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Telecommunications in Brazil

Brazil has both modern technologies in the center-south portion, counting with LTE, 3G HSPA, DSL ISDB based Digital TV. Other areas of the country, particularly the North and Northeast regions, lack even basic analog PSTN telephone lines. This is a problem that the government is trying to solve by linking the liberation of new technologies such as WiMax and FTTH) only tied with compromises on extension of the service to less populated regions.

Landline
The Brazilian landline sector is fully open to competition and continues to attract operators. The bulk of the market is divided between three operators: Telefónica, América Móvil, and Oi (controlled by Brazilian investors and Pharol SGPS). Telefónica operates through Telefónica Brasil, which has integrated its landline and mobile services under the brand name Vivo. The América Móvil group in Brazil comprises long distance incumbent Embratel, mobile operator Claro, and cable TV provider Net Serviços. The group has started to integrate its landline and mobile services under the brand name Claro, previously used only for mobile services. Oi offers landline and mobile services under the Oi brand name. GVT was the country's most successful alternative network provider, offering landline services only, until it was acquired by Telefónica in 2015 and integrated into Vivo.

National: extensive microwave radio relay system and a national satellite system with 64 earth stations.

International: country code - 55; landing point for a number of submarine cables, including Atlantis 2, that provide direct links to South and Central America, the Caribbean, the US, Africa, and Europe; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean), 1 Inmarsat (Atlantic Ocean region east), connected by microwave relay system to Mercosur Brazilsat B3 satellite earth station (2007)

Statistics

 * Served locations: 37,355
 * Installed terminals: 43,626,836
 * In service: 33,800,370
 * Public terminals: 1,128,350
 * Density: 22,798 Phones/100 Hab

Mobile
The history of mobile telephony in Brazil began on 30 December 1990, when the Cellular Mobile System began operating in the city of Rio de Janeiro, with a capacity for 10,000 terminals. At that time, according to Anatel (the national telecommunications agency), there were 667 devices in the country. The number of devices rose to 6,700 in the next year, to 30,000 in 1992.

In November 2007 3G services were launched, and increased rapidly to almost 90% of the population in 2012 and the agreements signed as part of the auction specify a 3G coverage obligation of 100% of population by 2019.

After the auction that took place in June 2012, LTE tests were undertaken in several cities, tourist locations and international conference venues. The first LTE-compatible devices became available in the local market and LTE services was commercially launched in 2013. Under the 4G licence terms, operators were required to have commercial networks in all twelve state capitals which are acting as host cities for the 2014 FIFA World Cup.

5G services were commercially launched in 2020, initially only in a few cities and in DSS mode. In 2021, the regulatory agency Anatel carried out the auction of the 3.5 GHz spectrum, which allowed the operation of 5G in standalone mode (SA). In July 2022, Brasília was the first city to have 5G NR SA made available, with all state capitals being served by the three major carriers by the end of 2022. By July 2023, 753 cities had 5G coverage, which accounts for 46% of the country's population.

The mobile market is ruled by 3 companies:

 * Vivo, controlled by the Spanish Telefónica, is the leading mobile and landline carrier in Brazil. In 1Q2023, Vivo served 98 million mobile subscribers.
 * Claro, controlled by the Mexican América Móvil (owned by Carlos Slim), ranks second in Brazilian mobile market. In 1Q2023, Claro served 82.8 million mobile subscribers.
 * TIM, controlled by the Italian Telecom Italia is the third largest mobile carrier in Brazil. In 1Q2023, TIM served 61.7 million mobile subscribers.
 * Oi, which was once Brazil's fourth-largest mobile carrier, filed for judicial reorganization in 2016, selling its mobile division (Oi Móvel) in 2020 to a consortium formed by the three largest operators. In 2022, the sale was approved by the regulatory agency Anatel and Oi's 36.5 million mobile customers were transferred to TIM (40%), Claro (32%) and Vivo (28%).
 * Algar Telecom is the largest regional mobile carrier, operating in 4 states. The company's customers have national coverage through roaming agreements with the three major telcos. In 1Q2023, Algar Telecom served 4.5 million mobile subscribers.

Statistics
 * Number of devices: 251.203.715
 * Percentage of prepaid lines: 43.62%
 * Density: 98.7 phones/100 hab

Technology distribution

Submarine cables
Several submarine cables link Brazil to the world:
 * Americas II cable entered operations in September 2000, connecting Brazil (Fortaleza) to United States.
 * ATLANTIS-2, with around 12 thousand kilometers in extension, operating since 2000, it connects Brazil (Rio de Janeiro and Natal) to Europe, Africa and South America. This is the only cable that connects South America to Africa and Europe.
 * EMERGIA – SAM 1 cable connects all three Americas, surrounding it with a total extension of more than 25 thousand kilometers.
 * GLOBAL CROSSING - SAC Connects all Americas, surrounding them with a total extension of more than 15 thousand kilometers.
 * GLOBENET/360 NETWORK Another link from North America to South America.
 * UNISUR Interconnects Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina.

All these cables have a bandwidth from 20 Gbit/s to 80 Gbit/s, and some have a projected final capacity of more than 1 Tbit/s.

Satellite connections
List of business and satellites they operate (Brazilian Geostationary Satellites)

Television and radio
Under the Brazilian constitution, television and radio are not treated as forms of telecommunication, in order to avoid creating problems with a series of regulations that reduce and control how international businesses and individuals can participate. Brazil has the second largest media conglomerate in the world in terms of revenue, Grupo Globo.

Internet
The Internet has become quite popular in Brazil, with steadily growing numbers of users as well as increased availability. Brazil holds the 6th spot in number of users worldwide. Many technologies are used to bring broadband Internet to consumers, with DSL and cable being the most common (respectively, about 13 million and 9 million connections), and 3G technologies. 4G technologies were introduced in April 2013 and presently are available in over 90% of the country.

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Transport in Brazil

Transport infrastructure in Brazil is characterized by strong regional differences and lack of development of the national rail network. Brazil's fast-growing economy, and especially the growth in exports, will place increasing demands on the transport networks. However, sizeable new investments that are expected to address some of the issues are either planned or in progress. It is common to travel domestically by air because the price is low. Brazil has the second highest number of airports in the world, after the USA.

Railways

The Brazilian railway network has an extension of about 30000 km. It is basically used for transporting ores. Usually, the railway sector was treated in a secondary way in Brazil, due to logistical, economic or political difficulties to install more railways.

The Brazilian railroad system had a great expansion between 1875 and 1920. The heyday of the railway modal was interrupted during the Getúlio Vargas government, which prioritized the road modal. In the 1940s, the railway network was already facing several problems, from low-powered locomotives to uneconomical layouts. In 1957, a state-owned company was created, the National Railroad Network (RFFSA), which started to manage 18 railroads in the Union. Several deficit railways were closed under the promise of state investment in new projects, which did not happen. The actions were centralized in the government until the opening of the market in 1990. So, the National Privatization Plan was instituted, with dozens of concessions being made. However, they ended up concentrating the railways, mainly, in three large business groups, América Latina Logística (ALL), Vale S.A. and MRS Logística. The refurbishment generated an increase in productivity (cargoes transported increased by 30% with the same railway line). However, the main problem was that the reform not only gave away the railway line, but also geographical exclusivity. This resulted in the non-creation of competitive incentives for the expansion and renewal of the existing network. With the State maintaining the opening of new railways a difficult, slow and bureaucratic process, as it maintains the total monopoly of power over this sector, the railways did not expand any further in the country, and the sector was very outdated.

In 2021, a New Framework for Railways was created, allowing the construction of railways by authorization, as occurs in the exploration of infrastructure in sectors such as telecommunications, electricity and ports. It's also possible to authorize the exploration of stretches not implemented, idle, or in the process of being returned or deactivated. With the change of rules in the sector, in December 2021, there were already requests to open 15000 km of new tracks, in 64 requests for implementation of new railways. Nine new railroads had already been authorized by the Federal Government, in 3506 km of new tracks.

 * Total actual network: 29,888 km of railroad and 1,411 km of subway and light rail
 * Broad gauge: 4,932 km gauge (939 km electrified)
 * Narrow gauge: 23,341 km gauge (24 km electrified)
 * Dual gauge: 396 km 1000 mm and 1600 mm gauges (three rails)
 * Standard gauge: 194 km gauge (2014)

 * Estrada de Ferro do Amapá in the middle of the Amazon Rainforest also used standard gauge.
 * A 12 km section of the former gauge Estrada de Ferro Oeste de Minas is retained as a heritage railway.

Railway links with adjacent countries
International rail links exist between Brazil and Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay.

Tramways
Brazil had a hundred tramway systems. Currently, there are vintage tramways operating in Belém, Campinas, Campos do Jordão, Itatinga, Rio de Janeiro and Santos.

Highways

Brazil has more than 1720700 km of roads, of which 213452 km are paved (12,4%), and about 17000 km are divided highways, 6300 km only in the State of São Paulo. Currently it is possible to travel from Rio Grande, in the extreme south of the country, to Brasília (2580 km) or Casimiro de Abreu, in the state of Rio de Janeiro (2045 km), only on divided highways. The total of paved roads increased from 35,496 km (22,056 mi) in 1967 to 215,000 km (133,595 mi) in 2018. The two most important highways in the country are BR-101 and BR-116.

Although Brazil has the largest duplicated road network in Latin America, it's considered insufficient for the country's needs: in 2021, it was calculated that the ideal amount of duplicated roads would be something around from 35000 km to 42000 km. The main road axes also have problems because they often have inadequate geometry and constructive characteristics that don't allow quality long-distance flow (non-interference from local traffic and high speed). The Brazilian Federal Government has never implemented a National Highway Plan at the same level as developed countries such as the USA, Japan or European countries, which specifically aimed at inter-regional travel, and which should preferably be served by highways (which would differ from the common duplicated highways by geometric pattern, access control without access to neighboring lots, zero level crossings and returns, prohibition of circulation of non-motorized vehicles such as cyclists, animal traction or human propulsion, as per the Vienna Convention). The Brazilian State, despite some planning efforts, has been guided by a reactive action to the increase in demand (only duplicating some roads with old and inadequate layout) and not by a purposeful vision, directing occupation and economic density in the territory. Another problem is the lack of directing the Union Budget towards infrastructure works: in Brazil there is no law that guarantees funds from the Federal Budget for works on highways and other modes of transport (unlike what happens in sectors such as Education and Health), depending exclusively on the goodwill of the rulers. In the US, for example, the gasoline tax can only be used for transport infrastructure works. Brazil even invested 1.5% of the country's budget in infrastructure in the 1970s, being the time when the most investment was made in highways; but in the 1990s, only 0.1% of the budget was invested in this sector, maintaining an average of 0.5% in the 2000s and 2010, insufficient amounts for the construction of an adequate road network. For comparative purposes, the average investment of the USA and the European Union was 1% between 1995 and 2013, even though they already have a much more advanced road infrastructure than Brazil.

The country has a medium rate of car ownership of 471 per 1000 people, however in comparison to the other developing economies of the BRIC group Brazil exceeds India and China.

The country still has several states where paved access to 100% of the state's municipalities has not yet been reached. Some states have 100% of cities with asphalt access, such as Santa Catarina, which reached this goal in 2014; Paraíba, which reached this goal in 2017, and Alagoas, which reached this goal in 2021 In states like Rio Grande do Sul, in 2020, there were still 54 cities without asphalt access. In Paraná, in 2021, there were still 4 cities without asphalt access. In Minas Gerais, in 2016, there were still 5 cities without asphalt access.

Waterways
50,000 km navigable (most in areas remote from industry or population) (2012)

Among the main Brazilian waterways, two stand out: Hidrovia Tietê-Paraná (which has a length of 2,400 km, 1,600 on the Paraná River and 800 km on the Tietê River, draining agricultural production from the states of Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Goiás and part of Rondônia, Tocantins and Minas Gerais) and Hidrovia do Solimões-Amazonas (it has two sections: Solimões, which extends from Tabatinga to Manaus, with approximately 1600 km, and Amazonas, which extends from Manaus to Belém, with 1650 km. Almost entirely passenger transport from the Amazon plain is done by this waterway, in addition to practically all cargo transportation that is directed to the major regional centers of Belém and Manaus). In Brazil, this transport is still underutilized: the most important waterway stretches, from an economic point of view, are found in the Southeast and South of the country. Its full use still depends on the construction of locks, major dredging works and, mainly, of ports that allow intermodal integration.

Pipelines

 * condensate/gas 62 km
 * natural gas 11,696 km (1,165 km distribution, 4,794 km transport)
 * liquid petroleum gas 353 km (37 km distribution, 40 km transport)
 * crude oil 4,517 km (1,985 km distribution)
 * refined products 5,959 km (1,165 km distribution, 4,794 km transport)

Seaports and harbors

The busiest port in the country, and the 2nd busiest in all of Latin America, losing only to the Port of Colón, is the Port of Santos. Other high-movement ports are the Port of Rio de Janeiro, Port of Paranaguá, Port of Itajaí, Port of Rio Grande, Port of São Francisco do Sul and Suape Port.

Amazon river

 * Belém
 * Manaus
 * Santarém

Paraguay River (international water way)

 * Corumbá

Merchant marine
770 ships ( (or over) totaling /

ships by type: (1999, 2019 and 2021 est.)

Airports

The country has the second largest number of airports in the world, behind only the United States. São Paulo/Guarulhos, is the largest and busiest in the country. Brazil has 37 international airports, such as those in Rio de Janeiro, Brasília, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Florianópolis, Cuiabá, Salvador, Recife, Fortaleza, Belém and Manaus, among others.

Most international flights must go to São Paulo–Guarulhos International Airport or Rio de Janeiro–Galeão International Airport. Belo Horizonte is the main international airport outside Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. A few go to Brasília, Recife, Natal, and just recently Fortaleza has accepted international flights.

As of 2020, Brazil had the eighth largest passenger air market in the world.

Airports - with paved runways

 * total: 698
 * over 3,047 m: 7
 * 2,438 to 3,047 m: 27
 * 1,524 to 2,437 m: 179
 * 914 to 1,523 m: 436 (2017)
 * under 914 m: 39 (2017)

Airports - with unpaved runways

 * total: 3,395
 * 1,524 to 2,437 m: 92
 * 914 to 1,523 m: 1,619
 * under 914 m: 1,684 (2013)

Main airlines

 * Azul Brazilian Airlines
 * Gol Linhas Aéreas Inteligentes
 * LATAM Brasil
 * Voepass Linhas Aéreas

Heliports

 * 16 (2007)
 * 13 (2010)
 * 13 (2013)

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Transport in Brazil


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Brazilian Armed Forces

The Brazilian Armed Forces (Forças Armadas Brasileiras, ) are the unified military forces of the Federative Republic of Brazil. Consisting of three service branches, it comprises the Brazilian Army (including the Brazilian Army Aviation), the Brazilian Navy (including the Brazilian Marine Corps and Brazilian Naval Aviation) and the Brazilian Air Force (including the Aerospace Operations Command).

Brazil's armed forces are the second largest in the Americas, after the United States, and the largest in Latin America and the Southern Hemisphere by the level of military equipment, with 334,500 active-duty troops and officers. Brazilian soldiers were in Haiti from 2004 until 2017, leading the United Nations Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH).

Organization
The Armed Forces of Brazil are divided into 3 branches:
 * Brazilian Army
 * Brazilian Army Aviation Command
 * Brazilian Navy
 * Brazilian Marine Corps
 * Brazilian Naval Aviation
 * Brazilian Air Force
 * Aerospace Operations Command

The Military Police (state police) alongside the Military Firefighters Corps are described as an auxiliary and reserve force of the Army. All military branches are part of the Ministry of Defence.

The Brazilian Navy which is the oldest of the Brazilian Armed Forces, includes the Brazilian Marine Corps and the Brazilian Naval Aviation.

Service obligation and manpower
18–45 years of age for compulsory military service; conscript service obligation – 10 to 12 months; 17–45 years of age for voluntary service. An increasing percentage of the ranks are "long-service" volunteer professionals; women were allowed to serve in the armed forces beginning in the early 1980s when the Brazilian Army became the first army in South America to accept women into career ranks; women serve in Navy and Air Force only in Women's Reserve Corps.

Mission and challenges
South America is a relatively peaceful continent in which wars are a rare event; as a result, Brazil hasn't had its territory invaded since 1865 during the Paraguayan War. Additionally, Brazil has no contested territorial disputes with any of its neighbours and neither does it have rivalries, like Chile and Bolivia have with each other. However, Brazil is the only country besides China and Russia that has land borders with 10 or more nations. Moreover, Brazil has 16,880 km of land borders and 7367 km of coastline to be patrolled and defended. Overall, the Armed Forces have to defend 8.5 million km2 (around 3.2 million sq. mi.) of land and patrol 4.4 million km2 (around 1.7 million sq. mi.) of territorial waters – or Blue Amazon, as the Brazilian Navy calls them. To achieve this mission, significant manpower and funding is required.

Military history of Brazil
Since 1648 the Brazilian Armed Forces have been relied upon to fight in defense of Brazilian sovereignty and to suppress civil rebellions. The Brazilian military also has three times intervened militarily to overthrow the Brazilian government.

The Brazilian Armed Forces were subordinated to the Emperor, its Commander-in-Chief. He was aided by the Ministers of War and Navy in regard to matters concerning the Army and the Armada, respectively. Traditionally, the Ministers of War and Navy were civilians but there were some exceptions. The model chosen was the British parliamentary or Anglo-American system, in which "the country's Armed Forces observed unrestricted obedience to the civilian government while maintaining distance from political decisions and decisions referring to borders' security".

The military personnel were allowed to run and serve in political offices while staying on active duty. However, they did not represent the Army or the Armada but instead the population of the city or province where elected. Dom Pedro I chose nine military personnel as Senators and five (out of 14) to the State Council. During the Regency, two were chosen to the Senate and none to the State Council as there was no Council at the time. Dom Pedro II chose four military personnel to become Senators during the 1840s, two in the 1850s and three until the end of his reign. He also chose seven military personnel to be State Counselors during the 1840s and 1850s and three after that.

It has built a tradition of participating in UN peacekeeping missions such as in Haiti and East Timor. Below a list of some of the historical events in which the Brazilian Armed Forces took part:

Armed conflicts involving Brazil
 Brazilian Expeditionary Force, initially composed of an infantry division, eventually covered all Brazilian military forces who participated in the conflict, including the Brazilian Air Force who did a remarkable job in the last nine months of war with 445 missions executed. Offensive: 2546, Defensive: 4.
 * First Battle of Guararapes (1648): Decisive Portuguese victory that helped end Dutch occupation. Due to this battle, the year 1648 is considered as the year of the foundation of the Brazilian Army.
 * Invasion of Cayenne (1809) (1809) : Was a combined military operation by an Anglo-Portuguese expeditionary force against Cayenne, capital of the French South American colony of French Guiana in 1809, during the Napoleonic Wars.
 * Luso-Brazilian invasion (1816–1820) : Was an armed conflict between the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves and the partisans of José Artigas over the Banda Oriental (Eastern Bank), present-day Uruguay.
 * Brazilian War of Independence (1822–1824): Series of military campaigns that had as objective to cement Brazilian sovereignty and end Portuguese resistance.
 * Confederation of the Equator (1824) : Was a short-lived rebellion that occurred in the northeastern region of Brazil during that nation's struggle for independence from Portugal.
 * Cisplatine War (1825–1828) : Armed conflict over an area known as Banda Oriental or "Eastern Shore" between the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata and Empire of Brazil in the aftermath of the United Provinces' emancipation from Spain.
 * Ragamuffin War (1835–1845) : Was a Republican uprising that began in southern Brazil, in the states of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina in 1835. The rebels, led by Generals Bento Gonçalves da Silva and Antônio de Sousa Neto with the support of the Italian fighter Giuseppe Garibaldi, surrendered to imperial forces in 1845.
 * Platine War (1851–1852): The Brazilian Empire and its allies went to war against the dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas of the Argentine Confederation.
 * Uruguayan War (1864–1865): Brazilian intervention in Uruguay. With support from Argentina, imperial forces deposed President Atanasio Aguirre from office and instated general Venancio Flores in his place.
 * Paraguayan War (1864–1870): Over 200,000 Brazilians fought on this conflict, which is considered as the most serious in Brazilian history.
 * Brazilian Naval Revolt (1893–1894) : Were armed mutinies promoted mainly by Admirals Custodio de Mello and Saldanha da Gama and their fleet of Brazilian Navy ships against unconstitutional staying in power of the central government in Rio de Janeiro.
 * War of Canudos (1893–1897): The deadliest rebellion of Brazil, the insurrectionists defeated the first 3 military forces sent to quell the rebellion.
 * Contestado War (1912–1916) : Was a guerrilla war for land between settlers and landowners, the latter supported by the Brazilian state's police and military forces. The war lasted from October 1912 to August 1916.
 * Brazil during World War I: Brazil entered into World War I in 1917 alongside the Triple Entente. Brazil's effort in World War I occurred mainly in the Atlantic campaign, with a smaller participation in the land warfare.
 * Constitutionalist Revolution (1932) : Was the armed movement occurred in the State of São Paulo, Brazil, between July and October 1932, which aimed at the overthrow of the Provisional Government of Getúlio Vargas and the promulgation of a new constitution for Brazil.
 * Brazil in World War II (1942–1945): Brazil declared war on Nazi Germany in August 1942 and in 1944 sent an Expeditionary Force of 25,334 soldiers to fight in Italy. Brazil also supplied vital raw materials for the war effort and ceded important airbases at Natal and Fernando de Noronha Archipel that made possible the North African invasion, i.e. Operation Torch, and had a key role in patrolling the South Atlantic sea lanes.

Brazilian military coups d'état
Although no military coups occurred during the 67 years of the Brazilian Empire, the Republican period experienced four military coups d'état in the 75 years between 1889 and 1964.
 * Proclamation of the Republic (1889): End of the Brazilian Empire, this was the first coup d'état by the Brazilian military.
 * Revolution of 1930: Second military overthrow of government, in which President Washington Luís was replaced by Getúlio Vargas, who became the Provisional President.
 * End of Estado Novo (1945): Then Dictator Getúlio Vargas was deposed by generals and General Eurico Dutra was elected president.
 * 1964 Brazilian coup d'état: President João Goulart was removed from office, leading to a military dictatorship which lasted until 1985.

Ministry of Defence
On 10 July 1999, the Ministry of Defence was created, with the abolition of the EMFA and the merger of all three ministries of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force) into a singular ministry of the Cabinet.

Joint Staff of the Armed Forces

Joint Staff of the Armed Forces is an agency of the Ministry of Defense of Brazil, which centralizes the coordination of command of the armed forces: Army, Navy and Air Force. It was created by Complementary Law No. 136 of 25 August 2010, and has in Ordinance No. 1429 its operating guidelines.

Advising the Minister of Defense in the upper direction of the armed forces, aiming the organization, preparation and employment, in order to fulfill its constitutional mission and its subsidiaries assignments, with the goals strategic planning and the joint use of the military services.

It is up to JSAF plan together and integrated employment of staff of the Navy, Army and Air Force, optimizing the use of the military and logistical support in the defense of the country and in peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescue operations; border security; and civil defense actions.

The body has its powers and duties according to the Regimental Structure approved by Decree 7.9744, April 1, 2013. Since its inception, the JSAF has worked with the Central Administration of the Ministry of Defence, on the Esplanade of Ministries in Brasilia (DF).

The head of the JSAF is private of a general officer of the last post, active or reserve, designated by the Ministry of Defence and appointed by the president. Their hierarchical level is the same of the military commanders of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Under the coordination of the Joint Armed Forces also operates the Committee of Chiefs of Staffs of the military services.

The current head of JSAF is the Admiral Renato Rodrigues de Aguiar Freire.

Brazilian Army
The Army High Command of Brazil is formed by the Army Commander and other army generals in active service. The country current have sixteen active 4-star generals, several of them in command posts. The mission of ACE include the selection of a list of candidates to the post of commander, the prospection of regional and global political situations, among others roles. All Brazilian generals are graduates of the Brazilian Superior War School.

FORPRON
The Brazilian Army Readiness Forces (Forças de Prontidão do Exército Brasileiro in Portuguese), is a division of the Army created to be ready for real combat 365 days per year. This division composed of 15,000 infantry troops, paratroopers and armored cavalry brigades is able to operate in real missions of conventional combat, law and order guarantee and interagency operations within the Brazilian territory or as divisional forces abroad led by officers from the General Staff of the Readiness Forces subordinate to the Army High Command.

Brazilian Navy
The navy (Marinha do Brasil) has eight bases throughout Brazil.

Brazilian Air Force
The Brazilian Air Force (Força Aérea Brasileira,, also known as FAB, or ) is the second-largest air force in the Americas (behind only the United States) and has around 70,000 active personnel. The FAB is subdivided into four operational commands.

Brazilian aerospace command
The Aerospace Operations Command is a Brazilian air and space command created in 2017 and is part of the Brazilian Air Force. It is responsible for planning, coordinating, executing and controlling the country's air and space operations. The Brazilian Navy and Brazilian Army also are part of the organization.

Troop relocation
Brazil has the need to patrol its 16,880 km of land borders. Since the 1990s Brazil has been relocating its forces in accordance to this national security requirement.

Between 1992 and 2008, the 1st, 2nd and 16th Jungle Infantry Brigades, the 3rd Infantry Battalion, the 19th Logistics Battalion, and the 22nd Army Police Platoon were transferred by the Army from the states of Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul to the Amazon region in accordance with the friendship policy with Argentina. After those redeployments the number of Army troops in that region rose to 25,000. Also relocated from the state of Rio de Janeiro were the 1st and 3rd Combat Cars Regiment, now stationed in the city of Santa Maria, in the state of Rio Grande do Sul.

However, despite those efforts, the presence of the Armed Forces on the border regions of the Brazilian Amazon continues to be sparse and disperse, given the fact that the Army has just 28 border detachments in that area, a total of 1,600 soldiers, or 1 man for every 7 km of borders. More redeployments are expected since the states of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo still concentrate over 49,000 soldiers. In May 2008, the Navy announced new plans to reposition its forces throughout Brazil.

Communications and territorial surveillance
The Brazilian territory corresponds to 47.3% of the South American continent, and its land border is over 16.000 km and 4,5 million km2 of sea territory. With the objective of ensuring Brazil's sovereignty, strategic monitoring and communications projects have been launched in recent years.

SGDC
The Geostationary Defense and Strategic Communications Satellites or SGDC, are geostationary communication satellites developed by the Brazilian Air Force and the Brazilian Space Agency, created with the objective of operating strategic military, government and civil communications, also offering broadband internet throughout the national territory. The first satellite called SGDC-1, was launched in 2017 and the SGDC-2 has planned to launch in 2022. The Space Operations Center (COPE) was inaugurated in 2020, subordinated to the Aerospace Operations Command, with the objective of operating the satellites.

SISFRON
The Integrated Border Monitoring System (SISFRON) is a border system developed by the Brazilian Army for supporting operational employment decisions, operating in an integrated manner with all defense systems in the country, whose purpose is to strengthen the presence and capacity for monitoring and action in the national land border strip. Was conceived at the initiative of the Army Command, as a result of the approval of the National Defense Strategy in 2008, which guides the organization of the Armed Forces. The SISFRON are deployed along the 16,886 kilometers of the border line, favoring the employment of organizations subordinate to the North, West, Southern and the Amazon military commands.

SisGAAz
The Blue Amazon Management System, is a surveillance system developed by the Brazilian Navy, in order to oversee the Blue Amazon, the country's exclusive economic zone and a resource-rich area covering about 4500000 km2 off the Brazilian coast. This area is home to a huge diversity of marine species, valuable metallic minerals and other mineral resources, petroleum, and the world's second largest rare-earth reserve. The SisGAAz integrates equipment and systems composed of radars incorporated on land and vessels, as well as high resolution cameras and features such as the fusion of information received from collaborative systems.

Link-BR2
The Link-BR2 is a datalink developed by the Air Force and the Brazilian defence company AEL Sistemas, this technology allow the exchange of data such radar information, videos and images with other units of the three branches anytime and anywhere, using an advanced encrypted protocol with a high degree of security.

title: Brazilian Armed Forces


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Foreign relations of Brazil

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for managing the foreign relations of Brazil. Brazil is a significant political and economic power in Latin America and a key player on the world stage. Brazil's foreign policy reflects its role as a regional power and a potential world power and is designed to help protect the country's national interests, national security, ideological goals, and economic prosperity.

Between World War II and 1990, both democratic and military governments sought to expand Brazil's influence in the world by pursuing a state-led industrial policy and an independent foreign policy. Brazilian foreign policy has recently aimed to strengthen ties with other South American countries, engage in multilateral diplomacy through the United Nations and the Organization of American States, and act at times as a countervailing force to U.S. political and economic influence in Latin America.

Overview
The President has ultimate authority over foreign policy, while Congress is tasked with reviewing and considering all diplomatic nominations and international treaties, as well as legislation relating to Brazilian foreign policy.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also known as Itamaraty, is the government department responsible for advising the President and conducting Brazil's foreign relations with other countries and international bodies. Itamaraty's scope includes political, commercial, economic, financial, cultural and consular relations, areas in which it performs the classical tasks of diplomacy: represent, inform and administer. Foreign policy priorities are established by the President.

Foreign policy
Brazil's foreign policy is a by-product of the country's unique position as a regional power in Latin America, a leader among developing countries, and an emerging world power. Brazilian foreign policy has generally been based on the principles of multilateralism, peaceful dispute settlement, and non-intervention in the affairs of other countries. Brazil engages in multilateral diplomacy through the Organization of American States and the United Nations, and has increased ties with developing countries in Africa and Asia. Brazil is currently commanding a multinational U.N. stabilization force in Haiti, the MINUSTAH. Instead of pursuing unilateral prerogatives, Brazilian foreign policy has tended to emphasize regional integration, first through the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosul) and now the Union of South American Nations. Brazil is also committed to cooperation with other Portuguese-speaking nations through joint-collaborations with the rest of the Portuguese-speaking world, in several domains which include military cooperation, financial aid, and cultural exchange. This is done in the framework of CPLP, for instance. Lula da Silva visit to Africa in 2003 included State visits to three Portuguese-speaking African nations (Angola, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Mozambique). Finally, Brazil is also strongly committed in the development and restoration of peace in East Timor, where it has a very powerful influence.

Brazil's political, business, and military ventures are complemented by the country's trade policy. In Brazil, the Ministry of Foreign Relations continues to dominate trade policy, causing the country's commercial interests to be (at times) subsumed by a larger foreign policy goal, namely, enhancing Brazil's influence in Latin America and the world. For example, while concluding meaningful trade agreements with developed countries (such as the United States and the European Union) would probably be beneficial to Brazil's long-term economic self-interest, the Brazilian government has instead prioritized its leadership role within Mercosul and expanded trade ties with countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.

Brazil's soft power diplomacy involves institutional strategies such as the formation of diplomatic coalitions to constrain the power of the established great powers. In recent years, it has given high priority in establishing political dialogue with other strategic actors such as India, Russia, China and South Africa through participation in international groupings such as BASIC, IBSA and BRICS. The BRICS states have been amongst the most powerful drivers of incremental change in world diplomacy and they benefit most from the connected global power shifts.

Workers Party administration: 2003-2016
The Brazilian foreign policy under the Lula da Silva administration (2003–2010) focused on the following directives: to contribute toward the search for greater equilibrium and attenuate unilateralism; to strengthen bilateral and multilateral relations in order to increase the country's weight in political and economic negotiations on an international level; to deepen relations so as to benefit from greater economical, financial, technological and cultural interchange; to avoid agreements that could jeopardize development in the long term.

These directives implied precise emphasis on: the search for political coordination with emerging and developing countries, namely India, South Africa, Russia and China; creation of the Union of South American Nations and its derivative bodies, such as the South American Security Council; strengthening of Mercosul; projection at the Doha Round and WTO; maintenance of relations with developed countries, including the United States; undertaking and narrowing of relations with African countries; campaign for the reform of the United Nations Security Council and for a permanent seat for Brazil; and defense of social objectives allowing for a greater equilibrium between the States and populations.

From 2003 to 2010, Lula embraced China as central to reforming what he considered an unjust global order. Lula stated Brazil's commitment to the One China principle that is the position held by the People's Republic of China and the ruling Chinese Communist Party, saying that the government of the People's Republic of China was the sole legal government representing the whole of China, including Taiwan -- as part of China.

Under Lula, Brazil provided money and corporate support to Cuba. The state-controlled Brazilian oil company Petrobras studied the possibility of drilling for oil off of Cuba, while the Odebrecht construction firm headed a revamp of the Cuban port of Mariel into the island's main commercial port. Brazil's state-run Brazilian Development Bank gave $300 million to Odebrecht to build new roads, rail lines, wharves, and warehouses at Mariel. Brazil also offered Cuba up to $1 billion in credit lines to pay for Brazilian goods and services.

In November 2007, Lula defended Venezuela's president Hugo Chávez as the democratic choice of his people. He said: "There is no risk with Chávez." Expressing his admiration for Chávez, he said "Only thanks to Chávez’s leadership, the people [of Venezuela] have had extraordinary achievements," and that in 2008 that Chávez was "the best president the country has had in 100 years."

The foreign policy of the Rousseff administration (2011–2016) sought to deepen Brazil's regional commercial dominance and diplomacy, expand Brazil's presence in Africa, and play a major role in the G20 on global warming and in other multilateral settings. At the United Nations, Brazil continues to oppose Economic sanctions and foreign military intervention, while seeking to garner support for a permanent seat at the Security Council. Cooperation with other emerging powers remain a top priority in Brazil's global diplomatic strategy. On the recent airstrike resolution supporting military action in Libya, Brazil joined fellow BRICS in the Council and abstained. On the draft resolution condemning violence in Syria, Brazil worked with India and South Africa to try to bridge the Western powers' divide with Russia and China.

Bolsonaro administration, 2019-2022
After Rousseff's impeachment, Brazil started reconnecting with its western allies. In 2019 Jair Bolsonaro succeeded Michel Temer. The new foreign policy focused on a reapprochement with major governments especially the United States and Colombia in the Americas; Israel, Japan and South Korea in Asia; United Kingdom, Italy and Greece in Europe. The Brazil–Portugal relations were also strengthened, and despite disagreements over the crisis in Venezuela, Brazil remained close to the BRICS countries.

During the 2018 presidential campaign, Bolsonaro said he would make considerable changes to Brazil's foreign relations, saying that the "Itamaraty needs to be in service of the values that were always associated with the Brazilian people". He also said that the country should stop "praising dictators" and attacking democracies, such as the United States, Israel and Italy. In early 2018, he affirmed that his "trip to the five democratic countries the United States, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan showed who we will be and we would like to join good people". Bolsonaro has shown distrust towards China throughout the presidential campaign claiming they "[want to] buy Brazil", although Brazil recorded a US$20 billion trade surplus with China in 2018, and China is only the 13th largest source of foreign direct investment into Brazil. Bolsonaro said he wishes to continue to have business with the Chinese but he also said that Brazil should "make better [economic] deals" with other countries, with no "ideological agenda" behind it. His stance towards China has also been interpreted as an attempt to curry favor from the Trump administration to garner concessions from the US. However, Bolsonaro has mostly changed his position on China after he took office, saying that the two countries were "born to walk together" during his visit to Beijing in October 2019. He has also said that Brazil will stay out of the ongoing China-U.S. trade war.

Bolsonaro said that his first international trip as president would be to Israel. Bolsonaro also said that the State of Palestine "is not a country, so there should be no embassy here", adding that "you don't negotiate with terrorists." The announcement was warmly received by the prime minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, who welcomed Bolsonaro to Israel in March 2019 during the final weeks of a re-election campaign, but was met with condemnation from the Arab League, which warned Bolsonaro it could damage diplomatic ties. "I love Israel," Bolsonaro said in Hebrew at a welcoming ceremony, with Netanyahu at his side, at Tel Aviv's Ben-Gurion airport.

Bolsonaro also praised U.S. President Donald Trump and his foreign policy, and has been called "the tropical Trump". His son Eduardo has indicated that Brazil should distance itself from Iran, sever ties with Nicolás Maduro's government in Venezuela and relocate Brazil's embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. Bolsonaro is widely considered the most pro-American candidate in Brazil since the 1980s. PSL members said that if elected, he would dramatically improve relations between the United States and Brazil. During an October 2017 campaign rally in Miami, he saluted the American flag and led chants of "USA! USA!" to a large crowd. U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton praised Bolsonaro as a "like-minded" partner and said his victory was a "positive sign" for Latin America.

At the regional level, Bolsonaro praised Argentine President Mauricio Macri for ending the 12-year rule of Néstor and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, which he saw as similar to Lula and Rousseff. Although he does not have plans to leave the Mercosur, he criticized it for prioritizing ideological issues over economic ones. A staunch anti-communist, Bolsonaro has condemned Cuba's former leader Fidel Castro and the current regime in that island.

Bolsonaro praised British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, saying that he had learned from Churchill: "Patriotism, love for your fatherland, respect for your flag – something that has been lost over the last few years here in Brazil... and governing through example, especially at that difficult moment of the Second World War." Bolsonaro said he's open to the possibility of hosting a U.S. military base in Brazil to counter Russian influence in the region. With the intention to persuade Trump to make Brazil a NATO member in March 2019, Bolsonaro said: "the discussions with the United States will begin in the coming months".

With formal U.S. support for Brazil's entry to OECD in May 2019, Bolsonaro said, "currently, all 36 members of the organization support the entry of the country, fruit of confidence in the new Brazil being built, more free, open and fair". In October 2019, on a state visit to China, he announced the end of the need for visas for Chinese and Indian entry into Brazil. Brazil had already removed the need for visas for people from the U.S., Canada, Japan, and Australia.

Lula second presidency, 2023-present
In May 2022, Lula placed blame for Russia's invasion of Ukraine on Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy, saying "This guy is as responsible as Putin for the war". Lula also repeatedly attacked NATO and the European Union as having caused the war. After Germany appealed to Lula to provide military aid to Ukraine by selling it arms, Lula refused. In December 2023, Lula said that he will invite Vladimir Putin to Brazil. In February 2024, he was visited by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

In November 2023, Lula met in Riyadh with the prime minister and crown prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman. They discussed strengthening bilateral relations, and investments in both countries. Salman said that a more robust strategic partnership between the two countries would benefit both sides. The $10 billion that the sovereign wealth fund of Saudi Arabia pledged to invest in Brazil was one topic of conversation. Lula mentioned Brazil's rapprochement with Arab countries. Salman also discussed Saudi Arabia's entry into BRICS in January 2024. Lula invited Salman to visit Brazil in 2024.

Regional policy

Over the first decade of the 21st century, Brazil has firmly established itself as a regional power. It has traditionally, if controversially, been a leader in the inter-American community and played an important role in collective security efforts, as well as in economic cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. Brazilian foreign policy supports economic and political integration efforts in order to reinforce long-standing relationships with its neighbors. It is a founding member of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty). It has given high priority to expanding relations with its South American neighbors and strengthening regional bodies such as the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and Mercosur. Although integration is the primary purpose of these organizations, they also serve as forums in which Brazil can exercise its leadership and develop consensus around its positions on regional and global issues. Most scholars agree that by promoting integration through organizations like Mercosur and UNASUR, Brazil has been able to solidify its role as a regional power. In addition to consolidating its power within South America, Brazil has sought to expand its influence in the broader region by increasing its engagement in the Caribbean and Central America., although some think this is still a fragile, ongoing process, that can be thwarted by secondary regional powers in South America.

In April 2019 Brazil left Union of South American Nations (Unasur) to become a member of Forum for the Progress and Development of South America (Prosur). In January 2020, Brazil suspended its participation in the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, (Celac).

Brazil regularly extends export credits and university scholarships to its Latin American neighbors. In recent years, the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) has provided US$5 billion worth of loans to countries in the region. Brazil has also increasingly provided Latin American nations with financial aid and technical assistance. Between 2005 and 2009, Cuba, Haiti, and Honduras were the top three recipients of Brazilian assistance, receiving over $50 million annually.

In November 2019, Brazil made a historic move to break with the rest of Latin America on the U.S. embargo of Cuba, becoming the first Latin American country in twenty-six years to vote against condemning the U.S.-led embargo of Cuba at the United Nations General Assembly.

United Nations politics
Brazil is a founding member of the United Nations and participates in all of its specialized agencies. It has participated in 33 United Nations peacekeeping missions and contributed with over 27,000 soldiers. Brazil has been a member of the United Nations Security Council ten times, most recently 2010–2011. Along with Japan, Brazil has been elected more times to the Security Council than any other U.N. member state.

Brazil is currently seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. It is a member of the G4, an alliance among Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan for the purpose of supporting each other's bids for permanent seats on the Security Council. They propose the Security Council be expanded beyond the current 15 members to include 25 members. The G4 countries argue that a reform would render the body "more representative, legitimate, effective and responsive" to the realities of the international community in the 21st century.

Outstanding international issues

 * Two short sections of the border with Uruguay are in dispute - the Arroio Invernada area of the Quaraí River, and the Brazilian Island at the confluence of the Quaraí River and the Uruguay River.
 * Brazil declared in 1986 the sector between 28°W to 53°W Brazilian Antarctica (Antártica Brasileira) as its Zone of Interest. It overlaps Argentine and British claims
 * In 2004, the country submitted its claims to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to extend its maritime continental margin.

Foreign aid
Overseas aid has become an increasingly important tool for Brazil's foreign policy. Brazil provides aid through the Brazilian Agency of Cooperation (Abbreviation: ABC; Agência Brasileira de Cooperação), in addition to offering scientific, economical, and technical support. More than half of Brazilian aid is provided to Africa, whereas Latin America receives around 20% of Brazilian aid. The share of aid allocated to the Asian continent is small. Within Africa, more than 80% of Brazilian aid is received by Portuguese-speaking countries. Brazil concentrates its aid for Portuguese-speaking countries in the education sector, specially in secondary and post-secondary education, but it is more committed to agricultural development in other countries. Estimated to be around $1 billion annually, Brazil is on par with China and India and ahead of many more traditional donor countries. The aid tends to consist of technical aid and expertise, alongside a quiet non-confrontational diplomacy to development results. Brazil's aid demonstrates a developing pattern of South-South aid, which has been heralded as a 'global model in waiting'. Concomitantly, South-South relations have become a major subfield of specialisation among Brazilian foreign policy experts. Some studies have suggested that, by giving aid, Brazil could be trying to get access to mineral and energy resources.

Participation in international organizations
ACS(Observer) • ACTO • AfDB • ALECSO(Observer) • BIS • CAF-BDLAC(Associate) • Cairns Group • CAN(Associate) • CDB • CPLP • FAO • G4 • BASIC countries • G8+5 • G15 • G20 • G20+ • G24 • G77 • IADB • IDB • IAEA • IBRD • IBSA •ICAO • ICC • ICRM • IDA • IFAD • IFC • IFRCS • IHO • ILO • IMF • IMO • Inmarsat •INSARAG • Intelsat • Interpol • IOC • IOM • ISO • ITU • LAES • LAIA • Mercosul • MINUSTAH • NAM(Observer) • NSG • OAS • OEI • OPANAL • OPCW • PCA • Rio Group • Rio Treaty • UN • UNASUR • UNCTAD • UNESCO • UNHCR • UNIDO • UNITAR • UNMIL • UNMIS • UNMOVIC • UNOCI • UNTAET • UNWTO • UPU • WCO • WHO • WIPO • WMO • WTO • ZPCAS

Diplomatic relations
Brazil has a large global network of diplomatic missions, and maintains diplomatic relations with As of 2019, Brazil's diplomatic network consisted of 194 overseas posts.

Relations with non-UN members or observers:
 * Kosovo - Brazil does not recognize Kosovo as an independent state and has announced it has no plans to do so without an agreement with Serbia. However, Brazil accepts the Kosovan passport.
 * 🇹🇼 Taiwan - Brazil does not recognize the Republic of China as it has recognized the People's Republic of China, although it has non-diplomatic relations and maintains a special office in Taiwan. Brazil also accepts the Taiwan passport.

List
List of countries which Brazil maintains diplomatic relations with:

Historical

 * Bethell, Leslie. The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade Question (2009) excerpt
 * Fritsch, Winston. External Restraints on Economic Policy in Brazil, 1889-1930 (1988), emphasis on role of Great Britain.
 * Garcia, Eugenio V. "Antirevolutionary diplomacy in oligarchic Brazil, 1919–30." Journal of Latin American Studies 36.4 (2004): 771–796. online
 * Graham, Richard. Britain and the Onset of Modernization in Brazil 1850–1914 (1972) excerpt
 * Harmer, Tanya. "Brazil's Cold War in the Southern Cone, 1970–1975' Cold War History (2012) 12#4 pp 659-681.
 * Hilton, Stanley E. "The Argentine factor in twentieth-century Brazilian foreign policy strategy." Political Science Quarterly 100.1 (1985): 27–51. online
 * Mota, Isadora Moura. "On the Verge of War: Black Insurgency, the 'Christie Affair', and British Antislavery in Brazil." Slavery & Abolition 43.1 (2022): 120–139. London threatened war in 1862–1863 in the "Christie Affair."
 * Rivere, Peter. Absent Minded Imperialism: Britain and the Expansion of Empire in 19th-Century Brazil (1995)
 * Rodrigues, Jose Honorio. "The Foundations of Brazil's Foreign Policy." International Affairs 38.3 (1962): 324–338; covers 1822 to 1889. online
 * Roett, Riordan. "Brazil ascendant: international relations and geopolitics in the late 20th century." Journal of international affairs (1975): 139–154. online
 * Skidmore, Thomas E. "The Historiography of Brazil, 1889-1964," Hispanic American Historical Review (1976) 56#1 pp 81–109; emphasis is on economics and foreign policy. DOI: 10.2307/2513726
 * Smith, Joseph. Unequal Giants: Diplomatic Relations between the United States & Brazil, 1889-1930 1991).
 * Topik, Steven C. Trade & Gunboats: The United States & Brazil in the Age of Empire (1997), covers 1870 to 1899.

title: Foreign relations of Brazil


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Geography of the British Virgin Islands

The British Virgin Islands (BVI) are one of three political divisions of the Virgin Islands archipelago located in the Lesser Antilles, between the Caribbean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean. The BVI are the easternmost part of the island chain. The land area totals (151 km2) (about 0.9 times the size of Washington, DC) and comprises 16 inhabited and more than 20 uninhabited islands. The islands of Tortola (21 sqmi), Anegada (14 sqmi), Virgin Gorda (8 sqmi) and Jost van Dyke (4 sqmi) are the largest. Maritime claims include 12 nmi territorial sea and a 200 nmi exclusive fishing zone. In terms of land use, it is 20% arable land, 6.67% permanent crops and 73.33% other as of a 2005 figure. It has strong ties to nearby U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.

Terrain
The majority of the islands are steep and hilly due to their volcanic origin. The lowest point of the island chain is the Caribbean Sea while the highest point is Mount Sage at 521 m above sea level and there are 80 km of coastline. Other than Anegada, the islands are composed of pyroclastic rock and mixed deposits of diorite and tonalite Anegada is geologically distinct, being composed of carbonate reef deposits. The entire archipelago, together with Puerto Rico to the west, is the above-water high points on an underwater ridge that was once a continuous land mass during the Pleistocene epoch. This bank formed from tectonic forces at the boundary where the Caribbean Plate collides with the North American Plate.

Settlements
The capital of the territory and the main port of entry for yachts and cruise ships visiting the BVI is Road Town on Tortola. In 2010, The United Nations found that 83% or the BVI population lived on Tortola, making Road Town the largest population center of the islands.

Spanish Town on Virgin Gorda, also known as "The Valley", is the second largest settlement and the original capital of the territory. Virgin Gorda was mined for copper in the 17th through 19th centuries but declined when the mine closed in 1867. The creation of a yacht harbour and resort by Laurance Rockefeller in the early 1960s turned Spanish Town into a wealthy tourist destination.

Residents on Jost van Dyke, Anegada, Cooper lsland, Great Camanoe Island and other locations collectively make up just over 2% of the population.

Climate
The British Virgin Islands have a tropical savanna climate, moderated by the trade winds. Temperatures vary little throughout the year. In the capital, Road Town, typical daily maxima are around 32 °C in the summer and 29 °C in the winter. Typical daily minima are around 24 °C in the summer and 21 °C in the winter. Rainfall averages about 1150 mm per year, higher in the hills and lower on the coast. Rainfall can be quite variable, but the wettest months on average are September to November and the driest months on average are February and March. Hurricanes occasionally hit the islands, with the hurricane season running from June to November.

title: Geography of the British Virgin Islands


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Demographics of the British Virgin Islands

This is a demography of the population of the British Virgin Islands including population density, ethnicity, education level, health of the populace, economic status, religious affiliations and various other aspects.

Population
A July 2009 estimate placed the population of the British Virgin Islands at 24,491. In 2003, 21.9% of the population was under 15 (male 2,401; female 2,358), 73.1% between 15 and 64 (male 8,181; female 7,709), and 5% over 64 (male 578; female 503). 40% of the total population lived in urban areas, with an estimated 1.7% annual rate of urbanization. In 2014, the average woman produced 1.25 children. The estimated population of is.

Health
In 2009, the infant mortality rate in the British Virgin Islands was 14.65/1000 births (16.61/1000 for females and 12.58/1000 for males). Life expectancy at birth was 77.26 years: 76.03 years for males and 78.55 years for females.

Education
The official language of the British Virgin Islands is English. In 1991, 97.8% of people aged 15 and over could read and write. Education expenditures represented 3.7% of total GDP in 2006.


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Economy of the British Virgin Islands

The economy of the British Virgin Islands is one of the most prosperous in the Caribbean. Although tiny in absolute terms, because of the very small population of the British Virgin Islands, in 2010 the Territory had the 19th highest GDP per capita in the world according to the CIA World factbook. In global terms the size of the Territory's GDP measured in terms of purchasing power is ranked as 215th out of a total of 229 countries. The economy of the Territory is based upon the "twin pillars" of financial services, which generates approximately 60% of government revenues, and tourism, which generates nearly all of the rest.

Historically the British Virgin Islands has normally produced a Government budget surplus, but during the financial crisis of 2007–2008 the Territory began to run at a deficit, which continued after the global recession receded. In 2011 the Territory had its largest ever budget deficit, of US$29 million (approximately 2.6% of GDP). By 2012 public debt had quadrupled from pre-crisis levels to approximately US$113 million (approximately 10.3% of GDP). Nearly 84% of that public debt was attributable to a new public hospital built in Road Town between 2003 and 2014. The Economist argued that deteriorating economic conditions in the British Virgin Islands were caused "not [by] sagging revenues but public-sector profligacy". By 2014 public debt had been reduced to US$106 million and the annual deficit reduced to US$25 million (including budgeted capital expenditure).

By 2016, the Government had returned to a primary budget surplus, but public debt had increased to approximately US$141 million and debt service accounted for over US$12 million of the primary surplus. However, because of an ongoing aggressive capital investment programme, and budget overruns on key public projects, the Government ran dangerously low on available cash. Cash in the consolidated fund fell below US$7 million (with average monthly expenditure at nearly US$30 million), and Government accrued over US$13 million in due but unpaid invoices.

Business environment
In 2015, British Virgin Islands has been assessed as the 34th in terms of global financial centres. This was the highest ranking of any offshore financial centre, and of any Latin American country. The Territory scored strongly in areas such as local taxation, rule of law, regulatory environment and quality of law for human resources. It scored less highly on infrastructure, access to capital and access to labour. The G-20 considers it a tax haven and its banking system is described as 'opaque'.

2017 Government Budget
The most recent national budget to be delivered was the 2017 budget (the Territory's fiscal year runs from 1 April to 31 March). That budget presented a picture of declining revenues and increasing costs. It was also delivered prior to the devastating effects of Hurricane Irma later in the year, which is likely to have a deleterious effect on the economy and on Government revenues.

The 2017 budget predicted that 2016 final revenue figures of $310,470,000 which was a decrease of 6.2% from the year before. It also predicted recurrent expenditure for 2016 at $288,640,000 which was an increase of 3.6% on the preceding year. That would mean a primary budget surplus of $21,830,000 which would be a decrease of 56.6% from the preceding year.

In addition there was an estimated $21,000,000 of capital expenditure in 2016 (down 38.3% from the previous year), and debt service of $20,200,000 leaving a primary deficit of $19,370,000. In 2017, after accounting for transfers to reserves, there is budgeted to be a structural deficit of $31,674,000. This was to be financed by new borrowing and transfers from the consolidated fund.

The Government's total borrowings were $106.5 million, but the Government has also underwritten significant loans made to the BVI Electricity Corporation and the BVI Ports Authority, meaning that the Government's total loan exposure is $178.3 million.

Much of the Government's increased expenditure arose from staffing costs. Staffing consumes 37.7% of Government expenditure, and increased in 2016 by 10.2% from the year before. The budget calls for it to increase again, but only by 2.6% in 2017.

The bulk of Government revenues (60%) comes from taxes on goods and services. The next largest segment is payroll taxes, which account for a further 16%. Property taxes account for less than 1% of revenue.

Tourism
In 2015, a total of 922,372 people visited the islands (of whom 529,354 were cruise ship passengers and 393,018 were overnight visitors), mainly from the United States. The bulk of the tourism income in the British Virgin Islands is generated by the yacht chartering industry. The Territory has relatively few large hotels compared to other tourism centres in the Caribbean. The British Virgin Islands also entertain cruise ships, although these generate relatively little revenue. However, cruise ship passengers are an important source of revenue for taxi drivers, who represent a politically important voice in the Territory.

Between 2007 and 2011, tourist visitors to be the British Virgin Islands declined by approximately 12.4%, largely due to the global recession which particularly affected North America, a key source of visitors for the Territory. However, by November 2013 tourist numbers had begun to recover.

According to the World Travel and Tourism Council: However, these statistics include travel as well as tourism, and so non-tourist related travel (i.e. travel relating to domestic consumption and other industries and services) are included and inflate the figures.
 * In 2013, the direct contribution of travel and tourism to the Territory's GDP was US$274 million (accounting for 27.0% of total GDP), and was forecast to rise by 2.8% in 2014, and to rise by 2.7% per annum for the period 2014–2024.
 * The total contribution of travel and tourism to GDP was US$780.8 million (76.9% of GDP) in 2013, and is forecast to rise by 3.2% in 2014, and to rise by 2.6% per annum for the period 2014–2024.
 * In 2013, travel and tourism directly supported 3,300 jobs in the Territory (33.2% of total employment). This was expected to remain unchanged in 2014 and fall by 0.3% per annum to 3,000 jobs (29.6% of total employment) by 2024.
 * The total contribution to employment in 2013 (which includes jobs indirectly supported by the industry), was 90.1% of total employment (8,850 jobs). This was expected to rise by 1.9% in 2014 to 9,050 jobs, but fall by 0.2% per annum to 9,000 jobs in 2024 (80.9% of total).
 * Travel and tourism investment in 2013 was US$35.8 million, or 14.8% of total investment. This was expected to rise by 10.1% in 2014, and rise by 2.0% per annum over the next ten years to a total of US$48.2 million in 2024.

Financial services
In the mid-1980s, the government began offering offshore registration to companies wishing to incorporate in the islands, and incorporation fees now generate an estimated 51.4% of Government revenues. As of 2019, it costs $450 to form a company with fewer than 50,000 shares and another $450 a year to maintain registration.

According to official statistics 447,801 BVI companies were 'active' (i.e. incorporated and not yet struck-off, liquidated or dissolved) as at 30 June 2012. There are no recent official statistics on total numbers of incorporations (including struck, liquidated and dissolved companies) but these are estimated at approximately 950,000. Many of these companies were originally formed under the International Business Companies Act, 1984, but have now been consolidated into the BVI Business Companies Act, 2004.

In 2000, KPMG were commissioned by the British Government to produce a report on the offshore financial industry generally, and the report indicated that nearly 45% of the offshore companies in the world were formed in the British Virgin Islands. The British Virgin Islands is now one of the world's leading offshore financial centres, and boasts one of the highest incomes per capita in the Caribbean.

In addition to basic company incorporations, the British Virgin Islands also forms limited partnerships and trusts (including signature "VISTA" trusts) but these have not proved to be as popular as companies.

On 12 April 2007, the Financial Times reported that the British Virgin Islands was the second largest source of foreign direct investment in the world (behind Hong Kong) with over US$123,000,000,000. Almost all of these sums are directly attributable to investment through the Territory's offshore finance industry.

The British Virgin Islands also promotes a number of regulated financial services products. The most important of these is the formation and regulation of offshore investment funds. The Territory is also the second largest domicile for formation of offshore investment funds (behind the Cayman Islands) with 2,422 licensed open-ended funds as at 30 June 2012 (there is no official statistics for closed-ended funds which are not regulated in the British Virgin Islands).

The British Virgin Islands also operates as a domicile for captive insurance services, but a prolonged period of overzealous Government regulation combined with the Government's increasing pressure to hire only locals ("belongers") in the insurance industry decimated the industry. Official reports from the Financial Services Commission reflect as of 30 June 2012 only 161 captives remain registered in the jurisdiction.

History of financial services
Former president of the BVI's Financial Services Commission, Michael Riegels, recites the anecdote that the offshore finance industry commenced on an unknown date in the 1970s when a lawyer from a firm in New York telephoned him with a proposal to incorporate a company in the British Virgin Islands to take advantage of a double taxation relief treaty with the United States. Within the space of a few years, hundreds of such companies had been incorporated.

This eventually came to the attention of the United States government, who unilaterally revoked the Treaty in 1981.

In 1984, the British Virgin Islands, trying to recapture some of the lost offshore business, enacted a new form of companies legislation, the International Business Companies Act, under which an offshore company which was exempt from local taxes could be formed. The development was only a limited success until 1991, when the United States invaded Panama to oust General Manuel Noriega. At the time Panama was one of the largest providers of offshore financial services in the world, but the business fled subsequent the invasion, and the British Virgin Islands was one of the main beneficiaries.

Agriculture
Livestock raising is the most important agricultural activity; poor soils limit the islands' ability to meet domestic food requirements. Fewer than 0.6% are estimated to work in agriculture. Despite its tiny economic impact, agriculture has its own dedicated Government minister (unlike financial services).

Dollarisation
Because of traditionally close links with the U.S. Virgin Islands, the British Virgin Islands has used the US dollar as its currency since 1959.

title: Economy of the British Virgin Islands


text:
Telecommunications in the British Virgin Islands

Country Code: +1284

International Call Prefix: 011 (outside NANP)

Calls from the British Virgin Islands to the US, Canada, and other NANP Caribbean nations, are dialled as 1 + NANP area code + 7-digit number. Calls from the British Virgin Islands to non-NANP countries are dialled as 011 + country code + phone number with local area code.

Number Format: nxx-xxxx

Telephones – main lines in use: 11,700 (2002)

Telephones – mobile cellular: 8,000 (2002)

Telephone system: worldwide telephone service

general assessment: worldwide telephone service

domestic: NA

international: Connected via submarine cable to Bermuda; the East Caribbean Fibre System (ECFS) submarine cable provides connectivity to 13 other islands in the eastern Caribbean (2007)

Radio stations: AM 1, FM 5, shortwave 0 (2004)

 * ZBVI 780 Tortola
 * ZJKC-FM 90.9 Tortola (repeats WJKC 95.1 Christiansted, USVI)
 * ZGLD-FM 91.7 Tortola
 * ZCCR-FM 94.1 Todman's Peak
 * ZWVE-FM 97.3 Tortola
 * ZKNG-FM 100.9 Chalwell
 * ZROD-FM 103.7 Tortola
 * ZVCR-FM 106.9 Chalwell

Television stations: 1 (ZBTV), (plus one cable company) (1997)

Internet service providers (ISPs): 1 (1999)

Internet country code: VG

Internet hosts: 465 (2008)

Internet users: 4,000 (2002)

 * See also : British Virgin Islands

Deregulation of the telephone market
In 2006, the British Virgin Islands government undertook a deregulation of the telephone industry. Prior to 2006, in common with many other Caribbean countries, Cable & Wireless (Caribbean) had a statutory monopoly on telephone and other electronic communications services. However, in the 1990s, a local company called CCT Boatphone, which had previously provided radio boatphones to tourists on charter boats, expanded into cellular (mobile) telecommunications for land-based users. Although technically in breach of the statutory monopoly, CCT Boatphone was backed by a powerful collection of local interests known as the BVI Investment Club. Negotiations between Cable & Wireless and CCT Boatphone led to a split of the monopolies, with Cable & Wireless retaining a monopoly over fixed line and internet services, and CCT Boatphone keeping a de facto monopoly over cellular telephones.

In 2007 the government abolished the previously existing monopolies under an order made pursuant to the new legislation. The process proved politically fraught, and the government's Minister for Communications and Works, Alvin Christopher, ended up leaving the government and joining the opposition party as a result of the furore. The process was also criticised as cumbersome and slow, the initial deregulation having been announced in 2004, and taking no less than three years to come to fruition through delays in legislation and regulation.

Although there have been no new entrants into the fixed line industry, the government issued three licences under the new regime to cellular telephone service providers. The existing provider, CCT Boatphone, obtained one licence. Bmobile, the cellular arm of Cable & Wireless, obtained a second. The third licence was obtained by BVI Cable TV, a local cable television service. The licence in favour of BVI Cable was controversial, as the Regulator had announced in advance that only three licences in total would be issued, and BVI Cable TV had crumbling cable television infrastructure, and was in no position to offer cellular telephone services (and to date, has not offered any cellular telephone services, or anything other than simple cable television). However, bmobile's main regional competitor, Digicel, was rejected for a licence. The decision was regarded as highly controversial in the local media.

Digicel then issued court proceedings against the Regulator, arguing that he had acted improperly by imposing an arbitrary limit of three licences (although no complaint was made about the decision to prefer BVI Cable TV's improbable licence over Digicel). Bmobile was joined to the suit as an interested party. High Court Judge Rita Joseph-Olivetti found in favour of Digicel and quashed the original decision. Digicel commenced separate proceedings against Cable and Wireless (as bmobile's parent company) in the English courts, claiming that Cable & Wireless has unfairly stifled competition in several Caribbean jurisdictions. During the intervening period, bmobile has obtained a virtual stranglehold on the cellular telecommunications market in the British Virgin Islands by a combination of low prices and aggressive advertising, as well as significant investment in infrastructure and technology.

Digicel was finally granted a licence on 17 December 2007 and started operations in the BVI on 28 November 2008.


text:
Transport in the British Virgin Islands

The systems of transport in the British Virgin Islands include 113 kilometres of highway and a harbour at Road Town.

Roads

 * total: 200 km
 * paved: 200 km
 * unpaved: 0 km (2007)

Despite using left-hand traffic, most vehicles are left-hand-drive, being imported from the United States.

Ports and terminals

 * Road Town

Airports

 * 4 (2008)

Paved runways

 * total: 2
 * 914 to 1,523 m: 1
 * under 914 m: 1 (2008)

Unpaved runways

 * total: 2
 * 914 to 1,523 m: 2 (2008)

Merchant Marine

 * registered in other countries: 1 (Panama) (2008)

title: Transport in the British Virgin Islands


text:
Geography of Brunei

Brunei is a country in Southeast Asia, bordering the South China Sea and East Malaysia. Its geographical coordinates are 4.5°N, 114.66667°W. The country is small with a total size of 5765 km2. It is larger in size than Trinidad and Tobago. It is close to vital sea lanes through the South China Sea linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The country has two parts physically separated by Malaysia, making it almost an enclave within Malaysia.

Brunei shares a 266 km border with Malaysia, and has a 161 km coastline. The terrain is a flat coastal plain that rises to mountainous in the east and hilly lowlands in the west. While earthquakes are quite rare, Brunei is located near the Pacific Ring of Fire.

Climate
A tropical climate with high humidity prevails in Brunei. Typically, the entire nation experiences the same climate. The entire year is hot in the country. The monsoon winds and other wind systems in the area brought on by the distribution of air pressure in Southeast Asia, as well as the location on Borneo's northwest coast, which lies in the equatorial tropics, all have an impact on the climate. ITCZ (Intertropical Convergence Zone) is the name given to the low pressure trough that occurs around the equator. Areas in the subtropics on both hemispheres, however, experience high pressure, resulting in a pressure difference. This is due to air masses from the southern and northern hemispheres meet in this region, causing major climate shifts, the Intertropical Convergence Zone is crucial.

It's vital that the ITCZ's position typically oscillates based on the sun's zenithal position and is not always fixed. The magnitude of the latitudinal oscillation is reduced to roughly half that of the sun because of the movement's two-month delay. There are two distinct seasons in the nation that are separated by two transitional phases as a result of the ITCZ's shifting location throughout the year and the associated trade winds. The South China Sea and Borneo are substantially impacted by northeast monsoon winds that recurve via the Inter-Tropical Convergence zone to become northwesterly winds that blow across Indonesia between December and March. The ITCZ's typical location is between latitudes 50S and 100S when it migrated south across Brunei and Borneo in late December, a time period known as the Northeast Monsoon.

The Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone, which is positioned east of the Philippines around latitude 150N between June and September, transforms into a monsoon trough to the west. The Southwest Monsoon is created by southeast trade winds that originate in the southern hemisphere and recurve on the equator. The northeast monsoon dominates from December to March whereas the southwest monsoon blows from May to September. Transitional months are recognized as April, October, and November.

The municipality of Bandar Seri Begawan's climate is tropical equatorial with two seasons. Dry season is extremely hot (24 to 36 C). Wet or rainy season is generally warm and wet (20 to 28 C). Most of the country is a flat coastal plain with mountains in the east and hilly lowland in the west. The lowest point is at sea level and the highest is Bukit Pagon (1850 m). The climatic regions of the country is as follows:
 * Brunei-Muara District and Bandar Seri Begawan are humid tropical on the coast and lower elevation north and Humid subtropical in central Brunei-Muara District. (20 to 36 C)
 * Tutong District is tropical, hot in the north and warm in the south. (22 to 32 C)
 * Belait District is tropical, hot in the north and slightly warm in the south. (25 to 37 C)
 * Temburong District is humid subtropical in the higher elevation south and humid tropical on the coast and lower elevation north. (18 to 29 C)

Natural disasters
Since the nation lies outside of the typhoon belt and mostly untouched by earthquakes, it is less likely to experience major disasters, making it a relatively safe area to live and work. Foreigners from temperate climes who want to avoid harsh winters are drawn to the country by its milder temperature. Additionally, the weather is suitable for outdoor activities and water sports.

Statistics
As of 2009, the statistics of Brunei is as follows: Area:
 * Total: 5765 km2
 * Land: 5265 km2
 * Water: 500 km2

Maritime claims: territorial sea: 12 nmi exclusive economic zone: 10,090 km2 and 200 nmi or to median line

Elevation extremes: lowest point: South China Sea 0 m highest point: Bukit Pagon 1,850 m

Natural resources: petroleum, natural gas, timber

Land use: arable land: 0.76% permanent crops: 1.14% other: 98.10% (2012)

Irrigated land: 10 km2 (2003)

Total renewable water resources: 8.5 km3

Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural) total: 0.09 km3/yr (97%/0%/3%) per capital: 301.6 m3/yr (2009)

Environment – current issues: seasonal smoke/haze resulting from forest fires in Indonesia

Environment – international agreements: party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution

title: Geography of Brunei


text:
Economy of Brunei

The economy of Brunei, a small and wealthy country, is a mixture of foreign and domestic entrepreneurship, government regulation and welfare measures, and village traditions. It is almost entirely supported by exports of crude oil and natural gas, with revenues from the petroleum sector accounting for over half of GDP. Per capita GDP is high, and substantial income from overseas investment supplements income from domestic production. The government provides for all medical services and subsidizes food and housing. The government has shown progress in its basic policy of diversifying the economy away from oil and gas. Brunei's leaders are concerned that steadily increased integration in the world economy will undermine internal social cohesion although it has taken steps to become a more prominent player by serving as chairman for the 2000 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) forum. Growth in 1999 was estimated at 2.5% due to higher oil prices in the second half.

Brunei is the third-largest oil producer in Southeast Asia, averaging about 180000 oilbbl/d. It also is the ninth-largest producer of liquefied natural gas in the world.

Macro-economic trend
In the 1970s, Brunei invested sharply increasing revenues from petroleum exports and maintained government spending at a low and constant rate. Consequently, the government was able to build its foreign reserves and invest them around the world to help provide for future generations. Part of the reserve earnings were reportedly also used to help finance the government's annual budget deficit. Since 1986, however, petroleum revenues have decreased, and government spending has increased. The government has been running a budget deficit since 1988. The disappearance of a revenue surplus has made Brunei's economy more vulnerable to petroleum price fluctuations.

Brunei's gross domestic product (GDP) soared with the petroleum price increases of the 1970s to a peak of $5.7 billion in 1980. It declined slightly in each of the next 5 years, then fell by almost 30% in 1986.

This drop was caused by a combination of sharply lower petroleum prices in world markets and voluntary production cuts in Brunei. The GDP recovered somewhat since 1986, growing by 12% in 1987, 1% in 1988, and 9% in 1989. In recent years, GDP growth was 3.5% in 1996, 4.0% in 1997, 1.0% in 1998, and an estimated 2.5% in 1999. However, the 1999 GDP was still only about $4.5 billion, well below the 1980 peak.

The Asian financial crisis in 1997 and 1998, coupled with fluctuations in the price of oil have created uncertainty and instability in Brunei's economy. In addition, the 1998 collapse of Amedeo Development Corporation, Brunei's largest construction firm whose projects helped fuel the domestic economy, caused the country to slip into a mild recession.

This is a chart of trend of gross domestic product of Brunei Darussalam at market prices estimated by the International Monetary Fund with figures in millions of Bruneian dollars. For purchasing power parity comparisons, the US dollar is exchanged at 1.52 Bruneian dollars only. Mean wages were $25.38 per man-hour in 2009.

The government regulates the immigration of foreign labor out of concern it might disrupt Brunei's society. Work permits for foreigners are issued only for short periods and must be continually renewed. Despite these restrictions, foreigners make up a significant portion of the work force. The government reported a total work force of 122,800 in 1999, with an unemployment rate of 5.5%.

Oil and natural gas account for almost all exports. Since only a few products other than petroleum are produced locally, a wide variety of items must be imported. Brunei statistics show Singapore as the largest point of origin of imports, accounting for 25% in 1997. However, this figure includes some transshipments, since most of Brunei's imports transit Singapore. Japan and Malaysia were the second-largest suppliers. As in many other countries, Japanese products dominate local markets for motor vehicles, construction equipment, electronic goods, and household appliances. The United States was the third-largest supplier of imports to Brunei in 1998.

Brunei's substantial foreign reserves are managed by the Brunei Investment Agency (BIA), an arm of the Ministry of Finance and Economy. BIA's guiding principle is to increase the real value of Brunei's foreign reserves while pursuing a diverse investment strategy, with holdings in the United States, Japan, western Europe, and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries.

The Brunei Government actively encourages more foreign investment. New enterprises that meet certain criteria can receive pioneer status, exempting profits from income tax for up to 5 years, depending on the amount of capital invested. The normal corporate income tax rate is 30%. There is no personal income tax or capital gains tax.

One of the government's most important priorities is to encourage the development of Brunei Malays as leaders of industry and commerce. There are no specific restrictions of foreign equity ownership, but local participation, both shared capital and management, is encouraged. Such participation helps when tendering for contracts with the government or Brunei Shell Petroleum.

Companies in Brunei must either be incorporated locally or registered as a branch of a foreign company and must be registered with the Registrar of Companies. Public companies must have a minimum of seven shareholders. Private companies must have a minimum of two but not more than 50 shareholders. At least half of the directors in a company must be residents of Brunei.

Between 1981 and 2013 the Sultan owned cattle stations in Australia that supplied most of the country's beef. In 1984 it was reported that at 2,262 sqmi, the total area of the stations was larger than Brunei itself. Some of the stations were sold in 2006 and 2014. As of 2019, the Sultan still owned the Opium Creek station. Eggs and chickens are largely produced locally, but most of Brunei's other food needs must be imported. Agriculture and fisheries are among the industrial sectors that the government has selected for highest priority in its efforts to diversify the economy.

The following table shows the main economic indicators in 1983–2021 (with IMF staff estimates in 2022–2027). Inflation below 5% is in green.

Oil and gas industry
Brunei Shell Petroleum (BSP), a joint venture owned in equal shares by the Brunei Government and the Royal Dutch/Shell group of companies, is the chief oil and gas production company in Brunei. It also operates the country's only refinery. BSP and four sister companies constitute the largest employer in Brunei after the government. BSP's small refinery has a distillation capacity of 10000 oilbbl/d. This satisfies domestic demand for most petroleum products.

The French oil company Elf Aquitaine became active in petroleum exploration in Brunei in the 1980s. Its affiliate Elf Petroleum Asia BV has discovered commercially exploitable quantities of oil and gas in three of the four wells drilled since 1987, including a particularly promising discovery announced in early 1990. Recently, UNOCAL, partnered with New Zealand's Fletcher Challenge has been granted concessions for oil exploration. Brunei is preparing to tender concessions for deep water oil and gas exploration.

Brunei's oil production peaked in 1979 at over 240000 oilbbl/d. Since then it has been deliberately cut back to extend the life of oil reserves and improve recovery rates. Petroleum production is currently averaging some 200000 oilbbl/d. Japan has traditionally been the main customer for Brunei's oil exports, but its share dropped from 45% of the total in 1982 to 19% in 1998. In contrast, oil exports to South Korea increased from only 8% of the total in 1982 to 29% in 1998. Other major customers include Taiwan (6%), and the countries of ASEAN (27%). Brunei's oil exports to the United States accounted for 17% of the total exported.

Almost all of Brunei's natural gas is liquefied at Brunei Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) plant, which opened in 1972 and is one of the largest LNG plants in the world. Over 82% of Brunei's LNG produced is sold to Japan under a long-term agreement renewed in 1993. The agreement calls for Brunei to provide over 5 million tons of LNG per year to three Japanese utilities. The Japanese company, Mitsubishi, is a joint venture partner with Shell and the Brunei Government in Brunei LNG, Brunei Coldgas, and Brunei Shell Tankers, which together produce the LNG and supply it to Japan. Since 1995, Brunei has supplied more than 700,000 tons of LNG to the Korea Gas Corporation as well. In 1999, Brunei's natural gas production reached 90 cargoes per day. A small amount of natural gas is used for domestic power generation. Brunei is the fourth-largest exporter of LNG in the Asia-Pacific region behind Indonesia, Malaysia, and Australia.

Brunei's proven oil and gas reserves are sufficient, as of 2015, to last until at least 2035. Deep sea exploration may find significant new reserves but can be prohibitively expensive. The government sought in the past decade to diversify the economy with limited success. Oil and gas and government spending still account for most of Brunei's economic activity. Brunei's non-petroleum industries include agriculture, forestry, fishing, and banking.

In 2015, Brunei registered its third year of economic recession, the only ASEAN nation to do so. Declining oil prices and a drop in production due to maintenance and repair work at major oil wells have dented the country's budget which will see a deficit in the fiscal years 2015-16 and 2016–17.

In 2020, more than 99% of produced electricity in Brunei was based on fossil fuels, while electricity produced from renewable energy accounted for less than 1%. It is advised for Brunei to diversify the economy away from the use of fossil fuels and focus more on renewable energy as part of climate change mitigation measures.

Petrochemical industry
In the western part of the country, Liang is currently experiencing a major development with the establishment of SPARK, which is a 271 hectare site developed to be a world-class petrochemical hub. The first major investment at SPARK is the US$450 million Methanol plant developed by the Brunei Methanol Company, a joint venture between Petroleum Brunei and two leading Japanese companies, Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings and Itochu. The plant design will give an output of 2,500t of methanol per day (850,000t annually). The plant was officially launched by Sultan of Brunei Hassanal Bolkiah on 25 May 2010.

Halal brand
Brunei Darussalam in July 2009 launched its national halal branding scheme Brunei Halal which allows manufacturers in Brunei and in other countries to use the premium Brunei Halal trademark to help them penetrate lucrative markets in countries with significant numbers of Muslim consumers. The Brunei Halal brand is said to be the first proper attempt to put together a global halal brand that will reap the potential commercial returns of catering to the consumption needs of Muslims worldwide.

As envisioned by the Sultanate, the use of the Brunei Halal brand would signify to Muslim consumers the manufacturers' strict compliance with laws relating to Islamic teachings. Brunei also aims to build confidence in the brand through strategies that will both ensure the halal integrity of the products and unfaltering compliance with set rules governing the sourcing of raw materials, manufacturing process, logistics and distribution.

A new company, government-owned Brunei Wafirah Holdings Sdn Bhd, has been established as the owner of the Brunei Halal brand. Wafirah has entered into a joint venture with Brunei Global Islamic Investment and Hong Kong-based logistics firm Kerry FSDA Limited to form Ghanim International Food Corporation Sdn Bhd. Ghanim International manages the use of the Brunei Halal trademark. Producers that want to use the brand are required to first acquire the Brunei halal label (or the certification for compliance with accepted manufacturing and slaughtering practices under Islam) through the Department of Syariah Affairs' Halal Food Control Section. They can then approach Ghanim for their application to use the brand.

title: Economy of Brunei


text:
Telecommunications in Brunei

Telephone
Telephone service throughout the country is excellent; international service is good to Southeast Asia, Middle East, Western Europe, and the US.

 * Main lines in use: 122,204 (2022)
 * Mobile phones: 603,486 (2021)

Landing points for the SEA-ME-WE-3, SJC, AAG, Lubuan-Brunei Submarine Cable via optical telecommunications submarine cables that provides links to Asia, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, Australia, and the US; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (1 Indian Ocean and 1 Pacific Ocean) (2019)

IDD Country Code: +673

Mobile Telephone
Brunei has 3 major telco namely DST, Imagine (TelBru) and Progresif which offers prepaid and postpaid plan. UNN is the Single Wholesale Network with holds all the telecommunication infrastructures in Brunei.

Internet

 * Internet service providers: 3 (2020), Telbru, Progresif Cellular and DSTCom
 * Country code: .bn
 * Internet fixed subscriptions: 49,452 (2020)
 * Internet users: 410,800 (2019)

Broadband
Brunei's Internet service was monopolized by Telekom Brunei. ADSL speeds were ranging from 512 kbit/s to the maximum speed of 1 Mbit/s through ADSL2+ broadband. 1 Mbit/s was introduced in 2006 and was priced at BND$128 per month (Equivalent to Singapore currency). It was well known that the Brunei's broadband ranging from 512 kbit/s to 1 Mbit/s is one of the most expensive in the world. The limited market in Brunei means that new developments in the telecommunications sector is stagnant.

In 2002, Telekom Brunei was incorporated become Telekom Brunei Berhad (TelBru). In 2008, the internet were improved with dramatically with speeds ranging from 1 Mbit/s to maximum speed of 5 Mbit/s. Price starting from B$65 to B$105 per month respectively.

In 2012, Telekom Brunei started deploying its FTTH network capable of 100 Mbit/s through a contract awarded to Huawei. They aimed to provide FTTH coverage to around 85% of the population by 2017.

In 2016 Telbru drastically reduced the price and increased the speeds of its broadband plans. Due to the fact that a significant number of people were now connected via FTTH and not via the old copper cables.

On 1 March 2018 Telbru rolled out their new 'high speed' broadband plans They also split the plans which have unlimited quota into 'unlimited plans'

In 2017 Forbes reported that Brunei had the 4th most expensive broadband service in the world

On 4 September 2019, The UNN took over all of the telecommunications infrastructure in Brunei. By doing so they aimed to provide equal infrastructure to all the isps in the country. This brought an end to a long held monopoly by Imagine Sdn Bhd (Formerly Known as Telbru) over the home broadband market with the introduction of Datastream Digital's 'Infinity' home broadband plans on 24 January 2020.

Television
In some areas residents may enjoy some of the Malaysian TV channels
 * Terrestrial TV Stations (Free to air)
 * 1) RTB Perdana (Formerly known as RTB 1 and RTB 5) - An 17.5-hour national flagship channel of Radio Television Brunei aired news and information programs, with local and sinetron Indonesia series in 1080p HDTV.
 * 2) RTB Aneka (Formerly known as RTB 2 and RTB 3 HD) - A 16.5-hour second channel of Radio Television Brunei airs entertainment programmes in 1080p HDTV.
 * 3) RTB Sukmaindera (Formerly known as RTB 4) - A 24-hour international satellite television channel airing all of RTB programs both locally and internationally in 1080p HDTV.

 * Pay TV (Satellite TV) 1 - Kristal Astro

Radio
All radio stations in the country use FM. 5 radio stations are broadcast by the state controlled Radio Television Brunei. The British Forces Broadcast Service (BFBS) broadcasts 2 other stations in the country. Reception from some Malaysia stations can be received.

title: Telecommunications in Brunei