the smallest of birds, such as sparrows. Humans are also attacked if they approach a nest too closely, with the aggressive male having torn clothes and drawn blood in such cases. Threats to their eggs and chicks include large savannah and white-throated monitor lizards, egg-eating snakes, foxes, jackals, birds-of-prey, meerkats, and mongoose.

Feeding
Blue cranes feed from the ground and appear to rarely feed near wetland areas. Most of their diet is comprised by grasses and sedges, with many types fed on based on their proximity to the nests. They are also regularly insectivorous, feeding on numerous, sizeable insects such as grasshoppers. Small animals such as crabs, snails, frogs, small lizards and snakes may supplement the diet, with such protein-rich food often being broken down and fed to the young.

Breeding
The breeding period is highly seasonal, with eggs being recorded between October and March. Pair-formation amongst groups often starts in October, beginning with both potential parents running in circles with each other. The male then engages in a "dance" flings various objects in the air and then jumps. Eventually, a female from the group and the male appear to "select" each other and both engage in the dance of throwing objects and jumping. After the dance, mating commences in around two weeks.

In a great majority of known nests, two eggs are laid (rarely one or three). Both males and females will incubate, with the male often incubating at night and, during the day, defending the nest territory while the female incubates. The incubation stage lasts around 30 days. The young are able to walk after two days and can swim well shortly thereafter. They are fed primarily by their mothers, who regurgitates food into the mouths. The chicks fledge in the age of 3–5 months. The young continue to be tended to until the next breeding season, at which time they are chased off by their parents.

Decline
While it remains common in parts of its historic range, and approx. 26 000 individuals remain, it began a sudden population decline from around 1980 and is now classified as vulnerable.

In the last two decades, the blue crane has largely disappeared from the Eastern Cape, Lesotho, and Eswatini. The population in the northern Free State, Limpopo, Gauteng, Mpumalanga and North West Province has declined by up to 90%. The majority of the remaining population is in eastern and southern South Africa, with a small and separate population in the Etosha Pan of northern Namibia. Occasionally, isolated breeding pairs are found in five neighbouring countries.

The primary causes of the sudden decline of the blue crane are human population growth, the conversion of grasslands into commercial tree plantations, and poisoning: deliberate (to protect crops) or accidental (baits intended for other species, and as a side-effect of crop dusting).

The South African government has stepped up legal protection for the blue crane. Other conservation measures are focusing on research, habitat management, education, and recruiting the help of private landowners.

The blue crane is one of the species to which the Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds (AEWA) applies.

Since October 2021, the Blue Crane has been classified as Moderately Depleted by the IUCN.

Cultural references
The blue crane is culturally significant to the Xhosa people, who call it indwe (flag). Traditionally, when a man distinguished himself in battle or otherwise, he was often decorated by a chief with blue crane feathers in a ceremony called ukundzabela. Men so honoured, who would wear the feathers sticking out of their hair, were known as men of ugaba (trouble)—the implication being that if trouble arose, they would reinstate peace and order.

It is also of significance to the Zulu people, whose kings and warriors wore a single or many feathers as a headdress.

Because of the association with warriors and heroism, the Isitwalandwe Medal was created to honour those who had "made an outstanding contribution and sacrifice to the liberation struggle", that is, those who resisted the apartheid regime in South Africa (1949–1991) in various ways. Isitwalandwe means "the one who wears the plumes of the rare bird", or blue crane.

The blue crane is also the national bird of South Africa.

title: Blue crane


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Babrak Karmal

Babrak Karmal (Dari/Pashto: ; born Sultan Hussein; 6 January 1929 – 1 or 3 December 1996) was an Afghan communist revolutionary and politician who was the leader of Afghanistan, serving in the post of general secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1986.

Born in Kabul Province into a Tajik family, Karmal attended Kabul University and developed openly leftist views there, having been introduced to Marxism by Mir Akbar Khyber during his imprisonment for activities deemed too radical by the government. He became a founding member of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and eventually became the leader of the Parcham faction when the PDPA split in 1967, with their ideological nemesis being the Khalq faction. Karmal was elected to the Lower House after the 1965 parliamentary election, serving in parliament until losing his seat in the 1969 parliamentary election.

Under Karmal's leadership, the Parchamite PDPA participated in Mohammad Daoud Khan's rise to power in 1973, and his subsequent regime. While relations were good at the beginning, Daoud began a major purge of leftist influence in the mid-1970s. This in turn led to the reformation of the PDPA in 1977, and Karmal played a role in the 1978 Saur Revolution when the PDPA took power. Karmal was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, synonymous with vice head of state, in the communist government. The Parchamite faction found itself under significant pressure by the Khalqists soon after taking power. In June 1978, a PDPA Central Committee meeting voted in favor of giving the Khalqist faction exclusive control over PDPA policy. This decision was followed by a failed Parchamite coup, after which Hafizullah Amin, a Khalqist, initiated a purge against the Parchamites. Karmal survived this purge but was exiled to Prague and eventually dismissed from his post. Instead of returning to Kabul, he feared for his life and lived with his family in the forests protected by the Czechoslovak secret police StB. The Afghan secret police KHAD had allegedly sent members to Czechoslovakia to assassinate Karmal. In late 1979 he was brought to Moscow by the KGB and eventually, in December 1979, the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan (with the consent of Amin's government) to stabilize the country. The Soviet troops staged a coup and assassinated Amin, replacing him with Karmal.

Karmal was promoted to Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Chairman of the Council of Ministers on 27 December 1979. He remained in the latter office until 1981, when he was succeeded by Sultan Ali Keshtmand. Throughout his term, Karmal worked to establish a support base for the PDPA by introducing several reforms. Among these were the "Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan", introducing a general amnesty for those people imprisoned during Nur Mohammad Taraki's and Amin's rule. He also replaced the red Khalqist flag with a more traditional one. These policies failed to increase the PDPA's legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people and the Afghan mujahidin rebels - he was widely seen as a Soviet puppet amongst the populace. These policy failures, and the stalemate that ensued after the Soviet intervention, led the Soviet leadership to become highly critical of Karmal's leadership. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union deposed Karmal in 1986 and replaced him with Mohammad Najibullah. Following his loss of power, he was again exiled, this time to Moscow. It was Anahita Ratebzad who persuaded Najibullah to allow Babrak Karmal to return to Afghanistan in 1991, where Karmal became an associate of Abdul Rashid Dostum and possibly helped remove the Najibullah government from power in 1992. He eventually left Afghanistan again for Moscow. Not long after, in 1996, Karmal died from liver cancer.

Early life and career
Karmal was born Sultan Hussein on 6 January 1929 in Kamari, a village close to Kabul. He was the son of Muhammad Hussein, a dagar jenral (lieutenant general, three-star rank) in the Afghan Army and former governor of the province of Paktia and Herat provinces, and was the first of six siblings. His family was one of the wealthier families in Kabul. His ethnic background was publicly disputed, with some sources claiming he was Pashtun and that he was Tajik. Throughout his tenure in the Afghan Parliament, Karmal strategically sowed confusion by alternately identifying himself as Pashtun and Tajik, demonstrating a deliberate avoidance of strict ethnic categorization. Karmal's ethnicity was a subject of persistent dispute, with conflicting claims made by Pashtun sympathizers and affiliates asserting that he belonged to the Mullahkhel Kakar tribe of Khost and Paktia as a Pashtun, while Tajik sympathizers and affiliates insisted that he was a Tajik with roots originating from Kashmir. It is important to note that during and after the Cold War, many English language sources tended to categorize him as a Tajik, often with the intention of discrediting him and providing a rationale for the Russians' decision to oust him from power for not being Pashtun.

He attended Nejat High School, a German-speaking school, and graduated from it in 1948, and applied to enter the Faculty of Law and Political Science of Kabul University. Karmal's application was initially denied admission to Kabul University because of his student political activist and his openly leftist views. He was always a charismatic speaker and became involved in the student union and the Wikh-i-Zalmayan (Awakened Youth Movement), a progressive and leftist organization. He studied at the College of Law and Political Science at Kabul University from 1951 to 1953. In 1953 Karmal was arrested because of his student union activities, but was released three years later in 1956 in an amnesty by Muhammad Daoud Khan. Shortly after, in 1957, Karmal found work as an English and German translator, before quitting and leaving for military training. Karmal graduated from the College of Law and Political Science in 1960, and in 1961, he found work as an employee in the Compilation and Translation Department of the Ministry of Education. From 1961 to 1963 he worked in the Ministry of Planning. When his mother died, Karmal left with his maternal aunt to live somewhere else. His father disowned him because of his leftist views. Karmal was involved in much debauchery, which was controversial in the mostly conservative Afghan society.

Communist politics
Imprisoned from 1953 to 1956, Karmal befriended fellow inmate Mir Akbar Khyber, who introduced Karmal to Marxism. Karmal changed his name from Sultan Hussein to Babrak Karmal, which means "Comrade of the Workers'" in Pashto, to disassociate himself from his bourgeois background. When he was released from prison, he continued his activities in the student union, and began to promote Marxism. Karmal spent the rest of the 1950s and the early 1960s becoming involved with Marxist organizations, of which there were at least four in Afghanistan at the time; two of the four were established by Karmal. When the 1964 Afghan Provisional Constitution, which legalised the establishment of new political entities, was introduced several prominent Marxists agreed to establish a communist political party. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA, the Communist Party) was established in January 1965 in Nur Muhammad Taraki's home. Factionalism within the PDPA quickly became a problem; the party split into the Khalq led by Taraki alongside Hafizullah Amin, and the Parcham led by Karmal.

During the 1965 parliamentary election Karmal was one of four PDPA members elected to the lower house of parliament; the three others were Anahita Ratebzad (whom he would later have an affair with according to Vasili Mitrokhin ), Nur Ahmed Nur and Fezanul Haq Fezan. No Khalqists were elected; however, Amin was 50 votes short of being elected. The Parchamite victory may be explained by the simple fact that Karmal could contribute financially to the PDPA electoral campaign. Karmal became a leading figure within the student movement in the 1960s, electing Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal as Prime Minister after a student demonstration (called for by Karmal) concluded with three deaths under the former leadership. In 1966 inside parliament, Karmal was physically assaulted by an Islamist MP, Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi.

In 1967, the PDPA unofficially split into two formal parties, one Khalqist and one Parchamist. The dissolution of the PDPA was initiated by the closing down of the Khalqist newspaper, Khalq. Karmal criticised the Khalq for being too communist, and believed that its leadership should have hidden its Marxist orientation instead of promoting it. According to the official version of events, the majority of the PDPA Central Committee rejected Karmal's criticism. The vote was a close one, and it is reported that Taraki expanded the Central Committee to win the vote; this plan resulted in eight of the new members becoming politically unaligned with and one switching to the Parchamite side. Karmal and half the PDPA Central Committee left the PDPA to establish a Parchamite-led PDPA. Officially the split was caused by ideological differences, but the party may have divided between the different leadership styles and plans of Taraki versus Karmal. Taraki wanted to model the party after Leninist norms while Karmal wanted to establish a democratic front. Other differences were socioeconomic. The majority of Khalqists came from rural areas; hence they were poorer, and were of Pashtun origin. The Parchamites were urban, richer, and spoke Dari more often than not. The Khalqists accused the Parchamites of having a connection with the monarchy, and because of it, referred to the Parchamite PDPA as the "Royal Communist Party". Both Karmal and Amin retained their seats in the lower house of parliament in the 1969 parliamentary election.

The Daoud era
Mohammed Daoud Khan, in collaboration with the Parchamite PDPA and radical military officers, overthrew the monarchy and instituted the Republic of Afghanistan in 1973. After Daoud's seizure of power, an American embassy cable stated that the new government had established a Soviet-style Central Committee, in which Karmal and Mir Akbar Khyber were given leading positions. Most ministries were given to Parchamites; Hassan Sharq became Deputy Prime Minister, Major Faiz Mohammad became Minister of Internal Affairs and Niamatullah Pazhwak became Minister of Education. The Parchamites took control over the ministries of finance, agriculture, communications and border affairs. The new government quickly suppressed the opposition, and secured their power base. At first, the National Front government between Daoud and the Parchamites seemed to work. By 1975, Daoud had strengthened his position by enhancing the executive, legislative and judicial powers of the Presidency. To the dismay of the Parchamites, all parties other than the National Revolutionary Party (NRP, established by Daoud) were made illegal.

Shortly after the ban on opposition to the NRP, Daoud began a massive purge of Parchamites in government. Mohammad lost his position as interior minister, Abdul Qadir was demoted, and Karmal was put under government surveillance. To mitigate Daoud's suddenly anti-communist directives, the Soviet Union reestablished the PDPA; Taraki was elected its General Secretary and Karmal, Second Secretary. While the Saur Revolution (literally the April Revolution) was planned for August, the assassination of Khyber led to a chain of events which ended with the communists seizing power. Karmal, when taking power in 1979, accused Amin of ordering the assassination of Khyber.

Taraki–Amin rule
Taraki was appointed Chairman of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, retaining his post as PDPA general secretary. Taraki initially formed a government which consisted of both Khalqists and Parchamites; Karmal became Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, while Amin became Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.Mohammad Aslam Watanjar became Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The two Parchamites Abdul Qadir and Mohammad Rafi, became Minister of Defence and Minister of Public Works, respectively. The appointment of Amin, Karmal and Watanjar led to splits within the Council of Ministers: the Khalqists answered to Amin; Karmal led the civilian Parchamites; and the military officers (who were Parchamites) were answerable to Watanjar (a Khalqist). The first conflict arose when the Khalqists wanted to give PDPA Central Committee membership to military officers who had participated in the Saur Revolution; Karmal opposed such a move but was overruled. A PDPA Politburo meeting voted in favour of giving Central Committee membership to the officers.

On 27 June, three months after the Saur Revolution, Amin outmaneuvered the Parchamites at a Central Committee meeting, giving the Khalqists exclusive right over formulating and deciding policy. A purge against the Parchamites was initiated by Amin and supported by Taraki on 1 July 1979. Karmal, fearing for his safety, went into hiding in one of his Soviet friends' homes. Karmal tried to contact Alexander Puzanov, the Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan, to talk about the situation. Puzanov refused, and revealed Karmal's location to Amin. The Soviets probably saved Karmal's life by sending him to the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia. In exile, Karmal established a network with the remaining Parchamites in government. A coup to overthrow Amin was planned for 4 September 1979. Its leading members in Afghanistan were Qadir and the Army Chief of Staff General Shahpur Ahmedzai. The coup was planned for the Festival of Eid, in anticipation of relaxed military vigilance. The conspiracy failed when the Afghan ambassador to India told the Afghan leadership about the plan. Another purge was initiated, and Parchamite ambassadors were recalled. Few returned to Afghanistan; Karmal and Mohammad Najibullah stayed in their respective countries. The Soviets decided that Amin should be removed to make way for a Karmal-Taraki coalition government. However Amin managed to order the arrest and later the murder of Taraki.

"One of the dirty faces who for years under the false revolutionary mask and false slogans wanted to seduce the youth was Babrak Karmal, a product of tyrannical and despotic rule of Daoud, the unprecedented hangman of history."

Amin was informed of the Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan and was initially supportive, but was assassinated. Under the command of the Soviets, Karmal ascended to power. On 27 December 1979, Karmal's pre-recorded speech to the Afghan people was broadcast via Radio Kabul from Tashkent in the Uzbek SSR (the radio wavelength was changed to that of Kabul), saying: "Today the torture machine of Amin has been smashed, his accomplices – the primitive executioners, usurpers and murderers of tens of thousand of our fellow countrymen – fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, sons and daughters, children and old people ..." Karmal was not in Kabul when the speech was broadcast; he was in Bagram, protected by the KGB.

That evening Yuri Andropov, the KGB Chairman, congratulated Karmal on his rise to the Chairmanship of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council, some time before Karmal received an official appointment. Karmal returned to Kabul on 28 December. He travelled alongside a Soviet military column. For the next few days Karmal lived in a villa on the outskirts of Kabul under the protection of the KGB. On 1 January 1980 Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Alexei Kosygin, the Soviet Chairman of the Council of Ministers, congratulated Karmal on his "election" as leader.

Domestic policies
Karmal's ascension was quickly troubled as he was effectively installed by the invading Soviet Union, delegitimizing him. Unrest in the country quickly escalated, and in Kabul two major uprisings, on 3 Hoot (22 February) and the months long students' protests were early signs of trouble. Karmal would also arrest Major Saddiq Alamyar in 1980, the commander of the 444th Commando Battalion, who committed the Kerala massacre while Afghanistan was still under the leadership of the Khalq. Other perpetrators were also arrested, such as other commandos and soldiers in the 11th Division of the Afghan Army. Alamyar remained in jail for a decade, even after Karmal was removed from his post as president.

The "Fundamental Principles" and amnesty
When he came to power, Karmal promised an end to executions, the establishment of democratic institutions and free elections, the creation of a constitution, and legalization of alternative political parties. Prisoners incarcerated under the two previous governments would be freed in a general amnesty (which occurred on 6 January). He promised the creation of a coalition government which would not espouse socialism. At the same time, he told the Afghan people that he had negotiated with the Soviet Union to give economic, military and political assistance. The mistrust most Afghans felt towards the government was a problem for Karmal. Many still remembered he had said he would protect private capital in 1978—a promise later proven to be a lie.

Karmal's three most important promises were the general amnesty of prisoners, the promulgation of the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the adoption of a new flag containing the traditional black, red and green (the flag of Taraki and Amin was red). His government granted concessions to religious leaders and the restoration of confiscated property. Some property, which was confiscated during earlier land reforms, was also partially restored. All these measures, with the exception of the general amnesty of prisoners, were introduced gradually. Of 2,700 prisoners, 2,600 were released from prison; 600 of these were Parchamites. The general amnesty was greatly publicized by the government. While the event was hailed with enthusiasm by some, many others greeted the event with disdain, since their loved ones or associates had died during earlier purges. Amin had planned to introduce a general amnesty on 1 January 1980, to coincide with the PDPA's sixteenth anniversary.

Work on the Fundamental Principles had started under Amin: it guaranteed democratic rights such as freedom of speech, the right to security and life, the right to peaceful association, the right to demonstrate and the right that "no one would be accused of crime but in accord with the provisions of law" and that the accused had the right to a fair trial. The Fundamental Principles envisaged a democratic state led by the PDPA, the only party then permitted by law. The Revolutionary Council, the organ of supreme power, would convene twice every year. The Revolutionary Council in turn elected a Presidium which would take decisions on behalf of the Revolutionary Council when it was not in session. The Presidium consisted mostly of PDPA Politburo members. The state would safeguard three kinds of property: state, cooperative and private property. The Fundamental Principles said that the state had the right to change the Afghan economy from an economy where man was exploited to an economy where man was free. Another clause stated that the state had the right to take "families, both parents and children, under its supervision." While it looked democratic at the outset, the Fundamental Principles was based on contradictions.

The Fundamental Principles led to the establishment of two important state organs: the Special Revolutionary Court, a specialized court for crimes against national security and territorial integrity, and the Institute for Legal and Scientific Research and Legislative Affairs, the supreme legislative organ of state, This body could amend and draft laws, and introduce regulations and decrees on behalf of the government. The introduction of more Soviet-style institutions led the Afghan people to distrust the communist government even more.

The Fundamental Principles constitution came into power on 22 April 1980.

Dividing power: Khalq–Parcham
With Karmal's ascension to power, Parchamites began to "settle old scores". Revolutionary Troikas were created to arrest, sentence and execute people. Amin's guard were the first victims of the terror which ensued. Those commanders who had stayed loyal to Amin were arrested, filling the prisons. The Soviets protested, and Karmal replied, "As long as you keep my hands bound and do not let me deal with the Khalq faction there will be no unity in the PDPA and the government cannot become strong ... They tortured and killed us. They still hate us! They are the enemies of the party ..." Amin's daughter, along with her baby, was imprisoned for twelve years, until Mohammad Najibullah, then leader of the PDPA, released her. When Karmal took power, leading posts in the Party and Government bureaucracy were taken over by Parchamites. The Khalq faction was removed from power, and only technocrats, opportunists and individuals which the Soviets trusted would be appointed to the higher echelons of government. Khalqists remained in control of the Ministry of Interior, but Parchamites were given control over KHAD and the secret police. The Parchamites and the Khalqists controlled an equal share of the military. Two out of Karmal's three Council of Ministers deputy chairmen were Khalqists. Khalqists controlled the Ministry of Communications and the interior ministry. Parchamites, on the other hand, controlled the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. In addition to the changes in government, the Parchamites held clear majority in the PDPA Central Committee. Only one Khalqi, Saleh Mohammad Zeary, was a member of the PDPA Secretariat during Karmal's rule.

Over 14 and 15 March 1982 the PDPA held a party conference at the Kabul Polytechnic Institute instead of a party congress, since a party congress would have given the Khalq faction a majority and could have led to a Khalqist takeover of the PDPA. The rules of holding a party conference were different, and the Parchamites had a three-fifths majority. This infuriated several Khalqists; the threat of expulsion did not lessen their anger. The conference was not successful, but it was portrayed as such by the official media. The conference broke up after one and a half days of a 3-day long program, because of the inter-party struggle for power between the Khalqists and the Parchamites. A "program of action" was introduced, and party rules were given minor changes. As an explanation of the low party membership, the official media also made it seem hard to become a member of the party.

PDPA base
When Karmal took power, he began expanding the support base of the PDPA. Karmal tried to persuade certain groups, which had been referred to class enemies of the revolution during Taraki and Amin's rule, to support the PDPA. Karmal appointed several non-communists to top positions. Between March and May 1980, 78 out of the 191 people appointed to government posts were not members of the PDPA. Karmal reintroduced the old Afghan custom of having an Islamic invocation every time the government issued a proclamation. In his first live speech to the Afghan people, Karmal called for the establishment of the National Fatherland Front (NFF); the NFF's founding congress was held in June 1981. Unfortunately for Karmal, his policies did not lead to a notable increase in support for his regime, and it did not help Karmal that most Afghans saw the Soviet intervention as an invasion.

By 1981, the government gave up on political solutions to the conflict. At the fifth PDPA Central Committee plenum in June, Karmal resigned from his Council of Ministers chairmanship and was replaced by Sultan Ali Keshtmand, while Nur Ahmad Nur was given a bigger role in the Revolutionary Council. This was seen as "base broadening". The previous weight given to non-PDPA members in top positions ceased to be an important matter in the media by June 1981. This was significant, considering that up to five members of the Revolutionary Council were non-PDPA members. By the end of 1981, the previous contenders, who had been heavily presented in the media, were all gone; two were given ambassadorships, two ceased to be active in politics, and one continued as an advisor to the government. The other three changed sides, and began to work for the opposition.

The national policy of reconciliation continued: in January 1984 the land reform introduced by Taraki and Amin was drastically modified, the limits of landholdings were increased to win the support of middle class peasants, the literacy programme was continued, and concessions to women were made. In 1985 the Loya Jirga was reconvened. The 1985 Loya Jirga was followed by a tribal jirga in September. In 1986 Abdul Rahim Hatef, a non-PDPA member, was elected to the NFF chairmanship. During the 1985–86 elections it was said that 60 percent of the elected officials were non-PDPA members. By the end of Karmal's rule, several non-PDPA members had high-level government positions.

Civil war and military
In March 1979, the military budget was 6.4 million US$, which was 8.3 percent of the government budget, but only 2.2 of gross national product. After the Soviet intervention, the defence budget increased to 208 million US$ in 1980, and 325 million US$ by 1981. In 1982 it was reported that the government spent around 22 percent of total expenditure.

When the political solution failed (see "PDPA base" section), the Afghan government and the Soviet military decided to solve the conflict militarily. The change from a political to a military solution did not come suddenly. It began in January 1981, as Karmal doubled wages for military personnel, issued several promotions, and decorated one general and thirteen colonels. The draft age was lowered, the obligatory length of arms duty was extended and the age for reservists was increased to thirty-five years of age. In June 1981, Assadullah Sarwari lost his seat in the PDPA Politburo, replaced by Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, a former tank commander and Minister of Communications, Major General Mohammad Rafi was made Minister of Defence and Mohammad Najibullah appointed KHAD Chairman.

These measures were introduced due to the collapse of the army during the Soviet intervention. Before the intervention the army could field 100,000 troops, after the intervention only 25,000. Desertions were pandemic, and the recruitment campaigns for young people often drove them to the opposition. To better organize the military, seven military zones were established, each with its own Defence Council. The Defence Councils were established at the national, provincial and district level to empower the local PDPA. It is estimated that the Afghan government spent as much as 40 percent of government revenue on defense.

Karmal refused to recognize the rebels as genuine, saying in an interview: "The people of Afghanistan do not recognise [the rebels] who include a number of hired people of the reactionary circles of Pakistan, Chinese chauvinists, imperialist America and Britain, and the reactionaries of Arab countries and the Zionists, who pretend to be the representatives of Afghanistan."

Economy
During the civil war and the ensuing Soviet–Afghan War, most of the country's infrastructure was destroyed. Normal patterns of economic activity were disrupted. The Gross national product (GNP) fell substantially during Karmal's rule because of the conflict; trade and transport was disrupted with loss of labor and capital. In 1981 the Afghan GDP stood at 154.3 billion Afghan afghanis, a drop from 159.7 billion in 1978. GNP per capita decreased from 7,370 in 1978 to 6,852 in 1981. The dominant form of economic activity was in the agricultural sector. Agriculture accounted for 63 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1981; 56 percent of the labor force was working in agriculture in 1982. Industry accounted for 21 percent of GDP in 1982, and employed 10 percent of the labor force. All industrial enterprises were government-owned. The service sector, the smallest of the three, accounted for 10 percent of GDP in 1981, and employed an estimated one-third of the labour force. The balance of payments, which had grown in the pre-communist administration of Muhammad Daoud Khan, decreased, turning negative by 1982 at 70.3 million $US. The only economic activity which grew substantially during Karmal's rule was export and import.

Foreign policy
Karmal observed in early 1983 that without Soviet intervention, "It is unknown what the destiny of the Afghan Revolution would be ... We are realists and we clearly realize that in store for us yet lie trials and deprivations, losses and difficulties." Two weeks before this statement Sultan Ali Keshtmand, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, lamented the fact that half the schools and three-quarters of communications had been destroyed since 1979. The Soviet Union rejected several Western-made peace plans, such as the Carrington Plan, since they did not take into consideration the PDPA government. Most Western peace plans had been made in collaboration with the Afghan opposition forces. At the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stated; "We do not object to the questions connected with Afghanistan being discussed in conjunction with the question of security in the Persian Gulf. Naturally here on only the international aspects of the Afghan problem can be discussed, not internal Afghan affairs. The sovereignty of Afghanistan must be fully protected, as must its nonaligned status."

The stance of the Pakistani government was clear, demanding complete Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the establishment of a non-PDPA government. Karmal, summarizing his discussions with Iran and Pakistan, said "Iran and Pakistan have so far not opted for concrete and constructive positions." During Karmal's rule Afghan–Pakistani relations remained hostile; the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was the catalyst for the hostile relationship. The increasing numbers of Afghan refugees in Pakistan challenged the PDPA's legitimacy to rule.

The Soviet Union threatened in 1985 that it would support the Baloch separatist movement in Pakistan if the Pakistani government continued to aid the Afghan mujahideen. Karmal, problematically for the Soviets, did not want a Soviet withdrawal, and he hampered attempts to improve relations with Pakistan since the Pakistani government had refused to recognise the PDPA government.

Public image
Because Karmal was put into power without a formal ceremony as in Afghan tradition, he was seen as an illegitimate leader in many eyes of his people. A poor performance in foreign interviews also did not help his public image where he was noted to speak like an "exhibitionist" rather than a statesman. Karmal was widely viewed as a puppet leader of the Soviet Union by Afghans and the Western press.

Despite his position, Karmal was apparently not permitted to make key decisions as he was following advice from Soviet advisers. The Soviet control of the Afghan state was apparently so much that Karmal himself admitted to a friend of his unfree life, telling him: “The Soviet comrades love me boundlessly, and for the sake of my personal safety, they don’t obey even my own orders.”

"The hands, feet and tongue of the poor Sultan had been tied, and he had no right to speak [without permission] with his personal friends."

Fall from power and succession
Mikhail Gorbachev, then General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, said, "The main reason that there has been no national consolidation so far is that Comrade Karmal is hoping to continue sitting in Kabul with our help." Karmal's position became less secure when the Soviet leadership began blaming him for the failures in Afghanistan. Gorbachev, worried over the situation, told the Soviet Politburo "If we don't change approaches [to evacuate Afghanistan], we will be fighting there for another 20 or 30 years." It is not clear when the Soviet leadership began to campaign for Karmal's dismissal, but Andrei Gromyko discussed the possibility of Karmal's resignation with Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1982. While it was Gorbachev who would dismiss Karmal, there may have been a consensus within the Soviet leadership in 1983 that Karmal should resign. Gorbachev's own plan was to replace Karmal with Mohammad Najibullah, who had joined the PDPA at its creation. Najibullah was thought highly of by Yuri Andropov, Boris Ponomarev and Dmitriy Ustinov, and negotiations for his succession may have started in 1983. Najibullah was not the Soviet leadership's only choice for Karmal's succession; a GRU report noted that the majority of the PDPA leadership would support Assadullah Sarwari's ascension to leadership. According to the GRU, Sarwari was a better candidate as he could balance between the Pashtuns, Tajiks and Uzbeks; Najibullah was a Pashtun nationalist. Another viable candidate was Abdul Qadir, who had been a participant in the Saur Revolution.

Najibullah was appointed to the PDPA Secretariat in November 1985. During Karmal's March 1986 visit to the Soviet Union, the Soviets tried to persuade Karmal that he was too ill to govern, and that he should resign. This backfired, as a Soviet doctor attending to Karmal told him he was in good health. Karmal asked to return home to Kabul, and said that he understood and would listen to the Soviet recommendations. Before leaving, Karmal promised he would step down as PDPA General Secretary. The Soviets did not trust him and sent Vladimir Kryuchkov, the head of intelligence (FCD) in the KGB, into Afghanistan. At a meeting in Kabul, Karmal confessed his undying love for the Soviet Union, comparing his ardor to his Muslim faith. Kryuchkov, concluding that he could not persuade Karmal to resign, left the meeting. After Kryuchkov left the room, the Afghan defence minister and the state security minister visited Karmal's office, telling him that he had to resign from one of his posts. Understanding that his Soviet support had been eliminated, Karmal resigned from the office of the General Secretary at the 18th PDPA Central Committee plenum. He was succeeded in his post by Najibullah.

Karmal still had support within the party, and used his base to curb Najibullah's powers. He began spreading rumors that he would be reappointed General Secretary. Najibullah's power base was in the KHAD, the Afghan equivalent to the KGB, and not the party. Considering the fact that the Soviet Union had supported Karmal for over six years, the Soviet leadership wanted to ease him out of power gradually. Yuli Vorontsov, the Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan, told Najibullah to begin undermining Karmal's power slowly. Najibullah complained to the Soviet leadership that Karmal used most of his spare time looking for errors and "speaking against the National Reconciliation programme". At a meeting of the Soviet Politburo on 13 November 1986 it was decided that Najibullah should remove Karmal; this motion was supported by Gromyko, Vorontsov, Eduard Shevardnadze, Anatoly Dobrynin and Viktor Chebrikov. A PDPA meeting in November relieved Karmal of his Revolutionary Council chairmanship, and exiled him to Moscow where he was given a state-owned apartment and a dacha. Karmal was succeeded as Revolutionary Council chairman by Haji Mohammad Tsamkani, who was not a member of the PDPA.

Later life and death
Many years after the end of his leadership, he denounced the Saur Revolution of 1978 in which he took part, taking aim at the Khalq governments of Taraki and Amin. He told a Soviet reporter:

"It was the greatest crime against the people of Afghanistan. Parcham's leaders were against armed actions because the country was not ready for a revolution... I knew that people would not support us if we decided to keep power without such support."

Karmal was invited back to Kabul by Najibullah, and "for equally obscure reasons Karmal accepted", returning on 20 June 1991 (this could have been on the recommendation of Anahita Ratebzad who was very close to Karmal and also respected by Najibullah). If Najibullah's plan was to strengthen his position within the Watan Party (the renamed PDPA) by appeasing the pro-Karmal Parchamites, he failed – Karmal's apartment became a center for opposition to Najibullah's government. When Najibullah was toppled in 1992, Karmal became the most powerful politician in Kabul through leadership of the Parcham. However, his negotiations with the rebels collapsed quickly, and on 16 April 1992 the rebels, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, took Kabul. After the fall of Najibullah's government, Karmal was based in Hairatan. There, it is alleged, Karmal used most of his time either trying to establish a new party, or advising people to join the secular National Islamic Movement (Junbish-i-Milli). Abdul Rashid Dostum, the leader of Junbish-i-Milli, was a supporter of Karmal during his rule. It is unknown how much control Karmal had over Dostum, but there is little evidence that Karmal was in any commanding position. Karmal's influence over Dostum appeared indirect – some of his former associates supported Dostum. Those who spoke with Karmal during this period noted his lack of interest in politics. In June 1992 it was reported that he had died in a plane crash along with Dostum, although these reports later proved to be false.

In early December 1996, Karmal died in Moscow's Central Clinical Hospital from liver cancer. The date of his death was reported by some sources as 1 December and by others as 3 December. The Taliban summed up his rule as follows: "[he] committed all kinds of crimes during his illegitimate rule ... God inflicted on him various kinds of hardship and pain. Eventually he died of cancer in a hospital belonging to his paymasters, the Russians."

title: Babrak Karmal


text:
Talk:Liberal Democrats (UK)

'Is' vs 'Are'
The Liberal Democrats are a federal party, thus, shouldn't it be: "The Liberal Democrats are...", rather than "The Liberal Democrats is..."? Touslesmemes49 (talk) 17:22, 1 October 2022 (UTC)

 * "The Liberal Democrats" is a proper singular noun. therefore "The Liberal Democrats is..." would be a proper way to start a sentence. 129.79.234.209 (talk) 12:30, 12 July 2024 (UTC)

 * In British English we tend to use notional agreement, so "are" is correct. DuncanHill (talk) 17:05, 12 July 2024 (UTC)

2019 Election Results
In the overview the text reads "and a poor performance in the 2019 general election saw Swinson lose her seat." But the link to the election page shows that the party saw a 4% swing, comparing that with the -7% of Labour or the ~1% of the Tories/SNP suggests a relatively good performance that was adversely affected by FPTP.

I'd like to change it to read" and the 2019 general election saw Swinson lose her seat." A factual statement without any judgement of the performance. Would that be OK with others? Efan78 (talk) 02:39, 11 June 2024 (UTC)

 * Agree, this is a more neutral statement. Go for it. — Czello (music) 07:43, 11 June 2024 (UTC)

I agreeSpinney Hill (talk) 07:24, 12 June 2024 (UTC)

Lib Dem ideology may clash with labour's
In a discussion in the labour talk page it ha sbeen proposed for labour's ideology to be changed to social liberalism but due to the liberal deocrat page also has this ideology it was proposed that the liberal democrats also add social democracy as an ideology not only to avoid confusion but also due to some sources suggesting they may be taking up a more centre-left position.

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/article/2024/jun/10/lib-dems-progressive-mantle-robust-opposition-labour Takis S1 (talk) 09:59, 2 July 2024 (UTC)

 * Aside from being an opinion piece, that article doesn't call them socdems. Also I don't think it's logical to alter this article based on what another does – we just say what the sources say. — Czello (music) 10:37, 2 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Also, same as on the Labour page, we should avoid WP:RECENTISM. A socdem trend in the Lib Dems isn't new, but the two wings of the party are already detailed in the body of the article. The infobox should remain broad. — Czello (music) 10:41, 2 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Progressivism may be better than Social liberalism considering it is a bit broader Takis S1 (talk) 11:10, 2 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Comment maybe Progressivism is a better label to add. Implies a shift to the explicit left while also not tying itself to a specific economic system. – GlowstoneUnknown   (Talk)  10:54, 2 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Yes propably or maybe just removing social liberalism Takis S1 (talk) 11:05, 2 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Why would we remove social liberalism? There's no question that they're a socially liberal party. — Czello (music) 11:09, 2 July 2024 (UTC)
 * (ec) No, there is no reason to remove social liberalism. DuncanHill (talk) 11:11, 2 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Strong oppose to removing social liberalism from the Infobox – in fact, my personal view is that if we were going to list a single ideology, it would be social liberalism, given it is the party's raison d'etre. I similarly oppose "progressivism", as it is essentially a meaningless term, particularly as we have actual political ideologies backed up with reliable references.-- Autospark (talk) 16:38, 3 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I would also have only "social liberalism" in the infobox, while I surely oppose "social democracy" (only a minority of the party adheres to that ideology), "progressivisim" (too generic) and "pro-Europeanism" (policy, not an ideology). Possibly, I would also remove "liberalism", but I am also fine with "liberalism" and "social liberalism". Two ideologies are enough. --Checco (talk) 16:48, 5 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Agreed about liberalism and social liberalism – those are two specific ideologies, backed up with sources, and are relevant. Social democracy is at best an exaggeration.— Autospark (talk) 19:17, 5 July 2024 (UTC)

title: Talk:Liberal Democrats (UK)


text:
Talk:Beltane

tree
Running around the tree with ribbons or strokes of paper reminds me of the may-tree which some villages in the south of the netherlands(where i live) plant in the beginning of may. It is an unusual high (it's very high, 25 meters or something) tree with only some green leaves at the top and it has some ribbons in usually yellow and white hanging from it. It simbolises fertility, just like the beltane feast in Wicca. Thought you might like to know ;) -Gwynn

Etymology section
Ribbon weaving dance a 19th Century innovation? ==

In his "Stations of the Sun" (Oxford), the British historian Ronald Hutton says the historical record in the British Isles does not support the ribbon-weaving dance as having any greater antiquity than the 1840's or so. People danced around maypoles for many centuries before that, just not doing the ribbon-weaving thing until well into the 19th century...

EarrachApr.17,2007

New folklore additions need context
you need to put locations and years on these recent additions. You are inserting them as if they are universal, with no era indicated. From what I can tell from the sourcing, all of them are from Co. Westmeath, and relatively late. Some of them may only be local customs. This needs to be indicated. If you can't add this context, they may need to be reverted, as it gives the false impression that late imports of customs to Ireland are possibly native customs. I corrected your conflation of the May Bush/Pole (which you wrote as "May Poll") with the European Maypole, but now you seem to be adding more content that again muddies the waters. Please fix these issues if you want this content included. - CorbieVreccan  ☊ ☼ 21:24, 13 February 2022 (UTC)

Consistency?
Dia dhaoibh, I was looking at this talk page, and I saw that there was a rejected proposal to move the page. I am not really fussed about the title of the page (Although I have always used Bealtaine), but I was thinking that we should at least try for consistency. In the very first line, it contradicts the title of the page and calls the festival Bealtaine, not Beltane. What spelling should be used in the page? If the Gaeilge spelling from the main body of the article is to be kept, I think that the discussion regarding moving the page be reopened.

Edited once for grammar.

Alpha2 5232 (talk) 08:07, 2 November 2022 (UTC)

 * I agree, I think the default title should be changed to Bealtaine, given that this is a celtic/irish festival and that the irish name has been around much longer than "Beltane".. Lievead (talk) 18:49, 4 May 2024 (UTC)

English spelling of Beltane
Why, when the article is about Celtic festivals, which are named in various Gaelic languages, is the dominant (outsider) Anglo-Saxon culture’s spelling used as the title? Galliv (talk) 03:39, 6 February 2023 (UTC)

 * Excellent question - also raised in the section above. I'm going to be bold and move to the correct Gaelic spelling. Bastun Ėġáḍβáś₮ŭŃ! 09:44, 23 October 2023 (UTC)

 * And in doing the move, I see had already done the same move in 2021, but for some reason the move back doesn't show in the logs? Odd. Bastun Ėġáḍβáś₮ŭŃ! 09:47, 23 October 2023 (UTC)
 * I've reverted this move... as noted, this was previously rejected in an RM discussion. Main reason is that Beltane is the WP:COMMONNAME spelling in English reliable sources, which is what Wikpiedia goes with as a policy. — Amakuru (talk) 10:13, 23 October 2023 (UTC)

 * It wasn't rejected, there was no consensus for the move, and it appears to be over whether MOS:TIES does or does not apply, but point taken, I missed the RM discussion linked above, and the original RM discussion itself, which seems to have had a massive eight participants. I may propose another RM at some point. Bastun Ėġáḍβáś₮ŭŃ! 10:50, 23 October 2023 (UTC)
 * Because this is the English Wikipedia not the Gaelic Wikipedia, and we use the name most common in English, just like we do for articles on anything that has a different spelling or name in another language. MClay1 (talk) 11:37, 6 April 2024 (UTC)
 * Exactly, the irish version is not difficult to pronounce, I don't understand why there was a need for Americans to create a whole new word for it when Bealtaine is so much prettier anyway :( Lievead (talk) 18:45, 4 May 2024 (UTC)

Pronunciation
The listed pronunciation in IPA at the start of the article is not what I expected, so I looked at the two sources that are linked. Both of them have a completely different pronunciation. Why are there cites to dictionaries that completely refute the listed pronunciation? I think either the IPA listed should be changed to match the links, or if the IPA listed is "correct", then someone should add cites proving the correctness. Derekt75 (talk) 17:43, 3 April 2023 (UTC)

 * correct spelling of this festival is "Bealtaine" (pronounced "bee-yowl-tana") Lievead (talk) 18:46, 4 May 2024 (UTC)

title: Talk:Beltane